tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/hong-kong-3798/articlesHong Kong – The Conversation2024-03-20T19:55:20Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2261862024-03-20T19:55:20Z2024-03-20T19:55:20ZWhat Article 23 means for the future of Hong Kong and its once vibrant pro-democracy movement<p><em>Lawmakers in Hong Kong <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/03/19/hong-kong-article-23-security-law/">passed new security legislation</a> on March 19, 2024, handing authorities in the semi-autonomous city-state further power to clamp down on dissent.</em></p>
<p><em>The law, under <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/19/what-is-article-23-hong-kongs-new-draconian-national-security-law">Article 23</a>, has been decades in the making but was resisted for a long time by protesters who feared the legislation’s effect on civil liberties in Hong Kong, a special administrative region in China that has become increasingly under the thumb of Beijing.</em></p>
<p><em>To explain what the adoption of Article 23, which is set to be signed into law on March 23, 2024, means for the future of Hong Kong, The Conversation turned to Michael C. Davis, a <a href="https://jgu.edu.in/jgls/prof-michael-c-davis/">law professor</a> who taught constitutional law and human rights in Hong Kong for more than 30 years, most recently at the University of Hong Kong, and is the author of “<a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/freedom-undone/9781952636448">Freedom Undone: The Assault on Liberal Values in Hong Kong</a>.”</em></p>
<hr>
<iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/what-article-23-means-for-the-future-of-hong-kong-and-its-once-vibrant-pro-democracy-movement-226186&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p><em>You can listen to more articles from The Conversation, narrated by Noa, <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/audio-narrated-99682">here</a>.</em></p>
<hr>
<h2>What is the background to Article 23?</h2>
<p>Article 23 has a lengthy backstory. It is an article in the <a href="https://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/index/">Basic Law of Hong Kong</a> requiring the Hong Kong government to enact a local ordinance governing national security. The Basic Law itself is effectively the constitution of Hong Kong. Its promulgation by the central government was part of China’s obligation under the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 – the treaty providing for Hong Kong’s return to China. Thirteen years later, in 1997, the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-40426827">territory was transferred to Chinese rule</a> after more than a century under the British. </p>
<p>The Basic Law established a largely liberal constitutional order for post-handover Hong Kong. This included guarantees of the rule of law and basic freedoms, as well as a promise of ultimate universal suffrage. It was formally adopted by China’s National People’s Congress in 1990.</p>
<p>Basic Law Article 23 requires the Hong Kong government to “on its own” enact certain national security laws relating to treason, secession, sedition, subversion or theft of state secrets, and to regulate foreign organizations.</p>
<p>The Hong Kong government first put forward an Article 23 bill in 2003. But due to concerns over the implications for press and organizational freedoms, as well as expanded police powers, the proposed bill <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-68594448">met with widespread opposition</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A uniformed police officer puts his fingers in his ears in front of a sign that has the number 23 crossed out." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583128/original/file-20240320-16-thmm5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583128/original/file-20240320-16-thmm5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583128/original/file-20240320-16-thmm5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583128/original/file-20240320-16-thmm5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583128/original/file-20240320-16-thmm5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583128/original/file-20240320-16-thmm5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583128/original/file-20240320-16-thmm5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Noisy protests help defeat an earlier version of Article 23 in 2003.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/police-officer-puts-his-fingers-in-his-ears-to-protect-news-photo/1258921548?adppopup=true">Peter Parks/AFP via Getty Images)</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A group of seven leading lawyers and two legal academics, including myself, challenged the proposed bill in a collection of pamphlets that highlighted its deficiencies under international human rights standards. Meanwhile, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3178339/july-1-2003-500000-take-hong-kongs-streets-protest-against">half a million protesters</a> took to the streets of Hong Kong. </p>
<p>In the face of such opposition and the consequent withdrawal of support by a leading pro-goverment party, the bill was withdrawn. </p>
<p>Rather than come forward with a replacement bill that would address human rights concerns, the government opted to let Article 23 languish for two decades.</p>
<p>Then, in 2020, Beijing <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/07/hong-kong-national-security-law-10-things-you-need-to-know/">imposed a national security law</a> that gave Hong Kong authorities greater power. It led to the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/one-year-hong-kong-arrests-117-people-under-new-security-law-2021-06-30/">arrest and repression of opposition figures</a> in Hong Kong, silencing the once-vibrant democracy movement. </p>
<p>With no effective opposition left and the threat of arrest for anyone who speaks out, the pro-Beijing Hong Kong government decided now was the time to ram through a more extreme version of the bill.</p>
<p>The Hong Kong government, with Beijing’s encouragement, was able to open up a short consultation on the new Article 23 legislative proposal with little or no opposition expressed. </p>
<p>The process was facilitated by a “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/hong-kong-patriots-only-election-falls-flat-with-record-low-turnout-2023-12-11">patriots only” electoral system</a> imposed by Beijing in 2021 that has tightened Beijing’s grip over the Hong Kong legislature, leading to unanimous support for the bill.</p>
<h2>How will it affect civil liberties in Hong Kong?</h2>
<p>In tandem with the 2020 Beijing-imposed national security law, the new Article 23 legislation will have a dramatic effect on civil liberties.</p>
<p>The national security law – with its vague provisions on secession, subversion, terrorism and collusion – has already been used along with a colonial-era sedition law to arrest and silence dissent in Hong Kong. Many opposition figures <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/20/world/asia/hong-kong-democracy-leaders.html">are in prison or have fled into exile</a>. And those with dissenting views who remain have largely gone silent. </p>
<p>The draft bill expands on the national security law in key areas: the stealing of state secrets, insurrection, sabotage and external interference in Hong Kong.</p>
<p>It essentially embraces mainland China’s comprehensive national security regime, which has long focused on suppressing internal opposition, targeting numerous areas of local civil life, impacting organizational, press and academic freedoms.</p>
<p>Included in Article 23 is the adoption of the mainland’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/28/world/asia/china-state-secrets-law.html">broad definition of “state secrets</a>,” which can even include reporting or writing on social and economic development policies. </p>
<p><iframe id="6v2wZ" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/6v2wZ/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>The legislation expands the potential use of incarceration with both lengthy sentences upon conviction and longer holding of suspects before trial.</p>
<p>Article 23 also intensifies <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/30/hong-kong-article-23-new-national-security-laws-explained-what-do-they-mean">scrutiny of “foreign influence</a>” – making working with outsiders risky for Hong Kong citizens.</p>
<p>The draft legislation speaks disparagingly of activism under the guises of fighting for or monitoring human rights and is critical of “so-called” nongovernmental organizations.</p>
<p>All of this makes working with or supporting international human rights organizations perilous. </p>
<p>In short, in the space of two decades, Hong Kong’s liberal constitutional order has been transformed into a national security order with weak or no protections for basic freedoms.</p>
<h2>What is the wider context to Article 23?</h2>
<p>To understand this legislation, one must appreciate the Chinese Communist Party’s deep hostility to liberal values and institutions, such as the rule of law, civil liberties, independent courts, a free press and public accountability. Such liberal ideas are viewed as an existential threat to party rule. </p>
<p>This mindset has led to a dramatic expansion of the party’s <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/china-vows-to-safeguard-national-security-with-new-laws-at-conclave-/7520474.html">national security agenda</a> under current leader Xi Jinping. </p>
<p>Beijing has emphasized economic development in recent decades, staking its legitimacy on economic growth – betting that people will care more about their standard of living than about political freedoms. But as <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2024/01/15/china-needs-reforms-to-halt-significant-growth-declines-imf-chief.html">growth declines</a>, leaders’ concerns about security and dissent have grown, placing such security even above economic development.</p>
<p>This has led to the comprehensive national security concept now being imposed on Hong Kong. </p>
<p>With Beijing advancing an agenda that casts liberal, democratic ideas as a threat, a liberal Hong Kong on the country’s border became impossible for the Chinese Communist Party to ignore.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A group of protesters shelter under umbrellas" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583131/original/file-20240320-18-8saqyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583131/original/file-20240320-18-8saqyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583131/original/file-20240320-18-8saqyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583131/original/file-20240320-18-8saqyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583131/original/file-20240320-18-8saqyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583131/original/file-20240320-18-8saqyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583131/original/file-20240320-18-8saqyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Protestors in Hong Kong use umbrellas as improvised shields in 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/protestors-using-improvise-shield-to-push-toward-police-news-photo/1191713262?adppopup=true">Kwan Wong/NurPhoto via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Widespread <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-48607723">protests in Hong Kong in 2019</a> both exacerbated this concern and offered an opportunity for Beijing to address the perceived threat under the <a href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202112/1240540.shtml">claim that protesters were advancing a so-called “color revolution</a>.”</p>
<p>Having long nurtured its loyalist camp to rule Hong Kong, these loyal officials became the instrument of the crackdown.</p>
<h2>What does the lack of protest now say about the pro-democracy movement?</h2>
<p>It tells us that the mainland national security regime imposed on Hong Kong has effectively intimidated the society, especially those with opposition views, into silence. </p>
<p>Hong Kong’s pro-democratic camp had <a href="https://doi.org/10.4000/chinaperspectives.5563">historically enjoyed majority support, at around 60%</a> of the voters in the direct elections that were allowed for half of the legislative seats.</p>
<p>The introduction of loyalists-only elections led to a dramatically reduced turnout.</p>
<p>This and emigration patterns tend to show that the majority of Hong Kong people do not support this new illiberal order.</p>
<p>Be that as it may, with most of their pro-democratic leaders either in jail or exile, they dare not speak out against the new national security regime.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226186/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael C. Davis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In the space of two decades, Hong Kong’s liberal constitutional order has been transformed into a security regime that grants citizens few civil libertiesMichael C. Davis, Professor of Law and International Affairs, O.P. Jindal Global UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2235132024-02-21T17:28:02Z2024-02-21T17:28:02ZThe 100-hour war between El Salvador and Honduras is famous for starting with a football match – the truth is more complicated<p>A recent football match in Hong Kong has flared geopolitical tensions. A sell-out crowd was left disappointed when Inter Miami’s Argentinian superstar, Lionel Messi, did not come onto the field. Their disappointment soon turned to anger as, just days later, Messi played in another game in Japan.</p>
<p>Chinese state media, Hong Kong politicians and frustrated fans interpreted the act as a sign of disrespect, suggesting that there were <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/football/2024/feb/08/lionel-messi-injury-return-japan-anger-china-benching-unfit">political reasons</a> for Messi’s absence. Two Argentina friendlies that were scheduled to take place in China in March <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/09/sport/china-cancels-argentina-match-messi-backlash-intl-hnk/index.html">have been cancelled</a>. Some Hong Kong officials have demanded an “explanation and apology” from the player, while fans <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/08/china/lionel-messi-china-backlash-hong-kong-japan-miami-intl-hnk/index.html">claimed</a> that Messi should no longer be welcome in China.</p>
<p>Football has flared up tensions before, with lasting political consequences. In 1990, a game between Zagreb’s Dinamo team and Belgrade’s Red Star <a href="https://www.croatiaweek.com/33-years-ago-today-the-most-famous-derby-never-played/">erupted into violence</a> between fans and the police. The violence is believed by some to have sparked the ensuing Croatian war of independence (1991–95). </p>
<p>But one case in particular holds the reputation for a war that was started over a series of football matches. </p>
<p>In 1969, El Salvador and neighbouring Honduras played each other three times in the qualifying stages of the 1970 Fifa World Cup. The two matches that took place in Tegucigalpa (June 8) and San Salvador (June 15) were marred by violence between fans. </p>
<p>On the same day as the third match, in Mexico City on June 29, the Salvadoran government cut diplomatic ties with Honduras. Military action began two weeks later with aerial bombardment and a ground invasion, before coming to an end after a ceasefire was negotiated four days later. For its brevity, the conflict is known as the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/27868774">100-hour war</a>.</p>
<p>Of course, it would be silly to look for the causes of war in an ugly tackle, or in questionable decisions by referees. More than silly, to reduce the causes of war to a football match is disrespectful to the memories of the thousands of civilians displaced and killed in the conflict. </p>
<p>For that reason, as pivotal as these matches might have been for that war, it is essential to understand the broader context in which such an escalation of conflict becomes possible.</p>
<h2>The war of the dispossessed</h2>
<p>El Salvador is a fraction of the size of Honduras. But, despite the difference in area, El Salvador has a much larger population. At the start of the 20th century, Salvadoran farmers began migrating to Honduras in large numbers, primarily because of the greater availability of land across the border.</p>
<p>By the 1960s, the issue of land ownership had fuelled social tension in Honduras against the large population of Salvadoran migrants. The National Federation of Farmers and Livestock Farmers of Honduras was created to promote a land reform aimed at <a href="https://html.rincondelvago.com/la-guerra-no-fue-de-futbol_eddy-jimenez-perez.html">expelling Salvadoran peasants</a> from Honduran land. </p>
<p>This allowed large property owners, including foreign companies like the US-based United Fruit Company, to increase their ownership share of arable land. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577015/original/file-20240221-20-1haedq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A map of Central America." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577015/original/file-20240221-20-1haedq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577015/original/file-20240221-20-1haedq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577015/original/file-20240221-20-1haedq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577015/original/file-20240221-20-1haedq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577015/original/file-20240221-20-1haedq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=595&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577015/original/file-20240221-20-1haedq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=595&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577015/original/file-20240221-20-1haedq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=595&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Honduras is roughly five times as large as El Salvador.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-vector/central-america-map-150994196">Rainer Lesniewski/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>After a coup in 1963, the then Honduran president, General Oswaldo López Arellano, pursued the interests of these agrarian elites through the suppression of political opposition and systematic institutionalised violence. </p>
<p>Arellano’s brutal repression of peasant movements, with a specific nationalist sentiment mobilised against Salvadorans, <a href="https://catalogosiidca.csuca.org/Record/UCR.000022943/Description">caused the displacement</a> of thousands of rural workers in the years before those football matches. This is why <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article-abstract/87/3/889/95948?redirectedFrom=fulltext">research</a> on the topic usually refers to the conflict as the “war of the dispossessed”. </p>
<h2>Escalating conflict</h2>
<p>The level of violence against Salvadorans led the government in San Salvador to formally accuse Honduras of genocide. The <a href="https://www.diariocolatino.com/una-guerra-breve-y-amarga/">communication</a> sent by the Salvadoran chancellor to inform Tegucigalpa of the severed diplomatic ties in 1969 clearly frames the conflict in these broader terms.</p>
<p>“In this republic [Honduras] there is still … homicide, humiliation and violation of women, dispossession, persecution, and mass expulsion that have targeted thousands of Salvadorans due simply to their nationality, in events that have no precedents in Central America, nor in America as a whole.”</p>
<p>The football matches simply added a mobilising element that contributed to escalating an already existing conflict. The number of displaced Salvadoran peasants after the conflict reached hundreds of thousands. After the ceasefire, El Salvador had to deal with this large population of refugees. </p>
<p>The conflict also increased the Salvadoran nationalistic sentiment and the political role of the armed forces, setting the stage for the political disputes in the 1970s that would culminate in the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/El-Salvador/Civil-war">Salvadoran civil war</a> in 1979.</p>
<p>Many of the Salvadoran refugees already had experience of political organisation from the land disputes in Honduras and ended up joining the <a href="https://prism.librarymanagementcloud.co.uk/port/items/686599?query=el+salvador+civil+war&resultsUri=items%3Fquery%3Del%2Bsalvador%2Bcivil%2Bwar">Farabundo Martí Popular Forces of Liberation</a>. This was a faction of the Salvadoran Communist Party that later became a left-wing military organisation with support from Cuba and the Soviet Union.</p>
<h2>Messi will not start a war in China</h2>
<p>The idea that football started a war is misguided. The violence in those matches in 1969 would not have escalated without the broader sociopolitical context of violent dispossession. Lacking a similar context, the declarations of frustrated fans who expected to see Messi in Hong Kong will not escalate. </p>
<p>This is not to say that football lacks political relevance. The inflamed reaction by fans and Chinese authorities shows the effect that a political statement (or one perceived as such) by a celebrity can have on global politics. Messi himself recently published a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/sports/soccer/messi-sets-record-straight-over-hong-kong-absence-2024-02-19/">statement</a> on Weibo (China’s most popular microblogging site) denying any political motivation for not playing in Hong Kong. </p>
<p>Messi has avoided getting involved with politics, especially during Argentina’s heated general election in 2023. But others have done the opposite. Perhaps former Chelsea striker Didier Drogba <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/football/52072592">calling</a> for a ceasefire in Ivory Coast in 2007 can serve as an inspiring example of how footballers can use their popularity to influence global politics and even stop wars.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223513/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Pedro Dutra Salgado does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Messi will not start a war in China, but this is not to say that football lacks political relevance.Pedro Dutra Salgado, Lecturer in International Relations, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2165672023-11-02T17:15:49Z2023-11-02T17:15:49ZGay Games: Hong Kong’s groundbreaking role as first Asian host could be overshadowed by politics<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/557278/original/file-20231102-27-nrumvz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=296%2C80%2C5694%2C3916&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/football-ball-gay-rainbow-flag-lies-540733465">esfera/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Gay Games – a global sporting event for LGBTQ+ athletes – have <a href="https://gaygames.org/History">been held</a> in San Francisco, Paris, Sydney and several other cities in North America and Europe. This year, the games will be held in Asia for the first time. Events begin in <a href="https://www.gghk2023.com">Hong Kong</a>, the co-host with Guadalajara in Mexico, on November 3.</p>
<p>Competitive sports have, historically, reinforced <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/soc4.12254">social inequalities</a> when it comes to race, gender, class and sexuality. Since their inception in 1982, the Gay Games have aimed to be a safe space for LGBTQ+ athletes. </p>
<p>Despite these aims, the games have <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/978-1-137-48562-5_13">been criticised</a> by researchers and participants for not being truly accessible and inclusive financially. The games are expensive to enter and travel to, and as a result, most participants are middle-class athletes who can afford the cost.</p>
<p>The Gay Games Hong Kong have run up against a number of logistical hurdles, including being initially postponed due to the pandemic. With international travel restrictions remaining, <a href="https://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1119600/guadalajara-co-host-2023-gay-games">organisers</a> announced the games would be co-hosted by <a href="https://gggdl2023.org/?lang=en">Guadalajara</a> to allow more people to attend. </p>
<p>While this co-hosting arrangement intended to make the games more accessible, it appears to have backfired for Hong Kong. The expected number of participants – around 2,000 – is significantly lower than the original estimation of <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/2023/08/24/2000-athletes-expected-to-participate-in-hong-kongs-embattled-gay-games-10k-fewer-than-originally-hoped/">12,000</a>. There has been <a href="https://www.outsports.com/2023/8/3/23816569/guadalajara-gay-games-fgg-lgbtq-athletes-sport">low registration</a> in both cities, and Hong Kong has scaled back its number of events. </p>
<h2>Threat of national security law</h2>
<p>The main political shadow hanging over the games is China’s <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-52765838">national security law</a>, which has been used to crack down on pro-democracy journalists and activists in Hong Kong. </p>
<p>Some organisations and human rights activists have expressed concern that this law could be used to <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/2023/06/16/hong-kong-gay-games-reject-slurs-from-activists-calling-for-cancellation-over-rights-and-safety-concerns">prosecute participants</a> and attendees of the games, and called for the event to be cancelled. The Gay Games Hong Kong described these concerns as “unfounded slurs” and said that it is not a political organisation. </p>
<p>But the national security law is a valid reason to be concerned. Participants could be arrested if they are seen by authorities to “endanger national security”, which critics argue is open to the authorities’ interpretation. </p>
<p>Indeed, the <a href="https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2021/08/07/2003762181">Taiwan Gay Sports and Movement Association</a> announced that it would not send a national delegation to the games due to “personal safety of the athletes”. Taiwan, which China does not recognise as a sovereign state, was the first Asian country to legalise same-sex marriage.</p>
<h2>LGBTQ+ rights in Hong Kong</h2>
<p>Unlike its co-host, Gay Games Hong Kong has not received sponsorship from the government. This is perhaps a diplomatic strategy by the government given China’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/lgbtq-rights-in-mainland-china-looking-gloomy-after-taiwans-new-ruling-on-same-sex-marriage-78695">conservative views</a> on homosexuality and in repressing LGBTQ+ rights.</p>
<p>As we have highlighted in <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13573322.2022.2030699">earlier research</a>, Hong Kong is commonly seen as a progressive Chinese city with British colonial influences. It has made some progress on LGBTQ+ rights, including <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/2023/10/17/hong-kong-court-rejects-govt-appeals-over-public-housing-rights-for-same-sex-couples/">a court decision</a> that upheld the public housing rights of same-sex couples. </p>
<p>But there remains public intolerance of sexual minorities. The city is influenced by <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13573322.2022.2030699">Chinese conservative norms about sexuality</a>, shaped by traditional Confucian familial beliefs and Christianity. Local activist groups are also frustrated by the slow progress on legal reforms to discrimination, such as legalising same-sex marriage.</p>
<p>The games have <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/2023/06/22/hong-kong-groups-urge-govt-to-oppose-gay-games-say-obscene-event-could-trigger-repeat-protests/">faced opposition</a> from some conservative groups and politicians in Hong Kong, with some protesters calling the games “obscene”. Pro-Beijing legislator <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/2023/04/26/hong-kong-lawmakers-petition-opposing-gay-games-is-prejudiced-activist-says/">Junius Ho</a> started a petition against the games, saying they are a threat to national security. He argued that supporting the games would effectively mean supporting same-sex marriage legislation, which “stands against Chinese traditions and moral values”.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/DPIWqxRIcPA?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<h2>A moment for progress</h2>
<p>These political concerns may disrupt what could be a major step for celebrating LGBTQ+ lives in the region. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, this is still a moment for the Gay Games to rethink what it really means to be inclusive. Organisers are taking steps to move the games away from their reputation as a historically white, western-centric, able-bodied sporting event. The Gay Games Hong Kong has reached out to those who are traditionally underrepresented in the games, engaging closely with queer Asian cultures and people who are part of <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-does-intersectionality-mean-104937">multiple marginalised groups</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.sfunglaw.com">Siufung Law</a>, a torch bearer for the games and genderqueer advocate, has praised the involvement of local groups in organising the Gay Games. Law argues this has helped make them more diverse, for example through the creation of a transgender advisory group led by trans and non-binary activists.</p>
<p>The Gay Games has set out a <a href="https://www.gaygames.org/resources/Documents/FGG%20Gender%20Policy.pdf">gender policy</a> that allows participants to self-identify their gender and take part in the event that aligns with their identity. This is another significant move, as the global sporting world has grappled with how to safely and fairly allow <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-world-sport-got-into-a-mess-over-trans-athletes-and-how-it-can-get-out-of-it-202188">transgender athletes</a> to compete in the traditional male and female categories of sport.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216567/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bonnie Pang is a volunteered Gay Games Hong Kong Lead Champion in the United Kingdom. She is also deputy directors of two research centres (Centre for Qualitative Research, and Centre for Equality in Sport, Physical activity, and Health) at University of Bath.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Denise Tse-Shang Tang receives funding from Hong Kong Research Grants Council for research on transgender men in the workplace under the Humanities and Social Sciences Prestigious Fellowship Scheme (2023). Tang is also currently the Hunt-Simes Visiting Chair of Sexuality Studies at the University of Sydney.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simone Fullagar receives funding from the Australian Research Council.</span></em></p>China’s national security law has already disrupted these co-hosted games.Bonnie Pang, Associate Professor, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2090292023-07-04T05:14:01Z2023-07-04T05:14:01ZBounties on exiled Hong Kong activists show the ambitious reach of China’s political repression<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/535433/original/file-20230704-17-7ocj4u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=445%2C26%2C5167%2C3929&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Hong Kong activist Nathan Law was one of the eight activists targeted with arrest warrants this week. Here, he is seen taking part in a protest during the visit of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Germany in 2020. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Markus Schreiber/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Hong Kong government has extended its efforts to suppress political dissent overseas, issuing arrest warrants for eight exiled pro-democracy figures and offering <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/03/hong-kong-issues-arrest-warrants-for-eight-overseas-democracy-activists">bounties of HK$1 million</a> (around A$191,000) each.</p>
<p>The targeted pro-democracy figures, who now live in Australia, the US and UK, were selected from a longer list of wanted dissidents. There is a curated feel to their profiles – three ex-legislators, three activists, a unionist and a lawyer – that suggests the list is symbolic, as well as pragmatic. </p>
<p>It is reminiscent of the infamous <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/24/umbrella-nine-hong-kong-pro-democracy-leaders-sentenced-to-jail">“Umbrella Nine” trial</a> that capped years of prosecutions after Hong Kong’s 2014 “Umbrella Movement” protests. Three academics, three politicians and three activists were tried and convicted together to send a message to “troublesome” sectors of civil society.</p>
<p>The mugshots of those <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/law-and-crime/article/3226372/hong-kong-national-security-law-police-offer-hk1-million-rewards-arrest-8-people">issued with arrest warrants</a> this week depict not gun-slinging outlaws, but amiable-looking intellectual types. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1675893116195184642"}"></div></p>
<p>Their “very serious crimes”, according to police, consist mostly of calling for sanctions to turn the tide of political repression in Hong Kong. In the terms of the controversial <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-52765838">national security law</a> under which the warrants were issued, this is considered “subversion of state power”, an offence punishable by up to life imprisonment.</p>
<h2>How extradition with Hong Kong works</h2>
<p>Hong Kong is nominally a self-governing region of China under the “one country, two systems” model agreed to when the UK handed the territory back in 1997. </p>
<p>However, the <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3749674">national security law</a> was drafted in Beijing and applied to Hong Kong after the tumultuous, protracted protests that gripped the city in 2019. These were prompted, ironically, by fears the region’s autonomy was breaking down.</p>
<p>A curious feature of the national security law is its purported extraterritorial effect. It claims jurisdiction over any person of any nationality who has committed any of its offences anywhere in the world. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-activists-now-face-a-choice-stay-silent-or-flee-the-city-the-world-must-give-them-a-path-to-safety-141880">Hong Kong activists now face a choice: stay silent, or flee the city. The world must give them a path to safety</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Whether the Hong Kong government can realistically bring these people to trial is another matter entirely.</p>
<p>The international law of extradition (technically, in Hong Kong’s case, the surrender of fugitive offenders, as only states engage in extradition) includes certain safeguards. The act must be a sufficiently serious crime in both places, and it must not be a political offence. </p>
<p>The warrants in question fail both of these tests, notwithstanding the Hong Kong government’s hyperbolic claims about national security.</p>
<p>Moreover, extradition is guided by bilateral agreements between jurisdictions. Numerous Western countries, including the UK, US, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, suspended their <a href="https://www.doj.gov.hk/en/external/table4ti.html">extradition agreements with Hong Kong</a> when the national security law was imposed, foreseeing the politicisation of criminal justice.</p>
<h2>China’s never-ending mission to muzzle its critics</h2>
<p>The pro-democracy figures targeted this week knew which way the wind was blowing when they left Hong Kong. They will probably never return there, a sad fact to which they may already be reconciled. </p>
<p>However, they may also need to reconsider their travel to jurisdictions which do maintain extradition agreements with Hong Kong or China. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1675797057649655808"}"></div></p>
<p>The risk goes beyond formal arrest and extradition. The bounties on offer may encourage vigilantism, and sympathetic governments may turn a blind eye to or even facilitate extra-legal rendition of the eight exiled activists. </p>
<p>This is illustrated by the 2015 case of the five <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/03/magazine/the-case-of-hong-kongs-missing-booksellers.html">Hong Kong booksellers</a> who disappeared from various locations, including Thailand, and later showed up in China where they “confessed” to crimes in the state media.</p>
<p>The existence of overseas dissidents has long rankled Beijing – as the lifetime of spats with the Dalai Lama illustrates – but in recent years it has shown increased determination to monitor and influence the overseas Chinese diaspora. </p>
<p>The government has even set up secret “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/program/101-east/2023/6/1/investigating-chinas-secret-overseas-stations">overseas police offices</a>” in Europe, North America and elsewhere, as bases for information-gathering and harassment.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/succession-on-the-tibetan-plateau-whats-at-stake-in-the-battle-over-the-dalai-lamas-reincarnation-202353">Succession on the Tibetan plateau: what's at stake in the battle over the Dalai Lama's reincarnation?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Hong Kong’s society brought to heel</h2>
<p>In the past, China and Hong Kong could be regarded as distinct political entities, but over the last decade, the “firewall” between the mainland and the region has gradually collapsed. Hong Kong’s government and political system have been stripped of democratic elements, and its national security and law enforcement apparatus are now dictated by the mainland.</p>
<p>Compared with its mainland counterpart, the Hong Kong government goes to greater pains to paper over its actions with a veneer of law and legal process.</p>
<p>However, this tactic is increasingly transparent as it ramps up its pursuit of authoritarian goals. The co-option of Hong Kong’s once-celebrated legal institutions undermines their already-damaged legitimacy.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-democracy-protesters-sentencing-sets-a-harsh-precedent-for-national-security-law-165274">Hong Kong democracy protester's sentencing sets a harsh precedent for national security law</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Hong Kong’s civil society has been brought to heel via a suite of repressive reforms spanning the legal, political, education and media sectors. These new warrants are the latest sign that China will never stop trying to muzzle its critics, so long as they are willing to speak out.</p>
<p>Ultimately, these warrants may be futile overreach – for the sake of their targets, we can only hope that is so – but the intention behind them remains condemnable. They are a threat to freedoms that lie at the core of our democratic society.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1675854010996396037"}"></div></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209029/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brendan Clift does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Hong Kong government may not be able to bring the activists to trial. But the warrants could encourage vigilantism or extra-legal rendition, which has occurred before.Brendan Clift, Lecturer, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2070372023-06-05T12:43:37Z2023-06-05T12:43:37ZHong Kong: crackdown on vigils to commemorate 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre show Beijing’s fear of the power of memory<p>For the past 34 years, the height of “<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10670564.2020.1852741">politically sensitive periods</a>” for the Chinese government invariably falls around the same day: June 4, the anniversary of the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-48445934">Tiananmen Square massacre</a> in Beijing. And, as use of the internet has become increasingly ubiquitous in China, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/04/tiananmen-square-online-search-censored">online surveillance and censorship</a> go into overdrive during this period. </p>
<p>On June 4 1989, the People’s Liberation Army opened fire on unarmed civilians staging a pro-democracy protest in the centre of Beijing. The number of deaths is still not confirmed, as it remains a taboo subject. But estimates vary from several hundred to several thousand. A <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-42465516">secret diplomatic cable</a> from the then British ambassador, Sir Alan Donald, citing a source within China’s State Council, claimed that at least 10,000 people were killed. </p>
<p>The massacre and oppression that followed have become the most sensitive and significant subject over which the Communist Party endeavours to have total control in China. The journalist Louisa Lim’s book <a href="https://www.louisalim.com/peoples-republic-of-amnesia">The People’s Republic of Amnesia</a> reveals the extraordinary determination and capacity the state possesses to rewrite history, erase public memories and silence dissent.</p>
<p>But despite the sweeping repression on the mainland, Hong Kong – until recently – stood out as a free “information enclave”. It was the only place on Chinese territory not to have forgotten the events of June 4 1989. Every year in Victoria Park on the night of June 4, come rain or shine, a candlelit vigil to commemorate the victims of the Tiananmen massacre has been attended by tens of thousands of people – often more than 100,000. </p>
<p>Organised by a grassroots NGO, the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movement in China (<a href="https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/organization/hong-kong-alliance-support-patriotic-democratic-movements-china">Hong Kong Alliance</a>), this became one of few defiant acts and symbols of freedom on Chinese-controlled soil. At the eighth vigil in 1997, a 26-foot-tall sculpture depicting a mass of distorted human bodies, the <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/2018/05/05/pillar-shame-history-hong-kongs-harrowing-tribute-tiananmen-massacre-victims/">Pillar of Shame</a> by Danish sculptor Jens Galschiot, was exhibited on Victoria Park before moving to the University of Hong Kong campus. </p>
<p>In 2014, the Hong Kong Alliance opened <a href="https://archive.nytimes.com/sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/04/24/june-4th-museum-set-to-open-in-hong-kong/">the June 4th Museum</a> to document and memorialise the horrific events of that day in Beijing. </p>
<p>Over the years the annual vigil, the sculpture and the museum kept these memories alive. Thus, as the BBC World Service journalist <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-59764029">Grace Tsoi</a> wrote in 2021, Hong Kong took pride in becoming the “conscience of China”, and the mass vigil grew to be part of the collective identity of the Hong Kong people.</p>
<p>But all this, however, suffered a fatal blow in 2020. The authorities used the convenient excuse of COVID restrictions to <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/2021/05/27/breaking-hong-kong-police-officially-ban-tiananmen-massacre-park-vigil-for-second-successive-year/">ban the annual vigil</a> in Victoria Park. In September 2021, the Hong Kong police raided the June 4 Museum following the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/4/hong-kongs-chow-hang-tung-convicted-in-2nd-tiananmen-vigil-case">arrest of the activist and barrister Chow Hang Tung</a>, the vice-chairwoman of Hong Kong Alliance. She was later sentenced to 15 months in prison for incitement to attend the banned vigil. The Hong Kong Alliance <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/26/hong-kong-tiananmen-vigil-group-disbands-amid-crackdown-on-dissent">was disbanded</a> under pressure from the authorities. In December 2021, the Pillar of Shame was <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-59764029">removed by the police</a>.</p>
<h2>Free speech in Hong Kong</h2>
<p>These drastic crackdowns on the June 4 remembrance events and their organisers need to be understood in the broader context of the rapidly deteriorating situation in terms of freedom of speech and assembly, the crumbling civil society and rule of law in Hong Kong since the <a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-how-chinas-new-national-security-law-subverts-the-territorys-cherished-rule-of-law-139683">introduction of the National Security Law</a> in June 2020.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-how-chinas-new-national-security-law-subverts-the-territorys-cherished-rule-of-law-139683">Hong Kong: how China's new national security law subverts the territory's cherished rule of law</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p><a href="https://www.hrw.org/feature/2021/06/25/dismantling-free-society/hong-kong-one-year-after-national-security-law">Human rights groups</a> have consistently argued that the law was imposed by Beijing to silence dissent following a year of pro-democracy protests and unrest in 2019. But the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/nov/25/remarkably-effective-carrie-lam-praises-hong-kong-national-security-law-in-annual-address">authorities claim</a> the law is necessary to bring stability to the city.</p>
<p>A wide range of international <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-52765838">media have reported</a> that since the law came into force, pro-democracy activists, media outlets and individuals critical of the government or the central authorities in Beijing have been targeted and hundreds arrested. </p>
<p>Among them were some of the most outspoken and prominent pro-democracy figures, such as the 71-year-old media tycoon <a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kongs-press-freedom-is-on-life-support-thanks-to-the-new-security-law-144458">Jimmy Lai</a>, along with a group of 47 legislators, politicians and activists.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kongs-press-freedom-is-on-life-support-thanks-to-the-new-security-law-144458">Hong Kong's press freedom is on life support thanks to the new security law</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>According to the human rights group <a href="https://www.hkdc.us/political-prisoner-report">Hong Kong Democracy Council</a>: “Hong Kong has one of fastest growing populations of political prisoners in the world”. The number has increased from “only a handful” when mass political protests began in June 2019 to more than 1,000 in less than three years. Human rights scholars and observers warn of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/16/trial-of-the-hong-kong-47-symbolises-chinas-attempts-to-dissolve-civil-society">“China’s attempts to dissolve civil society in Hong Kong”</a>.</p>
<h2>The power of memory</h2>
<p>Despite the grave situation in Hong Kong, memories of the Tiananmen protests – a symbol of the public struggle for democracy and liberty – continue to be kindled overseas. In August 2021, the <a href="https://8964museum.com">online June 4th museum</a> was opened to tell the stories of those who died in the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown. In May 2023, a replica of the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/style/article/pillar-of-shame-oslo-university/index.html">Pillar of Shame</a>“ sculpture was erected in Berlin. </p>
<p>As recently as June 2, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/02/nyregion/tiananmen-square-exhibit.html">the June 4th Memorial Museum</a> was opened in New York by activists overseas, ahead of the anniversary. And, although the Victoria Park vigil has been banned, vigils have now expanded globally in many cities in Europe, North America, Australia, Korea and Japan, with the biggest one in <a href="https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2023/06/05/2003800994">Taiwan</a>.</p>
<p>But how significant are these acts in the face of the intransigent repression of the Beijing regime? According to the former Czech president <a href="https://hac.bard.edu/amor-mundi/the-power-of-the-powerless-vaclav-havel-2011-12-23">Václav Havel</a>, when people are living in truth under a dictatorship, they pose a fundamental threat to the political system which is built on lies. Lies, perhaps best exemplified by a <a href="https://www.scmp.com/video/hong-kong/3222923/carnival-replaces-vigil-hong-kongs-victoria-park-tiananmen-crackdown-anniversary">carnival held by pro-Beijing groups in Victoria</a> Park on June 4, while 23 people were detained by police for trying to protest.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1665407538022748160"}"></div></p>
<p>Keeping the memories of the Tiananmen protests and massacre alive is one of the most potent ways for the Chinese – including the Hong Kong people – to live in truth and show their defiance to the party-state. This is what Havel called the ”<a href="https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/wp-content/uploads/1979/01/the-power-of-the-powerless.pdf">power of the powerless</a>“. And it is a power we should not underestimate.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207037/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tao Zhang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Freedom of speech and expression has been destroyed, despite Beijing’s promises they would be upheld.Tao Zhang, Senior Lecturer, School of Arts & Humanities, Nottingham Trent UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1956222022-11-30T23:14:30Z2022-11-30T23:14:30ZProtests in China are not rare – but the current unrest is significant<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/498309/original/file-20221130-20-idlrpn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=34%2C69%2C3808%2C2489&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters march along a street in Beijing on Nov. 28, 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/protesters-march-along-a-street-during-a-rally-for-the-news-photo/1245152808?phrase=china%20protest%20noel%20celis&adppopup=true">Noel Celis/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Street protests across China have <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/chinese-communist-party-faces-threat-not-seen-since-protests-that-led-to-tiananmen-square-massacre-12756809">evoked memories of the Tiananmen Square</a> demonstrations that were brutally quashed in 1989. Indeed, foreign media have suggested the current unrest sweeping cities across China is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/29/business/china-protesters.html">unlike anything seen in the country since that time</a>.</p>
<p>The implication is that <a href="https://www.wsj.com/story/rare-protests-exploded-across-china-over-covid-controls-0cf70321">protest in China</a> <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-covid-cases-hit-fresh-record-high-after-weekend-protests-2022-11-28/">is a rarity</a>. Meanwhile, the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/30/world/asia/jiang-zemin-dead.html">Nov. 30, 2022, death of Jiang Zemin</a> – the leader brought in after the bloody crackdown of 1989 – gives further reason to reflect on how China has changed since the Tiananmen Square massacre, and how Communist party leaders might react to unrest now.</p>
<p>But how uncommon are these recent public actions? And how do they compare with the massive weekslong demonstrations of 1989?</p>
<p>Having <a href="https://cla.csulb.edu/departments/polisci/faculty-staff/teresa-wright/">written extensively on protest in China</a>, I can attest that protests in China are not at all uncommon – but that doesn’t make what is happening now any less significant. Alongside similarities between the current street actions and <a href="https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Popular+Protest+in+China-p-9781509503568">more typical protests of recent years</a>, there are also parallels between the demonstrations today and those in 1989. Yet differences in China’s international status and domestic leadership reduce the chances for liberal democratic transformation now.</p>
<h2>Not so unusual, but still unique</h2>
<p>The current protests are ostensibly about the Chinese government’s <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/what-is-china-s-zero-covid-policy-/6854291.html">strict “zero COVID” policies</a>. They were triggered by a <a href="https://apnews.com/article/china-fires-6a1b6902e6ccf87e064f1232045a2848">deadly fire in the northwestern city of Urumqi</a> on Nov. 24, with some residents blaming lockdown rules for hampering rescue efforts. Unrest has since <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/11/28/protests-against-covid-controls-erupt-across-china.html">spread to multiple cities, including Beijing and Shanghai</a>.</p>
<p>The specifics are unique to the pandemic. But in many respects, what we are seeing is not new or unusual – protests, in general, are not rare in China.</p>
<p>In fact, from 1990 through the present, popular protests have been <a href="https://www.e-elgar.com/shop/usd/handbook-of-protest-and-resistance-in-china-9781786433770.html">more frequent and widespread in China</a> than they were in the years leading up to the Tiananmen Square-centered demonstrations.</p>
<p>According to <a href="http://www.danwei.com/a-report-on-mass-incidents-in-china-in-2012/">Chinese government statistics</a>, the yearly count of domestic “mass incidents” or “public order disturbances” – euphemisms used to refer to everything from organized crime to street protests – rose from 5,000 to 10,000 in the early 1990s to 60,000 to 100,000 by the early 2000s.</p>
<p>Despite the lack of official numbers since 2006 – which ceased to be published after that year – <a href="http://www.eeo.com.cn/ens/feature/2011/05/09/200868.shtml">verbal statements by Chinese officials</a> and <a href="https://www.grid.news/story/global/2022/10/21/depose-the-traitorous-despot-how-chinas-bridge-man-unleashed-a-global-protest-against-xi-jinping/">research by scholars and nongovernment organizations</a> estimate the number of yearly protests to have remained in the high tens-of-thousands.</p>
<h2>When protests turn political</h2>
<p>This is not to say the recent multi-city protests are unsurprising or insignificant. To the contrary, the current media spotlight is, I believe, well-deserved.</p>
<p>Nearly all the thousands of protests appearing every year in the post-Tiananmen Square period have been localized and focused on specific material issues. They occur, for example, when villagers feel they are <a href="https://factsanddetails.com/china/cat9/sub63/item1109.html">unfairly compensated for land acquisitions</a>, when <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lunar-newyear-china-insight/unpaid-and-angry-some-chinese-workers-ditch-holidays-to-protest-idUSKCN0VD2ZJ">private sector workers are not paid</a>, or when <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-environment/chinese-media-defend-waste-incinerator-plan-despite-protests-idUKKBN0DP0AQ20140509">residents suffer from environmental degradation caused by waste incinerators</a>.</p>
<p>In contrast, the anti-lockdown protests have emerged in numerous cities – reporting by CNN suggests there have been at least <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/28/china/china-protests-covid-political-freedom-intl-hnk-mic">23 demonstrations in 17 cities</a>. They are also all focused on the same issue: COVID-19 restrictions. Moreover, they are targeted at central Party leaders and official government policy.</p>
<p>For the the closest parallels in terms of size of protest, one has to go back to the late 1990s and early 2000s. </p>
<p>From 1998 to 2002, tens of thousands of state-owned enterprise workers in at least 10 Chinese provinces <a href="https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Popular+Protest+in+China-p-9781509503568">demonstrated against layoffs and enforced early retirements</a>. And in 1999, roughly 10,000 members of the now-banned spiritual movement Falun Gong <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1999/04/26/silent-protest-draws-thousands-to-beijing/e0b7ee29-eec6-48ba-b6a6-5cd10980ec77/">amassed in central Beijing</a> to protest their suppression and demand legal recognition. </p>
<p>But these protests were directed at issues that specifically affected only these groups and did not critique China’s top political leaders or system as a whole. </p>
<p>The only post-1989 examples of overt collective political dissent – that is, public action calling for fundamental change to the mainland’s Chinese Communist Party-led political system – have been exceedingly small and transpired off the streets. In 1998, activists <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0009443902000554">formed the China Democracy Party</a>, declaring it a new political party to usher in liberal democratic multi-party governance. Though the party persisted openly for roughly six months, establishing a national committee and branches in 24 provinces and cities, its leaders ultimately were arrested and the party driven underground.</p>
<p>A decade later, a group of intellectuals led by writer Liu Xiaobo posted online a <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/10/08/charter-08/">manifesto called “Charter 08”</a> advocating for liberal democratic political reform. Liu, who later received the Nobel Peace Prize, was jailed as a result. He remained in prison until his death, from untreated cancer, in 2017. </p>
<p>And while the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-49317695">massive and sustained protests in Hong Kong</a> over the past decade exemplify political dissent, protesters’ demands have remained confined to political reform in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China. </p>
<h2>Calls for change and for Xi to go</h2>
<p>So how much do the current anti-lockdown protests resemble the demonstrations that shook the regime in the spring of 1989? </p>
<p>Both have involved urban residents from various walks of life, including university students and blue-collar workers.</p>
<p>And in each case, the demands of protesters have been mixed. They include specific material complaints: In 1989, it was the <a href="https://www.marketplace.org/2019/06/05/economics-helped-spur-tiananmen-square-protests/">impacts of inflation</a>; in 2022, it is the effects of lockdowns and <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-11-28/china-covid-protests-anger-grows-over-profits-at-pcr-testing-companies">incessant PCR testing</a>. </p>
<p>But they also include broader calls for political liberalization, such as freedom of expression.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A giant white statue with arm aloft stand above 100s of people." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/498347/original/file-20221130-12-vigh2d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/498347/original/file-20221130-12-vigh2d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/498347/original/file-20221130-12-vigh2d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/498347/original/file-20221130-12-vigh2d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/498347/original/file-20221130-12-vigh2d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/498347/original/file-20221130-12-vigh2d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/498347/original/file-20221130-12-vigh2d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Goddess of Democracy stood as a symbol of protest during the 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstrations.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/crowds-of-people-watch-the-unveiling-of-the-goddess-of-news-photo/640492283?phrase=1989%20Goddess%20of%20Democracy&adppopup=true">David Turnley/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Indeed in some ways, the protesters of 2022 are being more pointed in their political demands. Those on the streets of at least two major cities have <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/xi-jinping-step-down-china-deadly-fire-protests-zero-covid-policy/">called on President Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party to step down</a>. Demonstrators in 1989 refrained from such system-threatening rhetoric.</p>
<p>That reflects the changing political realities of China then and now. In early 1989, Party leadership clearly was split, with more reform-oriented leaders such as Zhao Ziyang perceived as sharing the activists’ vision for change. As such, demonstrators saw a way of achieving their aims within the communist system and without a wholesale change in leadership.</p>
<p>The contrast with today is stark: Xi has a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/takeaways-power-one-xi-solidifies-grip-party-congress-2022-10-23/">firm grip on the party</a>. Even if Xi were to miraculously step down, there is no clear opposition leader or faction to replace him. And if the party were to fall, the resultant political void is more likely to bring chaos than orderly political transformation.</p>
<p>Yet if the Chinese Communist Party is a different entity now than it was in 1989, its response to unrest shares some traits. Central authorities in 1989 blamed the protests on foreign “black hands” seeking to destabilize China. The same accusations have been <a href="https://www.whatsonweibo.com/the-blank-white-paper-protest-in-beijing-and-online-discussions-on-outside-forces/">raised in online posts</a> now. </p>
<p>In fact, the government response to recent protests follows a pattern that has played out time and again in post-1989 protests. There is little to no official media coverage of the protests or acknowledgment by central Chinese Communist Party leaders. At the same time, local authorities attempt to identify and punish protest leaders while treating regular participants as well-intended and non-threatening. Central criticism – and possible sanction – of local officials portrayed as violating national policies follows. Meanwhile, there are moves to at least partially address protester grievances. </p>
<p>It is a messy and inefficient way to respond to public concerns – but it has become the norm since 1989.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195622/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Teresa Wright does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Comparisons have been made to the 1989 demonstrations that led to the Tiananmen Square massacre. An expert on Chinese protests explains why that is half right.Teresa Wright, Professor of Political Science, California State University, Long BeachLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1953162022-11-30T14:45:04Z2022-11-30T14:45:04ZWho is Jimmy Lai? The Hong Kong newspaper owner’s upcoming show trial is symbolic of the struggle with the mainland and its values<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/498252/original/file-20221130-24-ugeam9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Jimmy Lai.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Yung Chi Wai Derek/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Amid the widespread anti-zero-COVID protests in mainland China, political and judicial persecution in Hong Kong continues in the criminal court, where key pro-democracy figures and journalists are facing national security trials that could result in life in jail.</p>
<p>Jimmy Lai is one of the most well-known defendants outside Hong Kong, and his trials have become symbolic of the crackdown on freedom of speech by Beijing. As the owner of the famous liberal newspaper <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-12-01/jimmy-lai-imprisoned-apple-daily-founder-in-hong-kong-bloomberg-50-2021">Apple Daily</a>, Lai has been seen as a committed advocate for the city’s universal suffrage, promised in <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2629693">the Basic Law of Hong Kong</a>, a mini-constitutional document signed off by the Chinese state. </p>
<p>In 2020, Lai was charged by the national security police for colluding with foreign forces. He was <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/the-long-term-implications-of-the-jimmy-lai-bail-decision/">denied bail by the city’s top court</a> and kept in jail for almost two years. He is about to face another trial which could start on December 1, although it could get postponed at the last minute.</p>
<p>Hong Kong’s Department of Justice has submitted a request to the court to adjourn the case, but the decision is still uncertain.</p>
<p>In the past two years, Lai was convicted for <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/law-and-crime/article/3201308/jimmy-lai-and-other-opposition-figures-convicted-over-unauthorised-2019-march-victoria-park-seek">acts of civil disobedience</a> and <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/hong-kong-publisher-jimmy-lai-convicted-of-fraud-/6804470.html">commercial fraud</a> and is now facing trial for colluding with foreign forces under the National Security Law, alongside <a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-how-colonial-era-laws-are-being-used-to-shut-down-independent-journalism-174375">publishing seditious publications</a> under the local crimes ordinance. Lai could be sentenced to life in jail for the first charge. Three of his companies connected to Apple Daily were also charged with colluding with foreign forces and Lai’s six colleagues are awaiting trials for charges of colluding with foreign forces and publishing seditious publications, the same as Jimmy Lai. Lai and his three companies are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/23/hong-kong-tycoon-jimmy-lai-plead-not-guilty-national-security-case">pleading not guilty</a> in the case.</p>
<p>His case marks the first criminal trial in Hong Kong for the offence of colluding with foreign forces. Despite its symbolic importance, the secretary for justice has decided to <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220822-hong-kong-media-tycoon-jimmy-lai-to-face-no-jury-trial">remove a jury</a> from Lai’s case. Instead, three judges handpicked by the city’s executive leader will try it.</p>
<p>In pre-trial hearings, the public prosecution indicated evidence of Lai’s acts of foreign collusion would include his tweets, interviews with US scholars and former government officials, and <a href="https://www.theepochtimes.com/6-former-executives-of-apple-daily-plead-guilty-to-collusion-with-foreign-powers-charges_4881014.html">court reporting of the Apple Daily</a>. The removal of a jury implies that the authorities do not want the public to play a part in this trial, so members of the public cannot contribute their shared understanding of national security and foreign collusion to this case. </p>
<p>The secretary for justice went on to object to <a href="https://www.cityam.com/british-barrister-to-represent-democracy-activist-jimmy-lai-in-hong-kong-trial/">Timothy Owen</a>, a British King’s Counsel specialising in criminal law, human rights law and media law, defending Lai in the local court. Although the court had approved Owen’s involvement in the case, the secretary for justice has continued to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal, which is the city’s top court, for a final ruling to stop Owen participating.</p>
<h2>Lai’s history</h2>
<p>Born in the mainland, Lai fled to Hong Kong after witnessing his family members being sent to the labour camp after the “liberation” in mainland China. During the Tiananmen student movement in 1989, Lai, who owned a retailer, produced T-shirts with protest slogans in Hong Kong to support the movement. After that, his business in the mainland was closed down by the Chinese authorities. Before Hong Kong’s handover in 1997, Lai launched the Apple Daily newspaper, which became the city’s most popular pro-democracy media outlet.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/chinese-protests-are-about-more-than-covid-student-discontent-has-fuelled-the-biggest-movement-since-tiananmen-square-195515">Chinese protests are about more than COVID – student discontent has fuelled the biggest movement since Tiananmen Square</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>In the eyes of <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/law-and-crime/article/3201243/hong-kongs-top-court-upholds-decision-allow-british-barrister-defend-media-tycoon-jimmy-lai-national">the Chinese Communist party</a>, Lai might be a symbol of the anti-Chinese forces. Lai didn’t hide his political ideology and anti-party beliefs. He gave vast donations to support the pro-democracy movement and influence local elections. He held meetings and dialogues with <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/2019/07/10/hong-kong-media-tycoon-jimmy-lai-meets-us-no-2-mike-pence-sec-state-pompeo-discuss-extradition-bill/">western government leaders</a>, especially the United States, such as meeting then vice president Mike Pence, then secretary of state Mike Pompeo and US speaker Nancy Pelosi during Hong Kong’s anti-extradition bill movement in 2019. The Chinese authorities eventually sanctioned Pompeo and Pelosi, and Lai was sentenced to jail for 20 months for his involvement in illegal assemblies during the 2019 democracy movement.</p>
<h2>Struggles for freedom</h2>
<p>For many supporters of the democracy movement in Hong Kong, Lai is the icon struggling for political freedom and universal suffrage. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jun/23/hong-kong-apple-daily-symbol-of-pro-democracy-movement-to-close">The Apple Daily</a> had an impressive reputation for investigative journalism, unveiling many cases of government abuse of power and alleged corruption over decades. </p>
<p>It raised public awareness of the need for a democratic society and civil liberties and mobilised public opinion to resist illiberal government policies and laws, including the national security bill in 2003 and the ad hoc extradition agreement with China in 2019. Last but not least, his donations to local pro-democracy parties appeared to be a form of resistance to the CCP’s united front work that cultivates pro-government parties and elites in electoral politics. While pro-Beijing tycoons donate US$2.4 million (£2 million) to a pro-government party by buying a senior Chinese official’s <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/2048153/hong-kong-businessman-bids-hk188-million-calligraphy-beijing">calligraphy at auction</a>, attacks on Lai’s support for the local democracy movement show that double standards are being enforced.</p>
<p>Although the court of final appeal <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/hong-kong-s-top-court-allows-uk-lawyer-to-defend-publisher-jimmy-lai-in-national-security-trial/ar-AA14E5hz">ruled against the government</a>, Hong Kong’s chief executive, John Lee, recently announced that he had suggested the Chinese authorities <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Hong-Kong-security-law/Hong-Kong-taps-Beijing-in-high-profile-national-security-case">interpret the national security law</a> as a way of barring overseas lawyers from defending national security cases. Despite the <a href="https://www.hkba.org/uploads/97f289d7-d89e-46ec-bf48-d86267ec1d9b.pdf">local Bar Association’s open endorsement</a> of the government’s move, the interpretation of the NSL would certainly undermine judicial independence and belief in fair trials in Hong Kong.</p>
<p>Given that Beijing will interpret the NSL in December, it is likely that Jimmy Lai’s trial, which is supposed to commence on December 1, <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-xl/news/other/hong-kong-gov-e2-80-99t-to-seek-to-adjourn-jimmy-lai-e2-80-99s-collusion-trial-2-days-ahead-of-scheduled-start-date/ar-AA14FM2A">will be adjourned</a>.</p>
<p>Following John Lee’s proposal to Beijing, the Chinese authorities publicly disapproved of the CFA’s decision above and stressed that Lai deserved retribution for what he did. Beijing wants a show trial. For Hong Kong’s courts, Lai’s case is a test case for fair trials and free speech. </p>
<p>How Lai’s case is handled will signal how far Beijing will go to bring Hong Kong in line with the mainland and how much freedom and how many legal rights will remain on the island.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195316/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yan-ho Lai does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The upcoming trial of publisher Jimmy Lai is seen as a symbol of the erosion of freedom of speech in Hong Kong.Yan-ho Lai, Non-resident Fellow, Center for Asian Law, Georgetown University; PhD in Law, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1903192022-09-19T12:21:29Z2022-09-19T12:21:29ZWhy China feels threatened by the moral authority of a 90-year-old Catholic bishop<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/484942/original/file-20220915-25774-1djdnc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C70%2C5249%2C3394&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Cardinal Joseph Zen has long supported protesters and critiqued China.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/HongKong/480e34e0d6e04c6bb4609b88a0cbf07c/photo?Query=cardinal%20zen%20arrest&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=7&currentItemNo=0">AP Photo/Kin Cheung</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Cardinal Joseph Zen will stand trial on Sept. 19, 2022, in Hong Kong for his role as a trustee of the <a href="https://612fund.hk/en/home">612 Humanitarian Relief Fund</a>. This organization paid legal fees and medical bills for Hong Kongers protesting the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/10/world/asia/hong-kong-extradition-bill.html">Extradition Law Amendment Bill</a>. This 2019 legislation would have allowed extradition to the People’s Republic of China. Many residents viewed this as a subversion of Hong Kong’s semi-autonomous political system, leading to large-scale protests, political unrest and a police crackdown. It also prompted Beijing’s further direct intervention in Hong Kong’s governance. </p>
<p>For the Chinese Communist Party, this organization’s support of protesters and alleged <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/hong-kong-police-arrest-catholic-cardinal-alleged-collusion-with-foreign-forces-2022-05-11/">collusion with foreign forces</a> violated the party-mandated <a href="https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/doc/hk/a406/eng_translation_(a406)_en.pdf">national security law</a>. This law has since been applied <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3148072/hong-kong-leaders-apply-national-security-law-retroactively-us">retroactively</a>. </p>
<p>A retired bishop of the Hong Kong Diocese, Cardinal Zen has <a href="https://www.osvnews.com/2022/05/12/hong-kong-police-detain-release-90-year-old-cardinal/">long supported Hong Kong protesters</a>, critiqued Beijing and criticized the Vatican’s rapprochement with the Chinese Communist Party. <a href="https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/251219/it-s-a-way-to-keep-people-in-fear-chinese-catholics-react-to-cardinal-zen-s-arrest">Chinese Catholics</a> see the arrest as an attempt to intimidate and prevent activism among Hong Kong’s Catholic community.</p>
<p>To understand why the Chinese Communist Party would feel intimidated by a 90-year-old man and threaten him with life in prison, it is important to go beyond narrow, concrete effects – such as a cowed Catholic community – and identify the principles held by the leadership. As a former military diplomat currently researching the link between <a href="https://apcss.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/01-mcdonald-25A.pdf">philosophy and foreign policy</a>, I argue that Cardinal Zen’s threat to the Chinese Communist Party lies not in his support for democratic reform, but as a competing source of political authority.</p>
<h2>The party’s morality of hierarchy</h2>
<p>The Chinese Communist Party leadership continues to be shaped by the principles of classical Chinese philosophy. Despite <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2643955">official condemnation</a> during the Mao years, the party has more recently tried to bolster the foundations of classical Chinese thought to legitimize its own rule.</p>
<p>During a <a href="https://china.usc.edu/president-jiangs-speech-harvard-university-1997">1997 speech at Harvard University</a>, Jiang Zemin – then the general secretary of the party – praised classical Chinese thought and tied it to contemporary values and the state’s development. Today, General Secretary Xi Jinping routinely mentions classical philosophy in his speeches and noted <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi_Jinping's_report_at_19th_CPC_National_Congress.pdf">at the 19th National Congress</a> that the development of socialism with Chinese characteristics will build upon Chinese culture’s traditional vision, concepts, values and moral norms. </p>
<p>Classical Chinese ethics begin with the existential centrality of the family. <a href="https://scholars.cityu.edu.hk/en/persons/ruiping-fan(154f5f2b-cf56-44b9-ba74-68177bf79b6c).html">Fan Ruiping</a>, a researcher in Confucian ethics at the City University of Hong Kong, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7272-4_10">notes Confucianism sees</a> the family as the basic structure of human existence, not simply a social institution. Thus, the family becomes the standard against which behavior is judged. For example, to protect the family, Confucius argues it is <a href="https://ctext.org/analects/wei-zi#n1572">moral</a> for a son to hide the misconduct of his father.</p>
<p>According to the <a href="https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=25267">Yongle Emperor</a>, an emperor who ruled in the 15th century, the entire world is a single family. Within this system, one’s position is defined by one’s role, grounded in the five <a href="https://ctext.org/mengzi/teng-wen-gong-i#n1657">Confucian relationships</a>: ruler to subject, father to son, husband to wife, elder brother to younger brother, and friend to friend. Each of these is both reciprocal and hierarchical. The moral individual <a href="https://ctext.org/analects/wei-zi#n1572">conforms</a> to the role one fills in society and treats others according to theirs.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/484943/original/file-20220915-4859-tvjkns.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A tall statue of Confucius in Nanjing city in China." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/484943/original/file-20220915-4859-tvjkns.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/484943/original/file-20220915-4859-tvjkns.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/484943/original/file-20220915-4859-tvjkns.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/484943/original/file-20220915-4859-tvjkns.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/484943/original/file-20220915-4859-tvjkns.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/484943/original/file-20220915-4859-tvjkns.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/484943/original/file-20220915-4859-tvjkns.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Confucianism teaches that people’s positions and responsibilities in society are based on five key kinds of relationships.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/statue-of-confucius-royalty-free-image/901473246?adppopup=true">Feifei Cui-Paoluzzo/Moment via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Even in contemporary Chinese society, friends treat each other as elder and younger siblings, such that in any situation there is a hierarchical relationship – an older friend is addressed as “elder brother” or “elder sister.” In calling another “elder brother,” one’s own position in that reciprocal relationship – “younger” – becomes obvious.</p>
<p>Through identification of the family as the moral standard and its extension throughout society based on the five relationships, Confucianism views a moral society as a unified family, ordered hierarchically. At the top of the hierarchy sits the emperor, whose relationship with subjects mirrors that between father and son. One <a href="https://ctext.org/analects/zi-han#n1324">serves</a> the rulers as one would serve one’s father or elder brother.</p>
<p>In this view, society is well organized when each person fills the assigned role, paying appropriate deference to those above and acting benevolently toward those below. As Confucius <a href="https://ctext.org/analects/yan-yuan#n1392">stated</a>, “The ruler is the ruler; the minister is minister; the father is father; and the son is son. That is government.”</p>
<p>According to <a href="https://ctext.org/analects/ji-shi#n1523">Confucianism</a>, order, stability and prosperity are maintained when all subjects fill their proper roles. The danger of ignoring this lesson was highlighted by the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, when Chairman Mao Zedong used students <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/9780511980411">to attack those in the party who opposed him</a>. It was also evident in the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, when the party allowed the students to develop moral authority and had to resort to military force to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/9781107323728">crush peaceful student protests</a>. The consequences of losing control was made stark two years later when the Soviet Union collapsed.</p>
<h2>Cardinal Zen and challenge to hierarchy</h2>
<p>According to its moral principles, the party can tolerate no competition for authority, and has a long history of eliminating those who present a challenge to the party’s position. For example, following the 1956-57 Hundred Flowers Campaign that encouraged engagement from intellectuals, Mao Zedong used the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511842405.004">Anti-Rightist Campaign</a> to eliminate their growing authority. This campaign sought to refute anti-regime commentary made by intellectuals, punishing about 550,000 of them, many with reform through labor.</p>
<p>More recently, Xi Jinping has used an <a href="https://doi.org/10.4000/chinaperspectives.6542">anti-corruption</a> drive to eliminate intra-party challenges to his authority by purging prominent figures, such as Zhou Yongkang, retired public security chief and former member of the Politburo Standing Committee. In Hong Kong, the national security law has been used to charge publisher and democracy activist <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/09/world/asia/hong-kong-arrests-lai-national-security-law.html">Jimmy Lai</a>, whose media holdings regularly criticize the Hong Kong and Chinese Communist Party leadership.</p>
<p>The principle of hierarchy can also be used to understand and predict how events can unfold. For example, if Cardinal Zen dies in custody, he could become a martyr of the protest movement – hardly ideal for the Chinese Communist Party. Still, the leadership’s philosophy suggests it would be even worse for the party to let Zen continue his activism and become a more active threat to its moral and political monopoly. </p>
<p>Additionally, arresting a cardinal could disrupt ties with the <a href="https://cruxnow.com/church-in-asia/2022/08/hong-kong-five-day-trial-set-for-cardinal-zen-four-defendants">Vatican</a>. However, as political scientist Lawrence Reardon demonstrates, since 1949 the party’s chief <a href="http://press.georgetown.edu/book/georgetown/catholic-church-and-nation-state">concern</a> in relations with the Vatican has been whether the pope or the party appoints bishops within the People’s Republic of China. In other words, who sits atop the Catholic hierarchy within the People’s Republic of China is more important than anything else the party gains through relations with the Vatican.</p>
<p>To remain at the pinnacle of China’s moral hierarchy, the party will need to remove alternative sources of authority. Through his criticism of the party and the Vatican, Cardinal Zen has shown the potential of transforming into a <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/cardinal-joseph-zen-and-the-art-of-chinese-oppression-hong-kong-beijing-arrest-11652304547">political leader</a> in his own right. </p>
<p>As a possible alternative source of authority, Cardinal Zen has become the latest victim of the party’s moral hierarchy; he will not be the last.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/190319/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Scott McDonald receives funding from the Sarah Scaife Foundation and the Eisenhower Institute. He is affiliated with the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies as a Non-resident Fellow, however all opinions expressed are his own and do not necessarily represent those of the US Government or Department of Defense. </span></em></p>A scholar of philosophy and foreign policy explains why Cardinal Zen poses a threat to the Chinese Communist Party as a competing source of political authority.Scott D. McDonald, Non-resident Fellow, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies; PhD Candidate, The Fletcher School, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1862232022-08-14T20:03:48Z2022-08-14T20:03:48ZJess Ho’s ‘unflinching’ hospitality memoir is a Cantonese-Australian Kitchen Confidential<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478218/original/file-20220809-24-u88r0x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C3994%2C2353&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Farley Webb</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://affirmpress.com.au/publishing/raised-by-wolves/">Raised by Wolves</a> is like Anthony Bourdain’s <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/33313.Kitchen_Confidential">Kitchen Confidential</a>, if it were told by a second-generation Cantonese Australian from Hong Kong, whose work in the food industry spans 15 years. Jess Ho combines a compelling, unflinching critique of the Melbourne food scene with memories of an abusive childhood. </p>
<hr>
<p><em>Review: Raised by Wolves: A memoir with bite – Jess Ho (Affirm Press)</em></p>
<hr>
<p>This brilliantly written memoir discusses exploitative labour in the restaurant and bar industries, culinary appropriation – and enduring racism, sexism, alcohol abuse, depression, <a href="https://theconversation.com/coping-with-bereavement-and-grief-lessons-from-history-9088">grief</a> and loss. </p>
<p>Ho threads Chinese culture into the fabric of the book, reflecting how deeply it’s woven into who they are. “Culturally, spite was one pillar of being Chinese,” they quip at one point. And it’s intrinsic to how they experience food, for example: “the Chinese […] value silky gelatinous textures as much as we do crunchy”.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/from-lurid-orange-sauces-to-refined-regional-flavours-how-politics-helped-shape-chinese-food-in-australia-150283">From lurid orange sauces to refined, regional flavours: how politics helped shape Chinese food in Australia</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Raised by Wolves is delightful, sad, honest and funny in equal measure. Ho admits to hating themself for dumbing down ethnic cuisines to suit popular food culture, in their role at a popular Melbourne Asian restaurant frequented by hipsters. At a Chinese dinner, they castigate their white colleagues for adding soy sauce to their food at the table, threatening to “soy tax” them. </p>
<p>The author’s acerbic criticisms of their workplaces – and themself – shine through the pages. (And their liberal use of profanity reflects the high-octane environment of restaurant and bar work.) Interspersed with accounts of backbreaking restaurant work, Ho relives their experiences of their own dysfunctional family, including shocking physical and verbal abuse from their mother. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478221/original/file-20220809-18-ugd671.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478221/original/file-20220809-18-ugd671.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478221/original/file-20220809-18-ugd671.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478221/original/file-20220809-18-ugd671.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478221/original/file-20220809-18-ugd671.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478221/original/file-20220809-18-ugd671.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478221/original/file-20220809-18-ugd671.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478221/original/file-20220809-18-ugd671.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Jess Ho’s memoir writes of ‘backbreaking restaurant work’, in an unflinching critique of the food scene.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">John LeGrand/Unsplash</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Childhood trauma</h2>
<p>Ho recounts how “my mother threw a dishrack full of wet plates, knives and pots at me from across the room when she said I drank my cup of tea too loudly. I was five.” Outside the home, Ho was an anxious child, feeling “that my very flimsy grasp of the English language was going to reveal how Chinese I was to my low socio-economic, underfunded, poorly educated, racist breeding ground of a primary school”.</p>
<p>Hospitality provided an escape route. It was a way to earn a living from Ho’s teenage years on. In the restaurant industry, they excelled in everything they did, working in front-of-house and back-of-house. Hospitality staff often work a punishing 60 or more hours a week. The restaurant worker, having missed meals during the week, would later gorge on both food and drink, “eating like it’s your death-row meal on your day off”. Half-hour breaks at night were spent at bars, work then recommencing until sunrise. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-celebrity-award-winning-chefs-are-usually-white-men-106709">Why celebrity, award-winning chefs are usually white men</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Ho experienced discrimination as an Asian female. They have since chosen to identify as <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-are-gender-pronouns-and-why-is-it-important-to-use-the-right-ones-169025">nonbinary</a>, a decision they explore in the book.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I hated being a girl, but being a boy wouldn’t give me inner peace […] I never saw who I was reflected back at me until I cut all my hair off and gave myself permission to reject binary definitions.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Ho speaks of “crass chefs intent on flexing their masculinity or flaunting their homosexuality”. And they point out “it was an industry that had abused, stalked, harassed, sexually assaulted, intimidated, belittled, gaslit, bullied, discarded and overworked me”. There was no letup, even when they owned a bar. By the time they quit the industry before turning 30, Ho’s whole body was out of whack from hard physical work and stress. </p>
<p>Ho’s gripping account is a sad indictment of the hospitality industry in Melbourne (likely similar to scenarios in other Australian cities). </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478222/original/file-20220809-22-8q92iq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478222/original/file-20220809-22-8q92iq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478222/original/file-20220809-22-8q92iq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478222/original/file-20220809-22-8q92iq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478222/original/file-20220809-22-8q92iq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478222/original/file-20220809-22-8q92iq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478222/original/file-20220809-22-8q92iq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478222/original/file-20220809-22-8q92iq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Jess Ho has given voice to Asians and their food.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Elle Morre/Unspash</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Culinary appropriation</h2>
<p>Ho takes issue with the <a href="https://theconversation.com/jamie-olivers-jerk-rice-is-a-recipe-for-disaster-heres-why-101879">cultural appropriation of dishes</a> and “fusion” food. They disparage a Sichuan restaurant that served food that was a caricature of the region – such as potato salads with chunks of cold lap cheong, raisins and cubes of apple. However, history tells us that all cuisines are hybrids. Food historian Ken Albala <a href="http://kenalbala.blogspot.com/2019/01/cultural-appropriation-authenticity-and.html">says</a> the movement of people, plants and animals – and even colonisation and slavery – has given us every classic cuisine we now seek to protect. </p>
<p>Ho argues that the industry promotes European cooking as superior, overlooking “the skill involved in tempering spices, nixtamalising corn, fermenting cabbages or folding soup-filled dumplings”. They add that chefs and restaurant owners, after a week’s overseas visit, often return to Australia and become gatekeepers of cuisine sampled as tourists. </p>
<p>Ho blames the media for enabling this, using words such as “reinvented” and “elevated” to “describe their watered-down versions of generational familial recipes that they have mutilated in the name of artistry and capitalism”. </p>
<p>They felt themself contributing to the problem of cultural erasure, oppression and <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-systemic-racism-and-institutional-racism-131152">systemic racism</a>, and chide themself for </p>
<blockquote>
<p>censoring parts of someone else’s culture and selling the easily digestible bits to a rich, white audience. […] I’d be pushing white faces cooking Thai food and dumbing down an entire cuisine into entertainment. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Ho recalls all the Thai chefs in one restaurant quitting en masse in response to their “national dishes being bastardised and being stripped of their voices”. </p>
<p>Philosopher Lisa Heldke has done <a href="https://philpapers.org/rec/HELEAR-2">extensive work</a> on cultural colonialism, food cultural appropriation and exoticising ethnic foods. Heldke says cultural food colonialism is enacted by Western food adventurers, on a quest for “cooking and eating ethnic foods – most frequently the foods of economically dominated or ‘third world’ cultures”. Novelty, exoticism and “authenticity” are the values that frame their quest.</p>
<p>Significantly, Ho has given voice to Asians and their food, validating dishes and ingredients relished by Asians, without whitewashing them for a Western sensibility. When Ho seeks flavours: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I want crisp, charred, sweet vegetables kissed by a wok. I want fermented tofu melted over morning glory. I want herbal soup with tofu skins and chicken feet. I want silken tofu with raw garlic and century egg. I want crisp and lacy banh xeo with plump-arse prawns, immaculate lettuce, herbs and nuoc mam. I want a stinky bamboo salad. I want fermented fish som tum so spicy I see through time, and sticky rice to sop it up with. I want a cauldron of kimchi stew. I never crave cheese platters, but I always crave Asian food.</p>
</blockquote>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/young-womens-memoirs-of-migration-dispossession-and-australian-unbelonging-demand-to-be-heard-182223">Young women's memoirs of migration, dispossession and Australian 'unbelonging' demand to be heard</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/186223/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cecilia Leong-Salobir does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Jess Ho’s acerbic, sad, funny memoir of combines a compelling critique of the Melbourne food scene that became her family with memories of a traumatic childhood.Cecilia Leong-Salobir, Honorary Research Fellow, The University of Western AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1777932022-08-02T17:01:52Z2022-08-02T17:01:52ZHong Kong’s 1922 general strike: when the British empire struck back<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/448256/original/file-20220224-19-zlktij.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C1198%2C797&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">International trade hub: Hong Kong Harbour in 1922</span> </figcaption></figure><p>Following last year’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-communist-party-at-100-revolution-forever-163665">centenary of the foundation</a> of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 2022 marks the 100th anniversary of the <a href="https://libcom.org/article/1922-hong-kong-strike">first general strike</a> to shut down a British colonial territory – Hong Kong. </p>
<p>The strike began with the grievances of the British territory’s seamen, but rapidly spread to other sectors, effectively shutting Hong Kong down. It represents the first major episode of industrial unrest in the territory, to which the colonial authorities responded with emergency anti-strike legislation. The law introduced by the colonial authorities, which allowed the governer to pass “any regulations whatsoever which he may consider desirable in the public interest”, was <a href="https://qz.com/1721951/anti-mask-law-the-1922-origins-of-hong-kongs-emergency-powers/">used in 2019</a> to ban the use of face masks by protesters.</p>
<p>The CCP was founded only a few months before the strike began, but there is little evidence that the strike was led by the party. But many militants later joined the CCP and were very influential in much larger strikes in 1925 and 1926. It was the militancy of the strikes of 1920 to 1925 in China that shaped the formative years of Chinese communism rather than the party being in the vanguard of revolutionary activism.</p>
<p>The General Industrial Federation of Chinese Seamen (<em>Zhonghua Haiyuan Gongye Lianhe Zonghui</em>) had been established in March 1921 and its grievances were largely about payment. Inequity in payment between Chinese and non-Chinese seamen was stark – there was clearly an anti-imperialist dimension to the strike. The wage workers of Hong Kong were taking direct action against colonial businesses supported by the colonial government.</p>
<h2>Gathering unrest</h2>
<p>In 1921, demands for wage rises were generally ignored by shipping companies. The seamen’s union became increasingly determined. On January 12 1922 it again pressed the case for wage increases, setting a 24-hour limit for a response. The following day, 1,500 deck hands and stokers went on a 52-day strike. During the second half of January the number on strike grew to about 30,000. By early February, 167 steamers were moored and disabled causing serious losses to shipping companies.</p>
<p>Solidarity strikes had been planned from the start, with agreements to support the seamen. About 50,000 workers of all kinds were involved by the middle of February, including office workers, cooks, bakers, rickshaw pullers and even the Chinese staff of Government House. Transport services were halted. </p>
<p>By the end of the strike there was a complete paralysis of economic life in Hong Kong. It was estimated by the main English-language paper in Hong Kong, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) – whose archives are unfortunately not available online – that 120,000 workers went on strike.</p>
<p>More than 50% of the strikers were not part of the shipping industry. So this this movement represented a “general strike”, rather than just a seamen’s strike. </p>
<h2>Violent reaction</h2>
<p>Britain’s colonial administration – with support from the Westminster government – declared the strike illegal on February 1 and the government tried to repress industrial action by introducing emergency regulations. Hong Kong’s governor was given power to make “any regulations whatsoever which he may consider desirable in the public interest”. </p>
<p>According to the Government Gazette from February 28 1922, departures from Hong Kong without travel passes were forbidden. This was a critical issue. The union had moved its organisation to nearby Canton (now Guangzhou) on the Chinese mainland, where the local government gave support to strikers, including strike pay.</p>
<p>On March 3, according to a subsequent report in the SCMP of proceedings at the coroner’s court, more than 2,000 strikers decided to walk to Canton. When they tried to break through a cordon, an order to fire was given to troops. Four people were seriously injured and died at the scene.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474923/original/file-20220719-12-1u3bal.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Tearout from HK Telegraph" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474923/original/file-20220719-12-1u3bal.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474923/original/file-20220719-12-1u3bal.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474923/original/file-20220719-12-1u3bal.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474923/original/file-20220719-12-1u3bal.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474923/original/file-20220719-12-1u3bal.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=526&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474923/original/file-20220719-12-1u3bal.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=526&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474923/original/file-20220719-12-1u3bal.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=526&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">HOw the Hong Kong Telegraph reported the strike.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Hong Kong Telegraph</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The SCMP maintained good coverage. Only at the end of the strike was its own printing press closed temporarily. After being unable to publish on the previous day, the March 7 edition was a single page with the headline “Peace Celebrations”.</p>
<h2>Temporary truce</h2>
<p>The chairman of the Shipowners’ Committee wrote to the Hong Kong governor on March 15 with details of the settlement. At least on paper, the strikers were victorious. Wage rises of 15% to 30% were promised. Restrictions on the seamen’s union were lifted. There were to be no reprisals and imprisoned strikers would be released.</p>
<p>There may have been some temporary material improvement, but labour was engaged through contractors who took a big “top slice” known as the “squeeze”. Formal wage rises would have been notional because workers were paid indirectly using a “labour gang” system. </p>
<p>Management rarely had any reliable record of its workers. Companies agreed a fixed sum with an intermediary who would do the hiring, pay the workers, and often found their accommodation when not at sea. </p>
<p>Similar systems persisted throughout China until 1949, because there were large numbers willing to migrate from the impoverished agrarian sector. An economic strike was turned into a major political confrontation by government repression and inept response. </p>
<p>Union militancy drove CCP development rather more than the party leading the strikers. The CCP in Hong Kong only became an organised group during the next three years.</p>
<p>The Hong Kong general strike demonstrated to the recently created CCP that union militancy could be very powerful. Connected with other outbreaks of strike action – and at a time of optimism that the Russian example would be followed in other countries – CCP leaders became increasingly confident that revolution would soon sweep though the cities of China. </p>
<p>But after urban uprisings of 1927 were crushed, a new view – Mao’s advocacy of rural insurgency – began to take root. By 1949 the CCP took control across China. Hong Kong itself returned to Chinese rule in 1997, where – 22 years later – the government of the special administrative region themselves used the <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-10-04/hong-kong-bans-masks-for-protesters-explainer/11573842">1922 Colonial Emergency Laws</a> to deal with unrest and activism.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177793/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Law does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Strikes in the British colony 100 years ago were to provide the first flourishing of militancy that would bloom into full-scale revolution in China.David Law, Academic Director: Global Partnerships, Keele UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1881162022-08-02T16:54:12Z2022-08-02T16:54:12ZWhy Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan puts the White House in delicate straits of diplomacy with China<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477209/original/file-20220802-11-dgun2t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=26%2C143%2C5964%2C4203&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Not everyone is so thrilled by the visit.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/TaiwanAsiaPelosi/9de571a85ea94764b42c8468f79e6bbe/photo?Query=Pelosi&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=15306&currentItemNo=3">AP Photo/Chiang Ying-ying</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/08/02/world/pelosi-taiwan">arrived in Taiwan</a> on Aug. 2, 2022 – a highly controversial trip that has been strongly opposed by China.</p>
<p>Such is the sensitivity over the island’s status that even before Pelosi’s plane touched down in the capital of Taipei, mere reports of the proposed trip prompted a <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2022-07-25/china-confirms-warnings-to-u-s-on-pelosis-possible-taiwan-visit">warning by China</a> of “serious consequences.” In the hours before she set foot on the island, Chinese fighter jets <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pelosi-expected-arrive-taiwan-tuesday-sources-say-2022-08-02/">flew close to the median line separating Taiwan and China</a>, while Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi commented that U.S. politicians who “play with fire” on Taiwan would “come to no good end.”</p>
<p>For its part, the U.S. has distanced itself from the visit. Before the trip <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/07/20/biden-pelosi-trip-taiwan-china-military-00047031">President Joe Biden</a> said it was “not a good idea.” </p>
<p>As <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=3LqBuPEAAAAJ&hl=en">someone who has long studied</a> the U.S.’s delicate diplomatic dance over Taiwan, I understand why this trip has sparked reaction in both Washington and Beijing, given the current tensions in the region. It also marks the continuation of a process that has seen growing U.S. political engagement with Taiwan – much to China’s annoyance.</p>
<h2>Cutting diplomatic ties</h2>
<p>The controversy over Pelosi’s visit stems from the “<a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-us-one-china-policy-and-why-does-it-matter">one China” policy</a> – the diplomatic stance under which the U.S. recognizes China and acknowledges Beijing’s position that Taiwan is part of China. The policy has governed U.S. relations with Taiwan for the past 40-plus years. </p>
<p>In 1979, the U.S. abandoned its previous policy of recognizing the government of Taiwan as that of all of China, instead <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/china-policy">shifting recognition</a> to the government on the mainland.</p>
<p>As part of this change, the U.S. cut off formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan, with the U.S. embassy in Taiwan replaced by a nongovernmental entity called the <a href="https://www.ait.org.tw/">American Institute in Taiwan</a>.</p>
<p>The institute was a de facto embassy – though until 2002, <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/107th-congress/house-bill/1646">Americans assigned to the institute</a> would have to <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2019/02/ex-diplomat-calls-for-oversight-of-us-office-in-taiwan/">resign from U.S. State Department</a> to go there, only to be rehired once their term was over. And contact between the two governments was technically unofficial.</p>
<p><iframe id="NS3cP" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/NS3cP/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>As the government in Taiwan <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/taiwans-democracy-and-the-china-challenge/">pursued democracy</a> – starting from the <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/end-martial-law-important-anniversary-taiwan">lifting of martial law in 1987</a> through the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1996/03/24/opinion/taiwan-s-democratic-election.html">first fully democratic elections in 1996</a> – it shifted away from the assumption once held by governments in both China and Taiwan of eventual reunification with the mainland. The government in China, however, has never abandoned the idea of “one China” and rejects the legitimacy of Taiwanese self-government. That has made direct contact between Taiwan and U.S. representatives contentious to Chinese officials. </p>
<p>Indeed, in 1995, when Lee Teng-hui, Taiwan’s first democratically elected president, touched down in Hawaii en route to Central America, he <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1999/01/10/between-china-and-the-us/b540ea0c-3bdb-4b1a-8152-8230b7a47184/">didn’t even set foot on the tarmac</a>. The U.S. State Department had already warned that the president would be refused an entry visa to the U.S., but had allowed for a brief, low-level reception in the airport lounge during refueling. Apparently feeling snubbed, Lee refused to leave the airplane.</p>
<h2>Previous political visits</h2>
<p>Two years after this incident came a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1997/03/31/gingrich-tells-china-us-to-defend-taiwan/e6baa8f8-58fa-4119-8c0d-c936d36e9850/">visit to Taiwan by then-House Speaker Newt Gingrich</a>.</p>
<p>Similarly to the Pelosi visit, the one by Gingrich <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1997/03/31/gingrich-tells-china-us-to-defend-taiwan/e6baa8f8-58fa-4119-8c0d-c936d36e9850/">annoyed Beijing</a>. But it was easier for the White House to distance itself from Gingrich – he was a Republican politician visiting Taiwan in his own capacity, and clearly not on behalf of then-President Bill Clinton.</p>
<p>Pelosi’s visit my be viewed differently by Beijing, because she is a member of the same party as President Joe Biden. China may assume she has Biden’s blessing, despite his comments to the contrary.</p>
<p>Asked on July 20 about his views on the potential Pelosi trip, <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/07/20/biden-pelosi-trip-taiwan-china-military-00047031">Biden responded</a> that the “military thinks it’s not a good idea right now.” </p>
<p>The comment echoes the <a href="https://theconversation.com/biden-on-taiwan-did-he-really-commit-us-forces-to-stopping-any-invasion-by-china-an-expert-explains-why-on-balance-probably-not-176765">White House’s earlier handling of a comment by Biden</a> in which he suggested in May 2022 that the U.S. would intervene “militarily” should China invade Taiwan. Officials in the Biden administration rolled back the comment, which would have broken a long-standing policy of ambiguity over what the U.S. would do if China tried to take Taiwan by force.</p>
<p>Similarly with Pelosi, the White House is distancing itself from a position that suggests a shift in U.S.-Taiwanese relations following a period in which the U.S. had already been trying to <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/01/11/after-lifting-restrictions-on-us-taiwan-relations-what-comes-next/">rethink how it interacts</a> with Taiwan.</p>
<h2>Shifting policy?</h2>
<p>In 2018, Congress passed the bipartisan <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/535">Taiwan Travel Act</a>. This departed from previous policy in that it allowed bilateral official visits between the U.S. and Taiwan, although they are still considered to be subdiplomatic.</p>
<p>In the wake of that act, Donald Trump’s Health and Human Services secretary, Alex Azar, became the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/09/politics/alex-azar-taiwan/index.html">highest-ranking U.S. official to visit Taiwan</a> since 1979. Then in 2020, Keith Krach, undersecretary for economic growth, energy and the environment, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/17/world/asia/us-official-taiwan-china.html">visited Taiwan</a>.</p>
<p>And in April 2022, a U.S. <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/07/19/pelosi-trip-to-taiwan-00046495">congressional delegation visited Taiwan</a>. Pelosi herself was reportedly due to visit the island that same month, but canceled after <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/08/asia/nancy-pelosi-covid-19-taiwan-us-asia-intl-hnk/index.html">testing positive for COVID-19</a>. </p>
<p>Each of these visits has provoked angry statements from Beijing.</p>
<p>A high-profile visit – even one without the public backing of the White House – would signal support to the island at a time when the invasion of Ukraine by Russia has raised questions over the international community’s commitment to protect smaller states from more powerful neighbors.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the erosion of democracy in Hong Kong has undermined China’s commitment to the idea of “one nation, two systems.” The principle, which allowed Hong Kong to maintain its economic, political and social systems while returning to the mainland after the end of British rule, had been cited as a model for reunification with Taiwan. The Chinese Communist Party also plans to hold its <a href="https://www.scmp.com/topics/chinas-20th-party-congress">20th congress</a> in the coming months, making the timing sensitive for a Taiwan visit from a high-profile U.S. political figure such as Pelosi.</p>
<p><em>Editor’s note: This is an updated version of an <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-big-fuss-over-nancy-pelosis-possible-visit-to-taiwan-187657">article originally published</a> on July 26, 2022.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188116/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Meredith Oyen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Chinese fighter jets buzzed the line separating China and Taiwan just hours before the US House speaker arrived on the island.Meredith Oyen, Associate Professor of History and Asian Studies, University of Maryland, Baltimore CountyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1853342022-06-29T16:22:10Z2022-06-29T16:22:10ZHong Kong’s handover 25 years on: why human rights eroded so dramatically in the past two years<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/471618/original/file-20220629-19-i34tww.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protests have been banned at the 25th anniversary of the Hong Kong handover ceremony.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">John Ye/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>July 1 marks the 25th anniversary of <a href="https://eu.usatoday.com/videos/news/nation/2022/06/16/hong-kong-prepares-handover-25th-anniversary/7648842001/">Hong Kong’s handover</a> from British colonial rule to the People’s Republic of China. </p>
<p>The restrictions on how the anniversary is being held are symbolic of how much things have changed in Hong Kong in the past few years. Several major <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/some-media-blocked-covering-xis-handover-anniversary-visit-hong-kong-2022-06-29/">media outlets are blocked</a> from covering the anniversary ceremony attended by China’s president, Xi Jinping, drones have been banned <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-06-28/china-s-xi-to-visit-hong-kong-for-july-1-anniversary-police-say">from the city</a> and political activists have been told by the city’s national security police <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/2022/06/28/breaking-hong-kong-25th-anniversary-set-to-be-protest-free-after-nat-security-police-call-in-activist-group-volunteers/">not to protest</a>.</p>
<p>The past two years have seen significant changes in Hong Kong’s freedoms. National security police have arrested more than 180 leading activists, journalists, scholars, clergy and ordinary citizens <a href="https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/features/arrest-data-show-national-security-law-has-dealt-hard-blow-free">in the past 23 months</a>. More than 68 civil society organisations and media outlets have decided to close down <a href="https://safeguarddefenders.com/en/blog/ccp-crushing-hong-kong-civil-society">for safety reasons</a> and worries about political consequences. And in January 2022, lawyer <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/01/04/asia/chow-hang-tung-hong-kong-sentenced-intl-hnk/index.html">Chow Hang-tung</a> was sentenced to 15 months in prison for helping organise an annual vigil, commemorating the 1989 <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-48445934">Tiananmen Square protests</a> in Beijing.</p>
<p>Twenty-five years ago, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220628-a-promise-kept-or-betrayal-hong-kong-25-years-on-from-handover">some observers hoped</a> China would experiment in giving Hong Kong freedoms that were not available on the mainland. It was also expected to be a model for Taiwan’s reunification <a href="https://ash.harvard.edu/files/ash/files/overholt_hong_kong_paper_final.pdf">with China</a>. The Chinese government initially decided to govern Hong Kong using the “one country, two systems” policy, allowing Hong Kong’s existing systems and ways of life to remain after the handover in 1997. This included a free-market economy, independent courts and laws safeguarding basic political rights. </p>
<p>However, in the past two years, Hong Kong’s rule of law and political freedoms have been significantly eroded by the extensive use of a <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/hong-kong-how-beijing-perfected-repression/">China-imposed national security law</a> to make it easier to prosecute protesters and giving Beijing more authority over Hong Kong. It has also introduced a new <a href="https://merics.org/en/short-analysis/hong-kong-elections-beijing-redefines-democracy">electoral system</a> that has stripped Hong Kong of most of its opposition politicians. China has also reduced the number of seats elected by the public in the Hong Kong <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/china-sharply-reduces-elected-seats-in-hong-kong-legislature/">legislature</a>, and citizens <a href="https://news.rthk.hk/rthk/en/component/k2/1644701-20220419.htm">calling for</a> elections to be boycotted could now be sentenced to jail.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-how-chinas-new-national-security-law-subverts-the-territorys-cherished-rule-of-law-139683">Hong Kong: how China's new national security law subverts the territory's cherished rule of law</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Significantly, the UN Human Rights Committee will review Hong Kong’s implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) <a href="https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/SessionDetails1.aspx?SessionID=2572&Lang=en">in July</a>. </p>
<p>As part of the handover, China promised Hong Kong would have fundamental rights and freedoms under the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights">ICCPR</a> and other international human rights treaties and enjoy full democracy in the future.</p>
<p>However, in June 2020, a year after massive pro-democracy protests, China created a new <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-57649442">national security law</a> for Hong Kong. It included making crimes of secession, subversion, terrorism and collusion with foreign forces punishable by a maximum sentence of life in prison, and allowing people who were suspected of breaking the law to be wiretapped or put under surveillance. It gave China wide-ranging new powers.</p>
<h2>Past perspective</h2>
<p>Even before the handover, there was mutual distrust between the Chinese authorities and Hong Kong citizens, partly due to the regime’s military crackdown on student democracy protests in <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/30-years-after-tiananmen-hong-kong-remembers/">Tiananmen Square</a>. The Chinese authorities saw Hongkongers’ support for the students as <a href="https://academic.oup.com/icon/article/17/2/439/5523758">a threat of subversion</a>. In contrast, the people of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2621722">Hong Kong believed </a> that increased democracy was the only way to safeguard their ways of life and resist China’s harsh rule after the handover. </p>
<p>In 1990, China revised the final draft of the <a href="https://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclaw/index.html">Basic Law</a>, a constitutional-like document for <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/654371?saml_data=eyJzYW1sVG9rZW4iOiJmYjM1YjQ2OC1kMzJkLTQ4MzctOWJkNS01ZWI1NDQ4NmJlMTYiLCJpbnN0aXR1dGlvbklkcyI6WyI5OTE5YmNmYi1mOWYwLTRlYTktYmEzNi0wNzMwOTQxODcyMzciXX0&seq=2">post-handover Hong Kong</a>, which included rights to free expression and assembly, by prohibiting foreign political organisations from conducting “political activities” in the region, and banning political organisations establishing ties with foreign political <a href="https://theinitium.com/article/20170310-opinion-margaretng-article23/">organisations or bodies</a>.</p>
<p>Currently, seven international human rights treaties apply to Hong Kong, covering issues such as <a href="https://www.cmab.gov.hk/en/press/reports_human.htm#s2">political freedoms, torture</a>, <a href="https://www.lwb.gov.hk/CEDAW/eng/index.htm">women’s rights</a> and rights of people <a href="https://www.lwb.gov.hk/en/highlights/UNCRPD/index.html">with disabilities</a>.</p>
<p>Local courts and civil society have been striving to build on these rights in Hong Kong for decades. But the Hong Kong and Chinese authorities have steadily eroded these protections. The Hong Kong government has repeatedly ignored the recommendations of the UN Human Rights Committee to amend the existing rule that <a href="https://www.cmab.gov.hk/doc/en/documents/policy_responsibilities/the_rights_of_the_individuals/Advance_Version_2013_ICCPR_e.pdf">criminalises peaceful assembly</a>, as well as an order that punishes individuals and groups making anti-government <a href="https://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=6QkG1d%2fPPRiCAqhKb7yhsl5dp%2bfTK%2fnQ1XhTTdGMrBbOSzC29DxEjEwh8GRuzIWe93oRva500Js5WvalGdJTn4MmQWWhJgiqkh5pyoGmHXsEKqKa56irlLg%2fx7weUFCw">speeches</a>. The Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal has failed to denounce those illiberal laws. </p>
<p>The reluctance of Hong Kong’s local authorities to improve the legal rules has sowed the seeds of legal repression today. The government frequently uses those laws to arrest and charge <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/2021/09/01/breaking-7-hong-kong-democrats-sentenced-to-jail-over-unauthorised-assembly-in-oct-2019/">peaceful activists, pro-democracy lawmakers</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-how-colonial-era-laws-are-being-used-to-shut-down-independent-journalism-174375">journalists</a>.</p>
<h2>Democratic rights disappear</h2>
<p>The standing committee of China’s National People’s Congress, the country’s top legislative body, has repeatedly used its power to overturn the ruling of Hong Kong’s top court or to influence ongoing constitutional review cases. During the 2019 <a href="https://online.ucpress.edu/cpcs/article-abstract/53/4/41/114583/Solidarity-and-Implications-of-a-Leaderless?redirectedFrom=fulltext">protests against an extradition bill</a> that would send criminal suspects to China to be tried, the Chinese authorities <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3038471/high-courts-mask-ban-decision-beijings-angry-reaction">publicly criticised</a> a Hong Kong court ruling that stopped the local government using its emergency powers to put an anti-mask law in place. In a significant extension of its powers, Beijing declared the decision unconstitutional.</p>
<p>As the Georgetown Center for Asian Law observed, the new security law has undermined judicial independence, leading to an erosion of the principle of a fair trial in <a href="https://www.law.georgetown.edu/law-asia/wp-content/uploads/sites/31/2022/06/GCAL_HRCSubmission_220615.pdf">criminal courts</a>. </p>
<p>In March 2021, China also introduced an <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/cff/2021/05/26/ask-the-experts-has-democracy-in-hong-kong-come-to-an-end/">election overhaul</a> barring any meaningful opposition from running in future elections. <a href="https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CCPR/Shared%20Documents/HKG/INT_CCPR_CSS_HKG_48958_E.pdf">Observers</a> see the drastic shift of Hong Kong’s political and legal system as incompatible with the agreements China made 25 years ago. Unlike the early days of the handover, Hong Kong’s independent court, civil society organisations and its semi-democratic legislature are unable to provide effective checks on China’s government anymore.</p>
<p>If the new leadership of Hong Kong continues to ignore any commitment to its international human rights obligations, the city is inevitably heading towards the elimination of free expression, political freedoms and the rule of law.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/185334/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yan-ho Lai does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Hong Kong has seen a rapid erosion of its freedoms and human rights recently.Yan-ho Lai, Hong Kong Law Fellow, Center for Asian Law, Georgetown University; PhD Candidate in Law, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1790912022-06-05T20:01:16Z2022-06-05T20:01:16ZLouisa Lim’s ‘outstanding’ portrait of a dispossessed, defiant Hong Kong is the activist journalism we need<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466228/original/file-20220531-12-cpssmd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kin Cheung AP Hong Kong July protesters flood the streets as they take part in an annual rally in Hong Kong</span> </figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.textpublishing.com.au/books/indelible-city-dispossession-and-defiance-in-hong-kong">Indelible City</a> is more than a book: it is a haunting testimonial to the intertwined vitality, tragedy and hope of Hong Kong. </p>
<hr>
<p><em>Review: Indelible City: Dispossession and Defiance in Hong Kong by Louisa Lim (Text Publishing)</em></p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466229/original/file-20220531-16-61gc6e.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466229/original/file-20220531-16-61gc6e.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466229/original/file-20220531-16-61gc6e.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=918&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466229/original/file-20220531-16-61gc6e.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=918&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466229/original/file-20220531-16-61gc6e.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=918&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466229/original/file-20220531-16-61gc6e.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1153&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466229/original/file-20220531-16-61gc6e.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1153&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466229/original/file-20220531-16-61gc6e.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1153&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Louisa Lim weaves together three powerful narratives to tell this city’s story. </p>
<p>It’s a macro-level history of Hong Kong and its relationship with its two colonial masters: the United Kingdom and China. A micro-level history of a not-so-mentally-stable street calligrapher, the King of Kowloon, whose art and bearing embody the dispossession and defiance that frame the macro-level history. And Lim shares her own personal narrative of growing up in Hong Kong and witnessing the transformation of the city in recent decades. </p>
<p>It should really come as no surprise that Hong Kong’s “return to the motherland” since 1997 has been an unmitigated disaster. Hong Kong is after all a culturally diverse, socially complex, rule-of-law-conscious, and politically engaged community: all traits for which China’s post-1989 leaders have had little patience.</p>
<p>What should in fact shock us is that this community, as deserving as any of a say in its own fate, has nevertheless been perpetually denied it. Lim’s history narrates how this could happen.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466237/original/file-20220531-14-42xcnb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466237/original/file-20220531-14-42xcnb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466237/original/file-20220531-14-42xcnb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466237/original/file-20220531-14-42xcnb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466237/original/file-20220531-14-42xcnb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466237/original/file-20220531-14-42xcnb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466237/original/file-20220531-14-42xcnb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466237/original/file-20220531-14-42xcnb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Hong Kong cityscape.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jerome Favre/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>From British to Chinese colonisation</h2>
<p>Lim’s overview of the colonial era shows how British rule fostered the diverse, dynamic and mature society that we see today – but was structured around unforgivable exclusion and marginalisation. The latter, characteristic of the colonial experience, continued for Hong Kong in its process of supposed decolonisation. </p>
<p>Faced with the expiration of the 99-year lease on the New Territories in 1997, Great Britain pursued negotiations with China on the city’s future. </p>
<p>Lim brings us inside these negotiations and their often painful twists and turns, as the fate of millions was determined behind closed doors – with often quite inexplicable conclusions. Foremost among these was the diligent drafting of a supposedly legally binding agreement with China, a state that refuses to be bound by any law.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/we-fear-hong-kong-will-become-just-another-chinese-city-an-interview-with-martin-lee-grandfather-of-democracy-124635">'We fear Hong Kong will become just another Chinese city': an interview with Martin Lee, grandfather of democracy</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Tellingly, there was no seat at the negotiating table for a representative from Hong Kong. Lim shows how the concerns of excluded locals turned out to be prophetic. </p>
<p>One local official, excluded from the talks, expressed his worries that Hong Kong would not be genuinely autonomous, but rather controlled by Beijing; that Chinese officials charged with implementing policy would be unable to accept Hong Kong’s culture; and that future Chinese leaders might change their mind about promises made to Hong Kong. Few predictions of Hong Kong’s future could be more accurate.</p>
<p>The result of this deeply flawed process, as we can all see today, is a dynamic society muzzled under the so-called <a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-how-colonial-era-laws-are-being-used-to-shut-down-independent-journalism-174375">National Security Law</a>. Although marketed as a law, the National Security Law is effectively the end of all law in Hong Kong. It strips away legally protected rights and due process, giving the government free rein to imprison anyone it pleases indefinitely for speech crimes. </p>
<p>The fate of Hong Kong today is a stain on Britain’s legacy and a reminder of the fundamental duplicity of the Chinese Communist Party leadership. Yet most importantly, for the people of Hong Kong, none of whom have remained untouched by this debacle, it is a genuine tragedy: recolonisation masquerading as decolonisation.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-activists-now-face-a-choice-stay-silent-or-flee-the-city-the-world-must-give-them-a-path-to-safety-141880">Hong Kong activists now face a choice: stay silent, or flee the city. The world must give them a path to safety</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>‘Guerrilla street calligrapher’ the King of Kowloon</h2>
<p>Woven into this rich history is a parallel micro-history of the King of Kowloon: <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/04/hong-kong-chinese-calligraphy-democracy-indelible-city/629582/">Tsang Tsou-Choi</a>, a trash collector with some fairly obvious mental issues who made a name for himself as a guerrilla street calligrapher. Lim’s narrative of Tsang, his life, and his rise to the status of media icon makes for unforgettable reading. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466230/original/file-20220531-18-97oyo0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466230/original/file-20220531-18-97oyo0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466230/original/file-20220531-18-97oyo0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466230/original/file-20220531-18-97oyo0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466230/original/file-20220531-18-97oyo0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466230/original/file-20220531-18-97oyo0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466230/original/file-20220531-18-97oyo0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466230/original/file-20220531-18-97oyo0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">King of Kowloon street graffiti.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">longzijun/Flickr</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>At some point in his life, Tsang came to the admittedly unlikely but symbolically telling conclusion that his family had once owned the Kowloon Penninsula and that this land had been taken from them illegally. Rather than seeking redress in the courts – long the preferred avenue for settling disputes in the city – Tsang opted to decorate the cityscape with calligraphic declarations of his family’s ownership of the penninsula and his own self-declared royal status. </p>
<p>Tsang’s choice here anticipated a broader shift from working within the system to resolve issues, to seeking new paths outside the system: a driving ethos of the protest movement of 2019. Here again, the streets of Hong Kong were covered in calligraphic declarations of dispossession and defiance, seeking redress (that would never arrive) beyond the stifling confines of the conventional.</p>
<h2>Neutrality a ‘corrupt compromise’</h2>
<p>The third narrative thread in the book is Lim’s own personal experiences, from growing up Eurasian in Hong Kong to observing the defining moments of the 2019 protests. </p>
<p>I particularly appreciated Lim’s frequently witty casual observations and offhand comments, which incorporate a touch of humour into the narrative: much needed, considering the gravity of its subject. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466877/original/file-20220603-17-buzix6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="short-haired woman smiling at the camera, wearing a purple blazer" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466877/original/file-20220603-17-buzix6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466877/original/file-20220603-17-buzix6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466877/original/file-20220603-17-buzix6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466877/original/file-20220603-17-buzix6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466877/original/file-20220603-17-buzix6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=670&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466877/original/file-20220603-17-buzix6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=670&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466877/original/file-20220603-17-buzix6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=670&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Louisa Lim’s book is an ‘outstanding example’ of activist journalism. Photo Laura Du Vé.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In her reflections on the events of 2019, Lim narrates a number of moments at which she crossed over from an observer of political developments to become a participant. This poses a pressing question for our time: how does one balance the ideal of journalistic or academic neutrality with activist participation?</p>
<p>The answer to this question is, in my reading, extremely clear. As the horrifying nature of <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-communist-party-claims-to-have-brought-prosperity-and-equality-to-china-heres-the-real-impact-of-its-rule-163350">Chinese Communist Party</a> rule over its colonies – from Hong Kong to <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-choosing-the-next-dalai-lama-will-be-a-religious-as-well-as-a-political-issue-162796">Tibet</a> to <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-who-are-the-uyghurs-and-why-is-the-chinese-government-detaining-them-111843">Xinjiang</a> – becomes increasingly apparent, the ideal of neutrality becomes a corrupt compromise with the fundamentally unjustifiable. </p>
<p>If academic or journalistic work on China in the age of the National Security Law, <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-ominous-metaphors-of-chinas-uighur-concentration-camps-129665">concentration camps</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/despite-chinas-denials-its-treatment-of-the-uyghurs-should-be-called-what-it-is-cultural-genocide-120654">genocide</a> is to have any meaning at all beyond its own vapid self-reproduction, it must embrace an activist ethos – of which Indelible City is an outstanding example. </p>
<p>Lim’s book concludes with details of a fascinating exchange with a curator and friend of the King of Kowloon, Joel Chung Yin-chai. Chung has ironically spent years carefully painting over the King’s calligraphy in public spaces, to preserve and protect these works from state-enforced erasure. </p>
<p>The King’s defiance thus lives on under a thin veneer of paint, unnoticed by tens of thousands of passersby every day, awaiting a moment when it can again see the light of day. This image is deeply evocative in the context of Hong Kong today.</p>
<p>Similarly, if we peer beneath the surface of the National Security Law’s unrelenting reign of terror, we can still see a politically engaged and dynamic civil society – as captured so memorably in Lim’s book. Hopefully awaiting the day when the thin, fragile and always fundamentally unsustainable veneer of repression can finally be chipped away, as history shows it always will be.</p>
<p>This will be the day when the people of Hong Kong will finally have a say in determining their own future, once and for all.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179091/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kevin Carrico does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Louisa Lim’s ‘haunting testimonial’ to Hong Kong reveals a politically engaged and dynamic civil society beneath the surface of an unrelenting reign of terror.Kevin Carrico, Senior Lecturer, Chinese Studies, Monash UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1795432022-04-20T12:17:20Z2022-04-20T12:17:20ZHuman rights declined during the COVID-19 pandemic, in countries from Angola to the US to New Zealand<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458330/original/file-20220415-20-w4sju7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5760%2C3828&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Pro-democracy protesters are arrested by police in Hong Kong on May 24, 2020.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/prodemocracy-protesters-are-arrested-by-police-in-the-causeway-bay-picture-id1214821212?s=2048x2048">Isaac Lawrence/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/03/how-authoritarians-are-exploiting-covid-19-crisis-grab-power">Human rights activists</a> and international leaders <a href="https://www.un.org/victimsofterrorism/sites/www.un.org.victimsofterrorism/files/un_-_human_rights_and_covid_april_2020.pdf">first warned</a> in April 2020 that countries could use the COVID-19 pandemic as an excuse to crack down on human rights.</p>
<p>Human rights refers to a wide range of political and social rights <a href="https://www.un.org/en/global-issues/human-rights">recognized by international law</a>. It includes everything from people’s right to work and receive an education to people’s right to freely express their opinions and participate in politics. </p>
<p><a href="https://stephenbagwell.files.wordpress.com/2022/04/pandemic-page-proofs.pdf">Human rights scholars and I show in new research</a> that human rights violations ultimately happened in 2020. Each of the 39 countries we analyzed – including Saudi Arabia, Nepal, Mexico, the United Kingdom and the United States – saw an overall decrease in human rights in 2020. </p>
<p>There is new evidence that some <a href="https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/sites/default/files/2021_global_analysis_-_final.pdf">countries continue to use</a> the pandemic as a reason to restrict human rights by <a href="https://findings2021.monitor.civicus.org/rating-changes.html#global-press-release">muzzling dissent</a>, and specifically by limiting people’s rights to gather or demonstrate with others. </p>
<p>Our analysis of human rights in 2020 offers a window into the start of this downward trend.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458331/original/file-20220415-16-1nx5lx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Rows of young people, some of whom are holding Black Lives Matter flags, walk together down an empty Manhattan street" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458331/original/file-20220415-16-1nx5lx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458331/original/file-20220415-16-1nx5lx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458331/original/file-20220415-16-1nx5lx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458331/original/file-20220415-16-1nx5lx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458331/original/file-20220415-16-1nx5lx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458331/original/file-20220415-16-1nx5lx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458331/original/file-20220415-16-1nx5lx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Demonstrators walk in New York City during a Black Lives Matter protest in August 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/derrick-ingram-marches-with-kiara-williams-organizational-leader-for-picture-id1264763255?s=2048x2048">Ira L. Black/Corbis via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>No overall improvement</h2>
<p>More than two years after the World Health Organization first declared the COVID-19 outbreak <a href="https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---11-march-2020">a pandemic</a>, some human rights analyses show a continued regression of <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/11/two-years-what-has-covid-19-taught-us">human rights</a>.</p>
<p>Declarations of emergency, for example, gave police significant power to crack down on political protests. </p>
<p>Cambodia <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2021/04/un-experts-urge-cambodia-review-approach-covid-19?LangID=E&NewsID=26985">passed a law</a> in April 2021, for example, in response to COVID-19 that grants the government authority to prevent any gatherings or protests. Violators can be sentenced to up to 20 years in prison. Hundreds of individuals were arrested for violating this law <a href="https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/sites/default/files/2021_global_analysis_-_final.pdf">in 2021</a>.</p>
<p>In March 2022, Thailand again extended a state of emergency, originally established in April 2020, <a href="https://opendevelopmentmekong.net/news/coronavirus-thailand-extends-state-of-emergency-until-may-31/">through May</a>, giving authorities broad power to set public curfews and restrict meetings. Thai <a href="https://www.fortifyrights.org/tha-inv-2021-09-28/">authorities charged at least</a> 900 anti-government protesters under this emergency decree between May 2020 and Aug. 31, 2021. </p>
<h2>2020 findings</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://humanrightsmeasurement.org/">Human Rights Measurement Initiative</a>, a research group headquartered in New Zealand, and other human rights monitoring organizations are still collecting comprehensive global data for 2021 and 2022.</p>
<p>The initiative last reported on human rights data <a href="https://humanrightsmeasurement.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Human-Rights-During-the-Pandemic.pdf">in June 2021</a>, informing our research.</p>
<p>But there are other sources of evidence that the <a href="https://carnegieeurope.eu/2022/03/24/has-pandemic-done-lasting-damage-to-democratic-freedoms-in-europe-pub-86704">pandemic’s damage to human rights</a> will not quickly lift, even as COVID-19 cases decline globally.</p>
<p>Some positive changes during the pandemic, like addressing <a href="https://www.urban.org/features/out-pandemic-better-approach-homelessness">homelessness more seriously</a>, were “swamped by the many more negative impacts of government responses to COVID-19,” according to the Human Rights Measurement Initiative. </p>
<p>The initiative <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EwwTHRH_tpk&t=3s">surveyed human rights experts, journalists and lawyers</a> in 2020 and 2021. It found that government protection of <a href="https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20999/volume-999-i-14668-english.pdf">civil and political rights</a> and <a href="https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20993/volume-993-I-14531-English.pdf">economic and social rights</a> declined from 2019 to 2020.</p>
<p>This group produces human rights data because governments themselves are often unwilling to share accurate information about human rights violations.</p>
<p>The Human Rights Measurement Initiative’s findings are widely <a href="https://humanrightsmeasurement.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/JPR-Manuscript-HRMI-CPR-2020.pdf">used by</a> scholars, <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/454831/samoa-s-gender-based-violence-still-a-concern-at-un-rights-council">nonprofits</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/new-data-tool-scores-australia-and-other-countries-on-their-human-rights-performance-93942">journalists</a>. </p>
<p>The United States and Hong Kong serve as two examples of places where the pandemic led to a decline in respect for human rights.</p>
<h2>The United States</h2>
<p><a href="https://humanrightsmeasurement.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Appendix-to-Human-Rights-in-the-Pandemic.pdf">The United States</a> is one of many countries that scored worse on human rights in 2020 than in 2019, according to the initiative’s 2021 survey. </p>
<p>In the U.S. in 2020, public health restrictions, like limits on public gatherings, also led to human rights abuses and the use of excessive force by police, survey respondents said.</p>
<p>The reason people were protesting appeared to have influenced whether police targeted and arrested demonstrators, <a href="https://humanrightsmeasurement.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/HRMI-CPR-Methodology-Guide-2021.pdf">survey respondents reported</a>. People protesting social justice issues, like racial justice and gun violence, were especially likely to be arrested.</p>
<p>People arrested for alleged infractions during lawful demonstrations during the pandemic were also put at risk of contracting COVID-19 because of cramped detention spaces where people could not <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/04/police-arrest-coronavirus-301913">socially distance</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458334/original/file-20220415-24-gehvq4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="New York police officers wear masks and carry a young Black man by all of his limbs through a street" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458334/original/file-20220415-24-gehvq4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458334/original/file-20220415-24-gehvq4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458334/original/file-20220415-24-gehvq4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458334/original/file-20220415-24-gehvq4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458334/original/file-20220415-24-gehvq4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458334/original/file-20220415-24-gehvq4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458334/original/file-20220415-24-gehvq4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">New York police officers arrest a protester on May 29, 2020, during a Black Lives Matter protest.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/new-york-police-officers-arrest-a-protester-on-may-29-during-a-black-picture-id1216202680?s=2048x2048">Timothy A. Clary/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Hong Kong</h2>
<p>China passed new security laws in Hong Kong in June 2020, allowing it <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/beijing-passes-new-hong-kong-security-law-n1232330">to crack down</a> on opposition speech and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-protests-court-idUSKBN22U1BD">arrest journalists and pro-democracy activists</a>. </p>
<p>Pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong – a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/30/world/asia/hong-kong-security-law-explain.html">special administrative region</a> of China – <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-48607723">intensified in 2020</a>. In 2021, the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/china-hong-kong-beijing-democracy-national-security-9e3c405923c24b6889c1bcf171f6def4">democracy movement</a> in Hong Kong broke down with the arrest of more than 100 pro-democracy leaders. </p>
<p>The Chinese government and police reportedly enforced pandemic regulations unevenly in 2020, according to the Human Rights Measurement Initiative – pro-democracy and government opposition protesters were more likely to experience restrictions.</p>
<p>Survey respondents in Hong Kong said they believe the government used the pandemic as a cover for restricting rights for other reasons.</p>
<p>Officials in Hong Kong <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3095461/hong-kong-legislative-council-elections-be-postponed">delayed general elections</a> set for July 2020 by five months, citing COVID-19 concerns. </p>
<p>In February 2022, Hong Kong again <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/19/world/asia/hong-kong-election-covid.html">postponed elections</a> of its next political leader allegedly because of a COVID-19 surge. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458333/original/file-20220415-12636-hyhozf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Police wearing face masks stand over a row of young people seated against a wall in Hong Kong." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458333/original/file-20220415-12636-hyhozf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458333/original/file-20220415-12636-hyhozf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458333/original/file-20220415-12636-hyhozf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458333/original/file-20220415-12636-hyhozf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458333/original/file-20220415-12636-hyhozf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458333/original/file-20220415-12636-hyhozf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458333/original/file-20220415-12636-hyhozf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Riot police detain pro-democracy protesters in Hong Kong on May 27, 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/riot-police-mass-detain-prodemocracy-protesters-during-a-rally-in-picture-id1215623110?s=2048x2048">Anthony Kwan/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Lasting trends</h2>
<p>The pandemic has prompted <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14754835.2020.1830046">growing awareness</a> of structural inequalities based on wealth, ethnicity, gender and race, giving <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/14754835.2020.1814709">some reasons</a> for hope. </p>
<p>In many places, governments are lifting <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-022-00620-7">COVID-19 restrictions</a>, which could allow more individuals to return to work and school and gather or travel more freely. </p>
<p>Human rights <a href="https://findings2021.monitor.civicus.org/rating-changes.html#global-press-release">continue to decline</a> in most countries, though, according to the global alliance CIVICUS. </p>
<p>The pandemic also continues to draw public attention away from some human rights violations that are happening in ongoing wars, as in Yemen and Ethiopia. </p>
<p><a href="https://stephenbagwell.files.wordpress.com/2022/04/pandemic-page-proofs.pdf">Our analysis</a> indicates that countries that had more human rights protections in place before the pandemic saw, on average, smaller decreases in rights violations in 2020 than countries that did not have as many protections. We believe adopting policies and practices that protect human rights during calmer times appears to help countries weather the storm during crises like a global health pandemic.</p>
<p>[<em>More than 150,000 readers get one of The Conversation’s informative newsletters.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?source=inline-140K">Join the list today</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179543/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Bagwell is affiliated with the Human Rights Measurement Initiative, a global consortium of human rights scholars and practitioners who aim to provide accurate and comprehensive indicators of human rights respect around the world.</span></em></p>All of the 39 countries human rights experts tracked in 2020 experienced a decline in human rights. It’s not yet clear whether countries will quickly bounce back as the pandemic eases.Stephen Bagwell, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Missouri-St. LouisLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1803752022-04-04T12:57:15Z2022-04-04T12:57:15ZHong Kong: British judges leaving top court is a strong condemnation of the end of civil liberties<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456119/original/file-20220404-23-awra2w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=52%2C5%2C891%2C542&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Lord Robert Reed and Lord Patrick Hodge have left their roles on Hong Kong's court of final appeal.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.supremecourt.uk/about/biographies-of-the-justices.html">Supreme Court</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Lord Robert Reed and Lord Patrick Hodge, the UK supreme court president and deputy president, have resigned from their roles on Hong Kong’s top court. On their departure, <a href="https://www.supremecourt.uk/news/role-of-uk-judges-on-the-hong-kong-court-of-final-appeal-update-march-2022.html?fbclid=IwAR09Bc0EXwGe_1EdXEVmc4oqjYg08K9DnoHlwcq_yuKx9d7LoxmMPUvr-1I">they criticised</a> the state of civil liberties and the rule of law in Hong Kong following the implementation of the national security law by Chinese authorities in 2020. </p>
<p>Reed and Hodge are not the first foreign judges to leave the court following the national security law, which the local administration has used to target the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56228363">political opposition</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-how-colonial-era-laws-are-being-used-to-shut-down-independent-journalism-174375">shut down</a> independent media publications.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-security-judges/australian-judge-quits-hong-kong-court-citing-national-security-law-idUSKBN26912R">James Spigelman</a>, a former Chief Justice in Australia, resigned in September 2020. And <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/hong-kong-judiciary-says-british-judge-step-down-citys-top-court-2021-06-04/">Brenda Hale</a>, a retired president of the UK supreme court, decided not to renew her term of office in June 2021. </p>
<p>Spigelman and Hale did not explicitly cite the national security law in their departures, though both had expressed their concerns on other public occasions. After their departure, the UK supreme court reasserted its <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3146707/hong-kongs-judicial-independence-gets-vote-confidence-top">confidence</a> in the city’s rule of law and independent judiciary. </p>
<p>The latest resignations are particularly significant in that they represent the UK dropping its institutional support for Hong Kong’s legal authority.</p>
<h2>Foreign judges on Hong Kong’s top court</h2>
<p>During the colonial era, the UK privy council had the power of final adjudication over Hong Kong. In 1984, when Britain and China signed <a href="https://www.cmab.gov.hk/en/issues/jd3.htm#judi">the Joint Declaration</a> on Hong Kong’s sovereignty transfer, they established the court of final appeal as Hong Kong’s top court, and agreed it may invite judges from other common law jurisdictions to sit on the court. <a href="https://www.yearbook.gov.hk/1997/eindex.htm">In 1997</a>, the two jurisdictions agreed that Britain would provide the court with two serving law lords. Later, judges from other common law jurisdictions, including Australia, Canada and New Zealand, also joined.</p>
<p>Hong Kong authorities believed that the presence of foreign judges would <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2021-06-07/foreign-judges-will-remain-part-of-hks-hard-as-a-rock-judicial-system-lam">enhance confidence</a> in judicial independence and boost Hong Kong’s international <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/2096355/foreign-judges-must-be-retained-hong-kong-former-chief">reputation as</a> a global financial hub. </p>
<p>As Lord David Neuberger, one of <a href="https://www.hkcfa.hk/filemanager/speech/en/upload/1195/Judges,%20Access%20to%20Justice,%20the%20Rule%20of%20Law%20and%20the%20Court%20of%20Final%20Appeal%20under%20%E2%80%9COne%20Country%20Two%20Systems%E2%80%9D.pdf">the British judges</a> on the court, put it in 2017:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Foreign [judges] are the canaries in the mine: so long as they are happy to serve on the HKCFA, then I think you can safely assume that all is well with judicial independence and impartiality in Hong Kong, but if they start to leave in [droves], that would represent a serious alarm call.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The alarm rang in July 2020, when the Chinese authorities imposed Hong Kong’s national security law. The law established a “committee for safeguarding national security”, which is supervised by an envoy from Beijing and is not subject to judicial review. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.law.georgetown.edu/law-asia/wp-content/uploads/sites/31/2021/06/HongKongNSLRightToFairTrial.pdf">national security law empowers</a> the Hong Kong chief executive to handpick judges to handle related cases. It also allows the secretary for justice to remove a jury trial if a national security case is tried at the level of the high court. As of now, no foreign judge has been picked to hear a national security law case that has reached the high court on appeal.</p>
<h2>A condemnation of Hong Kong authorities</h2>
<p>The resignation of the two British judges marks a dramatic shift in the UK’s position. <a href="https://www.supremecourt.uk/news/role-of-uk-judges-on-the-hong-kong-court-of-final-appeal-update-march-2022.html?fbclid=IwAR09Bc0EXwGe_1EdXEVmc4oqjYg08K9DnoHlwcq_yuKx9d7LoxmMPUvr-1I">Their statement</a> says that remaining on the court would be seen as an endorsement of Hong Kong’s departure “from values of political freedom, and freedom of expression”.</p>
<p>Although the court handled many non-national security law cases fairly, foreign judges have been involved in Hong Kong’s weaponisation of its courts to crack down on free speech and political participation. One constitutional review, endorsed by Lord Reed, led to <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/02/foreign-judges-are-enabling-hong-kongs-legal-crackdown/">the imprisonment</a> of a former pro-democracy lawmaker for contempt after he chanted protest slogans in the legislative chamber.</p>
<p>The resignations of lords Reed and Hodge signal to the global community that foreign judges in Hong Kong cannot do much to observe and safeguard human rights in the existing system. Under <a href="https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/cap484">Hong Kong law</a>, foreign judges are barred from attending hearings of the high court appeal committee, which decides whether leave is granted for appeal. In short, foreign judges can only hear cases filtered by the local judges, who can also give rulings disrespecting basic legal rights. </p>
<p>After the resignation, the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/hong-kong-leader-says-british-judges-resignations-politically-motivated-2022-03-31/">Chinese and Hong Kong authorities</a>, the <a href="https://www.hkba.org/sites/default/files/20220330%20-%20Resignation%20of%20UK%20Supreme%20Court%20Judges%20as%20NPJ%20of%20HK%20Court%20of%20Final%20Appeal.pdf">Hong Kong Bar Association</a> and the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/uk-judges-quit-hong-kong-court-over-new-security-law-2022-03-30/">Law Society of Hong Kong</a>, expressed regrets and suspected possible “political interference” by UK parliament. However, they have missed the point. Lords Reed and Hodge declared that their decision is not about local courts’ commitment to the rule of law, but about the administration’s attitude to political and speech freedoms.</p>
<p>The remaining foreign judges, which includes three from Australia and five from the UK, have (for now) decided to <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3172534/hong-kong-leader-accuses-britain-meddling-judicial">remain on the court</a>, but it should be noted that they are retired from their other judicial roles. The UK supreme court’s decision is institutional, and <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-supports-the-withdrawal-of-serving-uk-judges-from-the-hong-kong-court-of-final-appeal">backed by the UK foreign secretary</a>. It marks the end of its confidence in Hong Kong’s authorities. Regrettably, the continuing presence of the remaining foreign judges is not comparable with the loss of endorsement from the UK.</p>
<p>Hong Kong’s rule of law has changed significantly since its handover to China, and the city’s top court has little room to provide a remedy. The more the Chinese and Hong Kong authorities weaponise laws and courts to achieve their political ends, the less it is possible for them to maintain public and global confidence in the city’s rule of law and independent court.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/180375/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yan-ho Lai does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Foreign judges have served on Hong Kong’s court of final appeal since 1997, but the national security law is changing that.Yan-ho Lai, Hong Kong Law Fellow, Center for Asian Law, Georgetown University; PhD Candidate in Law, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1797162022-03-31T11:16:35Z2022-03-31T11:16:35ZCOVID: why the current surge in cases is a problem for some countries but not others<p>Just when it looked like COVID cases were starting to fall after the high peaks of January, infections are rising once again around the world. The main driver of this latest surge is the more infectious <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1063424/Tech-Briefing-39-25March2022_FINAL.pdf">BA.2 sub-lineage</a> of the omicron variant, which has been becoming more common ever since Christmas. </p>
<p>In the UK, increased social mixing and waning vaccine effectiveness – even in those who have had a booster dose – are contributing to this rise. But we’re also seeing huge spikes in areas that had previously kept themselves fairly COVID-free – <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/coronavirus-data-explorer?zoomToSelection=true&time=2021-03-26..latest&facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=new_cases_smoothed_per_million&Metric=Confirmed+cases&Interval=7-day+rolling+average&Relative+to+Population=true&Color+by+test+positivity=false&country=GBR%7EDEU%7EFRA%7EITA%7EESP%7EKOR%7ENZL%7EHKG">New Zealand, Hong Kong and South Korea</a>, for example. </p>
<p>Case rates in these places are currently outstripping those seen in many European countries when they were at their worst, despite these newly struggling countries tending to follow rigorous zero COVID policies, with tight border controls and strict internal measures to limit infections. The highly infectious new variant having a bigger effect in places where restrictions are tighter. But why?</p>
<h2>Zero cases equals delayed cases</h2>
<p>Long before COVID, it was known that non-pharmaceutical control measures – <a href="https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/12/1/05-1371_article">whether within a country</a> or <a href="https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/12/1/05-1370_article">at its border</a> – rarely stop a pandemic spreading. Usually, these things – lockdowns, quarantines and so on – only delay a disease’s spread. However, this may be sufficient to flatten the curve of infections and ease pressure on health services, or to reduce illness and death by delaying most infections until treatments have improved or vaccines become available. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="An empty town square during lockdown in New Zealand" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455505/original/file-20220331-25-3odv22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455505/original/file-20220331-25-3odv22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455505/original/file-20220331-25-3odv22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455505/original/file-20220331-25-3odv22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455505/original/file-20220331-25-3odv22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=519&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455505/original/file-20220331-25-3odv22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=519&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455505/original/file-20220331-25-3odv22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=519&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Achieving zero COVID protects people in the present, but builds in less protection should the disease return.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/foxton-horowhenua-new-zealand-0821-we-2029838669">Ross Gordon Henry/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In reality, the most influential disease-control factor is immunity, which can be generated by infection or vaccination. Both are important. <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-will-the-covid-pandemic-end-167244">As I pointed out last summer</a>, the end of the pandemic in any country will likely depend on the proportion of people who have already had a COVID infection, and not just the proportion vaccinated. </p>
<p>Breakthrough infections in those who are vaccinated will drive their immunity to a higher level, while in the unvaccinated an infection provides a level of protection that would otherwise have been absent. In fact, immunity following an infection now gives rather better protection against being infected in the future than immunity from a booster vaccine, especially once <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/healthandsocialcare/conditionsanddiseases/bulletins/coronaviruscovid19infectionsurveycharacteristicsofpeopletestingpositiveforcovid19uk/2march2022">90 days have passed</a> since being vaccinated. </p>
<p>This helps to explain why some countries are now handling outbreaks better than others. In the UK, despite excellent vaccination coverage, the <a href="https://www.mrc-bsu.cam.ac.uk/now-casting/nowcasting-and-forecasting-25th-february-2022/">majority of people</a> have also now caught COVID, and many people have caught COVID more than once. Cases are high for sure, but not as high as in some of these Pacific countries, and <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/coronavirus-data-explorer?zoomToSelection=true&time=2020-03-01..latest&facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=new_deaths_per_million&Metric=Confirmed+deaths&Interval=7-day+rolling+average&Relative+to+Population=true&Color+by+test+positivity=false&country=GBR%7ENZL%7EKOR%7EHKG">rates of death</a> and severe disease are remaining at a relatively low level.</p>
<p>In comparison, countries that followed a zero COVID strategy are now seeing a larger surge in infections and deaths as they open up, even if they have high vaccine coverage. Their lack of prior infections means immunity across the population is lower.</p>
<h2>Vaccines still making a difference</h2>
<p>But despite the fact that both <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus/country/hong-kong">Hong Kong</a> and <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus/country/new-zealand">New Zealand</a> have both suffered huge rises in viral transmission recently, the impact on public health in the two places has been dramatically different. </p>
<p>New Zealand, with high vaccine coverage and a recent booster programme, is weathering this surge with far fewer deaths so far. Hong Kong has seen many more deaths, with a death rate per million people in the four weeks up to March 18 2022 that’s <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/covid-vaccinations">38 times as great</a> as in New Zealand. </p>
<p>The difference is down to the vaccination campaigns in these two places. In Hong Kong, at least up to the end of February, the uptake of the booster vaccine was much lower than in New Zealand, and was particularly low in <a href="https://www.covidvaccine.gov.hk/en/dashboard">older, more vulnerable age groups</a>. Even second-dose coverage was low in these groups, meaning plenty were at a high risk of severe disease and death. </p>
<h2>Did the UK get it right?</h2>
<p>My own country, the UK, decided to lift its remaining restrictions earlier this year, even though cases were still high when controls were eased and remain high now. Was this the right thing to do?</p>
<p>There’s no right answer, but given that non-pharmaceutical control measures only delay infections rather than prevent them, such measures should only continue if the benefits of delaying infections outweigh the more general harms to society and human health that come with restricting people’s freedoms. Given the high levels of immunity across the British population that have resulted from high case levels and good vaccine coverage, lifting controls made sense.</p>
<p>There’s also another important point to consider here. It’s been <a href="https://theconversation.com/covid-vaccine-effects-wane-over-time-but-still-prevent-death-and-severe-illness-167587">well publicised</a> that the vaccines’ protective effect against catching the virus and developing symptoms <a href="https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMoa2115481">wanes more quickly</a> than protection against severe disease and death. However, there’s <a href="https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2022.03.09.22272098v2">emerging evidence</a> (still in preprint, so awaiting review by other scientists) that protection against severe disease also wanes with time. </p>
<p>What this means is that delaying infections could result in people getting COVID at a later date when they are more susceptible to getting badly ill. This was predicted in some of the <a href="https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2021.12.30.21268307v1">disease modelling of omicron</a> published at the end of last year (also still in preprint). Imposing additional restrictions in December 2021 would have reduced COVID deaths in January 2022, but at the cost of increased deaths in March.</p>
<p>Personally, I would have preferred to wait till the end of March to lift restrictions, so that we were into spring, when respiratory viruses spread less rapidly. That could have reduced the current NHS pressures stemming from staff absences. </p>
<p>And finally, even though lifting controls made sense, today the UK still has a population of older or clinically vulnerable people who have not yet had the virus and whose vaccine immunity is waning. We must focus now on preventing these people from developing severe disease – perhaps through further vaccine boosters or use of antiviral drugs – rather than on attempting to reduce transmission in the general population.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179716/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Hunter consults for the World Health Organization (WHO). He receives funding from the UK National Institute for Health Research, the WHO and the European Regional Development Fund.</span></em></p>Countries that previously fared best at controlling COVID are now finding it tougher to keep cases and deaths down.Paul Hunter, Professor of Medicine, University of East AngliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1742102022-03-30T14:18:19Z2022-03-30T14:18:19ZHow the controversial nationality and borders bill may help people from Chagos Islands and Hong Kong<p>The nationality and borders bill has been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/audio/2022/feb/09/clause-9-and-the-erosion-of-citizenship-rights">widely condemned</a> as the continuation of a decade-long, Conservative-led immigration regime set on demonstrating that the UK is “tough on immigration”. It has been dubbed the “hostile environment” policy. </p>
<p>During its passage through the House of Lords, peers attempted to strip out some of the bill’s most contentious measures. But many of the proposed amendments have now been <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/borders-nationality-bill-refugees-msf-b2041671.html">rejected by</a> the House of Commons.</p>
<p>The bill is now in <a href="https://www.parliament.uk/site-information/glossary/ping-pong/">parliamentary ping-pong</a> – batted back to the Lords for its response to the Commons proposed changes. This is part of the process where the wording of the final bill is approved before it can be granted Royal Assent and become law.</p>
<h2>Clause 9 returns</h2>
<p>Some of the Lords amendments struck at the heart of bill, calling for <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2022/feb/27/lords-criticise-plans-to-remove-uk-citizenship-without-warning">the removal</a> of the two most controversial issues: the extension of the deprivation powers of the Home Secretary so that they can <a href="https://theconversation.com/stripping-british-citizenship-the-governments-new-bill-explained-173547">remove citizenship</a> from people without notice – the so-called Clause 9 – and new prohibitions on those entering the UK without prior authorisation <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk-nationality-and-borders-bill-qanda-how-will-it-affect-migration-across-the-english-channel-164808">to claim asylum</a>. </p>
<p>But when the amended bill was brought back to <a href="https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2022-03-22/debates/FA4FBF36-5168-4B9B-8C7E-09D2AAC33C39/NationalityAndBordersBill">the Commons</a> for consideration, these major amendments were overturned. Clause 9 and the criminalisation of those entering the UK as refugees without prior authorisation looks set to become law.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1506340930579742726"}"></div></p>
<p>These two issues have been incredibly divisive and have grabbed much of the attention around this controversial bill. But there are a set of other proposed changes that relate to Britain’s relationship with its former overseas citizens that have largely escaped notice.</p>
<h2>The Hong Kong visa</h2>
<p>The Hong Kong <a href="https://whodowethinkweare.org/what-can-the-hong-kong-bno-visa-tell-us-about-borders-and-belonging-in-britain-today">BN(O) visa</a> is the bespoke route introduced on January 31 2021 to facilitate the migration and settlement in the UK of those seeking to <a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-political-turmoil-provokes-difficult-decisions-about-whether-to-leave-155994">leave Hong Kong</a> in the wake of China’s imposition of national security law. This route rests on the applicant being eligible for <a href="https://www.gov.uk/types-of-british-nationality/british-national-overseas">British Nationals (Overseas) status</a> – the status awarded to the people of Hong Kong when sovereignty was handed to China <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Handover_of_Hong_Kong">in 1997</a>.</p>
<p>The latest statistics show that in 2021, <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/immigration-statistics-year-ending-december-2021/how-many-people-come-to-the-uk-each-year-including-visitors#british-national-overseas-bno-route">97,057 visas</a> were granted to people through this scheme. The original limits on this visa meant that those born after 1997 could only take advantage of this route as “dependants” of their BN(O) parents. This meant that in order to move to the UK through this route they would have to move with their parents. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/stripping-british-citizenship-the-governments-new-bill-explained-173547">Stripping British citizenship: the government's new bill explained</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>But subsequent amendments to the bill mean those with a BN(O) parent will be eligible to apply for the scheme <a href="https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/2022-02-24/hcws635">independently of their parents</a>. This is notable because previously many of the students and young people involved in political protests in Hong Kong fell out of the scope of the visa. </p>
<p>The routes available to them to enter the UK independently were limited to <a href="https://archive.discoversociety.org/2020/09/02/youth-mobility-scheme-panacea-or-unfolding-crisis-for-hong-kongese-without-british-national-overseas-status/">the youth mobility scheme</a> (a time-limited visa that explicitly prohibits a right to settlement) and applying for asylum. The amendment means that this is no longer necessary. This move has been welcomed by campaigners and the government <a href="https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2022-03-22/debates/FA4FBF36-5168-4B9B-8C7E-09D2AAC33C39/NationalityAndBordersBill">has confirmed</a> it will enact these changes by October. </p>
<h2>Children denied citizenship</h2>
<p>Citizens of the 14 remaining British overseas territories are eligible for British Overseas Territories Citizenship <a href="https://www.gov.uk/types-of-british-nationality/british-overseas-territories-citizen">(BOTC)</a>. This status was first introduced in 1981, when it did not permit the right to live and work in the UK. Its holders had to apply for visas to enter and settle. But because of changes introduced in 2002 through the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Overseas_Territories_Act_2002">British Overseas Territories Act</a>, those holding this status are now able to register for full British citizenship, which includes the right to live and work in the UK. </p>
<p>But this right to citizenship did not extend to the children of these citizens – specifically those born outside British territories to unmarried BOTC parents. In other words, they have been denied the right to the nationality of their British parent. This discrimination on the grounds of their parents’ marital status at the time of their birth exists to this day. It disproportionately impacts British people of colour. </p>
<p>Clause 1 of the bill addresses this. It commits the government to reforming the nationality legislation so children born abroad and outside of marriage to BOTC fathers can inherit the status of their parents, which would also entitle them to register as British citizens. This clause will make the world of difference to <a href="https://www.botccampaign.org/trentsstory">this group</a> of people. </p>
<h2>Chagos Islanders</h2>
<p>The case of the <a href="https://whodowethinkweare.org/what-can-we-learn-about-british-citizenship-from-the-chagos-islanders">Chagos Islanders</a> adds further complexity to this story of children denied the right to British nationality by descent. Between 1967 and 1972, the entire population of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chagos_Archipelago">Chagos Archipelago</a> was displaced to Mauritius and the Seychelles to make way for a joint UK-US military base on Diego Garcia.</p>
<p>The process included excising the archipelago from the control of Mauritius, at the time a British colony, to create the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT). The BIOT remains one of Britain’s <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Overseas_Territories">14 remaining overseas territories</a>, along with Gibraltar and the Falklands. At this time, the Chagos Islanders are citizens in British nationality law. </p>
<p>But the descendants of forcibly displaced Chagos Islanders were denied this status – BOTC status was only available to those born on the islands and the first generation born off-island. It could not be passed on to future generations. Their case is unique because they were granted <a href="https://theconversation.com/chagos-islands-mauritiuss-latest-challenge-to-uk-shows-row-over-sovereignty-will-not-go-away-177381">no right of return</a> to British territories. </p>
<p>The amendment that would permit direct descendants of those from the Chagos Islands to inherit their parents’ status was <a href="https://members.parliament.uk/member/3960/contact">defeated in the Commons</a> in November 2021. However, a later version of this amendment was introduced by Labour’s <a href="https://members.parliament.uk/member/4234/contact">Baroness Lister</a> when the bill reached the House of Lords. The Lords voted in favour and while the government found this amendment “technically deficient”, it has made clear its commitment to offering <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/nationality-and-borders-bill-chagossian-nationality-factsheet">a new route</a> to British nationality for these descendants.</p>
<p>These changes and amendments will make a huge difference for some of these communities. They are the provisions that seem to sweeten a deal that is otherwise set to introduce increasingly exclusionary measures aimed at controlling who can come to the UK and on what terms.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/174210/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michaela Benson received funding from the British Academy MD19\190055 for her research into Britain's relationship with its overseas citizens. She is also a currently funded by the ESRC ES/V004530/1 for the project 'Rebordering Britain and Britons after Brexit'. </span></em></p>It has been a hugely controversial bill - but some of the proposals will actually help certain communities fighting for British citizenship.Michaela Benson, Professor in Public Sociology, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1743752022-01-10T14:58:10Z2022-01-10T14:58:10ZHong Kong: how colonial-era laws are being used to shut down independent journalism<p>Hong Kong has never been a democracy, but it was home to a vibrant media scene and enjoyed the free flow of information. No more. The National Security Law (NSL), unilaterally imposed by Beijing in 2020, cracked down on protest and effectively outlaws dissent. </p>
<p>This law chilled free speech and forced the closure of the city’s sole pro-democracy newspaper, Apple Daily, in June 2021. Then, three days before the end of 2021, the city’s largest independent online media outlet, Stand News, came to a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/29/speed-of-stand-news-shutdown-sends-chilling-signal-to-hong-kongs-media">sudden end too</a>.</p>
<p>Local national security police arrested seven former directors, columnists and editors of the outlet, which had never hidden its pro-democracy views, for alleged “conspiracy of publishing seditious publication”. Company materials were seized and its financial assets frozen. The current and former editor-in-chief were criminally charged, and the outlet shut down its website and social media accounts and erased all its online content. </p>
<p>Amid <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1940161208326598">growing self-censorship</a>, independent digital media outlets like Stand News offered a space for more critical reporting and opinion. Stand News regularly provided <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/2022/01/05/timeline-hong-kongs-non-profit-outlet-stand-news-through-the-years/">in-depth coverage</a> of issues and individuals that were given short shrift or ignored in the mainstream media. The platform was funded mostly through monthly donations and crowdfunding. </p>
<p>Soon after <a href="https://theconversation.com/hongkongers-mourn-closure-of-apple-daily-and-fear-for-the-future-of-independent-journalism-163506">Apple Daily closed</a>, Stand News had taken preemptive action in response to <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/chinese/667617.html">what it called</a> “the arrival of the literary inquisition” in Hong Kong. The outlet announced the resignations of all but two of its directors, purged opinion articles from its website and suspended new donations. But this did not stop senior police figures from continuing to accuse the outlet of inciting public hatred against the force. </p>
<p>National security police have arrested more than 160 political dissidents and activists since the NSL <a href="https://www.chinafile.com/individuals-arrested-under-hong-kong-national-security-law-or-national-security-department">was implemented</a>. Apple Daily’s founder, Jimmy Lai, his former employees and related companies were charged under the NSL with colluding with foreign forces. </p>
<p>But high-profile arrests are just one part of the picture; the pressure on news organisations and journalists takes multiple forms. In the media, pro-Beijing voices have attacked <a href="https://learningenglish.voanews.com/a/hong-kong-journalists-association-s-future-in-question/6247741.html">the Hong Kong Journalists Association</a> and <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/society/article/3154909/hong-kong-journalists-urge-government-drop-plans-fake-news">Foreign Correspondents’ Club</a>. The government has refused to <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/asia/china/hong-kong-visa-economist-journalist-sue-wong-press-freedom-b1957078.html">renew work visas</a> for foreign correspondents, and foreign news organisations like the Wall Street Journal have received <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/hong-kong-china-wsj-threat-election-legco-democracy-freedom-protest-ccp-11638575014">threatening letters</a> from Hong Kong government officials.</p>
<h2>The return of sedition laws</h2>
<p>The government is now also using colonial laws to crack down on free speech and the free press. Hong Kong’s sedition laws were introduced in the early 20th century and can be overly broad and subjective. <a href="https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/cap200!en?INDEX_CS=N&xpid=ID_1438402821397_002">For example</a>, anyone who publishes or distributes content that “brings into hatred or excites disaffection against” the government or the administration of justice, or promotes enmity between different classes of people in Hong Kong, can be criminally prosecuted.</p>
<p>These colonial-era laws have been unused since the 1970s, <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/hong-kongs-sedition-law-is-back">but returned</a> in autumn 2020 when the Hong Kong department of justice used them to charge activists who made public speeches against the government and unionists who published <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jul/22/five-arrested-in-hong-kong-for-sedition-over-childrens-book-about-sheep">children’s picture books</a> about the 2019 pro-democracy protests. </p>
<p>Now, they are being used to charge Apple Daily and Stand News journalists. And police <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/2021/12/29/breaking-stand-news-closes-website-inaccessible-following-arrests-and-police-raid-chief-sec-slams-evil-elements/">recently told reporters</a> that opinion articles aren’t the only ones that can be regarded as seditious. Media interviews with exiled activists and features on clashes between protesters and riot police can also be considered seditious if the content is deemed by the government to be “fake news” or inciting hatred towards the government and endangering national security. </p>
<p>Newspaper editors and reporters now risk arrest if they have published articles critical of the government, if political authorities decide they are seditious. As the sedition laws predate the NSL, that potentially includes articles published before July 2020. Once they’re charged, journalists are likely to be denied bail and to face a long pre-trial detention.</p>
<p>Before the NSL, anyone charged with committing acts of sedition could expect to be granted bail unless the court suspected a high possibility they would reoffend or abscond. But under the NSL, this principle no longer applies. <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/2021/12/15/stringent-national-security-bail-threshold-applicable-to-other-offences-hong-kongs-top-court-rules/">The latest ruling</a> by the chief justice in Hong Kong’s top court stated that as acts of sedition qualify as offences endangering national security, defendants will only be granted bail if they meet stringent requirements set by the NSL. </p>
<h2>Chilling effect</h2>
<p>The impact on Hong Kong’s media has been immediate. At least six other independent digital media outlets chose to shut down following the closure of Stand News, including <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jan/02/hong-kong-citizen-news-close-fears-staff-safety">Hong Kong Citizen News</a>. Its chief editor, a respected news industry veteran, said the move was taken to protect staff in an environment in which nobody can be sure where the red lines of sedition and national security are. The broadsheet Ming Pao Daily has started <a href="https://www.trendsmap.com/twitter/tweet/1478884481775939593">putting disclaimers</a> on all opinion pieces, stating the paper does not intend to incite hatred, contempt or disaffection against the government or any community. </p>
<p>Hong Kong was once known for its independent judiciary and the rule of law. Now its laws and courts are being weaponised by the government to crush press freedom and independent journalism. The government has also floated the possibility of a <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/fake-news-law-hong-kong-china-b1959398.html">fake news bill</a> this year. Unless the courts can uphold their integrity as a guardian of free speech, the city’s international standing will be further eroded.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/174375/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The resurgence of sedition laws is having a devastating chilling effect on press freedom.Yan-ho Lai, Hong Kong Law Fellow, Center for Asian Law, Georgetown University, PhD Candidate in Law, SOAS, University of LondonYuen Chan, Senior Lecturer, School of Arts and Social Sciences, Department of Journalism, City, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1726922021-11-26T10:17:34Z2021-11-26T10:17:34ZThe hunt for coronavirus variants: how the new one was found and what we know so far<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434126/original/file-20211126-17-1n37m8h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Scientists find variants by sequencing samples from people that have tested positive for the virus. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Lightspring/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Since early in the COVID pandemic, the <a href="https://www.ngs-sa.org/">Network for Genomics Surveillance in South Africa</a> has been monitoring changes in SARS-CoV-2. This was a valuable tool to understand better how the virus spread. In late 2020, the network detected a new virus lineage, <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-african-scientists-who-discovered-new-covid-19-variant-share-what-they-know-153313">501Y.V2</a>, which later became known as the <a href="https://theconversation.com/coronavirus-variants-have-new-names-we-can-finally-stop-stigmatising-countries-159652">beta variant</a>. Now a new SARS-CoV-2 variant has been identified – <a href="https://www.nicd.ac.za/new-covid-19-variant-detected-in-south-africa/">B.1.1.529</a>. The World Health Organisation has <a href="https://www.who.int/news/item/26-11-2021-classification-of-omicron-(b.1.1.529)-sars-cov-2-variant-of-concern">declared</a> it a variant of concern, and assigned it the name Omicron. To help us understand more, The Conversation Africa’s Ozayr Patel asked scientists to share what they know.</em> </p>
<h2>What’s the science behind the search?</h2>
<p>Hunting for variants requires a concerted effort. South Africa and the UK were the first big countries to implement nationwide <a href="https://www.cogconsortium.uk/">genomic surveillance</a> <a href="https://www.ngs-sa.org/">efforts</a> for SARS-CoV-2 as early as April 2020. </p>
<p>Variant hunting, as exciting as that sounds, is performed through whole genome sequencing of samples that have tested positive for the virus. This process involves checking every sequence obtained for differences compared to what we know is circulating in South Africa and the world. When we see multiple differences, this immediately raises a red flag and we investigate further to confirm what we’ve noticed.</p>
<p>Fortunately South Africa is well set up for this. This is thanks to a central repository of public sector laboratory results at the <a href="https://www.nhls.ac.za/">National Health Laboratory Service</a>, (NGS-SA), good linkages to private laboratories, the <a href="https://ijpds.org/article/view/1143">Provincial Health Data Centre of the Western Cape Province</a>, and state-of-the-art <a href="https://sacmcepidemicexplorer.co.za/">modelling expertise</a>. </p>
<p>In addition, South Africa has several laboratories that can grow and study the actual virus and discover how far antibodies, formed in response to vaccination or previous infection, are able to neutralise the new virus. This data will allow us to characterise the new virus.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Viruses on a white background" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434123/original/file-20211126-19-1wwqniz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434123/original/file-20211126-19-1wwqniz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434123/original/file-20211126-19-1wwqniz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434123/original/file-20211126-19-1wwqniz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434123/original/file-20211126-19-1wwqniz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434123/original/file-20211126-19-1wwqniz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434123/original/file-20211126-19-1wwqniz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">3d Variants of Covid-19 Virus (Sars-COV-2). Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Delta in white background.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The beta variant spread much more efficiently between people compared to the “wild type” or “ancestral” SARS-CoV-2 and caused South Africa’s second pandemic wave. It was therefore classified as a variant of concern. During 2021, yet another variant of concern called delta spread over much of the world, including South Africa, where it caused <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-african-health-experts-have-identified-a-new-lineage-of-sars-cov-2-whats-known-so-far-167057">a third pandemic wave</a>.</p>
<p>Very recently, routine sequencing by Network for Genomics Surveillance member laboratories detected a new virus lineage, <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-03552-w">called B.1.1.529</a>, in South Africa. Seventy-seven samples collected in mid-November 2021 in Gauteng province had this virus. It has also been reported in small numbers from neighbouring Botswana and Hong Kong. The Hong Kong case is reportedly <a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/hong-kong-detects-new-covid-19-variant-in-traveller-who-had-been-to-south-africa">a traveller from South Africa</a>. </p>
<p>The World Health Organisation <a href="https://www.who.int/news/item/26-11-2021-classification-of-omicron-(b.1.1.529)-sars-cov-2-variant-of-concern">has given</a> B.1.1.529 the name Omicron and classified it as a variant of concern, <a href="https://www.nicd.ac.za/frequently-asked-questions-for-the-b-1-1-529-mutated-sars-cov-2-lineage-in-south-africa/">like beta and delta</a>.</p>
<h2>Why is South Africa presenting variants of concern?</h2>
<p>We do not know for sure. It certainly seems to be more than just the result of concerted efforts to monitor the circulating virus. One theory is that people with highly compromised immune systems, and who experience prolonged active infection because they cannot clear the virus, may be the source of new viral variants. </p>
<p>The assumption is that some degree of “immune pressure” (which means an immune response which is not strong enough to eliminate the virus yet exerts some degree of selective pressure which “forces” the virus to evolve) creates the conditions for new variants to emerge. </p>
<p>Despite an advanced antiretroviral treatment programme for people living with HIV, numerous individuals in South Africa have advanced HIV disease and are not on effective treatment. Several clinical cases have been investigated that support <a href="https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2021.06.03.21258228v1.full">this hypothesis</a>, but much remains to be learnt.</p>
<h2>Why is this variant worrying?</h2>
<p>The short answer is, we don’t know. The long answer is, B.1.1.529 carries certain mutations that are concerning. They have not been observed in this combination before, and the spike protein alone has over 30 mutations. This is important, because the spike protein is what makes up most of the vaccines. </p>
<p>We can also say that B.1.1.529 has a genetic profile very different from other circulating variants of interest and concern. It does not seem to be a “daughter of delta” or “grandson of beta” but rather represents a new lineage of SARS-CoV-2.</p>
<p>Some of its genetic changes are known from other variants and we know they can affect transmissibility or allow immune evasion, but many are new and have not been studied as yet. While we can make some predictions, we are still studying how far the mutations will influence its behaviour. </p>
<p>We want to know about transmissibility, disease severity, and ability of the virus to “escape” the immune response in vaccinated or recovered people. We are studying this in two ways.</p>
<p>Firstly, careful epidemiological studies seek to find out whether the new lineage shows changes in transmissibility, ability to infect vaccinated or previously infected individuals, and so on. </p>
<p>At the same time, laboratory studies examine the properties of the virus. Its viral growth characteristics are compared with those of other virus variants and it is determined how well the virus can be neutralised by antibodies found in the blood of vaccinated or recovered individuals. </p>
<p>In the end, the full significance of the genetic changes observed in B.1.1.529 will become apparent when the results from all these different types of studies are considered. It is a complex, demanding and expensive undertaking, which will carry on for months, but indispensable to understand the virus better and devise the best strategies to combat it.</p>
<h2>Do early indications point to this variant causing different symptoms or more severe disease?</h2>
<p>There is no evidence for any clinical differences yet. What is known is that cases of B.1.1.529 infection have increased rapidly in Gauteng, where the country’s fourth pandemic wave <a href="https://sacmcepidemicexplorer.co.za/">seems to be commencing</a>. This suggests easy transmissibility, albeit on a background of much relaxed non-pharmaceutical interventions and low number of cases. So we cannot really tell yet whether B.1.1.529 is transmitted more efficiently than the previously prevailing variant of concern, delta.</p>
<p>COVID-19 is more likely to manifest as severe, often life-threatening disease in the elderly and chronically ill individuals. But the population groups often most exposed first to a new virus are younger, mobile and usually healthy people. If B.1.1.529 spreads further, it will take a while before its effects, in terms of disease severity, can be assessed.</p>
<p>Fortunately, it seems that all diagnostic tests that have been checked so far are able to identify the new virus. </p>
<p>Even better, it appears that some widely used commercial assays show a specific pattern: two of the three target genome sequences are positive but the third one is not. It’s like the new variant consistently ticks two out of three boxes in the existing test. This may serve as a marker for B.1.1.529, meaning we can quickly estimate the proportion of positive cases due to B.1.1.529 infection per day and per area. This is very useful for monitoring the virus’s spread almost in real time.</p>
<h2>Are current vaccines likely to protect against the new variant?</h2>
<p>Again, we do not know. The known cases include individuals who had been vaccinated. However we have learnt that the immune protection provided by vaccination wanes over time and does not protect as much against infection but rather against severe disease and death. One of the epidemiological analyses that have commenced is looking at how many vaccinated people become infected with B.1.1.529. </p>
<p>The possibility that B.1.1.529 may evade the immune response is disconcerting. The hopeful expectation is that the high seroprevalence rates, people who’ve been infected already, found by <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/34477548">several studies</a> would provide a degree of “natural immunity” for at least a period of time.</p>
<p>Ultimately, everything known about B.1.1.529 so far highlights that universal vaccination is still our best bet against severe COVID-19 and, together with <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-south-africans-must-do-to-avoid-a-resurgence-of-covid-19-infections-148132">non-pharmaceutical interventions</a>, will go a long way towards helping the healthcare system cope during the coming wave.</p>
<p><em>This article was updated following the World Health Organisation’s announcement on the new variant.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/172692/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Prof. Wolfgang Preiser receives funding from the South African Medical Research Council, the National Health Laboratory Service Research Trust and the Poliomyelitis Research Foundation. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jinal Bhiman receives funding from the South African National Department of Health as part of the emergency COVID-19 response; a cooperative agreement between the National Institute for Communicable Diseases of the National Health Laboratory Service and the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; the African Society of Laboratory Medicine (ASLM) and Africa Centers for Disease Control and Prevention through a sub-award from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation; the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and Wellcome; the South African Medical Research Council and the South African Department of Science and Innovation; the UK Department of Health and Social Care, managed by the Fleming Fund and performed under the auspices of the SEQAFRICA project. She is affiliated with the National Institute for Communicable Diseases and the University of the Witwatersrand; and serves as an observer of the World Health Organization Technical Advisory Group on Viral Evolution.
</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marietjie Venter receives funding from the National Research Foundation of South Africa;The European Union (LEAP-Agri) program; The BMBF (the German Federal ministry for education and Research); and National Health Laboratory Services research foundation for unrelated research. She is currently employed by the University of Pretoria. She has acted as temporary advisor for the WHO. The views expressed here is that of the author and do not reflect those of the funders or employer.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tulio de Oliveira does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment. It is supported by funding from the South African Medical Research Council and the Department of Science and Innovation.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cathrine Scheepers does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There’s a new COVID lineage called B.1.1.529. It has a genetic profile very different from other circulating variantsWolfgang Preiser, Head: Division of Medical Virology, Stellenbosch UniversityCathrine Scheepers, Senior Medical Scientist, University of the WitwatersrandJinal Bhiman, Principal Medical Scientist at National Institute for Communicable Diseases (NICD), National Institute for Communicable DiseasesMarietjie Venter, Head: Zoonotic, Arbo and Respiratory Virus Programme, Professor, Department Medical Virology, University of PretoriaTulio de Oliveira, Director: KRISP - KwaZulu-Natal Research and Innovation Sequencing Platform, University of KwaZulu-NatalLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1715552021-11-10T18:44:58Z2021-11-10T18:44:58ZOlympic Games are great for propagandists – how the lessons of Hitler’s Olympics loom over Beijing 2022<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/431178/original/file-20211109-19-wz7uvf.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=23%2C23%2C7651%2C5074&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Will anodyne reporting from the upcoming Beijing Winter Olympics play into China's propaganda efforts? </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/women-practice-a-dance-routine-in-front-of-a-large-news-photo/1349382921?adppopup=true">Kevin Frayer/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>On the morning of Aug. 14, 1936, two NBC employees met for breakfast at a café in Berlin. Max Jordan and Bill Slater were discussing the Olympic Games they were broadcasting back to the United States – and the Nazi propaganda machine that had made their work, and their visit to Germany, somewhat unpleasant. </p>
<p>Slater complained about all the staged regimentation and the obviously forced smiles everywhere. </p>
<p>“Why don’t they revolt? We wouldn’t stand for all this browbeating and bullying in America. I know that. Why do they stand for it here?” Slater asked Jordan. </p>
<p>As they were talking, three armed Nazi guards sat down at the next table. The whole café quieted. “It was as though a chill had come over those present,” Jordan later recalled. “In a nutshell, there was the answer to Bill’s question.”</p>
<p>I included the story Max Jordan recounted in his memoir <a href="https://www.press.uillinois.edu/books/?id=p082214">in my book on the Nazi origins of Olympic broadcasting</a> because it perfectly encapsulated the quandary facing American sports journalists whenever the International Olympic Committee pushes them to broadcast happy images provided by repressive regimes.</p>
<p>It’s now less than 100 days from the opening ceremony of the <a href="https://olympics.com/en/beijing-2022/">2022 Beijing Winter Olympics</a>, and therefore it’s time for an honest discussion about the ethics of sport journalism and the morality of American media’s complicity with authoritarian regimes that hide the active repression of their citizens.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/431176/original/file-20211109-17-1oy0w0d.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A 1936 sign from Germany saying Jews were forbidden to go to that year's Winter Olympics." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/431176/original/file-20211109-17-1oy0w0d.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/431176/original/file-20211109-17-1oy0w0d.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=447&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/431176/original/file-20211109-17-1oy0w0d.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=447&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/431176/original/file-20211109-17-1oy0w0d.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=447&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/431176/original/file-20211109-17-1oy0w0d.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=561&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/431176/original/file-20211109-17-1oy0w0d.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=561&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/431176/original/file-20211109-17-1oy0w0d.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=561&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A sign reading ‘Juden Zutritt verboten!’ forbidding entry by Jewish people to the 1936 Winter Olympics in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/sign-reading-juden-zutritt-verboten-forbidding-entry-by-news-photo/1277756265?adppopup=true">Photo FPG/Archive Photos/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Abundant evidence</h2>
<p>The world knows what China is doing right now. Courageous reporting has publicized the series of <a href="https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-cables/as-global-pressure-over-human-rights-abuses-in-xinjiang-picks-up-china-remains-defiant/">repressive domestic</a> and <a href="https://www.propublica.org/article/operation-fox-hunt-how-china-exports-repression-using-a-network-of-spies-hidden-in-plain-sight">international actions taken by the Chinese government</a> over the past five years.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/08/world/asia/china-uighur-muslim-detention-camp.html">persecution of the Uyghurs</a> and other human rights abuses, the <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/24/chinas-new-hong-kong-laws-a-breach-of-agreement-foreign-officials-say.html">abrogation of the Hong Kong treaty</a> along with the imposition of the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/hong-kong-europe-business-5a7f50d5d5027fda34f9addeb883e809">Chinese government’s repression</a> in that port city, and the prevention of <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2021/07/22/1019244601/china-who-coronavirus-lab-leak-theory">a comprehensive and transparent investigation</a> into the origins of COVID-19 are all well documented. </p>
<p>Thus, the Chinese government now wants good press in the West. And its efforts to ensure favorable coverage have prompted new concerns about media control and censorship during the Games, with <a href="https://www.reuters.com/lifestyle/sports/us-calls-china-not-limit-journalists-freedom-2022-beijing-winter-olympics-2021-11-04/">a U.S. government spokesman recently</a> urging Chinese government officials “not to limit freedom of movement and access for journalists and to ensure that they remain safe and able to report freely, including at the Olympic and the Paralympic Games.”</p>
<p>But, as was clear from the experience during the 1936 Olympics, if U.S. journalists go to Beijing and emphasize the beauty of its landscape, the happiness of its citizenry and its futuristic infrastructure, and fail to cover the more controversial realities in China, that would signal compliance with – and promotion of – Chinese propaganda. </p>
<p>This is American sports journalism’s Red Smith moment. </p>
<h2>Politics, meet sports</h2>
<p>On Jan. 4, 1980, Walter “Red” Smith, the veteran New York Times sports columnist, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1980/01/04/archives/boycott-the-moscow-olympics-sports-of-the-times-we-should-have.html">surprised his readership</a> with his endorsement of the boycott movement against that summer’s Moscow Olympic Games. Boycott advocates were protesting the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan. </p>
<p>Smith’s stance was unexpected, as he had carefully sidestepped – or even ignored – many other moments he considered unhealthy political intrusion into international athletic competition. But Smith wrote that history had proved that America’s participation in the Nazi Games was a mistake – even if the <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/radio/day6/naming-heatwaves-custodians-vs-covid-19-nba-barbers-online-moderators-jesse-owens-granddaughter-and-more-1.5719784/remembering-jesse-owens-the-black-olympian-who-humiliated-hitler-1.5719794">great Black American runner Jesse Owens</a> redeemed the event in public memory.</p>
<p>“When Americans look back to the 1936 Olympics,” <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1980/01/04/archives/boycott-the-moscow-olympics-sports-of-the-times-we-should-have.html">Smith wrote in his famous column</a>, “they take pleasure only in the memory of Jesse Owens’ four gold medals.” Outside of that, he admitted, “we are ashamed at having been guests at Adolf Hitler’s big party.”</p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1982/01/16/obituaries/red-smith-sports-columnist-who-won-pulitzer-dies-at-76.html">Smith was an old-school sports reporter</a>, already an old-timer in 1980 – he died in 1982. His reporting and columns reflected the influence of <a href="https://theathletic.com/1876184/2020/06/18/how-he-played-the-game-assessing-the-complicated-legacy-of-grantland-rice/">Grantland Rice</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1976/07/17/archives/paul-gallico-sportswriter-and-author-is-dead-at-78-founded-golden.html">Paul Gallico</a>, the giants who invented modern American sports writing in the 1920s. But there had always existed another group of sports reporters less afraid to point out obvious political unpleasantness.</p>
<p>For example, the great <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1973/12/06/archives/jimmy-cannon-columnist-dies-sportswriter-ranged-far-afield-protege.html">Jimmy Cannon</a> had no problem freely peppering political references and acerbic commentary throughout his columns. Westbrook Pegler detested the Nazis and <a href="https://olympic-century.blogspot.com/2016/11/arms-and-olympics-westbrook-pegler-and.html">criticized them relentlessly</a> throughout the 1936 Games. And Howard Cosell’s <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fEg3uNqsTYQ">sharp commentaries</a>, on such issues as Muhammad Ali’s boxing suspension in the 1960s and the political activism that erupted in 1968 in Mexico City, remain a credit to his legacy.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/fEg3uNqsTYQ?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">‘The U.S. Olympic Committee … is in the main a group of pompous, arrogant and medieval-minded men who regard the games as a private social preserve,’ said Howard Cosell.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>That Red Smith had spent decades remaining largely apolitical in public made his support for the boycott surprising. That he was only the second sports columnist to be <a href="https://www.pulitzer.org/winners/walter-wellesley-red-smith">awarded a Pulitzer Prize</a>, and that his opinions were widely respected, gave his endorsement significant clout. </p>
<h2>‘The one lever we have’</h2>
<p>Smith opened the gates for others to point out the incongruity and obvious hypocrisy of celebrating the Soviet Union’s peaceful intentions while the Soviet army was invading and occupying Afghanistan. In his column, Smith quoted British Member of Parliament Neville Trotter, who led the boycott movement in Great Britain. </p>
<p>“This is the one lever we have to show our outrage at this naked aggression by Russia,” <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1980/01/04/archives/boycott-the-moscow-olympics-sports-of-the-times-we-should-have.html">Trotter told Smith</a>. “We should do all we can to reduce the Moscow Olympics to a shambles.” </p>
<p>One well-known and nationally respected sports journalist has explicitly and unambiguously called for boycotting the 2022 Beijing Games: Sally Jenkins. The Washington Post’s veteran columnist – who last year was a finalist for <a href="https://www.pulitzer.org/finalists/sally-jenkins-washington-post">the Pulitzer Prize for commentary</a> – published a scorching column plainly stating that “ignorance is no longer an excuse.”</p>
<p>“It was a forgivable mistake to award an Olympics to Beijing in 2008,” <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/olympics/2021/08/09/boycott-beijing-olympics">she wrote</a>. “It’s unforgivable to hold one there now.”</p>
<p>Red Smith’s boycott column remains one of his most important and lasting examples of public service. As a media historian, I believe that those who emulate his courage today, like Sally Jenkins, will likely be remembered in the same way tomorrow.</p>
<p>[<em>Like what you’ve read? Want more?</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-newsletter-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=likethis">Sign up for The Conversation’s daily newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/171555/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael J. Socolow does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In the face of China’s repression and human rights abuses, a scholar asks whether cheerful media coverage of the Beijing Olympics in February 2022 signals complicity with Chinese propaganda.Michael J. Socolow, Associate Professor, Communication and Journalism, University of MaineLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1702172021-10-22T03:29:14Z2021-10-22T03:29:14ZA cinema of intimacy: the enduring beauty of Wong Kar Wai<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/427951/original/file-20211022-25-14ympym.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C2%2C1920%2C1074&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Wong Kar-Wai's In The Mood for Love (2000)</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mercury Cinema</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The influence of Hong Kong director Wong Kar Wai on global cinema is difficult to overstate.</p>
<p>Wong emerged from the creative ferment of the Hong Kong film industry of the 1980s which, at its peak, was producing over 200 films a year. He never went to film school but began his career as a scriptwriter, primarily for the action films which would bring Hong Kong cinema to international attention following the release of John Woo’s <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0092263/">A Better Tomorrow</a> in 1986.</p>
<p>Today, Wong is primarily renowned as an art film auteur, yet his films traverse genres from melodrama to martial arts. In particular you can see the traces of his past in the Hong Kong film industry with early films <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0096461/?ref_=fn_al_tt_1">As Tears Go By</a> (1988) and <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0101258/?ref_=fn_al_tt_1">Days of Being Wild</a> (1990), riffing on the tropes of gangster cinema. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/from-bruce-lee-to-shang-chi-a-short-history-of-the-kung-fu-film-in-cinema-168273">From Bruce Lee to Shang-Chi: a short history of the kung fu film in cinema</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>His fluid approach to genre is also the result of childhood moviegoing. Wong has described spending time in cinemas with his mother, not differentiating between art films and commercial films. “We just liked to watch the cinema”, <a href="https://www.indiewire.com/2001/02/interview-the-mood-of-wong-kar-wai-the-asian-master-does-it-again-81154/">he said</a>.</p>
<p>An intertitle in <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0118694/?ref_=fn_al_tt_1">In the Mood for Love</a> (2000) contains the following plaintive reflection: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>He remembers those years as though looking through a dusty window pane. The past is something he could see, but not touch. And everything he sees is blurred and indistinct.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This sentiment crystallises the concerns of Wong’s films: a preoccupation with intimacy, memory and the indelible passage of time as registered in the everyday lives of his unforgettable protagonists. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/dWVDZ98AFhI?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<h2>Guerrilla filmmaking</h2>
<p>Wong’s fourth film, <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0109424/?ref_=fn_al_tt_1">Chunking Express</a> (1994) brought him to the attention of Western audiences. </p>
<p>Set in the infamous Chunking Mansions, a crowded 17-floor residential and shopping complex in Kowloon, the film introduced cinephiles to Wong’s universe of love-lorn romantics obsessing over the possibilities of what might have been. </p>
<p>A voiceover by one of the characters observes, “Every day we brush past so many people. People we may never meet or people who may become close friends.” </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/OPCug9jyG9k?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<p>This dance of chance and fate in a global metropolis underpins the film’s frenetic style. </p>
<p>Shot without a script in an improvisational guerrilla method, the film exemplifies the dazzling camerawork of Wong’s long-term collaborative partner, Australian cinematographer Christopher Doyle. This relationship, along with production designer and editor William Chang, has given Wong’s films an unmistakable visual style with slow motion, coloured lens filters and extreme wide angles giving an irrepressible vitality to his melancholic works. </p>
<p>Collaboration is a key feature of Wong’s work. He uses a recurring cast of actors such as Tony Leung, who has appeared in seven of Wong’s films, and other luminaries of Chinese cinema such as Maggie Cheung and Leslie Cheung. They have all delivered career defining performances under Wong’s careful direction. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/in-the-mood-for-wong-whatever-happened-to-wong-kar-wai-25979">In the mood for Wong: whatever happened to Wong Kar-Wai?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>The poetry of everyday life</h2>
<p>What has given Wong such a devotional following across the globe is the way he inexorably returns to the poetry of everyday life and the theme of heartbreak. </p>
<p>Whether this is the tortured romance between two men stranded in Buenos Aires in <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0118845/?ref_=fn_al_tt_1">Happy Together</a> (1997) or the unconsummated love affair of In The Mood For Love and its sequel, <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0212712/?ref_=fn_al_tt_1">2046</a> (2004), Wong’s filmography is an extended meditation on the ordeals of the heart.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/5VPvFaAWX9U?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<p>His films emphasise character, mood and detail over plot. As he <a href="https://medias.unifrance.org/medias/80/164/42064/presse/chacun-son-cinema-dossier-de-presse-francais.pdf">describes it</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Cinema can be the citric scent of a peeled orange, the touch of warm skin through a silk stocking; or simply a darkened space bathed in anticipation. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Wong’s films illustrate the way everyday objects and places are imbued with extraordinary meaning through the power of longing. </p>
<p>This concern with intimate details – the light from an ostensibly kitsch waterfall lamp, the expiry date on a can of tinned pineapples, the way smoke curls upward from a cigarette – give his films their incomparable lyricism and singular capacity to reflect on time’s merciless flow. </p>
<h2>History and intimacy</h2>
<p>By capturing the fleeting and the ephemeral, Wong’s films act as a powerful form of cultural memory. </p>
<p>This is most obvious in the nostalgic ambience of In the Mood For Love, set in the 1960s, where he had the entire crew eating Shanghainese food popular in 1960s Hong Kong and oversaw the meticulous design of the iconic cheongsam dresses worn by Maggie Cheung. </p>
<p>History is just as present in the films shot in Hong Kong in the 1990s: a place changing so rapidly, many locations had already disappeared by the time shooting had finished. </p>
<p>For Wong, cinema is a way of reflecting on history through the most intimate details. An object may appear minor or inconsequential, but in his films is liable to release a flood of desire. </p>
<p>It is a rare pleasure to see his intoxicating films on the big screen once again for the OzAsia Festival. Returning to his characters is like greeting old friends.</p>
<p>“All my works are really like different episodes of one movie,” the director <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781118425589.ch18">has revealed</a>. It feels particularly appropriate for his works to be screened together allowing the resonance between the films, with their repeated motifs of clocks, chance encounters and doomed love affairs, to materialise before the viewer. </p>
<hr>
<p><em>Wong Kar Wai recently oversaw the restoration of his filmography and seven of these prints are screening at the Mercury Cinema as part of the retrospective Love and Neon during Adelaide’s <a href="https://www.ozasiafestival.com.au/">OzAsia Festival</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/170217/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thomas Moran does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Wong’s films explore the indelible passage of time as registered in the everyday lives of his unforgettable protagonists.Thomas Moran, PHD Candidate, Monash UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1652102021-08-06T13:06:14Z2021-08-06T13:06:14ZWill mask wearing still be common in Britain after the pandemic is over?<p>Face masks have been a crucial part of the UK’s strategy to contain COVID-19, but have also evoked contradictory emotions and reactions. Some see masks as an important means to <a href="https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2776536">halt the virus’s spread</a>, as well as a sign of <a href="https://theconversation.com/covid-masks-how-and-when-to-ask-someone-to-wear-one-without-getting-into-a-fight-164888">social consideration</a> and <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(20)30918-1/fulltext">altruism</a>. Others have politicised them, seeing mask mandates as <a href="https://theconversation.com/face-mask-rules-do-they-really-violate-personal-liberty-143634">trampling over their rights</a> as individuals.</p>
<p>But what will mask wearing in the UK look like in the long term? This is an intriguing question, and one that our <a href="https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=AH%2FW003813%2F1">interdisciplinary team</a> is currently exploring as part of a larger project on the role that the media plays in influencing people’s decisions to wear masks. Our research covers what factors drive people to wear masks across different parts of the world, exploring the use and effects of media messaging in the UK in light of what happens elsewhere, such as in east Asia.</p>
<p>Globally, the UK sits somewhere between the politicisation of mask wearing <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/29/face-masks-us-politics-coronavirus">seen in the US</a> and the more communitarian mask wearing of east Asia. Importantly, the US and UK don’t have a history of mask wearing to build on, whereas many east Asian countries do.</p>
<p>People in east Asia have worn masks for a host of <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-brief-history-of-masks-from-the-17th-century-plague-to-the-ongoing-coronavirus-pandemic-142959">medical</a>, <a href="https://www.voanews.com/science-health/coronavirus-outbreak/not-just-coronavirus-asians-have-worn-face-masks-decades">cultural</a> and environmental reasons since at least the first half of the 20th century. Masks are worn out of courtesy, to avoid putting on makeup, to keep warm, to avoid attention and communication, and to protect against the sun. They’re also worn to protect against pollution (the <a href="https://www.iqair.com/world-most-polluted-cities">100 cities</a> worldwide with the worst air pollution are all in Asia), though people may <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-02938-1">overestimate the protection they offer</a>.</p>
<p>The real turning point, though, came in 2002, with the outbreak of <a href="https://www.who.int/health-topics/severe-acute-respiratory-syndrome#tab=tab_1">severe acute respiratory syndrome</a> (Sars), which started in China before spreading to Singapore and Taiwan over the following year. As a result, masks grew in popularity, so much so that they came to be used day to day as <a href="https://qz.com/299003/a-quick-history-of-why-asians-wear-surgical-masks-in-public/">fashion accessories</a> as well as for protection. Could the same thing happen in the UK too?</p>
<h2>How masks became normal in Asia</h2>
<p>In several east Asian countries, the high uptake of mask wearing has been driven by government messaging. As a result of Sars and avian flu, for example, the government in Hong Kong <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s15010-008-7277-y">urged people</a> consistently, clearly and frequently to use face masks when they had flu-like symptoms, both to prevent illness and prepare for other future flu-like epidemics. Warnings were regularly broadcast on television and in train stations.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, in Japan over the past few decades the government has <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1467-9566.2012.01466.x">stressed</a> that it’s up to individual citizens to lead a healthy lifestyle. In the early 2000s, <a href="https://www.med.or.jp/english/pdf/2003_02/047_049.pdf">public health programmes</a> and <a href="https://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/wp/wp-hw3/dl/2-063.pdf">laws</a> were introduced to get people to actively monitor and take care of their own health.</p>
<p>At the time of the 2009 swine flu epidemic, the Japanese government then relied on this sense of personal responsibility to help contain the virus. Campaign posters at the time <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1467-9566.2012.01466.x">read</a>: “The spread of the influenza must be prevented by each individual!” This reflects the sense of duty to act for the “greater good” that exists in many Asian countries, and which manifests itself in people choosing to wear masks if they feel under the weather so they don’t pass any illness on.</p>
<p>The success of this tactic may be due to many of these countries – including <a href="https://www.hofstede-insights.com/country-comparison/china/">China</a> and <a href="https://www.hofstede-insights.com/country-comparison/japan/">Japan</a> – having what the anthropologist Geert Hofstede has defined as “<a href="https://geerthofstede.com/culture-geert-hofstede-gert-jan-hofstede/6d-model-of-national-culture/">low individualism</a>”. In such countries, the prevailing culture generally favours acting in the interests of the group. A strong motivation to adhere to social norms will therefore <a href="https://warwick.ac.uk/newsandevents/expertcomment/how_does_wearing/">influence people</a> to wear masks. The force of this may be so strong that <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1467-9566.2012.01466.x">mask wearing moves</a> from being something targeted at specific health threats to a general practice, adhered to daily without a specific purpose. </p>
<p>The emergence of branded masks or masks as fashion statements reflects this. For example, in Japan, what is known as “<a href="https://www.asianstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/from-hello-kitty-to-cod-roe-kewpie-a-postwar-cultural-history-of-cuteness-in-japanA.pdf"><em>kawaii</em></a>” culture is strong. This encompasses a love for anime characters, cute animal mascots and colourful fashion, and masks have proven to be an easy home for this aesthetic. Masks becoming fashionable may then in turn influence behaviour, making the everyday wearing of them more popular.</p>
<h2>Will the same trends appear in the UK?</h2>
<p>In the short term, it’s unlikely that Britain’s mask wearing will mirror Japan’s or Hong Kong’s. In east Asia, there’s been almost two decades of experience with flu-like outbreaks, leading to repeated government messaging around mask wearing and personal responsibility. There just hasn’t been the same context in the UK.</p>
<p>There are cultural differences to consider too. Unlike in Britain, in Asia wearing a face covering is not only done by large numbers of people, but is also <a href="https://warwick.ac.uk/newsandevents/expertcomment/how_does_wearing/">socially approved of and expected</a>, with lower levels of individualism driving conformity with this norm. Britain, in contrast, <a href="https://www.hofstede-insights.com/country-comparison/the-uk/">scores much more highly</a> for individualism. Mask wearing, now that it’s broadly not mandatory in England, is therefore more likely to be seen as a matter of personal choice.</p>
<p>Current government messaging in England is also emphasising the rights of the individual (the branding of the lifting of restrictions as “<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-freedom-day-is-the-latest-example-of-covid-propaganda-164521">Freedom Day</a>” being the key example), and so stands in direct contradiction to supporting the greater social good through mask wearing. </p>
<p>Indeed, anecdotally it doesn’t seem that frequent exposure to people wearing masks – whether on TV or in the street – has resulted in the development of a continuous pro-mask attitude and lasting behaviour change in the UK, and <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/healthandsocialcare/healthandwellbeing/articles/twothirdsofadultsstillplantowearmasksinshopsandonpublictransport/2021-07-16">a third of people</a> have indicated that they won’t continue to wear masks now they don’t have to. However, one way this could change is if mask wearing continued to be <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/18/4/1879">depicted as normal across the media</a>, including in fictional settings – on TV and in films, music videos and so on.</p>
<p>If required for a healthier future, continuing to portray their use in this way could serve as a means to normalise them, beyond governmental campaigns. This, though, isn’t a public health tactic that has been tried extensively to date.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165210/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>All authors receive funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council. Simon Willcock is affiliated with both Rothamsted Research and Bangor University.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span> </span></em></p>In east Asian countries, past disease outbreaks have made face masks part of everyday life – but the social context supporting such behaviour isn’t present in the UK.Nathan Abrams, Professor of Film Studies, Bangor UniversityHayley Roberts, Senior Lecturer in Public International Law, Bangor UniversitySimon Willcock, Professor of Sustainability, Bangor UniversityThora Tenbrink, Professor of Linguistics, Bangor UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1652742021-07-30T09:24:17Z2021-07-30T09:24:17ZHong Kong democracy protester’s sentencing sets a harsh precedent for national security law<p>Hong Kong’s decades-long reputation for free speech, judicial independence and the rule of law has been dealt a harsh blow with the sentencing of pro-democracy protester Tong Ying-kit. He was sentenced to <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/2021/07/30/breaking-activist-tong-ying-kit-jailed-for-9-years-in-hong-kongs-first-national-security-case/">nine years</a> in prison after being found guilty of committing terrorist acts and inciting secession, by three judges in Hong Kong’s high court. </p>
<p>Tong, 24, is the first person to be <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jul/27/hong-kong-security-law-verdict-expected-in-first-ever-trial">indicted and convicted</a> under China’s new National Security Law. He was handed a six and a half-year sentence for the secession charge, and eight for the terrorism charge, but will serve a total of nine years.</p>
<p>The implementation of the law marked a turning point in Hong Kong’s democracy movement. The law is being used <a href="https://sg.news.yahoo.com/hong-kongs-civil-society-withers-031647654.html">to crack down</a> on pro-democracy politicians, journalists and student activists.</p>
<p>This case sets a precedent for how Hong Kong plans to treat those accused of violating the national security law. It is likely that Tong will appeal, and the case will eventually reach a higher court. </p>
<p>On July 1 2020, he was riding a motorbike in the city, holding a flag reading “Liberate Hong Kong, Revolution of Our Times,” in protest of the new law imposed by the Chinese authorities a day prior. He crashed into police officers, injuring three of them. </p>
<p>Despite the assurance of a fair trial, the government repeatedly intervened pre-trial to undermine Tong’s rights, in violation of the rule of law. Judges were handpicked by Hong Kong’s chief executive, Carrie Lam. The secretary of justice, Teresa Cheng, removed Tong’s right to a jury trial. And his bail application was denied, leading to a year of pre-trial detention. </p>
<p>All these arrangements were made under the new norms of the national security law, which has substantially weakened the prospect of a defendant getting a fair trial in the city’s common law system.</p>
<p>The verdict also sets a precedent that the court system will not give consideration to international <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx">human rights law</a> under the new law. The verdict does not begin with any human rights analysis or assurance, and fails to explain how Tong’s convictions on two offences are compatible with international human rights standards.</p>
<h2>The convictions</h2>
<p>Let’s look first at the charge of inciting secession. Although provisions of the national security law assert that nonviolent activities may be counted as secessionist activities, the court’s verdict failed to prove that the slogan on Tong’s sign was an act of secession itself.</p>
<p>The judges stressed only that the slogan was capable of inciting others to commit secession, disregarding other possible meanings explained by the defence’s expert opinions. The verdict, therefore, demonstrates a departure from a basic common law principle – the burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt.</p>
<p>Even if the numerous meanings of the slogan include promotion of secession, this does not mean that merely displaying it should be criminalised.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/4653fa1f2.html">The Johannesburg Principles</a>, used by UN human rights experts as a guide to balance national security and free speech, state that no one shall be punished as a threat to national security unless the government can prove that such expression incites imminent violence or has “a direct and immediate connection” between the expression and any violence that happened. Clearly, in Tong’s case, no subsequent and imminent violence occurred after displaying a flag with the popular slogan.</p>
<p>Any restriction on free speech must be based on necessity and proportionality. This principle is reaffirmed in the UN General Comment on <a href="https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/gc34.pdf">Freedom of Opinion</a> and Expression, which serves as an authoritative interpretation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights – which is still applicable in Hong Kong. Tong’s incitement conviction fails to meet this criteria. </p>
<p>As far as the terrorism conviction, the court’s verdict effectively escalated what could be seen as an ordinary crime (reckless driving) to an act of terrorism. Tong’s behaviour may well be punished by existing criminal laws, so a prosecutor ultimately added an alternative charge of dangerous driving causing grievous bodily harm, prior to the trial.</p>
<p>But Tong’s actions do not fit the definition of terrorism as agreed by UN experts. Two months after the passage of the national security law, seven UN experts published an <a href="https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=25487">open letter</a> to reinstate the UN Security Council’s definition of a terrorist act that “requires intentionality to cause death or serious bodily harm and the act must be committed to provoke a state of terror”. </p>
<p>The court agreed that “serious bodily harm” was not an element in Tong’s offence, and that the harm caused by his actions was not necessarily physical, but symbolic. Consequently, the verdict stretches the understanding of terrorist act in a manner at odds with legal certainty, a basic principle of the rule of law.</p>
<p>To avoid conflating criminal actions with terrorist acts, the government should use ordinary criminal law as a necessary and appropriate means to regulate and punish individuals who do not meet the standard of terrorist acts. Now it seems the court is going the opposite way. </p>
<h2>What’s next</h2>
<p>The verdict has significant implications for free speech and the rule of law in Hong Kong. It sets a precedent for the interpretation of the slogan “Liberate Hong Kong, Revolution of Our Times”. Tong’s case becomes an authoritative source for judges and magistrates to interpret it as a message of a secessionist agenda in dealing with future cases.</p>
<p>A chilling effect in Hong Kong society is therefore unavoidable.</p>
<p>Such interpretive consistency by the establishment will also affect trials in future speech crimes under existing sedition laws, which the government has recently revived by arresting ordinary citizens and prosecuting activists for displaying or uttering slogans regarded as seditious.</p>
<p>Above all, this trial reveals how the rule of law has been decimated by tough new legislation and legal statutes imposed by China – and how an unconvincing verdict can be weaponised to repress political dissent and free speech in Hong Kong.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165274/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yan-ho Lai does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The sentencing of Tong Ying-kit shows how the Hong Kong court system will treat those accused under its new national security law.Yan-ho Lai, Visiting Researcher, the Dickson Poon School of Law, King’s College London; PhD in Law, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1635062021-06-28T13:04:22Z2021-06-28T13:04:22ZHongkongers mourn closure of Apple Daily and fear for the future of independent journalism<p>Hongkongers had barely dried their tears over the forced closure of Apple Daily, a populist, sometimes bawdy, always staunchly pro-democracy daily launched as the “Hong Kong people’s newspaper” in 1995, when more bad news dropped for the city’s once-vaunted press freedom.</p>
<hr>
<iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/hongkongers-mourn-closure-of-apple-daily-and-fear-for-the-future-of-independent-journalism-163506&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p><em>You can listen to more articles from The Conversation, narrated by Noa, <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/audio-narrated-99682">here</a>.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>The former managing editor of Apple Daily’s English edition and lead Chinese editorial writer Fung Wai-kong (who wrote under the pen-name Lo Fung) was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/hong-kong-police-arrest-former-apple-daily-journalist-airport-local-media-2021-06-27/">arrested</a> at the Hong Kong International Airport on Sunday, June 27 as he prepared to leave for the UK. He is accused of conspiring to collude with foreign forces and is the seventh senior Apple Daily journalist to be arrested on national security charges in two weeks.</p>
<p>The paper Fung wrote for was undoubtedly flawed, with its sensationalist coverage and ethical lapses, but it also exposed corruption in high places, won awards for its investigative reporting, and dared to stand up to Beijing. Its existence was a barometer of Hong Kong’s press freedom and freedom of expression.</p>
<p>The end of Apple Daily on June 24 wasn’t a surprise. But that it came at such short notice, following dramatic raids, the arrest of senior journalists and the freezing of its assets has already had a chilling effect on the rest of Hong Kong’s media.</p>
<p>Many in the sector have harboured fears that independent online media would be next. Sure enough, hours before news of Fung’s arrest broke, <a href="https://beta.thestandnews.com/">Stand News</a> announced a <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/hong-kongs-stand-news-removes-op-eds-after-pro-democracy-apple-daily-folds-under-pressure-1604513">slew of pre-emptive measures</a> to reduce risk to its staff, authors and supporters. The platform is a non-profit, independent online news outlet that has reported extensively on Hong Kong protest movements and provides a platform for civil society voices. Among the measures was the temporary removal of all opinion articles published in and before May this year.</p>
<h2>Running out of places to work</h2>
<p>Apple’s demise and the wiping of Stand News archive are the latest in a series of developments that have <a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kongs-press-freedom-is-on-life-support-thanks-to-the-new-security-law-144458">eroded Hong Kong’s press freedom</a> and undermined editorial independence at the city’s news outlets. These include the muzzling of Hong Kong’s public service broadcaster RTHK and personnel changes at pay-TV channels i-Cable and Now TV that have seen pro-government figures replace respected journalists. In the wake of these developments, journalists are running out of newsrooms where they can still practise relatively independent, critical journalism.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kongs-press-freedom-is-on-life-support-thanks-to-the-new-security-law-144458">Hong Kong's press freedom is on life support thanks to the new security law</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Joy* joined Apple Daily in November 2019, at the height of the protests, due to the censorship she says was practised by her previous employer, the main terrestrial broadcaster TVB. “There was much more freedom at Apple Daily,” she says. “In my heart, I still want to be a journalist, but my only remaining choices are Stand News and Citizen News. Yet they’re likely to be the government’s next targets.”</p>
<p>Another journalist, Max* who currently works at <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/tag/citizen-news/">Citizen News</a> admits he does worry: “We’re always saying we might not be able to carry on for much longer, maybe a year, or maybe even that’s too optimistic.”</p>
<p>But Max insists that even if the platforms disappear, there will be journalism as long as there are journalists. He himself is a member of the former i-Cable China team that joined Citizen News en masse after the <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/2020/12/01/i-cables-china-reporters-resign-in-protest-after-40-colleagues-sacked/">mass resignations</a> there last year. His experience has prompted him to urge former Apple Daily journalists to set up their own teams and journalistic ventures.</p>
<p>He told me: “I’m always reminding myself that when mainland [Chinese] journalists are still striving within and outside the system … how can we give up so easily?”</p>
<h2>Tomorrow’s journalists</h2>
<p>Bruce Lui is now a senior lecturer in journalism at <a href="https://www.hkbu.edu.hk/eng/main/index.jsp">Hong Kong Baptist University</a>, but he too formerly worked for the storied i-Cable China Team. Lui says journalism schools used to teach students how to be journalists in a free society. But as Hong Kong loses more of its freedoms “we have to help students understand how to report in Mainland [China], because the environment is increasingly converging with that of the mainland, where there are many clear and hidden rules,” Lui says. “Behind them are a bunch of political intentions, controlling these regulations, determining the rules of the game.”</p>
<p>Another journalism lecturer, who did not want to give her name, agrees. She told me: “Fewer students may want to become journalists, but those that do are more serious about it. They pay great attention to topics like source protection in class. They have no fantasies or illusions about journalism, they know it’s hard, they know they could end up in prison.”</p>
<p>When I spoke to Charis*, a journalism student who reported from the frontlines of the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-49340717">2019 anti-extradition bill protests</a> in January last year, she said her experiences had hardened her resolve to become a journalist.</p>
<p>Now she’s conflicted because Hong Kong’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-how-chinas-new-national-security-law-subverts-the-territorys-cherished-rule-of-law-139683">national security law</a>, passed in 2020, has made it more difficult to report, and the crackdown on independent and critical media means there are fewer outlets where she’d be able to report freely. </p>
<p>Many journalism students used to aspire to work for RTHK, but Charis recently turned down a coveted internship there because new rules would have required her to swear an oath of allegiance to the Hong Kong government.</p>
<p>“I’m going on exchange to Taiwan in September, but in June Taipei issued a form where anyone seeking to reside there had to declare whether they had sworn allegiance to the Hong Kong government … I realised that swearing the oath could affect my whole future,” she explains.</p>
<p>Despite the setback and her concerns about how the Hong Kong mediascape will look when she graduates in a year’s time, Charis hasn’t given up on journalism just yet. “It’s a difficult path to tread and press freedom is forever shrinking. But I still hope we can use any remaining freedom to report the best we can. I believe that as long as there are people willing to do so, there will be space to practice journalism.”</p>
<hr>
<p><em>*Names have been changed to protect source anonymity</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/163506/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yuen Chan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Mainland China is tightening the screws on press freedom in Hong Kong.Yuen Chan, Senior Lecturer, School of Arts and Social Sciences, Department of Journalism, City, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1560702021-03-02T11:50:02Z2021-03-02T11:50:02ZHong Kong: ‘patriotism test’ for public officials shows China’s increasing assertiveness<p>Tensions are running high in Hong Kong after the pro-Beijing government charged <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/hong-kong-charges-47-pro-democracy-activists-over-unofficial-election-process-6xdnl3j7g">47 democracy activists and politicians</a> with sedition under the controversial new national security law. </p>
<p>The group is accused of running what has been described as an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/01/hong-kong-court-protests-democracy-activists-national-security-law">unofficial “primary” poll</a> in July last year in which more than 600,000 Honkongese voted to select candidates for a legislative election which was due to be held in September. The election was subsequently postponed by Carrie Lam, the territory’s pro-Beijing chief executive, who cited the coronavirus as the reason for delaying the vote.</p>
<p>The charges come just days after the Hong Kong government introduced <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/feb/23/hong-kong-plans-to-make-politicians-swear-oath-of-loyalty-to-beijing">new oath requirements</a> for public officials – swearing loyalty not to their constituents but Beijing and the Communist Party. The oaths are part of a plan outlined on February 23 by Xia Baolong, the director of the State Council’s Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, for major electoral reforms to ensure only “patriots” can stand for office. </p>
<p>This is designed to ensure that pro-Beijing officials will hold all the offices in the city’s executive, legislature and judiciary branches as well as statutory bodies. The move echoes words from Chinese President Xi Jinping earlier in the month when he said: “Hong Kong must always be governed by patriots”.</p>
<p>Pro-democrats accused the Hong Kong government of narrowing the scope for political participation, while the pro-establishment camp believed that the newly proposed requirements would work hand in hand with the National Security Law (NSL) to further eliminate “anti-China” elements from the city by providing it with a “patriotic” test. The NSL, imposed by Beijing in June 2020, has been <a href="https://theconversation.com/china-is-becoming-increasingly-assertive-security-law-in-hong-kong-is-just-the-latest-example-142313">widely criticised</a> both by pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong itself and by the international community as effectively outlawing opposition movements.</p>
<h2>Changing China</h2>
<p>The evolution of China’s posture towards the former British colony has largely tracked China’s development as a major global power. When the “<a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-why-the-one-country-two-systems-model-is-on-its-last-legs-118960">one country, two systems</a>” principle was agreed in the 1980s as part of the legally binding <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-8616/">handover agreement</a> between China and the UK, the city was given the assurance it could retain its own economic and administrative systems for 50 years with “a high degree of autonomy”. </p>
<p>At that stage, China was a rather marginal economic and geopolitical actor. But the rise of China to great power status, especially the country’s unprecedented economic growth, has inevitably caused a change in China’s perception of itself and others. </p>
<hr>
<p><em>You can hear more about the tough decisions facing people thinking of leaving Hong Kong in episode 4 of The Conversation Weekly podcast <a href="https://theconversation.com/leaving-hong-kong-after-chinas-clampdown-where-are-people-thinking-of-going-and-why-the-conversation-weekly-podcast-155927">Leaving Hong Kong after China’s clampdown: where are people thinking of going and why</a>. Listen and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts.</em></p>
<iframe src="https://embed.acast.com/60087127b9687759d637bade/6036629da9f63074a33de340?cover=true&ga=false" frameborder="0" allow="autoplay" width="100%" height="110"></iframe>
<hr>
<p>Hong Kong is one of the key examples of that change of perception. After handover in 1997, Hong Kong became a <a href="https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/1-530-5745?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true">Special Administrative Region</a> (SAR) but is – on every level – part of China. The former British colony still fulfils its function as a conduit between China and the world, but even this has gradually become symbolic as China now has several other important financial hubs, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3091526/shanghais-quest-be-global-financial-centre-gains-impetus-hong">principally Shanghai</a>. </p>
<p>China’s economy has <a href="https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL33534.html#:%7E:text=From%202008%20to%202010%2C%20China's,to%206.8%25%20in%202017">grown rapidly over the past two decades</a>, while, on the other hand, the outside world – particularly the US and Europe – was pushed into recession by the 2008 financial crisis and had barely recovered when COVID-19 hit.</p>
<p>China’s changing global power has radically changed the context which the Hong Kong issue sits. Beijing has clearly found it difficult, if not possible, to maintain the same attitude towards the former UK territory as it had at handover in 1997, especially in the face of rising political instability in the city and the deterioration of US-China relations during the presidency of Donald Trump.</p>
<h2>Jurisdictional loopholes</h2>
<p>The new US president, Joe Biden, made human rights in Hong Kong and elsewhere a focus of his <a href="https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-beijing-hong-kong-asia-china-df5d5e94d0862df0987f59b166cc4705">first phone call</a> with Xi Jinping at the beginning of February. Biden pressed Xi on Hong Kong, Taiwan and China’s treatment of its Uighur Muslim minority. The Chinese state broadcaster CCTV said Xi had pushed back on these concerns on China’s internal affairs, saying: “The US should respect China’s core interests and act with caution.”</p>
<p>The deterioration of relations between Washington and Beijing has been evident for some time, for example in 2019 when the US Congress passed <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/3289">Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act</a>, which established that the US would review its stance on Hong Kong annually with regard to China’s upholding of the 1997 Handover Agreement. China responded by <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-50626796">cancelling the US navy’s Hong Kong visit</a> in 2019.</p>
<p>Another important indication of China’s more assertive stance towards Hong Kong is that, 23 years after handover, the <a href="https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202009/29/P2020092900336.htm">Central Military Dock</a> was officially placed under the control of the People’s Liberation Army Navy on September 29 2020. The dock was part of a Sino-UK agreement made in 1994 on the arrangements for the future use of military sites in the former British colony. </p>
<p>It is evident that Beijing’s failure to uncouple Hong Kong from its colonial past created “jurisdictional loopholes” – the establishment of the national security law and the new oath requirement shows Beijing taking legal and legislative action to fully “decolonise” Hong Kong. </p>
<p>Hong Kong can still enjoy a certain degree of autonomy under the “one country, two systems” principle while remaining a Special Administrative Zone of China. But Beijing is expected to make more “loyalty” demands like the recent oath requirements to ensure that the notion of “one country” is a prerequisite for viability of Hong Kong’s “two systems” – at least, until the agreement ceases to have legal force in 2047.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/156070/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>New laws demand that all public officials swear loyalty to China and the Communist Party.Boyang Su, PhD Researcher, Lau China Institute, King's College LondonSophie Wushuang Yi, PhD Researcher in the Lau China Institute, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.