tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/kampala-23622/articlesKampala – The Conversation2023-10-01T09:57:46Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2145092023-10-01T09:57:46Z2023-10-01T09:57:46ZTrade unions and the new economy: 3 African case studies show how workers are recasting their power in the digital age<p>From US <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/biden-trump-woo-union-workers-michigan-auto-strikes-grow-2023-09-26/">car factories</a> to public sector workers <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/5/nigerian-unions-strike-again-to-protest-soaring-costs-after-subsidy-removal">in Nigeria</a> and <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2023/09/08/city-of-tshwane-samwu-strike-a-deliberate-effort-to-turn-the-city-into-a-dumpsite">South Africa</a>, strikes by trade unions continue unabated among the established sectors of the working class. In Detroit in the US, workers are resisting contract employment. In Nigeria they are angry over the rising cost of living and in South Africa, municipal workers are striking for better wages.</p>
<p>But it’s becoming increasingly difficult to build sustainable worker organisations as companies employ more people on a casual basis in the digital age. Work has become more precarious and workers are easily replaceable. </p>
<p>In our <a href="https://witspress.co.za/page/detail/Recasting-Workers%EF%BF%BD-Power/?k=9781776148820">new book</a>, Recasting Workers’ Power: Work and Inequality in the Shadow of the Digital Age, we focus on workers’ power. The classic example of workers’ power is the strike: the collective withdrawal of labour to force an employer to do what they would otherwise not have done. </p>
<p>In this book we challenge the dominant narrative that new technology has destroyed workers’ power. We focus on the new jobs that are being created – food couriers, e-hailing drivers, street traders and the growing numbers of casual workers at the core of the economy.</p>
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<p>We show how these precarious workers are organising in new ways that go beyond the traditional methods of union formation. For example, they are forming coalitions with other organisations, such as NGOs. In some cases they are combining these new approaches with traditional ways of bringing workers’ collective power to bear, for example by making use of laws that support workers’ rights.</p>
<h2>Three case studies</h2>
<p>We focus on three sectors: factory workers in Ekurhuleni, east of Johannesburg in South Africa; food couriers in Johannesburg; and transport workers in Kampala, Uganda. </p>
<p>We examined their ways of organising by applying, in addition to the strike weapon, the lens of three other ways of exercising power: associational power (collective organisation), coalitions (societal power) and institutional power (laws that entrench labour rights). </p>
<p>We found the factory workers were using a range of tools – old and new – to organise. Factory committees were formed at some workplaces. This involved working with a labour supportive NGO. But they also drew on old practices (institutional power) by taking up cases through the <a href="https://www.ccma.org.za/">Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration</a> and the amended <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/labour-relations-act">Labour Relations Act</a>. Both offer the possibility of workers being able to get permanent jobs in the company at which they work.</p>
<p>The food carriers were using different tactics. In Johannesburg they had created worker-driven messaging apps and chat groups where they shared information, developed a shared identity and announced local direct action. </p>
<p>Being self-employed weakens their organising power. But the potential for collective power was increased when they met face-to-face at work zones and began to form a collective identity. Some have engaged in collective action, but with limited impact to date. </p>
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<p>They achieved some success when they worked with a supportive NGO (an international organisation) to put forward demands to regulate their work.</p>
<p>In Kampala, we found that the Amalgamated Transport and General Workers’ Union was also using new approaches to organise workers. In the 1980s the union faced a near collapse of membership when privatisation undermined the public transport sector. This eliminated the position of the traditional public transport bus driver. Informal mini-taxi drivers and motorcycle taxi riders (known locally as boda boda) became the dominant mode of transport.</p>
<p>By classifying the growing number of boda boda riders as workers and therefore potential union members, the union expanded from a declining 5,000 members to over 100,000. In spite of the fragmented and isolated nature of their work these new workers were already organised – not into a trade union but into informal associations. </p>
<p>These associations formed an alliance with the established union. By doing this they gained concrete support from the International Transport Federation, a global union of transport workers. This led to the dramatic growth of the union, a decline in police harassment and growing recognition as a collective bargaining partner.</p>
<p>Importantly, where trade unions have taken up the issues of informal workers, unions have also undergone fundamental changes. They often become “hybrid” organisations, blurring the distinction between traditional unionism, informal workers’ associations and cooperatives.</p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>Our <a href="https://bristoluniversitypress.co.uk/recasting-labours-power">research</a> clearly articulates the challenges workers face. But it also suggests some grounds for optimism in the new and hybrid forms of organisation and the coalitions that are emerging. </p>
<p>The question raised by these findings is whether these embryonic forms of worker organisation are sustainable. Could they become the foundations for a new cycle of worker solidarity and union growth?</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-formal-employment-is-not-a-guaranteed-path-to-social-equality-177251">Why formal employment is not a guaranteed path to social equality</a>
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<p>We conclude that this is possible if they innovate and experiment with new forms of association, use digital tools, and broaden unions’ reach through coalition-building with other civil society organisations. In sum, we are suggesting that workers’ power is being recast as precarious workers in Africa experiment with new ways of organising in the digital age.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214509/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Edward Webster receives funding from organisation.Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. I am a Distinguished Research Professor at the Southern Centre of Inequality Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand </span></em></p>Workers’ power is being recast as precarious workers in Africa experiment with new ways of organising in the digital ageEdward Webster, Distinguished Reserach Professor, Southern Centre for Inequality Studies, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1984582023-01-30T14:27:27Z2023-01-30T14:27:27ZKampala, Kigali and Addis Ababa are changing fast: new book follows their distinct paths<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506296/original/file-20230125-22-fk3erh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kampala is one of the three Eastern African cities that transformed with little historical precedence</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GettyImages</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kampala, the Ugandan capital where I live, is naturally the city I have studied and worked on the most as an urban economist. Yet even with this background, reading <a href="https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/usp/people/academic-staff/tom-goodfellow">Tom Goodfellow’s</a> recently published book, <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/44624">Politics and the Urban Frontier: Transformation and Divergence in Late Urbanizing East Africa</a>, I learned astonishing new facts about Kampala. </p>
<p>I also learnt a great deal about the urbanisation processes of two other major East African cities – Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia, and Kigali, the capital of Rwanda. </p>
<p>Goodfellow is <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/tom-goodfellow-119040">professor of urban studies and international development</a> at the University of Sheffield. His research focuses on the political economy of urban development and change in Africa. He has also worked with universities across Africa.</p>
<p>In this review I provide a glimpse of the comparative analytical journey Goodfellow takes across these three cities. I also make the case that anyone interested in East Africa’s dynamic urbanisation process should have this book as a core part of their reading list. </p>
<h2>Three cities</h2>
<p>At the start of the 2000s, Addis Ababa, Kampala and Kigali were some of the least urbanised cities in the region. And, for different reasons, they didn’t command much attention from national policy makers. </p>
<p>Fast forward to 2023, and all three cities are undergoing an urban transformation that has little historical precedence in terms of speed or scale. They have become, for differing reasons, central to national, regional and in some senses even global, policy making. </p>
<p>Based simply on this fact, the cities are unique. </p>
<p>The histories that shaped them include their colonial pasts, or resistance to it in the case of Ethiopia, their struggles for independence and post independence political and economic policies. </p>
<p>Take the varied approaches that Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Uganda adopted to the World Bank’s structural adjustment programmes in the 1980s and 1990s. The Bank’s misguided neoliberal approach continues to have lingering after-effects on each of them. This is particularly true when it comes to the composition of their urban economies. In particular, the increased privatisation promoted by the programmes led to cuts in formal employment opportunities in the public sector as well industry, pushing people into informality. </p>
<p>Another consequence was the sharp decline in public service provision, particularly in urban areas.</p>
<p>They have also been influenced by external economic forces. East Africa, as a global latecomer to the urbanisation process, is urbanising at a time when globalisation has resulted in significant flows of capital. For example, East Africa as a region receives one of the <a href="https://repository.hanyang.ac.kr/bitstream/20.500.11754/114286/1/Official%20Development%20Assistance%20and%20Economic%20Growth%20in%20East%20African%20Countries.pdf">largest shares of development assistance</a>. It is also a central focus for China’s Belt and Road Strategy. </p>
<p>As Goodfellow illustrates, these forces of globalisation are continuously reshaping East Africa’s cities in terms of the infrastructure investments that are currently taking place. Influence can also be seen in the new patterns of commerce, employment and entrepreneurialism within them.</p>
<h2>A granular comparison</h2>
<p>Goodfellow’s most formidable achievement in the book is that he has been able to draw clear comparisons between three very different cities. At the same time he hasn’t lost critical details that have shaped each one of their unique and complex systems. </p>
<p>To do this, he employs a comparative framework with four dimensions. They are:</p>
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<li><p>each city’s urban planning vision, including major infrastructure projects, which has affected political outcomes </p></li>
<li><p>changing patterns of urban property development (propertyscapes) and how these interacted with and have been shaped by the underlying institutions</p></li>
<li><p>the diverse and powerful forces of the urban marketplace, generically termed “the informal sector”, as centres of urban working lives and livelihoods</p></li>
<li><p>the forms political mobilisation has taken in each of these contexts and how these have been institutionalised and therefore generally resisted change.</p></li>
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<p>Throughout Goodfellow’s book he keeps drawing on the theme of infrastructure creating property value, while property, shaped by several prevailing forces, creates the demand and need for infrastructure.</p>
<p>For example, he illustrates how the affordable housing crisis has played out in each city. There are differences of course, which can clearly be seen in Addis Ababa’s immense public condominium construction project compared to Kampala’s near lack of government engagement in the housing space.</p>
<p>But there are also similarities. For example, across all three cities construction costs are substantial and much of the housing finance being provided is coming from the domestic and diaspora elites. This partially reflects constraints across the banking systems in the three countries. </p>
<p>A further similarity is the prevalence of expensive international aid worker housing resulting from substantial inflows of development assistance. This has skewed property markets in all three cities to an oversupply of high-end properties. The extent of this is huge. For example, the average rent for someone working in the diplomatic corps or an international institution in Kigali is usually upwards of US$4,000 a month. In contrast the annual GDP per capita of Rwanda is currently about <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=RW">US$822</a>. </p>
<h2>New and dynamic forms of urbanism</h2>
<p>Over the past years all three cities have been experimenting with new forms of urban visioning. This has shaped, and been shaped by, property, infrastructure and the underlying state-society relations in highly contested political spaces. </p>
<p>Perhaps this is most aptly illustrated by the Kigali Urban Master Plan that was developed by <a href="https://surbanajurong.com/sector/kigali-city-master-plan/">Singaporean firm Surbana Jurong</a>. The plan aspires to transform Kigali into a type of Singapore of Africa – essentially proposing to replace the existing city with something entirely new. </p>
<p>In Addis Ababa, the vision is epitomised by a major infrastructure investment, namely the light rail train system. A Chinese company constructed the rail system at a cost of <a href="http://www.china.org.cn/business/2019-04/25/content_74720232.htm">US$475 million for 34km</a>. This was an expensive undertaking that has reorganised the economic form of the city.</p>
<p>Similar spatial disruption has occurred in Kampala through the Chinese constructed expressway that connects it to the airport in Entebbe. This is now the <a href="https://www.thevaluechainng.com/the-most-expensive-road-in-the-world-is-located-in-east-africa/">most expensive road per kilometre in the world</a>. </p>
<h2>The devil is in the complex details</h2>
<p>Goodfellow’s book is a must-read for those who are working in policy or project development within any of these cities. </p>
<p>It manages to show why attempting to supplant models from urban development elsewhere, including “best practices”, will not work. Rather we need to understand local contexts and complex systems.</p>
<p>The imperative for this is clear: East Africa is one of the fastest urbanising regions in the world, but it’s still in the early phases of this process. There’s a major opportunity to get the region’s cities right.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198458/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Astrid R.N. Haas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>East Africa is one of the fastest urbanising regions in the world, but it’s still in the early phases. There’s a big opportunity to get the region’s cities right.Astrid R.N. Haas, Fellow, Infrastructure Institute, School of Cities, University of TorontoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1935722022-11-02T14:56:07Z2022-11-02T14:56:07ZEbola in Uganda: lessons from COVID show that heavy-handed lockdowns may be a bad idea<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/492951/original/file-20221102-19-gkw3wm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Economic well-being is crucial to population health</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GettyImages</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since the first case of the current Ebola outbreak in Uganda was confirmed in mid-September, <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/uganda/uganda-ebola-virus-disease-situation-report-no-37">the number of cases has topped 127</a> across seven districts, including 17 in the capital city Kampala. </p>
<p>Yet most people living in the city fear <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/lockdown-fuel-price-hike-fears-loom-large-4001622">another round of lockdowns</a> perhaps even more than they fear becoming infected.</p>
<p>Two high-risk districts are already <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/10/16/1129342224/uganda-has-locked-down-two-districts-in-bid-to-stem-the-spread-of-ebola">under a 21-day lockdown</a>. And although the government says it is not considering Kampala high risk at the moment, it has not shied away from using <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/follow-sops-or-risk-lockdown-minister-3999588">the “threat” of lockdowns</a> to try to persuade people to conform to the health procedures. These include reporting suspected cases, supporting contact tracing and undergoing isolation where potential exposure to an infected person has taken place.</p>
<p>Fears about the impact of severe lockdown come against the backdrop of an economy that hasn’t recovered from the economic crisis associated with the COVID-19 pandemic, coupled with other global inflationary pressures. </p>
<p>This fear is warranted: a functioning economy, especially in highly vulnerable communities in urban areas, is crucial to population health. Blanket enforcement of lockdown measures may help to slow down the spread of a virus. But we now know that it can also quickly generate a larger and more protracted public health crisis in the form of deprivation and hunger.</p>
<p>I have been involved in a project, alongside <a href="https://khwaja.scholar.harvard.edu/">Asim Khwaja</a>, director of the Centre of International Development at Harvard University, and <a href="https://www.lse.ac.uk/school-of-public-policy/people/adnan-khan/adnan-khan">Adnan Khan</a>, professor at the London School of Economics and Political Science, to develop a more nuanced containment approach. We analysed different approaches adopted by countries across the globe during the COVID-19 pandemic. Based on our analysis we developed an approach we termed “<a href="https://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Haas-et-al-2020-brief_final.pdf">Smart Containment with Active Learning</a>”.</p>
<p>This requires policy makers to find ways to handle a public health crisis without creating an economic one. Containment options must be informed by local conditions and suit varying circumstances. They should be reviewed and continuously updated with incoming data and evidence. </p>
<p>The approach we outline has implications for managing the current Ebola outbreak in Uganda as well as future health epidemics.</p>
<h2>The human cost of blanket lockdowns</h2>
<p>There is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/23/health/covid-africa-deaths.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&referringSource=articleShare">no agreed explanation</a> about why the health impacts of COVID-19 were lower in some African countries, including Uganda, when compared against global rates. Still, the economic consequences, particularly of the lockdowns, were severe.</p>
<p>Researchers, using income data, have <a href="https://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/van-der-Ven-2020-Final-report.pdf">estimated</a> that economic losses across Uganda as a result of lockdowns were the equivalent of 9.1% of GDP. Over 65% of the population was affected and nearly ten years of poverty eradication efforts were erased.</p>
<p>The most extreme economic effects were felt in Kampala. Residents experienced <a href="https://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/van-der-Ven-2020-Final-report.pdf">an increase of 16.7 percentage points in poverty rates</a>. Income inequalities also rose, represented <a href="https://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/van-der-Ven-2020-Final-report.pdf">by a 10.5% increase in the GINI coefficient</a>. This was because many in the city could not earn a living at all for certain periods of time. </p>
<p>There are also likely to be long term effects on economic productivity, which remain to be seen. For example, Uganda <a href="https://www.ucl.ac.uk/news/2022/feb/opinion-uganda-closed-schools-two-years-impact-deep-and-uneven">closed schools for two years – the longest period</a> of any country. </p>
<p>It’s not yet possible to adequately quantify these losses. Nevertheless, <a href="https://www.oecd.org/education/The-economic-impacts-of-coronavirus-covid-19-learning-losses.pdf">based on evidence from school closures elsewhere</a>, this is likely to lead to a less skilled labour force and lower incomes. There are also likely to be significant associated social costs. </p>
<p>The reasons that Kampala fared worse than the national average lies in the overall structure of the city’s economy. In 2016 the World Bank <a href="https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/search/dataset/0041466">surveyed informal businesses</a> operating in the greater Kampala area. It showed that most businesses operated in the informal sector and were very small, with 46% employing fewer than five people.</p>
<p>Most importantly, 56% of owners said they engaged in trade and the services industry. And 93% of these microenterprise owners were, at the time of the survey, already operating close to the poverty line, or just beneath it. </p>
<p>When the lockdown was imposed, these businesses were no longer able to trade. Many of their owners and the households they supported would have been pushed far below the poverty line.</p>
<p>In urban areas like Kampala <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/25896">a high proportion of income</a> is used to buy food. The blanket lockdowns resulted in <a href="https://allianceforscience.cornell.edu/blog/2021/07/covids-second-wave-worsens-food-insecurity-in-east-africa/">17% of Kampala’s population </a> facing acute food insecurity and increased consumption gaps. </p>
<h2>Smart containment strategies</h2>
<p>The concern by the Ministry of Health in Uganda and the World Health Organization over the latest outbreak of Ebola in Uganda is warranted. The current strain of the virus circulating in Uganda, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/uganda-health-ministry-confirms-ebola-outbreak-2022-09-20/">the so-called Sudan strain</a>, does not yet have an approved vaccine and has an estimated case fatality rate of 40%-60%. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Haas-et-al-2020-brief_final.pdf">The 2014-2016 Ebola outbreak in West Africa</a> – caused by a different strain – resulted in 28,600 cases and 11,325 deaths. The case rate significantly increased once the virus hit the densely populated urban areas of Conakry, Freetown and Monrovia. </p>
<p>Containing the current outbreak, particularly in Kampala, is therefore critical.</p>
<p>But <a href="https://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Haas-et-al-2020-brief_final.pdf">containment needs to be done in a smarter way</a> than was the case in the COVID pandemic. Contagion risks need to be weighed up against the benefits of maintaining economic interaction. </p>
<p>We conclude in our policy brief that containment doesn’t need to take an all-or-nothing approach. Gradations need to be considered.</p>
<p>Any smart containment strategy requires accurate and up-to-date data on disease prevalence, trends and transmission. And, critically, regular socio-economic data also need to be collected to assess growing risks, particular in relation to poverty and hunger. This data should then be used to drive the analysis that underpins the policy decisions about when, where and how to impose restrictions – and lift them. </p>
<p>These decisions should be taken in a more targeted and flexible way, below district level, to ensure that containment is commensurate to localised information, which, in turn, will be far less economically costly.</p>
<p>The second part of a smart containment strategy is that it needs to be dynamic, and changes should be made based on updated information. This is what we termed “active learning”. Here, again, data play a key role, in continuously assessing the risk profile of an area. </p>
<p>This does not only have to be geographical, but can also be related to different sectors. For example, interactions with high contagion risk and limited economic value, such as sporting events, may be fully shut down for a period, while in the same area, activities that support the livelihoods of vulnerable populations may continue, adapted to meet health and hygiene standards. </p>
<p>Finally, continuous evaluations of policy responses are important in supporting this active learning.</p>
<h2>Communication is key</h2>
<p>Underpinning such a strategy is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/31/opinion/how-bad-data-fed-the-ebola-epidemic.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&referringSource=articleShare">clear, credible, transparent and regular
communication</a> on what is happening and why it is happening. There is evidence from Sierra Leone during the last Ebola outbreak that <a href="https://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Maffioli-2018-Working-paper.pdf">effective messaging</a> that makes use of citizens’ agency and self-efficacy is key in securing community support for containment measures.</p>
<p>It’s also important that the messaging focuses on de-stigmatising individuals and minorities, so that those who are potentially infected feel comfortable taking proactive measures like self-isolating and seeking medical care. </p>
<p>In the longer term it helped increase trust in authorities, popular understanding, and support for further measures, unleashing a positive cycle that ultimately ended the epidemic.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/193572/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Astrid R.N. Haas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Lockdown measures may stop the spread of the virus. But they can also lead to a larger and more protracted public health crisis in the form of deprivation and hunger.Astrid R.N. Haas, Fellow, Infrastructure Institute, School of Cities, University of TorontoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1915062022-09-29T14:13:28Z2022-09-29T14:13:28Z5 steps to stop Ebola spreading in East Africa – a frontline expert advises<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487036/original/file-20220928-16-2bwv9w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Staff from South Sudan's Health Ministry pose with protective suits during a drill for Ebola preparedness.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by PATRICK MEINHARDT/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The biggest Ebola outbreak in human history happened in <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/history/2014-2016-outbreak/index.html#:%7E:text=On%20March%2023%2C%202014%2C%20the,epidemic%2C%20the%20largest%20in%20history.">West Africa</a> from 2014 to 2015. I was on the front lines in Liberia serving as the head of case detection for the National Ebola Response team and administering critical aspects of Liberia’s Ebola response.</p>
<p>The outbreak affected Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia. It <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1002508#:%7E:text=The%202014%E2%80%932015%20Ebola%20virus%20disease%20(EVD)%20outbreak%20across,in%204%2C809%20deaths%20%5B1%5D.">claimed 11,310</a> lives and took <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1876034120304275">36 months</a> to contain. It made its way along major highways from Guinea into Liberia and Sierra Leone, which share a long border.</p>
<p>Uganda’s current <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/uganda-ebola-death-toll-3963084">Ebola virus outbreak</a> has a few similarities. The first case was found in Mubende district, located on a major highway to the capital city, Kampala, and neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo – putting both at high risk.</p>
<p>Ebola <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/symptoms/index.html">spreads through</a> body fluids and direct contact. The infectiousness of the virus increases as patients get sicker – when they vomit and have diarrhoea. At death the virus is at its most virulent and thus any communal burial increases the spread.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1572906430218506242"}"></div></p>
<p>In the 2014/2015 outbreak there was widespread disbelief in communities, due to ignorance, distrust and some traditional beliefs. People didn’t cooperate with response teams. Fear and disbelief <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/gaps-in-ebola-response-stick-out-as-cases-grow-3960154">have also been</a> documented in Uganda as four contacts of the alert case ran away from response workers.</p>
<p>If people doubt they have Ebola – because symptoms of fever or vomiting are similar to other common illnesses like malaria and typhoid – they’ll seek healthcare from a range of places, including traditional healers and religious groups. And they could move to urban centres in search of better care. All of these behaviours increase the risk of a further spread of the virus and more deaths.</p>
<p>On the positive side, Uganda has the <a href="https://www.afro.who.int/news/how-previous-ebola-virus-disease-outbreaks-helped-uganda-respond-covid-19-outbreak">right basics</a> to mount an effective response: experienced medical staff, knowledge and good infrastructure. The country has responded to four previous Ebola outbreaks. Its health systems are also in better shape than they were in three of the West African countries during the 2014/2015 outbreak. Health systems are as effective as the response and support they can get from the community.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ebola-outbreak-in-uganda-the-health-system-has-never-been-better-prepared-191021">Ebola outbreak in Uganda: the health system has never been better prepared</a>
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<p>But the ability of Ebola to spread must not be underestimated. There’s a <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/gaps-in-ebola-response-stick-out-as-cases-grow-3960154">knowledge gap</a> about the actual start of the outbreak and the index (or first identified) case. This means the actual first human case of this current outbreak, coupled with <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/gaps-in-ebola-response-stick-out-as-cases-grow-3960154">increasing</a> community <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/five-ugandan-doctors-catch-ebola-3966020">infections</a> and deaths, raises the risk of the outbreak spreading along the major highway to densely populated cities and neighbouring countries.</p>
<p>There’s no approved vaccine for this strain of Ebola – the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/uganda/ebola-disease-caused-sudan-virus">Sudan strain</a>. This is due to the focus on Ebola Zaire, the most deadly and infectious strain, which was responsible for the 2014/2015 Ebola outbreak in West Africa.</p>
<p>It’s therefore crucial that the region be prepared to work together to contain the spread of the virus. Drawing on my experience in the management of the 2014/2015 outbreak in West Africa, here are the five steps that might help East Africa curb the further spread of the virus.</p>
<h2>1. Set up a robust cross-border surveillance system</h2>
<p>To prevent a further spread, a cross-border surveillance system must be created that can quickly identify, test and isolate cases for treatment. This system must have direct, simple communication lines with minimal bureaucracy. For instance, teams should use mobile applications like WhatsApp.</p>
<p>One of the biggest weaknesses we faced during the 2014/2015 Ebola outbreak was that response workers in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea weren’t able to communicate easily with colleagues in other countries. This resulted in the use of intermediaries, like the World Health Organization (WHO) office, which caused delays. We lost the critical element of speed – every hour counts.</p>
<p>Communities along the borders must be part of the surveillance system. Ebola response workers in West Africa created a network along the borders that helped them move with speed. Cross border preparedness meetings and direct communication on the progress of the evolving outbreak in Uganda will be crucial for containment strategies.</p>
<h2>2. Create an army of community contact tracers</h2>
<p>To curb the Ebola outbreak in East Africa a portion of the response funding must be used to create an army of case finders and contact tracers. They must know people within their community well and report cases that families may be trying to hide. Fears, ignorance and cultural beliefs and practices tend to make contacts reluctant to report themselves; or they escape from treatment centres.</p>
<p>A crucial factor in containing the outbreak in Liberia was the payments of monthly stipends from the United Nations Development Fund and WHO to local pastors, imams, community leaders, teachers, university students and high school students. These ranged from US$80 to US$350 a month.</p>
<p>This is key because it can turn communities from being hostile to becoming champions of the effort. It also helps to create trust.</p>
<p>At the height of the Ebola outbreak in Liberia’s Montserrado County – where the capital is situated – we had 5,700 community leaders working with the response teams. They were able to visit 1.6 million households and identify thousands of sick people who were then either classified as suspect or probable cases by the more trained contact tracers.</p>
<p>These volunteers defeated Ebola because communities trusted them. Flying in foreigners at great cost <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/security-challenge-community-distrust-and-resistance">has been less effective</a> because communities don’t have the same level of trust in them.</p>
<h2>3. Recruit trusted messengers</h2>
<p>Misinformation, disinformation and rumours make response efforts difficult. It can create great hostility to response teams. The recruitment of messengers trusted by communities, and armed with the right message, is key.</p>
<p>During the 2014/2015 oubreak, we targeted influential people within a community. They included a former fighter during the Liberian civil war - people respected him because he was a part of group that protected them from armed robbers.</p>
<h2>4. Rapid field testing should be used</h2>
<p>Fast testing and short turnaround times are crucial to isolating cases and preventing further spread.</p>
<p>In the West Africa outbreak, our teams would ask a family to isolate a suspected case in a different room. They would then draw blood and send the sample to the field lab. Within three hours we had the results. If the person was positive we moved them to the isolation centre. If negative, we asked them to self-isolate for 48 hours so we could test them again. This allowed the families to call us as soon as they suspected that one of them had fever.</p>
<p>We also did oral swabs of all dead bodies in the communities. This helped us to pick up cases of silent super spreaders who had spread the virus <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/2015/04/10/how-bloody-brawl-sparked-fears-new-ebola-outbreak-liberia-318442.html">but were misdiagnosed</a> in the community.</p>
<p>Both of these approaches helped us to restore confidence with the community and gave us much speed.</p>
<h2>5. Increase surveillance of all vehicles</h2>
<p>Since this outbreak is occurring at a major road leading to Kampala and DRC, the surveillance of all vehicles is critical.</p>
<p>In Liberia, we recruited and trained motorbike riders and transport vehicle riders. We gave them ledgers and notebooks and embedded them with our surveillance teams. They tracked all sick people and even took records of drivers who missed work. These were visited at home to see if they were sick.</p>
<p>Tracing – documenting the full address and host – was done on all recent passengers. This helped us to tightly monitor the movements of people from the epicentre.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191506/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mosoka Fallah works as the Program Manager for Saving Lives and Livelihoods at the Africa Center for Disease Control</span></em></p>When tackling an Ebola outbreak speed is a critical element - every hour counts.Mosoka Fallah, Part-time lecturer at the Global Health & Social Medicine, Harvard University, and Lecturer at the School of Public Health, College of Health Sciences, University of LiberiaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1873732022-07-28T14:38:02Z2022-07-28T14:38:02ZZambia can meet growing food demand: how to fix what’s standing in its way<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/475418/original/file-20220721-10361-ayd9br.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Lorries blocked at the border between DRC and Zambia. Poor roads are a major stumbling block to trade.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Lucien Kahozi/AFP via Getty Images)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>African countries face great challenges in adapting to climate change to meet growing demand for food. The current <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/07/africa-drought-food-starvation/">drought in East Africa</a> is the latest manifestation of changing weather patterns.</p>
<p>But countries such as Zambia, where there is <a href="https://www.ifad.org/en/web/operations/w/country/zambia">good land and water</a>, have major opportunities to meet food demand by growing agriculture exports and processing their produce. Zambian farmers can earn substantial returns from increased production. Their production can also alleviate the pressures in countries such as Kenya.</p>
<p>To realise these opportunities, Zambian products have to reach export markets at good prices. For this, Zambia needs competitive cross-border markets and efficient transport and logistics services. However, regional grain and oilseeds trade is not working for producers in Zambia or for buyers in East Africa, with huge variances in agricultural commodity prices in Kenya and in Zambia.</p>
<p><a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/52246331e4b0a46e5f1b8ce5/t/627b83c72818b8346e9227a0/1652261854313/WP+Assessing+agriculture+food+markets+in+Eastern+and+Southern+Africa+an+agenda+for+regional+competition+enforcement.pdf">Our reality check</a> on the workings of cross-border markets points to regional integration being the key to unlocking massive potential for Zambia to anchor sustainable agricultural growth in Africa. But effective regional integration remains a dream, undermining Zambia’s potential. </p>
<h2>How are markets really working for Zambia?</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/341904098_Agriculture_as_a_Determinant_of_Zambian_Economic_Sustainability">Zambian agriculture</a> has been a growth story with expanding net exports in important products such as <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/52246331e4b0a46e5f1b8ce5/t/627b83c72818b8346e9227a0/1652261854313/WP+Assessing+agriculture+food+markets+in+Eastern+and+Southern+Africa+an+agenda+for+regional+competition+enforcement.pdf">soybeans</a>. However, this performance is very short of where it should be. Zambia should be the grain basket for the whole region. Malawi has shown what is possible in <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/52246331e4b0a46e5f1b8ce5/t/620fb231a08ee67644acc686/1645195827213/Price+tracker+9+DRAFT+14022022.pdf">soybeans</a>. It almost doubled production in 2019/2020, to <a href="https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data">421,000 tonnes</a>, <a href="https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data">more than Zambia</a> in that year.</p>
<p>A major issue is how cross-border markets are working, or not working. <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/335912204_Soya_Beans_Production_in_Zambia_Opportunities_and_Challenges">Zambian suppliers report</a> having substantial volumes of soybeans which can meet the huge regional demand. </p>
<p>Market prices for maize in Nairobi climbed to over <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/52246331e4b0a46e5f1b8ce5/t/62cd4f8496b1364d48c7548e/1657622405695/AMO_Price+tracker+14_12072022.pdf">US$500/Mt in June 2022</a>, reaching similar levels in Kampala, Uganda (Figure 1). In early July, prices were reported to have climbed well above <a href="http://kamis.kilimo.go.ke/">US$750/Mt</a> in Kenya. Meanwhile prices in <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/52246331e4b0a46e5f1b8ce5/t/62cd4f8496b1364d48c7548e/1657622405695/AMO_Price+tracker+14_12072022.pdf">Zambia</a> were around US$220/Mt or 3,700 kwacha/Mt.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/475123/original/file-20220720-24-jxsqfz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/475123/original/file-20220720-24-jxsqfz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475123/original/file-20220720-24-jxsqfz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475123/original/file-20220720-24-jxsqfz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475123/original/file-20220720-24-jxsqfz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475123/original/file-20220720-24-jxsqfz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475123/original/file-20220720-24-jxsqfz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p>Though lower than Kenya’s, Zambian maize prices are still substantially higher than last year’s. This is in line with <a href="https://www.sagis.org.za/swb_2022.html">global trends</a>. With higher input costs, farmers need higher output prices to incentivise production.</p>
<p>The gap between prices in Zambia and those in Nairobi and Kampala is close to US$300/Mt. This is double what would be explained by the efficient cost of transporting maize from Zambia to these countries. Efficient transport costs take account of reasonable trucking, logistics and border costs.</p>
<p>Even with the higher fuel costs, grain should cost around US$150/Mt to be transported from Lusaka to Kampala and Nairobi. Of course, quoted transport rates may be much higher, but this reflects the many problems in cross-border transport which need to be addressed.</p>
<p>The situation is even more extreme in soybeans, which are a much higher value commodity. Zambia’s bumper soybean harvest in 2022 was being sold at prices around US$550/Mt in June, with prices even being quoted as low as US$439/Mt at the end of the month. Prices in East Africa were well over US$1,000/Mt, some US$500-700/Mt above those in Zambia. This is three to four times the transport costs. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/475124/original/file-20220720-9522-pk6d40.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/475124/original/file-20220720-9522-pk6d40.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475124/original/file-20220720-9522-pk6d40.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475124/original/file-20220720-9522-pk6d40.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475124/original/file-20220720-9522-pk6d40.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=550&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475124/original/file-20220720-9522-pk6d40.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=550&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475124/original/file-20220720-9522-pk6d40.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=550&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p>In other words, producers in Zambia should be getting more for their crops and buyers in East Africa should be paying less, alleviating the food price spikes there. </p>
<h2>How can this be and what is to be done?</h2>
<p>A combination of factors is undermining the growth of Zambia. </p>
<p>First, reliable market information is required to link buyers and suppliers, and to enable markets to work. In the absence of information, it’s risky to export. This lack of information affects small and medium sized farmers and businesses. Large-scale traders who have operations across the region have an advantage over smaller businesses and farmers because they have private information. </p>
<p>Second, the market players require clear trade policy signals to take advantage of export opportunities. Any hesitation or mixed signals tend to undermine the ability to make deals with confidence. It is therefore important for Zambia’s new government not to impose ad hoc trade restrictions, for example, as the previous government did in August 2021 to restrict maize exports. Such restrictions, imposed and lifted from month to month, mean deals cannot be made with the confidence that they can be fulfilled. </p>
<p>Third, the market opportunities in East Africa require urgent regional co-operation to improve transport corridors on the ground rather than in rhetoric.</p>
<p>Malawian soybean suppliers have shown the value. Small suppliers have already been using the <a href="https://www.competition.org.za/africanmarketobservatory">African Market Observatory data</a> on East African prices in 2022 to negotiate better prices for their exports. This increased realised prices by around <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/52246331e4b0a46e5f1b8ce5/t/62cd4f8496b1364d48c7548e/1657622405695/AMO_Price+tracker+14_12072022.pdf">$200/Mt</a> more than they would otherwise have accepted.</p>
<p>Zambian farmers could reap similar benefits too. This would support a big push in production, enabling Zambian farmers to invest in improved agricultural systems. This is even more essential as next year is likely to be another <a href="https://gro-intelligence.com/insights/la-nina-is-forecast-to-impact-global-agriculture-for-a-third-year-in-a-row">La Niña</a> weather pattern which sees good rains in Zambia and poor rains in parts of East Africa and the Horn of Africa. </p>
<p>The ongoing effects of climate change mean more investment is required to make agriculture resilient. This involves investments in water management, irrigation, storage facilities, advice and information systems. </p>
<p>The vulnerability of the whole of Southern and East Africa as a climate “hotspot” means urgent and coordinated regional action is required. </p>
<p>But Zambia doesn’t have to wait for this action. </p>
<p>It can lead in championing sustainable agricultural growth in the knowledge that this is essential for resilient food supplies across the region. This requires good policies with a longer-term vision. The country needs, without any reservations, to fully back regional integration and competitive regional markets. Excessive margins cannot be captured by connected so-called “middlemen”. </p>
<p>Greater certainty for businesses needs to be accompanied by enforcement of clear rules for company power. Regional competition enforcement by the <a href="https://globalcompetitionreview.com/insight/enforcer-hub/2021/organization-profile/zambia-competition-and-consumer-protection-commission">Competition and Consumer Protection Commission of Zambia</a> together with the <a href="https://www.comesacompetition.org/">COMESA Competition Commission</a> is a key part of fair and competitive markets which work for all.</p>
<p>Investment is required in critical infrastructure such as storage for smaller market participants to use on fair terms. Finance can be mobilised, such as that being made available by the <a href="https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/press-releases/african-development-bank-board-approves-15-billion-facility-avert-food-crisis-51716">African Development Bank</a>.</p>
<p>It is essential to support regional research networks, such as those led by the <a href="https://www.devex.com/organizations/indaba-agricultural-policy-research-institute-iapri-115251">Indaba Agricultural Policy Institute</a> and the <a href="https://www.competition.org.za/africanmarketobservatory">African Market Observatory</a> of the <a href="https://www.competition.org.za/home">Centre for Competition, Regulation and Economic Development</a> and partners.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187373/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The Centre for Competition, Regulation and Economic Development at the University of Johannesburg has received funding for related work from the COMESA Competition Commission and the South African Department of Trade, Industry and Competition. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Antony Chapoto and Ntombifuthi Tshabalala do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Producers in Zambia should be getting more for their crops, and buyers in East Africa should be paying less, alleviating food price spikes.Antony Chapoto, Research Director, Indaba Agricultural Policy Research Institute (IAPRI)Ntombifuthi Tshabalala, Economist at Centre for Competition, Regulation and Economic Development, University of JohannesburgSimon Roberts, Professor of Economics and Lead Researcher, Centre for Competition, Regulation and Economic Development, UJ, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1814862022-05-12T14:02:44Z2022-05-12T14:02:44ZDar es Salaam’s bus rapid transit: why it’s been a long, bumpy ride<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/460513/original/file-20220429-14-vmfrxi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption"> Dar's rapid bus transit system is expected to be faster to build and cheaper to operate than railways. SAID KHALFAN/AFP via </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/this-picture-taken-on-august-18-2016-shows-a-dart-bus-news-photo/591875410?adppopup=true">Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Infrastructure projects are often subject to political aspirations. But when they are not realised as promised or their costs multiply over the years, the projects turn into public controversies. After a while, the aspirations, promises and controversies settle as the infrastructure system becomes an <a href="https://theconversation.com/megaprojects-in-addis-ababa-raise-questions-about-spatial-justice-141067">integral</a> part of the environment and society. </p>
<p>Dar es Salaam Bus Rapid Transit is such a project. It was planned to improve urban transport by gradually replacing minibuses in Tanzania’s largest city.</p>
<p>Various challenges, like unclear construction plans, residents’ protests and unexpected costs, led to several years of delay in constructing and implementing the transport system. Planning started in the early 2000s and it began to operate in 2016. </p>
<p>One out of six construction phases is complete, offering more than 300,000 trips daily. The second phase is under construction and funding has been secured for its third to fifth phases. Phase six is still under discussion.</p>
<p>My <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Assembling-Bus-Rapid-Transit-in-the-Global-South-Translating-Global-Models/Jacobsen/p/book/9780367894771">research</a> shows how the Dar es Salaam Bus Rapid Transit is both political and deeply embedded into global and local social structures. It also looks at what these entanglements mean for the implementation of a bus rapid transit model in a specific context.</p>
<p>Despite concrete plans and binding contracts that framed the infrastructural project over decades, local social and political conditions still shape its development.</p>
<h2>Pioneer project</h2>
<p>This transport project has played a central role in Tanzania’s national politics. The government set a strong focus on infrastructural development, and the project served as a pioneer of urban transport innovations and large infrastructure systems. It was mainly promoted by the late President John Magufuli while he served as minister for works.</p>
<p>Dar es Salaam <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/rapid-buses-to-bring-relief-2510284">experiences</a> heavy congestion. Minibuses, called “daladala”, are the main mode of urban transport. They are reliable and efficient, but they cannot handle the city’s rapid population growth. This is mainly because they do not have their own physical infrastructure like the rail and bus rapid transit systems do. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/dar-es-salaams-new-rapid-bus-system-won-international-acclaim-but-it-excludes-the-poor-109987">Dar es Salaam's new rapid bus system won international acclaim – but it excludes the poor</a>
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<p>A bus rapid transit system has designated lanes and high-capacity buses that call at stations every few minutes. It also <a href="https://www.itdp.org/library/standards-and-guides/the-bus-rapid-transit-standard/what-is-brt/">features</a> off-board fare collection, enclosed stations and access for pedestrians and cycles. Compared to rail-based systems, the rapid bus transit is expected to be faster and cheaper in terms of planning, construction and operation. </p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Dar’s bus rapid transit system is beset by lack of operational schedules and infrastructure delays but is in high demand.</span></figcaption>
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<p>Policymakers – international NGOs, development corporations and consultancies, local governments and transport businesses – <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2014/aug/27/buses-future-of-urban-transport-brt-bus-rapid-transit">say</a> that these bus systems make for high-quality transport available to the people. They have become a trend in cities of the global South for the last two decades. The Transmilenio system of Bogotá was used as a model of the concept that has been spreading to the African continent. </p>
<p>In 2003, international consultants picked Dar es Salaam’s system as the best practice model for urban Africa. Cities like Addis Ababa, Kampala and Nairobi are following suit, trying the Dar es Salaam model. Professional and personal networks around former Bogotá mayor <a href="https://www.pps.org/article/epenalosa-2">Enrique Penalosa</a> and the New York-headquartered <a href="https://www.itdp.org/about/">Institute for Transportation and Development Policy</a> have made the Tanzanian metropolis the point of reference for African technocrats instead of <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12135">South African cities</a>, which implemented the Transmilenio bus rapid transit model earlier.</p>
<p>But there is no guarantee that African cities will learn better from Dar es Salaam than they would from a Latin American or Asian city. Contexts like the attitude towards public-private partnerships or the structure and political power of the minibus industry differ from city to city, between and within continents.</p>
<h2>Plans and reality</h2>
<p>Since it began, Dar es Salaam’s project has been under pressure to succeed and act as a model. Its promoters tend to <a href="https://www.itdp.org/2018/06/01/webinar-dart-transforming-mobility/">portray</a> it as the way it was planned rather than how it actually operates. </p>
<p>On the ground, the system is grappling with overcrowded buses, lack of operational schedules and long delays in constructing and operating bus corridors and stations. The delays and changes of plans point to controversies and power struggles. </p>
<p>Controversies are nothing unusual in large-scale planning processes. They often have productive moments as they reveal uncertainties and enable renegotiation. </p>
<p>In contrast to the strong political will at international and national levels, not all Tanzanian politicians are in favour of the project. Some would have preferred a rail-based solution while others are part of the minibus industry.</p>
<p>In addition, the largest bus company — the state-controlled Shirika la Usafiri Dar es Salaam (UDA) — has been vying for a monopoly. The bus company tried to frustrate the contract between the Tanzanian government and the World Bank, which financed the first phase of the project. Under the agreement, the system was to run through a public-private partnership consortium, which would consist of Tanzanians and international operators.</p>
<p>The bus company used three tactics to render the international partnership impossible:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>It merged with the Dar es Salaam Commuter Bus Owners Association to form a new company: UDA Rapid Transit.</p></li>
<li><p>It lobbied politicians to support its joint venture as the interim operator of the rapid transit system pending the international public private partnership procurement.</p></li>
<li><p>It made huge investments that were inconsistent with its status as an interim operator. It installed an automated fare collection system and bought more than 200 buses. The investments made it appear irreplaceable. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>To ensure that the only available option for rapid transit operations did not become insolvent, the UDA Rapid Transit was allowed to earn revenue from its buses and fare collection system. </p>
<p>UDA Rapid Transit continues to be the single operator of the Dar es Salaam Rapid Transit System. Whether other operators might come on board in future phases is still uncertain. </p>
<p>Social practice, personal relations and political negotiations direct the system’s development. Infrastructure projects are political, controversial and permanently under transformation. They tell us about global models, national development agendas and sociopolitical negotiations on the ground.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181486/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Malve Jacobsen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Local realities shape the transport system, making it less directly applicable as a model elsewhere.Malve Jacobsen, Post-doctoral researcher, Johannes Gutenberg University of MainzLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1667062021-08-26T13:34:30Z2021-08-26T13:34:30ZUganda has a remarkable history of hosting refugees, but its efforts are underfunded<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/417647/original/file-20210824-23-8qpo1h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Refugees from the Democratic Republic of Congo gather by a market in the Kyangwali Refugee Settlement in Uganda.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jack Taylor/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Uganda has <a href="https://www.voanews.com/south-central-asia/afghan-refugees-expected-uganda">agreed to a request</a> from the United States to temporarily accommodate 2,000 refugees from Afghanistan while Washington processes their applications to live in the US. The move underscores the reputation Uganda has of being progressive on refugee issues. Refugee expert Dr Evan Easton-Calabria provides insights into why.</em></p>
<h2>When did Uganda start hosting refugees?</h2>
<p>Uganda has a long history of hosting refugees. This started <a href="http://makir.mak.ac.ug/bitstream/handle/10570/4077/mulumba_MAK_res.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">in the early 1940s</a> with Polish refugees who fled from Nazi-occupied Europe. The Nakivale refugee settlement – formed in 1959 – in southwest Uganda is the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/uganda/nakivale-settlement-profile-isingiro-district-uganda-july-2020">oldest refugee camp in Africa</a>.</p>
<p>Uganda also hosts huge numbers of refugees. In the mid-1950s almost 80,000 Sudanese refugees, fleeing the first civil war, <a href="http://makir.mak.ac.ug/bitstream/handle/10570/4077/mulumba_MAK_res.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">sought refuge</a> in the country. They were only the first of many waves of refugees from different neighbouring countries to arrive. Uganda has hosted significant numbers of refugees ever since. </p>
<p>Today, <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/">almost</a> 1.5 million refugees live in Uganda, making it the top refugee-hosting country in Africa and one of the top five hosting countries in the world. </p>
<p>Its longstanding ‘open-door’ policy has benefited it both politically and financially, with hundreds of millions of donor funds provided each year for humanitarian and development projects. These target both refugees and locals. While Kenya, for example, has received Euros 200 million in humanitarian aid from the European Union <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/echo/where/africa/kenya_en">since 2012</a>, Uganda has received this much from the EU in <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/echo/where/africa/uganda_en#:%7E:text=In%202021%2C%20the%20EU%20allocated,million%20refugees%20and%20host%20communities.&text=improving%20access%20to%20basic%20services%20in%20refugee%20settlements">just over four years</a>. </p>
<h2>Is the country more progressive towards refugees than its neighbours?</h2>
<p>Uganda’s policies towards refugees have been hailed as progressive. It has even been called <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/01/is-uganda-worlds-best-place-for-refugees-south-sudan">“the world’s best place for refugees”</a>. </p>
<p>Refugees have the right to work and freedom of movement, thanks to <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/4b7baba52.html">Uganda’s 2006 Refugee Act</a> and <a href="https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/544e4f154.pdf">2010 Refugee Regulations</a>, which provide a strong legal and regulatory framework for refugee rights. </p>
<p>Refugees have the right to the same social services as Ugandans, including health care and free primary education. They are not confined to camps but can also live in urban areas. The country has, therefore, received a lot of <a href="https://www.fmreview.org/sites/fmr/files/FMRdownloads/en/solutions/clements-shoffner-zamore.pdf">positive attention</a> for ‘fostering’ the self-reliance of refugees. </p>
<p>However, despite rights on paper in Uganda, refugees still struggle. </p>
<p>They are not legally recognised as refugees if they live in cities besides the capital, Kampala. As <a href="https://www.vng-international.nl/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/NEXUS-Summary-Self-settled-refugees-Koboko-MC-nov-2018.pdf">‘self-settled’ urban refugees</a>, they risk being misclassified as economic migrants. Lacking official refugee status (unless they have been registered in a settlement), urban refugees also often <a href="https://www.fmreview.org/issue64/lozet-eastoncalabria">lack assistance</a>. </p>
<p>Although refugees in Uganda are economically diverse – one study even identified <a href="https://www.refugee-economies.org/publications/refugee-economies-rethinking-popular-assumptions">over 70 different types of livelihoods activities by refugees in Uganda</a> – for many in settlements, subsistence farming is their primary livelihood. But, despite plots of land being provided in settlements, many don’t have enough land to farm on and soil quality is often low. This means that, for many, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/abs/between-a-camp-and-a-hard-place-rights-livelihood-and-experiences-of-the-local-settlement-system-for-longterm-refugees-in-uganda/5A10BC81539E29710C1CFD8DC08470FF">farming is no longer a viable livelihood</a>. This shows that liberal refugee policies, like those promoting self-reliance in Uganda, must be backed with adequate resources if they are to be more than just words on paper.</p>
<p>Comparatively, Uganda’s neighbours – such as Kenya and Ethiopia – have traditionally been more restrictive. Kenya relies on a system of encampment, where most refugees live in camps, and Ethiopia has only <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/press/2019/1/5c41b1784/unhcr-welcomes-ethiopia-law-granting-rights-refugees.html">recently expanded its out-of-camp policy</a> to all refugees and aslyum-seekers, <a href="https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=305031083029084112106090100025070109034071000010027054111069011102104096002110000102099011058111062051098125021096002098107064025070025007037002084027070029084064123068055056069016072089085027073012076091024024121025091026003118084116014101013064085029&EXT=pdf&INDEX=TRUE">although regulatory gaps remain</a>. Nevertheless, it’s important to note that both are major refugee-hosting countries. They host far more refugees than many western (and wealthier) countries. Kenya <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/ke/857-statistics.html">hosts over</a> half a million refugees, mainly from Somalia and South Sudan. Ethiopia <a href="https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/88291">hosts over</a> 788,000 and is the third largest refugee-hosting country in Africa.</p>
<h2>How effectively does Uganda manage its refugee community?</h2>
<p>‘Effectiveness’ is an interesting word in this context. On one hand, Uganda provides an important foundation in terms of providing the legal infrastructure to allow many refugees to lead independent lives. But refugees also enter a challenging context: Uganda struggles to provide adequate services for its own citizens and unemployment is high. It has one of the world’s lowest rankings in the <a href="https://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/hci/HCI_2pager_UGA.pdf?cid=GGH_e_hcpexternal_en_ext">Human Capital Index</a>. </p>
<p>In addition, the 2021 presidential election saw increased political and social unrest which has led to the violation of rights <a href="https://www.hrw.org/africa/uganda">such as</a> the freedom of assembly and expression for citizens and other residents, including refugees. While many Ugandans have welcomed refugees, there are increasing accounts of <a href="https://www.citiesalliance.org/newsroom/news/results/film-managing-migration-arua-uganda">overburdened cities</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/may/21/uganda-refugee-policy-breaking-point">strains on resources</a>, like firewood, in some parts of the country. </p>
<p>The corruption of humanitarian aid is also a problem, with UNHCR Uganda accused of <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2019/02/28/donors-freeze-uganda-refugee-aid-after-un-mismanagement-scandal">mismanaging tens of millions of dollars</a> in 2016-2017. This illustrates the clear need for effective financial management so that refugees can actually be helped.</p>
<p>There is also another important question of responsibility. Despite the positive attention the international community has given the country, donor funds have not often matched the praise. If schools and health facilities are crowded, in part because of refugees, the responsibility to provide additional support should not fall on a refugee-hosting country such as Uganda alone. Limited resources mean limited management. As of June, the 2020-2021 Uganda Refugee Response Plan <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/RRP%20Funding%20Dashboard%20Q1%202021.pdf">was only</a> 22% funded, leaving a shortfall of US$596 million to cover all sectors ranging from protection to food security to sanitation. </p>
<h2>Does it look likely that Uganda will continue in its role as a leading refugee destination?</h2>
<p>Uganda has had a strong commitment to hosting refugees for over 70 years –- about the same length that the <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/uk/1951-refugee-convention.html">1951 Refugee Convention</a> has existed. A spirit of <a href="https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/uganda_migration_country_profile_final.pdf">pan-Africanism</a> and <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/93AA7EAD7E739FF4C125705A00412A1E-globalidp-uga-10Aug.pdf">first-hand understanding of displacement</a> by many Ugandans have all contributed to its willingness to host refugees. Its recent temporary accommodation of Afghan refugees indicates that it is interested in continuing this role.</p>
<p>That said, no country should host refugees without significant international support. Many refugee response plans, such as Uganda’s, remain significantly underfunded even as displacement rises and challenges – such as the COVID-19 pandemic – remain. Even though Uganda receives a significant amount of money, it’s not enough to support the number of people arriving as evidenced by a funding <a href="https://www.unicef.org/uganda/press-releases/joint-press-release-uganda-refugee-response-partners">appeal by refugee response actors</a> in June this year. </p>
<p>Mechanisms such as the <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/uk/comprehensive-refugee-response-framework-crrf.html">Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework</a> offer a means to channel resources and increase collaboration on refugee hosting. But it is important to consider what displacement in Central, Eastern, and the Horn of Africa would look like if Uganda closed its borders. Uganda is making an effort in a neighbourhood where few other countries have the same enthusiasm.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/166706/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Evan Easton-Calabria receives funding from UNOPS/Cities Alliance.</span></em></p>Uganda is making an effort in a neighbourhood where few other countries have the same enthusiasm.Evan Easton-Calabria, Senior Research Officer, Refugee Studies Centre, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1430062020-08-26T15:00:15Z2020-08-26T15:00:15ZHow we’re measuring air quality in Kampala - and why it works for African cities<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/351497/original/file-20200806-24-ecrfpe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">AirQo monitoring system on a 'boda boda'. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Makerere University</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>In Uganda, even though air pollution is a <a href="https://www.iamat.org/country/uganda/risk/air-pollution">big challenge</a> in parts of the country, there is hardly any air quality monitoring. Engineer Bainomugisha – along with other scientists at Makerere University – has developed a machine that monitors air quality. He explains how it works, and why it’s so important.</em></p>
<p><strong>What are the main drivers of air pollution in Kampala and are there any indications of how bad it is?</strong></p>
<p>Generally, I would say the main drivers of air pollution in Kampala are transport, industry, burning of wood or charcoal and burning of waste. </p>
<p>Kampala is Uganda’s political capital and financial district contributing to <a href="https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/860311505816462189/uganda-from-regulators-to-enablers-role-of-city-governments-in-economic-development-of-greater-kampala">over 30%</a> of Uganda’s GDP. The city hosts <a href="https://www.ubos.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/03_20182010_COBE_Report.pdf">more than</a> 32% of the country’s manufacturing facilities and so industrial emissions from activity – such as metal processing, furniture, textiles and plastics – will contribute a significant amount of pollution to the air </p>
<p>It’s a very busy city, with millions using buses, private vehicles and motorbikes to commute in and out every day. A <a href="https://openjicareport.jica.go.jp/pdf/12013025_01.pdf">great deal</a> of pollution therefore <a href="https://www.hindawi.com/journals/jeph/2014/763934/#results">comes from</a> vehicle emissions and heavy traffic congestion. To make matters worse, most of the vehicles in Kampala are pre-owned and, until 2018, the average fleet age was <a href="https://www.ura.go.ug/Resources/webuploads/INLB/AMENDMENTS%20IN%20TAX%20LAWS%202018-19.pdf">more than</a> 15 years. These vehicles have a faster rate of wear and tear <a href="https://www.kcca.go.ug/news/308/#.XoSva4gzZPY">leading to</a> a higher environmental footprint. And with <a href="https://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/EDs-Presentation-Transport-Infrastructure-333.pdf">just</a> 30% paved road network, dust from unpaved road surfaces and road construction activities <a href="https://www.hindawi.com/journals/jeph/2014/763934/#results">will contribute</a> to particulate matter in the air.</p>
<p>In addition to this, <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/334093738_Wood_Charcoal_Fuel_Resilience_in_Kampala_Capital_City_Charcoal_in_the_Water_Energy_and_Food_Urban_Nexus">more than</a> 90% of households in Kampala rely on charcoal and firewood as an energy source for cooking.</p>
<p>And because there’s poor solid waste disposal, another key contributor of air pollution is the <a href="https://www.busiweek.com/unpaved-roads-vehicle-emissions-major-pollutants-in-kampala/">open burning</a> of garbage. </p>
<p><strong>You’ve started to manufacture machines that monitor air quality. How do they do this and who will be using them?</strong></p>
<p>Kampala, like many other cities in sub-Saharan Africa, has a critical data gap on the scale and magnitude of air pollution. </p>
<p>This challenge inspired my students and I to create <a href="https://www.airqo.net/">AirQo</a>, a low-cost air quality monitoring system which was publicly <a href="https://medium.com/@airqo/airqo-officially-launches-in-uganda-2544a0277c44?source=rss-22ba95f2fb07------2">launched</a> earlier this year. To my knowledge, this is the only locally developed system that’s been designed and optimised to help African cities – with limited resources and poor infrastructure – to measure and track air pollution trends. </p>
<p>AirQo devices primarily measure particulate matter – a mixture of solid particles in the air – which can have adverse effects on our health when we inhale them. </p>
<p>The devices continuously take samples of air from a location and use a light scattering method to quantify the concentration of particulate matter. These measurements are transmitted, in near real-time, to the cloud-based AirQo to predict local pollution. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/351501/original/file-20200806-14-17ared2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/351501/original/file-20200806-14-17ared2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351501/original/file-20200806-14-17ared2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351501/original/file-20200806-14-17ared2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351501/original/file-20200806-14-17ared2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351501/original/file-20200806-14-17ared2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351501/original/file-20200806-14-17ared2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">AirQo device.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Makerere University</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The devices are locally designed to withstand the environmental conditions of many African cities, such as dust and extreme weather. They also include a wide range of data transmission and power options so they can operate in areas where there is limited access to power or poor internet connectivity. </p>
<p>The AirQo device can be deployed at static locations or on mobile platforms, such as motorcycles locally called ‘boda-bodas’. Having them on moving objects improves our spatial coverage and resolution. This means that instead of buying one device that only collects data in one area, you have one device that can collect data from multiple data points. This is a new innovation which means that data can be collected from a wider area including, off-road areas that would normally be difficult to install static monitors. </p>
<p>Since 2018, for our own research purposes, we have deployed a network of over 80 devices across Uganda with over 45 in Kampala and in other towns. Some of the AirQo monitors are installed in schools or at private premises, such as shops. </p>
<p>The users of the data collected include government, public (businesses, individuals, and civil society organisations), and academia.</p>
<p>So far, our data (which has been collected since 2018) indicates that the levels of particulate matter peaks in the morning (between 6 and 9am), then flattens in the afternoon and peaks again after 5pm. This is consistent with major cities in other parts of the world. Overall, we’ve seen that Kampala’s particulate matter levels <a href="https://www.airqo.net/blog">are about</a> five times over World Health Organisation guidelines.</p>
<p><strong>Has this technology been used anywhere else and how does it compare to other air quality monitoring systems?</strong></p>
<p>Traditional air quality monitoring systems are expensive. They <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0160412016309989">cost</a> hundreds of thousands of dollars to <a href="https://aqicn.org/products/monitoring-stations">set up</a> and maintain and require specialised expertise which is not available in many places. This means only a few might be installed, resulting in limited readings.</p>
<p>Before starting the manufacture of AirQo monitors at Makerere University, we experimented with some lower-cost monitors but these didn’t fit the context. For example, a number of monitors assume the availability of constant power supply and WiFi, and are designed for less dusty environments. </p>
<p>Unlike these systems, the AirQo takes the considerations and constraints of an African city into the design. </p>
<p><strong>How do you hope this data will be used?</strong></p>
<p>We hope that the air quality data and information from our network can be used to inform decision-making and actions by city governments and regulators to control, better manage and improve air quality in the Kampala area and beyond. </p>
<p>For instance, Uganda is creating new air quality regulations and data from the AirQo network has <a href="https://www.airqo.net/government">been useful</a> in informing possible targets.</p>
<p>Having this data is useful for policymakers. For instance, we <a href="http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/716251593371242345/pdf/Main-Report.pdf">contributed</a> to the World Bank report on the Pollution Management and the Making of Prosperous Cities Program.</p>
<p>We also hope our data will raise awareness among citizens about the quality of air. We send out regular monthly air quality calendars to the schools that host AirQo monitors so they can educate the children about air pollution issues.</p>
<p>And we have developed <a href="https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.airqo.net&hl=en">an app</a> that people can use to access historical, real-time and forecast air quality data in the areas where they live or work. This can inform decisions that minimise exposure to high levels of air pollution, such as going out during peak pollution hours.</p>
<p><em>Maclina Birungi, Communications lead at AirQo, Makerere University, contributed to the writing of this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/143006/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Engineer Bainomugisha is the founder and project lead for AirQo at Makerere University. He is an Associate Professor and Chair of the Department Computer Science. He is also a co-founder of Sunbird AI, a not-for-profit organisation that develops practical and open AI systems for societal benefit. AirQo project has received funding and support from Google.org, Sida/Embassy of Sweden Kampala, The WorldBank Group, ESPRC, and NRF.
</span></em></p>Kampala, like many other cities in sub-Saharan Africa, has a critical data gap on the scale and magnitude of air pollution.Engineer Bainomugisha, Associate Professor, Makerere UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1416162020-07-01T14:19:12Z2020-07-01T14:19:12ZAcademic freedom is sacrosanct. But so is ethical responsibility<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/344830/original/file-20200630-103645-8ru41j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">shutterstock</span> </figcaption></figure><p>In 1990 <a href="https://www.codesria.org/">CODESRIA</a>, Africa’s premier social science council, organised a conference in Kampala, Uganda, on academic freedom. The conference was against the backdrop of mounting harassment of academics on the continent. They were subjected to travel restrictions in some countries, <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/dech.12481">arrest, detention</a>, and sometimes even <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/17/world/idi-amin-murderous-and-erratic-ruler-of-uganda-in-the-70-s-dies-in-exile.html">assassination</a>.</p>
<p>The idea of defence of specific rights for academics was <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/dech.12481">not without contention</a> within the council. Why would you argue for an exclusive right to middle-class academics when the basic rights of ordinary citizens are denied every day?</p>
<p>Nonetheless, the idea of a conference and a charter for intellectuals (not just scholars) prevailed. The African scholars at the conference took the <a href="https://www.achpr.org/legalinstruments/detail?id=49">1981 African Charter on Human and People’s Rights</a>, of the then Organisation of African Unity, as its grundnorm, that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>set the normal standards to guide the exercise of intellectual freedom and remind ourselves of our social responsibility as intellectuals.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Out of the conference, attended by the luminaries of the African social sciences, emerged <a href="https://www.codesria.org/spip.php?article350">the Kampala Declaration on Intellectual Freedom and Social Responsibility</a>. It remains Africa’s most definitive statement on academic freedom.</p>
<p>It followed almost two years after the 68th general assembly of the World University Service, held in Lima in 1988, adopted <a href="https://www.wusgermany.de/sites/wusgermany.de/files/userfiles/WUS-Internationales/wus-lima-englisch.pdf">the Lima Declaration on Academic Freedom and Autonomy of Institutions of Higher Education</a>. The Lima Declaration was driven by the realisation that, whereas there are several global instruments concerning human rights, there was none that specifically protected the freedom of intellectuals.</p>
<p>Both the Lima and the Kampala declarations are emphatic that academic freedom is fundamental to the functioning of the academic community. Its defence is seen as central to the viability and survival of the academy. Scholars must be able to teach, undertake research, report their findings and exchange ideas without fear or hindrance.</p>
<p>These principles still hold true. But that’s not the only consideration, as the Kampala Declaration acknowledges – academic freedom is only one wing by which the academy flies. The other is the duty of scholars to act ethically and responsibly.</p>
<h2>Uncomfortable truth</h2>
<p>By its nature, knowledge advances in unpredictable directions. Often, it might run counter to conventional wisdom and ideas with powerful vested interests. The most important findings from research may be something the researchers weren’t looking for. Similarly, the free exchange of information and protection of dissent against dominant paradigms are essential for the vitality of a research community.</p>
<p>The active and uninhibited dissemination of knowledge is vital for the advancement of knowledge. Scholarly debates need to be free and without let or hindrance. The instinct to restrict the free practice of the academic vocation does not come only from the state or powerful business interests. It may also come from powerful civil society entities. </p>
<p>You should not reject the findings of a study because they offend a segment of the population. You definitely should not attack a researcher purely because some find the results of their research offensive. The retort would be: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Don’t shoot the messenger. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Intellectuals can better deliver on their mandate to society when they can pursue their vocations without being hounded solely on account of their research findings and their dissemination. Nor should they be victimised for opinions they express in the practice of their vocation.</p>
<p>But the duty of scholars is to act ethically and responsibly. Article 19 of the Kampala Declaration <a href="https://www.codesria.org/spip.php?article350">states</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Members of the intellectual community are obliged to discharge their roles and functions with competence, integrity and to the best of their abilities. They should perform their duties in accordance with ethical and highest scientific standards.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The social responsibility of intellectuals was set out in eight articles of the declaration.</p>
<p>Academic freedom cannot be a defence for bad science. This, especially where the “findings” are driven by bigotry and subterfuge rather than science. Don’t shoot the messenger, alright. But it is essential for the integrity of the scholarly community that the messenger is not the message.</p>
<p>A scientist who cooks up data or makes scurrilous claims not based on research can legitimately be subjected to disciplinary action by their institution. Journals routinely retract the publications of “research papers” purely on the grounds of unethical research conduct and cooked-up data. </p>
<p>Academic institutions can legitimately discipline their academics found guilty of misconduct; including fiddling the results of their research. Fairness and due process are central requirements of such disciplinary steps. In other words, the buoyancy of the academy depends on the defence of academic freedom and the requirement that its members conduct themselves ethically.</p>
<h2>Critical compact</h2>
<p>Scholars, groups and institutions imperil their collective integrity when they pull up the shield of academic freedom to protect themselves from scrutiny and reckoning for unethical behaviour. Forces external to the academy who engage in similar ventures endanger the genuine defence of academic freedom. They both undermine a critical compact that the academy has with the rest of society. </p>
<p>The compact is this: on the one hand, society values and serves as a guarantor of academic freedom because it understands that this freedom is vital for the optimal functioning of the academy, and meeting the academy’s obligations to society. On the other hand, academics will not deploy this freedom merely to shield an offending colleague from scrutiny and accountability.</p>
<p>Such compact exists within the academic community as well. Mobilising the whole of the academy in defence of academic freedom requires transparency. All within the academy need to know that academic freedom is not being invoked to protect those who engage in unethical conduct. </p>
<p>Often, many in the academy appeal for intervention by external forces (the state or powerful civil society entities) in the affairs of the academy because they feel that academic freedom is being used to shield the privileged ones in its midst — those with immense cultural and procedural power.</p>
<p>Such misuse of the defence of academic freedom undermines the social compact within the academy itself. In the long run, such abuse of academic freedom threatens everyone’s academic freedom.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/141616/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Prof Jimi Adesina receives funding from the National Research Foundation, South Africa. The opinions expressed in this article are entirely his. They do not, in any way, implicate my university, the SARChI Chair that he holds, or the National Research Foundation. </span></em></p>The active and uninhibited dissemination of knowledge is vital for the advancement of knowledge.Jimi Adesina, Professor and Holder of the South African Research Chair in Social Policy, University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1389672020-06-04T14:25:03Z2020-06-04T14:25:03ZVisibility study of Nairobi, Kampala and Addis Ababa reveals big air pollution problems<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/336097/original/file-20200519-152315-1idv4k4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A man pulls a cart through the early morning smog in Nairobi.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">TOBIN JONES/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The global coronavirus pandemic is having a devastating effect on economies worldwide. However, one of the few positive consequences of travel restrictions and industrial downturn has been a temporary <a href="https://eartharxiv.org/edt4j/">reduction in air pollution</a>. This has made <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/23/coronavirus-photos-show-effect-of-air-pollution-drops-from-global-lockdown.html">skies cleaner and clearer</a>. </p>
<p>In Kenya’s capital, Nairobi, residents have documented this, reporting that they can now see two prominent mountains – Mount Kenya and Mount Kilimanjaro – from the city. It’s a view they haven’t enjoyed for decades. </p>
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<p>Similar <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/travel/article/himalayas-visible-lockdown-india-scli-intl/index.html">examples</a> have been seen in other cities around the world where short-term visibility – our ability to see blue skies – has improved due to the coronavirus lockdown effect. </p>
<p>So why have Mount Kenya and Mount Kilimanjaro not been seen for years? This is because visibility is mainly influenced by small airborne particles, often called particulate matter. These are generated through anthropogenic causes – such as traffic emission, power plants, factories, and crop burning – or natural causes – such as forest-fires, sea salt, dust, and volcanic eruptions. The particles scatter sunlight, thereby reducing visibility. So the more particles, the more pollution. </p>
<p>The evidence shows that the air pollution levels in <a href="https://www.atmos-chem-phys.net/18/15403/2018/">Nairobi</a>, as with other East African urban areas, are currently at <a href="https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/69477/WHO_SDE_PHE_OEH_06.02_eng.pdf?sequence=1">unhealthy levels</a>. But there are very few studies and a <a href="https://www.atmos-chem-phys.net/18/15403/2018/">lack of systematic and regulatory grade measurements of air pollution</a> in East African cities. The existing data only tells us about the current air quality – there’s no historical data to compare it with.</p>
<p>It’s important to know how much more air pollution there is because it can have significant impacts on our respiratory, cardiovascular, metabolic, and neurological systems. To this end, A Systems Approach to Air Pollution <a href="https://www.asap.uk.com/">(ASAP)</a> brings together leading UK and East African academics to provide a framework for improved air quality management. </p>
<p>We recently carried out <a href="https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/ab8b12">a study</a> to fill the gap in information in three East African cities: Addis Ababa, Nairobi and Kampala. The study period was from 1974 to 2018. </p>
<p>We found that air pollution levels in Nairobi increased by 182% over the study period, Kampala by 162% and Addis Ababa by 62%. </p>
<p>This new data set provides a much-needed air pollution baseline for the three cities. They can now assess how effective current and future efforts to reduce air pollution are. </p>
<h2>Visibility data</h2>
<p>For our study, we used visibility data to predict how much particle pollution there was. Visibility measurements are routinely recorded at airports and other locations, and so we were able to use this data for our research. </p>
<p>Before the 1990s visibility <a href="https://www.atmos-chem-phys.net/17/2085/2017/">was usually</a> measured manually. Afterwards light sensitive instruments were used, such as <a href="https://www.atmos-chem-phys.net/17/2085/2017/">visiometer sensors</a>. Crudely, visiometer sensors <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/engineering/mie-scattering-theory">measure how much</a> light is scattered by particles and thus <a href="https://www.wmo.int/pages/prog/www/IMOP/publications/CIMO-Guide/Prelim_2018_ed/8_I_9_en_MR_clean.pdf">dictates visibility</a>.</p>
<p>We found that, over the last 45 years, Nairobi has experienced the most loss in visibility (60%) – for instance the average visibility dropped from about 35km to 14km from the 1970s to 2010s. Next with the most loss in visibility was Kampala (56%), followed by Addis Ababa (34%).</p>
<p>From this data we were able to calculate the air pollution levels. Simply put, visibility depends on how many particles there are, so we are able to model this into how much pollution there is. Crudely, the more particles, the lower the visibility – which means the more pollution. </p>
<p>This visibility approach is also translatable to other regions worldwide and can be particularly useful for locations that lack high quality, long term air quality monitoring. </p>
<h2>Visibility approach</h2>
<p>Over the past 50 years, clear sky average visibility has <a href="https://science.sciencemag.org/content/323/5920/1468?casa_token=2uA46plzCsYAAAAA:oFMWlrdfpfRNosBuuJ_5pUGl0zuStqk7wnImc3yiHqwMZZgjGrrgLsDvUx8tDq78rxrfUqZ9W2Oetis">reduced all over the world</a>. This is indicative of <a href="https://science.sciencemag.org/content/323/5920/1468?casa_token=2uA46plzCsYAAAAA:oFMWlrdfpfRNosBuuJ_5pUGl0zuStqk7wnImc3yiHqwMZZgjGrrgLsDvUx8tDq78rxrfUqZ9W2Oetis">changes in particle, gas emissions and climatic conditions</a>. </p>
<p>In the case of these three African cities, the study linked increased particulate matter pollution to increased rates of <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2004/01/2004a_bpea_sachs.pdf">fuel use</a>, <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0269749116312933?casa_token=Lwf-fvxTp04AAAAA:edJbTbQotKoiDs1I2bMtHuMQ_lkk-7zRsVnP3h-As3oGZN9OEiYHUba0GxPCJX7Y29a_f-MN7Ac">motorisation</a> and <a href="http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/60775/1/NCE%20Cities%20Paper01.pdf">socio-economic development</a>. This influences the city’s air quality because of large-scale construction, energy use, and <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264275117312933">increased vehicle emissions</a>. In <a href="https://www.ceicdata.com/en/kenya/road-transport-number-of-motor-vehicles-registered/road-transport-no-of-motor-vehicles-registered">Kenya</a>, for instance, there was a notable increase (200%) in the number of vehicles on the roads over the past decade. </p>
<p>Besides East Africa, many cities in <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1352231012008291">India</a>, and <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1352231012004724?casa_token=ICu0inBk7qQAAAAA:ezSuDhTZs9Np9vNjA-xioqG2sIrhhfaSK_JlZIiJK_aukEKFlC5lgTslhfSJyqckcSvr88dnvB8">China</a> are also facing visibility degradation due to increased air pollution levels, while visibility significantly improved in <a href="https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1029/2010JD014603">European cities</a>. Improved long-term visibility in European cities is the result of <a href="https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/air-quality-in-europe-2015">decreasing air pollution</a> there, possibly due to the results of successful air quality policies.</p>
<h2>Air pollution</h2>
<p>We hope this approach will be used to assess future air quality improvement interventions in the region. </p>
<p>Air pollution is an important environmental problem and a major public health concern due to its significant adverse toxicological impact on human health. Globally, the <a href="https://www.who.int/airpollution/data/cities/en/">World Health Organisation</a> estimates that 7 million people die prematurely each year due to exposure to harmful levels of air pollution. More than <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/27-09-2016-who-releases-country-estimates-on-air-pollution-exposure-and-health-impact">90% of deaths</a> occur in low and middle income countries.</p>
<p>Our evidence shows that while urban growth is an inevitable product of national development, there is a critical need for actions to be taken that ensure that urban development does not take place at the expense of good air quality.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/138967/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Francis Pope received funding from the UK's Department for International Development (DFID) for this work. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ajit Singh and William Robert Avis do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>We found that air pollution levels in Nairobi increased by 182% over the study period, Kampala by 162% and Addis Ababa by 62%.Ajit Singh, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, University of BirminghamFrancis Pope, Professor, University of BirminghamWilliam Robert Avis, Research Fellow, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1141252019-03-27T15:21:33Z2019-03-27T15:21:33ZChina’s ‘Silk Road urbanism’ is changing cities from London to Kampala – can locals keep control?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266123/original/file-20190327-139380-1qnb43p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=1629%2C356%2C3290%2C2002&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">View of Kampala. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/kampala-uganda-skyline-661466815">Shutterstock.</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A massive redevelopment of the old Royal Albert Dock in East London <a href="http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/cn_eu/2017-06/29/content_29930452.htm">is transforming</a> the derelict waterfront to a gleaming business district. The project, which started in June 2017, will create 325,000 square metres of prime office space – a “city within a city”, as it has been dubbed – for <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f7b5599c-c7b0-11e2-9c52-00144feab7de">Asian finance and tech firms</a>. Then, in 2018, authorities in Kampala, Uganda celebrated as a ferry on Lake Victoria was unloaded with goods from the Indian Ocean, onto a rail service into the city. This transport hub was the final part of the <a href="http://centralcorridor-ttfa.org/countries/tanzania-2/">Central Corridor project</a>, aimed at connecting landlocked Uganda to Dar es Salaam and the Indian Ocean.</p>
<p>Both of these huge projects are part of the US$1 trillion global infrastructure investment that is China’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/one-belt-one-road-33049">Belt and Road Initiative</a> (BRI). China’s ambition to reshape the world economy has sparked massive infrastructure projects spanning all the way from Western Europe to East Africa, and beyond. The nation is engaging in what we, in <a href="https://rsa.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00343404.2019.1566703#.XJucwxP7SlM">our research</a>, call “Silk Road urbanism” – reimagining the historic transcontinental trade route as a global project, to bring the cities of South Asia, East Africa, Europe and South America into the orbit of the Chinese economy. </p>
<p>By forging infrastructure within and between key cities, China is changing the everyday lives of millions across the world. The initiative has kicked off a <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-sparks-new-development-race-with-china-but-can-it-win-105203">new development race</a> between the US and China, to connect the planet by financing large-scale infrastructure projects. </p>
<h2>Silk Road urbanism</h2>
<p>Amid this geopolitical competition, Silk Road urbanism will exert significant influence over how cities develop into the 21st century. As the transcontinental trade established by the ancient Silk Road once led to the rise of cities such as Herat (in modern-day Afghanistan) and Samarkand (Uzbekistan), so the BRI will bring new investment, technology, infrastructure and trade relations to certain cities around the globe. </p>
<p>The BRI is still in its early stages – and much remains to be understood about the impact it will have on the urban landscape. What is known, however, is that the project will transform the world system of cities on a scale not witnessed since the end of the Cold War. </p>
<p>Silk Road urbanism is highly selective in its deployment across urban space. It prioritises the far over the near and is orientated toward global trade and the connections and circulations of finance, materials, goods and knowledge. Because of this, the BRI should not only be considered in terms of its investment in infrastructure. </p>
<p>It will also have significance for city dwellers – and urban authorities must recognise the challenges of the BRI and navigate the need to secure investment for infrastructure while ensuring that citizens maintain their <a href="https://davidharvey.org/media/righttothecity.pdf">right to the city</a>, and their power to shape their own future. </p>
<h2>London calling</h2>
<p>Developments in both London and Kampala highlight these challenges. In London, Chinese developer Advanced Business Park is rebuilding Royal Albert Dock – now named the Asian Business Port – on a site it acquired for <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/may/29/chinese-developer-deal-london-business-park">£1 billion</a> in 2013 in <a href="https://www.channel4.com/news/boris-johnson-london-propery-deal-china-albert-dock">a much-criticised deal</a> by former London mayor Boris Johnson. The development is projected to be worth £6 billion to the city’s economy by completion. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266121/original/file-20190327-139361-14q71zw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266121/original/file-20190327-139361-14q71zw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266121/original/file-20190327-139361-14q71zw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=295&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266121/original/file-20190327-139361-14q71zw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=295&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266121/original/file-20190327-139361-14q71zw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=295&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266121/original/file-20190327-139361-14q71zw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=371&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266121/original/file-20190327-139361-14q71zw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=371&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266121/original/file-20190327-139361-14q71zw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=371&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Formerly Royal Albert Dock, now Asian Business Port.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://earth.app.goo.gl/qMifxX">Google Earth.</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But the development stands in sharp contrast with the surrounding East London communities, which still suffer <a href="https://www.familiesonline.co.uk/local/newham/in-the-know/newham-and-tower-hamlets-have-highest-levels-of-child-poverty-in-london">poverty and deprivation</a>. The challenge will be for authorities and developers to establish trusting relations through open dialogue with locals, in a context where large urban redevelopments such as the 2012 Olympic Park <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13604813.2012.754190">have historically brought few benefits</a>. </p>
<p>The creation of a third financial district, alongside Canary Wharf and the City of London, may benefit the economy. But it remains to be seen if this project will provide opportunities for, and investment in, the surrounding neighbourhoods. </p>
<h2>Kampala’s corridor</h2>
<p>The Ugandan capital Kampala is part of the Central Corridor project to improve transport and infrastructure links across five countries including Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. The project is financed through the government of Tanzania via a <a href="https://www.tanzaniainvest.com/transport/china-loan-central-corridor-railway">US$7.6 billion loan</a> from the Chinese bank Exim. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266143/original/file-20190327-139371-4dmro6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266143/original/file-20190327-139371-4dmro6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266143/original/file-20190327-139371-4dmro6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266143/original/file-20190327-139371-4dmro6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266143/original/file-20190327-139371-4dmro6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266143/original/file-20190327-139371-4dmro6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266143/original/file-20190327-139371-4dmro6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Under construction: the Chinese-funded Entebbe-Kampala Expressway.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/150899655@N07/32199177061/sizes/l">Dylan Patterson/Flickr.</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The growth of the new transport and cargo hub at Port Bell, on the outskirts of Kampala, with standardised technologies and facilities for international trade, is the crucial underlying component for Uganda’s <a href="https://www.gou.go.ug/content/uganda-vision-2040">Vision2040</a>. </p>
<p>This national plan alone encompasses a further ten new cities, four international airports, national high speed rail and a multi-lane road network. But as these urban transformations unfold, residents already living precariously in Kampala have faced further uncertainty over their livelihoods, shelter and place in the city.</p>
<p>During fieldwork for our ongoing research into Silk Road urbanism in 2017, we witnessed the demolition of hundreds of informal homes and businesses in the popular Namuwongo district, as a zone was cleared 30 metres either side of a rehabilitated railway track for the Central Corridor required. </p>
<p>As Silk Road urbanism proceeds to reshape global infrastructure and city spaces, existing populations will experience displacement in ways that are likely to reinforce existing inequalities. It is vital people are given democratic involvement in shaping the outcomes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/114125/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan Silver received funding from the Leverhulme Trust to conduct this research and writing.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alan Wiig does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>China is funding global infrastructure projects to expand its influence and capacity for economic growth.Jonathan Silver, Senior Research Fellow, University of SheffieldAlan Wiig, Assistant Professor of Urban Planning and Community Development, UMass BostonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/916882018-02-14T16:27:14Z2018-02-14T16:27:14ZThe real reason why cities in sub-Saharan Africa aren’t issuing municipal bonds<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/206241/original/file-20180213-118385-nj5yaq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">REUTERS/Euroluftbild.de</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Cities around the world have been financing their long-term investment needs through municipal bonds for centuries. The first recorded transaction occurred in Genoa in 1150. More recently, in the US, over <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/b792c166-fc61-11e7-9b32-d7d59aace167">USD$111 billion</a> were issued in November and December last year for infrastructure, pension obligations and other critical needs across the country.</p>
<p>A bond is a debt security issued by a public agency to raise money, often for infrastructure projects. Sovereign bonds are widely used by national governments, and municipal bonds are used by many cities (particularly in the Americas). </p>
<p>For comparison, cities in sub-Saharan Africa have raised less than 1% of the US amount since 2004. Only a handful of local governments have successfully issued municipal bonds, almost all of them in South Africa. Yet there is a desperate need for infrastructure investment throughout the region. Current estimates place the financing gap at <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2016/06/sy.htm">USD$ 41.6 billion</a>. Municipal bonds, originated for urban infrastructure, will go a long way to addressing this gap.
Why aren’t African cities using municipal bonds to raise money for capital projects?</p>
<p>Some international experts point to a lack of local capacity and technical ability to prepare a municipal bond. Others argue that projects are not structured in ways that ensure a sufficient return to prospective investors. Still another group insists that municipal leaders lack the interest or ability to use more transparent financing instruments.</p>
<p>All of these views stem from a belief that civil servants and investors in sub-Saharan Africa are not exposed to global financial best practices, or are unwilling to comply with them. Some of these assumptions are both wrong and offensive.</p>
<p>My <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0956247817741853">paper</a> considered this question and came to a conclusion that there is another key contributing factor that is often overlooked. This is the weakness in regulations governing the roles and powers of cities’ authorities to raise finance and the ability of central governments to adjust these based on political whims.</p>
<p>This creates an uncertain environment. Prospective issuers cannot be confident that their preparatory work will ultimately lead to a transaction. And they can’t be sure that their efforts can be undone at the last minute by a government.</p>
<h2>A bridge too far for Dakar?</h2>
<p>In my paper I argue that poor financial skills and ignorance is less of a problem than many suggest. </p>
<p>Take, for example, the cities of Dakar (Senegal) and Kampala (Uganda). Both recognised the need to reduce their reliance on development assistance or commercial banks. They also recognised that, to attract investment from institutional investors like pension funds and insurance companies, they would have to demonstrate their creditworthiness.</p>
<p>Creditworthiness can be understood as both the willingness and the ability to borrow. To achieve a satisfactory credit rating, Kampala and Dakar needed to prove that they could reliably raise and manage money from a range of local sources, including from property taxes, parking fines and license fees.</p>
<p>Months of dedicated work yielded positive results. Independent ratings agencies assessed the health of the cities’ finance systems. Both cities received investment-grade credit ratings, meaning that prospective investors could be reasonably confident of recovering their money.</p>
<p>Indeed, after the cities secured these credit ratings, several local investors indicated their desire to purchase municipal bonds. </p>
<p>But political conflicts between the local and national levels led to Dakar’s bond issuance being <a href="http://citiscope.org/story/2015/how-dakar-almost-got-its-first-municipal-bond-market">cancelled</a> at the last minute. And in the case of Kampala, national regulation has <a href="http://newclimateeconomy.report/workingpapers/workingpaper/financing-the-urban-transition-policymakers-summary/">capped</a> the city’s borrowing at a prohibitively low amount. This limit means that the city cannot borrow enough money to make bond issuance worthwhile. </p>
<h2>What’s the real problem?</h2>
<p>If the issue doesn’t stem from creditworthiness, technical proficiency, or financial market readiness, there must be another factor limiting municipal bond issuance.</p>
<p>My <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0956247817741853">paper</a> attributes the lack of bond issuance not to the municipality or potential investors, but to limiting behaviour of national governments. </p>
<p>While they devolve substantial responsibilities to cities, they limit their ability to raise funds. This is often driven by a fear on the part of sovereign leadership to allow cities to have a hand in holding their own purse strings. This power can ultimately lead to less dependence on the national government.</p>
<p>A closer look at a number of cities shows that only those in highly centralised countries – like Cameroon – or highly decentralised countries – like South Africa – have been able to successfully issue bonds. The argument for the success of bond issuance in decentralised economies is well-understood in the African context and more broadly around the world. But the case for success in countries at the other end of the spectrum is less-considered but equally valid.</p>
<p>Cities in heavily centralised countries are not provided with autonomy for decision-making. Instead they are positioned as direct participants within an administrative machine governed by decisions from the capital. Any financial obligation entered into by a city in this political ecosystem is viewed as one explicitly guaranteed by the central government.</p>
<p>South Africa provides a good example of how enabling legislation can help municipalities raise money. In 2004 the country passed a law – <a href="https://www.acts.co.za/municipal-finance-management-act-2003/index.html">The Municipal Finance Management Act</a> – that sets out clearly what financial activities cities can and can’t undertake. Cities are prohibited from borrowing for operational expenditures and, instead, can only borrow for long-term investments.</p>
<p>The law has made it safer for pension funds, insurance companies and other investors to lend to city governments. They know that municipalities cannot issue bonds without being in full compliance with existing regulations that are not subject to different types of interpretation or changes in political will.</p>
<p>By comparison, the cities of Dakar and Kampala have struggled because of ambiguous or contested relationships with their national governments. And both cities have spent years improving their revenue collection and management systems to achieve an investment-grade credit rating. Yet the constraints on municipal bonds are created by systems beyond the city’s control.</p>
<h2>Clarity is key</h2>
<p>More African governments need to clarify enabling regulatory and legal environments on the sub-national level. These must explain how much cities can borrow and under what conditions. Only then will African cities be able to use bonds to finance the infrastructure their citizens so desperately need.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/91688/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jeremy Gorelick does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>African cities are failing to raise development funds through bond markets.Jeremy Gorelick, Lecturer in Emerging Markets Finance, Johns Hopkins UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/898702018-01-15T15:12:57Z2018-01-15T15:12:57ZKey models that Kampala needs to consider to manage its urban sprawl<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/201501/original/file-20180110-46715-le9enw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kampala experiences heavy traffic in the city due to rapid population growth.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Metropolitan areas in less developed countries can provide the foundation <a href="http://www.lincolninst.edu/publications/books/financing-metropolitan-governments-developing-countries">for economic growth for the whole country </a>. But many face major challenges because local government jurisdictions don’t coincide with the boundaries of the economic region. This happens when cities grow beyond their administrative boundaries, often as a result of urban sprawl.</p>
<p>Uganda’s capital Kampala is a <a href="https://www.theigc.org/project/options-design-greater-kampala-metropolitan-authority/">good example</a>. The city was originally planned for a population of 150,000 people. It now spans an area that includes the surrounding districts of Mpigi, Mukono, and Wakiso with about <a href="https://www.kcca.go.ug/uploads/KCCA_STRATEGI_PLAN_2015-2016.pdf">4 million people working in the city itself</a>.</p>
<p>The challenge is how to plan, deliver and finance services when multiple jurisdictions are involved. Administrative fragmentation means that it’s difficult to coordinate service delivery and formulate coherent public policy for the metropolitan area. </p>
<p>What’s needed are appropriate political and administrative structures to ensure citizens’ preferences can be heard, adequate services are delivered, at the same time that regional issues can be addressed. </p>
<h2>Metropolitan Issues in Greater Kampala</h2>
<p>The Greater Kampala Metropolitan Area suffers from planning and policy dissonance. This is because of overlaps between the city authority and surrounding local government districts. </p>
<p>The City of Kampala itself is managed by the Kampala Capital City Authority <a href="https://www.kcca.go.ug/uploads/KCCA_ACT_2010.pdf">which is a national government ministry</a>. The surrounding districts are managed as local governments
and coordinated by the <a href="https://www.molg.go.ug/sites/default/files/LOCAL%20GOVERMENTS%20ACT.pdf">Ministry of Local Government </a>.</p>
<p>This leads to challenges in planning, financing, and coordination of service delivery, particularly when it comes to transport and waste management.</p>
<p>About half of the 4 million people living in what makes up the greater Kampala area live and work in the city’s core. <a href="https://www.kcca.go.ug/uploads/KCCA_STRATEGI_PLAN_2015-2016.pdf">The other half commute into the centre of the city and return to home at night</a>. </p>
<p>These commuting patterns mean that public transport has to also be coordinated across administrative boundaries. </p>
<p>And from a financing perspective, it’s more efficient as well as equitable to share costs and revenues across the metropolitan area.</p>
<h2>Different cities, different models</h2>
<p>There’s a wide spectrum of governance structures in cities around the world. These range from being very fragmented and informal to highly consolidated and formal. </p>
<p>For example Los Angeles has a fragmented structure made up of <a href="https://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Slack-presentation-on-Metropolitan-Governance-Kampala-November-22-2017_Final.pdf">200 cities and 5 county governments</a>. But Cape Town in South Africa has a highly centralised one tier structure.</p>
<p>Both models have pros and cons.</p>
<p>For example, fragmented structures allow for stronger local autonomy and responsiveness. But they are unable to adequately address spill overs of services or <a href="https://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Slack-presentation-on-Metropolitan-Governance-Kampala-November-22-2017_Final.pdf">coordinate service delivery across municipal boundaries</a>. A more consolidated structure can address these issues. </p>
<p>The problem is that consolidated models require local structures to cede their autonomy to one central authority. This isn’t always politically feasible.</p>
<p>Some countries have adopted structures with <a href="https://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Slack-presentation-on-Metropolitan-Governance-Kampala-November-22-2017_Final.pdf">two separate tiers</a> – an upper tier and a second tier. The upper tier is responsible for services and policies that affect the whole region. This would, for example, include transportation and planning how to use land. The second tier is responsible for <a href="https://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Slack-presentation-on-Metropolitan-Governance-Kampala-November-22-2017_Final.pdf">local services</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/a01d3df8-59ee-4507-a05e-a71f3833cb93.pdf">Barcelona</a> in Spain and <a href="https://www.greatermanchester-ca.gov.uk/">Manchester</a> in the UK are run this way. </p>
<p>The benefits of a two-tier structure are that it can better coordinate services and address spill overs at the upper tier. It can simultaneously maintain a degree of local autonomy at the lower tier. The downside is that, given the possible duplication of services, the model could be less efficient and possibly costlier to implement than a one-tier authority.</p>
<p>Another model involves local authorities within a metropolitan area setting up a special purpose body to deliver select services, such as transportation or waste collection, within a specified geographic area. A dedicated revenue stream such as user fees is usually part of the model.</p>
<p>The problem with this approach is that it’s difficult to coordinate policies across various sectors: for example planning transport with power supplies.</p>
<p>And special purpose districts, such as transportation districts in the US, have <a href="https://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Slack-presentation-on-Metropolitan-Governance-Kampala-November-22-2017_Final.pdf">been shown to be less accessible and less accountable to citizens</a>. </p>
<p>Perhaps the most common form of metropolitan governance relies on <a href="https://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Slack-presentation-on-Metropolitan-Governance-Kampala-November-22-2017_Final.pdf">voluntary cooperation</a> to provide individual services. In the Greater Kampala Metropolitan Area, for example, there is <a href="https://www.nwsc.co.ug/index.php/contenthome/item/161-kampala-sanitation-programme-lake-victoria-protection-phase-project">voluntary cooperation between the city authority and the surrounding districts</a> on solid waste management and on water and power supply. </p>
<p>Although voluntary cooperation can be a suitable short-term arrangement, the lack of legal protection of a more formalised system can, in the longer term, get in the way of providing stable services.</p>
<h2>Balancing act</h2>
<p>Metropolitan areas are key to the economic prosperity of their countries. This is because urban areas, if managed well, <a href="https://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Collier-2016-Policy-brief.pdf">will increase productivity and economic growth</a>. To ensure these benefits can be realised and cities are liveable, suitable metropolitan governance structures must be put in place. These must balance regional and local interests, and ensure adequate planning, coordination, and service delivery throughout the metropolitan area.</p>
<p>Kampala would do well to develop an approach that suits its needs – metropolitan governance models need to be context specific. To balance regional and local interests and given the existing administrative structures in a city, a two-tier model might be an interesting place to start.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89870/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Astrid R.N. Haas is affiliated with The International Growth Centre. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Enid Slack receives funding from the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. </span></em></p>Metropolitan areas are key to economic prosperity of countries. But this is affected when the population grows too fast like in Uganda’s Kampala, where growth has outpaced infrastructure development.Astrid R.N. Haas, Senior Country Economist, International Growth CentreEnid Slack, Director of the Institute on Municipal Finance and Governance (IMFG) at the Munk School of Global Affairs, University of TorontoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/609712016-06-28T19:26:13Z2016-06-28T19:26:13ZNigeria’s constitution holds the key to protecting internally displaced people<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/128044/original/image-20160624-28382-1n1tapr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Baby Lurky, whose family was displaced by Boko Haram in the northeast region of Nigeria, sleeps at a camp in Adamawa State. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Afolabi Sotunde </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The internal displacement of people has become a significant concern in Nigeria. More than <a href="http://www.tv360nigeria.com/people-displaced-boko-haram-now-2-17-million/">two million people</a> have fled their homes because of the <a href="https://africacheck.org/factsheets/factsheet-explaining-nigerias-boko-haram-and-its-violent-insurgency/">Boko Haram</a> insurgency in the northeast. Millions more have been displaced by other causes, including natural disasters and development projects.</p>
<p>The rise in the problem has led to calls for concrete <a href="http://opinion.premiumtimesng.com/2015/12/28/idps-in-nigeria-and-a-call-for-urgent-intervention-by-olawale-rotimi/">rights-based solutions</a> to protect and assist internally displaced persons. This is why the absence of a national legal framework for dealing with the crisis is receiving increased attention.</p>
<p>The problem of internal displacement is serious enough to require amendments to Nigeria’s constitution. The rising wave of displacements in the north has far-reaching implications for national political stability. Given that the constitution obliges the government to safeguard the welfare of all Nigerians, it becomes imperative that there be constitutional protection for displaced people. </p>
<p>There are existing trends for this argument. The <a href="http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/constitutions/ethiopia_constitution.pdf">Ethiopian constitution</a> recognises the right of pastoralists not to be displaced. It further requires that displaced persons must be protected. The Colombian Constitutional Court in 2004 declared the situation of internal displacement in the country an
“<a href="http://www.brookings.edu/%7E/media/Projects/idp/Colombia_T-025_2004.pdf?la=en">unconstitutional state of affairs</a>”. This is despite the <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2005.pdf">Colombian constitution</a> not having such explicit provision. </p>
<h2>The possible legal routes</h2>
<p>Nigeria is party to the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons (<a href="http://www.unhcr.org/about-us/background/4ae9bede9/african-union-convention-protection-assistance-internally-displaced-persons.html">Kampala Convention</a>). Increased attention is therefore being put on the need for it to align its national legal system with the convention.</p>
<p>But so far the discourse on a national instrument for addressing the plight of displaced people has ignored the role played by the <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Nigeria_1999.pdf?lang=en">Nigerian constitution</a>. The constitution is significant in that, among other things, it sets policy objectives for the state and makes provision for fundamental human rights.</p>
<p>In the national hierarchy of norms, the constitution is regarded as the supreme law. Its essence, set out in the preamble, is the need to ensure the welfare of the Nigerian people.</p>
<p>In fostering this objective, the constitution highlights strategic policy areas that the government must give priority to. It further provides for fundamental human rights that must be respected, and for which redress may be sought if they are infringed.</p>
<p>One might argue that a reason for the omission of the role of the constitution in the protection of internally displaced persons lies in the rigidity of constitutional amendments. But recent history has shown that it is possible to amend the Nigerian constitution if necessary. </p>
<p>There are arguably two reasons to follow this route.</p>
<h2>The case for constitutional protection</h2>
<p>A constitutional entrenchment of protection will elevate the discussion on internal displacement from being just an altruistic, humanitarian concern to a constitutional issue. It will thus necessitate a systemic institutional response.</p>
<p>As the constitution is the epicentre for the formation and functioning of government, including protection for internally displaced persons, its provisions will serve as a strong basis for the various organs of state to act proactively.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/128045/original/image-20160624-28354-g8idh6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/128045/original/image-20160624-28354-g8idh6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128045/original/image-20160624-28354-g8idh6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128045/original/image-20160624-28354-g8idh6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128045/original/image-20160624-28354-g8idh6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128045/original/image-20160624-28354-g8idh6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128045/original/image-20160624-28354-g8idh6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Evacuation of people displaced by Boko Haram in Nigeria.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Afolabi Sotunde</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A constitutional entrenchment will further grant people a legitimate claim to protection against arbitrary state decisions that result in their displacement without recourse to international standards.</p>
<p>This is particularly relevant when people are forced to leave their homes to make way for development projects. Constitutional protection will give displaced people the opportunity to assert their rights to adequate protection against impoverishment from disruptions to their livelihoods.</p>
<p>But how should the constitutional protection be entrenched? </p>
<p>Two models are proposed. The first is an insertion of a clause in chapter II of the 1999 constitution. The second is an insertion of a specific right under chapter IV.</p>
<h2>Safeguarding displaced people</h2>
<p>Chapter II of the constitution (sections 13 to 24) provides for the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy. The directive principles set out strategic policy direction for the state in the realisation of a democratic, just and egalitarian society. </p>
<p>The directive principles outline policy priorities in relation to economic, political, social and environmental concerns. In preserving social order, section 17 of the 1999 constitution mandates the state to direct its policy towards all citizens. In addition, it specifically recognises the need to protect children, young people and the elderly. </p>
<p>To this end, the state has developed national policies on children and young people. In 2001, a National Youth Policy was developed. The policy was revised in 2009. The aim of the policy was to enhance youth participation and foster youth development. In 2007, Nigeria developed a National Child Policy to promote engagement among stakeholders on child rights.</p>
<p>But a downside to entrenching protection for internally displaced persons in the directive principles is that its provisions are non-justiciable. As such, they cannot be legally asserted in a court of law. To circumvent this, an alternative proposition is to insert a specific right for protection of internally displaced persons under chapter IV of the constitution.</p>
<p>Chapter IV of the constitution (sections 33 to 46) provides for fundamental human rights. As rights contained in this chapter are enforceable, an insertion of a specific right will afford internally displaced persons a legitimate claim before national courts. </p>
<p>A sample provision that could be incorporated in this chapter is:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>every person shall have a right to be protected and assisted in situations of internal displacement.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Clarification on what protection and assistance entails in the various circumstances of internal displacement could be advanced by the judiciary. In advancing clarification, the judiciary should make reference to the United Nations <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/protection/idps/43ce1cff2/guiding-principles-internal-displacement.html">Guiding Principles</a> on Internal Displacement and the Kampala Convention, which Nigeria has ratified.</p>
<h2>The way forward</h2>
<p>In January 2016 the Nigerian National Assembly set up a constitutional review committee at the level of the <a href="http://guardian.ng/news/senate-begins-fresh-move-to-review-constitution/">Senate</a> and the <a href="http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/197143-house-of-reps-inaugurates-constitution-review-committee.html">House of Representatives</a>. </p>
<p>Having voiced a commitment to protect and assist internally displaced persons, the National Assembly is in a position to initiate constitutional amendments to incorporate their protection. This would ensure durable solutions to the problem of internal displacement at all levels of government. It will also serve as a basis to test the constitutionality of governmental actions, policies, interventions and laws on internal displacement.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/60971/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Romola Adeola does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The rise in the number of people fleeing Boko Haram terror calls for urgent amendments to Nigeria’s constitution to provide legal protection to the country’s millions of internally displaced citizens.Romola Adeola, Legal Researcher, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/608652016-06-14T15:21:41Z2016-06-14T15:21:41ZHow elites and corruption have played havoc with Nairobi’s housing<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/126121/original/image-20160610-29203-1ajodur.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Local residents walk past a collapsed building in Huruma, Nairobi. Many of the city's current problems emerged at its birth as a colonial town.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Dai Kurokawa</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Following a <a href="http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Why-Nairobi-s-floods-menace-won-t-go-away-soon/-/1056/3187782/-/dcywvq/-/index.html">heavy downpour and severe flooding</a>, a building collapsed in the crowded Huruma neighbourhood of Nairobi, Kenya, <a href="http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000204345/owner-of-collapsed-huruma-building-charged-with-52-counts-of-manslaughter">killing at least 52 tenants</a>. Sixteen months earlier, a building in the very same neighbourhood collapsed and <a href="http://nairobinews.nation.co.ke/news/two-dead-scores-trapped-in-huruma-collapsed-building/">killed at least two people</a>. In both instances, many more were injured.</p>
<p>Nairobi is rapidly urbanising, as the city is poised to grow to <a href="http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/AFR/2016/02/23/090224b0841a2f42/2_0/Rendered/PDF/Kenya0urbanization0review.pdf">six million people by 2030</a>. But its growth is driven in part by rural push factors rather than urban industrial growth, contributing to a large informal sector and <a href="http://www.knbs.or.ke/index.php?option=com_phocadownload&view=category&download=617:exploring-kenya-inequality-national-report-abridged-small-version&id=114:exploring-kenya-s-inequality&Itemid=599">stark inequalities</a> between neighbourhoods.</p>
<p>After the first building collapse, Nairobi city county responded by fast-tracking a <a href="https://nairobiplanninginnovations.com/2015/01/14/nairobi-city-hall-responds-to-collapsing-buildings-and-needs-your-feedback/">bill to fix the problem</a>. The second was marked by a blame game. The public and the national government pointed fingers at <a href="http://t.umblr.com/redirect?z=http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Opinion/To-stop-the-deadly-buildings-of-Nairobi-/-/440808/3189440/-/k5myytz/-/index.html&&t=NzkzMzVlMDIwMjI4ZTI4ODYwMWYwMmQ1MzIwZWUxYjBjZDQyZDIxMSxVaUlRbW5Pdg==">the county government</a> for failing to demolish the structure as planned. Others <a href="http://t.umblr.com/redirect?z=http://qz.com/675023/nairobis-governor-says-the-public-is-also-to-blame-for-the-citys-deadly-floods/&&t=ZWNhODYyZDA4NGU0ZjQ4NTE3ZGUwODA0YTkyMmU2MjYzMTcxMDYyMSxVaUlRbW5Pdg==">scorned the public</a> for littering and building unauthorised structures on flood plains. </p>
<p>In addition, many pinpointed <a href="http://t.umblr.com/redirect?z=http://qz.com/674159/corruption-is-making-kenyas-rainy-season-much-more-dangerous/&&t=NTg1MTIxYmI1MjY2NTQ3ODIwMzJlOWYxYTQzYzNmNDIzNDEwYjk3YSxVaUlRbW5Pdg==">corruption</a> as at least partly at fault for the crumbling infrastructure. Officers in the county government <a href="http://t.umblr.com/redirect?z=http://bigstory.ap.org/urn:publicid:ap.org:8fe0687fa9a543cbae479f6f6de6a14b&&t=NjBmMTM5ZjI2ODhiZjQ0NTRjOTMzMTIxMTQ3NWI3OGFkODEzMjY2YyxVaUlRbW5Pdg==">are accused of taking bribes</a> to overlook building code violations. However, others have argued, these codes and penalties <a href="http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/lifestyle/article/2000056052/current-building-code-fit-for-archives">make no sense</a>. The <a href="http://www.aak.or.ke/">Architectural Association of Kenya</a> has been drawing attention to poor development control frameworks for many years.</p>
<p>At root then is a complex set of failures that must be understood within the context of <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-africa-can-build-inclusive-safe-and-sustainable-cities-48445">politics</a> in historical perspective. Many current problems emerged at the very beginning of Nairobi’s birth as a colonial town: flooding, poor infrastructure, marginal “housing” for the majority that served as labour reserves, lack of development control, rampant “land grabbing” and speculation. Added to this has been the presence of a privileged elite who could not or would not conceive of a broader public interest. </p>
<p>As the insightful blogger and cartoonist Peter Gathara <a href="http://gathara.blogspot.com/2016/05/nairobis-buildings-are-collapsing-under.html">points out</a>, many of these speculative land and real estate dynamics persist, distorting prices in the housing market and creating high rents, gluts on the high-income end and shortages on the middle- to low-income end. </p>
<h2>The ‘low-quality, high-cost trap’</h2>
<p>Nairobi’s long-term urban governance “failures” are symptoms of deeper problems. “Failures” are economic opportunities for others. Recently, <a href="http://africauncensored.net/about/">Africa Uncensored</a>’s investigative series, “<a href="http://africauncensored.net/documentaries/kanjo-kingdom-part-3/#.V1_8K7t97IU">Kanjo Kingdom</a>”, revealed the way cartels operate to extract money from poor traders in Nairobi. Many of these traders have no space to operate because of the theft over time of <a href="http://www.columbia.edu/%7Ejk2002/publications/Klopp00_landgrabbing.pdf">public utility spaces meant for markets</a>.</p>
<p>Low incomes and limited jobs in the formal sector, much as in colonial times, means that to survive people must rely on running small businesses in marginal spaces in the city that are not officially designated as commercial. The failure to allocate space to vulnerable people means they become prey to cartels linked to the City Inspectorate. This is the very antithesis of service provision – it is poverty production through perverse “planning”.</p>
<p>A similar dynamic is at work when we come to the problem of slums and affordable housing. Slums, which were founded as colonial labour reserves, still persist in their informal status and use as labour “reserves”. Many slums are on government or former government land that was misallocated. Instead of using Nairobi’s once ample public land as a way to subsidise affordable housing (or industry and commercial activities), cartels and government officials extract from the poor who are in search of housing and livelihoods.</p>
<p>In the film “<a href="http://www.imdb.com/title/tt2174091/">Living with Corruption</a>” journalist Sorious Samura shows, for example, how he had to pay at least US$300, much of that in payments to officials, to build a shack in Nairobi’s Kibera slum with insecure rights. </p>
<p>These transactions signify a larger problem with corruption in Kenya’s political economy. According to the <a href="http://www.kenao.go.ke/index.php/reports/cat_view/2-reports/9-national-government-and-state-corporations/69-government-ministries">2013/2014 Auditor General’s report</a>, 98.8% of the money spent by Kenya’s ministries could not be clearly and lawfully <a href="http://www.forbes.com/sites/mfonobongnsehe/2015/12/01/corruption-and-tenderpreneurs-bring-kenyas-economy-to-its-knees/#41611cbe2dc2">accounted for</a>, contributing to significant barriers to economic development.</p>
<p>As Sumila Gulyani and Debabrata Talukdar <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X08001162">argue</a>, Kenyan slum residents – the same types of people who were victims of the Huruma building collapse – are stuck in a “low-quality, high-cost trap.” Housing is not affordable in Nairobi’s slums, infrastructure does not improve and people are stuck with poor and insecure living conditions. All because this is quite lucrative for many who get high rental returns for providing next to no services, including safe shelter.</p>
<p>Owning property in Kenyan slums <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0305750X84900378">requires</a> political connections and payment of significant fees (and often bribes) to get a building permit. Coupled with that is willingness to bear the risk of loss of capital if the structure is demolished. But once the investment is made, landlords benefit from informality and ambiguous land tenure rights, and work very hard to maintain the status quo. Politicians use <a href="http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/content/108/433/581.abstract">tenure insecurity</a> as a way to mobilise voters, promising private goods in exchange for electoral returns.</p>
<h2>The housing challenge across Africa</h2>
<p>The housing and flooding “crisis” of over 100 years is not unique to Kenya. <a href="http://floodlist.com/africa">Flooding</a> is one of the most deadly disasters that periodically hits African cities. Rapidly growing cities <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201511191506.html">Kampala</a>, in Uganda, and <a href="http://tribuneonlineng.com/flooding-no-safety-haven-even-for-the-rich-in-lagos">Lagos</a>, in Nigeria, have experienced significant flooding in the past year, and Ghana’s <a href="http://www.myjoyonline.com/news/2016/June-9th/30-dramatic-photos-as-accra-sinks-in-floods-again.php">Accra</a> has recently been in the midst of terrible flooding. This is likely to get worse with <a href="http://www.alnap.org/pool/files/urban-flooding-africa-report.pdf">climate change and rapid urbanisation</a>.</p>
<p>As in colonial times, the urban poor often become scapegoats for broader structural and political problems. Slum dwellers get blamed for poor infrastructure and lack of sanitation, while politicians and municipal authorities fail to deliver the public services needed to keep cities safe. Municipal authorities often advance demolition and displacement as solutions, rather than <a href="http://epc.sagepub.com/content/25/4/486.abstract">in situ and creative upgrading strategies</a> and increasing housing stocks by freeing up land on a citywide scale.</p>
<p>In Accra, poor urban residents face eviction threats every rainy season. When elections occur every four years, these threats are tabled until after the voting takes place. Politicians, their intermediaries and community leaders often take advantage of this insecurity to bolster their own <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/africatoday.62.1.31?seq=1">personal power</a>.</p>
<p>While many African cities are trying to deal with the urbanisation challenge by
<a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201605241406.html">improving infrastructure</a>, fixing drains and <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/11/how-can-africa-improve-sanitation/">investing in sanitation</a>, perverse incentives continue to hamper progress in addressing the deep causes of poor housing and services. </p>
<p>Secure and safe <a href="http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/news_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/news+and+events/news/trp_featurestory_africahousing">affordable housing</a> is still very difficult to find in most African cities. Simplistic slum upgrading schemes are not enough. As Dr Joan Cloas, Executive Director of UN-Habitat recently <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2016/apr/18/lost-science-building-cities-joan-clos-un-habitat">said</a>,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>You need to build cities – not houses.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Building better, inclusive cities involves <a href="http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/cities/">creating a politics </a>that enables using public land, land value and taxes wisely to ensure more and lower-cost, high-quality housing and amenities for all.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/60865/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jeffrey W Paller has received funding from the National Science Foundation and the Social Science Research Council. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jacqueline M Klopp does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Building better, inclusive cities involves enabling the wise use of public land and taxes to ensure that high-quality housing and amenities are provided for all at a lower cost.Jacqueline M Klopp, Associate Research Scholar, Center for Sustainable Urban Development, Columbia UniversityJeffrey W Paller, Post-doctoral Research Fellow, Columbia UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/522302015-12-24T05:06:40Z2015-12-24T05:06:40ZWhy Kampala holds single biggest growth opportunity for Uganda<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/106955/original/image-20151223-27851-1dny35m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Traffic jams in major African cities such as Lagos, pictured here, as well as Uganda's Kampala, are a major drain on productivity. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Akintunde Akinleye</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Uganda’s economy has been <a href="http://www.newvision.co.ug/news/655150-imf-tips-uganda-on-economic-growth-benefits-sharing.html">growing steadily</a> over the past decade. Like many other developing countries, its growth has benefited from a confluence of external events, including a sustained increase in commodity prices and partial debt relief. </p>
<p>But since the end of the financial crisis, capital markets have become more risk averse, and with the fall in commodity prices and its corresponding decrease in export revenues, Uganda will have to increase internal savings to finance its investments. This will require structural transformation in its economy, which is still characterised by low productivity and a majority of population being self-employed in agriculture. </p>
<p>As the case of East Asia has <a href="http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-06-29/news/63937757_1_high-investment-rate-china-urbanisation">shown</a>, urbanisation is a key route to achieving a so-called “productivity miracle”. This entails shifting labour from low productivity jobs in agriculture to high productivity jobs in urban manufacturing. As a result, the countries in that region were able to achieve high growth rates over a sustained period. </p>
<p>While the patterns of structural transformation in Uganda and the rest of sub-Saharan Africa are likely to be different, urbanisation – and creating efficient cities – will still provide the foundation for achieving their own productivity miracle.</p>
<p>For Uganda, urbanisation is the single largest opportunity in the coming decade. By some <a href="http://www.kcca.go.ug/uploads/KCCA_STRATEGI_PLAN_2015-2016.pdf">estimates</a>, Kampala, Uganda’s capital city and largest urban area, already generates about 60% of the country’s gross domestic product. Although there has been little strategic growth over the past decades, there is the real opportunity for Kampala to get it right, as two thirds of the city is yet to be built by 2050.</p>
<p>But to spearhead efforts to support improvements in connectivity, density, and overall urban infrastructure will require new investment and finance. If done well, Kampala could produce much-needed acceleration of productivity and growth by fostering the movement of people towards more productive employment.</p>
<h2>Why connectivity matters</h2>
<p>Connectivity is necessary for scale and specialisation - the two key ingredients of productivity and growth. But connectivity is a major challenge in Kampala, which is becoming more <a href="http://www.jica.go.jp/english/news/press/2015/150911_01.html">congested</a> by the day. </p>
<p>According to current <a href="http://www.monitor.co.ug/Magazines/PeoplePower/Flyover-won-t-decongest-Kampala-city/-/689844/2302210/-/mvret3/-/index.html">estimates</a>, a staggering 24 000 person-hours are lost every day just by people sitting in traffic jams. This is a serious drain on the productive capacity of the city.</p>
<p>The Kampala Capital City Authority has undertaken feasibility studies for a light rail system, cable cars and fly-overs as potential solutions to this challenge. But these are projects for the future. </p>
<p>Kampala is still a low density city and could already greatly benefit from cheaper and more easily implementable projects such as bus lanes and eventually a bus rapid transit system. Overall, a much higher proportion of the city will need to be devoted to road infrastructure. For example, today in Nairobi, only 11% of urban area is <a href="http://www.kachwanya.com/2015/04/26/traffic-congestion-in-nairobi/">roads</a>. But an efficient middle income city requires up to 30% to be taken up by road <a href="http://www.kachwanya.com/2015/04/26/traffic-congestion-in-nairobi/">networks</a>). </p>
<p>As a first step, Kampala can expand on the potential of the Northern Bypass road by increasing the number of access nodes. This will allow for clusters of firms, particularly those in manufacturing, which can benefit from the connectivity.</p>
<p>It is both easier and more cost effective to support connectivity and provide quality services if there is sufficient density within a city. This is partially driven by where people live. Over 60% of Kampala’s population lives in informal settlements, often characterised by single-storey shacks. </p>
<p>This is the primary reason for Kampala’s low density and rapid urban sprawl. To illustrate this, Lagos’ residential density is about 18 000 <a href="http://www.lagosstate.gov.ng/index.php?page=subpage&spid=12&mnu=null">people per square kilometre</a>, compared to Kampala which only has <a href="http://citydata.wu.ac.at/page/Kampala.html">9 000 people per square kilometre</a>. To increase residential density, Kampala can learn from Addis Ababa, where the government supported the building of low-cost five-storey <a href="http://www.theigc.org/project/low-cost-housing-for-africas-cities-the-impact-of-the-government-condominium-scheme-in-ethiopia/">housing units</a>. </p>
<p>Five stories is the maximum number of floors that do not require the installation of a lift. But the bottom floor of these developments can be used for commercial purposes.</p>
<h2>Money and land rights</h2>
<p>A number of investment decisions need to be taken and financing has to be generated. In this area in particular, the government needs to take a lead by investing in anchored public infrastructure as a commitment and a coordination device. </p>
<p>The second major input is a well functioning land market, which Kampala does not have. There are <a href="http://www.observer.ug/business/38-business/40941-tax-land-appreciation-in-the-city-says-expert">five or six major</a> landholders who are benefiting from loopholes in the laws and administrative shortcomings, and who are thus accruing all the value in the appreciation in land without being taxed. </p>
<p>The issue is far from simple as some of these land rights are legacies of traditional ownership patterns. Still, as a first and urgent step, Kampala needs to both strengthen its urban land registration process, ensuring there is a public record of transactions and land prices, and then impose a tax on the value of land. </p>
<p>Although this may be unpopular with current land owners, it is not only ethical but also necessary to ensure that the city has enough revenue to finance its growth. Aside from taxation, the authority has also just received an internationally recognised <a href="http://www.kcca.go.ug/uDocs/KCCA%20credit%20rating%20report.pdf">credit rating of A</a> in the long term, awarded by the Global Credit Ratings agency. Based on this, it is in the process of developing the first city bond as an alternative financing mechanism for their projects.</p>
<p>Kampala has made great strides in the last five years. It’s put in place a number of initiatives and institutional reforms in order to regain public trust and credibility.</p>
<p>But two thirds of the city of the future remains to be built. The city authority is now faced with the difficult decision on how to balance its efforts: there will be a lot of pressure to retrofit the parts of the city that have already been built. </p>
<p>Although this will be necessary to ensure that Kampala becomes a more productive city, it is still the opportune moment to put in place policies that will drive the development of the remaining parts of the city as well.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/52230/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Collier is affiliated with International Growth Centre. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Astrid Haas is affiliated with the International Growth Centre. </span></em></p>Kampala generates about 60% of Uganda’s GDP. In the coming decade urbanisation is the single largest opportunity to spur economic growth in the coming decade.Paul Collier, Professor of Economics and Public Policy at the Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford; Director of the Centre for the Study of African Economies; a CEPR Research Fellow; and Professorial Fellow of St Antony’s College, Oxford., University of OxfordAstrid R.N. Haas, Country Economist for South Sudan and Uganda at International Growth Centre, London School of Economics and Political ScienceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.