tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/marine-le-pen-2938/articlesMarine Le Pen – The Conversation2023-12-22T09:46:07Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2202432023-12-22T09:46:07Z2023-12-22T09:46:07ZAs France moves to limit the rights of migrants, research reveals just how reliant on them it is<p>Once again, France finds itself in the grip of a political crisis. After the pension reform of June, which prompted more than <a href="https://theconversation.com/pension-reform-in-france-macron-and-demonstrators-resume-epic-tussle-begun-over-30-years-ago-198354">1 million people to take to the streets</a>, president Emmanuel Macron’s framework immigration bill passed on Tuesday December 19. It will now be sent to be reviewed by the <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/french-president-to-send-disputed-immigration-law-to-constitutional-council-for-review-validation/3088157">Constitutional Council</a>, a body tasked with verifying legislation’s compatibility with the country’s constitution, in a move that could see some of its measures cancelled.</p>
<p>Voted through the national assembly with the support of the far-right and conservatives, the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/french-immigration-bill-tightens-welfare-benefits-foreigners-2023-12-20/">legislation tightens the screws on the rights of foreigners and of French citizens of migrant descent</a> across an unprecedented number of areas. Among the most emblematic measures features the end of the sacrosanct principle of <em>Jus soli</em>, whereby any child born on French soil is granted French nationality regardless of their parents’ origins. Instead, the child will now be able to benefit from citizenship rights until their 18th birthday, upon which they will need to officially demonstrate their will to become French. Welfare benefits also now depend on a five-year stay in the country, while undocumented migrants stand to lose free transport and automatic residency permits when working in low-wage, understaffed sectors. According to the <a href="https://www.francetvinfo.fr/societe/immigration/projet-de-loi-immigration-ce-que-contient-le-texte-negocie-entre-la-majorite-presidentielle-et-la-droite-largement-durci-par-rapport-a-la-version-initiale_6251754.html">latest text</a>, local prefects would have discretion as to whether or not to grant the permits. </p>
<p>The latter move comes three years after the COVID pandemic revealed the importance of immigrant workers in <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=89&furtherNews=yes&newsId=9630">“critical sectors”</a>, including health, transport and agriculture.</p>
<p>In the wake of the bill, our latest research helps us reflect on the reasons behind the numbers of immigrants in such sectors. According to a study by the (<a href="https://theconversation.com/institutions/cepii-2912">CEPII</a>), a research centre focused on the world economy, immigrant workers in France feature heavily among cleaners and home helps, but also hospital doctors.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
À lire aussi :
<a href="https://theconversation.com/dossier-limmigration-en-france-quels-enjeux-218289">Dossier : l’immigration en France, quels enjeux ?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>But France is hardly an exception. A year before the start of the COVID crisis, foreign-born workers, and in particular non-EU immigrants, were proportionally <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00197939231173676">more likely to work in critical sectors</a> than native-born workers in most EU countries.</p>
<h2>France is no exception</h2>
<p>Our research began by comparing the probability of native and immigrant workers being employed in essential sectors, taking into account a number of characteristics such as age, gender, professional experience, education levels and marital status. Can these factors explain the differences observed?</p>
<p>Our results show that, for an equivalent profile, the disparities between immigrants and native-born people are still largely visible. In almost two-thirds of EU countries, the probability of working in essential sectors is higher for immigrants than for natives. This is particularly true of Italy, the United Kingdom (included in our study along with Switzerland and Norway) and the Nordic countries. This probability is 5% higher for an immigrant worker in France, and rises to 12% in Sweden. The exception is Luxembourg, where the difference is negative.</p>
<p><iframe id="WxEgc" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/WxEgc/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>When we look at low-skilled jobs in key sectors (<a href="https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/Covid-19-and-key-workers-what-role-do-migrants-play-in-your-region-42847cb9/">as defined by the OECD</a>), the <a href="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/GxqmA/1/">gap is even more marked</a>. Immigrants, for example, are over-represented in the cleaning sector in three quarters of the countries surveyed. In other key sectors such as transport or health, the difference is less marked, but immigrants remain over-represented in half the countries surveyed, particularly in the UK, Denmark, Germany, Italy and Sweden.</p>
<p>If individual characteristics are not enough to explain this over-representation, then what are the reasons that lead immigrants to hold low-skilled jobs in key sectors? One plausible explanation lies in the structural disadvantage of immigrants on the labour market due to the institutional, linguistic, legal or discriminatory obstacles they may encounter.</p>
<h2>Those who emigrated as adults</h2>
<p>Our study thus analyses the way in which the over-representation of foreign-born workers evolves as a function of characteristics specific to immigrants and likely to influence their economic integration.</p>
<p><iframe id="rCdxi" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/rCdxi/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>On the one hand, <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0927537122000719">the age at which foreign-born workers emigrated</a> is largely correlated with their employment rate. Immigrants who emigrate at a younger age to their host country benefit for the most part from a comparative advantage in learning the language of the host country and a <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0014292119300200">cultural and educational background better suited</a> to their integration into the labour market.</p>
<p>With the exception of Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, our results indicate that the over-representation of immigrants in essential sectors thus exclusively affects immigrants who emigrated to their host country after the age of 15.</p>
<h2>Place of birth and place of graduation</h2>
<p>We also know that education and professional experience acquired abroad remain <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/209957">less valued than those obtained in the host country</a>. Immigrants trained abroad are therefore <a href="https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/1293de83-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/1293de83-en">more likely</a> to find themselves unemployed or in jobs for which they are overqualified than immigrants with qualifications obtained in their host country.</p>
<p>For an equivalent profile, there is no difference between foreign-born workers with qualifications obtained in Belgium, France, Spain, Austria and Switzerland compared with workers born in these countries, unlike their counterparts with foreign qualifications. The latter are much more likely to work in essential sectors.</p>
<p><iframe id="GxqmA" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/GxqmA/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Finally, in the EU, immigrants from other EU member countries occupy jobs on the labour market that are fairly similar to those of natives for the same profile, while the employment prospects of non-EU immigrants appear to be <a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.35.2.49">significantly lower</a>. This is due in particular to the <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214658X1630006X">racial and ethnic discrimination</a> they suffer.</p>
<p>Place of birth seems to matter as much as place of graduation: the probability of an immigrant born in an EU country working in a key sector is identical to that of a native of Belgium, Spain, Ireland and Norway. In the UK, Sweden, Denmark and Germany, it is higher but still significantly lower than that of non-EU immigrants.</p>
<h2>Where does the bill stand in all this?</h2>
<p>Additional analyses support the hypothesis that the over-representation of immigrants in key sectors is due to their less favourable position on the labour market.</p>
<p>This over-representation is more likely to be observed in countries where the core sectors are distinguished from the rest of the national economy by a greater demand for labour, a significant number of part-time employees, active job-seeking, a high degree of over-qualification and low professional status. The proportion of employees earning less than the median of the income distribution is particularly high.</p>
<p>Given the pitfalls we have identified, which penalise both the host countries, which deprive themselves of the real skills of the immigrants present on their territory, and the immigrant workers themselves, the regularisation of illegal foreign workers envisaged in the first draft of the government’s bill would have had little chance of changing the situation.</p>
<p>Conversely, opening up the status of civil servant to non-Europeans – as proposed by the <a href="https://www.sens-du-service-public.fr/communiques">civil servants’ collective Le Sens du service public</a> – could, for example, improve the professional mobility of non-EU workers and their integration into the labour market, with economic benefits for all concerned.</p>
<hr>
<p><em><a href="https://nikolajbroberg.org/">Nikolaj Broberg</a>, economist and analyst in the OECD’s Education and Skills Directorate, co-authored this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220243/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jérôme Gonnot ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>In the wake of France’s controversial immigration bill, one scholar compares France’s reliability on immigrant workers in key sectors against the rest of Europe.Jérôme Gonnot, Maître de conférences en économie à l’Université catholique de Lille-Espol, Institut catholique de Lille (ICL)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2114572023-08-16T15:40:38Z2023-08-16T15:40:38ZAre Europeans really democrats?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542339/original/file-20230725-15-b29u3n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C2723%2C1802&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Many Europeans aren't happy with the way their country's politics are run. Does this mean they could accept to live in a regime other than a democracy? Photo taken at a protest against pension reform, 2019.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/jmenj/49268357162/in/album-72157689446880593/">Jeanne Manjoulet / Flickr</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In France, the year 2022 saw the government repeatedly resort to <a href="https://theconversation.com/french-governments-long-record-of-bypassing-parliament-a-brief-history-of-article-49-3-202185">Article 49.3 of the constitution</a> to force unpopular reforms through parliament. The date of 16 March, in particular, marked the 100th time under France’s Fifth Republic that the executive chose to use these special powers. With this in mind, many French people now perceive their political system as undemocratic. Elsewhere in Europe, several countries have gone on to develop more or less authoritarian political systems over the past two decades, notably Poland and Hungary. In almost every country on the continent, <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-materiaux-pour-l-histoire-de-notre-temps-2021-1-page-16.htm">far-right parties are gaining momentum</a>.</p>
<p>Alongside this, political elites, especially parliamentarians, are <a href="https://theconversation.com/pourquoi-a-t-on-ou-pas-confiance-dans-les-responsables-politiques-72483">heavily criticised</a> for being corrupt, too out of touch with their population’s wants and needs, and incapable of passing effective legislation. A number of countries have experienced youth revolts <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-informations-sociales-2011-3-page-60.htm">betraying social malaise</a>, including France in its working-class suburbs. <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/fr/infographics/terrorism-eu-facts-figures/">Terrorist attacks</a> are also weakening European societies. It therefore appears European democracies are in crisis.</p>
<p>Beyond the events on which the media focus their attention, what can we learn about the values of Europeans and more particularly about their attachment to democracy?</p>
<p>A large number of European countries are members of the <a href="https://www.touteleurope.eu/fonctionnement-de-l-ue/l-union-europeenne/">European Union</a>. They are therefore expected to organise themselves in accordance with the fundamental principles set out in the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaties_of_the_European_Union">Union treaties</a>.</p>
<p>According to <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX%3A12012M002">Article 2</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>A fine programme, but the <a href="https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu">surveys</a> carried out among Europeans show that they are far from being as democracy-minded citizens as the treaties set them out to be. The collective research I have just overseen, <a href="https://www.pug.fr/produit/2045/9782706151620/les-europeens-et-leurs-valeurs"><em>Europeans and Their Values: Between Individualism and Individualisation</em></a> (in French, <em>Les Européens et leurs valeurs. Entre individualisme et individualisation</em>) clearly shows this. It is based on an analysis of the results of the <a href="https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu">European Values Studies</a> (EVS), a major survey carried out by European researchers every nine years to monitor changes in values in different parts of the continent (nearly 60,000 people interviewed in 34 countries between 2017 and 2020).</p>
<h2>Some positive trends, others less so</h2>
<p>The data reveals that, contrary to what many people think, the values of <a href="https://theconversation.com/comment-la-solidarite-se-reinvente-en-temps-de-crise-155248">solidarity</a> are slowly gaining ground, notwithstanding temptations of individualistic withdrawal. Individuals’ desire for autonomy and freedom to choose their own lives is asserting itself strongly in the areas of the family, politics, work and even religion.</p>
<p>But Europeans’ attachment to democracy is less obvious, as our survey shows. Virtually all Europeans say they are supportive of the democratic system, and three quarters consider it important to live in a country organised on this basis. 57% would like to have a greater say in their needs at work and in their daily environment. Expectations of democracy are therefore high. But criticism and dissatisfaction are predominant: only a third of Europeans believe that their country is governed democratically, and only 20% are satisfied with the way the political system works. This is a sign of a crisis in representation.</p>
<h2>Only 38% are “exclusive democrats”</h2>
<p>It is important that we put Europeans’ apparent enthusiasm for democracy into perspective. Indeed, for many, the choice of the democratic system is not exclusive. 52% of them would accept a government made up of experts who take decisions, 32% would welcome the power of an <a href="https://theconversation.com/la-france-penche-t-elle-vers-plus-dautoritarisme-184569">authoritarian leader</a> and 14% might even support a military regime. In total, only 38% of “exclusive democrats” find democracy good but other systems bad. In a fairly large part of the population, democratic values are not deeply rooted. Were a political crisis to occur, the pull toward an anti-democratic system may be strong.</p>
<p><iframe id="0QsCn" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/0QsCn/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>While many Europeans view democracy positively, they do not all have the same conception of it. Central features of representative democracy (free elections, civil rights, equality of men and women) are considered essential by most.</p>
<p>Some are also attached to economic aspects. For them, help for the unemployed, redistribution through taxation and income equalisation are also essential aspects of a democracy. These economic expectations are higher in Southern Europe and Russia.</p>
<p>[<em>More than 85,000 readers look to The Conversation France’s newsletter for expert insights into the world’s most pressing issues</em>. <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?nl=france&region=fr">Sign up now</a>]</p>
<p>Finally, the survey tested three characteristics usually considered to be undemocratic: obedience to those in power, the army taking power, and the regulation of politics by religious authorities. Admittedly, these values are not often considered essential to a democracy. But 57% of Russians and 45% of southern Europeans consider obeying those in power to be a strong feature of democracy. This principled obedience to those in power does not sit well with criticism or protest of those in power, both fundamental democratic rights.</p>
<h2>Where are people most attached to democracy?</h2>
<p>There are far more exclusive democrats in the Nordic countries and in western and southern Europe than in the east of the continent, particularly in countries that joined the EU in the early 2000s. And the exclusive attachment to democracy does not seem to have changed much in 20 years.</p>
<p>According to the map, democracy appears to be fairly solid in the Czech Republic, Lithuania and Estonia, while it is much more fragile in Croatia and Romania (only 10% and 8% exclusive democrats respectively). This is problematic given that these two countries are members of the European Union and must therefore respect its values.</p>
<p>In Western Europe, the Germans and the Swiss are clearly more attached to democracy than the French. The French are hardly more exclusive democrats than the average European: while 89% think that democracy is a good system, 48% say the same for an expert-led government, 23% for the authoritarian power of a strongman and 13% for a government of the army.</p>
<p><iframe id="yKNuh" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/yKNuh/2/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>In Russia, given Putin’s leadership, the survey results may come as a surprise. The level of exclusive democrats is as high in Russia (41%) as in several other European countries, notably France (40%). 81% of Russians consider democracy to be a good system. 32% would accept the government of an authoritarian leader and 19% of Russians would accept a military government. The level of support for a regime of experts is particularly low compared with many countries: only 38% would accept it, which sounds like a disavowal of the technocrats in the presidential entourage, <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-futuribles-2022-1-page-37.htm">judged to be responsible for everything that goes wrong</a>.</p>
<p>All in all, democracy in many EU countries is more fragile than many people might think. Politicians and civil society actors should consider ways of strengthening citizens’ attachment to the democratic system. In a context where elected representatives are heavily criticised, democracies need to re-legitimise themselves.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211457/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Pierre Bréchon ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>Sweeping new research shows many Europeans could accept to live under a non-democratic regime.Pierre Bréchon, Professeur émérite de science politique, Sciences Po Grenoble, Auteurs historiques The Conversation FranceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1931362022-11-02T19:51:34Z2022-11-02T19:51:34ZThe fox in the chicken coop: how the far right is playing the European Parliament<p>Several countries in the European Union are currently governed by far-right political parties. In Hungary, <em>Fidesz</em> under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has been <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/how-viktor-orban-wins/">progressively dismantling</a> the country’s constitutional protections of the rule of law and democratic institutions. Poland under its ruling Law and Justice party has shown <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/eu-fines-poland-1-million-per-day-over-judicial-reforms/a-59635269">equally worrying trends</a>. Most recently, Giorgia Meloni and the Brothers of Italy party just won the Italian general elections in September 2022 and have formed a governing coalition with Matteo Salvini’s far-right <em>Lega</em> and Silvio Berlusconi’s <em>Forza Italia</em>. In Sweden, the newly elected minority government depends on support from the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/14/swedish-parties-agree-coalition-with-backing-of-far-right">far-right Sweden Democrats</a>. </p>
<p>While far-right parties have been present in Europe for some time, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/sep/26/giorgia-meloni-won-big-italy-many-obstacles">liberal democratic parties still do not know how to respond to their presence</a>.</p>
<p>The European Parliament is a suitable place to observe the dilemmas that arise for mainstream politicians regarding the far-right. Particularly when the latter are elected democratically to office and form part of a democratic institution such as a supranational parliament. As the only directly elected body of the European Union (EU), the European Parliament hosts <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2022/698880/EPRS_BRI(2022)698880_EN.pdf">705 elected members from 206 national political parties</a>. Most of them gather in different political groups according to similar ideologies. The far right spreads widely across different political groups, underlining the degree to which they have become part of the system.</p>
<h2>Right at the core</h2>
<p>In 2015, Marine Le Pen and her <em>Rassemblement National</em> managed to create her own far-right political group and partnered with Matteo Salvini and his <em>Lega</em>. Today they are called the Identity and Democracy (ID) group and form the fifth-biggest political group (out of seven). Other like-minded parties include Germany’s Alternative for Germany, the Freedom Party of Austria, Belgium’s Flemish Interest, and the Danish People’s Party. Although they have been rather passive actors in the European Parliament’s committees, they have influence at the highest level. In the Conference of Presidents, each political group has one vote no matter their size. If bigger groups such as the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats do not reach a consensus, occasionally they may need far-right support to reach a majority.</p>
<p>The Polish Law and Justice party also lead their political group, known as the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR). It is the <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/erpl-public/hemicycle/index.htm?lang=en&loc=str">fourth-strongest force in the European Parliament</a>, and also the Sweden Democrats, the Brothers of Italy, and Spain’s <em>Vox</em> are part of this group. In contrast, the Hungarian <em>Fidesz</em> was part of the biggest political group, the Christian Democrats (until 2021 known as the European People’s Party, EPP). Orbán was long shielded by powerful politicians such as former German chancellor Angela Merkel and former European Council president Donald Tusk. <em>Fidesz</em> left the EPP in early 2021 when internal pressure over the rule of law concerns in Hungary grew too strong to justify their membership. Today, its members do not belong to any political group in the European Parliament, depriving them of political power and visibility.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/492977/original/file-20221102-16-rteo33.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/492977/original/file-20221102-16-rteo33.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=309&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492977/original/file-20221102-16-rteo33.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=309&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492977/original/file-20221102-16-rteo33.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=309&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492977/original/file-20221102-16-rteo33.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492977/original/file-20221102-16-rteo33.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492977/original/file-20221102-16-rteo33.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Seating chart of the European Parliament in Strasbourg, France (17 October 2022).</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/erpl-public/hemicycle/index.htm?lang=en&loc=str">europarl.europa.eu</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Using their political group status, far-right parties have gained not just visiblity and power, they’ve also reaped <a href="https://eu.boell.org/en/2016/01/14/enf-new-right-wing-force-european-parliament-and-how-deal-it">significant financial benefits</a>. In 2017, Marine Le Pen was accused of hiring <a href="https://euobserver.com/eu-political/136944">“fake assistants”</a>, and in April of this year she and other members of her party were charged with misusing <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/17/eu-anti-fraud-body-accuses-marine-le-pen-france-election">620,000 euros of EU funds</a>. In January, Morten Messerschmidt of the Danish People’s Party was convicted of using EU funds for <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/danish-mp-convicted-of-eu-funds-fraud-elected-to-head-far-right-party/">political campaigning</a>. Using European resources, many far-right political parties have thus been able to grow and expand their influence at home while simultaneously attacking the EU project.</p>
<h2>Friends and foes</h2>
<p>The traditional political groups in the European Parliament, including the Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, Liberals, and Greens have long had an <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/future-eu/news/the-brief-the-costs-of-a-cordon-sanitaire/">informal agreement</a> known as the <em>cordon sanitaire</em> that blocks members of the far right from obtaining key positions in Parliament.</p>
<p>In addition, the Social Democrats and the Greens each adopted internal policies of non-cooperation with the far right. The Social Democrats formally do not cooperate with Marine Le Pen’s Identity and Democracy Group, and while the Greens have a similar policy, it’s a bit looser – members can vote in favour of legislative proposals put forward by the far-right Identity and Democracy group if the content is deemed to be technical in nature. The Greens also leave the definition of who belongs to the far right rather open. Members can choose if they wish to boycott cooperation with certain political parties from other political groups, such as the Law and Justice or Brothers of Italy from the Europe of Conservatives and Reformists group. The <em>cordon sanitaire</em> is thus porous and context-dependent.</p>
<p>In addition, because the Christian Democrats successfully shielded Fidesz from any political pressure, it was long spared from <em>cordon sanitaire</em> measures. This changed in September 2018, when the <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2018-0340_EN.html">European Parliament launched a formal sanctions procedure</a>, known as Article 7 TEU, for concerns over Hungary’s democratic backsliding. Even most of the Christian Democrats voted in favour of the resolution thanks to the leadership of Judith Sargentini from the Greens, who led the negotiations at the time. After the EPP changed its internal rules to allow for the expulsion of an entire party, <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/epp-suspension-rules-fidesz-european-parliament-viktor-orban-hungary/">Fidesz chose to leave</a> in early 2021.</p>
<p>These examples demonstrate the inherent complexity and ambiguity of the far right in the European Parliament. They also shed light on the circumstances under which mainstream parties – despite their convictions – can choose to <a href="https://www.graduateinstitute.ch/communications/news/european-union-and-far-right-letting-wolf-fold">support the far right</a>.</p>
<h2>Business as usual continues</h2>
<p>Following the victory of the Brothers of Italy at home, not much has changed in the European Parliament. Within the Christian Democrats, there have been <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/call-boot-berlusconi-party-forza-italia-eu-parliament-epp-back-meloni-brothers-italy/">calls to ban <em>Forza Italia</em></a> from the EPP group should they continue to support Meloni, but this has yet to happen. Manfred Weber, head of the EPP, supported <em>Forza Italia</em> during the Italy’s election, and while he was <a href="https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/eu-weber-wegen-wahlkampfhilfe-fuer-berlusconi-in-der-kritik-dpa.urn-newsml-dpa-com-20090101-220909-99-693826">strongly criticised</a>, it’s another example of how traditional parties can directly or indirectly support and sustain far-right parties.</p>
<p>There have been speculations about a <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/eu-priorities-2020/news/brothers-of-italy-mep-no-way-for-ecr-and-id-to-merge-in-one-group/">possible merger</a> between Law and Justice’s ECR and Le Pen’s and Salvini’s ID group. The ECR also hosts the Brothers of Italy, while the ID is home to Italy’s <em>Lega</em>. In terms of numerical power, a merger would change the political game in the European Parliament – combined, they would become the third-largest force behind the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats. Yet a merger is unlikely to happen given their <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/eu-priorities-2020/news/brothers-of-italy-mep-no-way-for-ecr-and-id-to-merge-in-one-group/">differing stances</a> regarding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The ECR supports sanctions against Russia, most of the ID has been against them. On one issue the Brothers of Italy and the <em>Lega</em> do agree: both <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/italys-meloni-backs-orban-says-hungary-is-democratic/">voted against</a> a resolution in the European Parliament declaring that Hungary no longer constitutes a democracy.</p>
<p>An additional complication is that the electoral cycle of the European Parliament is not aligned with national elections. Even if Meloni won at the national level, it does not change the numerical representation of the Brothers of Italy in the European Parliament, and the next EU elections do not take place until May 2024. A bigger influence might be felt in the Council, where <em>Fidesz</em> and Law and Justice have been <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60400112">successfully blocking</a> several important decisions, such as the EU budget, due to their veto rights.</p>
<p>The far right has become an intrinsic part of EU politics. Of even more concern is their deep political entanglement with liberal democratic political parties, which renders the whole story even more complex.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/193136/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christin Tonne is an affiliated researcher at the Albert Hirschman Centre On Democracy at the Geneva Graduate Institute (IHEID). The article is based on the research she conducted for her doctoral dissertation. She currently receives funding from the IHEID for a follow-up pilot project on democratic defenses against the far right in the EU institutions.</span></em></p>How political parties such as Fidesz, Brothers of Italy, and the National Rally form part of the European Parliament.Christin Tonne, Research associate at the Albert Hirschman Centre On Democracy, Graduate Institute – Institut de hautes études internationales et du développement (IHEID)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1854132022-06-20T13:27:37Z2022-06-20T13:27:37ZParliamentary elections shock France’s political order to its core<p>The campaign for the second round of France’s legislative elections pitted two antagonistic forces against each other, Emmanuel Macron’s presidential coalition and the left-wing group, the New Popular Ecological and Social Union (NUPES).</p>
<p>But the results also clearly confirmed the weight of a third, Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National (RN). The far-right party now boasts of a parliamentary group for the first time since 1986, with 89 out of 577 elected deputies. The hopes of Macron’s bloc to secure an absolute majority of seats as in 2017 are now all but buried. Those of a classic <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/cohabitation">cohabitation</a>, too.</p>
<p>The uncertainty that hung over the campaign of the two rounds is unheard of since the 1997 parliamentary elections, which followed the dissolution decided by then-president Jacques Chirac (in office from 1995 to 2007). What was until now an “unthinkable” relative majority for Macron’s coalition will drive new alliance strategies – particularly between the presidential bloc and Les Républicains (LR) (64 seats), the right-wing party of former presidents Jacques Chirac (1995-2007) and Nicolas Sarkozy (2007-2012). Therein lies a risk of paralysis.</p>
<p>In the run-up to the election, two political forces dominated the public debate. Macron’s party, La République en Marche (now called “Renaissance”) had joined forces with François Bayrou’s MoDem and Edouard Philippe’s Horizons, to form Ensemble! (Together). The left-leaning NUPES was led by Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s La France Insoumise, which hammered together a coalition with France’s Socialist, Communist, and environmental parties after Mélenchon’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/french-president-emmanuel-macron-wins-re-election-a-victory-with-deep-challenges-181843">strong finish in the presidential election</a>.</p>
<p>While Macron’s coalition won the largest bloc of seats in the new national assembly, 245, it was 100 fewer than the total won in 2017, and Macron fell 34 seats short of the 289 required to have an absolute majority. NUPES picked up the second-largest bloc of seats in the National Assembly, 131, and showed that it was a political force to be reckoned with, but failed to reach the symbolic bar of 150 seats.</p>
<p>On the right end of the political spectrum, the LR party, had been nearly inaudible throughout the campaign, managed to hold on to 64 seats thanks to the anchorage of its local representatives. With the RN holding 89 seats, the new National Assembly is made up of four unequal blocs, the first of which is the presidential coalition which holds only a relative majority.</p>
<h2>A history of compromise</h2>
<p>While unexpected, such results are not without precedent: born in 1958, the country’s Fifth Republic has already seen a relative majority, in 1988. President François Mitterrand (1981-1995) was re-elected in 1986 and had to govern with a National Assembly dominated by the two right-wing parties, the RPR and UDF. After two years of cohabitation, Mitterrand chose to dissolve the National Assembly and hold fresh parliamentary elections. “It is not good for a party to govern alone” he said during the 1988 campaign, during his annual ascent of the <a href="https://www.burgundy-tourism.com/discover-burgundy/holiday-in-the-great-outdoors/unmissable-natural-sites/the-rock-of-solutre-explore-this-remarkable-place/">Solutré rock</a>, north of Lyon, during the Pentecost weekend.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="François Mitterrand climbs Solutré Rock" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/469767/original/file-20220620-20-vj1vpj.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/469767/original/file-20220620-20-vj1vpj.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469767/original/file-20220620-20-vj1vpj.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469767/original/file-20220620-20-vj1vpj.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469767/original/file-20220620-20-vj1vpj.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469767/original/file-20220620-20-vj1vpj.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469767/original/file-20220620-20-vj1vpj.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">François Mitterrand climbs Solutré Rock on 18 May 1986 alongside with Roland Dumas, mayor Dordogne, and Jack Lang, mayor of Blois.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Eric Feferberg/AFP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Mitterrand campaigned to “open up” to the centre – a movement he intended his new prime minister, Michel Rocard, to embody – and hoped that the gamble would reward him with a clear majority. He did not wish to return to the union of the left between Socialist and Communist parties, which constituted the basis of the government led by Pierre Mauroy between 1981 and 1984, nor to rely on a majority based on the Socialist Party alone, like in 1984-1986.</p>
<h2>The challenge of governing</h2>
<p>The governments led by Michel Rocard (1988-1991), Edith Cresson (1991-1992) and Pierre Beregovoy (1992-1993) had to build majorities to pass each piece of legislation, sometimes with the Communists, sometimes with the centrists and non-affiliated members. Macron’s coalition could also break deadlocks by resorting to Article 49-3 of the French Constitution, which allows the government to pass legislation without a parliamentary vote. Doing so is not without risk, as right- and left-wing oppositions can join up and call for a no-confidence vote.</p>
<p>Successive Mitterrand governments used the article 39 times. In five years, only the 1989 budget was adopted without it. On two occasions, no-confidence votes almost brought down the government. In 1990, Michel Rocard was five votes short of being overthrown when he used Article 49-3 to pass a bill raising taxes to finance social security. In 1992, Pierre Bérégovoy’s government faced a no-confidence vote when it sought to reform the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).</p>
<p>Despite the challenges, governing with a relative majority is therefore possible, and the first 1988 legislature is an example of this. It was marked by a certain ministerial stability and the implementation of important reforms, including the <em>revenu minimum d’insertion</em> (a cash benefit for low-income residents with children) and taxes to fund national health insurance. And all this despite a turbulent international context, with the collapse of the communist bloc, signing of the Maastricht Treaty and the first Gulf War.</p>
<h2>A necessary culture of compromise</h2>
<p>This historical precedent helps shed light on the present political situation. Like Mitterrand, Macron can hardly hope for the support of one of the opposition groups to form a stable majority. The left-wing coalition, NUPES, has emerged strengthened from an election in which their voters supported a collective front and strong opposition to Macron. RN deputies also stand at loggerheads with the executive, which since 2017 has designated the far-right group as its main opponent and an existential threat to France.</p>
<p>As for the LR parliamentarians, while some may be tempted, like the centrists of 1988, to form alliances with the government on ideological grounds, this would nevertheless be with the view of forming an anti-Macron front on the right.</p>
<p>As historian <a href="https://www.liberation.fr/politique/legislatives-la-majorite-relative-redonne-la-main-au-parlement-20220617_SP4U2GKSXRHZFAJNSKUAZHELN4/?redirected=1">Christian Delporte</a> points out, Macron hardly embodies the “culture of compromise” that the situation calls for. And he does not enjoy the same legislative arsenal as his predecessors.</p>
<p>Indeed, since the <a href="https://www.vie-publique.fr/fiches/19494-le-recours-larticle-493-de-la-constitution">2008 constitutional reform</a>, the 49-3 article has been considerably weakened. While its principle remains, its use is limited to one bill during a parliamentary session, with the exception of legislation relating to the budget or health care. Prior to this, the government could resort to it as often as it wanted and on any bill.</p>
<h2>An increasingly fragile democratic system</h2>
<p>Macron is facing a more delicate situation than François Mitterrand. He has to grapple with a radicalised opposition, both on the left (with the NUPES) and on the right (with the RN), who have no interest in helping him implement his political agenda. Above all, his majority is much more precarious than that of his distant predecessor. The three-way split of French politics, which we had first seen in the first round of the 2022 presidential elections, is such that deputies might have well been elected under a proportional representation system.</p>
<p>Moreover, the coherence of the presidential majority is more fragile than that of the Socialist Party (PS) in the late 1980s. The presidential party does not have the same territorial anchorage as the PS of 30 years ago, be it in terms of activists, executives or local elected officials. And it has to rely on allies – Edouard Philippe (Horizons) and François Bayrou (MoDem) who guard their autonomy and influence more closely than did the allies Mitterrand was able to count on.</p>
<p>This relative majority comes at a moment when France’s democratic system is far less robust than it was 40 years ago. The legitimacy of elected representatives and institutions is weakened by the rise of abstention (30% in the 1988 legislative elections vs. 52% in those of 2022), with a genuine distrust among a growing part of the population. The rise of the far right (14.5% in the 1988 presidential elections, more than 30% if we add up the voters of Le Pen and Eric Zemmour in 2022) is also one of the symptoms of the rise of populism.</p>
<p>The successive collapse of the parties that structured French political life in the second half of the 20th century (Gaullist, Socialist and Communist) has created a fragmented and shifting political landscape that brings back memories of the unstable <a href="https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110810104932582">Fourth Republic</a>, which saw 24 governments during its existence between 1946 and 1958.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>This article was translated from the original French by Natalie Sauer and Leighton Kille.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/185413/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mathias Bernard ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>The results of the second round resulted in a historic record of seats for the RN and an even greater polarisation of political life within the National Assembly itself.Mathias Bernard, Historien, Université Clermont Auvergne (UCA)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1849552022-06-13T11:59:56Z2022-06-13T11:59:56ZFrench parliamentary elections continue to redraw the political map, amid record low turnout<p>The results of the first round of the French parliamentary elections that took place on Sunday are out: according to national daily <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2022/06/13/legislatives-2022-nupes-ou-ensemble-en-tete-du-scrutin-les-raisons-de-la-divergence-entre-le-monde-et-le-ministere-de-l-interieur_6130066_823448.html"><em>Le Monde</em></a>, France’s new left-wing coalition headed by Jean-Luc Melenchon, the <em>Nouvelle union Populaire Ecologique et Sociale</em> (NUPES, New Popular Ecological and Social Union) has clinched most of the votes (26.10%), just ahead of Emmanuel Macron’s coalition <em>Ensemble</em> (25.81%). Marine Le Pen’s far-right party, Rassemblement National (RN), emerges as the third political force with 18.67% of the vote.</p>
<h2>Puzzling results</h2>
<p>In contrast, the figures of the <a href="https://www.resultats-elections.interieur.gouv.fr/legislatives-2022/FE.html">Interior Ministry</a> place the president’s coalition ahead by a fraction of 0.9% (25.75%) over the NUPES (25.66), equivalent to around 21,000 votes. Rassemblement National stands at 18.68%.</p>
<p><em>Le Monde</em> <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2022/06/13/legislatives-2022-nupes-ou-ensemble-en-tete-du-scrutin-les-raisons-de-la-divergence-entre-le-monde-et-le-ministere-de-l-interieur_6130066_823448.html">attributed</a> the contrasting outcomes to differing views on candidates’ political labels: although the publication recognised several socialist and green hopefuls rebelled against the coalition despite their parties’ agreement, the French daily ended up labelling a higher number of candidates as NUPES by comparison to the Interior Ministry. Speaking on French radio on Monday morning, green MEP <a href="https://twitter.com/franceinfo/status/1536205322691420161?s=20&t=m-44ko4U5Gh9vYuGyKEyLA">David Cormand</a> accused the state of identifying candidates from overseas territories based on their original affiliations (socialist or ecologist) prior to the coalition agreement.</p>
<p>Leaving aside the controversy over the results, what might we retain as the takeaways from this first round?</p>
<h2>French voters continue to shun the ballot box</h2>
<p>First up, the first round of the parliamentary elections saw a high level of abstention, reaching 52.61%, or 1.3 points more than in 2017. This is part of an underlying trend, which has seen French voters increasingly shun the ballot box since the 1993 parliamentary elections.</p>
<p>One of the reasons for the decreasing turnout in parliamentary elections could well be institutional. Reforms such as the reduction of the presidential mandate from seven to five years in 2000 or the new electoral calendar placing presidential elections before parliamentary ones have gradually erased differences between the two elections, accelerating the “presidentialisation” of France’s government, with the parliament becoming a secondary consideration.</p>
<p>Another might be down to circumstances. As journalist Gérard Courtois reminds us, since then-President François Mitterrand failed to clinch a majority in the 1981 and 1988, resulting in the dissolution of National Assembly, newly elected presidents had tended to work hard to dominate parliament. This year, however, the two camps that came out on top in the presidential elections (LREM, now Renaissance, and the Rassemblement National) ran an almost non-existent parliamentary campaign.</p>
<p>On the one hand, President Macron seems to have opted for what journalists have dubbed a <a href="https://www.nouvelobs.com/chroniques/20220530.OBS59077/macron-et-les-legislatives-la-strategie-du-chloroforme.html">“chloroform strategy”</a> – a reference to the colourless and odourless anaesthetic – by keeping a low profile during this campaign and delaying the nomination of a new government until three weeks after his re-election.</p>
<p>On the other hand, Marine Le Pen seems to have already admitted defeat by <a href="https://www.lefigaro.fr/elections/legislatives/marine-le-pen-jure-vouloir-battre-la-campagne-plutot-que-battre-en-retraite-20220524">aiming for only about 60 RN deputies in the Assembly</a>, shrinking from public view up <a href="https://www.publicsenat.fr/article/politique/legislatives-ou-est-passee-marine-le-pen-211521">to the point that some observers wondered where she’d gone</a>.</p>
<p>As a result, this <a href="https://www.publicsenat.fr/article/politique/legislatives-seulement-15-des-francais-trouvent-la-campagne-interessante-213113">parliamentary campaign has captivated only 15% of French citizens</a> and will not have been marked by a central theme in the debates.</p>
<h2>Who comes out on top?</h2>
<p>The creation of the NUPES recalled the glory days of the unified left – the Popular Front of 1936 or the Common Programme of 1972 – and tried to instil a new dynamic for these legislative elections. The slogan <a href="https://www.nouvelobs.com/elections-legislatives-2022/20220427.OBS57710/elisez-moi-premier-ministre-le-nouveau-cap-de-melenchon.html">“Jean-Luc Mélenchon Prime Minister”</a> adopted by the coalition personified and nationalised these elections and the strategy of the <a href="https://www.france24.com/fr/france/20220424-pr%8Esidentielle-le-pen-et-m%8Elenchon-d%8Ej%88-tourn%8Es-vers-le-troisi%8Fme-tour-des-l%8Egislatives">“third round”</a> finally followed the <a href="https://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=SCPO_PERRI_2007_01_0017&download=1">logic of presidentialisation of the regime</a>.</p>
<p>The NUPES’ strong presence <a href="https://www.leparisien.fr/elections/legislatives/legislatives-pourquoi-la-nupes-a-t-elle-eu-la-moitie-du-temps-de-parole-radio-et-tele-en-mai-08-06-2022-343IEHEOHNEFHIL56BFC52FFHQ.php">in the media</a> combined with Renaissance’s half-hearted campaign can explain the surprise of this election: for the first time in France’s Fifth Republic, the presidential camp did not obtain a clear majority of the votes cast in the first round of the legislative elections. As a result, Macron’s supporters may not wield an absolute majority in the second round of this election.</p>
<h2>What are the prospects for political life?</h2>
<p>The conservative Les Républicains party, of which Jacques Chirac (president from 1995-2007) and Nicolas Sarkozy (2007-2012) were standard bearers, obtained its lowest-ever score in the parliamentary elections with 13.6%. Here again, the campaign steered clear from national politics, focusing instead on its respective constituency identities as it sought to present itself as “party of the territories”.</p>
<p>The strategy appears to have borne little fruit, however, with estimates showing a drop in the number of LR deputies from <a href="https://www.francetvinfo.fr/elections/legislatives/infographies-premier-tour-des-legislatives-2022-voici-a-quoi-pourrait-ressembler-la-future-assemblee-nationale-selon-notre-estimation-ipsos-sopra-steria_5193349.html">100 to around 50 to 80 seats</a>. For the Rassemblement National, on the other hand, the number of MPs could rise to between 20 and 45 depending on the results next week.</p>
<p>In sum, we note a slow decline of LR since 2017 (or even 2012) while the RN consolidates its place on the benches of the National Assembly.</p>
<p>Going by estimates, the presidential camp could eek out a majority in the National Assembly, with just under 300 deputies, comparing with its current 346 seats. If it has fewer than 289 seats, it would fall short of an absolute majority.</p>
<p>For the NUPES coalition, the challenge is now less to obtain a majority than win as many seats as possible to become the leading opposition group in the Assembly. The prospect of a cohabitation with Jean-Luc Mélenchon as head of government is therefore compromised, even though it is important to note the leader of France Insoumise might not have been nominated as prime minister in in <a href="https://www.bfmtv.com/politique/elections/legislatives/nomination-du-premier-ministre-que-prevoit-la-loi-en-cas-de-cohabitation_AN-202206060348.html">the case of a NUPES victory</a> since France’s Constitution (art. 8) does not specify the criteria for the nomination of the prime minister.</p>
<p>Beyond talks of a majority, the NUPES risks seeing other political blocs form an anti-Mélenchon front. Indeed, the coalition’s leader continues to polarise, be it for his calls to disobey European treaties, his stance on Russia, or his recent accusations against the French police after officers shot at a car that refused to stop, killing a female passenger.</p>
<p>If the progressive coalition is to become the country’s chief opposition force, it will need to maintain its coherence in the Assembly amid <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2022/05/30/programme-de-la-nupes-aux-legislatives-les-points-de-convergence-et-de-desaccord-entre-lfi-eelv-le-ps-et-le-pcf_6128161_4355770.html">policy disagreements</a> and <a href="https://www.leparisien.fr/elections/legislatives/direct-legislatives-la-gauche-se-lance-unie-pour-la-conquete-de-lassemblee-06-05-2022-A47XOF3Z5BA43HD5QMTUOYM6JQ.php">a lack of a single parliamentary group</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>The author is writing his thesis under the supervision of Jean-François Godbout.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/184955/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Julien Robin has received funding from the Department of Political Science at the University of Montreal. He is a member of the Jean Monnet Research Centre in Montreal.</span></em></p>Amid record abstention, the left-wing NUPES coalition performed well against the presidential coalition.Julien Robin, Doctorant en science politique, Université de MontréalLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1819372022-05-03T13:09:39Z2022-05-03T13:09:39ZHow Marine Le Pen managed to gain ground with youth voters – and why her success isn’t being replicated by the US right<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/460836/original/file-20220502-6157-n6xhg9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C696%2C4120%2C1776&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Marine Le Pen going down well with her young supporters.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/frances-far-right-party-rassemblement-national-leader-news-photo/1391462840?adppopup=true">Chesnot/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Far-right candidate Marine Le Pen may have missed out on the French presidency, falling <a href="https://www.resultats-elections.interieur.gouv.fr/presidentielle-2022/FE.html">17 pecentage points short</a> of incumbent Emmanuel Macron <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/04/24/world/french-election-runoff-results">in a runoff</a> held April 24, 2022. But to characterize her campaign as a total loss would be missing an essential point: with nearly 41.2% of the vote, a far-right contender came closer to securing the French presidency than at any point in the past.</p>
<p>She outperformed the previous two times that her party got through to the final round. In 2017, Le Pen received only <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2017/may/07/french-presidential-election-results-latest">33.9% of the vote</a>. Her father and predecessor as head of the Front National – now rebranded as Rassemblement National, or National Rally – won <a href="http://www.electionresources.org/fr/president.php?election=2002">just 17.8% of the vote</a> in the 2002 runoff.</p>
<p>Marine Le Pen is enjoying an undeniable, upward trend in popularity.</p>
<h2>Chasing the youth vote</h2>
<p>The growth in support for France’s far right isn’t taking place in a vacuum. A wave of populist sentiment has swept across <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62855-4">much of Europe</a> <a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/532781-the-future-of-populism-in-america/">and North America</a> in the last few years. Moreover, the French and American far right have demonstrated a <a href="https://www.leparisien.fr/politique/candace-owens-invitee-de-marion-marechal-macron-n-est-pas-un-leader-fort-21-09-2019-8156766.php">mutual admiration</a> and <a href="https://www.france24.com/fr/france/20220215-%C3%A9ric-zemmour-se-f%C3%A9licite-d-un-long-et-chaleureux-entretien-t%C3%A9l%C3%A9phonique-avec-donald-trump">exchange of strategies</a>. The French right’s <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/14/the-french-right-is-obsessed-with-fighting-wokeness/">fight against “wokisme”</a> echoes American conservative discourse around critical race theory. Similarly, the American right <a href="https://www.thedailybeast.com/tucker-carlson-pushes-racist-great-replacement-theory-yet-again-adl-renews-call-for-fox-to-fire-him">has drawn inspiration</a> from French writer Renaud Camus’ <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/fr/2019/09/20/world/europe/renaud-camus-grand-replacement.html">white nationalist</a> idea of a “<a href="https://www.adl.org/education/references/hate-symbols/you-will-not-replace-us">grand remplacement</a>,” which holds that white populations and culture are being replaced by non-white, non-Christian people.</p>
<p>But the results of the recent election show something beyond a general growth in support for the far right – something that is happening on both sides of the Atlantic. The French right is succeeding in one key demographic that the <a href="https://morningconsult.com/2021/06/28/global-right-wing-authoritarian-test/">American right has seemingly failed to capture</a>: youth voters.</p>
<p><iframe id="frY0m" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/frY0m/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p><a href="https://www.ipsos.com/fr-fr/presidentielle-2022/second-tour-profil-des-abstentionnistes-et-sociologie-des-electorats">Analysis of the presidential runoff</a> shows that 49% of 25-34 year olds who voted opted for Le Pen – compared to just over 41% of the general population, and 29% of voters over 70.</p>
<p>This wasn’t always the case. Like in the <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2018/03/01/the-generation-gap-in-american-politics/">United States</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/le-vote-jeune-existe-t-il-179871">youth voters in France</a> have historically supported progressive and left-leaning platforms. The Front National – which was established as an <a href="https://www.cairn-int.info/article-E_POUV_157_0005--the-origins-of-the-national-front.htm">explicitly neo-fascist, anti-immigrant party</a>, and whose founder Jean-Marie Le Pen has been <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/france/20210901-french-far-right-party-founder-jean-marie-le-pen-faces-new-hate-trial">repeatedly convicted</a> <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20121105195546/http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-93051559.html">by French courts</a> for inciting racial hatred – was especially far from youth politics.</p>
<p>Indeed, until recently, the French far right’s relation to the under-30 crowd could be summarized in the words of punk rock group Bérurier Noir, which <a href="https://france3-regions.francetvinfo.fr/bretagne/il-y-a-38-ans-berurier-noir-chantait-la-jeunesse-emmerde-le-front-national-entretien-avec-loran-beru-2531640.html">famously sang</a> during a 1989 concert that “la jeunesse emmerde le Front National” – “young people piss off the Front National.” </p>
<p>This lyric became a rallying cry during the 2002 elections, as youth voters turned out in overwhelming numbers – both to the ballot box and <a href="https://www.20minutes.fr/diaporama/diaporama-15314-images-20-ans-jeunesse-manifestait-contre-extreme-droite-france">to the streets in protest</a> – when the far right advanced to the runoffs for the first time in the Front National’s history. </p>
<h2>Rebranding the right</h2>
<p>The tide began to change when <a href="https://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/2011/01/14/01002-20110114ARTFIG00673-marine-le-pen-elue-presidente-du-front-national.php">Marine Le Pen took control</a> of the Front National from her father in 2011. Over the last decade, she has undertaken a conscious process of “<a href="https://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/le-reportage-de-la-redaction/du-fn-au-rn-dix-ans-de-dediabolisation">de-demonizing</a>” the party in an effort to distance itself from its <a href="https://www.liberation.fr/actualites/2017/03/15/le-front-national-face-a-ses-vieux-demons-antisemites_1555982/">antisemitic past</a>. Instead, Le Pen wants to present herself as a <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20210703-france-s-far-right-marine-le-pen-under-fire-for-going-mainstream">mainstream candidate</a>.</p>
<p>While, as <a href="https://www.20minutes.fr/elections/presidentielle/2060491-20170502-presidentielle-front-national-vraiment-change">many point out</a>, many of the policies of Rassemblement National <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2022/article/2022/03/31/presidentielle-2022-derriere-la-normalisation-de-marine-le-pen-un-projet-qui-reste-d-extreme-droite_6119942_6059010.html">aren’t substantively different</a> from their far-right roots, the party has tried to appeal to young voters by reframing its stances on issues like <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/2022-presidential-election/article/2022/04/17/le-pen-challenges-macron-s-punitive-ecology-with-her-national-ecology_5980790_16.html">the environment</a> and <a href="https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/presidentielle-marine-le-pen-et-le-feminisme-un-engagement-de-facade_2169345.html">feminism</a>. Le Pen retreated from her <a href="https://www.linternaute.com/actualite/politique/2626647-marine-le-pen-climatosceptique-l-accusation-de-macron-est-elle-fondee/">previous climate skepticism</a> and embraced a program of so-called <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2022/04/15/marine-le-pen-oppose-son-ecologie-nationale-a-l-ecologie-punitive-d-emmanuel-macron_6122325_823448.html">nationalist ecology</a>, which advocates for energy independence and French-made products. She also positioned herself as a <a href="http://www.slate.fr/story/225591/marine-le-pen-defense-animaux-chats-rassemblement-national-electorat-populaire">pro-animal welfare candidate</a> by calling for stricter regulations on the meatpacking industry, and claimed to “<a href="https://www.nouvelobs.com/tribunes/20220422.OBS57476/marine-le-pen-feministe-defendre-les-femmes-parce-qu-on-est-une-femme-est-un-leurre.html#">defend women</a>” by campaigning against street harassment.</p>
<p>Critics note that her animal welfare proposals amounted to a <a href="https://www.rtl.fr/actu/politique/presidentielle-2022-cette-mesure-de-le-pen-qui-signifierait-l-interdiction-du-halal-et-du-casher-7900137659">ban on halal and kosher meat</a> and that her rhetoric on street harassment <a href="https://www.leparisien.fr/politique/marine-le-pen-condamne-le-harcelement-de-rue-produit-de-l-immigration-selon-elle-15-01-2018-7502490.php">placed the blame on immigrant men</a> who, according to her campaign videos, either did not know or did not respect “<a href="https://www.franceinter.fr/societe/violences-faites-aux-femmes-que-proposent-les-candidats-a-l-election-presentielle">French cultural codes</a>.”</p>
<h2>Appealing to youth</h2>
<p>Beyond reframing, though, the Rassemblement National also proposed a number of concrete fiscal policies that target youth voters. In her <a href="https://www.lejdd.fr/Politique/presidentielle-voici-les-propositions-de-marine-le-pen-et-demmanuel-macron-pour-la-jeunesse-4105995">2022 presidential platform</a>, Le Pen promised to eliminate taxes for those under 30, offer financial assistance to student workers and increase housing for students.</p>
<p>Le Pen and the Rassemblement National haven’t convinced everyone. It remains a primarily <a href="https://www.lesechos.fr/politique-societe/politique/europe-derriere-lapparent-recentrage-de-marine-le-pen-un-programme-radical-menant-au-frexit-1400170">anti-immigrant, anti-European nationalist party</a> that often faces accusations of <a href="https://www.franceinter.fr/politique/laissez-les-musulmans-tranquilles-deplacement-chahute-pour-marine-le-pen-dans-le-vaucluse">Islamophobia</a>, <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2022/article/2022/04/08/marine-le-pen-se-defend-de-tout-racisme-dans-son-programme-et-denonce-les-propos-outranciers-d-emmanuel-macron_6121222_6059010.html">racism</a> and <a href="https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/190422/derriere-la-dediabolisation-de-marine-le-pen-le-veritable-danger-du-rn-pour-les-lgbti">homophobia</a>. </p>
<p>When Le Pen advanced to the runoffs after the first round of voting on April 10 – <a href="https://www.lejdd.fr/Politique/lecart-entre-jean-luc-melenchon-et-marine-le-pen-se-resserre-fortement-4104913">barely edging out</a> far-left candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon – huge numbers of students turned out in protest across France, declaring that they would vote “<a href="https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/ni-le-pen-ni-macron-le-slogan-qui-divise-les-etudiants_2172021.html">neither Macron, nor Le Pen</a>.” Many young voters in 2022 abstained from voting altogether – an estimated <a href="https://www.lesechos.fr/elections/presidentielle/presidentielle-le-taux-dabstention-chez-les-jeunes-restera-eleve-au-second-tour-1400817">30%</a> of those under 35 years old in the first round, climbing to a historic <a href="https://www.publicsenat.fr/article/politique/abstention-des-jeunes-les-politiques-ne-parlent-pas-des-sujets-qui-les-preoccupent">40% in the runoff</a>. </p>
<h2>Declining support of GOP</h2>
<p>In both <a href="https://www.lepoint.fr/presidentielle/pourquoi-les-jeunes-ne-votent-plus-11-04-2022-2471686_3121.php">France</a> and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-so-few-young-americans-vote-132649">U.S.</a>, younger generations express feelings of disinterest in and neglect by mainstream political institutions.</p>
<p>Yet young people in the U.S. continue to show <a href="https://morningconsult.com/2021/06/28/global-right-wing-authoritarian-test/">comparatively low levels of support</a> for right-wing authoritarianism. In <a href="https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/how-groups-voted-2016">2016</a> and <a href="https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/how-groups-voted-2020">2020</a>, voters age 18-29 were 10 points lower in their support for Donald Trump compared to the overall population.</p>
<p>So why aren’t we seeing the French trend in the U.S.? </p>
<p>It’s important to note that the U.S. Republican Party and the French Rassemblement National are not completely analogous, due at least in part to the fact that the U.S. <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/04/27/why-are-there-only-two-parties-in-american-politics/">is a two-party system</a>. The Republican Party is the only viable option available to right-wing voters. In France, the Rassemblement National is one of several far-right movements, and is wholly separate from the mainstream conservative Les Républicains party. </p>
<p><iframe id="89090" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/89090/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Still, the GOP and the Rassemblement National are increasingly occupying the same political space. According to the University of Gothenburg’s V-Dem Institute, the Republican Party <a href="https://www.v-dem.net/static/website/img/refs/vparty_briefing.pdf">shifted dramatically</a> towards illiberal rhetoric between 2002 and 2018, putting it in proximity to European far-right parties. Similarly, the GOP and the Rassemblement National received similar scores on Harvard University’s 2019 <a href="https://www.globalpartysurvey.org/">Global Party Survey</a> in terms of opposition to ethnic minority rights and adherence to liberal democratic principles, norms and practices. </p>
<p>The GOP and the RN have also demonstrated a growing, <a href="https://www.liberation.fr/actualites/2019/09/28/la-convention-de-la-droite-de-marion-marechal-le-pen-vire-a-la-caricature-radicale_1754246/">mutual recognition</a> and <a href="https://www.francetvinfo.fr/monde/usa/presidentielle/donald-trump/une-delegation-du-rassemblement-national-aupres-de-l-equipe-trumpaux-etats-unis_4165547.html">exchange of ideas</a> over the last few years.</p>
<p>Indeed, over the last few weeks, far-right groups in France have even begun to echo U.S.-style “<a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/28/election-conspiracy-theories-macron-victory-le-pen">Stop the Steal</a>” rhetoric in response to Emmanuel Macron’s vote shares.</p>
<p>Yet is seems unlikely that far-right segments of the Republican Party can replicate the metamorphosis that allowed Rassemblement National to appeal to youth voters.</p>
<p>Party structures in the U.S. are significantly more decentralized than in France. While Le Pen was able to lead the charge in “softening” her image, it’s not clear who would play that role in an American context for Republicans. Trump remains a <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/cracks-begin-show-republicans-split-over-trump-rnc-meeting-1676470">polarizing figure</a> within the party and <a href="https://theconversation.com/whats-at-stake-for-trump-twitter-and-politics-if-the-tweeter-in-chief-returns-from-banishment-182011">seemingly shows no desire</a> to engage in such “de-demonizing.”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="An elderly woman wears a 'Keep America Great Again' hat and holds an American flag." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/460856/original/file-20220502-22-12c1hd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/460856/original/file-20220502-22-12c1hd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460856/original/file-20220502-22-12c1hd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460856/original/file-20220502-22-12c1hd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460856/original/file-20220502-22-12c1hd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460856/original/file-20220502-22-12c1hd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460856/original/file-20220502-22-12c1hd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An age-old problem for the GOP?</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/trump-supporter-holds-a-flag-and-wears-a-keep-america-great-news-photo/1229340481?adppopup=true">Aimee Dilger/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>And the GOP also doesn’t seem to have the political desire to “soften” its image in issues that matter most to youth voters. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://iop.harvard.edu/youth-poll/fall-2021-harvard-youth-poll%20https://iop.harvard.edu/youth-poll/fall-2021-harvard-youth-poll">2021 survey</a> by the Harvard Kennedy School Institute of Politics found that young Americans list addressing climate change, health care, education, social justice and income inequality as their top priorities – several of which are <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/01/05/gop-red-wave-critical-race-theory-526523">difficult to reconcile</a> with the “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/mar/26/republicans-midterms-culture-war-lgbtq-abortion-book-bans">culture war</a>” that parts of the GOP have made a <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/04/10/1091543359/15-states-dont-say-gay-anti-transgender-bills">core part of their mandates</a>. </p>
<p>By and large, major Republican officials remain <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/planetpolicy/2021/05/10/republicans-in-congress-are-out-of-step-with-the-american-public-on-climate/">publicly skeptical</a> that climate change exists, and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/feb/04/joe-biden-climate-crisis-republican-backlash">vote against</a> Democratic-led climate proposals as too expensive or unnecessary. </p>
<p>The Rassemblement National’s youth-oriented fiscal policies – which often involve direct financial assistance for students, in a distinct break from the party’s “<a href="https://www.lesechos.fr/politique-societe/politique/marine-le-pen-en-operation-seduction-aupres-des-jeunes-1311687">Reaganomics” under Jean-Marie Le Pen</a> in the 1980s – run counter to a GOP that opposes solutions to the <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/finance/3469647-republicans-take-aim-at-bidens-authority-on-student-loans/">student debt crisis</a>. </p>
<p>The GOP seems to be <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2021/12/11/republican-party-gains-temporary-young-voter-strategy-524086">keenly aware</a> of its <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2020/11/27/blame-game-erupts-over-trumps-decline-in-youth-vote-440811">declining support among youth voters</a>. Yet Republican efforts seem more geared toward tactics such as <a href="https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2021/10/22/partisan-gerrymandering-targets-college-campuses">diluting the vote of districts with college campuses, particularly historically Black colleges and universities</a>, and <a href="https://civilrights.org/edfund/resource/youth-vote/">voter ID laws</a> that would make it more difficult for young people to vote. In contrast, Le Pen <a href="https://www.sudouest.fr/france/1er-mai-marine-le-pen-cible-la-jeunesse-2339713.php">openly courted youth voters</a> and dedicated a large part of her <a href="https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=3204171586469277">final rally</a> before the April 24 runoff to calling on young people to get out and vote. </p>
<p>Part of the GOP approach can likely be ascribed to the fact that young voters are becoming <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/new-census-data-shows-the-nation-is-diversifying-even-faster-than-predicted/">increasingly racially diverse</a> and that young adults of color are <a href="https://time.com/5910291/weve-seen-a-youthquake-how-youth-of-color-backed-joe-biden-in-battleground-states/">an especially strong base</a> for Democratic candidates. But GOP support is dropping among <a href="https://circle.tufts.edu/latest-research/election-week-2020%20">white youths</a>, too.</p>
<p>It took years for Le Pen’s “de-demonization” among youth voters to start paying dividends – and even then, it was insufficient to propel her to electoral victory. The U.S. will, in a few months, undergo its own elections with the 2022 midterms. It’s <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/04/10/democrats-youth-vote-2022-midterms-john-della-volpe-00024264">far from certain</a> that young people in the U.S. will continue to throw their support behind Democratic candidates. But who they cast their ballot for, and whether they turn out to vote at all, will show just how big the gap is between the Rassemblement National and the GOP in appealing to a younger electorate. </p>
<p>[<em>The Conversation’s Politics + Society editors pick need-to-know stories.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?nl=politics&source=inline-politics-need-to-know">Sign up for Politics Weekly</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181937/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kimberly Tower receives funding from the French-American Fulbright Commission. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Camille Gélix receives funding from Sciences Po Paris (PhD contract). </span></em></p>While Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National has engaged in a decade-long campaign to rehabilitate its image with youth voters, the GOP is moving in the opposite direction.Kimberly Tower, PhD Candidate in International Relations and Comparative Politics, American University School of International ServiceCamille Gélix, PhD candidate, Sciences Po Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1818772022-04-26T13:16:43Z2022-04-26T13:16:43ZUkraine: will Putin’s war alienate his many admirers on Europe’s far right?<p>A key moment in the final French presidential debate between Emmanuel Macron and Marine Le Pen, before the recent election, was when Macron attacked his challenger on her links to Russia. “You cannot defend the interests of France,” <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/macron-le-pen-putin-french-election-second-round-debate/">he said</a>, adding: “When you speak to Russia … you are talking to your banker.” He was referring to a 2014 campaign loan Le Pen took from a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/a-russian-bank-gave-marine-le-pens-party-a-loan-then-weird-things-began-happening/2018/12/27/960c7906-d320-11e8-a275-81c671a50422_story.html">bank seemingly linked</a> to Russia’s leadership.</p>
<p>Le Pen forcefully defended her independence and patriotism, but her link to Vladimir Putin’s Russia was clearly a vulnerability against the backdrop of the invasion of Ukraine. While Le Pen condemned Russia’s actions, she opposed energy sanctions. And there was no way she could hide from her campaign literature, which carried a <a href="https://mlafrance.fr/pdfs/tract-france-quon-m.pdf">smiling 2017 photograph</a> of herself with Putin, or her <a href="https://mlafrance.fr/pdfs/projet-la-defense.pdf">manifesto commitment</a> to end military dependency on the US and form “an alliance with Russia”.</p>
<p>It is not just Le Pen who has taken such a pro-Russian stance. Politicians across the European radical right have shown striking warmth for Putin’s Russia over the years. Will this change due to the war in Ukraine?</p>
<p>The attraction of Putin may seem puzzling. Why would radical right politicians that proudly claim to put their own nation first, be drawn to an aggressive geopolitical rival that threatens their nation’s sovereignty and security? The answer is not simply a desire for practical assistance like campaign financing, or <a href="https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Make-Germany-Great-Again-ENG-081217.pdf">online election interference</a> of the kind that helped Donald Trump win the US presidency in 2016.</p>
<p>In 2020, I <a href="https://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/xmlui/handle/123456789/66804">interviewed several elected representatives</a> from Rassemblement National in France and Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany about international politics, including their attitudes towards Russia. They all called for a warmer approach towards Moscow. But they revealed a spectrum of ideological and practical reasons that varied according to personal world views and national contexts.</p>
<p>Some have a deeply ideological mindset, believing in a western liberal conspiracy to dissolve nations or mix races, threatening the very existence of the ethnocultural identities they hold dear. One AfD representative told me that Germany’s leaders had been “brainwashed” by too much time in the US, a country many saw as a source of lies and propaganda. For them, Putin’s Russia is seen as a like-minded ally against a corrupt global system. Russia is ideologically kin, being committed to the preservation of distinct ethnocultural nations. It is civilisationally kin, a European Christian nation that confronts both secular liberalism and Islamist extremism. And it’s a practical ally which challenges the EU and US vision of internationalism or “globalism”.</p>
<p>Putin also appeals as an archetype of strong leadership – apparently able to channel the will of the Russian people and act decisively and unashamedly in the national interest, unencumbered by commitments to multilateral institutions or internationalist values.</p>
<h2>Historical visions</h2>
<p>Some draw on historical national icons to bolster their stance. In the French case, they may recall De Gaulle’s quest for a more balanced posture between the US and the Soviet Union, and his vision of a Europe “<a href="https://www.iris-france.org/155712-why-the-legacy-of-de-gaulle-and-mitterand-still-matters-for-the-french-public-opinion/">from the Atlantic to the Urals</a>”. </p>
<p>In Germany, there is also a strong foreign-policy tradition rooted in the cold war that seeks to overcome division in Europe through better relations with Russia. But AfD representatives I interviewed reach back further. For them, Bismarck – the architect of a mighty German nation state – is an icon. The very first AfD foreign <a href="https://www.facebook.com/notes/alternative-f%C3%BCr-deutschland/thesen-zur-au%C3%9Fenpolitik/630628333634176">policy platform</a> in 2013 called repeatedly for reviving Bismarck’s 19th-century alliance with Russia.</p>
<p>But these politicians are not identical in their thinking. Some were closer to the mainstream right, feeling there is still some relevance in a sense of kinship with western democracies, including the US. Their attitudes towards Russia were framed more in terms of a “national interest” agenda to reduce tensions and be more realist, independent and balanced in relations with the great powers.</p>
<p>Some AfD representatives expressed open incredulity at the extent of their own colleagues’ loyalty to Russia’s agenda, particularly those who grew up in the former Soviet bloc member, East Germany. One expressed bemusement that “the people from Eastern Germany, who suffered 40 years from communism … have the best view of Russia. It’s like Stockholm syndrome.”</p>
<p>What none would acknowledge is the potential motivation of practical support that Putin or his allies provides to his western sympathisers.</p>
<h2>The Ukraine factor</h2>
<p>Will recent events force radical right parties to reevaluate their attitudes towards Putin’s Russia? Since there is a range of world views within and between these parties, there is unlikely to be one answer. In the AfD, for example, a party riven with internal division through its short history, the conflict is <a href="https://jungefreiheit.de/politik/deutschland/2022/afd-reden-zum-ukraine-krieg-sorgen-fuer-parteiinternen-zoff/">reportedly</a> a source of internal discord.</p>
<p>Certainly, there will be those focused on their election prospects who will, as Le Pen did, seek to distance themselves from Putin’s military aggression. It’s one thing to justify Russia’s actions when its air force is flattening Syrian cities in the name of a war against Islamist extremism. It’s another when the victims are Christian Europeans. But Le Pen made no attempt in her campaign to reverse her general approach, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xQE7ytvf-2s">calling</a> for strategic rapprochement with Russia once the war in Ukraine is over.</p>
<p>The electoral liability seems, in any case, limited. Foreign policy does not tend to determine voting choices. The grievances that have drawn voters to the radical right relate to domestic cultural and economic effects of globalisation. In opposing energy sanctions, Le Pen used the international crisis to pivot to a more opportune domestic issue: the <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/marine-le-pen-bounces-back-in-far-right-duel-amid-soaring-energy-prices/">cost of living</a>. Le Pen’s 41.5% was well short of victory, but a major advance on her performance in 2017. Nor did the warmth shown towards Putin by the Hungarian prime minister, <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2022/03/17/orban-is-trying-a-daunting-balancing-act-over-the-ukraine-war-view">Viktor Orbán</a>, prevent him being reelected with an outright majority at the beginning of April. </p>
<p>It seems that Russia and its regime are likely to retain its attraction as an irreplaceable pole for those in the west resistant to the dominant liberal internationalist agenda and US dependency, longing for a world of bordered and ethnically uniform nation states.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181877/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Toby Greene's research was supported by a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Individual Fellowship grant under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme, carried out at Queen Mary University of London.</span></em></p>Research shows that Europe’s far right has deep ideological and practical ties to Putin’s Russia.Toby Greene, Lecturer in the Department for Political Studies, Bar-Ilan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1818432022-04-24T21:21:18Z2022-04-24T21:21:18ZFrench president Emmanuel Macron wins re-election: a victory with deep challenges<p>Emmanuel Macron’s <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/politics/article/2022/04/24/macron-wins-french-presidential-election_5981506_5.html">decisive victory</a> over Marine Le Pen in the second round of France’s presidential election on 24 April 2022 is no surprise. For more than a year, opinion polls had been predicting it. As early as April 2021, the leading polling institutes (Elabe, Harris interactive, Ifop, Ipsos) estimated the final score of the outgoing president in a range of 54 to 57% of the vote. And when it came down to the final night, Macron made it through all the campaign’s twists and came out unscathed, with 58.8% of the vote.</p>
<p>The success continues the theme of the first round, when Macron finished 4.5 points and 1.6 million votes ahead of Le Pen, with Jean-Luc Mélenchon just barely being eliminated for the second round – he won nearly <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/politics/article/2022/04/11/french-presidential-election-the-winners-and-the-losers-of-the-first-round_5980244_5.html">22% of the vote</a>, just a single percentage point behind the far-right candidate.</p>
<p>With the first round behind him, Macron knew that he could count on the support of a larger number of candidates (Valerie Pécresse, Les Républicains; Yannick Jadot, Europe Ecologie–Les Verts; Fabien Roussel, Parti Communiste; and Anne Hidalgo, Parti Socialiste) than Le Pen, who was endorsed only by the two other far-right candidates (Eric Zemmour and Nicolas Dupont-Aignan). </p>
<p>While Mélenchon did not call for his supporters to cast votes for Macron, he proclaimed that <a href="https://www.france24.com/fr/france/20220410-pr%C3%A9sidentielle-jean-luc-m%C3%A9lenchon-appelle-%C3%A0-ne-pas-donner-une-seule-voix-%C3%A0-marine-le-pen">“not a single vote”</a> should go to Marine Le Pen.</p>
<h2>Re-election without shared power</h2>
<p>Emmanuel Macron thus escapes the curse of the <a href="https://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/le-billet-politique/emmanuel-macron-face-a-la-malediction-du-sortant">“punishment vote”</a> against the incumbent president that led to the defeats of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing in 1981 and Nicolas Sarkozy in 2012, and also contributed to François Hollande’s decision not to stand for re-election in 2017. Macron also becomes the first president of France’s Fifth Republic to be reelected without having to <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/cohabitation">share power</a>. François Mitterrand went into the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/44484352">1988 elections</a> with the centre-right Jacques Chirac as prime minister. The situation was reversed from <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/42843396">1997 to 2002</a>, after then-president Chirac made the error of calling elections early and ended up with Lionel Jospin of the Parti Socialiste as his prime minister.</p>
<p>Macron’s win appears to vindicate his 2017 strategy in which he cast himself as the “progressive” champion of pro-European liberals of the right and the left against the “nationalist populists” gathered around Marine Le Pen. In the past five years, Macron’s words and actions have sought to consolidate the bipolarisation that had ensured his success in the second round of the 2017 presidential election and appeared to be the key to a second term.</p>
<h2>An imperfect strategy</h2>
<p>The strategy worked, but only imperfectly. Indeed, the French political landscape is now <a href="https://theconversation.com/les-resultats-du-premier-tour-une-stabilite-apparente-une-reconfiguration-profonde-181046">structured around three poles</a> rather than two. Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s score was the <a href="https://theconversation.com/les-resultats-du-premier-tour-une-stabilite-apparente-une-reconfiguration-profonde-181046">first round’s biggest surprise</a>, as was his capacity to bring together left-wing voters hostile to Macron’s liberalism. This was most overlooked by Macron himself, who concentrated on capturing the electorate of the traditional right. </p>
<p>During the two-week period between the two rounds, the question of what left-wing voters would – or wouldn’t – do was crucial, with the two finalists both seeking to attract those who voted for Mélenchon. Marine Le Pen pushed her <a href="https://theconversation.com/economic-fallout-from-ukraine-war-could-give-le-pens-social-populist-strategy-an-edge-179863">“social-populist strategy”</a> while seeking to minimise her party’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/marine-le-pen-the-rassemblement-national-and-russia-history-of-a-strategic-alliance-181649">deep ties to Russia</a>. Emmanuel Macron, meanwhile, declared that he would <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/politics/article/2022/04/17/macron-unveils-plan-to-address-climate-change-ahead-of-french-election_5980777_5.html">make the environment the top priority</a> of his goverment. Neither succeeded in fully convincing voters nor did the balance of power really shift.</p>
<p>The results of the second round seem to indicate that left-wing voters did not behave in a mechanical and uniform way. A significant proportion opted for Marine Le Pen, particularly in rural areas and in the <a href="https://la1ere.francetvinfo.fr/guadeloupe/marine-le-pen-plebiscitee-par-les-guadeloupeens-les-saint-martinois-et-les-saint-barths-1276256.html">overseas departments and territories</a>. In the latter, she attracted many who had voted for Jean-Luc Mélenchon in the first round: she obtained almost 70% of the vote in Guadeloupe, where he had won 56% of the vote a fortnight earlier. Still, a slightly larger fraction voted for Emmanuel Macron, especially in the big cities where Mélenchon’s supporters have a sociological profile fairly close to that of the incumbent president. </p>
<h2>Refusing to choose</h2>
<p>Even more numerous are those who refused to choose. More than 12% of voters cast a blank or invalid ballot, compared to 2.2% for the first round. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/la-cause-cachee-de-la-montee-de-labstention-180152">abstention rate</a> was also significantly higher than that of the first round of 2022 (28% versus 26.3%), and was also higher than that of 2017’s second round (25.4%). </p>
<p>The electorate’s three-way split does not sit well with the two-round majority vote. In 1969, the low proportion of votes cast in relation to the number of registered voters (63%) was already proof of this. 2022 serves as an even bolder example, with turnout sinking below 60% – a record for a French presidential election. Emmanuel Macron is therefore both one of the “best elected” presidents of the Fifth Republic (behind Jacques Chirac in 2002 and himself in 2017) if we compare his score to the votes cast, and “worst elected” if we look at the percentage of registered voters (barely 35%, against 38% for Georges Pompidou in 1969 and 43.5% for himself in 2017).</p>
<p>The scattering of left-wing, and to a lesser extent, of traditional right-wing votes, has caused Macron to fall back by more than 8 points and nearly 4 million voters compared to the second round of 2017. This drop is unprecedented in the history of presidential elections: Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, in 1981, and Nicolas Sarkozy, in 2012, had respectively lost 3 and 5 points compared to the previous election.</p>
<h2>A crumbling “Republican front”</h2>
<p>This has less to do with a punishment vote than the <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/m-le-mag/article/2021/06/25/de-la-sfio-aux-regionales-de-2021-la-lente-erosion-du-front-republicain-dans-le-monde_6085704_4500055.html">erosion</a> of the “Republican front” – or the French political tradition consisting in setting aside political differences to prevent the far right’s rise to power. It had a huge impact in 2002, was less effective in 2017 and only worked partially in 2022. Hence although Le Pen has lost again, voting for a far right candidate is no longer seen as unacceptable in France.</p>
<p>The victory of Emmanuel Macron, while anticipated, should not mask the election’s two main lessons. First, the far right obtained a level never before reached in France, thanks to its ability to bring together a heterogeneous, predominantly working-class electorate. Second, the country’s political landscape, now structured around three poles, is out of step with a voting system adapted to two dominant parties. These two issues make the outcome of France’s upcoming legislative elections, which take place in June, all the more uncertain.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181843/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mathias Bernard is president of the University of Clermont-Auvergne.</span></em></p>Emmanuel Macron’s success validates a strategy aimed at making him appear as the champion of the “progressives”, but it has only partially worked.Mathias Bernard, Historien, Université Clermont Auvergne (UCA)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1814882022-04-24T20:25:02Z2022-04-24T20:25:02ZEmmanuel Macron is reelected but the French are longing for radical change<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/459393/original/file-20220424-12-aekoff.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Guilliame Horcajuelo/EPA/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Emmanuel Macron has been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/24/emmanuel-macron-wins-french-presidential-election-say-projected-results">reelected</a> as President of the Republic of France for a second five-year term.</p>
<p>He defeated far-right candidate Marine Le Pen in the second round of the presidential election only hours ago, winning about 58.8% of the votes against 41.2% for his opponent. While votes are still being counted, about 30% of the French electorate did not vote. This is perhaps the highest abstention rate at a presidential election since 1969.</p>
<p>While most political watchers were expecting a narrower Macron victory, many in France were genuinely scared by the <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2022/article/2022/04/16/presidentielle-2022-coup-de-fievre-general-sur-le-front-republicain-avant-le-second-tour_6122415_6059010.html">lack of nationwide mass demonstration</a> against Le Pen and the far right ahead of Sunday’s vote. The possibility of having Le Pen elected was higher than ever before. </p>
<p>What are the key consequences of Macron’s reelection for both France and Europe?</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/french-elections-a-divided-country-faces-an-uncertain-second-round-181180">French elections: a divided country faces an uncertain second round</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Continuity amid dissatisfaction</h2>
<p>Providing Macron’s party <a href="https://en-marche.fr/">La République en Marche!</a> can win the lower house election in June – which it is predicted to do – the first major outcome of this election is continuity.</p>
<p>For now, France remains a stable, moderate, “steady-as-she-goes” nation with inclusive values. No major change in policies is expected under Macron.</p>
<p>And this, paradoxically enough, might become a major issue because the 2022 results have clearly shown the French are seeking radical changes and want <a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/france-is-doing-well-but-feeling-miserable/21806329">their concerns to be addressed</a>. Rising costs of living, inflation, low salaries, the environment, law and order, and immigration have all been <a href="https://www.institut-economiepositive.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/sondage_preoccupations-des-francais-presidentielle-2022.pdf">burning issues</a> during the campaign.</p>
<hr>
<iframe src="https://flo.uri.sh/visualisation/9474215/embed" title="Interactive or visual content" class="flourish-embed-iframe" frameborder="0" scrolling="no" style="width:100%;height:300px;" sandbox="allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-scripts allow-downloads allow-popups allow-popups-to-escape-sandbox allow-top-navigation-by-user-activation" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<div style="width:100%!;margin-top:4px!important;text-align:right!important;"><a class="flourish-credit" href="https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/9474215/?utm_source=embed&utm_campaign=visualisation/9474215" target="_top"><img alt="Made with Flourish" src="https://public.flourish.studio/resources/made_with_flourish.svg"> </a></div>
<hr>
<p>As opposed to the 2017 presidential election, when most voters still supported traditional mainstream parties, this year, the majority of those who voted did so for parties promoting radical measures from both the far left and the far right.</p>
<p>Never before in the history of France’s <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Fifth-Republic-French-history">Fifth Republic</a> had those extremist parties totalled more votes than the moderate parties of the left, the centre and the right.</p>
<p>This means that despite being re-elected somewhat as a result of the French “winner takes it all” voting system, Macron has a real challenge if he does not want to face major social unrest, as was the case in 2018-19 with the violent <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/03/who-are-the-gilets-jaunes-and-what-do-they-want">Yellow Vests</a> movement.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-protests-roil-france-macron-faces-a-wicked-problem-and-it-could-lead-to-his-downfall-151206">As protests roil France, Macron faces a wicked problem — and it could lead to his downfall</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>More work ahead for the French</h2>
<p>While Macron endlessly repeats he is neither from the left nor from the right, his election campaign’s economic program was preferred by France’s major employers’ federation, <a href="https://www.lefigaro.fr/conjoncture/presidentielle-pour-le-medef-le-programme-de-macron-est-le-plus-favorable-pour-l-economie-20220411">the MEDEF</a>. </p>
<p>For instance, in the coming months, Macron once again wants to reform France’s generous pensions system to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/12/macron-hints-at-compromise-over-plan-to-raise-retirement-age-france-le-pen">make the French work longer</a>, so that the existing retirement scheme can endure.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Presidential candidate Marine Le Pen with supporters." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458788/original/file-20220420-15-c9he1t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458788/original/file-20220420-15-c9he1t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458788/original/file-20220420-15-c9he1t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458788/original/file-20220420-15-c9he1t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458788/original/file-20220420-15-c9he1t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458788/original/file-20220420-15-c9he1t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458788/original/file-20220420-15-c9he1t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Marine Le Pen was mobbed by supporters when campaigning in Normandy last week.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jeremias Gonzales/AP/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>He would also like to propose some conditions for the two million French people who are on the lowest possible social aid scheme, so they perform 15 to 20 hours of work or training in exchange of the money they receive.</p>
<p>The returning president has also pledged to continue attracting foreign investment through the “<a href="https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/choose-france">choose France</a>” program, while supporting <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/08/world/europe/france-presidential-election-macron-economy-le-pen.html">start-ups</a>.</p>
<h2>But social protections to continue</h2>
<p>But Macron also wants to make <a href="https://www.francetvinfo.fr/politique/emmanuel-macron/versement-des-aides-sociales-a-la-source-l-idee-est-belle-mais-ca-ne-se-fera-pas-du-jour-au-lendemain-estime-un-specialiste-de-la-pauvrete_5022241.html">social benefits easier to access</a>.
Instead of having to apply for a particular scheme, eligible benefits would be paid straight into a person’s bank account. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A woman pushes her bike past campaign posters ahead of the final vote." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458803/original/file-20220420-15105-zbx54v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458803/original/file-20220420-15105-zbx54v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=410&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458803/original/file-20220420-15105-zbx54v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=410&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458803/original/file-20220420-15105-zbx54v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=410&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458803/original/file-20220420-15105-zbx54v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=516&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458803/original/file-20220420-15105-zbx54v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=516&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458803/original/file-20220420-15105-zbx54v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=516&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A woman pushes her bike past campaign posters in Versailles ahead of the final vote.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Michael Euler/AP/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Given the complexity of social aid schemes in France, it is estimated that hundreds of thousands of people who struggle applying for support would be better off under Macron’s new proposal.</p>
<h2>A greener France</h2>
<p>To gather the support of the Greens electorate, Macron has also pledged to continue subsidising nation-wide insulation programs, renovate 700,000 homes, protect biodiversity and legislate for a greener farming industry. This is an ambitious program in comparison to a first term that delivered <a href="https://www.greenpeace.fr/ecologie-climat-bilan-emmanuel-macron/">mixed results</a> on green policies and climate change.</p>
<p>Macron has also promised to extend the operational life of most nuclear powerplants and to get started on the construction of <a href="https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2022/02/10/reprendre-en-main-notre-destin-energetique">six new generation nuclear powerplants</a>. In France, most citizens consider nuclear power as a green energy, given the <a href="https://www.lesechos.fr/politique-societe/societe/sondage-exclusif-une-majorite-de-francais-reconnait-les-merites-du-nucleaire-1361153">minimal carbon emissions</a> it generates. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/can-nuclear-power-secure-a-path-to-net-zero-180451">Can nuclear power secure a path to net zero?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>This also provides the country with a higher level of energy (and therefore diplomatic) independence than its European neighbors.</p>
<h2>What does Macron mean for the European Union?</h2>
<p>The re-election of Macron is a blessing for Brussels and European institutions. With Brexit and the departure of German Chancellor Angela Merkel, France is playing an even greater role in European affairs and Paris has the opportunity to breathe new life into the EU.</p>
<p>This, of course, is a defeat for Putin, who tried to intervene in the <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/The_Macron_Leaks_Operation-A_Post-Mortem.pdf">2017 Presidential election</a>. Le Pen had close ties to the Russian regime for many years, although she tried to brush them off during the campaign.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Macron and Russian President Vladimir Putin during a joint press conference" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458797/original/file-20220420-17-6uyve5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458797/original/file-20220420-17-6uyve5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458797/original/file-20220420-17-6uyve5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458797/original/file-20220420-17-6uyve5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458797/original/file-20220420-17-6uyve5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458797/original/file-20220420-17-6uyve5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458797/original/file-20220420-17-6uyve5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Macron and Russian President Vladimir Putin held a joint press conference at the Kremlin in February.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Thibault Camus/EPA/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Macron is a dedicated European and wants to build a stronger and more independent Europe. Russia’s invasion of Ukrainian has certainly provided a wake-up call for European leaders.</p>
<p>Previously, many <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/german-defense-minister-europe-still-depends-on-us-for-security/a-55626599">relied on the United States</a> to ensure European defence, while others looked to <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/20/viktor-orban-is-the-wests-pro-putin-outlier/">Moscow for cooperation</a>, or to the French for <a href="https://www.vie-publique.fr/eclairage/18474-les-operations-militaires-exterieures-de-la-france-opex">peacekeeping operations</a>.</p>
<p>That landscape is radically shifting now, and France’s traditional approach to <a href="https://presidence-francaise.consilium.europa.eu/en/news/press-release-a-strategic-compass-for-a-stronger-eu-security-and-defence-in-the-next-decade/">ultimate sovereignty in defence</a> (as the only European country with <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/04/perspectives-nuclear-deterrence-21st-century-0/nuclear-deterrence-destabilized">second strike</a> capability) suddenly looks quite attractive to other European states.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Macron at a summit with European leaders." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458799/original/file-20220420-17-mpbnyu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458799/original/file-20220420-17-mpbnyu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458799/original/file-20220420-17-mpbnyu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458799/original/file-20220420-17-mpbnyu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458799/original/file-20220420-17-mpbnyu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458799/original/file-20220420-17-mpbnyu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/458799/original/file-20220420-17-mpbnyu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Macron, and other European leaders gathered at Versailles for summit on the war in Ukraine in March.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ludovic Marin/AP/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>High on Macron’s agenda for Europe is greater cooperation between EU states. He wants to ensure Europe’s “<a href="https://www.polytechnique-insights.com/tribunes/economie/autonomie-strategique-le-reveil-de-leurope-puissance/">strategic autonomy</a>”, be it military, energetic, economic and political.</p>
<p>This will please neither Moscow nor Beijing. It may, however, offer breathing space to Washington who desperately wants to focus on the Pacific.</p>
<p>Macron’s European ambitions are likely to be supported by the Baltic states who fear for their existence, by Eastern European countries who now understand that anything can happen with Putin, and even by the Germans who are <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220227-a-new-era-germany-rewrites-its-defence-foreign-policies">radically rethinking</a> their previously timid foreign policy.</p>
<p>The next five years are going to be Macron’s hardest term, be it in the national or international spheres. To succeed he will need to keep radical parties at bay in France, accelerate measures on climate change, and steer the European Union toward a stronger, more independent future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181488/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Romain Fathi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The next five years are going to be harder than Emmanuel Macron’s first term.Romain Fathi, Senior Lecturer, History, Flinders UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1817412022-04-22T13:01:27Z2022-04-22T13:01:27ZMarine Le Pen and Emmanuel Macron go head to head: why many French voters will be voting against a candidate rather than for them<p>France’s electoral system is held over two rounds. In the first, anyone who meets the <a href="https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/infographie_election_pr_vaccess_en_cle814c2a.pdf">threshold criteria</a> (this year, 12 candidates) can run. Assuming no one wins an absolute majority (this has never happened), the top two candidates go head to head in the second round. <a href="https://theconversation.com/french-elections-a-divided-country-faces-an-uncertain-second-round-181180">This year</a>, as in 2017, those top two candidates are Emmanuel Macron (centre right) and Marine Le Pen (far right).</p>
<p>One goal of voting over two rounds is to ensure that the final victor enjoys the support of an absolute majority of the nation. The other goal is for people to vote with their hearts in the first round and their heads (that is, strategically) in the second round. But in 2022, neither of these goals has been fulfilled.</p>
<h2>Head over heart</h2>
<p>The tradition of voting with your heart was based on the old style of electoral competition between various parties of the left and right. People chose their preferred party in the first round, then supported whichever party from their side of the spectrum qualified to the second round. This pattern has <a href="https://theconversation.com/first-round-of-the-french-election-apparent-stability-yet-a-profound-reconfiguration-181084">collapsed</a> since the emergence of the far right as a major electoral force in France, and the more recent emergence of the centre. For the second election running, neither the mainstream left nor the mainstream right has made it through to the final run-off. Voters are now being forced to vote tactically from the first round onwards.</p>
<p>This year, many mainstream-right voters understood that they would have to give their vote to Macron even in the first round (rather than the mainstream-right candidate) in order to prevent a second round between the far right (Le Pen) and the far left (Jean-Luc Mélenchon). This resulted in a collapse in the vote for the Republican candidate, Valérie Pécresse.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, disunity on the left, with six left-wing candidates competing over similar turf, led to growing fears that the left would once again be absent from the second round. With Jean-Luc Mélenchon being the front-running left winger, a growing consensus emerged on the left to unite tactically behind him. A corresponding surge in support saw Mélenchon’s electorate double to reach 22%. Had a few more left-wing voters gone with their heads rather than their heart in the first round, Mélenchon would have qualified to the second round ahead of Le Pen. Le Pen also enjoyed a tactical transfer of votes from Eric Zemmour, another far-right candidate. They were initially running neck and neck but Le Pen managed to secure a growing advantage over her rival and became the default choice of the far right.</p>
<h2>Negative over positive</h2>
<p>So the French now vote tactically even in the first round. But what of the other goal – to grant a majority of support to the victor? While this is still technically true, the problem is that many voters will vote negative rather than positive – against one candidate, rather than for the other. While the outcome, in terms of ballots cast, is the same, its significance is very different.</p>
<p>Macron has had five years to disappoint people. It has been a challenging first term, defined by the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402382.2021.1925017">pandemic</a> and more recently by the conflict in <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-why-emmanuel-macrons-open-line-to-moscow-has-not-delivered-the-international-prestige-he-expected-178855">Ukraine</a>. Macron’s key political strategy has been to neutralise the electoral threat posed by the mainstream right Republican party. In this goal he has been very successful; he has poached some of their key players, usurped their policies, encroached upon their electoral turf and caused their vote share in the first round to plummet <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-2022-french-presidential-election-%E2%80%93-first-round-results">below 5%</a>.</p>
<p>However, this success has come at a cost. Initially situating himself as a centrist capable of appealing to both the left and the right, Macron has increasingly situated himself firmly on the right, assuming that internal divisions on the left would prevent anyone from presenting an electoral threat from that end of the political spectrum.</p>
<p>While this assumption has largely held true, the consequence is a deep and growing dislike of Macron among left-wing voters. These are the same voters who chose Mélenchon in the first round and who now hold the keys to the second round result. Macron has realised – belatedly – that he cannot take it for granted that these disgruntled voters will choose him over Le Pen. Many intend <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/poll-shows-gap-between-le-pen-macron-abstention-is-seen-historic-low-2022-04-12/">not to vote at all</a>. Macron’s attempts to win over these voters, without alienating the right-wing electorate that he has so delicately courted, are unconvincing. His best tactic has been to highlight the menace that Le Pen poses to the fundamental values of French democracy, and scare left-wing voters into voting for him, even if reluctantly, in order to block her. Consequently, many voters who choose Macron will do so grudgingly and with a heavy heart.</p>
<p>It is not only Macron courting the negative vote – the “vote against”. Le Pen has positioned her candidacy as a referendum on Macron, and encouraged people to see her as a vote against the policies of the past five years. This is less likely to be an effective strategy for her – many voters disappointed in Macron will choose simply to abstain – but it has bolstered her support among certain categories of the electorate.</p>
<p>Why does this matter? Whoever wins will need to govern the country for five years. They will want to secure a majority in the parliamentary elections in June. They will want a mandate to enact their policies. Le Pen, in particular, is proposing to essentially <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/2022-presidential-election/article/2022/04/14/marine-le-pen-wants-to-govern-by-referendum-bypassing-both-parliament-and-constitutional-council_5980497_16.html">govern by referendum</a> (because she is unlikely to obtain a parliamentary majority, making it much harder for her to pass legislation through the normal channels). She will therefore need the public behind her more than most other presidents if she were to win.</p>
<p>And more fundamentally, trust in French politics has eroded to the point where mainstream parties have collapsed and the extremes of the spectrum have become central players. Encouraging people to vote against, rather than for, only nurtures this distrust in politics and deepens people’s sense of alienation. Winning an election on a negative vote might be winning a battle to lose a war.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181741/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rainbow Murray does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With the collapse of traditional politics, voters must vote with their heads rather than their hearts at every stage.Rainbow Murray, Professor of Politics, Queen Mary University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1816492022-04-21T18:00:08Z2022-04-21T18:00:08ZMarine Le Pen, the Rassemblement National and Russia: history of a strategic alliance<p>Days before the second round of the French presidential elections, far-right presidential candidate Marine Le Pen (Rassemblement National, RN) spelled out some of her <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MX59QEqsVDk">foreign policy priorities</a>: limit military support to Ukraine and steer clear from voting new sanctions against Russia; leave NATO’s integrated command; and relaunch a “strategic rapprochement between NATO and Russia” as soon as peace between Moscow and Kiev can be secured.</p>
<p>Amid the war in Ukraine, Le Pen has had to soften her pro-Russian rhetoric to stay closer to the French public opinion. However, she continues to advance a foreign policy at odds with most French – and European – politics.</p>
<h2>A relationship dating back to Jean-Marie Le Pen</h2>
<p>The reasons for this pro-Russian stance are manifold.</p>
<p>The links of the Rassemblement National (known until 2018 as the Front National, FN) with Russia are long-standing. As early as 1968, Le Pen’s father and president of the party, Jean-Marie Le Pen, welcomed the Soviet Russian nationalist and antisemitic painter Ilya Glazunov, who had come to Paris as part of a Soviet delegation in the hope of painting a portrait of General Charles de Gaulle. After the French president declined the offer, Glazunov ended up <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=1rA0DwAAQBAJ&pg=PT77&lpg=PT77&dq=jean+marie+le+pen+glazounov+1968">drawing a portrait of Le Pen himself</a>. The episode would herald the party’s attempts to present itself as Charles de Gaulle’s natural heir in a bid to connect with Russia.</p>
<p>At an ideological level, the French Catholic, monarchist and collaborationist right has always held the image of the eternal, tsarist and Orthodox Russia close to heart. Personal ties between the Russian emigre community and French far right abound: among the most notable is the marriage of Jean-François Chiappe (1931-2001), who sat at the FN’s central committee and contributed to the far-right magazine <em>Rivarol</em>, to <a href="https://www.whoswho.fr/decede/biographie-marina-grey_2920">Maria Denikina</a>, daughter of the white, anti-Bolshevik figurehead of the civil war, <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2005/10/06/la-depouille-mortelle-du-general-tsariste-anton-denikine-a-ete-inhumee-en-grande-pompe-a-moscou_696343_3214.html">General Anton Denikin</a>.</p>
<p>In the 1980s, the Russian writer and future National-Bolshevik <a href="https://www.lepoint.fr/livres/limonov-l-homme-qui-ne-voulait-pas-mourir-dans-son-lit-25-03-2020-2368764_37.php">Eduard Limonov</a> introduced the eccentric Russian imperialist politician <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/04/06/vladimir-zhirinovsky-far-right-court-jester-of-russian-politics-dies-at-75-a77240">Vladimir Zhirinovsky</a> to Jean-Marie Le Pen. The two leaders attempted to launch a kind of “international of nationalists,” but their irritable characters and ideological differences would eventually scupper the project.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/vMBcpA1xI9A?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Jean-Marie Le Pen visits Vladimir Zhirinovsky (AP Archive).</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The then unknown but already well-connected fascist philosopher <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2006/06/01/the-philosophy-behind-the-nationalism-a204701">Alexander Dugin</a> interviewed Jean-Marie Le Pen for the leading Russian national-conservative newspaper <em>Den’</em>. Former diplomat and KGB chief Vladimir Kryuchkov (1924-2007), who played a leading role in the <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2016/08/19/the-forgotten-coup-a55030">August 1991 conservative putsch</a> that attempted to overthrow Mikhail Gorbachev, was also mentioned by Jean-Marie Le Pen as one of the <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=1rA0DwAAQBAJ&pg=PT77&lpg=PT77&dq=jean+marie+le+pen+glazounov+1968">instigators</a> of these first post-Soviet contacts with the French far right.</p>
<p>Jean-Marie Le Pen (along with his then right-hand man <a href="https://rassemblementnational.fr/author/bruno-gollnisch/">Bruno Gollnisch</a>) visited Russia several times, at least once in 1996 and again in 2003, while figures of the Russian nationalist right such as Sergey Baburin have <a href="https://www.nouvelobs.com/rue89/rue89-idees-land/20120103.RUE6821/pourquoi-le-front-national-est-fascine-par-la-russie.html">attended FN meetings</a>.</p>
<h2>Marine Le Pen’s Russian coming-out</h2>
<p>Once Marine Le Pen took over the reins of the FN in 2011, her family’s private ties to Russia became official party policy, in particular serving as a guiding principle in the area of foreign policy.</p>
<p>A good number of the people then surrounding her such as <a href="http://www.slate.fr/story/162369/fn-extreme-droite-francaise-guerre-ukraine-russie-lobby">Emmanuel Leroy</a>, <a href="https://www.francetvinfo.fr/elections/presidentielle/jeunesse-au-gud-accusations-d-antisemitisme-combines-financieres-frederic-chatillon-un-fidele-toujours-dans-l-ombre-de-marine-le-pen_2109402.html">Frédéric Châtillon</a>, <a href="https://www.streetpress.com/sujet/1478533707-schaffhauser-agent-russe-de-marine-le-pen">Jean-Luc Schaffhauser</a>, or even her former international adviser, <a href="https://www.ouest-france.fr/europe/russie/vladimir-poutine/la-fille-du-porte-parole-de-poutine-stagiaire-de-l-eurodepute-francais-aymeric-chauprade-6237778">Aymeric Chauprade</a>, boasted close links with Russia.</p>
<p>The attraction between the FN/RN and Russia is mutual and based on shared values. Key to understanding them is the concept of sovereignty, which includes several aspects:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>political and geopolitical sovereignty: the nation state must be above international legislation and supranational organisations.</p></li>
<li><p>economic sovereignty: economic protectionism is a legitimate tool against the destabilising, corporate-led phenomenon of globalisation.</p></li>
<li><p>cultural sovereignty: the nation is perceived as a homogeneous, ethnocultural entity where minorities or immigrants are accepted only if they agree to assimilate.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Opportunistic motives</h2>
<p>The alliance isn’t just driven by shared ideology. When Marine Le Pen became head of the FN, she sought international recognition in a bid to strengthen her presidential credentials. This included working to secure a meeting with Vladimir Putin, which took place in <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2017/article/2017/03/24/marine-le-pen-recue-par-vladimir-poutine-a-moscou_5100247_4854003.html">March 2017</a>.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/e2zjOLF8C3c?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Marine Le Pen: “One can’t treat Vladimir Putin with contempt” (INA Politique).</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>She largely owes her rise to Russia’s highest circles to her family’s ties with the Orthodox and monarchist oligarch <a href="https://www.rtbf.be/article/konstantin-malofeev-l-oligarque-de-dieu-proche-de-vladimir-poutine-et-de-la-famille-le-pen-10971433">Konstantin Malofeev</a>, introduced to the Le Pens by Glazunov. Malofeev’s TV channel Tsargrad regularly portrays Marine Le Pen in a glowing light.</p>
<p>The FN was also in need of financial support, and here again, Russia played a central role. For her 2017 presidential bid, Marine Le Pen obtained a loan of <a href="https://www.france24.com/fr/20170502-neuf-millions-euros-prix-fn-soutenir-diplomatie-poutine-ukraine-mediapart-schaffhauser-russ">9 million euros</a> from a bank with close ties to Vladimir Putin. An investigation by the French investigative-news website Mediapart also revealed that in 2014 Jean-Marie Le Pen <a href="https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/291114/la-russie-au-secours-du-fn-deux-millions-d-euros-aussi-pour-jean-marie-le-pen">received 2 million euros</a> from a Cyprus-based company controlled by a former KGB agent. While Marine Le Pen claimed that it was a loan, it remains unpaid, and at the time it was perceived as a reward for the FN’s support of Russia’s annexation of Crimea.</p>
<h2>Common interests</h2>
<p>The Kremlin has long had an interest in gaining allies with the potential to act as an echo chamber for its worldview. France is of particular interest because of the country’s relative independence from Washington and its status as a nuclear power and a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Major French companies are doing business in Russia and therefore inclined to lobby in Moscow’s favour, while France enjoys a rich Russian cultural scene due to the history of Russian emigration.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/D7lXBgtLXX0?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Is the French far-right candidate too close to Moscow? (France 24).</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>When foreign policy under President François Hollande (2012-2017) failed to play out in Russia’s favour, the Kremlin pivoted toward Marine Le Pen. But Moscow is typically more fair-weather friend than loyal ally. It partly deserted her in the 2017 presidential campaign when François Fillon (Les Républicains, LR) emerged as the leading right-wing candidate. For a while, Russian state TV presented him as a figure capable of rallying conservative religious and economic circles before <a href="https://www.letemps.ch/monde/entre-pen-fillon-kremlin-balance">swinging back in the direction of the RN</a>.</p>
<p>Since then, Marine Le Pen has become one of the darlings of <a href="https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/presidentielle-marine-le-pen-cauchemar-de-la-presse-occidentale-et-espoir-des-medias-russes_2171628.html">Russian television</a>. She is painted as a leading European politician, an authentic patriot, Gaullism’s natural heir, and the standard-bearer of the idea of a Europe of nations and of “traditional” values.</p>
<p>A victory by Marine Le Pen in Sunday’s presidential election would obviously be welcome news for Russia. As the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-how-russian-denial-of-civilian-casualties-follows-tactics-used-in-syria-179583">brutal war in Ukraine drags on</a>, the country’s support in Europe has dwindled to illiberal democracies such as Hungary and Serbia.</p>
<p>Based on <a href="https://graphics.reuters.com/FRANCE-ELECTION/POLLS/zjvqkomzlvx/">polling for the final round of the election</a>, a victory by the Rassemblement National seems unlikely. But even if Le Pen again fails in her bid to win the French presidency, her presence and that of several other political actors sympathetic to Russia on the right and far right – and with some nuance, on the far left – will help ensure that Moscow’s views continue to be reflected in the French political arena.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181649/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marlene Laruelle ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>A victory of the far-right presidential candidate would be good news for Moscow, which has a long-standing history with Le Pen and her party.Marlene Laruelle, Research Professor and Director at the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (IERES), The George Washington University, George Washington UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1814502022-04-21T12:18:35Z2022-04-21T12:18:35ZMany young French voters are approaching the presidential runoff with a shrug and vow to ‘vote blank’<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458944/original/file-20220420-56929-c01pkq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=7%2C23%2C2619%2C1583&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Decisions, decisions.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/woman-walks-past-official-campaign-posters-of-marine-le-pen-news-photo/1392521857?adppopup=true">Chesnot/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The race for the presidential post in France <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220406-the-12-candidates-standing-in-france-s-presidential-election">began with 12 candidates</a>. It will <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/16/europe/macron-le-pen-france-election-runoff-intl/index.html">conclude on April 24</a> with the same choice that confronted voters five years earlier: the centrist Emmanuel Macron or the far-right Marine Le Pen.</p>
<p>Sequels tend to be less inspiring, and the election as a whole has f<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/poll-shows-gap-between-le-pen-macron-abstention-is-seen-historic-low-2022-04-12/">ailed to spark widespread enthusiasm</a> among <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/france-election-president-2022-abstention-what-if-nobody-came/">many disappointed and often apathetic voters</a>, despite the starkly different visions for France displayed by the candidates.</p>
<p>Before the field was narrowed on April 10, French voters had a quintet of front-runners from across the political spectrum to choose from: Le Pen was <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/france/20210913-%C3%A9ric-zemmour-the-far-right-pundit-who-threatens-to-outflank-le-pen">being outflanked on the far right</a>, and the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/26/world/europe/melenchon-france-election-left.html">far left was at one point surging</a>. Meanwhile, centrist candidates including Macron seemingly failed to get much traction, and the right-wing Valérie Pécresse, representing the once powerful but now divided Les Républicains, ran arguably <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/09/france-presidential-election-macron-v-le-pen">the least successful campaign</a>.</p>
<h2>Grand disillusions of <em>La Grande Nation</em></h2>
<p>The election process has not been without intrigue, not least over the polarized positions and debates between the far-left environmentalist <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/09/france-presidential-election-macron-v-le-pen">Jean-Luc Mélenchon and the far-right polemicist Éric Zemmour</a>. But even here, the two candidates eventually failed to capture enough enthusiasm to propel them into the runoff.</p>
<p>Mélenchon, who prioritized “<a href="https://www.france24.com/en/france/20220417-leftist-party-consultation-shows-majority-will-abstain-vote-blank-in-macron-le-pen-run-off">planification écologique</a>,” or “ecological planning,” which focuses on <a href="https://www.jacobinmag.com/2021/10/jean-luc-melenchon-france-insoumise-political-philosophy-climate-change-short-termism-long-time">sustainability</a>, became only partially popular among young voters, many of whom tend toward a global, pan-European viewpoint at odds with <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/france-presidential-election-2022-emmanuel-macron-marine-le-pen-young-euroskeptics/">Mélenchon’s Euro-scepticism</a> and overall critique of the European Union.</p>
<p>The ultra-right Zemmour <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/30/world/europe/eric-zemmour-france-president.html">captured global headlines</a> through his zealous anti-immigration rhetoric and policies aimed at protecting what he saw as a pure French identity. And he proved quite popular at the beginning of the campaign with a group of youth supporters, numbering around 10,000 members, who called themselves <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/video/20220215-generation-z-pro-zemmour-far-right-youth-group-masters-art-of-posts-posters">Generation Z</a>.</p>
<p>But that name – and the association – quickly became problematic when the letter “Z” became a symbol of <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/03/09/1085471200/the-letter-z-russia-ukraine">Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine</a>. Zemmour’s campaign also suffered from another Z–related faux pas that became known as <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/macron-campaign-problem-president-no-candidate/">Z chez ZZ/</a> or “Z at ZZ.” Zemmour was booted out of the soccer club set up by the great Zizou, as former French national player Zinedine Zidane is affectionately known, after turning up <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/03/french-far-right-politician-eric-zemmour-booted-out-of-zinedine-zidane-football-club">uninvited</a> as part of a publicity stunt. Zemmour’s anti-immigration policies apparently did not sit well with the French-Algerian Zidane.</p>
<p>With both extreme candidates’ campaigns faltering, and those of others failing to ignite, <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/politics/article/2022/04/10/2022-french-presidential-election-a-first-round-marked-by-seriousness-strategic-voting-and-low-turnout_5980223_5.html">one-quarter of French voters stayed away from the ballot</a> on April 10 – the lowest participation rate since 2002. </p>
<p>And <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/france/20220410-live-follow-the-results-of-the-first-round-of-france-s-presidential-election">neither of the two front-runners got even close to the 50%</a> of the vote needed to avoid a runoff – Macron secured just shy of 28%, with Le Pen second on 23%. But the list of candidates shrinking to just two has done little to inject enthusiasm into the race.</p>
<p>Macron has governed France, one of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/13/france-lift-most-covid-controls-macron-rides-high-polls">most vaccinated nations in Europe</a>, through the COVID-19 crisis and may seem to outsiders as a sure bet – indeed he is thought likely to win the runoff with Le Pen <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/macrons-polling-lead-over-le-pen-widens-ahead-french-presidential-election-2022-04-19/">reasonably comfortably</a>. However, Macron is hardly being carried through on a wave of enthusiasm. His tenure as president to date has been marked by disappointment – with an approval rating that <a href="https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/france/">now hovers in the low 40s</a>.</p>
<p>His image was harmed by the <a href="https://www.npr.org/2018/12/03/672862353/who-are-frances-yellow-vest-protesters-and-what-do-they-want">Yellow Vests</a> movement – protesters who took to the street over the impact of a flat tax and an energy tax. Macron’s handling of the protest resulted in him being widely perceived as an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/15/macron-finds-elitist-tag-hard-to-shake-but-he-has-the-upper-hand">arrogant representative of the French elite</a>.</p>
<p>Le Pen’s campaign has centered around making the far-right candidate appear more approachable than <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/macron-campaign-problem-president-no-candidate/">Macron</a> by attempting to soften her image – hitherto associated with racism and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/frances-le-pen-proposes-referendum-immigration-if-elected-president-2021-09-27/">anti-immigration sentiments</a>.</p>
<p>As the French newspaper Le Monde summarizes, the choice between Macron and Le Pen pits the “<a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2022/article/2022/04/11/resultats-de-la-presidentielle-2022-le-premier-tour-bouleverse-le-paysage-politique-national_6121578_6059010.html">France of executives and retirees against France of employees and workers, cities against the periphery, European integration against national sovereignty …</a>” It is a choice not simply between the two very different candidates, but between two different futures.</p>
<h2><em>Déjà Vu</em>: Populist vs elitist</h2>
<p>But try as she might, Le Pen will find it hard to extinguish voters’ preexisting reservations concerning the far-right leader. In 2017, Le Pen’s Euro-scepticism, racism, xenophobia and Islamophobia <a href="https://www.natcom.org/communication-currents/france-en-marche-communicating-hope">stained her candidacy</a>. It may well keep many from voting for her this time around. Despite trying to soften her image – her <a href="https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement">promise to not abandon</a> the <a href="https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement">global climate agreement </a> and to take care of the French <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/macron-campaign-problem-president-no-candidate/">rural heartlands</a> have helped in this regard – Le Pen still espouses hard-right positions.</p>
<p>She insists on policies such as imposing fines on <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/marine-le-pen-headscarf-france-presidential-campaign-elections/">Muslim women who wear the veil</a> and advocates for Frexit – a French exit from the EU.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, as the war in Ukraine has shifted the focus of political debates, Le Pen has faced criticism over her <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/what-marine-le-pen-said-about-vladimir-putin-friend-admirer-1698984">apparent admiration for Russian president Vladimir Putin</a> and a <a href="https://www.thelocal.fr/20220420/latest-macron-and-le-pen-clash-on-household-finance-and-ukraine-in-live-debate/">previous loan to her party from a Russian bank</a>. Le Pen has had to walk a thin line between repairing her image while upholding her <a href="https://www.liberation.fr/politique/elections/cette-photo-le-pen-poutine-qui-gene-au-rn-20220301_D5PSTOFGCZE2VGQPI6ZWW44X3Q/?redirected=1">friendship with the Kremlin</a>.</p>
<p>The rapidly deteriorating image of Russia in France might well haunt Le Pen on election day.</p>
<p>Macron, meanwhile, has been trying to re-win voters’ hearts in multiple ways. He is openly <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/en/international/20220403-russia-must-answer-for-crimes-in-ukraine-says-france-s-macron-eu-atrocities-bucha">opposing the war in Ukraine</a> – to the extent that he has been accused of “<a href="https://www.indy100.com/news/emmanuel-macron-zelensky-outfit-pictures">cosplaying</a>” Volodymyr Zelenskyy by swapping his usual immaculate suits for the more casual hoodie and jeans preferred by the Ukrainian president. Such sartorial changes are aimed to put across an image of Macron as more approachable, as well as provide a visual juxtaposition to Le Pen’s sympathies for Russia.</p>
<p>Macron has also promised a renewal of his policies to make <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/france/20220417-leftist-party-consultation-shows-majority-will-abstain-vote-blank-in-macron-le-pen-run-off">France an environmental leader</a> of the world.</p>
<p>He aims to reboot the economy, even if that risks potentially unpopular measures, such as <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/03/24/macron-wants-to-push-back-frances-retirement-age-to-65-.html">pushing back the retirement age from 62 to 65</a> or tax increases that might lead to even more civil unrest.</p>
<p>It is a fine balance, though. Many families in France are suffering from the increase in the cost of living. Macron has failed to deliver an increase in <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/macron-knows-inflation-is-le-pens-best-weapon/2022/04/14/27daf744-bbbd-11ec-a92d-c763de818c21_story.html">purchasing power</a> for many voters and has been accused of being “<a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/macron-called-president-of-the-rich-in-new-study/1725852">the president of the rich</a>.”</p>
<h2>Between plague and cholera, <em>ce sera blanc</em></h2>
<p>One thing appears likely: 2022 <a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/04/16/the-race-to-be-the-next-president-of-france-enters-the-final-stretch?gclid=CjwKCAjwu_mSBhAYEiwA5BBmfzGia1K02azsdBHLRZr8GiVqds-j42z-nA2gEYSEy1W-b8iXlNLJVRoCdmwQAvD_BwE&amp;gclsrc=aw.ds">will not bring a landslide victory for Macron</a>, especially if the young voters, disappointed in both candidates, abstain. The apathy of the youth, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/france/20220414-french-students-block-schools-to-protest-choice-between-macron-and-le-pen">disappointed in both candidates</a>, can significantly alter the election’s outcome.</p>
<p>Environmental issues, particularly important for this demographic, are perceived as being not sufficiently prioritized, as seen in the criticism of the candidates by Clément Sénéchal, spokesperson for Greenpeace France, who described Macron and Le Pen as a “<a href="https://information.tv5monde.com/video/presidentielle-2022-un-climato-cynique-et-une-climato-sceptique-denonce-greenpeace">climate cynic” and a “climate skeptic</a>,” respectively.</p>
<p>[<em>Over 150,000 readers rely on The Conversation’s newsletters to understand the world.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?source=inline-150ksignup">Sign up today</a>.]</p>
<p>And Macron has also <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/macron-campaign-problem-president-no-candidate/">disappointed too many</a> of his young voters with a lack of social dialogue. Some claim that although Le Pen is still worse, it will be <a href="https://www.france24.com/fr/france/20220413-cette-fois-ci-cela-va-%C3%AAtre-humainement-impossible-de-voter-pour-macron">humanly impossible to vote for Macron</a> – as if the choice between the two is like the choice between plague and cholera.</p>
<p>Calls to boycott the upcoming election altogether have become louder in recent weeks. Many have vowed to abstain from the vote, claiming “<a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.fr/entry/ce-dessin-de-joann-sfar-resume-ce-que-beaucoup-de-francais-pensent_fr_6253ec83e4b0e97a3513e9c4">Pour moi ce sera blanc</a>” – “For me, it will be a blank vote.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181450/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>French voters face a stark choice at the polls, but many are saying ‘non’ to both candidates.Julia Khrebtan-Hörhager, Associate Professor of Critical Cultural & International Studies, Colorado State UniversityEvgeniya Pyatovskaya, Ph.D. Candidate in Communication, University of South FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1811802022-04-12T18:27:04Z2022-04-12T18:27:04ZFrench elections: a divided country faces an uncertain second round<p>The first round of the French election took place on April 10, and predictably it did nothing to resurrect old-school parliamentarism, five years after <a href="https://theconversation.com/disruption-ou-irruption-la-republique-dans-limpasse-presidentielle-174980">Emmanuel Macron</a> first burst into the country’s fragile party system.</p>
<p>On the contrary. Far from stabilising the political order born in 2017, it unveils an <a href="https://theconversation.com/first-round-of-the-french-election-apparent-stability-yet-a-profound-reconfiguration-181084">eerie landscape</a> from which the old governing parties seem to be excluded, on the right as well as on the left. Five years ago, with candidate Benoît Hamon at 6.36%, it was the Socialist Party (PS) that was on its way out; now it is the turn of conservative Les Républicains (LR), torn between Emmanuel Macron (La République en Marche, LREM) and Éric Zemmour (Reconquête), tallying less than 5% of the vote. Meanwhile, the PS was overtaken by rural centrist Jean Lassalle (Résistons) and communist Fabien Roussel (Parti Communiste Francais, PCF), marking the lowest score in its history at less than 2%.</p>
<p>This is a terrible descent into hell in a two-tier society where political parties that are still the masters of the game at the local level are paradoxically ditched at the national scale.</p>
<h2>Deadly triangulation</h2>
<p>In France there has been a longstanding discussion over adjusting the balance of power and creating the conditions for full democratic representation. However, this would have required reforming the country’s political institutions, and successive governments, left and right, have failed to do so. As a result, the merciless, guillotine-like mechanics of the presidential election have been at work, amid an atmosphere where anger and fear compete with resignation.</p>
<p>Uncertain voters, who have alternatively cast their ballot in the name of strategy, values, or protest, have hammered the last nails in the coffin of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/la-gauche-et-la-droite-font-elles-encore-sens-en-france-178181">distinction between the political left and right</a>. Now, voters hover around three poles:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>far right, with 32.29% of the vote and which has gained 1.6 million votes compared to 2017.</p></li>
<li><p>radical left, described by Mélenchon as “union populaire” (popular unity), with 22% of the vote.</p></li>
<li><p>centre right, as embodied by the current president, who received 27.84% of the vote.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Candidates outside these poles are left isolated: Roussel, Jadot, Pécresse, and Hidalgo total just 13.45% (4,727,073 votes). Caught between the far right and Macron, LR comes out particularly damaged by such dynamics. Valérie Pécresse received just 1,679,470 votes – 5,533,525 fewer than those cast for <a href="https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/fr/Elections/Les-resultats/Presidentielles/elecresult__presidentielle-2017/(path)/presidentielle-2017/FE.html">François Fillon</a> five years earlier.</p>
<p>Ecologists and the socialists are also reeling from the momentum that has benefited Mélenchon – who cast himself as the only progressive candidate capable of facing off against Macron and Le Pen.</p>
<h2>Spectacular defeats</h2>
<p>In the face of this great political shake-up, some defeats are more noticeable than others: of the twelve candidates, only three received more than 20% of the vote, while nine are below the 10% and eight below the 5% mark – and almost 15 points separate the fourth from the third candidate.</p>
<p>It is particularly strange to observe how at odds this new political field is with <a href="https://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/linvite-des-matins-dete/entre-decompositions-et-recompositions-ou-va-la-vie-politique-francaise">local power dynamics</a>. The <a href="https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Elections/Les-resultats/Presidentielles/elecresult__presidentielle-2017/(path)/presidentielle-2017/FE.html">2017 presidential election</a>, when the four candidates fought an exceptionally tight race, now seems like another world: at the time, Macron scored 24.01%; Le Pen, 21.30%; LR’s François Fillon, 20.01%; and Mélenchon, 19.58%.</p>
<p>Mélenchon can boast of a higher score than the polls suggested, although probably less important than he had hoped for: at 21.95%, he has progressed by 655,000 votes compared to 2017 (+5.97%). The fact that many ecologists and socialists rallied around him was not enough to compensate for the presence of his former communist ally, Roussell, who this time went it alone. Mélenchon fell short by just 421,000 votes in his bid to overtake Le Pen.</p>
<p>Macron, on the other hand, managed to come out ahead of his main rival by almost four points. With 27.84% of the vote, he improves his 2017 score by more than 1,130,000 votes (+13%). As for Le Pen, her 23.15% shows she has been successful in her appeal to the French to vote strategically for her, thereby overcoming the initial obstacle represented by Zemmour’s candidacy. Compared with the last election, she gains more than 450,000 votes (+5.96%).</p>
<h2>Vote transfers</h2>
<p>The road to the second round is riddled with uncertainties and pitfalls, and the game that will be played is doubly complex. Aside from the question of who will get the keys to the Elysée Palace, there is also the issue of the <a href="https://www.cairn.info/sociologie-des-institutions-politiques--9782707158611-page-87.html">capacity of the country’s institutions</a> to meet the expectations of a deeply divided country.</p>
<p>The first round’s results leave us with the illusion the second might yield a clearer outcome. Instead, its three-way crystallisation could curb what constitutes one of the two key dynamics of the second round: <a href="https://www.cairn.info/comment-les-electeurs-font-ils-leur-choix--9782724611076-page-381.htm">vote transfers</a>.</p>
<p>Le Pen seems to have the least to worry about on that front: The far-right vote is homogeneous and the two other candidates in her camp, Zemmour and Nicolas Dupont-Aignan (Debout la France, DLF), have called on their supporters to vote for her. In addition, the far-right leanings of the second most popular candidate of the LR’s primaries, Éric Ciotti, make it likely she will reap a share of the votes collected by Pécresse.</p>
<p>Le Pen could end up benefiting from some of Mélenchon’s “everything but Macron” votes. This is despite the fact the leftwing candidate urged his supporters several times on Sunday evening not to “give a single vote” to the far right, while failing to explicitly back Macron.</p>
<h2>A difficult campaign for Macron</h2>
<p>Faced with two blocs united by their common hostility to him, Macron does not have the same potential resources. It is true that Anne Hidalgo, Valérie Pécresse, Yannick Jadot and Fabien Roussel have firmly and clearly called to vote for him. But their potential electorate remains weak. Macron will have to fight hard to attract Mélenchon’s voters and make an LREM ballot politically less toxic to progressives. Other cards left to play include boosting participation levels among those who shunned the first round. Turnout in the latter was lacklustre: only two points more than in 2002 and four less than in 2017.</p>
<p>This brings us to the second dimension of the election: French institutions’ democratic efficiency. French people suffer from a <a href="https://www.sciencespo.fr/cevipof/fr/content/le-barometre-de-la-confiance-politique.html">dearth of confidence in their elected representatives</a>. These past years have gone to show that elections – however brilliant they may be – are not enough on their own to guarantee consent to politics. It will be necessary to invent a mode of government for the country to exit the dead-end into which the presidential illusion has parked it over the decades.</p>
<p>Rather than presidential smoke and mirrors, the future would look very different if France benefited from a <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2021/02/24/quel-serait-le-visage-de-l-assemblee-nationale-avec-la-proportionnelle-integrale-ou-partielle_6071093_4355770.html">proportional representation system</a> that allowed for pluralism and diversity of opinions. If our institutions worked in a way that was more respectful of the balance of power. To make do without this reform in the past five years has been a serious mistake. We must now foot the bill.</p>
<p>Emmanuel Macron seems to have understood this, as he declared on the evening of the first round:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“I am ready to invent something new to bring together [the country’s] various convictions and sensibilities.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Not having the means to act immediately, Macron must now work to convince voters of how he intends to proceed to help France escape from the vertical and concentrated practice of power up to now.</p>
<p>In light of the results of the first round, the exercise promises to be perilous. One of the French Revolution’s leading figures, Georges Danton, once said that it takes enthusiasm to found a republic. It’s also required to preserve one.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181180/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Claude Patriat ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>The first round of the French presidential elections leaves the country’s party system in tatters and voters divided along three poles. What will happen in the second round is now anyone’s guess.Claude Patriat, Professeur émérite de Science politique Université de Bourgogne, Université de Bourgogne – UBFCLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1809942022-04-11T12:58:41Z2022-04-11T12:58:41ZFrench election: as Marine Le Pen makes it to second round, the left-wing vote is what troubles president Emmanuel Macron<p>After the first round of the 2017 presidential election in France, economist <a href="https://www.liberation.fr/debats/2017/04/28/thomas-piketty-plus-le-score-de-macron-sera-fort-plus-il-sera-clair-que-ce-n-est-pas-son-programme-q_1566141/">Thomas Piketty</a> suggested that while there were four candidates on very close scores at the head of the field (Emmanuel Macron, Marine Le Pen, François Fillon and Jean-Luc Mélenchon), in reality France was divided into three political camps: a socialist and more-or-less eurosceptic left, a pro-European and liberal centre and right, and a nationalist far right. The results of the first round for this year’s presidential election suggest he was right. </p>
<hr>
<iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/french-election-as-marine-le-pen-makes-it-to-second-round-the-left-wing-vote-is-what-troubles-president-emmanuel-macron-180994&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p><em>You can listen to more articles from The Conversation, narrated by Noa, <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/audio-narrated-99682">here</a>.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>Despite a poor campaign, centrist president Macron has emerged in <a href="https://theconversation.com/les-resultats-du-premier-tour-une-stabilite-apparente-une-reconfiguration-profonde-181046">first place</a>, with 27.8% of the vote – three points up on 2017 and better than final opinion polls predicted.</p>
<p>Macron hoped that a late entry into the official campaign, leaving six weeks of playing the president-candidate, would allow him to use his management of the pandemic as a platform and focus on the electorate’s key concerns – the cost of living and pensions reform. The Ukrainian war got in the way, with Macron focusing too much on being president and not enough on being the candidate. A brief burst of rallying round the flag saw him surge past 30% before dropping back to a predicted score around 26%. Every vote above that on Sunday will have been seen as a bonus.</p>
<h2>Less is more</h2>
<p>By contrast, the general view is that Le Pen ran a good campaign – not the best, but good – by focusing less on the far-right aspects of her programme and instead posing as the candidate speaking for the economically hard pressed, struggling to make ends meet. This also meant, paradoxically, making less of an effort to look like a president in waiting and putting her <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20170324-marine-le-pen-visits-russia-french-presidential-election-putin">pro-Putin past</a> (and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/02/french-far-right-leader-marine-le-pen-forced-to-defend-putin-links">present?</a>) to one side by simply refusing to address it. Local and low-key were the watch words and they have worked, lifting her from 21% in 2017 to 23.15% now. But the score is nevertheless a disappointment.</p>
<p>Le Pen’s cause has benefited enormously from the presence of the other far-right candidate, Eric Zemmour. His outspoken campaign helped her seem more moderate even though she isn’t. But Zemmour’s low score of barely 7% suggests that Le Pen might not pick up as many votes from his departure from the race as she might have hoped. Even throwing in the 2% of the vote garnered by Nicolas Dupont-Aignan (another far-right candidate) and part of the vote for the mainstream right’s Valérie Pécresse suggests Le Pen will come up short again in the second round. </p>
<h2>The death of the French right?</h2>
<p>Pécresse’s tailspin has been a key subplot of the election. When she won the nomination for the mainstream right-wing Les Républicains last December, she was touted as a significant threat to Macron, but her campaign tanked. In the end, she sunk as low as to drop below the 5% vote threshold at which candidates get half their election expenses reimbursed by the state. On reflection, that Pécresse came away with just 4.8% isn’t so much of a surprise. Les Républicains is still a party full of heavyweights who are still household names, but most are throwbacks to the Nicolas Sarkozy years and votes these days are routinely lost to the parties led by Macron and Le Pen in both local and national elections.</p>
<h2>The votes still in play</h2>
<p>The award for the best performance goes to Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the left-wing La France Insoumise candidate who hauled himself past Pécresse and Zemmour to 21.95% (19.9% in 2017), despite hovering around 12-14% for much of the campaign. There was even a point late on Sunday evening when he very nearly closed the gap with Le Pen.</p>
<p>This is a remarkable achievement, suggesting the French left is not dead. Mélenchon remains divisive, but while he is not naturally a man to bring together the various factions of the left under his leadership, he has rallied their voters. The big question now is whether his voters will turn out to vote for Macron. Other left-wing candidate <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/video/20220410-french-presidential-election-centre-left-candidate-hidalgo-endorses-macron">Anne Hidalgo</a> and the Green party’s Yannick Jadot have asked theirs to do so but Mélenchon has not followed suit. As in 2017, Mélenchon has not declared himself for Macron, but instead flipped the question around. “Not a single vote for her” is the line.</p>
<p>This is why everything is still in play for the second round. The old certainty of republican discipline to block the far right seems less sure. Many left-wing voters find Macron unpalatable at best. Turnout therefore becomes a key pressure point in the two weeks ahead. There may not be a concern that many left-wing votes would go to Le Pen but Mélenchon’s position means that Macron will have to give those voters a reason to turn out for him rather than stay at home.</p>
<p>By the same token, however, Mélenchon has little to gain, even in the general election that follows in June, from being the man who made Le Pen president. The stakes could scarcely be higher.</p>
<h2>On to the second round</h2>
<p>Now Macron and Le Pen will face off in the second round on April 24. Le Pen’s team has planned a very different itinerary to 2017. Less frenetic, fewer personal appearances, a period of rest before the head-to-head election with Macron.</p>
<p>The president’s handlers, meanwhile, will be hoping that without the noise of the first-round campaign, he can make his programme audible and intelligible, while reining in his alarming tendency to put his foot in his mouth. The margins are too tight for Macron to go, in his <a href="https://theconversation.com/piss-off-annoy-shit-on-why-macrons-use-of-the-french-swear-word-emmerder-is-so-hard-to-translate-174627">vocabulary</a>, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20220107-macron-says-he-stands-by-remarks-pledging-to-piss-off-france-s-unvaccinated">pissing anyone else off</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/180994/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Smith does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Jean-Luc Mélenchon was the great success story of the first round. The question now becomes – who gets his votes in the second?Paul Smith, Associate Professor in French and Francophone Studies, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1810842022-04-11T11:56:36Z2022-04-11T11:56:36ZFirst round of the French election: apparent stability, yet a profound reconfiguration<p>With the majority of the ballots counted on Monday morning, the <a href="https://www.resultats-elections.interieur.gouv.fr/presidentielle-2022/FE.html">official results</a> of the first round of the French presidential election appear to confirm the power dynamics at work from the previous election. </p>
<p>Emmanuel Macron (La République en Marche, LREM) and Marine Le Pen (Rassemblement National, RN) have made it into the second round – in the same order as five years ago, making it the second time the duel will take place. The last and only time this happened in France was when Valéry Giscard d'Estaing (RPR) twice faced off against François Mitterrand (Socialist Party), first in 1974, when the <a href="https://www.lefigaro.fr/histoire/archives/2017/05/02/26010-20170502ARTFIG00146-10-mai-1974-le-debat-televise-giscard-mitterrand-point-d-orgue-de-l-entre-deux-tours.php">right-wing candidate won</a> and then again in 1981, when the <a href="https://www.lepoint.fr/invites-du-point/michele-cotta/giscard-mitterrand-1981-un-duel-historique-06-12-2020-2404386_1595.php">socialist candidate triumphed</a>.</p>
<p>Such stability is largely linked to the main candidates’ clout. Already in the game five years ago, Macron and Le Pen have been able to retain a loyal electoral base. Over the past weeks new voters have rallied around them, prioritising a so-called strategic vote (“vote utile”) over partisan considerations. </p>
<h2>Strategic voting</h2>
<p>Compared to 2017, Macron is up by <a href="https://www.lejdd.fr/Politique/presidentielle-retrouvez-tous-les-resultats-du-scrutin-commune-par-commune-4104853">nearly 4%</a>. The rise is all the more notable given the incumbent president has abandoned the middle-ground stance between right and left that had ensured his initial success and adopted an agenda that clearly places him <a href="https://www.lesechos.fr/idees-debats/editos-analyses/emmanuel-macron-balise-au-centre-droit-1362478">on the centre-right</a> of the political spectrum. </p>
<p>The move alienated a fraction of his voters from the left, but attracted a larger part of the voters from the centre and the right – a testament of which is the <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.fr/entry/les-resultats-de-valerie-pecresse-sont-les-pires-a-la-presidentielle-pour-la-droite_fr_624ebd8ce4b007d3845fbea5">very low score</a> (4,7%) of Valérie Pécresse, candidate of Les Républicains (LR).</p>
<p>Le Pen has <a href="https://www.lejdd.fr/Politique/presidentielle-avec-pres-de-24-des-voix-marine-le-pen-obtient-un-score-historique-pour-son-parti-4104873">risen nearly as much</a>, with a score never before achieved by the Front National (FN) and then RN within the context of a presidential election. She too benefited from calls to vote strategically and was thus able to largely outperform Éric Zemmour (Reconquête), the former <em>Figaro</em> journalist and far-right candidate. Having initially undermined her leadership, in the end Zemmour helped complete Le Pen’s decade-long effort to “normalise” her candidacy. By claiming the niche of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/dou-vient-lobsession-identitaire-de-la-politique-francaise-175540">identity-based right</a>, Zemmour enabled Le Pen to stress the bread-and-butter issues that appealed to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/economic-fallout-from-ukraine-war-could-give-le-pens-social-populist-strategy-an-edge-179863">working classes</a>. </p>
<p>On the left of the political spectrum, Jean-Luc Mélenchon of La France Insoumise (LFI) obtained his best score in his third presidential election, also benefiting from the in extremis support of an electorate of the moderate left concerned above all to avoid a second round opposing Emmanuel Macron to Marine Le Pen. Mélenchon came within less than 1.5 points of Le Pen’s score, yet wasn’t able to stop her and make it to the second round himself. </p>
<h2>A French political field split into three</h2>
<p>The momentum of the strategic vote, which picked up barely a month before the first round, appears to confirm the restructuring of the French political field around three major poles dating back to the 2017 election.</p>
<ul>
<li><p>A liberal, centrist and European pole attracting, at every national election, a little more than a quarter of the voters but which, thanks to the mechanics of the majority vote, manages to dominate political life until now. </p></li>
<li><p>A populist and identity-based pole, today dominated by Le Pen and represented by two candidates whose cumulative score (over 30%) constitutes an all-time record for the extreme right and populist identity in a national election in France: it is therefore this pole that has recorded the strongest surge over the last five years.</p></li>
<li><p>A radical left-wing pole, dominated by the La France Insoumise. If we include the results of the communist and Trotskyist candidates, this totals just under 25% of the vote. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Such a three-way split results in the marginalisation of the two political parties that have structured French political life since the 1970s, the centre-right Les Republicains (formerly the UMP) and the centre-left Socialist Party.</p>
<h2>The decline of the traditional parties: an air of déjà vu</h2>
<p>With less than 2% of the vote, the Socialist Party sees a decline that could merely be circumstantial. Such a turn of events is not without reminding of the fate of the Radical Party at the beginning of the Fifth Republic: having dominated the left at the time, the party had fallen victim to the bipolarisation of the political landscape set in motion by President Charles de Gaulle and had survived only thanks to a large network of elected representatives, mainly present (like that of the Socialist Party today) in the southwest of France.</p>
<p>The decline of the traditional right is another significant fact of this election, with LR candidate Valérie Pécresse gaining just a quarter of the score achieved by her party five years earlier. The result appears as yet another blow to Les Républicains (LR), who recorded their <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2019/05/26/elections-europeennes-2019-les-republicains-placent-la-droite-a-son-plus-bas-niveau_5467643_4355770.html">lowest vote share</a> in the 2019 European elections at 8.4%, in contrast to 20.1% in 2014. It also goes to show the narrowness of the political space now occupied by this party, wedged between Macron’s centre-right and Marine Le Pen’s populist far right.</p>
<h2>Important developments since 2017</h2>
<p>It’s important to not interpret the results of this first round as a repeat of the 2017 election. The apparent stability of the balance of power masks important changes. The political landscape continues to shift rightward. Testament to this is the emergence of Éric Zemmour’s identity-based platform and Emmanuel Macron’s renewed political offer. While Jean-Luc Mélenchon made gains, they were not enough to compensate for the Socialist Party’s precipitous decline.</p>
<p>Populism also continues to grow. In five years and under the effect of a certain number of social movements (the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/yellow-vest-protests-65314">Yellow Jackets</a> in particular), its rhetoric has become more radical. More than ever, the split between the people and the elite shows itself at the ballot box. This populist rise weakens Emmanuel Macron, whose position is less favourable than it may appear at first glance.</p>
<p>The incumbent president obtains scores comparable to some of his predecessors who were not re-elected for a second term: Giscard d'Estaing in 1981 (28% of the vote), Nicolas Sarkozy in 2012 (27% of the vote). Moreover, he cannot capitalise on the desire for change that largely explained his victory five years ago. The campaign between the two rounds will thus bring into play two antagonistic projects, two visions of society, but also a tension between the “dégagisme” (i.e., a political ideology based on the French verb <em>dégager</em>, “to oust”, calling for the rejection of the established political class) hostile to the outgoing president, and calls by most first round candidates for a collective front against the extreme right.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181084/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mathias Bernard is president of the University of Clermont-Auvergne.</span></em></p>The dynamics of the “strategic vote” in France have amplified the restructuring of the political field around three major poles: centrist, identitarian and far left.Mathias Bernard, Historien, Université Clermont Auvergne (UCA)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1808192022-04-08T16:12:28Z2022-04-08T16:12:28ZBehind French election tweets, the far right is hidden in plain sight<p>During the 2017 French presidential election, Emmanuel Macron was the darling of digital democracy. With his calls for a “startup nation,” the future head of state placed technology at the centre not only of his programme but also of his <a href="https://frenchcrossroads.substack.com/p/startup-president-part-3?s=r">campaign</a>.</p>
<p>The now-president’s digital performance in the run-up to this year’s election has been much less clear-cut. It’s left-wing Jean-Luc Mélenchon who’s been trying to push the technological envelope, going so far as to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/06/jean-luc-melenchon-hologram-french-election">appear in the form of a hologram</a>, while Macron concentrated on shifting his programme to the right. And while he still leads in the polls, his <a href="https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/france/">margin is slipping</a>. Indeed, five years after Macron took office, far-right candidates have been more effective than Macron at exploiting the Internet and social networks.</p>
<p>In the newly published book <a href="https://www.epflpress.org/produit/1047/9782889154548/l-illusion-de-la-democratie-numerique"><em>L’illusion de la démocratie numérique. Internet est-il de droite?</em></a> (EPFL Press), I argue that conservatives dominate online. While the Internet may have been a key part of left-leaning movements, such as the Arab Spring or Occupy Wall Street, the right dominates the online world thanks to factors such as its popular bases, hierarchical organisations, capital, as well as social inequality. The French presidential elections are a case in point.</p>
<h2>The French Internet: a political genealogy</h2>
<p>But before we turn to the current elections, it is worth revisiting French politics’ digital history. France is no newcomer to digital politics, with the egalitarian use of the 1980s pre-web French <a href="https://daily.jstor.org/thank-minitel-for-the-french-election/">Minitel computers for political information</a> paving the way to current global networks. Imagining the early web as a bastion of left-leaning French politics led by Macron is overly simplistic, though, as the National Front was the first political party in France to have a web presence, as well as an army of trolls working behind the scenes.</p>
<p>But it would be a mistake to view Le Pen’s support as artificial or top-down. She has been the sleeper in this current election, pulling ahead in the polls. While digital media eyes were on Zemmour, Le Pen boasts a strong base of support throughout the country, both online and offline. From Facebook groups, Twitter, down to WhatsApp channels, she dominates her rival. Despite extensive coverage in international media outlets, the former <em>Figaro</em> columnist has fewer than 400,000 Twitter followers, versus 2.7 million in the case of Le Pen.</p>
<h2>Zemmour and Le Pen</h2>
<p>Both have launched their campaigns amid a rightward turn of French politics, as voters increasingly resent the gap between their purchasing power and that of previous generations. While Zemmour and Le Pen have both clearly capitalised on such sentiments, scapegoating immigrants subtly or explicitly, there are differences between them.</p>
<p>Throughout his campaign, Zemmour has deployed an openly Islamophobic rhetoric that closely mirrored that of a <a href="http://hatemeter.eu/">research project tracking online anti-Muslim hatred</a> between 2018 and 2020. Zemmour’s movement, Reconquête (“Reconquer”) echoes the theme of a supposed “invasion” by immigrants that marked the 2016 US presidential campaign. Like former US president Donald Trump, Zemmour asserts the need to make France “great again”.</p>
<p>Le Pen also privileges imagery celebrating “traditional France”, including its agricultural heritage. Unlike Zemmour, she has confined most of her speeches to bread-and-butter issues, directly appealing to much of the working-class and rural <em>gilets jaunes</em> base. The movement started out in 2018 as a fuel-tax occupations in mostly small towns stopping traffic and morphed into a series of mostly urban marches. Once focused on cost-of-living issues, the protesters’ demands became diverse and sometimes contradictory ideologically, and the movement lost steam in late 2019 when the pandemic hit.</p>
<h2>Popular bases</h2>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456985/original/file-20220407-21-mlmngx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456985/original/file-20220407-21-mlmngx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456985/original/file-20220407-21-mlmngx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456985/original/file-20220407-21-mlmngx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456985/original/file-20220407-21-mlmngx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456985/original/file-20220407-21-mlmngx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=672&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456985/original/file-20220407-21-mlmngx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=672&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456985/original/file-20220407-21-mlmngx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=672&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In advance of the French election, Eric Zemmour has been sinking in the polls relative to Marine Le Pen, and so has sought to dismiss them.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Eric Zemmour/Twitter</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Too many people on the left present right-wing leaders as puppet masters and downplay the role of organised people on the ground. The fantasy is that by somehow getting rid of these leading online influencers, whether Zemmour or Le Pen, or even Putin or Trump, that the right-wing digital base will disappear.</p>
<p>The reality is in fact the opposite. These leaders built their movements on existing networks and groups. These include everything from the far-right component of the <em>gilets jaunes</em> to Civitas, Action Française, and even elements of the Catholic Church. Institutions like these are more likely to have a solid network of political supporters that are in constant communication, as well as have dedicated armies of volunteers to post and promote online content relevant to its members.</p>
<p>This finding of the role of organisations, and especially what I found in the United States in how hierarchical organisations dominated online as opposed to the myth of horizontal digital activism. Simply put, conservative groups are more likely to be hierarchical, as compared to many of those on the left, and this enables more online engagement.</p>
<h2>A media ecosystem benefiting the far right</h2>
<p>But it is not just individual groups peppered throughout France, or any other country, that enable conservative digital activism. Key to the circulation of social media information is how these groups work in sync with an ecosystem of other like-minded organisations. As in the United States, conservative media outlets are growing in France: the far-right media empire of <a href="https://www.vivendi.com/en/biography/vincent-bollore/">Vincent Bolloré</a> includes CNews, which propelled Zemmour into the nightly TV spotlight, while the media conglomerate of <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20200122-bernard-arnault-france-s-wolf-in-cashmere-billionaire">Bernard Arnault</a> pushes free-market ideas. And the content they produce and personalities they promote feed directly into conservative social-media feeds, despite – and because of – conservative claims that the media censors them.</p>
<p>By contrast, the left in France is fragmented and does not work as effectively as the far right does with all types of media outlets. This has a direct relationship with what works – and doesn’t – in terms of virality on social media. Conservative conceptions of <em>freedom</em> play better on platforms that favour simplistic, short, and provocative posts, whether it is “freedom” from immigrant “invasions” or from “mask mandates.” The left focuses more on principles such as <em>fairness</em>, and the messages are inherently more nuanced and dispersed. Whether it is the environment, gender rights, anti-racism, or LGBTQ+ issues, the broad coalition of ideas can lead to fuzzy messaging. So in today’s digital era, the left has a bigger hill to climb, and France is no exception.</p>
<p>So this is how ideology, even in its own right, fuels the digital activism gap I found in my research in why conservatives dominate online.</p>
<h2>Inequality</h2>
<p>Now for the last factor that we also see in France: inequality. The Internet was supposed to be a place where everyone can come together on the same playing field, but this is not the case. But how does this map onto the French working-class increasingly voting for Le Pen?</p>
<p>As the saying goes, the devil is in the details. Not included in polls of Le Pen’s working-class base are the members of the working-class who do not vote or those who are not citizens and thus can’t vote. As it is defined in surveys, the working class in France also does not include other low-wage workers or those unable to work. The digital divide in access and skills, for example, is still strong in France, especially in rural areas. The cliche of far-right supporters is that they are duped, uninformed, and uneducated, but in my research and with Zemmour’s base, it’s key to see the dominance of middle to upper-class “well-educated” voters that he has captured.</p>
<h2>The right’s big money</h2>
<p>Questions have also swirled around who may be financing Zemmour’s glitzy campaign of slick posters, synced social media, and well-orchestrated rallies. Certainly, conservatives are more likely to have these resources, both individually and organisationally. And this kind of big money is key to digital <em>production</em> of online content, but it does not automatically result in digital <em>participation</em>. It takes people on the ground who believe and support these far-right philosophies to keep the social media content flowing. It is not just individual supporters. Political organisations, whether parties or civil society groups, that have a lot of resources can harness the power of platform algorithms by paying staff (or trolls) to engage online or can afford the high-tech software and other gadgets to sustain digital participation.</p>
<p>The result, then, of differences in institutions, ideologies, and inequalities offline is a dominance of the far right online. The bottom line is that offline power results in online power, and with conservatives having and gaining power, it is an uphill battle for those on the left.</p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310261/original/file-20200115-134768-1tax26b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310261/original/file-20200115-134768-1tax26b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=158&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310261/original/file-20200115-134768-1tax26b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=158&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310261/original/file-20200115-134768-1tax26b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=158&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310261/original/file-20200115-134768-1tax26b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=198&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310261/original/file-20200115-134768-1tax26b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=198&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310261/original/file-20200115-134768-1tax26b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=198&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><em>Created in 2007 to help accelerate and share scientific knowledge on key societal issues, the AXA Research Fund has been supporting nearly 650 projects around the world conducted by researchers from 55 countries. To learn more, visit the site of the <a href="https://www.axa-research.org">Axa Research Fund</a> or follow on Twitter <a href="https://twitter.com/axaresearchfund?lang=fr">@AXAResearchFund</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/180819/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jen Schradie ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>While many progressive movements have organised online, conservatives dominate because of better organisation, capital, and social inequality. France’s presidential elections are a case in point.Jen Schradie, Digital Sociologist, Sciences Po Paris, Sciences Po Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1808352022-04-08T12:38:37Z2022-04-08T12:38:37ZWill French presidential election be a case of ‘plus ca change, moins ca change?’ – 5 things to watch as nation heads to the poll<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/457002/original/file-20220407-21-lcdq1p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=22%2C37%2C4953%2C3252&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Is France heading for Macron vs. Le Pen rematch?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/woman-walks-past-official-campaign-posters-of-marine-le-pen-news-photo/1389505862?adppopup=true">Chesnot/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>With <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-04-05/french-election-le-pen-narrows-gap-on-macron-in-tighter-race">polls suggesting a narrowing gap</a> among the front-runners, French voters will begin the two-stage <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/france-presidential-election-2022.html">process of choosing a president</a> on April 10, 2022.</em> </p>
<p><em>A lot has changed since incumbent Emmanuel Macron <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39839349">captured the presidency in 2017</a> – with a <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/coronavirus-5830">global pandemic</a> and a <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/ukraine-invasion-2022-117045">major conflagration in Europe</a> topping the list. Yet the vote looks likely to be heading to another showdown between Macron and far-right challenger Marine Le Pen, despite the presence of new faces in the election campaign. A second round of voting is expected to take place on April 24.</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation U.S. asked European politics expert <a href="https://www.american.edu/sis/faculty/garretm.cfm">Garret Martin of American University</a> to provide a guide of what to watch for in the election.</em></p>
<h2>1. Encore! When one national vote isn’t enough</h2>
<p>April 10 will mark only the first in a series of votes that will take place in France in the coming weeks. In the first round of the presidential election, voters will be deciding between <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/france/20220307-france-narrows-presidential-field-to-12-official-candidates">12 official candidates</a>, including front-runners Macron and Le Pen. </p>
<p>If no one candidates secures more than 50% of all votes – an outcome that is <a href="https://www.economist.com/interactive/france-2022">very likely</a> – the two leading candidates qualify for a run-off that is scheduled for April 24. In that second-round vote, the candidate with the most votes will become president.</p>
<p>But the voting won’t end there. The French public will be called upon again to vote in <a href="https://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/3804/">two rounds of parliamentary elections</a> currently scheduled for June 12 and June 19. </p>
<p>These parliamentary elections are just as crucial as the ones to choose a president. Whoever wins the presidency will be dependent on securing a majority of supporters in parliament to implement his or her agenda.</p>
<p>But should Macron win re-election, he may be tempted to dissolve the parliament the next day, which would mean holding the elections two weeks earlier than planned. This could hypothetically give him a chance to capitalize on the momentum of the presidential election to elect a parliament aligned with his agenda.</p>
<h2>2. The demise of the mainstream</h2>
<p>One key thing to watch in the first round of voting is how well – or badly – France’s establishment parties do.</p>
<p>Up until 2017, French politics was dominated by two parties: the <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2017/07/20/french-socialist-party-does-the-ps-still-have-a-future/">leftist Socialist Party</a> and the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/07/opinion/europe-politics.html">conservative Les Républicains</a>. Candidates from one or the other of these two parties has won every single presidential election since 1958. </p>
<p>And then came the political earthquake of 2017. In that election, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2017/apr/23/french-presidential-election-results-2017-latest">neither party even qualified for the second-round runoff</a>. Les Républicains’ candidate was nudged out a place in the second round by Le Pen and the Socialist candidate could barely muster more than 6% of the vote. </p>
<p>Emmanuel Macron topped the first-round vote in 2017 and went on to win the runoff. He did so as the head of a new party, <a href="https://carnegieeurope.eu/2018/04/06/en-marche-from-movement-to-government-pub-75985">La République En Marche</a>. Macron positioned himself in the center of the political spectrum, taking oxygen away from the two established parties.</p>
<p>Five years on, the <a href="https://graphics.reuters.com/FRANCE-ELECTION/POLLS/zjvqkomzlvx/">polls have confirmed the demise</a> of these two previously dominant political parties. Barring a major surprise, the Socialist party and Les Républicains will once again be shut out of the second round. <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/6855ef17-643c-4cfd-b249-0bbbb9a85195">Current predictions</a> suggest fewer than 10% of voters will opt for Les Républicains’ Valérie Pécresse and barely 2% for Anne Hidalgo, the Socialist mayor of Paris.</p>
<p>A catastrophic result in the first round of voting could very well spell the end of these two parties.</p>
<h2>3. And the rise of the extremes</h2>
<p>Macron’s capturing of the political center is only half of the story. The demise of traditional mainstream parties in France has been helped along by the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/13/world/europe/france-far-right-national-rally-le-pen-macron.html">growth of political extremes</a>, with more voters gravitating to the extreme left and right.</p>
<p>But for the first time in recent French political history, the far-right camp is split between two candidates, seasoned presidential candidate Le Pen and Eric Zemmour, a TV pundit and journalist who has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/27/world/europe/eric-zemmour-france.html">presented himself as the insurgent far right candidate</a> in the 2022 election.</p>
<p>In single-round votes, such a divide might hurt the chances of election success for the right, but that is hardly the case here. Polls suggest that Le Pen and Éric Zemmour combined <a href="https://graphics.reuters.com/FRANCE-ELECTION/POLLS/zjvqkomzlvx/">will attract close to one-third</a> of all votes. And Le Pen is still very likely to qualify for the run-off against Macron, during which she can be expected to pick up a majority of Zemmour’s voters.</p>
<p>Zemmour’s campaign – with its <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20220329-spooked-by-immigration-islam-and-woke-ideas-who-are-%C3%A9ric-zemmour-s-supporters">fiery rhetoric and extreme views on migration</a> – has in many ways helped, and not hindered Le Pen. It has bolstered Le Pen’s “<a href="https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2021/07/02/has-marine-le-pen-s-normalisation-strategy-taken-the-french-far-right-out-of-the-running">normalization” strategy</a> of recent years, through which she has attempted to improve the image of her party and make it appear more respectable. </p>
<p>As Bruno Cautrès, a <a href="https://www.sciencespo.fr/cevipof/en/researcher/bruno-cautres.html">political scientist at Sciences-Po</a> university in Paris, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/04/the-rise-and-rise-of-frances-far-right-marine-le-pen">explained in a recent Guardian article</a>: “The radicality of Eric Zemmour has softened the image of Marine Le Pen.” </p>
<p>The apparent success in Le Pen’s strategy is seen in the tightening race. Polls predict only <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/6855ef17-643c-4cfd-b249-0bbbb9a85195">a narrow advantage for Macron in the case of a runoff against Le Pen</a>. In 2017, in comparison, Macron <a href="https://graphics.france24.com/results-second-round-french-presidential-election-2017/">trounced Le Pen in the second round</a>, winning 66% of the votes.</p>
<p>Meanwhile on the left, the radical wing has also been on the ascendancy. Veteran politician <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20220407-jean-luc-m%C3%A9lenchon-the-veteran-leftist-standing-in-way-of-macron-le-pen-rematch">Jean-Luc Mélenchon</a>, in his third presidential campaign, is the clear standard bearer on the left. With his focus on inequality and the rising cost of living, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/26/world/europe/melenchon-france-election-left.html">he has firmly placed himself</a> in third place in the polls, with close to <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/6855ef17-643c-4cfd-b249-0bbbb9a85195">17% of intended votes</a>. </p>
<p>Mélenchon is still unlikely to displace either Macron or Le Pen in the runoff positions. But even so, a third-place finish will give further evidence that French voters are gravitating away from the political center.</p>
<h2>4. The shadow of Putin</h2>
<p>The French election is taking place with a backdrop of war in Europe, which has given voters the opportunity to review candidates’ record on Russia.</p>
<p>Macron aside, many of the leading candidates have displayed a history of complacency toward Putin, prior to the invasion of Ukraine. Mélenchon, with his strong ideological animus toward the United States, <a href="https://www.franceinter.fr/politique/de-la-menace-n-existe-pas-a-la-russie-agresse-l-ukraine-sur-la-russie-melenchon-varie">called Russia a partner early 2022</a>. Meanwhile, Zemmour called Putin a “<a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/where-is-france-anti-kremlin-russia-candidate-marine-le-pen-charles-de-gaulle-valerie-pecresse/">patriot” defending Russian interests</a>. And Le Pen gave a prominent place to a picture of herself with Putin <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/02/french-far-right-leader-marine-le-pen-forced-to-defend-putin-links">in campaign leaflets</a> in an apparent bid to highlight her international stature.</p>
<p>Since the invasion of Ukraine, most of these candidates have changed their tone somewhat toward Russia and Putin, or pivoted to other subjects. Le Pen, for instance, has reoriented her campaign toward <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/05/france-election-macron-le-pen-ukraine/">the rising cost of living and the impact of sanctions on energy prices</a>. And the current polls do not suggest they will face significant repercussions among voters for their past flirting with the Russian president. At the very least, it does not look like like it will prevent Le Pen from being in the runoff again, despite late attempts by Macron to <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2022/04/06/france-election-macron-targets-le-pen-s-indulgence-of-putin-as-hard-right-rival-closes-gap">draw attention to his opponents’ perceived</a> “indulgence regarding Vladimir Putin.” </p>
<p>[<em>Get the best of The Conversation, every weekend.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?nl=weekly&source=inline-weeklybest">Sign up for our weekly newsletter</a>.]</p>
<h2>5. Beyond Ukraine</h2>
<p>As the apparent limited impact of candidates’ attitude to Putin suggests, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/5/five-reasons-why-you-should-care-about-french-elections">the war in Ukraine is not at the top of most voters’ concerns</a>.</p>
<p>With record-high inflation in the Eurozone – running at 5.1% this year – <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2022/03/29/five-charts-to-explain-the-key-issues-shaping-france-s-presidential-race">the rising cost of living has become a major source of concern</a> for many French people. It is further compounded by other economic difficulties, such as <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/increase-in-electricity-prices-inevitable-says-french-elected-official/">high energy</a> and housing costs. And pocketbook challenges are also combining with other hot-button debates <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2022/03/29/five-charts-to-explain-the-key-issues-shaping-france-s-presidential-race">around the environment and immigration</a>.</p>
<p>While there is no shortage of major topics in the current presidential campaign, the shadow of apathy and cynicism looms large. Forecasts suggest we could see <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/france/20220325-turnout-concerns-loom-large-for-french-presidential-election-frontrunners">close to 30% abstention rate in the first round of the election</a>. This would be the lowest participation rate since 2002.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/180835/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Garret Martin receives funding from the European Union for the Transatlantic Policy Center, which he co-directs.</span></em></p>For the second time running, it is looking like the French presidential election will go to a runoff between centralist Emmanuel Macron and far-right Marine Le Pen.Garret Martin, Senior Professorial Lecturer, Co-Director Transatlantic Policy Center, American University School of International ServiceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1807192022-04-08T10:45:25Z2022-04-08T10:45:25ZFrench election: who are the candidates running against Emmanuel Macron?<p>On April 10, 48 million French will be asked to vote in the first round of France’s 2022 presidential election. Of the 12 candidates, only two will qualify for the second-round runoff taking place on April 24. These are the candidates in the running. </p>
<h2>Emmanuel Macron</h2>
<p>Incumbent President Emmanuel Macron is the favourite to win both the first and second rounds of the election to secure a second five-year mandate. He survived the two main crises of his term: the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/yellow-vest-protests-65314">“yellow vests”</a> protests and the pandemic. He has also benefited from the Ukraine war and the “rally-round-the-flag” effect, polling up to 30%.</p>
<p>The 44th president has campaigned on gender equality, European integration and his strong record on employment. Yet, the rising cost of living, a recent scandal involving consulting firm <a href="https://qz.com/2152056/macron-could-be-in-trouble-for-hiring-mckinsey-to-help-run-france/">McKinsey</a> and his refusal to engage in TV debates with other candidates will not help his image of an aloof and elitist “president of the rich”. </p>
<p>Despite a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/french-election-poll-macron-beat-le-pen-le-pen-gains-ground-2022-04-06/">marked drop in the latest polls</a>, Macron remains popular with the elderly and the middle classes, two groups who can be relied upon to vote even if a low turnout is expected.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/war-anxiety-makes-french-voters-rally-round-macron-for-how-long-179120">War anxiety makes French voters rally round Macron. For how long?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Marine Le Pen</h2>
<p>A candidate for the far right since 2012, Marine Le Pen is the favourite to face president Macron in the second round, as she did in 2017. Moving away from the traditional far-right agenda and softening her eurosceptic stance, she has cleverly campaigned on economic issues and the popular theme of the cost of living, getting solid support from the working class.</p>
<p>Her proposals include lowering VAT and ditching income tax for under 30s, as well as a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/frances-le-pen-proposes-referendum-immigration-if-elected-president-2021-09-27/">referendum on immigration</a>.</p>
<p>Le Pen’s former image of a harsh and incompetent leader has been replaced by a softer, more composed figure. She has resisted Eric Zemmour’s challenge, even when key members of her party and even her niece (Marion Maréchal Le Pen) deserted her to support him. The key question now is whether this new image will be enough to see off a challenge from the far left to make it to the second round again.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/economic-fallout-from-ukraine-war-could-give-le-pens-social-populist-strategy-an-edge-179863">Economic fallout from Ukraine war could give Le Pen’s social-populist strategy an edge</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Jean-Luc Mélenchon</h2>
<p>The man worrying Le Pen as she aims for a head-to-head with Macron is currently Jean-Luc Mélenchon. The candidate from the radical left-wing party La France Insoumise is enjoying a surge thanks to a strong, and at times <a href="https://www.euronews.com/next/2022/04/06/france-election-jean-luc-melenchon-s-hologram-held-12-campaign-rallies-at-once">innovative</a>, campaign. Mélenchon has steadily climbed in the polls to become the strongest outsider. Solid oratory skills, consistency and lack of competition on the left have enabled him to position himself as the only credible left-wing option.</p>
<p>The 70-year-old veteran campaigner is running on a <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/jean-luc-m-lenchon-s-populist-gamble/">post-Keynesian agenda</a> involving increased public spending and is emphasising green policies.</p>
<p>Mélenchon would like to be seen as the voice of the deprived suburbs and ethnic minorities. And as a great debater, he will pose a significant challenge for Macron if makes it as far as the TV debate which traditionally takes place after the first round.</p>
<p>However, Mélenchon’s weak points – including his ambiguous <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J0Z7el1PtXM">position</a> on what to do about Vladimir Putin and the war in Ukraine and his radical economic agenda – have the potential to alienate moderate voters.</p>
<h2>Éric Zemmour</h2>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="French presidential candidate Éric Zemmour" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456571/original/file-20220406-12-mdsvaw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456571/original/file-20220406-12-mdsvaw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456571/original/file-20220406-12-mdsvaw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456571/original/file-20220406-12-mdsvaw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456571/original/file-20220406-12-mdsvaw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456571/original/file-20220406-12-mdsvaw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456571/original/file-20220406-12-mdsvaw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Eric Zemmour has run a controversial campaign.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Controversial far-right journalist Éric Zemmour was the sensation of the beginning of the campaign. Presenting himself as the French Donald Trump, he surprised everyone by polling up to 18% and had looked set to qualify for the second round.</p>
<p>Zemmour has attracted impressive crowds to his rallies and he has even managed to create a successful <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/jean-luc-melenchon-eric-zemmour-launch-presidential-campaigns/">new political party</a>. But Zemmour’s project has rapidly unravelled thanks to confusion and controversy surrounding his position on issues such as immigration, gender and the Ukraine war. Still, Zemmour and his supporters claim he remains the one to watch on April 8.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/eric-zemmour-the-far-right-polemicists-ideas-have-a-long-history-in-france-169430">Éric Zemmour: the far-right polemicist’s ideas have a long history in France</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Valérie Pécresse</h2>
<p>Valérie Pécresse, the conservative candidate from Les Républicains (the party of former president Nicolas Sarkozy) is the big disappointment of this campaign. After unexpectedly winning the vote to become the candidate of Les Républicains, she looked at one point able to qualify for the second round.</p>
<p>Yet due to a lacklustre campaign, the absence of support from Sarkozy and one particularly <a href="https://www.thelocal.fr/20220215/opinion-fear-and-laziness-explain-pecresses-disastrous-french-election-start/">catastrophic public meeting</a>, she has continuously slipped in the polls. It’s now unlikely that Pécresse will take more than 10% of the vote, leaving her clearly behind the other main contenders.</p>
<h2>…And everyone else</h2>
<p>Alongside the candidates who stand some chance are a crowd of others who do not. Yannick Jadot, the Green candidate, is too far from the main candidates to hope for a second round place. Green parties do well in France’s local elections but traditionally struggle in presidential votes and 2022 will be no exception, despite the global environmental challenges. </p>
<p>Another six candidates are currently under 5% in the polls. Fabien Roussel, the communist candidate, has run a cheerful and positive campaign, in particular by defending the French gastronomic heritage. He is estimated to achieve between 3% and 5% of the vote. </p>
<p>Nicolas Dupont-Aignan, the eurosceptic right-wing candidate, will try to capitalise on his very vocal opposition to the government’s COVID policies. Jean Lassalle, the iconoclast MP for the Pyrenees, who ran in 2017, claims to be the voice of “authentic France” and the countryside. He will be happy to get 3% of the vote.</p>
<p>Socialist Anne Hidalgo is the car-crash candidate in this election. She epitomises the decline of the former ruling Socialist Party, and her record as technocratic mayor of Paris – where she is blamed for rising crime, dirtiness and traffic jams – has not helped her. Finally, the far left will be represented by two candidates: Philippe Poutou and Nathalie Arthaud. Both are estimated to win just 1% of the vote.</p>
<p>This campaign has caused frustration, not least because of the lack of proper debates. And a low turnout has long been expected. But this remains an important contest which shows how much the French political landscape is changing and fragmenting, resulting in the demise of the two big traditional parties. Radical forces are thriving on both left and right, while the centre is now key. Many of the personalities that have been the driving forces of these changes, including Macron, Mélenchon and Le Pen, may not run again next time. And while Macron’s victory had looked inevitable, surprises are still possible.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/180719/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Laurent Binet does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There are 12 candidates in the first round of the campaign – two favourites, three outsiders and a host of people with no chance of making it to the second round.Laurent Binet, Senior Lecturer, School of Modern Languages, Newcastle UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1798632022-03-28T18:27:50Z2022-03-28T18:27:50ZEconomic fallout from Ukraine war could give Le Pen’s social-populist strategy an edge<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454187/original/file-20220324-17-33awhp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The RN candidate has spent the past years attempting to present herself as a champion for living standards.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">VALENTINE CHAPUIS / AFP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As the economic impact of the war in Ukraine looms over French voters, Marine Le Pen’s social-populist appeal may give her a boost in the battle over second place that is taking place to the right of France’s presidential politics, despite her prominently <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/02/french-far-right-leader-marine-le-pen-forced-to-defend-putin-links">pro-Russian stance</a> prior to the invasion.</p>
<h2>Economic concerns take over the presidential agenda</h2>
<p>The economic consequences of the war in Ukraine are already being felt in France. The <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-01-07/france-s-le-maire-says-power-price-surge-is-absolute-emergency">surge in energy prices</a> is adding to the inflation that has accompanied the post-Covid‑19 recovery of France’s economy. Price shocks are expected to have a significant impact on both households and companies.</p>
<p>Economic fears are clearly one of the dominant themes of the campaign. According to CEVIPOF-Science Po Paris’ latest presidential <a href="https://www.sciencespo.fr/cevipof/sites/sciencespo.fr.cevipof/files/EnEF%202022%20vague%208%20-%2021-24%20mars%202022%20(1).pdf">election survey</a>, 58% of those polled stated that prices and purchasing power will bear an important influence on their vote in April, up by 6% since early March.</p>
<p>While the war in Ukraine is of great concern in France, fears are falling somewhat. A third (34%) of respondents say they’re “very worried” about the war: it was 43% early March. The war is also becoming less salient politically: only 23% of our respondents say it will matter to their vote, down by 10% from two weeks earlier.</p>
<p>The focus now is on the economic consequences of the Ukraine crisis, with 43% of respondents claiming they are “very worried”. Fears of a wider conflict or a nuclear strike by Russia are, on the other hand, shrinking at 33% and 28%, down by 6% and 7% respectively since early March (see Figure 1).</p>
<h2>Figure 1. Changing concerns about the war in Ukraine</h2>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454660/original/file-20220328-25-14c17a4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454660/original/file-20220328-25-14c17a4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454660/original/file-20220328-25-14c17a4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454660/original/file-20220328-25-14c17a4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454660/original/file-20220328-25-14c17a4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454660/original/file-20220328-25-14c17a4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454660/original/file-20220328-25-14c17a4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Percentage of those polled who say they are ‘very worried’.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">National Election Panel, IPSOS–CEVIPOF–_Le Monde_, Wave 8, 20-24 March 2022</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The outcome of the presidential race in April will hinge a good deal on the candidates’ response to bread-and-butter issues in the electorate.</p>
<p>Anticipating a “long crisis”, Jean Castex’s government has signalled the importance of supporting the French economy by drawing up an <a href="https://www.gouvernement.fr/actualite/presentation-du-plan-de-resilience-economique-et-sociale">emergency “resilience plan”</a>. The <a href="https://www.francebleu.fr/infos/economie-social/guerre-en-ukraine-ce-qu-il-faut-retenir-du-plan-de-resilience-presente-par-jean-castex-1647425415">26-billion-euros-strong plan</a> is intended to help companies and households cope with rising energy costs.</p>
<p>The plan is intended to help keep Macron’s re-election bid on track just three weeks ahead of the first-round vote. Memories of 2018’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/shockwaves-from-french-yellow-vest-protests-felt-across-europe-108578">“yellow jackets” movement</a> are still vivid, and they have prompted the government to respond quickly to signs of popular discontent.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454182/original/file-20220324-13-3n95az.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454182/original/file-20220324-13-3n95az.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=352&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454182/original/file-20220324-13-3n95az.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=352&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454182/original/file-20220324-13-3n95az.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=352&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454182/original/file-20220324-13-3n95az.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=443&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454182/original/file-20220324-13-3n95az.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=443&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454182/original/file-20220324-13-3n95az.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=443&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Like elsewhere in Europe, fuel prices have soared in France following Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Thomas Coex/AFP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Diverging economic strategies</h2>
<p>Macron still dominates the polls – at 28% in our latest study – but economic concerns have become key to the battle over second place.</p>
<p>To the left of the political spectrum, Jean-Luc Mélenchon from La France Insoumise (FI) is consolidating his lead in a crowded field, currently polling at 14% in our survey. His agenda of social justice and economic redistribution is popular among voters who see the <em>Insoumis</em> as a <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2022/article/2022/02/18/presidentielle-2022-jean-luc-melenchon-se-reve-en-candidat-du-vote-utile-a-gauche_6114176_6059010.html"><em>vote utile</em></a> (tactical vote) for the left to make it to the second round. Mélenchon has moved ahead despite his pro-Russian stance prior to the invasion and subsequent attempts to <a href="https://www.leparisien.fr/elections/presidentielle/guerre-en-ukraine-zemmour-melenchon-le-pen-le-changement-de-pied-des-candidats-pro-russes-24-02-2022-SAPOHM4F6BDYBI3Q5ZLOFJ6LJ4.php">recalibrate earlier comments</a>.</p>
<p>Sinking in the polls after creating an early buzz among potential voters, Éric Zemmour has continued to push his overriding theme of immigration. On March 22, he stated that if elected, he would create a government ministry of <a href="https://www.nouvelobs.com/election-presidentielle-2022/20220322.OBS56037/ministere-de-la-remigration-de-zemmour-un-message-vers-l-extreme-droite-la-plus-radicale.html">“reimmigration”</a> with the goal of forcing 1 million French residents to leave the country.</p>
<p>Le Pen has also run into trouble with her longstanding pro-Russian positions and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/02/french-far-right-leader-marine-le-pen-forced-to-defend-putin-links">support for Vladimir Putin</a>, although these seem to have only marginally hurt her standing among potential voters.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454179/original/file-20220324-22-1dyc4ha.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454179/original/file-20220324-22-1dyc4ha.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454179/original/file-20220324-22-1dyc4ha.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454179/original/file-20220324-22-1dyc4ha.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454179/original/file-20220324-22-1dyc4ha.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454179/original/file-20220324-22-1dyc4ha.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454179/original/file-20220324-22-1dyc4ha.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Despite once boasting of her links with Russian president Vladimir Putin, Marine Le Pen is surviving the war in Ukraine politically.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mikhail Klimentyev/AFP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A potentially more important consideration relates to the candidates’ economic stances. We see diverging economic strategies to the right of French politics, which may produce different opportunities in the first round.</p>
<p>When it comes to the government’s coffers, Zemmour and Valérie Pécresse of Les Republicains (LR) are pushing a right-wing agenda of tax cuts and welfare retrenchment, including unpopular pension reform. Amid turbulent economic times, such conservatism appears increasingly at odds with popular demand for more protection and state intervention, most evidently among working-class and lower-middle-class voters.</p>
<p>Le Pen has chosen a different economic path, emphasising social issues, healthcare, public services and redistribution.</p>
<p>Even prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Rassemblement National (RN) candidate had promised a positive “shock” to purchasing power, pledging that she would “protect the people” and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hEVj9za0298">“give the French their money back”</a>. Alongside traditional immigration and security themes – far less present than with Zemmour, however – Le Pen’s presidential platform offers a significant Keynesian package of lower VAT, higher wages, tax exemptions and free transport for young workers, while advocating the revaluation of pensions.</p>
<h2>Le Pen’s social-populist credentials</h2>
<p>According to a <a href="https://www.sciencespo.fr/cevipof/sites/sciencespo.fr.cevipof/files/NoteBaroV13_GI_socialpopulisme_mars2022_V4.pdf">statistical analysis of Le Pen’s presidential manifesto</a>, left-leaning policies make up no less than two-thirds (66%) of her economic platform: this is the highest percentage since the party’s electoral breakthrough in the mid-1980s (see Figure 2).</p>
<p>In contrast, the RN has moved further away from the hallmarks of conservative economics such as welfare retrenchment, small government and free market reforms. Such policies make up only 21% of the 2022 manifesto compared with 35% five years ago. It was nearly 80% under Jean-Marie Le Pen back in the mid-1980s.</p>
<h2>Figure 2. Clusters of FN/RN economic policies since 1986</h2>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454245/original/file-20220324-17-qiw34p.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454245/original/file-20220324-17-qiw34p.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=483&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454245/original/file-20220324-17-qiw34p.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=483&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454245/original/file-20220324-17-qiw34p.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=483&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454245/original/file-20220324-17-qiw34p.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=607&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454245/original/file-20220324-17-qiw34p.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=607&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454245/original/file-20220324-17-qiw34p.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=607&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">This figure shows the orientation of the FN/RN’s economic policies since 1986. The data consist of 500 economic policy pledges across FN/RN electoral platforms between 1986 and 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author’s own analysis and calculations</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In line with the RN’s <a href="https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01889832/">traditional nationalist and populist agenda</a> of opposing the so-called “globalist” elite to the “people”, Le Pen’s increasingly social tone bears all of the trappings of <a href="https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01385779/document"><em>social populism</em></a> – a political approach drawing from both left-leaning egalitarian and nationalist economic traditions.</p>
<p>This shift is <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/fp.2015.17">nothing new to RN politics</a>, however. Le Pen has worked to establish a reputation as the candidate of the <em>pouvoir d’achat</em> (purchasing power) for more than a decade, immediately after she took over her father’s party and veered to the economic left. In the wake of the 2008 financial and 2011 Eurozone debt crises, the FN had taken up a “Keynesian” program of state regulation, government spending, and public services expansion, emphasising income redistribution and purchasing power. In 2012, 59% of the FN’s economic proposals were already leaning toward the economic left.</p>
<h2>Le Pen’s successful gamble?</h2>
<p>Since 2017, Le Pen has worked to cultivate her social-populist image, joining ranks with the left and trade unions against Macron on several occasions. In late 2019, she <a href="https://www.europe1.fr/politique/marine-le-pen-tout-est-a-jeter-dans-la-reforme-des-retraites-3937513">opposed the government’s pension reform</a>. In March 2021, she denounced cuts to the unemployment insurance scheme as <a href="https://twitter.com/mlp_officiel/status/1445398684288655365">“shameful, economically stupid, humanly unworthy and deeply unfair”</a>.</p>
<p>As the latest <a href="https://www.sciencespo.fr/cevipof/sites/sciencespo.fr.cevipof/files/EnEF%202022%20vague%208%20-%2021-24%20mars%202022%20(1).pdf">CEVIPOF National Election survey</a> suggests, the RN candidate is currently polling at 17.5% (up by 3% since early March) compared to 11.5% and 10% for Zemmour and Pécresse, respectively.</p>
<p>In a recent <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2022/article/2022/03/26/en-meeting-dans-le-bordelais-marine-le-pen-s-attaque-au-bilan-de-macron_6119256_6059010.html">campaign meeting</a>, Le Pen reiterated her populist vision, contrasting the “little” people to the “big” interests. “Between Emmanuel Macron and us,” <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cad2sY77tz8">Le Pen said</a>, “it is a choice between the power of money for the few and more purchasing power for all”.</p>
<p>Le Pen’s social-populist agenda clearly resonates with a slice of the French electorate, particularly working-class and less-educated voters. Rising fuel prices tied to Russia’s invasion have been easily incorporated in Le Pen’s social-populist rhetoric, with the RN leader pledging that she would lower petrol taxes and compensate by <a href="https://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-eco/marine-le-pen-veut-taxer-les-petroliers-20220310">taxing major oil companies</a>. More recently she said that she would enact a <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2022/article/2022/03/24/marine-le-pen-presente-un-budget-bancal-de-son-projet-pour-la-presidentielle_6118918_6059010.html">zero-VAT policy</a> on a selection of 100 essential products to reduce prices for low-income households.</p>
<p>The CEVIPOF survey shows that war-driven economic concerns are highest among Marine Le Pen’s electoral support: 53% say they are “very worried” about the economy, as opposed to 43% in the general electorate. 69% of Le Pen’s voters say that concerns about purchasing power will define their first-round vote, as opposed to 56% and 47% among those who say they would vote for Valérie Pécresse and Éric Zemmour.</p>
<p>By pushing a social-populist agenda long before the war and increasing her rhetoric after the invasion, Le Pen is gambling that growing socio-economic concerns among the country’s electorate could help give her an edge among voters. So far, polls appear to be proving her right.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179863/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gilles Ivaldi has received funding from the French National Agency for Research (ANR)</span></em></p>Under fire for her past Russian links, Marine Le Pen may still be within reach of the second round of the French presidential elections thanks to her left-leaning economic agenda.Gilles Ivaldi, Chercheur en science politique, Sciences Po Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1694302021-10-17T15:59:57Z2021-10-17T15:59:57ZÉric Zemmour: the far-right polemicist’s ideas have a long history in France<p>In October 2021, the far-right presidential candidate Éric Zemmour was on the heels of Marine Le Pen, <a href="https://www.bfmtv.com/politique/elections/presidentielle/presidentielle-macron-en-tete-zemmour-a-16-mais-derriere-le-pen-selon-un-nouveau-sondage_AD-202110150490.html">polling 16%</a>. However, in the <a href="https://www.bfmtv.com/politique/elections/presidentielle/presidentielle-macron-en-tete-zemmour-a-16-mais-derriere-le-pen-selon-un-nouveau-sondage_AD-202110150490.html">latest survey by BFMTV</a>, dated 5 April, his support has nearly fallen by half, to just 9%.</p>
<p>What changed everything was Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. A backer of the traditional values espoused by the Kremlin, Zemmour’s long-standing call for closer diplomatic ties with Moscow and criticisms of NATO have <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/le-monde-in-english/article/2022/02/28/collateral-electoral-damages-of-war-in-ukraine_6115563_5026681.html">backfired</a>. Having committed a first political blunder in December by “betting Russia would not invade Ukraine,” the candidate haemorrhaged further support when he recently rejected the possibility of hosting Ukrainian refugees. Meanwhile, Marine Le Pen has also managed to overtake him as the champion for living standards, at a time when the <a href="https://theconversation.com/economic-fallout-from-ukraine-war-could-give-le-pens-social-populist-strategy-an-edge-179863">economic fallout from the war</a> continues to skim off Zemmour’s natural supporters.</p>
<p>Regardless of his position, the candidate will have left a deep mark on the presidential campaign by shifting public discourse further to the right. A few days ahead of the first round of the elections, political scientist Alain Policar walks us through his most popular – and controversial - ideas. </p>
<hr>
<p><em><strong>Lire cet article en français:</strong> <a href="https://theconversation.com/eric-zemmour-une-histoire-francaise-169213">Éric Zemmour: une histoire française</a></em></p>
<hr>
<h2>The ‘Great Replacement’ theory</h2>
<p>Throughout the campaign, Zemmour has openly promoted the “Great Replacement” theory – a racist belief, popular on the far-right in Europe, the US and the UK, that white people will soon be “replaced” by non-white, non-European immigrants.</p>
<p>The head of Reconquête, who has been convicted by the French courts twice for <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2019/09/20/eric-zemmour-definitivement-condamne-pour-provocation-a-la-haine-raciale_6012389_3224.html">inciting racial hatred</a>, would have us believe that France’s greatness is built upon its position at the top of a “<a href="https://www.acrimed.org/Eric-Zemmour-rehabilite-les-races-avec-video">hierarchy of cultures</a>”. This position turns a blind eye to the horrors of French colonial racism, considering it a necessary price for offering colonised people their moral enlightenment.</p>
<h2>Assimilation and separatism</h2>
<p>In Zemmour’s view, French life and French values are under threat from Islam. He argues that France is contaminated by “<a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2021/02/25/vous-presentez-une-loi-qui-est-tout-a-fait-positive-apres-marine-le-pen-gerald-darmanin-poursuit-le-debat-face-a-eric-zemmour_6071114_823448.html">separatism</a>”.</p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/frances-new-separatism-law-stigmatises-minorities-and-could-backfire-badly-162705">“Separatism”</a> is a loaded term in France. It was once used to <a href="https://www.franceculture.fr/histoire/separatisme-de-lanti-france-chez-les-soviets-a-lislam-en-passant-par-la-negritude">describe anti-colonial struggles</a>, particularly those in Algeria and has been the standard accusation thrown at Jewish people since antiquity, and <a href="https://www.maisondulivre.com/livre/9782204069236-judeophobie-attitudes-a-l-egard-des-juifs-dans-le-monde-antique-peter-schafer/">forms the basis of much modern anti-Semitism</a>. But it is also current government policy to root out “separatism” through a new law promoting “respect for the principles of the Republic”.</p>
<p>Zemmour is also an ardent supporter of <a href="https://www.lefigaro.fr/vox/politique/eric-zemmour-separatisme-ce-projet-de-loi-qui-refuse-de-considerer-la-realite-20210205">assimilation</a> of migrants to France. His endorsement of assimilation should not be surprising, particularly when we recall that this word was once used to justify the <a href="https://www.cairn.info/les-frontieres-de-l-identite-nationale--9782707169365-page-25.htm">race-based politics</a> evident in the privileges enjoyed by French colonists, which turned them into a quasi-aristocracy; a race apart.</p>
<p>In fact, <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/chrhc/956">American historian Tyler Stovall</a> observed that colonists were more inclined to call themselves “white” or “European” than French. He writes:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“It was in the colonies that understandings of the French national idea first became confused with the racial idea of whiteness.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Yet upholding assimilationism in Zemmour’s view would also imply the non-assimilation of certain groups. He regularly argues, for example, that <a href="https://www.rtl.fr/actu/politique/immigration-l-islam-n-est-pas-compatible-avec-la-france-selon-zemmour-7900076221">Islam is not compatible with the Republic</a> – the opposite of assimilationist politics.</p>
<p>This is also an idea with deep roots – it should be remembered that to obtain French citizenship in 1958, Algerian Muslim women were required to remove their headscarves during inauguration ceremonies. What better way to illustrate that you had to stop being a Muslim woman to become a French one?</p>
<h2>False universalism</h2>
<p>Zemmour’s pronouncements may be incendiary, but through them we can see that the old idea of a French nation defined in racial terms has had a lasting influence on contemporary debate.</p>
<p>One such idea is that of “universalism”, which holds that the national characteristic of being French supersedes any other identity an individual may have. But if immigrants are asked to defer to French traditions based on an assumption that such traditions are inherently universal, universalism becomes not a form of humanism that embraces diversity, but rather a nationalistic symbol.</p>
<p>This is how <a href="https://www.cairn.info/la-fracture-coloniale--9782707149398-page-137.htm">Achille Mbembe</a> described the concept in a <a href="https://www.editionsladecouverte.fr/la_fracture_coloniale-9782707149398">2005 article</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Having long upheld the ‘republican model’ as the perfect vehicle for inclusion and the emergence of individuality, we have ultimately turned the Republic into an imaginary institution, and underestimated its original capacity for brutality, discrimination and exclusion.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>A harsh judgement, perhaps, but French history (long before the establishment of the Republic) attests to this racialised dimension. When it uses national identity as the guiding light of the republican cause, universalism has been seriously misled, to the point of forfeiting all substance.</p>
<p>It is worth noting that this version of universalism can appear in other guises, particularly in <a href="https://www.editionsbdl.com/produit/comment-peut-on-etre-cosmopolite">anti-cosmopolitanism</a>, which slanders society’s incorrigible utopians and blindsided bleeding hearts. This is precisely the tone adopted by Éric Zemmour.</p>
<p>One might even hypothesise that hiding behind this false universalism is a hatred of the universal, exemplified in the famous quote by Joseph de Maistre in his <a href="https://fr.wikisource.org/wiki/Livre:Maistre_%E2%80%93_Consid%C3%A9rations_sur_la_France_(Ed._1829).pdf"><em>Considerations on France</em> (1796)</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“In my life I have seen Frenchmen, Italians, Russians, and so on. I even know, thanks to Montesquieu, that one can be Persian. But as for man, I declare I’ve never encountered him.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In much the same way, Zemmour presents us with a fragmented world that offends his own obsession with purity – his simultaneous hatred of intermingling and <a href="https://livre.fnac.com/a209544/Henry-Mechoulan-Le-Sang-de-l-autre-ou-l-Honneur-de-Dieu">a fear of sameness</a>.</p>
<p>Three years ago, my colleague and I wrote <a href="https://theconversation.com/eric-zemmour-un-symptome-107288">an article</a> about Zemmour’s place in the public arena in France, and how we should resist his impoverished, extremist rhetoric. While Zemmour is likely to have his campaign come to an early end, many of his ideas continue to live through Marine Le Pen. More provocative than his rival, the former journalist may have unwittingly <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.fr/entry/comment-zemmour-a-permis-a-le-pen-daccentuer-sa-dediabolisation_fr_623ed6c2e4b0e340f6a3593d">given her the means</a> to make it to the second round herself – and possibly to Elysee Palace.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/169430/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alain Policar ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>Zemmour’s statements about universalism, assimilation and “separatism” have deep roots in the history of the French Republic.Alain Policar, Chercheur associé en science politique (Cevipof), Sciences Po Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1655682021-08-17T11:22:17Z2021-08-17T11:22:17ZThe south of France is a Marine Le Pen stronghold – but has she hit a ceiling?<p>With eight months to go until the next French presidential election, it’s possible that the 2022 contest will once again come down to a choice between Emmanuel Macron and far-right leader Marine Le Pen.</p>
<p>If she is to advance to the second round, as she did in 2017, Le Pen will rely on her party strongholds in the north and south of the country. In particular, the Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur region, known as PACA, where the Rassemblement National (formerly the Front National) has patiently established itself as a force over the course of many years.</p>
<p>PACA is composed of six departments: Alpes-de-Haute-Provence, Alpes-Maritimes, Bouches-du-Rhône, Hautes-Alpes, Var and Vaucluse. It includes large cities such as Marseille, Nice and Toulon, as well as those with strong symbolic or cultural significance such as Avignon and Cannes.</p>
<p>It was in 1995 that the Front National first won three important cities in the region during municipal elections: Toulon, Orange and Marignane, adding <a href="https://livre.fnac.com/a990906/Virginie-Martin-Toulon-la-noire">Vitrolles in 1997</a>. The cities fell to the far-right due to a combination of historical mismanagement and growing dissidence, though some have since returned to more traditional parties.</p>
<iframe title="French presidential election results -- Front National" aria-label="table" id="datawrapper-chart-jYy22" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/jYy22/1/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="border: none;" width="100%" height="364"></iframe>
<p>In the 2017 presidential election, Le Pen won the first round with 28% of the vote in PACA, while Macron came third. Le Pen lost the second round to Macron, gaining 45% of votes to Macron’s 55%.</p>
<p>These electoral moments have allowed the Rassemblement National to establish itself firmly in the region, securing support, consolidating networks, hiring more employees, attracting volunteers, <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-critique-internationale-1999-3-page-169.htm?contenu=resume">getting involved with local organisations</a> and establishing <a href="https://theconversation.com/lenracinement-comme-valeur-politique-declin-des-partis-retour-des-notables-161845">a more respectable image</a> for itself.</p>
<h2>The anti-immigrant vote</h2>
<p>How did the far-right become so established in the south? More than any other issue, the vote is united around the issue of <a href="https://theconversation.com/le-rassemblement-national-par-ses-electorats-161836">immigration</a> which <a href="https://theconversation.com/le-fn-et-la-parano-a-identitaire-52183">aggregates</a> almost all Rassemblement National voters, whatever their disagreements may be on other subjects such as the economy. My research has <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-francaise-de-science-politique-2019-2-page-223.html">shown</a> just how crucial this point has been in building <a href="https://www.editions-harmattan.fr/index.asp?navig=catalogue&obj=livre&no=1698&razSqlClone=1">support for the far-right</a> in this region since 2000.</p>
<p>The term “immigration” must be analysed in its complexity for the electorate in PACA. It is strongly linked with cultural, cultural, economic or historical markers of identity in the region. And unlike <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2017/05/10/presidentielle-le-vote-fn-est-il-concentre-dans-des-zones-avec-peu-d-immigres_5125715_4355770.html">in other parts of France</a>, in PACA there is a <a href="https://books.google.fr/books?hl=fr&lr=&id=IbHZCgAAQBAJ">strong correlation</a> between areas with higher rates of immigration and those where there is a significant far-right vote.</p>
<p>The other key point lies in the rejection of Islam in its most visible forms among far-right voters, notably women who wear the veil and the presence of halal shops.</p>
<p>Some people – especially older voters – feel that the Provençal identity, which is not confined to the Provence department but <a href="https://livre.fnac.com/a990906/Virginie-Martin-Toulon-la-noire">runs through the region</a>, is being disturbed by waves of migration.</p>
<p>French-origin repatriates who left Algeria after it secured independence, while <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-pole-sud-2016-2-page-119.htm">not a homogeneous voting bloc</a>, are a significant component of the far-right vote in PACA, due to their historical rejection of Charles de Gaulle who they see as having “given up” Algeria. Today this community is ageing and the historical trauma is gradually fading, but the connections have left their mark and their votes often <a href="https://popups.uliege.be/2295-0311/index.php?id=189&file=1">goes to the extreme right</a>.</p>
<p>Rassemblement National voters are receptive to the link often drawn between immigration and delinquency by party leaders. “Crime is the consequence of immigration”, Marine Le Pen stated in <a href="https://www.lepoint.fr/politique/insecurite-et-immigration-le-pen-repart-a-l-attaque-contre-l-executif-11-01-2018-2185860_20.php">2018</a>, an argument that is now widely used in relation to <a href="https://youtu.be/O6ud72ZjcG8">immigration and terrorism</a></p>
<p>This electorate also remains partly convinced by the words of Marine’s father and party founder Jean Marie Le Pen, who served as a regional councillor in PACA and spoke of immigrants taking jobs from “French” people. But the argument is less present today in view of two elements: on one hand, Marine Le Pen now links employment to the wider issue of globalisation, which she says destroys jobs; on the other, the expressions “Islamists” and “migrants” have come to replace the terms <a href="https://www.nouvelobs.com/presidentielle-2017/20170202.OBS4761/au-fn-on-ne-dit-plus-arabes-ou-immigres-sait-on-jamais.html">“Arabs or immigrants”</a> used in the past.</p>
<p>Certainly, at the heart of the party, the white supremacist idea of the <a href="https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounders/the-great-replacement-an-explainer">“great replacement”</a> remains appealing, but there is no longer any question of singling out “Arabs”, because second-generation immigrants formerly categorised as such are now seen as <a href="https://www.lepoint.fr/politique/ces-musulmans-seduits-par-le-fn-07-10-2015-1971307_20.php">potential far-right voters</a>.</p>
<h2>Respectability politics</h2>
<p>Whereas in some parts of the country, Le Pen and her party are seen as an anathema even to those on the right, in PACA the relationship between the traditional right, Les Républicains, and the Rassemblement National is more porous.</p>
<p>It is in this context that Thierry Mariani, who has spent his entire political career on the right of French politics, has become a key candidate for the Rassemblement National. After suggesting Les Républicains consider <a href="https://www.lejdd.fr/Politique/thierry-mariani-il-faut-un-accord-avec-le-fn-3595874">agreements</a> with Le Pen’s party in 2018, this native of Orange ended up joining the Rassemblement National list for the European elections in 2019. He was top of the electoral list for PACA in the 2021 regional elections.</p>
<p>Mariani is well known and well rooted in the region, particularly in Vaucluse: he was for a long time a councillor of the department and has been mayor of Valréas. In the 1990s, he was a regional councillor for PACA and then served as minister for transport during the presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy.</p>
<p>As head of the electoral list in the regional elections, Mariani offered the Rassemblement National a <a href="https://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/le-reportage-de-la-redaction/du-fn-au-rn-dix-ans-de-dediabolisation">veneer of respectability</a>, part of a process of rehabilitation of the party initiated by Marine Le Pen since she became leader in 2011.</p>
<p>Mariani did not win PACA as expected in the 2021 regional elections, which were marked by <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-undisputed-winner-of-the-french-regional-elections-abstention-163545">record high levels of abstention</a>, but by his presence alone, he contributed to a growing feeling that the far-right is no longer taboo or <a href="https://jean-jaures.org/nos-productions/2022-evaluation-du-risque-le-pen">repellent</a> in France.</p>
<p>Still, his failure will give the Rassemblement National pause for thought ahead of the 2022 presidential poll. Has the party hit a ceiling for electoral success? Have other parties successfully found a way to block it from winning in the second round of elections?</p>
<p>Marine Le Pen remains a serious contender for the upcoming presidential elections. But it would seem that the competition is getting tougher for the Rassemblement National. There is the candidacy of Éric Zemmour, who threatens to outflank the party on the extreme right. Then there is Florian Philippot, Le Pen’s former campaign director, who is now riding the wave of the <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2021/08/07/florian-philippot-tente-de-surfer-sur-le-mouvement-anti-passe-sanitaire_6090797_823448.html">anti-health pass movement</a>, as well as her traditional rival, Nicolas Dupont Aignan. The ranks of the far-right challengers are filling up and risk splitting Le Pen’s vote in France.</p>
<p>As for PACA, though the region remains a bastion for the Rassemblement National, it is not the indispensable base many had thought before the regional elections.</p>
<p>It seems the points of weakness are multiplying for the Le Pen.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165568/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Virginie Martin ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>The south-eastern region of France known as PACA has long been a centre of power for the far-right, but recent failures in the regional elections bring its future into question for Marine Le Pen.Virginie Martin, Docteure sciences politiques, HDR sciences de gestion, Kedge Business SchoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1531462021-01-15T11:10:56Z2021-01-15T11:10:56ZWhy it’s no surprise that pro-Trump rioters sang Bob Marley songs outside the Capitol<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/378627/original/file-20210113-23-1qxqzws.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=44%2C0%2C5000%2C3315&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In recent decades, musicians have been quick to object to the use of their material by the far-right</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://webgate.epa.eu/thumb.php/56604544.jpg?eJw1jrEOgkAMht-ls0Ovtly5zbBgIpqIiToZTjgX4yAyie9uhTh9-fv9afuGYgUhNfe-W0BRQgAwniA4w3nCZg2BDFuT3eN2GfrGOpUlyTJkYf7Fw9Stp2pdQGBDNc9MvZ6D7T_Oeg_BI1qs_mJnAvQaJXe5F6dEy9h6FXWSGPMmecdoV-xVIBSSkZBQx9iq_RBVJSFyK_D5AiG9Mb8~">Etienne Laurent/EPA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Amid the serious criminal offences committed during the recent breach of the US Capitol, one prominent trespass was against good taste. Numerous commentators, including original I Three singers <a href="http://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/entertainment/20210110/inappropriate-use-song-written-i-three-marcia-griffiths-surprised">Marcia Griffiths and Judy Mowatt</a>, took exception to Trump supporters <a href="https://www.dancehallmag.com/2021/01/07/news/pro-trump-protesters-vibe-to-bob-marley-after-us-capitol-riot.html">singing</a> Bob Marley classics “Three Little Birds” and “One Love”.</p>
<p>The sound of white nationalists appropriating Afro-Caribbean music (though <a href="https://academic.oup.com/jsh/article-abstract/38/1/157/927064?redirectedFrom=fulltext">all too familiar</a> in the UK of the 1970s-80s) was considered both offensive and surprising. Ideologically, such groups are <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139505963.008">more often associated</a> with fetishising “white” classical music and eschewing “black” culture. One of the early warning signs of UK singer Morrissey’s far-right leanings was his 1986 comment “<a href="https://www.standard.co.uk/culture/music/morrissey-from-reggae-to-royalty-a-timeline-of-the-singer-s-most-controversial-opinions-a3857906.html">reggae is vile</a>”.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1346957374410661892"}"></div></p>
<p>Some may find it surprising to realise that the alt-right can enjoy Bob Marley as well as death metal and Wagner. But this might be less of an example of deliberate <a href="https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Twerking-and-Cultural-Appropriation-%3A-Cyrus/7b73eb8d9a4411f82eb3a7913426e52b3808ff55">cultural appropriation</a> than a pragmatic example of how music works when organising a crowd. </p>
<p>The lyrics of “One Love” unify its listeners, forming an in-group against an implicit other. The choruses of both songs are effortless to sing. Above all, the tempo is perfect. The Capitol mob neither goose-stepped nor surged: it shuffled slowly. Famously, it even <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/culture/archive/2021/01/capitol-when-mob-entered-chamber-pictures-tourists/617586/">kept between the guide ropes</a>. Marley’s songs, with their relaxed, off-beat rhythm, are the perfect soundtrack for a movement that mostly mills about.</p>
<p>Still, this wasn’t the first time that the far-right’s choice of song has come out of left field. Here are five more instances when history has sounded a little out of tune.</p>
<h2>2014: UKIP Calypso</h2>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/a7QYJ7pVhUo?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Mike Read’s 2014 “UKIP Calypso”</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In 2014, the anti-immigration UK Independence Party featured a song at its annual conference penned by former BBC Radio 1 DJ Mike Read, “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lYOBZ3Seeio">UKIP Calypso</a>” – a travesty of Trinidadian music sung in an accent that, in the views of many, bordered on minstrelsy. Bona fide calypso star Alexander D Great responded with his own song “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9BN0RgaCi9o">Copycat Crime</a>”.</p>
<h2>1934: La Marseillaise</h2>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/HM-E2H1ChJM?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">“La Marseillaise” in its more common anti-fascist incarnation: 1942’s Casablanca.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Yes, that Marseillaise: the anthem of liberty written by
Claude Joseph Rouget de Lisle in 1792 and France’s national song. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/0031322X.2013.845447">In 1934</a> the British Union of Fascists needed a song of its own. But its publication Fascist Week rejected Elgar’s “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-tW0QqiT2LU">Land of Hope and Glory</a>”, a far-right favourite then as now, because “it stands for ideals we regard as obsolete”. The Italian fascist anthem “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mLclQf9ecjc">Giovinezza</a>” was deemed too, well, Italian. Instead, asked Blackshirt magazine (the British Union of Fascists’ newspaper), “Who is to be the first ‘Rouget de Lisle’ to give the Movement a ‘Marseillaise’?”</p>
<p>The anti-democratic right had a precedent here: <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Miscellaneous_Essays_naval_moral_politic.html?id=VTtcAAAAcAAJ&redir_esc=y">in 1799</a>, reactionary Royal Navy chaplain Alexander Duncan also proposed imitating the Marseillaise. But the idea never caught on, and today Britain’s far-right <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oaA3Ewa6EeI">favours</a> “Keep St George In My Heart” sung to the tune of the hymn “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oil_in_My_Lamp">Oil in my Lamp</a>”, most commonly associated with small schoolchildren.</p>
<h2>2015: Nicolas</h2>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/fE0L4ZVHzMs?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Marine Le Pen sings “Nicolas” in 2015.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Few far-right figures have embraced song in quite the manner of the leader of the French political party Rassemblement National (National Rally), Marine Le Pen. <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/video-marine-le-pens-love-song-for-nicolas-sarkozy-gddsnll5ln2">In 2015</a> she was filmed ironically serenading former French president and political rival Nicolas Sarkozy with the 1979 love song “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7DL_Fq7122I">Nicolas</a>”. But the joke may have been on the anti-immigration Le Pen – “Nicolas” was made a hit by French singer Sylvie Vartan, born in Bulgaria and of Armenian and Jewish heritage.</p>
<h2>1936: <em>Das Lied der Deutschen</em></h2>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/BVH4v2e-15Y?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">German players and fans sing their anthem at Euro 2006.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The most extreme case of misappropriation is surely the German national anthem. Its 1797 tune was penned by Haydn for the Habsburg emperor. So when August Heinrich Hoffman gave it new words in 1841, he was reappropriating a royalist song for republican ends. </p>
<p>Its infamous opening “<em>Deutschland, Deutschland über alles</em>” was a call for the disparate German states to form a liberal union, putting their shared identity above allegiance to petty monarchs. Its lyrics are essentially peaceful, unlike bloodthirsty lines found in “God save the King”, “The Star-Spangled Banner”, or the “Marseillaise” itself. But since its appropriation by the Nazis, broadcast worldwide at the Berlin Olympics, its message has been tainted, and now only the third verse is officially sung.</p>
<h2>2009: If You Tolerate This…</h2>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/cX8szNPgrEs?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">The Manics’ 1998 song in its official setting.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In recent decades, musicians have been quick to object to the appropriation of their material. Though Neil Young <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/music/2020/dec/08/neil-young-drops-lawsuit-against-donald-trump">has abandoned</a> his fight against Trump’s use of “Rockin’ in the Free World”, Tom Petty did successfully prevent the Bush campaign from playing “I Won’t Back Down” in 2000. As a former Bush spokesman said: “<a href="https://www.pophistorydig.com/topics/wont-back-down-petty/">we backed down</a>”. And when in 2009 the British National Party plumbed new ironic depths by pirating the Manic Street Preachers’ anti-fascist anthem “If You Tolerate This”, the band’s label were swift to <a href="https://www.nme.com/news/music/manic-street-preachers-138-1318336">take action</a>.</p>
<p>There’s little room for nuance when a movement takes a fancy to a slogan. The ultimate example is Bruce Springsteen’s “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EPhWR4d3FJQ">Born in the USA</a>” – meant as a critique of the Vietnam War and its effect upon veterans. Knowing this, some commentators sneer at its use by jingoistic nationalists and “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barack_Obama_citizenship_conspiracy_theories">birthers</a>”. But its verses require concentrated listening, whereas the macho, stadium-rock chorus is simplicity itself. </p>
<p>Perhaps we should suspend our knowing impulses, and accept that in practice, a song’s meaning is determined in performance, not in the intentions of its author.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/153146/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Oskar Cox Jensen receives funding from UK Research and Innovation via his work on Our Subversive Voice: see <a href="https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=AH%2FT006390%2F1">https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=AH%2FT006390%2F1</a></span></em></p>After rioters outside the US Capitol sang Bob Marley’s ‘Three Little Birds’, here are more global instances when history has sounded a little out of tune.Oskar Cox Jensen, Senior Research Associate, University of East AngliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1483432020-11-01T19:06:29Z2020-11-01T19:06:29ZWe compared the language of populist leaders with their mainstream opponents – the results were unexpected<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/366569/original/file-20201029-19-1up1w73.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ross D Franklin/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>According to a <a href="https://readable.com/blog/the-flesch-reading-ease-and-flesch-kincaid-grade-level/">formal measure</a> of language simplicity, United States President Donald Trump’s acceptance speech at this year’s Republican National Convention was far more complex than challenger Joe Biden’s at the Democratic Convention. </p>
<p>While Biden’s speech could be understood by a fifth grader, Trump’s required an eighth-grade level of education.</p>
<p>Surprised? After years of <a href="https://nypost.com/2016/03/17/donald-trump-speaks-at-a-fourth-grade-reading-level/">stories</a> about how Trump uses much simpler language than his rivals, you should be.</p>
<p>During the last campaign, we read numerous accounts of how Trump’s language was pitched low — at a child’s level.</p>
<p>Or, as <a href="https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2015/10/20/donald-trump-and-ben-carson-speak-grade-school-level-that-today-voters-can-quickly-grasp/LUCBY6uwQAxiLvvXbVTSUN/story.html">The Boston Globe</a> gleefully proclaimed, his 2015 announcement speech “could have been comprehended by a fourth-grader”. By contrast, the announcement speeches of other candidates, such as Hillary Clinton, Ted Cruz and Marco Rubio scored several grades higher.</p>
<p>Those reports were easily believable to experts. Trump is a right-wing populist and academics have <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/02/what-is-populist-trump/516525/">long asserted</a> populist leaders use simple language in order to appear close to the “common people” and distance themselves from linguistically convoluted elites. </p>
<p>But as our <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/perspectives-on-politics/article/language-of-rightwing-populist-leaders-not-so-simple/D4FA130AABEE20E11A953D226187F3E4/core-reader">new research</a> shows, when you look at a comprehensive sample of populist leaders’ speeches, this is not always the case. </p>
<h2>Researching the simplicity of leaders’ language</h2>
<p>To investigate whether right-wing populists in different countries really do use simpler language than mainstream ones, we assembled a database of more than one million words. This was made up of speeches by populist leaders and their non-populist opponents in the United States, Italy, France, and the United Kingdom.</p>
<p>Looking at the simplicity of a single text, as the media had done with Trump’s 2015 announcement speech, makes for a good headline, but you need far more than that to make sound judgements about someone’s language.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Hillary Clinton speaking to a crowed as Donald Trump watches on." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/366572/original/file-20201030-15-19fe1gv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/366572/original/file-20201030-15-19fe1gv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=433&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/366572/original/file-20201030-15-19fe1gv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=433&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/366572/original/file-20201030-15-19fe1gv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=433&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/366572/original/file-20201030-15-19fe1gv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=545&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/366572/original/file-20201030-15-19fe1gv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=545&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/366572/original/file-20201030-15-19fe1gv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=545&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A detailed analysis showed Donald Trump’s language was only slightly more ‘simple’ than that of his former challenger, Hillary Clinton.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Rick T Wilking/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For each populist and non-populist leader, we analysed at least 100,000 words (per leader) from their speeches over a given period of time, using an array of measures for evaluating linguistic simplicity. </p>
<p>These included Flesch-Kincaid <a href="https://readable.com/blog/the-flesch-reading-ease-and-flesch-kincaid-grade-level/">Grade Level and Readability Tests</a> for English, along with similar scales for Italian and French. Using these measures to assess simplicity is based on the idea that, the greater the presence of shorter words and sentences, the easier a text is to understand.</p>
<p>We also measured lexical density (the number of words conveying meaning), lexical richness (the number of different words), and the presence of words considered difficult in each language. </p>
<p>Our right-wing populists were the most prominent ones from their respective countries over the past decade: Trump, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/02/matteo-salvini-set-to-be-tried-over-migrant-kidnapping-charges-italy">Matteo Salvini</a> (leader of the League, one of Italy’s major parties), <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/oct/29/nigel-farage-heaps-praise-on-donald-trump-at-arizona-rally">Nigel Farage</a> (former leader of the UK Independence Party), and <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/marine-le-pen-sees-political-opening-after-teacher-beheading-in-france/">Marine Le Pen</a> (France’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38321401">far-right</a> presidential candidate).</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/trump-has-changed-america-by-making-everything-about-politics-and-politics-all-about-himself-146839">Trump has changed America by making everything about politics, and politics all about himself</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The mainstream leaders we used for comparison were their key opponents. For Trump and Le Pen, we chose their principal rivals in the last presidential campaigns, Clinton and French President <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/07/emmanuel-macron-wins-french-presidency-marine-le-pen">Emmanuel Macron</a>. In the UK and Italy, we compared Farage and Salvini to the main centre-right and centre-left leaders in those countries during the 2014-2016 period.</p>
<h2>Surprising results</h2>
<p>Our results were not what we expected.</p>
<p>First, the gap between Trump and Clinton in the 2016 campaign was actually not very wide. Trump’s speeches were pitched at a level comprehensible to a sixth grader, while Clinton’s required a seventh-grade level of education. On our other measures, there was little difference between the two. </p>
<p>In Italy, UK, and France, the results were even more surprising.</p>
<p>In Italy, the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-01-24/italy-s-chief-disrupter-is-masterminding-his-comeback">college dropout</a> Salvini was only simpler on one of our measures than his opponents, law graduates, Democratic Party leader <a href="https://theconversation.com/matteo-renzi-just-killed-off-italys-centre-left-73492">Matteo Renzi</a> and New Center-Right leader <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/18/world/europe/partys-new-leader-agrees-to-form-government-in-italy.html">Angelino Alfano</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/has-the-coronavirus-proved-a-crisis-too-far-for-europes-far-right-outsiders-142415">Has the coronavirus proved a crisis too far for Europe's far-right outsiders?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>In the United Kingdom, it was Oxford graduate and then Labour Party leader <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/jun/03/undoing-of-ed-miliband-and-how-labour-lost-election">Ed Miliband</a> who came out simplest, not Farage. The main reason for Farage’s greater complexity was the length of his sentences compared to both Miliband and former prime minister and Conservative Party leader, <a href="https://theconversation.com/life-after-david-cameron-the-conservatives-have-lost-a-major-asset-66159">David Cameron</a>. While Miliband’s sentences were on average 13.99 words long, and Cameron’s 15.49, Farage’s were a remarkable 24.61.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, in France, we found Le Pen consistently used much more complex language than the product of France’s elite <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/c17a92b8-5253-11ea-90ad-25e377c0ee1f">Ecole Nationale d'Administration</a>, Macron. According to the Kandel and Moles index for assessing the simplicity of French, Le Pen’s speeches were rated “difficult”, while Macron’s were “standard”. Her language was also significantly more complex according to all our other measures.</p>
<h2>Why do populist leaders use more complex language?</h2>
<p>How do we explain these counterintuitive results? </p>
<p>One possibility is that, since <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-anti-intellectual-presidency-9780195342642?cc=au&lang=en&">studies</a> have shown the language of mainstream political leaders in countries like the US and Italy has become simpler over time, it could be that the gap between elite and populist language has reduced, thus making claims about greater populist simplicity outdated. </p>
<p>In other words, perhaps mainstream leaders like Clinton and Biden have moved closer to the populist Trump’s level (and sometimes even below).</p>
<p>Another, related, possibility is that, at the same time as mainstream politicians have followed the advice of professional communications advisers and reduced the complexity of their speeches, right-wing populists in some countries have instead chosen to appear less coached and more authentic.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Former leader of the UK's Independence Party, Nigel Farage" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/366573/original/file-20201030-13-kew9wx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/366573/original/file-20201030-13-kew9wx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/366573/original/file-20201030-13-kew9wx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/366573/original/file-20201030-13-kew9wx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/366573/original/file-20201030-13-kew9wx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/366573/original/file-20201030-13-kew9wx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/366573/original/file-20201030-13-kew9wx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Former leader of the UK’s Independence Party, Nigel Farage used a surprisingly large number of works per sentence.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Andy Rain/EPA</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For example, Farage’s long rambling sentences make his language more complex, but also add to his “man holding court in the pub” <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/mar/02/nigel-farage-pub-ukip-activists">image</a>. Similarly, as a French nationalist who <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/24/marine-le-pen-rails-against-rampant-globalisation-after-election-success">opposes globalisation</a> and its alleged cultural homogenising effects, Le Pen may see an advantage in not imitating English-speaking political language trends that, by contrast, Macron has embraced.</p>
<p>Opting for national rhetorical traditions as opposed to slogan-based communication techniques derived from the US model might thus be useful for right-wing populist leaders in Europe.</p>
<h2>Mind the bias</h2>
<p>If right-wing populists do not necessarily use simpler language than their mainstream opponents, it begs the question: why were we so easily convinced they do?</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/covid-wont-kill-populism-even-though-populist-leaders-have-handled-the-crisis-badly-145309">COVID won't kill populism, even though populist leaders have handled the crisis badly</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Perhaps the answer is many of us like to think right-wing populists speak like fourth graders and their “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/election-us-2016-37329812">deplorable</a>” supporters lap it up. It fits our biases to believe populists like Trump are successful because they cynically deliver their message in much simpler language than mainstream politicians like Biden.</p>
<p>Our research shows, however, despite this convenient and even comforting idea, the reality is much more complex.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/148343/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Populists leaders are supposed to use simpler language than their opponents. A comprehensive study shows this is not always the case.Duncan McDonnell, Professor, School of Government and International Relations, Griffith UniversityStefano Ondelli, Associate professor, University of TriesteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1465482020-09-28T18:55:32Z2020-09-28T18:55:32ZElection violence in November? Here’s what the research says<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360160/original/file-20200927-16-1vvp0ql.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=38%2C12%2C8582%2C5704&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A man carrying a club is seen as the Proud Boys, a right-wing pro-Trump group, gather with their allies in a rally against left-wing Antifa in Portland, Oregon, Sept. 26, 2020. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/man-carrying-a-club-is-seen-as-the-proud-boys-a-right-wing-news-photo/1228751842?adppopup=true">John Rudoff/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>After Kenya’s 2007 election, as incumbent President Mwai Kibaki declared victory, the opposition alleged the election had been rigged. </p>
<p>A wave of <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-do-people-participate-in-election-violence-insights-from-kenyas-2007-elections-143016">protests, riots and ethnic violence</a> followed. As many as 1,500 citizens were killed and another 600,000 forcibly displaced.</p>
<p>As the U.S. presidential election draws near, many have expressed <a href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2020/8/18/21371964/2020-transition-integrity-project-simulation-trump">concern that a similar scenario may unfold here</a>. Some envision President Donald Trump’s supporters using <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/09/03/trump-stay-in-office/">misinformation to mobilize vigilante militias</a> to clash with leftist protesters. Others envision that groups on the left will <a href="https://time.com/5892945/law-enforcement-post-election-violence/">refuse to accept the results and mobilize</a>, leading to violence and deaths across the country.</p>
<p>Having a contested election in times of crisis, however, is by no means a guarantee of violence. The front-runners in the 2017 French presidential election, for example, were <a href="https://www.daily-sun.com/post/223523/Violence-scars-Frances-preelection-May-Day-marches">as politically polarizing</a> as their U.S. 2020 counterparts, with centrist candidate Emmanuel Macron calling right-wing leader Marine Le Pen’s party <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/07/marine-le-pen-defeated-front-national-far-from-finished">racist and xenophobic</a> and Le Pen charging that Macron was “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39802776">the candidate of savage globalisation</a>.”</p>
<p>And the first round of voting in France took place just after a shooting in the heart of Paris sent the country into a <a href="https://apnews.com/article/ae9439a65ff04fb19bf8e102a0840703">state of emergency</a>. Yet, as the votes were counted and Macron was declared the winner, Le Pen <a href="https://pittsburgh.cbslocal.com/2017/05/07/le-pen-concedes-defeat-in-french-election/">conceded defeat</a>, allowing for a peaceful transition.</p>
<p>With the barrage of 24/7 media coverage of the upcoming U.S. election, it can be hard to tell what’s real and what’s not – and that can be frightening. It’s important to step back and ask: What does the research say about the likelihood of election-related violence in November?</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360161/original/file-20200927-24-l5n6g2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Protesters around a bonfire" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360161/original/file-20200927-24-l5n6g2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360161/original/file-20200927-24-l5n6g2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360161/original/file-20200927-24-l5n6g2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360161/original/file-20200927-24-l5n6g2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360161/original/file-20200927-24-l5n6g2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360161/original/file-20200927-24-l5n6g2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360161/original/file-20200927-24-l5n6g2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Deadly violence followed the disputed 2007 presidential election in Kenya, including in this Nairobi slum.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/kenyans-demonstrate-30-december-2007-at-the-kibera-slum-as-news-photo/107605579?adppopup=true">Tony Karumba/AFP/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Predicting political instability</h2>
<p>When <a href="https://polisci.indiana.edu/about/faculty/koren-ore.html">social science researchers like me</a> try to predict political violence, we look at a large number of historical cases across multiple countries, and try to identify which events have resulted in many casualties. </p>
<p>In taking this approach, we can systematically evaluate what explains these extreme events, pinpointing specific issues that were present in most of the situations, and avoiding the inaccuracies that can happen by relying too much on anecdotal stories. </p>
<p>Such studies have highlighted three factors relevant to the upcoming election.</p>
<p>First, strong political institutions are <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00426.x">especially effective</a> in reducing the risk of violence. Many have voiced concerns that <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/04/how-to-destroy-a-government/606793/">President Trump has weakened American political institutions</a>. But as one of the world’s longest-enduring democracies, the United States and its democratic institutions have proven their capacity to maintain order through <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/watergate/timeline.html">crises and abuse of presidential power</a> before.</p>
<p>In the U.S., for example, despite allegations to the contrary, <a href="https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/voter-fraud-is-very-rare-in-american-elections/">electoral fraud is extremely rare</a>. Even if uncertainty and chaos were to ensue in the wake of the election, the authority to decide a winner is vested in an independent institution such as <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-case-of-biden-versus-trump-or-how-a-judge-could-decide-the-presidential-election-146367">the U.S. Supreme Court</a> or by the <a href="https://history.house.gov/Institution/Electoral-College/Electoral-College/">House of Representatives</a>. Kenya in 2007 had no comparable institutional anchors to help ensure post-election stability.</p>
<p>Second, research, including <a href="https://academic.oup.com/isq/article/62/2/274/4909422">my own</a>, finds that mass political violence usually happens in countries that <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3118222.pdf">have no capacity to prevent it</a>. In Kenya, for example, most violence was perpetrated by unofficial militias affiliated with ethnic or religious groups, such as the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/20406424.pdf">Mungiki</a>, which the government was unable – or unwilling – to curb.</p>
<p>In the U.S., if any political leader calls for vigilantes to mobilize, both the federal government and states have the capacity to expeditiously eliminate this threat. Militias may be armed, but they are no match for a <a href="https://theconversation.com/remind-us-what-exactly-is-the-national-guard-94621">well-trained National Guard</a> or Army regiment. This should help deter the risk of <a href="https://theconversation.com/portland-and-kenosha-violence-was-predictable-and-preventable-145505">violence by vigilantes</a>. </p>
<p>Some, however, fear that the president will send <a href="https://www.economist.com/united-states/2020/09/19/assessing-donald-trumps-use-of-the-homeland-security-department">federal agencies to seize ballots</a>. Although military officers continue to express <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/25/politics/pentagon-election-insurrection-act/index.html">formal commitment</a> to <a href="https://www.stripes.com/news/us/west-point-grads-raise-concerns-about-politicization-of-military-urge-class-of-2020-to-uphold-ideals-1.633448">keeping the military nonpoliticized</a>, such actions, if taken, may result in a violent backlash by left-wing vigilantes. But federal agents acting under orders from the White House will have the tactical upper hand in such clashes, which greatly adds to their deterrent capacity.</p>
<p>Finally, an especially strong predictor of election violence is a <a href="https://academic.oup.com/isr/article/15/4/473/1862712?casa_token=QxU1-hjGgBYAAAAA:6TdId2CGSKQi-Kaj6pKm64uGluAQ-RnhlbbXSOwr1ulk2LeKTQ_zbFI2MQIN7SDLOxBdvbjDXpQ">history of armed political conflict</a>. After the 2016 elections, America experienced <a href="https://www.politico.com/gallery/2016/11/2016-election-protest-photos-002366?slide=0">massive protests and some rioting</a>, but little in the way of deadly political violence.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Women protesting Trump's 2016 election." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360166/original/file-20200927-24-1sgjod2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360166/original/file-20200927-24-1sgjod2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360166/original/file-20200927-24-1sgjod2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360166/original/file-20200927-24-1sgjod2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360166/original/file-20200927-24-1sgjod2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360166/original/file-20200927-24-1sgjod2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360166/original/file-20200927-24-1sgjod2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">After the 2016 elections, America experienced large protests and some rioting, but little deadly political violence.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/demonstrators-fill-5th-avenue-in-midtown-manhattan-during-a-news-photo/959107274?adppopup=true">David Cliff/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What the numbers say</h2>
<p>Is post-election violence impossible in 2020 America? No. </p>
<p>However, <a href="https://acleddata.com/special-projects/us-crisis-monitor/">data suggests</a> it is unlikely. </p>
<p>Ninety-five percent of the 12,607 political demonstrations in the U.S. between May 24 and Sept. 19, 2020, were peaceful. There were 351 other kinds of incidents, including imposing curfews and perpetrating physical attacks. In 29 of those, there was violence against civilians, where 12 people were killed, nine of them by the police. And in an additional five drive-by shootings, three police officers were killed by the extremist group the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/08/19/magazine/boogaloo.html">Boogaloo Bois</a>. </p>
<p>Considering the number of people involved in the recent Black Lives Matter and COVID-19 protests, and the fact that <a href="https://theconversation.com/portland-and-kenosha-violence-was-predictable-and-preventable-145505">many were heavily armed</a>, these casualty figures are surprisingly low. According to <a href="https://acleddata.com/special-projects/us-crisis-monitor/">the data</a>, the majority of deaths were caused by police, not vigilantes or protesters, and all of the perpetrators (with the exception of two drive-by shooters), police and civilians alike, were taken into custody.</p>
<p>Like the U.S., France experienced protests and riots, in addition to multiple terrorist attacks, prior to Election Day. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/18/secret-plans-protect-le-pen-french-republic-emerge">There was even a government plan</a> to handle the potential violence and instability that might ensue if Le Pen were elected. And yet, as the most polarizing elections in decades concluded, there were few riots and no killing.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360376/original/file-20200928-22-j20fjl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="French riot policemen advance during clashes with protesters" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360376/original/file-20200928-22-j20fjl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360376/original/file-20200928-22-j20fjl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360376/original/file-20200928-22-j20fjl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360376/original/file-20200928-22-j20fjl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360376/original/file-20200928-22-j20fjl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360376/original/file-20200928-22-j20fjl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360376/original/file-20200928-22-j20fjl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">French riot police clash with protesters at a demonstration against the presidential candidate for the far-right Front National party, Feb. 25, 2017 in Nantes.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/french-riot-policemen-advance-during-clashes-with-news-photo/645260214?adppopup=true">Jean-Sebastien Evrard/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>So, what will happen in November?</h2>
<p>Researchers cannot perfectly predict political violence. Their analyses rely on the past. </p>
<p>Add to the equation a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-promised-this-kind-of-presidency--unpredictable-ad-hoc-and-impulsive/2018/03/10/e928b73e-23ef-11e8-badd-7c9f29a55815_story.html">notoriously unpredictable incumbent</a> against a backdrop of <a href="https://time.com/5876599/election-2020-coronavirus/">unprecedented social and economic conditions</a>, and making accurate predictions about potential post-election bedlam is impossible, as much as scholars and others may try.</p>
<p>[<em>Deep knowledge, daily.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>.]</p>
<p>While I think some concern is valid, it is important to remember that there is a big difference between using a call to arms to mobilize your voters and instill fear in the other party’s supporters, and staging a post-election insurrection, which could subject its instigators to charges of <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2381">sedition, if not high treason</a>.</p>
<p>Ultimately, the three factors discussed here suggest that fears of widespread violence by vigilantes and activists during and after Election Day should be treated as fears, not as a probable outcome.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/146548/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>In the past, Ore Koren received funding from the United States Institute of Peace. </span></em></p>Are the conditions ripe in the US for violence before, during or after the presidential election?Ore Koren, Assistant Professor, Indiana University Bloomington; International Security Fellow, Indiana UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1424152020-07-17T11:09:28Z2020-07-17T11:09:28ZHas the coronavirus proved a crisis too far for Europe’s far-right outsiders?<p>In recent years, far-right political parties in Europe have capitalised on crises to build their support bases. Many have made it to positions of power as a result of these efforts. The financial crisis of 2008, the refugee crisis that began in 2014 and the ongoing debate around climate change have all provided opportunities to harness growing uncertainty and resentment for political purposes.</p>
<p>However, early signs suggest these groups have not had the same success during the coronavirus crisis. For now at least, incumbent European governments seem to be in control.</p>
<p>On the internet, far-right communities have played a role in circulating
<a href="https://journals.uic.edu/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/10633">conspiracy theories</a> about COVID-19’s origins during the pandemic. They have helped spread the idea that the virus was created in a laboratory rather than coming from nature – and even that it was released intentionally – despite <a href="https://theconversation.com/heres-how-scientists-know-the-coronavirus-came-from-bats-and-wasnt-made-in-a-lab-141850">overwhelming evidence</a> to the contrary. They have <a href="https://theconversation.com/leicester-lockdown-blame-on-minority-communities-needs-to-be-challenged-142418">blamed minorities</a> for the spread of the disease and adopted a <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/nigel-farage-china-pay-must-covid-19-1501478">racist rhetoric</a> that blames China for the pandemic.</p>
<p>In turn, many far-right political parties have picked up the themes and brought them into <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2020/05/12/trans-atlantic-conspiracy-coronavirus-251325">mainstream discourse</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-are-there-so-many-coronavirus-conspiracy-theories-listen-to-part-six-of-our-expert-guide-136664">Why are there so many coronavirus conspiracy theories? Listen to part six of our expert guide</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Given the massive surge of conspiracy theories that have circulated online in the past few months, there has been concern that another surge in anti-establishment xenophobic politics is on the cards for Europe. The <a href="https://institute.global/policy/covid-19-and-global-far-right">worry has been</a> that the far right will make gains again as a result. But, so far, it seems this crisis has not actually been particularly “profitable” for these groups. In fact, they seem to be floundering.</p>
<h2>In retreat</h2>
<p>In Germany, the far-right AfD <a href="https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article207181643/Umfrage-zu-Corona-Krise-Angela-Merkel-mit-der-besten-Bewertung.html">openly embraced</a> conspiracy theories. Its members claimed Angela Merkel’s lockdown measures were unnecessary. </p>
<p>This initially gained traction among a public trying to adapt to a strange new way of life. But the AfD were quickly seen to have <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/14/coronavirus-has-paralyzed-europes-far-right/">painted themselves into a corner</a> when it became clear that Germany’s lockdown was producing the desired effect and infections were dropping.</p>
<p>The AfD has lost a significant amount of support during the pandemic, sliding from around 15% approval in <a href="https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/germany/">pre-coronavirus polls</a> to something more like 9% now. This is a blow to German ultranationalists.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, in Italy, Matteo Salvini, leader of the League party, has found it very hard to <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/countering-radical-right/after-covid-19-will-matteo-salvini-lead-europes-radical-right/">hold the attention</a> of the national media – which is a new experience for him. The League’s messaging has been confusing. In late February, the party initially called for the partially locked down region of Lombardy to be re-opened but then later demanded a full lockdown. The news website Politico’s analysis of opinion polling in Italy shows that the League’s popularity is <a href="https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/italy/">down 11%</a> from last summer.</p>
<p>The National Rally in France has also seen better days. Party leader Marine Le Pen asserted that <a href="https://www.valeursactuelles.com/clubvaleurs/politique/interview-marine-le-pen-le-gouvernement-est-le-plus-gros-pourvoyeur-de-fake-news-depuis-le-debut-de-cette-crise-117518">it makes sense to ask</a> if COVID-19 was made in a lab. <a href="https://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/coronavirus-marine-le-pen-trouve-legitime-de-se-demander-si-le-virus-ne-s-est-pas-echappe-d-un-laboratoire-20200330">A recent poll</a> found that 40% of National Rally voters believe that the virus was intentionally designed in a laboratory. Support for Le Pen’s party appears to have <a href="https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/france/">flatlined</a> during the pandemic.</p>
<p>In Greece, the leader of a new far-right group called Greek Solution is <a href="https://www.ekathimerini.com/250508/article/ekathimerini/news/probe-ordered-into-misleading-ad-on-party-leaders-tv-station">under investigation</a> by the Supreme Court for producing TV commercials advertising balms that “effectively protect people from coronavirus”. Vox in Spain has also failed to advance in polls, while mainstream parties in the country have enjoyed a significant boost.</p>
<h2>Incumbents hold support</h2>
<p>In spite of the far right’s continuous attempts to cause further instability during the pandemic, most European countries have rallied around their governments. Even mainstream opposition parties have struggled to make an impact.</p>
<p>Germans have been supportive of <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/opinion-germans-rally-behind-merkel-amid-coronavirus-crisis/a-53014974">Merkel’s evidence based approach</a> , while both France’s Emmanuel Macron and Italy’s Giuseppe Conte have seen their approval ratings <a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/04/17/835988054/several-european-leaders-see-a-popularity-boost-during-coronavirus-pandemic">climb</a>.</p>
<p>Greece’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/28/world/europe/coronavirus-greece-europe.html">success</a> at controlling the virus so far has not gone unnoticed either. It’s hard for opposition parties of any kind to gain traction when the current government has managed to keep total infections to fewer than 4,000 by taking swift action to restrict movement.</p>
<p>The predicament facing Europe’s far-right and nationalist parties represents a very interesting break with the past. In the last decade, most crises in the continent played out with a familiar winner. There was significant disunity between European leaders when it came to managing the financial crash and the refugee crisis. This fractured the European Union and opened a space for the far right.</p>
<p>Drawing on old notions of identity and boosted by online conspiracy theories, far-right actors once again openly doubted European policies and attempted to take advantage of the crisis. But compared to the more scientific and realist approaches of most European governments, their response looks insufficient.</p>
<p>The far right has been the significant loser of the pandemic. Not only have these groups lost credibility, but their nationalist agenda looks highly irrelevant in the era of COVID-19. Amid lockdowns and closed borders, the issue of immigration has lost its significance in 2020 and the failure to come up with viable solutions to the biggest issue of the day has hurt the popularity of far-right actors.</p>
<p>However, now the focus has shifted towards the need to return to “normality” things might change. Impatience is growing among populations that have been living in lockdown for months. </p>
<p>A recession looms – and it looks set to dwarf the last. That presents opportunities to governments and fringe groups alike – opportunities that the far right will be actively looking into, to further weaken liberal democracies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/142415/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Georgios Samaras does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Incumbent governments are enjoying renewed popularity during the pandemic, while far-right challengers get bogged down in conspiracy theories.Georgios Samaras, PhD Candidate, Department of European and International Studies, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.