tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/is-11889/articlesIS – The Conversation2023-04-02T11:46:42Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2015422023-04-02T11:46:42Z2023-04-02T11:46:42ZHow a Canadian judge erred in ordering the repatriation of suspected ISIS members<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/517997/original/file-20230328-2416-9jv03h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=30%2C0%2C6669%2C4426&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A woman and a child stand in a detention camp in northeast Syria in 2022. Tens of thousands of ISIS-affiliated foreign nationals are in the camps, including four Canadian men. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Baderkhan Ahmad)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In a January 2023 <a href="https://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fc-cf/decisions/en/item/522819/index.do?q=boloh">Federal Court decision</a>, the government of Canada was ordered to request repatriation of four suspected ISIS members <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/radio/thecurrent/canadians-accused-of-joining-isis-could-soon-come-home-1.6724477">currently being held</a> in Syria.</p>
<p>Lawrence Greenspon, who represents three of the detainees, <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/government-appeal-court-order-repatriate-1.6744096">said the decision “covered all the bases and covered them well”</a> and that an appeal would therefore be difficult for the government to pursue. Similarly, <a href="https://socialistproject.ca/author/matthew-behrens/">socialist activist</a> Matthew Behrens <a href="http://homesnotbombs.blogspot.com/2023/01/federal-court-orders-repatriation-of.html?m=1">described the decision</a> as an “important ruling with global human rights implications.” </p>
<p>Nonetheless, the federal government <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/canadian-government-appeals-order-repatriate-canadians-syria-2023-02-10/">is appealing</a> the decision and oral arguments <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/one-day-federal-court-of-appeal-hearing-men-detained-syria-1.6792201">were recently held at the Federal Court of Appeal in Toronto. </a></p>
<p>With the appeal ongoing, what are the chances that Justice Henry Brown’s ruling is upheld? Does the decision actually cover all the bases, and does it truly have important global human rights implications?</p>
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<p>Not so fast.</p>
<p>In the process of interpreting Canada’s <a href="https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/rfc-dlc/ccrf-ccdl/resources-ressources.html#copy">Charter of Rights and Freedoms</a> through the lens of international law, Brown illegitimately expands Canada’s existing human rights obligations.</p>
<h2>Human rights obligations</h2>
<p>The precedent established by the decision threatens Canada’s national security now and into the future, and it sets up a potential showdown between the judiciary and the government. </p>
<p>Here’s why.</p>
<p>Brown <a href="https://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fc-cf/decisions/en/522819/1/document.do#page=50">correctly notes</a> in the decision that subsection 6(1) of the Charter should be “presumed to provide at least as great a level of protection” as Canada’s international human rights obligations. </p>
<p><a href="https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/const/page-12.html#h-44">This Charter provision establishes</a> the right for citizens “to enter, remain in and leave Canada.” It makes sense to interpret the Charter, including the “right to enter” provision, in a manner that is consistent with existing human rights requirements.</p>
<p>The decision also <a href="https://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fc-cf/decisions/en/522819/1/document.do#page=37">correctly relies</a> on the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights">International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights</a> as the primary instrument establishing Canada’s international law obligations. </p>
<p>The covenant, in turn, <a href="https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20999/volume-999-i-14668-english.pdf#page=6">provides</a> that no person “shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.”</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/is-it-more-dangerous-to-let-islamic-state-foreign-fighters-from-the-west-return-or-prevent-them-from-coming-back-112588">Is it more dangerous to let Islamic State foreign fighters from the West return or prevent them from coming back?</a>
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<h2>The heart of the covenant</h2>
<p>No issues so far. But Brown fails to consider the central jurisdictional clause of the covenant while interpreting the Charter in light of international law.</p>
<p>That provision of the covenant <a href="https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20999/volume-999-i-14668-english.pdf#page=3">requires a country</a> to respect and ensure “to all individuals <em>within its territory</em> and <em>subject to its jurisdiction</em> the rights recognized” in the treaty. Suspected ISIS members being held in Syria, of course, are not on Canadian territory or subject to Canadian jurisdiction.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/518011/original/file-20230328-806-ef102g.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A sign that says Federal Court in French and English" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/518011/original/file-20230328-806-ef102g.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/518011/original/file-20230328-806-ef102g.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/518011/original/file-20230328-806-ef102g.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/518011/original/file-20230328-806-ef102g.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/518011/original/file-20230328-806-ef102g.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/518011/original/file-20230328-806-ef102g.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/518011/original/file-20230328-806-ef102g.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Federal Court Justice Henry Brown’s ruling was inconsistent with Canada’s international legal obligations.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Sean Kilpatrick</span></span>
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<p>This deficiency in Brown’s reasoning is not remedied by his reliance on <a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2013/2013scc47/2013scc47.html">prior precedence</a> established by the Supreme Court of Canada <a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fca/doc/2009/2009fca21/2009fca21.html">or other</a> <a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2009/2009fc580/2009fc580.html">federal court decisions</a> — none of which imposed on the government an obligation to apply Charter rights as a matter of international law to people who are beyond Canadian territory and jurisdiction.</p>
<p>Brown does so in his decision, which is inconsistent with Canada’s international legal obligations. </p>
<h2>National security implications</h2>
<p>One especially concerning aspect of Brown’s decision is that the government has no obligation to implement it — even if the ruling survives the appeal. It is undoubtedly <a href="https://www.scc-csc.ca/court-cour/events-evenements/quebec2022/scc-csc-eng.html#role">the role</a> of the Supreme Court of Canada — and, by extension, lower courts as well — to “interpret and provide guidance on Canada’s laws.” </p>
<p>However, the judiciary has no authority to create international law obligations while interpreting the Charter or any other aspect of domestic law. Although a significant degree of political risk would be involved, the government may refuse to implement a judicial decision that creates a domestic legal obligation from a non-existent requirement in international law. </p>
<p>Even more concerning are the national security implications at stake. As suggested by my colleague, international affairs professor Leah West, <a href="https://globaljustice.queenslaw.ca/news/human-rights-and-citizenship-abandoned-in-ne-syria-a-special-issue-of-the-global-justice-journal#Shortsighted">there are several sensible options the government can take</a> to mitigate the potential public safety concerns associated with repatriating suspected ISIS fighters and their family members.</p>
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<p>The government has the resources needed to make these calculations and to act accordingly. The same cannot be said for Brown or any member of the judiciary or, for that matter, the general public. </p>
<p>Although West’s conclusion that “repatriation is in the best interests of Canadian national security” is certainly reasonable, the government is in the best position to make that determination in practice. </p>
<p>Aside from the potential public safety concerns involved with requiring the government to seek repatriation, it’s difficult to predict the full scope of national security implications inherent in expanding Canada’s human rights obligations across the globe as Brown’s decision mandates.</p>
<p>Such unconstrained territorial reach is inconsistent with the jurisdictional components of international human rights instruments — and for good reason.</p>
<h2>The world is watching</h2>
<p>For better or worse, Brown’s ruling set a global precedent. It was <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/85049/repatriating-alleged-isis-linked-men-from-northeast-syria-the-start-of-judicial-responses-to-the-political-stalemate/">recently described</a> on the <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/about-us/">progressive blog Just Security</a> as a “landmark decision” in large part because of the “rights-based perspective” implemented by Brown.</p>
<p>A co-author of that Just Security article is Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/special-procedures/sr-terrorism/ms-fionnuala-d-ni-aolain">a current</a> United Nations special rapporteur whose <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/terrorism/sr/2023-01-25/Letter-Canada-repatriations.pdf">representations</a> on this case <a href="https://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fc-cf/decisions/en/522819/1/document.do#page=51">feature prominently</a> in Brown’s decision.</p>
<p>Because UN special rapporteurs bear no political responsibility for representations they make to governments, these positions have essentially <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/calls-for-input-listing?deadline_status%5Bstate%5D=all&field_coi_stage_value%5Bstage_1%5D=stage_1&field_coi_stage_value%5Bstage_2%5D=stage_2">taken on the role</a> of high-profile global social justice activists. But their assertions carry no actual legal authority. </p>
<p>Although Ní Aoláin invokes Canada’s international human rights obligations, she doesn’t address relevant jurisdictional limitations. This isn’t surprising given she’s advocating for a particular outcome, but it is not a basis for a policy approach that balances competing governmental interests.</p>
<p>Brown found her representations to be compelling, but judges considering the pending appeal should take a more balanced approach. The world is watching, and significant national security considerations are at stake both at home and abroad.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201542/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brian L. Cox does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A Federal Court justice ruled four men, suspected ISIS members, must be repatriated to Canada from a Syrian detention camp. Here’s why the decision is flawed and an ongoing appeal is justified.Brian L. Cox, Visiting scholar, uOttawa Faculty of Law; Doctoral candidate lecturer, Cornell Law School, L’Université d’Ottawa/University of OttawaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1982692023-02-16T13:25:10Z2023-02-16T13:25:10ZCOVID-19 restrictions unexpectedly reduced Islamic State violence – political science experts explain why<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510108/original/file-20230214-24-ab590n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A woman walks in Raqa, the former Syrian capital of the Islamic State, in December 2020. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1230242180/photo/topshot-syria-conflict-daily-life-raqa.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=i-FdQOqRBmciGD8TCY0hyKF8kvbZ5ixLz7y_77mY_7E=">Delil Souleiman/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>World leaders and <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/contending-isis-time-coronavirus">policy experts </a>at the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic <a href="https://time.com/5828630/isis-coronavirus/">feared that</a> the health crisis might make the world more dangerous. They worried specifically that terrorist organizations like the <a href="https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/isil.html">Islamic State group</a> would <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/69508/how-terrorist-groups-will-try-to-capitalize-on-the-coronavirus-crisis/">capitalize on the pandemic</a> to increase attacks on civilians and recruit new sympathizers. </p>
<p>In some ways, the pandemic presented an opportunity to groups like the Islamic State group, known by the initials IS, because the sudden increase in health spending <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/35298/From-Double-Shock-to-Double-Recovery-Implications-and-Options-for-Health-Financing-in-The-Time-of-COVID-19.pdf?sequence=8&isAllowed=y">strained many countries’ budgets</a> and diverted attention <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/04/28/preventing-violent-extremism-during-and-after-the-covid-19-pandemic/">away from extremism</a>. Governments’ COVID-19 responses also called on police and armies to deliver health care services <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7870912/">in some cases</a>. </p>
<p>But the feared increase in IS violence <a href="https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2021/06/28/has-isis-made-gains-as-a-result-of-the-pandemic/">largely did not materialize</a>.</p>
<p>We are <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=C2IitzkAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">scholars who study</a> the causes of violence within countries, often between armed groups and governments, and what works to prevent it. Along with our colleague <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/expert/qutaiba-idlbi/">Qutaiba Idlbi</a>, a senior fellow at the <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/">Atlantic Council</a> think tank, <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=1dHeQGgAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">we wanted to understand</a> how COVID-19 lockdowns affected the ability of groups like IS to operate. </p>
<p>As our new <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/locking-down-violence-the-covid19-pandemics-impact-on-nonstate-actor-violence/19073EF1BC0873E1D614A34F6BD1365C">research</a> shows, 2020 COVID-19 lockdown measures such as curfews and travel bans – which governments have mostly <a href="https://ig.ft.com/coronavirus-lockdowns/">since lifted</a> – made it difficult for IS to operate and, as an indirect result, helped reduce violence in Egypt, Iraq and Syria. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510111/original/file-20230214-2150-zdys90.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A soldier in camouflage steps into a destroyed vehicle that appears charred from the inside." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510111/original/file-20230214-2150-zdys90.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510111/original/file-20230214-2150-zdys90.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510111/original/file-20230214-2150-zdys90.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510111/original/file-20230214-2150-zdys90.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510111/original/file-20230214-2150-zdys90.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510111/original/file-20230214-2150-zdys90.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510111/original/file-20230214-2150-zdys90.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">An Iraqi fighter inspects the site of an Islamic State group attack north of Baghdad in May 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1211657465/photo/topshot-iraq-conflict-is.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=s34V40b5F3hAhyP1ZlD-BjZRPY6MdKZxgDoUmPzBCL0=">Ahmad Al-Rubaye/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>Understanding the Islamic State group</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.cnn.com/2016/08/12/middleeast/here-is-how-isis-began/index.html">Islamic State group</a> – also known as IS, ISIS and ISIL – emerged as an offshoot of the Islamic <a href="https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/">militant terrorist group</a> al-Qaida in Iraq around 2004. </p>
<p>In its rise, Islamic State group used unusually brutal and sadistic <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-61016908">tactics</a> against government officials, as well as civilians, including intense <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/04/syria-isis-tortured-kobani-child-hostages">torture</a> and <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/death-steven-sotloff">beheadings</a>. </p>
<p>But IS still cultivated genuine support from some locals in Iraq and Syria by exploiting <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/02/17/not-by-counterterrorism-alone-root-causes-and-the-defeat-of-the-islamic-state-group/">their grievances</a> over weak, corrupt governance – while sometimes providing better <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/04/04/world/middleeast/isis-documents-mosul-iraq.html">public services</a>, like routine street cleanings and power line repairs, than the government did in the areas it controlled. </p>
<p>Omar, a local journalist and civil society activist from Deir Ezzor, Syria, recalled in 2022 to our co-author Qutaiba how for many in his province, “When ISIS took over Deir Ezzor province, the poor and those unable to flee were glad that the province did not fall back to the Assad regime. For them, ISIS was the better devil.” </p>
<p>Throughout 2013 and 2014, the <a href="https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/islamic-state">Islamic State group began</a> to take over territory in Syria and Iraq. At the time, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35806229">engaged in a civil war</a>, which began in 2011 when Assad attempted to quash a popular uprising against his family’s 40-year-long rule. </p>
<p>The Assad regime shot at <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/22/syria-protests-forces-shoot">peaceful demonstrators</a>, detained and tortured activists, and <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/coisyria/2022-06-28/Policy-paper-CoH-27-June.pdf">retaliated against communities</a> that challenged his authority. In 2013, the <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2013/09/18/united-nations-releases-report-use-chemical-weapons-syria">Assad regime attacked its own</a> people with sarin gas, killing more than 1,400 people – many of them children – in Eastern Ghouta. </p>
<p>Political instability was not limited to Syria at the time. </p>
<p>In Iraq, for example, then-Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki responded to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-protests/thousands-rally-in-iraqs-day-of-rage-protests-idUSTRE71O1RN20110225">2011 protests</a> against corruption with violence, kidnapping, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2011/02/02/133440159/group-claims-iraq-secret-prison-in-operation">torture and</a> <a href="https://www.jpost.com/opinion/who-are-the-people-killed-by-nouri-al-maliki-and-why-482227">assassinations of activists</a> and protesters. </p>
<p>The Islamic State group grew during the civil conflicts and public uprisings, and <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/whos-who-syrias-civil-war">tried to establish</a> control over territory in parts of Iraq and Syria. </p>
<p>At its height in 2014, IS <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-47678157">controlled</a> 34,000 square miles – or 88,000 square kilometers – across Syria and Iraq, home to about <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034">10 million people</a>. The group also changed <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27994277">its name from the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham to the Islamic State</a>, reflecting its plans to expand control over more territory. </p>
<p>The U.S. launched an <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-us-policy-isis">international military intervention</a> to defeat the Islamic State group in 2014. </p>
<p>This military coalition <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/19/us/politics/trump-syria-turkey-troop-withdrawal.html">brought IS to its knees</a> by the beginning of 2018 and ended its control over the large territory it once controlled in Syria and Iraq.</p>
<p>The U.S. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/19/us/politics/trump-syria-turkey-troop-withdrawal.html">announced it would pull out its troops</a> from Syria in 2018 and declared victory over IS. The Islamic State group lost control over its last <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-47678157">bit of</a> territory in Syria in 2019. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510133/original/file-20230214-16-mmzz9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A group of men, one with crutches and an amputated leg, walk, followed by some men with cameras photographing them." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510133/original/file-20230214-16-mmzz9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510133/original/file-20230214-16-mmzz9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510133/original/file-20230214-16-mmzz9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510133/original/file-20230214-16-mmzz9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510133/original/file-20230214-16-mmzz9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510133/original/file-20230214-16-mmzz9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510133/original/file-20230214-16-mmzz9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Men suspected of having collaborated with the Islamic State group are released from a Syrian prison in October 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1229085930/photo/topshot-syria-conflict-kurds-prisoners.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=mGP42EEK4ZWsKARtSrKaK5OxLHxJxpKX8gWJAF_MWQw=">Delil Souleiman/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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</figure>
<h2>Islamic State group under lockdown</h2>
<p>But despite the group’s setbacks – including <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/gen-raymond-thomas-socom-60000-to-70000-isis-fighters-killed-2017-7">tens of thousands</a> of fighters killed since its rise – IS <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/02/kurdish-leader-isis-conflict-iraq-iran/606502/">remained active in early 2020</a>.</p>
<p>In March 2020, the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/syrian-arab-republic-covid-19-response-2020-fact-sheet">Syrian government enforced</a> a two-month lockdown that closed most businesses and imposed a partial curfew. <a href="https://crisis24.garda.com/alerts/2020/03/iraq-nationwide-lockdown-implemented-march-22-update-15">Iraq</a> <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/coronavirus/2020/06/23/Coronavirus-Egypt-to-reopen-restaurants-cafes-sports-clubs-from-July-27">and Egypt</a> also implemented widespread closures and curfews to prevent COVID-19 from spreading. </p>
<p>We analyzed data on more than 1,500 attacks initiated by IS over an 18-month period in these places during 2019 and 2020. Our <a href="https://www.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055422001423">research, published in January 2023</a>, shows that travel bans and curfews helped reduce IS attacks substantially. </p>
<p>These findings highlight that COVID-19 lockdown measures affected the Islamic State’s ability to operate. The curfews made it difficult for IS to generate revenue and hide its movements by closing public and private institutions and restricting travel between provinces.</p>
<p>Our analysis showed that while in effect, curfews and travel bans helped to significantly reduce IS violence, especially in highly populated areas. </p>
<p>In Iraq, violence declined around 30% because of lockdowns. In Syria, there was an approximate 15% overall reduction in violence during this period.</p>
<p>But in Egypt, the government had already instituted curfews <a href="https://egyptindependent.com/curfew-announced-in-some-north-sinai-areas/">in some areas because of the Islamic State group’s presence</a> and violence there. This made it difficult to analyze COVID-specific lockdowns.</p>
<p>Unlike many other militant groups, IS had large <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/03/isis-caliphate-money-territory/584911/">financial reserves</a> to sustain itself during the lockdown. It also operates in largely <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/207-averting-isis-resurgence-iraq-and-syria">rural areas</a> and, therefore, was not especially vulnerable to the effects of lockdown measures in urban areas. </p>
<h2>Broader implications</h2>
<p>Our research comes at a critical time as policymakers and <a href="https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA900/RRA958-1/RAND_RBA958-1.pdf">counterterrorism experts debate</a> a long-term strategy to eliminate the Islamic State group. </p>
<p>In 2022, the U.S. and <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2023/01/19/who-are-the-syrian-democratic-forces">local military forces in</a> Syria <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/iraqi-security-forces">and Iraq</a> conducted 313 operations in Iraq and Syria, killing 700 IS fighters. </p>
<p>The U.S. and its partners in the region have also killed several prominent <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3266973/us-partners-find-success-in-mission-to-defeat-isis/">IS leaders</a> over the past few years, including Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi, <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2922796/leader-of-isis-dead-following-us-raid-in-syria/">who died</a> in February 2022. </p>
<p>But we think the United States’ <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/10/09/the-us-played-down-turkeys-concerns-about-syrian-kurdish-forces-that-couldnt-last/">current strategy</a>, which focuses heavily on military alliances with local partners, is not sustainable – in part because it does not pay heed to the reasons some people in Syria and Iraq still support IS.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198269/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>While some world leaders and foreign policy experts expected IS to increase its attacks during COVID-19’s early days, travel bans and curfews helped slow violence.Jóhanna Kristín Birnir, Professor Comparative Politics, University of MarylandDawn Brancati, Senior Lecturer, Political Science Department, Yale UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1659052021-09-10T14:29:32Z2021-09-10T14:29:32Z9/11 twenty years on: al-Qaida is defeated – but jihadism is here to stay<p>Twenty years ago, the terrorist group al-Qaida carried out the deadliest attack on US soil the world had ever seen. Overnight, al-Qaida founder Osama bin Laden became the most notorious terrorist to date. </p>
<p>Inspired by pan-Islamist ambitions and outraged by US foreign presence and intervention in the Middle East, this was the highlight of al-Qaida’s campaign to shatter the notion of US hegemony and invincibility. Their ultimate aim was to bring back the <em>umma</em>, the community of all Muslims once united by a political authority. </p>
<p>Al-Qaida first appeared on the terrorism radar in 1998 when it carried out <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/east-african-embassy-bombings">simultaneous bombings</a> on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing 224 people and wounding more than 4,000. In October 2000, al-Qaida rammed a small boat filled with explosives into the USS Cole in the port of Aden, Yemen, <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/uss-cole-bombing">killing 17</a> US navy personnel.</p>
<p>Following the strike on 9/11, so they reckoned, the US would withdraw their military forces from Muslim lands and end their support for its autocratic rulers, ushering in a modern day caliphate.</p>
<p>“I have only a few words for America and its people,” <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2021-08-13/osama-bin-ladens-911-catastrophic-success">bin Laden declared</a> in the aftermath of the attack. “Neither the United States nor he who lives in the United States will enjoy security before we can see it as a reality in Palestine and before all the infidel armies leave the land of Mohammed.” </p>
<p>Bin Laden’s expectations turned out to be a serious miscalculation. Instead of withdrawing military forces, the then US president, George W. Bush, moved swiftly to declare a global “war on terror”, calling on world leaders to join the US in its response. </p>
<p>In October 2001, when a US-led coalition went into Afghanistan to hunt down al-Qaida and oust the Taliban, who had allowed the organisation to operate in the country since 1996, bin Laden was caught off-guard. There was no strategy in place to ensure al-Qaida’s survival.</p>
<h2>Evolution of al-Qaida</h2>
<p>The 9/11 attacks turned out to be a short-lived victory for al-Qaida. Within weeks of the Taliban’s collapse, the majority of its leaders and fighters were captured or killed. Those who managed to escape, including bin Laden, went into hiding in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, an autonomous area bordering Afghanistan. </p>
<p>For ten years, until he was killed by US special forces on May 2, 2011, bin Laden tried but failed to revive al-Qaida and influence its legacy. </p>
<p>The next phase (and arguably the biggest mistake) of the “war on terror” was the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The ousting of the Iraqi president, Saddam Hussein, who had viewed jihadist activity with disdain, led to a political vacuum allowing al-Qaida to rise under terrorist leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Upon his death in a US bomb strike in June 2006, al-Qaida in Iraq would become the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and ultimately merge into the Islamic State (IS).</p>
<p>The highly publicised creation of al-Qaida “franchises” in Iraq and elsewhere including Egypt, North Africa and Yemen, among others, seemed to indicate the revival of al-Qaida. </p>
<p>These franchise leaders, all deeply involved in their respective local disputes, had much to gain from acquiring the infamous brand of al-Qaida. The appearance of the black al-Qaida flag in diverse corners of the world sent shockwaves to Washington. Terrorism experts in the west speculated about the <a href="http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/26305/">reemergence of the group</a> and the severity of its threat with precious little agreement amongst them. </p>
<p>Hidden away, bin Laden and the senior leaders of al-Qaida had little influence over the running of the new franchises. This is evident in terrorism researcher Nelly Lahoud’s careful reading of the “Abottabad letters”, files of internal communications recovered by US special operations forces during their raid on bin Laden’s compound in the Pakistani city of Abbottabad. In the letters, <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2021-08-13/osama-bin-ladens-911-catastrophic-success">bin Laden lamented</a> his “brothers” had become a “liability” for global jihad during the last year of his life. The new generation of jihadis, <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2021-08-13/osama-bin-ladens-911-catastrophic-success">he concluded</a>, had lost their way.</p>
<p>Upon bin Laden’s death in 2011, senior members of al-Qaida vowed to continue the global jihad, promising the <a href="http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/24701/">worst attacks</a> the world had ever seen.</p>
<p>While the vocal threats put al-Qaida back on the international terrorism radar, action never followed. The group formally continued to operate under the command of its new leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. However, it it had no influence over IS, which was beginning to operate with impunity in areas across Iraq and Syria, and orchestrate suicide attacks in Europe.</p>
<p>By 2014, IS – under the lead of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi – had replaced al-Qaida as the terrorist group most worrying to the west. Within five years, on <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-us-canada-50224939">October 27 2019</a> al-Baghdadi was also killed in a US military operation. IS was assumed to be, at least temporarily, defeated. It reemerged spectacularly on 26 August 2021 when IS-K, a local affiliate, claimed responsibility for <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58333533">the Kabul airport attack</a> that claimed the lives of up to 170 people including 13 US service members – the deadliest incident for US troops in Afghanistan in a decade.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/live/world-58279900">On August 30 2021</a> the US completed its withdrawal from Afghanistan, marking the end of America’s longest war. Less than a week later, the Taliban announced a new government and declared it an “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/live/world-58279900">Islamic emirate</a>”. Sarajuddin Haqqani, a US “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/live/world-58279900">most wanted terrorist</a>” is the new acting interior minister.</p>
<p>On the 20th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks al-Qaida might be defeated, but it is clear that jihadism and the ambition to (re)create a caliphate are here to stay.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165905/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christina Hellmich does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The terrorist group behind the 9/11 attacks has been replaced by other jihadist threats.Christina Hellmich, Associate Professor in International Relations and Middle East Studies, University of ReadingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1643002021-07-15T12:26:05Z2021-07-15T12:26:05ZThe US withdraws from Afghanistan after 20 years of war: 4 questions about this historic moment<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411330/original/file-20210714-23-1rxk4ch.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=5%2C0%2C3773%2C2515&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, center, greets Gen. Scott Miller, the former top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, upon Miller's July 14, 2021, return to the U.S. at Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/secretary-of-defense-lloyd-austin-greets-gen-scott-miller-news-photo/1233974983?adppopup=true">Alex Brandon - Pool/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Mark R. Jacobson, a foreign policy expert at the Maxwell School at Syracuse University, served in Afghanistan as a reserve officer in 2006 and then returned in a civilian role, working as a foreign policy adviser to Gen. Stanley McChrystal and later as the deputy NATO senior civilian representative in Afghanistan.</em> </p>
<p><em>As both a scholar and practitioner of foreign policy and national security, Jacobson in the interview below offers both personal and professional perspectives on the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. The interview has been edited for length and clarity.</em></p>
<h2>As an Afghanistan veteran, what do you think at this turning point as the U.S. withdraws from the country?</h2>
<p>I’m saddened by the policy decision to completely withdraw. I think it’s a poor choice and I believe that both President Trump’s and President Biden’s assessment of the issue was based on their belief in a false choice between a so-called <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/17/us/politics/presidential-war-powers.html">“endless war” and full withdrawal</a>. </p>
<p>But I can live with lousy policy decisions. I’m more concerned about my former Afghan colleagues and their families and whether we can do our part to make sure they can evacuate safely if the need arises. What gives me hope is that the Biden administration is taking this issue seriously and <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2021/07/14/biden-afghan-interpreters-evacuation-499625">working through a process to get former interpreters, advisers and their families to the U.S.</a> under the special immigrant visa program. </p>
<p>Each time I served in Afghanistan had a significant impact on me, and each in particular ways. I had a colleague address this issue the other day by saying “I’m just trying to absorb the fact of being on the losing side in a war.” </p>
<p>I don’t feel that way at all and, in fact, rigid conceptions of winning and losing are what created the misunderstanding about what we had to do to succeed in Afghanistan. We focused too much on military victory – defeating the terrorists, defeating the insurgency. What happens on the battlefield is a sideshow. There’s no victory or peace until there’s a political settlement and that can’t be imposed by the United States – it will only come when the intra-Afghan peace talks – between the Taliban and the Afghan government – succeed. </p>
<p>Likewise, I don’t feel most veterans of Afghanistan or Iraq carry the burden that U.S. veterans of the Vietnam War had to struggle with, in terms of a <a href="https://www.history.com/news/vietnam-war-veterans-treatment">population that resented their service</a>.</p>
<h2>Is there a story you tell colleagues that epitomizes your time in the country?</h2>
<p>As an academic, I’ve come to understand my time as a series of stories that, when taken together, show the dissonance that a war like Afghanistan brought to some of us who served. </p>
<p>I had an incredible job during my tour there as an intelligence officer in 2006. Some evenings I’d be at a formal dinner at an Afghan official’s home or a foreign embassy, and then after midnight I’d be in combat gear out on a mission, going after a high-value target with NATO Special Operations Forces. </p>
<p>I spent a lot of time on my own or with a small group, and my nights were busier than my days. Like many others, I left a part of me there that I’ll never get back. But it was worth it, especially when thinking about how our intervention not only protected the United States, but also encompassed what we did for the children in Afghanistan. </p>
<p>I spent a lot of time each week at an orphanage outside of Kabul. I went there after missions or just to see the kids and play with them and practice my rudimentary Dari. I arranged with some Navy vets in the U.S. to send soccer balls for the kids, and one time some friends of mine helped arrange a fundraiser in Washington, D.C., for the orphanage. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411318/original/file-20210714-17-voeyri.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A soldier hikes up to begin an overwatch shift on a hilltop observation post in Afghanistan's mountainous Kunar province." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411318/original/file-20210714-17-voeyri.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411318/original/file-20210714-17-voeyri.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411318/original/file-20210714-17-voeyri.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411318/original/file-20210714-17-voeyri.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411318/original/file-20210714-17-voeyri.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411318/original/file-20210714-17-voeyri.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411318/original/file-20210714-17-voeyri.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Pfc. Bryan Corteal, 22, on Sept. 12, 2011, hikes up to begin his shift on a hilltop observation post at Combat Outpost Monti in Kunar Province, Afghanistan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/NATOAfghanistan/5681a881a28c48ce8eb8b1f8b3b3bb00">AP Photo/David Goldman</a></span>
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<p>Everyone wanted to come with me to the orphanage – folks from my unit, colleagues from the U.S. Embassy – even a Hollywood star who was in-country came to love the place. This was my own pet project, not a formal mission, but I loved it – it reminded me what I was fighting for, to help the children of Afghanistan have a future. </p>
<p>That may not be the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghan-whitepaper-sb/text-new-u-s-strategy-on-afghanistan-and-pakistan-idUSTRE52Q42Z20090327">“disrupt, dismantle, and defeat” al-Qaida mission</a> that U.S. presidents would like to have had, but one that reflects that in the end, wars are about people. And frankly, it was the most meaningful. </p>
<h2>What are the three most important things America has achieved in Afghanistan over the past 20 years?</h2>
<p>Certainly, <a href="https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R45122.pdf">American intervention has prevented terrorists</a> from using Afghanistan as a base for terrorist attacks against the U.S. and our allies. This was, after all, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2021/afghanistan-war-photos/">the rationale for the invasion of October 2001</a>, to eliminate the al-Qaida haven and topple their Taliban hosts. </p>
<p>This achievement may be fleeting, however, as the withdrawal of U.S. forces will diminish the capacity to identify and take action against future threats. After all, the threat of international terrorism based in Afghanistan is not over for good. Groups such as the Islamic State still use the country as a base, and it’s unclear whether or not the Taliban will give up support for an al-Qaida presence in Afghanistan. </p>
<p>The U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, especially during the surge of 2009 to 2011, created greater Afghan military capability and destroyed some Taliban capability. This put the Afghan government in a better position to sit down at the table and find a peaceful way forward. </p>
<p>The challenge is, whether this work by the U.S. military was enough so that the Afghan National Security Forces can handle the Taliban on their own. Other than Afghan Special Operations Forces, their record of tactical success against the Taliban is mixed, and that is cause for concern.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411321/original/file-20210714-25-183ghdz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A woman applies makeup on a customer at a beauty Salon in Kabul, Afghanistan." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411321/original/file-20210714-25-183ghdz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411321/original/file-20210714-25-183ghdz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=421&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411321/original/file-20210714-25-183ghdz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=421&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411321/original/file-20210714-25-183ghdz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=421&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411321/original/file-20210714-25-183ghdz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=529&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411321/original/file-20210714-25-183ghdz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=529&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411321/original/file-20210714-25-183ghdz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=529&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Sultana Karimi applies makeup on a customer at a salon in Kabul, Afghanistan, April 25, 2021. Kabul’s young working women say they fear their dreams may be short-lived if the Taliban return to Kabul.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/AfghanistanWomen/7336d00c3a6648418928205a099ee4ef">AP Photo/Rahmat Gul</a></span>
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<p>Most importantly, American and NATO intervention took the people of Afghanistan back toward a more free and open society that many had not experienced since the 1960s and 1970s. There are millions of girls in school. Women now own businesses and are actors, singers and activists. There are <a href="https://www.ndi.org/afghan_women_seated_in_parliament">68 women in the Afghan Parliament</a>, or 27% of the total, something impossible under Taliban rule, where there was an almost complete ban on female employment.</p>
<p>Likewise, <a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fgwh.2021.610578/full">maternal mortality has been cut in half</a>, the <a href="https://uil.unesco.org/interview-literacy-rate-afghanistan-increased-43-cent">literacy rate in Afghanistan</a> is higher, and more than 67% of Afghans <a href="https://www.unicef.org/afghanistan/wash-water-sanitation-and-hygiene">have access to clean water</a>. </p>
<h2>President Biden has said, “It’s the right and the responsibility of Afghan people alone to decide their future and how they want to run their country.” What are some of the challenges Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and his people face?</h2>
<p>The lack of a U.S. military presence fundamentally changes the security dynamics in Afghanistan, reducing the leverage necessary to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table, especially with the loss of U.S. air power.</p>
<p>Additionally, security is a precondition to development, and it’s unclear how long the <a href="https://ngo.gov.af/en/">international development community</a>, which has had a large presence in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, will be able to work, or whether Afghan nationals will be safe implementing these projects. </p>
<p>A political solution is the only way this war ends – and not one imposed by the United States, but one agreed to by Afghan parties. This was one of the great failures of <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/afghanistan-bonnagreement2001">the agreement on interim governance for Afghanistan</a> negotiated in Bonn in December 2001 – not having a seat at the table for the Taliban.</p>
<p>Additionally, while the U.S. and the Taliban <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-taliban-truce-begins-feeding-hope-of-a-peaceful-more-prosperous-afghanistan-127772">reached an agreement in February 2020</a> – albeit one the Taliban are not living up to – the so-called “intra-Afghan” peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban underway in Doha <a href="https://theconversation.com/afghanistans-peace-process-is-stalled-can-the-taliban-be-trusted-to-hold-up-their-end-of-the-deal-144335">are not yet complete</a>.</p>
<p>President Ghani must get the Taliban to the table to discuss a permanent cease-fire and a political settlement. I worry, however, this will be tough to do with the Taliban once again growing in power. In the end, it may be the U.S. withdrawal that, ironically, prevents the Afghan people from deciding their future.</p>
<p>[<em>Understand key political developments, each week.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/politics-weekly-74/?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=politics-understand">Subscribe to The Conversation’s politics newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/164300/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mark R. Jacobson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A scholar and practitioner of foreign policy and national security offers personal and professional perspectives on the US withdrawal from Afghanistan.Mark R. Jacobson, Assistant Dean of the Maxwell School of Citzenship & Public Affairs, Syracuse UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1259872019-10-30T12:56:26Z2019-10-30T12:56:26ZWill killing Al-Baghdadi give Trump a boost in the polls? Probably, but it won’t last<p>After former Islamic State Group leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was killed in a U.S military action, speculation began on <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/politics/the-killing-of-al-baghdadi-is-a-win-trump-needed-but-the-credit-could-be-fleeting/ar-AAJrIGv">whether or not President Donald Trump would get a boost in public opinion surveys</a> as a result.</p>
<p><a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=3y3BVcEAAAAJ&hl=en">My political science research</a> with my students shows that presidents do enjoy a short-term poll boost after foreign policy raids and capital city captures.</p>
<p>However, that’s often followed by a long-term decline. </p>
<h2>A closer look at the polls</h2>
<p>Supporters of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/449098.pdf">the diversionary theory of war</a>, known in the media as the <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1998-aug-26-mn-16707-story.html">“Wag the Dog” effect</a>, contend that presidents can boost their approval ratings in the polls by fighting a war abroad. </p>
<p>In other words, they benefit from a burst of patriotism during the conflict. </p>
<p>But <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/174524.pdf">international relations scholars Bradley Lian and John R. Oneal</a> tested this theory by looking at conflicts from 1950 through 1984 and found scant empirical support for this hypothesis.</p>
<p>My students and I considered 12 cases to determine whether presidents benefit at the polls from conducting raids involving the capture of a leader, seizure of a capital city or an attempt to rescue hostages, and how long that support can be expected to last.</p>
<p>The events we looked at included the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/december/20/newsid_4054000/4054951.stm">surrender of Manuel Noriega</a> in January of 1990; the <a href="https://www.upi.com/Top_News/2018/12/13/On-This-Day-US-troops-capture-Saddam-Hussein/9531544457729/">apprehension of Saddam Hussein</a> in 2003; and the <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8839964/Col-Gaddafi-killed-convoy-bombed-by-drone-flown-by-pilot-in-Las-Vegas.html">killing of Moammar Gaddafi</a> in 2011.</p>
<p>We looked at polls conducted by the <a href="https://news.gallup.com/interactives/185273/presidential-job-approval-center.aspx">Gallup Polling Presidential Job Approval Center</a>, calculating an average of three presidential approval polls taken before the foreign policy event, and the mean of the first three polls issued after the case. </p>
<p>We also analyzed polls taken by the end of the year, or six months later if the raid took place near the end of the year, to see how presidents fared long after the event.</p>
<p>Our results show that in 75% of cases, the U.S. president received a boost in the polls shortly after a foreign policy raid or capital capture. </p>
<p><iframe id="bVj5R" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/bVj5R/3/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>But the jump is short lived. In 83% of cases, presidential approval declined over the next several months. In seven cases, it fell by more than five percentage points from the initial poll boost.</p>
<p>For example, President Donald Trump insisted that al-Baghdadi’s death was a bigger deal than <a href="https://psmag.com/news/bin-ladens-death-and-previous-terrorist-passings-30828">the raid that killed Osama Bin-Laden</a>. That <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2012/11/07/turnout-and-organization-were-key-to-obama-victory/1688537/">May 2011 event was widely credited with sealing President Barack Obama’s reelection</a> the following year.</p>
<p>That credit may have been misplaced. Our evidence shows that Obama’s approval ratings had declined to 45% by December of 2011.</p>
<p><iframe id="XIVka" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/XIVka/4/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Thus, if history is any guide, I expect that Trump may have higher approval ratings in the coming days but shouldn’t count on better polls over the next several months.</p>
<p>[ <em>You’re smart and curious about the world. So are The Conversation’s authors and editors.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=youresmart">You can read us daily by subscribing to our newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/125987/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nothing to disclose. This research was completed with the help of students Pete Alford, Thomas Bird, Tia Braxton, Casey Evans, Natalie Glass, Olivia Hanners, Alanna Martin, Wade Ray, Yasmin Roper, Payton Smith, Katie Still, Jason Timms, Kento Uno, Andrew Valbuena, Ben Womack, and Bre Wyrosdick.</span></em></p>After a foreign policy win, presidents usually enjoy a short-term poll boost. But that’s often followed by a long-term decline.John A. Tures, Professor of Political Science, LaGrange CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1148312019-04-10T08:34:15Z2019-04-10T08:34:15ZIslamic State: the ‘caliphate’ is off the map for now, but will evolve in dangerous ways<p>The so-called Islamic State (IS) recently lost its <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-45547595">last remnant of territory in Syria</a>, but observers were quick to remind the world that the war against the organisation is <a href="https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/03/18/trump-isis-terrorists-defeated-foreign-policy-225816">far from over</a>. What then does this loss of territorial control actually mean for IS?</p>
<p>At its height, the self-proclaimed “caliphate” controlled an estimated <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/the-times-view-on-the-fall-of-isis-state-of-collapse-2xx9dt9cl">34,000 square miles</a> across Syria and Iraq, so its defeat on the ground is clearly a severe blow for it. Nevertheless, IS is now <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/11/world/middleeast/isis-syria.html?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Frukmini-callimachi&action=click&contentCollection=undefined&region=stream&module=inline&version=latest&contentPlacement=18&pgtype=collection">expected</a> to evolve. Its networks will disperse into virtual, online spaces and become largely invisible. It will focus on insurgency tactics and terror attacks with a wider reach.</p>
<p>In the face of this evolution, it may seem like maintaining IS in a <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2019-02-18/isis-not-terrorist-group">contained</a> geographic pocket would have been better than eradicating its primary territorial base altogether. With its defeat on the ground in Syria and Iraq, however, IS and its offshoots will have a more limited capacity for recruitment, indoctrination and growth.</p>
<h2>The importance of territory</h2>
<p>The success of rebel groups to survive protracted armed conflicts is dependent on their ability to maintain territorial <a href="https://www.scholars.northwestern.edu/en/publications/rebelocracy-a-theory-of-social-order-in-civil-war">control</a>. They require it to extract resources and enlist local recruits. </p>
<p>Territorial control allows armed groups to force local populations into <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/07/07/the-logic-of-violence-in-islamic-states-war/?utm_term=.a02d92013da8">compliance and conformity</a> with their ideological outlook. Since its inception, IS understood that its radical “Islamic” community does not locally exist. Instead, the organisation set about creating it, reshaping communities under its control in its own image. </p>
<p>Comparative evidence from civil wars around the world demonstrates how territorial control does not depend on a local population’s ideological agreement with the forces in place. Instead, in his book <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/logic-of-violence-in-civil-war/3DFE74EA492295FC6940D58CA8EF4D5C">The Logic of Violence in Civil War</a>, Stathis Kalyvas argues that a combination of coercive measures and local administrative bodies allows a force to maintain order, stability and compliance.</p>
<p>For example, during the Liberian civil war in the early 1990s, NPFL (The National Patriotic Front of Liberia) rebels, led by <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-41509896">Charles Taylor</a>, used administrative bodies and courts in the territory they controlled to create an alternative order backed up by displays of brutality and violence. This <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436599550036266">led</a> to an intricate system of patronage and loyalty that created new dependencies between local communities and the new regime.</p>
<p>These Taylor-era Liberian courts are comparable to IS’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/04/04/world/middleeast/isis-documents-mosul-iraq.html">religious courts</a> which controlled the issuing of permits for cross border activities, defined the educational content of local schools, distributed social services – and carried out extreme public punishments. </p>
<p>In enduring armed conflict, these administrative bodies, social services and displays of order encourage the cooperation of the local population. In other words, territorial control allows the occupier to manage the behaviour and, potentially, the ideology of the people under its control. </p>
<h2>Instruments of control</h2>
<p>Under IS, spectacles of brutality and violence were a key part of this. Public executions involved people being incinerated, stoned, decapitated, and thrown off towers. Staged in front of local people, these executions were carefully choreographed, and meticulously documented and disseminated – both locally and internationally. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/268464/original/file-20190409-2914-1w5m035.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/268464/original/file-20190409-2914-1w5m035.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268464/original/file-20190409-2914-1w5m035.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268464/original/file-20190409-2914-1w5m035.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268464/original/file-20190409-2914-1w5m035.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268464/original/file-20190409-2914-1w5m035.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268464/original/file-20190409-2914-1w5m035.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">At its height, Islamic State controlled large swathes of Syria and Iraq.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/download/success?u=http%3A%2F%2Fdownload.shutterstock.com%2Fgatekeeper%2FW3siZSI6MTU1NDg2NDA3NSwiYyI6Il9waG90b19zZXNzaW9uX2lkIiwiZGMiOiJpZGxfMjIwODYyMDExIiwiayI6InBob3RvLzIyMDg2MjAxMS9tZWRpdW0uanBnIiwibSI6MSwiZCI6InNodXR0ZXJzdG9jay1tZWRpYSJ9LCJaRnkza1pDbXdqZWRtT2hvdStMblRsNXNKMFkiXQ%2Fshutterstock_220862011.jpg&pi=33421636&m=220862011&src=JJCm7jxbmTTwGitAD46kAQ-1-14">Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>IS explicitly <a href="https://clarionproject.org/docs/isis-isil-islamic-state-magazine-Issue-1-the-return-of-khilafah.pdf">claimed</a> that these acts of brutality were intended to create a vacuum by disrupting local societal structures that could then be “filled” and “managed” by them. Essentially, displays of violence were used as an instrument of social organisation.</p>
<p>Data <a href="https://www.strikingmargins.com/news-1/2018/9/21/dr-harout-akdedian-at-university-of-utrecht-workshop-on-syira">personally collected</a> between 2012 and 2014 shows that many living under the rule of radicalised groups such as IS judge these groups based on their own immediate day-to-day conditions rather than the organisation’s overall performance or outlook.</p>
<p>If administrative structures function and people have access to food and basic services, for example, local populations may overlook – or even adhere to – the occupying force’s ideology (albeit under duress). And those that don’t are severely and publicly punished as an “example” to others. </p>
<p>The 2014 executions of members of the Sunni Arab al-Sheitaat tribe, in Deir el-Zor, Syria, are a case in point. IS took the lives of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-execution/islamic-state-executed-700-people-%20from-syrian-tribe-monitoring-group-idUSKBN0GG0H120140817">more than 700</a> of its members for revoking a pledge of allegiance. In addition, IS incessantly targeted <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/09/02/the-islamic-state-vs-al-qaeda/">other</a> Jihadi or predominantly Sunni rebel formations. Indeed, the tally of those killed continues to <a href="https://www.apnews.com/01c50935854b425295ef8731cdfc42a4,%20a">increase</a> as more mass graves are discovered. </p>
<h2>Violent consolidation</h2>
<p>Such atrocities were examples of IS consolidating its power through the elimination of rivals and the suppression of potential or real dissent within its area of control. Faced with this, local populations had no choice but to imitate expressions of religiosity as defined by IS and to demonstrate compliance. For local people, this was a method of adaptation and survival – but IS’s loss of territorial control now greatly reduces its capacity to control and indoctrinate local residents in this way.</p>
<p>The question of how IS’s methods impacted local populations in the long run is yet to be answered. A lot will depend on what happens next in its former territory and to those living there now. </p>
<p>Either way, while IS is badly incapacitated, it certainly is not finished. It will most likely splinter into new organisations which might try to establish territorial control <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/178-how-islamic-state-rose-fell-and-could-rise-again-maghreb">elsewhere</a>. Parts of North Africa and the Maghreb are particularly susceptible, where control over vast swathes of land remain <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ia/article-abstract/93/4/883/3897522?redirectedFrom=fulltext">contested</a>. In the meantime, IS will continue to try to nurture its virtual communities and seek new audiences online.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/114831/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Harout Akdedian does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Its defeat in Syria may now give way to new dangers.Harout Akdedian, Carnegie SFM Postdoctoral fellow, Central European UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1130112019-03-08T11:43:22Z2019-03-08T11:43:22ZHow women wage war – a short history of IS brides, Nazi guards and FARC insurgents<p>The names of American-born Hoda Muthana and Brit Shamima Begum have appeared in countless headlines in the United States and Europe since these two female members of the Islamic State group were discovered in a large displaced persons camp weeks ago. </p>
<p>The women were among the holdouts in Islamic State’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/03/isis-nowhere-baghouz-last-stronghold-syrian-defence-forces">last stronghold</a> in Baghouz, Syria. When they were <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/shamima-begum-bring-me-home-says-bethnal-green-girl-who-fled-to-join-isis-hgvqw765d">found</a> by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/17/us-woman-hoda-muthana-deeply-regrets-joining-isis-and-wants-return-home">journalists</a>, one was pregnant and the other was caring for her young child.</p>
<p>In the four years that these women lived as part of IS, they went from a self-described idyll in IS’s capital, Raqqa, to fleeing airstrikes with little more than the clothes on their backs. Now, as young mothers, they have been held up as iconic <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/24/isis-brides-secret-world-jihad-western-women-syria">IS brides</a>, evidence of the group’s ability to distort the minds of vulnerable teenagers.</p>
<p>In numerous <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5bzeMFx8R2k">interviews</a>, these two women have wholeheartedly adopted this narrative.</p>
<p>“When I went to Syria, I was just a housewife for the entire four years – stayed at home, took care of my husband, took care of my kids,” Begum <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/is-bride-shamima-begum-full-transcript-i-did-have-a-good-time-there-11640278">told Sky News</a>. Although Muthana incited the murder of Americans on <a href="https://www.buzzfeednews.com/amphtml/ellievhall/gone-girl-an-interview-with-an-american-in-isis?__twitter_impression=true">Twitter</a>, according to these women’s accounts they did not take part in Islamic State’s <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/eprint/mFTJeBS22yPWqr37QecV/full">violence</a>. They did not even see it. </p>
<h2>A history of impunity</h2>
<p>We’ve heard this story before. </p>
<p>As Wendy Lower meticulously details in <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Hitlers-Furies-German-Killing-Fields/dp/0544334493/">“Hitler’s Furies: German Women in the Nazi Killing Fields,”</a> roughly half a million German women followed their husbands or volunteered to settle the territory conquered by Nazi Germany in Eastern Europe. Women on the Eastern Front were integral to the expansion of the Nazi state, serving in key administrative, logistical and medical roles.</p>
<p>Some of these Nazi women also perpetrated horrific crimes. As many as <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/18/world/europe/18holocaust.html">5,000</a> served as concentration camp guards. Roughly 10,000 women were SS auxiliaries, or <a href="https://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/1183">Helferinnen</a>, serving in a bureaucracy that murdered millions in the gas chambers of Auschwitz and elsewhere. A total of 7,900 women were employed in the <a href="https://homepage.univie.ac.at/ljiljana.radonic/texte/Schwarz.pdf">SS Frauenkorps</a>, where those working as secretaries would often decide which political prisoners ended up on the day’s kill lists. Thousands more Nazi nurses assisted in heinous medical experiments and euthanasia. </p>
<p>Yet, like most of the women in IS, <a href="http://hydrastg.library.cornell.edu/fedora/objects/nur:01147/datastreams/pdf/content">Nazi women</a> did not engage in armed combat. They clung to the <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Women-in-Nazi-Germany-1st-Edition/Stephenson/p/book/9780582418363">gender roles and identities</a> that National Socialism had created for them as wives and mothers.</p>
<p>As the Third Reich collapsed around them, most Nazi women in the East fled and returned to their former lives in Germany. Of the few who were apprehended, only a small portion ever faced justice. Following a military trial, the United Kingdom executed one such woman – <a href="https://www.upi.com/Archives/1945/12/14/Belsen-Beast-Irma-Grese-hanged-with-nine-other-horror-camp-aides/9191481832607/">Irma Grese</a>, a 22-year-old Bergen-Belsen guard. But the vast majority of Nazi women were never held to account for their crimes, <a href="https://www.welt.de/regionales/hamburg/article156213757/Geschichte-einer-Frau-die-unbedingt-zur-SS-wollte.html">in Germany</a> or abroad.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/262574/original/file-20190307-100802-fdwioe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/262574/original/file-20190307-100802-fdwioe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/262574/original/file-20190307-100802-fdwioe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/262574/original/file-20190307-100802-fdwioe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/262574/original/file-20190307-100802-fdwioe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/262574/original/file-20190307-100802-fdwioe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=592&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/262574/original/file-20190307-100802-fdwioe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=592&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/262574/original/file-20190307-100802-fdwioe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=592&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Irma Grese, shown here in 1945, was an SS supervisor at the Nazi concentration camp Bergen-Belsen. Grese was later hanged for war crimes.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Associated-Press-International-News-Germany-WWI-/48f2711962e5da11af9f0014c2589dfb/4/0">AP photo</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Insurgent women</h2>
<p>The roles carved out for women in Islamic State and Nazi Germany as wives and mothers, first, and perpetrators of violence, second, differ from the experiences of most women in armed groups. </p>
<p>In <a href="http://press.georgetown.edu/book/georgetown/insurgent-women">“Insurgent Women: Female Combatants in Civil Wars,”</a> <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Why-Women-Rebel-Understanding-Womens-Participation-in-Armed-Rebel-Groups/Henshaw/p/book/9781138209855">Alexis Henshaw</a>, <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/us/book/9783319401409">Ora Szekely</a> and I detail women’s participation in conflicts in Colombia, Ukraine and the Kurdish regions of the Middle East. Women in rebel groups in these contexts often participate in combat, in addition to communications, logistics and other support roles. </p>
<p>In Colombia’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-36605769">FARC</a>, women were first mobilized with their families as the wives of fighters. Only later were women permitted to take up arms, eventually constituting between 30 and 40 percent of the FARC’s fighting force. Unlike IS, which encouraged women to give birth to grow the population of the caliphate, the FARC heavily regulated <a href="https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-07-20/end-farcs-50-year-pregnancy-ban-leads-baby-boom">women’s fertility and sexual relations</a>. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-35082412">Forced abortions</a> and abandoned children were accepted as a cost of victory.</p>
<p>In contrast, many women who took up arms against the Ukrainian military in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine did so precisely because they were mothers. Women in these <a href="https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/female-warlord-defects-to-ukraine-details-russias-involvement-in-donbas.html">pro-Russian</a> separatist groups often say they are fighting to protect their families and their homeland, having been abandoned by men who are avoiding conscription by both sides of the conflict. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/06/ukraine-women-battalion-mans-barricades-201463132521484197.html">Yelena Dustova</a>, a 39-year-old mother of three, said, “What, should I allow them to shoot at me in my town? No. I will stand here so that they won’t be allowed to pass. I have my mom and kids in there.”</p>
<p>As our book <a href="http://press.georgetown.edu/book/georgetown/insurgent-women">“Insurgent Women”</a> details, rebel women in the Donbas see no tension between their duties driving tanks, staffing checkpoints or serving as snipers and their roles as daughters, mothers and wives. </p>
<h2>Holding women accountable</h2>
<p>Women’s roles in armed groups vary. But, in large part due to their ability to blur the line between civilian and combatant, women’s often unseen contributions to conflict can be key to an armed group’s success. </p>
<p>The mobilization of <a href="https://icsr.info/2018/07/23/from-daesh-to-diaspora-tracing-the-women-and-minors-of-islamic-state/">more than 4,700 women</a> like Shamima Begum and Hoda Muthana by IS was unprecedented because they were foreign. But women’s participation in violent projects to remake their societies is more common than we realize.</p>
<p>Tens of thousands of Nazi women escaped justice. This historical precedent should be considered as governments decide how they will hold the women of IS to account for their crimes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/113011/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jessica Trisko Darden is a Jeane Kirkpatrick Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.</span></em></p>Hundreds of thousands of women helped the Nazi cause. Few ever faced justice.Jessica Trisko Darden, Assistant Professor of International Affairs, American University School of International ServiceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1044662019-02-27T11:41:57Z2019-02-27T11:41:57ZWill terrorism continue to decline in 2019?<p>Lost in the headlines, rapidly accelerating news cycles and the pervasive fear generated by terrorist threats is the fact that terrorist attacks worldwide have actually been declining – in some areas substantially. </p>
<p>Terrorism researchers like me have long noted that the number of terrorist attacks <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/177387728/The-Four-Waves-of-Rebel-Terror-and-September-11">rises and</a> <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/The_New_Global_Terrorism.html?id=nITaAAAAMAAJ">falls in waves – generally lasting several decades</a>. </p>
<p>I’m the founding director of the National Consortium for the <a href="https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/">Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, or START</a>, and one of the original creators of the Global Terrorism Database. My <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Putting-Terrorism-in-Context-Lessons-from-the-Global-Terrorism-Database/LaFree-Dugan-Miller/p/book/9780415671422">colleagues Laura Dugan, Erin Miller and I define terrorism</a> as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by non-state actors to attain a political, economic, religious or social goal through fear, coercion or intimidation.” The database shows that the world has been gripped by a wave of terrorist attacks that <a href="https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/">began shortly after the 9/11 attacks</a>.</p>
<p>My research using the START database shows the extent of this spike. From 2002 through 2014, worldwide terrorist attacks increased by 12 times and terrorist fatalities increased by more than eight times. Especially hard hit were Iraq and Afghanistan in the Middle East, India and Pakistan in South Asia, and Nigeria in sub-Saharan Africa.</p>
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<p>The most active terrorist organizations driving this worldwide boom were the Taliban, Al-Shabaab, the Islamic State Group (also known as IS), the Communist Party of India–Maoist and Boko Haram. </p>
<p>But since 2014, the picture has <a href="http://www.start.umd.edu/publication/putting-terrorism-context-lessons-global-terrorism-database-contemporary-terrorism">changed dramatically</a> – a development that has gone largely unreported in the media.</p>
<p>Let’s examine that change.</p>
<h2>A downward trend</h2>
<p>In 2015 total <a href="http://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_GTD_Overview2017_July2018.pdf">terrorist attacks decreased</a> by 11.5 percent and total terrorism-related deaths by 12.7 percent. </p>
<p>In 2016, we saw a further 9.2 percent decrease in attacks and 10.2 percent decline in total terrorism-related deaths. </p>
<p>The downward trend continued in 2017, the most recent data available, with a 19.8 percent drop in attacks and a 24.2 percent decline in fatalities.</p>
<p>Taken together, these 36 months have witnessed the single largest three-year decline in attacks and fatalities since the Global Terrorism Database began in 1970 – nearly a half century ago.</p>
<p>The recent declines are geographically dispersed. In the peak year of 2014, five countries – Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Ukraine and Somalia – accounted for 57.2 percent of the world’s total terrorist attacks and more than half of the worldwide terrorism-related fatalities. </p>
<p>By the end of 2017, all five of these countries had experienced sizable declines in attacks.</p>
<p>Three of these countries also experienced a dramatic decline in fatalities: a 53.6 percent drop in Iraq, a 55.4 percent drop in Pakistan, and a 97.1 percent drop in Ukraine. The violence in Ukraine was concentrated in 2014 and 2015 and associated with the rapid rise of the <a href="https://jsis.washington.edu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Ukraine_Euromaidan_CCP_ii.pdf">Euromaidan revolution</a> and culminated in the overthrow of the Russian-backed Ukrainian president.</p>
<p>During the same period, fatalities increased by 12.5 percent in Afghanistan and 203 percent in Somalia, but these increases weren’t big enough to offset the declines in Iraq, Pakistan and Ukraine.</p>
<h2>Major groups less active</h2>
<p>Attacks and fatalities claimed by the world’s most active and dangerous terrorist organizations have also declined during the last three years. </p>
<p>In 2014, the five most active terrorist organizations in the world were the Islamic State Group, or IS, the Taliban, Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram and the Donetsk People’s Republic – a separatist organization operating in Ukraine and receiving military backing from Russia.</p>
<p>By the end of 2017, attacks by the Taliban, Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram and the Donetsk People’s Republic had all declined. Total attacks by IS decreased by 2.2 percent from 2014 to 2015 but then increased by 7.7 percent from 2015 to 2017.</p>
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<p>In Western Europe and the United States, total terrorist attacks are down sharply from the 1970s. In 2017, Western Europe accounted for only 2.7 percent of worldwide attacks and the United States for less than 1 percent of attacks.</p>
<p>That may seem surprising given the amount of media attention generated by a small number of high profile attacks. In 2015, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34818994">attacks in Paris</a> took the lives of 130 and injured another 400. In 2016, Western Europe experienced a series of mass casualty attacks carried out by IS and its affiliates in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/16/islamic-state-claims-responsibility-for-nice-truck-attack">Nice</a>, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/23/world/europe/brussels-airport-explosions.html">Brussels</a> and <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2016/12/20/europe/berlin-christmas-market-truck/index.html">Berlin</a>. </p>
<p>While the total number of attacks in the United States remains extremely low, the public was shocked in 2015 by the 14 victims of the attack by <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/san-bernardino-shooting">Syed Farook and Tashfeen Malik in San Bernardino, California</a>, and the nine people killed by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/10/us/dylann-roof-trial-charleston.html">Dylann Roof’s attack at the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church</a> in Charleston, South Carolina. </p>
<p>In 2016, Americans witnessed the 49 deaths linked to the assault carried out by <a href="https://www.npr.org/tags/481924875/omar-mateen">Omar Mateen in Orlando, Florida</a>. And in 2017, Americans learned of the eight deaths in New York City linked to <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/28/us/new-york-terror-attack-arraignment/index.html">Sayfullo Habibullaevic Saipov</a> who claimed an affiliation with IS. </p>
<h2>Some hotspots remain</h2>
<p>Terrorist attacks and fatalities are not declining everywhere and every year. </p>
<p>The START database shows that in 2017, attacks and fatalities increased in India, the Philippines and Nepal. In 2016, attacks and fatalities increased in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan and Turkey. And in 2015 attacks and fatalities increased in Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Egypt.</p>
<p>Also, while worldwide attacks have declined, a large number of countries are still being targeted. Thus, while terrorist attacks took place in a total of 100 countries in 2014, total countries experiencing attacks was 99 in 2015, 108 in 2016 and 100 in 2017. Countries only experiencing attacks in 2016 included Kazkhstan, Panama and Switzerland.</p>
<p>This effect was especially apparent with IS and its affiliates, which claimed fewer attacks and deaths in 2017 but at the same time carried out attacks in a larger number of different countries. </p>
<p>Not all reasons for declines in terrorist attacks are positive. </p>
<p>For example, an argument can be made that terrorist attacks have declined in <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/afghanistans-terrorism-resurgence-al-qaida-isis-and-beyond/">Afghanistan</a> in part because the Taliban in recent years has been <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/afghanistans-terrorism-resurgence-al-qaida-isis-and-beyond/">so successful</a> in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/21/world/asia/afghanistan-security-casualties-taliban.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FTaliban&action=click&contentCollection=timestopics&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=1&pgtype=collection">taking back control</a> of the country.</p>
<p>A similar outcome – but with the regime rather than the terrorist perpetrators gaining control of the situation – no doubt explains <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/23/the-syrian-war-is-over-and-america-lost/">declining terrorist attacks and fatalities in Syria</a>. </p>
<p>While we have observed major declines in terrorist attacks and fatalities from 2015 to 2017, both <a href="http://www.start.umd.edu/news/terrorist-violence-decreases-worldwide-2017-remains-historically-high">attacks and fatalities remain at historically high levels</a>. </p>
<p>The number of attacks in 2017 is 27.9 percent higher than in 2012, and deaths 70.6 percent higher. </p>
<p>Even more strikingly, attacks were more than twice as common in 2017 as they were during 1992 – the peak year for an earlier wave.</p>
<h2>An end to chaos?</h2>
<p>One thing is certain: The number of terrorist attacks in a particular region of the world as a whole will eventually peak and then decline. </p>
<p>It seems logical to conclude that the chaos and disorder that follow in the wake of terrorist attacks provide strong incentives for societies to adopt strategies for countering them.</p>
<p>Few individuals or communities prefer living endlessly in chaos and violence. We can only hope that we have reached that tipping point in 2019. At the same time, we must humbly admit that <a href="https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/04/do-terrorist-groups-really-die-a-warning.html">prediction is the most precarious</a> task of the social sciences.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/104466/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gary LaFree receives funding from the National Institute of Justice, the US State Department and the Department of Homeland Security.</span></em></p>Terrorist attacks and fatalities peaked in 2014, and have been on the decline since then.Gary LaFree, Professor of Criminology and Criminal Justice, University of MarylandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1045302018-10-05T21:01:08Z2018-10-05T21:01:08ZWarriors against sexual violence win Nobel Peace Prize: 4 essential reads<p>In a world whose attention is <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/metoo-goes-global-and-crosses-multiple-boundaries">fixed on the victims of sexual assault and violence</a>, the 2018 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Denis Mukwege of the Congo and Nadia Murad of Iraq “for their efforts to end the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war and armed conflict.”</p>
<p>The two winners, said the <a href="https://www.nobelpeaceprize.org/The-Nobel-Peace-Prize-2018">Nobel committee in its award announcement</a>, “have made a crucial contribution to focusing attention on, and combating, such war crimes. Denis Mukwege is the helper who has devoted his life to defending these victims. Nadia Murad is the witness who tells of the abuses perpetrated against herself and others.”</p>
<p>The Conversation’s archives provide background on the problems the two winners are trying to address. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/239541/original/file-20181005-72130-mdqeb5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/239541/original/file-20181005-72130-mdqeb5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/239541/original/file-20181005-72130-mdqeb5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=378&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/239541/original/file-20181005-72130-mdqeb5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=378&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/239541/original/file-20181005-72130-mdqeb5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=378&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/239541/original/file-20181005-72130-mdqeb5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/239541/original/file-20181005-72130-mdqeb5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/239541/original/file-20181005-72130-mdqeb5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Nobel Peace Prize winners Denis Mukwege, left, and Nadia Murad, right.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Nobel-Peace-Prize/5899fc698d774153b360444ff6d20506/9/0">AP/Christian Lutz</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>1. Helping the victims</h2>
<p>In 2015, scholar Lee Ann De Reus got ahead of the Nobel committee when she wrote an analysis for The Conversation headlined <a href="https://theconversation.com/denis-mukwege-deserves-the-nobel-peace-prize-for-his-work-in-congo-48489">“Denis Mukwege Deserves the Nobel Peace Prize for His Work in Congo.”</a>. </p>
<p>Mukwege, a physician, runs a hospital for victims of sexualized violence in the Congo, the site of armed conflicts for the last 20 years. One 2011 study estimated that 48 women were raped every hour in that country. While what is known as the Second Congo War ended in 2003 with an estimated 5 million dead, violence has continued throughout the country since then, with rape frequently used by militias to terrorize civilians. </p>
<p>Hospital records documented that at the time De Reus wrote the article, Mukwege had “personally treated over 20,000 women, girls, men and boys who have suffered the physical and psychological wounds of traumatic rape.”</p>
<h2>2. Fighting IS</h2>
<p>Reports emerged from the Middle East in 2015 that the Islamic State group, or IS, was systematically raping women and girls under the pretext that their religion sanctioned such assaults on non-Muslims. Nobel winner Nadia Murad, a member of a minority in Iraq known as the Yazidis, was herself raped by IS members, along with thousands of other women and girls abducted by the militants. Murad was able to escape her captors and has subsequently devoted herself to publicizing the ordeal of IS victims. </p>
<p>“Beheadings, burning people alive, mass rape – these are <a href="https://theconversation.com/isis-has-changed-international-law-56781">the methods of IS terror,”</a> writes international law scholar Michael Scharf. But countries that wanted to fight IS and its brutal methods found themselves in a quandary, wrote Scharf. IS wasn’t a state, and international law made fighting such a group difficult. The need to fight IS, writes Scharf, would challenge international law’s very foundation. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/239542/original/file-20181005-72100-1uxclua.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/239542/original/file-20181005-72100-1uxclua.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/239542/original/file-20181005-72100-1uxclua.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=865&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/239542/original/file-20181005-72100-1uxclua.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=865&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/239542/original/file-20181005-72100-1uxclua.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=865&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/239542/original/file-20181005-72100-1uxclua.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1086&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/239542/original/file-20181005-72100-1uxclua.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1086&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/239542/original/file-20181005-72100-1uxclua.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1086&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A 47-year-old rape victim in the refugee camp in the Liberian capital Monrovia in 2003. Kula, who wished to have her identity protected for fear of reprisals, was repeatedly gang-raped by rebels.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Nobel-Peace-Sexual-Violence-In-Conflicts/565bcd9781254669b0362ab2402df3f3/4/0">AP/Ben Curtis</a></span>
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<h2>3. ‘Global pandemic’ of sexual violence</h2>
<p>Women across the globe experience sexual assault and sexual violence at shockingly high rates, write Valerie Dobiesz and Julia Brooks, <a href="https://theconversation.com/its-not-just-oreilly-and-weinstein-sexual-violence-is-a-global-pandemic-85960">experts in emergency medicine and legal research</a>. </p>
<p>From honor killings to female infanticide to forced marriages and trafficking, “This issue transcends national borders and class boundaries to touch the lives of roughly 33 percent of all women worldwide,” they write. </p>
<h2>4. Stopping sexual predation where it starts</h2>
<p>How to fight the scourge of sexual assault and violence in the U.S.? <a href="https://theconversation.com/want-to-prevent-sexual-harassment-and-assault-start-by-teaching-kids-85879">Begin with children</a>, write scholars Poco Kernsmith, Joanne Smith-Darden and Megan Hicks. </p>
<p>Right now, prevention programs focus on teaching girls and women how to minimize their risks of being assaulted. Instead, write the scholars, “Real prevention needs to focus on the only person who can actually prevent harassment: the potential perpetrator.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/104530/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
With the 2018 Nobel Peace Prize awarded to two leaders who fight against sexual violence as a tool of war, we looked into our archive to find stories about those efforts across the globe.Naomi Schalit, Senior Editor, Politics + Democracy, The Conversation USLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1029662018-09-11T10:37:45Z2018-09-11T10:37:45ZWhy al-Qaida is still strong 17 years after 9/11<p>Seventeen years ago, on Sept. 11, 2001, al-Qaida conducted the most destructive terrorist attack in history. </p>
<p>An unprecedented onslaught from the U.S. followed. <a href="https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/20177.pdf">One-third of al-Qaida’s leadership</a> was killed or captured in the following year. The group lost its safe haven in <a href="https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/369161-2001-03-27-afghanistan-an-incubator-for.html">Afghanistan</a>, including its extensive <a href="https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/369179-2003-06-20-afghanistan-camps-central-to-11.html">training</a> infrastructure there. Its surviving members were on the run or in hiding. Though it took nearly 10 years, the <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2011/05/02/osama-bin-laden-dead">U.S. succeeded in killing</a> al-Qaida’s founding leader, Osama bin Laden. Since 2014, al-Qaida has been <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2014/06/30/world/meast/isis-overshadows-al-qaeda/index.html">overshadowed</a> by its former ally al-Qaida in Iraq, now calling itself the Islamic State.</p>
<p>In other words, al-Qaida should not have survived the 17 years since 9/11. </p>
<p>But it has. Why?</p>
<h2>The ties that bind</h2>
<p>Much of the credit goes to al-Qaida’s extraordinary ability to form alliances and sustain them over time and under pressure.</p>
<p>In my book “<a href="http://www.upenn.edu/pennpress/book/15818.html">Why Terrorist Groups Form International Alliances</a>,” I examine why a small number of groups, such as al-Qaida and IS, emerge as desirable partners and succeed at developing alliance networks. </p>
<p>Understanding terrorist alliances is critical because terrorist organizations with allies are <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228192307_Allying_to_Kill">more lethal</a>, <a href="https://academic.oup.com/isq/article-abstract/58/2/336/2963248/Terrorist-Group-Cooperation-and-Longevity1?redirectedFrom=fulltext">survive longer</a> and are more apt to seek <a href="http://www.start.umd.edu/publication/connections-can-be-toxic-terrorist-organizational-factors-and-pursuit-cbrn-weapons">weapons of mass destruction</a>. Though terrorist partnerships face numerous <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546553.2014.993466">hurdles</a> and severing al-Qaida’s alliances has been a U.S. objective for <a href="https://www.cia.gov/news-information/cia-the-war-on-terrorism/Counter_Terrorism_Strategy.pdf">over a decade</a>, the fact is that these counterterrorism efforts have failed.</p>
<p>It was allies that enabled al-Qaida to survive the immediate aftermath of 9/11. The Afghan Taliban stood by al-Qaida after the attack, <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/taliban-wont-turn-over-bin-laden/">refusing to surrender bin Laden</a> and thereby precipitating the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. Fleeing, al-Qaida was able to turn to allies in Pakistan to hide its operatives and punish the Pakistani government for capitulating to U.S. pressure to crackdown on the group.</p>
<p>It was alliances that helped al-Qaida continue to terrorize. In October 2002, for example, al-Qaida’s ally in Southeast Asia, Jemaah Islamiyah brutally commemorated the first anniversary of 9/11 by bombing a <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-19881138">bar and a nightclub in Bali</a>, killing more than 200 people and injuring an additional 200.</p>
<p>And it was alliances that allowed al-Qaida to project viability. With the “prestige” that came with conducting 9/11, al-Qaida was able to forge affiliate alliances in which partners adopted its name and pledged allegiance to bin Laden.</p>
<p>Al-Qaida’s first and most notorious affiliate alliance, <a href="https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/31694.htm">al-Qaida in Iraq</a>, was formed in 2004 with Jordanian jihadist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Using the standing he accrued through his role in the insurgency in Iraq, Zarqawi then helped al-Qaida acquire its second affiliate in 2006, <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/world/africa/01transcript-droukdal.html?mcubz=0">al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb</a>. Then, in 2009, al-Qaida designated its branch in Yemen and Saudi Arabia <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11483095">as al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula</a>. Its alliances spanned the Middle East and helped it to project power, despite the U.S. war on terrorism. </p>
<h2>A lower profile</h2>
<p>While al-Qaida still sought affiliates, by 2010, it changed some aspects of the relationships.</p>
<p>Al-Qaida forged an alliance with al-Shabaab in Somalia, but did not initially publicly announce it or ask al-Shabaab to change its name. Bin Laden <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/letter-from-usama-bin-laden-to-mukhtar-abu-al-zubayr-original-language-2">justified</a> the shift to a less visible form of alliance as a way to prevent an increase in counterterrorism pressure or a loss of funds from the Arabian Peninsula. He privately expressed <a href="http://www.jihadica.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/SOCOM-2012-0000009-Trans.pdf">concerns</a> that al-Qaida’s name “reduces the feeling of Muslims that we belong to them, and allows the enemies to claim deceptively that they are not at war with Islam.” Bin Laden’s deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, saw the move as bin Laden capitulating to members of al-Qaida who worried about “<a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/letter-to-azmarai-english-translation-2">inflating the size and the growth of al-Qaida</a>.” After bin Laden’s death, Zawahiri <a href="http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/al-qaeda-allied-somali-terror-group-al-shabaab/story?id=15548647">publicly announced</a> al-Qaida’s alliance with al-Shabaab, though al-Shabaab still did not adopt al-Qaida’s name.</p>
<p>The “<a href="https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/2018-ATA---Unclassified-SSCI.pdf">staying power</a>” of Al-Qaida’s allies has helped it remain a threat despite the loss of its founding leader in 2011 and the ascent of a far less capable leader. <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2002/09/16/the-man-behind-bin-laden">Zawahiri’s</a> rise to the helm of the group was itself the consequence of an alliance between his original Egyptian group, al-Jihad, and al-Qaida. The alliance culminated in a merger in 2001, with Zawahiri becoming bin Laden’s deputy and successor.</p>
<p>Zawahiri lacks bin Laden’s cachet or diplomatic savvy, and his shortfalls are evident in al-Qaida’s alliances. His <a href="https://archive.org/stream/710588-translation-of-ayman-al-zawahiris-letter/710588-translation-of-ayman-al-zawahiris-letter_djvu.txt">poor handling</a> of the strife between jihadist group al-Nusra in Syria and its parent organization, the Islamic State in Iraq – previously al-Qaida in Iraq and now known as the Islamic State – led to the alliance <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2017.1373895">rupture</a> between al-Qaida and its affiliate in Iraq.</p>
<p>Zawahiri has also struggled to manage the relationship with al-Qaida’s ally in Syria, the very group that spurred the conflict between IS and al-Qaida. Al-Nusra changed its name, an effort to gain <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/al-qaida-lost-control-syrian-affiliate-inside-story/">more legitimacy within the conflict in Syria by publicly distancing</a> itself from al-Qaida, which left a <a href="https://www.lawfareblog.com/true-story-al-qaedas-demise-and-resurgence-syria">smaller faction still allied with al-Qaida</a>.</p>
<p>Al-Qaida organized a new branch, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-29056668">al-Qaida in the Indian subcontinent</a>, in 2014. The branch in South Asia reflected al-Qaida’s success at expanding beyond its predominantly Arab base, particularly in <a href="http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/10/22/going-native-pakistanization-of-al-qaeda-pub-53382">Pakistan</a>, and has allowed the group to expand its activities in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and Bangladesh.</p>
<p>Most of al-Qaida’s alliances have proven resilient over time. This is true despite ample reasons for its partners to abandon ties, such as the heightened counterterrorism pressure that comes with affiliation to al-Qaida; the death of its charismatic leader; and the Islamic State’s efforts to <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/03/isil-eyes-east-africa-foments-division-150322130940108.html">court</a> al-Qaida allies. Even the Afghan Taliban has not severed ties, even though doing so would eliminate one of the major reasons that the United States will not withdraw from the “forever war” in Afghanistan. </p>
<p>There is still a window for the U.S. to damage al-Qaida’s alliances: It has a weak leader and major rival. But that window may be closing as the Islamic State <a href="https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/08/islamic-state-leader-downplays-territorial-losses-in-new-audio-message.php">adapts</a> to its losses and al-Qaida appears poised for a <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/resurgence-al-qaeda">resurgence</a> with <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/bin-ladens-son-steps-into-fathers-shoes-as-al-qaeda-attempts-a-comeback/2017/05/27/0c89ffc0-4198-11e7-9869-bac8b446820a_story.html">bin Laden’s son</a> as its future, more inspiring leader. </p>
<p><em>Editor’s note: This story has been updated. The original version ran on <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-al-qaida-is-still-strong-16-years-after-9-11-83403">Sept. 10, 2017</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/102966/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tricia Bacon is a fellow at Fordham University's Center for National Security and a non-resident fellow with George Washington's Center for Extremism.</span></em></p>An unprecedented onslaught from the US hasn’t destroyed the terrorist organization. What is the secret of its resilience?Tricia Bacon, Assistant Professor of Justice, Law & Criminology, American University School of Public AffairsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/857312018-05-24T07:30:32Z2018-05-24T07:30:32ZDoes Indonesia need a tougher anti-terrorism law?<p>Indonesia is hastening deliberations of an anti-terrorism bill, following a series of suicide bombings carried out by supporters of Islamic State in Surabaya, East Java, this month. The parliament is expected to pass the bill on <a href="https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20180522202050-32-300475/ketua-dpr-pastikan-ruu-terorisme-disahkan-jumat">Friday</a>. </p>
<p>The new legislation will replace the current anti-terrorism law amid a strong <a href="http://www.metrotvnews.com/amp/5b2VqGVb-tokoh-lintas-agama-desak-ruu-terorisme-segera-disahkan">public push</a> in the world’s third-largest democracy to “strengthen the state” in countering terrorism. The largest national daily newspaper, Kompas, recently published a black front page displaying a headline <a href="https://www.pressreader.com/indonesia/kompas/20180511/281479277052977">“Time for the state to be firm”</a>.</p>
<p>Police chief <a href="https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20180513173418-12-297830/bom-surabaya-tito-mohon-jokowi-terbitkan-perppu-terorisme">Tito Karnavian</a> blamed the delay in passing a tougher anti-terrorism law for the force’s inability to prevent terrorist acts. He had asked the government to issue an anti-terrorism regulation in lieu of law (<em>perppu</em>) . President Joko Widodo had said that if the parliament failed to pass the anti-terrorism bill this month, the government would issue this new <a href="http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/05/15/jokowi-urged-to-issue-perppu-on-terrorism.html"><em>perppu</em></a>. </p>
<p>But these are reactionary responses, which can be dangerous for Indonesian democracy. Such responses justify the strengthening of state power based on an alarmist understanding of the Islamist political movement. This may lead to stronger religious extremism, while increasing the potential for abuse of state power. </p>
<h2>The emergence of Islamic extremism</h2>
<p>Violent groups that attempt to establish an Islamic state indeed <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/roots-terrorism-indonesia-darul-islam-jemaah-islamiyah">exist</a>. But, so far, their presence is predominantly understood as simply a result of the <a href="https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20180515113011-21-298324/ideologi-kematian-keluarga-teroris">rising influence of radical and intolerant ideas</a> or due to <a href="https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/CO16057.pdf">weak state capacity</a>. Many employ such alarmist understandings, including <a href="https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/setara-desak-dpr-sahkan-ruu-anti-terorisme-/3936047.html">rights activists</a>, but they neglect aspects of power and political conflict. </p>
<p>We argue that some individuals may turn to radical Islamic ideas in a setting where <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/islamic-populism-in-indonesia-and-the-middle-east/2F39D8B48CCDD596DC66F7A4D847D284">Islamic populist alliances</a> have failed to seriously challenge the secular authority. An absence of <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9781137408792">alternative political movements</a>, such as the organised left, that could further channel public dissent can also contribute to a setting ripe for religious radicalism. </p>
<p>Hence, as stated by political scientist <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?hl=en&lr=&id=mMwqDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR5&dq=john+sidel+extremist+violent+working+paper&ots=8mbi3WT_qK&sig=cjq7GuSjvOuyBRxbPoonv3-3HT0#v=onepage&q&f=false">John Sidel</a>, religious extremism is a symptom of the weakness and fragmentation of Islamist political movements. It is also a reaction to political marginalisation and state repression. </p>
<p>In the case of Indonesia, Islamic extremism is a legacy of the repressive Soeharto era. Most of the current terrorists link up to the old members of the underground extremist group <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14672715.2016.1260887?src=recsys&journalCode=rcra20">Darul Islam</a>, which aims to establish an Indonesian Islamic state. </p>
<p>Responding to Islamic extremism with a stronger security approach may increase the degree of repression. Instead of stamping out terrorism, this could cause religious extremism to proliferate. </p>
<h2>Contentious clauses</h2>
<p>In our discussions with a number of rights activists, they said the draft legislation (April 17 2018 version) has accommodated most of the <a href="https://www.kontras.org/data/Pasal%20bermasalah%20RUU%20Antiteror.pdf">human rights principles</a> of concern. </p>
<p>According to the parliament and the government, there is only one article left to be debated, which is about what <a href="https://en.tempo.co/read/news/2018/05/15/055918445/DPR-Wants-Terrorism-Bill-Discussion-Finalized-before-Eid">constitutes</a> terrorism. </p>
<p>The government proposed that terrorism be defined as “any deed that uses violence or threats of violence on a massive scale, and/or causes damage to strategic vital objects, the environment, public facilities or international facilities”. The House wants to limit the definition to acts that are based on “political and ideological motives and/or threats to state security”.</p>
<p>As with any expansion of state power, any definition could actually still be interpreted flexibly by the authorities. </p>
<p>In addition to the debate on the definition of terrorism, the bill contains provisions that could lead to abuses of power. </p>
<p>For example, Article 13A regulates hates speech, a type of offence that can be misused to target critics. The Law on Information and Electronic Transactions (ITE Law) has a provision banning this kind of offence, which has been used to <a href="http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/05/03/amnesty-international-blasts-hate-speech-conviction-of-spiritual-book-author.html">jail people for expressing their thoughts on religious matters</a>. </p>
<p>Further, the bill will allow police to keep someone accused of terrorism in custody for 14 days before being officially charged. This period of detention can be extended for an extra seven days. The current law allows only seven days of pre-charge custody. </p>
<p>The bill also allow police to keep a terror suspect in custody for a maximum 290 days after being officially charged. This is almost twice the period in the existing law, which is 180 days. </p>
<p>Extending the detention periods will increase the risks of <a href="https://www.vice.com/id_id/article/pamz8n/saatnya-kita-tak-abai-pada-dugaan-penyiksaan-tersangka-pelaku-teror-oleh-densus-88">torture</a> in custody. </p>
<p>Lastly, the bill added a clause on bringing in the military to assist in anti-terrorism efforts. This will potentially create problems since the military’s nature is to paralyse and exterminate the state’s opponents. </p>
<p>Given its repressive nature, increasing the <a href="http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/05/17/indonesian-military-expected-to-play-greater-role-in-counterterrorism.html">military’s role</a> creates a greater chance of human rights violations. Consequently, civilian supremacy will be threatened, meaning Indonesia risks sliding back to military dictatorship.</p>
<p>Besides, with the existing law, the police have shown they can work effectively in domestic operations. Since 2002, when the first anti-terrorism law was enacted, until 2016, the annual number of terrorism incidents has <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism#terrorism-in-specific-countries-and-regions">decreased</a> significantly from 43 to 19. </p>
<h2>Do we need the tougher law?</h2>
<p>While many rights activists are somewhat satisfied with the latest draft, the remaining problematic provisions show that the interests that wish to extend state authority have not been successfully challenged. It confirms the activists’ compromise with those complications as a consequence of their problematic assumptions in understanding terrorism.</p>
<p>As the bill represents a security approach to terrorism, it inherently equips the state with greater authority that could be misused to <a href="http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/01/29/security-measures-too-much-defy-terror.html">silence oppositions</a>. </p>
<p>Indonesia’s history shows that abuses of power potentially come out of regulations that strengthen the state’s power over its citizens. The <a href="http://www.hukumonline.com/pusatdata/detail/lt59dc8cf94ab6c/node/38/penpres-no-11-tahun-1963-pemberantasan-kegiatan-subversi">anti-subversion law</a> is one example. Soeharto used this draconian law to silent <a href="https://arielheryanto.files.wordpress.com/2016/02/1996_02_17_k-undang-undang-anti-subversi-c1.pdf">political opposition</a>.</p>
<p>A stronger security approach will likely be <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?hl=en&lr=&id=mMwqDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR5&dq=john+sidel+extremist+violent+working+paper&ots=8mbi3WT_qK&sig=cjq7GuSjvOuyBRxbPoonv3-3HT0#v=onepage&q&f=false">counterproductive</a> in eradicating terrorism. </p>
<p>It exerts greater pressure and control not only over the acts but also the ideas that are believed as a source of religious extremism. Such an approach will create a deeper feeling of being politically marginalised, which is one of the main aspects that makes possible the emergence of religious terrorism. </p>
<p>It also leads to abuses of power that tend to repress critics and obstruct the emergence of alternative organised political movements. Indeed, the absence of such alternatives is another aspect that makes religious extremism more likely.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/85731/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abdil Mughis Mudhoffir terafiliasi dengan Department of Sociology, Universitas Negeri Jakarta and LabSosio, Sociological Research Centre, FISIP Universitas Indonesia. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rafiqa Qurrata A'yun tidak bekerja, menjadi konsultan, memiliki saham, atau menerima dana dari perusahaan atau organisasi mana pun yang akan mengambil untung dari artikel ini, dan telah mengungkapkan bahwa ia tidak memiliki afiliasi selain yang telah disebut di atas.</span></em></p>A tougher security approach to terrorism may be counterproductive and could even potentially undermine the supremacy of civilian government in Indonesia.Abdil Mughis Mudhoffir, PhD Candidate in politics at the Asia Institute, The University of MelbourneRafiqa Qurrata A'yun, Lecturer, Department of Criminal Law, Faculty of Law, Universitas IndonesiaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/969442018-05-22T06:27:57Z2018-05-22T06:27:57ZHow people become suicide bombers: the six steps to terrorism<p>Suicide bombings of three churches last week in Indonesia by a couple, Dita Oepriarto and Puji Kuswanti, who involved their children were the result of a long process of radicalisation. A perpetrator of violent extremism goes through several phases until he or she becomes determined to be a mujahid or “fighter” and carries out an attack. </p>
<p>Dita had been exposed to extremist thinking since he was young, according to a junior classmate in high school in Surabaya, Ahmad Faiz Zainudin. <a href="http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-44124947">Ahmad Faiz on his Facebook page shared his recollection of Dita</a> in high school. The story went viral and was discussed in the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Plf6KdxwhlA">Indonesian Lawyer Club (ILC)</a> show on TV One on May 15, 2018. </p>
<p>Faiz wrote that they met in religious study groups outside school hours in Surabaya in the 1990s. Faiz said that at that time Dita and his group deemed people outside their religious group as <em>thagut</em> or demonic. </p>
<p>Based on this, <a href="https://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/pengakuan-adik-kelas-tentang-dita-terpapar-radikalisme-hingga-jadi-bomber-gereja.html">Faiz was not surprised</a> when he found out that Dita was the perpetrator of the bombings. Dita also <a href="https://kumparan.com/@kumparannews/dita-otak-teror-bom-di-surabaya-bercita-cita-ingin-mati-syahid">reportedly told his family</a> that he would like to die as a martyr.</p>
<p>According to <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15740448">Fathali Moghaddam of Georgetown University</a>, psychology theory can explain Dita’s case. He said there were six phases one goes through before committing a deadly violent act. Each stage takes time, depending on a person’s level of exposure to a violent ideology. </p>
<h2>A sense of injustice and desire for change</h2>
<p>The six phases start from a base. At this stage the feeling that most people have in common is one of suffering injustice. In the context of “Islamic terrorism”, they feel the international system oppresses Muslims. They often refer to Palestinian oppression by Israel and, more recently, Rohingya Muslims being persecuted in Myanmar. </p>
<p>In Faiz’s story, he said the issue during his high school years was the slaughter of ethnic Bosnian Muslims by Serbia. Islamic magazines often cover the Bosnian war. </p>
<p>Those who wish to find the perpetrators of the injustice enter the second phase. </p>
<h2>Looking for the mastermind and starting to fight</h2>
<p>In the third phase they try to find who’s behind the oppression of Muslims. Currently, they blame the United States and the democratic system. Therefore terrorist groups often target American interests and denounce the democratic system. </p>
<p>As Indonesia embraces democracy, terrorist groups call the state a demonic government. Therefore, they see law enforcers such as the police as enemies. Meanwhile they have targeted the church for the “infidels” and to gain international attention.</p>
<p>In the fourth phase, they start to agree to resist using all means, including suicide bombings. People who agree with what terrorist groups do may be in this stage. </p>
<h2>Preparations and explosions</h2>
<p>In the fifth phase, they start to prepare to attack. Extremists deem the preparations (<em>idad</em>) before the attack (<em>amaliyat</em>) part of jihad, or holy battle. Dita’s family did this by preparing bombs, putting on the suicide bomb belt and approaching the targets. In the sixth stage, Dita and his family detonated the bombs. </p>
<p><a href="https://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/6004022">Psychology professor Sarlito W. Sarwono writes that</a> the seeds of extreme ideology are sown from a young age and it’s not an instant brainwashing process. Therefore, changing their extreme ideology is not easy. To prevent exposure to extreme ideology the young should be targeted with values of tolerance from a young age. </p>
<p>The case of Dita’s family illustrates this. It could not have been a short brainwashing process to make Dita bring his whole family to carry out suicide bombings together. Rather, it was the result of an extreme ideology that he has held for a long time. For children who carry out suicide bombings, they have learned the ideology of violence from their guardians, such as their parents. </p>
<p><a href="http://banjarmasin.tribunnews.com/2018/05/14/gila-dalang-bom-3-gereja-di-surabaya-orang-kaya-punya-usaha-minyak-dan-%20house-worth-billions">Dita’s family is well off</a>. His family also seemed like a happy one. If we look at Dita’s family pictures, there is no indication that they hold extreme beliefs. Terrorist are stereotyped as men with long beards and veils for women. They did not wear those. </p>
<p>From here it is evident that being a terrorist is not a matter of physical appearance and clothing, but the extreme ideology embedded in one’s head and heart. </p>
<h2>Family network extremism</h2>
<p>Family can serve as fertile ground for radicalisation. For example, the main perpetrators of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bom_Bali_2002">Bali bombings of October 12 2002</a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mukhlas">Mukhlas</a>, involved his siblings, Ali Imron and Amrozi, to commit the deadly bombings with him.</p>
<p>A member of Jemaah Islamiyah who took part in the violence in Poso, <a href="http://video.metrotvnews.com/mata-najwa/4KZxv9Wb-the-farihin-ama-kombatan-poso">Farihin</a>, followed the footsteps of his father and grandfather. They were involved in “jihad” violence in the era of President Soekarno. His father, <a href="https://www.jpnn.com/news/payness-treatment-resident-not-new-new-new">Ahmad Kandai</a>, is a member of Darul Islam, a group that tried to assassinate Soekarno in Cikini in 1957.</p>
<p>Farihin’s brothers, <a href="https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1848/abdul-jabar-dikenai-undang-undang-duraturat-no-12-tahun-1951">Abdul Jabar</a> and <a href="https://news.detik.com/berita/675670/terdakwa-atrium-diadili-karena-from-members-pengebom">Salahuddin</a>, were involved in a series of bombings in the early 2000s. Abdul Jabar was involved in the bombing of the Philippine embassy in Jakarta in 2000. Salahuddin was involved in the bombing of a mall in Jakarta in 2001.</p>
<p>After ISIS leader Abu Bakar Al-Baghdadi in Syria proclaimed himself leader of an Islamic State in 2013, many Indonesian families, including those from the public sector, flocked to Syria to join IS. A civil servant in Indonesia’s Ministry of Finance who was educated in Australia, <a href="https://ekonomi.kompas.com/read/2017/01/27/113000626/diduga.terkait.isis.ini.alasan.eks.pejabat.kemenkeu.berhenti.jadi.pns">Triyono Utomo</a>, was one of the people who brought his wife and children to join IS. <a href="https://metro.tempo.co/read/1069433/dwi-djoko-mantan-pejabat-batam-terdakwa-terorisme-isis-diadili">Dwi Joko Wiwoho</a>, director of the Integrated Services One Door Batam Enterprises agency, also brought his wife and children to Syria. </p>
<p>Although family has been known as a radicalisation ground, the suicide bombings involving a family in Surabaya <a href="https://theconversation.com/whenika-teroris-to%20sacrifice-children-in-the-bomb-battle-of-who-%20can-do-96642">were the first</a> for terrorism networks in Indonesia. </p>
<p>When terrorist attacks were carried out mainly by members of Jemaah Islamiyah, suicide bombings were only done by men. The perpetrator would leave a will for their parents or their wives and children. In the case of the Surabaya bombings, there were no wills as the whole family carried out the attack. </p>
<h2>Then how to solve it?</h2>
<p>There are no shortcuts to solve the problem of terrorism. Countering violent extremism through education in the values of tolerance takes a long time. </p>
<p>In the short term, security forces must identify all IS supporters in Indonesia and question them to understand their network and obtain profiles of their members and supporters. </p>
<p>Indonesia can learn from France, which succeeded in pacifying a terror network that involved women and children <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%20Battle_of_Algiers_%20(1956-57)">to terrorise the French government in the 1950s</a>. France identified and questioned supporters of the terror group and ultimately uncovered its organisational and terror patterns. Thus the terror that haunted France could be stopped at that time.</p>
<p>Indonesia should start identifying and questioning IS supporters and not wait for innocent people to fall victims to the attacks of a small group of violent extremists.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/96944/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robi Sugara tidak bekerja, menjadi konsultan, memiliki saham, atau menerima dana dari perusahaan atau organisasi mana pun yang akan mengambil untung dari artikel ini, dan telah mengungkapkan bahwa ia tidak memiliki afiliasi selain yang telah disebut di atas.</span></em></p>To prevent people from climbing the staircase to terrorism, educating people about the values of tolerance should start early.Robi Sugara, Associate lecturer, Universitas Islam Negeri Syarif Hidayatullah JakartaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/965122018-05-15T08:09:44Z2018-05-15T08:09:44ZWhen parents take their children to die in jihadist suicide bombings, what can be done?<p>A series of suicide bombings in Surabaya, East Java, in the past two days is the worst terrorist attack Indonesia has seen since 2005. Families attacked three churches on Sunday and a police station on Monday, killing at least 23 people and injuring dozens. People are doubly shocked and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/14/world/asia/indonesia-church-bombings-families-isis-suicide.html">sickened</a> that the bombings were carried out by parents who brought their children along to die.</p>
<p>On Sunday, a mother took her two daughters, aged 9 and 12, and detonated a bomb at the Indonesian Christian Church. Her two sons, aged 16 and 18, rode a motorcycle to the Santa Maria Church and blew themselves up. Her husband, Dita Oepriarto, reportedly the Surabaya cell leader of Jemaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), an extremist group that has pledged allegiance to IS, drove his car to the Pentecostal Church and bombed it. </p>
<p>On Monday, a family of five riding two motorcycles <a href="http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/05/14/breaking-another-bomb-attack-hits-surabaya-police-hq.html">detonated a bomb at Surabaya Police Headquarters</a>.</p>
<p>The attacks lend weight to warnings by analysts <a href="http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/society/article/2103070/ignoring-women-jihadis-ranks-asias-islamic-state-fatal-mistake">not to ignore the role of women in violent extremism</a>. In 2016, Indonesian police caught the first female jihadists – Dian Yulia Novi, who had prepared a pressure-cooker bomb and planned to detonate it in Jakarta, and, a few days later, Ika Puspitasari in Bali. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2017/01/IPAC_Report_35.pdf">increase of women’s role in violent extremism has been helped by the fast growth of social media</a>, which extremist groups use to recruit members. </p>
<p>But the attacks show not only a shift in women’s roles in violent extremism, but also the involvement of families in acts of terror. </p>
<p>IS might be giving up persuading people to come to Syria. The group has lost most of the territory it occupied and the Syrian government has defeated most of the IS fighters. But the attacks of the past few days are part of a propagation of jihad involving family members locally. </p>
<h2>Parents bringing children to die</h2>
<p>People are shocked that the perpetrators brought their children in the attacks. </p>
<p>There is, however, a rational parental choice behind these acts, based on their belief that a reward for their <em>amaliyah</em> (the term jihadists use to refer to field action) is waiting for them in the afterlife. They believe they will be together again in heaven.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218929/original/file-20180515-100719-2x8jy5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218929/original/file-20180515-100719-2x8jy5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218929/original/file-20180515-100719-2x8jy5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218929/original/file-20180515-100719-2x8jy5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218929/original/file-20180515-100719-2x8jy5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=621&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218929/original/file-20180515-100719-2x8jy5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=621&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218929/original/file-20180515-100719-2x8jy5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=621&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A photo of the family police say was responsible for Sunday’s attack in Surabaya.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Handout</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>If a father committed a suicide bombing alone, he would be leaving his wife and children to bear the stigma of a terrorist’s family. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, as women are taking a more active role in terrorism, as mothers they will find it hard to leave their children without being able to ensure their children follow their ideology. So, they choose to do the <em>amaliyah</em> together. </p>
<p>This may also be part of their strategy to disseminate their propaganda to persuade other militants to follow in their footsteps. </p>
<h2>The story of ‘Ummu Shabrina’</h2>
<p>Propaganda to involve the family in <em>amaliyah</em> has been circulating since 2014 in Indonesia’s militant communities. A story about Ummu Shabrina and her family’s journey had been widely spread. The four-chapter story ended with border guards arresting her and her children. </p>
<p>Ummu Shabrina closed her story with a strong message to all families of IS supporters to strengthen their resolve and sacrifice themselves for Islamic State. </p>
<h2>The role of family in radicalisation</h2>
<p>I research the family’s role in creating a jihadist. As the primary unit for an individual’s social and psychological development, <a href="http://sk.sagepub.com/reference/sociology/n13.xml">the family is an effective domain for extreme ideological development</a> through the process of socialisation. This can happen through daily activities such as discussing jihadism, Islam and politics, watching extremist videos together, participating in couple’s and parents’ religious activities, etc. </p>
<p>Children view this as something usual and common in families. They may not question it, as they trust their parents as their guardians. </p>
<p>For families who had gone to Syria, living under Islamic State rule also created a context for the socialisation itself. Unwittingly, it becomes a family ideology shared and accepted by all family members who went there. </p>
<p>Children also imitate how parents express their commitment and loyalty to an ideology or organisation on a daily basis. <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2014.952511">Children then shape their “ready loyalty”</a> that they wish to attach to someone or something like an ideology, leaders or organisation, etc. </p>
<p>This kind of loyalty does not emerge naturally. It is primarily the result of <a href="http://books.wwnorton.com/books/Identity-and-the-Life-Cycle/">parental values being inculcated in their children</a> in the form of ideas, norms, customs and methods. </p>
<p>There are examples of successful values transmission to jihadists who are upholding their father’s legacy and following a career in jihadism. Hatf Saifurrasul, 13, died in Syria in 2016. He was the son of Saiful Anam or Brekele, a jihadist convicted of involvement in a bombing in Poso, Maluku, in 2005 and other crimes. </p>
<p>The family is like two sides of a coin. On one side, a family is a place for radicalisation and terrorism engagement. On the other side, a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546553.2015.1034855">family is also a place for disengagement</a>. The key is in the cohesiveness between members of the family, including between parents, and between parents and children. </p>
<p>The better the condition of the family relationship, the more values will be transmitted, as parents have more opportunity to transmit their values to children. And, vice versa, the worse the condition of the family relationship, the fewer values will be transmitted in the family. </p>
<h2>What should the government do?</h2>
<p>The government has carried out counter-terrorism operations and raids, run deradicalisation programs and provided economic support programs for reformed militants. In addition to these strategic counter-terrorism efforts, several recommendations might be useful to deal with radicalisation within families. </p>
<p>A preventive program targeted at parents may prevent the values of radicalism being transmitted to children. Children are likely to adopt the views of their parents, especially when they frequently share similar extreme ideological matters, and when there is both an ideological consensus and a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1386273?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">high degree of religious salience</a>. Therefore, prevention should start with educating the parents, as it begins in the family. </p>
<p>Social interventions can counter extreme ideologies, such as community activities involving parents and children. Where an extreme ideology is perceived as less important, where there is an intervention, and where children acknowledge that they have options in life, extreme ideologies are less likely to flourish.</p>
<p>The government should actively involve people who have returned to Indonesia from Islamic State in Syria in counter-extremism programs. In 2017, it was reported that <a href="http://thesoufancenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Beyond-the-Caliphate-Foreign-Fighters-and-the-Threat-of-Returnees-TSC-Report-October-2017-v3.pdf">around 600 Indonesians had joined IS in Syria, including around 100 women</a>. With IS losing much of the territory it occupied, some have returned home. </p>
<p>Finally, extreme ideology is not something that easily happens to people, and nothing about ideological transmission is predictable. An ideology ultimately serves the individuals who hold it by providing them choises in life - to be a terrorist or a humanist.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/96512/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Haula Noor tidak bekerja, menjadi konsultan, memiliki saham, atau menerima dana dari perusahaan atau organisasi mana pun yang akan mengambil untung dari artikel ini, dan telah mengungkapkan bahwa ia tidak memiliki afiliasi selain yang telah disebut di atas.</span></em></p>The attacks show not only a shift in women’s roles in violent extremism, but also the involvement of families in acts of terror.Haula Noor, PhD Candidate at Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs , Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/866262017-12-04T09:05:46Z2017-12-04T09:05:46ZOn social media, ISIS uses fantastical propaganda to recruit members<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/196127/original/file-20171123-17985-4tetx4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">ISIS has been using fantastical propaganda on social media that describes the Islamic State as a land that is full of happiness to recruit supporters.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>ISIS has now <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/isis-is-on-the-run-caliphate-land-lost-2017-11/?IR=T">lost much of the territory they occupied</a>, including the onetime capital of the Islamic State, Raqqa. Some Indonesians who had travelled to Syria to join ISIS managed to <a href="http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-40288296">flee from Raqqa when the city was attacked by anti-ISIS militias</a>.</p>
<p>In September, the Indonesian police said that around 600 Indonesians have joined ISIS. What pulled them to uproot their lives life and join ISIS? </p>
<p>The stories of two Indonesian women, Leefa and Nur, who returned home after joining ISIS, can provide some clues. </p>
<p>Both said they flew to Raqqa after they saw ISIS’s photos and videos about Islamic State on the internet. Leefa said that from the videos she imagined it to be a better place to live.</p>
<p>ISIS has been using fantastical propaganda on social media that describes the Islamic State as a land that is full of happiness to recruit supporters. </p>
<h2>Islamic utopia</h2>
<p>Charlie Winter, a senior research fellow at the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR), in his <a href="http://www.quilliaminternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/FINAL-documenting-the-virtual-caliphate.pdf">report</a>, Documenting the Virtual “Caliphate” (2015), wrote that ISIS has six instruments to improve its existence and strategic goals. One of them is Islamic utopia. The others are brutality, mercy, victimhood, war and belonging.</p>
<p>Islamic utopia is the basis of ISIS’s fantastical propaganda. <a href="http://www.quilliaminternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/FINAL-documenting-the-virtual-caliphate.pdf">According to Winter</a>, this is ISIS’s most important instrument. They develop stories on how Muslims will live full of joy and happiness under the ISIS caliphate and Islamic law. </p>
<p>ISIS develops its fantasy of Islamic State from seven themes, namely religion, economic activity, governance, justice, social life, expansion, and nature and landscapes. <a href="http://www.quilliaminternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/FINAL-documenting-the-virtual-caliphate.pdf">Among those, governance, religion and economy are the top three themes</a>. </p>
<p>ISIS builds narratives that its Islamic State is an effective governmental system that is equipped with good social facilities and a flourishing economy. ISIS also claims that its “state” is the only implementer of true Islam. This narrative is depicted through videos showing people jointly practising religious activities, such as praying and breaking fast.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/445/html">Aaron Zelin</a>, a Richard Borow Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, looked at ISIS media releases between April 18 and April 24 2015. He found 32 media releases that depict fantastical ideas around government, <em>hisba</em> (moral policing) and the promotion of the caliphate. In those releases ISIS describes its Islamic state as a naturally beautiful caliphate with high-quality social services as well as respect for justice. </p>
<h2>Fantasy</h2>
<p>Fantasy, pleasant imagination that is not based on reality, is an important element of the human mind. As humans, we not only make sense of our world based on what we see and feel but also based on what we think or imagine. An individual or a group of people can create fantasies for political and strategic purposes. </p>
<p>Potential targets for ISIS recruitment are usually individuals who have a <a href="https://www.deseretnews.com/article/865632100/The-personality-thats-most-vulnerable-to-Islamic-State-recruitment-in-the-West.html">black-and-white view of the world</a>. They tend to think in categorical terms, such as good and bad, or right and wrong. They also usually harbor feelings of being <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-graham/who-joins-isis-and-why_b_8881810.html">“inadequate, disrespected, full of unfulfilled ambitions, angry at real or perceived injustices, and who are blaming other people or institutions for their woes”</a>. </p>
<p>Some others dream of having better religious experiences. By exploiting their grievances and black-white mentality, ISIS potentially transforms this kind of people into supporters.</p>
<h2>Attracting Indonesians</h2>
<p>To attract Indonesian audiences, <a href="https://geotimes.co.id/kolom/indonesia-dan-pintu-jihad-isis-di-luar-suriah/">ISIS released online videos of ISIS members from Indonesia</a> inviting Indonesians to join them.</p>
<p>Leefa said she later regretted joining ISIS. Leefa explained she travelled to Raqqa because <a href="http://www.straitstimes.com/world/middle-east/indonesians-decry-isis-lies-after-fleeing-bastion-of-raqqa-as-coalition-forces">she imagined ISIS territory was a better place to live</a> and to become a real Muslim. <a href="http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-40288296">She had hoped to get good health services</a> as well as to have surgery for her neck problem. </p>
<p>Leefa said <a href="http://www.straitstimes.com/world/middle-east/indonesians-decry-isis-lies-after-fleeing-bastion-of-raqqa-as-coalition-forces">she had talked to ISIS members</a> before deciding to travel to Syria and to join ISIS. One-on-one chats with potential recruits are part of ISIS recruitment strategies because ISIS understands that <a href="https://www.technologyreview.com/s/541801/fighting-isis-online/">personal or private messages are more effective in persuading people</a>. </p>
<p>ISIS members also hold <a href="http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/indonesian/2016-02-22/isis-aktif-sebar-propaganda-di-sejumlah-masjid-di-jakarta/1550618">religious meetings at mosques</a> to spread their fantastical propaganda. </p>
<p>They promised everyone who travelled to Islamic State territory would have a better life and be provided with free public services, such as water, electricity and houses. They even promised all people would get monthly allowances as well as free food and health services.</p>
<p>However, the reality shows otherwise. Leefa and Nur acknowledged that once they arrived in ISIS territory <a href="http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-40288296">they discovered</a> that the information as well as the Islamic State they imagined was completely different from the reality. </p>
<p>Leefa, Nur and other Indonesians only heard the stories from one side, the ISIS side. They lacked accurate information about ISIS for two reasons. </p>
<p>In the current post-truth era facts have become less important than personal beliefs. People tend only to want to hear information that is in line with their beliefs. To cherry-pick information and to selectively read media/news are common in this kind of society. Hence, people only get one side of the story.</p>
<p>The distance between Indonesia and ISIS territory in the Middle East also makes it difficult for Indonesians to acquire direct and accurate information about ISIS and the real situation in their controlled land.</p>
<p>ISIS may have lost most of their territory, but it’s important to be aware that ISIS can still utilise the Internet and social media to recruit people and to spread their fantastical propaganda.</p>
<p>This recruitment method has been proved effective to attract lots of people to join ISIS. So, this is the time for us to find ways to counter this kind of propaganda as well as to safeguard people from it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/86626/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Wendy Andhika Prajuli tidak bekerja, menjadi konsultan, memiliki saham, atau menerima dana dari perusahaan atau organisasi mana pun yang akan mengambil untung dari artikel ini, dan telah mengungkapkan bahwa ia tidak memiliki afiliasi selain yang telah disebut di atas.</span></em></p>ISIS may have lost most of their territory, but it’s important to be aware that ISIS can still utilise the Internet and social media to recruit people and to spread their fantastical propaganda.Wendy Andhika Prajuli, Lecturer in International Relations, Binus UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/851542017-10-13T04:20:31Z2017-10-13T04:20:31ZUnder the Trump administration, US airstrikes are killing more civilians<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/190071/original/file-20171012-31395-qkq5hm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=32%2C929%2C2775%2C3158&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Smoke from an airstrike rises in the background as a man flees during fighting between Iraqi special forces and IS militants in Mosul, Iraq, on May 17, 2017. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Maya Alleruzzo</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When President Donald Trump took office in January, it was unclear whether the bombast from his campaign would translate into an aggressive new strategy against terrorism. At campaign rallies he pledged to “<a href="http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/15/middleeast/donald-trump-isis-strategy/index.html">bomb the hell”</a> out of the Islamic State. He <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/05/27/trump-said-he-would-take-out-the-families-of-isis-fighters-did-an-airstrike-in-syria-do-just-that/?utm_term=.03bc589dc87a">openly mused</a> about killing the families of terrorists, a blatant violation of <a href="https://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions/overview-geneva-conventions.htm">the Geneva Conventions</a>, which prohibits violence against noncombatants.</p>
<p>Ten months into his presidency, a clearer picture is emerging. The data indicate several alarming trends.</p>
<p>According to research from the nonprofit monitoring group Airwars, the first seven months of the Trump administration have already resulted in <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/trump-has-already-killed-more-civilians-obama-us-fight-against-isis-653564">more civilian deaths</a> than under the entirety of the Obama administration. <a href="https://twitter.com/airwars/status/900034913839312897">Airwars reports</a> that under Obama’s leadership, the fight against IS led to approximately 2,300 to 3,400 civilian deaths. Through the first seven months of the Trump administration, they estimate that coalition air strikes have killed between 2,800 and 4,500 civilians. </p>
<p>Researchers also point to <a href="https://www.irinnews.org/opinion/2017/06/20/disturbing-civilian-death-trends-iraq-syria-air-war-researcher%E2%80%99s-view">another stunning trend</a> – the “frequent killing of entire families in likely coalition airstrikes.” In May, for example, such actions led to the deaths of at least 57 women and 52 children in Iraq and Syria.</p>
<p>The vast increase in civilian deaths is not limited to the anti-IS campaign. In Afghanistan, the <a href="https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/protection_of_civilians_in_armed_conflict_midyear_report_2017_july_2017.pdf">U.N. reports</a> a 67 percent increase in civilian deaths from U.S. airstrikes in the first six months of 2017 compared to the first half of 2016. </p>
<p>The key question is: Why? Are these increases due to a change in leadership? </p>
<h2>Delegating war to the military</h2>
<p>Experts offer several explanations.</p>
<p>One holds that Trump’s “<a href="https://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/trumps-total-authorization-military-gives-deep-concerns">total authorization</a>” for the military to run wars in Afghanistan and against IS has loosened Obama-era restrictions and increased military commanders’ risk tolerance. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jun/06/us-syria-iraq-isis-islamic-state-strikes-death-toll">Micah Zenko</a> of the Council on Foreign Relations notes: “Those closer to the fight are more likely to call in lethal force and are less likely to follow a value-based approach.”</p>
<p>In other words, an intense focus on destroying IS elements may be overriding the competing priority of protecting civilians. Because Trump has scaled back civilian oversight and delegated authority to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jun/06/us-syria-iraq-isis-islamic-state-strikes-death-toll">colonels rather than one-star generals</a>, the likely result is higher casualties.</p>
<h2>Urban battlefield?</h2>
<p>A second explanation points to the changing nature of the counter-IS campaign. <a href="https://www.thedailybeast.com/has-the-us-air-war-killed-685-civiliansor-more-than-5200">The Pentagon contends</a> that the rise in casualties is “attributable to the change in location” of battlefield operations towards more densely populated urban environments like Mosul and Raqqa.</p>
<p>This is a partial truth. While urban warfare has increased, Trump’s team has substantially escalated air strikes and bombings. According to CENTCOM data, the military has already used <a href="http://www.afcent.af.mil/Portals/82/Documents/Airpower%20summary/Airpower%20Summary%20-%20September%202017.pdf?ver=2017-10-06-082818-797">20 percent more</a> missiles and bombs in combined air operations in 2017 than in all of 2016. One notable airstrike in March, for example, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/05/25/pentagon-confirms-airstrike-killed-more-than-100-civilians-in-mosul-blames-isis-explosives/?utm_term=.159a53b63bc0">killed 105 Iraqi civilians</a> when U.S. forces dropped a 500-pound bomb in order to take out two snipers in Mosul. In fact, a <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/06/08/iraq/us-led-coalition-weapons-choice-endangers-mosul-civilians">Human Rights Watch analysis</a> of bomb craters in West Mosul estimates that U.S. coalition forces are routinely using larger and less precise bombs – weighing between 500 and 1,000 pounds – than in prior operations. Finally, the urban battlefield explanation also does not account for increased civilian deaths in Afghanistan from airstrikes, where the environment has remained static for several years.</p>
<h2>Pressure from the president</h2>
<p>A third explanation of higher civilian casualties is that aggressive rhetoric from the president is inadvertently pressuring the military to take more risks and to deprioritize protecting civilians. </p>
<p>As former Assistant Secretary of State <a href="https://www.thedailybeast.com/president-trumps-air-war-kills-12-civilians-per-day">Tom Malinowski observes</a>: “If your leaders are emphasizing the high value of Raqqa and Mosul, while saying less about the strategic and moral risks of hurting civilians, it’s going to affect your judgment.” Words matter, especially coming from the commander-in-chief. In the face of such aggressive rhetoric, it should not come as a surprise that military officers feel encouraged – if not indirectly pressured – to take greater risks.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, the increased trend of civilian casualties is unlikely to diminish. In fact, signs abound that the White House is developing a new set of policies and procedures that will authorize more sweeping discretion to the military. In September, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/21/us/politics/trump-drone-strikes-commando-raids-rules.html">The New York Times reported</a> that White House officials were proposing two major rules changes. First, they would expand the scope of “kill missions” and allow for the targeting of lower-level terrorists in addition to high value targets. Second – and more notably – they would suspend high-level vetting of potential drone attacks and raids.</p>
<p>These changes represent a sharp about-face. The Obama administration carefully crafted a deliberate set of rules guiding the use of force. In 2013, Obama released the <a href="https://www.justice.gov/oip/foia-library/procedures_for_approving_direct_action_against_terrorist_targets/download">Presidential Policy Guidance for Approving Direct Action Against Terrorist Targets</a> (PPG), which created specific rules for determining when the use of force against terrorists was legally justified.</p>
<p>Then, in 2016, Obama issued an <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/07/01/executive-order-united-states-policy-pre-and-post-strike-measures">executive order on civilian harm</a> that established heightened standards to minimize civilian casualties from military actions, and required the public release of information pertaining to strikes against terrorist targets.</p>
<p>While the latest actions from the Trump administration stop short of reversing Obama-era restraints, they are unsettling steps in the opposite direction. For example, it appears for now that the White House will preserve the “near certainty” standard, which requires commanders to have near certainty that a potential strike will not impact civilians. But this could change over time.</p>
<p>One senior official quoted in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/21/us/politics/trump-drone-strikes-commando-raids-rules.html">The New York Times article</a> bluntly asserts that the latest changes are intended to make much of the “bureaucracy” created by the Obama administration rules “disappear.” As the White House dissolves the existing bureaucracy and relinquishes civilian oversight, Trump is embarking on a slippery slope that will potentially lead to major diminutions of civilian protection. </p>
<p>The current battle to take the Syrian city of Raqqa is emblematic of the stakes at hand. The U.S. is leading a punishing air war to soften IS defenses. In August, U.S. forces <a href="https://airwars.org/news/raqqa-bombardment/">dropped 5,775 bombs and missiles</a> onto the city. For context, this represented 10 times more munitions than the U.S. used for the whole of Afghanistan in the same month and year. The resulting civilian toll has been gruesome. At least 433 civilians <a href="https://airwars.org/news/raqqa-bombardment/">likely died in Raqqa</a> due to the August bombings, more than double the previous month’s total. Since the assault on Raqqa commenced on June 6, more than 1,000 civilians have been reported killed. </p>
<p>U.N. human rights chief <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21810&LangID=E">Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein cautions</a> that the intense bombardment has left civilians caught between IS’s monstrosities and the fierce battle to defeat it. Zeid insists that “civilians must not be sacrificed for the sake of rapid military victories.” </p>
<p>Trump would be wise to heed this warning. Even as U.S. forces continue to turn the tide on IS, the trail of destruction left in the campaign’s wake is unsettling. The specter of massive civilian casualties will remain a rallying point for new terrorist organizations long after anti-IS operations conclude.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/85154/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Feldstein is affiliated with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a member of the Board for IHC Global.</span></em></p>Ten months of data reveal some alarming trends.Steven Feldstein, Frank and Bethine Church Chair of Public Affairs & Associate Professor, School of Public Service, Boise State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/827302017-08-19T12:13:07Z2017-08-19T12:13:07ZAre Islamic State recruits more street gang members than zealots?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/182647/original/file-20170818-7961-1t5zwqt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A makeshift memorial to the victims of the terrorist attack in Barcelona. Police killed five men August 18 believed to have been involved.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Spain-Attacks/a9e68af4d43d44a68c4e73f8560046c4/3/0">AP Photo/Manu Fernandez</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The recent terrorist attacks in <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/spain-terror-threat-van-attack-isis-first-europe-country-651983">Spain</a> and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/finnish-police-call-fatal-stabbing-an-act-of-terrorism/2017/08/19/4e9c916c-84bd-11e7-b359-15a3617c767b_story.html">Finland</a> once again compel us to ask: Who joins the Islamic State, and why?</p>
<p>As a professor of modern Middle Eastern history, I have spent the majority of my professional life studying the region, its culture, society and politics. In recent years, I have researched and written about IS and its terrorist activities. While other experts and I have looked at how radicalization occurs, some new ideas are emerging about how and why men are attracted to IS.</p>
<h2>Where do the recruits come from?</h2>
<p>We know that <a href="http://www.npr.org/2017/02/06/513769884/the-new-york-times-uncovers-how-isis-recruits-from-afar">IS recruits</a> people from within the territory under its control and neighboring areas as well as from abroad. According to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, as of 2013 – that is, before Islamic State’s major push in the region – there were <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/foreign-fighters-syria-iraq-is-isis-isil-infographic/26584940.html">between 17,000 and 19,000 IS members</a> in Iraq and Syria. </p>
<p>This is probably a low estimate, however. As of 2015, there were <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/11/world/meast/isis-syria-iraq/index.html">about 30,000</a>, more than enough to replace the <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-islamic-state-us-american-soldier-how-many-deaths-killed-iraq-syria-a7226061.html">15,000 killed by the American-led bombing</a> campaign during the first year of that campaign.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/foreign-fighters-syria-iraq-is-isis-isil-infographic/26584940.html">majority of IS recruits came from the Middle East</a>. The <a href="http://time.com/4739488/isis-iraq-syria-tunisia-saudi-arabia-russia/">largest number </a>of Arabs who hail from places other than Iraq and Syria came from Saudi Arabia and Tunisia. Other fighters came from as far away as North America, Europe (<a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/11/belgium-radical-islam-jihad-molenbeek-isis/416235/">Belgium</a> has supplied the largest per capita contingent from Europe), Australia and the <a href="http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/18466/russia-s-north-caucasus-insurgency-widens-as-isis-foothold-grows">Caucasus</a> (particularly Chechnya). </p>
<h2>Why do they join?</h2>
<p>Social scientists cite a <a href="http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/benmelech/html/BenmelechPapers/ISIS_April_13_2016_Effi_final.pdf">number of reasons people join IS</a>. Some of those recruited in Iraq and Syria, they assert, join because they believe in the Islamic State’s message. Others, however, join because they are compelled by IS to do so or for reasons to do with <a href="https://psyc.umd.edu/news/two-articles-psychological-appeals-behind-isis-successful-recruitment">revenge, money, sectarian sentiments, camaraderie, the promise of power or the promise of sex slaves</a> such as <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/jul/01/i-was-sold-seven-times-yazidi-women-welcomed-back-into-the-faith">captured Yazidi women and girls.</a>.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.zwemercenter.com/sample-post-with-a-title/">Some social scientists</a> claim that the sense of empowerment that comes from joining a group noted for its ultra-violence, disaffection from society, and just plain sociopathy might also factor into the calculations of European Muslims who face discrimination and impoverishment in their adopted homes. </p>
<p>The list of potential reasons for joining is so long that one is reminded of something the late U.S. Supreme Court Justice <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/justice-scalia-dissents">Antonin Scalia</a> once said: “[I]nterior decorating is a rock hard science compared to psychology practiced by amateurs.”</p>
<h2>Of lone wolves, flaming bananas and machismo</h2>
<p>Many ISIS attacks around the globe are carried out by individuals the media have dubbed <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/23/world/isis-lone-wolf-social-media-trnd/index.html">“lone wolves”</a> – that is, freelancers who act without the direct knowledge of the IS leadership. To avoid glamorizing them, the RAND Corporation prefers the term <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/30313709/Terrorism-and-Beyond-A-21st-Century-Perspective">“flaming bananas”</a>. </p>
<p>There are two theories why these individuals – or, indeed, those who travel to the caliphate to join IS – pledge allegiance to the group. The first is that they get <a href="http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-hughes-stop-isis-recruit-radicalization-20160517-snap-story.html">“radicalized.”</a></p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/how-radicalization-happens-and-who-is-at-risk-52248">Radicalization</a> refers to a step-by-step process whereby individuals become increasingly susceptible to jihadi ideas. First, they cut themselves off from social networks such as family, which provide them with support and a conventional value system. They then immerse themselves in a radical religious counterculture. They might do this on their own, or a jihadi recruiter might bring them into the fold. Either way, the result is the same.</p>
<p>Most attempts to counter IS base their efforts on this model. For example, the U.S. <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/05/world/state-department-anti-isis-video/index.html">Department of State has released a short video</a> titled, “Run – Don’t Walk – to ISIS Land.” The video shows graphic images of crucifixions, beheadings, suicide bombings and the destruction of mosques perpetrated by ISIS members. It ends with a warning: “Think again – turn away.”</p>
<p>Interestingly, the video mimics IS propaganda, which, some observers claim, plays a key role in recruitment. Rather than presenting a religious rationale for the group’s actions, IS propaganda tends to focus on the violence the group perpetrates. IS has even released a <a href="http://english.alarabiya.net/en/variety/2014/09/20/Grand-Theft-Auto-ISIS-Militants-reveal-video-game.html">video game based on Grand Theft Auto 5</a> in which, rather than stealing cars and battling the police, the player destroys advancing personnel carriers and shoots enemy soldiers. </p>
<p>Perhaps, then, the radicalization model is wrong or not universally applicable. Perhaps there’s something other than religious zealotry at play.</p>
<p>There is other evidence that the radicalization model is, at best, only part of the story. For example, there is the widely reported story of two would-be jihadists who, before they left Birmingham, U.K., for Syria, <a href="https://apnews.com/9f94ff7f1e294118956b049a51548b33">ordered “Islam for Dummies”</a> and “The Koran for Dummies” to fill the gaps in their knowledge.</p>
<p>Newspaper stories time and again puzzle over the problem of how it happens that <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/01/isis-criminals-converts/426822/">individuals who go on to join IS were found in bars,</a> even gay bars, or had Western girlfriends and smoked and drank almost up to the time they committed some act of violence for the group. The most common explanation is that their dissolute lifestyle was a cover. </p>
<p>After the driver of a truck ran down and killed 84 people in Nice, France, for example, the French interior minister was at a loss to explain how <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/nice-france-terror-attack-truck-driver-algerian-isis-manuel-valls-booed/">someone who drank during Ramadan</a> (which had ended a week and a half before) could have radicalized so quickly.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/182648/original/file-20170818-7959-10oswx7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/182648/original/file-20170818-7959-10oswx7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=454&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/182648/original/file-20170818-7959-10oswx7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=454&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/182648/original/file-20170818-7959-10oswx7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=454&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/182648/original/file-20170818-7959-10oswx7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=571&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/182648/original/file-20170818-7959-10oswx7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=571&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/182648/original/file-20170818-7959-10oswx7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=571&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Former French President Francois Hollande in Paris in September 2016 at a memorial service for victims killed by terrorism in France.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/France-Terrorism/7a09ec8328bb45228f357169ec615fb6/22/0">AP Photo/Michael Euler</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A number of experts have thus argued that the radicalization model should be replaced by or <a href="https://www.scribd.com/doc/298536508/Radicalisation-and-Subcultures-a-Theoretical-Analysis">supplemented with a different model</a>.</p>
<p>Rather than joining a radically different religious counterculture, individuals are attracted to IS, these experts argue, because its actions reaffirm the cultural values of those who are marginalized, or those who exhibit what psychiatrists call “anti-social personality disorders.”</p>
<p>Could it be that IS volunteers are drawn to a value system that asserts an aggressive machismo, disparages steady work, and sustains the impulse for immediate gratification? Are they attracted to a culture that promotes redemption through violence, loyalty, patriarchal values, self-sacrifice to the point of martyrdom and the diminution of women to objects of pleasure?</p>
<p>In this reading, IS more closely resembles the sort of street gang with which many of its Western and Westernized enlistees are familiar than its more austere competitor, al-Qaida.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/82730/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James L. Gelvin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With terrorists striking again in Spain and in Finland, one cannot help but ask – again – why people want to follow the Islamic State. Some new theories are emerging.James L. Gelvin, Professor of Modern Middle Eastern History, University of California, Los AngelesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/776522017-07-11T01:08:54Z2017-07-11T01:08:54ZIs it ever a good idea to arm violent nonstate actors?<p>In May, President Donald Trump authorized a plan to <a href="https://nyti.ms/2q0Swl8">arm the YPG</a>, a Kurdish militia in Syria. A month later, the YPG and their Arab partners in the Syrian Democratic Forces began the fight to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/06/us-backed-forces-say-battle-to-retake-raqqa-from-isis-will-take-months">take the Syrian city of Raqqa</a> back from the Islamic State. While the U.S., Russia and Jordan agreed to a <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-ceasefire-idUSKBN19S2DG">ceasefire in southwest Syria</a> that went into effect Sunday, the intense <a href="https://apnews.com/42f2eadc8f9447f2a442854bcfdb8916/A-fraction-of-Mosul,-Syria%27s-Raqqa-no-less-challenging">battle for Raqqa</a> continues in the north of the country. </p>
<p>Turkey, a NATO ally and U.S. partner, is <a href="http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/national/national-security/article149617089.html">fiercely opposed</a> to providing weapons to the YPG because Turkey considers the fighters to be terrorists. But the Pentagon insists arming the Kurdish fighters is essential to beating IS in Syria.</p>
<p>Is the Pentagon right that the benefits outweigh the risks? Is it ever a good idea to increase the lethality of violent nonstate actors? These are questions I address in <a href="http://publicpolicy.unc.edu/people/patricia-l-sullivan">my research</a> on the long-term effects of providing such aid. </p>
<h2>Security assistance as foreign policy</h2>
<p>Arming Kurdish and Arab fighters with heavy machine guns, mortars and anti-tank weapons to support operations against IS is not an entirely new development. U.S. Special Forces have been training and <a href="http://www.militarytimes.com/articles/syrian-kurds-ypg-us-military-weapons">equipping</a> the Syrian Democratic Forces <a href="http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/world/article38868126.html">since at least 2015</a>.</p>
<p>This is also just one recent example of U.S. <a href="https://www.army.mil/e2/rv5_downloads/info/references/army_strategic_planning_guidance.pdf">security assistance to partner forces</a> around the world. The United States is turning to this foreign policy tool with <a href="http://securityassistance.org/fact_sheet/us-military-and-police-aid-programs-basic-guide-purpose-type-recipient">increasing frequency</a>, but the U.S. has a long history of arming proxy forces in a wide range of locations around the world.</p>
<p>Most security assistance goes to the regular armed forces of recognized states like Egypt and Israel. But, according to the <a href="http://securityassistance.org/content/security-aid-dashboard">Security Assistance Monitor</a>, approximately 14 percent of publicly disclosed security assistance, and an unknown amount of covert assistance, currently goes to irregular forces – rebels, mercenaries and other nonstate groups. Over the past two decades, the U.S. Department of Defense, State Department and Central Intelligence Agency have trained, armed and advised nonstate armed groups in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, Angola and elsewhere. </p>
<h2>Considering the risks</h2>
<p>So what are the risks of transferring military capabilities to nonstate armed groups? </p>
<p>One serious concern is that weaponry provided to a sympathetic group will end up in the hands of hostile actors. For example, weapons, ammunition and vehicles given by the U.S. to Syrian rebels have been found in the possession of the al-Qaida affiliated <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/29/under-fire-u-s-suspends-part-of-syrian-rebel-training-program/">al Nusra Front</a>. And a <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/12/islamic-state-atrocities-fuelled-by-decades-of-reckless-arms-trading/">2015 report</a> from Amnesty International claims that IS built much of its arsenal by capturing weapons manufactured in the U.S. and Russia from the U.S.-allied Iraqi military and Syrian rebels. </p>
<p>Armed groups can also use their training and weapons to commit atrocities against innocent civilians. Afghan leaders trained and equipped by the U.S. to fight the Taliban are now heading militias accused of kidnapping, extortion and <a href="https://nyti.ms/2qzljet">human rights violations</a>. </p>
<p>Another risk is that members of the armed group can switch sides. Hundreds of Sunni fighters put on the Department of Defense payroll between 2006 and 2008 to fight al-Qaida in Iraq were reported to have <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/17/world/middleeast/17awakening.html">rejoined the insurgent movement</a> after U.S. troops began to withdraw in 2009. </p>
<h2>Competing interests</h2>
<p>These negative outcomes are not simply bad luck or a result of the clumsy execution of particular security assistance programs. Providing weapons to violent nonstate actors creates textbook conditions for what social scientists call <a href="http://amr.aom.org/content/14/1/57.short">principal-agent problems</a>. </p>
<p>Principals – like the U.S. – employ agents – like the YPG – to perform some task on the principal’s behalf. Problems arise when the principal cannot be sure that the agent’s actions will be consistent with <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/1912246">the principal’s interests</a>. </p>
<p>Principal-agent problems are most severe when the parties’ motivations and goals are not the same. Uncertainty about the motives of the agent and circumstances that make it difficult for the principal to monitor the agent’s behavior make the problems worse. If the principal is also unable or unwilling to fire the agent for poor performance, the agent is free to use the principal’s resources to do as she pleases.</p>
<p>The priorities and motivations of violent nonstate actors in foreign countries will rarely be closely aligned with those of the U.S., even if they share a common adversary. While the U.S. is arming Kurdish fighters to combat IS, many of the Kurdish militia’s leaders see Turkey as a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/24/world/middleeast/syria-kurds-isis-turkey.html">greater threat</a>. In addition, if the Syrian Democratic Forces capture Raqqa from IS, American and Kurdish interests are likely to diverge over <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2017/07/the-post-caliphate-gauntlet-in-eastern-syria/">who will govern</a> the Arab majority city. </p>
<p>Moreover, by design, rebel groups, paramilitary organizations and other violent nonstate actors are difficult to monitor. Constantly shifting membership, leadership and alliances are typical of militant organizations. This also makes it extraordinarily difficult to screen potential aid recipients to make sure leaders will maintain control of weapons stockpiles and foot soldiers. </p>
<p>Finally, even if a state becomes aware that its agent is behaving badly, governments providing lethal aid are slow to cut ties. Although the state holds the purse strings, it has <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1743-8594.2011.00138.x/full">limited leverage</a> over the agents it arms. This may sound surprising. But it makes sense if you consider armed groups have many ways to get weapons, but states have fewer options if they want to combat a threat in a foreign country without committing their own troops to the fight. Proxy warfare almost always involves choosing local allies from a limited set of imperfect options.</p>
<p>In fact, military aid can create perverse incentives – encouraging recipients to act recklessly or shirk on fulfillment of tasks knowing they are unlikely to lose funding for behaving badly, but will lose the contract when <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022343310394472">their tasks are fulfilled</a>. </p>
<h2>Difficult choices</h2>
<p>Despite the risks, the U.S. and its allies will continue to provide assistance to nonstate armed groups. Providing military assistance to a domestic opposition group is a means, however imperfect, of combating foreign threats without the human, material and political costs of committing large numbers of troops to combat. Partnering with local forces is playing a larger role in U.S. security strategy because perceived threats to American interests are dispersed across the globe and public <a href="http://archive.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf">support for large-scale military deployments is low</a>. In addition, evolving U.S. military doctrine recognizes that local forces can have levels of local knowledge, cultural sensitivity and legitimacy a foreign force could never attain. </p>
<p>Moreover, there are situations in which providing lethal assistance to a nonstate actor could be the least-bad feasible policy option. Syria, for example, presents the leadership of the U.S. and other capable states with practical, political and moral dilemmas – and no good options. Arming the YPG runs all the risks outlined above, plus it angers a key ally. On the other hand, a brutal dictator is indiscriminately massacring his own population and the Islamic State is terrorizing innocent civilians. Over 400,000 have died and up to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/syria">five million people are seeking refuge in other countries</a>.</p>
<p>How can policymakers anticipate the unintended consequences of a decision to arm a nonstate actor, or weigh the costs and benefits of providing lethal aid against those of withholding such assistance? Unfortunately, empirical evidence is thin because the data required to do systematic, unbiased analyses are so hard to attain. </p>
<p>My own research suggests that the arms and ammunition supplied to a combatant in wartime can perpetuate a state of insecurity in the region long after the war has officially ended. A recent study concludes that security force assistance <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2017.1307745">can achieve some limited goals</a>, but only if states make aid conditional and intrusively monitor recipients. The reality is the conditions under which the U.S. trains, equips and advises armed opposition groups are seldom conducive to either.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77652/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Patricia Sullivan receives funding from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. </span></em></p>The US is doing so with increasing frequency around the world – most recently with Kurdish fighters in Syria. A scholar explains what can go wrong, and why this approach is likely to continue.Patricia Sullivan, Associate Professor of Public Policy and the Curriculum in Peace, War, and Defense, University of North Carolina at Chapel HillLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/788232017-06-07T01:32:52Z2017-06-07T01:32:52ZHow does IS claim responsibility for a terrorist attack?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/172557/original/file-20170606-3707-11kextu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An Iraqi soldier inspects a train tunnel adorned with an Islamic State group flag in Mosul, Iraq. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Khalid Mohammed</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>News outlets have reported that <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/isil-claims-responsibility-london-attack-170605060231113.html">the Islamic State claimed responsibility</a> for a terrorist attack on a London Bridge June 3. </p>
<p>But how do they know? And how reliable are such claims?</p>
<p>We asked Monica Duffy Toft, an international security expert and director
of the Center for Strategic Studies at Tufts Fletcher School to explain.</p>
<h2>How does media know when IS is behind an attack?</h2>
<p>IS generally claims responsibility in <a href="http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/05/24/529685951/what-does-it-mean-when-isis-claims-responsibility-for-an-attack">one of two ways</a>. </p>
<p>First, IS has its own Amaq News Agency. Amaq acts like an official state news agency, similar to North Korea’s Korean Central News Agency. It pushes out breaking news reports, both text and video, through an encrypted mobile Android app. You must be invited or know someone in the network to be able to download it. Its reports are then tweeted by people interested in IS like supporters, the media and analysts.</p>
<p>The second route is less common: IS issues a statement directly via its official channel, the Nashir Media Foundation. While Amaq also publishes statements and stories by Islamists and jihadists other than IS, Nashir is considered the direct voice of IS leadership.</p>
<p>IS’ use of limited and strictly controlled outlets for claims of responsibility for its operations allows it to stop rivals from faking claims of responsibility on IS’ behalf. </p>
<h2>What does a claim of responsibility mean?</h2>
<p>IS claims responsibility both for attacks it deliberately planned and executed, and also those inspired by its propaganda. </p>
<p>According to the Long War Journal’s <a href="http://www.defenddemocracy.org/about-fdd/team-overview/thomas-joscelyn/">Thomas Jocelyn</a>, IS calls formal members of the group “soldiers of the caliphate.” They also use that term for lone wolves such as the San Bernardino, California and Orlando, Florida attackers. </p>
<p>When IS is directly responsible for a planned attack, a claim of responsibility tends to mention specifics about the attacker and to be released in about 24 hours, according to Jocelyn. If the claim takes longer to appear and offers no details about the attacker, the attack was likely not known to IS in advance. </p>
<p>Rita Katz of SITE Intelligence Group <a href="http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/05/24/529685951/what-does-it-mean-when-isis-claims-responsibility-for-an-attack">says</a> her group has yet to catch IS claiming responsibility for attacks they had no part in, although they frequently exaggerate the number of casualties.</p>
<h2>Why does IS bother to claim responsibility?</h2>
<p>According to <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2017.1280304">recent research by terrorism experts</a> Justin Conrad and Max Abrahms, only one in seven terror attacks is actually claimed by the terrorist group responsible.</p>
<p>Given that the act of violence itself is meant as a performance – a way to remind the apathetic or ignorant of a group’s grievances and the costs of ignoring them – that number is surprisingly high. </p>
<p>Conrad and Abrahms argue that groups like IS are composed of two kinds of agents. One is rational leaders with strategic, political objectives. The other is operational foot soldiers, some of whom are not rational. IS’ leaders claim responsibility only when they calculate a political benefit; they refuse to claim responsibility when an attack might hurt the group’s objectives. Conrad and Abrahms analyzed hundreds of cases and conclude that this method is true not just for IS, but for other terrorist groups too.</p>
<p>If this theory is correct, IS claimed responsibility for both the recent Manchester bombing and the London Bridge assaults because its leaders calculated that it would result in a net benefit – like cash from its sympathizers or overreaction from its targets.</p>
<p>Such thinking might explain why no one, including the Taliban, has yet to claim last week’s attack in Kabul, which is believed to have claimed at least 150 lives and wounded another 300 people. We can speculate that something about the victims caused the perpetrators to calculate that it would be too politically costly for them to claim responsibility.</p>
<p>When would IS choose not to claim credit? When an attack results in heavy noncombatant casualties. For example, when Osama Bin Laden – whose group al-Qaida is considered by some to be less radical than IS – was interviewed by Pakistani journalist Taysir Alluni, he was challenged on the legitimacy of killing faithful Muslims who were in New York’s World Trade Center when it was destroyed on 9/11. <a href="http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/219013263">He responded</a> that these could not have been noncombatants because “Islamic law says that Muslims should not stay long in the land of infidels.” </p>
<p>This exchange shows that the meaning of “noncombatant” is not universal. Even nominal IS supporters may disagree with the group about who is a legitimate “combatant.”</p>
<h2>Aren’t we giving IS too much credit? Do they really think strategically?</h2>
<p>One of the most important insights to emerge in social science research on ethnic, religious and terrorist violence since the early 1990s, including <a href="http://books.wwnorton.com/books/Gods-Century/">my own</a>, has been the recognition that groups representing hyper-violent operators <a href="http://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/is3104_pp097-131_toft.pdf">do tend to act rationally and strategically</a>. That means their actions and interests can be judged, patterned and predicted.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/78823/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Monica Duffy Toft does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>An expert explains that such claims are probably more calculated and careful than you’d expect.Monica Duffy Toft, Professor of International Politics, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/786672017-06-04T20:23:51Z2017-06-04T20:23:51ZErasing history: why Islamic State is blowing up ancient artefacts<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171748/original/file-20170601-23531-1t4uqpi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Iraqi soldiers gather near the remains of wall panels and colossal statues of winged bulls that were destroyed by Islamic State militants in the Assyrian city of Nimrud, late last year.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ari Jalal/Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>One of the many tragedies that have unfolded in the wake of the Islamic State (IS) is their smashing of statues and the destruction of ancient archaeological sites. Indeed, the rapid and terrifying advance of the IS has proved fatal for much invaluable heritage. </p>
<p>They toppled priceless statues at the Mosul Museum in northern Iraq. They used sledgehammers and power tools to deface giant winged-bull statues at Nineveh on the outskirts of Mosul. At Nimrud, IS detonated explosives, turning the site into a giant, brown, mushroom cloud. They used assault rifles and pickaxes to destroy invaluable carvings at Hatra; and at Palmyra in Syria they blew up the 2,000-year-old temples dedicated to the pagan gods Baal Shamin and Bel.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171747/original/file-20170601-23531-11ygue3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171747/original/file-20170601-23531-11ygue3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171747/original/file-20170601-23531-11ygue3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171747/original/file-20170601-23531-11ygue3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171747/original/file-20170601-23531-11ygue3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171747/original/file-20170601-23531-11ygue3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171747/original/file-20170601-23531-11ygue3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171747/original/file-20170601-23531-11ygue3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A damaged artefact at the Mosul museum, where Islamic State militants filmed themselves destroying priceless statues and sculptures in 2015.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Thaier Al-Sudani /Reuters</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It’s difficult to interpret the unprecedented scale of this heritage destruction. The global media and politicians have tended to frame these events as random casualties of wanton terror or as moments of unrestrained barbarism.</p>
<p>UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Director General Irina Bokova, for instance, reacted to the destruction of Nimrud by arguing that such attacks were underpinned by “<a href="http://en.unesco.org/news/unesco-director-general-condemns-destruction-nimrud">propaganda and hatred</a>”. There is, she said, <a href="http://whc.unesco.org/en/news/1244/">“absolutely no political or religious justification for the destruction of humanity’s cultural heritage</a>”.</p>
<p>However, in an article published recently in the <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13527258.2017.1325769">International Journal of Heritage Studies</a>, we argue that the acts of heritage destruction undertaken by IS are much more than mere moments of propaganda devoid of political or religious justification.</p>
<p>We analysed two key IS media outlets: Dabiq, their glossy periodical online magazine, which is part manifesto, part call to arms, and part grisly newsletter; and the various slick propaganda films released by Al-Hayat.</p>
<p>We found that the heritage destruction wrought by IS was not only very deliberate and carefully staged, but underpinned by three specific and clearly articulated frameworks.</p>
<h2>Theological</h2>
<p>Firstly, the IS have gone to great theological (if selective) lengths to justify their iconoclasm. For example, an Al-Hayat film documenting the destruction at the Mosul Museum and Nineveh starts:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Oh Muslims, the remains that you see behind me are the idols of peoples of previous centuries, which were worshipped instead of Allah. The Assyrians, Akkadians, and others took for themselves gods of rain, of agriculture, and of war, and worshipped them along with Allah, and tried to appease them with all kinds of sacrifices… Since Allah commanded us to shatter and destroy these statues, idols, and remains, it is easy for us to obey, and we do not care [what people think], even if they are worth billions of dollars.</p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171749/original/file-20170601-25652-afm8cs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171749/original/file-20170601-25652-afm8cs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171749/original/file-20170601-25652-afm8cs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171749/original/file-20170601-25652-afm8cs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171749/original/file-20170601-25652-afm8cs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171749/original/file-20170601-25652-afm8cs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171749/original/file-20170601-25652-afm8cs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171749/original/file-20170601-25652-afm8cs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Jounalists walk near the remains of the Monumental Arch in the historic Syrian city of Palmyra in April last year.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Omar Sanadiki/Reuters</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The destruction at Palmyra features in a double-page spread with 14 colour photographs in Dabiq. In the French edition, Dar-al-Islam, the text states:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Baal is a false divinity for which people sacrificed their children as indicated in the book of Jeremiah (Old Testament). But by the Grace of Allah, soldiers of the Caliphate destroyed it.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Historical</h2>
<p>Secondly, the IS make frequent reference to key historical figures to justify their iconoclasm. These include the Prophet Abraham’s destruction of idols and the Prophet Muhammad’s iconoclasm at the Ka’ba, the centrepiece of Mecca’s mosque.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171752/original/file-20170601-25658-8g60j3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171752/original/file-20170601-25658-8g60j3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171752/original/file-20170601-25658-8g60j3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171752/original/file-20170601-25658-8g60j3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171752/original/file-20170601-25658-8g60j3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171752/original/file-20170601-25658-8g60j3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171752/original/file-20170601-25658-8g60j3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171752/original/file-20170601-25658-8g60j3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Palmyra’s Monumental Arch in 2010.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sandra Auger/Reuters</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In an Al-Hayat film documenting the destruction at the Mosul Museum and Nineveh, one militant states: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The Prophet Muhammad shattered the idols with his own honourable hands when he conquered Mecca. The Prophet Muhammad commanded us to shatter and destroy statues. This is what his companions did later on, when they conquered lands.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Similar homage is also paid throughout the magazine Dabiq to other, more contemporary, moments of iconoclasm perpetrated by Islamic fundamentalists. These include the destruction of untold numbers of heritage sites by the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wahhabism">Wahhabi sect</a> across the Arabian peninsula from the mid-18th century; the Taliban’s destruction of the <a href="https://www.pri.org/stories/2015-06-11/they-were-destroyed-taliban-now-giant-buddha-statues-bamiyan-have-returned-3-d">Bamiyan Buddhas</a> in Afghanistan in 2001; and the destruction of the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tpp-5L7vevQ">al-‘Askari</a> mosque by al-Qa’eda in Iraq in 2006. </p>
<h2>Political</h2>
<p>Finally, and often overlooked, the IS have used political reasoning to justify the destruction. One Dabiq article states:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The kuffār [unbelievers] had unearthed these statues and ruins in recent generations and attempted to portray them as part of a cultural heritage and identity that the Muslims of Iraq should embrace and be proud of. Yet this opposes the guidance of Allah and His Messenger and only serves a nationalist agenda.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>We can see two dimensions of the IS’s political iconoclasm here. First, it is an attack on “the kuffār”. These are presumably Westerners who, as part of the colonial period, drew the modern borders and created the contemporary states of the Middle East. They also excavated Mesopotamian archaeological sites and placed relics in public museums to be admired.</p>
<p>Second, the attacks on sites inscribed on UNESCOs World Heritage List (such as Hatra and Palmyra) are also an attack on the values such institutions promote: secular, liberal, humanist values that promote a recognition of the shared heritage of human civilization. This is in stark contrast to the IS who seek to create religious, historical and political homogeneity under the rule of a strict caliphate. </p>
<p>In March 2015 UNESCO’s Bokova issued a statement referring to the destruction of heritage sites at the hands of the IS as a “<a href="http://en.unesco.org/news/unesco-director-general-condemns-destruction-nimrud">war crime</a>”.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171755/original/file-20170601-25697-iwcq40.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171755/original/file-20170601-25697-iwcq40.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171755/original/file-20170601-25697-iwcq40.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171755/original/file-20170601-25697-iwcq40.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171755/original/file-20170601-25697-iwcq40.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171755/original/file-20170601-25697-iwcq40.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171755/original/file-20170601-25697-iwcq40.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171755/original/file-20170601-25697-iwcq40.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Hatra in 2002, before the carnage.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Suhaib Salem/Reuters</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Knowing that UNESCO was powerless to stop them, the following month the IS released an Al-Hayat video filmed at the ancient city of Hatra. The film shows militants using sledgehammers and assault rifles to destroy priceless reliefs engraved into the walls of the fortress city. It also features a bold repost to Bokova: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Some of the infidel organisations say the destruction of these alleged artefacts is a war crime. We will destroy your artefacts and idols anywhere and <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/isis">Islamic State</a> will rule your lands.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Such brash assertions made by IS clearly demonstrate that their heritage destruction cannot be dismissed as being simple propaganda. </p>
<p>Instead, as we have shown, the heritage destruction undertaken by the IS are not only very carefully planned and executed, but also couched within a broader religious, historical and political framework that seeks to justify their violent iconoclasm. </p>
<p>Understanding the complex layers that drive such iconoclasm are a step towards developing better responses to the destruction of our shared cultural heritage.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/78667/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Benjamin Isakhan receives funding from the Australian Department of Defence and the Australian Research Council’s Discovery Early Career Researcher Award (DE120100315). The views expressed in this article do not reflect those of Defence or Government policy.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jose Antonio Gonzalez Zarandona is affiliated with the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University (Australia) and Division de Historia, Centro de Investigacion y Docencia Economicas (Mexico). </span></em></p>Islamic State has destroyed globally-significant sites in Iraq and Syria, but not as wanton acts of destruction. Instead, they are calculated political and religious attacks.Benjamin Isakhan, Associate Professor of Politics and Policy, Deakin UniversityJose Antonio Gonzalez Zarandona, Associate Research Fellow, Heritage Destruction Specialist, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/759582017-04-07T21:15:06Z2017-04-07T21:15:06ZUS airstrike on Syria: What next?<p>Make no mistake. The April 6 U.S. airstrike on Syria following Bashar al-Assad’s chemical weapon attack is a remarkable shift in President Donald Trump’s – and Washington’s – past policy. </p>
<p>As president-elect, Trump’s Middle Eastern concerns <a href="https://theconversation.com/trump-and-tillerson-face-the-middle-east-68695">centered</a> on defeating the Islamic State and depicted Syria’s millions of refugees as potential extremists and a threat to U.S. borders. The president now justifies American attacks on Syrian airfields as a “<a href="http://abcnews.go.com/International/eyewitness-syrian-military-anticipated-us-raid/story?id=46641107">vital national security interest of the U.S.</a>”</p>
<p>Trump himself said that Tuesday’s ghastly chemical attacks changed his mind on the Assad regime. Just as suddenly, <a href="https://twitter.com/Ibishblog">U.S.-based Middle Eastern experts</a> and <a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/news/allies-and-adversaries-react-to-us-attack-in-syria/">key foreign leaders</a> have approved this U.S. policy move. Some Syrians, too, are showing <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-39526653">appreciation for “Abu Ivanka,”</a> or the “Father of Ivanka.”</p>
<p>Moreover, the U.S. airstrikes may have involved some strategic thought and multilateral diplomacy, two central aspects of foreign policymaking not previously associated with the Trump administration. The choice of the airfield for attack was a limited, comparatively low-stakes target. Both <a href="http://www.cnbc.com/2017/04/06/the-us-warned-the-russians-ahead-of-syria-missile-strikes-official.html">Russia</a> and Syria had advance knowledge from the U.S. of the attack. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/world/middleeast/russia-iran-us-strikes-syria.html">Syrian and Russian outrage</a> at the U.S. involvement is an expected response to this first open major American military action against Assad since the 2011 civil war began. But that doesn’t mean the conflict will necessarily entangle the U.S. more deeply. Indeed, Russian frustration with the particular nastiness of its ally’s chemical attack may make the US strike a relief to President Vladimir Putin because it signals to Assad that he had better be careful about how he tries to reassert control over Syria. That signal, however, need not undermine Assad himself.</p>
<h2>A one-time thing?</h2>
<p>So what comes next for U.S. policy?</p>
<p>Was this a one-off U.S. intervention reflective of Trump’s interest in doing “something” in response to a particularly shocking event? </p>
<p>Or did Trump wish to look strong after critiques of his foreign policy during a visit by <a href="http://www.npr.org/2017/04/06/522903377/trump-welcomes-chinese-president-xi-jinping-at-mar-a-lago">China’s President Xi Jinping</a> or distract attention from his overall <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/02/28/us/politics/the-highs-and-lows-of-trumps-approval.html">low approval ratings</a>? </p>
<p>We don’t know, because the U.S. leader has shown limited consistent attention to foreign policy.</p>
<p>The easiest guess? Trump’s lack of prior expertise in the Syrian crisis, his <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/steve-bannon-is-losing-to-the-globalists">moves back toward</a> the U.S.‘ more typical globalized outlook and apparent genuine shock at Assad’s brutality may signal a real shift. Yet, even if so, it is unlikely founded on a broader policy vision. The problem of what Trump does when faced with a complex global challenge, without the background and fully staffed bureaucracy to respond rapidly, has been raised appropriately by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/opinion/creeping-toward-crisis.html">journalists and pundits</a>. We have seen no sign so far that the White House has a strategy on Assad larger than the air strike.</p>
<p>Of course, Assad, Putin and Iran’s leadership do <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/putin-calling-strategic-shots-in-syria/a-19504175">have such strategies</a>. They involve continued strengthening of the Syrian strongman’s power. </p>
<p>The long-term, entrenched nature of these countries’ commitments casts doubt that the U.S. for now will take bigger steps to undermine Assad’s <a href="http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-syria-assad-20170406-story.html">recently improved position in Syria</a>. The Trump administration has expressed indifference toward <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/03/politics/donald-trump-diplomacy/">complex diplomacy</a>. Indeed, greater U.S. determination to adopt a multipronged, multilateral effort to weaken Assad or crush Syrian opposition might make defeating the Islamic State harder. It would embroil Trump in a problem that proved too vexing for the extensive brainpower and experience of the Obama administration. And it might risk long-term, unpopular military engagement, with greater responsibility for state-building, like what bedeviled Washington a decade ago in Iraq.</p>
<p>Moreover, in terms of broader U.S. military involvement, Syria today is not a clear analogy with Iraq in 2003. The absence of a prior attack on U.S. soil, the longer-term plan of U.S. policy advisers to topple Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi government and that government’s lack of powerful international allies are all key factors that facilitated American military escalation in Iraq that are not present in Syria.</p>
<p>Syrians, and people who care about Syria, might hope that a U.S. airstrike leads to new, international, creative efforts to try to alleviate Syrians’ suffering. We all know that President Trump is quite capable of actions that surprise. Could a sustained American commitment to stop Assad’s killing be such a surprise? Such a commitment would require not quick attacks but subtle diplomacy, with the credible threat of force as one policy lever among many. It’s unlikely, but with Donald Trump, it is hard to know for sure.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/75958/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Mednicoff does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Was this a one-off intervention – or a sign that Trump will undertake more of an effort to undermine the Assad regime?David Mednicoff, Assistant Professor of Public Policy and Director, Middle Eastern Studies, UMass AmherstLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/716712017-01-20T21:42:05Z2017-01-20T21:42:05ZNATO’s future when America comes first<p>Former President Obama famously suggested <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/">in a 2016 interview </a>that he questioned a set of orthodox assumptions about American foreign policy that he labeled “the Washington Playbook.” </p>
<p>That orthodoxy, widely accepted among American political elites since 1945, includes an unending national commitment to employ America’s financial resources and military forces in opposition to any challenges to global peace and stability. The dominant assumption has been that America’s broader, enlightened self-interest is best served by a system where peace rules and free trade flourishes.</p>
<p>Obama may have begun the process of reorienting America’s global role. But the newly inaugurated Donald Trump is busy shredding the Washington Playbook – as <a href="http://www.cnbc.com/2017/01/20/transcript-of-president-trumps-inauguration-speech.html">his comments at his inaugural address</a> made clear.</p>
<p>Hearkening back to language not employed in the United States <a href="https://theconversation.com/trumps-america-first-echoes-from-1940s-59579">since the 1930s,</a> Trump declared categorically that it is all about putting America’s interests first.</p>
<p>Among his most controversial challenges is his questioning of the relevance, utility and cost of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the pursuit of America’s national security goals. In a somewhat oblique reference to NATO, he said: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“For many decades we’ve…subsidized the armies of other countries while allowing for the very sad depletion of our military.” </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Indeed, Donald Trump has repeatedly suggested that NATO is obsolete, most recently in <a href="http://www.thetimes.co.uk/edition/news/i-ll-do-a-deal-with-britain-6hl2hl73l">an interview with The Times of London</a>. Trump’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/15/world/europe/donald-trump-nato.html">logic is simple</a>: America’s biggest security concern is terrorism, and NATO is not relevant to that process. </p>
<p>But is Trump correct in asserting that NATO has outlived its utility? Or that NATO’s members enjoy a “free ride” on the back of a security umbrella furnished and paid for by the United States?</p>
<p>The first claim is highly questionable. But when we step back from his abrasive tone and language, there is more bipartisan consensus about the second claim among America’s political leadership than we might assume.</p>
<p>Let’s look at the evolution of NATO, and each claim in turn.</p>
<h2>NATO’s creation and growth</h2>
<p>Since its founding in 1949 at the dawn of the Cold War, NATO has commonly been regarded as an intrinsically important, stabilizing force in the West. Originally composed of a dozen founder members, its initial central task was to deter the Soviet Union and its allies in the <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/warsaw-treaty">Warsaw Pact</a>, from invading Western Europe.</p>
<p>The political climate at the time was so tense and NATO considered so important that, in his speech at its founding, <a href="http://www.historytoday.com/richard-cavendish/founding-nato">President Truman described</a> the new treaty as</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“a shield against aggression and the fear of aggression – a bulwark which will permit us to get on with the real business of government and society, the business of achieving a fuller and happier life for all our citizens.” </p>
</blockquote>
<p>But times have changed and so have the circumstances. </p>
<p>At the Cold War’s conclusion, NATO’s membership spread eastward, incorporating many of the countries that were formerly members of the Warsaw Pact. Today that number totals 28, with <a href="http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52044.htm">Albania being the latest to join</a>. </p>
<h2>Is NATO still relevant?</h2>
<p>So is Trump fair in challenging NATO’s relevance today? The short answer is “no.”</p>
<p>First, NATO forces have been deeply involved in the fight against terrorism. Afghanistan provides the most compelling example. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm">Article 5,</a> a provision in NATO’s original Washington Treaty, stipulates that an attack on any NATO member is an attack on all NATO members. The only time it has ever been triggered was when Al-Qaida attacked the United States on <a href="http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2001/1001/e1002a.htm">Sept. 11, 2001.</a> Since then, <a href="http://icasualties.org/oef/">over 1,000 non-American military personnel have died</a> fighting alongside U.S. troops in Afghanistan, all but a few of them from NATO countries. If American policymakers intend to fight a global war against Jihadism, as incoming national security advisor Michael Flynn maintains in his book<a href="https://www.amazon.com/Field-Fight-Global-Against-Radical/dp/1250106222?tag=bisafetynet-20"> “The Field of Fight</a>,” then NATO would form a cornerstone of that fight.</p>
<p>The second reason for NATO’s continued relevance is Russia. </p>
<p>President Trump’s repeated assertions that the United States can negotiate a rapprochement with Russia and potentially drop its sanctions against them <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/trump-russia-sanctions-poll_us_586d736ee4b0c8575a771276">have met with disapproval</a> in domestic opinion polls. </p>
<p>The idea of forging a working relationship with Moscow in fighting the Islamic State has its attractions for Americans consumed by concerns about terrorism. But the precedents are not good. George W. Bush believed he could work collaboratively with Russia. So did Barack Obama. <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/14/politics/russia-us-trump-reset-pros-cons/">Both failed.</a> What’s more, both Vladimir Putin’s and Donald Trump’s combustible and confrontational “A-type” personalities don’t suggest that either will give an inch when they disagree. So it isn’t outlandish to anticipate a breakdown in that relationship, and a resurgence of NATO’s importance in central and eastern Europe if incoming <a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/dec/6/donald-trump-james-mattis-differ-on-vladimir-putin/">Defense Secretary General James Mattis’</a> comments that Russia is the major threat to US interests gains currency in the White House.</p>
<h2>Show me the money</h2>
<p>But what of Trump’s claims that NATO members are just free riders while America pays for their defense? </p>
<p>Here there is across-the-board consensus. Both <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/02/statement-president-fy2017-european-reassurance-initiative-budget">Barack Obama</a> and <a href="http://money.cnn.com/2016/07/08/news/nato-summit-spending-countries/">Hillary Clinton</a> said the same thing, albeit in more diplomatic language and without the accompanying claim that NATO serves no purpose. </p>
<p>Even NATO’s own Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/nato-to-press-europe-at-warsaw-summit-for-higher-military-spending-1467974996">has recognized the problem</a> and cajoled NATO members to pay more toward the cost of their defense. </p>
<p>The math is fairly simple. </p>
<p>Each NATO member is supposed to spend 2 percent of its annual gross domestic product on defense. But as its membership has grown, the willingness of the individual members to contribute to the collective defense has conversely waned. That’s because as the Soviet threat declined, most European countries engaged in <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/23/world/europe/europes-shrinking-military-spending-under-scrutiny.html">a wind-down of their defense budgets</a> – what’s commonly called a “peace dividend.” America stopped the wind-down after 9/11. But it’s a process <a href="http://money.cnn.com/2016/07/08/news/nato-summit-spending-countries/">that has continued in Europe</a> to this day. </p>
<p>Only five NATO members meet the 2 percent requirement, including the U.S., which spends about <a href="http://money.cnn.com/2016/07/08/news/nato-summit-spending-countries/">3.6 percent</a>. And of the other four, only the United Kingdom could realistically be characterized as having major military capabilities – the remainder being Estonia, Greece and Poland.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/153698/original/image-20170120-5214-nm9vai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/153698/original/image-20170120-5214-nm9vai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/153698/original/image-20170120-5214-nm9vai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/153698/original/image-20170120-5214-nm9vai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/153698/original/image-20170120-5214-nm9vai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/153698/original/image-20170120-5214-nm9vai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/153698/original/image-20170120-5214-nm9vai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The NATO flag is raised in Poland at the beginning of joint exercises in 2013.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/usarmyeurope_images/10643976416">US Army Europe</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Even France, which has Europe’s other truly capable force, spent only 1.8 percent last year. Among the remaining members below the 2 percent threshold, Germany provides perhaps the most startling example.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38675522">Germany has just announced</a> it will increase expenditure – to 1.2 percent of GDP. What does that tangibly mean? Well, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34983396">a German Defense Ministry report</a> published at the end of 2015, for example, revealed that only 29 of Germany’s 66 Tornado jets were “deployable.” The air force had no spare parts for the planes. So they had to be scavenged from the more than 50 percent that couldn’t be used. <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/11057330/German-fighter-jets-unable-to-fly-and-mechanics-forced-to-borrow-spare-parts-claims-magazine.html">A 2014 report by Der Spiegel magazine (which was challenged by the German Defense Ministry)</a> claimed that as few as seven of Germany’s 67 CH-53 transport helicopters were fully operational, including those being deployed in Afghanistan, and only five of its 33 NH-80 helicopters. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, despite the end of the Cold War over two decades ago, the <a href="https://southfront.org/military-analysis-us-military-presence-in-europe/">U.S. deploys huge resources </a>to Germany, and throughout Europe, at considerable cost. </p>
<h2>Looking ahead</h2>
<p>There is little doubt that most NATO members have reneged on their financial commitment to an organization that undoubtedly serves their security interests.</p>
<p>The fact is, however, that NATO has played, and may well continue to play, an essential role in America’s national security, whether it is in combating groups like ISIS or deterring Russian aggression in central and eastern Europe. </p>
<p>Maybe the incoming president’s criticisms are simply a ploy to get NATO members to pay more. Maybe these countries will succumb to pressure. Let’s hope that is all it is. Because neither America nor Europe will be more secure without NATO.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/71671/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Reich does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Is Trump correct in asserting that NATO has outlived its utility? Or that NATO’s members enjoy a ‘free ride’ on the back of the US? A political scientist examines the evidence.Simon Reich, Professor in The Division of Global Affairs and The Department of Political Science, Rutgers University - NewarkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/686952016-12-13T16:47:05Z2016-12-13T16:47:05ZTrump and Tillerson face the Middle East<p>Can President-elect Donald Trump adopt policies that respond to the realities of today’s Middle East, despite his lack of regional knowledge, absence of <a href="http://www.salon.com/2016/12/09/see-no-evil-hear-no-evil-donald-trump-is-turning-away-his-intelligence-briefings/">deep engagement</a> in global issues and use of inflammatory language toward Muslims?</p>
<p>It’s still <a href="http://www.thearabweekly.com/Opinion/7011/American-intifada%E2%80%99-creates-uncertainty-for-the-Middle-East">too early</a> to answer this question definitively, but Trump’s pick of oil executive Rex Tillerson for secretary of state heightens concerns about the Trump administration’s <a href="http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/politics/ct-trump-tillerson-secretary-of-state-20161210-story.html">possible excessive closeness</a> to Russia, while leaving other likely U.S. foreign policy priorities unclear. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, it is conceivable that some of Trump’s postures on the campaign trail and the general appeal he made to his voters could help him respond to issues facing the contemporary Middle East. That’s especially true if he could build policies that eschewed Islamophobia and American militarism. </p>
<p>As a scholar with broad expertise in contemporary Middle Eastern law and politics, who was among those who <a href="http://valleyadvocate.com/2007/06/28/countering-the-orchestra-of-orthodoxies-a-umass-amherst-fulbright-scholar-returns-from-qatar/">foresaw the likely rise in Islamic extremism and instability</a> following the U.S. regime overthrow in Iraq, I’m in a good position to analyze the realities the Trump administration will face. </p>
<p>First of all, ignoring the Middle East is not an option. Humanitarian crises – think <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/12/middleeast/aleppo-syria-government-gains/">Syria</a> – and regional popular dissatisfaction with politics and economics will inevitably affect Americans’ security at home and abroad. That’s why it’s important to envision how the new U.S. government can actually capitalize on Trump’s lack of prior foreign policy experience to seek policies that can help both Americans and Middle Easterners.</p>
<h2>Anti-Islamic postures are not productive</h2>
<p>The aftermath of the 2011 mass uprisings against unpopular, coercive governments in the Middle East and North Africa was renewed authoritarianism and devastating civil war. As a result, leaders and many citizens in today’s Middle East have deferred their hopes for democratizing change. They fear that the violence and chaos that decimated Syria and Yemen <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/refugee-crisis-was-caused-by-a-careless-west-that-allowed-anarchy-and-fear-to-take-root-in-the-10509173.html">will spread to them</a>. Yet the region has a <a href="http://www.arab-hdr.org/PreviousReports/2016/2016.aspx">young population</a> with strong interest in better economic opportunity and greater freedom.</p>
<p>Muslims are <a href="http://www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/middle-east-north-africa/">a large majority in the region</a>. As a candidate, Trump’s clearest stance relevant to the Middle East was a willingness to appeal to some Americans’ mistrust of Muslims. People who have experience with Middle Eastern extremism <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/i-used-to-be-an-islamic-extremist-this-is-the-truth-about-how-you-can-prevent-further-terror-attacks-a7145816.html">warn</a> that looking at the region through an Islamophobic lens won’t lead to any good. </p>
<p>Even common sense, which Trump and Tillerson seem to share, suggests hostile statements by a world leader toward a region’s majority religion are destructive. Indeed, militant group propagandists have been gleeful in their expectations that the incoming U.S. leader’s anti-Islamic statements <a href="http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/306076-isis-trumps-win-is-good-for-our-recruiting">will enhance their recruitment</a>.</p>
<p>President-elect Trump should back off from inflammatory language that demeans Muslims broadly in favor of a clear-headed appreciation of regional concerns. Doing this is imaginable if he can build on aspects of other positions he took during the campaign. Key among these postures are the view that the U.S. is too enmeshed in global alliances and politics, a determination to destroy the Islamic State, concern about spillover of the Syrian crisis into the U.S. and mistrust of Iran.</p>
<p>Let’s consider each one.</p>
<h2>US involvement in the Middle East</h2>
<p>Like Trump, some Middle Eastern governments, concerned with a legacy of excessive Western imperial domination and American interference, might <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/nov/10/middle-east-donald-trump-president">favor less extensive U.S. enmeshment</a> in the region. </p>
<p>Others realize that a less robust American engagement risks enhancing the power of repressive leaders like Syria’s Assad or decreasing U.S. global power. It would also likely mean <a href="http://www.vox.com/world/2016/11/15/13629690/trump-israel-palestine-peace-process-settlements-jerusalem">no progress, or worse, for long-suffering Palestinians</a> and Israelis. </p>
<p>Yet, weaker U.S. unilateral enmeshment in regional issues may avoid future long-term disasters like Iraq. It would prevent inconsistent or hypocritical efforts to promote American priorities in the region from making some issues worse. Tunisia, the one Arab country that made a transition to democracy after the 2011 regional uprisings, did so <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/03/17/tunisia.clinton/">without being a major U.S. priority</a>. Some scaling back of U.S. efforts in the region, assessed soberly with <a href="http://www.mei.edu/content/recalculating-us-policy-middle-east-less-military-more-civilian">a view to U.S. priorities</a>, would be not only welcome in some quarters, but arguably no less effective than current policy. Indeed, a well-planned reduced U.S. role could encourage greater capacity for Middle East regional institutions like the <a href="http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/joint-declaration-at-gcc-summit-raises-hopes-and-expectations">Gulf Cooperation Council</a>, which has <a href="https://theconversation.com/pan-arab-identity-lives-on-and-could-help-to-forge-a-better-middle-east-32134">proven elusive</a> in the past.</p>
<h2>Defeat IS, but then what?</h2>
<p>Most countries in the region have no love for IS. They have cooperated financially, logistically or militarily, in the effort <a href="http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/716306/ISIS-finished-When-will-Islamic-State-be-defeated-Iraq-Syria-daesh">to destroy it</a> that is <a href="http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/739882/ISIS-defeat-Donald-Trump-US-Defence-Secretary-Ash-Carter">succeeding on the battlefield</a>. Yet, as was true with Saddam Hussein’s overthrow in Iraq in 2003, U.S.-supported military efforts to oust a toxic political entity are just a first step. Understanding the reconstruction that must follow is central. </p>
<p>The Iraqi government’s <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/the-shia-are-in-power-in-iraq-but-not-in-control-8523280.html">lack of control</a> over parts of the country’s territory, its ties to Iran and the expectations for <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/10/kurdistan-iraq-economy-independence.html">some subnational ethnic group autonomy</a> are key problems that no great power can afford to ignore. Doing so may sow the seeds for future IS-like entities.</p>
<h2>Spillover from Syria</h2>
<p>A third point that Trump stressed while campaigning was a fear that the Syrian crisis’ spillover would lead refugees to the U.S. where they could pose a security risk. </p>
<p>This fear is unfounded. Only a small number of Syrian refugees are accepted by the U.S. The Department of Homeland Security has a <a href="http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2016/jun/13/donald-trump/wrong-donald-trump-says-theres-no-system-vet-refug/">stringent process</a> of refugee approval. What’s more, refugees have historically made important contributions to American society. Practically speaking, people fleeing groups like IS could <a href="https://theconversation.com/more-syrian-refugees-good-for-national-security-47347">help</a> American efforts to combat the groups and their violent ideology. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, it is difficult to imagine Trump opening U.S. borders to Syrian refugees. But the <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/document/aleppo-fighting-rages-everything-must-be-done-protect-civilians">Syrian humanitarian crisis won’t go away</a> simply because Trump might prefer to ignore it. Syria’s tragedy <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/13/opinion/what-comes-after-aleppo-falls.html">has only intensified</a> in the wake of limited global action.</p>
<p>As with IS, it would be foolhardy if the new administration turned its back on the <a href="http://gulfnews.com/opinion/thinkers/aleppo-s-fall-will-signal-a-terrifying-stage-1.1943152">broad dangers represented by Syria’s collapse</a>. Europe and Turkey are turning away people fleeing Syria’s and Yemen’s violence. A policy that would be consistent with Trump’s unwillingness to increase refugee presence on U.S. soil would be to provide more consistent post-conflict services. These could include vocational <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2016-04-28/jordans-refugee-experiment">training and jobs</a> for the millions of Syrian civilians in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.post-gazette.com/news/nation/2015/12/20/What-makes-someone-become-a-terrorist/stories/201512200045">Research on extremism</a> suggests that recruits are driven by issues of identity and perceived deprivation or social exclusion, not specific ideological or religious beliefs. This danger has been, and remains, acute in Syria and will require practical attention.</p>
<h2>What about Iran?</h2>
<p>Trump has also promised to renegotiate the <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-historic-deal-for-iran-and-the-world-44641">multilateral treaty that stopped</a> Iran’s move toward nuclear weapons. Arab Gulf states frequently express anxiety around Iran’s power. They see Iran as a threat to their countries’ autonomy and to the majority Sunni Islam that differs from the assertive minority Shi’ism central to Iran’s political ideology. </p>
<p>While some Middle Eastern countries may <a href="http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2016/11/15/OPINION-Goodbye-to-Obama-s-lean-years.html">welcome a renewed U.S. hard line toward Tehran</a>, other factors could nudge the Trump administration toward little more than a symbolic push against the treaty. These include the opportunities for American companies to sell to Iran; Iranian oil, in which <a href="http://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/Exxon-Setting-Its-Sights-On-Iranian-Oil-Fields.html">Tillerson’s company has shown interest</a>; Russia’s good ties to Iran; and the real risks of an Iran with nuclear weapons. </p>
<p>In any case, the U.S. will not be able to ignore Iran’s role as a player in regional politics. This role annoys Israel and some Sunni Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia. Indeed, American pragmatism and fresh eyes could actually help an ongoing, acrimonious struggle between Iran and Saudi Arabia for influence in the oil-rich Gulf that can be expected to be viewed as important by Tillerson.</p>
<h2>The bigger picture</h2>
<p>Perhaps candidate Trump’s main message was that bloated government has failed to serve many people. Many Middle Easterners feel this exact sentiment toward their own political systems. </p>
<p>“Drain the swamp” could well have been a winning slogan during the 2011 Middle East uprisings – except for its geographical mismatch in a desert region. Trump should readily understand the long-seething anger which Middle Easterners harbor toward their leaders and economic prospects.</p>
<p>If the new U.S. leader works with his pragmatic, deal-oriented nominee for secretary of state, and can tune his ear toward this frustration that ordinary Middle Easterners share with his own supporters, he might apply his affinities for business and construction to policies and projects that could address the region’s predominantly sociopolitical grievances. This is admittedly a huge “if.” </p>
<p>It means focusing U.S. foreign policy on common interests between nonelite Americans and Middle Easterners, rather than deference to either regional governments’ or Russia’s often-repressive definitions of these interests, or a narrow conception of American nationalism.</p>
<p>For now, the incoming U.S. top leaders should deploy their outsiders’ independence to reject both dangerous generalized Islamophobia and calls to renew <a href="http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/america-already-tried-imperialism-in-the-middle-east--and-it-failed">failed militarism</a>. If President-elect Trump could develop an approach to the Middle East that’s distinct from Russia’s, and that’s attuned to, and not a retread of, past U.S. failures in the region, he might actually find some support among the many experts skeptical of his foreign policy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/68695/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Mednicoff does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Could the president-elect and his secretary of state nominee Rex Tillerson adopt useful policies in the Middle East? A scholar sees some hopeful possibilities.David Mednicoff, Assistant Professor of Public Policy and Director, Middle Eastern Studies, UMass AmherstLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/683902016-11-09T21:04:57Z2016-11-09T21:04:57ZDonald Trump and the world: Five challenges<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/145297/original/image-20161109-19092-1jji04f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The world reacts to President-Elect Donald Trump.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Marco Ugarte</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The election is finally over. It has resulted in the most stunning political upset in the modern era.</p>
<p>But that is really just the end of the beginning. The country <a href="http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/01/its-harder-for-clinton-supporters-to-respect-trump-backers-than-vice-versa/">will require a large amount of healing</a>. That the electorate <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/04/us/politics/hillary-clinton-donald-trump-poll.html?smprod=nytcore-ipad&smid=nytcore-ipad-share&_r=0">has expressed</a> record high levels of disgust with the political process, and few believe that the country can be united, does not augur well for the new administration.</p>
<p>And, unlike in the past, America appears as divided over key aspects of foreign policy as it is over domestic policy. So how does President-elect Trump hope that to handle that divide, and what will be the major issues facing him?</p>
<h2>Foreign policy was once bipartisan</h2>
<p>At the outset of the Cold War, Republican Sen. Arthur Vandenberg uttered what became a common mantra. Faced with the Soviet threat, <a href="http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/Featured_Bio_Vandenberg.htm">he suggested that</a> “politics stopped at the water’s edge.” The American approach to foreign policy was to be bipartisan. </p>
<p>The protests against the Vietnam War dealt a blow to that assumption. But Americans were united in initially supporting the wars in <a href="http://www.gallup.com/poll/116233/afghanistan.aspx">Afghanistan</a> and <a href="http://www.gallup.com/poll/8038/seventytwo-percent-americans-support-war-against-iraq.aspx">Iraq,</a> even if <a href="http://www.gallup.com/poll/161399/10th-anniversary-iraq-war-mistake.aspx">Democrats and Republicans were divided on this too a decade later.</a> Indeed, Americans today are as polarized about foreign affairs as they are about domestic matters – and regard them as very important.</p>
<p>In pre-election polls, the economy and job security <a href="http://www.people-press.org/2016/07/07/4-top-voting-issues-in-2016-election/">were ranked the number one </a>issue. But, in fact, this was a foreign policy issue masquerading as a domestic one because it was a debate about the merits of globalization and whether the new president should pursue a free trade agenda. </p>
<p>It’s significant that <a href="http://www.people-press.org/2016/07/07/4-top-voting-issues-in-2016-election/">in these same polls</a>, terrorism ranked second, and foreign policy in general ranked third, in front of health care.</p>
<h2>Old and new style</h2>
<p>Hillary Clinton campaigned on a promise, largely, of <a href="https://www.hillaryclinton.com/feed/what-president-obamas-legacy-means-me/">extending Barack Obama’s legacy.</a> Donald Trump campaigned to reverse domestic reforms and repeatedly signaled a <a href="http://www.frontpagemag.com/fpm/264108/reversing-obamas-failed-foreign-policy-course-joseph-klein">disdain</a> for Obama’s preference for multilateralism and “strategic patience.” Instead he offered Americans a return to a more muscular foreign policy – crushing ISIS, rebuffing China and engaging Russia. </p>
<p>Scholars, unlike the media, often argue about whether individual leadership really matters when it comes to foreign policy. <a href="http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/A-D/Decision-Making-Structural-and-systemic-factors.html">Many</a> argue that American foreign policy is dictated by consistent factors such as the size of its military and its importance to the global economy.</p>
<p>So is it the personality of the leadership, or are broader factors at play in the formulation and implementation of U.S. foreign policy? In a grand experiment, we are about to find out.</p>
<p>And what is likely to preoccupy the new president when it comes to foreign policy over the next four years? I’d identify five challenges – in order of their public visibility, if not their importance – plus a bonus that nobody is yet discussing. </p>
<h2>Challenge number one: The Middle East</h2>
<p><a href="http://www.people-press.org/2016/05/05/3-international-threats-defense-spending/">Americans regard IS</a> as the greatest foreign threat. But clearly, IS’ position in both Iraq and Syria is <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-the-islamic-state-finished-five-possible-scenarios-67676">waning.</a> </p>
<p>By the time Trump gets into office in January, IS will probably represent a negligible threat in Iraq. And there will be no need for American intervention in Syria if, <a href="http://www.breitbart.com/video/2015/09/29/trump-on-putin-controlling-syria-okay-fine-him-fighting-isis-wonderful-thing-very-little-downside/">as anticipated,</a> Trump signals a willingness to let Bashar al-Assad and Putin finish the job of pulverizing the opposition. So, ironically, it is likely that Trump will maintain Obama’s policy of “no boots on the ground” in Syria, although <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2016/10/31/politics/us-special-forces-syria-iraq/">in reality</a> American forces are already there, assuming a variety of advisory and training functions. </p>
<p>Still, the abiding question is what the U.S. will do after IS disintegrates as a coherent fighting force in Iraq and Syria. American Special Forces <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/08/09/u-s-special-operations-forces-are-providing-direct-on-the-ground-support-for-the-first-time-in-libya/">are now operating in Libya,</a> where IS has a powerful affiliate. That may become the next large-scale venue for American operations in the vortex of the Middle East.<br>
But it is just as possible that Trump will tell the Europeans that Libya is their problem, not America’s, and they should invade the country to stop the flow of both migrants and terrorists into Europe.</p>
<p>Unlike Obama, however, there will be no <a href="http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2014/sep/07/barack-obama/what-obama-said-about-islamic-state-jv-team/">JV comments</a> about IS coming from Trump. </p>
<h2>Challenge number two: Russia</h2>
<p>Trump, of course, has spoken admiringly of Putin. His views of the Russian leader are more reminiscent of George Bush’s comment that he famously “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/bush-saw-putins-soul-obama-wants-to-appeal-to-his-brain/2015/12/01/264f0c7c-984b-11e5-8917-653b65c809eb_story.html">looked Russian President Vladimir Putin in the eye and peered into his soul</a>.”</p>
<p>So there is some superficial evidence that Trump and Putin can reach some rapprochement, a kind of reset. This view is further fueled by Trump’s avowed preference to treat every negotiation as “<a href="http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2016-03-01/could-donald-trump-be-new-kind-transactional-president">transactional</a>” – pragmatically treating any foreign policy like a business deal. </p>
<p>So, in the short term, Trump’s election boosts Putin’s ambitions to regenerate Russia as a global power. Nonetheless, a <a href="http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2016/09/12/russia-economic-power-shrinking-losing-market-share/#14c56821c374">shrinking economy</a>,
<a href="http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/2016/04/11/Why-Russian-Military-Spending-Falling">declining military spending</a>, a host of <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jonathan-adelman/thinking-the-unthinkable-_2_b_9720304.html">domestic problems</a> and no sign of a major rise in oil and gas prices to bring Putin more revenues will limit Russia’s options. </p>
<p>But then again, if personality plays a role when it comes to foreign policy, then there are grounds for concern that Trump’s and Putin’s honeymoon won’t last long. The president-elect likes to play second fiddle to no one. The same is true for Putin. </p>
<p>So a clash could eventually ensue. There is now an arc that spreads from the Arctic down to the Black Sea that constitutes a zone of potential conflict. And there has already been a small movement of NATO’s troops <a href="http://www.nato.int/docu/Review/2016/Also-in-2016/security-baltic-defense-nato/EN/index.htm">into the Baltics</a> and <a href="http://www.csmonitor.com/World/2016/0709/NATO-sends-troops-to-Poland-Baltic-states-to-face-off-with-Russia">Poland</a>. </p>
<p>Trump may make greater demands of NATO. But troop deployment won’t change in the short term. So their presence may eventually reinforce hostilities once the honeymoon is over.</p>
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<h2>Challenge number three: Europe</h2>
<p>Trump is <a href="http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/06/29/as-obama-years-draw-to-close-president-and-u-s-seen-favorably-in-europe-and-asia/">unpopular</a> to an unprecedented degree in Europe. Only 15 percent of the public expressed confidence in his leadership, in contrast to the 85 percent that said the same about Obama.</p>
<p>That said, the one thing that <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/04/25/obama-tells-complacent-europe-to-hike-military-spending/">Obama,</a> Clinton and Trump all have agreed on – albeit using different language – is that European countries <a href="http://money.cnn.com/2016/07/08/news/nato-summit-spending-countries/">should pay more</a> toward the cost of their own defense. Last year, <a href="http://www.defenseone.com/politics/2015/06/nato-members-defense-spending-two-charts/116008/">only five of NATO’s 28 members</a> fulfilled their commitment to pay the two percent of GNP for defense. It is the United States that <a href="https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/editorials/2015/10/28/europe-must-pay-more-its-own-defense/uS7XOolclB6vX1BqJDYScI/story.html">pays 73 percent of NATO’s defense.</a> </p>
<p>But now a new reality is taking shape. Poll after poll reveals that Americans may like NATO but <a href="http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/06/support-for-nato-is-widespread-among-member-nations/">many are tired of paying for Europe’s defense</a>. </p>
<p>Expect Trump to reinforce Obama’s warning, even as Trump’s prior comments about <a href="http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/08/06/national/politics-diplomacy/trump-rips-u-s-defense-japan-one-sided-expensive/#.WCNTIhQXZQc">Japan</a> and <a href="http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2016/jan/10/donald-trump/donald-trump-mostly-wrong-we-get-practically-nothi/">South Korea</a> paying for their own defense suggest that the U.S. might militarily “re-pivot” to Europe and the Middle East, in contrast to Obama’s focus on Asia.</p>
<h2>Challenge number four: China</h2>
<p>Speaking of which, every American president since Richard Nixon has tried a combination of three strategies when it comes to the China. </p>
<p>First, engage the Chinese diplomatically, mostly to draw them away from Russia. Second, do all that the U.S. can to encourage the growth of a large Chinese middle class in the hope that they will demand democratic reforms. And third, constrain China’s growth as a regional military power by locating forces in Asia and reinforcing alliances with other Asian powers.</p>
<p>Obama did all three. Trump will likely represent a notable contrast. </p>
<p>Contrary to what he has said about Russia, Trump has sounded an avowedly confrontational tone about China. He has called it a <a href="https://www.donaldjtrump.com/policies/trade">currency manipulator</a> and discussed introducing <a href="https://www.donaldjtrump.com/policies/trade">new trade barriers against Chinese imports</a>. </p>
<p>It is easy to dismiss some of this as electoral hyperbole. But, in the absence of a track record, we have to believe what he says. And the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/10/world/asia/trump-president-asia-china-japan.html?action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=span-abc-region&region=span-abc-region&WT.nav=span-abc-region">early responses from China </a>are not comforting, despite Xi Jingping’s conciliatory expression of <a href="http://fortune.com/2016/11/09/china-president-xi-jinping-donald-trump/">congratulations.</a></p>
<p>Obama had championed the proposed <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-tpp-about-jobs-or-china-42296">Trans-Pacific Partnership</a> free trade agreement that does not include China as a means to deal with China’s rising power. But the TPP is <a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/news/hillary-clinton-breaks-with-obama-on-trans-pacific-partnership/">extremely unpopular at home,</a> and that deal is now probably dead in the water.</p>
<p>So the policy toward Asia will likely tilt from a military presence coupled with multilateral economic engagement to a bilateral focus on trade and finance between the U.S. and China. Still, Trump will need China’s help in dealing with <a href="https://theconversation.com/should-america-be-focusing-on-isis-when-north-korea-poses-an-existential-threat-57610">a bellicose North Korea</a> to avoid war on the Korean peninsula.</p>
<h2>Challenge number five: Free trade agreements</h2>
<p>Since 2008, many Americans have abandoned the notion that globalization benefits the U.S. They think it is the source of <a href="http://www.pewglobal.org/2008/06/24/assessing-globalization/">job insecurity</a>, not the solution to it. </p>
<p>Even the Democrats recognized this problem. Clinton was forced to incorporate <a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/news/hillary-clinton-breaks-with-obama-on-trans-pacific-partnership/">Bernie Sanders’ criticism</a> of free trade into her electoral platform. </p>
<p>Trump was far more hostile, criticizing NAFTA and any possible trade agreements that did not explicitly put America’s interests first. So, while he might try to renegotiate existing agreements, the proposed new ones are all off the table for now. </p>
<p>Clinton made it undiplomatically clear that there is no saving those mining jobs in Appalachia. Her vision of a 21st-century American economy is built on technology, finance and a few high-value added manufacturing jobs – and that requires free access to global markets. Trump’s vision is of a 19th-century economy, with revitalized production of steel and fossil fuels to appeal to his electoral base. That will be hard to pull off. So it is no surprise that he immediately <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/10/us/politics/trump-speech-transcript.html">announced</a> a new infrastructure program to create new jobs for those former miners.</p>
<h2>Finally, the black swan challenge from the Arctic</h2>
<p>Foreign policy is always full of “unforeseen” problems that are often described as “black swans.” </p>
<p>My best guess is that Trump’s will be the Arctic. The accelerating effects of climate change are creating a series of challenges that the new president will have to face, even if he thinks it is a <a href="http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2016/09/21/trumps-stance-on-the-paris-climate-agreement-is-criticized-by-375-scientists/?_r=0">hoax</a>. </p>
<p>These include <a href="http://theweek.com/articles/614075/how-russia-fortifying-arctic">Russian claims of sovereignty </a> as it builds up its military forces, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/apr/29/climate-change-refugees-arctic-obama-administration-warning">new waves of environmental refugees</a> as its waters rise and questions about access in <a href="http://www.cfr.org/arctic/thawing-arctic-risks-opportunities/p32082">keeping the new waterways open</a> for global shipping, energy and even tourism. America has no long-term plan to deal with these issues. </p>
<p>New presidents quickly discover that being the most powerful figure in the world does not mean that your orders will be carried out as you wish, that others respond as you expect or that you can achieve your policy outcomes. The environment is far more complex. New actors, new threats and new forms of warfare pose significant challenges for any American president. Even the largest military does not ensure an effective foreign policy. </p>
<p>Having a president with no foreign policy experience isn’t helpful in that environment. America and the world are inevitably in for a rocky ride – at odds with the simple solutions espoused by politicians on the campaign trail.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/68390/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Reich does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>America appears as divided over key aspects of foreign policy as it is at home. So how does President-elect Trump hope to handle that divide, and what will be the major issues facing him?Simon Reich, Professor in The Division of Global Affairs and The Department of Political Science, Rutgers University - NewarkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/676762016-10-28T01:02:32Z2016-10-28T01:02:32ZIs the Islamic State finished? Five possible scenarios<p>Most military <a href="http://www.military.com/daily-news/2016/08/28/battle-for-mosul-appears-to-be-entering-final-stage.html">analysts believe</a> it’s only a matter of time before Mosul falls. </p>
<p>Mosul is Iraq’s third largest city. The Islamic State captured it in June 2014 during a campaign that left it in control of territory <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/16/mapped-the-islamic-state-is-losing-its-territory-and-fast/">the size of</a> the United Kingdom. But on Oct. 16, 2016, a coalition of the Iraqi army, military forces from Iraq’s autonomous Kurdish region and paramilitary units, began an <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/17/world/middleeast/in-isis-held-mosul-beheadings-and-hints-of-resistance-as-battle-nears.html?_r=0">attack</a> to recapture the city.</p>
<p>Military prowess does not explain IS’ initial success in Iraq. Rather, it depended on the collapse of the Iraqi army and Sunni disaffection with the Shi’i-dominated Iraqi government. </p>
<p>But, then, between 2015 and 2016, IS territory in Iraq <a href="http://bigstory.ap.org/article/9457cc02fcc54ecbae66905a9396ffb3/us-official-says-has-lost-half-its-territory-iraq">shrank</a> by an estimated 50 percent. IS has lost major population <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/fleeing-residents-detail-the-horrors-of-ramadi-under-islamic-state-rule-1451693379">centers</a>, including the cities of Tikrit, Ramadi, Kobani, <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/iraqi-city-of-fallujah-fully-liberated-from-islamic-state-iraqicommander-says-1466934423">Fallujah</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/explained-strategy-behind-the-battle-to-rescue-the-ruins-of-palmyra-56948">Palmyra</a>.</p>
<p>The next target on the coalition’s agenda is Raqqa, Syria, the capital of IS. It may only be a matter of time before IS’ territorial “caliphate” is no more.</p>
<p>What then will be the fate of IS? Can the group survive without controlling any territory? Will it rebound? Or will it disappear?</p>
<h2>Five possible scenarios</h2>
<blockquote>
<p>Scenario #1: IS goes underground, only to emerge in the future. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>This scenario is not very likely. It ignores the <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/how-isis-started-syria-iraq/412042/">unique circumstances</a> that gave rise to IS and enabled it to win victory after victory in 2014: the political and military vacuum created by the Syrian civil war, the dysfunction of the Iraqi government of Nuri al-Maliki, the collapse of the Iraqi army and the indifference of much of the world to the group’s ambitions until it was too late. A similar set of circumstances is unlikely in the future.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Scenario #2: IS will simply set up shop elsewhere. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Over the years, IS has <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/isis-goes-global">established franchises</a> in West and North Africa, Libya, Yemen, the Sinai and other locations. In some places, such as Libya, IS deployed fighters from Syria and Iraq to establish its franchises. In others, preexisting groups pledged allegiance to the caliphate. <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-virtual-significance-of-boko-harams-pledge-of-allegiance-to-isis-38690">Boko Haram in West Africa</a> is one such group. </p>
<p>IS assumed that each of its franchises would expand the territory under its control until it met up with other franchises and, eventually, with the caliphate based in Syria and Iraq. Observers call this an “ink spot” strategy because each affiliate would widen like an ink spot on blotting paper. </p>
<p>This scenario, too, is unlikely. None of IS’ franchises is <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/09/27/whats-beyond-the-defeat-of-isis/">doing well</a>, and those that have not already failed are on the verge of failing. Internal conflicts tore some apart, including those in Yemen and West Africa. External enemies have rolled back others, such as those in Libya and Algeria. </p>
<p>IS franchises have not been able to forge alliances with similar-minded groups because IS doesn’t play well with others. Rather than building partnerships, IS insists on unconditional loyalty to its caliphate project and organizational uniformity. It has thus turned potential collaborators into enemies.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Scenario #3: IS fighters continue to wage an insurgency in Syria or Iraq, or both. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>This is exactly what the Taliban did in Afghanistan after the American invasion in 2001. Indeed, after the American invasion in Iraq, al-Qaida in Iraq – a precursor of IS – and members of the disbanded Iraqi army who joined IS did the same.</p>
<p>This is a more likely scenario than the first two. However, fighting an insurgency is quite a step down from establishing, defending and expanding a territorial caliphate – what IS devotees consider an epochal event. And establishing, defending and expanding a territorial caliphate is precisely what differentiated IS from al-Qaida and similar groups. IS true believers deem a territorial caliphate cleansed of non-Islamic influences necessary for the survival of <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/from-paper-state-to-caliphate-the-ideology-of-the-islamic-state/">true Islam</a>.</p>
<p>IS fighters might continue the struggle. Revenge is a powerful motivator. But IS would no longer be IS were its fighters to limit their vision to waging a guerilla-style campaign. It would be indistinguishable from Jabhat al-Nusra, for example, the former <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/isis-vs-al-qaeda-jihadisms-global-civil-war/">al-Qaida affiliate</a> and IS spin-off fighting the Syrian government. Jabhat al-Nusra’s goal of overthrowing the government of Syria – less grandiose than reestablishing a territorial caliphate that would unite all Muslims – was one of the reasons the split between the two groups occurred.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Scenario #4: IS disappears. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>What if IS fighters just give up, or move on to other criminal enterprises? For true believers, the defeat of their caliphate might persuade them that their goal is unobtainable. It might therefore be extraordinarily dispiriting. Those who signed on for the thrill might find their kicks elsewhere, or merely fade back into the woodwork. </p>
<p>This too is a strong possibility, particularly if other nations <a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/denmark-isis-fighters-warmly-welcome-home-by-psychiatrists-1470546">besides Denmark</a> offer their citizens who have joined IS incentives for returning home. Similar groups, such as al-Qaida, have experienced <a href="https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/why-terrorists-quit-gaining-from-al-qaida%E2%80%99s-losses">defections</a> in their ranks as members became disillusioned or discouraged or isolated.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Scenario #5: Former fighters and freelancers continue their attacks globally with or without organizational backing. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>This too is a possibility, if only for a while. After all, a number of attacks outside of IS-held territory – including the attack in San Bernardino, California – occurred without the knowledge and assistance of IS.</p>
<p>The destruction of IS’ caliphate could reduce its capacity to produce and disseminate propaganda. This would diminish IS’ ability to capture the imagination of would-be followers in the future. Nevertheless, in the short term, the world is not lacking in gullible and <a href="https://theconversation.com/psychology-expert-why-extremists-use-violence-in-their-quest-for-significance-62594">disturbed individuals</a>.</p>
<h2>Short shelf-life</h2>
<p>Whatever the case, history provides lessons on how to effectively deal with movements and individuals who wage war against the international order. </p>
<p>During the 19th and early 20th centuries, anarchists struck out at rulers and symbols of capitalism <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10576100802671009?src=recsys">throughout the world</a>. Anarchists assassinated the presidents of France and the United States, an empress of Austria, a king of Italy and numerous government ministers in Russia. They also bombed symbols of oppression, from the haunts of the bourgeoisie to Wall Street itself. </p>
<p>Then, suddenly, the wave of anarchist violence ceased. By the onset of the Great Depression, anarchist activity was limited to a few isolated pockets. Historians point to a number of reasons the anarchist moment passed. Anarchism competed for hearts and minds with other dissident groups. Nations undertook political and social reforms that addressed the grievances of potential anarchists. They adopted new methods of policing and surveillance. Police agencies cooperated across borders. </p>
<p>But perhaps most important was the fact that high-risk movements that attempt to realize the unrealizable have a short shelf life. Such might be the case for IS.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/67676/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James L. Gelvin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>What happens to the Islamic State if it loses the battle for territory in Iraq and Syria? Here’s a list of ways it might go down.James L. Gelvin, Professor of Modern Middle Eastern History, University of California, Los AngelesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/634862016-08-09T14:58:36Z2016-08-09T14:58:36ZPutin, Obama and the battle for Aleppo<p>The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/03/syrian-rebels-advance-on-assad-forces-aleppo-siege">battle for Aleppo</a> has the Arab world, Middle East observers and Western policymakers on edge. </p>
<p>In what is likely a turning point in the long Syrian civil war, a coalition of opposition fighters is attempting to break Bashar al-Assad regime’s siege of the country’s commercial capital. Meanwhile, the Syrian government – with Russian support – is bombing rebel strongholds in the city which is still home to <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-37006859">250,000 people</a>, according to the BBC.</p>
<p>Thanks to recent U.S. diplomatic overtures to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/obamas-syria-plan-teams-up-american-and-russian-forces/2016/07/13/8d7777cc-4935-11e6-acbc-4d4870a079da_story.html">deepen cooperation</a> with Russia against the Islamic State, or IS, and al-Qaida affiliate Al-Nusra Front, the U.S. could be considered a partner in those airstrikes. The U.S. overtures have been criticized as <a href="http://mobile.nytimes.com/2016/08/03/opinion/the-case-for-finally-bombing-assad.html?">strategically inconsistent</a> and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/obamas-syria-plan-teams-up-american-and-russian-forces/2016/07/13/8d7777cc-4935-11e6-acbc-4d4870a079da_story.html">Putin-pleasing.</a></p>
<p>As a student of American policy in the Middle East, I’d argue that American efforts are key to the tumultuous trajectory of Syria’s uprising-turned-war. What’s less clear to me is how much U.S. President Barack Obama’s approach prioritizes either the immediate needs of Syrians suffering from war and terrorism or their aspirations for self-liberation from authoritarian rule.</p>
<h2>IS overshadows Syrians</h2>
<p>Cynics might consider U.S. policy in Syria apathetic to the plight and aspirations of the Syrian people. </p>
<p>Even worse, we may be witnessing a microcosm of a teetering world order in Syria. Longstanding international dynamics have been upended as the freedom- and dignity-seeking popular uprisings of the Arab Spring have gone bloodily awry. </p>
<p>What there is now, in the words of democratization specialists Thomas Carothers and Oren Samet-Marram, is a new “<a href="http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/04/20/new-global-marketplace-of-political-change-pub-59808">global marketplace of political change</a>” that is contested by an array of international actors rather than just influenced by Western democratic powers. In addition to the U.S., Russia, China, Qatar, Iran, IS and Hezbollah are all vying to shape the politics of transitional countries in the Middle East. Sometimes their tools are diplomacy; more often, military force or terrorism.</p>
<p>So whose political interests are winning out in Syria? </p>
<h2>More losers than winners</h2>
<p>It’s complicated, because <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-the-syrian-war-in-one-short-easy-read-50866">so many interests</a> are at play.</p>
<p>Ever since late 2011, months after Assad began <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/aug/09/syria-protest-troops-attack-democracy-demonstrators">violent attacks on his own people</a>, Obama has pledged to work toward <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/08/18/president-obama-future-syria-must-be-determined-its-people-president-bashar-al-assad">his ouster</a>. </p>
<p>However, Russian’s President Vladimir Putin has long ties to Assad and has remained loyal to him.</p>
<p>The U.S. and Russia first overcame this difference and agreed to a “political solution” in Syria after meeting in Geneva in June 2012. In August of that year, Obama declared that any use of chemical weapons by Assad would be a “<a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/">red line</a>” that the Americans would not tolerate. </p>
<p>Then, in August 2013, Assad unleashed a chemical weapons massacre in the suburbs of Damascus, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/29/2013-eyewitness-accounts-syria-chemical-attack">killing as many as 1,400</a> of his own citizens. Obama threatened airstrikes but <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/world/middleeast/syria-talks.html?_r=0">reversed himself</a> after Russia mediated a deal that stayed Obama’s hand in return for a promise that Assad would turn over Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal to be destroyed.</p>
<p>Obama’s vacillating Syria policy has spurred ongoing debate, especially with regard to fighting IS. The counterterrorism turn, starting with the anti-IS “<a href="http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814_Inherent-Resolve">Inherent Resolve</a>” campaign in September 2014, is one way to explain the dissonance in U.S. policy. </p>
<p>The fact is that since fall 2015, Russian military intervention has bolstered Assad positions on the ground. And Assad’s strength has strengthened Moscow’s position in negotiations with the U.S.</p>
<p>In parallel, in December of last year, the U.N. moved its focus from the Geneva mandate to seek a “Syrian-led political transition” to one focused on stamping out terrorism in the region through <a href="http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2254.pdf">Security Council Resolution 2254</a>.</p>
<p>But Syrians living under aerial bombardment in a half-emptied-out country don’t have the luxury of the UN and Obama’s extended time horizon. The president may be able to exercise <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf">“strategic patience”</a> through January 2017, when a new president will occupy the Oval Office, to further test Russian promises. But each passing day means starvation and bloodshed for Syrians. Besieged populations suffer in Aleppo as well as areas such as Damascus suburb Darayya.</p>
<p>The banalization of death intensifies as “international norms” of warfare are disregarded. The latest testament of ongoing horror has been Assad regime targeting of <a href="http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/press/press-releases/aleppo-region-suffers-worst-week-of-hospital-attacks-since-syrian-conflict-began.html?referrer=https://www.google.com/">six hospitals in Aleppo</a> last week.</p>
<p>The U.S. goal to “degrade and ultimately destroy” IS has taken precedence over any other imperative. U.S.-Russian bargaining within the International Syria Support Group, the working group they cosponsor that seeks diplomatic solution to Syria’s conflict, centers around the identification of targeted terrorists as a means to end the war. The new proposal from the White House, in which the U.S. and Russia will cooperate in specifically pursuing al-Nusra, is just one more sign of this new focus.</p>
<h2>Uncertain political transition</h2>
<p>But a stronger U.S.-Russian partnership is unlikely to achieve the elusive political solution. </p>
<p>Russia’s unabashed flouting of the February 2016 internationally agreed <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/25/middleeast/syria-civil-war-q-and-a/">“cessation of hostilities”</a> demonstrates these long odds. And the path toward a ceasefire is made more difficult by the agreement’s exclusion of ambiguously defined terrorist groups and territory. </p>
<p>Russian bombing, combined with Assad strikes, are responsible for most of more than <a href="http://sn4hr.org/blog/2016/07/29/24984/">5,000 civilian deaths</a> since the cessation of hostilities began, according to the Syrian Network for Human Rights. The new Washington-Moscow cooperation is intended, in theory, to clearly mark out Russian and U.S. targets and therefore avoid civilians and U.S.-backed “moderate” opposition fighters. In exchange, Putin is to pressure Assad to abide by U.N. provisions against bombing civilians. </p>
<p>In the meantime, Al-Nusra has announced that it is <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/syrias-jabhat-al-nusra-splits-from-al-qaeda-and-changes-its-name/2016/07/28/5b89ad22-54e6-11e6-b652-315ae5d4d4dd_stTohe%20effry.html">splitting from al-Qaida.</a> The effects of this move are as yet unclear, but the fallout will likely impact both armed opposition dynamics and U.S. policy.</p>
<p>Ultimately, in my view, the U.S. has made itself complicit in Russia’s support for Assad. Washington is effectively buttressing a regime whose repressive crackdown on peaceful protests in 2011 pushed the country into its downward spiral of proxy and regional warfare. </p>
<p>Obama <a href="http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/obama-adresses-fight-against-iran-payments-and-russian-involvement-syria-1584039564">chides</a> Putin in speeches: “It is time for Russia to show it is serious” about “reduc[ing] the violence.” A military counterterrorism strategy is the key, he said. But in the same breath, he declared a commitment to working with Russia on those very goals. Such remarks put nobody at ease except perhaps Assad and his Russian and Iranian backers. </p>
<p>The apparent skepticism with which Syrians approached peace talks earlier this year is vindicated. The Syrian High Negotiations Committee stuck to its minimalist humanitarian conditions. These included a suspension of barrel bombing, the freeing of political prisoners and an end to siege-and-starvation tactics. These calls echoed those by <a href="https://docs.google.com/document/d/1_oO9QrlL_CIshuHQ3N0mIkzG4_R4O4GVc-EbmKE0doQ/edit?pref=2&pli=1">Syrian civil society activists</a> on the eve of the talks in late January. </p>
<p>Yet these appeals have been repeatedly trampled upon in a U.S.-blessed process. John Kerry has not, in my view, made a serious effort to meet the U.N.-sanctioned opposition demands, based in the <a href="http://www.un.org/undpa/en/Speeches-statements/14112015/syria">“confidence-building measures”</a> agreed upon in Vienna in the lead-up to Resolution 2254. These attempts to mitigate Assad’s so-called <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/twt/assads-starve-or-kneel-policy">“starve or kneel”</a> strategy, in which Putin has become a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/putins-model-of-success/2015/10/11/4cb3a592-6dcd-11e5-aa5b-f78a98956699_story.html">credentialed associate</a>, are basic requirements unmet thus far in the ISSG process.</p>
<p>The dramatic <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-opposition-idUSKCN0XK0KU">suspension</a> of the opposition’s participation in the peace talks in April was thus no surprise. The latest U.S.-Russian agreement will not help U.N. Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura’s attempts to resume negotiations later this month.</p>
<p>An important question must be clearly enunciated. Where is this U.S.-Russian orchestrated process, claiming to seek an end to Syria’s war and a political transition, headed? </p>
<p>When the running cost of diplomatic road maps with open-ended timetables is buckets of blood, the acrobatics of international statecraft appear unsuited for an explosive region and a post-colonial order whose unraveling began with cries of “al sha’b yureed,” or “the people want.” </p>
<p>In my opinion, the U.S.-Russian process promises neither to substantively address the dire humanitarian situation nor seriously pursue an end to the war. That a political transition hammered out among Syria’s “people” can emerge from this diplomatic deadlock is even less likely. The battle for Aleppo confirms the primacy of violence over politics in Syria today. No solutions, diplomatic or otherwise, are in sight. The war rages on.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/63486/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Layla Saleh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The survival of civilians seem forgotten in a new U.S. and Russian agreement to root out IS and other terrorists in Syria.Layla Saleh, Assistant Professor of International Affairs, Qatar University, Qatar UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.