tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/iranian-politics-38552/articlesIranian politics – The Conversation2024-02-29T17:47:45Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2248042024-02-29T17:47:45Z2024-02-29T17:47:45ZIranian parliamentary election: what people are voting for and why it’s different this time<p>Iranian voters head to the polls on March 1 to elect the country’s next parliament and the powerful Assembly of Experts. The result is likely to be a foregone conclusion, given the tight control that the Islamic Republic holds over who can run for office. But the way the election plays out – and its significance – may be different to normal.</p>
<p>Every four years the public get to vote for the 290 members of the <a href="https://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/parliament">Iranian parliament</a> (also known as the Islamic Consultative Assembly). The parliament is the legislature of the country, and its members are responsible for drafting legislation, approving the annual budget and any international treaties or agreements. It is not responsible for foreign or nuclear policy.</p>
<p>At the same time, elections are being held for the <a href="https://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/assembly-experts">Assembly of Experts</a>, which serves an eight-year term and is imbued under the <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Iran_1989">Iranian constitution</a> to monitor, dismiss and elect the supreme leader. </p>
<p>Despite Iranians being able to vote, there are a number of limitations to the democratic process in Iran. Most notably, all candidates are vetted by the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/03/iran_power/html/guardian_council.stm">Guardian Council</a> – an unelected body – hence removing a significant element of choice. </p>
<p>Of the 49,000 people who registered to run for parliament this year, <a href="https://www.shora-gc.ir/en/news/243/over-14000-candidates-approved-for-irans-parliamentary-elections">14,200 applicants</a> were approved. This has involved the disqualification of many reformist and centrist conservatives and has left mainly right-wing conservatives vying for posts. </p>
<p>In fact, only 30 reformists have been approved to run for office, leaving them <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202402204964">to claim</a> that the elections are “meaningless, non-competitive, unfair, and ineffective in the administration of the country”.</p>
<p>In the Assembly of Experts, 144 candidates have been approved to run for the 88 seats. But the centrist and reformist former president, <a href="https://twitter.com/hassanrouhani?lang=en">Hassan Rouhani</a>, has been <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/mena/iran/2024/01/24/irans-rouhani-says-he-is-banned-from-running-in-march-election-for-elite-assembly/">banned from seeking re-election</a>. This has further cemented the Assembly of Experts as a stronghold of conservatives and ultra-conservatives.</p>
<p>The names of the final candidates were also released very late – just two weeks before the election. This has allowed little time for campaigning or, more importantly, for the public to get to know who they are supposed to be voting for.</p>
<h2>It’s different this time around</h2>
<p>There are three important points to note about this election. First, this is the first election since the death of <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/09/what-happened-to-mahsa-zhina-amini/">Mahsa Amini</a>. Amini died in police custody in September 2022, at the age of 26, after being arrested by Iran’s morality police for violating the country’s strict Islamic dress code. </p>
<p>Her death led to <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/maggiemcgrath/2022/12/06/mahsa-amini-the-spark-that-ignited-a-women-led-revolution/">widespread protests</a> <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/16/iran-one-year-after-the-death-of-mahsa-amini">across Iran</a> which were met with a brutal crackdown. And while these “woman, life, freedom” protests, may have largely died down after 18 months, they <a href="https://theconversation.com/womens-activism-in-iran-continues-despite-street-protests-dying-down-in-face-of-state-repression-213514">continue via online activism and civil disobedience</a>. </p>
<p>Therefore, this election is likely to see some response from these events, with women and young people wanting to continue the protest through the ballot box.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/womens-activism-in-iran-continues-despite-street-protests-dying-down-in-face-of-state-repression-213514">Women's activism in Iran continues, despite street protests dying down in face of state repression</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Second, there is expected to be a <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/28/middleeast/iran-election-parliament-turnout-low-jihad-vote-mime-intl/index.html">low turnout</a>. Voting turnout has been on the decline in Iranian elections for some time, but increasing dissatisfaction with the voting choice, combined with apathy and frustration over the lack of change in the country means that many voters are planning to stay away from the ballot box.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.etemadonline.com/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%DB%8C-9/652287-%D9%87%D8%B4%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%86%D8%AC%DB%8C-%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%AF%D9%87%D9%85">recent poll</a> suggested that national turnout is likely to be at 35% and only 18% in the capital, Tehran. By comparison, the <a href="https://irandataportal.syr.edu/2020-parliamentary-election">turnout in 2020 was 42.5%</a> – but this was the lowest it had been since 1979 and was during a global pandemic.</p>
<h2>Succession question</h2>
<p>A low turnout could be problematic for the political leadership, who rely on elections to provide a veil of legitimacy over their regime. As a result, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has started a dual pronged campaign of encouraging citizens to vote and blaming the west if they don’t.</p>
<p>Last month he <a href="https://twitter.com/khamenei_ir/status/1759192438504120516">tweeted</a>: “Elections are the main pillar of the Islamic Republic, and they are the way to improve the country. For those who are seeking to solve the problems, the way to do this is the elections.” </p>
<p>He also attended a meeting with people from the East Azerbaijan province and used the opportunity to emphasise that it was the intention of what he called the <a href="https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/495092/Enemies-oppose-Iran-elections">“arrogant powers”</a> and the US to encourage people to boycott the elections.</p>
<p>The third point is that the elections are likely to have a greater significance for the future of Islamic Republic than normal. Khamenei is currently 84 years old, so the election of the next supreme leader is likely to happen within the next eight-year term of the Assembly of Experts. </p>
<p>This is why it is thought that the Guardian Council has been so restrictive when it has come to this year’s <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202401293591">candidate selection</a> for the Assembly – because this election could secure Iranian succession.</p>
<p>The first results could emerge within 24 hours, although the full tally – and what it means for Iran’s future – may not be clear for some days.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224804/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Louise Kettle is an Associate Fellow of the Royal United Services Institute</span></em></p>Candidates have been pre-approved to favour the religious right.Louise Kettle, Assistant Professor of International Relations, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1837662022-09-27T12:27:49Z2022-09-27T12:27:49ZUnrest across Iran continues under state’s extreme gender apartheid<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486562/original/file-20220926-4427-sp0ee8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=610%2C277%2C2475%2C1799&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In this Sept. 21, 2022, photo, Iranian demonstrators gather along a street in Tehran.
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/picture-obtained-by-afp-outside-iran-on-september-21-shows-news-photo/1243408188?adppopup=true">AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/21/middleeast/iran-mahsa-amini-death-widespread-protests-intl-hnk/index.html">Unrest continues to erupt across Iran</a> following the death of a 22-year-old Kurdish Iranian woman, who died after being arrested and reportedly beaten by <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/21/middleeast/iran-morality-police-mime-intl/index.html">Iran’s morality police</a>. </p>
<p>The Iranian force took Mahsa (Zhina) Amini into detention on Sept. 16, 2022, for not wearing her hijab according to the rules. </p>
<p>As of Oct. 26, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-63397159">at least 234 people have been confirmed killed</a> and hundreds have been <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/09/iran-deadly-crackdown-on-protests-against-mahsa-aminis-death-in-custody-needs-urgent-global-action/?fbclid=IwAR3lh8TLZ8Nyxhx0hMA9WPyg0ZmLmSqkAJQ0qFjvFI7UIIZhxlcHWmD5Gcc">arrested and wounded</a> in protests that erupted after Amini’s death. </p>
<p>As a Kurdish-born scholar and <a href="https://cah.ucf.edu/languages/faculty-staff/profile/414">a professor of Middle Eastern studies at the University of Central Florida</a>, I have previously written about <a href="https://theconversation.com/kurds-targeted-in-turkish-attack-include-thousands-of-female-fighters-who-battled-islamic-state-125100">gender in Middle Eastern cultures</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/unrest-in-iran-will-continue-until-religious-rule-ends-90352">Iranian protests</a>.</p>
<p>With the exception of bland condemnations, the discrimination against women in Iran is often overlooked while the world focuses on <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2017/578024/EXPO_IDA(2017)578024_EN.pdf">limiting the country’s nuclear capabilities</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/45302144">Some scholars and activists</a> have criticized international law for its lack of initiative and public action in recognizing Iran’s systematic discrimination against women as gender apartheid and acting to prevent it.</p>
<p>But many discriminatory laws, including those forcing women to cover their head and face with a hijab, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/there-are-two-types-of-hijabs-the-difference-is-huge/2019/04/07/50a44574-57f0-11e9-814f-e2f46684196e_story.html">honor neither tradition nor religion</a> and are applied to women of all ethnicities and faiths.</p>
<p>After all, Amini was not a Shiite woman by ethnicity or religion. </p>
<h2>Iran’s gender apartheid</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/01/24/the-iranian-revolution-a-timeline-of-events/">1979 Islamic Revolution</a> established a republic that implements similar inhumane policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination as practiced in <a href="https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/apartheid">South Africa under the government’s former brutal apartheid regime</a>. </p>
<p>The laws and policies in Iran establish and maintain domination by men and the state over women and their right to choose their own clothing or obtain a divorce. Systematic gender inequalities are prescribed legally and enforced by the regime to deny the women the “<a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.10_International%20Convention%20on%20the%20Suppression%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Apartheid.pdf">right to life and liberty</a>” and “<a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.10_International%20Convention%20on%20the%20Suppression%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Apartheid.pdf">basic human rights and freedoms</a>,” which according to <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.10_International%20Convention%20on%20the%20Suppression%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Apartheid.pdf">Article II of the United Nations’ Apartheid Convention in 1973</a>, are considered “the crime of apartheid.”</p>
<p>For example, according to <a href="https://iranhumanrights.org/2017/07/married-women-in-iran-still-need-permission-to-travel-abroad-under-amendment-to-passport-law/">Article 18 of Iran’s Passport Law</a>, a married woman still needs written permission from her male guardian to travel abroad.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Several cars are unable to move through thousands of demonstrators." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486368/original/file-20220924-15747-3pw3xm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486368/original/file-20220924-15747-3pw3xm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486368/original/file-20220924-15747-3pw3xm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486368/original/file-20220924-15747-3pw3xm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486368/original/file-20220924-15747-3pw3xm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486368/original/file-20220924-15747-3pw3xm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486368/original/file-20220924-15747-3pw3xm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Thousands of demonstrators stop traffic in Iran on Sept. 19, 2022, to protest the death of Mahsa Amini while in police custody.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-gather-in-protest-against-the-death-of-mahsa-amini-news-photo/1426271257?adppopup=true">Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Women in Iran are unable to hold any positions within the judicial, religious and military systems, nor are they able to serve as members of the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/02/09/everything-you-need-to-know-about-irans-assembly-of-experts-election/">Assembly of Experts</a>, the <a href="https://irandataportal.syr.edu/political-institutions/the-expediency-council">Expediency Discernment Council</a> or the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Council-of-Guardians">Guardian Council</a>, the three highest councils in the Islamic Republic.</p>
<p>Women under law cannot be president or supreme leader of
Iran. <a href="https://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ir00000_.html">According to Article 115</a>, the president of the Islamic Republic must be elected from among the “religious and political men.”</p>
<p>In addition, the Iranian state <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/45302144">has added discriminatory features to the criminal code</a> – one such feature is the principle that the value of a woman is one-half of the value of a man. </p>
<p>That principle applies in matters involving compensation for a killing and in what a son or daughter receives from a family inheritance. They also apply in the weight given to legal testimony or in obtaining a divorce.</p>
<p>Such laws, policies and practices continue to mark women as lesser citizens, legally and socially unequal.</p>
<h2>Segregation in daily life</h2>
<p>The state also has imposed <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202209012125">systematic segregation</a> in schools, hospitals, universities, transportation, sports and other major areas of day-to-day life.</p>
<p>For many decades, Iran’s gender apartheid had relegated women to the back of the bus with <a href="https://wcfia.harvard.edu/publications/women-place-politics-gender-segregation-iran">a metal bar segregating</a> them from men.</p>
<p>Under the government’s direction, universities <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/20/world/middleeast/20iht-educbriefs20.html">have set limits on women’s options</a> and have banned them from many fields of study. </p>
<p>Iran has <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/31/iran-women-blocked-entering-stadium#:%7E:text=Over%20the%20past%2040%20years,detention%2C%20and%20abuses%20against%20women.">generally barred female spectators</a> from soccer and other sports stadiums since the 1979 revolution. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A protestor in California holds a sign with the image of the 22-year-old Iranian woman who died in Iranian police custody." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486563/original/file-20220926-17-y19r3i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486563/original/file-20220926-17-y19r3i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486563/original/file-20220926-17-y19r3i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486563/original/file-20220926-17-y19r3i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486563/original/file-20220926-17-y19r3i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=516&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486563/original/file-20220926-17-y19r3i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=516&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486563/original/file-20220926-17-y19r3i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=516&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Demonstrators in California hold signs at a protest over the death of Mahsa Amini.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/demonstrators-hold-signs-at-a-protest-over-the-death-last-news-photo/1427444152?adppopup=true">Rodin Eckenroth/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Clerics play a major role in decision-making and <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220330-iran-again-bans-women-from-football-stadium">have argued that women must be shielded</a> from the masculine atmosphere and sight of semi-clad men during sporting events.</p>
<p>Under such discriminatory policies, the Persian terms such as za'ifeh, meaning weak and incapable, has found its way into <a href="https://vajehyab.com/dehkhoda/%D8%B6%D8%B9%DB%8C%D9%81%D8%A9">Persian dictionaries</a> as synonyms for “woman” and “wife.”</p>
<h2>‘Women, life, freedom’</h2>
<p>Iran’s notorious extrajudicial morality police <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/21/middleeast/iran-morality-police-mime-intl/index.html">have terrorized women for decades</a>. </p>
<p>Like the articles of the <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Iran_1989.pdf?lang=en">Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran</a>, principles of the morality police are founded on an interpretation of <a href="https://www.bl.uk/collection-items/hadith-collection">canonical Shiite texts</a> and are implemented through modern tools of control and prosecution.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A fire is blazing in the middle of a street in Iran as hundreds of people gather." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486631/original/file-20220926-22-bb07bs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486631/original/file-20220926-22-bb07bs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486631/original/file-20220926-22-bb07bs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486631/original/file-20220926-22-bb07bs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486631/original/file-20220926-22-bb07bs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486631/original/file-20220926-22-bb07bs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486631/original/file-20220926-22-bb07bs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">People gather in Tehran on Sept. 19, 2022, during a protest for 22-year-old Mahsa Amini, who died while in police custody.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-gather-during-a-protest-for-mahsa-amini-who-died-news-photo/1243377054?adppopup=true">Stringer/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In international criminal law, specific unlawful acts that are committed within a system of oppression and domination are considered crimes against humanity.</p>
<p>As set out in the U.N.’s <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.10_International%20Convention%20on%20the%20Suppression%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Apartheid.pdf">Apartheid Convention</a>, these crimes include denial of basic rights that prevent a racial group or groups from participating in the political, social, economic and cultural life of the country. </p>
<p>Most known for the brutal regime in South Africa, apartheid comes from the Afrikaans word meaning “apartness.” It <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-apartheid-south-africa">was the ideology</a> that was introduced in South Africa in 1948 and supported by the National Party government. </p>
<p>The compulsory hijab is at the center of what I call Iran’s extreme gender apartheid, where a misplaced headscarf can result in up to <a href="https://en.radiofarda.com/a/anti-hijab-activist-in-iran-sentenced-to-15-years-in-prison/30133081.html">15 years in prison</a>, <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/meast/09/04/iran.stoning/index.html">lashing</a>, <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iranian-women-fined-260-bad-hijabs">fines</a> and inhumane and unlawful arrest and death.</p>
<p>Several <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/05/middleeast/iran-hijab-law-report-intl/index.html">anti-compulsory hijab movements</a> emerge every few years in Iran, such as in the case of Zhina Amini.</p>
<p>In the Kurdish language, her name originates from “jin,” the word for woman and shares a root with the word for life, “jiyan.”</p>
<p>Those Kurdish words are at the heart of the most used slogan by
the <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/how-a-small-but-powerful-band-of-women-led-the-fight-against-isis">Kurdish Female Fighters against the Islamic State</a> in Iraq and Syria, and by women across Iran today against the Islamic Republic of Iran.</p>
<p>Add in “azadi” – the Kurdish word for freedom – and the slogan “Jin, Jiyan, Azadi” means “Women, Life, Freedom” and is resounding among protesters in streets throughout Iran and the world to dismantle the state’s gender apartheid.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/183766/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Haidar Khezri does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, women in Iran have been forced to accept second-class citizenship, as Shiite religious leaders control most aspects of women’s lives.Haidar Khezri, Assistant Professor, University of Central FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/963642018-05-15T15:19:39Z2018-05-15T15:19:39ZHow Donald Trump’s nuclear deal withdrawal will hurt Iran’s dissenters and activists<p>Now the Trump administration has <a href="https://theconversation.com/donald-trump-backs-out-of-iran-nuclear-deal-now-what-96317">withdrawn from the Iranian nuclear deal</a>, the world is yet again bracing for an all-out confrontation between Washington and Tehran. But while Donald Trump’s decision inevitably has serious implications for the security balance of the Middle East, it will also hit Iranian society hard – and in particular, it will hurt Iranians protesting against their government.</p>
<p>More than any other time in the last four decades, Iran is seeing an uptick in protests over <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-a-new-kind-of-protest-movement-is-taking-hold-89589">all</a> <a href="https://www.iranhumanrights.org/2016/05/gold-mine-workers-flogged-for-protest/">manner</a> of <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-iran-uses-a-compulsory-hijab-law-to-control-its-citizens-and-why-they-are-protesting-91439">issues</a> as its dominant political tendencies clash out in the open.</p>
<p>Since the 1997 presidential election, Iran’s political scene has been dominated by three main tendencies. At one extreme are totalitarians backing the religious-political establishment; at the other are homegrown advocates of regime change. And in the middle are the so-called reformists, who have advocated for change while steering clear of challenging the regime per se. For the last two decades, reformists have managed to all but monopolise mainstream anti-government struggles while marginalising the advocates of regime change, whom it labelled as destructive and delusional. </p>
<p>The reformists hit their peak with the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/14/world/middleeast/14iran.html">disputed 2009 election</a> and the massive protests that followed it, during which they successfully rallied much of the opposition to their cause. In spite of public uproar at the fraudulent election, the reformists easily smeared more radical protesters whom they couldn’t co-opt as warmongers, traitors and fanatics.</p>
<p>While the protests failed to transform Iranian politics, they still looked like something of a moral victory for the reformists. But as it turned out, 2009 was the point at which reformism began to turn away from democratic liberalism and towards an ultra-nationalist, anti-Western, and semi-fascist populism. In other words, it was the point where reformism began to be absorbed into the ruling discourse of totalitarianism. And as the next election in 2013 proved, even as the reformists have taken the reins of power, their once-bold agenda has begun to fade.</p>
<h2>Falling short</h2>
<p>First elected president in 2013 and then re-elected in 2017, reformist <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22886729">Hassan Rouhani</a> has totally failed to deliver on any of his major campaign promises. Most gallingly, the economic boom he promised would follow the nuclear deal never came to pass. </p>
<p>Even as post-deal sanctions relief released billions of dollars to the government, Iranians became poorer, workers and government employees went unpaid, and the currency lost value. The Iranian public has long known that public money has a habit of ending up in the elite’s pockets, but today, the government doesn’t even bother denying it.</p>
<p>Besides corruption, Iranians are furious that public money is going to fund foreign wars. In a public speech in July 2017, Rouhani <a href="http://fa.euronews.com/2017/07/11/hassan-rouhani-iran-prepared-weapon-for-iraq">admitted</a> that “despite our most difficult economic situation, we have provided Iraq and Syria with all the weapons and other supplies they need”. A day later, the Ministry of Roads and Urban Development <a href="http://iran-hrm.com/index.php/2017/11/05/iran-plagued-poverty-drought/">released a report</a> showing that 33% of the population were living in extreme poverty. And at around the same time, a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0Qn1MysQzP8">video</a> went viral showing a Hezbollah leader explaining that “Hezbollah’s budget, its income, its expenses, everything it eats and drinks, its weapons and rockets, come from the Islamic Republic of Iran. As long as Iran has money, we have money”.</p>
<p>These policies drastically eroded the regime’s popular support – and unsurprisingly, the ensuing protests are of a size and potency not seen since the 1979 revolution. The discourse of regime change has resurged, with protesters taking to the streets and chanting “we will take our Iran back”. In response, the reformists’ rhetoric turned harsh, with <a href="http://iranfocus.com/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=32337:a-look-at-the-real-stories-behind-iran-s-protests&catid=4:iran-general&Itemid=109">ominous warnings</a> about Iran “becoming the next Syria”. But it didn’t work, and as they lost many of their supporters, the reformists joined with some of Iran’s most extreme factions to call for a crackdown on the protests. This puts them on the side of forces they have fought against for decades.</p>
<h2>A gift from Washington</h2>
<p>All this has been exacerbated by the American withdrawal from the deal, which has sharpened the regime’s old propaganda tools just when it needs them the most. Until Trump announced his decision, the government’s years of scaremongering about a possible US invasion had backfired, met with popular <a href="https://en.radiofarda.com/a/iran-farmers-protests-isfahan/29165769.html">slogans</a> such as “They say the US is the enemy, but our enemy is right here”. But now, Trump has provided this politically bankrupt elite with a foreign scapegoat for its every domestic failure.</p>
<p>The US’s unilateral withdrawal is also a boost to Iran’s image abroad, allowing the regime to take up its favourite pose as the victim of a tyrant, ensuring that many outsiders who understand little about Iran’s domestic politics will come to regard one of the world’s most outlaw regimes as a reliable supporter of international law.</p>
<p>The Iranian government has exploited this misperception before. Many Western leftists and liberals are so disgusted by the US government and Western “imperialism” that they end up supporting and admiring brutal dictatorships and regional imperialists whom the US considers beyond the pale. At home and abroad, the Iran government’s cultural, political and academic advocates <a href="http://iranfocus.com/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=32337:a-look-at-the-real-stories-behind-iran-s-protests&catid=4:iran-general&Itemid=109">smear dissenters</a> as proxy agents of a US-led Western regime change project.</p>
<p>This all leaves the Iranian opposition with precious few allies abroad. In their efforts to keep the deal alive, the US’s erstwhile partners will have to compromise with Tehran – and high up the list of likely concessions is for the EU countries in particular to overlook the government’s human rights violations even more than they already do.</p>
<p>All the while, the hostile relationship between Iran and the US looks more and more warlike. A similar situation arose in the hotheaded 1980s; it led to the bloody suppression of Iranian dissidents, and saw full-on theocracy take root. Now as then the mere spectre of war will help the Tehran government keep much of Iran’s civil society in line, and it sets the stage for a brutal crackdown on any opposition.</p>
<p>So far, many Iranians angry with the regime seem undeterred. In the days after Trump withdrew from the deal, <a href="https://www.iranhumanrights.org/2017/03/teachers-hold-rallies-across-iran-for-labor-and-education-rights/">teachers protested in seven cities</a> for free education and an end to discrimination. But while Iran is now hearing some of the loudest calls for regime change since 1979, recent events will surely muffle them. And so long as the rest of the world’s views on Iran are <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-does-the-american-right-hate-iran-so-much-96304">so intensely polarised</a>, Iran’s activists will struggle to make themselves heard.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/96364/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Omid Shams has been working as a writer and human rights activist since 2002.</span></em></p>Just as Iran’s centre ground was collapsing under political pressure, Donald Trump offered the hardliners a gift.Omid Shams, PhD Candidate, School of Law, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/963172018-05-08T18:25:10Z2018-05-08T18:25:10ZDonald Trump backs out of Iran nuclear deal: now what?<p>Thanks to Donald Trump, the hard-won deal that set up a process to end Iran’s nuclear weapons programme is on its deathbed. After weeks of entreaties and visits from his counterparts in the other states that signed the accord, Trump <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2018/may/08/iran-nuclear-deal-donald-trump-latest-live-updates">has announced</a> that the US will be withdrawing from it and reimposing the sanctions the deal lifted. That makes it hard to see how the deal will survive. </p>
<p>Given Trump has spent years referring to this as “the worst deal ever”, perhaps his decision to back out is less than surprising – but that doesn’t mean it isn’t shocking.</p>
<p>To be sure, there are real problems with the deal. <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-the-iran-nuclear-deal-means-and-what-it-doesnt-44685">Struck in 2015</a> between Iran and the P5+1 powers – the US, the UK, Russia, China, France, and Germany – it fails to address longer-term concerns about the nuclear programme (the Iranian government is renowned for playing a long game) and does not limit the country’s ballistic missile capability. Perhaps the biggest criticism, though, concerns Iran’s behaviour in the Middle East, which has not been curtailed. </p>
<p>As the British foreign secretary, Boris Johnson, recently <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-44026548">said on Fox & Friends</a>, a right-wing talk show Trump is known to watch: “Look, Iran is behaving badly, has a tendency to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles. We’ve got to stop that. We’ve got to push back on what Iran is doing in the region. We’ve got to be tougher.” But Johnson also urged the US not to “throw the baby out with the bathwater”.</p>
<p>It seems that plea, and those of other world leaders, fell on deaf ears. So what does it all mean? First, Trump’s decision to effectively scrap deal plays into the hands of Saudi Arabia and Israel. It will also inflame already livid tensions across the Middle East, pouring fuel onto the fires of conflict from Syria to Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and beyond.</p>
<h2>Taking sides</h2>
<p>In recent years, belligerents in the Middle East’s various conflicts have generally fallen into two separate camps. On the one hand is a pro-Iranian camp that is comprised of the Syrian government, the Iraqi government, Hezbollah and a range of non-state actors; on the other is an anti-Iranian camp, comprised primarily of Saudi Arabia, Israel, Egypt, Bahrain and the UAE. Both camps are seizing opportunities to recalibrate the regional order, and as they try to set and push boundaries in their favour, they raise the chances of error, miscalculation and catastrophe.</p>
<p>But while Iranian-Saudi rivalry has played a central role in shaping the nature of the contemporary Middle East, so have Iran’s rivalries with two other powers: Israel – with whom Saudi Arabia is seeking <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-43632905">a rapprochement of sorts</a> – and the US.</p>
<p>Debate about the nuclear deal is as much about these different camps as it is about the deal itself. Washington, Riyadh and Jerusalem have long been concerned about the development of an Iranian nuclear weapon, yet the more short-term concern is about Tehran’s behaviour across Syria, Bahrain, Iraq and Lebanon, where it capitalises on schisms within and across state borders. Iran has long demonstrated an excellent ability to exploit and manipulate such divisions. To see that ability in action, one only has to look at events in <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/02/the-man-who-could-help-rebuild-iraq/553799/">Iraq</a>, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-politics/lebanon-emerges-from-crisis-with-iran-on-top-but-risks-remain-idUSKBN1E11VV">Lebanon</a> and <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syria-civil-war-isis-latest-beheading-iran-shadow-war-khan-tuman-basij-a7768026.html">Syria</a> – leaving aside allegations of nefarious involvement in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bahrain-security/bahrain-says-seizes-armed-network-set-up-by-irans-revolutionary-guard-idUSKCN1GF0G4">Bahrain</a>, where it’s accused of backing anti-government groups, and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/09/saudi-arabia-iran-great-game-ye-201492984846324440.html">Yemen</a>, where Saudi Arabia is waging a massive military campaign against forces it claims are Iranian proxies.</p>
<p>Few want to see Iran further indulge what one US official <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1475-4967.2012.00537.x">called</a> its “propensity for mischief”, and escalating tensions across already deeply divided societies risk adding to the already catastrophic loss of human life. So long as Iran feels emboldened or mandated to act up, the nightmarish conflicts in Syria and Yemen will be even more difficult to resolve.</p>
<p>But perhaps the biggest concern in all this is the Israeli response. </p>
<h2>Keeping the lid on</h2>
<p>Iran has sought to ameliorate its strategic concerns by pushing forward geopolitically, away from its sovereign borders. Getting influence over territory is a key strategic goal. But in doing this, Iran is directly inserting itself into <a href="https://theconversation.com/are-israel-and-iran-about-to-clash-head-on-over-syria-95958">Israeli security calculations</a>. </p>
<p>Ever since the revolution of 1979, Israel has long viewed the Islamic Republic of Iran with great trepidation. As concerns about Iranian nuclear aspirations increased, so too did the rhetoric from Israeli leaders condemning Tehran’s actions. No one who has heard it will forget the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17287860">March 2012 speech</a> where Benjamin Netanyahu said: “If it walks like a duck, if it talks like a duck, then what is it? That’s right, it’s a duck. But this is a nuclear duck.” More recently, Israel produced a <a href="https://theconversation.com/netanyahus-attempt-to-discredit-the-iran-nuclear-deal-doesnt-hold-water-95829">dossier</a> that sought to demonstrate that Iran had lied during the negotiations that produced the deal.</p>
<p>In addition, Israel has a precedent of striking against what it perceives to be a serious threat to its survival. Take the <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/35-years-on-iaf-pilots-recall-daring-mission-to-bomb-saddams-nuke-reactor/">strike on Iraq’s Osirak reactor</a> in 1981, or the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-syria-nuclear/israel-admits-bombing-suspected-syrian-nuclear-reactor-in-2007-warns-iran-idUSKBN1GX09K">strike against a suspected Syrian nuclear facility</a> in 2007. If the deal collapses and Iran restarts its nuclear programme, then similar unannounced attacks on suspected nuclear sites are a strong possibility.</p>
<p>So where do things stand as of now? If the deal breaks down in full, tensions across the Middle East could escalate to a dangerous level, as players on all sides rush to recalibrate their positions. The various fronts in Syria will only become more deadly as Iran doubles down to preserve its influence over territory there – a corridor of control that has been <a href="http://www.inss.org.il/publication/irans-land-bridge-mediterranean-possible-routes-ensuing-challenges/">called</a> a “land bridge to the Mediterranean”, and by extension, to Israel.</p>
<p>Ultimately, Trump has missed the point of his counterparts’ pleas to keep the deal in place. This isn’t about whether or not Iran has leeway to build a nuclear weapon; it’s about keeping tensions across the Middle East in check, and preventing a catastrophic new war. Diplomats the world over are in for some sleepless nights.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/96317/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Mabon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Iran is a dangerous mischief-maker in the Middle East – but scrapping the nuclear deal will probably make things worse.Simon Mabon, Lecturer in International Relations, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/903522018-01-23T19:29:38Z2018-01-23T19:29:38ZUnrest in Iran will continue until religious rule ends<p>The two-week protest movement that <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/12/30/world/iran-protests-issues/index.html">rocked cities across Iran</a> earlier this year has largely subsided, but the fallout from the government’s harsh response <a href="https://mobile.nytimes.com/2018/01/14/world/middleeast/iran-protests-deaths.html?smid=fb-share&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fm.facebook.com%2F">has just begun</a>.<br>
On Jan. 14, two activists, Saro Ghahremani and Ali Poladi, <a href="http://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iran/140120181">died in prison</a>, reportedly from torture. By early February, the detainee death toll had <a href="http://www.iranobserver.org/thousands-illegally-detained-in-iran-amidst-protests-number-of-torture-deaths-rises-to-11/">risen to 11</a>.</p>
<p>Family members have been <a href="http://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iran/140120181">gathering by the thousands outside Iranian jails</a> since January. <a href="http://www.indiana.edu/%7Eceus/about/people/faculty/khezri.shtml">As an Iranian-born scholar</a>, I see this daily vigil as a warning to the government: Violence against dissidents will not go unnoticed. It’s also a sign that unrest in Iran is far from over.</p>
<h2>Criminalizing protest</h2>
<p>Though Iran’s Constitution enshrines the <a href="http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ir00000_.html">right to peaceful protest</a>, dissent has historically been met with harsh reprisal. </p>
<p>More than 3,700 people were arrested and 23 were killed in the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/01/03/tens-of-thousands-of-people-protested-in-iran-this-week-heres-why/">sometimes violent nationwide marches</a> that started on Dec. 28, 2017, in response to an austerity budget proposed by President Hasan Rouhani. </p>
<p>At first, the protests were a display of anger by working-class Iranians in the city of Mashhad, who complained of poverty and inequality. But the unrest <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/iran-protests-spread-with-lightning-speed/">soon spread to more than 80 cities</a>. And as thousands of disenchanted citizens widened the agenda to include <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/20/world/middleeast/iran-protests-corruption-banks.html">corruption</a>, human rights, foreign policy and women’s empowerment, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-rallies-strategy/iran-treads-cautiously-as-protests-spread-idUSKBN1EQ136">police began to crack down</a>. Eventually, using <a href="https://www.npr.org/2018/01/01/574942821/anti-government-protesters-in-iran-risk-violence-from-police">tear gas, batons and bullets</a>, police quelled the protests in early January 2018. </p>
<p>In 2009, hundreds of people were arrested during <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/06/19/iran-halt-crackdown">the Green Movement</a>, a mass uprising of the Iranian middle class. Many were allegedly <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/8102358/Rape-in-Irans-prisons-the-cruellest-torture.html">later tortured and raped in jail</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202881/original/file-20180122-182938-l7k5vr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202881/original/file-20180122-182938-l7k5vr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202881/original/file-20180122-182938-l7k5vr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202881/original/file-20180122-182938-l7k5vr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202881/original/file-20180122-182938-l7k5vr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202881/original/file-20180122-182938-l7k5vr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202881/original/file-20180122-182938-l7k5vr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">During and after the 2009 Green Movement uprising, hundreds of Iranian protesters were arrested and allegedly tortured in jail.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4f/Iran_election_%282%29.jpg">mangostar/Wikimedia</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The recent deaths of nearly a dozen detainees have again raised fears that more activists will suffer a similar fate – concerns heightened by the hard-line rhetoric of Iran’s supreme leader, the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.</p>
<p>On Jan. 2, Khamenei called the protesters – who across the country had <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/12/31/574842829/2-protesters-killed-as-anti-government-protests-enter-fourth-day-in-iran">taken the bold step of calling for his removal</a> – “<a href="http://time.com/5083800/ayatollah-khamenei-iran-protests-9-dead/">enemies of Iran</a>.” </p>
<p>Two weeks later, after the protests had ended, the spokesman for the judicial system – which falls under Khamenei’s jurisdiction – <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/14/world/middleeast/iran-protests-deaths.html">denied</a> any government responsibility for protester deaths. He said that the <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-wave-protests-prices-government-rallies-trump/28947178.html">bullets used to kill marchers</a> aren’t the type used by Iranian police. </p>
<p>Such statements have earned popular sympathy for the thousands of people now keeping daily watch at Iran’s jails. Many Iranians were outraged when the same government spokesman, Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/14/world/middleeast/iran-protests-deaths.html">claimed</a> that the first two activists who died in jail “were drug addicts” who had “committed suicide.”</p>
<p>The victims’ families, relatives, and even <a href="https://twitter.com/baharerahnama/status/952502396814536704">celebrities familiar with the case</a> firmly denied this assertion. </p>
<p>Though President Rouhani has on several occasions <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-42531165">defended Iranians’ right to protest</a>, he seems unwilling to challenge the supreme leader on the brutality that has lead to 34 protester deaths. </p>
<p>His silence has infuriated Iranians. A few days into the protests, demonstrators began accusing the self-declared reformist president of being no different than supreme leader, chanting, “<a href="https://twitter.com/ArminNavabi/status/948013866897653760">Reformists, hardliners, your time is up</a>.” </p>
<h2>Who is Iran’s supreme leader?</h2>
<p>To understand Iranian voters’ frustration, it is key to understand just how powerful the Ayatollah Khamenei is in Iran.</p>
<p>Ever since the <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/01/iran-1979-revolution-shook-world-2014121134227652609.html">1979 Iranian Revolution</a> created the Islamic Republic of Iran, replacing Iran’s 2,500-year-old monarchy with a clerical regime, the <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2013-08-12/who-ali-khamenei">supreme leader</a> has been both the head of state and the highest ranking religious authority in Iran. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202630/original/file-20180119-110084-1ltsupw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202630/original/file-20180119-110084-1ltsupw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202630/original/file-20180119-110084-1ltsupw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202630/original/file-20180119-110084-1ltsupw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202630/original/file-20180119-110084-1ltsupw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202630/original/file-20180119-110084-1ltsupw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202630/original/file-20180119-110084-1ltsupw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The 1979 Iranian Revolution established the supreme leader as the country’s ultimate ruler. Now many citizens say the time for clerical rule is over.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/8a/Iranian_Revolution_in_Shahyad_Square.jpg">Wikimedia</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Constitution grants the supreme leader’s office almost unlimited power. Today, Khamenei – like his <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/khomeini_ayatollah.shtml">well-known predecessor Ayatollah Khomeini</a>, whose reign ended when he died in 1989 – wields enormous control over Iran’s military, judiciary, treasury, media, foreign policy, presidential cabinet and legislative process. </p>
<p>The executive branch, in contrast, is rather weak. The president is limited to enforcing or changing the Constitution, meaning he can appoint ministers and ambassadors, for example – but he cannot, say, repeal laws that <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-iranian-women-want-rights-jobs-and-a-seat-at-the-table-77633">discriminate against women</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/kurdistan-earthquake-politics-creates-roadblocks-to-relief-87928">ethnic minorities</a>.</p>
<p>As a result, Rouhani, like other reform-minded presidents before him, have <a href="https://theconversation.com/irans-rouhani-may-now-control-parliament-but-do-his-economic-reforms-stand-a-chance-59120">struggled to keep such campaign promises as modernizing Iran’s economy</a> and improving human rights.</p>
<p>Khamenei’s power is also financial. A major portion of Iran’s national budget goes to the office of the supreme leader and its affiliated institutions. This funding is <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-setad-legal-specialreport/special-report-to-expand-khameneis-grip-on-the-economy-iran-stretched-its-laws-idUSBRE9AC0JS20131113">not subject to government oversight</a>, and no one but Khamenei himself knows how much money he receives.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202882/original/file-20180122-182976-1c99mvn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202882/original/file-20180122-182976-1c99mvn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=856&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202882/original/file-20180122-182976-1c99mvn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=856&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202882/original/file-20180122-182976-1c99mvn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=856&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202882/original/file-20180122-182976-1c99mvn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1076&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202882/original/file-20180122-182976-1c99mvn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1076&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202882/original/file-20180122-182976-1c99mvn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1076&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/7a/Ali_Khamenei_crop.jpg">Wikipedia</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Nor does anyone control how he spends it. Since the 1979 revolution, the office of the supreme leader has laid out billions of dollars to expand the influence of his faith, Shia Islam, across the Middle East. </p>
<p>War is a key part of that foreign policy. From 1980 to 1988, under the auspices of the Ayatolla Khomeini, Iran fought <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-34353349">the Sunni-led government of Saddam Hussein</a>, in Iraq. Since 2011, the current supreme leader has sent Iranian troops into Syria’s civil war <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/14/iran-troop-deployment-syria-anti-rebel-offensive-revolutionary-guards-assad">to help keep its contested president, Bashar al-Assad, in power</a>.</p>
<p>The supreme leader is also behind Iran’s controversial nuclear program. The country’s <a href="http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/iran.aspx">insistence on processing nuclear-grade uranium</a> – ostensibly as a source of energy – has brought international sanctions, invasive inspections and <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/heshmatalavi/2017/09/29/iran-economy-nuclear-deal/#7f8b326c3e42">global political criticism to Iran</a>.</p>
<p>Finally, because it controls police and the judiciary, the supreme leader’s office sets the tone for government handling of protest. And, since 1979, it has <a href="https://fanack.com/iran/faces/sadeq-larijani/">appointed conservative leaders</a> who criminalize dissent.</p>
<p>As a result, for nearly four decades, both citizen dissident and reform-minded leaders who oppose Iran’s Islamic regime have been harshly suppressed. The recent protests mark seven years since three Green Movement leaders <a href="https://www.iranhumanrights.org/2016/12/karroubi-mousavi-rahnavard/">were placed under house arrest</a>. They are still awaiting trial. </p>
<h2>‘We regret Rouhani’</h2>
<p>President Rouhani has twice <a href="https://theconversation.com/rouhanis-commanding-election-victory-might-just-help-him-change-iran-78051">won election handily</a> by promising to resolve Iranian’s nuclear conflict, free the Green Movement leaders and ensure civil rights for all citizens. </p>
<p>All of these initiatives require him to go head to head with the supreme leader. In 2015, he succeeded in achieving a <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33521655">hard-fought nuclear agreement between Iran and six world powers</a>, a deal Khamenei ostensibly opposed. </p>
<p>But, in exchange, Rouhani has had to sacrifice other campaign promises like <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/28/world/middleeast/un-rights-investigator-highly-critical-of-iran.html?_r=0">improving human rights</a>, fighting corruption and addressing inequality. The mass discontent on display recently reflects voter frustration with the president’s lack of progress on these important issues.</p>
<p>One recent scandal has implicated two high-level officials – judiciary head Sadeq Larijani and his brother Ali Larijani, who is speaker of the parliament – for <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-politics/ahmadinejad-accuses-iran-speakers-family-of-corruption-idUSBRE9120DG20130203">using their political connections for their family’s economic gain</a>.</p>
<p>And last year, a January 2016 leak dubbed “<a href="http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-iran-salaries-20160622-snap-story.html">Payslip-gate</a>” revealed that the top brass at state-owned companies were earning extravagant salaries of up to <a href="http://beta.latimes.com/world/la-fg-iran-salaries-20160622-snap-story.html">100 times the monthly wage of the lowest-paid government employees</a>.</p>
<h2>The end of the supreme leader?</h2>
<p>Between Rouhani’s ineffectiveness and Khamenei’s state-sanctioned violence, both leaders seem to have alienated Iranian voters. </p>
<p>The damage may be beyond repair. Protest slogans like “Overthrow the clerics’ regime” and “Death to Rouhani” suggest that for the first time since 1979, Iranians are demanding not incremental reform but a whole new era – one without an omnipotent, unaccountable supreme leader. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202632/original/file-20180119-110117-4n9mqk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202632/original/file-20180119-110117-4n9mqk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202632/original/file-20180119-110117-4n9mqk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202632/original/file-20180119-110117-4n9mqk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202632/original/file-20180119-110117-4n9mqk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202632/original/file-20180119-110117-4n9mqk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202632/original/file-20180119-110117-4n9mqk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Many Iranians have pushed their government to address persistent gender inequality, to little avail.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Ebrahim Noroozi</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>That puts President Rouhani in an uncomfortable position. I believe Iran’s president is loyal to the principle of an Islamic republic rooted in religious authority. After all, he is a cleric, too. </p>
<p>But Rouhani – who <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-23554836">has a doctorate in constitutional law from a Scottish university</a> – is also smart enough to observe that this medieval dual-government system is struggling to survive in modern, restive Iran. </p>
<p>Time may heal all. Khamenei is 78 years old and in poor health. In my assessment, it is conceivable that his death could actually mark the beginning of the end of supreme leadership in Iran.</p>
<p>And if it doesn’t, then Iran’s uprisings will go on.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/90352/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Haidar Khezri does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>11 activists have died in prison since Iran’s mass protests were crushed in January. Now, some detainees’ families are keeping a daily vigil outside jails. It’s a sign that unrest in Iran is not over.Haidar Khezri, Adjunct Assistant Professor at the Department of Central Eurasian Studies (CEUS), Indiana UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/897452018-01-08T21:37:17Z2018-01-08T21:37:17ZWhy Iran’s protests matter this time<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/201230/original/file-20180108-83571-31hfeq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">University students attend a protest inside Tehran University as anti-riot Iranian police prevent them from joining other protesters.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A series of urban uprisings in Iran that began on Dec. 28 in its second-largest city <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2018/0105/In-Iran-s-surprise-uprising-of-the-poor-dents-to-revolution-s-legitimacy">shocked the country’s Islamic regime</a>, as well as much of the world. </p>
<p>Although the Mashhad protests were spearheaded by conservative opponents of President Hassan Rouhani to discredit his economic policies, the organizers lost control of the crowd. Protesters <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/protests-threaten-irans-ascendant-role-in-the-middle-east/2018/01/04/86246e7e-994f-457b-a85b-f1eb76b71998_story.html?utm_term=.5346051e732d">angrily chanted slogans</a> – such as “Leave Syria alone, think about us” and “Death to Hezbollah” – that were aimed at not only Rouhani but the entire Islamic regime. </p>
<p>In the days that followed, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-rallies-guards/iran-guards-say-quell-unrest-fomented-by-foreign-enemies-idUSKBN1EW085">protests spread</a> to 80 cities, leading to at least 22 deaths and over 1,000 arrests. On Jan. 8, Rouhani, who won a second term last May, <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-08/rouhani-challenges-iran-s-hardliners-with-call-for-more-freedoms">said they signaled</a> Iranians want not only a stronger economy but also more freedom. </p>
<p>While the government says it now has the situation under control, that doesn’t eliminate the significance of the largest protests since 2009, when <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/14/world/middleeast/14iran.html">millions came out to oppose</a> the outcome of that year’s presidential election. The government forcefully suppressed that uprising, and two candidates who disputed the results remain under house arrest. </p>
<p>Why have so many Iranians again taken to the streets and will these protests have a larger impact than those eight years ago? As a close observer of Iran, I believe there are several important differences between the protests today and in 2009 that can help us answer both questions.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/201240/original/file-20180108-83571-1jv1j8c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/201240/original/file-20180108-83571-1jv1j8c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201240/original/file-20180108-83571-1jv1j8c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201240/original/file-20180108-83571-1jv1j8c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201240/original/file-20180108-83571-1jv1j8c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201240/original/file-20180108-83571-1jv1j8c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201240/original/file-20180108-83571-1jv1j8c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iran President Hassan Rouhani says the protests show Iranians are crying out for both economic and political change.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Iranian Presidency Office via AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What’s behind the uprising</h2>
<p>Not surprisingly, the conservative faction of the Islamic regime <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/01/02/nine-dead-iran-protesters-storm-police-station-fresh-unrest/">was quick to blame</a> Iran’s adversaries, namely the U.S., Israel and Saudi Arabia. In contrast, reformists <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/irans-government-warns-protesters-they-will-pay-the-price-for-mass-unrest/2017/12/31/1d4abd52-edb1-11e7-956e-baea358f9725_story.html?utm_term=.47edd657fc6a">say that the protests</a> are about <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/29/world/middleeast/scattered-protests-erupt-in-iran-over-economic-woes.html">economic grievances</a> such as unemployment, inequality and corruption. </p>
<p>They do have a point. While the overall economy is growing again, and many indicators <a href="https://financialtribune.com/articles/economy-domestic-economy/74009/imf-forecasts-sustained-growth-for-iran-s-economy">have turned positive</a> in the past two years, the gains haven’t been shared by all Iranians.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/iran/publication/iran-economic-outlook-october-2017">economy grew</a> 13.4 percent in 2016 after oil and financial sanctions were lifted as part of the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33521655">nuclear agreement</a> with the West, which increased the country’s oil and gas production.</p>
<p>The non-oil sector, however, expanded just 3.3 percent – a clear sign the <a href="http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13930504000667">economy’s recovery</a> has been slow in visibly improving people’s living standards. Real incomes of many segments of the economy remain weak, and the housing and construction sector remains in recession. </p>
<p>Unemployment is still high, at 12 percent, particularly among young university graduates. But it is much higher in small towns and <a href="http://www.sid.ir/En/Journal/ViewPaper.aspx?ID=304096">peripheral regions</a> of the country, where many of the protests occurred, driven by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/29/world/middleeast/scattered-protests-erupt-in-iran-over-economic-woes.html">concerns over inequality and poverty</a>.</p>
<p>Under Iran’s Constitution the supreme leader has broad powers, and even Rouhani has a limited ability to influence key policies, including those concerning the economy. Some key policies are entirely off limits, such as <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-06-09/iran-spends-billions-to-prop-up-assad">Iran’s involvement</a> in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon. These campaigns, <a href="http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/protests-put-spotlight-irans-vast-shadowy-syria-war-52156143">which are costing Iran billions of dollars</a> every year, seem to be driving at least some of the protesters’ anger.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/201239/original/file-20180108-83581-km0gd3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/201239/original/file-20180108-83581-km0gd3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201239/original/file-20180108-83581-km0gd3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201239/original/file-20180108-83581-km0gd3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201239/original/file-20180108-83581-km0gd3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201239/original/file-20180108-83581-km0gd3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201239/original/file-20180108-83581-km0gd3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iranian worshipers chant slogans during a rally against anti-government protestors in Tehran, Iran, on Jan. 5.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Ebrahim Noroozi</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Key differences</h2>
<p>There are three key differences between today’s uprisings and those in 2009. </p>
<p>In 2009, the demands were political. The reformist faction of the ruling regime, which disputed the results of the presidential election, was the main actor in the protests. Current protests do not have a visible political leader and appear to be directed at the entire regime, including reformists. This is best demonstrated by one of the slogans frequently chanted by protesters, which roughly translates as, “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gt-Eft0Y3hM">It is over for all of you</a>.”</p>
<p>Another difference is that the 2009 protests were centered around the capital Tehran and other major cities. While the recent demonstrations involve fewer actual protesters, they are spread over a much larger area of the country, including many small cities that suffer from underdevelopment and low incomes. </p>
<p>These primarily young protesters, <a href="https://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB89.pdf">including unemployed university graduates</a> and low-income workers, are also outraged by the frequent reports of corruption and unfair accumulation of wealth among some government officials. Competing factions of the ruling elite have frequently <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/40a7a75c-2ffb-11e7-9555-23ef563ecf9a">exposed each others’ corruption</a>, revelations that have alienated the marginalized segments of the population that are struggling with poverty and unemployment. Economic issues <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/iran-protests-green-movement_us_5a4e4caae4b0b0e5a7ab865c">are far more important</a> today than they were for the primarily middle-class protesters of 2009. </p>
<p>Finally, the U.S. response to the current uprisings has also been markedly different. </p>
<p>The Obama administration <a href="https://www.factcheck.org/2018/01/response-iranian-protests-now/">reacted with caution</a> to the 2009 uprisings and refrained from openly cheering on the protesters, motivated by a fear that overt support would provoke a harsher crackdown. </p>
<p>In contrast, President Donald Trump and his State Department have actively supported the protesters, and the U.S. is trying to mobilize an international condemnation of the Iranian government’s response. This initiative, however, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/05/world/middleeast/un-iran-protests-debate.html">faces strong resistance</a> from China and Russia in the United Nations. </p>
<p>Concern about a stronger reaction from the Trump administration might explain the <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/iran-security-forces-show-restraint/4191801.html">cautious and measured approach</a> of Iran’s security forces in confronting the current protesters. The response <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/06/23/iran-violent-crackdown-protesters-widens">was more violent</a> and brutal in 2009.</p>
<h2>What might change</h2>
<p>The protestors’ focus on economic rather than political issues enables some moderate members of the regime to meaningfully address their grievances rather than being forced to keep silent or issue outright condemnations, as they did in 2009.</p>
<p>While condemning the acts of violence by some protesters, many of Iran’s political leaders, <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/01/iran-khamenei-reaction-protests-shamkhani-kowsari.html">including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei</a>, have expressed sympathy for their economic concerns. </p>
<p>They have also led to some changes in fiscal budget and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/56b6eba0-4178-11e7-82b6-896b95f30f58">economic reform priorities</a>. Planned increases in prices of fuel and bread, for example, have been suspended. </p>
<p>While it’s encouraging that the government is reacting to protester concerns at all, stalling important economic reforms is not the right way to do it. These steps will surely be welcomed by lower-income Iranians, ensuring they’re politically popular, yet they may lead to more hardship down the road by worsening the budget deficit and potentially fueling inflation. </p>
<p>Instead of keeping prices of essential items artificially low, which leads to considerable waste and inefficiency in the economy, it would be more effective to offer targeted subsidies to the poor while doing more to fight corruption and political nepotism, a primary cause of rising income and wealth disparities in Iran.</p>
<h2>What won’t</h2>
<p>Will the recent unrest serve as a wake-up call for the political elite that more needs to be done?</p>
<p>Unfortunately, an inefficient populist response is probably as far as the country’s supreme leader will be willing to go – at least for now. Protesters’ more political demands, such as tackling corruption, limiting Khamenei’s powers or reducing Iran’s role in regional conflicts, are unlikely to be addressed anytime soon. </p>
<p>Iran’s political system carefully screens candidates for public office and thus remains closed to ordinary citizens, leaving Iranians with few options for influencing government policy besides the streets. And neither political faction, reformist or conservative, has yet offered any practical solution for how to change that. </p>
<p>For most Iranians, however, corruption, poverty and economic inequality can not be addressed without serious reforms. And that suggests that while the most recent uprising may be winding down, similar uprisings are likely in the future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89745/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nader Habibi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Although the unrest that shocked Iran’s ruling elite appears to be over, there are several reasons to think this won’t be the last time disaffected citizens take to the streets.Nader Habibi, Henry J. Leir Professor of Practice in Economics of the Middle East, Brandeis UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/896042018-01-05T15:07:08Z2018-01-05T15:07:08ZIran’s reformists have sided with the hardliners – and doomed their cause<p>For a few days at the start of 2018, nationwide protests hit the streets of several Iranian cities, blindsiding the government and briefly drawing the world’s attention. The government sponsored counter-protests in support of the status quo, but anti-government protests continued. It all signals that the arrangement of Iranian politics has radically changed – and in particular that the mainstream political project known as <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2013/05/23/the-legacy-of-reform-in-iran-sixteen-years-later/">reformism</a> is no longer the decisive force it was.</p>
<p>Until now, the only visible protests on the streets of Iran since 2013 revolved around economic issues. They have mostly been organised by Iranians lower down the social ladder; the bus drivers’ union, teachers, and those who lost their savings to fraud and embezzlement by top officials or financial institutions affiliated with the Revolutionary Guard.</p>
<p>The largest demonstrations since the the 2009 Green Movement came in November 2016 and were held by workers <a href="https://www.radiozamaneh.com/297387">against the government’s bill</a> to reform labour laws. In May 2017, hundreds who lost their deposits to Caspian financial institutions protested in front of the Iranian parliament wearing white shrouds – <a href="https://humanrightsiniran.com/1396/42064/">implying they were ready to die</a> for their cause. Union leaders, meanwhile, have made enough political trouble to become the <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde13/6147/2017/en/">largest group of political prisoners</a> during Rouhani’s presidency. In January 2015, <a href="https://www.iranhumanrights.org/2016/05/gold-mine-workers-flogged-for-protest/">17 gold miners</a> from Agh Darreh were arrested and lashed on orders of the judiciary for protesting the firing of 326 miners.</p>
<p>The signals of discontent these protests sent were completely ignored by the government and the pro-government elite, who forgot that Rouhani’s first campaign revolved around the idea that economic hardship could be ended through the nuclear negotiations. But even though he was re-elected president in 2017, he has ultimately never lived up to his initial promise. </p>
<h2>State of denial</h2>
<p>He offered a last slap in the face for Iran’s lower middle and working classes with his 2018 budget bill. With workers in state-owned factories and pensioners facing <a href="https://en.radiozamaneh.com/articles/iranian-workers-pensioners-protest-months-of-delayed-wages/">months of delayed wages</a> and the victims of recent earthquakes still sleeping in tents during western Iran’s deadly winter, the bill <a href="http://www.dw.com/fa-ir/%D8%B3%D9%87%D9%85-%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%B0%D9%87%D8%A8%DB%8C-%D8%BA%DB%8C%D8%B1%D9%BE%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AE%DA%AF%D9%88-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%AC%D9%87-%D9%BE%DB%8C%D8%B4%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AF%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84-%DB%B9%DB%B7/a-41812179">allocated billions of dollars</a> to numerous religious institutions owned by high-ranking clerics, mostly focused on missionary activities abroad. </p>
<p>In one case, the government channelled <a href="http://www.magiran.com/npview.asp?ID=3684196">IRR280 billion</a> (about US$7.8m) to a religious institution owned by Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, a radical cleric who was allegedly behind <a href="https://fa.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84%E2%80%8C%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C_%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%81%D9%84%DB%8C_%DA%A9%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86">murders committed by Islamist fanatics</a> in Kerman. This institution has been receiving annual allocations since the second term of the last reformist president, <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3027382.stm">Mohammad Khatami</a>.</p>
<p>Ayatollah Khomeini called the 1979 Islamic Revolution a “revolution of the barefooted”, a powerful image that helped the regime establish its hegemony and eradicate leftists from Iran’s official political spectrum. But three decades later, pro-government reformists too are using the epithet “barefooted masses” in quite a different way: to denigrate and scorn anyone who protests against the established order.</p>
<p>In total denial about their economic and political failures, the majority of reformists tried at first to blame the most recent protests on their conservative rivals. This was not true. From the beginning, the most recent protests were aimed not just at economic problems, but at the very foundations of the Islamic Regime and its religious leaders. </p>
<p>A week before the main wave of the current protests, <a href="http://bit.ly/2lT2imm">pensioners</a> in the pro-Rouhani city of Isfahan gathered in front of the office of the governorate chanting “pensioners’ wages are under the mullahs’ cloak” and “revolution, our mistake”. Then came the protests in Mashhad, Iran’s second-largest and most religious city; in less than a day, the protests flared up and spread to 14 cities across the country. On the sixth day, at least 21 people were killed on the streets. </p>
<p>The reformists’ response was all too predictable. </p>
<h2>Decline and decay</h2>
<p>Mohajerani, a former minister of culture and a pro-government reformist living in exile, has called the protests a rootless movement, <a href="https://twitter.com/MohajeraniSayed/status/946652772052754432">attributed them to Israel</a>, and reproached the media for covering them. Reformist journalist Ebrahim Nabavi, meanwhile, <a href="https://twitter.com/ebrahimnabavi/status/946348055392960512">mocked the protesters</a> as “beetroot sellers and cherry pickers”.</p>
<p>Once a democratic and civil movement, reformism in Iran has now been totally absorbed into the hardliners’ authoritarianism. Confronted with an apparent third force in Iran’s bipolar political spectrum, they chose to become one with their former adversaries on the hardline religious front. Once outraged when former president <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23538717">Mahmoud Ahmadinejad</a> called the Green Movement protesters “dust and dirt”, they are borrowing the same rhetoric to describe the new movement – right down to the shop-worn cliche of tying them to the hostile US.</p>
<p>In the last several elections, reformists successfully mobilised dissident middle and upper middle-class Iranians. This they did mainly through fearmongering; the fear of hardliners and of war got many, even among the most radical opposition of the regime, to the ballot box. </p>
<p>But the truth is that since Khatami’s second term, Iranian reformism has been constantly backing away from its own principled demands to the point that it is now almost unrecognisable. In a same way, the apparatus of the Islamic Republic of Iran has now lost any legitimacy as a “revolution of the barefooted”. The regime, as professor of political science <a href="http://zeitoons.com/42531">Fatemeh Sadeghi</a> puts it, “is no longer a system, but a pure reign without any justification”.</p>
<p>The diversity of today’s protesters looks set to become a pattern for the reconstruction of the opposition, whose prominent figures and leaders have been systematically <a href="http://www.iranhrdc.org/english/publications/reports/3152-no-safe-haven-iran-s-global-assassination-campaign.html">assassinated</a> over the last four decades. For the first time in the history of post-revolution Iran, an opposition is at the verge of forming a real and functional coalition of all the country’s secular forces, from socialists to liberals and all the factions in between. As the reformists’ agenda shrivels into cynicism, that opposition’s time may just be coming.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89604/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Omid Shams does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With a hollowed-out agenda and a cynical attitude to corruption, Iran’s reformist forces have squandered their people’s trust.Omid Shams, PhD Candidate, School of Law, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/895892018-01-03T13:35:10Z2018-01-03T13:35:10ZIran: a new kind of protest movement is taking hold<p>When the news broke about a protest in Mashhad, Iran’s second largest city and a stronghold for the country’s religious hardliners, in the waning days of 2017 no one thought it would lead to a national rally against the government. But since then the demonstrations have <a href="https://theconversation.com/protests-in-iran-could-spell-trouble-for-the-middle-east-at-large-89588">rapidly spread to Iran’s other provinces</a> and have left the political elite shocked and baffled. </p>
<p>It’s hard to believe that a regime with such a strong regional position, and one that just recently <a href="https://theconversation.com/rouhanis-commanding-election-victory-might-just-help-him-change-iran-78051">held a successful presidential election</a> with a wide range of participants, is in trouble. All parts of the Iranian establishment have duly responded with various forms of denial. </p>
<p>The country’s political <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/01/iran-reformist-reaction-protests-unrest-tajzadeh-abtahi.html">reformists</a> see the protests as a plot by hardliners against the president, Hasan Rouhani, and his moderate government. Iran’s vice-president, Eshaq Jahangiri, implicitly blamed hardliners and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/29/iranian-police-disperse-anti-government-protests">said</a> “those who are behind such events will burn their own fingers”. </p>
<p>Similarly, hardliners are ignoring the fact that the protesters are venting their anger against the religious regime as a whole. Instead, they are framing the protests as a spasm of rage against the elected government’s economic policies. As the protests spread and grew, one of Iran’s most conservative newspapers, Kayhan, <a href="http://kayhan.ir/fa/news/122312/%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AD%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%DA%AF%D9%84%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%87%E2%80%8C%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%85-%D8%AE%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA">denounced</a> the Rouhani government and said the protesters were angry that it had “ignored” its own election slogans and promises.</p>
<p>But the last seven days have indicated that the protesters are neither lackeys of the hardliners, as the reformists would have it, nor just unhappy with Rouhani‘s government, as the hardliners claim. Indeed, they are representing a new movement: the “economically marginalised people movement”. And this movement is unlike any other seen in post-revolutionary Iran.</p>
<h2>Those who show up</h2>
<p>Whereas 2009’s <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/05/201351661225981675.html">Green Movement</a> mostly comprised middle-class and affluent Iranians who demanded democracy and political reform, today’s protests come mostly from working-class and low-income families fed up with Iran’s unjust distribution of wealth and the corruption that exacerbates it. These Iranians know that their country has some of the world’s richest natural resources, but they also know that the revenue that should be spent on them is instead siphoned off to fund the government’s foreign adventurism. And so goes their chant: “Leave Syria, do something for us.”</p>
<p>In addition, the current movement, unlike the Green Movement, has no specific leader, and its demonstrations are mostly organised via <a href="https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/01/01/irans-telegram-revolution-216206">Telegram</a>, Iran’s most popular messaging app. While having no leadership can be a negative point for any movement, it also can have its benefits. The Green Movement came to an end when the regime placed its leaders under <a href="https://www.iranhumanrights.org/2016/12/karroubi-mousavi-rahnavard/">house arrest</a>. But when Telegram was <a href="https://twitter.com/durov/status/947441456238735360">blocked</a> in Iran to stymie the growing protests, the movement kept going; people have started to use virtual private networks and proxy servers, and they now have access to Telegram again.</p>
<p>Previous protests in post-revolutionary Iran were hardly national movements. <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3879535.stm">The student protests in 1999</a> against the closure of Salam, a reformist newspaper, were confined to Tehran. Conversely, the current movement in Iran extends across the country; even in Qom, a very conservative city where unrest is usually thought highly unlikely, people have been <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/iran/1.831956">out on the streets</a> chanting against the regime.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"946770453099663360"}"></div></p>
<p>Until these demonstrations began, big social movements in Iran were principally organised by reformists – but this time, reformist leaders are withholding their support. As the most powerful challenger to the hardliners, whom they have to fight to win over the broad middle of Iranian public opinion, the reformists have no interest in backing what can be described as a left-wing movement, at least in terms of who its participants are. Equally, the protesters clearly don’t think their economic grievances can be settled within the current reformist discourse. </p>
<p>So if the protests continue to grow and the reformists still want to be Iran’s main opposition voice, they may soon have no choice but to accommodate at least some of the demonstrators’ demands in their political agenda. If they do not, their political struggle could soon be hijacked by something entirely new.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89589/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dr Meysam Tayebipour does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Iran’s main opposition is loath to embrace a new wave of protesters. It may soon have no choice.Dr Meysam Tayebipour, PhD Candidate, Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/864862017-11-01T11:21:02Z2017-11-01T11:21:02ZTrump’s hostility to Nuclear Deal could polarise Iranian opinion even further<p>The <a href="http://collections.internetmemory.org/haeu/20160313172652/http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/docs/iran_agreement/iran_joint-comprehensive-plan-of-action_en.pdf">Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action</a> (JCPOA), signed on July 15, 2015 to limit Tehran’s controversial nuclear enrichment programme in exchange for sanctions relief, seems now to be under serious threat. On October 13, in a widely expected but still alarming <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-41617488">speech</a>, US President Donald Trump described the deal as “one of the worst and most one-sided transactions the US has ever entered into”, announced he would decertify it, and called for a renegotiation that would curb the Revolutionary Guards’ <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/what-is-irans-revolutionary-guard/a-40948522">ballistic missile programme</a>.</p>
<p>Although Trump stopped short of calling for a full cancellation of the JCPOA, commonly referred to as the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-the-iran-nuclear-deal-means-and-what-it-doesnt-44685">Iranian nuclear deal</a>, his wording reveals the extent to which his new strategy differs from Obama’s. Trump expressed solidarity with the people of Iran, whom he called the Iranian dictatorial regime’s “longest-suffering victims”, and chose to use the term “Arabian Gulf” instead of the internationally recognised “Persian Gulf” – a sign of his warmth towards Saudi Arabia.</p>
<p>So why, then, was Tehran’s immediate reaction so muted?</p>
<p>The Iranian president, Hasan Rouhani, attaches great importance to the deal, seen as crucial to Iran’s economic growth. Thus, although Iran’s long-term course of action probably will be determined by the US Congress decision to preserve, modify or back out of the deal on December 14, Rouhani’s foreign minister, Javad Zarif, stated after Trump’s October announcement that so long as the nuclear deal’s European signatories stick to its terms, <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/iran-we-will-stick-to-nuclear-deal-if-europe-does/a-40959819">Iran will comply as well</a>. </p>
<p>Rouhani wanted also to contain the potential harsh reaction of Iranian hardliners, who have opposed the nuclear deal since its inception, and <a href="https://rusi.org/commentary/angry-tehran-cautious-after-trump%E2%80%99s-iran-nuclear-speech">tried to avoid further domestic polarisation</a> over the deal’s merits by trying to keep the country united against Trump and defending the Revolutionary Guards against his allegations. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, the Rouhani government’s efforts to simply stay the course are not sustainable long-term. A closer look at Iranian media coverage of the decertification confirms just how complex and divided the Iranian political sphere is on this critical issue.</p>
<h2>Press review</h2>
<p>Across the board, the response of media outlets to Trump’s actions threw the country’s political debate into sharp relief. The conservative and moderate media alike depicted Trump as an unreliable counterpart who cannot be trusted. Mockery, caricatures, and invitations “to study the history of the Persian Gulf” were reported in a wide range of papers such as <a href="http://www.ebtekarnews.com/">Ebtekar</a>, <a href="http://www.iran-newspaper.com/">Iran</a>, <a href="http://jamejamonline.ir/">Jaam-e Jam</a> and <a href="http://kayhan.ir/en">Kayhan</a>.</p>
<p>However, Iranian media outlets are financed by and related to all manner of different political factions, and they do not lack diversity in views. </p>
<p>The conservative media stuck to the anti-American themes that have been in constant use since the 1979 Iranian revolution. According to Jaam-e Jam, Trump has finally unveiled “his anti-Iran strategy”. For <a href="http://www.javanonline.ir/">Javal</a>, a paper close to the conservative Principlists and critical of the nuclear deal’s provisions, Trump’s attempt to mislead global public opinion reveals the US’s intention “to confront Iran’s increasing role in the region”.</p>
<p>One particularly interesting response came from conservative outlet Kayhan. Reflecting the hardliners’ longstanding opposition to the accord, the paper welcomed Trump’s speech, saying it would open Rouhani’s eyes to the unreliability of his Western partners and eventually convince him to scrap the deal.</p>
<p>More moderate papers, meanwhile, were bitter at Trump’s attack on the “historic deal”, but they showed little surprise. Ebtekar, <a href="http://www.etemaad.ir/">Etemad</a>, <a href="http://jomhourieslami.net/">Jomhouri Eslami</a> and Besharat-e Now all focused on Rouhani’s intention to preserve it with the support of the European signatories. <a href="http://www.hamdelidaily.ir/">Hamdeli</a>, <a href="http://aftabnews.ir/">Aftab</a> and <a href="http://www.sharghdaily.ir/">Sharg</a> strongly emphasised the need to “adopt a path of moderation”, while the Islamic Republic News Agency offered responses imploring Iranians not to fall into Trump’s trap and allow public opinion to become polarised.</p>
<p>While the media landscape has been reproducing the different stances of Iran’s political factions, many Iranians are using social media, primarily Twitter and Facebook, to criticise Trump for taking a harder line on the Islamic republic. Words such as “mistrust”, “bully”, and “disappointment” have been widely used, with supporters of the deal clearly afraid that Trump will eventually undermine it. Their hope is that the deal’s other signatories will stand up for it and won’t surrender to Trump’s pressures to renegotiate.</p>
<p>Iranian critics of the deal have interpreted Trump’s decertification as a sign of the JCPOA failure. This narrative is particularly alarming if we set it against surveys on Iranian public opinion. <a href="https://theconversation.com/three-ways-trumps-nuclear-strategy-misunderstands-the-mood-in-iran-85637">Researchers</a> at the Centre for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) and IranPoll found that Iranian support for the deal is still high (55%), but substantially lower than it was in August 2015 (75%).</p>
<p>Due to the slow pace of economic recovery, many Iranians feel that the nuclear deal is not living up with the expectations. They blame Washington for the JCPOA ineffectiveness as they perceive the US is limiting other countries’ trade with Iran. It is not surprising therefore that Iranians do not intend to renegotiate the deal with Trump.</p>
<p>Regardless of the immediate implications of Trump’s decision, it is sure to have long-term repercussions. The number of Iranians who want to resume the controversial activities suspended under the nuclear deal is already significant, and it may well increase. With Trump in office, international investors and multinationals will think twice before entering the Iranian market, in turn undermining the positive effects of sanctions relief. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, Rouhani is struggling to keep Iranian hardliners sweet; the Revolutionary Guards <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-19/iran-guards-hit-back-at-trump-with-vow-to-boost-missile-program">recently announced</a> an expansion of Iran’s missile program, and the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/iran-nuclear-deal-latest-trump-tehran-us-support-withdraw-agreement-international-a8006561.html">threatened to shred the deal</a> to pieces if the US backs out of it.</p>
<p>All this will only polarise Iranian public opinion further and undermine domestic support for the deal, which has been crucial to legitimise Rouhani’s foreign policy. The hope is that, regardless of Washington’s moves, the understanding between the Iranian President and the nuclear deal’s signatories will remain intact, and that Europeans leaders <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/04/iran-nuclear-deal-europe-trump-congress">won’t cave in</a> to Trump’s pressures.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/86486/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Vittorio Felci does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>An insight into Iranian media and public opinion in the aftermath of Donald Trump’s speech decertifying the 2015 Iran Nuclear deal.Vittorio Felci, Researcher, Centre for Middle Eastern Studies, Lund UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/804252017-07-06T09:43:41Z2017-07-06T09:43:41ZWhy Total’s gas deal with Iran is so important for the country’s future<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/176951/original/file-20170705-23561-91gv9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Nine years ago, when sanctions were imposed on Iran by the international community, Total was the last Western energy company to <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/26088244-4ded-11dd-820e-000077b07658?mhq5j=e1">suspend</a> its activity there. Now, following the lifting of <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-35335078">nuclear sanctions</a> on Iran in January 2016, Total is the first Western company to return to the Iranian energy market. On July 3, the French company <a href="http://www.total.com/en/media/news/press-releases/iran-total-and-nioc-sign-contract-development-phase-11-giant-south-pars-gas-field?utm_source=Sociallymap&utm_medium=Sociallymap&utm_campaign=Sociallymap">announced</a> that it had signed a contract with Iran to develop and produce gas from phase 11 of South Pars (SP11) – the world’s largest gas field. </p>
<p>This is significant not just for Total and the Iranian economy, it also gives an important boost for the 2015 nuclear deal which has been the subject of debate in the US, as well as within Iran, in which the benefits of the deal have been questioned.</p>
<p>The deal is important for Iran for several reasons. Iran is the largest <a href="http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/en/corporate/pdf/energy-economics/statistical-review-2017/bp-statistical-review-of-world-energy-2017-natural-gas.pdf">gas reserve holder globally</a>. But, due to the lack of infrastructure and investment, it has struggled to extract enough energy from its gas fields even for its own consumption. Hence, Iran has long been a <a href="http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/iran-beyond-oil">net importer of gas</a>, largely from Turkmenistan. To produce more gas for its own market, Iran needs international oil companies to invest in its energy industry. </p>
<p>Data shows that in the past year, there has been a dramatic increase in Iran’s natural gas consumption. Last year, around 1.6 billion cubic feet of natural gas <a href="https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/en/corporate/pdf/energy-economics/statistical-review-2017/bp-statistical-review-of-world-energy-2017-full-report.pdf">was consumed a day</a> in Iran, and this is set to rise. The investment <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-total-southpars-idUSKBN19O1IO">will produce</a> 2 billion cubic feet per day for Iran’s domestic markets by 2021. </p>
<h2>Domestic growth</h2>
<p>Iran will also be hoping that this deal sets the ball rolling for more international engagement. After years of isolation and sanctions that have crippled its economy, Iran wants to enter the international market. Hassan Rouhani, who was <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/05/iran-election-president-hassan-rouhani-takes-lead-170520042625946.html">recently re-elected</a> as president, is a pragmatic politician and is constantly announcing that Iran is looking to open up to the rest of the world. </p>
<p>Rohuani, who <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-33268240">made the nuclear deal</a> with the West, now wants to encourage foreign investment to return to Iran. The deal with Total will provide an incentive for other foreign companies to sign deals with Iran. Oil companies such as <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-shell-iran-deals-idUSKBN13W14D">Dutch Shell</a> and Italy’s <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/43fc0b92-559d-11e7-9fed-c19e2700005f?mhq5j=e1">Eni</a> have already started to negotiate with Iran for new contracts. The Total deal shows it is possible. </p>
<p>Plus, it strengthens Rouhani’s position as a political reformer. His more hardline opponents <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-election-debate-idUSKBN1811BV">have criticised</a> the nuclear deal for failing to help the country’s economy and halting its nuclear programme. The deal was signed in 2015 and since then Iran’s economy, despite the lifting of sanctions, is making <a href="https://qz.com/729036/a-year-on-irans-nuclear-deal-is-helping-its-economy-but-not-as-much-as-some-hoped/">a slow recovery</a>. The Total deal gives Rouhani a concrete example of much-needed investment returning, thanks to the lifting of sanctions.</p>
<h2>International importance</h2>
<p>For Western companies investing in Iran, the country is still not free of risk. Foreign investors need to see stability, but the region is in turmoil. Iran’s policies on <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23849587">Syria</a> and <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-iran-houthis-idUSKBN16S22R">Yemen</a> are at odds with its neighbours, including Saudi Arabia – which is currently showing its opposition to Iran by <a href="https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21723018-kingdom-raising-tensions-its-immediate-neighbours-well-iran">cutting ties with Qatar</a>. </p>
<p>More importantly, US policy towards Iran is still vague. The Trump administration approved the nuclear agreement, but Rex Tillerson, secretary of state, said that the White House still needs to review the deal to recognise <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/19/iran-nuclear-deal-trump-administration-approves-agreement-but-review-looms">whether the agreement is in US interests</a>. Plus, the US Senate also recently passed a bill to <a href="https://theconversation.com/irans-hardliners-benefit-from-us-ramping-up-talk-of-sanctions-76439">step up sanctions</a> against Iran. Iran meanwhile <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/c13ad47e-a99c-11e6-a0bb-97f42551dbf4?mhq5j=e1">is adamant</a> that it will not tolerate new sanctions or changes to the nuclear agreement that was reached in 2015. This could scare off future business deals.</p>
<p>Total is no doubt aware of these potential risks, but clearly does not want to lose the opportunity to invest and gain a 51% stake in developing the world’s biggest gas field. Nonetheless, the company has split its US$5 billion investment into two parts. Total will first invest <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2017/07/iran-total/532560/">US$2 billion</a> and the rest of money will be invested only if the initial phase of development and extraction is successful. </p>
<p>There are also signs of a transatlantic split at play. Total is aware that, in contrast to the US, the European Union <a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/news/iran-nuclear-deal-compliance-europe-un-nikki-haley-trump-administration/">has praised</a> Iran for implementing the nuclear deal and wants to improve its relationship with Iran. Perhaps in a dig to the US president, the chairman of Total, Patrick Pouyanné, <a href="http://www.france24.com/en/20170702-iran-total-oil-deal-sanction">remarked</a>: “We are here to build bridges, not walls.”</p>
<p>So, while the Total deal would not have been possible without the nuclear deal, it is also helping keep it alive by pouring investment into Iran’s economy. It sends a political message for both hardliners in Iran and the US that Europe is keen to not only support the nuclear deal but its companies are ready to invest in Iran.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80425/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dr Meysam Tayebipour does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The deal will give a much-needed boost to Iran’s economy and lend important support to Rouhani’s government.Dr Meysam Tayebipour, PhD Candidate, Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/776332017-05-24T06:30:25Z2017-05-24T06:30:25ZWhat Iranian women want: rights, jobs and a seat at the table<p>Issues affecting women were conspicuously absent from Iran’s 2017 presidential election. That’s unless one finds useful the leading conservative candidate Hojjat al-Islam Ebrahim Raisi’s <a href="http://www.bbc.com/persian/blog-viewpoints-39792914?SThisFB">comment</a> that his government would enhance women’s dignity within the family, because women should be “good mothers and wives”.</p>
<p>The absence was a departure from the <a href="http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/womens-movement">June 2009 presidential campaign</a>, when two reformist candidates backed women’s rights.</p>
<p>Now that President Hassan Rouhani has been reelected by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/20/world/middleeast/iran-election-hassan-rouhani.html?_r=0">a wide margin</a> for another four-year term, it is crucial to ponder what his victory means for Iranian women. Rouhani has widespread support among Iran’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/20/iran-hassan-rouhani-set-for-landslide-in-huge-victory-for-reformists">urban population, the middle class, young people and women</a>.</p>
<p>Iranian activists did try to raise the issue during the electoral season. On May 6, several weeks before the election, some 180 women, including journalists, intellectuals and veteran activists, such as <a href="https://tavaana.org/en/content/noushin-ahmadi-khorasani-two-decades-struggle-womens-rights">Noushin Ahmadi Khorasani</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/iran-blog/2016/mar/04/iranian-election-seven-key-human-rights-challenges-facing-president-rouhani">Minoo Mortazi</a>, <a href="http://www.merip.org/author/fatemeh-sadeghi">Fatemeh Sadeghi</a>, <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/iran_segregation_divide/24264572.html">Fatemeh Govarayee</a>, issued a <a href="http://news.gooya.com/2017/05/post-3446.php">statement</a> outlining their <a href="https://www.iranhumanrights.org/2017/05/iranian-womens-rights-activists-use-elections-as-opportunities-to-put-forth-demands/">demands for the next president of Iran</a>. </p>
<p>Among them were <a href="http://norooznews.org/news/2017/05/6/5179">greater inclusion of women</a> in the country’s economic activity, repeal of discriminatory laws, increased female sports and a quota reserving at least 30% of ministerial positions for women. </p>
<p>The statement was hardly noticed, in part because the months prior to the election saw a crackdown on activism, with <a href="https://www.iranhumanrights.org/2017/03/mps-demand-answers-from-rouhani-on-increasing-arrests-ahead-of-election/">increasing</a> detentions, arrests, trials and long prison terms. </p>
<h2>No space for women</h2>
<p>All six candidates made promises about <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-do-iranians-want-better-salaries-more-jobs-and-safe-working-conditions-76872">creating jobs and reducing poverty</a> during their campaigns, but the social, economic and political status of women was barely discussed.</p>
<p>According to a May 11 <a href="http://www.icanpeacework.org/2017/05/11/women-iranian-elections/">analysis by the International Civil Society Action Network</a> of the first televised electoral debate, there was just one question about women, with a two-minute response time allotted. And that question centred on the role of women in the family. </p>
<p>In another debate, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/persian/blog-viewpoints-39792914?SThisFB">Sardar Ghalibaf</a>, Tehran’s mayor and former candidate, who is Raisi’s ally, discussed single mothers and the challenges of raising children with disabilities. But he focused on supporting the children without highlighting that their mothers require financial help to do so.</p>
<p>Reacting in an interview with the daily newspaper <a href="http://shahrvand-newspaper.ir/news:nomobile/main/98274/%D8%BA%D9%81%D9%84%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B2%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86">Shahrvand</a>, Parvaneh Salahshouri, a female parliamentarian from Tehran, asked, “How is it that social issues are addressed but the demands of half of society are not taken into consideration?”</p>
<p>Salahshouri criticised the state broadcasting agency, but her remarks also pointed at the candidates, suggesting that by limiting their discussion of gender issues to the family, the men displayed a contempt for the real problems faced by women. </p>
<h2>Discrimination against women</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/10/28/womens-rights-iran">Discrimination against women remains prevalent in Iran</a>. Iranian women do not have custody of their children, compulsory veiling is still enforced and domestic violence is insufficiently condemned by law. With inheritances, a man is entitled to twice as much a woman. </p>
<p>Iranian women are highly educated. In 2013, they <a href="http://www.educationnews.org/international-uk/highly-educated-iranian-women-kept-out-of-job-market/">represented over 60% of the country’s university applicants</a>. But they lack access to jobs. </p>
<p>Though official unemployment figures <a href="http://www.tradingeconomics.com/iran/unemployment-rate">hover around 12% </a>, the number could as <a href="http://www.rahesabz.net/story/81704/">high as 20% for women</a>. </p>
<p>Female workers are also <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/05/iran-women-factory-workers-face-discrimination.html">paid less than male peers, especially in factories</a>, and many women must work two jobs to make ends meet. </p>
<p>A rising number of women from <a href="https://books.google.fr/books?id=Y3SRPEEB-7IC&pg=PA85&lpg=PA85&dq=iranian+women+turn+to+prostitution&source=bl&ots=hcVC9uf0SO&sig=SVSNmJMaAYHNagPMDO0fk8S1ZtQ&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=iranian%20women%20turn%20to%20prostitution&f=false">fragile socioeconomic backgrounds</a> have turned to sex work to earn higher wages, both <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-18966982">online</a> and on the streets.</p>
<p>Activities that seem mundane in many other parts of the world, such as partaking in sports, are still a challenge in Iran. Women are not allowed into stadiums with men, even though Iranian female athletes have achieved significant <a href="https://www.iranhumanrights.org/2016/09/olympics-leila-varizi-2/">success in international sports competitions</a>.</p>
<h2>Small, steady successes</h2>
<p>There are some bright spots. Iranian businesswomen have thrived in recent years, <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-39129-8_5?no-access=true">excelling in diverse sectors</a>, from knowledge-based corporate services and recycling to animal husbandry. </p>
<p>On the political front, too, women are emerging victorious. In the May 2016 parliamentary election, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-36182796">17 women were elected to join the 290-member body)</a>, an historic record for the Islamic Republic.</p>
<p>This year’s city council elections, which took place on the same day as the presidential election, saw heavy participation by women as voters and on the ballot, with an increase in female candidates of nearly <a href="https://english.shabtabnews.com/2017/04/28/female-former-council-member-advocates-for-women-candidates-in-irans-local-elections">6% over the previous year</a>. </p>
<p>Women competed even in small cities, and images of female candidates circulated widely on Iranian social media. City councils are important in Iran’s city planning and urban life, and many activists <a href="https://www.iranhumanrights.org/2017/04/female-former-council-member-advocates-for-women-candidates-in-irans-local-elections/">encouraged women</a> to participate. </p>
<p>The high female turnout, and the volume of qualified women in city councils, could give women <a href="https://globalvoices.org/2017/05/11/irans-upcoming-local-elections-are-an-opportunity-for-women/">more latitude to actually change their everyday lives</a>. But they will need support from higher authorities to do so.</p>
<h2>Rouhani’s failed efforts</h2>
<p>Is Rouhani their guy? The president is considered a religious moderate, and <a href="https://www.iranhumanrights.org/2013/08/president-hassan-rouhani/#Women">in 2013 he claimed</a> that he would open up social and political spheres to women. In 2014, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27099151">he went so far as to criticise</a> gender discrimination and encourage equality. </p>
<p>Such statements clash with those of the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who believes that women should be primarily <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/04/khamenei-rouhani-clash-women-issue.html">dedicated to household activities</a> and that Iran must not adopt Western views on gender.</p>
<p>In his first term, Rouhani <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/en/originals/2016/12/iran-cabinet-reshuffle-women-vp-ministers-shojaei-ahmadipour.htm">appointed women to ministerial and cabinet positions</a>. The vice president for women and family affairs, Shahindokht Molaverdi, has used this space to contribute to the national gender debate by <a href="http://www.hindustantimes.com/world/female-iran-vp-scolds-hardliners-over-volleyball-ban-for-women/story-C05ZB6INkXjy1qcTpHR3dM.html">condemning hardliners</a> who threatened female spectators at a men’s volleyball match.</p>
<p>Speaking at <a href="http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2016/feb/09/rouhani-women%E2%80%99s-rights">a national conference and women and development</a> on February 7, President Rouhani said, “We should believe in women’s presence and capabilities and know that our country’s women can have roles in science, knowledge, economy, politics, and arts just like men.”</p>
<p>But many Iranian women feel <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-election-women-youth-insight-idUSKCN0VD2FS">Rouhani has failed them</a>. Segregation in public spaces, gender discrimination, and morality police all <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-16/iran-s-oppression-of-rights-women-worse-under-rouhani-un-says">persist</a>, and the president <a href="http://www.iranpressnews.com/english/source/205439.html">remained silent</a> when female activists were arrested during the election campaign.</p>
<p>Admittedly, Rouhani has limited room to manoeuvre. Powerful hardliners <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/da7e7704-d1c1-11e6-b06b-680c49b4b4c0">control</a> key Iranian political structures, among them the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/03/iran_power/html/guardian_council.stm">Guardian Council</a>, which has the final say on interpretation of Islamic values and laws, including veto power. A conservative majority in the parliament also prevents strong reforms from passing.</p>
<p>The question now is whether Rouhani will use his second term to find new opportunities and live up to Iranian women’s hopes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77633/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Azadeh Davachi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Will President Rouhani, who has spoken up for gender equality, give women a chance in his second term?Azadeh Davachi, Researcher, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/780512017-05-22T14:13:51Z2017-05-22T14:13:51ZRouhani’s commanding election victory might just help him change Iran<p>Around 70% of Iranians who were eligible to vote participated in the country’s presidential election and re-elected the incumbent, Hassan Rouhani, to another four-year term. Rouhani, who was supported by Iran’s moderates and reformists, won <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/20/iran-hassan-rouhani-set-for-landslide-in-huge-victory-for-reformists">around 57%</a> of the vote; his main rival, the more hardline Ebrahim Raisi, won only 38.5%. </p>
<p>Reformist office-holders and the Iranian electorate alike have all sorts of priorities for the next four years, but based on the slogans Rouhani’s supporters used during the election, three big ones stand out: improving political freedom, fighting ingrained corruption, and freeing three prominent dissidents who have been under house arrest since 2009: <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/article/iran-s-shame-detention-mousavi-karroubi-and-rahnavard">Mir Hossein Mousavi</a>, <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/article/iran-s-shame-detention-mousavi-karroubi-and-rahnavard">Zahra Rahnavard</a> and <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/article/iran-s-shame-detention-mousavi-karroubi-and-rahnavard">Mehdi Karroubi</a>. </p>
<p>In every city Rouhani visited during his campaign, his supporters asked him to see these prisoners released. When confronted on the issue during a campaign stop in Tabriz, he responded that to get certain things done, a president needs more than 51% of the vote for a mandate – nodding to the share of the vote he won at the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22916174">2013 election</a> to imply that a more commanding win would empower him to finally sort the issue out. He ultimately won 5m more votes this time around, and his supporters are duly waiting to see if he will use his boosted political capital as promised.</p>
<p>There are plenty of obstacles. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and the head of the judicial system, Ayatollah Shadeq Larijani, support the house arrest along with most hardliners in the country. As far as they’re concerned, house arrest is a lenient punishment for these dissidents, and a <a href="https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1393/10/13/607859/%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%B1-%D9%81%D9%82%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87-%D8%AD%DA%A9%D9%85-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%81%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%87">list of powerful ayatollahs</a> have already demanded their execution. Whether Rouhani’s strengthened mandate will give him enough clout to change the situation remains to be seen.</p>
<p>The same goes for the thorny problem of political freedom more generally. Just a few days before the election, Rouhani publicly <a href="http://www.dw.com/fa-ir/%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AF%D9%87%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%B4%D9%86%D8%A8%D9%87-%DB%B1%DB%B8-%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%B4%D8%AA/a-38747530">railed against</a> the hardliners’ plans to restrict people’s freedoms further and exclude women from the public sphere. But for all he campaigned as a liberator, Rouhani will know all too well how hard any attempt to open up new freedoms will be.</p>
<p>After all, little progress was made during Rouhani’s first term, during which hardliners held enough key positions to <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/iran">limit any improvement</a> in political freedom or the general human rights situation. Amnesty International’s last annual <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/middle-east-and-north-africa/iran/report-iran/">country report</a> highlighted that “the authorities heavily suppressed the rights to freedom of expression, association, peaceful assembly and religious belief, arresting and imprisoning peaceful critics and others after grossly unfair trials before revolutionary courts”.</p>
<p>So for all that those extra 5m votes might boost Rouhani’s confidence and legitimacy, they also come with high expectations that he’ll be able to make progress that’s so far eluded him – and in circumstances that haven’t fundamentally changed.</p>
<h2>Caught in the middle</h2>
<p>The fight against corruption, however, might be a rather different story. Iran is routinely ranked as <a href="https://www.transparency.org/country/IRN">one of the world’s most corrupt countries</a>; Iranians themselves are understandably fed up, and fortunately for them, this is a problem that Rouhani and his administration do have some power to tackle. The government directly manages powerful institutions such as <a href="http://www.cbi.ir/default_en.aspx">the Central Bank</a>, <a href="http://www.irica.gov.ir/Portal/Home/Default.aspx?CategoryID=68bde3d2-c2d5-411f-meaning-2b50ce202c04">Customs Administration</a> and <a href="http://en.mop.ir/Portal/Home/">the Ministry of Petroleum</a>, meaning it can easily monitor all money transfers and contracts inside Iran. </p>
<p>But other powerful institutions will have little trouble escaping scrutiny. The Revolutionary Guards and the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting have huge budgets and are independent of the elected administration, instead being mostly under the control of Ayatollah Khamenei himself. Municipal authorities are also both well-funded and largely independent of central government, which cannot directly monitor them without a mandate from parliament – so far, not forthcoming.</p>
<p>On all fronts, Rouhani faces a demanding balancing act: to preserve moderate and reformist voters’ trust in him while simultaneously winning over Khamenei and the hardliners. He will have to be honest with the Iranian people and directly explain to them why he cannot commit to some of his campaign promises, some of which will inevitably fail to come true. And thanks to Iran’s very particular power structure, all big changes in the country need Khamenei’s consent to stand a chance. </p>
<p>This sort of intricate, high-stakes triangulation will not be easy. But as Rouhani proved with the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-33521655">2015 nuclear deal</a>, he is probably as capable a political negotiator as the Iranian people could hope for.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/78051/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dr Meysam Tayebipour does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Between an electorate hungry for change and a powerful hardline elite, Hassan Rouhani has his work cut out for him.Dr Meysam Tayebipour, PhD Candidate, Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/768242017-05-18T07:31:13Z2017-05-18T07:31:13ZIran is using indirect censorship methods to avoid international criticism<p>Human rights watchdogs repeatedly shame Iran as one of the world’s <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/iran">worst offenders</a> against freedom of expression, a harsh censor with little compunction about cracking down on critics with direct methods such as prior restraint and violent means of repression. But Iran, like other states around the world, is increasingly using other, more unorthodox ways of controlling speech – what might be called “indirect censorship”.</p>
<p>Instead of the classic methods of removing content wholesale or blocking access to it, indirect censorship methods make producing or accessing “undesirable” ideas and information costly, technically difficult or legally risky. They often do so via unrelated laws, or by bypassing weak or nonexistent protective regulations. Deployed by both governments and private actors, these methods often don’t fall under conventional definitions of censorship, and are therefore often not condemned as such.</p>
<p>The Iranian government is using indirect censorship partly out of geopolitical necessity. Tehran clearly wants to improve relations with the West, but the country’s domestic human rights situation is a major obstacle – and its attitudes to freedom of speech are a particular sticking point. Since the government is hardly inclined to fundamentally change its ways, it has come up with a typically <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/01/iran-economist-rouhani-policies.html">neoliberal</a> solution: to transfer responsibility for enforcing censorship to the private sector.</p>
<p>In a speech at Tehran’s <a href="http://www.tehrantimes.com/news/301127/President-Hassan-Rouhani-opens-Tehran-Intl-Book-Fair">2016 International Book Fair</a>, president Hassan Rouhani proposed that the ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance hand its job of censoring books and cultural products to an association of writers and publishers. His government promoted this idea as an initiative to relax book censorship, and it was broadly accepted as such by the Western media. But because there are few clear regulations regarding censorship and a huge range of “sensitive” subjects, it would more likely have the opposite effect. </p>
<p>The plan is currently in its pilot stage, and if it becomes operational, the government will free itself from direct responsibility for book censorship. It would be left to publishers and writers themselves to enforce vague “red lines”, including upon themselves, lest they fall foul of a judiciary capable of seizing books after publication and inflicting paralysing financial damage.</p>
<p>This would inculcate a conservative culture of self-censorship, with writers and publishers desperate to avoid unbearable financial or legal consequences taking an even more cautious and strict approach than the government itself.</p>
<h2>Burden of proof</h2>
<p>Using unrelated laws to put pressure on media and to silence the dissidents is a typical method of indirect censorship. In Iran, defamation and insult lawsuits are an effective instrument with which to punish critics, and have a powerful and chilling effect on the media. And the way defamation laws are currently interpreted by the court means they can easily be used to restrict freedom of expression.</p>
<p>The Iranian legal system hosts two major approaches to dealing with defamation cases. The first, dominant until the <a href="http://iranhrdc.org/english/human-rights-documents/iranian-codes/1000000351-islamic-penal-code-of-the-islamic-republic-of-iran-book-five.html">Islamic Penal Code</a> was introduced in 1983, considers that when someone attributes a specific crime to someone else, the accusations must be adjudicated by a court, and that if the accused is acquitted and considers themselves defamed, they may take their defamer to court in turn. </p>
<p>The other approach, which began to take hold in 1983, also allows someone claiming defamation to take their alleged defamer to court, but puts the burden of proof on the accuser. This violates the principle of presumption of innocence, and it puts particular pressure on investigative journalists who rely on anonymous or secret sources. </p>
<p>Worse still, according to an additional <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/128000/mde130452001en.pdf">clause</a> in the Islamic Penal Code’s article 697, allegedly defamatory statements can be punishable even when they are proven justified and true. This provision makes a useful pretext to crack down on any whistleblower or investigative journalist who reveals defensible evidence of the government’s corruption to the public.</p>
<p>A notorious case of this sort kicked off recently when the Iranian website <a href="http://www.memarinews.com/">Memari News</a> published a set of official reports by the General Inspection Office that indicated that the Tehran Municipality had illegally transferred properties to a number of its high-ranking officers. Memari’s editor-in-chief, Yashar Soltani, was soon <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/iran-blog/2016/nov/04/silencing-iranian-journalist-draws-huge-public-backlash-tehran-corruption">arrested</a> and <a href="https://www.iranhumanrights.org/2016/09/yashar-soltani/">charged</a> with defamation and “gathering classified information with the intent to harm national security”. </p>
<p>Even though the General Inspection Office confirmed the credibility of the documents and that the municipality was involved in the illegal transfer of public properties, Soltani remains on bail with his case open, and still stands accused of harbouring a hidden political agenda.</p>
<p>For now, the Iranian government is still using the same <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2015/iran">harsh methods of direct censorship</a> for which it has long been known – blocking critical websites, for instance, or arresting government critics. But as it increasingly turns to more indirect methods, it is doing a better job of evading the scrutiny of the human rights watchdogs who’ve justifiably criticised it for so long.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76824/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Omid Shams does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Handing over censorship to authors and writers themselves may actually make it harsher.Omid Shams, PhD Candidate, School of Law, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/770692017-05-15T13:54:51Z2017-05-15T13:54:51ZIranian voters want economic justice – but the candidates don’t measure up<p>The campaign for the 2017 election in Iran, which takes place on May 19, has now moved into its final phase. The incumbent president, Hassan Rouhani, faces an assortment of competitors. These include one of his vice-presidents, <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/05/iran-first-vp-eshagh-jahangiri-debate-ghalibaf-rouhani.html">Eshaq Jahangiri</a>, the mayor of Tehran, <a href="http://www.tehrantimes.com/news/413271/Qalibaf-Government-marginalize-people">Mohammed Baqer Qalibaf</a>, and <a href="http://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/03/conservative-ebrahim-raisi-stokes-fear-over-iran-presidential-election.html">Ebrahim Raisi</a>, head of Astan Qods Razavi, the country’s richest foundation. Raisi is considered a potential successor to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, and was thought of as Rouhani’s main challenger – until his somewhat <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/04/29/the-ayatollahs-favorite-didnt-do-so-well-fridays-iranian-presidential-debate/?utm_term=.1639fd58f345">lacklustre performance</a> in the campaign’s live televised presidential debates in April.</p>
<p>Political pundits are often quick to dismiss the Islamic Republic’s electoral system as scripted and predictable, with the final decision in the hands of the supreme leader. Yet every presidential election since 1997 has defied such expectations. The assumption that the supreme leader “anoints” or implicitly makes his preference clear does not always hold. Candidates with this <a href="http://backchannel.al-monitor.com/index.php/2013/05/5234/who-is-saeed-jalili/">supposed blessing</a> have lost more than once. </p>
<p>In 1997, the establishment candidate and preference of the supreme leader was <a href="http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/tehran/inside/elections.html">Ali Akbar Nateq Nouri</a>, who lost to <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9705/24/iran.elex/">Mohammed Khatami</a>. In 2005, he was <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/hi/originals/2017/04/iran-khamenei-raisi-preferred-candidate-jalili-2013.html">probably in favour</a> of Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf or Ali Larijani, but instead the voters went for a largely unknown conservative, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. And in 2013, Hassan Rouhani <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22916174">defeated</a> the candidate <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/06/iran-supreme-leader-presidential-elections-favors-jalili.html">ideologically closest to Khamenei</a>, Saeed Jalili. </p>
<p>Ahmadinejad mounted a brief bid to enter this year’s contest, but was ultimately disqualified by the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/20/iran-disqualifies-ahmadinejad-from-bid-to-regain-presidency">Guardian Council</a>. The rejection was not a surprise. Besides his dismal record on <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/05/25/the-incredible-shrinking-ahmadinejad/">foreign</a> and <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/fr/originals/2013/09/ahmadinejad-leaves-rouhani-economic-problems.html">economic</a> policies, he proved to be a deeply divisive president and managed to alienate most fellow conservatives. </p>
<p>But as a master populist, he attracted many voters driven less by ideology than by a craving for a bigger share of the state’s resources – and a deep antipathy towards the elite that has been running the country for nearly four decades. </p>
<p>Iranian election campaigns are short and intense, and the small pool of candidates need to work hard to differentiate and distinguish themselves. Their best chances to do that are in the three <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/video/news/2017/05/iran-presidential-hopefuls-face-off-election-debate-170506101006273.html">live TV debates</a>. </p>
<p>In the first of these, the top contenders Rouhani and Raisi were somewhat hesitant and Jahangiri and Qalibaf more forceful. But by the third debate the personal attacks and allegations of corruption, fraud, and abuse of institutional resources were abundant between all four of them. Rouhani in particular had choice words for his conservative competitors and their backers within the political and military elite. </p>
<p>While the whole spectacle was perhaps a bit unseemly by Iranian standards, this level of public animosity between some of the most influential politicians of the country <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-election-debate-idUSKBN1881SI">was also revealing</a>. It showed that everyone is well aware of the scale of corruption in Iran. By publicly questioning each other’s records, they implicitly admitted that the problem is structural, deeply enmeshed in the institutions of the state that they control – and that their track record on finding a solution has not been impressive.</p>
<p>While the economy was the main topic of the debates, other issues, such as <a href="https://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/">the 2015 nuclear agreement</a>, were discussed. This agreement was the most important foreign policy issue of the previous administration (and their greatest achievement). In the debates the government came under fire for giving away too much in the negotiations or not realising the potential of the sanctions relief that is part of the result. </p>
<p>Yet more importantly all the candidates, regardless of ideological position, acknowledged that the agreement is now “the law of the land” and a deal that will last. The internal Iranian political consensus that helped produce the agreement holds – unlike the situation in the United States.</p>
<p>Another issue at the debates was the subject of citizens’ rights. These are part of the Iranian constitution, but are often ignored or violated by various state institutions. There are disagreements on how much power the state would have to relinquish in order for citizens and their voluntary organisations (civil society) to be able to exercise their rights. In short, the very institutions and political forces in charge are the ones who need to change in order for theoretical rights to become practice.</p>
<h2>Back to basics</h2>
<p>Each of the three separately themed debates eventually returned to the issues of the economy, inequality and corruption. Rouhani won the 2013 election mainly by promising to solve the nuclear deadlock precisely so the sanctions could be lifted. But though the historic nuclear deal was ultimately sealed in 2015, the subsequent economic recovery has been slower than expected and the problems of the average Iranian have not eased. This feeds into a decade-long frustration at the state’s inability or unwillingness to tackle inequality seriously. Unfortunately the remedies suggested by the candidates of this year’s presidential election are either superficial or unimaginative. </p>
<p>Both Qalibaf and Raisi have tried to borrow from Ahmadinejad’s economic populism. Qalibaf repeatedly contrasted the country’s wealthy elites, who he branded “the 4%”, against the disenfranchised 96%. But while he was glad to demonise the top tier, he failed to identify its members – primarily because he is part of this very elite.</p>
<p>Raisi, on the other hand, recycled the idea of increasing subsidies to alleviate poverty, as was done for food and fuel during the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s. But that programme became a millstone around Iran’s neck for decades to come. Subsidies were kept in place after the war to avoid social unrest, and over the years became so bloated that they threatened to consume the whole state budget. Ahmadinejad’s administration tried to implement <a href="http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/subsidies-conundrum">a programme of reforms</a> to restrict the subsidies and the number of recipients, but its approach was a half measure and not the required success.</p>
<p>Regardless of their place on the political spectrum, all the candidates subscribe to a kind of liberal, trickle down market economics, starting from the premise that economic growth will (eventually) benefit all Iranians. </p>
<p>While that’s true as far as it goes – growth will help tackle unemployment and poverty – none of the candidates seem able to articulate a programme to remedy the structure and perpetuation of social inequality. Yet again, Iran seems stuck with a political elite that cannot imagine what an equitable society would look like – much less how to make it a reality.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77069/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>As part of the non-profit research network European Iran Research Group I have received funding from Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (Sweden), British Council (UK), Heinrich Böll Stiftung (Germany)</span></em></p>The election TV debates have shown the candidates to be out of touch.Rouzbeh Parsi, Senior Lecturer, Department of History, Lund UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.