tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/human-rights-watch-21176/articlesHuman Rights Watch – The Conversation2023-03-28T18:08:16Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2015452023-03-28T18:08:16Z2023-03-28T18:08:16ZWhy is Canada rejecting evidence of Israeli apartheid against Palestinians?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/517760/original/file-20230327-18-23vrzi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C1127%2C5381%2C2448&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Palestinians carry the body of a man who was killed during an Israeli military raid in the West Bank city of Jenin in March 2023. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Majdi Mohammed)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>For the past two months, hundreds of thousands of Israeli citizens have been <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-03-11/ty-article/.premium/biggest-in-israeli-history-organizers-claim-half-a-million-protesters-in-tenth-week/00000186-d261-dfef-a3ef-d26d9bbc0000">demonstrating against proposed judicial reforms</a> by the country’s new far right-wing government that could seriously threaten their human rights.</p>
<p>The mass protests and general strikes have prompted the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/middleeast/live-news/israel-protests-netanyahu-updates-03-27-23-intl/h_c18f20712db932dee7a2697516b16c3a">reforms to be delayed.</a></p>
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<img alt="A sea of blue and white Israeli flags during a protest." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/517761/original/file-20230327-24-yeeq5y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/517761/original/file-20230327-24-yeeq5y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517761/original/file-20230327-24-yeeq5y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517761/original/file-20230327-24-yeeq5y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517761/original/file-20230327-24-yeeq5y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517761/original/file-20230327-24-yeeq5y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517761/original/file-20230327-24-yeeq5y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Israelis protest against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s judicial overhaul plan outside the parliament in Jerusalem on March 27, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Ariel Schalit)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The situation in Israel has led some esteemed Canadian jurists, including former Supreme Court justices Beverley McLachlin and Rosalie Abella, to <a href="https://www.law.utoronto.ca/blog/faculty/statement-canadian-jurists-proposed-transformation-israels-legal-system">publicly express their concerns in a letter</a> that the proposed Israeli changes will “weaken democratic governance, undermine the rule of law, jeopardize the independence of the judiciary (and) impair the protection of human rights.”</p>
<p>Their letter raises concerns about serious threats to the human rights of Israelis. It also inevitably <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/2023-03-21/ty-article-opinion/.premium/for-palestinians-israels-fight-to-protect-democracy-is-bitterly-surreal/00000187-036e-dde5-ab8f-236e33ea0000">raises questions</a> about another grave Israeli human rights problem almost entirely ignored by that country’s legal institutions: the human rights of Palestinians.</p>
<h2>Israeli apartheid</h2>
<p>Over the past two years, several recognized international human rights organizations, including <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/02/israels-apartheid-against-palestinians-a-cruel-system-of-domination-and-a-crime-against-humanity/">Amnesty International</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/27/threshold-crossed/israeli-authorities-and-crimes-apartheid-and-persecution">Human Rights Watch</a>, have released reports documenting massive and widespread Israeli violations of the human rights of Palestinians, both inside Israel and in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. </p>
<p>They have made headlines around the world because they have charged Israel with committing the crime of “apartheid.”</p>
<p>The term “apartheid” has been used before in relation to Israel by many thoughtful and respected international figures, including former U.S. president <a href="https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/Palestine-Peace-Not-Apartheid/Jimmy-Carter/9780743285032">Jimmy Carter</a>, Archbishop <a href="https://www.jpost.com/diplomacy-and-politics/desmond-tutu-israel-guilty-of-apartheid-in-treatment-of-palestinians-344874">Desmond Tutu</a>, former UN Secretary-General <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/former-un-chief-says-israeli-oppression-arguably-constitutes-apartheid">Ban Ki-moon</a>, former Israeli attorney general <a href="https://www.thejournal.ie/readme/israel-apartheid-5678541-Feb2022/">Michael Ben-Yair</a> and former Israeli Shin Bet director <a href="https://www.twn.my/title2/unsd/2022/unsd220313.htm">Ami Ayalon</a>.</p>
<p>The Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch reports do not compare Israel to South Africa. Instead, they are judging Israeli practices in the light of the long accepted international definition of apartheid, enshrined in a <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.10_International%20Convention%20on%20the%20Suppression%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Apartheid.pdf">UN treaty on apartheid</a> dating back to 1973, as well as the <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/RS-Eng.pdf">1998 Rome Statue</a> establishing the International Criminal Court.</p>
<p>According to the Rome Statute, apartheid is:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“An institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over another racial group or groups and committed with the intention of maintaining that regime.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Amnesty and Human Rights Watch’s conclusions align with the findings of several other respected human rights organizations, including <a href="https://www.btselem.org/publications/fulltext/202101_this_is_apartheid">B’Tselem</a> and <a href="https://www.alhaq.org/advocacy/18174.html">Al-Haq</a>, as well as the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/03/special-rapporteur-situation-human-rights-occupied-palestinian-territories">UN special rapporteur</a> on human rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory — and one of the co-authors of this article.</p>
<h2>Discrimination, repression</h2>
<p>The reports are detailed, with hundreds of pages of evidence based on years of investigation, field reports and legal analysis. They document an embedded two-tier legal and political structure that gives one group — Israeli Jews — privileges in housing, employment and lifestyle while depriving Palestinians under occupation of the same access.</p>
<p>Accordingly, this constitutes “apartheid” — which international and <a href="https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-45.9/fulltext.html">Canadian law recognize to be a crime against humanity</a>.</p>
<p>Resistance to this unequal system is answered by embedded repression, which includes incarceration without trial, torture, imprisonment of children and home demolitions. It also includes banning Palestinian human rights organizations on the grounds of “fighting terrorism.”</p>
<p>Palestinians resist Israeli apartheid at their own peril. At a recent news conference, Amnesty International Secretary General <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/02/israel-opt-palestinian-lives-in-peril-as-israel-reinforces-apartheid/">Agnès Callamard</a> noted that since the Amnesty report was released a year ago, another 220 Palestinians have been killed by Israeli forces.</p>
<p>According to these human rights reports, “apartheid” is no mere derogatory epithet about some possible future state, but an evidenced-based accusation of current, grave breaches of international human rights law.</p>
<p>Predictably, the response of the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/01/middleeast/israel-apartheid-amnesty-intl/index.html">Israeli government</a> has been to accuse Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the other organizations of antisemitism while ignoring the specific accusations of human rights abuses in their detailed reports.</p>
<p>The response of the <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/israel-palestinian-apartheid-1.6436138">Canadian government</a> has been to look away. <a href="https://thecjn.ca/news/canada-is-dismissing-amnesty-internationals-report-that-israel-is-an-apartheid-state/">It repeatedly rejects the accusation of apartheid</a> without providing any reasons for that conclusion. </p>
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<img alt="People wave a red, green, black and white flag in a grassy field, surrounded by smoke, during a protest." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/517762/original/file-20230327-1418-7gazlo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/517762/original/file-20230327-1418-7gazlo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517762/original/file-20230327-1418-7gazlo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517762/original/file-20230327-1418-7gazlo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517762/original/file-20230327-1418-7gazlo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517762/original/file-20230327-1418-7gazlo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517762/original/file-20230327-1418-7gazlo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A person waves the Palestinian flag during a protest against an Israeli military raid in the West Bank city of Nablus in February 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Adel Hana)</span></span>
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</figure>
<h2>Difficult to refute</h2>
<p>Perhaps it’s because the evidence and legal analysis are difficult to refute, uncomfortably so when it deals with a country Canada considers to be a close friend and ally.</p>
<p>But the case made by experienced and impartial organizations that Israel is responsible for the international crime of apartheid, cannot be ignored simply by saying “we disagree.”</p>
<p>Canada has been a reliably strong champion and supporter of the evidentiary research, legal analysis and conclusions of a range of UN human rights experts and bodies, and respected international human rights groups such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. </p>
<p>Yet, on this occasion, Canada categorically disagrees with their comprehensive findings, and does so without any analysis or explanation of its own to back up and explain that rejection.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/canada-missing-in-action-on-israels-proposed-annexation-of-the-west-bank-138274">Canada missing in action on Israel's proposed annexation of the West Bank</a>
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<p>These are substantive conclusions from highly respected human rights organizations that deserve to be treated seriously. Their findings have already been <a href="https://www.btselem.org/press_releases/20221228_10_ngos_to_icc_prosecutor_we_are_all_committed_to_assisting_your_officein_advancing_the_ongoing_investigation_of_the_situation_in_palestine">referred to the International Criminal Court</a>. Ignoring them denies the reality before our eyes. </p>
<p>Canadians need to hear more, and in convincing detail. Why does Canada disagree that the Israeli government is responsible for the crime of apartheid?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201545/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Israelis are justifiably opposing reforms to the country’s judicial system that would erode their human rights. But what about the human rights of Palestinians?Michael Lynk, Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Western UniversityAlex Neve, Senior Fellow, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs and Adjunct Professor, International Human Rights Law, University of Ottawa, L’Université d’Ottawa/University of OttawaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1976412023-01-24T14:34:50Z2023-01-24T14:34:50ZFootball and politics in Kinshasa: how DRC’s elite use sport to build their reputations and hold on to power<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/504456/original/file-20230113-26-o6a4dx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Young people play football on a street in Goma, eastern DRC. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Guerchom Ndebo/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Football in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) – as in much of the world – is intertwined with politics. </p>
<p>In the central African country, football clubs have long been a way for the regime in power to build political capital. Many politicians involve themselves with clubs to bolster their image. On the other hand, football is also a space for political opposition. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://medialibrary.uantwerpen.be/files/8518/fa1af368-d443-41cc-88b9-38bcdcb90449.pdf">our recent paper</a>, we show how politics and football come together in a number of ways in Kinshasa, the country’s capital city. </p>
<p>Football was particularly important for Joseph Kabila’s regime, from 2001 to 2019. His was a <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2018/01/kabila-must-go-the-congolese-see-this-why-cant-the-west/">contested and repressive regime</a>. Throughout his tenure as president, Kabila and his party members looked for ways to improve their reputation to gain votes. One way was by financially supporting football clubs. This worked because these clubs don’t have structural or sufficient commercial or state support. </p>
<p>But <a href="https://medialibrary.uantwerpen.be/files/8518/fa1af368-d443-41cc-88b9-38bcdcb90449.pdf">our study finds</a> that football politics can also work against a regime. During the Kabila years, football stadiums and supporter crowds offered a relatively safe place to protest the repressive regime. Anti-Kabila songs, for example, were often heard at matches. </p>
<h2>Football and power</h2>
<p>Our interviews with supporters, regime figures and others found that during the Kabila years, supporters and club officials made a distinction between regime figures supporting the club, and the regime. A common statement we heard was: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>supporters still appreciated Kabila-associated politicians as long as they were able to provide financial support.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Gabriel Amisi (commonly known as Tango Four), for example, was a close ally of Kabila’s and currently serves as an <a href="https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1016772/politique/rdc-sous-pression-des-usa-felix-tshisekedi-procede-a-un-prudent-remaniement-dans-larmee/">army general and inspector general of the Congolese army</a>. Amisi has been accused of a wide range of human rights abuses during his time as a <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2002/08/20/congo-war-crimes-kisangani">rebel commander</a> and an <a href="https://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2012/11/22/rdc-le-president-kabila-suspend-le-general-major-amisi-le-chef-de-forces-terrestres">army commander</a>. One press article describes him as “<a href="https://afridesk.org/whos-who-le-general-amisi-tango-four-le-boucher-du-kivu-jj-wondo/">the butcher of Eastern Congo</a>”. </p>
<p>Between 2007 and 2020, Amisi was president of the AS Vita Club, one of the biggest clubs in Kinshasa. Before 2007, the team was performing poorly. Under Amisi’s leadership, the team won three national titles and excelled internationally. Players remember his leadership as providing financial stability, with regular and good salaries, and material supplies. </p>
<p>This made him very popular. When Amisi tried to resign in 2012 after AS Vita Club’s elimination from the national league, the team’s management and club supporters didn’t accept his submission. When protests began against the Kabila regime in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-politics-idUSKBN14800C">2016</a> in Kinshasa, AS Vita supporters protected Amisi’s house. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/12/16/dr-congo-profiles-individuals-sanctioned-eu-and-us">Human Rights Watch</a> has documented how Amisi (and other elite figures) used youth league members of football clubs to infiltrate protests against the Kabila regime “<a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/12/16/dr-congo-profiles-individuals-sanctioned-eu-and-us">and incite protesters to loot and commit violence</a>”. </p>
<p>An association with regime figures gives football clubs advantages, such as protection from prosecution if supporters are caught up in stadium violence. This makes it unattractive for clubs to associate with opposition figures, who generally have less money to invest and less political power. </p>
<p>In this way, Congolese football isn’t very different from football elsewhere in the world. It has been shown how <a href="https://books.google.be/books?id=VIlcDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA463&lpg=PA463&dq=Armstrong,+G.,+%26+Mitchell,+J.+P.+(2001).+%E2%80%9CPlayers,+patrons,+and+politicians:+oppositional+cultures+in+Maltese+football.%E2%80%9D+Fear+and+loathing+in+world+football,+137-158.&source=bl&ots=6GcJZyJ7BE&sig=ACfU3U3YaJGbpHXEt6nnlRXMeLAYfrrpVw&hl=nl&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiorpSsspz8AhUROewKHQ0BDxAQ6AF6BAgHEAM#v=onepage&q&f=false">worldwide</a> – not only on the <a href="https://polaf.hypotheses.org/5030">African continent</a>, but in a variety of places such as <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14660970.2013.792482">Turkey, Indonesia</a> and <a href="http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/10117/">Malta</a> – football helps regimes to reproduce their hegemony, particularly by creating political capital. </p>
<h2>Football and protest</h2>
<p>But the opposite has also been shown. Football has played an important role in contesting power. It has, for example, played a role in decolonising struggles in <a href="https://experts.arizona.edu/en/publications/visualizing-politics-in-african-sport-political-and-cultural-cons">Zimbabwe</a>, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/africa/article/abs/kickin-it-leisure-politics-and-football-in-colonial-zanzibar-1900s1950s/A97494FF2D4FEB7BFA1252B4A11A6309">Zanzibar</a> and <a href="https://books.google.be/books?hl=nl&lr=&id=N65pbr2hC4wC&oi=fnd&pg=PP12&dq=Martin,+P.+(2002).+%E2%80%9CLeisure+and+society+in+colonial+Brazzaville.%E2%80%9D+Cambridge+University+Pr&ots=2MF69toPoN&sig=6yK6P7RbPAWkvnTOo0XuYu3Tp6U#v=onepage&q=Martin%2C%20P.%20(2002).%20%E2%80%9CLeisure%20and%20society%20in%20colonial%20Brazzaville.%E2%80%9D%20Cambridge%20University%20Pr&f=false">Congo-Brazzaville</a>; and in the <a href="https://www.eurasiareview.com/24122012-pitched-battles-the-role-of-ultra-soccer-fans-in-the-arab-spring-analysis-2/">Arab spring</a> in the 2010s. </p>
<p>These dynamics also played out in Kinshasa, where football supporters participated in decolonisation struggles. On <a href="https://dialectik-football.info/16-juin-1957-lunion-saint-gilloise-au-congo-et-la-premiere-emeute-anti-coloniale/">16 June 1957</a>, a match between Kinshasa’s FC Leopoldville and Belgium’s Union Saint Gilloise de Bruxelles led to the first riots leading up to independence. A year and a half later, AS Vita Club supporters played <a href="https://books.google.be/books?id=bF5Vx8cCnrMC&printsec=frontcover&hl=nl&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false">an important role</a> in decisive riots against colonial authorities. In 1960, the DRC got its independence from Belgium. </p>
<p>In the postcolonial period, football has also played a role in challenging power. During the Kabila regime, as <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/29/dr-congo-repression-persists-election-deadline-nears">political repression escalated</a> in almost every other space, the football stadium became an important venue for political protest. </p>
<p>In the words of a soccer fan in <a href="https://medialibrary.uantwerpen.be/files/8518/fa1af368-d443-41cc-88b9-38bcdcb90449.pdf">our study</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Since we’re in the stadium, we won’t be arrested. The police knows this: they won’t try anything because we’re way more numerous than them.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The lyrics of protest songs and slogans – referred to as “hymns of the oppressed” – included: “God is doing everything so that Kabila dies!” and “Eeeh, we refuse (to be) the voting machine”. </p>
<p>During <a href="https://qz.com/africa/569612/dr-congos-joseph-kabila-is-taking-a-slippery-path-to-a-third-term">the “slippage” period</a> from 2015 onwards – when Kabila went beyond the formal limits of his mandate – anti-Kabila slogans became even more popular. </p>
<p>The engagement of regime figures with soccer clubs didn’t overcome hostile feelings about the regime. </p>
<h2>Regime controls</h2>
<p>The impact of these confrontations of regime power was limited, though. </p>
<p>For example, during the Kabila regime, radio and TV stations would cut their broadcasting when political songs were sung during games involving the national team. And in late 2016, the minister of sports <a href="https://www.radiookapi.net/2016/12/14/actualite/sport/rdc-le-ministre-des-sports-suspend-le-championnat-national-de-foot">temporarily suspended</a> the national football competition. The official reason for this was “<a href="https://www.radiookapi.net/2016/12/14/actualite/sport/rdc-le-ministre-des-sports-suspend-le-championnat-national-de-foot">excessive violence in the stadiums</a>”. But it was widely understood as a political measure by the regime, fearing protests by supporters in reaction to the end of Kabila’s official mandate during this period. The former minister confirmed this to us during interviews. </p>
<p>In sum, football in Kinshasa is politics – but primarily regime politics. Even though political opposition can be expressed through football, it is questionable how much potential for change this carries. </p>
<p>During the authoritarian Kabila regime, the protest role of football was confined. It’s similar under the current Felix Tshisekedi regime, which uses football as a political tool. Kinshasa’s main clubs (Daring Club Motema Pembe and AS Vita), for example, have club presidents who are close allies of Tshisekedi.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197641/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Football provides a way for unpopular elites to build political capital – but also creates space for citizens to voice dissent.Kristof Titeca, Professor in International Development, University of AntwerpAlbert Malukisa Nkuku, Associate researcher, University of AntwerpLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1843122022-06-10T03:21:24Z2022-06-10T03:21:24ZEdtech is treating students like products. Here’s how we can protect children’s digital rights<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/467352/original/file-20220607-12-won02o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C57%2C5499%2C3606&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Schools’ use of educational technologies (edtech) grew exponentially at the height of COVID lockdowns. A recent <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2022/05/25/how-dare-they-peep-my-private-life/childrens-rights-violations-governments">Human Rights Watch (HRW) report</a> has exposed children’s rights violations by providers of edtech endorsed by governments in Australia and overseas. </p>
<p>The lockdowns have ended but edtech remains embedded in education. Children will have to navigate issues of data privacy in their learning and other activities.</p>
<p>So what can Australian governments and schools do to protect students? Both can take steps to ensure children’s digital rights are enabled and protected.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/childrens-privacy-is-at-risk-with-rapid-shifts-to-online-schooling-under-coronavirus-135787">Children's privacy is at risk with rapid shifts to online schooling under coronavirus</a>
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<h2>What problems did the report expose?</h2>
<p>HRW reviewed 164 edtech products, including ten of the many apps and websites used in Australian schools. According to its report, New South Wales and Victorian education departments endorsed the use of six of these, including Zoom, Minecraft Education and Microsoft Teams. </p>
<p>The review found that, to varying degrees, these apps and websites harvested children’s personal, location or learning data to monitor, track or profile students. These practices ultimately violated children’s digital rights to privacy. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1529439735990607877"}"></div></p>
<p>The use and commodification of data associated with our online activities may not seem particularly alarming. It is, after all, a transaction we routinely make. Yet, for children, rights to privacy and to <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/treaty-bodies/crc/general-comments">protection from corporations</a> that seek to maximise profits rather than act in the best interests of the child are fundamental. </p>
<p>Edtech commodifies children when their personal data is made available to the advertising technology industry, as the HRW report shows. When a child uses an app or website for learning, the resulting data can be collected, monitored, tracked, profiled and traded in data economies. These practices are intentionally opaque and highly profitable for technology corporations. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-new-proposed-privacy-code-promises-tough-rules-and-10-million-penalties-for-tech-giants-170711">A new proposed privacy code promises tough rules and $10 million penalties for tech giants</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>A further complication is that schools choose digital technologies on behalf of children and their families. Students often do not have a genuine choice when required to use apps and websites endorsed by schools or education departments. This means children do not have the agency to make informed decisions about their online learning.</p>
<h2>What can the government do?</h2>
<p>Australian law can be improved to better protect children’s privacy. </p>
<p>In 2019, the then Coalition government announced a <a href="https://www.ag.gov.au/integrity/consultations/review-privacy-act-1988">review</a> of the Australian Privacy Act 1988, with submissions closing in January this year. The act predates the development of the world wide web. It needs to be strengthened to account for personal data and data-driven economies. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1453211703441690627"}"></div></p>
<p>The new Labor government should commit to continuing this important work. It should also develop a legislated Australian Children’s Code setting out principles governing the management of children’s data. The code to protect their digital rights must be enforceable and resourced. </p>
<p>Countries such as the UK (<a href="https://ico.org.uk/your-data-matters/the-children-s-code-what-is-it/">Age-Appropriate Design Code in the UK</a>) and Ireland (<a href="https://www.dataprotection.ie/en/dpc-guidance/fundamentals-child-oriented-approach-data-processing">Fundamentals for a Child-Oriented Approach to Data Processing</a>) have already adopted such codes. These require online services to follow a set of standards when using children’s data.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/apps-that-help-parents-protect-kids-from-cybercrime-may-be-unsafe-too-156583">Apps that help parents protect kids from cybercrime may be unsafe too</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>What can the education system do?</h2>
<p>Without legislation to protect children’s privacy, schools and education departments can still enable children’s rights to privacy. They can do so through considered selection of educational technologies and through everyday school practices and curriculum.</p>
<p>Education departments can draw on international standards, such as the UK Children’s Code, to:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>inform technology procurement practices</p></li>
<li><p>better consider privacy risks when assessing educational technologies</p></li>
<li><p>develop policy and guidelines to support schools’ decision-making. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>There will always be a need for schools and teachers to make critical decisions about which apps and websites they bring into the classroom. This is not to promote a “use it” or “do not use it” position. Rather, informed guidelines would support school assessments of risks and help develop practices that uphold children’s digital rights.</p>
<p>Assessing the risks is difficult due to the intentionally opaque designs of digital technologies. The development of assessments, policy and guidelines at a department level is necessary to support teachers to integrate edtech in ways that protect children’s privacy. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, there are some practical steps teachers and families can take. Examples include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>consider the purpose and advantage of using the chosen educational technology</p></li>
<li><p>access privacy reviews through organisations like <a href="https://www.commonsensemedia.org/">Common Sense Media</a></p></li>
<li><p>review the privacy policy of each app or website, paying attention to what data it collects, for what purpose, and who the data are shared with (although these aren’t always clear or accurate, as the HRW report shows)</p></li>
<li><p>review privacy settings on apps</p></li>
<li><p>check websites using a privacy tool like <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/09/25/privacy-check-blacklight/">Blacklight</a>, used in the HRW review.</p></li>
</ul>
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<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/in-an-age-of-elsa-spider-man-romantic-mash-ups-how-to-monitor-youtubes-childrens-content-123088">In an age of Elsa/Spider-Man romantic mash ups, how to monitor YouTube's children's content?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Education can also empower children to make informed choices about their data and privacy.</p>
<p>Current Australian school programs focus on digital safety and well-being. They aim to help students understand interpersonal online risks and harms. Examples of this approach are the newly revised Australian Curriculum’s <a href="https://v9.australiancurriculum.edu.au/teacher-resources/understand-this-general-capability/digital-literacy">digital literacy capability</a> and the new Labor government’s promise of an <a href="https://www.alp.org.au/policies/safe-kids-are-esmart-kids">eSmart Digital Licence+</a>. </p>
<p>While understanding interpersonal online risks and harms are crucial for children’s well-being, this focus overlooks risks associated with the commodification of personal data. To enable children’s digital rights they must be given opportunities to understand and critically engage with digital economies, datafication and the associated impacts on their lives.</p>
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<h2>We’re still catching up to edtech</h2>
<p>The HRW report has shone a spotlight on children’s right to digital and data privacy in schools. However, its findings may be just the tip of the iceberg in a largely unregulated industry. The report covered only a small proportion of the educational technologies being used in Australian schools. </p>
<p>Children have the right to engage with digital environments for learning and play, and to develop their autonomy and identity, without compromising their privacy. </p>
<p>The Australian government has the power to create laws to protect children’s digital rights. Together with education that empowers teachers and children to make informed decisions, these rights can be much better protected.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/184312/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tiffani Apps receives funding from Australian Research Council. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Karley Beckman receives funding from the Australian Research Council. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sarah K. Howard receives funding from the Australian Research Council. </span></em></p>The fast-growing educational technology industry is poorly regulated and profits from user data. Australian law, education departments and schools can all do more to improve safeguards for children.Tiffani Apps, Senior Lecturer in Digital Technologies for Learning, University of WollongongKarley Beckman, Senior Lecturer in Digital Technologies for Learning, University of WollongongSarah K. Howard, Associate Professor, Digital Technologies in Education, University of WollongongLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1795432022-04-20T12:17:20Z2022-04-20T12:17:20ZHuman rights declined during the COVID-19 pandemic, in countries from Angola to the US to New Zealand<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458330/original/file-20220415-20-w4sju7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5760%2C3828&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Pro-democracy protesters are arrested by police in Hong Kong on May 24, 2020.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/prodemocracy-protesters-are-arrested-by-police-in-the-causeway-bay-picture-id1214821212?s=2048x2048">Isaac Lawrence/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/03/how-authoritarians-are-exploiting-covid-19-crisis-grab-power">Human rights activists</a> and international leaders <a href="https://www.un.org/victimsofterrorism/sites/www.un.org.victimsofterrorism/files/un_-_human_rights_and_covid_april_2020.pdf">first warned</a> in April 2020 that countries could use the COVID-19 pandemic as an excuse to crack down on human rights.</p>
<p>Human rights refers to a wide range of political and social rights <a href="https://www.un.org/en/global-issues/human-rights">recognized by international law</a>. It includes everything from people’s right to work and receive an education to people’s right to freely express their opinions and participate in politics. </p>
<p><a href="https://stephenbagwell.files.wordpress.com/2022/04/pandemic-page-proofs.pdf">Human rights scholars and I show in new research</a> that human rights violations ultimately happened in 2020. Each of the 39 countries we analyzed – including Saudi Arabia, Nepal, Mexico, the United Kingdom and the United States – saw an overall decrease in human rights in 2020. </p>
<p>There is new evidence that some <a href="https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/sites/default/files/2021_global_analysis_-_final.pdf">countries continue to use</a> the pandemic as a reason to restrict human rights by <a href="https://findings2021.monitor.civicus.org/rating-changes.html#global-press-release">muzzling dissent</a>, and specifically by limiting people’s rights to gather or demonstrate with others. </p>
<p>Our analysis of human rights in 2020 offers a window into the start of this downward trend.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458331/original/file-20220415-16-1nx5lx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Rows of young people, some of whom are holding Black Lives Matter flags, walk together down an empty Manhattan street" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458331/original/file-20220415-16-1nx5lx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458331/original/file-20220415-16-1nx5lx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458331/original/file-20220415-16-1nx5lx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458331/original/file-20220415-16-1nx5lx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458331/original/file-20220415-16-1nx5lx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458331/original/file-20220415-16-1nx5lx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458331/original/file-20220415-16-1nx5lx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Demonstrators walk in New York City during a Black Lives Matter protest in August 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/derrick-ingram-marches-with-kiara-williams-organizational-leader-for-picture-id1264763255?s=2048x2048">Ira L. Black/Corbis via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>No overall improvement</h2>
<p>More than two years after the World Health Organization first declared the COVID-19 outbreak <a href="https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---11-march-2020">a pandemic</a>, some human rights analyses show a continued regression of <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/11/two-years-what-has-covid-19-taught-us">human rights</a>.</p>
<p>Declarations of emergency, for example, gave police significant power to crack down on political protests. </p>
<p>Cambodia <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2021/04/un-experts-urge-cambodia-review-approach-covid-19?LangID=E&NewsID=26985">passed a law</a> in April 2021, for example, in response to COVID-19 that grants the government authority to prevent any gatherings or protests. Violators can be sentenced to up to 20 years in prison. Hundreds of individuals were arrested for violating this law <a href="https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/sites/default/files/2021_global_analysis_-_final.pdf">in 2021</a>.</p>
<p>In March 2022, Thailand again extended a state of emergency, originally established in April 2020, <a href="https://opendevelopmentmekong.net/news/coronavirus-thailand-extends-state-of-emergency-until-may-31/">through May</a>, giving authorities broad power to set public curfews and restrict meetings. Thai <a href="https://www.fortifyrights.org/tha-inv-2021-09-28/">authorities charged at least</a> 900 anti-government protesters under this emergency decree between May 2020 and Aug. 31, 2021. </p>
<h2>2020 findings</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://humanrightsmeasurement.org/">Human Rights Measurement Initiative</a>, a research group headquartered in New Zealand, and other human rights monitoring organizations are still collecting comprehensive global data for 2021 and 2022.</p>
<p>The initiative last reported on human rights data <a href="https://humanrightsmeasurement.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Human-Rights-During-the-Pandemic.pdf">in June 2021</a>, informing our research.</p>
<p>But there are other sources of evidence that the <a href="https://carnegieeurope.eu/2022/03/24/has-pandemic-done-lasting-damage-to-democratic-freedoms-in-europe-pub-86704">pandemic’s damage to human rights</a> will not quickly lift, even as COVID-19 cases decline globally.</p>
<p>Some positive changes during the pandemic, like addressing <a href="https://www.urban.org/features/out-pandemic-better-approach-homelessness">homelessness more seriously</a>, were “swamped by the many more negative impacts of government responses to COVID-19,” according to the Human Rights Measurement Initiative. </p>
<p>The initiative <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EwwTHRH_tpk&t=3s">surveyed human rights experts, journalists and lawyers</a> in 2020 and 2021. It found that government protection of <a href="https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20999/volume-999-i-14668-english.pdf">civil and political rights</a> and <a href="https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20993/volume-993-I-14531-English.pdf">economic and social rights</a> declined from 2019 to 2020.</p>
<p>This group produces human rights data because governments themselves are often unwilling to share accurate information about human rights violations.</p>
<p>The Human Rights Measurement Initiative’s findings are widely <a href="https://humanrightsmeasurement.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/JPR-Manuscript-HRMI-CPR-2020.pdf">used by</a> scholars, <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/454831/samoa-s-gender-based-violence-still-a-concern-at-un-rights-council">nonprofits</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/new-data-tool-scores-australia-and-other-countries-on-their-human-rights-performance-93942">journalists</a>. </p>
<p>The United States and Hong Kong serve as two examples of places where the pandemic led to a decline in respect for human rights.</p>
<h2>The United States</h2>
<p><a href="https://humanrightsmeasurement.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Appendix-to-Human-Rights-in-the-Pandemic.pdf">The United States</a> is one of many countries that scored worse on human rights in 2020 than in 2019, according to the initiative’s 2021 survey. </p>
<p>In the U.S. in 2020, public health restrictions, like limits on public gatherings, also led to human rights abuses and the use of excessive force by police, survey respondents said.</p>
<p>The reason people were protesting appeared to have influenced whether police targeted and arrested demonstrators, <a href="https://humanrightsmeasurement.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/HRMI-CPR-Methodology-Guide-2021.pdf">survey respondents reported</a>. People protesting social justice issues, like racial justice and gun violence, were especially likely to be arrested.</p>
<p>People arrested for alleged infractions during lawful demonstrations during the pandemic were also put at risk of contracting COVID-19 because of cramped detention spaces where people could not <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/04/police-arrest-coronavirus-301913">socially distance</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458334/original/file-20220415-24-gehvq4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="New York police officers wear masks and carry a young Black man by all of his limbs through a street" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458334/original/file-20220415-24-gehvq4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458334/original/file-20220415-24-gehvq4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458334/original/file-20220415-24-gehvq4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458334/original/file-20220415-24-gehvq4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458334/original/file-20220415-24-gehvq4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458334/original/file-20220415-24-gehvq4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458334/original/file-20220415-24-gehvq4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">New York police officers arrest a protester on May 29, 2020, during a Black Lives Matter protest.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/new-york-police-officers-arrest-a-protester-on-may-29-during-a-black-picture-id1216202680?s=2048x2048">Timothy A. Clary/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Hong Kong</h2>
<p>China passed new security laws in Hong Kong in June 2020, allowing it <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/beijing-passes-new-hong-kong-security-law-n1232330">to crack down</a> on opposition speech and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-protests-court-idUSKBN22U1BD">arrest journalists and pro-democracy activists</a>. </p>
<p>Pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong – a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/30/world/asia/hong-kong-security-law-explain.html">special administrative region</a> of China – <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-48607723">intensified in 2020</a>. In 2021, the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/china-hong-kong-beijing-democracy-national-security-9e3c405923c24b6889c1bcf171f6def4">democracy movement</a> in Hong Kong broke down with the arrest of more than 100 pro-democracy leaders. </p>
<p>The Chinese government and police reportedly enforced pandemic regulations unevenly in 2020, according to the Human Rights Measurement Initiative – pro-democracy and government opposition protesters were more likely to experience restrictions.</p>
<p>Survey respondents in Hong Kong said they believe the government used the pandemic as a cover for restricting rights for other reasons.</p>
<p>Officials in Hong Kong <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3095461/hong-kong-legislative-council-elections-be-postponed">delayed general elections</a> set for July 2020 by five months, citing COVID-19 concerns. </p>
<p>In February 2022, Hong Kong again <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/19/world/asia/hong-kong-election-covid.html">postponed elections</a> of its next political leader allegedly because of a COVID-19 surge. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458333/original/file-20220415-12636-hyhozf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Police wearing face masks stand over a row of young people seated against a wall in Hong Kong." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458333/original/file-20220415-12636-hyhozf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458333/original/file-20220415-12636-hyhozf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458333/original/file-20220415-12636-hyhozf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458333/original/file-20220415-12636-hyhozf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458333/original/file-20220415-12636-hyhozf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458333/original/file-20220415-12636-hyhozf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458333/original/file-20220415-12636-hyhozf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Riot police detain pro-democracy protesters in Hong Kong on May 27, 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/riot-police-mass-detain-prodemocracy-protesters-during-a-rally-in-picture-id1215623110?s=2048x2048">Anthony Kwan/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Lasting trends</h2>
<p>The pandemic has prompted <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14754835.2020.1830046">growing awareness</a> of structural inequalities based on wealth, ethnicity, gender and race, giving <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/14754835.2020.1814709">some reasons</a> for hope. </p>
<p>In many places, governments are lifting <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-022-00620-7">COVID-19 restrictions</a>, which could allow more individuals to return to work and school and gather or travel more freely. </p>
<p>Human rights <a href="https://findings2021.monitor.civicus.org/rating-changes.html#global-press-release">continue to decline</a> in most countries, though, according to the global alliance CIVICUS. </p>
<p>The pandemic also continues to draw public attention away from some human rights violations that are happening in ongoing wars, as in Yemen and Ethiopia. </p>
<p><a href="https://stephenbagwell.files.wordpress.com/2022/04/pandemic-page-proofs.pdf">Our analysis</a> indicates that countries that had more human rights protections in place before the pandemic saw, on average, smaller decreases in rights violations in 2020 than countries that did not have as many protections. We believe adopting policies and practices that protect human rights during calmer times appears to help countries weather the storm during crises like a global health pandemic.</p>
<p>[<em>More than 150,000 readers get one of The Conversation’s informative newsletters.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?source=inline-140K">Join the list today</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179543/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Bagwell is affiliated with the Human Rights Measurement Initiative, a global consortium of human rights scholars and practitioners who aim to provide accurate and comprehensive indicators of human rights respect around the world.</span></em></p>All of the 39 countries human rights experts tracked in 2020 experienced a decline in human rights. It’s not yet clear whether countries will quickly bounce back as the pandemic eases.Stephen Bagwell, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Missouri-St. LouisLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1636472021-06-30T08:11:31Z2021-06-30T08:11:31ZAcademic freedom is paramount for universities. They can do more to protect it from China’s interference<p>A report from <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/06/30/they-dont-understand-fear-we-have/how-chinas-long-reach-repression-undermines">Human Rights Watch</a> released yesterday found students and academics critical of China’s Communist Party are being harassed and intimidated by supporters of Beijing. </p>
<p>Human Rights Watch interviewed 24 pro-democracy students from mainland China and Hong Kong, and 22 academics at Australian universities. In three verified cases, families of students in Australia who lived in China were visited or were requested to meet with police about the student’s activities in Australia. </p>
<p>The report also said Australian universities had failed to protect the academic freedom of students from China, and academics.</p>
<p>As a result, the report said students from China and academics researching China had been self-censoring “to avoid threats, harassment, and surveillance”. This frequent self-censorship threatened academic freedom.</p>
<p>Freedom of speech and academic freedom are paramount values for Australian universities. To protect these values, universities must do more to ensure the safety and well-being of students and employees.</p>
<h2>The majority can still speak freely</h2>
<p>While the report detailed concerning instances of intimidation and harassment, it also noted most Chinese students in Australia could express their views freely and engaged in healthy political debate. Intimidation is carried out by a small but highly motivated, vocal minority.</p>
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<p>In a <a href="https://go8.edu.au/media-statement-go8-universities-committed-to-providing-a-safe-secure-environment-for-students-and-staff">statement</a>, The Group of Eight — which comprises Australia’s biggest research universities including the universities of Melbourne and Sydney — said harassment and censorship were unacceptable. But it also added universities weren’t solely responsibility for foreign interference protection: </p>
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<p>[…] the primary responsibility for monitoring the actions of foreign governments on Australian soil lies with the Australian Government and its agencies, not universities.</p>
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<p>Author of the Human Rights Watch report, Sophie McNeill, said:</p>
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<p>[…] the majority of students who experienced harassment didn’t report it to their university. They believe their universities care more about maintaining relationships with the Chinese government and not alienating students supportive of China’s Communist Party.</p>
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<p>Universities are struggling from a loss of foreign student revenue as a result of the pandemic. Before COVID-19, <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1819/Quick_Guides/OverseasStudents">about two in every five</a> international students enrolled in Australian higher education institutions were from mainland China. These students bring in <a href="https://www.austrade.gov.au/news/economic-analysis/chinese-education-exports-reach-10-billion">billions for universities</a>.</p>
<p>Still, universities can and should do a few things to protect their students and academics from foreign-power threats and intimidation.</p>
<h2>What universities can do</h2>
<p>The Australian government introduced the <a href="https://www.dese.gov.au/guidelines-counter-foreign-interference-australian-university-sector">University Foreign Interference Taskforce</a> in August 2019. This is a way for universities to engage with the government on foreign interference. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/government-boosts-scrutiny-over-chinese-targeting-of-university-sector-122484">Government boosts scrutiny over Chinese targeting of university sector</a>
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<p>Current taskforce <a href="https://www.dese.gov.au/guidelines-counter-foreign-interference-australian-university-sector/resources/guidelines-counter-foreign-interference-australian-university-sector">guidelines</a> however, don’t seem to cover issues of foreign-power intimidation with regard to free debate. They are limited to addressing foreign interference in the university sector, through:</p>
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<p>[…] efforts to alter or direct the research agenda; economic pressure; solicitation and recruitment of post-doctoral researchers and academic staff; and cyber intrusions.</p>
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<p>The <a href="https://www.universitiesaustralia.edu.au/media-item/universities-australia-condemns-all-forms-of-coercion-on-campus-and-in-the-classroom/">peak body representing Australia’s universities</a> has said the kind of coercion shown in the Human Rights Watch report will be addressed in a “refresh” of the guidelines, which are currently being worked on.</p>
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<p>Universities must not be afraid to punish students who harass others, or report back to the Chinese authorities. This should include expelling them from the university. This creates a safer environment for all students, including international students who are paying high foreign-student fees.</p>
<p>Universities could also encourage lecturers to hold classroom debate on sensitive topics while protecting students from surveillance. One strategy is anonymous online discussion, where students remain anonymous to other students but not to the lecturer. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/pro-china-nationalists-are-using-intimidation-to-silence-critics-can-they-be-countered-without-stifling-free-speech-145241">Pro-China nationalists are using intimidation to silence critics. Can they be countered without stifling free speech?</a>
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<p>Other <a href="https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/how-teach-china-fall">strategies include</a> universities letting students know before enrolment about potential risks they may face if they talk freely about sensitive issues — particularly students learning remotely from China or Hong Kong — and actively preventing recordings of discussions. </p>
<p>Chinese students come to Australian universities in a big part to experience the culture and society. Part of this experience is democratic, healthy debate. Students should be encouraged to express their views, whether they support or oppose the Chinese government.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/163647/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yun Jiang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A new report has found students and academics critical of China’s Communist Party are being harassed and intimidated by supporters of Beijing. Universities must do more to protect academic freedom.Yun Jiang, Managing Editor, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1600692021-05-04T09:37:01Z2021-05-04T09:37:01Z‘Apartheid’ claim, Israel and the verdict of international law<p>Discrimination against Palestinians by Israeli laws and policies amount to the crime of apartheid, according to a recent report from Human Rights Watch. The 213-page <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/27/threshold-crossed/israeli-authorities-and-crimes-apartheid-and-persecution">report</a>, released on April 27, accuses Israel of operating a system of apartheid in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. It concludes that “in certain areas … they amount to the crimes against humanity of apartheid and persecution”.</p>
<p>This is not the first time the term “apartheid” has been applied to the case of Israel and Palestine. <a href="https://www.freedomarchives.org/Documents/Finder/DOC12_scans/12.zionist.colonialism.palestine.1965.pdf">Palestinians have described</a> their daily experience in this way since at least the mid-1960s. But the report from the international human rights organisation has brought the term into <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/27/world/middleeast/israel-apartheid-palestinians-hrw.html">mainstream public debate</a>.</p>
<p>Language plays an important role in the rhetoric on Israel and Palestine, as I explain in <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/the-israeli-peace-movement-9780755643707/">my book on Israeli</a> anti-occupation and human rights activism. Referring to the “Israeli-Palestinian conflict”, “Israeli military occupation”, “Israeli settler-colonialism” or “Israeli apartheid” reflect different ideological perspectives. Beyond the level of rhetoric, these terms also signify different legal frameworks and therefore differing obligations for Israelis and Palestinians. </p>
<p>While it is important to determine the accuracy of the report, equally important is understanding the term “apartheid” and the implications of defining the situation as such.</p>
<h2>Origin of the term ‘apartheid’</h2>
<p>The word “apartheid” first gained currency as an ideology and political tool promoted by the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/national-party-np">National Party</a> government in South Africa, under which they won the 1948 general election. The term is translated from Afrikaans, meaning “apartness”. It promoted the separation of different racial groups. </p>
<p>Apartheid initially purported to “<a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-apartheid-south-africa">enable the equal development and freedom of cultural expression</a>” and allow the groups to “<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00358534808451544?journalCode=ctrt20">run their own affairs</a>”. But in practice the system privileged the white minority and discriminated against <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/race-and-ethnicity-south-africa">Native (Black), Coloured and Indian</a> people. </p>
<p>Apartheid was based on Afrikaner fear that their way of life would be threatened by the “<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00358534808451544?journalCode=ctrt20">rising tide of colour</a>”. The system aimed at reducing the power of non-whites by separating them from each other and dividing the Black population along tribal lines.</p>
<p>Legislation imposing racial segregation had been enforced since the mid-1850s. But the overt ideology of the National Party was not enforced until 1950. This was when the <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv01538/04lv01828/05lv01829/06lv01838.htm">Population Registration Act</a> detailed the basic framework for apartheid by classifying all South Africans by race. Until the end of apartheid in the early 1990s, a <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/apartheid-legislation-1850s-1970s">system of laws</a> ensured the separation of the races and the discrimination of non-whites. </p>
<h2>An international crime</h2>
<p>Since 1962, the UN general assembly annually condemned South African apartheid as contrary to the UN charter. But it was not until 1973 that the UN declared acts of apartheid as constituting a crime under international law, through the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.10_International%20Convention%20on%20the%20Suppression%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Apartheid.pdf">Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid</a>. </p>
<p>In 2002, the <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/resource-library/documents/rs-eng.pdf">Rome Statute</a> of the International Criminal Court included the crime of apartheid as a “crime against humanity”. This is understood as comprising “inhumane acts … committed in the context of an institutionalised regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any other racial group”. </p>
<p>So, although the term “apartheid” originated in South Africa and the international legislation was first formulated in response to the situation in South Africa, the crime detailed under international law is <a href="https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/cspca/cspca.html">intended to apply to other situations</a>.</p>
<p>Other countries have thus been accused of employing practices that amount to the crime of apartheid, including <a href="https://www.economist.com/special-report/2014/04/16/ending-apartheid">China</a> and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2001/12/22/saudi-arabias-apartheid/6dc54ab8-37bc-4a87-86f4-c0b489fc8b8e/">Saudi Arabia</a>. Human Rights Watch <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/01/13/myanmar-serious-rights-abuses-persist">conducted a similar study</a> to the Israeli case and defined the abuses committed against ethnic minorities by the Myanmar government as crimes of apartheid.</p>
<h2>Does terminology matter?</h2>
<p>Despite apartheid becoming a universal legal term, discussions arising from the Human Rights Watch report and earlier accusations of Israeli apartheid often centre on whether the term is relevant beyond the case of South Africa. Those who apply the term often cite similarities to South African apartheid and those who reject the term highlight the differences.</p>
<p>In many cases, the term is used as a rhetorical tool to emphasise the severity of abuses committed, and to rouse opposition to emulate that of the anti-apartheid movement. Others reject such accusations and use the term “Israeli-Palestinian conflict”. This implies there is a two-sided conflict that can only be resolved through negotiations between both parties. </p>
<p>In South Africa, the issue was not about denying whether there was a policy or system of apartheid. The debate focused on whether those who were racially different should have the same rights. </p>
<p>The terminology used is not only a matter of rhetoric, it determines the legal framework governing the situation. Under current International Law, the West Bank, Golan Heights and East Jerusalem are defined as Occupied Territories, under Israeli military occupation following the war in 1967. Laws of occupation are drawn from the law of international armed conflict. </p>
<p>This legal framework seeks to balance the security interests of the occupying power with the interests of the local population until a solution is reached. </p>
<p>The consequences, as explained by legal scholar <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-international-law-of-occupation-9780199682232?cc=gb&lang=en&">Eyal Benvenisti</a>, are that “at the heart of all occupations exists a potential – if not inherent – conflict of interest between occupant and occupied”. </p>
<p>It is the occupying forces, however, that have the power to decide where the balance lies. Hence, much of the opposition to military occupation is about redressing the balance and protecting the rights of the occupied population. </p>
<p>Other considerations and issues arise if the framework is defined differently. Defining the situation using the legal term of “apartheid” points the finger solely in one direction, accusing one party of not only being unlawful but of committing a crime against humanity. It removes the symmetry stemming from the term “conflict” and the justifications of “reasonable” or “proportional” acts that stem from the legal framework of occupation. Terminology matters. </p>
<p>And yet, does terminology matter to those who face discrimination and daily abuses of their rights? Whether apartheid, occupation or conflict, unless concrete action is taken to resolve the situation, it seems the question still remains that of who deserves rights, who does not, and who gets to decide.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/160069/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Leonie Fleischmann does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Human Rights Watch says Israeli action amounts apartheid in certain areas. But what does that really mean?Leonie Fleischmann, Lecturer in International Politics, City, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1197652019-07-08T15:09:11Z2019-07-08T15:09:11ZAmid mounting abuse claims, Jammeh is unlikely to face justice soon. Here’s why<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/282270/original/file-20190702-126376-yh8adk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Then President of The Gambia Yahya Jammeh and First Lady Zeinab arrive at the White House in Washington DC for the US Africa Leaders Summit in 2014. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Michael Reynolds</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Two weeks ago, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48757981">new allegations</a> were added to a litany of human rights abuses that have been levied against the former president of The Gambia, Yahya Jammeh. The exiled former leader, who once infamously claimed that he could cure AIDS with his own <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/jun/01/survivors-yahya-jammehs-bogus-aids-cure-sue-former-gambian-leader">secret herbal mixture and spiritual healing techniques</a> has been <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/06/26/gambia-women-accuse-ex-president-sexual-violence">accused of sexually abusing</a> at least three women at the height of his power.</p>
<p>Jammeh ruled The Gambia with a totalitarian grip for 22 years after seizing power in an army coup in 1994. After he suffered a shock defeat in the 2016 presidential election, he refused to relinquish power. It was only after regional troops <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-38682184">mobilised troops</a> on The Gambian border that he fled to Equatorial Guinea. He’s still there. </p>
<p>Since then, allegations of torture, enforced disappearances, freedom of speech violations, and suspicious deaths in government custody have <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/12/gambia-truth-commission-uncover-jammeh-abuses">emerged</a>. To get to the bottom of the allegations hearings are being carried out by a <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5a7c2ca18a02c7a46149331c/t/5a8451b4e4966bfad91329e9/1518621128178/truth%2C+reconcilation+and+reparations+commission+act%2C+2017.pdf?fbclid=IwAR34Rm3AtU6WJhL_h6nSuckVavr_8rbCMMMNRFLb0W7jG5YNNK8zMIsiuxo">Truth, Reconciliation, and Reparations Commission</a> set up by the new government. </p>
<p>Under the slogan, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48525284">“never again”</a>, the Commission has the job of creating an impartial historical record of violations of human rights that took place under Jammeh’s regime. It is hoped that process achieves a number of objectives. These include promoting healing and reconciliation, addressing the impunity of previous members of government, establishing the fate of disappeared victims, allowing victims to tell their account of violations, and to grant reparations where appropriate.</p>
<p>So far, the public has heard from current and former members of armed forces over an alleged counter-coup plot against Jammeh early in his rule. The testimony of those soldiers has been <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-48525284">horrific</a>. But even if more victims come forward and speak out, and more human rights violations are revealed during future testimony from both victims and abusers, pursuing legal consequences against Jammeh is likely to prove very difficult, if not impossible.</p>
<p>The problem is one that those pursuing justice against former dictators and human rights abusers have encountered <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/22/it-finally-happened-the-long-fight-to-expel-americas-last-known-nazi">before</a>. After Jammeh lost power, he fled to Equitorial Guinea with the equivalent of more than <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/27/gambias-ex-president-stole-almost-1bn-before-fleeing-country">$1 billion from public funds</a>. Equitorial Guinea is not a signatory to the Rome Statute and has no obligation to return him to The Gambia to face justice. This has left Jammeh’s fate in the hands of the country’s President Teodoro Obiang, a close friend and ally. </p>
<h2>The evidence</h2>
<p>In one <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-48525284">incident</a> an alleged member of the counter-coup was arrested, beaten, stripped naked, shot and stabbed with bayonets. It was then discovered that his body was too tall for the grave that had been dug, so one of the executioners chopped off his legs with an axe. </p>
<p>Three women so far have levied accusations of sexual violence against Jammeh. Two have remained anonymous while one – Fatou “Toufah” Jallow – has agreed to come forward publicly. She is expected to give testimony to the Commission later in the year. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/06/26/gambias-women-break-their-silence">graphic detail</a>, Toufah explained to Human Rights Watch how she became a target of the president’s unwanted attentions when, at the age of 18, she won a state-sponsored beauty pageant. As part of her duties as a beauty queen, she was called to a meeting with Jammeh, who began to shower her with presents and money. After a sexual attack in the presidential residence, and fears for her future safety, she disguised herself in a burka and fled across the border to Senegal.</p>
<p>Two other women have also made allegations to Human Rights Watch, but they have chosen to remain anonymous. Marion Volkmann-Brandau, the researcher who exposed these allegations, believes that there were <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/06/26/gambias-women-break-their-silence">many more victims</a>.</p>
<p>Toufah has said that she hopes her revelations encourage other victims to come forward and share their stories. Her plea has been echoed by the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/26/world/africa/gambia-president-rape-accusation.html">Attorney General </a> who has praised her actions and asked others to speak out. </p>
<p>The Truth and Reconciliation Commission has not yet examined any allegations of sexual violence. These hearings are due to take place later in the year. </p>
<h2>Justice might be elusive</h2>
<p>Pursuing legal consequences against Jammeh is likely to prove very difficult, if not impossible. One reason for this is that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission does not have the power to prosecute Jammeh, or any other individual for human rights abuses. Its powers are limited to recommending that the Attorney General acts on cases that can be taken before the courts. </p>
<p>Even if cases are brought, the Gambian government would have to extradite Jammeh from Equatorial Guinea to face trial. Initially, there were hopes that Obiang, who himself has been accused of numerous <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/02/human-rights-defenders-and-activists-in-equatorial-guinea/">human rights atrocities</a>, might feel political pressure to return Jammeh to The Gambia to face his accusers. But a recent <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e-6nzNzX87E">video</a> of the two celebrating New Year together extinguished those hopes.</p>
<p>At least in the short term, it looks unlikely that Jammeh will face either his victims or consequences for human rights abuses.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/119765/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sophie Gallop does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>At least in the short term, it looks unlikely that Jammeh will face either his victims or consequences for human rights abusesSophie Gallop, Lecturer, Nottingham Trent UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1191332019-06-26T13:29:46Z2019-06-26T13:29:46ZWhy some rebel groups force kids to fight: it depends on how they are funded<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/280727/original/file-20190621-61771-1ox3jo0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Rebels from the Lord's Resistance Army making their way to a camp in southern Sudan. The group forcibly recruits children.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Stephen Morrison</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>To sustain their operations, armed groups must have a steady supply of recruits. These serve to fill their fighting ranks and <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/forced-coerced-and-voluntary-recruitment-into-rebel-and-militia-groups-in-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/6842D5D8E2A4725A2A994D168D66C167">to replace those lost to injury, death, or desertion</a>. </p>
<p>Most rebel groups around the world rely initially on volunteers but resort to some form of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09636412.2014.905368">forced recruitment</a> when they can no longer attract enough voluntary recruits. This <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022343317722700">strategy</a> is particularly prevalent among rebel groups that recruit children. But the extent of forcible recruitment of children differs across rebel groups and conflicts and often evolves over the course of a conflict.</p>
<p>The topic of child soldiering has garnered significant attention in academic research. But few studies have considered why rebel organisations resort to the forcible recruitment of children. In cases when research has been done, a prevalent assumption has been that coercive recruitment is a “cheap alternative” to voluntary recruitment and a strategy that <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09636412.2014.905368">“rebel groups will choose to employ … if given the opportunity”</a>. </p>
<p>But is this really the case? In <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1354066119850622">our recent work</a> we tried to understand why some rebel groups forcibly recruit large numbers of children while others don’t. To explain this variation, we examined a factor that’s often overlooked: the influence of a rebel group’s funding. Specifically, we looked at whether rebels profited from natural resources.</p>
<p>To explore the relationship between rebels’ funding sources and forcible recruitment, we looked at more than 150 rebel groups operating around the globe, from South America through Africa to Southeast Asia. We collected information on the level of forcible recruitment of children by these groups. For source data, we relied primarily on independent reports from organisations including Child Soldiers International, the International Labour Organisation, Human Rights Watch, and various independent news and academic outlets. </p>
<p>We made a clear distinction between the broader use of child soldiers, a significant portion of whom volunteer to join armed groups, and those forced into fighting for rebel armies. </p>
<h2>The role of resources</h2>
<p>Why would natural resource funding influence a rebel group’s forced recruitment of children? We offer several plausible explanations. First, we argue that rebel groups that do not profit from natural resources are often more dependent on civilian support to sustain their operations. Lacking a steady funding stream, these groups tend to rely more on local people to contribute money and supplies (like food and water) to their rebellions. Not surprisingly, such groups generally <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/inside-rebellion/FFABBC623483806EFE0A1C48073909F6">refrain from abusing civilians in order to maintain this support</a>. </p>
<p>In contrast, we suggest that when groups successfully profit from natural resources, they become less dependent on the local population. As a result, they tend to be less accountable to local communities and suffer <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/inside-rebellion/FFABBC623483806EFE0A1C48073909F6">fewer costs</a> for abusing civilians. A group that illustrates this point is the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19392206.2016.1208472">Lord’s Resistance Army</a> in northern Uganda. It started to forcibly recruit many children only after solidifying its economic security. </p>
<p>Second, previous research has shown that resource-rich rebel groups are more likely to attract a higher proportion of <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/inside-rebellion/FFABBC623483806EFE0A1C48073909F6">“opportunistic”</a> recruits who are primarily motivated by a desire for personal benefit. In seeking to maximise their own personal gains, they may be reluctant to share group assets with other members. We contend that in such instances, children become prime targets as they can <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818312000409">easily be excluded</a> from the equitable division of assets.</p>
<p>Third, rebels that profit from natural resources generally want to <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022002709336457">sustain and even increase revenues</a>. But they may need additional labour to do so. Coercive recruitment strategies can help them do this. This is particularly true in situations where the natural resources being exploited don’t require skills or equipment. Children can be especially useful in the exploitation of <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0010414006288724?casa_token=h1WegrniG9IAAAAA:umtaS1EwyOlm_FA83sl9NUshKMzbIvOWoqidzfWb_WM8ipUkR8lm9CrvwQpx1b9s4VZp0t9PxF_CuD8">lootable</a> resources, which generally are easier and cheaper to exploit and have low barriers to access. They include commodities such as alluvial diamonds, gems, and drugs like cannabis or coca. </p>
<h2>What we found</h2>
<p>We combined our new data on the level of forcible child recruitment by rebel groups with information on whether these groups profited from natural resources. The <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022343317740621">Rebel Contraband Dataset</a> provides yearly information on rebels’ exploitation of over 20 natural resources ranging from charcoal and diamonds to timber and oil. </p>
<p>Analysing data across a global sample of rebel groups active between 1990 and 2012, our analysis showed that the probability of forced child recruitment increased by 41% when a group profited from natural resources as compared to groups that didn’t. </p>
<p>We also found robust evidence for the linkage between forcible recruitment of children and the exploitation of lootable natural resources. Rebel groups exploiting lootable resources were 27% more likely to forcibly recruit children than groups with only non-lootable or no natural resource funding.</p>
<p>The case of the <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9781849775786/chapters/10.4324/9781849775786-15">Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone</a> offers an illustrative example. The group forcibly recruited children to mine and smuggle diamonds in addition to fighting. Another example is the rebel group <a href="https://www.voanews.com/africa/m23-rebels-drc-using-illegal-gold-finance-rebellion">M23</a> in the <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11832.doc.htm">Democratic Republic of Congo</a>. It forcibly recruited children to aid in the exploitation of valuable minerals including gold.</p>
<h2>Digging deeper</h2>
<p>Overall, our findings underscore the importance of identifying rebel revenue streams in efforts to predict which groups will engage in the forcible recruitment of children. Given that resource-exploiting rebels are significantly more likely to forcibly recruit children, policymakers seeking to mitigate child soldiering may want to focus first on those groups. </p>
<p>The international community can also continue to make it more challenging for rebels to profit from the commodities they exploit, particularly those for which they may need children. An example is the <a href="https://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/what-kp">Kimberley Process</a>, a certification scheme that regulates the rough diamond trade in an effort to stop the flow of conflict diamonds. Initiatives like this have helped inhibit the flow of conflict diamonds and curtail rebels’ demand for labourers, including children.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/119133/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>This material is based in part on work by Beth Elise Whitaker and colleagues that was supported by the US Army Research Office through the Minerva Initiative under grant number W911NF-13-0332.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christopher Michael Faulkner has received funding from the Minerva Research Initiative and the United States Institute of Peace. The views expressed in this article are the authors’ and should not be attributed to the US Institute of Peace,
which does not advocate specific policy.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roos van der Haer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Natural resources are an important factor in explaining why some rebel groups forcibly recruit children into their ranks.Roos van der Haer, Assistant professor of International Relations at the Institute of Political Science, Leiden UniversityBeth Elise Whitaker, Associate Professor of political science, University of North Carolina – CharlotteChristopher Michael Faulkner, Visiting Assistant Professor in International Studies; 2018-2019 Minerva-USIP Peace and Security Scholar, Centre CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1089472019-01-21T13:40:47Z2019-01-21T13:40:47ZThe CAR provides hard lessons on what it means to deliver real justice<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/253637/original/file-20190114-43525-1gdlngs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Many have been displaced by violence in the Central African Republic. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Stringer</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The conundrum facing justice in the Central African Republic (CAR) was well summed up by Jean Pierre Waboe, Vice-president of the country’s Constitutional Court, whom I interviewed:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>In a situation whereby the state does not exist, injustice becomes the norm. Anybody can set about doing anything. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The breakdown of state control since the resurgence of conflict in 2013 has had drastic consequences for the possibility of any forms of governance – political, economic or legal in CAR. </p>
<p>Under these circumstances, the need for “justice” has become more crucial. For Waboe, however, the problem of justice in the country is that it’s seen as too formal, too distant, too complex, and too slow to respond to what’s needed. For justice to work, a country needs a judiciary system that’s functioning, legitimate and credible. And that can deliver justice that’s immediate, operative and helps populations to reconnect torn relationships. A justice that, for him, can “dry tears”. </p>
<p>The question that keeps getting asked is: what justice is possible in a climate of impunity? And indeed in times of war.</p>
<p>The CAR’s Special Criminal Court is the site of protracted struggle over the meaning, and the feasibility of justice. In the absence of a functioning judicial system, the establishment of a <a href="http://www.cps-rca.cf/sites/default/files/inline-files/Loi%20_%20Cour%20p%C3%A9nale%20sp%C3%A9ciale%20_.pdf">tribunal in 2015</a>
was an unprecedented initiative. Yet, the precarious conditions of its existence make it a promise that teeters on the ledge of collapse. </p>
<p>The special court is something of an experiment. Unlike previous ad hoc tribunals such as Yugoslavia and Rwanda, it isn’t meant to constitute an alternative or competitor to the International Criminal Court (<a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/pids/publications/uicceng.pdf">ICC</a>). Rather, it’s role is to complement the ICC’s ongoing investigations into alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity. If successful, <a href="https://justiceinconflict.org/2015/05/14/why-central-african-republics-hybrid-tribunal-could-be-a-game-changer/">the hope</a> is that it could become a model of shared prosecuting authority across domestic and international judicial regimes for grave crimes. </p>
<h2>Fraught with difficulties</h2>
<p>The mandate of the court is to prosecute crimes committed since 2003 including rape and sexual violence, widespread crimes and material destruction. Human Rights Watch found that some of the most egregious and brutal crimes have been committed since <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/05/17/looking-justice/special-criminal-court-new-opportunity-victims-central-african">the breakout of the civil war in 2013</a>. And yet, no form of justice has been offered and no one prosecuted. </p>
<p>The temporary nature of the special court’s mandate sits at odds with the fact that violence is ongoing. In the provinces outside of Bangui and the South West, a plethora of armed groups offer “protection” one day, the next they repress. They raze villages, extract rare minerals, levy tax, loot humanitarian supplies, kidnap people for ransom, set up racket schemes and impose tolls to trucks and people. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13600820701562843?src=recsys&journalCode=cgsj20">Many scholars view</a> special courts as part of the liberal peace building treatment package and in that sense a part of a broader agenda of social transformation of post-conflict societies.</p>
<p>But the CAR’s current volatile conditions render the very administration of justice a dangerous endeavour. Judges and witnesses have to be protected; the domestic judiciary personnel lacks experience in investigating crimes against humanity and the judiciary system itself is vulnerable to “instrumentalisation”, that is its misuse for political or other ends. Deterring fighters from committing grave crimes or recidivists from committing further crimes is one thing. Restoring confidence, trust and respect for the justice system is another. How are ordinary people to respond when it’s clear that the assessment of crimes happens against a backdrop of entrenched hierarchies based on ethnicity, political and religious affiliation, and economic capacity? </p>
<p>There are a host of additional problems too. For instance, the recruitment of young people into armed groups has gone unabated. According to the United Nations’ Children and Armed Conflict report, <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/world/children-and-armed-conflict-report-secretary-general-a72865-s2018465-enar">the number of young recruits quadrupled</a> in 2017 relatively to 2016.</p>
<p>The reality is that, for victims, the promise of justice is a spectrum that carries both risks and possibilities. </p>
<p>The court, for instance, regulates the forms, spaces, styles and even the emotional structure of victim testimony. And the convention of legal proceedings – the use of codified language and formal rules of presentation and evidence for example – leave victims, most of whom are illiterate, further marginalised. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/251933/original/file-20181222-103657-1vcq1gs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/251933/original/file-20181222-103657-1vcq1gs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/251933/original/file-20181222-103657-1vcq1gs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/251933/original/file-20181222-103657-1vcq1gs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/251933/original/file-20181222-103657-1vcq1gs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/251933/original/file-20181222-103657-1vcq1gs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/251933/original/file-20181222-103657-1vcq1gs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">CAR’s Special Criminal Court.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Supplied by author.</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A further complication is that war criminals seem to have little to fear from United Nations forces given the latter’s limited mandate. Besides, atrocities have been committed by all parties involved. The <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/car/bemba?ln=fr">acquittal</a> of Jean Pierre Bemba by the ICC remains a great puzzle for those that have witnessed the atrocities committed by his troops in CAR. </p>
<p>This poses the question of the criteria and line of priority that are to guide future prosecutions. </p>
<h2>The alternatives</h2>
<p>Is there an alternative to lengthy and costly procedures and imprisonment? For Walidou, a legal scholar who has taught at the University of Bangui for many years, there is:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Give to each [former fighter] a modest income, a decent uniform and integrate them in an auxiliary unit to calm them down and they will leave armed groups.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>For Walidou, by taking back youngsters, the state can gather information on logistics, the circulation of weapons, the exploitation of resources, the means of supply to armed groups, and other information that it currently doesn’t have.</p>
<p>The imperative for a justice that restores what has been broken, and the need to make examples of perpetrators who have been captured, can pull in different directions. In fact, they run the risk of cancelling out each other. </p>
<p>What this points to is the need to better understand the sociology of the conflict, to assess the role of justice in relation to the peace process and to reconstruction more generally. This could, for example, mean considering the role of amnesty and moratoria as well as non-legal mechanisms in national reconciliation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/108947/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amy Niang received a grant to cover a research trip to the Central African Republic as part of the Uncovering Security Story Lab programme supported by the Thomson Reuters Foundation, the Stanley Foundation and the Gerda Henkel Stiftung.</span></em></p>The volatile conditions in the Central African Republic make the administration of justice difficult.Amy Niang, Visiting Professor at the University of Sao Paulo and Senior Lecturer in International Relations, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/973302018-05-28T13:24:22Z2018-05-28T13:24:22ZWhen the poor sponsor the rich: Rwanda and Arsenal FC<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/220617/original/file-20180528-80658-35bz8h.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Arsenal FC's new sponsor is Rwanda.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://twitter.com/search?q=Visit%20Rwanda&src=typd">Twitter/@Arsenal</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Rwanda keeps surprising. Recently the Rwandan Development Board signed a <a href="https://www.arsenal.com/news/club-welcomes-visit-rwanda-new-partner">sleeve sponsoring deal</a> with London Premier League club, Arsenal. Over a three-year period, the 200 sq centimetre ad “Visit Rwanda” will cost the country USD$39 million. </p>
<p>President Paul Kagame is known to be a <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2018/05/23/rwanda-becomes-arsenal-s-first-sleeve-sponsor-in-3-year-partnership//">committed Arsenal fan</a>. Recently, he even tweeted that the club needed a new coach after Arsenal’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/sport/football/43846363">once invincible</a> league and cup winning manager Arsene Wenger’s poor record over the past number of seasons. One may suppose that it is a coincidence that the deal was struck just after Wenger’s retirement at the end of the 2017/18 season.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"992151058892902403"}"></div></p>
<p>Rwanda is the <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD">19th poorest country</a> in the world with a per capita income of around USD$700. Arsenal is one of the <a href="http://www.cityam.com/257361/arsenal-chelsea-tottenham-and-west-ham-make-london-home">richest football clubs</a> in the world. It’s not surprising therefore that the nearly USD$40 million has upset quite a few people. </p>
<p>Dutch lawmakers, including some from the governing coalition, immediately <a href="http://ktpress.rw/2018/05/dutch-mps-annoyed-by-rwanda-arsenal-fc-deal/">reacted angrily</a> to the news that such a poor country receiving a great deal of aid from The Netherlands would sponsor one of the world’s richest soccer clubs. Similar reactions could be heard in the UK, Rwanda’s second largest bilateral donor. An MP <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world/africa">described</a> the deal as “an own goal for foreign aid”. </p>
<p>In addition, those concerned with democracy and human rights think the deal is sending the wrong message about a country that has a strong <a href="https://theconversation.com/presidential-term-limits-slippery-slope-back-to-authoritarianism-in-africa-96796">authoritarian streak</a> running through it. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-rwandas-development-model-wouldnt-work-elsewhere-in-africa-89699">Why Rwanda's development model wouldn't work elsewhere in Africa</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The question is: Is Kagame entering into a deal with his favourite club to promote tourism or has he done it to enhance his image and shield him from criticism? He appears to have made the <a href="http://www.minecofin.gov.rw/fileadmin/templates/documents/BUdget_Management_and_Reporting_Unit/Budget_Framework_Papers/2017-2020_Budget_Framework_Paper.pdf">decision</a> off his own bat: the contract appears not to have been discussed in the cabinet and the money does not figure in the budget approved by parliament.</p>
<h2>Rwanda’s rationale</h2>
<p>For the Rwandan government, the deal is part of a broader strategy to develop <a href="https://www.wttc.org/-/media/files/reports/economic-impact-research/countries-2018/rwanda2018.pdf">tourism</a>, which in 2017 accounted for about 12.7% of GDP and USD$400 million of revenue. The country sees upmarket leisure and convention tourism as an important growth sector. It has a lot going for it: lush green landscapes, the mountain gorillas of the Virunga volcanos, the Akagera wildlife park, the tropical Nyungwe forest, idyllic Lake Kivu, and even genocide memorials – all compressed into a space of just 26,000 sq kms.</p>
<p>This strategy is integrated and makes sense on paper. The state has invested heavily in its national airline<a href="https://www.rwandair.com/"> RwandAir</a> and built the Kigali Convention Centre and high-end hotels. And the development of the new Bugesera International Airport, designed to become a major regional hub, is underway. </p>
<p>But there are doubts about the profitability of these ventures. For instance, RwandAir has yet <a href="https://www.afritraveller.com/single-post/2017/08/28/Aggressive-Marketing-RwandAir-Reduces-Losses-to-1million">to break even</a> 14 years after it was launched. The government <a href="http://www.therwandan.com/rwandair-bankrupting-rwanda/">keeps it afloat</a> with an annual grant of USD$50 million just for operations.</p>
<p>Investments in a constantly expanding fleet to cater for an ever growing network of continental and intercontinental destinations require considerable borrowing at a high cost. The fiscal <a href="https://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1458768/rwandas-risky-bet-prosperous-economic-future">risk</a> involved in the government’s strategy is high, and economists wonder how sustainable these outlays will be in the medium term.</p>
<p>Calculations like these are for the Rwandan government to consider. But has Arsenal considered the signal it’s giving in light of Kagame’s human rights and democracy records?</p>
<h2>Risks for Arsenal</h2>
<p>Canadian investigative journalist Judi Rever recently <a href="http://www.cbc.ca/radio/asithappens/as-it-happens-monday-full-episode-1.4602119/canadian-journalist-challenges-rwandan-genocide-narrative-in-new-book-1.4602122">recorded in a book</a>, “In Praise of Blood: The Crimes of the Rwandan Patriotic Front”, that the Rwandan regime has massacred tens if not hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians, particularly in the 1990s. </p>
<p>And last year <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/rwanda">Human Rights Watch</a> issued worrying reports about human rights abuses. These included the rounding up and arbitrary detention of poor people in “transit centres” across the country, widespread repression in land cases, extrajudicial killings and unlawful detention and torture in military facilities. </p>
<p>In October 2017 the United Nations subcommittee on Prevention of Torture <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/live/world-africa-41513811">suspended</a> its visit to Rwanda because of “a series of obstructions imposed by the authorities”. It was only the third time in 10 years the subcommittee has done this. </p>
<p>On top of this there has been widespread analysis and commentary on the state of democracy in Rwanda. The country is a <em>de facto</em> one-party state with no meaningful political opposition, no press freedom and no independent civil society. </p>
<p>Kagame’s grip on power is absolute and in August last year he was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/05/paul-kagame-secures-third-term-in-rwanda-presidential-election">reelected</a> with over 98% of the vote. A <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/20/rwanda-vote-gives-president-paul-kagame-extended-powers">referendum</a> on a constitutional amendment in 2015 gave him the right to stay office until 2034.</p>
<p>Realising that battles are fought in the media as much, if not more than on the ground, Kagame’s party, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) has developed a formidable information and communication <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno15-8-03.htm">strategy</a> stretching back to the civil war it launched in October 1990.</p>
<p>Kagame once <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=qMi8CwAAQBAJ&pg=PA225&lpg=PA225&dq=Kagame+:+We+used+communication+and+information+warfare+better+than+anyone.+We+have+found+a+new+way+of+doing+things.&source=bl&ots=c02IPqnffm&sig=jxE09JPPgsHbjPXcOOR1tSB6-Lo&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi_wZiOkKjbAhVpBMAKHXPaADkQ6AEIJjAA#v=onepage&q=Kagame%20%3A%20We%20used%20communication%20and%20information%20warfare%20better%20than%20anyone.%20We%20have%20found%20a%20new%20way%20of%20doing%20things.&f=false">said</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We used communication and information warfare better than anyone. We have found a new way of doing things. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>This has involved paying those who can help promote the right image, including <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=dX4LAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA188&lpg=PA188&dq=Rwanda+W2+Group+at+the+cost+of+US$50,000+per+month&source=bl&ots=K_Itl3UI_t&sig=JYFJVP5vXlWUknNJaV3o1kYnd-0&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj84q2kkKjbAhXJLMAKHVE5APkQ6AEIJjAA#v=onepage&q=Rwanda%20W2%20Group%20at%20the%20cost%20of%20US%2450%2C000%20per%20month&f=false">public relations firms</a>. </p>
<h2>Political ethics and sport</h2>
<p>True, political ethics and sports don’t match well. Until recently FC Barcelona agreed to a Qatar sponsorship that saw the country featured on the team’s jerseys. Qatar has a very chequered political record. Due to host the 2022 World Cup, it’s <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/middle-east-and-north-africa/qatar/report-qatar/">known</a> for its notorious human rights abuse, especially when it comes to the rights of migrant workers and women. </p>
<p>Another example is Atlético Madrid which was controversially <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/football/2014/may/04/football-sponsored-shirts-shame-atletico-madrid-azerbaijan">sponsored by Azerbaijan</a>, where the Euro 2020 football tournament will take place. This east European country has been <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-and-central-asia/azerbaijan/">flagged by Amnesty International</a> for its “crackdown on the right to freedom of expression, particularly following revelations of large-scale political corruption”.</p>
<p>Not that it should make any difference, but these two countries are very rich, while Rwanda is very poor.</p>
<p>And I nearly forgot: Many Arsenal fans were <a href="https://news.arseblog.com/2018/05/arsenal-reveal-sleeve-sponsor-for-2018-19-season/">opposed to the deal</a>, not because of Rwanda’s human rights and democracy records, but because they didn’t like the design of the sleeve print.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/97330/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Filip Reyntjens does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Political ethics and sports don’t match well. The recent deal between Rwanda and Arsenal is potentially a case in point.Filip Reyntjens, Professor of Law and Politics, Institute of Development Policy and Management (IOB), University of AntwerpLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/940442018-03-27T14:41:40Z2018-03-27T14:41:40ZWhy the election of a black senator won’t make a dent on racism in Italy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/212178/original/file-20180327-109179-wgqbxl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Legal senator Tony Chike Iwobi casts his ballot to elect the speaker of the Italian Senate.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Alessandro di Meo</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/italy-elections-black-senator-elect-lega-nord-anti-immigration-party-toni-iwobi-brescia-lombardy-a8243736.html">recent election</a> of Nigerian-born Mr Anthony (Tony) Chike Iwobi as a Senator at the Italian Parliament of the far-right, Populist Party of the Ligue (La Lega), has brought into sharp relief the question of racism and xenophobia in the country.</p>
<p>Iwobi is not only the first Senator of African origin to have been elected in Italy. He’s also the first person from sub-Saharan Africa to have been elected to <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/italy-elections-black-senator-elect-lega-nord-anti-immigration-party-toni-iwobi-brescia-lombardy-a8243736.html">represent a far-right party</a>, la Lega (The League) led by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/05/matteo-salvini-the-italian-far-right-leader-stepping-out-of-berlusconis-shadow">Matteo Salvini</a>.</p>
<p>But his election is unlikely to lead to less racism and xenophobia in the country nor will it bring any respite for migrants in the country. This is for two reasons: racism and xenophobia have become more entrenched in Italy, and neither Iwobi’s party, nor the senator himself, are sympathetic towards migrants.</p>
<p>In recent years both Italians and outside observers have become increasingly concerned <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/03/21/everyday-intolerance/racist-and-xenophobic-violence-italy">about the rise of xenophobia in the country</a>. Italian anti-racism groups and international human rights institutions have greater and greater intolerance. </p>
<p>The momentum picked up over the past year. Xenophobia spread, <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-italy-fake-news-helps-populists-and-far-right-triumph-92271">fuelled by fake news</a> which targeted Italian political personalities seen to hold more liberal views. </p>
<p>In February 2018, just weeks before the election of Iwobi, Amnesty International declared that Italy was</p>
<blockquote>
<p>steeped in hatred, racism and xenophobia, and unjustified fear of the other.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It added that 50% of discriminatory, racist, and hate speech came from the League leader <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/05/matteo-salvini-the-italian-far-right-leader-stepping-out-of-berlusconis-shadow">Salvini</a> himself.</p>
<p>Migrants in Italy are increasingly seen as a threat to society. The centre-right coalition, which attracted the highest percentage of votes in the recent elections, focused its campaign on the slogan “Italians first”. The leader of the coalition Silvio Berlusconi even declared that “migrants are a social bomb.”</p>
<p>Iwobi is likely to be part of the problem, rather than part of campaign to end racism and xenophobia in the country. This is because his views towards migrants aren’t very sympathetic. As he <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/europe/comments/82fpx9/the_first_black_senator_of_italy_was_elected_with/">put it</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>There are two types of immigration: regular immigration, which is welcome, and illegal immigration, which is a crime everywhere except in Italy. Why import new poor people without being able to guarantee them a future?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>And at a conference in Abuja in 2015, he <a href="https://www.thecable.ng/got-europe-student-visa-warned-nigerians-libya-meet-iwobi-first-black-italian-senator">said</a> he would not want to discourage his people from travelling but “he would rather advise them to stay at home where it is more secure.” </p>
<p>This is a peculiar assertion given that in 2017 the World Economic Forum <a href="http://reports.weforum.org/travel-and-tourism-competitiveness-report-2017/ranking/#series=TTCI.A.02">ranked Nigeria</a> the fifth most dangerous country in the world.</p>
<h2>Rise of xenophobia</h2>
<p>In 1985, the number of foreign-born people in Italy holding a residence permit was estimated at about 423,000. <a href="https://www.istat.it/en/files/2017/10/Infographic-Non-EU-citizens-in-Italy.-Years-2016-2017.pdf">Between 2016-2017</a> the total number of non EU-citizens had risen to <a href="https://www.istat.it/en/files/2017/10/Infographic-Non-EU-citizens-in-Italy.-Years-2016-2017.pdf">3,714,137</a>. Most were from Morocco (454,817).</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/italys-southern-exposure">new flows of migrants</a> have created tensions. But racism and xenophobia have been on the rise for over a decade.</p>
<p>In 2008, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination expressed concern about <a href="http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/docs/co/CERD-C-ITA-CO-15.pdf">hate speech</a> in the country. This included comments by politicians, negative attitudes and stereotypes directed at foreigners and the minority Roma people as well as their ill-treatment <a href="http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/docs/co/CERD-C-ITA-CO-15.pdf">by law enforcement officers</a> during camp raids. The committee urged Italy to:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>take resolute action to counter any tendency, especially from politicians, to target, stigmatize, stereotype or profile people on the basis of race, colour, descent and national or ethnic origin or to use racist propaganda for political purposes.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Two years later <a href="http://www.un.org/news/dh/pdf/english/2010/11032010.pdf">Navi Pillay</a>, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, expressed her “considerable concern at the authorities’ policy of treating migrants and <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-who-are-the-roma-19402">the Roma as</a>, above all, a security problem rather than one of social inclusion.” She expressed </p>
<blockquote>
<p>alarm at the often extraordinarily negative portrayal of both migrants and Roma in some parts of the media, and by some politicians and other authorities.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In March 2011, Human Rights Watch <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/03/21/everyday-intolerance/racist-and-xenophobic-violence-italy">published a report</a> entitled “Everyday Intolerance: Racist and Xenophobic Violence in Italy”. The report pointed to</p>
<blockquote>
<p>worrying signs exist that increasing diversity has led to increasing intolerance, with some resorting to or choosing violence to express racist or xenophobic sentiments.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The current reality for African immigrants is that it’s become increasingly difficult to become a legal migrant. <a href="http://openmigration.org/en/analyses/5-things-to-know-about-italys-plan-for-immigration/">Forced returns</a> have been accelerated. This is true even to countries with dictatorships such as Sudan, or where there are systematic violations of human rights such as Libya. </p>
<p>And migrants have been made more vulnerable. There’s been a reduction in the <a href="http://openmigration.org/en/analyses/5-things-to-know-about-italys-plan-for-immigration/">jurisdictional guarantees</a> for asylum-seekers and appeals for rejected claims are increasingly being denied.</p>
<h2>False stereotypes</h2>
<p>One of the false stereotypes about migrants in Italy is that they want to remain in the country. In fact, a study done by the <a href="https://www.iom.int/">International Migration Organisation</a>, in 2016 found that migrants arriving in Italy didn’t have any destination in mind. </p>
<p>In addition, according to a recent report of <a href="https://www.msf.org.za/stories-news/press-releases/italy-migrants-and-refugees-margins-society">Medecins sand Frontieres</a>, Italy doesn’t have adequate reception policies for migrants. About 10,000 are living in inhumane conditions in informal settlements with limited access to basic services.</p>
<p>Yet in September 2017 the previous government presented its first official plan for the integration of migrants. This included objectives such as teaching new arrivals Italian. In addition, <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/italy-elections-2018-migrants-berlusconi-italians-first-refugees-deportation-coalition-a8216721.html">the government committed</a> to promoting training and apprenticeship schemes for migrants. </p>
<p>But, in this climate, the situation for migrants in Italy doesn’t seem rosy – at least for now and the imminent future. </p>
<p>Italy still doesn’t have a government given the fractured outcome of the elections. But, giving that the centre-right, anti-immigrant coalition (including the Ligue) got the highest number of votes, it’s likely that the new government will be headed by a centre-right leader whose ideas will not favour integrating African migrants. </p>
<p>A recent banner, portrayed at a school, where a debate on the integration of migrants was to be held in 2017 portrayed the climate surrounding African migrants in Italy:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Non ci sono negri italiani (There are no black Italians).</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/94044/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cristiano d'Orsi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Italy’s first black senator, and the party he represents, won’t be advancing the fight against xenophobia.Cristiano d'Orsi, Research Fellow and Lecturer at the South African Research Chair in International Law (SARCIL), University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/744542017-03-15T16:05:02Z2017-03-15T16:05:02ZHow human rights are faring in South Africa two decades after democracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/160743/original/image-20170314-10759-a9ctny.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mass funeral for the victims of the 1960 Sharpeville massacre. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Flickr</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Every year South Africans celebrate <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/project-event-details/2">Human Rights Day</a> on March 21 to commemorate the 1960 <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/sharpeville-massacre-21-march-1960">Sharpeville massacre</a> when police opened fire on a crowd killing 69 unarmed people. They were protesting against the humiliating <a href="http://overcomingapartheid.msu.edu/multimedia.php?id=65-259-3">pass laws</a> that controlled the movement of black people.</p>
<p>Besides a reminder of a dark period in the country’s history, this day also celebrates South Africa’s unique and highly acclaimed <a href="http://www.gov.za/DOCUMENTS/CONSTITUTION/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996-1">constitution</a>. Its <a href="http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/constitution/english-web/ch2.html">Bill of Rights</a> guarantees human dignity and equal rights to all citizens.</p>
<p>But, despite the constitutional protection of human rights and its relative success at providing basic services to citizens, the government struggles to meet demands for socio-economic rights. For example the pace of delivery of housing, water and sanitation, health care and education, which are provided for in the constitution, has been slow since South Africa’s <a href="http://www.hurisa.org.za/training/socio-economic-rights/">transition to democracy</a>. </p>
<p>The biggest concerns for many South Africans, according to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/africa/south-africa">Human Rights Watch</a>, include: access to treatment for people with disabilities, unemployment, corruption, freedom of expression, police brutality and violence. </p>
<p>What South Africa has going for it is its constitution. This needs to come to life by protecting human rights across the board. This can only happen if laws are made real, by for example, cases being taken to court to set precedents that protect rights.</p>
<h2>Human rights challenges</h2>
<p>An estimated half-a-million children with disabilities have been shut out of the country’s <a href="https://www.hrw.org/africa/south-africa">education system</a> according to Human Rights Watch. </p>
<p>Unemployment remains stubbornly high. In the third quarter of last year it reached 27.1% after averaging 25.37% <a href="http://www.tradingeconomics.com/south-africa/unemployment-rate">from 2000-2016</a>. This has led to <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/general/94849/shocking-levels-of-poverty-in-south-africa-revealed/">high levels of poverty</a>. According to Stats SA’s Quarterly Labour Force Survey 8.9 million people who want to work <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=9561">don’t have jobs</a>.</p>
<p>And corruption</p>
<blockquote>
<p>threatens the rule of law, democracy and <a href="https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/173">human rights</a> …</p>
</blockquote>
<p>South Africa is ranked 64th out of 175 in the 2016 Transparency International’s <a href="http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016">Corruption Perceptions Index</a>. It ranks countries and territories based on how corrupt their public sectors are perceived to be. </p>
<p>In addition, people who try to report corruption are often <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/general/78489/r700-billion-lost-to-corruption-in-south-africa/">intimidated or muzzled</a>. </p>
<p>Media freedom, free expression and the free flow of information are vital to a healthy democracy. These have all been hard-won in the country. Although it’s not all bad news on this front, the Right2Know Media Freedom & Diversity movement, which focuses on freedom of expression and access to information, notes that:</p>
<p>Compared to most of our neighbours, and indeed many old western democracies, our press freedom record is not all that bad, but this is only because with every attempt by the powerful to restrict media freedom, the public is able to keep <a href="http://www.r2k.org.za/2016/05/03/world-press-freedom-day-2016-challenges-to-media-freedom-in-sa/">pushing back</a>.</p>
<p>Another persistent problem is police brutality and use of excessive force, especially <a href="https://www.hrw.org/africa/south-africa">against protesters</a>. In its submission to the United Nations in 2016, the South African Human Rights Commission reported that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>South Africa has witnessed a tremendous increase in the number of protests, particularly those relating to the failures of local government to <a href="http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/SessionDetails1.aspx?SessionID=1016&Lang=en">deliver basic services</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Another major concern is that South Africa remains a deeply violent society. For example, violence against women, including rape and domestic violence, remains very high. One in every four women is physically abused by her <a href="http://city-press.news24.com/News/shocking-stats-on-abuse-of-women-in-sa-20161120">intimate partner</a>. According to Professor Naeemah Abrahams, Deputy Director at the Gender and Health Unit at the Medical Research Council, a woman is killed every six hours by her current or former <a href="http://city-press.news24.com/News/shocking-stats-on-abuse-of-women-in-sa-20161120">intimate partner</a>.</p>
<p>A study conducted by the World Health Organisation in 2012 found that 65% of women in SA had experienced <a href="http://city-press.news24.com/News/shocking-stats-on-abuse-of-women-in-sa-20161120">spousal abuse</a> in the year before the research was conducted. </p>
<p>Thankfully, South Africa continues to play an important, although at times inconsistent role, in advancing the rights of <a href="http://www.uas.alaska.edu/juneau/activities/safezone/docs/lgbtiq_terminology.pdf">LGBTIQ+</a> people. It was the first country to protect sexuality in its constitution and is reckoned to be a champion of gay rights. Yet in June 2016 it refused to support a <a href="https://theconversation.com/lgbti-vote-at-the-un-shows-battle-for-human-rights-is-far-from-won-62307">landmark resolution</a> on LGBTI rights at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva.</p>
<h2>Fixing the problem</h2>
<p>To address these shortcomings South Africa must focus on the judicial enforcement of human rights. A right without a remedy raises questions of whether it is in fact a right at all.</p>
<p>Although there are other ways of protecting rights, judicial enforcement has a clear role in developing an understanding of these rights. Test cases can lead to systematic institutional change to prevent violations of rights in the future. This has already happened in some important landmark cases such as the Constitutional Court ruling that set the bar for protection of <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2002/16.html">HIV positive people</a>. </p>
<p>Other possible solutions include: education, constructive dialogue, exerting pressure to bring violations of human rights to public notice and to discourage further violence and <a href="http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/human-rights-protect">curbing corruption</a> by protecting whistleblowers.</p>
<p>But two questions remain: do South Africans have the perseverance and are they strong and morally bold enough to stand up for these rights? And, if necessary, to challenge the powerful (government) in court where they are threatened?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/74454/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Jones does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Besides a reminder of a dark period in South Africa’s history, Human Rights Day also celebrates the country’s unique, highly acclaimed constitution which guarantees human dignity and equal rights.Chris Jones, Academic project leader in the Department of Practical Theology and Missiology, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/713672017-01-19T15:01:03Z2017-01-19T15:01:03ZA triple execution in Bahrain has provoked national outrage – and international silence<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/153466/original/image-20170119-26577-1e2fjqf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Executed in Bahrain.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reprieve</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the middle of the night, on January 15 2017, three citizens of Bahrain were <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/15/bahrain-three-men-death-sentence-shia-muslims-gulf">executed by firing squad</a>. Abbas al-Samea, 27, Ali al-Singace, 21, and Sami Mushaima 42, had all been found guilty of planting a bomb which killed three policemen – but their convictions were <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/01/bahrain-first-executions-in-more-than-six-years-a-shocking-blow-to-human-rights/">widely seen as unsafe</a>. </p>
<p>Rumours of their 3am deaths had been circulating on the social media of those with links to the government. Once the state news agency confirmed the news, many Bahrainis took to the streets in protest, confronting riot police, who used tear gas and birdshot in response. Human rights organisations condemned the killings, not simply because they oppose the death penalty, but because these executions were viewed as being political and extrajudicial. </p>
<p>The UN Special Rapporteur on extra-judicial executions tweeted: </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"820532830744772608"}"></div></p>
<p>Nicholas McGeehan of Human Rights Watch added on <a href="https://twitter.com/NcGeehan">social media</a>: “These men’s convictions were based on retracted confessions and mired in allegations of serious torture.” It was a sentiment reflected poignantly by many Bahrainis, who formed huge queues to pay their respects to the executed men’s families. </p>
<p>The national controversy surrounding the executions is the latest demonstration of the political turmoil in Bahrain, and popular opposition to what is a democracy in name only. Since 2011, when widespread pro-democracy protests broke out, over a hundred civilians have been killed – many by teargas and torture. An independent <a href="http://www.bici.org.bh/">report</a> (the BICI report) documenting the events of that year revealed systematic torture, arbitrary detentions, and extra judicial killing in the streets. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/152910/original/image-20170116-9062-12rkgaz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/152910/original/image-20170116-9062-12rkgaz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152910/original/image-20170116-9062-12rkgaz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152910/original/image-20170116-9062-12rkgaz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152910/original/image-20170116-9062-12rkgaz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152910/original/image-20170116-9062-12rkgaz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152910/original/image-20170116-9062-12rkgaz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Image from social media showing the bullet hole patterns in the bodies of the shot men, with their initials in Arabic letters.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Since the report, which the King accepted to much international acclaim, the Bahrain government has emphasised its commitment to reforms. Yet implementation of the recommendations has been frequently documented as inadequate. Americans for Democracy and Human Rights in Bahrain (ADHRB) <a href="https://www.adhrb.org/2015/11/shattering-the-facade-a-report-on-bahrains-implementation-of-the-bahrain-independent-commission-of-inquiry-bici-four-years-on/">found</a> that only two of the report’s 26 recommendations had been fully implemented, and eight had not even begun. Many of these reforms centred around creating mechanisms to ensure an end to torture and an increase of state accountability. Even Professor Cherif Bassiouni, the head of the BICI team, <a href="http://mcherifbassiouni.com/bahrain-right-thing/">wrote</a> in June last year that most of the reforms had not been fully implemented. </p>
<p>But things are actually getting worse. Amid the token reforms, the January executions show that Bahrain is regressing with regards to political development and human rights. The country’s only remotely critical newspaper, Al Wasat, which was shut down in 2011, has now been <a href="http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/766028">ordered by the government</a> to close its online paper, too. The official reason given was that it was “jeapordising national unity and disrupting public peace”. In fact, it had been slighty critical of the executions. </p>
<p>Earlier this year, the government of Bahrain announced that it was reversing one of the BICI reforms which stipulated that Bahrain’s National Security Agency (NSA) have its powers of arrest removed. The power separation was considered important in controlling torture. Other laws enacted which have clamped down on freedom of expression, alongside the arrest of activists, have prompted accusations not of reform, but of <a href="http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/abs/10.1108/S0163-786X20160000039011">de-democratisation</a>. The fact that these are the first official executions to have occurred since 2010 suggest Bahrain is becoming more, not less authoritarian. </p>
<h2>International influence</h2>
<p>Bahrain’s small size and its reliance on foreign countries has also resulted in anger at the perceived complicity of numerous governments. Saudi troops, along with officers from states including the UAE, assisted in dealing with the unrest in 2011. Many of Bahrain’s military officers are from other Arab or Muslim countries, and many have <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/british-commandos-training-bahraini-armed-forces-to-use-sniper-rifles-a6952836.html">received training by the British</a> (including from John Yates, ex-assistant Commissioner of Scotland Yard). </p>
<p>As a result, many Bahrainis feel increasingly isolated from the global community, who they believe are the only ones able to put pressure on the Bahrain government to reform, democratise, and implement human rights reform. Activist <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/sep/02/maryam-alkhawaja-arrest-bahrain-us-uk">Maryam Al Khawaja</a> accused the UK, Bahrain’s former protector, of abetting this authoritarian excess and allowing the executions to go ahead. She wrote on Twitter: </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"820553226399387652"}"></div></p>
<p><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GZjvLgjBpH4">Protests</a> in London outside the embassy also reflected this anger. And it is an anger founded not simply on the fact that the British response to the executions was considered <a href="https://inews.co.uk/essentials/news/uk/britain-condemned-inadequate-response-execution-bahrain-shia-torture-victims/">“woefully inadequate”</a>, but because the UK has been training the Bahrain police since 2011. The charity <a href="http://www.reprieve.org.uk/">Reprieve</a> noted that the UK also taught the Bahrainis how to <a href="http://www.reprieve.org.uk/press/uk-taught-bahrain-police-whitewash-custody-deaths/">“whitewash custody deaths”</a> and provided training to the police <a href="http://www.reprieve.org.uk/press/police-scotland-trained-saudi-bahraini-officers-without-human-rights-checks/">without</a> conducting proper human rights assessments. </p>
<p>As a result of the executions, frustration in Bahrain will inevitably increase. Scenes of people chanting “Down with [King] Hamad” at the police are becoming more common again. The regression back to more authoritarian ways is enabled by a lack of pressure from traditional international allies. </p>
<p>For the UK, this apparent “complicity” is unlikely to change. Jane Kinninmont of <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/">Chatham House</a>, the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, notes that Brexit will likely <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/post-brexit-britain-would-double-down-middle-east-alliances">diminish attempts to support human rights</a>. With traditional allies like the UK less choosy about trade, less choosy about allies, and less choosy about human rights, Bahrain is set to see more instability and unrest.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/71367/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marc Jones received funding from the ESRC for his PhD. He is affiliated with Bahrain Watch, an NGO that documents issues of governance, arms sales, and PR in Bahrain and the wider Gulf. </span></em></p>State killings are the latest demonstration of the country’s regression.Marc Jones, Research Fellow, Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies, University of ExeterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/691222016-12-12T18:05:19Z2016-12-12T18:05:19ZBurundi edges closer to the abyss in 2016<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/149385/original/image-20161209-31370-j197sj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A protestor uses grass to obscure his identity during a protest against President Pierre Nkurunziza's decision to run for a third term in Bujumbura, Burundi. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Goran Tomasevic</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Burundi’s President Pierre Nkurunziza was hardly a household name. That was before he turned his country into a hellhole following his unconstitutional <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33590991">decision</a> in 2015 to run for a third term. </p>
<p>Burundi <a href="http://www.swarthmore.edu/SocSci/soconne1/documents/Nkurunziza.pdf">is</a> an overpopulated and immensely corrupt state. It shares much the same ethnic map as Rwanda. But it hardly attracted a fraction of the attention claimed by its neighbour to the north during and after the <a href="http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/education/rwandagenocide.shtml">1994 genocide</a>. If anything, its principal claim to fame was that it successfully managed its <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/burundi">transition</a> to multi-party democracy after a vicious 10-year civil war.</p>
<p>The key to this remarkable achievement was a power-sharing arrangement. The arrangement gave a share of executive and legislative power to the two principal, and once bitterly antagonistic, ethnic communities, the Hutu and Tutsi. The Tutsi account for approximately 30% – this is a guesstimate as no reliable recent census figures are available – of a population of some ten million.</p>
<p>At first, the experiment seemed highly promising. It was formalised in the <a href="http://africacenter.org/spotlight/burundi-why-the-arusha-accords-are-central/">Arusha accords</a> of 2000, and later enshrined in the <a href="http://aoma.ukzn.ac.za/Libraries/Newsletters_2011/Constitution_of_Burundi_English.sflb.ashx">2005</a> constitution. It offered a striking counter-example to Rwanda’s tragic destinies. It all went well until the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32724083">failed coup</a> of May 13 2015. The coup was a desperate attempt by a group of dissident officers to seize power by force. The light was shone on the regime’s savagery. The precipitating factor was Nkurunziza’s decision to run for a third term, in violation of the constitution.</p>
<h2>The Burundi enigma</h2>
<p>Burundi today seems dangerously close to a Rwanda-like scenario. The Tutsi minority was targeted once again as a potential victim of genocidal violence. On closer inspection, the events of 2016 reveal a more ambivalent state of affairs. A <a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/burundi-hears-echoes-anti-tutsi-hate-speech-that-sparked-rwanda-genocide-1527836">significant number</a> of Tutsi elites, civil servants, army men, journalists and human rights activists have been killed by pro-regime elements. Scores of Tutsi <a href="http://time.com/4179101/rape-burundi/">women have been raped</a>.</p>
<p>But the same could be said of the hundreds of <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/29/world/africa/burundi-crackdown-puts-hutus-and-tutsis-and-the-west-on-edge.html?_r=0">Hutu victims</a>. One can’t ignore the large number of extra-judicial killings <a href="http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/burundi_report_english-2.pdf">committed</a> by anti-Nkurunziza rebels. These are opponents of Nkurunziza and both Hutu or Tutsi are targets. </p>
<p>Since 2015, <a href="http://eng.imirasire.com/news/all-around/out-of-rwanda/article/burundians-living-in-terror-after">at least</a> 1,000 people have been killed. Thousands of others have been arbitrarily arrested and tortured. An estimated 330,000 have fled their homeland to <a href="https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/burundi">neighbouring states</a>. </p>
<p>But we have to be cautious in speaking of a straight Hutu-Tutsi confrontation. The conflict is not strictly speaking ethnic. It’s political. It revolves around the pro- and anti-Nkurunziza’s third term option.</p>
<p>At the heart of the Burundi enigma lies a paradox. This is the power-sharing formula devised in the Arusha accords – the critical element behind the transition to democracy – and it still holds. Nonetheless, everything points to a diffuse yet distinctly anti-Tutsi political climate.</p>
<h2>Hutu takeover</h2>
<p>Today 60% of government positions and parliamentary seats are <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/burundi1105/2.htm">controlled</a> by Hutu and 40% by Tutsi. The army, as prescribed by the constitution, is evenly split between Hutu and Tutsi, each accounting for 50% of the officer corps and troops. Left out of the accounting, however, is:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>The growing number of Hutu hard-liners in positions of authority</p></li>
<li><p>The presence of parallel security organisations under tight Hutu control</p></li>
<li><p>The systematic clamping down on civil society organisations, and</p></li>
<li><p>The climate of pervasive fear created by the omnipresent Hutu-dominated youth militia known as <em>imbonerakure</em>. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Burundi is seen by many as alarmingly close to the edge of the abyss. Given the salience of such informal control mechanisms this is hardly surprising. Such is the consensus of most Burundi experts. Their views are corroborated by the International Federation of Human Rights Leagues <a href="https://www.fidh.org/en/region/Africa/burundi/repression-and-genocidal-dynamics-in-burundi">report</a>, the <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/UNIIB/Pages/UNIIB.aspx">2016 report</a> of the UN High Commission for Human Rights, many Human Rights Watch <a href="https://www.hrw.org/africa/burundi">reports</a> and the <a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/burundi-will-soon-be-one-africas-biggest-refugee-crises-says-msf-1591871">international media</a>.</p>
<h2>A bleak future</h2>
<p>But what adds to the sense of pessimism is such actions as the appointment of notorious hard-liners to key positions. </p>
<p>For example, General Evariste Ndayishimiye’s <a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/burundian-opposition-concerned-by-appointment-army-general-ndayishimiye-head-cndd-fdd-1577368">appointment</a> as the secretary general of the Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie – the current ruling party in Burundi. This leaves few doubts about the intransigence of the regime. He is known to be a tough-minded general and viscerally anti-Tutsi. </p>
<p>Ethnicity is becoming more noticeable as a policy issue. A growing number of Tutsi elements have been excluded from key government positions. In February of 2016 some 700 Tutsi troops <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21697289-political-ethnic-and-economic-crises-stalk-rwandas-neighbour-sliding-towards">were forced</a> into early retirement. The police force and the ruling party’s youth wing, now <a href="http://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2016/06/07/briefing-%E2%80%93-who%E2%80%99s-who-burundi%E2%80%99s-armed-opposition">undergoing</a> regular military training, have become virtually mono-ethnic, and so too the security units operating alongside the normal channels. </p>
<p>Perhaps even more ominous is the <a href="https://africanvoicess.wordpress.com/2015/11/07/discours-du-president-du-senat-du-burundi-reverien-ndikuriyo-on-va-travailler-invitation-au-genocide/">outrageous language</a> used by the president of the Senate, Reverien Ndikuriyo. Some of his utterances have been reminiscent of the coded euphemisms employed during the Rwanda genocide as synonyms for killing Tutsi. He even made <a href="https://africanvoicess.wordpress.com/2015/11/07/discours-du-president-du-senat-du-burundi-reverien-ndikuriyo-on-va-travailler-invitation-au-genocide/">reference</a> to “going to work”, a metaphor for killing.</p>
<p>It is easy to see why the thinly veiled anti-Tutsi posturings of the Nkurunziza regime should be seen by many as payback for the <a href="http://migs.concordia.ca/documents/The-Burundi-Killings-of-1972Lemarchand.pdf">1972 tragedy</a>. Some 200,000 Hutu were killed at the hands of a predominantly Tutsi army. Hundreds if not thousands of Tutsi civilians were killed by Hutu insurgents. </p>
<p>The prospects for reconciliation are bleak. Formal gestures by the government to nudge the legitimate opposition parties to join an intra-Burundi dialogue have consistently <a href="http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Burundi-peace-talks-fail-to-take-off-in-Tanzania-/2558-3027236-fa0un7/index.html">failed</a>. As for the weak and fragmented rebel forces in exile, nothing short of a miracle would enable them to capture power in the foreseeable future. </p>
<p>There have been repeated attempts by organisations like the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/burundi/african-union-and-burundi-crisis-ambition-versus-reality">African Union</a> to impose sanctions aimed at stopping atrocities and prepare the ground for the presence of an international protection force. These efforts have not been successful. <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-13/u-s-russian-tensions-threaten-to-paralyze-un-security-council">Internal rifts</a> in the UN Security Council between supporters of Nkurunziza, like China and Russia, and their opponents ensured the failure of a concerted diplomatic initiative. </p>
<p>Burundi’s <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-burundi-politics-idUSKCN12622V">planned withdrawal</a> from the international criminal court in response to pressure to investigate the country’s human rights situation stands as another ill omen for the future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/69122/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rene Lemarchand does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The prospects for reconciliation are bleak. Formal gestures by the government to nudge the opposition parties to join an intra-Burundi dialogue have consistently failed.Rene Lemarchand, Emeritus professor of Political Science, University of FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/690872016-12-08T02:11:50Z2016-12-08T02:11:50ZAn activist’s playbook: How to influence Trump’s cabinet and policies<p>As Donald Trump works to fill his cabinet, his choices have inspired considerable anxiety among his critics. Advocacy organizations such as the <a href="https://www.aclu.org/blog/washington-markup/aclu-responds-potential-nominations-sen-sessions-attorney-general-and-rep">American Civil Liberties Union</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/11/23/letter-president-elect-trump">Human Rights Watch</a> have reacted with concern and outright objections, in particular to the nomination of Sen. Jeff Sessions as attorney general and Rep. Michael Pompeo to lead the Central Intelligence Agency. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/11/18/us-trumps-justice-cia-picks-threaten-rights">They claim</a> these appointments show that “Trump’s administration will threaten human rights protections.”</p>
<p>In 1980, Ronald Reagan’s election similarly raised widespread <a href="http://www.cambridge.org/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=1107645107">anxiety</a> among human rights advocates. His nomination of <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/05/us/politics/05lefever.html">Ernest W. Lefever</a> to head the State Department’s Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs heightened their fears. Lefever had been a vocal <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/1977/01/24/archives/the-rights-standard.html?_r=0">critic</a> of Jimmy Carter’s emphasis on human rights in U.S. foreign policy.</p>
<p>Lefever’s nomination elicited a groundswell of opposition among members of Congress, human rights activists and the public that helped defeat his nomination. </p>
<p>My <a href="https://www.academia.edu/6717096/_The_Defeat_of_Ernest_Lefevers_Nomination_Keeping_Human_Rights_on_the_United_States_Foreign_Policy_Agenda_in_Challenging_US_Foreign_Policy_America_and_the_World_in_the_Long_Twentieth_Century_ed._Bevan_Sewell_and_Scott_Lucas_Palgrave_2011_">research</a> shows how this coalition succeeded. Its efforts could serve as a model for concerned activists today. </p>
<h2>‘Outspoken apologist’</h2>
<p>During the campaign, Reagan and his aides had criticized elements of Carter’s human rights policy. They <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/1981/01/29/world/excerpts-from-haig-s-remarks-at-first-news-conference-as-secretary-of.html">charged</a> that Carter’s criticisms of repressive governments threatened U.S. national interests without meaningfully improving human rights. Such criticisms raised expectations that the Reagan administration would decrease the prominence of human rights in its foreign policy. At the outset of his presidency, Reagan’s aides suggested he would emphasize spreading democracy and defeating terrorism, rather than championing human rights.</p>
<p>In February 1981, the administration nominated Lefever, confirming these suspicions.</p>
<p>Opposition to the nominee was driven by policy differences, doubts about his qualifications for the role and concerns about his <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/Nomination_of_Ernest_W_Lefever.html?id=y1V47SEZcwUC">cultural arrogance</a> toward human rights abuses in Africa and Latin America. Extensive and contentious congressional hearings followed, which undermined Lefever’s candidacy. </p>
<p>Lefever had a record of questioning the relevance of human rights to U.S. policy. An editorial in <a href="http://unz.org/Pub/Nation-1981feb21">The Nation</a> pointed out, “He is an outspoken apologist for the barbarous practices of right-wing dictatorships.” </p>
<p>In the 1970s, Congress had played a leading role in U.S. human rights policy. Many members of Congress <a href="http://www.csmonitor.com/1981/0225/022532.html">interpreted</a> Lefever’s criticisms of Carter’s policy as opposition to their own efforts. As a result, there was also some rivalry between the executive and legislative branches during Lefever’s confirmation hearings. </p>
<p>Members of Congress who resisted Lefever’s nomination believed he opposed human rights legislation, public support for human rights and even the bureau to which he was nominated. Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Charles Percy, a Republican from Illinois, <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/Nomination_of_Ernest_W_Lefever.html?id=y1V47SEZcwUC">expressed doubt</a> about Lefever’s commitment to human rights and personal integrity: “Concern for human rights is not just a policy of the United States. It is an underlying principle of our political system and a fundamental factor in the appeal of democracy to people throughout the world.”</p>
<p>They also expressed concerns about the candidate’s demeanor. Sen. Rudy Boschwitz, a Republican from Minnesota, <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/1981/05/23/world/reagan-firm-on-rights-choice-as-opposition-rises.html">said</a> Lefever “lacks the diplomatic skills needed for the post.” </p>
<p>Not surprisingly, many in the human rights community also actively opposed Lefever. They made repeated trips to Washington to campaign against his confirmation. Some attended and testified at his confirmation hearings. Prominent human rights scholar Louis Henkin <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/Nomination_of_Ernest_W_Lefever.html?id=y1V47SEZcwUC">testified</a> before the Senate committee, “I do not believe that this law can be faithfully executed by someone who thinks there should be no such law, who has been firmly opposed to it in its spirit and in every detail.” </p>
<p>Activists at Helsinki Watch, a precursor to Human Rights Watch, <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/Nomination_of_Ernest_W_Lefever.html?id=y1V47SEZcwUC">agreed</a>. According to <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Taking-Liberties-Decades-Struggle-Rights/dp/1586482912/ref=asap_bc?ie=UTF8">Aryeh Neir</a>, “We thought it vital for the future of the human rights cause to defeat him.”</p>
<p>Reagan’s supporters argued that Reagan “has just won an election,” and therefore deserved to have his nominee confirmed, as columnist <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/1981/05/28/opinion/essay-the-new-haynsworth.html">William Safire wrote</a>. Yet, the committee voted 13 to four against Lefever – the first instance since 1959 that a president’s nominee had been <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/1981/06/07/weekinreview/added-attractions-exit-lefever-with-a-nudge.html">rejected</a> by a Senate committee.</p>
<h2>New approach to human rights</h2>
<p>In the wake of the defeated nomination, the White House worked to convey its concern about human rights to Congress, the American public and an international audience. To do so, the administration deliberately leaked parts of a State Department memorandum entitled “Reinvigoration of Human Rights Policy,” which <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/1981/11/05/opinion/essay-human-rights-victory.html">stated</a>, “human rights is at the core of our foreign policy.” In addition, it nominated a new candidate, Elliott Abrams, who garnered bipartisan support and a unanimous Senate confirmation.</p>
<p>After criticizing Carter’s policy on human rights during the 1980 campaign, Reagan and his aides had indicated that they wanted to transform U.S. policy once in office. Reagan may have been able to accomplish such a change through an evolutionary process, but observers viewed his selection of Lefever as extremist. </p>
<p>The efforts of members of Congress, human rights activists and the public prevented Lefever’s confirmation and ensured that human rights remained a rhetorical and substantive element of U.S. foreign policy in the years that followed. Members of Congress and concerned citizens can play a similar role in shaping the new president’s policies in the months to come.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/69087/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sarah Snyder received funding from the Open Society Archives, Yale University, and Georgetown University. </span></em></p>In 1981, many criticized Ronald Reagan’s nominee to head human rights initiatives in the State Department. Here is how activists mobilized to ensure the nomination was rejected.Sarah B. Snyder, Associate Professor, American University School of International ServiceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/627842016-07-22T05:10:48Z2016-07-22T05:10:48ZAsia’s ‘shoot-to-kill’ republic? The rising body count of the Philippines’ ‘war on drugs’<p>Here’s a snapshot of what a coalition of Philippines human rights groups <a href="http://www.philippinehumanrights.org/">describe</a> as a “surge of extrajudicial killings of suspected criminals and drug offenders”.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>2.50am July 14: Unidentified drug suspect #43 | San Juan City, Metro Manila | Found dead, hogtied, face wrapped with packaging tape and with eight sachets of suspected shabu [crystal meth] strapped to the body</p>
<p>5.00am July 13: Evangeline Tan, suspected drug user but not on the city’s drug watch list | Dasmariñas City, Cavite | Found dead, body full of stab wounds and hands tied with an electric cord; found on the body was a paper saying, “Wag tularan, tulak ako (Do not imitate, I’m a drug pusher).”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Those fatality reports are from the Philippine Daily Inquirer’s twice-weekly “<a href="http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/794598/kill-list-drugs-duterte">Kill List</a>”, which tallies the killings of suspected drug dealers and users by police and unidentified vigilantes. </p>
<p>The “Kill List” records a “marked and unmistakable” rise in such killings amounting to 265 deaths between June 30, the day President Rodrigo Duterte assumed office, and July 18.</p>
<p>Official <a href="http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/philippines-hails-deadly/2957520.html">statistics</a> support assertions of an alarming increase in police killings of drug-related criminal suspects. Philippines National Police <a href="http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/philippines-hails-deadly/2957520.html">data</a> indicate that police killed at least 192 such criminal suspects between May 10 and July 10. </p>
<p>That death toll in the two months following <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-philippines-new-strongman-romped-into-office-despite-a-shocking-campaign-58891">Duterte’s electoral victory</a> dwarfs the <a href="https://twitter.com/pnppio/status/743651544650813441">68 killings</a> of suspects that police recorded during “anti-drug operations” between January 1 and June 15, 2016. </p>
<p>Police have <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/07/rodrigo-duterte-drug-war-160704152252796.html">attributed</a> the killings to suspects who “resisted arrest and shot at police officers”, but have not provided further evidence that they acted in self-defence.</p>
<h2>Duterte’s rhetoric</h2>
<p>The Duterte administration has not put forward any policy proposals on criminal justice or crime control. He has been in office less than one month. </p>
<p>But the government’s rhetorical stance on the upsurge in police killings of criminal suspects shows that the disregard Duterte showed for Philippine law and international human rights standards during his campaign has become the presidential reality. </p>
<p>He had <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/17/duterte-harry-has-been-dirty-long-time">told his supporters</a> on the election trail: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>If I make it to the presidential palace … you drug pushers, hold-up men and do-nothings, you better get out because I’ll kill you.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>At a pre-election campaign rally he promised a supportive crowd the <a href="http://www.rappler.com/nation/politics/elections/2016/94302-rodrigo-duterte-davao-death-squad">mass killings</a> of tens of thousands of “criminals”, whose bodies he would dump in Manila Bay.</p>
<p>At his <a href="http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/793344/full-text-president-rodrigo-duterte-inauguration-speech">inauguration</a>, Duterte identified illegal drugs as one of the country’s top problems and vowed his government’s anti-drug battle “will be relentless and it will be sustained”. </p>
<p>Now in office, Duterte has praised the killings as proof of the “success” of the anti-drug campaign and urged police to “<a href="http://pcoo.gov.ph/palace-anti-drug-campaign-a-success-seize-the-momentum/">seize the momentum</a>”. </p>
<h2>Against check and balances</h2>
<p>After calls for a Senate probe of those killings, the Philippine National Police (PNP) chief, Director-General Ronald dela Rosa, on July 11 <a href="http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/795314/leila-seeks-immediate-probe">slammed</a> these as “legal harassment” and said it “dampens the morale” of PNP officers. </p>
<p>That same day, Duterte’s top judicial official, Solicitor-General Jose Calida, <a href="https://www.yahoo.com/news/philippines-top-lawyer-urges-more-killings-suspected-criminals-100423947.html">defended</a> the legality of the killings and opined that the number of such deaths was “not enough”. </p>
<p>The PNP will soon make it easier for Calida to track the number of those killings. On July 18 it announced <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-07-18/philippines-duterte-not-afraid-of-human-rights/7639738">plans</a> to erect outside the PNP’s Manila headquarters a large electronic billboard that will provide an updated tally of drug suspects either arrested or “neutralised” by police.</p>
<h2>Complicit in serious crimes</h2>
<p>Official statements calling for what is effectively the extrajudicial killing of criminal suspects could make the officials responsible complicit in serious crimes. And an unwillingness to investigate alleged unlawful killings would be dereliction of duty.</p>
<p>There are already indications that some local politicians have taken inspiration from some of Duterte’s rhetoric during his election and enacted potentially abusive “anti-crime” measures. </p>
<p>Days after Duterte’s May 10 electoral victory, the mayor-elect of Cebu City in the central Philippines, Tomas Osmeña, announced he would pay a 50,000 peso (US$1,080) <a href="http://www.sunstar.com.ph/cebu/local-news/2016/05/17/osmena-give-p50000-every-drug-lord-killed-474002">bounty</a> for each “criminal” killed by his police force. Osmeña didn’t specify how police would determine the legality of such killings or the identity of the suspects.</p>
<p>The most sinister articulation of this approach has been the rise of “death squads” in cities in the southern Philippines linked to local police and government officials. </p>
<p>Human Rights Watch exposed in a 2009 <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/16/duterte-harry-has-been-dirty-for-a-long-time/">report</a> the operations of a death squad that operated in Davao City with the support of city officials and police. Hundreds of people deemed to be “undesirables” – petty criminals, drug dealers and street children as young as 14 – were killed. </p>
<p>Duterte, who served as Davao City’s mayor for 22 years, publicly <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/16/duterte-harry-has-been-dirty-for-a-long-time/">applauded</a> such killings. </p>
<p>There have been no prosecutions related to the Davao death squad operations and a federal inquiry was called off. There is evidence that the Davao death squad inspired a similar operation in the nearby municipality of Tagum City. This was linked <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/20/philippines-death-squad-linked-hundreds-killings">to hundreds of killings</a> and operated as a salaried arm of the municipal government.</p>
<h2>Eroding the rule of law</h2>
<p>In his inauguration speech, Duterte pledged that his “adherence to due process and the rule of law is uncompromising”. The gruesome daily toll of police killings of criminal suspects demands that he deliver on that promise. </p>
<p>Duterte needs to demonstrate his commitment to due process and rule of law. He should urgently order a credible and independent inquiry into those deaths.</p>
<p>The government needs to make clear that the human rights protections embodied in the <a href="http://www.comelec.gov.ph/?r=References/RelatedLaws/Constitution/1987Constitution/Article3">constitution</a> apply to all the people of the Philippines — even those that police may consider “criminals”.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>The author’s disclosure statement has been updated since publication.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/62784/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Phelim Kine is deputy Asia director at Human Rights Watch.</span></em></p>The Philippines is seeing a surge of extrajudicial killings of suspected criminals and drug users since Rodrigo Duterte assumed office last month.Phelim Kine, Adjunct Professor, Roosevelt Public Policy Institute at Hunter College, City University of New YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/582622016-06-16T09:57:22Z2016-06-16T09:57:22ZLosing control: The dangers of killer robots<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/125442/original/image-20160606-13040-16h7t1k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Should we act to prevent this from ever happening?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.shutterstock.com/pic-312599078/stock-photo-sci-fi-fantasy-d-robot-the-killer-with-titaniumn-amor.html">Armed robot via shutterstock.com</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>New technology could lead humans to relinquish control over decisions to use lethal force. As artificial intelligence advances, the possibility that machines could independently select and fire on targets is <a href="http://futureoflife.org/open-letter-autonomous-weapons/">fast approaching</a>. Fully autonomous weapons, also known as “killer robots,” are quickly moving from the realm of science fiction toward reality.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/125440/original/image-20160606-13061-7be5iw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/125440/original/image-20160606-13061-7be5iw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/125440/original/image-20160606-13061-7be5iw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/125440/original/image-20160606-13061-7be5iw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/125440/original/image-20160606-13061-7be5iw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/125440/original/image-20160606-13061-7be5iw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/125440/original/image-20160606-13061-7be5iw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The unmanned Sea Hunter gets underway. At present it sails without weapons, but it exemplifies the move toward greater autonomy.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Sea_Hunter_gets_underway_on_the_Willamette_River_following_a_christening_ceremony_in_Portland,_Ore._(25702146834).jpg">U.S. Navy/John F. Williams</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>These weapons, which could operate on land, in the air or at sea, threaten to revolutionize armed conflict and law enforcement in alarming ways. <a href="http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/%28httpAssets%29/54B1B7A616EA1D10C1257CCC00478A59/$file/Article_Arkin_LAWS.pdf">Proponents say these killer robots are necessary</a> because modern combat moves so quickly, and because having robots do the fighting would keep soldiers and police officers out of harm’s way. But the threats to humanity would outweigh any military or law enforcement benefits. </p>
<p>Removing humans from the targeting decision would create a dangerous world. Machines would make life-and-death determinations outside of human control. The risk of disproportionate harm or erroneous targeting of civilians would increase. No person could be held responsible. </p>
<p>Given the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources/11.2013_memo_to_ccw_delegates_fully_autonomous_weapons.pdf">moral, legal and accountability risks</a> of fully autonomous weapons, preempting their development, production and use cannot wait. The best way to handle this threat is an international, legally binding ban on weapons that lack meaningful human control.</p>
<h2>Preserving empathy and judgment</h2>
<p>At least <a href="http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/%28httpPages%29/37D51189AC4FB6E1C1257F4D004CAFB2?OpenDocument">20 countries have expressed in U.N. meetings</a> the belief that humans should dictate the selection and engagement of targets. Many of them have echoed <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/04/11/killer-robots-and-concept-meaningful-human-control">arguments laid out in a new report</a>, of which I was the lead author. The report was released in April by <a href="http://www.hrw.org">Human Rights Watch</a> and the <a href="http://hrp.law.harvard.edu/">Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic</a>, two organizations that have been campaigning for a ban on fully autonomous weapons.</p>
<p>Retaining human control over weapons is a <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G13/127/76/PDF/G1312776.pdf?OpenElement">moral imperative</a>. Because they possess empathy, people can feel the emotional weight of harming another individual. Their respect for human dignity can – and should – serve as a check on killing. </p>
<p>Robots, by contrast, lack real emotions, including compassion. In addition, inanimate machines could not truly understand the value of any human life they chose to take. Allowing them to determine when to use force would undermine human dignity. </p>
<p>Human control also promotes compliance with international law, which is designed to protect civilians and soldiers alike. For example, the laws of war <a href="https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=4BEBD9920AE0AEAEC12563CD0051DC9E">prohibit disproportionate attacks</a> in which expected civilian harm outweighs anticipated military advantage. Humans can apply their judgment, based on past experience and moral considerations, and make case-by-case determinations about proportionality. </p>
<p>It would be almost impossible, however, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/Advancing%20the%20Debate_8May2014_Final.pdf">to replicate that judgment in fully autonomous weapons</a>, and they could not be preprogrammed to handle all scenarios. As a result, these weapons would be unable to act as “<a href="http://www.icty.org/sid/10052">reasonable commanders</a>,” the traditional legal standard for handling complex and unforeseeable situations. </p>
<p>In addition, the loss of human control would threaten a target’s <a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/arms0514_ForUpload_0.pdf">right not to be arbitrarily deprived of life</a>. Upholding this fundamental human right is an obligation during law enforcement as well as military operations. Judgment calls are required to assess the necessity of an attack, and humans are better positioned than machines to make them.</p>
<h2>Promoting accountability</h2>
<p>Keeping a human in the loop on decisions to use force further ensures that <a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/arms0415_ForUpload_0.pdf">accountability for unlawful acts</a> is possible. Under international criminal law, a human operator would in most cases escape liability for the harm caused by a weapon that acted independently. Unless he or she intentionally used a fully autonomous weapon to commit a crime, it would be unfair and legally problematic to hold the operator responsible for the actions of a robot that the operator could neither prevent nor punish.</p>
<p>There are additional obstacles to finding programmers and manufacturers of fully autonomous weapons liable under civil law, in which a victim files a lawsuit against an alleged wrongdoer. The United States, for example, establishes <a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/487/500/case.html">immunity for most weapons manufacturers</a>. It also has high standards for proving a product was defective in a way that would make a manufacturer legally responsible. In any case, victims from other countries would likely lack the access and money to sue a foreign entity. The gap in accountability would weaken deterrence of unlawful acts and leave victims unsatisfied that someone was punished for their suffering. </p>
<h2>An opportunity to seize</h2>
<p>At a U.N. meeting in Geneva in April, <a href="http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/ccw/2016/meeting-experts-laws/documents/DraftRecommendations_15April_final.pdf">94 countries recommended beginning formal discussions</a> about “lethal autonomous weapons systems.” The talks would consider whether these systems should be restricted under the <a href="http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/%28httpPages%29/4F0DEF093B4860B4C1257180004B1B30?OpenDocument">Convention on Conventional Weapons</a>, a disarmament treaty that has regulated or banned several other types of weapons, including incendiary weapons and blinding lasers. The nations that have joined the treaty will meet in December for a review conference to set their agenda for future work. It is crucial that the members agree to start a formal process on lethal autonomous weapons systems in 2017.</p>
<p>Disarmament law provides precedent for requiring human control over weapons. For example, the international community adopted the widely accepted treaties banning <a href="https://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/450?OpenDocument">biological weapons</a>, <a href="https://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/553?OpenDocument">chemical weapons</a> and <a href="https://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/580">landmines</a> in large part because of humans’ inability to exercise adequate control over their effects. Countries should now prohibit fully autonomous weapons, which would pose an equal or greater humanitarian risk.</p>
<p>At the December review conference, countries that have joined the Convention on Conventional Weapons should take concrete steps toward that goal. They should initiate negotiations of a new international agreement to address fully autonomous weapons, moving beyond general expressions of concern to specific action. They should set aside enough time in 2017 – at least several weeks – for substantive deliberations.</p>
<p>While the process of creating international law is notoriously slow, countries can move quickly to address the threats of fully autonomous weapons. They should seize the opportunity presented by the review conference because the alternative is unacceptable: Allowing technology to outpace diplomacy would produce dire and unparalleled humanitarian consequences.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/58262/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bonnie Docherty works as a senior researcher in the Arms Division of Human Rights Watch. </span></em></p>Machines that can target and kill people without human intervention or accountability pose a moral threat to the world.Bonnie Docherty, Lecturer on Law, Senior Clinical Instructor at Harvard Law School's International Human Rights Clinic, Harvard UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/484792015-10-06T04:07:33Z2015-10-06T04:07:33ZWhy helping ‘economic migrants’ may help stop others becoming ‘refugees’<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/97245/original/image-20151005-28747-1nu7krk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mickael, from Eritrea, sits close to a security fence on the main access route to the ferry harbour terminal in Calais, France.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Pascal Rossignol</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>With the prevalence of <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoIEritrea/A_HRC_29_CRP-1_Chapter_I_II.pdf">reports</a> documenting the worrying conditions faced by individuals within Eritrea, and the huge numbers leaving the country, one might ask: who remains in the country and why? </p>
<p>Conversations with colleagues and friends within Eritrea last year often turned to people discussing why they had decided not to leave. For many, their rationale was simple: because somebody they knew already had. Those who had left constituted the “lungs” whose <a href="http://mgafrica.com/article/2015-05-29-remittance-in-africa-where-does-it-go">remittances</a> kept those within the country alive. The question then is what would happen if that flow dried up.</p>
<p>All of their dependants, whether brothers, sisters, fathers, mothers, children, friends and wider relatives, would have to rethink the feasibility of remaining in Eritrea. Many reasoned that the only solution would be to themselves cross the border and leave their country. The country of 6.7 million is <a href="http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/eritrea-population/">located</a> in the Horn of Africa. </p>
<p>For many reasons, leaving Eritrea is an intimidating prospect. Every stage of the onward journey <a href="https://theconversation.com/europe-wont-resolve-the-migrant-crisis-until-it-faces-its-own-past-46555">carries danger</a>, and no certainty of employment. Those who leave Eritrea forfeit their automatic right to return and their rights to assets within the country. It potentially places their relatives and friends at risk of being accused by the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/eritrea">government</a> of assisting their escape. </p>
<p>For others, love for their country runs deep and they do not wish to abandon it after its hard-fought struggle for <a href="http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Eritrean_War_of_Independence">independence</a>. Their desire to stay put is nonetheless linked to the ability of others around them to move.</p>
<p>Beyond the contribution that gold and mining make to the Eritrean economy, the World Bank says that <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/eritrea/overview">“economic conditions remain challenging”</a>. Government policies have impoverished those surviving in Eritrea without external support. These include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>indefinite national service;</p></li>
<li><p>restrictions on citizens’ domestic and international movements; and</p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/eritrea">reports</a> of harsh punishments for those transgressing some of the state’s more repressive policies.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Many of the those individuals that are stopped from entering Europe, <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/immigration/11703636/Calais-migrants-Britain-to-build-huge-fence-at-Channel-Tunnel-port-in-France.html">barricaded in camps in Calais</a>, or ping-ponged between European member states on an increasingly frequent basis, are therefore part of complex transnational coping strategies. </p>
<h2>Futility of ‘migrant’, ‘refugee’ debate</h2>
<p>A distraction from understanding the problems faced by individuals in Europe and at its frontiers right now has been the obsession with how to categorise them. This is done purely according to their status in the immediate “here and now”. </p>
<p>Why people move is always a mixture of voluntary and involuntary factors. The compartmentalisation of people into economic migrants or refugees therefore obscures the fundamental ways in which these two groups are intimately related.</p>
<p>As is so clear in Eritrea, to mitigate against the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-thousands-of-asylum-seekers-are-fleeing-eritrea-and-risking-their-lives-in-the-mediterranean-40969">worst effects</a> of the state and its market, those individuals who can leave become “economic migrants”. What is important is that they do so precisely to protect their families and friends from becoming refugees themselves. </p>
<p><a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/03/24/uk-eritrea-eu-aid-idUKKBN0MK1I220150324">Plans by the EU</a> to reduce the numbers of individuals leaving Eritrea through <a href="http://en.rsf.org/erythree-eu-plans-to-provide-eritrea-s-28-04-2015,47814.html">development aid</a> thus epitomises the inability of policymakers to join up the dots between those leaving the country and those staying behind. Proposals such as these are weak for at least two reasons: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>when it is the violence perpetrated by a state which forces citizens to leave, channelling aid through those very same institutions may well fail to address any of the original problems; and</p></li>
<li><p>a few million pounds of development aid, as was the case in Eritrea, is often nothing compared to the scale of remittances that many states receive through their diaspora. </p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Role of remittances</h2>
<p>Policies that deny people the opportunity to provide financial support to friends and relatives outside of Europe, by seeing “migrants” and “refugees” as discrete groups of individuals, are self-defeating. We should rather support individuals to work in Europe, thus enabling them to send remittances to those who may not wish to undertake that journey themselves. </p>
<p>Allowing certain individuals to stay in Europe for work prevents whole families having to cross militarised borders, board ramshackle boats or pay huge fares to be smuggled in appalling conditions overland. Remittances provide a lifeline, both to individuals who remain within countries that are experiencing high degrees of violence, persecution and state failure, and for those who wish to remain in refugee camps near their country of origin.</p>
<p>Evidence abounds about the importance of remittances and the value of facilitating these global flows of money. The celebration of remittance economies nonetheless seems to have remained detached in the popular media from the broader debates on migration and asylum.</p>
<p>Remittances are not only <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-22169474">quantitatively greater</a>, but also qualitatively <a href="http://www.thisisafricaonline.com/Development/Why-remittances-work-better-than-aid">more effective</a> at assisting local populations and catalysing their development. </p>
<p>Linking the importance of remittances to the debate about whether people are economic migrants or refugees is critical. Images of young women or men sitting on <a href="http://www.irinnews.org/report/101533/migrants-limbo-in-spain-s-african-enclave">fences at Melilla</a> or boarding trains in Europe often invoke the label “economic migrant”, as if to dismiss the critical importance of their journeys. </p>
<p>On the contrary, and alongside the fact that on too many occasions this label is wrongly applied instead of granting asylum, in certain situations it is entirely because of these “migrants” that other individuals in their families are not forced to become “refugees”. </p>
<p>Allowing people to come, work and send back remittances preempts the need for more people to leave their homes to escape the devastating effects of war, violence and economic collapse. In building fences, bombing boats and blocking borders, however, we undermine these strategies and contribute towards forcing certain people to leave their countries and claim asylum elsewhere. </p>
<p>Regardless of the labels used, it seems naive and counterproductive not to join these debates and movements together.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/48479/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Georgia Cole does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The European obsession with labeling people either economic migrants or refugees hampers understanding of the problems they face. Adding the role remittances play to the debate would help.Georgia Cole, Researcher in the Department of International Development, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.