tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/iraq-2301/articlesIraq – The Conversation2024-03-21T17:53:21Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2255242024-03-21T17:53:21Z2024-03-21T17:53:21ZWhether it’s Trump or Biden as president, U.S. foreign policy endangers the world<p>Many observers of American politics are understandably terrified at the prospect of Donald Trump being re-elected president of the United States in November.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/11/9/has-us-democracy-failed-for-good">The U.S.</a> is already showing signs of a <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/democracy-crisis">failed democracy</a>. <a href="https://www.citizen.org/news/twelve-years-since-citizens-united-big-money-corruption-keeps-getting-worse/">Its government</a> <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2023/9/28/corruption-is-as-american-as-apple-pie">and politics</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/01/us/politics/government-dysfunction-normal.html">are often dysfunctional</a> and plagued <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/28/report-transparency-international-corruption-worst-decade-united-states/">with corruption</a>. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/canada-should-be-preparing-for-the-end-of-american-democracy-176930">Canada should be preparing for the end of American democracy</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>A Trump victory would raise fears of a new level of decline into <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/20/us/politics/trump-rhetoric-fascism.html">fascist authoritarianism</a>. However, a second Trump presidency would not necessarily implement a foreign policy any more destructive than what is normal for the U.S. </p>
<h2>Violence part of U.S. foreign policy</h2>
<p>Since the start of the 21st century, the U.S. has unleashed enormous violence and instability on the global stage. This is a feature of American foreign policy, regardless of who’s president. </p>
<p>In 2001, in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. launched its “war on terror.” It invaded and <a href="https://theconversation.com/by-not-investigating-the-u-s-for-war-crimes-the-international-criminal-court-shows-colonialism-still-thrives-in-international-law-115269">occupied Afghanistan</a>, then illegally invaded and occupied Iraq. </p>
<p>These actions <a href="https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/">caused the deaths of 4.6 million people over the next 20 years, destabilized the Middle East and caused massive refugee migrations</a>. </p>
<p>In 2007-2008, <a href="https://www.economicsobservatory.com/why-did-the-global-financial-crisis-of-2007-09-happen">the under-regulated U.S. economy caused a global financial crisis</a>. The <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2018/10/03/blog-lasting-effects-the-global-economic-recovery-10-years-after-the-crisis">associated political and economic fallout</a> <a href="https://hbr.org/2018/09/the-social-and-political-costs-of-the-financial-crisis-10-years-later">continues to resonate</a>. </p>
<p>In 2011, <a href="https://www.globalvillagespace.com/consequences-of-us-nato-military-intervention-in-libya/">the U.S. and its</a> <a href="https://www.cato.org/commentary/how-nato-pushed-us-libya-fiasco">NATO allies intervened in Libya</a>, <a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/libya-floods-nato/">collapsing that state, destabilizing northern Africa</a> and creating more refugees. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/11/opinion/nato-summit-vilnius-europe.html">The U.S. tried to</a> <a href="https://harpers.org/archive/2023/06/why-are-we-in-ukraine/">consolidate its dominance in Europe by expanding NATO</a>, despite Russia <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/feb/28/nato-expansion-war-russia-ukraine">warning against this for decades</a>. This strategy played a role in the Russia-Ukraine war in 2014 and the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. </p>
<p>President Joe Biden’s administration <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2022/03/30/why-the-us-and-nato-have-long-wanted-russia-to-attack-ukraine/">has been accused both of helping to provoke the war</a> in the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/25/russia-weakened-lloyd-austin-ukraine-visit/">hopes of permanently weakening Russia</a> and <a href="https://www.theamericanconservative.com/why-peace-talks-but-no-peace/">of resisting peace negotiations</a>.</p>
<p>Today, <a href="https://time.com/6695261/ukraine-forever-war-danger/">Ukraine appears to stand on the verge of defeat</a> and territorial division, and U.S. Congress <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2024/01/us-congress-support-ukraine-war/677256/">seems set to abandon it.</a></p>
<h2>Fuelling global tensions</h2>
<p>The U.S. has provoked tensions with China <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2022/11/harvard-guru-gives-biden-a-d-for-china-policy/">by reneging on American commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act (1979) to refrain from having official relations or an “alliance” with Taiwan</a>. <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2022/07/proposals-for-us-action-in-s-china-sea-should-worry-everyone/">The U.S. has also been accused</a> of <a href="https://eastasiaforum.org/2018/06/20/us-pundits-and-politicians-pushing-for-war-in-the-south-china-sea/">encouraging conflict in the South China Sea</a> as it has <a href="https://www.democracynow.org/2023/2/14/david_vine_us_bases_china_philippines">surrounded China with hundreds of military bases.</a> </p>
<p>Israel’s assault on Gaza is partly the culmination of decades of misguided U.S. foreign policy. Unconditional American support of Israel has helped enable <a href="https://www.amnesty.ca/human-rights-news/israels-apartheid-against-palestinians-a-cruel-system-of-domination-and-a-crime-against-humanity/?psafe_param=1&gad_source=1&gclid=CjwKCAjw7-SvBhB6EiwAwYdCAVW84WyFFiEvbjzsIp5pPDN5CDlYOCBM52mCC6X6HGC6u52iuTDyyxoCM7MQAvD_BwE">the country’s degeneration</a> into what human rights organizations have called <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/27/threshold-crossed/israeli-authorities-and-crimes-apartheid-and-persecution">apartheid</a>, as the state has built illegal settlements on Palestinian land and violently suppressed Palestinian self-determination. </p>
<p>As Israel is accused <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68550937">of using starvation as a weapon against 2.3 million Palestinians in Gaza</a>, half of them children, the U.S. is fully <a href="https://ccrjustice.org/home/press-center/ccr-news/building-case-us-complicity">complicit in the Israeli war crimes</a> and <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/south-african-lawyers-preparing-lawsuit-against-us-uk-for-complicity-in-israels-war-crimes-in-gaza/3109201">for facilitating a conflict</a> that is further inflaming a critically important region. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/western-strikes-against-houthis-risk-igniting-a-powderkeg-in-the-middle-east-221392">Western strikes against Houthis risk igniting a powderkeg in the Middle East</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Israel is of <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/israel-strategic-liability">little to no strategic value</a> <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20230804-israel-no-longer-serves-us-interest-says-ex-senior-white-house-official/">to the U.S</a>. <a href="https://doi.org/10.3167/isf.2007.220205">American politicians contend that its overwhelming support for Israel reflects moral and cultural ties,</a> <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/11/us-ignores-israeli-war-crimes-domestic-politics-ex-official">but it’s mainly</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/13/us/politics/aipac-israel-gaza-democrats-republicans.html">driven by domestic politics</a>. </p>
<p>That suggests that for <a href="https://www.vox.com/2014/7/24/5929705/us-israel-friends">domestic political reasons</a>, the U.S. has endangered global stability and supported atrocities. </p>
<h2>Biden/Trump foreign policy</h2>
<p>The Biden administration has continued many of the foreign policy initiatives it inherited from Trump. </p>
<p>Biden doubled down on <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/miltonezrati/2022/12/25/biden-escalates-the-economic-war-with-china/?sh=1f1caa1412f3">Trump’s economic</a>, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3253917/no-end-us-trade-war-china-biden-administration-pledges-policy-document">technological and political war against China</a>. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-american-technological-war-against-china-could-backfire-219158">Why the American technological war against China could backfire</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>He <a href="https://www.cato.org/blog/biden-administration-continues-be-wrong-about-wto">reinforced Trump’s trade protectionism</a> and <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2024/03/08/wto-flops-usa-shrugs-00145691">left the World Trade Organization hobbled</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/07/09/1110109088/biden-is-building-on-the-abraham-accords-part-of-trumps-legacy-in-the-middle-eas">He built on Trump’s “Abraham Accords,”</a> an initiative to convince Arab states to normalize their relations with Israel without a resolution to the Palestine question. </p>
<p>The Biden administration’s efforts to push normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/10/11/analysis-why-did-hamas-attack-now-and-what-is-next">is considered part of Hamas’s motivation to attack Israel on Oct. 7, 2023</a>.</p>
<p>None of this inspires confidence in U.S. “global leadership.”</p>
<p>Biden and Trump share the same goal: <a href="https://www.theamericanconservative.com/americas-plot-for-world-domination/">permanent American global domination</a>. They only differ in how to achieve this. </p>
<p>Trump <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/deconstructing-trumps-foreign-policy/">believes the U.S.</a> can <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/20/key-moments-in-trumps-foreign-policy">use economic and military might</a> <a href="https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_2020_the_year_of_economic_coercion_under_trump/">to coerce the world</a> into acquiescing to American desires, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trumps-strong-arm-foreign-policy-tactics-create-tensions-with-both-us-friends-and-foes/2020/01/18/ddb76364-3991-11ea-bb7b-265f4554af6d_story.html">regardless of the costs to everyone else</a> and without the U.S. assuming any obligations to others. </p>
<p>In office, <a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2021/01/20/trump-the-anti-war-president-was-always-a-myth/">Trump tried to present himself as “anti-war.”</a> But his inclination to use of threats and violence reflected established American behaviour.</p>
<p>Biden <a href="https://jacobin.com/2022/10/biden-national-security-strategy-us-hegemony">follows a more diplomatic strategy</a> that tries to control international institutions and convince key states their interests are best served by accepting and co-operating with American domination. However, <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/biden-warns-us-military-may-get-pulled-direct-conflict-russia-1856613">Biden readily resorts to economic and military coercion</a>, too. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1770275239097778506"}"></div></p>
<h2>Reality check?</h2>
<p>The silver lining to a Trump presidency is that it might force U.S. allies to confront reality.</p>
<p>American allies convinced themselves that <a href="https://www.policymagazine.ca/the-biden-doctrine-our-long-international-nightmare-is-over/">the Biden presidency was a return to normalcy</a>, but they’re still accepting and supporting American global violence. They’re also wilfully ignoring the ongoing American political decay that could not be masked by Biden’s defeat of Trump in 2020.</p>
<p>Trump is a <a href="https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/expressions/trump-symptom-diseased-american-democracy">symptom of American political dysfunction, not a cause</a>. Even if he loses in November, the Republican Party will continue its slide towards fascism and American politics will remain toxic.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/02/18/1232263785/generations-after-its-heyday-isolationism-is-alive-and-kicking-up-controversy">A second Trump presidency may convince American allies that the U.S. is unreliable and inconsistent</a>. It may undermine the mostly <a href="https://www.yanisvaroufakis.eu/2024/03/14/how-europe-and-australia-can-end-our-slide-into-irrelevance-servility-national-press-club-of-australia-speech-13-march-2024/">western coalition that has dominated and damaged the world so profoundly</a>. </p>
<p>If Trump returns, traditional U.S. allies may recognize that their interests lie in reconsidering their relations with the U.S. </p>
<p>For American neighbours Canada and Mexico, a Trump presidency is only bad news. They’ll <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/joly-us-authoritarian-game-plan-1.6939369#:%7E:text=Politics-,Canada%20mulling%20'game%20plan'%20if%20U.S.%20takes%20far%2Dright,after%20next%20year's%20presidential%20elections.">have to somehow protect themselves from creeping U.S. fascism</a>. For the rest of the world, it may herald the start of a dynamic multipolar order.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225524/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shaun Narine has contributed to Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East and Jewish Voice for Peace.</span></em></p>A second Donald Trump presidency would not necessarily implement a foreign policy any more destructive than what is normal for the United States.Shaun Narine, Professor of International Relations and Political Science, St. Thomas University (Canada)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2248332024-03-04T13:37:27Z2024-03-04T13:37:27ZCommander of Iran’s elite Quds Force is expanding predecessor’s vision of chaos in the Middle East<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579281/original/file-20240301-50192-65mwly.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C0%2C2966%2C1853&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Esmail Ghaani, head of Iran's expeditionary Quds Force, speaks at a ceremony in Tehran on April 14, 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/IranIsrael/7769f2ccb99244898fcb9149111c664d/photo?Query=quds%20force&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=200&currentItemNo=47">AP Photo/Vahid Salemi</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Most Americans have likely never heard of <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/who-is-esmail-ghaani-the-successor-to-slain-iranian-general-soleimani/">Esmail Ghaani</a>, despite his fingerprints being over a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/27/world/middleeast/us-iran-militias.html">slew of recent attacks</a> on U.S. targets.</p>
<p>As the powerful chief of the Quds Force, the unconventional warfare wing of Iran’s <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards">Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps</a>, Ghaani is charged with overseeing Tehran’s network of allied and proxy groups across the Middle East.</p>
<p>But despite <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/esmail-qaani-commander-of-the-axis/article67808742.ece">recent media attention</a> following a significant increase in attacks by Quds-backed militants since the Oct. 7, 2023, attack in Israel, Ghaani remains a figure who largely shuns the public spotlight.</p>
<p>This is both like and unlike his predecessor Qassem Soleimani, who died in a <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/mideast/airport-informants-overhead-drones-how-u-s-killed-soleimani-n1113726">controversial 2020 U.S. strike in Iraq</a>.</p>
<p>For the first decade of his stint as Quds Force commander, which began <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20190925041643/http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/suleimani.pdf">in the late 1990s</a>, Soleimani also kept a low profile. But in the years leading up to his death in 2020, he promoted his accomplishments <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/esmail-ghaani-iran-announces-new-military-leader-after-commander-killed-in-us-airstrike-11901047">openly on social media</a>.</p>
<p>Soleimani’s loss was seen as a massive blow to the Quds Force and Iran’s national security agenda overall given his popularity in Iran and his achievements, making the task of replacing him daunting. Ghaani had been <a href="http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2011/12/profile-the-canny-general-quds-force-commander-ghasem-soleimani.html">Soleimani’s deputy</a>, and the two had known each other since the early 1980s during their <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/who-esmail-qaani-new-chief-commander-irans-qods-force">military service in the Iran-Iraq War.</a> </p>
<p>In the initial aftermath of Soleimani’s death, experts questioned <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2020/1/20/esmaii-qaani-new-shadow-commander-of-irans-quds-force">whether Ghaani would be a capable replacement</a>.</p>
<p>But despite differing from Soleimani in both personality and attitude toward publicity, Ghaani has managed to expand upon the foundation that Soleimani carefully cultivated over a 20-year period.</p>
<p>Under Ghaani, the Quds Force has doubled down on the strategy of supporting, arming and funding terrorist and insurgent groups in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, Afghanistan and the Palestinian territories. </p>
<p>Building from Soleimani’s legacy, Ghaani is responsible for developing the network into what Iranian officials call the “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-axis-resistance-against-israel-faces-trial-by-fire-2023-11-15/">Axis of Resistance</a>.”</p>
<p>It is a coalition that cuts across ethnic and religious divides in the region, despite Iran itself remaining a hard-line theocracy with an ethnic Persian and Shia Muslim identity. In cultivating the network, first Soleimani and now Ghaani have displayed a degree of pragmatism and flexibility at odds with the extreme ideological position of Iran’s ruling ayatollahs. And Ghaani, like Soleimani before him, appears to have done this with the full trust and support of Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.</p>
<h2>Pressuring Iran’s enemies</h2>
<p>As <a href="https://fordschool.umich.edu/faculty/javed-ali">an expert in national security issues</a> with a focus on counterterrorism, I have observed how the Quds Force’s <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/02/07/iran-unleashed-forces-that-it-can-no-longer-control/">unconventional warfare strategy</a> has changed the security landscape in the region. It is premised on creating pressure against Iran’s enemies — Israel, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia — through partnering with groups within the axis.</p>
<p>As Quds Force commander, Ghaani has to manage his organization’s relationships with each of these groups. This is made all the more tricky as each maintains its own agendas, decision-making calculations and, at times, independence despite Iran’s influence and largesse.</p>
<p>Take the Quds Force’s relationship with Hamas. Despite the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/04/hamas-drew-detailed-attack-plans-for-years-with-help-of-spies-idf-says">long planning involved</a> with the horrific Hamas attacks in Israel in October 2023, the Quds Force <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2023/12/28/Iran-s-IRGC-retracts-statement-on-Oct-7-attacks-after-rare-public-spat-with-Hamas">does not appear to have had a direct role</a>.</p>
<p>Not that the assault wasn’t welcomed by Ghaani, in public at least. In late December 2023, he <a href="https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-780069">was reported as saying</a> on Iran’s official news agency that, “Due to the extensive crimes committed by the Zionist regime against the Muslim people of Palestine, [Hamas] themselves took action. … Everything they did was beautifully planned and executed.”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Man speaking in front of image of two men." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Esmail Ghaani speaks at event commemorating the death of former Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani on Jan. 3, 2024.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com.mx/detail/fotograf%C3%ADa-de-noticias/commander-esmail-qaani-of-the-islamic-fotograf%C3%ADa-de-noticias/1898123764?adppopup=true">Photo by Morteza Nikoubazl/NurPhoto via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>With other militant groups in the region, Ghaani appears to have a more hands-on approach. The deadly <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/01/28/politics/us-troops-drone-attack-jordan/index.html">Jan. 28, 2024, drone attack</a> against a U.S. military outpost in Jordan, launched by the Iraq-based and Iran-supported <a href="https://theconversation.com/drone-attack-on-american-troops-risks-widening-middle-east-conflict-and-drawing-in-iran-us-tensions-222216">Islamic Resistance in Iraq</a> network, significantly escalated tensions in the region.</p>
<p>It provoked a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/27/world/middleeast/us-iran-militias.html">significant U.S. and British response</a> in Iraq and Syria. After the incident, it was reported that <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraqi-armed-groups-dial-down-us-attacks-request-iran-commander-2024-02-18/">Ghaani spent considerable effort</a> getting the Iraqi groups responsible to temporarily pause anti-U.S. attacks. </p>
<p>Whether that pause lasts for an extended period or if attacks resume will be a test of Ghaani’s ability to wield his influence in Iraq.</p>
<p>Ghaani’s calculus in regard to Yemen, where the Houthis have emerged as a dangerous insurgent group, looks less clear.</p>
<p>Having been armed throughout a decadelong civil war by Iran, the Houthis responded to Israel’s campaign in the Gaza Strip <a href="https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Documents/News/Military_Power_Publications/Iran_Houthi_Final2.pdf">by launching hundreds of rocket, missile and drone attacks</a> against commercial and military shipping in the Red Sea. </p>
<p>Retaliatory strikes by the U.S. and other coalition members <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/24/politics/us-uk-strikes-houthi-targets-yemen/index.html">on Houthi targets</a> have destroyed a significant amount of the capability that Iran had provided. Yet the Houthis seem undeterred and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/02/stricken-ship-attacked-by-houthi-rebels-sinks-in-red-sea">have continued anti-shipping operations</a>. </p>
<p>It is unclear if Ghaani has attempted to dial those operations back or if he has encouraged the Houthis to maintain their pace, given the shared goals between Iran and the Houthis to keep pressure on the United States and Israel.</p>
<h2>Relationship with Hezbollah</h2>
<p>Beyond Israel, Iraq and Yemen, Ghaani is also likely attempting to manage the Quds Force’s relationship with Lebanon’s Hezbollah, <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/hizballah-and-the-qods-force-in-irans-shadow-war-with-the-west">arguably Iran’s strongest partner</a> in the Axis of Resistance. The partnership stretches back to the early 1980s and has transformed Hezbollah into a powerful force in Lebanon and a serious security concern in the region.</p>
<p>Since Oct. 7, the group has engaged in near daily conflict with Israel, with both sides conducting cross-border strikes. Hezbollah’s general secretary, Hassan Nasrallah, seems wary of engaging in a broader war with Israel, but at the same time he has not reined in the attacks and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/16/hezbollah-warns-that-israel-will-pay-in-blood-for-killing-civilians">has vowed to retaliate against Israel</a> for the death of civilians in Lebanon. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Three Iranian leaders, two in military fatigues stand and talk." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iranian leader Ali Khamenei, left, meets with Esmail Ghaani, right, and Revolutionary Guards General Commander Hossein Salami, center, on Dec. 28, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com.mx/detail/fotograf%C3%ADa-de-noticias/iranian-leader-ali-khamenei-iranian-fotograf%C3%ADa-de-noticias/1883329738?adppopup=true">Anadolu via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Although Iran may well welcome Hezbollah becoming a persistent irritant to Israel, Tehran is also wary of a full-blown conflict. In such a scenario, Nasrallah, Ghaani and Supreme Leader Khamenei would have to worry about whether the United States would get directly involved – as, reportedly, the White House <a href="https://www.axios.com/2023/10/17/israel-news-us-military-hezbollah-attacks">had been considering</a> in the days after the Oct. 7 attack on Israel.</p>
<p>Any future statements by Ghaani regarding Hezbollah will be a strong indicator of Iran’s intent in regard to how it sees this volatile aspect of tensions in the Middle East developing.</p>
<h2>Walking a tightrope</h2>
<p>To date, Ghaani seems to have successfully navigated the transition between replacing the charismatic figure of Qassem Soleimani and advancing Iran’s interests through Quds Force operations with the full backing of Khameini.</p>
<p>He may never be as revered in Iran as Soleimani, but by managing the Quds Force’s relationship with Axis of Resistance groups, Ghaani has proved to be a formidable and capable adversary who should not be underestimated. </p>
<p>The recent escalation of multifaceted tensions across the Middle East has provided both opportunities and potential pitfalls for Ghaani’s strategy – how to encourage the activities of its Axis of Rrsistance while insulating Iran from any direct blowback from the United States.</p>
<p>But one thing is becoming clear: Reversing the Quds Force’s influence while bolstering U.S. interests is likely to be a top policy priority for Washington as it attempts to manage the developing conflict in the Middle East.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224833/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Javed Ali does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Esmail Ghaani took control of the unconventional warfare wing of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps following the killing of predecessor Qassem Soleimani.Javed Ali, Associate Professor of Practice of Public Policy, University of MichiganLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2231392024-02-08T17:51:39Z2024-02-08T17:51:39ZGaza update: Netanyahu knocks back Hamas peace plan while the prospect of mass famine looms ever larger<p>The Israeli military is poised to enter what its defence minister, Yoav Gallant, has referred to as the “last centre of gravity that remains in Hamas’s hands: Rafah”. Unfortunately for many of the 1.7 million people reportedly displaced by Israel’s four-month onslaught in Gaza, this is where more than a million of them have taken refuge, according to the latest estimates.</p>
<p>As the Gaza death toll compiled by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) surpassed 26,750 people, with a further 65,000-plus people wounded, the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, rejected a peace deal proposed by Hamas and relayed by Egyptian and Qatari negotiators as “deluded”. </p>
<p>The proposed three-part plan was for a staged cessation of hostilities and prisoner-hostage swap, with the aim of ending the war completely via negotiations to be finalised by the time the final hostages had been returned.</p>
<p>Insisting that “the day after [the war] is the day after Hamas – all of Hamas”, Netanyahu said he intended to press on until Israel had achieved “total victory”.</p>
<p>But Anne Irfan, an expert in the history of the modern Middle East from University College London, <a href="https://theconversation.com/netanyahus-position-becoming-more-uncertain-as-israeli-pm-rejects-hamas-deal-to-end-war-223113">believes</a> the Israeli prime minister may be thinking it is in his own interests to keep the conflict going as long as he can. His personal approval ratings are abysmal – only 15% of Israelis in a recent survey said they thought he should keep his job after the war ends.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574411/original/file-20240208-24-86knbn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map showing the latest developments in Israel's war with Hamas." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574411/original/file-20240208-24-86knbn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574411/original/file-20240208-24-86knbn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574411/original/file-20240208-24-86knbn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574411/original/file-20240208-24-86knbn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574411/original/file-20240208-24-86knbn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574411/original/file-20240208-24-86knbn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574411/original/file-20240208-24-86knbn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Map of Israel’s war with Hamas.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Institute for the Study of War</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Meanwhile, Netanyahu is increasingly trapped between the clamour from the families of the Israeli hostages still trapped in Gaza, and the intransigence of the far-right members of his own government who won’t consider doing a deal with Hamas. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/netanyahus-position-becoming-more-uncertain-as-israeli-pm-rejects-hamas-deal-to-end-war-223113">Netanyahu's position becoming more uncertain as Israeli PM rejects Hamas deal to end war</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Netanyahu has also resisted international pressure to consider a two-state solution, which would by definition involve a sovereign Palestine, insisting that Israel is the only state that can guarantee regional security in the long term. </p>
<p>Despite Netanyahu’s wholesale rejection of the notion of Palestinian statehood, both the US and UK have said they are considering the possibility of recognising Palestine after the conflict ends. The UK foreign secretary, David Cameron, said such a move would be “absolutely vital for the long-term peace and security of the region”.</p>
<p>They would be coming into line with much of the rest of the world: 139 of 193 UN members have already recognised the state of Palestine, which has sat in the UN as a “non-member observer state” since 2012, and has already acceded to many of its human rights treaties.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Gaza Update is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/gaza-update-159?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Gaza">Click here to get our updates directly in your inbox</a>.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>Tonny Raymond Kirabira, an expert in international law at the University of East London, walks us through the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk-and-us-may-recognise-state-of-palestine-after-gaza-war-what-this-important-step-would-mean-222538">complex issues</a> involved in becoming a state. At the moment, international law dictates that the prerequsites for statehood are a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. As Kirabira reminds us, questions remains whether Palestine actually possesses a “defined territory” and “effective government”.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/uk-and-us-may-recognise-state-of-palestine-after-gaza-war-what-this-important-step-would-mean-222538">UK and US may recognise state of Palestine after Gaza war – what this important step would mean</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>So what is the two-state solution? It’s a vexed issue that has been exercising the minds of peacemakers since before the state of Israel was even formally declared in 1948. An early UN partition plan called for what was then known as the “Mandate of Palestine” – under British control – to be divided into separate Jewish and Arab states.</p>
<p>Andrew Thomas, an expert in the politics of the Middle East from Deakin University in Australia, runs through the various iterations of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-the-two-state-solution-to-the-israeli-palestinian-conflict-221872">two-state solution</a> since 1948 – and recalls the <a href="https://theconversation.com/jan-egeland-remembers-the-secret-negotiations-that-led-to-the-oslo-accords-podcast-213092">Oslo accords</a> in the 1990s, when the then-Israeli prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin, and the head of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), Yasser Arafat, got so close to agreeing a solution which would have recognised Palestine as a state while guaranteeing Israeli security. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-the-two-state-solution-to-the-israeli-palestinian-conflict-221872">Explainer: what is the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>War crime and punishment</h2>
<p>Netanyahu’s pledge to push on to total victory, meanwhile, flies in the face of demands made by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) more than a week ago. The ICJ ordered Israel to take steps to prevent genocidal actions in Gaza, to punish incitement to genocide, to allow Gaza’s people access to humanitarian aid, and to preserve and collect any evidence of war crimes committed during the conflict.</p>
<p>It appears Israel has not yet done any of these things, although it has about another three weeks until it is due to report back to the ICJ. Basema Al-Alami, an expert in international law from the University of Toronto, considers how reports of what is happening on the ground in Gaza <a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-isnt-complying-with-the-international-court-of-justice-ruling-what-happens-next-222350">conflict with the ICJ’s demands</a>, and also what pressure the ICJ rulings will put on Israel’s international donors to reconsider their stance.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-isnt-complying-with-the-international-court-of-justice-ruling-what-happens-next-222350">Israel isn't complying with the International Court of Justice ruling — what happens next?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>It didn’t take the international community long to act after Israel raised allegations that some staff from the UN’s Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees (UNRWA) had taken part in Hamas’s October 7 massacres. Within days, 18 donor countries including the UK and US had pulled their support for UNRWA, the principal charity supplying aid to Palestinians.</p>
<p>UCL’s Irfan and Jo Kelcey of the Lebanese American University assess the <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-conflict-what-is-unrwa-and-why-is-israel-calling-for-its-abolition-222310">fallout from this mass withdrawal of support</a>, concluding that it could be catastrophic for Palestinians in Gaza, 87% of whom are dependent on UNRWA for its services which include food aid, shelter and medical care. They also point out that Israel’s allegations about the involvement of UNRWA staff in October 7 came the day after the ICJ published its interim ruling.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-conflict-what-is-unrwa-and-why-is-israel-calling-for-its-abolition-222310">Gaza conflict: what is UNRWA and why is Israel calling for its abolition?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Greg Kennedy, an expert in strategic foreign policy issues at King’s College London, believes that Israel is deliberately <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-weaponisation-of-food-has-been-used-in-conflicts-for-centuries-but-it-hasnt-always-resulted-in-victory-221476">weaponising food supplies</a> in Gaza. He writes that it has been a tactic of war for centuries, and that sieges and blockades remain part of the arsenal of armed conflict.</p>
<p>Starvation, Kennedy adds, can seriously undermine morale and the will to resist. It is also a collective punishment – something explicitly banned under international humanitarian law.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-weaponisation-of-food-has-been-used-in-conflicts-for-centuries-but-it-hasnt-always-resulted-in-victory-221476">Gaza: weaponisation of food has been used in conflicts for centuries – but it hasn't always resulted in victory</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>There goes the neighbourhood</h2>
<p>Day by day, missile by missile, tensions are ratcheting up around the region as Iran-backed proxies, who have been targeting US military bases for years, have stepped up their campaign of harassment. Taken individually, these attacks are of little significance. As Middle East expert Julie Norman from UCL notes, neither Iran nor the US <a href="https://theconversation.com/middle-east-crisis-us-airstrikes-against-iran-backed-armed-groups-explained-222768">wants to wage a major conflict</a> at the moment – but both countries have political reasons for wanting to act tough. </p>
<p>In Iran, the Islamic Republic presides over a parlous economy and considerable public unrest as the “woman, life, freedom” mass protests continue. In the White House, meanwhile, Joe Biden wants a telegenic show of US force without embroiling his country in a major land war.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/middle-east-crisis-us-airstrikes-against-iran-backed-armed-groups-explained-222768">Middle East crisis: US airstrikes against Iran-backed armed groups explained</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>George W. Bush once joked to troops in the Middle East: “You don’t run for office in a democracy and say, ‘Please vote for me, I promise you war.’” And as Andrew Payne, an international security expert from City, University of London notes, Bush – as well as his successor in the White House, Barack Obama, and even the vainglorious Donald Trump (who said of a recent attack on a US base in Jordan: “This attack would NEVER have happened if I was president, not even a chance.”) – grew increasingly averse to military action as the next election loomed.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/middle-east-conflict-joe-biden-must-weigh-the-risks-of-using-force-in-an-election-year-222410">Middle East conflict: Joe Biden must weigh the risks of using force in an election year</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Christoph Bluth, an expert in international affairs at the University of Bradford, presents a <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-iran-controls-a-network-of-armed-groups-to-pursue-its-regional-strategy-221520">cast list of Iran’s affiliates</a> in the region, and explains how Tehran is using them to further its long-term aims in the region – from replacing the US as the dominant power to establishing an “axis of resistance” that could potentially box in Israel.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-iran-controls-a-network-of-armed-groups-to-pursue-its-regional-strategy-221520">How Iran controls a network of armed groups to pursue its regional strategy</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Gaza Update is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/gaza-update-159?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Gaza">Click here to get our updates directly in your inbox</a>.</em></p>
<hr><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223139/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
A selection of analysis from our coverage of the war in Gaza over the past fortnight.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2215202024-02-07T17:35:23Z2024-02-07T17:35:23ZHow Iran controls a network of armed groups to pursue its regional strategy<p>It took the US several days <a href="https://theconversation.com/middle-east-crisis-us-airstrikes-against-iran-backed-armed-groups-explained-222768">to respond</a> to the January 28 attack on its military base in Jordan that killed three of its service personnel. But when it did, it hit at least 85 targets across Iraq and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/02/02/us-strike-retaliates-jordan-attack/">Syria</a>. </p>
<p>The Pentagon was careful not to directly attack Iran itself, but it targeted Iranian-backed groups which have been conducting raids on US military assets in the region since before Hamas launched its attack on Israel on October 7.</p>
<p>The US strikes were carefully calibrated to avoid <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/austin-vows-all-necessary-actions-after-us-troop-deaths-2024-01-29/">escalation</a>. The five days between the attack on the Tower 22 US base in Jordan and the US airstrikes on February 2 gave Iran and its proxies time to move people and high-value assets. </p>
<p>This retaliation wasn’t about body counts, it was about US president Joe Biden showing Iran – and the American electorate – that it doesn’t do to mess with the US. It was a classic shot across the bows.</p>
<p>But who are these groups that Iran can rely on to act in its interests and how much of a threat do they pose to regional security?</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573823/original/file-20240206-20-bg1uq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Graphic showing Middle East and the varioujs armed groups operating there on behalf of Iran" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573823/original/file-20240206-20-bg1uq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573823/original/file-20240206-20-bg1uq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=1031&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573823/original/file-20240206-20-bg1uq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=1031&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573823/original/file-20240206-20-bg1uq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=1031&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573823/original/file-20240206-20-bg1uq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1295&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573823/original/file-20240206-20-bg1uq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1295&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573823/original/file-20240206-20-bg1uq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1295&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iran’s network of armed groups.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Council for Foreign Relations</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Iran’s foreign policy over nearly five decades since the 1979 revolution has had <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47321#">several key objectives</a>. It wants to remove the US from the Middle East and to replace it as the guarantor of regional security. </p>
<p>It has worked to boost the fortunes of Shia groups in the region, working directly against Saudi Arabia’s Sunni proxies, as seen in the conflict in Yemen. And it refuses to recognise the state of Israel, instead working with Palestinian groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah to pressure the Jewish state.</p>
<h2>Quds Force</h2>
<p>The Quds Force is part of the Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and is the IRGC’s primary vehicle for foreign affairs. According to the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards">Council on Foreign Relations</a>, Quds is largely responsible for providing training, weapons, money and military advice to a range of groups in the so-called <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-much-influence-does-iran-have-over-its-proxy-axis-of-resistance-hezbollah-hamas-and-the-houthis-221269">“Axis of Resistance”</a>. </p>
<p>Quds was led by General Qasem Soleimani, who had oversight of Shia armed groups in Iraq and Syria as well as wielding a significant amount of influence with Hezbollah in Lebanon. Soleimani was killed in a US drone strike in the Iraqi capital, Baghdad, on January 3 2020. </p>
<p>He was succeeded by his longtime deputy <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-s-new-quds-force-leader-has-a-long-history-with-afghanistan/30379354.html">Ismail Qaani</a>, who had gained extensive experience in organising and supporting insurgent groups in Afghanistan.</p>
<h2>Syria</h2>
<p>In 2021, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-quds-force-in-syria-combatants-units-and-actions/">estimated that</a> the IRGC had established 82 fighting units in Syria with up to 70,000 fighters. Many of these have been recruited since 2011 to help the Shia regime of Bashar al-Assad combat insurgents there.</p>
<p>Quds activities in Syria are reportedly overseen by <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-quds-force-in-syria-combatants-units-and-actions/">Khalil Zahedi</a>, nicknamed Abu Mahdi al-Zahdi. Working through regional subordinates, he controls a number of armed groups, including Liwa al-Quds, Lebanese Hezbollah, Fatemiyoun Brigade, Zainebiyoun Brigade, Hezbollah al-Nujaba, Liwa al-Baqir and Kata’ib al-Imam Ali.</p>
<p>Iran’s principal aims in Syria are to keep the Assad regime in power, maximise Iranian influence, protect Shia minorities and reduce and – if possible – eliminate the US presence in Syria. It also aims to create the conditions for a possible encirclement of Israel by occupying strategic position around the Golan heights.</p>
<h2>Iraq</h2>
<p>In Iraq, since the US invasion, Iran-backed armed groups come under an <a href="https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2021/nov/10/profiles-pro-iran-militias-iraq">umbrella organisation</a> called the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) or <em>Quwwāt al-Ḥashd ash-Shaʿbī</em>. The PMF claims to have as many as 230,000 fighters, mainly Shia. The PMF was founded in 2014 when Iraq’s Shia religious leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/shiite_militias_iraq_english.pdf">issued a fatwa</a> calling on Iraqis to defend their country after the Iraqi army collapsed and Islamic State took the northern province of Mosul. </p>
<p>In 2018 the PMF was incorporated into Iraq’s armed forces as an auxiliary force. As a result its wages are paid by the Iraqi military, but the Iranian government lacks proper command and control over the PMF. The same year PMF’s political wing contested elections in Iraq, coming second in the poll. It also performed well in Iraq’s 2023 regional elections and is now believed to wield considerable control in both the Iraqi parliament and the country’s supreme court. </p>
<p>Its military forces are now believed to be <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-popular-mobilization-force-is-turning-iraq-into-an-iranian-client-state/">active in Kurdistan</a> as part of an overall strategy to force the US to withdraw from the region.</p>
<h2>Lebanon</h2>
<p>North of Israel’s border with Lebanon, Hezbollah has been conducting military operations against Israel for many years and since October 7 clashes between Hezbollah forces and the Israel Defence Forces have become <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-6-2024">almost daily occurences</a>.</p>
<p>Hezbollah (Party of God) was formed in 1982 to fight against the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. It was trained and equipped by Iran, which continues to provide practically all of its <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/irans-islamist-proxies">financial and military resources</a>. In its <a href="https://www.ict.org.il/UserFiles/The%20Hizballah%20Program%20-%20An%20Open%20Letter.pdf">1985 manifesto</a>, it vowed to expel western powers from Lebanon, called for the destruction of Israel state and pledged allegiance to Iran’s supreme leader.</p>
<p>In 2021 Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, claimed that the organisation has <a href="https://apnews.com/article/middle-east-lebanon-beirut-civil-wars-hassan-nasrallah-a3c10d99cca2ef1c3d58dae135297025">100,000 trained fighters</a>, but estimates as to its actual strength vary considerably.</p>
<p>While heavily involved both politically and economically in Lebanon, Hezbollah is also active throughout the region, <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/hezbollahs-regional-activities-support-irans-proxy-networks">doing Iran’s business</a> rather than looking after Lebanese interests.</p>
<h2>Major headache for the west</h2>
<p>As can be seen with the recent attacks by Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen on shipping in the Red Sea (the Houthis are armed and trained by Iran as part of a civil war against the Sunni national government backed by Saudi Arabia), dealing with Iran’s proxies throughout the Middle East is a serious challenge. </p>
<p>Many of these groups now wield significant political influence in the countries in which they are embedded, so confronting them is not simply a military exercise. And, as the dramatic rise in tensions in the region following the assault by Hamas on Israel (also planned with Iranian help) suggests, Iran is capable of fomenting trouble for the west almost at will across the region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221520/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christoph Bluth does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Iran funds a large network of armed groups across the Middle East as part of its ambition to replace the US as regional power.Christoph Bluth, Professor of International Relations and Security, University of BradfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2227682024-02-05T14:23:35Z2024-02-05T14:23:35ZMiddle East crisis: US airstrikes against Iran-backed armed groups explained<p>US airstrikes on Iran-backed armed groups <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-2-2024">on February 2</a> have been anticipated for some time. Since the Hamas attacks in Israel on October 7, US forces in the Middle East have been targeted more than <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/28/us/politics/biden-iran-drone-strike.html">150 times</a>. These attacks, mainly on US bases in Iraq and Syria caused minimal damage thanks to US air defence capabilities.</p>
<p>The Biden administration had responded with <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/21/us/politics/us-militias-tipping-point.html">modest strikes</a> on the militias’ weapons storage and training sites. But a <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-troops-killed-jordan-american-service-members-syria/">drone attack</a> on January 28 on Tower 22, a US base on the Jordanian-Syrian border, killed three soldiers and wounded dozens of others. </p>
<p>The deaths represented an unofficial red line for many in Washington, and <a href="https://www.google.com/search?q=biden+pressure+to+bomb+iran&oq=biden+pressure+to+bomb+iran&aqs=chrome..69i57j33i160l3j33i671l4.10890j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8#:%7E:text=Political%20pressure%20builds,political%2Dpressure%2Dbuil...">political pressure</a> mounted fast on President Biden to respond more forcefully against the armed groups – or even <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-28/biden-faces-pressure-to-confront-iran-after-us-troops-killed">against Iran</a> itself.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/02/02/us-strike-retaliates-jordan-attack/">Officials</a> said the air strikes targeted command-and-control sites, intelligence centres and drone storage facilities in Iraq and Syria affiliated with the militias and also with the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards">Quds Force</a>, a branch of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. </p>
<p>Biden <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/02/02/us-strike-retaliates-jordan-attack/">also stated</a> that the US would continue strikes at times and places of their choosing.</p>
<p>Though more widespread than previous strikes, the response was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/02/03/world/us-strikes-israel-hamas-news">carefully calibrated</a> to avoid stoking a broader war. Furthermore, the US signalled its intentions days in advance, giving the groups and their advisers time to move to minimise casualties.</p>
<h2>Militant groups targeted</h2>
<p>There are about <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/iran-backed-groups-iraq-militias-middle-east/">40 militant groups</a> in the region backed by Iran. These include high-profile groups such as <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hamas">Hamas</a>, which carried out the October 7 attack in Israel as well as <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hezbollah">Hezbollah</a>, which has been engaged in cross-border fire with Israel on the Lebanon border since October. Meanwhile, <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/who-are-yemens-houthis">Houthi rebels</a> in Yemen have faced separate <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-68159939">US and UK strikes</a> in response to their targeting of commercial ships in the Red Sea. </p>
<p>But many other, smaller groups operate as well. Responsibility for the lethal drone strike was claimed by the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/29/jordan-drone-strike-who-are-islamic-resistance-in-iraq-and-what-is-tower-22">Islamic Resistance of Iraq</a>, a loose network of Iran-backed militias including <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/islamic-resistance-in-iraq-israel-hamas/">Kataib Hezbollah</a>, which fought against coalition forces during the Iraq war. These and other militias have continued to target US troops who remain in the region to prevent the resurgence of Islamic State.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573413/original/file-20240205-21-awmjo4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map showing attacks on US bases in Middle East by armed groups." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573413/original/file-20240205-21-awmjo4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573413/original/file-20240205-21-awmjo4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=807&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573413/original/file-20240205-21-awmjo4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=807&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573413/original/file-20240205-21-awmjo4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=807&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573413/original/file-20240205-21-awmjo4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1015&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573413/original/file-20240205-21-awmjo4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1015&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573413/original/file-20240205-21-awmjo4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1015&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Map showing the location and number of attacks on US bases in the Middle East since October 7.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Institute for the Study of War</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Iran <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/02/world/middleeast/iran-militias-israel.html">provides</a> a mix of training, intelligence, funding and weapons to groups within its self-described “axis of resistance”. But Tehran <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2024/02/01/iran-proxies-intel-houthis-00139099">does not fully control</a> the militias, who operate with varying degrees of autonomy, and who might be better seen as affiliates than proxies.</p>
<h2>US political choices</h2>
<p>The Biden administration has been walking a tightrope in the Middle East. On the one hand, the administration’s primary aim for the past four months has been <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67911825">preventing</a> a regional war in the aftermath of the Hamas attack and the subsequent war in Gaza. At the same time, the US has sought to deter adversaries who have been using increasing degrees of armed force against US personnel (and, in the case of the Red Sea, against international commercial vessels).</p>
<p>The challenge has been in determining a response that is forceful enough to deter further attacks, but not so devastating as to provoke a fully fledged war.</p>
<p>With the election year, Biden is also facing <a href="https://theconversation.com/middle-east-conflict-joe-biden-must-weigh-the-risks-of-using-force-in-an-election-year-222410">additional scrutiny</a> from home on his foreign policy decisions. Donald Trump has long sought to make Biden <a href="https://www.standard.co.uk/news/world/donald-trump-joe-biden-us-drone-strike-iran-world-war-three-b1135418.html">look weak</a> on Iran, while many Democrats have been <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-67959375">critical</a> of the president’s use of airstrikes, as well as his approach to the war in Gaza. The calibrated airstrikes of the weekend will probably attract further <a href="https://www.axios.com/2024/01/27/biden-houthi-rebels-strike-congress">criticism</a> from both sides – for going too far or not far enough.</p>
<h2>Gaza conflict</h2>
<p>There’s no guarantee that a ceasefire (temporary or permanent) would bring a stop to attacks on US troops in Iraq and Syria, or to Houthi attacks on vessels in the Red Sea. But it’s undeniable that the crisis in Gaza has emboldened armed groups around the region, who have repeatedly <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wT2NTbZ7Q2w">used the war to justify</a> their actions.</p>
<p>The US, Egypt and Qatar have been mediating between Israel and Hamas to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/27/us/politics/hostage-deal-cease-fire-hamas-gaza.html">negotiate a deal</a> that would see a halt of military operations in Gaza in return for a phased release of hostages. While clearly crucial for the <a href="https://www.ynetnews.com/article/b1r11o1b9t">hostages</a> and their families and for the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/live/world-middle-east-67920784/page/2">civilian population of Gaza</a>, the deal could also be the key to defusing other tensions in the region, at least temporarily. </p>
<p>While the deal is far from a final <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/02/03/world/us-strikes-israel-hamas-news/hamas-signals-that-wide-gaps-remain-on-reaching-a-cease-fire-agreement?smid=url-share">agreement</a>, the nature of the US strikes was probably calibrated in part to avoid disrupting the process.</p>
<h2>Preventing regional war</h2>
<p>Iran, as well as Iraq and Syria, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/02/03/world/us-strikes-israel-hamas-news/syria-and-iraq-are-angered-by-us-strikes-warning-they-could-deepen-regional-turmoil?smid=url-share">have denounced</a> the strikes, and accused the US of aggression. But Iran has not indicated it <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/02/03/world/us-strikes-israel-hamas-news/iran-denounces-the-us-strikes-but-doesnt-threaten-to-retaliate?smid=url-share">plans to retaliate</a>. This suggests that Tehran – like Washington – is still keen to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/01/world/middleeast/iran-us-war.html#:%7E:text=After%20Iran%2Daligned%20militants%20killed,awaiting%20President%20Biden's%20promised%20response.">avoid</a> a head-to-head conflict with the US. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, while Kataib Hezbollah has announced it <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/31/kataib-hezbollah-says-it-suspends-attacks-on-us-forces">will halt</a> attacks on US troops, other armed groups have said that <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/02/03/world/us-strikes-israel-hamas-news/iran-denounces-the-us-strikes-but-doesnt-threaten-to-retaliate?smid=url-share">this</a> is not the end, and they will continue to strike against the US presence in the region.</p>
<p>For the Biden administration, the aim of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67911825">preventing</a> a regional war is still the right objective, even – perhaps especially – in the face of rising tensions. A policy of careful calibration, coupled with meaningful negotiations to halt the war in Gaza, may not be as politically enticing as flexing US military might – but it’s the approach that is most in line with the longer-term interests of the US and the region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222768/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Julie M Norman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Biden administration has calibrated its strikes so as not to provoke a wider armed conflict in the region.Julie M Norman, Senior Associate Fellow on the Middle East at RUSI; Associate Professor in Politics & International Relations; Deputy Director of the Centre on US Politics, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2227182024-02-03T17:28:29Z2024-02-03T17:28:29ZUS raids in Iraq and Syria: How retaliatory airstrikes affect network of Iran-backed militias<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573194/original/file-20240203-29-7pf0p7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=2%2C126%2C1594%2C1069&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The headquarters of an Iranian-linked group in Anbar, Iraq was among the sites targeted by U.S. bombers.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/view-of-destruction-after-the-us-warplanes-carried-out-an-news-photo/1974225653?adppopup=true">Hashd al-Shaabi Media Office/Handout/Anadolu via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>U.S. bombers <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-starts-retaliatory-strikes-iraq-syria-officials-2024-02-02/">struck dozens of sites</a> across Iraq and Syria on Feb. 2, 2024, to avenge a drone attack that killed three American service members just days earlier.</em></p>
<p><em>The retaliatory strikes were the first following a deadly assault on a U.S. base in Jordan that U.S. officials blamed on Iranian-backed militias. Sites associated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) were among those hit by American bombs.</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation U.S. turned to American University’s <a href="https://www.american.edu/profiles/students/sh5958a.cfm">Sara Harmouch</a> and <a href="https://www.westpoint.edu/social-sciences/profile/nakissa_jahanbani">Nakissa Jahanbani</a> at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center – both experts on Iran’s relationship with its network of proxies – to explain what the U.S. strikes hoped to achieve and what could happen next.</em></p>
<h2>Who was targeted in the U.S. retaliatory strikes?</h2>
<p>The U.S. response extended beyond targeting Al-Muqawama al-Islamiyah fi al-Iraq, or <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-islamic-resistance-iraq">Islamic Resistance in Iraq</a>, the entity <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/01/29/us-troops-jordan-iraq-militias/">claiming responsibility</a> for the drone attack on Jan. 28. </p>
<p>This term, Islamic Resistance in Iraq, does not refer to a single group per se. Rather, it encompasses an umbrella organization that has, since around 2020, integrated various Iran-backed militias in the region. </p>
<p>Iran <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68126137#">officially denied</a> any involvement in the Jan. 28 drone strike. But the Islamic Resistance in Iraq is known to be part of the networks of militia groups that Tehran supports with money, weapons and training through the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards">Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force</a>.</p>
<p><iframe id="uoUf8" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/uoUf8/4/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>In recent months, parts of this network of Iran-backed militias have <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/what-is-irans-axis-resistance-which-groups-are-involved-2024-01-29/">claimed responsibility</a> for more than 150 attacks on bases housing U.S. forces in Syria and Iraq.</p>
<p>As such, the U.S. <a href="https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3665602/centcom-statement-on-us-strikes-in-iraq-and-syria/">retaliatory strikes</a> targeted over 85 sites across Iraq and Syria, all associated with Iranian-supported groups and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.</p>
<p>The U.S. operation’s stated aim is to deter further Iranian-backed aggression. Specifically, in Syria, the U.S. executed several airstrikes, reportedly resulting in the death of at least <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/03/world/middleeast/at-least-18-members-of-iran-backed-groups-were-killed-in-syria-monitoring-group-says.html#:%7E:text=The%20aftermath%20of%20the%20U.S.,16%20people%20had%20been%20killed%2C">18 militia group members</a> and the destruction of dozens of locations in <a href="https://www.syriahr.com/en/324467/">Al-Mayadeen and Deir el-Zour</a>, a key stronghold of Iranian-backed forces.</p>
<p>In Iraq, the Popular Mobilization Forces, a state security apparatus comprising groups backed by Iran, reported that U.S. strikes resulted in the deaths of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-launches-retaliatory-strikes-iraq-syria-nearly-40-reported-killed-2024-02-03/">16 of its members</a>, including both fighters and medics. </p>
<p>The U.S. response was notably more robust than other recent actions against such groups, reflecting an escalation in efforts to counter the threats posed by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its affiliates.</p>
<h2>What do we know about the network targeted in the strike?</h2>
<p>Initially, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq emerged as a response to foreign military presence and political interventions, especially after <a href="https://www.cfr.org/timeline/iraq-war">the 2003 U.S.-led invasion</a> of Iraq. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq acted as a collective term for pro-Tehran Iraqi militias, allowing them to launch attacks under a single banner. Over time, it evolved to become a front for Iran-backed militias operating beyond Iraq, including those in Syria and Lebanon.</p>
<p>Today, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/drone-attack-on-american-troops-risks-widening-middle-east-conflict-and-drawing-in-iran-us-tensions-222216">Islamic Resistance in Iraq</a> operates as a cohesive force rather than as a singular entity. That is to say, as a network its objectives often align with Iran’s goal of preserving its influence across the region, but on a national level – in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon – the groups have their distinct agendas.</p>
<p>Operating under this one banner of Islamic Resistance, these militias effectively conceal the identities of the actual perpetrators in their operations. This was seen in the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-says-three-us-service-members-killed-drone-attack-us-forces-jordan-2024-01-28/">deadly Jan. 28, 2024, attack on Tower 22</a>, a U.S. military base in Jordan. Although it is evident that an Iranian-supported militia orchestrated the drone assault, pinpointing the specific faction within this broad coalition is difficult.</p>
<p>This deliberate strategy of obscuring the particular source of attacks hinders direct attribution and poses challenges for countries attempting to identify and retaliate against the precise culprits. </p>
<h2>What are the strikes expected to accomplish?</h2>
<p>U.S. Central Command <a href="https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3665602/centcom-statement-on-us-strikes-in-iraq-and-syria/">said on Feb. 2</a> that the operation’s aim is to significantly impair the operational capabilities, weaponry and supply networks of the IRGC and its Iranian-backed proxies.</p>
<p>The strikes targeted key assets such as command and control centers, intelligence facilities, storage locations for rockets, missiles, drones and logistics and munitions facilities. The goal is not only to degrade their current operational infrastructure but also to deter future attacks. </p>
<p>The action followed the discovery of an <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-believes-drone-that-killed-soldiers-was-iranian-made-sources-2024-02-01/">Iranian-made drone</a> used in an attack on Jordan. </p>
<p>In a broader strategy to counter these groups, the U.S. has also <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/02/us/politics/us-iran-sanctions-charges.html">implemented new sanctions</a> against IRGC officers and officials, unsealed criminal charges against individuals involved in selling oil to benefit Hamas and Hezbollah, and conducted <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/02/us/politics/us-iran-sanctions-charges.html">cyberattacks</a> against Iran.</p>
<h2>How will this affect Iran’s strategy in the region?</h2>
<p>Prior to the U.S. response on Feb. 2, Kataib Hezbollah, a group linked to Iran, announced <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraqs-kataib-hezbollah-suspends-military-operations-us-forces-statement-2024-01-30/">a halt</a> in attacks on American targets – a move seen as recognizing the serious implications of the Jordan drone incident. </p>
<p>It is possible that the cessation was the result of pressure from Tehran, though this has been <a href="https://thehill.com/newsletters/morning-report/4443950-us-plan-retaliate-against-iran-takes-shape/">met with skepticism</a> in Washington.</p>
<p>But the development nonetheless speaks to the interplay of <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-much-influence-does-iran-have-over-its-proxy-axis-of-resistance-hezbollah-hamas-and-the-houthis-221269">influence and autonomy</a> among the so-called Axis of Resistance groups, which oppose U.S. presence in the Middle East and are supported by Iran <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-much-influence-does-iran-have-over-its-proxy-axis-of-resistance-hezbollah-hamas-and-the-houthis-221269">to varying</a> degrees.</p>
<p>The U.S. airstrikes – <a href="https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3665602/centcom-statement-on-us-strikes-in-iraq-and-syria/">combined with sanctions and charges</a> – serve as a multifaceted strategy to deter further aggression from Iran and its proxies. By targeting critical infrastructure such as command and control centers, intelligence operations and weapons storage facilities, the approach aims to undermine Iran’s ability to project power in Syria and Iraq.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3665602/centcom-statement-on-us-strikes-in-iraq-and-syria/">comprehensive and broad nature</a> of the U.S. response signals a robust stance against threats to regional stability and U.S. interests.</p>
<p>The aim is to isolate Iran diplomatically and economically, while squeezing its support for regional proxies. This underscores a commitment by the U.S. to counter Iranian influence that could potentially weaken Tehran’s regional engagement strategies, negotiation positions and capacity to form alliances.</p>
<p>However, the effectiveness of airstrikes and sanctions in deterring Iranian-backed aggression remains uncertain. Historical <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/how-iranian-backed-militias-do-political-signaling">trends suggest</a> that similar U.S. actions since the Oct. 7 Hamas assault in Israel, and as far back as 2017, have not completely halted attacks from Iranian-backed groups.</p>
<p>The Biden administration’s approach seeks to navigate this landscape without <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/02/politics/us-strikes-iraq-syria/index.html">escalating the conflict</a>, focusing on <a href="https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2024-01-31/iran-hamas-gaza-israel-war-terrorism">targeting</a> the financial mechanisms that <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-much-influence-does-iran-have-over-its-proxy-axis-of-resistance-hezbollah-hamas-and-the-houthis-221269">support Iranian proxies</a>. Yet the impact and repercussions of such sanctions on Iran and the broader regional dynamics is complex.</p>
<p>In the short term, any direct U.S. retaliation against Iranian interests could heighten regional tensions and exacerbate the cycle of <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-uk-airstrikes-risk-strengthening-houthi-rebels-position-in-yemen-and-the-region-221006">tit-for-tat strikes</a> between the U.S. and Iranian-backed forces, increasing the risk of a broader regional conflict. And given that the attack’s pretext involves the Israel-Hamas war, any U.S. response could indirectly affect the course of that conflict, impacting future diplomatic efforts and the regional balance of power. </p>
<p>Iran’s “<a href="https://www.newamerica.org/future-security/reports/whither-irgc-2020s/">forward defense” strategy</a> – focused on addressing threats externally before they become ones within its borders – would suggest that Iran will continue to support proxies through weaponry, funding and <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2023/11/how-iran-and-its-allies-hope-to-save-hamas/">tactical knowledge</a> to reduce the influence and legitimacy of the U.S. and its allies in the region.</p>
<p>This underscores the delicate balance required in responding to Iranian-backed aggression – aiming to safeguard U.S. interests while preventing an escalation into a wider regional confrontation.</p>
<p><em>Editor’s note: Parts of this story were included in <a href="https://theconversation.com/drone-attack-on-american-troops-risks-widening-middle-east-conflict-and-drawing-in-iran-us-tensions-222216">an article</a> published on Jan. 29, 2024.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222718/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The views, conclusions, and recommendations in this article are the authors’ own and do not reflect those of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sara Harmouch does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>More than 85 locations linked to militias were hit in a robust response by Washington to an earlier deadly drone attack on a US base in Jordan.Sara Harmouch, PhD Candidate, School of Public Affairs, American UniversityNakissa Jahanbani, Assistant Professor at the Combating Terrorism Center, United States Military Academy West PointLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2226952024-02-03T13:35:03Z2024-02-03T13:35:03ZUS launches retaliatory strikes in Iraq and Syria − a national security expert explains the message they send<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573164/original/file-20240202-17-gyzhww.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Joe Biden attends the arrival of the remains of three U.S. service members killed in a drone attack in Jordan.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-joe-biden-attends-the-dignified-transfer-of-the-news-photo/1973658835?adppopup=true">Roberto Schmidt/AFP via Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The United States mounted more than 125 retaliatory strikes against Iranian forces and Iranian-backed militias at seven military sites in Iraq and Syria on Feb. 2, 2024, after a drone strike <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-says-three-us-service-members-killed-drone-attack-us-forces-jordan-2024-01-28/">killed three U.S. soldiers</a> and injured 34 more in Jordan on Jan. 28.</em> </p>
<p><em>The retaliatory strikes, <a href="https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3665602/centcom-statement-on-us-strikes-in-iraq-and-syria/">which U.S. military officials say hit 85 targets, including command</a> and control operations centers, intelligence centers and munition supply chain facilities, are the latest chapter in the Middle East conflict, which President Joe Biden has tried to avoid escalating.</em></p>
<p><em>Biden announced on Jan. 30 that he had decided how to respond to the drone strike that killed the soldiers and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=75WsnYkuTlI">said</a>, “I don’t think we need a wider war in the Middle East.” The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, an Iranian-backed militia group, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-68063741">claimed responsibility</a> for the attack, while Iran denied any direct involvement in it.</em> </p>
<p><em>The U.S. retaliatory strikes happened hours after the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/biden-witness-return-remains-us-soldiers-killed-jordan-2024-02-02/">remains of the American soldiers</a> were returned to the U.S.</em> </p>
<p><em>The Conversation U.S. spoke with <a href="https://dornsife.usc.edu/profile/gregory-treverton/">Gregory Treverton</a>, a former chairman of the National Intelligence Council in the Obama administration, to understand the strategic thinking behind this retaliatory attack.</em> </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573167/original/file-20240203-21-258l39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A satellite image shows a cleared area in a desert with beige and grey buildings, seen from high in the sky" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573167/original/file-20240203-21-258l39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573167/original/file-20240203-21-258l39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573167/original/file-20240203-21-258l39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573167/original/file-20240203-21-258l39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573167/original/file-20240203-21-258l39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=535&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573167/original/file-20240203-21-258l39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=535&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573167/original/file-20240203-21-258l39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=535&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A satellite image from 2022 shows Tower 22, the U.S. military base where three U.S. soldiers were killed and dozens more were wounded on Jan. 28, 2024, in a drone strike by an Iranian-backed militia group.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/maxar-satellite-imagery-of-tower-22-which-houses-a-small-news-photo/1963648340?adppopup=true">Satellite image (c) 2024 Maxar Technologies</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What are some of the factors that likely played a role in the US deciding to launch a retaliatory strike and when to launch it?</h2>
<p>Regarding timing, the president may have wanted to get the bodies of the service people who were killed in Jordan back home and give some time for everyone to think. In the last few days, we saw that Iran and Iraq did put pressure on some of the proxy groups to wind down their operations. In one case, one of these Iran-backed militia groups in Iraq <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/01/30/middleeast/kataib-hezbollah-suspend-military-ops-us-intl/index.html">agreed to cease operations</a> this last week. Iran also said that they <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/01/31/world/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news">do not want a wider war</a> with the U.S. </p>
<p>With the time it took Biden to authorize the strike, it also gave the Iranian soldiers and others time to move out of harm’s way, if they wanted to leave the military bases. </p>
<p>More strategically, Biden already committed earlier this week to make some kind of response, and he was under all kinds of political pressure to do something. But he still appears to be trying to avoid further escalating the conflict.</p>
<p>Biden, for example, avoided striking Iranian territory directly, though some <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/republicans-pressure-biden-to-strike-iran-directly-after-deadly-drone-strike/">Republicans had pressured</a> him to do so. </p>
<h2>Iran says it wants to avoid a war with the US. But its proxy group just struck a US military base. Does that imply some sort of internal friction there?</h2>
<p>In our own country’s experience with proxy groups, we know that they have their own interests, and there are also the interests that we share. Sometimes, proxy groups that the U.S. has backed act in a way we don’t like and are just in their own interest. These proxy relationships are always complicated, in that sense. </p>
<p>Even if Iran wants to avoid further escalation with the U.S., my guess is that many of these groups would not mind a broader conflict happening, if their goals are more apocalyptic, such as destroying Israel. </p>
<h2>What do these retaliatory strikes accomplish?</h2>
<p>I think they accomplish fulfilling the Biden administration’s commitment to do something significant and respond to the drone strike killing U.S. soldiers. The response itself is measured enough so far that it is unlikely to escalate the conflict dramatically, though we could be surprised by that. </p>
<p>Overall, it is a calibrated measure that plainly is not going to entirely degrade the military capacity of any of these groups. But it should still have a pretty significant effect and weaken their military capabilities, at least to some extent. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573162/original/file-20240202-19-xitmbb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Soldiers wearing camouflage uniforms carry a casket draped in an American flag on a grey day. President Joe Biden stands nearby in a dark jacket." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573162/original/file-20240202-19-xitmbb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573162/original/file-20240202-19-xitmbb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573162/original/file-20240202-19-xitmbb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573162/original/file-20240202-19-xitmbb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573162/original/file-20240202-19-xitmbb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573162/original/file-20240202-19-xitmbb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573162/original/file-20240202-19-xitmbb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">On Feb. 2, 2024, U.S. President Joe Biden watches as U.S. Army soldiers carry the remains of Army Sgt. Kennedy Sanders, who was killed in a drone strike in Jordan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/army-carry-team-moves-a-flagged-draped-transfer-case-news-photo/1980832024?adppopup=true">Kevin Dietsch/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What else is most important to understand about these retaliatory strikes?</h2>
<p>The wider context here is that the U.S. strikes make it all the more important to get to some cease-fire in Gaza. At least then, these proxy forces would lose that <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/how-iranian-backed-militias-do-political-signaling">rationale – of Israel’s attacks</a> on Gaza – to <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/us-bolsters-defenses-around-jordan-base-as-it-readies-response-to-drone-attack/7468786.html">justify what they are doing</a>. </p>
<p>It seems to me we are still seeing no real sign from the Israelis of a sense of an endgame in this war. We presume that the Israeli government is thinking about some way to reform the Palestinian Authority or consider some coalition of Arab states, maybe the U.S. and European countries, to govern Gaza once the war ends. But we have not seen any sign of that publicly. </p>
<p>So, as long as the war continues in Gaza and as long as Palestinians are being killed, these proxy groups see this as their only way to respond.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222695/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gregory F. Treverton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The US attacks on military sites in Iraq and Syria are unlikely to further escalate conflict in the Middle East, he writes.Gregory F. Treverton, Professor of Practice in International Relations, USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2222812024-02-01T02:56:51Z2024-02-01T02:56:51ZWhat is Iran’s ‘axis of resistance’ and why is it uniting in fury against the US and Israel?<p>Days after a drone attack <a href="https://theconversation.com/drone-attack-on-american-troops-risks-widening-middle-east-conflict-and-drawing-in-iran-us-tensions-222216">killed</a> three US soldiers at a military outpost in Jordan – an attack blamed on a shadowy Iranian-linked militia group – it appears a wider regional conflict may have been averted. At least for now.</p>
<p>The US has indicated it will take a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UTUYPnX6BlE">tiered response</a> to the attack – though it hasn’t said how – and the head of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/01/31/world/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news#:%7E:text=aid%20group%20says.-,Iran%20is%20'not%20looking%20for%20war%2C'%20the%20head,of%20the%20Revolutionary%20Guards%20says.&text=The%20head%20of%20Iran's%20Revolutionary%20Guards%20said%20on%20Wednesday%20that,prepared%20to%20respond%20if%20attacked.">said</a> that Tehran is “not looking for war.”</p>
<p>But Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and Syria have now <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/01/29/us-troops-jordan-iraq-militias/">launched</a> more than 160 attacks against the US military since the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel and start of the war in Gaza. And Houthi militants in Yemen, also supported by Iran, have threatened to continue their attacks on ships in the Red Sea. </p>
<p>So, what is driving these groups in the so-called “axis of resistance” and how much control does Iran have over their actions?</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570929/original/file-20240123-27-c7730z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map showing the so-called 'Axis of Resistance' in the MIddle East." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570929/original/file-20240123-27-c7730z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570929/original/file-20240123-27-c7730z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=554&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570929/original/file-20240123-27-c7730z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=554&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570929/original/file-20240123-27-c7730z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=554&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570929/original/file-20240123-27-c7730z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=697&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570929/original/file-20240123-27-c7730z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=697&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570929/original/file-20240123-27-c7730z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=697&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iran’s influence in the Middle East.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://historica.fandom.com/wiki/Axis_of_Resistance?file=Axis_of_Resistance.jpg">Master Strategist/Axis of Resistance</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Shia armed groups in Iraq</h2>
<p>The militia blamed by the US for the drone attack in Jordan, Kata’ib Hezbollah, said earlier this week it was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/01/31/world/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news#jordan-drone-iran-iraq-kataib-hezbollah">halting</a> its military operations in Iraq under pressure from both Iran and Iraq. </p>
<p>It is just one of many Iran-backed groups in the country that operates under the umbrella banner of Islamic Resistance in Iraq. </p>
<p>Armed militias began emerging in Iraq in the wake of the US invasion of the country in 2003. These groups grew exponentially stronger when they organised as a collective front to confront the ISIS terror group. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.lse.ac.uk/middle-east-centre/research/Iraq-Research/iraq-shia-militias">Popular Mobilisation Forces</a>, or Al Hashd Al Sha’bi, was established in 2014 and became the main Shia paramilitary organisation confronting ISIS, alongside other Iran-backed groups such as Hezbollah in Syria. </p>
<p>But with threat of ISIS decreasing after its military defeat in 2019, the Popular Mobilisation Forces shifted their attention back to US targets in Iraq.</p>
<p>In recent years, these groups have presented themselves as the <em><a href="https://acleddata.com/2023/05/23/the-muqawama-and-its-enemies-shifting-patterns-in-iran-backed-shiite-militia-activity-in-iraq/">muqawama</a></em>, or “resistance”, against the US and its allies in Iraq. As such, they have launched hundreds of attacks against US and Turkish military bases and other targets in Iraq and Syria. </p>
<h2>Hezbollah</h2>
<p>Hezbollah, or the “Party of God”, emerged in the 1980s as an armed militia to free the southern parts of Lebanon from Israeli occupation and to improve conditions for the marginalised Shia minority in Lebanon. </p>
<p>The party has subsequently portrayed itself as a legitimate political party in Lebanon. As such, Hezbollah has been able to successfully operate across <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Religion-and-Hezbollah-Political-Ideology-and-Legitimacy/Farida/p/book/9780367784959">multiple domains</a>. It has a civilian (<em>da’wa</em>) role in social welfare and religious education in Lebanon, as well as a military-resistance role (<em>jihad</em>), carrying out attacks against US and Israeli targets in Lebanon and across the border with Israel. </p>
<p>Its relationship with Iran has <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-much-influence-does-iran-have-over-its-proxy-axis-of-resistance-hezbollah-hamas-and-the-houthis-221269">deepened</a> over the years, with Hezbollah <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hezbollah">receiving</a> hundreds of millions of dollars a year from Iran for training and weapons.</p>
<p>Yet, Hezbollah has proved to be extremely competent in its ability to downplay its religious ideals and principles to operate with autonomy as a mainstream political organisation in Lebanon. </p>
<h2>Houthis</h2>
<p>Also known as Ansar Allah (“Supporters of God”), the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-yemens-houthis-are-getting-involved-in-the-israel-hamas-war-and-how-it-could-disrupt-global-shipping-219220">Houthis</a> are a Shia armed group that emerged out of the Zaydi sect from Yemen’s northern highlands in the 1990s. The group rebelled against Yemen’s government in 2014 and eventually took control over most of the country. The group then spent years, with Iran’s backing, fighting a military coalition led by Saudi Arabia that was trying to oust them. </p>
<p>Interestingly, even though Houthis were never directly engaged in attacking US targets (or its allies) in the past, this changed with the Israeli war against Hamas in Gaza. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-much-influence-does-iran-have-over-its-proxy-axis-of-resistance-hezbollah-hamas-and-the-houthis-221269">How much influence does Iran have over its proxy 'Axis of Resistance' − Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>The Iran connection</h2>
<p>From the outset, what these groups have in common is a shared sectarian and ideological connection – Shia Islam. </p>
<p>Shias have <a href="https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/martinkramer/files/shia_introduction_comp.pdf">historically</a> been a minority in the Muslim world, suffering systematic persecution, political isolation and low socio-economic status in countries such as Iraq, Lebanon and the Gulf states. </p>
<p>But this began to change with the Iranian revolution in 1979 and the rise of Shia clergy in that country. The Iranian regime, mainly through its military apparatus, the Revolutionary Guards, sought to transfer the “Shia revolution” across borders to try to redress years of Shia political isolation and economic deprivation.</p>
<p>Hezbollah was considered the first and most successful of the Iran-backed organisations that arose from this movement. It was able to build and maintain a strong military arm and political presence in Lebanon that made it a key regional player – and still does. </p>
<p>With its weaponry and financial backing, Iran became the ideological guardian of this growing “axis” of groups across the Middle East. These proxy groups, in turn, have helped Iran maintain a great degree of strategic power in the region, which has become key to its foreign policy and its ability to wield influence.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-is-not-the-regional-puppetmaster-many-think-and-risks-losing-control-if-the-current-crisis-escalates-221430">Iran is not the regional puppetmaster many think and risks losing control if the current crisis escalates</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>United by resistance</h2>
<p>But even though these groups share deep political and ideological connections, they still operate as nationalist organisations in their respective countries. As such, each has its own domestic interests and ambitions. This has included improving the livelihoods of Shia communities and gaining political power. </p>
<p>This has been framed as a form of resistance or <em>muqawama</em>. This can be viewed in different ways: resistance against occupation, resistance against oppressive regimes and resistance against imperialist, hegemonic powers. </p>
<p>This is a cornerstone of Shia ideology – the idea of “oppressors vs. the oppressed” – which grew from the martyrdom of Hussein ibn Ali, grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, during the <a href="https://blog.oup.com/2011/10/hussein/#:%7E:text=On%20that%20day%2C%20Hussein%20ibn,and%20Fatima%2C%20the%20Prophet's%20daughter.">battle of Karbala</a> in the year 680. This narrative has become the symbol of Shia resistance in its various forms.</p>
<p>This is part of the reason why groups like Hezbollah, the Houthis and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq have united under the same banner – “Axis of Resistance”. This theme extends to Hezbollah’s resistance against the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, the Houthis resistance against the Saudi-coalition forces, and the armed Shi’ite groups in Iraq attacking ISIS and now US troops.</p>
<p>More recently, these groups have united as a form of resistance against Israel (and its main supporter, the US) over its war in Gaza. </p>
<p>The extent of Iran’s power over these proxies remains a big question. Iran has denied ordering the attacks on US forces in Iraq, Syria and now Jordan, saying each faction in the “axis of resistance” acts independently to oppose “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/29/world/middleeast/iran-us-troops-jordan.html">aggression and occupation</a>”.</p>
<p>The fact we are seeing a rise in military operations by all of these groups, however, indicates they are becoming increasingly essential to Iran and its strategy of expanding its influence and countering the US in the Middle East.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222281/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mariam Farida does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Shia militant groups operating in Iraq, Lebanon and other parts of the Middle East share political and ideological connections, yet they also have their own nationalist goals.Mariam Farida, Lecturer in Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Studies, Macquarie UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2224102024-01-31T14:13:19Z2024-01-31T14:13:19ZMiddle East conflict: Joe Biden must weigh the risks of using force in an election year<p>The recent <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/01/28/politics/us-troops-drone-attack-jordan/index.html">drone attack</a> that killed three US soldiers has placed Joe Biden’s handling of the conflict in the Middle East under renewed scrutiny. Under pressure from critics demanding a hard-hitting response, the president has vowed to <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/01/28/statement-from-president-joe-biden-on-attack-on-u-s-service-members-in-northeastern-jordan-near-the-syria-border/">“hold all those responsible to account”</a>.</p>
<p>But using force in an election year is fraught with political risk.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/19/us/politics/biden-israel-gaza-poll.html">Recent polls</a> suggests the US public is divided about the Gaza conflict. According to a poll last month, 39% of voters favour a continuation of Israel’s military campaign, while 44% say that Israel should stop to avoid mounting civilian casualties. <a href="https://d3nkl3psvxxpe9.cloudfront.net/documents/econTabReport_Vow57W6.pdf">Another poll</a> suggests that the sympathies of those who voted for Biden in 2020 are evenly split between Israel and the Palestinians.</p>
<p>Crucially, 57% of voters <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/19/us/politics/biden-israel-gaza-poll.html">disapprove</a> of the president’s handling of the war. This sentiment is particularly strong among younger voters and Democrats, upon whom Biden’s hopes for reelection may depend. </p>
<p>Biden’s Republican opponents have also <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/28/us/politics/biden-iran-drone-strike.html#:%7E:text=President%20Biden%20has%20carefully%20calibrated,killed%20three%20American%20service%20members.">lined up to lambast</a> him. Donald Trump, who looks all but certain to secure his party’s nomination for November’s presidential election, <a href="https://www.standard.co.uk/news/world/donald-trump-joe-biden-us-drone-strike-iran-world-war-three-b1135418.html">attributed the recent attack</a> to Biden’s “weakness and surrender” while Nikki Haley, Trump’s only remaining Republican challenger, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/30/us/politics/haley-iran-drone-strike.html">suggested that</a> the US should “go after” Iran’s military leaders.</p>
<p>Facing <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/01/29/biden-attacks-iran-mideast/">criticism</a> on all sides, the ideal <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/29/us/politics/us-biden-iran-drone-response.html">solution</a> for Biden is likely to be one that satisfies public demands to “do something” without alienating his base or provoking a widening of the war.</p>
<h2>Balancing risks</h2>
<p>Biden’s challenge is a familiar one. As I show in <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/war-on-the-ballot/9780231209656">my recent book</a>, presidents throughout history have taken political considerations into account when making decisions about war and peace. As both commander-in-chief and holder of the highest elected US office, presidents must balance the competing interests of national security and political survival.</p>
<p>Usually, that results in a degree of caution. Since voters bear the brunt of the human and financial costs of war, they tend not to reward incumbents who recklessly engage in conflict. So presidents have good political reasons to think twice before putting troops in harm’s way. As former president George W. Bush <a href="https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060301-3.html">once joked to troops</a> in the Middle East: “You don’t run for office in a democracy and say, ‘Please vote for me, I promise you war.’”</p>
<p>But the strength of this kind of democratic constraint can <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691164984/war-and-democratic-constraint">vary across contexts</a> and <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/reality-asserts-itself-public-opinion-on-iraq-and-the-elasticity-of-reality/2EC85066D94345C881A4ECD0EBB29848">over time</a>. <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/dp/B01FKU1IIC?ie=UTF8&linkCode=gs2&creativeASIN=B01FKU1IIC&tag=slate01-21&camp=1789">Mounting casualties</a> tend to erode support for lengthy commitments, but shocking events or provocations like those that took place over the weekend can also lead to a public demand for <a href="https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:7f9516c8-ee8e-4368-a96b-f45553e277d3/download_file?file_format=application%2Fpdf&safe_filename=Pelican_2021_Justice_intuitions_and.pdf&type_of_work=Thesis">retribution</a>.</p>
<h2>Lessons from history</h2>
<p>We have been here before. Almost exactly four years ago, Trump authorised the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, a senior Iranian military commander, apparently motivated in part by a desire to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/amid-confusion-and-contradictions-trump-white-house-stumbles-in-initial-public-response-to-soleimanis-killing/2020/01/07/61c9242e-3174-11ea-a053-dc6d944ba776_story.html">appear tough</a> in an election year. Trump then decided to de-escalate, declining to respond militarily for attacks on bases housing US troops in Iraq. It was a sign that his appetite for a direct conflict with Iran was <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/amid-confusion-and-contradictions-trump-white-house-stumbles-in-initial-public-response-to-soleimanis-killing/2020/01/07/61c9242e-3174-11ea-a053-dc6d944ba776_story.html">moderated</a> by <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13569775.2022.2029239">similar political realities</a> that now face his successor.</p>
<p>Trump’s recent criticism of Biden’s policies – including <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/01/28/donald-trump-brink-world-war-three/">his claim</a> on social media that “this attack would NEVER have happened if I was president, not even a chance” – conveniently fails to mention this. But it is the kind of counterfactual criticism that candidates who are challenging an incumbent have <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/war-on-the-ballot/9780231209656">often tended to embrace</a>, safe in the knowledge that they won’t be held accountable for delivering on policies that may prove unwise or unworkable. At least, not until after the election.</p>
<p>Elsewhere, <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/war-on-the-ballot/9780231209656">my research</a> indicates that these dynamics also featured during previous conflicts involving the US. During the war in Iraq, for example, the administrations of both Bush and Obama grew increasingly anxious about additional or extended troop deployments as elections loomed. </p>
<p>More broadly, several studies find that leaders facing reelection tend to be more <a href="http://conconi.ulb.be/DP.pdf">conflict-averse</a>, <a href="https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=353">entering fewer wars</a> in the months before an election than during other parts of their tenure.</p>
<h2>Ending endless wars?</h2>
<p>Whether or not a lasting <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/30/us/politics/israel-hamas-gaza-hostages.html">diplomatic solution</a> to the crisis in Gaza can be found remains to be seen. But from a wider perspective, the genie may already be out of the bottle. It is only a few short months since the US national security advisor, Jake Sullivan, triumphantly <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2023/10/israel-war-middle-east-jake-sullivan/675580/">declared</a> that “the Middle East region is quieter today than it has been in two decades”.</p>
<p>On Monday, by contrast, secretary of state <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/international/4437128-blinken-middle-east-israel-iran/">Antony Blinken warned</a> that the Middle East faces its most “dangerous” situation since at least 1973.</p>
<p>These rhetorical gymnastics reflect a fast-moving strategic reality. But they also render hollow the political promises of successive presidents – <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/08/31/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-end-of-the-war-in-afghanistan/#:%7E:text=It%20was%20time%20to%20be,should%20have%20ended%20long%20ago.">including Biden</a> – to bring an end to the era of major military operations in the wider region.</p>
<p>The reality is that many of the forces deployed to the region during the fight against the Islamic State never left. The US still has thousands of troops <a href="https://dwp.dmdc.osd.mil/dwp/app/dod-data-reports/workforce-reports">stationed</a> in Iraq, Syria and Jordan. It is these forces that have been subject to periodic attacks from Iranian proxies. Over 150 such attacks have <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/28/us/politics/biden-iran-drone-strike.html#:%7E:text=President%20Biden%20has%20carefully%20calibrated,killed%20three%20American%20service%20members.">taken place</a> since October 7. </p>
<p>Coupled with the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/22/us/politics/houthi-yemen-strikes.html">joint US-UK airstrikes</a> against Houthi targets in Yemen, the promised response to last weekend’s attack indicates we may be entering the latest instalment of the “endless wars” from which Biden had hoped to move on. The episode therefore raises questions about the scope of the broader US military commitment in the Middle East – and whether either candidate is prepared to make clear the real strategic trade-offs implied in their promises.</p>
<p>In the meantime, we can be sure of one thing: war is very much on the ballot in November’s presidential election.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222410/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Payne is a Nonresident Fellow at the Institute for Global Affairs</span></em></p>History tells us that US presidents tend to be cautious about foreign policy in an election year – especially in the Middle East.Andrew Payne, Lecturer in Foreign Policy and Security, City, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2216602024-01-31T11:55:05Z2024-01-31T11:55:05ZIran: with a tanking economy and an election in weeks, the Islamic Republic tries to rally support by acting tough<p>As tensions continue to rise in the Middle East, the world is waiting for the Biden administration <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/jan/28/us-service-members-killed-drone-attack-jordan">to act in response</a> to the strike on a US base in Jordan by an Iran-backed militia on January 28, which killed three American service personnel. The US president, reportedly given several options, is weighing up deterrence of further attacks in the region against the risks of escalation.</p>
<hr>
<iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/iran-with-a-tanking-economy-and-an-election-in-weeks-the-islamic-republic-tries-to-rally-support-by-acting-tough-221660&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p><em>You can listen to more articles from The Conversation <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/audio-narrated-99682">narrated by Noa</a>.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>As has so often been the case in the past, Iran has denied responsibility for the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-says-three-us-service-members-killed-drone-attack-us-forces-jordan-2024-01-28/">drone attack</a>, on the Tower 22 outpost in northeast Jordan near the borders with Syria and Iraq. But the Islamic Resistance in Iraq – an umbrella group of Shia militias backed by Iran – has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/what-is-irans-axis-resistance-which-groups-are-involved-2024-01-29/#:%7E:text=An%20umbrella%20group%20of%20hardline,said%20their%20troops%20were%20targeted.">claimed responsibility for the attack</a>.</p>
<p>Any involvement of Iran would be something of a gamble for the regime, which needs to look tough – particularly to its population ahead of elections on March 1 – but is in a weakened position. The economy is in trouble, there have been mass popular protests against the authorities’ treatment of women, and now the country has been involved a string of foreign incidents involving Israel, the Islamic State jihadist group and Pakistan. If it sanctioned the killing of Americans, Iran may have only compounded its difficult situation.</p>
<h2>Tehran under pressure</h2>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572198/original/file-20240130-27-svehoh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map showing attack on US bases in the Middle East." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572198/original/file-20240130-27-svehoh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572198/original/file-20240130-27-svehoh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=624&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572198/original/file-20240130-27-svehoh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=624&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572198/original/file-20240130-27-svehoh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=624&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572198/original/file-20240130-27-svehoh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=784&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572198/original/file-20240130-27-svehoh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=784&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572198/original/file-20240130-27-svehoh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=784&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A regional conflict: strikes against US military bases in the Middle East.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Institute for the Study of War</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>On Christmas Day, Israel hit an Iranian military compound in southern Damascus, killing <a href="https://themedialine.org/headlines/senior-irgc-officer-sayyed-reza-mousavi-killed-in-alleged-israeli-airstrike-in-syria/">Sayyed Reza Mousavi</a>. Mousavi had been the right-hand man of General Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force who was <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-50979463">assassinated by the US</a> in January 2020.</p>
<p>Nine days later, Islamic State detonated two bombs at Soleimani’s grave in Kerman in south-central Iran on the fourth anniversary of his assassination. For the regime, Soleimani was the iconic commander who had defeated Islamic State in Iraq. But far from being vanquished, Islamic State was able to decimate his memorial, <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-kerman-bombing-death-toll-91/32763647.html">killing 91 people</a>, with the regime apparently powerless to stop it.</p>
<p>Iran’s leaders and military appeared unable to protect their officers abroad or their citizens at home, let alone head the so-called <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-much-influence-does-iran-have-over-its-proxy-axis-of-resistance-hezbollah-hamas-and-the-houthis-221269">“Axis of Resistance”</a>. They needed a show of strength.</p>
<p>On January 15, the Revolutionary Guards <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-revolutionary-guards-say-they-have-attacked-espionage-centers-iraqs-erbil-2024-01-15/">fired missiles into Iraqi Kurdistan</a> on the pretext of wiping out an Israeli intelligence cell. They killed a multi-millionaire businessman, members of his family, and other civilians including a Dutch infant less than a year old.</p>
<p>Just over 24 hours later, the target was the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/18/where-balochistan-why-iran-pakistan-strikes">Baluchistan region in Pakistan</a>. Regime media proclaimed a Guards missile and drone strike on a camp of the Baloch separatist group Jaish ul-Adl, which has fought security forces in southeast Iran for more than a decade. In fact, the dead included two children.</p>
<p>The display backfired. Needing to make its own statement over the violation of sovereignty, Pakistan’s armed forces <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-pakistan-strikes-cross-border-escalation-region/32782339.html">carried out cross-border attacks</a> in Iran’s southeastern province of Sistan-Baluchestan. They claimed “terrorists” had been killed – local media said at least three women and four children, all “non-Iranian nationals”, were slain.</p>
<p>On January 20, Iran’s intelligence command in Syria met in southern Damascus to consider the regional situation. They never completed the discussion. Israeli missiles <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/israel-strike-syria-iran-aligned-leaders/32784579.html">destroyed the three-storey building</a>, killing the Iranian head of intelligence, his deputy, and three other Revolutionary Guards.</p>
<h2>Challenges for the supreme leader</h2>
<p>International commentators usually treat Iran’s regime as a player in the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. But, while ostentatiously supporting Hamas, Hezbollah and Yemen’s Houthi rebels, the regime has officially kept its distance from those groups’ operations. And the Iranian public has shown <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202311061514">little enthusiasm</a> for the regime’s support for Hamas – the absence of large rallies since October 7 has been marked.</p>
<p>The main issue is a domestic one. Soleimani has been admired by many Iranians and his anti-Islamic State legend, burnished and manipulated by the regime. And the killings from Damascus to Kerman come weeks before <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/in-iran-gaza-war-overshadows-preparations-for-2024-legislative-vote-/7361213.html">parliamentary elections</a> on March 1.</p>
<p>The regime is seriously concerned about the prospect of another weak electoral performance, following historic lows of 42.6% in the <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/factbox-the-outcome-of-irans-2020-parliamentary-elections/">2020 parliamentary election</a> and 48.8% — a drop from 72% in 2017 — in the <a href="https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2021/jun/23/raisi-election-results-explainer">2021 presidential election</a>.</p>
<p>But much of Iran’s electorate was alientated by the regime’s repression after the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/06/16/iran.elections.timeline/">disputed 2009 presidential election</a>. The brutal crackdown to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-the-hijab-protests-are-now-massive-but-a-revolution-will-need-the-military-to-change-sides-191786">“woman, life, freedom”</a> protests since September 2022 has angered people further. Ahead of the poll, the Guardian Council has excluded thousands of qualified candidates, including the former president, Hassan Rouhani, to ensure the reins of power remain in the hands of hardliners.</p>
<p>Iran’s economy is in the doldrums amid US-led sanctions and ongoing issues of mismanagement and corruption. Inflation is officially <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/iran/inflation-cpi#">about 40%</a> and far higher in reality for food and other essential items. Discontent over wages and working conditions is widespread. The currency, which had stabilised after all-time lows in 2022, <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202401232785">has lost about 10% in value</a> in the past month.</p>
<h2>‘Neither Gaza nor Lebanon. My life for Iran’</h2>
<p>But the regime persists with its tough talk. While racing to proclaim “friendship” with Pakistan, it is <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-warns-us-iraq-drones/32060585.html">threatening more attacks on Iraqi Kurdistan</a> on the pretext of dismantling Israeli intelligence networks. Iran’s president, Ebrahim Raisi, declared that Israel’s strikes “<a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-68040493">will not go unanswered</a>”.</p>
<p>Tehran’s Houthi allies in Yemen are <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-led-taskforce-deploys-in-red-sea-as-middle-east-crisis-threatens-to-escalate-beyond-gaza-220164">damaging international shipping</a> in the Red Sea, site of 12% of global trade. Hezbollah is in daily skirmishes with Israel.</p>
<p>But Iran’s leadership is trapped in a vice. If it pulls back from direct operations, while insisting on the “independence” of its allies, it risks the appearance of being all bark and no bite across the region. If the Revolutionary Guards try another missile strike, they risk further retaliation and even defeat – whether it is from Pakistan or Israel.</p>
<p>So the militias in Syria and Iraq appear to have become the vehicle – and probably the sacrifice – for Iran’s leaders to signal to Iranians that they are still tough, even as they officially deny any role in the attacks.</p>
<p>As the US measures its response, the final word may come from Iranians whose primary concern is at home. Amid the mass protests after the disputed 2009 presidential election, they chanted: “Neither Gaza nor Lebanon. My life for Iran.” Khamenei and his inner circle are gambling that they can finally bury that message.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221660/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Scott Lucas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Facing a parliamentary election in March, the Islamic Republic is trying to distract attention away from its economic woes with a show of strength.Scott Lucas, Professor of International Politics, Clinton Institute, University College DublinLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2217222024-01-30T17:55:16Z2024-01-30T17:55:16ZIran has so far resisted direct involvement in the Gaza war, but is that changing?<iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/iran-has-so-far-resisted-direct-involvement-in-the-gaza-war-but-is-that-changing" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>Iran has tried to keep the war in Gaza at arm’s length by providing support for Hamas <a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/01/04/1222880864/after-striking-throughout-the-middle-east-irans-proxies-now-become-the-targets">through armed groups it backs in Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq</a>. </p>
<p>The Islamic Republic has indicated it wants neither to get directly involved in the fighting nor see the conflict escalate across the region. But as illustrated by <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/01/29/politics/biden-jordan-attack-response-options/index.html">the recent drone attack by pro-Iranian militias in Jordan that killed three American soldiers</a>, the violence is spreading. Tehran may not be able to sustain its strategy much longer.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20231014-qatar-iran-turkey-and-beyond-the-galaxy-of-hamas-supporters">Tehran’s support for Hamas dates back to the 1990s</a>, though the two have never been a perfect ideological match. Hamas comes from the Sunni sect of Islam, identifying more closely with the Muslim Brotherhood than it does with Shi’a Iran. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/is-hamas-the-same-as-isis-the-islamic-state-group-no-and-yes-219454">Is Hamas the same as ISIS, the Islamic State group? No − and yes</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Relations broke down during the Syrian civil war as <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/evolution-russian-and-iranian-cooperation-syria">Tehran backed Bashar al-Assad’s regime</a> and Hamas sympathized with the Sunni opposition. However, when the fighting ebbed, the two mended fences and Hamas rejoined the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/14/irans-axis-of-resistance-is-a-potent-coalition-but-a-risky-strategy">Axis of Resistance</a>, a group of state and non-state entities centred in Iran that oppose Israel and the American presence in the region. </p>
<p>As part of the alliance, Hamas reportedly receives military equipment, training and somewhere <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/10/09/iran-support-hamas-training-weapons-israel/">between $70</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/how-hamas-secretly-built-mini-army-fight-israel-2023-10-13/">$350 million per year</a>, depending on the source.</p>
<h2>Important role</h2>
<p>Iran does not appear to have been involved in the planning or execution of Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023 attack on Israel. Indeed, United States intelligence reported Tehran <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/initial-us-intelligence-shows-hamas-attack-surprised-iranian-leaders-ny-times-2023-10-11/#:%7E:text=WASHINGTON%2C%20Oct%2011%20(Reuters),U.S.%20sources%20said%20on%20Wednesday.">was surprised</a> by events. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, as the Gaza war continues, Iran is playing an important role. Tehran provides Hamas with rhetorical support and indirect military backing through the other members of the Axis of Resistance. While not tilting the balance of power in Gaza, this has signalled to the West and Israel that the campaign against Hamas will have a cost, particularly if it escalates. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/12/19/1219748268/lebanon-hezbollah-israel-hamas-iran-war">There have been almost daily</a> skirmishes between Hezbollah and Israeli Defense Forces on the Lebanese border. In Iraq, Iranian-backed militias have launched more than <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-strikes-targets-iraq-after-us-forces-wounded-officials-2024-01-23/">150 attacks</a> against American military installations, and the pro-Iranian Houthis in Yemen have launched ballistic missiles at Israel and attacked shipping in the Red Sea.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/western-strikes-against-houthis-risk-igniting-a-powderkeg-in-the-middle-east-221392">Western strikes against Houthis risk igniting a powderkeg in the Middle East</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Nevertheless, Tehran’s message that it <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-axis-resistance-against-israel-faces-trial-by-fire-2023-11-15/">does not intend to get directly involved</a> in the fighting has been relayed directly to Hamas by the Islamic Republic’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei <a href="https://amwaj.media/media-monitor/is-saudi-arabia-relaying-us-messages-to-iran">and to the U.S. privately through intermediaries</a>.</p>
<p>Tehran’s stance is evident in the particular way military force has been employed. Hezbollah’s attacks have been limited in size and restricted to the area around the Lebanese border — significant enough to indicate support for Hamas, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/12/19/1219748268/lebanon-hezbollah-israel-hamas-iran-war">but not threatening enough</a> to justify Israel opening a second front. </p>
<p>Similarly in Iraq, the attacks have been relatively small. The strike against the Al-Asad air base in Iraq was <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/u-s-strikes-militias-iraq-iranian-backed-over-attacks-u-s-forces/">described by the Pentagon</a> as one of the largest yet, but the result was some damage to non-critical facilities and no fatalities. The U.S. retaliated with strikes of its own, but repeated the same mantra as Tehran; it did not want the <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/u-s-strikes-militias-iraq-iranian-backed-over-attacks-u-s-forces/">fighting to escalate.</a> </p>
<h2>Houthis active</h2>
<p>The most active of Iran’s proxies has been, surprisingly, the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67614911">Houthis in Yemen, who say that they will blockade the Red Sea until the Israelis cease military operations in Gaza</a>. By some estimates, <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/edwardsegal/2024/01/28/most-surveyed-companies-are-vulnerable-to-another-supply-chain-crisis/?sh=5c94fd391bd1">90 per cent of container shipping has been diverted</a>, leading to higher prices and fractured supply lines. </p>
<p>Their attacks on shipping have provoked a series of missile and airstrikes from the U.S. and the United Kingdom, <a href="https://nationalpost.com/news/politics/canada-helped-plan-but-didnt-have-assets-to-participate-in-u-s-u-k-strikes-against-houthis">with Canada playing a supporting role</a>. </p>
<p>While provocative, the risk for Tehran in this area is far less than it would be on the Lebanese border, where Israel would likely respond with a ground invasion.</p>
<p>A major conflict between Hezbollah and Israel <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/12/19/1219748268/lebanon-hezbollah-israel-hamas-iran-war">would be devastating</a> and unpredictable. It would put Iran’s main regional ally in jeopardy and could create conditions that would prompt Washington to attack Iran directly.</p>
<p>There’s little chance, however, of a ground invasion in Yemen, where the airstrikes appear <a href="https://www.newarab.com/analysis/saudi-arabias-balancing-act-amid-strikes-yemens-houthis">to be bolstering</a> the popularity of the Houthi leadership.</p>
<h2>On the sidelines</h2>
<p>It’s not difficult to understand why Tehran has chosen to straddle the fence between supporting Hamas and standing on the sidelines. </p>
<p>If Iran was to remain passive while Gaza is flattened by Israel, it would lose credibility. This would cost Tehran in terms of regional influence and undermine an alliance network essential to its ability to deter the U.S. and Israel. </p>
<p>A certain degree of conflict is also in Iran’s interest. Popular support for the Axis of Resistance has increased across the region, and the trend toward Israeli-Arab normalization is on hold for the foreseeable future. At the same time, though, Iran potentially has a lot to lose.</p>
<p>Iran has grown into a formidable military power, but its military, nuclear and economic infrastructure remain vulnerable to U.S.-Israeli military strikes. </p>
<p>The regime may also be politically vulnerable at home. <a href="https://www.stimson.org/2023/iranians-differ-widely-with-their-leaders-over-the-war-between-israel-and-hamas/">It is unlikely</a> the Iranian public would support a war to liberate Palestine, and given the recent anti-hijab protests and several years of simmering domestic unrest, it can no longer be taken for granted that U.S. military strikes would cause Iranians to rally around the flag.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/iranian-protesters-are-making-demands-in-charters-and-bills-of-rights-201543">Iranian protesters are making demands in charters and bills of rights</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Maintaining the balance</h2>
<p>Iran’s strategy is designed to strike a balance between these two concerns, but there are a number of things that could go wrong. </p>
<p>For one, Iran cannot control how its opponents respond. In Syria, Israel raised the stakes by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/26/world/middleeast/iran-military-official-israel-syria.html">assassinating a high ranking member of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard thought to be involved in arms transfers to Hezbollah</a>. </p>
<p>Compelled to reply directly, Iran was only able to avoid a confrontation with Israel <a href="https://amwaj.media/article/inside-story-iranian-ballistic-missiles-rock-iraqi-kurdistan">by striking targets in Iraq it claimed were associated with the Israeli Mossad</a>.</p>
<p>Even within the Axis of Resistance, the lines of command and control are imprecise. Iran’s allies have their own agendas and their own ideas about how much force to use. </p>
<p>The recent drone attack in Jordan is a case in point. Although the Islamic Resistance in Iraq — a loose group of pro-Iranian militias — has claimed responsibility, the U.S. is holding Iran accountable. </p>
<p>President Joe Biden’s administration <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/us-jordan-attack-iran-1.7098603">still seems reluctant to target Iran directly</a>, but the attack has ratcheted tensions up significantly. </p>
<p>It is also possible that Iran’s leadership will simply overplay its hand, particularly in the Red Sea. At a certain point, the West may lose patience with bombing Iran’s proxies and target the country itself.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221722/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Devine does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Iran prefers to engage Israel through its proxies, but the risk of escalation makes this a dangerous strategy.James Devine, Associate Professor Politics and International Relations, Mount Allison UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2194492023-12-29T11:44:39Z2023-12-29T11:44:39ZWhy Russia and China have been added to Republicans’ new ‘axis of evil’<p>Former US president George W Bush’s concept of an “axis of evil”, introduced in his 2002 <a href="https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html">State of the Union</a> address, came to define the flawed foreign policy decisions of his years in power.</p>
<p>He used it to legitimise both the invasion of Iraq and the ensuing <a href="https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/wh/6947.htm">“war on terror”</a>. Bush’s axis of evil included Iraq, Iran and North Korea. They were bound together as long-standing US adversaries, rendered as actively seeking weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and who, he argued, collectively posed a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/onpolitics/transcripts/sou012902.htm">“grave and growing danger”</a> as antagonist regimes capable of attacking the US and its allies.</p>
<p>Rolling into 2024, with a <a href="https://fpc.org.uk/2024-us-presidential-elections-a-fork-in-the-road-for-the-future-of-american-foreign-policy/">US presidential election</a> on one side, and continuing geopolitical volatility from Ukraine to east Asia on the other, Republicans, in particular, have recently <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/11/29/axis-of-evil-russia-china-iran-north-korea-bush-era/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=FP%20This%20Week%20-%2012052023&utm_content=B&utm_term=fp_this_week#cookie_message_anchor">revived the term</a> to explain concurrently the machinations of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea.</p>
<h2>Clear and present danger?</h2>
<p>The new “axis” however, operates on different principles, and its links to US policy are more tenuous.</p>
<p>First, the distinction between original axis countries, including long-standing US adversaries North Korea and Iran, and new additions <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/05/china-beijing-biden-us-foreign-policy">China</a> and Russia. </p>
<p>During the cold war, Russia and China were of great concern to the US. But during the Bush era, neither was regarded as constituting either the remote or proximate threat of that first axis. Grouping the four suggests that some in Washington feel that both China and Russia pose a significant enough challenge to both US and global systems to add them to a renewed axis of evil, rather than categorising them separately as individual belligerents.</p>
<p>Second, the perceived threat to the US arising from associations between each of the four members is uneven. <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/the-persian-russian-connection">Russia’s connections with Iran</a> are long-standing and have been, mostly, tolerated by the US. </p>
<p>These links only become unpalatable, and worthy of including in an axis, when nations step over a particular line. Iran did so by helping Hamas plan <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-israel-hamas-strike-planning-bbe07b25#:%7E:text=DUBAI%E2%80%94Iranian%20security%20officials%20helped,another%20Iran%2Dbacked%20militant%20group.">the October 7 attack</a> in Israel. </p>
<p>Russia has been added to the axis list – after undertaking expansionist adventures so significant (by invading Ukraine) that it cannot be ignored. So for both Iran and Russia, magnitude of ambitions counts. </p>
<p>Neither Russia’s invasion of <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/the-2008-russo-georgian-war-putins-green-light/">Georgia in 2008</a> nor <a href="https://www.history.co.uk/articles/putin-s-gamble-russia-s-2014-invasion-of-crimea">Crimea</a> in 2014 saw it consigned to a newfound axis of evil. It merely consolidated its status as a potential Eurasian rogue state. </p>
<p>It appears to be the risk of concerted collaboration between two or more axis members, and the combined threat that they represent that worries Washington. For example, former governor of South Carolina and presidential candidate Nikki Haley argued that <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/11/29/axis-of-evil-russia-china-iran-north-korea-bush-era/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=FP%20This%20Week%20-%2012052023&utm_content=B&utm_term=fp_this_week">“a win for Russia is a win for China”</a>.</p>
<p>Third, the complexities of what the four have in common with each other remain unclear. What currently binds China and Russia together is their expansionist intent. But this differs from the historic willingness to stir up regional volatility exhibited by <a href="https://geopoliticalfutures.com/predictable-volatility-iran-north-korea/">Iran and North Korea</a>. </p>
<p>China stands opposed to such sabre-rattling from North Korea, while simultaneously undertaking plenty of its own regional expansion.</p>
<p>More interesting perhaps are the immense natural resources wielded by <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/02/huge-impact-fortress-economics-russia-and-china">Russia and China</a>, and to a lesser extent Iran. Russia and China make up enormous sections of Eurasia in terms of landmass, population and trading links binding their economies. </p>
<p>Does this suggest that the size, finances and natural resources <a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3754480-20-years-later-the-axis-of-evil-is-bigger-bolder-and-more-evil/">of the new axis</a> and its friends may allow it to become a semi-insulated trade and economic block? Probably not, but only while Russia’s current expansionist efforts remain at a standstill. </p>
<p>A post-conflict situation in Europe (assuming an end to the Ukraine war) will ultimately reset the sanctions regime against Russia, and – depending on Beijing’s peace-maker intentions – could facilitate warmer east-west relations.</p>
<h2>Why revive the axis?</h2>
<p>There are both drawbacks and benefits to resurrecting the idea of an “axis”. For supporters of the approach, the new axis provides policymakers with a <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780203073629-7/theories-truisms-tools-international-relations-kjell-goldmann">convenient who’s who of adversaries</a>. Assuming all four present a similar danger to the US, it gives a likely challenger for the presidency the chance to point at President Joe Biden’s foreign policy shortcomings.</p>
<p>While, unlike in Bush’s era, military interventions are probably not on the agenda, a more regionally targeted protectionist approach to <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/11/29/axis-of-evil-russia-china-iran-north-korea-bush-era/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=FP%20This%20Week%20-%2012052023&utm_content=B&utm_term=fp_this_week">“not try to do business with them”</a> is more probable.</p>
<p>There is little of real value for US foreign policy in taking this approach. This uneven grab basket of anti-American villainy is reductivist at best, and cartoonish at worst. It suggests equivalences of power whether there are none, imagined ideological symmetry, and coordination incapable of surviving the short-term twists of four separate foreign policies. </p>
<p>The revival of the “axis” appears to be largely coming from Republicans, currently in charge of Congress, rather than the White House. But much may change in 2024 if they take over the presidency.</p>
<p>Like the original axis, the new grouping conflates power and ambition across states, muddies domestic objectives with regional support between two or more of the members, and suggests the need for a new global fistfight to defend democracy.</p>
<p>Rather than superficial attempts at suggesting basic enmity across four disparate nations, more important for the US ought to be a concern about Russia, China, Iran and North Korea’s long-standing preference for authoritarianism, and the ominous implications for their neighbouring states and regions. Alignment and agreements come and go. Entrenched authoritarianism, however, is hell to shift.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219449/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amelia Hadfield does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>So far, the revival of the ‘axis’ appears to be largely coming from Republicans, rather than the White House.Amelia Hadfield, Head of Department of Politics, University of SurreyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2163912023-12-13T17:19:15Z2023-12-13T17:19:15ZGaza war: how Hezbollah has opened a second front inside Israel<p>While the attention of the world has focused on <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/israeli-palestinian-conflict-140823">Israel’s assault on Gaza</a> over the past two months, following Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, one aspect of the Middle East conflict not getting a great deal of news coverage has been the continuing battle with Hezbollah in south Lebanon.</p>
<p>There have been daily reports of clashes between the Israeli army and Lebanese Hezbollah. On December 11, <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-11-2023">nine Hezbollah attacks</a> on Israeli towns or military positions were recorded. The group, whose name means “Party of God” and which is largely funded by Iran while embedded in Lebanon, has lost <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/1-more-hezbollah-fighter-killed-in-clashes-with-israeli-forces-on-lebanon-border/3081316#:%7E:text=At%20least%20101%20Hezbollah%20fighters,figures%20released%20by%20the%20group.">more than 100 fighters</a> since October 7.</p>
<p>Hezbollah and Hamas are thought to collaborate as part of the broader “<a href="https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2023/11/15/what-is-irans-axis-of-resistance">axis of resistance</a>”, which also includes the Houthi rebels in Yemen and other groups in Syria, Iraq and Iran. While there is no evidence that Hezbollah was directly involved in the planning for the October 7, <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-says-hamas-working-with-hezbollah-to-train-thousands-in-lebanon/">logistical training and coordination</a> between Hezbollah, Hamas and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards has been going on for years.</p>
<p>One example of this cross-pollination of ideas is the “Gaza metro” – the extensive network of tunnels built by Hamas throughout Gaza. These are generally thought to have <a href="https://www.memri.org/tv/hamas-rep-lebanon-ahmad-abd-hadi-hizbullah-imad-mughniye-irgc-qods-force-qasem-soleimani-architects-tunnels-gaza">been masterminded</a> by Hezbollah commander Imad Mughnieh and Iranian commander <a href="https://theconversation.com/guns-drones-and-poison-the-new-age-of-assassination-151224">Qasem Soleimani</a>, who was killed in a US airstrike on Baghdad in 2020.</p>
<h2>Party of God</h2>
<p>Hezbollah has its roots in the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/17/beyond-hezbollah-the-history-of-tensions-between-lebanon-and-israel">Israeli invasion of Lebanon</a> in 1982 when Israel occupied all of south Lebanon as far as Beirut in its attempt to root out the Palestine Liberation Organisation. </p>
<p>After Israel withdrew from Beirut, it continued to occupy large amounts of territory in the south of Lebanon. In 1985, Hezbollah announced itself with an <a href="https://www.ict.org.il/UserFiles/The%20Hizballah%20Program%20-%20An%20Open%20Letter.pdf">open letter</a> published in the Lebanese daily newspaper, al-Safir, stating its mission as a resistance movement against US imperialism and Israeli occupation. </p>
<p>In the 1992 general election, Hezbollah’s political wing <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1992_Lebanese_general_election">won eight seats</a>, giving it the largest block in the Lebanese parliament and establishing the group as a major political force.</p>
<p>In 2000, after repeated Hezbollah-led operations against the Israeli military, Israel withdrew its troops from most of southern Lebanon – up to what was called the <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/its-time-to-talk-about-blue-line-constructive-re-engagement-is-key-to-stability">blue line</a>, a UN-designated “line of withdrawal” which delineates Israeli territory from Lebanon and the Golan Heights and is policed by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/565186/original/file-20231212-29-3tf6ve.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of Israel, Lebanon and the Golan Heights showing the UN Blue Line." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/565186/original/file-20231212-29-3tf6ve.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/565186/original/file-20231212-29-3tf6ve.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/565186/original/file-20231212-29-3tf6ve.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/565186/original/file-20231212-29-3tf6ve.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/565186/original/file-20231212-29-3tf6ve.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/565186/original/file-20231212-29-3tf6ve.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/565186/original/file-20231212-29-3tf6ve.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The ‘blue line’, or ‘line of withdrawal’ was established by the UN in 2000 to formalise Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Striving2767/Wikimedia Commons</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It is at best a sticking-plaster solution, as Israel still occupies areas – such as the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Shebaa-farms">Shebaa Farms</a> and seven other villages, that Lebanon considers to be part of its territory.</p>
<p>In July 2006, after a brief military confrontation across the Lebanese border, Hezbollah captured two Israeli soldiers sparking a month-long war between Israel and Lebanon during which more than 1,000 Lebanese people were killed and 150 Israelis. Israel also conducted a massive campaign of airstrikes, including targeting the southern suburbs of Beirut, known as <em>Dahiyah</em> in Arabic.</p>
<p>The conflict eventually led to a prisoner swap between Israel and Hezbollah, yet it exemplified a new strategy by the Israeli military which became known as the “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/11/10/israel-dahiya-doctrine-disproportionate-strategy-military-gaza-idf/">Dahiyah doctrine</a>”. This held that the disproportionate use of airstrikes for which the destruction of military targets was not the main aim – the goal was to change a population’s hearts and minds.</p>
<p>The doctrine was explained in 2008 by the then-commander of the Israeli army, General Gadi Eizenkot, who told an Israeli newspaper in 2008: “We will wield disproportionate power against every village from which shots are fired on Israel, and cause immense damage and destruction. From our perspective, these are military bases. This isn’t a suggestion. This is a plan that has already been authorised.” </p>
<p>Eizenkot is now a member of Benjamin Netanyahu’s war cabinet. He <a href="https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-777364">has lost</a> both a son and a nephew in the current conflict in Gaza.</p>
<p>To show the axis of resistance that it will stop at nothing to impose its will on Palestine, the Israeli military is <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/israel-hamas-war-dutch-memo-gaza-disproportionate-force-iran-hezbollah/">using “disproportionate force” in Gaza</a> as a key part of its strategy.</p>
<h2>Balance of terror</h2>
<p>The main point of difference between previous clashes between the Israeli military and Hezbollah is that most of the recent battles have taken place inside Israel. It’s a key development. The legacy of the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah has been what has become known as the “<a href="https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/2018-02-07/ty-article-opinion/.premium/israel-and-lebanons-mutually-assured-defeat/0000017f-dbe0-df62-a9ff-dff7e0e70000">balance of terror</a>”.</p>
<p>Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah, has said publicly that had he known what the outcome of the 2006 raid in Israel that captured two Israeli soldiers and led to the second Lebanon war, he would not have approved it. Israel knows, too, that launching a ground war in Lebanon would also be disastrous.</p>
<p>From 2010 until today, clashes between Israel and Hezbollah have mainly been confined to Israel’s military <a href="https://jp.reuters.com/article/us-syria-israel-attack/israel-hits-syria-arms-convoy-to-lebanon-sources-idUSBRE90T0K120130130/">targeting convoys of weaponry</a> sent by Iran and its <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran%E2%80%93Israel_conflict_during_the_Syrian_civil_war">killing of Hezbollah members</a>. </p>
<p>Hezbollah announced in February 2022 that it had acquired the technology to build <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hezbollah-making-drones-can-turn-rockets-into-precision-missiles-nasrallah-2022-02-16/">high-precision guided missiles</a> that reach targets across the whole of Israel and could <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/how-precision-guided-munitions-could-destroy-israels-iron-dome-1833262">pose a threat</a> to its Iron Dome defence system.</p>
<p>Regionally, Hezbollah and Iran’s allies in the axis of resistance have concentrated their attacks on US bases through Iraq, Syria and Yemen. This is a deliberate strategy aimed at putting pressure on Washington to, in turn, pressure Israel to agree to a ceasefire.</p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/nasrallah-hezbollah-leader-gaza-war">speech delivered on November 3</a>, Nasrallah articulated Hezbollah’s strategy. Attacks in northern Israel were aimed at dividing the focus of the Israeli military between defending Israel’s borders and its operation in Gaza. Meanwhile, he said, attacks on US bases in Iraq and Syria would continue. </p>
<p>Nasrallah gave <a href="https://www.moonofalabama.org/2023/11/nasrallahs-second-speech-on-gaza.html">another speech</a> on November 11 calling on Arab nations to put pressure on Washington to end Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories. Meanwhile Hezbollah, with help from allies in Iraq, Iran, Yemen and Syria would continue to launch attacks on Israel.</p>
<p>“We will continue with this,” Nasrallah said. “We will increase the quantity, quality and depths of our operations. The people in Lebanon support the resistance … What happens on the battlefield is more important than words.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216391/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bashir Saade is the author of Hizbullah and the Politics of Remembrance (Cambridge University Press).
</span></em></p>Israel is effectively fighting a war on two fronts.Bashir Saade, Lecturer in Religion & Politics, University of StirlingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2188532023-12-05T16:56:48Z2023-12-05T16:56:48ZWarfare ruins the environment – and not just on the front lines<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563364/original/file-20231204-17-mbv0cy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C486%2C4061%2C2212&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/russian-battle-tank-t72-b3-dramatic-1955971672">RoProy/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>On the morning of December 6 1917, a French cargo ship called SS Mont-Blanc collided with a Norwegian vessel in the harbour of Halifax in Nova Scotia, Canada. The SS Mont-Blanc, which was laden with 3,000 tons of high explosives destined for the battlefields of the first world war, caught fire and <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Halifax-explosion">exploded</a>.</p>
<p>The resulting blast released an amount of energy equivalent to roughly 2.9 kilotons of TNT, destroying a large part of the city. Although it was far from the front lines, this explosion left a lasting imprint on Halifax in a way that many regions experience environmental change as a result of war.</p>
<p>The attention of the media is often drawn to the destructive explosions caused by bombs, drones or missiles. And the devastation we have witnessed in cities like Aleppo, Mosul, Mariupol and now Gaza certainly serve as stark reminders of the horrific impacts of military action.</p>
<p>However, <a href="https://doi.org/10.3390/su14127138">research</a> is increasingly uncovering broader and longer-term consequences of war that extend well beyond the battlefield. Armed conflicts leave a lasting trail of environmental damage, posing challenges for restoration after the hostilities have eased.</p>
<p><strong>Research interest in the environmental impacts of war</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562996/original/file-20231201-18-wniw9e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A figure showing the rising trend of publications on military-caused soil pollution since the 1990s." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562996/original/file-20231201-18-wniw9e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562996/original/file-20231201-18-wniw9e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562996/original/file-20231201-18-wniw9e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562996/original/file-20231201-18-wniw9e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562996/original/file-20231201-18-wniw9e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=621&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562996/original/file-20231201-18-wniw9e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=621&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562996/original/file-20231201-18-wniw9e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=621&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Interest in the topic of military-caused soil pollution increased in the first half of the 2000s.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/14/12/7138#">Stadler et al. (2022)/Sustainability</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Toxic legacies</h2>
<p>Battles and even wars are over relatively quickly, at least compared to the timescales over which environments change. But soils and sediments record their effects over decades and centuries. </p>
<p>In 2022, a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/ejss.13297">study</a> of soil chemistry in northern France showed elevated levels of copper and lead (both toxic at concentrations above trace levels), and other changes in soil structure and composition, more than 100 years after the site was part of the Battle of the Somme. </p>
<p>Research on more recent conflicts has recorded the toxic legacy of intense fighting too. A <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/15569543.2019.1684949">study</a> that was carried out in 2016, three decades after the Iran-Iraq war, found concentrations of toxic elements like chromium, lead and the semi-metal antimony in soils from the battlefields. These concentrations were more than ten times those found in soils behind the front lines. </p>
<p>The deliberate destruction of infrastructure during war can also have enduring consequences. One notable example is the first Gulf War in 1991 when <a href="https://ceobs.org/what-the-environmental-legacy-of-the-gulf-war-should-teach-us/">Iraqi forces</a> blew up more than 700 oil wells in Kuwait. Crude oil spewed into the surrounding environment, while fallout from dispersing smoke plumes created a thick deposit known as “tarcrete” over 1,000 sq km of Kuwait’s deserts.</p>
<p>The impact of the oil fires on the air, soil, water and habitats captured <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/dec/11/the-sound-of-roaring-fires-is-still-in-my-memory-30-years-on-from-kuwaits-oil-blazes">global attention</a>. Now, in the 21st century, wars are <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2022.157932">closely scrutinised</a> in near real-time for environmental harm, as well as the harm inflicted on humans.</p>
<h2>Conflict is a systemic catastrophe</h2>
<p>One outcome of this scrutiny is the realisation that conflict is a catastrophe that affects entire human and ecological systems. Destruction of social and economic infrastructure like water and sanitation, industrial systems, agricultural supply chains and data networks can lead to subtle but devastating indirect environmental impacts. </p>
<p>Since 2011, conflict has marred the north-western regions of Syria. As part of a research project that was led by my Syrian colleagues at <a href="http://shamuniversity.com">Sham University</a>, we conducted soil surveys in the affected areas. </p>
<p>Our <a href="https://doi.org/10.1039/D2VA00333C">findings</a> revealed widespread diffuse soil pollution in agricultural land. This land feeds a population of around 3 million people already experiencing <a href="https://www.wfp.org/countries/syrian-arab-republic">severe food insecurity</a>. </p>
<p>The pollution probably stems from a combination of factors, all arising as a consequence of the regional economic collapse that was caused by the conflict. A lack of fuel to pump wells, combined with destruction of wastewater treatment infrastructure, has led to an increased reliance on <a href="https://www.algherbal.com/archives/5076">streams contaminated by untreated wastewater</a> for irrigating croplands. </p>
<p>Contamination could also stem from the use of low-grade fertilisers, unregulated industrial emissions and the proliferation of <a href="https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2020/04/24/dying-to-keep-warm-oil-trade-and-makeshift-refining-in-north-west-syria/">makeshift oil refineries</a>.</p>
<p>More recently, the current conflict in Ukraine, which prompted international sanctions on Russian grain and fertiliser exports, has <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038%2Fs41598-023-43883-4">disrupted agricultural economies worldwide</a>. This has affected countries including the Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Nigeria and Iran particularly hard. </p>
<p>Many small farmers in these countries may have been forced into selling their livestock and abandoning their land as they struggle to buy the materials they need to feed their animals or grow crops. Land abandonment is an <a href="https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.abm8999">ecologically harmful</a> practice as it can take decades for the vegetation densities and species richness typical of undisturbed ecosystems to recover.</p>
<p>Warfare can clearly become a complicated and entangled “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2023.166131">nexus</a>” problem, the impacts of which are felt far from the war-affected regions.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A field of rapeseed flowers in Ukraine, mimicking the Ukraine flag." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563359/original/file-20231204-27-wopcng.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563359/original/file-20231204-27-wopcng.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563359/original/file-20231204-27-wopcng.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563359/original/file-20231204-27-wopcng.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563359/original/file-20231204-27-wopcng.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563359/original/file-20231204-27-wopcng.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563359/original/file-20231204-27-wopcng.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A field of rapeseed flowers in Ukraine.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/field-colza-rapeseed-yellow-flowers-blue-2131379587">Delpixel/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Conflict, cascades and climate</h2>
<p>Recognising the complex, cascading environmental consequences of war is the first step towards addressing them. Following the first Gulf War, the UN set up a compensation commission and included the environment as one of six compensable harms inflicted on countries and their people. </p>
<p>Jordan was <a href="https://uncc.ch/hashemite-kingdom-jordan">awarded</a> more than US$160 million (£127 million) over a decade to restore the rangelands of its Badia desert. These rangelands had been ecologically ruined by a million refugees and their livestock from Kuwait and Iraq. The Badia is now a <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0140196320302378">case study</a> in sustainable watershed management in arid regions. </p>
<p>In the north-west region of Syria, work is underway to assess farmers’ understanding of soil contamination in areas that have been affected by conflict. This marks the first step in designing farming techniques aimed at minimising <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/whole-syria-cholera-outbreak-situation-report-no-20-issued-23-october-2023">threats to human health</a> and restoring the environment.</p>
<p>Armed conflict has also finally made it onto the climate agenda. The UN’s latest climate summit, <a href="https://www.cop28.com/en/schedule">COP28</a>, includes the first themed day dedicated to “relief, recovery and peace”. The discussion will focus on countries and communities in which the ability to withstand climate change is being hindered by economic or political fragility and conflict.</p>
<p>And as COP28 got underway, the Conflict and Environment Observatory, a UK charity that monitors the environmental consequences of armed conflicts, <a href="https://ceobs.org/what-to-expect-on-militarism-conflict-and-climate-at-cop28/">called for</a> research to account for carbon emissions in regions affected by conflict. </p>
<p>The carbon impact of war is still not counted in the <a href="https://unfccc.int/topics/global-stocktake">global stocktake</a> of carbon emissions – an essential reference for climate action. But far from the sound and fury of the explosions, warfare’s environmental impacts are persistent, pervasive and equally deadly.</p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="Imagine weekly climate newsletter" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><strong><em>Don’t have time to read about climate change as much as you’d like?</em></strong>
<br><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/imagine-57?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Imagine&utm_content=DontHaveTimeTop">Get a weekly roundup in your inbox instead.</a> Every Wednesday, The Conversation’s environment editor writes Imagine, a short email that goes a little deeper into just one climate issue. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/imagine-57?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Imagine&utm_content=DontHaveTimeBottom">Join the 20,000+ readers who’ve subscribed so far.</a></em></p>
<hr><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218853/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jon Bridge works voluntarily with the Council for At-Risk Academics (Cara) to support their Syria Programme, which funded some of the work described in this article.</span></em></p>War is often described as long periods of waiting punctuated by short periods of terror – for the environment, the reverse is true.Jonathan Bridge, Reader / Associate Professor in Environmental Geoscience, Sheffield Hallam UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2166572023-10-30T13:42:31Z2023-10-30T13:42:31ZIsrael-Hamas war: will the US and Iran be drawn into a broader conflict? It’s Tehran’s move<p>Washington has sent a warning to Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, about Iranian anti-US provocation in the Middle East. This has been going on sporadically for years, but from October 17 to October 25 there was an increase, as Iran-backed militias in Syria and Iraq <a href="https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2023/10/24/iranian-backed-militias-in-iraq-and-syria-continue-attacks-on-u-s-troops/">carried out 16 drone and rocket attacks</a> on bases with US personnel. One contractor died of a heart attack, and 21 troops suffered light injuries.</p>
<p>The US warning came in two parts. On October 25, Joe Biden sent a note to Khamenei, which he later <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/biden-sent-message-irans-khamenei-against-targeting-us-troops-white-house-2023-10-26/">summarised for the press</a>: “My warning to the Ayatollah was that if they continued to move against those troops, we will respond, and they should be prepared.” </p>
<p>But on Thursday the militias fired another three volleys at US positions. So that night, US F-16 fighter jets <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-67236438">struck a weapons depot and an ammunition store</a> used by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and the militias, in northeast Syria near the Iraq border. The US defence secretary, Lloyd Austin, emphasised: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>If attacks by Iran’s proxies against US forces continue, we will not hesitate to take further necessary measures to protect our people … We continue to urge all state and non-state entities not to take action that would escalate into a broader regional conflict.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>These US messages were loud and clear. But will Iran heed them? </p>
<h2>‘Axis of Resistance’</h2>
<p>The immediate context for the militia attacks was Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7. Sources differed on whether the Revolutionary Guards or Iran’s leadership – or both – had advance notice of the deadly assault. But <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/10/09/iran-support-hamas-training-weapons-israel/">most analysts agree</a> that Tehran provides funding, weapons, intelligence, and operational and logistical advice to Hamas.</p>
<p>But whether or not they knew Hamas was going to attack, Iranian officials appeared to be taken back by the scale of the killing. They tried to contain the fallout with strident <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-khamenei-says-tehran-was-not-behind-hamas-attack-israel-2023-10-10/">denials of any involvement</a>. Khamenei insisted in a public address on October 10: “Those who say that the recent saga is the work of non-Palestinians have miscalculated.”</p>
<p>But if the Iranian regime gave any indication that it did not fully back the killing, then its proclaimed position as the leader of the “<a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/10/iran-and-the-axis-of-resistance-vastly-improved-hamass-operational-capabilities/">Axis of Resistance</a>” would be shaken. So Tehran stepped up its rhetorical offensive with daily assurances of alliance with Hamas and daily threats against Israel, the US and the west.</p>
<p>In his <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-khamenei-says-tehran-was-not-behind-hamas-attack-israel-2023-10-10/">October 10 address</a>, Khamenei said: “We kiss the hands of those who planned the attack.” Intelligence minister, Esmail Khatib, <a href="https://english.almasirah.net.ye/post/35561/Iran-s-Intelligence-Minister-Harsh%2C-Crushing-Revenge-Awaits-Israel">pledged</a> “a harsh, destructive, mortal and annihilating revenge for the Zionist regime and its advocates”. Foreign minister, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/un-iran-warns-us-will-not-be-spared-if-war-gaza-continues-2023-10-26/">told the UN general assembly</a> on October 26 – after Biden’s message to the supreme leader but before the US strikes in Syria – that America “would not be spared from the fire” if Israel continued attacks on Gaza.</p>
<p>There is no evidence the regime has followed up the rhetoric with planning – for example, through Lebanon’s Hezbollah or the Houthi insurgency in Yemen – for a wider war against Israel or in the region. But the Quds Force, the Revolutionary Guards branch for operations outside Iran, supervises as well as funds and equips the militias in Iraq and Syria. So it is almost certain that Iran’s leaders have authorised the more limited response against US positions.</p>
<h2>Did Khamenei listen?</h2>
<p>A clue to the regime’s response to the US message came in the coverage of the US strikes by Iranian state media. For hours, there was silence across the regime outlets. Finally, the English-language site Press TV <a href="https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2023/10/20/713069/explosions-rock-bases-housing-US-occupation-troops-in-eastern-Syria-near-Baghdad">mentioned the US missiles</a>. However, it did so in an article which gave most of the emphasis to further militia attacks on US positions.</p>
<p>The indications are that the regime – <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/12/irans-raisi-saudi-arabias-mbs-discuss-israel-hamas-war">having been cautioned by Saudi Arabia</a> as well as the US – does not want a regional war. The supreme leader came to power after the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88 in which hundreds of thousands of Iranians – including up to 30,000 executed by Iran’s leaders – perished. He pulled back from war in Afghanistan in 1998 after the Taliban killed ten Iranian diplomats. He shook his fist, including token attacks on bases with US personnel, but avoided a showdown after the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-50979463">US assassinated Iran’s leading commander</a>, Qassem Soleimani, in January 2020.</p>
<p>With Israel now starting a ground offensive into Gaza, Tehran can turn its initial defence over Hamas’s mass murders – “this is the work of Palestinians themselves,” Khamenei said – into political offence, calling for the world to unite against the Israelis.</p>
<p>But the regime will not publicly rule out getting involved in an armed confrontation. On October 15, Amir-Abdollahian announced: “We have conveyed our message to Israel through its allies that if they do not cease their atrocities in Gaza, Iran cannot simply remain an observer.” </p>
<p>Two days later, Khamenei <a href="https://www.stimson.org/2023/decoding-irans-position-on-the-gaza-war/">expanded the point</a>: “If the crimes of the Zionist regime continue, Muslims and resistance forces will become impatient, and no one can stop them.” And so on Sunday, three days after the US strikes, Press TV ran with the headline: Simultaneous Attacks Hit 3 US Bases in Syria.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1718513702784082347"}"></div></p>
<p>The drone and rocket show of the militias, overseen by the Revolutionary Guards, will go on. And from that show may come the regional war that no one wants. If one of the militia assaults causes significant casualties among US personnel, the always-circling cast of hawks in Washington – among activists, lobbyists, and legislators – will demand escalation. That could further unsettle a fractured Syria and a perpetually unstable Iraq. Lebanon’s Hezbollah, settling for skirmishes on Israel’s northern border so far, and its Iranian interlocutors could risk wider attacks. </p>
<p>The Biden administration was at great pains to say that Thursday’s strikes had nothing to do with the Israel-Gaza violence. That, of course, is a facade. While US tensions with Iran are rooted in the soil of post-2003 Iraq and the Assad leadership’s devastation of Syria from 2011, the supreme leader and his allies will seize maximum advantage from deadly Israeli operations in Gaza. </p>
<p>Only a halt to those operations will curb the manoeuvres of Khamenei and his commanders – including the lobbing of rockets at the “US occupation forces”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216657/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Scott Lucas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As Israel prepares for a land invasion of Gaza, tensions are rising in the region between Iran and the US.Scott Lucas, Professor, Clinton Institute, University College DublinLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2131482023-09-25T04:02:27Z2023-09-25T04:02:27ZHow popular music videos drove the fight against the Islamic State<p>Almost a decade ago, the Sunni jihadist network known as the Islamic State (IS) declared the formation of an Islamic Caliphate after they <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fall_of_Mosul">captured the Iraqi city of Mosul in June 2014</a>.</p>
<p>In response, tens of thousands of Shia men joined a complex patchwork of militias to fight against IS. Many of these militias are notoriously violent and directly loyal to Iran’s theocratic state.</p>
<p>But very little is known about how these Shia militias were so quickly and so effectively mobilised. In <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13569775.2023.2196875">our research</a>, we have taken a novel approach, examining the many popular music videos produced by these militias.</p>
<p>These music videos drew on a complex cocktail of historical myths and contemporary clergymen to mobilise Iraq’s Shia population to fight the IS.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/understanding-islamic-state-where-does-it-come-from-and-what-does-it-want-52155">Understanding Islamic State: where does it come from and what does it want?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Foundational myths, historical grievances</h2>
<p>The popular music videos explicitly reference a deeply held set of religious myths and symbols that have informed Shia politics since its inception.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LUUGLiTzUSY">One video</a> shows images of militiamen driving towards the front-lines and firing from a bunker at IS targets. </p>
<p>The singer extols the religious virtues of fighting the IS by comparing those killed today with the Shia martyrs at the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Karbala">Battle of Karbala</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>We fight our enemies. Our martyrs are similar to the martyrs of Karbala. Our people are supporters of Hussein.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The divide between the Sunni and Shia sects dates back to the early years of Islam. </p>
<p>A debate emerged after the Prophet Muhammad’s death about who should lead the Islamic community. The majority accepted the authority of the Prophet’s senior companion, Abu Bakr. A minority, later identified as Shiites, believed only a blood relative of the Prophet – in particular, his cousin Ali – had the right to lead.</p>
<p>In the year 680, the division between the two sects escalated at the Battle of Karbala, where Ali’s son Hussein and many of his followers were defeated and executed by Sunni forces.</p>
<p>The legend of the Battle of Karbala has come to symbolise the historical injustice of the Shia faithful at the hands of the Sunni majority. It is commemorated at the annual <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ashura">Ashura</a> festival in which Shiites reenact the battle, including by self-flagellation. </p>
<p>The emotive lyrics and tone of the song are specifically designed to resonate with this history of suffering. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-the-shia-sunni-divide-78216">What is the Shia-Sunni divide?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>The Shia jihad against the IS</h2>
<p>The popular music videos produced by different Shia militias also draw on fatwas (religious edicts) issued by several prominent Shia clerics in response to the violence of the IS.</p>
<p>In 2014, Iraq’s most senior Shia cleric <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_al-Sistani">Grand Ayatollah Sistani</a> issued a fatwa announcing <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R7by5almGhA">a jihad (holy war) against the IS</a>.</p>
<p>He called for a mass Shia mobilisation, arguing </p>
<blockquote>
<p>It is the legal and national responsibility of whoever can hold a weapon to take up arms to defend the country, the citizens and the holy sites.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Some popular music videos explicitly cite the fatwas of Sistani and other clerics, encouraging their young supporters to heed these calls. <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gpvDC9XTRcU.">A short clip</a> shows armed members of one militia chanting: “Al-Sistani is like a crown on our heads. Your wish is our command.”</p>
<p>One very slickly produced <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q6DMWC93po8">music video</a> refers to both historical grievances over the failure to recognise Ali as the legitimate heir of the Prophet Muhammad and to the centrality of Sistani’s fatwa to their decision to fight the IS:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We are the Turkmen [of Iraq] <br>
We follow Ali’s path <br>
Iraq must live in peace and happiness <br>
When Sistani orders us, we obey. We will defeat and destroy the IS <br>
We believe in the fatwas of our religious authorities, and we defend our holy sites.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>As the singer recites each verse, the footage shows heavily armed Shia men posing in front of a tank. It also features live action footage from various battles against the IS, including advancing on key targets, firing machine guns and heavy artillery. </p>
<h2>Mobilising young men</h2>
<p>These videos serve as a unique archive of the war against the IS, demonstrating the ways in which these militias found novel ways to mobilise young men to fight by drawing on a rich catalogue of Shia religious symbolism as well as the fatwas of clerics like Sistani.</p>
<p>Slick popular music videos draw on a rich catalogue of historical motifs of suffering as well as the contemporary edicts of key clergymen, produced by different Shia militias and shared on YouTube and other social media platforms. </p>
<p>These evocative and poignant songs played an underappreciated and under-examined part in mobilising young men to fight back against the horrors of the IS, indicating the powerful role popular culture plays in contemporary warfare.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-islamic-state-flag-hijacks-muslim-words-of-faith-banning-it-could-cause-confusion-and-unfair-targeting-of-muslims-209042">The Islamic State flag hijacks Muslim words of faith. Banning it could cause confusion and unfair targeting of Muslims</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213148/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Benjamin Isakhan receives funding from the Australian Research Council and the Australian Department of Defence.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ali Akbar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In our new research we examined popular music videos which drew on historical myths and contemporary clergymen to mobilise Iraq’s Shia population to fight the Islamic State.Benjamin Isakhan, Professor of International Politics, Deakin UniversityAli Akbar, Sessional lecturer and researcher, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2105372023-09-05T12:31:07Z2023-09-05T12:31:07ZSaudi reforms are softening Islam’s role, but critics warn the kingdom will still take a hard line against dissent<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545381/original/file-20230829-17-2c62j3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=41%2C8%2C1762%2C1183&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/SaudiArabiaHistoryofSuccession/9eb082a3e58543aea3bc012814e60aad/photo?Query=saudi%20arabia%20mbs&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=25&currentItemNo=3">AP Photo/Pavel Golovkin, pool, File</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The crown prince of Saudi Arabia, Mohammed bin Salman, or “MBS,” is bringing a new vision of a “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-41747476">moderate, balanced”</a> Saudi Islam by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/21/world/middleeast/mohammed-bin-salman-saudi-arabia.html">minimizing the role of Saudi religious institutions</a> once seen as critical to the monarchy. </p>
<p>For decades, Saudi kings provided support to religious scholars and institutions that advocated an austere form of Sunni Islam known as <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-wahhabism-in-saudi-arabia-36693">Wahhabism</a>. The kingdom enforced <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139047586.005">strict codes of morality</a>, placing restrictions on the rights of women and religious minorities, among others. </p>
<p>Under MBS, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-women-drive.html">women have been allowed to drive</a>; <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/11/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-islam-wahhabism-religious-police.html">co-educational classrooms</a>, <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/News/gulf/2017/12/12/Saudis-welcome-decision-to-allow-public-cinemas">movie theaters</a> and <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/30/middleeast/saudi-arabia-biggest-rave-mime-intl/index.html">all-night concerts</a> in the desert – in which men and women dance together – are a new normal. </p>
<p>Scholars <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/experts/1663">Yasmine Farouk</a> and <a href="https://politicalscience.columbian.gwu.edu/nathan-j-brown">Nathan J. Brown</a> call the diminishing role of Wahhabi religious scholars within Saudi domestic and international policy nothing short of a “<a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/06/07/saudi-arabia-s-religious-reforms-are-touching-nothing-but-changing-everything-pub-84650">revolution</a>” in Saudi affairs.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/saudi-crown-prince-lambasts-his-kingdoms-wahhabi-establishment">MBS acknowledges</a> that these reforms risk infuriating certain constituents or could even provoke retaliation. As a scholar who studies <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/and-god-knows-the-martyrs-9780190092153?cc=us&lang=en&">interpretations of Islamic law</a> to justify or contest militancy, I’ve followed these reforms closely.</p>
<p>In the past, Saudis who challenged the authority of Wahhabis have provoked unrest. When King Fahd, who ruled between 1982-2005, rejected the advice of his Wahhabi scholars and allowed the U.S. military to station weapons and female service members on Saudi soil, several of them <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511809439">supported a violent insurrection</a> against him.</p>
<p>MBS <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2022/04/mohammed-bin-salman-saudi-arabia-palace-interview/622822/">seems unconcerned</a> with such challenges. In an interview broadcast widely throughout the kingdom, MBS <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/saudi-crown-prince-lambasts-his-kingdoms-wahhabi-establishment">chastised Wahhabi scholars</a>, accusing some of falsifying Islamic doctrines. He then detained a major Wahhabi scholar <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/25/middleeast/saudi-cleric-sheikh-salman-al-awda-intl/index.html">from whom he once sought counsel</a>, charging him with crimes against the monarchy. MBS <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-41747476#:%7E:text=Prince%20Mohammed%20defended%20the%20reforms,to%20live%20a%20normal%20life.">defended these actions</a>, claiming, “We are returning to what we were before. A country of moderate Islam that is open to all religions, traditions and people around the globe.”</p>
<h2>Negotiating Wahhabism</h2>
<p>This proclaimed return of “moderate Islam” echoes the reforms of MBS’s grandfather, King Abdulaziz, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511993510.008">founder of the modern Saudi kingdom</a>. This vision rejects policies toward Wahhabi Islam favored by his uncles, King Faisal and King Khalid.</p>
<p>Between 1925 and 1932, Abdulaziz suppressed Wahhabi scholars and militants who had demanded that he uphold <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/ebook/9780691241609/wahhabism">their version of “pure Islam”</a> and not open the kingdom to trade and development. He did the opposite and asserted the supremacy of the monarchy.</p>
<p>The booming Saudi oil economy developed by Abdulaziz required his son, King Faisal, who ruled from 1964 to 1975, to <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674049642">reconsider the monarchy’s relationship</a> with Wahhabism. Unlike Abdulaziz, Faisal believed Wahhabis would help him save the kingdom.</p>
<p>Saudis who felt left behind in the emerging Saudi oil economy had found an inspirational symbol of liberation in Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who helped overthrow the Egyptian monarchy in 1952 and implemented plans to redistribute Egyptian wealth.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674049642">Faisal encouraged</a> Wahhabi scholars to work with politically driven Islamists to reject the revolutionary politics of Abdel Nasser’s Egypt and craft a new vision of Islam for Saudi youth.</p>
<p>Faisal permitted Wahhabi scholars to reform Saudi educational institutions with their conservative Islamic curriculum. Abroad, Faisal’s scholars presented Wahhabism as <a href="https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=25998">an authentic Islamic alternative</a> to the Cold War ideologies of the U.S. and USSR. Wealthy Saudis, these Wahhabi scholars argued, had a religious duty to promote Wahhabism across the globe.</p>
<h2>Resisting Wahhabism</h2>
<p>Faisal’s reforms met with success. King Khalid, who followed Faisal, continued to favor Wahhabi scholars, particularly while responding to two major challenges in 1979. </p>
<p>A group of Saudi students, who believed Faisal’s and Khalid’s reforms to be illegitimate, seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Islam’s most sacred site, for two weeks in 1979. An attack on the Grand Mosque was viewed as an attack on the monarchy itself, which claims the mantle of “Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques.”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A black and white photograph showing smoke rising above the minarets of a mosque with other buildings in the background." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545382/original/file-20230829-21-b5h148.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545382/original/file-20230829-21-b5h148.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545382/original/file-20230829-21-b5h148.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545382/original/file-20230829-21-b5h148.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545382/original/file-20230829-21-b5h148.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=463&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545382/original/file-20230829-21-b5h148.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=463&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545382/original/file-20230829-21-b5h148.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=463&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The 1979 seizure of the Grand Mosque.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/picture-dated-november-1979-of-burning-meccas-great-mosque-news-photo/51398174?adppopup=true">AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The seizure came to a violent end with combined action by French and Saudi military forces. Afterward, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2010/jul/25/inside-the-kingdom-robert-lacey-book-review">Khalid agreed</a> to elevate religious officials who affirmed the Islamic credentials of the monarchy.</p>
<p>Also in 1979, other Saudi youth traveled to join the resistance against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. One such Saudi who answered the call that year was Osama bin Laden, who would establish al-Qaida in 1988. </p>
<p>Bin Laden’s and al-Qaida’s grievances against the monarchy emerged following King Fahd’s acceptance of an increased deployment of U.S. soldiers to Saudi soil following Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. <a href="https://www.versobooks.com/products/1952-messages-to-the-world">Bin Ladin proclaimed</a> the presence of American infidels in Saudi Arabia to be a defilement of Islamic holy lands, an “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511809439.003">affront</a>” to Islamic sensibilities, and demanded the destruction of the monarchy. Al-Qaida launched anti-Saudi insurgent campaigns lasting through 2010.</p>
<p>Not all conservative Islamist leaders called for violence. As historian <a href="https://www.lse.ac.uk/middle-east-centre/people/madawi-al-rasheed">Madawi Al-Rasheed</a> notes, many Saudi scholars <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/muted-modernists/">framed themselves as reformers</a> who sought to correct Fahd’s departures from “authentic” Islam and restore Faisal’s vision.</p>
<p>When MBS speaks of a “moderate Islam” he is not just condemning the violence of al-Qaida. He’s abandoning the monarchy’s accommodations of the Wahhabi establishment. He <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/saudi-crown-prince-lambasts-his-kingdoms-wahhabi-establishment">blames some Wahhabi scholars</a> for the violence that the monarchy faced in 1979 and again in the the 1990s and 2000s. </p>
<p>He has worked quickly to erase those accommodations and, like his grandfather, affirm the supremacy of the monarchy.</p>
<h2>A ‘moderate Wahhabism’ for Saudi society?</h2>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545383/original/file-20230829-21-zqby2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man, wearing a headdress, walking past a display sign of 'Vision 2030.'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545383/original/file-20230829-21-zqby2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545383/original/file-20230829-21-zqby2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545383/original/file-20230829-21-zqby2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545383/original/file-20230829-21-zqby2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545383/original/file-20230829-21-zqby2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545383/original/file-20230829-21-zqby2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545383/original/file-20230829-21-zqby2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">‘Saudi Vision 2030’ aims to bring a complete Saudi political, economic, educational and cultural transformation.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Many of these revolutionary changes occurred amid the 2016 unveiling of “Saudi Vision 2030,” a plan for complete Saudi political, economic, educational and cultural transformation. MBS believes that this will meet the demands of Saudis under the age of 30 – who <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/fuller20030601.pdf">number more than 60%</a> of the kingdom’s population.</p>
<p>The religious curriculum shaped by King Faisal is gone, replaced with a “Saudi first” education, which <a href="https://agsiw.org/the-saudi-founding-day-and-the-death-of-wahhabism/">removes Ibn abd al-Wahhab</a>, the founder of Wahhabism, from textbooks and emphasizes Saudi patriotism over a Wahhabi Islamic religious identity. Saudi Arabia <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200125-saudi-arabia-to-stop-funding-mosques-in-foreign-countries/">has announced it will no longer fund</a> mosques and Wahhabi educational institutions in other countries.</p>
<p>Saudi religious police, once tasked with upholding public morality, saw their <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/64501">powers curtailed</a>. They no longer have powers of investigation or arrest. They cannot punish behaviors deemed morally inappropriate.</p>
<p>Critics remain unimpressed, noting that demoting religious officials does not diminish the violence of the Saudi state. Religious police continue their online surveillance of social media. In 2018, Jamal Khashoggi, a Saudi journalist, was killed <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/10/06/read-jamal-khashoggis-columns-for-the-washington-post/">following his calls</a> for a continued voice for Islamist reformers in Saudi Arabia. <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/women-saudi-arabia-make-gains-overall-rights-remain-issue-n838296">Al-Rasheed argues</a> that the images of a new Saudi society conceal suppression of Saudi reformers. Some observers note that a growing Saudi “<a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2022/01/08/many-saudis-are-seething-at-muhammad-bin-salmans-reforms">surveillance state</a>,” with capacities to peek into the private lives of Saudis, underwrites these reforms. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://schar.gmu.edu/profiles/pmandavi">Peter Mandaville</a>, a scholar of international affairs, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/live/BbxJAWvM1tc">observes, the “moderate Islam” offered by MBS is complicated</a>. On the one hand, it characterizes a new tolerant Saudi Arabian Islam. Yet, inside the kingdom, Mandaville argues that the “moderate Islam” of MBS demands that Saudi youth – as good Muslims – will submit to the authority of the monarchy over the kingdom’s affairs.</p>
<p>Some observers believe this might not be enough. <a href="https://www.law.utoronto.ca/faculty-staff/full-time-faculty/mohammad-fadel">Mohammad Fadel</a>, a professor of Islamic legal history, <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/saudi-arabia-mbs-religious-reform-incoherent-modernism">argues that the current configuration of the Saudi monarchy is incompatible</a> with “the kind of independent thought the crown prince is calling for in matters of religion.” Saudi society will flourish, he adds, “when Prince Mohammed recognizes the right of Muslims to rule themselves politically.”</p>
<p>With these reforms to Wahhabism, MBS hopes to secure the loyalty of a generation of young Saudis. As Saudi history would indicate, however, such a bargain requires constant renegotiation and renewal.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210537/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nathan French does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A scholar who has closely followed reforms that MBS has made to Wahhabism, an austere form of Islam, explains the changes taking place in the Saudi kingdom and their impact.Nathan French, Associate Professor of Religion, Miami UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2089602023-07-24T10:34:51Z2023-07-24T10:34:51ZSyria’s attempts to rejoin the international fold are far from convincing – here’s why<p>In the carefully composed photograph released by their state news agencies at the beginning of May, Syria’s leader Bashar al-Assad has his arms outstretched to welcome the Iranian president, Ebrahim Raisi. The two men are beaming.</p>
<p>Raisi’s visit was a sign of Tehran’s essential support for Assad, more than 12 years after the Syrian leader’s bloody repression of a popular uprising that called for reform and guarantees of human rights. The meeting was also an attempt to portray that both leaderships are stable and in control amid Assad’s quest for normalisation and re-entry into the regional community of nations. </p>
<p>But it’s a facade. The template agreements for “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-iran-sign-strategic-cooperation-accord-including-oil-mou-news-agency-2023-05-03/">strategic cooperation</a>” and declaration of Iranian support for Assad via “sovereignty” cannot knit together a Syria that is fractured, perhaps for the long term. They cannot provide relief for Syrians facing inflation and shortages of food, fuel and utilities, let alone the 11 million — almost half of the pre-conflict population — who are <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/740233/major-syrian-refugee-hosting-countries-worldwide/">refugees</a> or <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/06/1138202">internally displaced</a>.</p>
<p>Nor can they sweep aside <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-unions-and-civil-rights-groups-demand-democracy-and-social-justice-201422">ten months of Iran’s nationwide protests</a>, sparked by the death in police custody of <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/mahsa-amini-127580">Mahsa Amini</a> after her detention and reporting beaten for “inappropriate attire”. They cannot end the standoff over <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-iran-nuclear-deal">Tehran’s nuclear programme</a> or lift US and European sanctions. And despite <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/iranian-backed-attacks-on-us-forces-in-syria-caused-23-traumatic-brain-injuries-/7054091.html">Iran-backed attacks</a> on American personnel in the region, they cannot break US support for the Kurdish administration in northeast Syria.</p>
<p>Seven weeks after the Assad-Raisi photo in Damascus, another international meeting in mid-June testified to the illusions of an Iran-Syria “<a href="https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-june-13-2023">Axis of Resistance</a>”.</p>
<p>In Kazakhstan’s capital, the Assad regime was joining the six and a half-year “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/kazakhstan-unexpectedly-proposes-ending-syria-talks-astana-2023-06-21/">Astana process</a>” – the <a href="https://www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=4930&lid=1744">UN-sponsored agreement</a> between Iran, Russia, and Turkey to monitor its 2016 ceasefire for the first time in that part of Syria. This would be a sign of Damascus being actively involved in the supposed resolution of the March 2011 uprising.</p>
<p>But as soon as the session began, illusion met reality. The regime’s deputy foreign minister, Ayman Sousan, demanded Turkey withdraw its forces from opposition territory in northwest Syria. The Turks unsurprisingly refused. They wanted the gathering to put pressure on the Kurdish administration in northeast Syria, which Ankara sees as part of the Turkish Kurdish insurgency PKK.</p>
<p>But that raises the challenge of confronting the US, the backer of the Kurds and the Syrian Democratic Forces, who had helped evict the Islamic State from the country in 2019. Russia, embroiled in Vladimir Putin’s failing invasion of Ukraine, showed no appetite for a showdown with Washington.</p>
<p>So everyone went home with nothing beyond Moscow’s declaration: “This is a very crucial process.”</p>
<h2>Moving pieces</h2>
<p>The two days in Astana highlighted the difficulty for both the Assad regime and Iran. In a Middle East kaleidoscope of many moving pieces, it is daunting for either to line up all of them.</p>
<p>Assad’s headline ploy has been the restoration of relations with Arab states, hoping to break political isolation and his economic bind. There has been success: <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2019/1/8/why-did-the-uae-and-bahrain-re-open-their-embassies-in-syria">UAE and Bahrain reopening embassies</a>; Assad’s visits to the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrias-assad-arrives-uae-official-visit-state-media-2023-03-19/">Emirates</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrias-assad-visits-oman-first-post-earthquake-trip-2023-02-20/">Oman</a>; and <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/syria-and-arab-league">re-entry into the Arab League</a> in May, with Saudi Arabia — once the leading supporter of anti-Assad factions — <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/News/saudi-arabia/2023/05/19/Saudi-Arabia-s-Crown-Prince-meets-Syria-s-al-Assad-in-Jeddah">welcoming Assad to the summit in Jeddah</a>.</p>
<p>However, that process runs head-on into Assad’s reliance on Iran to maintain control over even part of Syria, given the longtime rivalry between Tehran and some Arab states — notably Saudi Arabia — throughout the region.</p>
<h2>An Arabian pipedream?</h2>
<p>The solution to the conundrum is a grand reconciliation, in which Iran would also repair its position in the region. In March, Iran and Saudi Arabia announced the <a href="https://theconversation.com/saudi-iran-deal-wont-bring-peace-to-the-middle-east-but-will-enhance-chinas-role-as-power-broker-201692">resumption of diplomatic ties</a> more than seven years after they were broken. </p>
<p>The China-brokered deal was accompanied by a high-level Iranian visit to the UAE. Tehran spoke loudly about the prospect of billions of dollars of Gulf investments in its battered economy.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/saudi-iran-deal-wont-bring-peace-to-the-middle-east-but-will-enhance-chinas-role-as-power-broker-201692">Saudi-Iran deal won't bring peace to the Middle East but will enhance China's role as power broker</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The manoeuvres freed the Iranian leadership from an immediate crisis. Amid the nationwide protests, its currency had almost halved in value, sinking to 600,000:1 against the US dollar. The easing of tensions with the Arab states, as well as talk of an “interim deal” with the US over the nuclear programme, helped lift the rial to 500,000:1, relieving pressure on an official inflation rate of 50%, with increases for food about 75% per year.</p>
<p>But this is a tentative respite. Saudi Arabia and Iran remain on opposite sides in the Yemen civil war. They back different factions in Lebanon’s long-running political and economic turmoil. Gulf States are wary about the renewal of Iran-backed attacks on Iraqi bases which host US personnel, as well as any further moves by Tehran towards the capacity for a nuclear weapon.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/east-mediterranean-mena/syria/normalising-relations-syria-how-significant">International Crisis Group</a> has highlighted the unending instability in the Assad-held part of Syria. No Gulf country is likely to want to spend significant sums in support of his regime. Syria is far from their top priority, and it offers poor returns on investment. They cannot realistically hope to compete with the influence that Tehran has built through years of military engagement. </p>
<p>Western sanctions limit potential economic gains – and <a href="https://www.state.gov/syria-sanctions/">US sanctions in particular</a> impose major legal barriers and political costs. Also, investing large amounts in Syria with a devastated infrastructure, an impoverished population with little purchasing power, a predatory regime and dismal security in the areas it nominally controls would be like pouring money into a bottomless pit. </p>
<p>Assad can still pose before the cameras to claim legitimacy. But his Iranian backers are entangled in domestic difficulties, his Russian backers are being sapped of strength by Putin’s deadly folly in Ukraine, and his would-be Arab escape route is far from assured.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208960/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Scott Lucas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Despite initiatives which appear to be normalising Suria’s relations with Arab states, Damascus remains isolated and insecure.Scott Lucas, Professor, Clinton Institute, University College DublinLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2093102023-07-14T12:48:37Z2023-07-14T12:48:37ZIs the US being hypocritical in taking years to destroy its chemical weapons, while condemning other nations for their own chemical weapons programs? A political philosopher weighs in<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536842/original/file-20230711-25-mdhw2x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=92%2C25%2C5481%2C3699&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Technicians working to destroy the United States' chemical weapons stockpile at the U.S. Army Pueblo Chemical Depot on June 8, 2023, in Pueblo, Colo. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/ChemicalWeapons/8d1fbfd1fe5141e3b9be5758135070c6/photo?Query=chemical%20weapons&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=2756&currentItemNo=2">AAP Photo/David Zalubowski</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The United States has finished destroying the last of its stock of <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/antoniopequenoiv/2023/07/07/us-destroys-last-of-chemical-weapons-a-mandated-act-decades-in-the-making/?sh=5f46dcba4839">chemical weapons</a>, marking the end of a 26-year period during which it frequently <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/03/24/us-decries-iraqi-use-of-chemical-weapons/4421ebe8-df59-477d-882b-7d381f3a1868/">condemned other states</a> for maintaining and using chemical weapons while continuing to keep a stockpile of such weapons for itself. </p>
<p>The use of chemical weapons on the battlefield has been <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Chemical-Weapons-Frequently-Asked-Questions#IV">illegal since 1925</a>, and the United States in 1997 ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention, which committed it to destroying its <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/cwcsig">existing chemical weapons</a>. </p>
<p>This delay reflects, in part, the sheer difficulty of destroying <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3453616/dod-destroys-last-chemical-weapons-in-arsenal/">chemical weapons safely</a>. Nonetheless, some commentators have also thought the U.S. displayed <a href="https://truthout.org/articles/history-shows-hypocrisy-of-us-outrage-over-chemical-weapons-in-syria/">hypocrisy</a> for loudly condemning other states for their chemical weapons programs while <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15276.doc.htm">maintaining supplies</a> of such weapons itself. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://phil.washington.edu/people/michael-blake">political philosopher</a>, I am interested in the ways in which moral ideas such as hypocrisy can be applied to international politics. The idea of hypocrisy is a complex one, and it is not easy to understand what exactly follows, morally speaking, when one is accused of being a hypocrite. </p>
<h2>Political hypocrisy</h2>
<p>The first thing to note here is that hypocrisy generally involves conflict between what someone does and what someone says. And as philosopher <a href="https://www.stonybrook.edu/commcms/philosophy/people/_faculty/kittay.php">Eva Feder Kittay</a> notes, that does not generally mean that the hypocrite’s words <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24435495">are false</a>. Sometimes “do as I say and not as I do” is good moral advice. In other words, if a politician praises honesty while practicing deceit, honesty still constitutes the morally superior choice. </p>
<p>Political theorist <a href="https://www.thecrimson.com/article/1992/9/18/judith-shklar-professor-and-noted-theorist/">Judith Shklar</a> similarly noticed this truth about hypocrisy. She asserted that the disdain we feel for a hypocrite is not because her moral statements about others are wrong, but because the hypocrite is <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674641761">too weak to live up to what she may require of others</a>. </p>
<p>This may help us understand why we tend to think the hypocrite is morally inadequate. The one who condemns others without living up to the morality that grounds such condemnation seems not to be taking morality itself all that seriously. </p>
<p>That, in turn, suggests that the hypocrite does not offer moral condemnation as sincere moral advice. Like the deceitful politician praising honesty, the hypocrite instead uses moral language for the purpose of self-interest – to score political points, or to demonstrate dominance over someone else. </p>
<p>Critics of American foreign policy have often described the U.S. as hypocritical in just this way. Singaporean diplomat and author Kishore Mahbubani has argued that the <a href="https://mahbubani.net/can-asians-think/">U.S. is too often willing to condemn the human rights abuses of its adversaries</a> while ignoring those of its allies, and indeed its own practices – including decisions about when and how to use <a href="https://www.americamagazine.org/politics-society/2016/10/12/how-us-violates-international-law-plain-sight">military force</a>, as in the invasion of Iraq – that seemingly contravene international law. This suggests, he argued, that the U.S. does not always care about human rights in themselves and too often uses them as a tool for self-interested politics. </p>
<p>And some Middle Eastern commentators have noted that the United States condemns the use of chemical weapons by hostile nations while ignoring, or assisting, the use of chemical weapons by allies. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536843/original/file-20230711-2328-vrtbyn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Police officers and others stand in front of tall buildings that appear to be damaged." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536843/original/file-20230711-2328-vrtbyn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536843/original/file-20230711-2328-vrtbyn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536843/original/file-20230711-2328-vrtbyn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536843/original/file-20230711-2328-vrtbyn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536843/original/file-20230711-2328-vrtbyn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536843/original/file-20230711-2328-vrtbyn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536843/original/file-20230711-2328-vrtbyn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Damaged buildings in the town of Douma, the site of a suspected chemical weapons attack, near Damascus, Syria, in April 2018.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/Syria/139a58728d5545d1a9683b02f12a8743/photo?Query=chemical%20weapons%20syria%20civilians&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=149&currentItemNo=2">AP Photo/Hassan Ammar</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Iranian foreign minister <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/chemical-weapons-and-claims-of-hypocrisy-irans-facebook-foreign-minister-tackles-syria/">Mohammad Javad Zarif</a>, for instance, noted in 2013 the irony that the U.S. condemned the use of chemical weapons by Syrian leader Bashar Assad against civilians while refusing to issue sanctions on the use of such weapons by Saddam Hussein to kill nearly 5,000 of his own citizens in the 1988 Halabja massacre. The reasoning for this silence was purely political, argued Zarif: At the time, Saddam was viewed as a staunch U.S. ally and a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/education/2003/jun/29/highereducation.news">necessary counter</a> to regional Iranian influence. </p>
<p>An investigation later revealed through CIA documents and interviews with former officials that the U.S. had provided Iraq with intelligence it knew would result in in a chemical weapons attack <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/26/exclusive-cia-files-prove-america-helped-saddam-as-he-gassed-iran/">against its own citizens</a>. Those <a href="https://irp.fas.org/congress/2002_cr/s092002.html">weapons</a> were partly derived from thiodiglycol, a chemical manufactured in the U.S. and imported from <a href="https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/npr/81ali.pdf">an American firm</a>. </p>
<p>After the relationship with Iraq soured, then-U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld acknowledged to Congress that he was seeking to find a legal way to permit the use of “<a href="https://www.military.com/defensetech/2003/02/06/rumsfeld-wants-ok-for-u-s-chemical-strikes">non-lethal” chemical weapons</a> as part of the invasion of Iraq.</p>
<p>These weapons are explicitly banned by the Chemical Weapons Convention as tools of war and are often more destructive than the term would imply: Russia’s use of nonlethal sleeping gas in response to a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-20067384">hostage-taking in Chechnya</a> left 130 hostages dead in 2002. The willingness to use chemical weapons during that invasion sits uneasily with the fact that the invasion was justified, in part, on the basis that Iraq itself <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/iraq-justifying-war">maintained a stock of chemical weapons</a>.</p>
<h2>Maintaining moral authority</h2>
<p>Coming back to today, the destruction by the U.S. of its chemical weapons supplies will, at the very least, remove some of the perception that the United States has been hypocritical in its attitudes toward such weapons. </p>
<p>From my perspective, as regards those weapons, their destruction is not sufficient to fully ensure American moral authority. The U.S. might be rightly accused of hypocrisy until it consistently condemns their use by anyone – ally or adversary. </p>
<p>The accusation of hypocrisy doesn’t change the fact that countries shouldn’t use chemical weapons. The American condemnation, even if hypocritical, is still valuable.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209310/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Blake receives funding from the National Endowment for the Humanities.</span></em></p>When it comes to chemical weapons, American condemnation, even if hypocritical, is still valuable.Michael Blake, Professor of Philosophy, Public Policy and Governance, University of WashingtonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2077862023-07-09T12:02:11Z2023-07-09T12:02:11ZU.S. allies should rethink their allegiance to an aggressive but declining superpower<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/535647/original/file-20230704-17-a7zax4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C6000%2C3458&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A U.S. artillery rocket system fires a missile during annual combat drills between the Philippine Marine Corps and U.S. Marine Corps in the northern Philippines in October 2022 in a region where the United States says it wants to deter China.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Aaron Favila)</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/us-allies-should-rethink-their-allegiance-to-an-aggressive-but-declining-superpower" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>In its pursuit of permanent global domination, the United States has pushed the world towards unnecessary conflict, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/1/the-us-war-on-terror-20-years-after-mission-accomplished">especially via its two-decade “war on terror.</a>”</p>
<p>American allies could dissuade the U.S. from its tendency to take a dangerous and divisive path, but their own weaknesses and commitment to the status quo are making them complicit.</p>
<p>According to the Watson Institute at Brown University, the conflicts connected to the war on terror have killed <a href="https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/figures">about 4.6 million people</a> since 2001. About a million have died in direct violence but the others — disproportionately women and children — have been casualties of political, economic and social instability in numerous countries that have been the target of the war on terror.</p>
<p>That conflict defines 21st century world politics, far more than the war in Ukraine. It was driven by former U.S. president <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/behind-the-iraq-war-a-story-of-influence-intelligence-and-presidential-power/2020/08/20/23b610ba-cab3-11ea-91f1-28aca4d833a0_story.html">George W. Bush’s messianic impulses</a> and <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/iraq-war-2003-bush-neoconservative-failure-civilian-deaths-islamist-insurgencies/">neoconservative ideologues</a> <a href="https://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/handle/10161/9249">who aspired to reshape the Middle East</a> in the American image using military force.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/11/us/threats-responses-vote-congress-authorizes-bush-use-force-against-iraq-creating.html">U.S. Congress voted overwhelmingly</a> to support the Bush wars. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/mar/19/2003-iraq-invasion-legacy-west-international-law-ukraine">The war in Iraq</a>, an unprovoked and illegal invasion of a sovereign state, demonstrated the danger of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/5/1/ukraine-war-did-putin-learn-from-bushs-iraq-horrors">unchecked American power and hubris</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A grey-haired man stands a podium with the U.S. presidential insignia. Behind him a sign reads Mission Accomplished." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/535617/original/file-20230704-29-gwwpyo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/535617/original/file-20230704-29-gwwpyo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535617/original/file-20230704-29-gwwpyo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535617/original/file-20230704-29-gwwpyo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535617/original/file-20230704-29-gwwpyo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535617/original/file-20230704-29-gwwpyo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535617/original/file-20230704-29-gwwpyo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In this May 2003 photo, President George W. Bush declares the end of major combat in Iraq as he speaks aboard the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln off the California coast. The war dragged on for many years after that.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/J. Scott Applewhite)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Ignoring international law</h2>
<p>The Watson Institute report explains why states targeted by the U.S. have reasons to fear American violence and interference. International law doesn’t necessarily constrain the U.S. — it’s often willing to abuse its power and privileges for political, economic and strategic advantage.</p>
<p>This reality <a href="https://thearabweekly.com/how-russia-war-ukraine-echoes-precedent-set-us-iraq">partly explains Russia’s reaction to the expansion of NATO</a> and its invasion of Ukraine. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/3-nato-gambles-that-have-played-a-big-role-in-the-horrors-of-war-in-ukraine-178815">3 NATO gambles that have played a big role in the horrors of war in Ukraine</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Concerns about U.S. overreach also influences China’s policies in the South China Sea, as <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2013/02/12/stranglehold-context-conduct-and-consequences-of-american-naval-blockade-of-china-pub-51135">the Chinese worry about being economically strangled by an American naval blockade</a>.</p>
<p>China has done little to the U.S. <a href="https://canadiandimension.com/articles/view/pentagon-study-declares-american-empire-is-collapsing">except to grow to an economic size and a level of technological innovation that challenges American global domination</a>. </p>
<p>In response, the U.S. is <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/09/16/u.s.-china-trade-war-has-become-cold-war-pub-85352">attacking China’s economic</a> <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/19/demarais-backfire-sanctions-us-china-technology-war-semiconductors-export-controls-biden/">and technological</a> development. It is <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/quad-indo-pacific-what-know">creating economic</a> and <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/aukus-explained-how-will-trilateral-pact-shape-indo-pacific-security">military alliances</a> against China. </p>
<p>American leaders apparently believe a country four times the population of the U.S. must remain forever subordinate to American power.</p>
<p>It’s true that China has threatened Taiwan and behaved aggressively in the South China Sea. Even so, compared to the U.S., Chinese foreign policy has been restrained.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nancy-pelosis-visit-to-taiwan-causes-an-ongoing-chinese-tantrum-in-the-taiwan-strait-188205">Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan causes an ongoing Chinese tantrum in the Taiwan Strait</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Much of the world has refused to back western sanctions against Russia because, in part, <a href="https://quincyinst.org/2022/04/11/why-non-western-countries-tend-to-see-russias-war-very-very-differently/">the West’s hypocrisy around issues of global violence and interference has undermined western credibility</a>. </p>
<p>Instead, many countries are <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2023/02/in-face-of-us-china-rivalry-non-alignment-is-back/">pursuing “non-alignment”</a> — choosing to avoid getting caught in the middle of any future battles between the U.S. and China.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A short dark-haired woman shakes hands with a man in a dark suit and glasses." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/535620/original/file-20230704-21-ty8118.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/535620/original/file-20230704-21-ty8118.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535620/original/file-20230704-21-ty8118.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535620/original/file-20230704-21-ty8118.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535620/original/file-20230704-21-ty8118.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=523&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535620/original/file-20230704-21-ty8118.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=523&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535620/original/file-20230704-21-ty8118.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=523&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi, right, shakes hands with her Chinese counterpart Qin Gang during a meeting in Jakarta, Indonesia, in February 2023. Indonesia was among states that refused to back western efforts to suspend Russia from the UN Human Rights Council.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Adek Berry/Pool Photo via AP)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Rallying allies</h2>
<p>Nonetheless, the U.S. has rallied its established allies against China. Canada has become an <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2023/03/biden-visit-makes-it-official-canada-is-a-us-vassal-state/">American vassal</a>, meaning it’s essentially dominated by the U.S. <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/12/23/japan-unveils-record-defence-budget-amid-regional-security-fears">Japan has increased its military spending</a>. The European Union <a href="https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/europe-takes-tougher-stance-toward-china-in-boost-to-us-policy-1.1913902">has taken a harder line on economic and technological engagement with China</a>.</p>
<p>There are <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2023/06/the-g7-anti-china-facade-shows-cracks-in-europe/">some indications</a> that <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/france-in-favor-of-status-quo-about-taiwan-being-us-ally-doesnt-mean-being-vassal-french-president/2870526">France</a> and Germany recognize <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2023/06/decoupling-not-on-europes-agenda-li-visit-shows/">their interests may not align with those of the U.S.</a>, but they have not confronted American officials on these issues.</p>
<p>Why do American allies refuse to discuss U.S. global violence, despite its horrific consequences and the fact that it clearly affects the world view of America’s rivals and the non-western world?</p>
<p>Why are they so tolerant of American militarism — often even <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/02/european-complicity-in-cia-torture-in-black-sites/">complicit in it</a> — while condemning the militarism of others? </p>
<p>It’s likely because American allies have <a href="https://canadiandimension.com/articles/view/pentagon-study-declares-american-empire-is-collapsing">benefited enormously from the U.S.-backed status quo</a>, even if they’ve had to deal with the fallout of western militarism — particularly in Europe, where <a href="https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/europe/">the influx of refugees</a> has coarsened regional politics. </p>
<p>They’re accustomed to following the U.S. Many have willingly <a href="https://rabble.ca/politics/canadian-politics/freelands-speech-signals-a-dangerous-turn-in-canadian-foreign-policy/">accepted, parroted and even amplified American propaganda</a>.</p>
<h2>Politics of fear</h2>
<p>This attitude is understandable for narrowly self-interested, amoral states, but it’s short-sighted. </p>
<p>American allies are wilfully ignoring the extent of the <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/trump-americas-coming-age-instability">profound social, political and economic divisions</a> within the U.S. and their implications for reliable and coherent American leadership and policy. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/canada-should-be-preparing-for-the-end-of-american-democracy-176930">Canada should be preparing for the end of American democracy</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/01/us/politics/richard-haass-biden-trump-foreign-policy.html">Domestic political instability</a> in the U.S. may eventually motivate even more aggressive American foreign policy. The U.S. has never shied away from the <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-united-states-independence-day-fear/">politics of fear</a> and the <a href="https://canadiandimension.com/articles/view/the-united-states-specializes-in-exaggerating-the-threat">exaggeration of threat</a>. Its escalating demonization and provocation of China is especially dangerous.</p>
<p>China is a country of 1.4 billion people with an ancient culture and a massive economy. It cannot be locked in a box, as the U.S. is trying to do, without consequences.</p>
<p><a href="https://doi-org.proxy.hil.unb.ca/10.1093/cjip/pov001">China gains a great deal from the current international system</a>. It has reasons to support much of the existing economic order. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Construction workers at a construction site with a green sign with Chinese characters in front of them." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/535626/original/file-20230704-24595-mniw5c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/535626/original/file-20230704-24595-mniw5c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535626/original/file-20230704-24595-mniw5c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535626/original/file-20230704-24595-mniw5c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535626/original/file-20230704-24595-mniw5c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535626/original/file-20230704-24595-mniw5c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535626/original/file-20230704-24595-mniw5c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Construction workers work at a site in the central business district in Beijing in June 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Mark Schiefelbein)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Accommodating China will require adjustments on the part of status quo states. That means abandoning the <a href="https://peacediplomacy.org/2020/09/09/why-the-blob-needs-an-enemy/">world view that so many western democracies</a> have embraced as part of western triumphalism since the end of the Cold War.</p>
<p>Is preserving the privileged global position of the U.S. really so important to the rest of the world? Is maintaining such an imbalanced world order possible or, given its results, truly desirable? </p>
<p>U.S. allies need to learn the lessons of the war on terror and the 4.6 million people it’s killed. A leader needs followers. American allies could make their support of the U.S. conditional on a pledge to ease up on militarism and focus on greater global co-operation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207786/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shaun Narine does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Why have U.S. allies refused to grapple with American global violence, despite its horrific consequences and the fact that it clearly affects how the non-western world responds to the country?Shaun Narine, Professor of International Relations and Political Science, St. Thomas University (Canada)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2077252023-06-19T20:00:58Z2023-06-19T20:00:58ZMosul faced mass heritage destruction by the Islamic State. We asked residents what they thought about rebuilding<p>After the Islamic State captured the northern Iraqi city of Mosul <a href="https://time.com/isis-mosul/">in mid-2014</a>, they unleashed a wave of devastating human suffering and unprecedented heritage destruction.</p>
<p>The Islamic State <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/05/29/the-islamic-states-threat-to-cultural-heritage/">targeted</a> many of Mosul’s most sensitive and important cultural heritage sites.</p>
<p>Most notoriously, in 2015 the Islamic State released a number of propaganda videos in which they had filmed themselves using sledgehammers to topple and destroy statues <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-middle-east-39470521">at the Mosul Museum</a>, and using power tools to deface giant reliefs at the ancient archaeological site of Nineveh. </p>
<p>In response to such mass heritage destruction, the international community has launched <a href="https://www.unesco.org/en/revive-mosul">various initiatives</a> worth millions of dollars to reconstruct the heritage sites of the city.</p>
<p>However, very little is known about whether or not the people of Mosul support such initiatives.</p>
<p>To find out, <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00108367231177796">we conducted a survey</a> of 1,600 people from across Mosul. Here are four of the more significant findings. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/isis-is-destroying-ancient-artefacts-to-send-a-message-of-intent-38235">ISIS is destroying ancient artefacts to send a message of intent</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>1. Heritage is not a priority</h2>
<p>We wanted to gauge whether or not heritage reconstruction was a priority for the people of Mosul, given other urgent needs following years of dictatorship, war and Islamic State control.</p>
<p>We presented respondents with a list of ten options, and asked: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>If you had to choose just three, which of the following do you think are the most urgent priorities for the future of Iraq?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The top answers were “safety and security” (61%), “unemployment and poverty” (54%), “education and schools” (52%) and “hospitals, health and sanitation” (49%).</p>
<p>Only 16% of respondents listed “heritage protection and reconstruction” in their top three urgent priorities.</p>
<h2>2. But people still believe heritage sites should be reconstructed</h2>
<p>We also wanted to gauge respondents’ overall attitude to heritage reconstruction efforts in Mosul.</p>
<p>We asked whether they agreed with the statement: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Heritage sites that were damaged or destroyed during recent conflicts should be restored or reconstructed.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The overwhelming majority (98%) of respondents agreed with the statement.</p>
<p>So, while very few respondents considered heritage reconstruction to be among the most urgent priorities facing Iraq, assuming it would continue regardless of their preferences, it had broad support from the people of Mosul.</p>
<h2>3. Restoration should prioritise modernising buildings</h2>
<p>We also wanted to know what form they would like restoration to take.</p>
<p>We provided respondents with a list of six possible answers, and asked: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>What would you prefer to see happen to the heritage sites that have been damaged or destroyed during the recent conflicts?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>None of those surveyed wanted to see damaged or destroyed heritage sites left in ruins. Only 4% wanted them developed into entirely new structures.</p>
<p>Instead, the vast majority (96%) wanted to see buildings restored and reconstructed, with the largest number of respondents (48%) indicating they would like to see the sites “restored and reconstructed into a new and more modern structure”.</p>
<p>The people of Mosul prefer damaged structures to be transformed into new and more usable buildings for the community over projects that aim to match historical or pre-war conditions.</p>
<p>This finding has implications for foreign heritage actors as they undertake reconstruction works in Mosul. It points to a long-standing dichotomy in heritage practice between UNESCO’s stated preference to preserve the “authenticity” of heritage sites and developing something meaningful and useful for a living community.</p>
<h2>4. Iraqis think rebuilding should be Iraqi-lead</h2>
<p>Finally, we sought to understand respondents’ views on who had done the most to restore heritage sites to date and who they would like to see leading such works in the future.</p>
<p>We asked two key questions:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Which actor do you think has done the most to restore or reconstruct heritage sites across Iraq?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>And:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>If you had to choose just one, who would you most like to see being entrusted with any restoration or reconstruction work at heritage sites?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>After each question, we presented respondents with a list of 14 actors, from the Iraqi government to foreign states and multilateral institutions.</p>
<p>For the question concerning who respondents understood to have done the most reconstruction work, 17% identified global agencies such as UNESCO, 13% chose the Iraqi government and 8% identified the Gulf States. Only 2% saw Western governments as having done the most to restore heritage sites across Iraq.</p>
<p>This contrasts sharply with results from the second question on which agencies locals would most like to see leading the reconstruction efforts. </p>
<p>Most respondents named the Iraqi government (48%), with only 8% support for UNESCO, 6% for the involvement of the Gulf States, and just 2% for Western governments to lead restoration projects.</p>
<p>Despite an acknowledgement that multilateral actors like UNESCO have led much of the reconstruction to date, people expressed a clear preference for the Iraqi government to be entrusted with heritage projects into the future.</p>
<p>To harness local support for the rebuilding effort, international actors must make every effort to work closely with local partners and communities in Mosul to ensure their endeavours are embedded within broader security, developmental and infrastructure investment.</p>
<p>For Iraqis themselves to embrace ongoing efforts to reconstruct Mosul’s heritage, foreign actors will need to foster an authentic grass-roots process where Iraqis take ultimate responsibility for the reconstruction of their heritage.</p>
<p>Taken together, our findings demonstrate engaging with local opinion on heritage is perhaps the only way efforts to restore heritage can have a meaningful long-term impact on the prospects of peace in complex environments like Mosul.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/iraq-war-20-years-on-how-the-world-failed-iraq-and-created-a-less-peaceful-democratic-and-prosperous-state-200075">Iraq war, 20 years on: how the world failed Iraq and created a less peaceful, democratic and prosperous state</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207725/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Benjamin Isakhan has received funding from the Australian Department of Defence and the Australian Research Council.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lynn Meskell has received funding from the Australian Research Council.</span></em></p>In a survey of 1,600 people from across Mosul, we asked what they thought of the millions of dollars being spent to reconstruct the heritage sites of the city.Benjamin Isakhan, Professor of International Politics, Deakin UniversityLynn Meskell, PIK Professor of Anthropology; Professor of Historic Preservation, Weitzman School of Design, Penn Museum, University of PennsylvaniaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2075912023-06-13T12:56:21Z2023-06-13T12:56:21ZSilvio Berlusconi had a complex relationship with US presidents: Friend to one, shunned by another<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531504/original/file-20230613-15-3b421j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C122%2C2048%2C1321&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Things looking up for the Bush-Berlusconi relationship.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-george-w-bush-and-italian-prime-minister-silvio-news-photo/119806434?adppopup=true">Philippe Desmazes/AFP via Getty Images)</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When the administration of Geroge W. Bush needed an ally to help sell its <a href="https://www.cfr.org/timeline/iraq-war">proposed invasion of Iraq</a> to a <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-crisis-in-the-alliance/">skeptical European audience</a>, Silvio Berlusconi stepped forward.</p>
<p>It wasn’t that the Italian prime minister was particularly concerned over the threat of Saddam Hussein’s <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna7634313">imagined</a> <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-crisis-in-the-alliance/">weapons of mass destruction</a> to his country, or the region – <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/oct/31/italy.usa">he wasn’t</a>. But it was a chance for the former businessman to burnish his credentials as an international statesman and to draw the U.S. closer into Italy’s orbit.</p>
<p>Indeed, strengthening U.S.-Italian relations was the key driver of Berlusconi’s foreign policy, as <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=BEzB1hYAAAAJ&hl=en">I learned</a> while interviewing Berlusconi government officials for my 2011 book “<a href="https://www.amazon.com/Americas-Allies-War-Kosovo-Afghanistan/dp/0230614825">America’s Allies and War</a>.” The fact that Berlusconi couldn’t repeat the trick some years later when Barack Obama came to power was in large part entirely of his own making – he reportedly never recovered in the eyes of Obama from <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/nov/06/italy-barackobama">comments widely seen as racist</a>. Eventually, Berlusconi would again fall in line with Washington’s interventionist foreign policy – <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/04/12/everyone-says-the-libya-intervention-was-a-failure-theyre-wrong/">this time in Libya</a> – but by then the damage had been done. Fair to say, the legacy in regards to U.S.-Italian relationship left by Berlusconi – who <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/former-italian-pm-silvio-berlusconi-has-died-italian-media-2023-06-12/">died on June 12, 2023,</a> at 86 – is mixed, a tale of two halves.</p>
<h2>A friend in need</h2>
<p>Italy never had the “<a href="https://www.georgewbushlibrary.gov/research/topic-guides/us-uk-special-relationship">special relationship</a>” that the U.K still claims to possess in regards to Washington. Nor did it have the clout of post-war France and Germany, whose economies were more central to the well-being of the European Union. Moreover, Italy’s political instability – it is currently on its <a href="https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/10/21/italy-is-set-for-its-68th-government-in-76-years-why-such-a-high-turnover">69th goverment since 1945</a> at a rate of one every 13 months or so – makes it more difficult to establish lasting bilateral political relationships.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, by the time Berlusconi came to power for a second time in 2001 – following a one-year stint as prime minister between 1994 and 1995 – Italy had gone some way to ingratiating itself with successive U.S. administrations. In 1990, Italy <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-64980565">supported President George H.W. Bush’s military operation</a> in the Persian Gulf, joining a coalition of 39 countries opposing Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait and sending fighter jets to support the subsequent aerial bombing campaign.</p>
<p>Then in 1999, Italian jets participated in airstrikes and Italian bases served as the main launching site for U.S. and NATO jets during the alliance’s <a href="https://www.nato.int/kosovo/">military operations in Kosovo</a>.</p>
<p>But the war in Iraq was different. By fall of 2002, George W. Bush had <a href="https://www.politico.com/story/2018/09/04/this-day-in-politics-sept-4-2002-805725">made it clear</a> that he intended to invade. But by then, the U.S. had lost some of the near-unanimous international support that it was afforded after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. </p>
<p>Europe was divided. The public was <a href="https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/185298">very much against invasion</a>. But governments had to weigh political consequences at home, with the benefits of supporting the world’s largest economy.</p>
<p>Outside of the U.K, Berlusconi was Bush’s biggest European ally. Shrugging off <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/10/world/threats-and-responses-italy-florence-wary-as-opponents-of-war-stage-a-huge-march.html">massive street protests in Italian cities</a>, the opposition of many within the Italian parliament and public opinion that put support for the invasion <a href="https://www.gla.ac.uk/media/Media_140583_smxx.pdf">as low as 22%</a>, Berlusconi went to bat for Bush’s war. </p>
<p>Unlike the U.K. – and to a lesser extent Australia and Poland – Italy did not directly participate in the invasion itself. But by April of 2003, Italy agreed to <a href="https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/italy-and-the-new-iraq-the-many-dimensions-of-a-successful-partnership-121530">send a contingent of 3,000 troops</a> to help stabilize Iraq. Explaining his rationale to the New York Times in 2003, Berlusconi <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/05/world/berlusconi-urges-support-for-us-on-iraq.html">said it was “absolutely unthinkable</a>” to decline Bush’s request for an Italian military presence given how the U.S. had come to Europe’s aid after World War II.</p>
<p>Even sending that peace mission was controversial in Italy, especially after 17 Italian soldiers <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/12/international/middleeast/at-least-26-killed-in-a-bombing-of-an-italian.html">were killed in a November 2003 attack</a>. in Iraq. Indeed, with elections around the corner, in 2005 Berlosconi announced <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna7337476">Italian troops would withdraw</a> from the war-torn country.</p>
<h2>Surplus to US requirements</h2>
<p>Sticking his neck out for Bush’s war won Berlusconi friends in Washington. During the Bush’s administration, the Italian prime minister <a href="https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/visits/italy">visited the U.S. on 11 occasions</a> and was invited to <a href="https://www.upi.com/News_Photos/view/upi/4da5ea3a0de9b336906cb83e3c71663a/ITALIAN-PRIME-MINISTER-BERLUSCONI-ADDRESSES-JOINT-SESSION-OF-CONGRESS/">address both houses of Congress</a> – a rarity for overseas leaders.</p>
<p>The deployment of Italian troops both in Iraq and also Afghanistan – where some 4,000 Italians were sent <a href="https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2021/Davidson_AlliesCostsofWar_Final.pdf">and 48 died</a> – helped stabilize the U.S.-Italian ties.</p>
<p>It wasn’t a one-way relationship. In return for military support, Berlusconi benefited from his elevated role in trans-Atlantic relations, being able to sell himself as a major international player at home. And remaining friendly with the world’s biggest economy is also prudent for a country <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/20/business/italy-economy.html">prone to economic instability</a>.</p>
<p>So while he was ejected from office in Italy in 2006, he departed with a legacy of building up Italy’s standing with leaders in the U.S.</p>
<p>And then came the Obama years. Berlusconi <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/apr/15/italy1">returned to power in 2008</a>, the same year that Obama was elected to his first term in office. But even before Obama could be sworn in, the Italian prime minister had soured the relationship, referring to the U.S. president elect as “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/nov/06/italy-barackobama">young, handsome and tanned</a>.”</p>
<p>It may have been meant as a compliment, but it certainly came across as at best off-key, at worst racist.</p>
<p>Such eyebrow-raising remarks were, of course, not uncommon for Berlusconi, who gained a reputation for <a href="https://ca.finance.yahoo.com/news/silvio-berlusconis-most-controversial-distasteful-101700715.html">saying at times outrageous things</a>. But the incident didn’t bode well for bilateral relations.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A glum looking man looks off to the side next to a similarly downcast man shuffling papers." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531505/original/file-20230613-29-awxc1v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531505/original/file-20230613-29-awxc1v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531505/original/file-20230613-29-awxc1v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531505/original/file-20230613-29-awxc1v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531505/original/file-20230613-29-awxc1v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=636&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531505/original/file-20230613-29-awxc1v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=636&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531505/original/file-20230613-29-awxc1v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=636&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-barack-obama-meets-with-italian-prime-minister-news-photo/88501434?adppopup=true">Win McNamee/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Conversations I have had with officials in Obama’s White House and State Department and others in Washington suggest that it wasn’t primarily about Berlusconi’s comments; there was a feeling that by the late 2000s he wasn’t reliable and had little to offer.</p>
<p>There was, however, one last U.S.-led foreign intervention that the aging Italian prime minister could play a role in. In 2011 a coalition of NATO countries were entrusted to implement a <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2011/sc10200.doc.htm">U.N.-sanctioned no-fly zone over Libya</a>, amid claims of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/18/muammar-gaddafi-war-crimes-files">civilian attacks by Moammar Gaddafi’s regime</a>. Berlusconi – mindful of Italy receiving a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-libya/gaddafi-hails-italy-for-overcoming-colonial-past-idUSTRE5593OO20090610">quarter of its oil from Libya</a> and reliant on the country to implement a deal aimed at preventing African immigrants arriving on Italian shores – resisted.</p>
<p>But after Obama threw his wholesale support behind NATO’s intervention, Berlusconi acquiesced and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13188951">joined Italy’s allies in the military coalition</a>. To Berlusconi, not being aligned with the U.S. was one thing; opposing Washington’s wishes entirely was a step too far.</p>
<h2>A precursor of the populist premier</h2>
<p>Much comment has been made over the <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/04/berlusconi-italy-trump-president/587014/">similarities between Berlusconi and another U.S. president</a>: Donald J. Trump. No doubt, the pair share commonalities – businessmen whose forays into politics were marked by right-wing populism and many, many scandals.</p>
<p>But Berlusconi’s legacy as an Italian leader on trans-Atlantic relations is best seen through the lens of Trump’s two predecessors. And it is a very mixed legacy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207591/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jason Davidson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The former Italian prime minister died on June 12, 2023, at the age of 86. Throughout his terms in office he cultivated closer ties with the US – with mixed results.Jason Davidson, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, University of Mary WashingtonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2037272023-04-30T13:12:16Z2023-04-30T13:12:16ZThe power of cultural identity on psychological well-being: Singing, trauma and the resilience of the Yazidi population of northern Iraq<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/520700/original/file-20230413-20-8ypkl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=28%2C84%2C3748%2C2230&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mourners preparing to bury the remains of 104 Yazidi victims in a cemetery in Sinjar, Iraq on Feb. 6, 2021. The Yazidis were killed by the Islamic State group in 2014, and were given a proper burial after the bodies were exhumed from mass graves and identified through DNA tests.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Farid Abdulwahed)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Behind each door and gate in Sinuni, Iraq, there is a different story of trauma and resilience. The Yazidi community is still coping with the trauma and mental health burden following the <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-year-after-massacre-by-islamic-state-iraqs-yazidis-are-clinging-on-44494">ISIS genocide of 2014</a>, where thousands of men, women and children were killed, tortured and kidnapped for sexual slavery. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/81-mass-graves-of-yazidis-found-in-iraqs-sinjar-since-2014-official/2538307#:%7E:text=A%20total%20of%2081%20mass,the%20Daesh%2FISIS%20terrorist%20group">Eighty-one mass graves</a> have been discovered, the most recent of which was found in June 2022.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/520732/original/file-20230413-26-483g5a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A collage of nine different ornamental gates" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/520732/original/file-20230413-26-483g5a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/520732/original/file-20230413-26-483g5a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/520732/original/file-20230413-26-483g5a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/520732/original/file-20230413-26-483g5a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/520732/original/file-20230413-26-483g5a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/520732/original/file-20230413-26-483g5a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/520732/original/file-20230413-26-483g5a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ornamental property gates from random houses in the Sinuni region of Iraq.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Mylène Ratelle)</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Yazidi community is based in Sinjar region, which is located in Nineveh Governorate, in northern Iraq. For thousands of years, this Mesopotamian-based population was <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/iraq-s-yazidi-minority-has-long-been-singled-out-for-hatred-1.2732115">persecuted for their unique ethno-cultural and religious beliefs</a>, which promote harmony and peace. </p>
<p>After the genocide of 2014, members of the Yazidi community <a href="https://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/CIMM/Brief/BR9342569/br-external/Yazda-e.pdf">looked for safety</a> in countries all over the world. However, a community core still stands with resolution on the land where their ancestors were born, around the Sinjar Mount. Some by choice, some because they were not able to leave.</p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1002297">A study from 2015</a> estimated that 2.5 per cent of the Yazidi population was either killed or kidnapped over the course of a few days in August 2014. Thousands were kept as sexual slaves. As such, it is not surprising that <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0020764021994145">a study published in 2022</a> investigating the traumatic experience of displaced Yazidis living in a Kurdistan camp estimated that about four out of five respondents had PTSD symptoms, and that women had a higher rate and score of trauma and PTSD symptoms. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1097/nmd.0000000000001400">Resilience strengthening</a> is a key for the treatment of those survivors, especially for the Yazidi individual, collective and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1186%2Fs12916-017-0965-7">transgenerational traumatization</a>.</p>
<h2>Link between mental health and cultural identity</h2>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0020764003494001">Research has indicated</a> that a positive cultural identity contributes to better mental health. Cultural identity is a concept that encompasses <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007%2Fs11013-016-9514-7">personal, ethnic and social self-identity</a>, which is critical for self-esteem.</p>
<p>In a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/a0029329">longitudinal study with Asian and Latino youth</a>, cultural identity was associated with lower levels of depression symptoms. In addition, for <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s00127-017-1424-7">Syrian refugees</a>, the sense of belonging to a social or cultural community was a predictor of lower levels of depression symptoms, as well as greater life satisfaction.</p>
<p>Historical colonialism, oppression and marginalization have contributed to poor mental health of Indigenous Peoples in Canada and Australia. However, cultural identity seems to have a role to play in health and well-being. </p>
<p>For example, for Australian Indigenous people in custody, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-017-4603-2">their cultural engagement was associated with non-recidivism</a>. Cultural continuity helped Indigenous communities of Canada to thrive, and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/070674370004500702">promoting the sense of collective pride</a> might contribute to positive mental health.</p>
<p>As such, the idea was suggested recently that <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/jcop.22827">mental health programs should support the development of cultural identities</a>, with the potential to improve psychological well-being.</p>
<p>Since the genocide, some <a href="https://theconversation.com/5-years-after-islamic-state-massacre-an-iraqi-minority-is-transformed-by-trauma-126917">Yazidis report a renewed interest in their Yazidi cultural and political identity</a>. They have a stronger will than before to protect Yazidi holy sites, preserve oral traditions and hymns and their unique cultural practices.</p>
<h2>Humanitarian intervention</h2>
<p>My work is usually done in collaboration with Indigenous Peoples in North America, who deal with systematic racism, exclusion and stigma, generational trauma, awful abuses from residential schools and thousands of unmarked graves of children. </p>
<p>The Yazidi issues are a different type of deliberate horror, and are still very recent in the memory of survivors. <a href="https://www.msf.org/msf-warns-mental-health-crisis-among-yazidis-iraq">Médecins Sans Frontières warned the world in 2019 of the mental health crisis</a> and of increasing suicide rates in the region.</p>
<p>I was recruited by Médecins Sans Frontières in summer 2022 to support a health promotion program in Sinuni, Iraq. The role of our health promotion team was to provide a bridge between the local hospital services and the population, as well as to implement preventive initiatives to improve physical and mental health in the community. In parallel, mental health professionals were offering support to the residents.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/520735/original/file-20230413-22-uny1dy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Photo of a mountain landscape" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/520735/original/file-20230413-22-uny1dy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/520735/original/file-20230413-22-uny1dy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=332&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/520735/original/file-20230413-22-uny1dy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=332&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/520735/original/file-20230413-22-uny1dy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=332&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/520735/original/file-20230413-22-uny1dy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/520735/original/file-20230413-22-uny1dy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/520735/original/file-20230413-22-uny1dy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Sinjar Mount is the core of the Yazidi community location in Iraq.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Mylène Ratelle)</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>During our outreach activities, we often got a glimpse of the depth of the trauma of some community members, and witnessed their mental challenges. These included expressions such as:</p>
<ul>
<li> How can I be stress-free while there are 21 members of my family who are still missing?</li>
<li> My father’s house was destroyed years ago. Every time I see it, next to my house, it makes me sad.</li>
<li> I think about killing myself, day after day. We don’t have skills, hobbies, hope.</li>
<li> Many of us have someone we don’t let alone in the house because we fear they might kill themselves.</li>
</ul>
<p>As part of the mental health activities, I developed the content of a series of workshops, with the aim to: </p>
<ol>
<li><p>destigmatize mental health issues, </p></li>
<li><p>improve individual resiliency to stress by learning techniques to decrease anxiety at home,</p></li>
<li><p>increase community support, social capital and cultural identity to prevent and cope with mental health issues. </p></li>
</ol>
<p>Those workshops were implemented by the team in homes and schools. As part of the last workshop, there were participatory activities on the importance of peer groups, on the role of cooking and traditional practices. One key activity was to invite participants to sing traditional songs together. </p>
<p>The aim of those activities was to bring awareness on the positive impact of cultural identity, and strengthen social relations between neighbours. Those activities were evaluated, with participants reporting immediate and lasting positive impacts. </p>
<p>Assessment of the workshops indicated increased happiness index: 58 per cent were above the threshold for depressive symptoms before the workshop while 92 per cent of participants were above the threshold immediately after. In addition, after two weeks post workshop, there were fewer participants self-isolating and meeting socially once a month or less (30 per cent versus 10 per cent post-workshop), and there was an increased average number of social activities. </p>
<p>Our team observed that the Yazidi are collectively strong, resilient and hopeful. However, the trauma is still acute, and the extent of the mental health issues is such that it could pass on a <a href="https://dictionary.apa.org/intergenerational-trauma">generational trauma</a>. </p>
<p>As several <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2023/03/20/un-united-nations-shift-away-emergency-aid-iraq">NGOs cease their activities in the region</a>, there are fewer organizations offering mental health care for the Yazidis, on the south and north side of Sinjar Mount. </p>
<p>However, more work needs to be done to improve mental health in the region via health promotion, counselling, therapy and psychiatry. There is also an opportunity to support cultural identity to reinforce mental health resilience.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/203727/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mylene Ratelle worked on a health promotion program for Doctors without Borders in 2022-2023 in Iraq, but her views are not those of Doctors Without Borders.</span></em></p>For the Yazidi communities in northern Iraq, there is a need to improve mental health. The sense of cultural identity has the potential to improve psychological well-being.Mylène Ratelle, Adjunct Professor, School of Public Health Sciences, University of WaterlooLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2019982023-03-18T16:01:27Z2023-03-18T16:01:27Z20 years on, George W. Bush’s promise of democracy in Iraq and Middle East falls short<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/516090/original/file-20230317-1658-o8gjxt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An Iraqi person walks down a road blocked by burning tires in Basra in August 2002. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1242803428/photo/topshot-iraq-politics-sadr-demo.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=S4tOIc6I7PC-scxNWjeb_aZUVwt5U2jKeyr1k5lyhzo=">Hussein Faleh/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>President George W. Bush and his administration put forward a variety of reasons to justify <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Iraq-War">the 2003 invasion of Iraq</a>.</p>
<p>In the months before the U.S. invasion, <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/iraq-justifying-war">Bush said the looming conflict</a> was about eradicating terrorism and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/03/22/iraq-war-wmds-an-intelligence-failure-or-white-house-spin/">seizing weapons of mass destruction</a> – but also because of a “<a href="https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html">freedom deficit</a>” in the Middle East, a reference to the perceived lag in participatory government in the region.</p>
<p>Many of these arguments would emerge as poorly grounded, given later events. </p>
<p>In 2004, then Secretary of State Colin Powell reflected on the weak rationale behind the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/17/world/powell-says-cia-was-misled-about-weapons.html">main arguments for the invasion</a>: that there were weapons of mass destruction. He acknowledged that “it turned out that the sourcing was inaccurate and wrong and in some cases deliberately misleading.” </p>
<p>In fact <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna7634313">Iraq did not have a stockpile of weapons of mass destruction</a>, as Powell and others had alleged at the time.</p>
<p>But the Bush administration’s rhetoric of building a more free, open and democratic Middle East persisted after the weapons of mass destruction claim had proven false, and has been harder to evaluate – at least in the short term. <a href="https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030226-11.html">Bush assured</a> the American public in 2003 that, “A new regime in Iraq would serve as a dramatic and inspiring example of freedom for other nations in the region.” </p>
<p>He focused on this theme during <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11107739">the ground invasion</a>, in which a coalition force of nearly 100,000 American and other allied troops rapidly <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jul/08/toppling-saddam-hussein-statue-iraq-us-victory-myth">toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime</a>. </p>
<p>“The establishment of <a href="https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html">a free Iraq</a> at the heart of the Middle East will be a watershed event in the global democratic revolution,” Bush said in November 2003. He also said that the U.S. would be pursuing a “forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East.”</p>
<p>Twenty years on, it is worth considering how this “forward strategy” has played out both in Iraq and across the Middle East. In 2003, there was indeed, as Bush noted, a “freedom deficit” in the Middle East, where repressive <a href="https://www.eui.eu/documents/rscas/research/mediterranean/mrm2008/09ws-description.pdf">authoritarian regimes dominated the region</a>. Yet, in spite of tremendous upheaval in the Middle East over the past two decades, many authoritarian regimes remain deeply entrenched.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/516091/original/file-20230317-26-u42lcl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A group of men appear to be protesting in the street and raise Iraqi flags." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/516091/original/file-20230317-26-u42lcl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/516091/original/file-20230317-26-u42lcl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516091/original/file-20230317-26-u42lcl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516091/original/file-20230317-26-u42lcl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516091/original/file-20230317-26-u42lcl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516091/original/file-20230317-26-u42lcl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516091/original/file-20230317-26-u42lcl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iraqis demonstrate to show support for Saddam Hussein in February 2003 in Baghdad, Iraq.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1798778/photo/activists-in-iraq-rally-for-peace.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=oPWRXG5RzA-kS2bmMT5D9rlLapEelUW5FMqeyCxxqKQ=">Oleg Nikishin/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Measuring the ‘Freedom Gap’</h2>
<p>Political science <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=1waDubkAAAAJ&hl=en">scholars like myself</a> try to measure the democratic or authoritarian character of governments in a variety of ways. </p>
<p>The non-profit group <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world">Freedom House</a> evaluates countries in terms of democratic institutions and whether they have free and fair elections, as well as people’s civil rights and liberties, such as freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and a free press. Freedom House <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/reports/freedom-world/freedom-world-research-methodology">rates each country</a> and its level of democracy on a scale from 2 to 14, from “mostly free” to “least free.” </p>
<p>One way to think about the level of democracy in the region is to focus on the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/arab-league">23 countries and governments that form the Arab League</a>, a regional organization that spans North Africa, the Red Sea coast and the Middle East. In 2003, the average Freedom House <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/Freedom_in_the_World_2003_complete_book.pdf">score for an Arab League member</a> was 11.45 – far more authoritarian than the global average of 6.75 at the time. </p>
<p>Put another way, the Freedom House report in 2003 <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/Freedom_in_the_World_2003_complete_book.pdf">classified a little over 46%</a> of all countries as “free,” but no country in the Arab League met that threshold.</p>
<p>While some <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/03/08/heavy-lies-the-crown-the-survival-of-arab-monarchies-10-years-after-the-arab-spring/">Arab countries, like Saudi Arabia</a>, were ruled by monarchies around this time, others, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/dec/14/arab-spring-autocrats-the-dead-the-ousted-and-those-who-survived">like Libya</a>, were ruled by dictators. </p>
<p>The nearly <a href="https://www.pbs.org/tpt/dictators-playbook/episodes/saddam-hussein/">30-year-long regime</a> of Hussein in Iraq fit this second pattern. Hussein was part of a 1968 coup led by <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Baath-Party">the Ba'ath political party</a>, a group that <a href="https://www.encyclopediaofmigration.org/en/the_bath_party_in_iraq/">wanted all Arab countries</a> to form one unified nation – but also became known for human rights violations. The Ba'ath Party relied upon <a href="https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/164.htm">Iraq’s oil wealth</a> and <a href="https://news.stanford.edu/2018/03/29/baath-party-archives-reveal-brutality-saddam-husseins-rule/">repressive tactics against civilians</a> to <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2745001.stm">maintain power</a>. </p>
<p>The fall of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saddam-hussein-fell-then-violence-iraq-spiralled-2023-03-14/">Hussein’s regime in April 2003</a> produced a nominally more democratic Iraq. But after fighting a <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/21172">series of sectarian insurgencies</a> in Iraq over an eight-year period, the U.S. ultimately left behind <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/all-us-troops-to-leave-iraq/2011/10/21/gIQAUyJi3L_story.html">a weak and deeply divided government</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/516142/original/file-20230318-5624-50d8gi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A row of newspapers show a bearded man with words like 'We got him' and 'Saddam captured.'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/516142/original/file-20230318-5624-50d8gi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/516142/original/file-20230318-5624-50d8gi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=380&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516142/original/file-20230318-5624-50d8gi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=380&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516142/original/file-20230318-5624-50d8gi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=380&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516142/original/file-20230318-5624-50d8gi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516142/original/file-20230318-5624-50d8gi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516142/original/file-20230318-5624-50d8gi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A newsstand sells papers reporting the capture of Saddam Hussein, former leader of Iraq, by U.S. forces in 2003.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/2811512/photo/papers-run-story-on-saddam-capture.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=1H9qDW1rPW1wVPbyKH3HUrgRll8pRZ36ZhzVeS-rM6A=">Graeme Robertson/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Post-invasion Iraq</h2>
<p>The U.S. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-usa-pullout-idUSTRE7BE0EL20111215">2003 invasion</a> succeeded in ousting a brutal regime – but establishing a healthy and thriving new democracy proved more challenging. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2003/05/religious-politics-iraq">Rivalry between</a> Iraq’s three main groups – the Sunni and Shiite Muslims as well as the Kurds, the largest ethnic minority in the country – paralyzed early attempts at political reorganization. </p>
<p>While Iraq today has a constitution, a parliament and holds regular elections, the country struggles both with <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/bdc-snapshots-the-iraqi-states-crisis-of-legitimacy/">popular legitimacy</a> and with practical aspects of governance, such as providing <a href="https://www.unicef.org/iraq/what-we-do/education#:%7E:text=Decades%20of%20conflict%20and%20under,Iraqi%20children%20out%20of%20school.">basic education</a> for children. </p>
<p>Indeed, in 2023, <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/iraq/freedom-world/2023">Freedom House</a> continues to score Iraq as “Not Free” in its measure of democracy.</p>
<p>Since the U.S. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/21/obama-us-troops-withdrawal-iraq">military withdrawal in 2011</a>, Iraq has lurched from one political crisis to another. From 2014 to 2017, large portions of western Iraq were controlled by the extremist militant <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-the-rise-spread-and-fall-the-islamic-state">Islamic State group</a>. </p>
<p>In 2018 and 2019, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-protests-economy-analysis-idUSKBN1WH1S8">rampant government corruption</a> led to a string of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50595212">anti-government protests</a>, which sparked a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/fear-spreads-among-iraqi-protesters-as-government-cracks-down-keeps-death-toll-secret/2019/11/11/be210a28-03f9-11ea-9118-25d6bd37dfb1_story.html">violent crackdown</a> by the government. </p>
<p>The protests prompted early <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/10/11/1045092941/iraq-election-results-sadr">parliamentary elections in November 2021</a>, but the government has not yet been able to create a coalition government representing all competing political groups. </p>
<p>While Iraq’s most recent crisis avoided descending into civil war, the militarized nature of Iraqi political parties poses <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2023/03/01/shiite-rivalries-could-break-iraqs-deceptive-calm-in-2023/">an ongoing risk of electoral violence</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/516141/original/file-20230318-14-aztvn4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man pushes a cart in a desolate looking area with sandy, dirt ground and blue skies." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/516141/original/file-20230318-14-aztvn4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/516141/original/file-20230318-14-aztvn4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516141/original/file-20230318-14-aztvn4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516141/original/file-20230318-14-aztvn4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516141/original/file-20230318-14-aztvn4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516141/original/file-20230318-14-aztvn4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/516141/original/file-20230318-14-aztvn4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An Iraqi man pushes a cart in Mosul after the government retook control from the Islamic State in 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/632292674/photo/topshot-iraq-conflict-mosul.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=Nhx4QWu-dMm2zA-P6RdP4cf62WwjFwQMUkSrHcfjkf4=">Ahmad Al-Rubaye/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The post-invasion Middle East</h2>
<p>While Iraq continues to face deep political challenges, it is worth considering the U.S. efforts at regional democracy promotion more fully. </p>
<p>In 2014, widespread protest movements associated with the <a href="https://www.npr.org/2011/12/17/143897126/the-arab-spring-a-year-of-revolution">Arab Spring</a> <a href="https://www.cfr.org/article/arab-spring-ten-years-whats-legacy-uprisings">toppled dictators in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya</a>. In other countries, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-12482680">such as Morocco</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-12482679">Jordan</a>, monarchs were able to offer concessions to people and remain in control by delaying public spending cuts, for example, and replacing government ministers. </p>
<p>Yet sustaining stable democracies has proved challenging even where the Arab Spring seemed to succeed in changing political regimes. In <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-19256730">Egypt, the military</a> has reasserted itself and the country has slid steadily back to authoritarianism. In <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/yemen-crisis">Yemen, the political vaccum</a> created by the protests marked the start of a devastating civil war. </p>
<p>The average Freedom House democracy score for <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores">members of the Arab League</a> is today 11.45 — the same as it was on the eve of the Iraq invasion. </p>
<p>It is hard to know if U.S. efforts at democracy promotion accelerated or delayed political change in the Middle East. It is hard to know if a different approach might have yielded better results. Yet, the data – at least as social scientists measure such things – strongly suggests that the vision of an Iraq as an inspiration for a democratic transformation of the Middle East has not come to pass.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201998/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brian Urlacher is affiliated with North Dakota Dem/NPL and serves as vice chair for District 18.</span></em></p>The Bush administration invaded Iraq with plans for it to become a democracy. But according to some social science measures, the country isn’t any more democratic than it was before 2003.Brian Urlacher, Department Chair and Professor, Political Science & Public Administration, University of North DakotaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2016562023-03-17T17:26:20Z2023-03-17T17:26:20ZThe Iraq war’s damage to public trust in experts has consequences right up to today<p>Twenty years after the invasion of Iraq, politicians continue to repeat the errors of the past by taking information from security briefings that they want to hear.</p>
<p>Ahead of the 2003 invasion and subsequent occupation, US and UK politicians used some of the intelligence gathered by western security agencies to suggest that the local population would predominantly welcome external military powers as liberators. But it quickly became apparent <a href="https://www.leadingtowar.com/war_rosecolored.php#as6">this was a mistake</a> and that the fighting capability of those who would resist had been underestimated. A <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/iraq-without-a-plan">long and bloody insurgency</a> followed.</p>
<p>Fast forward to 2022 and we saw Russian president Vladimir <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/putin-believed-his-own-propaganda-and-fatally-underestimated-ukraine/">Putin</a> acting under the apparent belief that his conquest of Ukraine would also be simple, and meet with little resistance from a weak defence force. Western intelligence reports have since highlighted how Putin and his advisers significantly underestimated Ukraine and <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-invasion-ukraine-intelligence-putin/31748594.html">made poor judgements</a> about their own intelligence information.</p>
<p>The public, however, at least in western countries, appears to have become much more sceptical of politicians armed with intelligence from experts. As well as the <a href="https://theconversation.com/iraq-20-years-on-death-came-from-the-skies-on-march-19-2003-and-the-killing-continues-to-this-day-201988">thousands of deaths</a>, trillions of dollars of expense and irreversible changes to national and international politics, this arguably remains one of the legacies of the Iraq war.</p>
<p>The conflict taught the public valuable lessons about intelligence. A review by <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/61171/wmdreview.pdf">Lord Butler</a> and the <a href="https://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/">Chilcot inquiry</a> that followed the war showed that intelligence is never certain. Intelligence agencies provide “<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt32bxwh">best truths</a>” to politicians, who then take decisions. </p>
<p>The Iraq war made secret intelligence a topic for discussion in homes across the world. A publicly accessible version of the intelligence picture was presented to the public by UK prime minister <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/02/uk_dossier_on_iraq/pdf/iraqdossier.pdf">Tony Blair</a>. This was a groundbreaking decision and one that defined Blair’s career. </p>
<p>The weaknesses in the intelligence <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20110614090401/http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/layout/set/print/content/view/full/100?id=10215&lng=en&ord588=grp2&ots591=0C54E3B3-1E9C-BE1E-2C24-A6A8C7060233">dossiers</a>, once exposed, also appeared to undermine public support for the conflict. In contrast, the public continued to strongly support the armed forces and particularly those injured and killed in <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0095327X13516616">action</a>.</p>
<p>In parallel a public narrative developed that experts were often wrong, and politicians could not be <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00138380701771025">trusted</a>. The idea that experts are not to be trusted has become ever more repeated in recent years, through the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/3be49734-29cb-11e6-83e4-abc22d5d108c">Brexit debates</a> and governmental responses to the <a href="https://www.standard.co.uk/insider/matt-hancock-isabel-oakeshott-whatsapp-leak-scandal-lockdown-files-b1064185.html">pandemic</a>. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/its-been-20-years-since-the-us-invaded-iraq-long-enough-for-my-undergraduate-students-to-see-it-as-a-relic-of-the-past-199460">It's been 20 years since the US invaded Iraq – long enough for my undergraduate students to see it as a relic of the past</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>However, the failings in the communication and use of intelligence data does not mean security services were to blame for the war.</p>
<p>True, some of the vulnerabilities in western intelligence reporting seemed farcical when exposed to public scrutiny. The information from an informant known as Curveball – an Iraqi expatriate – was used by the US in making the case for war in the UK, despite German and British reservations. Curveball’s information later emerged to be <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/24/AR2006062401081_pf.html">inaccurate</a>. </p>
<p>But in other areas it appears intelligence services provided nuanced information and accurate warnings. For example, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/jul/20/chilcot-mi5-boss-iraq-war">UK intelligence chiefs</a> warned ministers that the conflict would increase the terrorist threat. </p>
<p>Others within <a href="https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmdfence/65/6506.htm">defence intelligence</a> warned that once the first phase of the conflict against regular Iraqi armed forces were complete that a long-running insurgency would follow. Commanders in the British army warned that without direct investment into the Iraqi city of Basra and surroundings that this area would become <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2003/06/02/basra/crime-and-insecurity-under-british-occupation">radicalised</a>.</p>
<p>Some key assumptions around Iraq’s chemical weapons programme were clearly unhelpful. But the agencies were arguably also right to feel bruised that the blame for the war landed with them, when they had no way of changing government policy.</p>
<h2>The rise of conspiracy theories</h2>
<p>The leaks and publication of intelligence related to Iraq brought with them the era of the armchair expert and the conspiracy theorist. Many academics argued that this <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/02684520500268897?casa_token=p5QSeVc4Qx8AAAAA:ZflrGCpLRHBF3w4c595W8uYDHRcMpf2etc83HqSip8QsRL-R2sSV1dnPvKHcymS0ZVCtMscLGmMj">openness</a> in intelligence would produce a mature public debate. But the weaknesses in the intelligence undermined the idea that governments are a source of <a href="https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/blog/how-iraq-war-led-legacy-public-mistrust-intelligence/">truth</a>. </p>
<p>Deep dive investigations and conspiracies have surrounded the death of biological weapons expert and UK government advisor David Kelly in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/jul/16/david-kelly-death-10-years-on">2003</a>. Kelly’s untimely death has been the subject of official and unofficial investigations and spurred a cottage industry in speculation. </p>
<p>Kelly died after he was publicly revealed to be a confidential source for BBC journalist Andrew Gilligan’s assertion that part of the government’s intelligence dossier on “weapons of mass destruction” was <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/43828472">fabricated</a>. His death was officially ruled a <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20110515030509/http://www.the-hutton-inquiry.org.uk/content/report/huttonreport.pdf">suicide</a>. </p>
<p>This was confirmed by the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2004/feb/06/huttonreport.davidkelly">Hutton inquiry</a> and again by a later inquiry by the attorney general. But <a href="https://www.standard.co.uk/hp/front/iraq-whistleblower-dr-kelly-was-murdered-to-silence-him-says-mp-6644896.html">public suspicion</a> about Kelly’s death persist with books and a <a href="https://www.channel4.com/press/news/government-inspector">TV drama </a>.</p>
<p>More broadly, Iraq resulted in a loss in public support for British involvement in <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/1467-9256.12073">war</a>, which was seemingly conditional on how people viewed the purpose of the conflict and prospects of victory. </p>
<p>This view will in part be shaped by their trust in the initial intelligence and in whether they believe governments tell the truth. As debates around <a href="https://www.oecd.org/governance/trust-in-government/">the pandemic</a> have shown, once <a href="https://yougov.co.uk/topics/international/articles-reports/2020/03/17/perception-government-handling-covid-19">trust</a> has gone it is hard to get back. </p>
<p>Intelligence agencies did change the way they operate in response to criticisms over Iraq. Agencies spent more time and resource on ensuring they had more evidence for their claims and were more careful with wording claims. This was a necessary change for the intelligence community, but did not address how politicians use intelligence. Without that change, the world is still vulnerable to misread and misunderstood intelligence assessments.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201656/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert M. Dover received funding from the ESRC for a series of seminars examining the role of intelligence in public policy making and from the AHRC for a project examining the lessons that could be drawn from successful intelligence operations. </span></em></p>Agencies may make more checks, but they can’t prevent politicians misusing intelligence information, says an expert.Robert M. Dover, Professor of Intelligence and National Security, University of HullLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.