tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/military-rule-20104/articlesMilitary rule – The Conversation2024-02-07T13:27:05Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2227202024-02-07T13:27:05Z2024-02-07T13:27:05ZEcowas: why withdrawal of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso signals fresh trouble for the Sahel<p><em>On 27 January 2024, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-mali-burkina-faso-say-they-are-leaving-ecowas-regional-block-2024-01-28/">announced</a> their plan to withdraw from membership of the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas), despite repeated efforts at reconciliation.</em></p>
<p><em>Diplomacy scholar Nicholas Westcott explains how the decision may be the latest symptom of a deepening crisis in the Sahel, the area south of the Sahara desert stretching from Mauritania in the west to Chad in the east.</em></p>
<h2>Why does their decision pose a threat to the region?</h2>
<p>The coastal states in Ecowas fear <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f9c0ca66-8c32-4906-9e22-f2d3fc0e8c67">contagion</a> from both jihadism and political disorder in the Sahel. If the three Sahelian countries leave Ecowas, that risk increases. So does the risk of potential hostility to Malian and Burkinabe migrants in Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal. Stopping free movement between these three countries and the rest of west Africa would have serious economic consequences for all concerned.</p>
<p>Other governments in the region also fear damage to their own democracies – if not from coups, then from anti-western populists. </p>
<p>Guinea already has a military government. Others such as Cameroon, Togo and Sierra Leone may be vulnerable. </p>
<p>With elections ahead in <a href="https://ec.gov.gh/electoral-system/">Ghana</a>, and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/6/senegal-parliament-delays-election-to-december-15-after-chaotic-vote">postponement</a> of the election in Senegal, this year will test democracy in the region.</p>
<p>This schism in Ecowas is also a risk for Africa’s partners in Europe and the US. Recent research in the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/advance-article/doi/10.1093/afraf/adad034/7564826?searchresult=1">African Affairs journal</a> showed that resentment of the increased French military presence was a key reason for the Nigerien military backing the coup led by <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66430115">General Abdourahmane Tchiani</a> rather than elected <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/what-you-need-know-about-nigers-ousted-president-2023-08-14/">president Mohamed Bazoum</a>. </p>
<p>Other western countries risk being tarred with the same neocolonial brush unless they reform international institutions to reflect African concerns. They need to expedite the changes necessary to ensure that the multilateral system works for the benefit of small poor countries.</p>
<p>If this doesn’t happen, China’s narrative that the existing system works only to the benefit of “the west” will gain traction on the continent.</p>
<h2>What are the drivers?</h2>
<p>All countries in west Africa face a multilayered crisis. This has been brought on by years of sluggish growth following the <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/great-recession.asp">2008 financial crisis</a>, <a href="https://www.who.int/health-topics/coronavirus#tab=tab_1">COVID</a> and the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ukraine">Ukraine war</a>, the impact of climate change and population growth. </p>
<p>Elected governments are finding it increasingly difficult to satisfy the expectations of their citizens. This is particularly true of the growing number of unemployed young people who have become disillusioned with democracy and are open to violent regime change, whether through jihad or a coup d’etat. </p>
<p>It is almost a re-run of the 1970s when drought, corruption and development failures led to a rash of coups in the region. People who cannot make a living legitimately will find other ways to do so.</p>
<p>Jihadism and banditry have <a href="https://www.iiss.org/publications/armed-conflict-survey/2023/from-global-jihad-to-local-insurgencies/">increased</a> despite western efforts to combat them. Western support has thus lost credibility, even if the real failure is primarily political and economic. </p>
<h2>Why have regional bodies like Ecowas not been able to help?</h2>
<p>Faced with the juntas’ threat of secession, African regional organisations, in this case Ecowas and the African Union, face a dilemma. Do they to stick to their principles and exclude states that have experienced unconstitutional changes of government until they re-establish governments accountable to their citizens? Or do they compromise their principles to preserve at least nominal unity, and allow authoritarian governments back into the club? </p>
<p>Reconciliation efforts by Togo, through its <a href="https://lpsf.africa/lpsf-2023/">Peace and Security Forum</a> in Lomé last November, and by Nigerian Islamic leaders have not borne fruit. Nevertheless, it’s possible that the departure announcement is a bargaining chip to get more lenient terms for their reintegration into Ecowas. </p>
<p>Ecowas <a href="https://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-communique-on-burkina-faso-mali-niger/">responded</a> by saying that it had not yet received formal notification, which means, according to the regulations, that the countries can only leave in a year’s time. This provides all parties with negotiation time. The <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20240130/communique-withdrawal-three-ecowas-member-states">AU</a> has also urged negotiation to keep Ecowas together. For its part, Nigeria’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/mali-notifies-west-african-bloc-ecowas-decision-leave-2024-01-29/">response</a> has been less accommodating.</p>
<h2>What lies behind the military regimes’ announcement?</h2>
<p>Regime survival has become their overriding objective. Their explicit intention seems to be to undermine the principle that African nations should apply standards to each other. The fact that African governments themselves signed up to these principles is as irrelevant to the insurrectionists, who want to retain power, as it is to the jihadists, who want to seize it. </p>
<p>They have set out the following <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/28/niger-mali-burkina-faso-announce-withdrawal-from-ecowas">justifications</a> for their withdrawal:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Ecowas provided no support against the jihadists</p></li>
<li><p>Ecowas has imposed “illegal” sanctions that are harming the people </p></li>
<li><p>Ecowas has fallen under the influence of foreign governments.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>These arguments are weak. They reflect an attempt to look like defenders of the poor and opponents of western influence.</p>
<p>It seems to be working. Populations are being <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/burkina-faso/burkina-faso/313-armer-les-civils-au-prix-de-la-cohesion-sociale">mobilised and armed</a> to fight the jihadists.</p>
<p>The juntas appear to be donning the mantle of <a href="https://www.thomassankara.net/facts-about-thomas-sankara-in-burkina-faso/?lang=en">Thomas Sankara</a>. The revered former president of Burkina Faso, who seized power himself, is seen as a hero for his opposition to corrupt elites and French influence, his modesty and principles, and his concern for the ordinary Burkinabe. </p>
<p>It also plays conveniently into a narrative that both <a href="https://www.economist.com/china/2023/09/21/china-wants-to-be-the-leader-of-the-global-south">China</a> and Russia are promoting: that current global institutions have been set up to defend neocolonial western interests, that adherence to “western values” (such as democracy and human rights) denies countries their right to develop in their own way; and that only China and Russia are true defenders of the interests of the global south.</p>
<p>Russia is putting its guns where its mouth is. There are an estimated <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/20/russian-mercenaries-behind-slaughter-in-mali-village-un-report-finds">1,000</a> Russian troops in Mali – formerly Wagner, now state-run and re-branded the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/russian-troops-deploy-burkina-faso-2024-01-25/">Africa Corps</a> – and the first 100, with more to follow, have arrived in Burkina Faso. </p>
<p>Others are being recruited for Niger. Their official justification may be anti-terrorist duties, but their real purpose is to protect the regime from further threats of mutiny, coup or invasion. </p>
<p>The danger is that the Sahelian states could become unaccountable regimes, protected by Russia in return for gold, and living off the illicit trafficking of people and goods across the Sahara. </p>
<p>The migrant trade is already <a href="https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/54581/niger-migrants-return-to-the-route-towards-the-mediterranean">thriving again in Agadez</a>, the key transit point in northern Niger to the Mediterranean coast. And nothing worries European countries more than a dramatic increase in African migration. So they will be watching developments with concern.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222720/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicholas Westcott does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger announced their intention to leave Ecowas. This may be a pointer to a deeper crisis in the Sahel region.Nicholas Westcott, Professor of Practice in Diplomacy, Dept of Politics and International Studies, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2223882024-02-05T09:27:55Z2024-02-05T09:27:55ZMali, Burkina Faso and Niger want to leave Ecowas. A political scientist explains the fallout<p><em>Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have sent Ecowas, west Africa’s main political union of 15 countries, a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/28/niger-mali-burkina-faso-announce-withdrawal-from-ecowas">formal notice</a> of their withdrawal from the bloc. The three countries are governed by military rulers who <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/coups-africa-even-ecowas">have overthrown</a> democratically elected leaders since 2021.</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation Africa’s Godfred Akoto Boafo asked political scientist <a href="https://www.leedsbeckett.ac.uk/staff/dr-olayinka-ajala/">Olayinka Ajala</a> about the implications of the withdrawal.</em></p>
<h2>Why are Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso withdrawing?</h2>
<p>The three countries have given <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20240129-mali-and-burkina-faso-withdraw-from-ecowas">three main reasons</a>.</p>
<p>First is what they call the “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/28/niger-mali-burkina-faso-announce-withdrawal-from-ecowas">illegal, illegitimate, inhumane and irresponsible sanctions</a>” imposed on them for truncating their democracies. </p>
<p>Second is the failure of Ecowas to assist them in their “existential fight against terrorism and insecurity”. </p>
<p>The juntas have also argued that Ecowas has deviated from the founding principles of the organisation and is now <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-68122947">controlled by foreign powers</a>. </p>
<p>In 2001, Ecowas adopted a protocol on democracy and good governance which included a mechanism for unconstitutional changes of government. <a href="https://www.eisa.org/pdf/ecowas2001protocol.pdf">Article 1a</a> of the protocol maintains a “zero tolerance for power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means”. </p>
<p>Ecowas cited this clause as its reason for suspending the three countries and for imposing sanctions against them.</p>
<p>Ecowas has made it clear that it won’t work with the regimes. Its statements make it clear that it has taken a strong stance because it wishes to deter military coups in other countries within the bloc. </p>
<p>The regional bloc is also clearly frustrated at the lack of interest the three countries have shown in returning to democratic rule. It has asked for a clear and definite transition timetable, especially for Mali and Burkina Faso. </p>
<h2>What impact will the withdrawal have on Ecowas?</h2>
<p>The main impact will be on trade and economic development. Ecowas is primarily an economic community and the loss of any member will affect trade and economic development.</p>
<p>The three countries collectively account for 8% of the <a href="https://countryeconomy.com/countries/groups/economic-community-west-african-states">US$761 billion</a> Ecowas gross domestic product (GDP). In 2022, the total trade volume from the Ecowas region totalled <a href="https://punchng.com/mali-b-faso-niger-exit-may-weaken-277bn-ecowas-trade-report/">US$277.22 billion</a>. </p>
<p>The concern is that the exit of these countries could affect the flow of goods and services in the bloc. </p>
<p>Leaving the bloc could have other knock-on effects too:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>The economic collapse of the countries. These countries have strategic importance, especially in food security. Niger is a key source of onions while Burkina Faso exports tomatoes to the sub-region.</p></li>
<li><p>This would lead to an exodus of citizens to other Ecowas countries, further threatening the stability of the bloc. </p></li>
<li><p>Concerns that the three countries will enter into bilateral relationships with countries that might not be favourable to other Ecowas countries. For example, there are already concerns about Niger’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-and-russia-are-forming-military-ties-3-ways-this-could-upset-old-allies-221696">alliance with Russia</a> after it severed ties with France. </p></li>
</ul>
<h2>What impact will it have on each of the countries?</h2>
<p>The main impact on the countries will be on the movement of people, goods and services. </p>
<p>Under Ecowas, members enjoy unrestricted movement of citizens within the bloc. Citizens of Ecowas countries can live and work in any country in the bloc. For instance, there are more than 5 million citizens of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger living and working in Côte d'Ivoire alone. Ghana, Togo and Republic of Benin also host large numbers of Nigeriens. </p>
<p>The citizens of all three landlocked countries would no longer be able to travel to other Ecowas states without impediments. Niger also shares a border of over 1,600km with seven states in Nigeria and <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2024-01-30/analysis-west-africas-brexit-moment-spells-trouble-for-the-region">80% of its trade</a> is done with Nigeria. </p>
<p>The sanctions imposed on Niger by Ecowas are <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/niger/ecowas-nigeria-and-niger-coup-sanctions-time-recalibrate">already affecting</a> citizens of the country. Hardship is likely to increase after the exit if Nigeria decides to police its borders. </p>
<p>Also, depending on how Ecowas agrees to relate to the countries in future, there could be restrictions on goods and services which would further affect the economies of these countries. </p>
<h2>What impact will it have on security in the region?</h2>
<p>The security arrangement might not be affected in the short term. But it could be in the long term. There is already limited security cooperation between the three countries and other Ecowas members. For instance, they have all withdrawn from the G5 Sahel, resulting in the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/6/chad-mauritania-pave-way-to-dissolve-g5-anti-rebel-alliance#:%7E:text=The%20G5%20was%20created%20in,major%20issue%20across%20the%20Sahel.&text=The%20two%20remaining%20members%20of,other%20three%20founding%20countries%20left.">collapse of the organisation</a>. </p>
<p>Although the lack of security support from Ecowas was stated as one of the reasons for exiting Ecowas, a total collapse of existing security infrastructure would affect not only the three countries but also other relatively stable states such as Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Togo and Benin. The three states have joined forces to form the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/military-led-sahel-states-rally-thousands-support-alliance-2023-12-30/">Alliance of Sahel States</a>, but without support from regional groups such as Ecowas, they will struggle to curtail insurgencies. </p>
<p>Currently, Mali has over 1,000 members of Africa Corps (formerly Wagner group), supported by Russia. There are <a href="https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2024-01-31/wagner-forces-under-a-new-flag-russias-africa-corps-burkina-faso">100 in Burkina Faso</a>. After months of Burkina Faso insisting it would not engage foreign mercenaries, the first contingent arrived in January 2024 and more are expected soon. Niger also recently agreed to <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-and-russia-are-forming-military-ties-3-ways-this-could-upset-old-allies-221696">military cooperation</a> with Russia. </p>
<p>This indicates the three countries still require external assistance to combat insecurity. The problem is that Russia is fighting a huge war in Ukraine and might not be able to support the three countries as much as they would require. If the three countries fail to combat insurgence through the newly formed Alliance of Sahel States, the threat will spread to other countries in the bloc and beyond. </p>
<p>Ecowas leaders have indicated that they are willing to have a dialogue with the three countries. I think Ecowas granting some concessions to prevent them from exiting would be in the interest of the bloc and all the citizens of Ecowas countries.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222388/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The decision by the three countries could change the dynamics of Ecowas.Olayinka Ajala, Senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2213012024-01-19T13:40:58Z2024-01-19T13:40:58ZBeijing may have brokered a fragile truce in northern Myanmar – but it can’t mask China’s inability to influence warring parties<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570235/original/file-20240118-17-o51ffm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=6%2C6%2C4514%2C3002&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Members of the rebel Ta'ang National Liberation Army standing guard in Shan state, Myanmar.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/this-photo-taken-on-december-13-2023-shows-members-of-news-photo/1851374184?adppopup=true">STR/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A <a href="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/myanmar-ceasefire-breaks-down-01172024054526.html">shaky agreement to end fighting</a> in northern Myanmar has served to highlight concerns in Beijing over the ongoing unrest – and the limits of <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/12/chinas-influence-increases-amid-myanmars-instability">China’s power to influence</a> the <a href="https://theconversation.com/military-violence-in-myanmar-is-worsening-amid-fierce-resistance-and-international-ambivalence-203646">ongoing civil war</a>.</p>
<p>On Jan. 12, 2024, China announced that it had <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3248278/china-brokers-myanmar-ceasefire-urges-junta-and-rebel-militia-exercise-maximum-restraint">brokered a cease-fire</a> between the Myanmar military and a trio of ethnic armies, known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance.</p>
<p>There is, however, one caveat: The agreement only applies to the northern Shan state. The state has seen <a href="https://isdp.se/publication/return-to-war-militarized-conflicts-northern-shan-state">conflict since Myanmar’s independence in 1948</a>, and especially after <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2015/05/chinas-relations-burma">the once-Beijing-backed</a> Burma Communist Party established its headquarters there in 1968 and engaged the country’s army in a prolonged war.</p>
<p>It is also a region where opposition to Myanmar’s military government has had the most success in the current civil war. Since launching a fresh push against the Myanmar military on Oct. 27, 2023, the alliance has captured one town in Shan state <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/conflicts-in-numbers/33-towns-in-80-days-mapping-the-gains-of-myanmars-anti-junta-offensives.html">every three days</a>, according to media reports.</p>
<p>And despite the China-brokered agreement, <a href="https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20240115_33/">sporadic fighting has continued</a> in Shan state. Meanwhile, the truce has done nothing to end the civil war outside the state.</p>
<p>But that might not be the point: The agreement brokered by Beijing is, I believe, more about trying to <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/01/09/myanmar-china-border-offensive-cyberscams-three-brotherhood-alliance/">safeguard the interests of China</a> than about ushering in elusive peace to Myanmar. Beijing has increasingly been concerned over the threat of Myanmar’s turmoil spilling over into China.</p>
<p>Indeed, a <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/b5f830f7-8aec-4862-832c-c68f81fac49f">statement by the Chinese foreign ministry</a> announcing the truce noted that both sides in the conflict had “committed to not harming the safety of Chinese border residents and personnel involved in projects in Myanmar.”</p>
<p>There are clear reasons why China would like to see peace in Myanmar. The destabilized northern region has become <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/12/19/china/myanmar-conflict-china-scam-centers-analysis-intl-hnk/index.html">a haven for Chinese criminal gangs</a> that traffic humans and drugs, and run online scams from across the border. Meanwhile, the war has <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-border-trade-falls-100-million-in-april-december-amid-clashes.html">blocked trade routes</a> and seen Chinese citizens in border towns increasingly put at risk.</p>
<p><iframe id="RWA6y" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/RWA6y/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>Military under siege</h2>
<p>Regardless of China’s desire to see the truce hold, there appears little chance of that happening. Myanmar’s army has faced major losses since fighting began in 2021, sparked by a coup in which the country’s generals <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/myanmar-news-protests-coup.html">overthrew the democratically elected government</a>. Since then, a <a href="https://theconversation.com/military-violence-in-myanmar-is-worsening-amid-fierce-resistance-and-international-ambivalence-203646">fierce resistance movement</a> has emerged across Myanmar – one the generals have failed to subdue.</p>
<p>The recent truce has done little to end the violence, opposition successes or the threat to China. A day after the cease-fire was announced, one member of the Three Brotherhood Alliance, the Arakan Army, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-67982635">captured Paletwa</a>, a border town with India in the west of Myanmar. Meanwhile, the Kachin Independence Army <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/war-against-the-junta/myanmar-junta-loses-battalion-hq-fighter-jet-hundreds-of-troops-in-two-days.html">shot down a China-made fighter jet</a> – the third one in just a few weeks – and the Myanmar army lost control of one of its division headquarters in the cease-fire area.</p>
<p>In southeast regions of Myanmar bordering Thailand, the <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/in-person/interview/operation-1111-close-to-securing-all-of-kayah-state-for-myanmar-resistance.html">Karenni Nationalities Defense Forces</a> and allied fighters launched “Operation 1111,” expanding their territorial and administrative control in the region. And in the central plains, the People’s Defense Forces, an umbrella resistance group, continues to engage in guerrilla warfare against the military. </p>
<h2>Dwindling Chinese influence</h2>
<p>In the context of the sprawling civil war, China has found itself in uncharted territory. </p>
<p>In the past, China has been able to exert its influence over Myanmar’s politics. But the civil war has seen the emergence of new resistance groups, such as the People’s Defense Forces, most of whose members are younger than the soldiers in established armies. And they have no intention of entering any agreement with the Myanmar military – despite the entreaties of Beijing.</p>
<p>Moreover, these new groups have made strategic and logistic links beyond Myanmar’s borders, giving them access to smuggled arms and supplies.</p>
<p>As such, China’s influence over Myanmar is constrained. This is even more so given the ethno-nationalism underpinning much of the fighting in Myanmar. Chinese efforts to end the fighting do little to provide solutions to tie the disparate ethnic groups in Myanmar together. In fact, the one thing binding the ethnic groups that form the Three Brotherhood Alliance is the common goal of defeating the Myanmar army.</p>
<p>In addition, the safety of Chinese citizens in regions across the Myanmar border cannot be guaranteed by the cease-fire agreement with the military. The army’s inability to tackle criminal gangs in Shan state prior to civil war suggests that even without warfare, the region will continue to pose a threat to China.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, China’s relationship with, and influence over, groups in northern Myanmar has changed as a result of the civil war.</p>
<p>Take the <a href="https://thediplomat.com/tag/myanmar-national-democratic-alliance-army-mndaa/">Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army</a> (MNDAA), a resistance group in the Kokang region that borders China’s Yunnan province and shares linguistic and cultural ties with China. Since being formed in 1989, its support has switched back and forth from the Myanmar government to the resistance groups – as has China’s.</p>
<p>But the MNDAA cannot be viewed as a vassal state of China. </p>
<p>In 2019, the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/16/what-is-myanmars-three-brotherhood-alliance-thats-resisting-the-military">MNDAA joined the Three Brotherhood Alliance</a> with the Arakan Army and Ta'ang National Liberation Army, groups with different cultural and linguistic backgrounds.</p>
<p>China’s diplomacy and influence over the Three Brotherhood Alliance is limited: A truce threatens the unity that the group has developed in opposition to the military.</p>
<p>And there is little incentive among the Three Brotherhood Alliance to stop fighting at a time when it appears to be on the front foot, and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-65743887">morale among Myanmar’s soldiers is low</a>. </p>
<p>Entering the truce is in itself risky for the alliance, as it may threaten the group’s standing with other armed groups – many of whom China never dealt with until 2021.</p>
<h2>Losing faith in the military</h2>
<p>As such, Beijing’s power to influence Myanmar’s ethnic resistance groups is limited. But there is another reason why the truce Beijing brokered may not hold: Beijing’s desire to give any support to the military government has its limits, too.</p>
<p>China is losing patience with the Myanmar military, which has failed to crack down on criminal gangs that have targeted Chinese citizens. As many as <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/08/hundreds-thousands-trafficked-work-online-scammers-se-asia-says-un-report">120,000 people</a>, many of them Chinese citizens, have been trafficked into Myanmar by these organizations to help <a href="https://www.vox.com/world-politics/2024/1/18/24041696/cyberscams-myanmar-china-pig-butchering">operate online scams</a>.</p>
<p>China’s default position on Myanmar has traditionally been to support whoever is in power. And Beijing had a good relationship with the democratic government under Aung San Suu Kyi prior to the 2021 coup.</p>
<p>The corruption and non-governability of Myanmar’s border towns since then threaten the safety of Chinese citizens and undermines any faith China has in the military’s ability to deliver stability.</p>
<p>If Myanmar’s military cannot stabilize northern Myanmar, China is in a difficult situation. The status quo – with the Myanmar military in power, but unable to subdue resistance movements – will continue to present a threat to China.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221301/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tharaphi Than does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Beijing is losing patience with Myanmar’s military, as well as its influence with resistance groups.Tharaphi Than, Associate Professor of World Cultures and Languages, Northern Illinois UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2191302024-01-08T13:58:09Z2024-01-08T13:58:09ZScramble for the Sahel – why France, Russia, China and the United States are interested in the region<p>The Sahel, a region <a href="https://theconversation.com/sahel-region-africa-72569">3,860km wide located south of the Sahara Desert</a> and stretching east-west across the African continent, has been a focus of attention around the world recently. </p>
<p>In the last decade, issues such as <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15365.doc.htm#:%7E:text=drivers%20of%20insecurity.-,From%201%20January%20to%2030%20June%202023%2C%20the%20region%20recorded,displaced%20persons%20exceeding%206%20million.">terrorism</a>, <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/01/1132332#:%7E:text=%E2%80%9CIndeed%2C%20the%20central%20Sahel%20continues,in%20Ukraine%2C%E2%80%9D%20she%20added.">insecurity</a> and <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/06/1137072">trafficking</a> have characterised the region. </p>
<p>Military takeovers have been a major source of concern in the region and beyond in the last few years. Since 2020, the region has had <a href="https://www.gcsp.ch/publications/understanding-crisis-democracy-west-africa-and-sahel">four successful coup d’états</a> and three failed ones. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://acleddata.com/2023/08/03/fact-sheet-military-coup-in-niger/">coup in Niger</a> particularly attracted attention. This is because Niger was seen as a “<a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/west-africa/nigers-coup-and-americas-choice">darling of the west</a>” and a model for democratic governance in the region. </p>
<p>Despite the challenges facing the region, the scramble for the Sahel remains intense. </p>
<p>The main actors in this scramble are the <a href="https://european-union.europa.eu/index_en">European Union</a>, France, Russia, China and the United States.</p>
<p>The EU relies on Sahelian countries, especially Niger, to stop mass illegal immigration into the bloc. Niger is a major transit country in the region. Niger had security and defence partnerships with the EU until recently when the <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/niger-ends-security-and-defence-partnerships-with-the-eu/">country unilaterally cancelled the deals</a>. This is a source of concern to the EU. </p>
<p>Why are these foreign powers interested in the Sahel?</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.leedsbeckett.ac.uk/staff/dr-olayinka-ajala/">scholar</a> in international relations and having <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/scientific-contributions/Olayinka-Ajala-2181806326">researched</a> the region for over a decade, I see the main reasons as follows: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>availability of natural resources</p></li>
<li><p>strategic location of the region in Africa</p></li>
<li><p>economic interests of the countries involved in the scramble</p></li>
<li><p>defence and security cooperation in the form of arms sales.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Foreign powers all have their reasons to be involved in the scramble for the Sahel.</p>
<h2>France</h2>
<p>Most of the countries in the Sahel region were colonised by France. Unlike Britain, France has maintained strong links with former colonies. They cooperate in the economy, defence and resource extraction, to mention a few areas. </p>
<p>France has the <a href="https://www.ieri.be/en/publications/wp/2019/f-vrier/france-still-exploiting-africa">first right</a> to buy any natural resources discovered in all its former colonies. Although the relationship between France and its former colonies appeared cordial, recent coups in Francophone countries and <a href="https://theconversation.com/france-in-africa-why-macrons-policies-increased-distrust-and-anger-212022">anti-France sentiments</a> across Africa have revealed the opposite. </p>
<p>The coups have been followed by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/huge-protests-niger-call-french-forces-leave-after-coup-2023-09-02/">large demonstrations</a> against France and in support of the putschists. </p>
<p>Despite these cracks, France is keen to maintain its grip on these countries, especially pertaining to military cooperation and resource extraction. France was reluctant to pull its military out of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger despite the countries severing military partnerships. It continues to extract natural resources in these countries.</p>
<h2>Russia</h2>
<p>The relationships between Russia and many Sahelian countries were established during the cold war and colonial era. More recently, the emphasis by western countries on <a href="https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/research-report-72-the-impact-of-counter-terrorism-measures-on-muslim-communities.pdf">human rights</a>, especially during counterterrorism operations, has pushed Sahelian countries closer to Russia.</p>
<p>While western allies demand the rule of law, democracy, and human rights in return for security and economic support, Russia portrays itself differently. The <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/2022-Russian-invasion-of-Ukraine">invasion</a> of Ukraine by Russia in 2022 also increased Russia’s interest in the Sahel because it is keen to maintain allies in Africa. </p>
<p>Russia has <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/28/russia-s-growing-footprint-in-africa-s-sahel-region-pub-89135">openly backed</a> military regimes in Mali and Burkina Faso and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66478430">warned</a> against any military intervention in Niger when the military took power. Furthermore, the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-60947877">Wagner group</a>, the controversial private military company which is controlled by Russia, cooperates with some countries in the Sahel. Niger has <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20231204-niger-s-junta-ends-key-security-agreements-with-eu-turns-to-russia-for-defence-deal">cancelled defence agreement with the EU</a> and switched to Russia. All of these factors explain Russia’s interest in the Sahel. </p>
<h2>China</h2>
<p>Like Russia, China portrays itself as an alternative to the traditional ally (France) of Sahelian countries. With a mantra of “<a href="https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation.aspx?paperid=94683">non-interference</a>” and “<a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/praxis/files/2020/05/1.-Condon.pdf">respecting sovereignty</a>”, China has entrenched itself as a “partner” of countries in the Sahel. </p>
<p>The Sahel region is rich in natural resources such as oil, uranium, natural gas and lithium. Chinese state-owned enterprises <a href="https://faoajournal.substack.com/p/the-future-of-strategic-competition">operate</a> in Niger, Chad, Mali and Burkina Faso. </p>
<p>For instance, Mali potentially has <a href="https://www.mining-technology.com/features/top-ten-biggest-lithium-mines/?cf-view">one of the largest</a> lithium reserves in the world and China’s Ganfeng Lithium has <a href="https://faoajournal.substack.com/p/the-future-of-strategic-competition">invested</a> heavily in the country. In addition, despite China’s development in military hardware, most of the weapons are untested. China is keen to use the conflicts in the Sahel to <a href="https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Papers/WF_93_Rajosefa_The_Future_of_Strategic_Competition_in_the_Sahel_Region.pdf">test</a> its arms products. </p>
<h2>The United States</h2>
<p>In 2019, the US opened its <a href="https://intellinews.com/us-in-danger-of-losing-control-of-its-extensive-drone-base-in-niger-289069/#:%7E:text=The%20Agadez%20drone%20base%2C%20officially,by%20the%20US%20Air%20Force.">largest drone base</a> in Africa in Agadez-Niger. A year before that, I had <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071847.2018.1552452">written</a> about the security implications of the base for the region. </p>
<p>Unlike France and China, which both have extensive economic interests in the Sahel, the US has a strong military interest. Niger, in particular, is strategically located and the US can easily fly surveillance and reconnaissance drones from the country to cover the Sahel, west and central Africa. </p>
<p>As France is being militarily dislodged by its former colonies in the region, the US has been trying to fill the void to prevent Russia and China from establishing further military presence. </p>
<p>The US took several months to label the military takeover in Niger a coup so as not to lose strategic military cooperation and dominance. </p>
<p>The year 2023 has been particularly challenging for the countries in the Sahel. With issues ranging from economic instability to insecurity, the region remains fragile. Despite the instability and fragility, the scramble for the region remains intense with traditional allies such as France losing its grip and other powers stepping up. </p>
<p>The Sahel is one to keep an eye on in 2024 and beyond.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219130/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Foreign powers’ interest in the Sahel is driven by its natural resources and strategic location for security and illegal migration control.Olayinka Ajala, Senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2128092023-09-05T13:40:23Z2023-09-05T13:40:23ZGabon coup has been years in the making: 3 key factors that ended the Bongo dynasty<p>The recent <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/gabonese-military-officers-announce-they-have-seized-power-2023-08-30/">military intervention</a> that put an end to the Bongo family’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/gabon-president-bongo-run-re-election-august-2023-07-09/">56-year hold</a> on power in Gabon has been many years in the making. </p>
<p>Its roots can be traced back to when deposed president Ali Bongo Ondimba <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/10/29/gabon-president-ali-bongo-hospitalised-in-saudi-arabia">suffered a stroke</a> in 2018. </p>
<p>The political crisis caused by Bongo’s illness and the opaque manner in which he <a href="https://www.barrons.com/news/gabonese-president-ali-bongo-defies-illness-father-s-shadow-4c2dba69">continued</a> to hold the reins of power through close family members during his convalescence created tensions within the power circles. </p>
<p>On one side were critics who <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gabon-cabinet-idUSKCN0RC0I720150912">demanded</a> his resignation and sought to end the Bongo dynasty’s grip on power in the oil rich Central African country. These critics were mostly responsible for the emergence of <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2023/09/01/albert-ondo-ossa-everything-must-be-done-so-that-general-oligui-nguema-hands-over-power-to-me_6119686_124.html">Albert Ondo Ossa</a> as a consensus opposition presidential candidate at the 2023 elections. </p>
<p>On the other side were loyal members of the ruling <a href="https://pdg-gabon.org/">Parti Démocratique Gabonais</a>. The party was founded by former <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jun/08/gabon-omar-bongo-death-reports">president Omar Bongo</a>, who ruled the country from 1967 to 2009. In this group were party members who continued to play an institutional charade of cabinet meetings and rubber-stamp legislation that masked the troubling absence and incapacitation of Ali Bongo. </p>
<p>The group also includes powerful clan members inside the Bongo dynasty jockeying for position and wealth in the uncertainty surrounding Ali Bongo’s health.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.ags.edu/international-relations/agsird-faculty/douglas-a-yates">political scientist</a> specialising in African politics and the politics of the oil industry in Africa, I have <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/240810975_The_Rentier_State_in_Africa_Oil_Rent_Dependency_and_Neocolonialism_in_the_Republic_of_Gabon">researched</a> the implications of oil rent dependency and neocolonialism in Gabon.</p>
<p>My view is that the corrupt oil-rentier dynastic regime that ruled Gabon for the past half century was brought to an end by a combination of three factors. They are Ali Bongo’s illness; the contagion effect of other recent successful coups in Africa; and the power tussle between General Brice Oligui Nguema (the coup leader, who is said to be Bongo’s distant cousin) and Sylvia Bongo Ondimba, Ali Bongo’s wife. The former first lady was believed to be preparing her son, Noureddine Bongo, to succeed his father. </p>
<h2>Factors in favour of coup</h2>
<p>Before the coup d’état there was little hope that Ali Bongo Ondimba would lose his third re-election bid. </p>
<p>His party had over <a href="https://data.ipu.org/node/62/elections?chamber_id=13398">80%</a> of the seats in the legislature, control of regional and municipal governments, and a hold on the courts and the security apparatus of the state. </p>
<p>Ali Bongo was said to have won <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/gabon-election-idAFKBN30507D">64.27%</a> of votes cast in the election, which the opposition described as a sham. According to the electoral umpire, Bongo’s main challenger, Albert Ondo Ossa, came second with 30.77%. That was before the military struck. </p>
<p>One of the factors that encouraged the military intervention in Gabon is the contagion effect of recent successful coups in Africa. A series of coups in Mali (2020), Chad (2021), Guinea (2021), Burkina Faso (2022) and Niger (2023) appear to have demonstrated to Gabon’s military that not only was a successful coup possible, it was acceptable. </p>
<p>After the coup, crowds came out in Libreville and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2023/8/30/photos-hundreds-celebrate-in-gabons-capital-after-soldiers-seize-power">danced</a> in the streets. </p>
<p>The second factor is a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/9/1/has-gabons-all-powerful-bongo-dynasty-really-lost-its-55-year-grip">power tussle</a> between the coup leader, Nguema, and Sylvia Bongo. The deposed president’s wife is widely believed to have grown in influence after her husband suffered a stroke in 2018. Nguema was relieved of his duties as head of the president’s security.</p>
<p>If it is true that Sylvia was preparing her son to succeed his father, Noureddine would have been the third generation of the Bongo family to rule Gabon. Ali Bongo <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-46885467">succeeded</a> his father in 2009. </p>
<h2>The way forward</h2>
<p>Prior to the 30 August coup, the only thing that seemed to have united the numerous opposition parties in Gabon (who barely managed to rally around a joint candidate just nine days before the 26 August poll) was the desire to remove Ali Bongo from office. </p>
<p>Now that a coup appears to have achieved that, it will be difficult for Albert Ondo Ossa to take office.</p>
<p>Given what appears like the <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/News/world/2023/08/31/US-urges-Gabon-military-to-preserve-civilian-rule-">willingness</a> of France and the United States to accept this palace coup, the only question is whether Nguema will lead a transition to civilian rule, hold elections, refuse to present himself for office, or become the next member of the Bongo clan to rule.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212809/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Douglas Yates does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ali Bongo’s illness, the contagion effect of other recent successful coups and palace power tussles are factors responsible for Gabon’s recent coup.Douglas Yates, Professor of Political Science , American Graduate School in Paris (AGS)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1854482023-08-20T09:27:05Z2023-08-20T09:27:05ZCivilian support for military coups is rising in parts of Africa: why the reasons matter<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543212/original/file-20230817-25-4iakmh.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The clamour for coups among citizens is rising</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On the night of <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/142678/togo-who-killed-sylvanus-olympio-the-father-of-togolese-independence/">13 January 1963</a>, Togo’s President Sylvanus Olympio was shot dead by rebels in the first military coup staged in Africa. A long list, as shown below, was to come. From the 1960s to the end of the millennium, there were an average of four military coups a year on the continent. By the end of the 1990s this phenomenon seemed to have faded away. </p>
<p>But since August 2020 six African nations have suffered seven coups or attempted coups. </p>
<p>First came <a href="https://theconversation.com/malis-predictable-coup-leaves-an-unclear-path-to-civilian-rule-144774">Mali</a>, in August 2020. The military took advantage of social unrest and insecurity caused by the activities of violent extremists. Mali had two coups or attempts in a nine-month span. </p>
<p>In April 2021, <a href="https://theconversation.com/no-signs-of-a-true-transition-in-chad-a-year-after-idriss-debys-death-181203">Chad</a> followed the same path. In March 2021, there was a coup attempt in Niger, and in September 2021 it was <a href="https://theconversation.com/guinea-coup-highlights-the-weaknesses-of-west-africas-regional-body-167650">Guinea’s</a> turn. A month later, it was <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-the-longer-the-conflict-lasts-the-higher-the-risk-of-a-regional-war-204931">Sudan</a>. In <a href="https://theconversation.com/jihadism-and-military-takeovers-in-west-africa-burkina-faso-coup-highlights-the-links-193972">Burkina Faso</a>, an attack in November 2021 led to the coup in January 2022. </p>
<p>More recently, a coup was <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-caused-the-coup-in-niger-an-expert-outlines-three-driving-factors-210721">launched in Niger</a>, deposing President Mohamed Bazoum. Two days later, General Abdourahamane Tchiani declared himself the leader of Niger. </p>
<p>All together, that’s more than <a href="https://defishumanitaires.com/en/2019/11/27/the-sahel-is-a-demographic-bomb/">100 million people</a> being ruled by the military after power was seized violently. All are in the Sahel. This has alerted governments in the region.</p>
<p>Researchers, analysts and journalists have pointed to mismanagement, incompetence, corruption, economic crisis and state weakness as the main factors propelling military coups all over the world and, of course, in Africa. State weakness is a factor in the recent instances in Africa. They have happened partly because of governments’ failure to stem the spread of groups linked to Al Qaeda and the Islamic State all over the Sahel. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-coup-why-an-ecowas-led-military-intervention-is-unlikely-211136">Niger coup: why an Ecowas-led military intervention is unlikely</a>
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</em>
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<p>But there are two intertwined characteristics that differentiate Africa from the rest of the world. One is the public support of many citizens on the streets when there is a coup. The other is the society’s rising support for military rule as a form of government. Popular support for military rule has grown in the last 20 years.</p>
<p>My <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02589346.2022.2072582">research</a> explored the reasons for this. I used survey data to examine whether support for nondemocratic rule was mainly due to poor institutional and economic performance or to an existing so-called authoritarian personality and culture in the region. This type of personality refers to values existing in certain societies that make them more prone to embrace authoritarian forms of government. </p>
<p>This distinction is relevant because if the reason for military rule support is cultural, then societies will continue to endorse authoritarian regimes. If the reason is institutional performance, then as long as incumbent governments perform efficiently, both politically and economically, democratic support will overcome authoritarian support.</p>
<h2>Citizen discontent</h2>
<p>I carried out a quantitative analysis using <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/">Afrobarometer</a> survey data gathered from 37 African countries, both from North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. The analysis looked for underlying factors propelling the rise in support for military rule. </p>
<p>Respondents were asked about the extent of their support for military rule as a form of government plus a number of other potential explanatory questions such as perception of corruption, governing and opposition parties performance, economy evaluation and socio-demographic issues like their level of education.</p>
<p>The data shows that from 2000 to the present, the level of support for military rule as a form of government has doubled, from 11.6% of people supporting “much” or “very much” military rule as a form of government to 22.3%. Of the 37 countries <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege">analysed</a>, there were 11 where support for military dictatorship was decreasing and 26 where this figure was on the rise. The latest <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/articles/young-africans-show-tolerance-for-military-intervention-a-wake-up-call-afrobarometer-ceo-tells-german-leaders/#:%7E:text=Afrobarometer%20findings%20from%2028%20African,if%20elected%20leaders%20abuse%20power.">Afrobarometer data</a> shows that support for democracy has fallen in the last year. Out of 38 countries, only four show decreasing support for military rule since 2000, whereas 34 show higher support for higher military rule than in 2000.</p>
<p><a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege">Support</a> for military rule was higher in “partly free” and “not free” countries than in “free” countries. (They were categorised according to the <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world">Freedom House</a> index.) </p>
<p>But there were some exceptions. In <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege">South Africa</a>, which is a constitutional democracy with regular elections, one in three South Africans supported military rule as a form of government. In democratic Namibia the level of support showed that one in four Namibians supported military rule.</p>
<h2>Reasons to support military rule</h2>
<p>The analysis points to three conclusions:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>In sub-Saharan Africa, the legitimacy of military rule is mainly based on institutional performance and economic management. These are weakened by jihadist organisations rapidly expanding throughout the region. State institutions are not able to tackle their expansion throughout the region.</p></li>
<li><p>In North Africa, institutional performance plays a role but authoritarian personality plays a larger role in the support for military rule.</p></li>
<li><p>Education seems to be an antidote against authoritarianism. Those with higher level of education, according to survey data, show higher level of democratic endorsement.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The study’s findings suggest that people in sub-Saharan Africa are fed up with their governments for many reasons, including security threats, humanitarian disasters and lack of prospects. Waiting for the next elections to take place to change government does not seem to them to be a good option. Opposition parties do not seem to enjoy a better image. For the survey respondents, the solution appears to be to welcome the military to intervene.</p>
<p>If citizens perceive that politicians don’t care about them, this will invite the military to continue overthrowing civil governments, with society publicly legitimising their intervention in politics. </p>
<p>If military, political and economic solutions are not found, military coups in the region will increase and people will continue gathering on the streets to welcome them. Niger’s recent coup may not be the last one.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/185448/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carlos García Rivero is Research Fellow at the Centre for International and Comparative Politics, at Stellenbosch University, South Africa. </span></em></p>Citizen expectations of governments are not being met by most elected leaders.Carlos García Rivero, Associate Professor, Universitat de ValènciaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2052362023-05-10T09:37:47Z2023-05-10T09:37:47ZSudan’s people toppled a dictator – despite the war they’re still working to bring about democratic change<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/524896/original/file-20230508-251777-o6xtme.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Civilians protest in Sudan's capital, Khartoum, in December 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>While <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-crisis-explained-whats-behind-the-latest-fighting-and-how-it-fits-nations-troubled-past-203985">Sudan’s generals</a> have unleashed indiscriminate destruction and occupation on wide swaths of the capital, Khartoum, neighbourhood resistance committees and pro-democracy activists have stepped up to respond to the needs of citizens. </p>
<p>They have risked their lives to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/05/world/africa/sudan-fighting-evacuations-rescue.html">drive people to safety</a> or to working hospitals. They have maintained up-to-the-minute information on <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/22/sudan-resistance-activists-mobilise-as-crisis-escalates">where medicine can be found</a> or which roads are safe. </p>
<p>These actions have solidified this decentralised network of youth and civil society groups as the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/22/sudan-resistance-activists-mobilise-as-crisis-escalates">most trusted and legitimate</a> organisations in Sudan. Resistance committees are part of a <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/sudans-unfinished-democracy/">diverse collection of Sudanese pro-democracy groups</a>. These groups include political parties, university students and staff, professional associations and unions, and civil society organisations. </p>
<p>Together, they helped bring down <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/18/12-defining-moments-in-sudans-12-month-uprising">long-time dictator Omar al-Bashir</a> in April 2019 after months of protests. Women emerged as <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/4/23/sudans-female-protesters-leading-the-pro-democracy-movement">particularly visible and vocal</a> in these protests, stepping forward after years of being arbitrarily targeted by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/aug/19/sudan-community-squad-morality-policing-fears">Bashir’s morality police</a>. </p>
<p>Sudan’s hopes for democratic change were dashed, however, when General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20211025-abdel-fattah-al-burhan-the-general-who-leads-sudan">led a coup</a> in October 2021 against the transitional government. </p>
<p>Resistance committees <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-59045020">led marches</a> against the military takeover. Their insistence on non-violence maintains their status as citizens and civilians. They are not insurgents, combatants or the enemy.</p>
<p>I have spent nearly two decades <a href="https://elliott.gwu.edu/linda-bishai-0">researching</a> the role of Sudan’s civil society organisations in managing conflict. I have also studied the rise of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13629387.2023.2207228">resistance committees</a> and what keeps them going in the face of <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/28/sudan-hundreds-protesters-detained-mistreated">vicious repression</a> by Sudanese security forces. </p>
<p>In my view, these groups’ <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13629387.2023.2207228">consistency of action and messaging</a> has given them a form of political power that Sudan’s traditional elites have struggled to attain. Sudan’s resistance committees provide a model for young people in Africa to participate in politics, even without the approval of established structures.</p>
<h2>The growth of a movement</h2>
<p>Sudan’s resistance committees grew out of youth activist groups that <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/afr540372012en.pdf">formed in 2009-2010</a>. The members were largely aged below 40. The groups coalesced around years of anger at <a href="https://theconversation.com/omar-al-bashir-brutalised-sudan-how-his-30-year-legacy-is-playing-out-today-204391">Bashir’s authoritarian regime</a>, its inability to provide basic services and its divisive politics.</p>
<p>They engaged in a range of political activities, including voter registration and awareness raising around the 2010 general elections. The hope was that they could bring down Bashir’s National Congress Party. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/omar-al-bashir-brutalised-sudan-how-his-30-year-legacy-is-playing-out-today-204391">Omar al-Bashir brutalised Sudan – how his 30-year legacy is playing out today</a>
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<p>Bashir’s reelection only made the groups more determined. They continued to operate in local and decentralised ways. For example, they assisted during disasters <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/30/world/africa/as-floods-ravage-sudan-young-volunteers-revive-a-tradition-of-aid.html">such as floods</a> and other emergencies where the government was absent. </p>
<p>In 2012-2013, the <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2012/06/sudan-end-crackdown-protesters-and-journalists/">regime hit back hard</a>. It attacked demonstrators, arrested known activists, and tortured and killed youth leaders. This forced a pause in activities as activists lay low. </p>
<p>In the years that followed, many youth leaders began to <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2022-11/FHPrecursorsSudan11302022.pdf#page=6">study the techniques of non-violent movements</a> in other countries and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13629387.2023.2207228">shared the lessons</a> with their colleagues. In early 2019, when pro-democracy protests began in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/18/12-defining-moments-in-sudans-12-month-uprising">regions outside Khartoum</a>, many of these leaders and new youth activists joined in. Drawing <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/5/7/in-sudan-neighbourhoods-mobilised-against-al-bashir">structure and cohesion from their home bases</a>, neighbourhood committees became part of the resistance, too. </p>
<p>These groups augmented the coalition of trade unions, political parties and civil society organisations that brought down al-Bashir. </p>
<p>After the October 2021 coup that ousted prime minister <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/3/profile-abdalla-hamdok-sudans-outgoing-civilian-leader">Abdalla Hamdok</a>, resistance committees <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudans-resistance-committees-take-centre-stage-fight-against-military-rule-2022-02-02/">took centre stage</a> in the fight against a return to military rule. </p>
<p>Alongside other civilian protest groups, they led <a href="https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/anti-junta-marches-of-the-millions-continue-across-sudan">relentless street marches</a> and social media campaigns calling for the coup leaders to step down and make way for legitimate civilian leadership. </p>
<p>Despite a violent clampdown by security forces, resistance committees persisted. They maintained a momentum for protest that kept civilians motivated to march right up until the recent war between Burhan and General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-conflict-hemedti-the-warlord-who-built-a-paramilitary-force-more-powerful-than-the-state-203949">Hemedti</a>. The committees’ campaign slogan of “<a href="https://www.newframe.com/women-and-three-nos-chart-sudans-future/">the three nos</a>” – no negotiation, no partnership, no legitimacy – affirms their resolve to change Sudanese politics. </p>
<h2>The potential for democracy</h2>
<p>In March 2023, resistance committees set out plans to <a href="https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/khartoum-resistance-committees-to-form-local-legislative-councils">form a parallel government</a>. This was to be done through local legislative councils based on collectively negotiated charters written and approved by two main clusters of committees. </p>
<p>These local councils didn’t take root, but if they had, they would have represented a serious challenge to the two generals’ claims to the sovereignty of Sudan. While Sudan has <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-crisis-explained-whats-behind-the-latest-fighting-and-how-it-fits-nations-troubled-past-203985">collapsed into war</a> and appears to be further than ever from a democratic transition, it would be wrong to disregard the potential of resistance committees to bring change. </p>
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<p>They continue to act collectively and provide for citizen needs.</p>
<p>During the course of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13629387.2023.2207228?journalCode=fnas20">my research</a> between June 2022 and March 2023, resistance committee leaders explained to me that their commitment stems from a belief that their generation is the one to carry the burden of standing for change. Therefore, they would rather risk paying the ultimate price than stand by and watch their country be looted. </p>
<p>In continuing to provide public safety and services at the local level, resistance committees are actively performing legitimate citizen-centred leadership. </p>
<p>And the lesson for Africa’s youth from Sudan is that when it comes to providing leadership at the local level, they don’t need permission from absent government structures. They can provide civilian-led, citizen-centred governance.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205236/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Linda Bishai does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Sudan’s civilian protesters have gained a form of political power that traditional elites have struggled to attain.Linda Bishai, Adjunct Professor of International Affairs, George Washington UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2039852023-04-17T21:52:35Z2023-04-17T21:52:35ZSudan crisis explained: What’s behind the latest fighting and how it fits nation’s troubled past<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521406/original/file-20230417-14-9k84wu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=6%2C170%2C4166%2C2628&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Sudan army soldiers are fighting a rival paramilitary group.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/sudanese-greet-army-soldiers-loyal-to-army-chief-abdel-news-photo/1251884288?adppopup=true">AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Days of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2023/4/17/sudan-fighting-live-news-nearly-100-killed-as-clashes-spread">violence in Sudan</a> have resulted in the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/sudan-fighting-military-rsf-eafa3246b1e3004a1a9f2b9af9561362">deaths of at least 180 people</a>, with many more left wounded.</em></p>
<p><em>The fighting represents the latest crisis in the North African nation, which has contended with <a href="https://www.bbc.com/pidgin/tori-59057559">numerous coups and periods of civil strife</a> since becoming independent in 1956.</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation asked <a href="https://history.washington.edu/people/christopher-tounsel">Christopher Tounsel</a>, a Sudan specialist and interim director of the University of Washington’s African Studies Program, to explain the reasons behind the violence and what it means for the chances of democracy being restored in Sudan.</em></p>
<h2>What is going on in Sudan?</h2>
<p>It all revolves around infighting between two rival groups: the Sudanese army and a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/16/sudan-unrest-what-is-the-rapid-support-forces">paramilitary group known as the RSF</a>, or Rapid Support Forces.</p>
<p>Since a <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/25/africa/sudan-coup-explained-intl-cmd/index.html">coup in the country in 2021</a>, which ended a transitional government put in place after the fall of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-16010445">longtime dictator Omar al-Bashir</a> two years earlier, Sudan has been run by the army, with coup leader General Abdel-Fattah Burhan as de facto ruler.</p>
<p><iframe id="nO9q2" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/nO9q2/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>The RSF, led by General Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo – who is <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-conflict-hemedti-the-warlord-who-built-a-paramilitary-force-more-powerful-than-the-state-203949">generally known by the name Hemedti</a> – has worked alongside the Sudanese army to help keep the military in power.</p>
<p>Following Bashir’s ouster, the political transition was supposed to result in elections <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/oct/25/sudan-coup-fears-amid-claims-military-have-arrested-senior-government-officials">by the end of 2023</a>, with Burhan <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-59855246">promising a transition to civilian rule</a>. But it appears that neither Burhan nor Dagalo has any intention of relinquishing power. Moreover, they are locked in a power struggle that <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2023/4/15/sudan-unrest-live-news-explosions-shooting-rock-khartoum">turned violent on April 15</a>, 2023.</p>
<p>Since then, members of the RSF and the Sudanese army have engaged in gunfights in the capital, Khartoum, as well as elsewhere in the country. Over the course of three days, the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/sudan-fighting-military-rsf-eafa3246b1e3004a1a9f2b9af9561362">violence has spiraled</a>.</p>
<p>The recent background to the violence was a disagreement over how RSF paramilitaries <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/sudan-s-military-warns-of-conflict-after-rival-force-deploys-/7050034.html">should be incorporated</a> into the Sudanese army. Tensions boiled over after the RSF started deploying members around the country and in Khartoum without the expressed permission of the army.</p>
<p>But in reality, the violence has been brewing for a while in Sudan, with concern over the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48987901">RSF seeking to control more of the country’s economic assets</a>, notably its gold mines.</p>
<p>The developments in Sudan over the last few days are not good for the stability of the nation or its prospects for any <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/03/1134137">transition to democratic rule</a>.</p>
<h2>Who are the two men at the center of the dispute?</h2>
<p>Dagalo rose to power within the RSF beginning in the early 2000s when he was at the <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-tracing-the-history-of-sudans-janjaweed-militia-118926">head of the militia known as Janjaweed</a> – a group responsible for human right atrocities in the Darfur region.</p>
<p>While then-Sudanese President Bashir was the <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/albashir">face of the violence</a> against people in Darfur – and was later <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/CaseInformationSheets/AlBashirEng.pdf">indicted on crimes against humanity</a> by the International Criminal Court – the Janjaweed is <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur">also held responsible</a> by the ICC for alleged acts of genocide. While they were doing so, Dagalo was rising up the ranks.</p>
<p>As head of the RSF, Dagalo has faced accusations of overseeing the bloody crackdown of pro-democracy activists, including <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/11/18/they-were-shouting-kill-them/sudans-violent-crackdown-protesters-khartoum">the massacre of 120 protesters</a> in 2019.</p>
<p>The actions of Burhan, similarly, have seen the military leader <a href="https://www.hrw.org/africa/sudan">heavily criticized by human rights groups</a>. As the head of the army in power and the country’s de facto head of government for the last two years, he <a href="https://www.barrons.com/news/pro-democracy-protests-set-to-mark-sudan-coup-anniversary-despite-crackdown-01666672508">oversaw a crackdown of pro-democracy activists</a>.</p>
<p>One can certainly interpret both men to be obstacles to any chance of Sudan transitioning to civilian democracy. But this is first and foremost a personal power struggle.</p>
<p>To use an African proverb, “When the elephants fight, it is the grass that gets trampled.”</p>
<h2>So this is about power rather than ideology?</h2>
<p>In my opinion, very much so.</p>
<p>We are not talking about two men, or factions, with ideological differences over the future direction of the country. This cannot be framed as a left-wing versus right-wing thing, or about warring political parties. Nor is this a geo-religious conflict – pitting a majority <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-south-sudan-turns-10-questions-over-the-role-of-the-church-emerge-amid-anti-clerical-violence-164018">Muslim North against a Christian South</a>. And it isn’t racialized violence in the same way that the Darfur conflict was, with the self-identified Arab Janajaweed killing Black people.</p>
<p>Some <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/sudan-burhan-hemeti-tensions-escalate-framework-dea">observers are interpreting</a> what is happening in Sudan – correctly, in my opinion – as a battle between two men who are desperate not to be ejected from the corridors of power by means of a transition to an elected government.</p>
<h2>How does the violence fit Sudan’s troubled past?</h2>
<p>One thing that is concerning about the longer dynamics at play in Sudan is the violence now forms part of a history that fits the trope of the “failed African nation.”</p>
<p>Sudan has, to my knowledge, <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-coup-years-of-instability-have-made-the-army-key-power-brokers-170676">had more coups</a> than any other African nation. Since gaining independence from the U.K. in 1956, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/pidgin/tori-59057559">there have been coups</a> in 1958, 1969, 1985, 1989, 2019 and 2021.</p>
<p>The coup in 1989 <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudans-bashir-admits-role-1989-coup-during-trial-2022-12-20/">brought Bashir to power</a> for a three-decade run as dictator during which the Sudanese people suffered from the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/11/quran-and-ak-47-the-30-year-rule-of-sudans-omar-al-bashir">typical excesses of autocratic rule</a> – secret police, repressions of opposition, corruption. </p>
<p>When Bashir was <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/4/11/omar-al-bashir-deposed-how-the-world-reacted">deposed in 2019</a>, it was shocking to many observers – myself included – who assumed he would die in power, or that his rule would end only by assassination.</p>
<p>But any hopes that the end of Bashir would mean democratic rule were short-lived. Two years after his ouster – when elections were due to be held – the army decided to take power for itself, claiming it was <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/10/26/sudans-army-chief-defends-militarys-seizure-of-power">stepping in to avert a civil war</a>.</p>
<p>As striking as the recent violence is now, in many ways what is playing out is not unusual in the context of Sudan’s history.</p>
<p>The army has long been at the center of political transitions in Sudan. And resistance to civilian rule has been more than less the norm since <a href="https://countrystudies.us/sudan/20.htm">independence in 1956</a>.</p>
<h2>Is there a danger the violence will escalate?</h2>
<p>A coalition of civilian groups in the country has called for an immediate halt to the violence – as has the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/us-secretary-state-blinken-calls-immediate-end-violence-sudan-2023-04-15/">U.S. and other international observers</a>. But with both factions dug in, that seems unlikely. Similarly, the prospect of free and fair elections in Sudan seems some ways off.</p>
<p>There doesn’t appears to be an easy route to a short-term solution, and what makes it tougher is that you have two powerful men, both with a military at their disposal, fighting each other for power that neither seem prepared to relinquish.</p>
<p>The concern is that the fighting might escalate and destabilize the region, jeopardizing Sudan’s relations with its neighbors. Chad, which borders Sudan to the west, has already <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20230416-chad-closes-borders-with-sudan-amid-armed-clashes/">closed its border</a> with Sudan. Meanwhile, a couple of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/16/egyptian-soldiers-captured-in-sudan-to-be-returned-says-rsf">Egyptian soldiers were captured</a> in northern Sudan while violence was happening in Khartoum. Ethiopia, Sudan’s neighbor to the east, is still reeling from a <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ethiopia">two-year war in the Tigray region</a>. And the spread of unrest in Sudan will be a concern to those watching an <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/why-has-peace-eluded-south-sudan-2023-02-03/">uneasy peace deal</a> in South Sudan – which <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/10/world/africa/10sudan.html">gained independence from Sudan in 2011</a> and has been <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan">beset by ethnic fighting ever since</a>.</p>
<p>As such, the stakes in the current unrest could go beyond the immediate future of Burhan, Dagalo and even the Sudanese nation. The stability of the region could also be out at risk.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/203985/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christopher Tounsel has previously received funding from the Council of American Overseas Research Centers, the Institute for Citizens & Scholars, the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, Social Science Research Council, the Doris G. Quinn Foundation, the University of Michigan, the Pennsylvania State University, Macalester College, and the University of Washington. </span></em></p>Violence in Sudan threatens to throw the troubled nation into chaos. A scholar of the region explains what is going on and what’s at stake.Christopher Tounsel, Associate Professor of History, University of WashingtonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2036462023-04-15T12:42:22Z2023-04-15T12:42:22ZMilitary violence in Myanmar is worsening amid fierce resistance and international ambivalence<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521085/original/file-20230414-28-pqalii.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C40%2C2982%2C1953&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A village elder stands outside a school destroyed by aircraft fire in Shan State.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/village-elder-is-standing-in-front-of-the-village-school-news-photo/1246147334?adppopup=true">Mai Thomas/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the early days of a brutal 2021 military crackdown on anti-coup protesters in Myanmar, members of the nascent resistance movement began asking “<a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/myanmar-protester-dead-bodies-united-nations-b1809046.html">how many dead bodies</a>” it would take for the world community to act.</p>
<p>More than two years on from a coup that installed military rule in the Southeast Asian country, pro-democracy protesters say they have <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/the-world-myanmar/global-community-slammed-for-failure-to-act-over-myanmar-junta-atrocities.html">yet to receive an adequate answer</a>.</p>
<p>On April 11, 2023, the country’s armed forces dropped <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/12/myanmar-airstrike-on-civilians-sparks-global-outcry-as-witnesses-describe-attack">multiple bombs</a> on a gathering in Pazigyi, a village in Sagaing Region, killing <a href="https://apnews.com/article/airstrikes-military-myanmar-village-918fd636bb81153928ab7481e06423e5">around 100 people</a>, it has been estimated, including many children.</p>
<p>Such attacks are not uncommon, if not usually so deadly. The day before the Sagaing massacre, the Myanmar air force <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/war-against-the-junta/eleven-chin-civilians-killed-in-myanmar-regime-airstrikes.html">dropped bombs in Falam</a>, Chin State, killing 11 people. In fact, since civil war broke out, 3,240 civilians and pro-democracy activists <a href="https://aappb.org/?p=24712">have been killed</a>, according to the human rights group Assistance Association for Political Prisoners. In response, a <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/02/01/1153150529/resistance-to-military-rule-in-myanmar-remains-steady-2-years-after-army-seized-">fierce resistance movement</a> has emerged, with an <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/11/understanding-peoples-defense-forces-myanmar">estimated 65,000 fighters</a> using ambushes and other guerrilla tactics against military targets.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.niu.edu/clas/world-languages/about/directory/than.shtml">scholar on Myanmar’s history</a>, I would argue that the escalating violence can be attributed to two main factors, one internal and one external: a miscalculation by the military over the resistance of Myanmar’s people, and ambivalence from the international community.</p>
<h2>From coup to civil war</h2>
<p>Myanmar has witnessed <a href="https://aappb.org/?cat=109">killings by the military almost daily</a> since generals <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/19/myanmar-coup-2021-explained-in-30-seconds">seized control of the country in 2021</a>. The coup ended the short period of democratic rule under <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1991/kyi/facts/">Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi</a>’s party, the National League for Democracy.</p>
<p>But there are, I believe, reasons to suggest that the Myanmar military grossly miscalculated the timing of the coup, and underestimated the sentiment of a people unwilling to give up the freedom and prosperity they experienced under democracy.</p>
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<p>In this, the military may have been misled by the experience of their counterparts in neighboring Thailand. In 2014, generals in Thailand <a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/thailand-coup-a-brief-history-of-past-military-coups-0">launched a coup</a> ending months of political instability and promising a process back to democratic rule. That coup was met by sporadic protests, but no unified armed resistance emerged in response.</p>
<p>The Myanmar military similarly promised “free and fair elections” <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-62373975">further down the line</a> after its coup.</p>
<p>Unlike in Thailand, people in Myanmar – especially younger generations that came of age in the democratic decade after 2010 – fiercely resisted the army’s takeover and were skeptical of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/1/myanmar-coup-military-repeats-election-promise-people-strike">claims that it would restore democracy</a>.</p>
<p>After peaceful protests following the coup were <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-56636345">met with live ammunition</a>, pro-democracy activists turned to armed resistance.</p>
<p>In the years since, many young people have <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/02/01/1153150529/resistance-to-military-rule-in-myanmar-remains-steady-2-years-after-army-seized-">undergone military training</a> – often by armed ethnic groups that already existed along the country’s borders – and fought back under the umbrella resistance group, <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/11/understanding-peoples-defense-forces-myanmar">People’s Defense Forces</a>.</p>
<p>Protracted counter-coup activities have humiliated the Myanmar army. The commander in chief, Min Aung Hlaing, recently conceded that two years after the coup, the military was still <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-03-28/myanmar-junta-chief-vows-crush-resistance-forces-rare-speech/102152844">not in control of swaths of the country</a>. He vowed to intensify a crackdown against people <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-03-28/myanmar-junta-chief-vows-crush-resistance-forces-rare-speech/102152844">he branded “terrorists</a>.”</p>
<p>The growing instability, Min Aung Hlaing said, meant that promised elections – after which the military was to hand over power to a civilian government – cannot be scheduled.</p>
<h2>Uniting around a common enemy</h2>
<p>Myanmar’s military leaders have <a href="https://apnews.com/article/race-and-ethnicity-myanmar-army-min-aung-hlaing-aung-san-suu-kyi-cc6402c492edbc1fbaefef5e6e9dbf21">vowed to annihilate</a> resistance groups. Yet there are reasons to believe that the resistance is only getting stronger. </p>
<p>Despite slow initial progress to show a common front, the Bamar majority and minority ethic groups such as Karen, Chin, Kachin, Rakhine and Karenni appear to be <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/05/asia/myanmar-protests-ethnic-minorities-intl-hnk/index.html">unifying against military rule</a>. And resistance fighters have <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/02/01/1153150529/resistance-to-military-rule-in-myanmar-remains-steady-2-years-after-army-seized-">widespread support</a> throughout the country.</p>
<p>A lot will now depend on whether Myanmar soldiers lose the will to fight. Already there are signs of strain. The military is reportedly facing an acute shortage of new recruits, resulting in <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/women-recruits-being-trained-for-combat-roles-by-myanmar-junta.html">women being trained to fight in combat</a>. People in the <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-military-struggling-to-recruit-new-officers.html">Bamar heartlands</a>, including Sagaing where the April 11 massacre occurred, are refusing to let their sons join the Myanmar army.</p>
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<img alt="A line of men with camouflage helmets and guns. One looks at the camera." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521086/original/file-20230414-20-l1d8jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521086/original/file-20230414-20-l1d8jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521086/original/file-20230414-20-l1d8jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521086/original/file-20230414-20-l1d8jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521086/original/file-20230414-20-l1d8jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521086/original/file-20230414-20-l1d8jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521086/original/file-20230414-20-l1d8jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Military officers march during Armed Forces Day in Myanmar.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/PicturesoftheWeekAsiaPhotoGallery/cde66b8eac814040b3e7e1f39ed927d7/photo?Query=Myanmar&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=38717&currentItemNo=1">AP Photo/Aung Shine Oo</a></span>
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<p>In such circumstances, the Myanmar army is increasingly relying on guns and bombs rather than troop numbers.</p>
<p>But the longer the resistance lasts, the more humiliating it will be for a junta that has upped its annual spending on the military to an estimated <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-junta-increases-military-budget-to-us2-7-billion.html">US$2.7 billion</a> – more than 25% of the national budget – largely to suppress its own population.</p>
<h2>Leaving the oil and gas taps running</h2>
<p>These internal dynamics have taken place largely in the absence of intense scrutiny from the international community, <a href="https://www.devex.com/news/has-the-international-community-abandoned-myanmar-99854">pro-democracy activists say</a>.</p>
<p>The Ukraine war has seemingly pushed Myanmar down the list of international concerns. It has also exacerbated cracks among the global powers that would, otherwise, likely be on the same page over the worsening situation – prolonged violence and instability in Myanmar is not in any country’s strategic interests, not least China’s or the United States’.</p>
<p>Both the U.S. and the United Nations have made statements <a href="https://www.state.gov/marking-two-years-since-the-military-coup-in-burma/">in support of democracy</a> in Myanmar, and <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sgsm21759.doc.htm">condemned killings</a>. </p>
<p>But concrete action – which to date has been largely limited to <a href="https://earthrights.org/media_release/new-report-shines-light-on-flaws-in-international-use-of-sanctions-in-response-to-myanmar-coup/">sanctions on individuals and entities</a> – falls well short of what <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/03/support-myanmars-junta-only-prolongs-countrys-conflict">human rights groups</a> <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/06/myanmars-junta-benefits-weak-international-response">have demanded</a>. There has, for example, been <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/01/myanmar-coup-second-anniversary/">no comprehensive global arms embargo</a> despite the use of weapons against civilians. Neither has Myanmar been <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/11/01/asean-act-stop-myanmar-military-abuses">shut off from foreign currency revenues</a>. And the country is still able to purchase the jet fuel being used by bombers, despite calls for a <a href="https://www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/myanmar-atrocity-commentary-04122023130016.html">global ban on such sales</a> to accompany the recent sanctions imposed by some governments, <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1364">including the U.S</a>. </p>
<p>Moreover, sanctions have yet to bite Myanmar’s energy sector. Activist group Justice for Myanmar has identified <a href="https://www.justiceformyanmar.org/stories/the-international-oilfield-services-companies-supporting-the-myanmar-juntas-oil-and-gas-industry">22 oil and gas companies</a> from countries including the U.S. that have continued to provide revenue to Myanmar’s generals during the civil war. Indeed, U.S. oil companies including Chevron <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/22/us/politics/chevron-myanmar-sanctions.html">lobbied hard against broad sanctions</a> against the Myanmar military.</p>
<p>The failure to shut off oil revenue allows Myanmar’s generals – for whom oil and gas is a <a href="https://www.mizzima.com/article/eu-imposes-sanctions-myanma-oil-and-gas-enterprise-moge">major revenue source</a> – to fund the military.</p>
<p>To many within the resistance movement, the reluctance of the international community to exert more pressure on the country’s military looks like global collusion. It also has the potential to prolong the violence by funding the military’s campaign.</p>
<h2>Beware the tiger’s tail</h2>
<p>A well-known Myanmar phrase <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/from-the-archive/letting-go-of-the-tigers-tail.html">warns against the dangers</a> of “catching hold of a tiger’s tail” – once you do so there is no turning back; let go and you will be killed.</p>
<p>It aptly sums up the position now for Myanmar’s military rulers and the resistance fighters being drawn deeper into conflict with each atrocity. They are fighting for the past, present and the future and can’t let go now.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/203646/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tharaphi Than does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Since seizing power in a 2021 coup, Myanmar’s military has killed more than 3,000 civilians and pro-democracy activists. But the army has struggled to contain an armed resistance movement.Tharaphi Than, Associate Professor of World Cultures and Languages, Northern Illinois UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1916222022-09-30T14:14:26Z2022-09-30T14:14:26ZNigeria’s Independence Day is a time to reflect on political gains and challenges – and a way forward<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487475/original/file-20220930-13-gwzr37.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A woman selling Nigerian flags in preparation for Nigeria's independence anniversary in Lagos on September 30, 2020. Photo by Olukayode Jaiyeola/NurPhoto via Getty Images.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/woman-selling-nigerian-flags-reacts-as-she-display-flags-news-photo/1228808113">Olukayode Jaiyeola/NurPhoto via Getty Images.</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em><a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Nigeria/Independent-Nigeria">Nigeria got independence from Britain on 1 October 1960</a>. As the country celebrates its political journey in the last 62 years, political scientist Ayo Olukotun takes a look at the nation’s political development, gains and challenges. He also offers the way forward.</em></p>
<h2>How would you describe Nigeria’s political development?</h2>
<p>Well, in terms of evolution, the nation appears to be shedding the toga of unitarism and <a href="https://www.sunnewsonline.com/jackboot-democracy/">jackboot politics</a> – at least for now. However, there are residues of the long years of military rule in today’s civilian democracy. Nigeria is still quite authoritarian.</p>
<p>One example would be a report recently released by the National Human Rights Commission. Discipline was recommended against some police officers because they allegedly <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/556400-abuja-endsars-panel-indicts-72-police-officers-for-human-rights-violations.html">brutalised civilians</a>. And, despite the <a href="https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2021/10/20/what-led-to-endsars-protests/">EndSARS protests</a> against police brutality in 2020, not much has changed in terms of their behaviour.</p>
<p>There is also presidential omnipotence. <a href="https://za.opera.news/za/en/politics/829f9dd5586062ecfdf683cff27cca43">The Nigerian president is about the most powerful president in Africa</a>. This power is made possible by the <a href="http://www.nigeria-law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm">1999 constitution</a>, a unitary document masquerading as a federalist one. State governors, too, are protected by the constitution. Nobody dares challenge them: in one instance a <a href="https://saharareporters.com/2021/10/11/breaking-ebonyi-governor-umahi-orders-arrest-journalist-over-facebook-posts-about">journalist was arrested</a> for statements a governor considered uncomplimentary.</p>
<h2>What about political gains?</h2>
<p>One of the gains is the fact that we have not had a coup since 1999, although there <a href="https://authorityngr.com/2022/08/17/how-jonathan-escaped-coup-plot-ex-army-spokesman/">have been coup rumours</a>. We appear, for now, to have overcome democratic regression – unlike other countries in West Africa and other parts of Africa where you have one-man rule, coup d’etats and so on.</p>
<p>Another gain is freedom of speech. Nigerians can now express themselves, unlike during the military era. However, as evidenced by the journalist’s experience I described, this gain is being eroded by authoritarian governors and leaders. </p>
<h2>What is working against Nigeria’s development?</h2>
<p>Despite the launching of some anti-corruption agencies, there is still large scale corruption. Take the former accountant general of the federation, who has been <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/544180-efcc-set-to-arraign-former-accountant-general-ahmed-idris-over-n109bn-fraud-charges.html">charged with stealing N109 billion</a>. And there are other cases of corruption involving former office holders. </p>
<p>Then look at how the last primaries by the major political parties <a href="https://theconversation.com/money-is-breaking-democracy-in-nigeria-184595">were monetised</a>. One contender withdrew because, <a href="https://thenationonlineng.net/updated-why-i-quit-pdp-presidential-race-by-hayatu-deen/">he said</a>, the process was “obscenely monetised”.</p>
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<p>Poverty is another challenge. The political leaders have turned poverty into a weapon against the people. Ethnicity and religious bigotry are also holding back Nigeria’s political and economic development. </p>
<h2>What should Nigeria be doing to uplift itself?</h2>
<p>We must go back to federalism or what some people call true federalism: power should be devolved to the federating units. These are the federal, state and local governments.</p>
<p>Many have called for this over time because <a href="https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/our-work/devolution/english-devolution">Britain, which is a unitary nation, embraced power devolution</a>. If unitary states are reaping the benefits of devolution, why not Nigeria? The council flats that you hear about in the UK are built by local governments and that system works far better than our own councils. Also, their police are decentralised and they are effective. The same is true in several parts of Europe.</p>
<p>Before now political leaders in northern Nigeria opposed state police, but now <a href="https://guardian.ng/news/northern-governors-monarchs-meet-canvass-state-police-to-contain-insecurity/">northern governors, leaders and monarchs</a> have been calling for state police because of the high level of insecurity in those areas. </p>
<p>There must also be more focus on corruption. What we have under President Muhammadu Buhari is like a contest between anti-corruption and politics. In my opinion, politics has overtaken anti-corruption – that is why ministers who have fraud cases at the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission are still in office. The government finds it difficult to nail them because of political issues and deals.</p>
<p>There are other things that a nation that wants to move forward should do; quality education is one of them. We should invest in education. But Nigeria is not funding education at all levels. And the universe has disappeared from our nation’s university system: what makes it global has disappeared over time.</p>
<h2>Do you think Nigeria has a future?</h2>
<p>It depends on how the public office holders behave. All of them come with rosy promises. They promise heaven and earth. At the end of the day maybe they achieve only 10% of those promises. But if they can up their game there’s no reason why Nigeria can’t progress. </p>
<p>Twenty years ago, Nigeria was predicted to be similar to one of the Asian Tigers (South Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan). It was going to grow at a comparable rate to these nations. Instead it has been regressive.</p>
<p>At independence <a href="https://medium.com/@david.himbara_27884/in-1960-china-was-poorer-than-most-african-countries-but-here-is-china-bankrolling-africa-b7b0b10f41ba">in 1960, Nigeria was richer than China</a>. China is a world power today. Nigeria could be a continental power, or bigger, if the leaders and the followers can reverse the current tide of regression and corrupt politics.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191622/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ayo Olukotun does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>If Nigeria’s public office holders behave, there’s no reason why the country can’t progress.Ayo Olukotun, Professor and Chair of the department for Governance and Political Science, Olabisi Onabanjo UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1876882022-07-26T06:11:47Z2022-07-26T06:11:47ZWill the Myanmar executions force Australia to act decisively at last?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/475983/original/file-20220726-22016-bg641z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">“We Will Never Be Frightened”: Young demonstrators holding a banner during a protest in Yangon yesterday.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">STR/NurPhoto via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jul/25/myanmar-junta-who-four-people-executed">execution</a> of four political prisoners in Myanmar is further confirmation of what was already well known. The regime of Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing will stop at nothing to maintain its grip on the country.</p>
<p>Since its coup in February last year, the military has used terror to assert control: extrajudicial killings, torture and the arbitrary arrest and detention of protesters. It has murdered civilians, tortured children and condemned the country’s elected leaders to long terms of imprisonment following farcical show trials. More than 1,600 people, including at least 75 children, have been killed.</p>
<p>The executions make a political solution to the crisis, already dim, virtually impossible. Opponents of the military, the People’s Defence Force, have renewed their commitment to using whatever means they have – including attacks, assassinations, and bombings – to overturn military rule. Peaceful protest, once championed by Aung San Suu Kyi, is no longer the modus operandi of many dissidents.</p>
<p>Of the country’s many armed ethnic groups, some have reportedly begun negotiating peace talks with the military. However, many others have aligned themselves with the Peoples Defence Force, and are providing weapons, protection and training to those fighting against military rule.</p>
<p>The country trembles on the brink of civil war. Its existing problems – poverty, sickness, a lack of fuel, food and medicine – have brought the country to crisis point.</p>
<p>Western powers seemed shocked by the suddenness of Myanmar’s return to brutal military dictatorship after almost a decade of a seemingly promising new quasi-democracy. In truth, although Myanmar adopted some of the trappings of multi-party democracy in the nationwide elections of 2015 and 2020, the military retained its role as the central political player.</p>
<p>After 2011, the military waged a brutal campaign of civil war against the Kachin in the North of the country. In 2016 and 2017, it carried out deadly clearance operations against the Rohingya in Rakhine state. In both cases it used devastating violence against civilians. No one ought to have been surprised when it applied the same methods to protesters following last year’s coup.</p>
<h2>Strong words, little action</h2>
<p>The response of Western governments has been weak. Bewilderingly, and almost alone among Western countries, Australia has still not sanctioned Min Aung Hlaing.</p>
<p>Early images from Myanmar after the coup showed crowds of people holding placards begging for the Security Council to implement the UN’s principle of <a href="https://www.globalr2p.org/what-is-r2p/#:%7E:text=The%20Responsibility%20to%20Protect%20%E2%80%93%20known,cleansing%20and%20crimes%20against%20humanity.">Responsibility to Protect</a> by authorising humanitarian intervention to protect the lives of civilians. But the Security Council is hamstrung by China and Russia’s support for Myanmar’s generals.</p>
<p>The UN General Assembly passed a strong resolution in June 2021 calling for an arms embargo and other measures. But the General Assembly has no power to enforce its resolutions. Unlike in Ukraine, the people of Myanmar have not been provided with weapons to fight for their lives.</p>
<p>Two months earlier, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Myanmar is a member, attempted to negotiate an end to the crisis. It was not successful. ASEAN’s <a href="https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/Chairmans-Statement-on-ALM-Five-Point-Consensus-24-April-2021-FINAL-a-1.pdf">Five Point Plan</a> called for an immediate end to violence in the country, dialogue among all parties, the appointment of a special envoy to immediately visit Myanmar, and humanitarian assistance.</p>
<p>Having agreed to the plan, Min Aung Hlaing almost immediately announced the military would continue using violence until the protests stopped. There is no platform for building trust between the parties.</p>
<p>The executions confirm to those opposing the military that Myanmar’s “Spring Revolution” is a battle they must win. The cost to Myanmar will be very high and will be paid by generations of Burmese people. And countries in the region, including Australia, will also pay a price.</p>
<h2>What Australia must do</h2>
<p>War creates the conditions in which the gravest of human rights abuses flourish. When the level of suffering inside a country becomes intolerable, the result is a flow of refugees and even greater exploitation of those vulnerable to practices like human trafficking. These problems will arrive on Australia’s doorstep. For that reason alone, Australia should do much more to assist the people of Myanmar.</p>
<p>First, it should impose targeted sanctions on the coup leaders, including Min Aung Hlaing. Other countries imposed targeted sanctions in response to atrocities carried out against the Rohingya back in 2017. If Australia’s failure to follow suit was part of a strategy to facilitate the repatriation of Australian economist Sean Turnell, who has been held in Insein Prison since the coup, then an urgent rethink is needed.</p>
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<p>Second, the Australian government should consider recognising the National Unity Government, which represents the democratically elected parliament and those who oppose the coup. The execution of a member of the former parliament confirms, if confirmation was necessary, that the military has no claim to legitimate rule.</p>
<p>Finally, Australia should ensure its humanitarian response to a crisis in a country in the region at least matches the generosity of its response to Ukraine, and that funds for aid and relief are channelled through the National Unity Government.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187688/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Catherine Renshaw previously received funding from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, the Community of Democracies and Rotary International, for work connected to Myanmar. </span></em></p>This week’s executions have reminded the world about what’s happening under the generals. It’s time for Australian policy to changeCatherine Renshaw, Professor, School of Law, Western Sydney UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1750742022-01-18T05:35:45Z2022-01-18T05:35:45ZAnother coup has been averted in Burkina Faso: but for how long?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/441084/original/file-20220117-23-bkmkzy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An honorary guard of Burkina Faso soldiers. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Olympia De Maismont/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Within a few weeks of the start of a new year and West Africa had its first attempted coup d’état. On January 12 the Burkinabè government <a href="https://www.thecable.ng/eight-soldiers-arrested-in-burkina-faso-over-coup-plot">announced</a> that it foiled a plot from within the armed forces to destabilise the state. </p>
<p>At a <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/08/28/burkina-faso-vows-major-security-changes-after-deadly-attack//">press conference</a>, Minister of Defence, General Aimé Barthélemy Simporé, announced that 10 soldiers and five civilians had been arrested in connection with the plot. They will be tried by military tribunal.</p>
<p>Military governments are already in power in <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/mali-s-military-authorities-propose-5-year-extension-of-transition-period-/6382307.html">Mali</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/guinea-coup-has-left-west-africas-regional-body-with-limited-options-but-there-are-some-168092">Guinea</a>, <a href="https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/30028/chad-s-political-transition-is-a-smokescreen-for-military-rule">Chad</a>, and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-59033142">Sudan</a> following four coup d’états in the last year. </p>
<p>Speculation and rumour that a coup plot might topple Ouagadougou next has swirled over social media. For now, that crisis has been averted but there are still many reasons to be concerned. </p>
<p>Burkina Faso has a <a href="https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-1944">long legacy</a> of military intervention. In the first 27 years of independence, Burkinabè soldiers staged five coups d’état and one autogolpe – a military coup initiated or abetted by a country’s elected leader. </p>
<p>The last coup killed the famed <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/10/11/only-survivor-of-1987-burkina-coup-relives-thomas-sankara-s-assassination//">Captain Thomas Sankara</a>. He gave Burkina Faso its name, meaning land of the upright people. The coup saw Sankara’s second-in-command Captain Blaise Compaoré installed as president.</p>
<p>Compaoré put an end to Burkina Faso’s coups. After taking power, he ruthlessly <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Blaise-Compaore">eliminated</a> his rivals. With few to stand in his way, Compaoré succeeded in restructuring the military, creating the <a href="https://www.jeuneafrique.com/338958/politique/burkina-officiers-de-lex-regiment-de-securite-presidentielle-remis-liberte-provisoire/">Régiment de la sécurité présidentielle</a>, an elite unit that functioned as a sort of special forces and praetorian guard. </p>
<p>The unit answered only to Compaoré operating under a separate hierarchy and exhibited the sine qua non of coup proofing tactics. It insulated him from coup threats, even helping him endure a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2011/4/17/soldiers-mutiny-in-burkina-faso">widespread mutiny</a> in 2011.</p>
<p>But they were unable to protect him from citizens demanding change. </p>
<p>In 2014, <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2014/10/protesters-storm-burn-burkina-faso-parliament/100843/">millions of protesters</a> filled the streets demanding that Compaoré adhere to, rather than reform, presidential term limits barring him from contesting another election. The insurrection ultimately forced him to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/10/7/burkina-ex-leader-compaore-to-snub-trial-on-sankara-assassination">resign and flee</a> into exile. </p>
<p>This popular movement then transformed into a political transition to democracy. </p>
<p>The transition was nearly overturned when Compaoré loyalists within the unit staged their own <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/25/burkina-faso-foiled-military-coup">coup d’état</a> in September 2015. But Burkinabè citizens refused to stand by and again took to the streets. </p>
<p>To support them, a detachment of the regular army operating under the orders of civilian transitional authorities, surrounded the putschists and ended the failed coup. The political transition culminated in the country’s freest, fairest, and most competitive elections to date.</p>
<p>What is unclear today, however, is the armed forces’ continued commitment to civilian leadership. The recent coup attempt calls into question the coherence of a republican and professional ethos among Burkinabè military officers. </p>
<h2>Deja vu?</h2>
<p>Past military interventions into politics have resulted from popular pressures for change. Similar pressure may be building anew, driven by a growing insecurity in the country.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1251496/download">Militant Islamist groups</a> have been gaining ground across the country’s territory. Violence has displaced nearly two out of every 25 citizens from their homes. The insecurity wrought by these groups and other criminal opportunists, has grown exponentially over the last five years. </p>
<p>The number of violent events linked to militant Islamist groups in Burkina Faso more than <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/6/un-outraged-as-death-toll-in-burkina-faso-attack-rises-to-132">doubled</a> from nearly 500 in 2020 to more than 1,150 in 2021. This put Burkina Faso well ahead of Mali’s 684 and Niger’s 149 violent events.</p>
<p>The inability to get the security situation under control has <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/burkina-faso-prime-minister-dabire-resigns-amid-security-crisis/a-60063223">soured support</a> for the current administration led by President Roch Kaboré. Now in his second term, Kaboré has seen his unprecedented election in 2015 shift from a beacon of democratisation to a test of the country’s strength. </p>
<p>Violence initiated by militant Islamist groups has torn at Burkina Faso’s well known social tolerance. It has sparked inter-communal violence and reprisal attacks. It has also brought war economies and child soldiers to the landlocked nation.</p>
<p>In June, civilians working in and around an artisanal gold mine were <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/child-soldiers-carried-out-burkina-faso-massacre-say-un-government-2021-06-24/">massacred by teenagers</a> presumably armed and deployed by militant Islamist groups seeking to control the resource. In response to popular outcry over the event, Kaboré sacked his Minister of Defense. </p>
<p>Four months later dozens of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/17/burkina-faso-death-toll-security-post-attack-jumps-to-53">gendarmes were killed</a> by militants after having gone weeks without resupply. A letter from the unit explained that they had run out of rations and had been relying on poaching to feed themselves. The event laid bare serious dysfunction within the military’s administration and command.</p>
<p>Given these circumstances, discontent among the rank and file and up the chain of command is understandable. As is the impatience and disillusionment of Burkinabè citizens. The country is in disarray. The government must confront multiple crises that it has failed thus far to even contain. </p>
<p>Ominously, the situation resembles that of Mali prior to the August 2020 coup d’état: an embattled administration scrambling to address a quickly evolving and spreading security crisis in the country’s hinterland, a frustrated military lacking the basics tools to confront the enemy and growing popular dissatisfaction with the perceived shortcomings of their elected officials. In short, a recipe for a coup d’état.</p>
<h2>Key difference</h2>
<p>But there’s a key difference to the Malian experience. Little more than six years ago and no doubt still present in the minds of many Burkinabè citizens, the military stood up and defended the people and constitution against soldiers seeking power. </p>
<p>Burkina Faso has never been more in need of such a service from the military. Burkinabè soldiers and civilians have an opportunity to further strengthen their democratic institutions by remaining firmly against any extra constitutional seizure of power. </p>
<p>Those citizens who stood against the Régiment de la sécurité présidentielle putschists in 2015 may need to be called on again to protect Burkina Faso’s democratisation. </p>
<p>Democracy is messy. It facilitates change, but through an imperfect process of self correction. This requires patience, engagement, and commitment.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/175074/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Daniel Eizenga received funding for research in Burkina Faso as part of grant FA9550-12-i-0433 awarded from the United States Department of Defense to the University of Florida. He is currently a Research Fellow with the Africa Center for Strategic Studies. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and are not an official policy or position of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies.</span></em></p>Democracy is messy. It facilitates change, but through an imperfect process of self-correction. This requires patience, engagement, and commitment.Daniel Eizenga, Research Fellow, Africa Center for Strategic StudiesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1748902022-01-13T14:50:29Z2022-01-13T14:50:29ZErnest Shonekan obituary: an ineffectual leader during turbulent times in Nigeria<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/440722/original/file-20220113-21-13b2qaa.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ernest Shonekan.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Source: British High Commission, Abuja/Flickr</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ernest Adegunle Shonekan, who has <a href="https://www.thecable.ng/breaking-ernest-shonekan-former-head-of-interim-government-ousted-by-abacha-is-dead">died</a> at the age of 85, was appointed Nigeria’s <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/nigeria/stories/bab0893.htm">interim president</a> after the <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/BILLS-103hconres151eh">annulment</a> of the June 12, 1993 Presidential elections. He served as Head of State of Nigeria for 83 days – from 26 August 1993 to 17 November 1993.</p>
<p>Shonekan became an unelected leader of the largest black democracy in the world neither through election nor a coup. The military government of General Ibrahim Babangida appointed him after a bungled transition effort to take the country from military to civilian rule.</p>
<p>In 1993 Nigeria had been through a tumultuous 33 years since <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Nigeria/Independent-Nigeria">independence from Britain in 1960</a>. This included a devastating civil war – <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-51094093">the Biafran conflict </a> – and a series of military coups. The country had also become one of the wealthiest on the continent following the <a href="https://nnpcgroup.com/NNPC-Business/Business-Information/Pages/Industry-History.aspx#:%7E:text=Oil%20was%20discovered%20in%20Nigeria,on%20stream%20producing%205%2C100%20bpd.">discovery</a> of vast oil reserves in 1956 at Oloibiri in the Niger Delta. </p>
<p>Shonekan had made an indelible impression on the then junta, led by Babangida, when he assumed the head of government affairs to supervise a smooth and peaceful electoral transition into a democracy. </p>
<p>The world and Nigerians were watching to see whether this democratic transition would succeed. The last that ushered President Shehu Shagari <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1979/10/02/archives/civilian-president-installed-in-nigeria-ending-13-years-military.html">into power in 1979</a> had been tainted and controversial.</p>
<p>Shonekan was the first head of state in Nigeria to be appointed. His predecessors had assumed the post either after an election, or after a coup. Opinions are still divided as to his suitability and justification of his appointment. </p>
<p>Some Nigerians argued that he was a man with genuine intentions, citing this as the reason that he agreed to serve as interim leader. Others, however, describe him as a usurper who exploited his closeness with military leaders. </p>
<p>Despite these debates, he was nevertheless, in our view, a stabilising factor for the economy and Nigeria’s peace. </p>
<p>While his time as the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1993/11/18/world/nigerian-military-leader-ousts-interim-president.html">head of the Interim National Government</a> was short, he said during his inauguration that he was committed to restoring peace and stability to the country. </p>
<h2>Political forerunner or stooge?</h2>
<p>Shonekan was born in Lagos on 9 May 1936, into a family of six children. Although from Abeokuta in south west Nigeria, he lived the early part of his life in Lagos. </p>
<p>He had his secondary education at the C.M.S. Grammar School in Lagos before attending the University of London where he earned a Bachelor’s degree in Law. Shonekan also attended Harvard Business School.</p>
<p>He began his professional career at the United African Company. Originally a British company that traded in West Africa during the 20th century, it was formed in 1929. The company has grown into one of the largest African controlled groups on the continent and is listed on the Nigerian stock exchange as <a href="https://www.uacnplc.com/">UAC PLC</a>. It’s involved in manufacturing, services, logistics and warehousing, agricultural and real estate.</p>
<p>Shonekan moved through the ranks of the company to become the chairman and chief executive in 1993.</p>
<p>But, in our view, it was neither his professional achievements nor his patriotism that landed him the job as head of state. Rather it was the fact that he came from Abeokuta. It was Shonekan’s ethnic background and chieftaincy position that accounted for his appointment. He was viewed as a man who could steer the country away from more internecine conflict.</p>
<p>The reason for this was that Abeokuta is also the hometown of Chief Moshood Abiola, who, after the 1993 poll and its annulment by the military, had declared himself the winner. The annulment led to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/NIGERIA938.PDF">widespread unrest across the country</a>. In particular, tensions mounted in the southwestern part of the country raising fears that Nigeria was headed for another civil war. </p>
<p>Shonekan’s appointment was a way to show that there was no political marginalisation of the Yoruba people to which he and Abiola belonged. </p>
<p>There was, nevertheless, a great deal of scepticism to his appointment. Despite this he forged ahead, meeting with different segments of the country. </p>
<p>But Shonekan was unable to exert authority. He was unable to create an excellent democratic transitioning plan, which was the primary purpose of his tenure. This could have been because of distractions like strike actions by labour unions and the persistent protests. There was also a general indifference by citizens towards him and his government. This is because many felt he had no business heading a troubled Nigeria through the decree of a military junta responsible for the same mess he was asked to clear. </p>
<p>His attempts to lobby for debt cancellation were rebuffed by Western countries because of the elections annulment. Shonekan’s timetable for troops’ withdrawal from the <a href="https://search.archives.un.org/economic-community-of-west-african-states-monitoring-group-ecomog-2">Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group</a> was also jettisoned as he was not in full control of the armed forces. </p>
<p>He was truly a lame duck leader and difficult to remember him for any notable achievement in office. </p>
<p>It must be said that this was due in large part to the fact that the government he ran was powerless. So powerless in fact that he was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1993/11/18/world/nigerian-military-leader-ousts-interim-president.html">ousted easily</a> by General Sani Abacha, the defence minister. There were no protests or murmurs anywhere. </p>
<h2>Life after interim government</h2>
<p>After his ouster, with other business people he started the <a href="https://nesgroup.org/">Nigerian Economic Summit Group</a> in 1993. It was conceived as a platform for bringing together private sector leaders and senior public sector officials to discuss and dialogue on the future of the Nigerian Economy. </p>
<p>It holds a yearly summit which provides government and private sector an opportunity to review the progress made in economic reform efforts. The summits also deliberate on practical ways to manage issues which may have constrained effective policy implementation. The 27th edition of the summit was held in 2021. </p>
<p>It is fitting that his enduring legacy is in the business world and not the political arena where he remains a footnote in Nigeria’s history.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/174890/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Shonekan’s enduring legacy is in the business world and not the political arena where he remains a footnote in Nigeria’s history.Olaniyi Ayodele, Assistant Lecturer, Covenant UniversityKester Onor, Lecturer, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Covenant UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1717492021-11-17T14:00:54Z2021-11-17T14:00:54ZFresh insights on how to create civic spaces in authoritarian settings: small steps matter<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/432199/original/file-20211116-15-25x82.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Bring Back our Girls Movement in Nigeria brought to the fore the power of women in mobilising around sexual harassment.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Stringer</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Across the world citizens are grappling with the pressing questions of how to defend and renew democracy in the midst of <a href="https://www.v-dem.net/files/25/DR%202021.pdf">rising authoritarianism</a> globally. They’re also battling with how to protect the civic spaces <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/CivicSpace/UN_Guidance_Note.pdf">“within which people express views, assemble, associate and engage in dialogue with one another and with authorities”</a> in the face of this challenge. </p>
<p>Efforts are underway to mobilise governments to make commitments for <a href="https://www.state.gov/summit-for-democracy/">democratic renewal</a> and reform. The world also expects greater <a href="https://ogpsummit.org/">transparency and accountability</a> from those same governments that made pledges at COP26 in Glasgow to protect the future of the planet.</p>
<p>For the last five years, the <a href="https://www.ids.ac.uk/programme-and-centre/action-for-empowerment-and-accountability-a4ea/">Action for Empowerment and Accountability Research Programme</a> has been exploring the question of what forms of action strengthen citizen empowerment and democratic accountability in increasingly hostile environments. The project is a collaborative international research programme based at the Institute of Development Studies in the UK.</p>
<p>The project drew on research from 22 countries. <a href="https://www.ids.ac.uk/programme-and-centre/action-for-empowerment-and-accountability-a4ea/">Our research</a> focused largely on Mozambique, Myanmar, Nigeria and Pakistan. All have legacies of conflict, military rule and authoritarianism. </p>
<p>Working with partners in each country, we used multiple qualitative and quantitative research methods to understand how relatively marginalised groups perceived authorities and mobilised to express their claims. This included making use of innovative <a href="https://www.ids.ac.uk/projects/governance-diaries-of-the-poor/">‘governance diaries’</a> to record when and how these groups interacted with authorities and on which issues.</p>
<p>With over 200 publications, the research programme provides a unique citizen-eye view on pressing governance issues. Five key findings are particularly important for policymakers and those working towards protecting democratic space and improving accountability.</p>
<h2>The findings</h2>
<p>First, closing civic space is a critical issue, threatening basic democratic rights. Our work on <a href="https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/20.500.12413/16602">Navigating civic space</a> shows that the trend towards closing civic space has accelerated under COVID-19.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/africans-want-consensual-democracy-why-is-that-reality-so-hard-to-accept-164010">Africans want consensual democracy – why is that reality so hard to accept?</a>
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<p>Commitments to open governance are important. But they don’t go very far if citizens don’t have the basic freedoms to speak truth to power without fear of reprisal. This means also actively protecting democratic space. That includes joining forces with those defending the rights of those speaking out against corruption and abuses of power.</p>
<p>Second, even in increasingly hostile and authoritarian settings, a rich repertoire of citizen actions are taking place. But, not through the normal, established channels which many have come to expect. Sometimes these claims are expressed in cultural forms rather than engaging directly to authorities. One example is the use of <a href="https://www.ids.ac.uk/publications/shaping-social-change-with-music-in-maputo-mozambique/">political rap lyrics </a> in Mozambique. </p>
<p>Other times, they are made through informal channels, through networks or intermediaries, as our work using <a href="https://www.ids.ac.uk/opinions/mediating-between-the-state-and-its-poor-and-marginalised-during-covid-19/">‘governance diaries’</a> with marginalised groups found. And, sometimes protests may arise from a sense of collective moral outrage of citizens who, no matter how vulnerable, have just had enough. </p>
<p>We found this for example in struggles for <a href="https://closingspaces.org/navigating-civic-space-in-a-time-of-covid-19-reflections-from-nigeria/">security and against violence</a>, or <a href="https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/20.500.12413/15649">against sexual harassment</a>, or for access to <a href="https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/20.500.12413/16822">energy</a>. </p>
<p>Donors and governments seeking to support movements for democratic reform need to start with looking for where these sources of civic energy are actually emerging. This, instead of the more traditional channels where they are often thought they ought to be.</p>
<p>Third, women are often leading the way. Our work found women were often in the front lines of protecting civic space and demanding reforms. This is despite patriarchal social norms, threats of violence, or biases of authorities and political parties who do not recognise women as legitimate claim makers.</p>
<p>We saw, for instance, the power of women’s leadership in the <a href="https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/20.500.12413/14559">Bring Back our Girls Movement</a> against the abduction of girls in Nigeria, or in widespread mobilising against <a href="https://bulletin.ids.ac.uk/index.php/idsbo/issue/view/244">sexual harassment</a>. We also saw this in struggles for <a href="https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/20.500.12413/15890">women’s rights in Pakistan</a>. </p>
<p>Commitments to action for protecting or expanding democratic space must include commitments to support women as leaders and champions of reform. </p>
<p>Fourth, small steps matter. In fragile, closed and authoritarian settings, donors and other actors need to re-calibrate their definitions and measures of success.
Measuring success through examples of full-blown democratic accountability or well-established democratic institutions is perhaps an unrealistic goal when faced with limited civic space, weak institutional channels for engagement and repressive leadership. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/sub-saharan-africas-liberty-deficit-can-civil-society-help-fill-the-gap-166948">Sub-Saharan Africa's liberty deficit: can civil society help fill the gap?</a>
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<p>The focus instead should be on more intermediary outcomes, which can serve as building blocks for longer term democratic renewal. In our work, these included:</p>
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<li><p>increased visibility of previously excluded issues and voices; </p></li>
<li><p>improved access to higher levels of authority by local groups;</p></li>
<li><p>a strengthened sense of rights and citizenship among the citizenry; </p></li>
<li><p>greater responsiveness from authorities on certain concrete issues;</p></li>
<li><p>changing norms, including gender norms, increased expectations and cultures of accountability; </p></li>
<li><p>greater trust between people and public authorities, as well strengthened solidarity between groups. </p></li>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ghanas-style-of-democracy-has-recently-shown-cracks-heres-how-to-fix-it-164439">Ghana's style of democracy has recently shown cracks. Here's how to fix it</a>
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<p>Outcomes such as these will go a long way to creating the conditions that are possible for larger, more institutionalised democratic reforms.</p>
<p>Finally, our <a href="https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/20.500.12413/16822">research</a> shows that citizens across the world see access to energy as more than a necessity for cooking, transport, communications and livelihoods. They also see it as a fundamental right. This has led to widespread protests to try and get their voices heard when it is denied. </p>
<h2>Linking democratic renewal and climate change</h2>
<p>Yet those who consume the least yet need the most are not being listened to. Little attention is made to how to make <a href="https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/20.500.12413/16916">energy policy more accountable</a> or inclusive, especially in repressive and often resource-rich settings. </p>
<p>Building on our research on civic space and the politics of energy, a <a href="https://www.ids.ac.uk/projects/making-space-for-dialogue-on-just-transitions-in-africas-oil-and-gas-producing-regions/">new project with African partners</a> will explore the the spaces for inclusive deliberation on what a just transition would look like for the citizens of oil and gas producing regions in sub-Saharan Africa.</p>
<p>So far, our research points to the need to carry the grassroots demands for inclusion on energy policy – which we saw on the streets of Glasgow during the COP26 as well as many countries around the world – into upcoming summits on democracy and open governance. </p>
<p>When the space is created for citizens to truly have a say on their energy futures, especially in often resource-rich but repressive regimes, then perhaps we can perhaps also say that democracy is being renewed. </p>
<p><em>Two global summits will be taking place in December, with important implications for the state of democracies around the world. On December 9-10, US President Joe Biden will host the virtual <a href="https://www.state.gov/summit-for-democracy/">Summit for Democracy</a> for leaders from government, civil society, and the private sector. Then on December 15-17, the government of Korea will host the 10th <a href="https://ogpsummit.org/">Open Government Partnership Summit</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/171749/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>This article is based on research funded with UK aid from the UK government (Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office – FCDO, formerly DFID). The opinions are the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of IDS or the UK government. </span></em></p>The focus on building democracy should be on more intermediary outcomes, which can serve as building blocks for longer term democratic renewal.John Gaventa, Professor, Institute of Development StudiesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1711332021-11-16T14:32:03Z2021-11-16T14:32:03ZNigeria is a federation in name only. Why Buhari isn’t the man to fix the problem<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/431709/original/file-20211112-15357-a9d4iw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Is President Muhammadu Buhari committed to the genuine federalisation of the Nigerian polity? </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The scenes and stories emerging from Nigeria are simply frightening. Nigeria, not a regional powerhouse but traditionally a veritable continental player, has been missing in action in most vital spheres of leadership because it’s saddled with a leader who has abdicated the duties and responsibilities of leading.</p>
<p>When the <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/10/nigeria-the-lekki-toll-gate-massacre-new-investigative-timeline/">#EndSars protests engulfed Nigeria</a> in late 2020, General Muhammadu Buhari demonstrated an appalling lack of understanding, empathy and foresight. In desperately ill health and busy with frequent visits to hospitals abroad, he handed over his responsibilities to an array of sycophants and shady characters who have no business with leadership.</p>
<p>Buhari’s initial stint as head of state was as a military general <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Muhammadu-Buhari">between 1983 and 1985</a> when he was deposed in a palace coup d'etat by General Ibrahim Babangida and his cabal. Given his military antecedents, can Buhari be truly committed to the genuine federalisation of the Nigerian polity? </p>
<p>I would argue not. The military establishment is generally strictly hierarchical in nature and concepts and practices relating to the devolution of power are often problematic to entrench.</p>
<p>The over-centralisation of power became doubly evident during the nefarious reign of General Sani Abacha whose regime hanged the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/pidgin/tori-50371699">Ogoni nine in 1995</a>. I conducted a series of studies on the Ogoni tragedy culminating in <a href="https://www.cambridgescholars.com/product/978-1-5275-6075-8">a book</a>, Ken Saro-Wiwa’s Shadow (expanded edition): Politics, Nationalism and the Ogoni Protest Movement.</p>
<p>Indeed, Nigeria’s current political problems are simply too daunting to embark on an honest journey to true federalism at this stage. Federalism entails the sharing of political power between the central seat of government and other federating units within a polity. In this way, power, responsibilities and obligations are not solely imposed on the central government but shared with other regions or states (as in the case of the United States) of a nation.</p>
<h2>Neither unitary nor federalist</h2>
<p>The Nigerian military has toyed with <a href="https://www.cambridgescholars.com/resources/pdfs/978-1-5275-6075-8-sample.pdf#page=23">the idea of federalism</a> since the first putsch that installed Major-General Johnson Aguyi-Ironsi as head of state in January 15, 1966. </p>
<p>Since then a rash of military adventurers have held the country in thrall. It continued to claim that was a federation when in fact there was a steady concentration of political power at the centre to the detriment of the federating units. These eventually rose to 36 states.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the federal seat of power became more arbitrary – distant, unresponsive and insufferably corrupt and inefficient.</p>
<p>The notions of nationhood and national interest are, at the best of times, inchoate and contentious. They have become more meaningless if not completely lost. </p>
<p>In June 2020, the US Council on Foreign Relations declared that Nigeria was <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202106010607.html">on verge of state collapse</a>. John Campbell and Robert Rotberg, both of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/05/27/nigeria-is-a-failed-state/">corroborate this view</a>.</p>
<p>Nigeria’s unpoliced borders have been usurped by well-armed mercenaries, cattle rustlers and a bewildering assortment of jihadists, bandits and terrorists. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, <a href="https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/why-so-many-school-kidnappings-in-nigeria/?">the country bleeds</a>. School children by the hundreds are captured frequently by terrorists who demand and receive millions in ransom. Since January 2021, well over <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-57960544">1,000 students</a> have been kidnapped for ransom in Nigeria. </p>
<p>Ethnic tensions and agitations have reached fever pitch, lives are lost daily on the highways and farmlands at an alarming rate. Girls and women are routinely raped on the way to and from markets and farms by bandits. There is no security to be found anywhere.</p>
<p>Militants in the Niger Delta led by the Niger Delta Avengers have <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1165870/quarterly-oil-production-in-nigeria/">destroyed oil installations</a>. </p>
<p>The banned Indigenous People of Biafra movement has become <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-drives-the-indigenous-people-of-biafras-relentless-efforts-for-secession-163984">re-vitalised</a>. Largely inspired by the Biafran secessionist bid of 1967-70 it is led by the ex-fugitive <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/10/nigeria-trial-of-separatist-leader-nnamdi-kanu-adjourned">Nnamdi Kanu</a>. The Inspector General of Police, Usman Baba has <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/10/nigeria-the-lekki-toll-gate-massacre-new-investigative-timeline/">confirmed</a> that the Eastern Security Network, the militant arm of the movement, is responsible for the deaths of 187 soldiers, police and paramilitary operatives.</p>
<p><a href="https://guardian.ng/news/yoruba-groups-warn-against-move-to-silence-akintoye-igboho-kanu/">Sunday Adeyemo</a>, a currently exiled Yoruba freedom fighter, is fervently agitating for the creation of a Yoruba nation. He says there would be no elections in 2023. </p>
<p>None of this began under Buhari’s leadership. But things have got worse under his leadership.</p>
<h2>Why Buhari can’t deliver</h2>
<p>Buhari is the nominal leader of the Fulani, an ethnic group to be found in considerable numbers in virtually every West African country. He is <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/262-stopping-nigerias-spiralling-farmer-herder-violence">alleged</a> to have invited his ethnic kinfolk from across West Africa in 2015 to aid his presidential ambitions.</p>
<p>Such a case of ethnic particularism deflects the purpose of Nigerian nationhood. It also undermines the concepts of sovereignty, territoriality and ultimately, modernity. </p>
<p>Buhari also has no understanding the notion of true federalism. </p>
<p>He is pursuing a grand agenda of Fulanisation. As the nominal leader of the Fulani in West Africa there has been an alarming influx of Fulanis from other West African nations. </p>
<p>The retreat into ethnic chauvinism has also meant an evisceration of the nation-state as a modernist project. Since it has become quite difficult to transform this dire state of affairs within Nigerian territory, there has been an expatriation of political struggles abroad as activists seek to pursue their causes outside the country. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-10-01/nigerian-president-announces-conditional-lifting-of-twitter-ban">ban on Twitter</a>, just as the brutal clampdown on anti-SARS protesters is an anti-people onslaught, a measure against digital democracy, an attack on the idea of freedom and finally, an act of feudalist terror. </p>
<p>Buhari’s desperation demonstrates him to be a Don Quixote. He is out-of-place, out-of-joint, irretrievably lost within a borderless technological universe that he does not understand. </p>
<p>With this sort of frame of mind, concepts such as federalism go out of the window. Indeed the immediate problems of political survival and dominance are far more pertinent than such highfalutin concepts.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/171133/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sanya Osha does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Nigeria’s current political problems are simply too daunting to embark on an honest journey to true federalism at this stage.Sanya Osha, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Humanities in Africa, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1706702021-10-26T14:26:37Z2021-10-26T14:26:37ZSudan’s generals have torn up the transition playbook. But don’t count out the masses<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/428519/original/file-20211026-15-mus7x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Crowds gather to protest the coup in the Sudanese capital, Khartoum. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/MOHAMMED ABU OBAID</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>This week the head of Sudan’s Sovereign Council, General Abdel Fattah El Burhan, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20211025-abdel-fattah-al-burhan-the-general-who-leads-sudan">declared</a> the dissolution of the transitional council, which has been in place since the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47852496">overthrow</a> of former president Omar el-Bashir in 2019. He also disbanded all the structures that had been set up as part of the transitional roadmap, and decreed a <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/10/25/sudan-s-army-declares-state-of-emergency-dissolves-government/">state of emergency</a>.</p>
<p>In essence, he staged a palace coup against the transitional authority he chaired. </p>
<p>The general’s actions, which included the arrest of Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, are a culmination of a long period of tension between the civilian and military wings of the council. The tensions were punctuated by an alleged attempted coup only <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/09/21/coup-attempt-jolts-sudan-s-fragile-transition//">weeks earlier</a>. The days leading to the palace coup were marked by street protests <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/pro-military-protests-sudan-political-crisis-deepens-2021-10-16/">for</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-58996079">against</a> the military.</p>
<p>Does this mark the end of the transition as envisaged by the protest movement?</p>
<p>The popular uprising against Bashir’s government was <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-01818-y">led by the Sudan Professional Association</a>. It ushered in the political transitional union of civilians and the military establishment. The interim arrangement was to lead to a return to civilian rule. But this cohabitation was tenuous from the start, given the oversized role of the military in the transition. Moreover, the military appeared to be reluctant to see the civilian leadership as an equal partner in shepherding through the transition.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, until recently there had been progress towards creating the institutional architecture for the transition. Despite the challenges and notable tension between the signatories to the accord, it was never evident that the dysfunction was so great as to herald the collapse of the transitional authority. </p>
<p>For now, the transition might be disrupted and in fact temporarily upended. But the lesson from Sudan is never to count the masses out of the equation. Their ability to mobilise and confront counter revolutionary forces cannot be underestimated.</p>
<h2>Unfinished business</h2>
<p>The transitional pact itself had been anchored by eight arduously negotiated protocols. These included regional autonomy, integration of the national army, revenue sharing and repatriation of internal refugees. There was also an agreement to share out positions in national political institutions, such as the legislative and executive branch. </p>
<p>Progress towards these goals was at different stages of implementation. More substantive progress was expected to follow after the end of the transition. This was due in 2022 when the chair of the sovereignty council handed over to a civilian leader. This military intervention is clearly self-serving and an opportunistic power grab.</p>
<p>In November, the rotational chairmanship of the transitional council was to be passed from the military to the civilian wing of the council. That meant the military would cede strong leverage to the civilians. Instead, with the coup afoot, Burhan has announced both a dissolution of the council as well as the dismissal of provincial governors. He has <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/10/26/sudan-coup-which-constitutional-articles-suspended">unilaterally</a> promised return to civilian rule in July 2023 through national elections. </p>
<p>Prior to this, the military had been systematically challenging the pre-eminence of the civilian authority. It undermined them and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudans-military-strikes-out-civilian-politicians-after-coup-attempt-2021-09-22/">publicly berated</a> them for governmental failures and weaknesses. For the last few months there has been a deliberate attempt to sharply criticise the civilian council as riddled with divisions, incompetent and undermining state stability. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/sudans-hard-won-transition-to-civilian-rule-faces-a-precarious-moment-170467">Sudan's hard-won transition to civilian rule faces a precarious moment</a>
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<p>Since the revolution against Bashir’s government, the military have fancied themselves as generals in suits. They have continued to wield enough power to almost run a parallel government in tension with the prime minister. This was evident when the military continued to have the say on security and <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/sudanese-fm-downplays-israel-ties-says-no-plans-for-israeli-embassy-in-khartoum/">foreign affairs</a>. </p>
<p>For their part, civilian officials concentrated on rejuvenating the economy and mobilising international support for the transitional council. </p>
<p>This didn’t stop the military from accusing the civilian leadership of failing to resuscitate the country’s <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/06/09/fuel-prices-almost-double-in-sudan-for-a-country-facing-deep-economic-crisis//">ailing economy</a>. True, the economy has continued to struggle from high inflation, low industrial output and <a href="https://www.afdb.org/en/countries/east-africa/sudan/sudan-economic-outlook">dwindling foreign direct investment</a>. As in all economies, conditions have been exacerbated by the effects of COVID-19. </p>
<p>Sudan’s weakened economy is, however, not sufficient reason for the military intervention. Clearly this is merely an excuse.</p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>The success or failure of this coup will rest on a number of factors. </p>
<p>First is the ability of the military to use force. This includes potential violent confrontation with the counter-coup forces. This will dictate the capacity of the military to change the terms of the transition. </p>
<p>Second is whether the military can harness popular public support in the same way that the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/heavy-gunfire-heard-guinea-capital-conakry-reuters-witness-2021-09-05/">Guinean</a> or <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/07/03/is-what-happened-in-egypt-a-coup-or-a-revolution-its-both/">Egyptian</a> militaries did. This appears to be a tall order, given that popular support appears to be far less forthcoming. </p>
<p>Third, the ability of the Sudanese masses to mobilise against military authorities cannot be overlooked. Massive nationwide street protests and defiance campaigns underpinned by underground organisational capabilities <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2019/01/sudan-protests-learn-1964-1985/">brought down governments</a> in 1964, 1985 and 2019. They could once again present a stern test to the military.</p>
<p>Finally, the international community’s appetite for military coups is wearing thin. The ability of the military to overcome pressure from regional and international actors to return to the status quo could be decisive, given the international support needed to prop up the crippled economy.</p>
<p>The Sudanese population may have been growing frustrated with its civilian authority’s ability to deliver on the demands of the revolution. But it is also true that another coup to reinstate military rule is not something the protesters believe would address the challenges they were facing. </p>
<p>Sudan has needed and will require compromise and principled political goodwill to realise a difficult transition. This will entail setbacks but undoubtedly military intervention in whatever guise is monumentally counterproductive to the aspirations of the protest movement.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/170670/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David E Kiwuwa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Sudan has needed and will require compromise and principled political goodwill to realise a difficult transition from military rule.David E Kiwuwa, Associate Professor of International Studies, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1628672021-06-17T11:29:20Z2021-06-17T11:29:20ZBrazil: inside Jair Bolsonaro’s militarised democracy – podcast<p>In this episode of <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/the-conversation-weekly-98901">The Conversation Weekly</a>, we look at just how politicised Brazil’s military has become since President Jair Bolsonaro took office in 2019. And we speak to a zooarchaeologist studying animal bones from 700-year-old trash in Spain to learn about people left out of history. </p>
<iframe src="https://embed.acast.com/60087127b9687759d637bade/60cb0e202dc225001a70bebc?cover=true" frameborder="0" allow="autoplay" width="100%" height="110"></iframe>
<p><iframe id="tc-infographic-561" class="tc-infographic" height="100" src="https://cdn.theconversation.com/infographics/561/4fbbd099d631750693d02bac632430b71b37cd5f/site/index.html" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Jair Bolsonaro is openly nostalgic for the era of Brazil’s military dictatorship, which ended in 1985. Since the former army captain was elected president in 2018, he’s maintained a close relationship with the armed forces – but in recent months it’s not always been straightforward. With Brazil heading towards presidential elections in 2022, and Bolsonaro <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-politics-bolsonaro-idUSKBN2B9317">slumping in the polls</a>, some of those military officers who’ve tasted political power may be assessing their options. </p>
<p>We speak to two experts to understand the history of relations between the military and politics in Brazil – and what’s at stake. </p>
<p>Maud Chirio, lecturer in history at Université Gustave Eiffel in Paris, is a specialist in Brazil’s military dictatorship and the recent growth of extreme right ideologies within the military. She believes Brazil’s mishandling of the coronavirus pandemic, that has left more than <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus/country/brazil">490,000 people dead by mid-June</a>, could cause some high ranking military officers to distance themselves from Bolsonaro. While some believe he can – and should – be re-elected, and that he’s the best guardian of their interests, she tells us “some military do not want to sink with Bolsonaro’s ship”. </p>
<p>Vinicius Mariano de Carvalho is director of King’s Brazil Institute at King’s College London, and served as a lieutenant in the army technical corps during Lula’s presidency in the early 2000s. He explains that despite the legacy of the military dictatorship, many Brazilians still have a positive view of the armed forces and so Bolsonaro’s military background helped him get elected. Yet De Carvalho says Bolsonaro appears not to fully understand the role of the military in a civilian democracy. “Sometimes the president talks about the military almost as his praetorian guard that he can use to do whatever he wants.” </p>
<p>De Carvalho thinks part of the longer-term solution is to reduce Brazil’s dependence on the military for tasks that should be left to civilian authorities. He tells us that when there is a change of minister, it’s common for Brazilians to wonder what the military thinks about it. “That’s a question we should never ask.”</p>
<p>And in our second story (24m20s), we travel back to 12th century Islamic Iberia with the help of zooarchaeologist Marcos García García, a postdoctoral research fellow at the University of York in the UK. He’s part of a project examining household garbage at Cercadilla, an archaeological dig outside Córdoba in Spain. Garcia explains what studying this ancient waste is revealing about the people who lived there – including <a href="https://revistaselectronicas.ujaen.es/index.php/ATM/article/view/5797">evidence of pork</a>. This suggests that there were Christians living in Islamic Al-Andalus, contrary to the previous historical consensus that Christian communities had disappeared by this point. </p>
<p>And Nick Lehr, arts and culture editor at The Conversation in the US, tells us about a new series of articles on <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/trans-youth-2021-102529">transgender young people</a> (34m15s). To go alongside it, The Conversation has put together an email newsletter course to help shed light on the issues that transgender young people and their families face. Anyone of any age, gender or sexuality that is interested in learning about the latest research on transgender youth can <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/transgender-youth-77/">sign up here</a> to receive the mini-course in the form of four emails over about a week. </p>
<p>This episode of The Conversation Weekly was produced by Mend Mariwany and Gemma Ware, with sound design by Mau Loseto. Our theme music is by Neeta Sarl. You can find us on Twitter <a href="https://twitter.com/TC_Audio">@TC_Audio</a>, on Instagram at <a href="https://www.instagram.com/theconversationdotcom/?hl=en">theconversationdotcom</a>. or via email on podcast@theconversation.com. You can also sign up to <a href="https://theconversation.com/newsletter?utm_campaign=PodcastTCWeekly&utm_content=newsletter&utm_source=podcast">The Conversation’s free daily email here</a>.</p>
<p>News clips in this episode are from <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GcaMUX0FnPk">Journalismo TV</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PccBZ-yVvQ0">France</a> <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TkfdbpCYvHU">2</a><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lxhuo7Jt3AE">4</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NAQZvlaNF4s">Al Jazeera</a> <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NAQZvlaNF4s">English</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mG5zfZLG8XI">TRT News</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NjNilKUvBDo">CNN</a> News, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5VOuJK7Aag">VICE</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eNyIMUc5nSA">CGTN News</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7S6BawcbbaM">The Guardian</a> and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H9ajzCq2lMk">BBC News</a>. </p>
<p><em>You can listen to The Conversation Weekly via any of the apps listed above, our <a href="https://feeds.acast.com/public/shows/60087127b9687759d637bade">RSS feed</a>, or find out how else to <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-listen-to-the-conversations-podcasts-154131">listen here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/162867/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Plus, what the study of 700-year old garbage is revealing about who lived in Islamic Andalusia. Listen to episode 20 of The Conversation Weekly.Gemma Ware, Head of AudioDaniel Merino, Associate Breaking News Editor and Co-Host of The Conversation Weekly PodcastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1582702021-04-05T19:19:42Z2021-04-05T19:19:42ZMyanmar’s brutal military was once a force for freedom – but it’s been waging civil war for decades<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/393194/original/file-20210401-17-wbsofw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C15%2C5184%2C3430&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Every March 27, the Myanmar military celebrates its anniversary with a parade. The day of the 2021 parade, soldiers killed at least 90 pro-democracy protesters.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/march-27-2021-military-vehicles-march-in-a-formation-during-news-photo/1231981232?adppopup=true">Xinhua/Zhang Dongqiang via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>With great fanfare – but few guests – Myanmar’s armed forces recently celebrated their <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/27/myanmar-coup-leaders-put-on-show-of-force">76th anniversary</a> in the nation’s capital of Naypyitaw. </p>
<p>Only Russia, China, Thailand and a handful of other Asian countries sent representatives to attend the March 27, 2021, parade showing off Myanmar’s modern war machines – mostly imported from <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Myanmar-Coup/Myanmar-embraces-Russian-arms-to-offset-China-s-influence">Russia and China</a> over the past decade, to the tune of US$2.4 billion. </p>
<p>The Myanmar military has been terrorizing civilians since a <a href="https://theconversation.com/myanmar-coup-how-the-military-has-held-onto-power-for-60-years-154526">coup two months earlier</a>. On the day of the parade, soldiers killed over 90 people for protesting military rule, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/27/world/asia/myanmar-protests.html">including a 5-year-old boy and three teenagers</a>. An estimated <a href="https://aappb.org">564 people</a> have been killed in Myanmar since the Feb. 1 coup.</p>
<p>One of Asia’s poorest countries, Myanmar spends twice as much on defense as it does on <a href="https://www.mmtimes.com/news/govt-spend-more-health-education-funds-agri-lacking.html">education and health combined</a>. With <a href="https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country_id=myanmar&fbclid=IwAR1uhlfS7Xwh1N4K1NXhAKN0wL8lD2s7rDskIgEgGO-PzTZx31yrGY9rof8">half a million soldiers</a>, at least on paper, Myanmar has the world’s 38th strongest military, according to Global Fire Power, which ranks 140 nations on their capability to wage war.</p>
<p>Myanmar’s military wasn’t always a repressive force. It began as an <a href="https://newint.org/features/2008/04/18/history">adored liberating force founded to end colonial rule</a>. </p>
<h2>History of the Burma army</h2>
<p>Burma’s first national army came out of World War II and <a href="https://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/burma601/timeline.html">the quest for independence</a>.</p>
<p>Led by a group called the “30 comrades” who <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/commentary/man-behind-burma-independence-army.html">received military training from the Japanese</a>,“ the Burma Independence Army allied itself with Japan to fight the British. Everyday people sold their gold to support this revolutionary force.</p>
<p>The Burma Independence Army forced the British out in 1941. The Japanese then occupied Burma, fighting <a href="https://history.army.mil/brochures/burma42/burma42.htm">Britain, the U.S. and other Allied forces from this strategic location in Southeast Asia</a>.</p>
<p>Soon, though, Burma’s army <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Aung-San#ref86513">wanted Japan out of Burma</a>, too. So did many Burmese people. Thousands of members of ethnic and religious minorities from rural border areas joined the army. </p>
<p>Historically, these minority groups had kept their distance from the country’s Buddhist majority, called Bamar, and from each other. The British <a href="https://thegeopolitics.com/british-rule-and-partition-in-south-asia-blueprint-of-two-refugee-crises/">maintained and strengthened these ethnic divisions</a> as a tactic to maintain their colonial rule.</p>
<p>But during the 1940s resistance movement against the Japanese, <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Women-in-Modern-Burma/Than/p/book/9781138687332">everyone was united behind Burma’s army</a>, my research finds – including women. </p>
<p>In 2007 I interviewed the <a href="https://www.igi-global.com/pdf.aspx?tid%3D114701%26ptid%3D91277%26ctid%3D17%26t%3Dwomen+in+modern+burma%26isxn%3D">first five women soldiers who joined Burma’s struggle for independence</a>. </p>
<p>"When the resistance movement began, we were ready to give everything, including our lives,” Daw Khin Kyi Kyi, then in her 80s, told me.</p>
<p>The women attended military training, traveled to villages near army camps to explain why the army was now fighting against the Japanese, and convinced locals to offer food and shelter to the soldiers. The women also enlisted locals to spy on Japanese troops.</p>
<h2>Civil war begins</h2>
<p>The Japanese surrendered to the Allied forces in 1945 and withdrew from all occupied territories, including Burma. </p>
<p>That put Burma back in British hands, with promises of full sovereignty.</p>
<p>Before the British would grant Burma independence, however, they demanded that the country’s Bamar leadership prove that its many minority groups also wanted independence as one nation. Burma’s revolutionary army leader Aung San convened a summit in the town of Panglong with the leaders of various ethnic groups to negotiate the foundations of a unified, independent Burma.</p>
<p>However, <a href="https://minorityrights.org/minorities/karen/">the Karen</a>, a mostly Christian population from the country’s southeast, had previously been promised British help in establishing their own free state. Karen leaders refused to join the 1947 <a href="https://rpl.hds.harvard.edu/faq/panglong-agreement">Panlong Agreement</a>. </p>
<p>Burma became independent in 1948. The next year, elite Karen troops staged an armed revolt against the new national government. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/393282/original/file-20210402-13-18yyr4c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Black-and-white image of a guard hut and a wooden sign reading 'give me liberty or give me death'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/393282/original/file-20210402-13-18yyr4c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/393282/original/file-20210402-13-18yyr4c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393282/original/file-20210402-13-18yyr4c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393282/original/file-20210402-13-18yyr4c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393282/original/file-20210402-13-18yyr4c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=536&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393282/original/file-20210402-13-18yyr4c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=536&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393282/original/file-20210402-13-18yyr4c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=536&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A sign marking the independence movement of the Karen National Liberation Army, in eastern Myanmar, July 1988.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/karen-people-walk-towards-a-sign-saying-give-me-liberty-or-news-photo/860546768?adppopup=true">Pornvilai Carr/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Ever since, Myanmar’s military, called Tatmadaw, has essentially existed solely to fight against Myanmar’s minorities. </p>
<h2>Myanmar’s war economy</h2>
<p>For about a decade after independence, Burma had a democratic government. But the army was more powerful. Between <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-16546688">1962 and 2010, Burma was a military dictatorship</a>. Military rule endured through <a href="https://www.npr.org/2013/08/08/209919791/as-myanmar-opens-up-a-look-back-on-a-1988-uprising">occasional uprisings, show elections</a> and several coups in which one set of generals overthrew another.</p>
<p>Civil war is costly, so Myanmar developed a war economy. At first, it funded its battles with rice exports and loans from the U.S. and Soviet Union. Over time, Burma’s military entrenched itself in the global economic system.</p>
<p>In 1962, the military junta regime established <a href="https://burma.irrawaddy.com/article/2017/06/24/137302.html">Burma Trade Limited</a> in central London as its “legitimate” international brokerage. The military also mined and sold jade, mostly in areas that were home to repressed ethnic minorities and profited from a lively <a href="https://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/power-money-economics-and-conflict-burma">opium trade</a> in Burma.</p>
<p>This military-controlled economy enriched Burma’s generals, but the money did not translate into national economic growth. In 1987, the United Nations rated Burma among the world’s “<a href="https://www.mm.undp.org/content/myanmar/en/home/presscenter/articles/2013/05/ldcgraduation.html">least developed countries</a>.” </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/393281/original/file-20210402-23-ckx16q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Children in white tops and green pants hang on the outside of a very crowded bus; other children sit on top of the bus" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/393281/original/file-20210402-23-ckx16q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/393281/original/file-20210402-23-ckx16q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393281/original/file-20210402-23-ckx16q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393281/original/file-20210402-23-ckx16q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393281/original/file-20210402-23-ckx16q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393281/original/file-20210402-23-ckx16q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393281/original/file-20210402-23-ckx16q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A bus headed to Mandalay, Myanmar, in the late 1980s or early 1990s.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/on-the-road-to-mandalay-in-maymyo-birmanie-sur-la-route-de-news-photo/947436940?adppopup=true">Robert Tixador/Gamma-Rapho via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Burma’s name was changed to Myanmar in 1989.</p>
<h2>Sanctions and boycotts</h2>
<p>Today, Myanmar’s economy is almost entirely controlled by the military, from telecommunications to drugs. The military’s sprawling business networks – which <a href="https://www.justiceformyanmar.org/stories/myanmars-military-cartel-corruption-by-design">some rights groups call “cartels”</a> – have protected the generals from attempts to democratize. </p>
<p>In 2008, for example, the Myanmar military assented to a new Constitution officially giving 75% of seats in Parliament to civilian politicians and reserving 25% for army representatives. </p>
<p>Unofficially, though, the military largely continued to run the nation. That included unrelenting repression of minority groups, including the Karen – who have <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-politics-ethnic-explainer/explainer-truce-over-as-myanmars-karen-insurgents-brace-for-battle-with-junta-idUSKBN2BO4G6">maintained their insurgency for seven decades</a> – and the Rohingya Muslims. </p>
<p>[<em>Deep knowledge, daily.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>.]</p>
<p>Elections in 2015 were supposed to mark a turning point in this quasi-democratic system. Aung San Suu Kyi, daughter of the revolutionary Aung San and leader of a prior democratic uprising, and her National League for Democracy <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-33547036">won in a landslide</a>. </p>
<p>Suu Kyi faced criticism for failing to stand up to the military, particular in its assaults on the Rohingya. Even so, she was deposed in the February 2021 coup and is now detained in an unknown location. Some dissidents are fleeing into to Karen territory and other rebel-held ethnic areas to escape <a href="https://www.myanmar-now.org/en/news/myanmar-army-soldiers-defect-to-knu-to-side-with-anti-coup-protesters">the military.
</a></p>
<p>As the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2021/3/28/myanmar-protests-continue-a-day-after-more-than-100-killed">death toll in Myanmar mounts</a>, international pressure is growing for <a href="https://theconversation.com/we-know-how-to-cut-off-the-financial-valve-to-myanmars-military-the-world-just-needs-the-resolve-to-act-158220">countries to impose harsher sanctions</a> on the junta and for companies to cease trade. <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/02/05/business/japan-kirin-myanmar-intl-hnk/index.html">Japan’s Kirin beer</a> and <a href="https://www.livemint.com/news/world/german-company-halts-supply-of-myanmar-bank-note-components-11617187349429.html">a German company that supplies the Myanmar mint</a> are among those that have cut ties with Myanmar. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, civil disobedience inside the country continues. Choking off the military’s funding could give the protesters and deposed civilian government a fighting chance.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/158270/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tharaphi Than does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>What began in the 1940s as a revolutionary army created to liberate Myanmar from British colonial rule soon turned repressive. The country has been a military dictatorship on and off since 1962.Tharaphi Than, Associate Professor, Department of World Cultures and Languages, Northern Illinois UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1554522021-03-15T12:58:27Z2021-03-15T12:58:27ZResistance to military regime in Myanmar mounts as nurses, bankers join protests – despite bloody crackdown<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/389082/original/file-20210311-24-pelj4o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C133%2C5246%2C3290&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nurses in Myanmar have been striking since February to protest the military coup. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/nurses-hold-up-signs-as-they-march-during-a-demonstration-news-photo/1231133016?adppopup=true">STR/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Young people were the first in Myanmar to peacefully protest the country’s new military regime. Then came <a href="https://jacobinmag.com/2021/03/myanmar-burma-general-strike-coup">labor unions</a>. In the weeks since a Feb. 1 military coup, Mynamar’s resistance movement has expanded dramatically to include some <a href="https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/back-to-the-stone-age-striking-bank-workers-bring-an-industry-and-an-economy-to-its-knees/">perhaps unlikely activists</a>: doctors, nurses, bankers, grocers, <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/another-300-protesters-yangon-arrested-juntas-security-forces.html">railway workers</a> and other working professionals risking their middle-class comforts. </p>
<p>Myanmar was under military rule from 1988 to 2011. During the elections in 2015, the National Democratic League won by a landslide, and party leader Aung San Suu Kyi, a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11685977">well-known dissident</a>, became the country’s leader. The army <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/14/world/asia/myanmar-military-crackdown.html">overthrew her government on Feb. 1, 2021</a>, and imposed martial law. </p>
<p>Soon, thousands of <a href="https://www.myanmar-now.org/en/news/striking-doctors-foreign-ministry-staff-charged-as-junta-continues-crackdown-on-civil">Myanmar’s health care workers</a> were refusing to go to work – an attempt to thwart the coup regime by grinding government machinery to a halt. Health care is public in Myanmar, and health workers hold <a href="https://themimu.info/Economic_Activity">10% of all government jobs</a>. Most hospitals and medical schools have closed their doors. </p>
<p>As elsewhere in the world, doctors and nurses in Myanmar have become public <a href="https://www.mmtimes.com/news/home-heroes.html">heroes</a> during the pandemic. Their high social status makes them important allies to the pro-democracy cause. </p>
<p>Doctors and nurses are among many other civil servants in Myanmar to engage in civil disobedience. Up to 90% of the staff in <a href="https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/striking-government-workers-say-they-are-ready-to-face-the-worst/">some government ministries is on strike</a>, according to a senior official at the Ministry of Electricity and Energy; the junta says it’s 30%. Some of Myamar’s 7.4 million private-sector workers are also striking, including <a href="https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/they-are-destroying-their-own-economy-central-bank-official-lambasts-protesters-cdm/">bank employees</a>, whose absence has forced the government to <a href="https://www.bloombergquint.com/global-economics/myanmar-central-bank-to-limit-cash-withdrawal-from-banks-atms">limit daily cash withdrawals</a>.</p>
<p>A revolt started by young people raised during Myanmar’s democratic transition is becoming a broadly based national resistance movement involving the middle classes – whom history shows are <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/704699?af=R&mobileUi=0">central to any successful protests movement</a>.
And despite increasingly <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-killings-beatings-and-disappearances-escalate-whats-the-end-game-in-myanmar-156752">deadly military crackdowns beginning in early March</a>, the protests are still gaining steam.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/389096/original/file-20210311-23-bd4tr0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="People with shields and hard hats duck and run for cover on a smoky street" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/389096/original/file-20210311-23-bd4tr0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/389096/original/file-20210311-23-bd4tr0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389096/original/file-20210311-23-bd4tr0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389096/original/file-20210311-23-bd4tr0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389096/original/file-20210311-23-bd4tr0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389096/original/file-20210311-23-bd4tr0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389096/original/file-20210311-23-bd4tr0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Protesters in Yangon try to defend themselves against tear gas at a demonstration March 8 against the military coup.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/protesters-hold-homemade-shields-after-tear-gas-was-fired-news-photo/1231593285?adppopup=true">STR/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Money talks</h2>
<p>I study <a href="https://theconversation.com/myanmar-debates-womens-rights-amid-evidence-of-pervasive-sexual-and-domestic-violence-104536">social movements</a> and <a href="https://humanitiesacrossborders.org/people/tharaphi">dissent in Myanmar</a>. Active support from the comfortable middle class differentiates current protests from previous pro-democracy movements in Myanmar, from the Buddhist monks’ “<a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/from-the-archive/saffron-revolution-rangoon-diary.html">saffron revolution</a>” against the military dictatorship in 2007 to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-31812028">student protests for education reform</a> in 2015. </p>
<p>Those protests, which did not achieve their goals, were confined to one segment of the population. This time around, Generation Z is leading Myanmar’s pro-democracy uprising, and some of my university students from there were arrested in a March 3 crackdown and face up to three years in prison. </p>
<p>But the youth are joined by many other kinds of people. Some workers walked off their jobs to rally behind the young people at protests. Other middle-class professionals support the movement more quietly, with money, rations, shelter and professional services like legal advice. </p>
<p>People across Myanmar are also boycotting products produced by the army and its conglomerates, such as Myanmar beer and the Joox music app, and goods imported from <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/43e6ecfe-081a-4390-aa18-154ec87ff764">China</a> and <a href="https://mothership.sg/2021/02/myanmar-coup-boycott-singapore-brands/">Singapore</a> – two top investors in Myanmar, neither of which condemned the coup. </p>
<p>After bank workers began to strike late last month, international observers worried <a href="https://www.trtworld.com/asia/myanmar-s-military-coup-creates-banking-woes-44465">banks in Myanmar would collapse</a>. But banks serve very few people in Myanmar. As of 2017, only <a href="https://www.centerforfinancialinclusion.org/mobile-money-in-myanmar-going-directly-from-cash-to-digital">6% of the Southeast Asian country’s 54 million people</a> were served by a financial institution.</p>
<p>During the pandemic, which has hit Myanmar hard, nonprofit organizations mobilized to create small aid networks that could <a href="https://commonpurpose.org/blog/archive/i-do-nation-a-yangon-covid-19-direct-cash-transfer-and-support-programme/">provide funds to poor people who needed cash</a> using online sites and phone apps. About <a href="https://consult-myanmar.com/2020/11/12/wavepay-app-reaches-more-than-1-million-active-users/">1 million</a> people in Myanmar used a phone-to-phone cash transfer service called Wave every month of last year.</p>
<p>Now, during the protests, those same aid networks are providing financial support to help striking civil servants and private-sector workers partially make up for their forgone salaries. Grocers provide rations to keep food on protesters’ tables. Medical professionals help those hurt in the protests and provide free health care to their families. Teachers provide free education.</p>
<p>Through new apps such as <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/myanmar-digital-insurgents-finally-found-150343681.html">Stay away</a>, people are scrutinizing how they spend their money to avoid unintentionally financing the army and its supporters, who have investments in nearly every sector of Myanmar’s economy, from supermarkets to entertainment.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/389088/original/file-20210311-19-99j553.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Men in hardhats sit on the ground facing monks in robes holding colorful umbrellas" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/389088/original/file-20210311-19-99j553.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/389088/original/file-20210311-19-99j553.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389088/original/file-20210311-19-99j553.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389088/original/file-20210311-19-99j553.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389088/original/file-20210311-19-99j553.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389088/original/file-20210311-19-99j553.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389088/original/file-20210311-19-99j553.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An anti-coup protest March 11 joined by monks in Yangon, Myanmar.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-gather-during-an-anti-coup-protest-as-monks-also-news-photo/1231644788?adppopup=true">Stringer/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Moral shaming</h2>
<p>As protests grow, the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/video/world/asia/100000007653340/myanmar-protests-military-coup.html">military’s crackdowns</a> are getting more and more brutal. As of March 15, <a href="https://aappb.org/?p=13578">more than 100 people had been killed and nearly 2,000 detained</a>. Still, <a href="https://www.trtworld.com/asia/defiant-myanmar-protesters-march-day-after-bloodiest-post-coup-unrest-44614">thousands of students</a> and workers flood into the streets every day.</p>
<p>“Dhamma versus adhamma” is their slogan: “Justice versus injustice.”</p>
<p>To help the frontline activists, residents of neighborhoods surrounding the protest sites in Myanmar’s commercial capital, Yangon, build barricades and hide protesters from security forces. Businesses in the neighborhood of Sanchaung close between 9 a.m. and 3 p.m. for protests. Afterward, as trading and daily activities resume, neighbors clear the debris from <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210307-myanmar-protesters-rally-after-overnight-raids-on-opposition-figures">clashes between security forces and protesters</a>, then rebuild barricades for the next act of resistance. </p>
<p>When soldiers beat, shoot and kidnap protesters, people take videos and photos from nearby buildings and send them to media and to investigators at the <a href="https://iimm.un.org/?fbclid=IwAR2AEcGS6-2dHy5eNTHZxvyPf5MPiW2vSpd-JmPwOmz3Dq9FNtWbFp1XfkU">United Nations</a>.</p>
<p>[<em>Deep knowledge, daily.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>.]</p>
<p>All over the country, <a href="https://www.thaipbsworld.com/social-punishment-and-civil-disobedience-the-weapons-of-myanmar-people/">social shaming of regime leaders and their families is a tactic of resistance</a>. In the town of Monywa, in central Myanmar, residents have been following family members of the security forces in the streets and asking local shopkeepers not to serve them as customers. </p>
<p>From striking students to online activists to no-show nurses to helpful neighbors, Myanmar’s protesters resist in different ways with a shared goal: to restore their country’s nascent democracy. With sustained massive resistance to the military and moral support from much of the nation, Myanmar’s peaceful demonstrations may contain the seeds of a revolution.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/155452/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tharaphi Than does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Young people in Myanmar have rallied daily since a Feb. 1 coup, demanding democracy. Now, ever more middle-class professionals are backing their cause, offering food, legal advice and moral support.Tharaphi Than, Associate Professor, Department of World Cultures and Languages, Northern Illinois UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1548882021-02-18T14:35:24Z2021-02-18T14:35:24ZThe quest to identify Fela’s successor: why it’s time to end it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/384021/original/file-20210212-23-18mv752.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Femi Kuti performing in Mexico City in 2019.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Pedro Gonzalez Castillo/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It’s nearly a quarter of a century since Fela Kuti passed <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1997/08/04/arts/fela-58-dissident-nigerian-musician-dies.html">away</a>. Yet, the influence of his music and pan-Africanist thoughts hasn’t stopped. Fela was notorious for the deployment of his Afrobeat as a critical tool against human rights violations, social injustice and insensitive cum inept leadership in Africa. And the conversation as to who best fits the profile of a successor has continued unabated. </p>
<p>Many Nigerian artists have gone as far as naming themselves as the reincarnation of Fela. From Dede Mabiaku’s endless references to his closeness to the Abami Eda – the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2018/7/15/how-fela-kuti-came-to-be-celebrated-by-those-he-sang-against">name Fela gave himself</a> – a Yoruba phrase that roughly translates to “the strange one” – and Chief Priest, to <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/08/charly-boy-blasts-pastors/">Charles ‘Charly Boy’ Oputa’s antics</a>, a few have pretended to be made of the sort of defiant stuff at Fela’s core. </p>
<p>Musically, <a href="https://www.czech.radio/node/5230887">Eedris Abdulkareem’s</a> success with the 2004 hit ‘Jaga Jaga’ appeared to have instigated a Fela complex in him to the point that he got Fela’s eldest son Femi Kuti’s saxophone support to legitimise his tribute in the <a href="https://za.pinterest.com/pin/316307573799878914/">single titled ‘Fela’ (2013)</a>. </p>
<p>There have been several other musical tributes to the memory of Fela. These have included Seyi Sodimu’s remarkable ‘Fela the King’ (2002) and W4’s rather cheesy ‘Like fada, Like son’ (2012). Beyond these, pop-inclined artistes have sought to appropriate different features of the great musician’s legacy. This has included drawing from the rich repertoire of Fela’s ensemble in embellishing their works, particularly over the last <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00020184.2020.1750349">decade</a>.</p>
<p>Yet, undoubtedly the most powerful of the tributes to Fela is ‘’97’ (2001) which was recorded and performed by Femi Kuti, himself an accomplished Afrobeat star. </p>
<p>A great deal of work has been done on protest music in Nigeria. But, in my view, studies have been reticent in appreciating the works of Femi. </p>
<p>I set about to fill this gap. In my <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/21681392.2020.1810085?journalCode=rcaf20">study</a>, I look at Femi’s music through the framework of a re-democratised Nigeria and I invariably draw equivalents with Fela’s works which constituted a major alternative voice through military-ruled Nigeria.</p>
<p>I conclude that, to source for a Fela successor outside the direct lineage of his family is to court the ridiculous – that is if there is any need to source for a Fela successor to begin with. </p>
<h2>Protest music under military rule</h2>
<p>Previous <a href="https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198804307.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780198804307-e-24">research</a> showed that Femi’s consciousness through art had begun during military dictatorship in Nigeria. Songs like ‘Wonder Wonder’ (1995), ‘Plenty Nonsense’ (1995), ‘Nawa’ (1995), ‘Stubborn Problem’ (1995), ‘Sorry Sorry’ (1998), ‘What Will Tomorrow Bring’ (1998), and ‘Victim of Life’ (1998) are standouts from Femi’s catalogue during that particularly dark era.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Man singing into a microphone." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/384413/original/file-20210216-18-8y22rh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/384413/original/file-20210216-18-8y22rh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384413/original/file-20210216-18-8y22rh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384413/original/file-20210216-18-8y22rh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384413/original/file-20210216-18-8y22rh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384413/original/file-20210216-18-8y22rh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384413/original/file-20210216-18-8y22rh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Fela Kuti performing on stage.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Michael Putland/Getty Images</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The <a href="https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198804307.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780198804307-e-24">same study</a> posited that Fela was not the only popular musician who confronted the military and tyrannous leaders of Nigeria between independence in 1960 and Fela’s passing in 1997. </p>
<p>The study discussed the protest contributions by reggae, highlife and other Afrobeat stars during the same period. These included Sonny Okosuns, Tunji Oyelana, Wole Soyinka, Victor Essiet and The Mandators, Majek Fashek, Ras Kimono, Lagbaja and Osayomore Joseph.</p>
<p>Femi Kuti’s protest credentials spans across both military-ruled and democratic Nigeria. My research further found that hip hop has constituted an accomplice to Femi Kuti’s work having served as a veritable vehicle in speaking truth to power in Nigeria since re-democratisation in 1999. Contrary to its critics’ claims, hip hop culture in Nigeria isn’t always about hedonism and the objectification of women. </p>
<p>Kuti himself featured American hip hop acts Mos Def and Common on ‘Do Your Best’ and ‘Missing Link’ off 2001’s Fight to Win album. </p>
<h2>Blood is indeed thicker than water</h2>
<p>A review of Femi Kuti’s discography from 1989’s No Cause for Alarm to 2018’s One People One World shows that through all ten albums spanning about 30 years, Femi is undoubtedly the most prolific creator of protest music in Nigeria. Add to this the maturation of his first son Omorinmade Kuti. Now 23 years old, he released his debut single ‘Free Your Mind’ in 2020 to respectable acclaim in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/music/2021/feb/05/femi-kuti-and-made-kuti-legacy-plus-review">the Afrobeat genre</a>.</p>
<p>Omorinmade who has grown to become an Afrobeat artist in his own right under his father’s watch, makes it even clearer that Femi’s proximity to the title of a Fela successor is rivalled by none. </p>
<p>Yet, there are no signs that the family plans to rest on past laurels. A new release, Legacy+, is out. A double record comprising Femi’s Stop the Hate (his 11th album) and Omorinmade’s debut, For(e)ward, it links three generations of the Kuti <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/music/2021/jan/31/different-beat-fela-kuti-femi-made-afrobeat-nigeria-legacy">dynasty</a>. </p>
<p>Through Legacy+, we find a deliberate merging of Fela’s legend, Femi’s unrelenting struggle and Omorinmade’s forging on through youthful and possibly futuristic Afrobeat.</p>
<p>The sole caveat to this chain is that Fela’s last son Seun Kuti, also an Afrobeat artist, presents the public space in Nigeria with the most cerebral viewpoints of any artist at the present time. Following the #EndSARS protests, Seun has flown kites on the possibility of relaunching his father’s Movement of the People, a political party through which Fela attempted to run for Nigeria’s presidency during the Second Republic. </p>
<p>The truth is that no artist through Nigeria’s postcolonial years has contributed close to what Fela did – and continues to do - for human rights and social justice. Appreciation must of course follow the efforts of Charly Boy, Eedris Abdulkareem, Dede Mabiaku, Lagbaja and Wole <a href="https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198804307.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780198804307-e-24">Soyinka</a>. But, musically and otherwise, only <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/sep/08/gani-fawehinmi-obituary">Gani Fawehinmi</a>, the late human rights lawyer, holds the semblance of a record anywhere in the neighbourhood of the organic consistency for the betterment of Nigerian lives close to Fela’s.</p>
<p>To put it simply, I re-assert the words of singer and song-writer Seyi Sodinmu: </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/zgSfTrxWHjY?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<blockquote>
<p>There will never be another Fela</p>
<p>Fela was the King</p>
<p>The King of our music</p>
<p>Oh what a King</p>
<p>The King of Kalakuta</p>
<p>Oh what a King…</p>
<p>From a shrine in Lagos, he gave us his music</p>
<p>The music of our lives</p>
<p>The music of our time</p>
<p>The awesome musician</p>
<p>A master composer</p>
<p>Songs of redemption</p>
<p>The fighter of oppression</p>
<p>The pride of Nigeria</p>
<p>The African superstar</p>
<p>Fela!</p>
<p>There will never be another Fela.</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/154888/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Garhe Osiebe does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The truth remains that no artist through Nigeria’s postcolonial years has contributed close to what Fela did – and continues to do - for human rights and social justice.Garhe Osiebe, Research Fellow, Rhodes UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1243062019-10-01T14:38:35Z2019-10-01T14:38:35ZLagos’s chequered history: how it came to be the megacity it is today<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/294788/original/file-20190930-194866-1xzz818.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Lagos was affected positively and negatively by Nigeria’s emergence as a crude oil producer in the 1970s.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Lagos was an orderly urban environment 70 years ago. This was the case from the 1950s, when the city was a federal territory through to the 1960s when it became federal capital – a status it held until 1991.</p>
<p>The foundations of orderliness for any city are planning and management. Lagos had this in place in the early days. The city was governed by an elected Lagos City Council, Nigeria’s oldest, established in 1900. It was governed according to colonial legislation, particularly the 1948 Building Line regulations and the <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/afrrev/article/viewFile/72352/61280">1957 Public Health Law</a>.</p>
<p>The city was much smaller and was made up of Lagos Island (Eko) which included Ikoyi and Obalende neighbourhoods. It was a beautiful environment that featured Portuguese, Brazilian, and British Victorian architecture. Its <a href="http://repository.londonmet.ac.uk/57">streets were clean and tree-lined</a>. Urban crime was virtually non-existent.</p>
<p>Governance standards declined when political control of Lagos, and the rest of Nigeria, came under military rule between 1966 and 1979 and again from 1984 to 1999. Proximity of the two capitals – federal and state, respectively – in the Ikoyi and Ikeja neighbourhoods of the same conurbation, put more pressure on the city. In the 1970s the city expanded to link up previously distinct areas such as Ikeja, Mushin, Orile, Ojo, Oshodi and Agege.</p>
<p>The result was increased pollution, congestion and wear on infrastructure. This was particularly true between 1970 and 1991.</p>
<p>But things have changed. Efforts have been made to revitalise the city in terms of a cleaner and greener environment, improved road and water infrastructure, urban bus system and waste management, overhaul of security and consultation with citizens through town hall meetings. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, big challenges remain. The city still has far too many slums and squatter settlements, it lacks a functioning public transportation system, proper traffic management, efficient waste disposal, sanitation, adequate potable water supply and routine road maintenance. </p>
<p>Lagos also suffers because of problems that afflict the country. There isn’t regular electricity supply, and there are high rates of poverty and unemployment. And, as elsewhere in the country, many residents don’t comply with laws on building, traffic and sanitation.</p>
<h2>The history</h2>
<p>Lagos was affected positively as well as negatively by Nigeria’s 1970s emergence as a major crude oil producer.</p>
<p>On the upside, there was investment in infrastructure. This included the building of the second bridge linking the Island, the Eko Bridge, and re-building of the first (colonial) Carter Bridge. The third and longest bridge was commissioned in 1990. </p>
<p>These bridges were aimed at improving accessibility between the two islands (Victoria and Lagos) and the mainland. But, uncontrolled commercial development on the islands has produced persistent traffic bottlenecks. This has been worsened by the lack of a public transport system.</p>
<p>Two developments added to pressures on the city. Its population burgeoned while infrastructure lagged behind. This period marked the beginning of the decline of planning for the city. The worst periods were the late 1980s and the 1990s. As architects Rem Koolhaas and Kunle Adeyemi <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2016/feb/26/lagos-rem-koolhaas-kunle-adeyemi">noted</a> in an interview, these were Lagos’ darkest times:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Lagos, in the 1990s, was the ultimate dysfunctional city and an example of what happens to a society where the state is absent. At that point the state had really withdrawn from Lagos; the city was left to its own devices, both in terms of money and services. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The city was <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/afrrev/article/view/67310">being governed</a> by the military. But it was not cut out for governance, had no accountability and couldn’t care less about planning and environmental issues. As a result it routinely disregarded existing regulations.</p>
<p>In the 1990s, for instance, the largest public park in Lagos – the old, colonial 10-hectare Victoria Park in Ikoyi – <a href="https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/real-estate/little-spaces-make-big-difference-in-megacity-lagos">was sold </a> as residential development land. The waterfront of the Lagos Cowrie Creek in Victoria Island was also sold for commercial development, effectively blocking direct public access to the waters and a picturesque view of Ikoyi.</p>
<p>The collapse of zoning all over Lagos also led to residential neighbourhoods such as Victoria Island and southwest Ikoyi being converted for commercial use. The military had no reasoned response to Lagos’ urban challenges. Instead, it took the decision in 1975 to establish a new capital in <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Abuja-national-capital-Nigeria">Abuja</a>. </p>
<p>This move, which finally came to fruition in December 1991, left Lagos forlorn.</p>
<h2>The positives</h2>
<p><a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2015/01/12/governing-lagos-unlocking-politics-of-reform">Positive changes</a> have taken place.</p>
<p>For example, over the past 15 years the authorities succeeded in raising more taxes using money to restore basic infrastructure, expand public services and strengthen law enforcement.</p>
<p><a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2015/01/12/governing-lagos-unlocking-politics-of-reform">Research</a> shows that the commitment to reform the city was driven by electoral pressures as well as elite ambitions to construct an orderly megacity. The return to democracy helped to make these changes possible by enabling an elected government to work in the people’s interest.</p>
<p>Improvements includes public transport and the reclamation and greening of previously disused and misused spaces below Lagos’s many flyovers, bridges and interchanges. In addition, roads have been fixed and pavements built. In some parts of the city there is potable water supply and blighted residential and commercial areas have been rebuilt.</p>
<p>But, given decades of neglect, a great deal still needs to be done. </p>
<h2>What’s broken</h2>
<p>One of the biggest problems is <a href="https://ng.boell.org/2018/09/25/urban-planning-processes-lagos">the lack of coherent and integrated development </a>.</p>
<p>Another major issue is flooding which Bongo Adi, a Lagos based environmental expert <a href="https://guardian.ng/opinion/the-poverty-of-lagos-urban-planning/">argues</a>, hasn’t been decisively tackled. </p>
<p>Nor have improvements over the past decade impressed everyone. As Femi Akintunde <a href="http://www.financialnigeria.com/the-blind-sides-of-governance-in-lagos-blog-215.html">argues,</a> Lagos remains deplorable, rowdy, unsanitary, and a city of the urban poor. Akintunde is the managing editor and CEO of Financial Nigeria International Limited.</p>
<p>Lagos still <a href="https://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=Liveability17">ranks low</a> on liveability. Its governance <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2015/01/12/governing-lagos-unlocking-politics-of-reform">deficits</a> are acutely felt by the poor, but also touch wealthier residents.</p>
<p>For these issues to be fixed, the standard of governance has to improve.</p>
<h2>Who should run the city?</h2>
<p>There are two potential authorities: Lagos state, sitting at the top, and the municipal authorities which interact with the grassroots. </p>
<p>The problem is that Lagos city isn’t really run by the city authorities. But effective urban governance should be “bottom-up”, making it possible for the people to take increasingly greater control over their lives. </p>
<p>In addition, being run from the top means that local capacity is being stunted. This has implications for sustainable change. As international fellow at International Institute for Environment and Development Jorgelina Hardoy <a href="https://www.iied.org/wanted-more-inclusive-resilient-sustainable-cities">says</a>,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>sustainable development in cities largely depends on the actions and capacity of local governments.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Whoever takes charge should recognise <a href="http://www.financialnigeria.com/the-blind-sides-of-governance-in-lagos-blog-215.html">the necessity of getting</a> residents’ buy-in before implementing modernisation policies. The city can’t develop by leaving its people behind. </p>
<p>Also, city planners should not plan for only the rich to the exclusion of the poor and disadvantaged. While accepting that slums and informal settlements have to be tackled, <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325264101_broken_lives_and_broken_limbs-An_evaluation_of_slum_clearances_and_forced_evictions_in_metropolitan_Lagos">my research</a> recommends a policy rethink that should involve</p>
<blockquote>
<p>enabling strategies which fully address the rights of people who are illegally settled on public land.</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/124306/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ndubisi Onwuanyi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The foundations of orderliness for any city are planning and management. Lagos had this in place in the early days.Ndubisi Onwuanyi, Lecturer, University of BeninLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1166762019-05-14T13:45:45Z2019-05-14T13:45:45ZHow using the military in Nigeria is causing, not solving problems<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/274086/original/file-20190513-183109-kdftrh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Soldiers patrol the Nigerian city of Jos, in the central Plateu State, in a bid to quell religious violence.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/George Esiri</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Governments have a responsibility to protect their citizens against external aggression and internal violence. The first is usually the responsibility of the military. The second duty falls on the police.</p>
<p>But in Nigeria, the government <a href="https://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/104931">often deploys </a> the military to restore order and to keep the peace. This is largely due to the inability of the police to contain violent conflicts, particularly in areas where armed groups are active.</p>
<p>This is the situation in Jos, the capital of Plateau State in the centre of Nigeria, just north of the administrative capital Abuja. The military has been <a href="https://academicjournals.org/article/article1381854533_Ambe-Uva.pdf">used</a> to maintain security since violence broke out between Christians and Muslims in September 2001. </p>
<p>The violence has <a href="http://www.omct.org/pdf/Nigeriareport0802.pdf">evolved</a> into one of the <a href="https://www.iiste.org/Journals/index.php/RHSS/article/view/14330/14638">most enduring conflicts</a> in Nigeria. Initially, angry young people used crude implements such as axes, sticks and machetes. Now various organised ethnic and religious militias wield <a href="https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/assets/HomePage/ODAPublications/AdhocPublications/PDF/Small_Arms_2008.pdf">small arms and light weapons</a>. The conflict has spilled over into most parts of the state, with a pattern of hit-and-run attacks developing. </p>
<p>Several <a href="https://www.mcser.org/journal/index.php/mjss/article/view/5210">studies</a> have indicated support the use of the military as a “necessary evil” to ensure the return to peace in the region. </p>
<p>But my <a href="https://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/104931">study</a> found that using the military to quell internal conflicts and restore order causes several problems. These included undermining the legitimacy of the military mission, as well as failing to quell the violence. In my PhD thesis I concluded that the conduct of soldiers only worsens the security situation for ordinary people. </p>
<p>I identified two factors as responsible for the problems. The first was a lack of military professionalism. Soldiers often intimidate and coerce civilians. They also engage in corruption and extortion, especially at military checkpoints. Some soldiers also subject civilians to psychological and emotional abuse. Yet others engage in blatant and flagrant acts of sexual and gender-based violence.</p>
<p>The second factor I identified was the fact that the command-and-control structure of the military is at odds with the way society operates. </p>
<p>These problems could be addressed with effective civil control of the military. But the study argues that civil control is weak in the country.</p>
<h2>The use of the military</h2>
<p>The response of the Nigerian government to growing levels of insecurity has increasingly been to use the military. Several peace and security conferences and commissions of inquiry have been instituted. But these yielded little or no result due to the lack of political will by the government to implement the <a href="https://socialscienceresearch.org/index.php/GJHSS/article/view/888">recommendations</a>.</p>
<p>The military has been deployed because of the weaknesses and inadequacies of the Nigerian police. Inadequate training, shortage of manpower as well as policing equipment, coupled with <a href="http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?eid=2-s2.0-84892850004&partnerID=40&md5=0a75634ab0792627523e16739e0cbca4">excesses</a> have added to the erosion of public trust in the police and their <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/30225922">legitimacy</a>. </p>
<p>But the use of the military has introduced a host of new problems. </p>
<p>In my study I set out to understand whether the Nigerian state is exercising adequate civil control of the military to ensure that it doesn’t become a threat to the citizenry and exacerbate insecurity. I conducted 55 one-on-one interviews with civilians in six local government areas in Plateau State. </p>
<p>The study found that civilians see the military as exacerbating insecurity. For example, increased militarisation has led to people’s movements and activities being <a href="http://arabianjbmr.com/pdfs/JPDS_VOL_9_1/9.pdf">severely restricted</a>. And several emergency rules have been declared. These have involved suspending civilian government and replacing it with military administrators. </p>
<p>Another finding was that dereliction of duty is rife among soldiers, with some choosing which distress calls from citizens to respond to or not. </p>
<p>On top of this, there’s tension between military culture and civilian values. The <a href="https://g.co/kgs/rwrH9s">military</a> operates a culture which follows an authoritarian leadership style, and is combat-focused. For their part, civilians are more likely to seek resolution to issues and to use the criminal justice system to adjudicate problems.</p>
<p>This has led to relations between civilians and the military becoming severely strained.</p>
<h2>Lack of civil control</h2>
<p>A bigger problem is the weak civil control over the Nigerian military. This has led to a lack of accountability and compliance with rules of engagement. </p>
<p>Nigerian law subordinates the military to civil control and parliamentary oversight. Ideally, this should ensure that the military acts within its mission and mandate. But, the problem lies with implementation. The culture of civilian supremacy over the military is not as yet <a href="https://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/104931">well institutionalised</a>. </p>
<p>The result is that citizens counteract abuse by the military in various ways. One way is to simply comply with the demands and orders of the soldiers, even when they are illegitimate. Another entails non-violent resistance or non-compliance. For example, it’s common for civilians to refuse to cooperate and share information with the military.</p>
<p>A third way is to collaborate with compromised soldiers. The fourth is to use various forms of violent resistance. This involves people either aligning with armed groups, or forming their own. This proliferation of armed groups worsens insecurity. </p>
<p>My study also showed a sharp difference of opinions between people of different religions. Christians contended that the military was biased in favour of Muslims. For their part, Muslims didn’t share this view. </p>
<h2>What needs to happen</h2>
<p>The use of the military is not an effective intervention against internal armed conflict. This is especially so in states with weak institutional control over the military as is the case in Nigeria.</p>
<p>The more recent setting up of a peace building <a href="http://www.plateaupeacebuilding.org/">agency</a> is a more plausible alternative towards bringing the violent conflict to an end through effective mediation and peace education. The use of the military needs to be reconsidered and the peace building agency should focus on reuniting people and bridging the gap between the reactive security measures with proactive conflict prevention strategies. This is the only way in which trust and relative peace can be restored in this once peaceful Nigerian state.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/116676/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sallek Yaks Musa received funding from Lisa Maskell Fellowship of the Gerda Henkel Foundation in Germany as administered by the the Graduate School of Arts and Social Sciences, Stellenbosch University and the Social Science Research Council’s Next Generation Social Sciences in Africa. He is affiliated with the Jos Stakeholders Center for Peace Collaborative of the Search for Common Ground, Nigeria.</span></em></p>In Nigeria, the government often uses the army to restore order and to keep the peace, largely because the police are unable to contain internal violent conflicts.Sallek Yaks Musa, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1154702019-04-15T14:59:34Z2019-04-15T14:59:34ZSudan can avoid past mistakes by drawing lessons from its history<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/269284/original/file-20190415-147522-1xxg51n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Leader of Sudan's transitional council, Lieutenant General Abdel-Fattah Burhan</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/STRINGER</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A military coup d’etat in Sudan <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-sudans-protesters-upped-the-ante-and-forced-al-bashir-from-power-115306">has ended</a> Omar al-Bashir’s 30-year rule. </p>
<p>This is the sixth coup the country’s military have led <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14095300">since</a> independence in 1956. The military were pressured into the coup by the country’s third major civilian uprising. Historically, the two most famous uprisings were the October Revolution of 1964, which ushered out Sudan’s first military regime, and the April Intifada of 1985, which ousted the second.</p>
<p>As in the 1985 uprising, the military maintain that they are siding with a popular uprising. A Transitional Military Council has been formed and its leadership maintains that it’s committed to bringing back a civil state and multi-party democracy.</p>
<p>But there’s still <a href="https://rakobanews.com/sudan-news/sudan-now/13195/">considerable scepticism</a> towards the new military leaders. Protesters continue their sit in outside army headquarters, which originally began nine days ago when they demanded the army support the movement against al-Bashir. They <a href="https://rakobanews.com/sudan-news/sudan-now/13190/">now fear</a> the army may use force to break it up. </p>
<p>The continuing protests have forced the Transitional Military Council to change its leader once already. And there are worrying signs that the transition to civilian rule will not be smooth. </p>
<p>There is a real risk that a trend which emerged during the last two transitional periods of 1964 - 1965 and 1985 - 1986 will be repeated. On both occasions key rebel groups didn’t participate in the negotiations. This meant that negotiated settlements of the country’s broader conflicts were doomed from the get go. </p>
<p>The other danger is the military’s future role. Key here will be the relationship between the new military transition council and the civilian leaders of the Intifada. </p>
<p>Sudan has seen this movie play out before. In 1985, Siwar al-Dahab became chairman of a transitional military council after he had ousted President Gaafar Nimeiry in a coup. After elections, he surrendered power to prime minister Sadiq al-Mahdi. </p>
<p>Siwar al-Dahab, relatively unambitious but politically conservative, played on divides between the political parties and the professionals, and between left-leaning and Islamist-leaning factions in the professional movement. The result was that the Intifada failed to achieve a number of its aspirations for more meaningful social transformation.</p>
<p>It’s crucial that the professionals and other political forces do not allow the same issues that divided them in 1985 to divide them today. This could play into the hands of the factions in the military that want to maintain the authoritarian system which <a href="https://qz.com/africa/615938/sudan-could-spend-up-to-70-of-its-budget-on-several-war-fronts-this-year/">awarded</a> the majority of the government’s budget to the security sector.</p>
<h2>The principal players</h2>
<p>Events since al-Bashir was forced out suggest there’s still a lot left to play for. </p>
<p>Lieutenant General Ahmed Awad Ibn Auf was named as al-Bashir’s replacement. But he was forced to <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-47913338">step down</a> after just one day as protesters regarded him as too close to al-Bashir’s regime. </p>
<p>General Abdel-Fattah Burhan then took over the military council, immediately promising to <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-47918736">“uproot”</a> al-Bashir’s regime. He also promised to hand over power to civilians after a two year transition period.</p>
<p>Burhan, a soldier by profession, has never previously taken any political positions. His role in the army included responsibility for Sudan’s operations alongside the Saudi led coalition in <a href="https://www.sudanakhbar.com/488615">Yemen</a>. He also has close ties to the Transitional Military Council’s new deputy leader Mohammad Hamdan aka Himeidti, who helped him remove al-Bashir from power. </p>
<p>Himeidti is the commander of the <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/5a0d6be54.html">Rapid Support Forces</a>, a private military force which was <a href="https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/background-who-are-the-rapid-support-forces-in-sudan">partially</a> integrated into the military and security services. The unit is <a href="https://enoughproject.org/reports/janjaweed-reincarnate-sudans-new-army-war-criminals">regarded</a> by many as a re-branded version of the Janjaweed militias of which Himeidti was himself a part. These perpetrated mass atrocities during the government’s counter-insurgency against the rebel movement in Darfur from 2003. </p>
<p>How the leaders of the Darfur rebel factions react to Himeidti’s involvement will be crucial to the viability of any transitional government Burhan leads. </p>
<p>Equally important is who comes out on top in the current contest over key ministerial posts.</p>
<h2>Control of ministries</h2>
<p>The Transitional Military Council has demanded that it’s represented in both the <a href="https://rakobanews.com/sudan-news/sudan-now/13056/">interior and defence</a> ministries. </p>
<p>Care needs to be taken on these appointments. Whoever controls these ministries will be in a position to determine the fate of the deeply entrenched, and <a href="https://enoughproject.org/reports/sudans-deep-state-how-insiders-violently-privatized-sudans-wealth-and-how-respond">highly corrupt</a>, military and security complex established by al-Bashir and his Islamist allies. </p>
<p>It’s also crucial that any new technocratic cabinet is not seen as being biased towards one political group or set of interests. </p>
<p>Historically there has been a great deal of crossover between prominent professional unions and the political parties. Particularly with regards to lawyers, doctors and university lecturers who <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/civil-uprisings-in-modern-sudan-9781472574015/">played</a> a prominent role in the forerunner of today’s Sudan Professional Association.</p>
<p>In 1964, many of the professionals who participated in the first transitional cabinet <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/civil-uprisings-in-modern-sudan-9781472574015/">were members or sympathisers</a> of the Sudan Communist Party. In 1985, a good number of them sympathised to a greater or lesser extent with <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/civil-uprisings-in-modern-sudan-9781472574015/">political Islam</a>. </p>
<p>During the uprising the Sudan Professional Association has been good at not making its affiliations clear. But as it becomes more public – and members engage in talks and join transitional bodies – there will inevitably be considerable speculation as to its sympathies.</p>
<h2>Representation of marginalised groups</h2>
<p>The new cabinet should also take two other issues on board: women’s representation and regional representation.</p>
<p>Previous transitional cabinets have been very male dominated. This needs to change, particularly given the <a href="https://www.vox.com/world/2019/4/11/18305358/omar-al-bashir-sudan-president-military-coup-protests-women">enormous</a> presence of women on the streets during this uprising. </p>
<p>Regional representation is also key. There’s a real risk that the trend from the last two transitional periods continues. Then, political forces based in the riverain north negotiated the transition to democracy and rebels did not participate in the interim governments. This meant that the war in the periphery continued, as did the regional inequalities that fed it. </p>
<p>Then it was the southern-based rebels that were sidelined during the transitional process. Now it could be those who have taken up arms in the West of the country.</p>
<p>It’s crucial that both east, west and the new south – and particularly the groups targeted by the regime’s lethal counter-insurgencies – are given fair representation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/115470/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Willow Berridge does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There are concerns that the transition to civilian rule in Sudan won’t be smooth.Willow Berridge, Lecturer in History, Newcastle UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/985032018-07-24T13:35:49Z2018-07-24T13:35:49ZPakistan elections: weak government will allow army to keep pulling the strings<p>On one level, 2018’s elections in Pakistan look like a chance to further embed the country’s democracy. They herald the country’s second transition of power from one elected civilian-led government to another, and may see a change in the party heading the government – two key measures of a successful democratic transition.</p>
<p>Large numbers of new voters are registered – <a href="https://tribune.com.pk/story/1704041/6-politics-resentment-elections-2018/">about 22m</a> – and 16% of them are <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1409842">25 or under</a>. Social media is <a href="https://en.dailypakistan.com.pk/pakistan/pml-ns-jamal-leghari-grilled-by-constituents-for-no-show-as-lawmaker/">empowering voters</a>, helping them hold their representatives to account. Meanwhile, a corrupt former prime minister has been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/06/former-pakistani-leader-nawaz-sharif-sentenced-to-10-years-in-jail">imprisoned</a> for ten years, a demonstration of the rule of law in action.</p>
<p>But this apparently rosy picture conceals an important reality: these elections are far from a level playing field, and Pakistan’s institutions are far from transparent.</p>
<p>For a democracy to thrive, the rule of law must be upheld – but in Pakistan, the law is too often applied selectively. While the Sharif family will have certainly come under pressure over the <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5878097/Former-prime-minister-Pakistan-sons-ploughed-millions-Londons-swankiest-addresses.html">London apartments</a> they have reportedly purchased, few can dispute that they’re being singled out for punishment.</p>
<p>It’s widely believed that Nawaz Sharif is being punished by the <a href="http://www.thefridaytimes.com/tft/the-plot/">military establishment</a> for his outspoken criticism <a href="https://thewire.in/politics/nawaz-sharif-pakistan-dawn">of the army</a>, and that his ten-year prison sentence was designed to remove an effective campaigner from the campaign trail. His daughter and <a href="https://herald.dawn.com/news/1153881">heir apparent</a>, Maryam, was also sentenced to seven years in prison for abetting her father. To compound the situation, on the day that the Sharifs were returning to Pakistan, hundreds of supporters of their party, the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) or PML-N, were <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/07/12/sharif-loyalists-arrested-former-pm-returns-appeal-conviction/">rounded up</a> and arrested.</p>
<p>That much of the PML-N leadership has been selectively targeted can be demonstrated by the authorities’ inaction against other politicians with longstanding corruption allegations against them, including the former president, Asif Ali Zardari, of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). One commentator <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1419328/the-plot-thickens">argued</a> that this inaction was “to stop the PPP joining hands with the PML-N when Nawaz Sharif was ousted and put on trial on corruption charges”.</p>
<p>When civilian parties are united against military interference in Pakistan, it is harder for the military’s wishes to prevail, as was seen during <a href="https://theconversation.com/shadow-of-military-looms-large-over-pakistan-street-protests-31132">Imran Khan’s protests</a> in Islamabad in September 2014. The success of the military’s divide-and-rule strategy was revealed in Zardari’s willingness to <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1405924">go into coalition</a> with Khan’s PTI in May this year.</p>
<h2>The side of the angels</h2>
<p>The army, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-politics-language/aliens-and-angels-euphemisms-mask-pakistani-election-fears-idUSKCN1J21UV">euphemistically</a> known as the “angels”, has made its presence known mostly by pressuring candidates to <a href="https://www.economist.com/asia/2018/06/21/pakistans-army-is-using-every-trick-to-sideline-nawaz-sharif">defect</a> from the PML-N, often using the threat of corruption charges. This pressure has been particularly notable in the south of Pakistan’s most populous province, Punjab, which returns the majority of seats to the National Assembly.</p>
<p>Many of these candidates are now standing as independents, using the <a href="https://tribune.com.pk/story/1750245/1-why-all-the-fuss-about-jeeps/">“jeep”</a> symbol on the ballot paper. Independents in Pakistan have the choice of joining the governing party after the election; in 2013 Sharif’s PML-N did not win an overall majority of seats until the independents decided to join its ranks after the results were declared. This year, these same independents are likely to be pivotal in the formation of a new government after the vote, as are religious parties such as the newly formed <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-pakistan-politics-islamists/inspired-by-blasphemy-killer-new-pakistani-party-eyes-2018-vote-idUKKCN1BV29N">Tehrik-e-Labaik</a>.</p>
<h2>Chilling effect</h2>
<p>Finally, the media has come under <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-44693968">pressure</a> during the campaign. It’s impossible to ignore the <a href="https://dailytimes.com.pk/230937/a-season-of-self-censorship-confessions-of-an-editor-at-large/">self censorship</a> of many journalists and the overt pressure put on media groups such as Dawn and Geo. At the beginning of June, journalist Gul Bukhari, a prominent critic of the army and its role in Pakistan, was <a href="https://tribune.com.pk/story/1728710/1-columnist-gul-bukhari-abducted-lahore/">abducted</a>. Although she was released hours later, her abduction served as a salutary warning to journalists of the danger of not toeing the line of the security services.</p>
<p>The effect of censorship has been most apparent in the (non)reporting of the demands of the <a href="https://dailytimes.com.pk/249627/pakistanis-deserve-to-know-about-ptm/">Pashtun Tahafuz Movement</a>, a youth movement protesting against disappearances and abductions that’s been particularly critical of the army. With the mainstream media variously censored and cowed, social media has kept the movement alive.</p>
<p>At the time of writing, the election result is too close to call. It’s unlikely that one party will be able to win a majority of seats. With Sharif removed from the campaign trail, the PML-N has been deprived of its star performer, but his incarceration may well inspire many voters to support the party. Khan’s PTI will perform much better than it did in 2013, but will it be enough to break the PML-N’s electoral hold on central and northern Punjab?</p>
<p>One thing is certain: a weak coalition government, whether led by the PTI or by the PML-N, would suit the military – and a divided parliament will only boost its ability to manage affairs from behind the scenes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/98503/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Katharine Adeney does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There are no angels in Pakistan’s political scene – except the ‘angels’ of the military.Katharine Adeney, Professor of Politics and Director of the University of Nottingham Asia Research Institute, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/973002018-06-21T12:31:45Z2018-06-21T12:31:45ZNigeria is not ready to hold free and fair elections next year. Here’s why<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/223995/original/file-20180620-137741-t2n3ul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Members of Nigeria's All Progressives Congress party protest the 2015 elections. More trouble is likely ahead of the 2019 elections.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Tife Owolabi</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The 2019 presidential elections in Nigeria will be the country’s sixth since 1999, when it shifted to democracy after a long period of military rule. Most of these elections have been tarnished by acts of violence – including attacks on politicians – and vote rigging <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/nigeria">often influences the results</a>. </p>
<p>In the past, election violence has been blamed on a lack of education among citizens, poverty, the long history of military rule and <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0974928417749639">corruption</a>. However, political patronage is also to blame in a country where power and state resources are often <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09592318.2018.1403744?needAccess=true">exploited for personal use by office holders</a>. The <a href="https://www.stearsng.com/article/scramble-for-the-national-cake">scramble for the “national cake”</a> by the political elite is often the real reason for many politicians’ do-or-die attitude. </p>
<p>Such was the case when the former president, General Olusegun Obasanjo declared in 2007 that the April elections would be a <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/200702110015.html">do-or-die affair</a> for the country and his ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP). The election was marred by <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2007/04/25/nigeria-presidential-election-marred-fraud-violence">fraud and violence</a>.</p>
<p>With the 2019 elections less than a year away, Nigeria’s ability to hold free and fair elections is open to question. Of particular concern are the security threats posed by the Boko Haram insurgency and clashes between farmers and herdsmen in northern Nigeria. There is also a threat posed by the arming of rival political supporters. Finally, there is the lack of election financing regulations which leaves the door open for patronage networks to fund campaigns using public funds.</p>
<h2>Boko Haram problem</h2>
<p>Although the government claimed to have <a href="http://www.pulse.ng/bi/politics/technically-defeated-boko-haram-carried-out-135-attacks-id7837805.html">“technically defeated”</a> Boko Haram in December 2015, the armed group was still able to carry out 135 attacks in 2017, five times higher than the 2016 number of attacks. The insurgents most recently killed at least <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/06/dozens-killed-suspected-boko-haram-attack-nigeria-180617105120520.html">31 people</a> in twin bomb blasts targeting people returning from Eid celebrations in Borno state. </p>
<p>The insurgency, which has <a href="http://www.nan.ng/news/boko-haram-insurgency-affects-14m-people/">affected 14 million </a> Nigerians, resulting in 1.7 million being displaced, still poses a significant threat in the north-east. In 2015 elections, the Boko Haram threat affected elections in many parts of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/28/millions-vote-in-nigeria-elections-hit-by-islamist-attacks-and-technology-issues">northern Nigeria</a>. If the threat is not significantly contained, it poses a threat to free and fair elections next year. </p>
<h2>New threats</h2>
<p>Apart from the Boko Haram insurgency, several states in Nigeria, such as Benue, Taraba and Nasarawa, have witnessed violent clashes between herdsmen and farmers in recent years. Although this was not an issue in previous elections, the intensity of the clashes has <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-clashes-are-on-the-rise-between-farmers-and-herdsmen-in-the-sahel-95554">increased tremendously</a>. There have been 716 clashes and thousands of deaths recorded in the country since 2012. </p>
<p>In the same way Boko Haram was the primary campaign issue prior to 2015 elections, the clashes between herdsmen and farmers pose an election risk. Several opposition political parties have already seized on the insecurity as a campaign rallying point. Violent clashes could potentially ensue if the security situation is not addressed before the elections.</p>
<p>The proliferation of arms prior to elections also remains a huge threat. Since the 2003 elections, the <a href="http://www.inecnigeria.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Conference-Paper-by-Gani-Yoroms.pdf">arming of supporters</a> has become an election tool. </p>
<p>As seen in previous elections, political patronage is often behind the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09592318.2018.1403744?needAccess=true">formation of insurgent groups towards the time of elections</a>. Politicians have been known to arm youths prior to elections in order to <a href="http://punchng.com/blame-politicians-police-for-arms-proliferation-group/">seek undue advantage</a> over their political opponents. </p>
<p>Indeed, former Nigerian vice president Atiku Abubakar claimed to have <a href="https://www.dailytrust.com.ng/news/politics/i-warned-governors-against-giving-youth-guns-atiku/96660.html">personally warned</a> some state governors against arming youths prior to elections. </p>
<h2>Campaign finance</h2>
<p>Political patronage extends to the crucial factor of election funding. Previous elections have been marked by allegations of <a href="https://www.omicsonline.org/open-access/political-party-financing-and-corruption-in-nigerias-fourth-republic-thecase-of-2015-general-elections-2151-6200-1000298.pdf">mismanagement of public resources</a> to fund campaigns. It was estimated that the total amount spent by the electoral commission, political parties and candidates for the 2015 elections was about one trillion naira (USD$4 billion). A large percentage of these were <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/02/2015-election-cost-n1-trillion-inec/">“untraceable” public funds</a>. </p>
<p>About half of this amount was allegedly <a href="https://www.thecable.ng/exclusive-dasuki-got-jonathans-approvals-collect-2-1bn-nnpc-9-months">siphoned out of the Nigerian National Petroleum Commission</a> by the former national security adviser Sambo Dasuki to finance the 2015 election campaign of President Goodluck Jonathan. The implication of using public funds to finance personal ambition is that it often gives the incumbent an unfair advantage over their opponents and creates a cycle of corruption which hinders development. </p>
<p>Although the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) has called for the <a href="http://www.nan.ng/news/2019-inec-calls-for-regulation-of-campaign-funds/">regulation of campaign finance</a> towards the 2019 elections, it is unclear how this will be done. </p>
<h2>Towards a credible election</h2>
<p>The sum of all these challenges is that Nigeria is far from ready to hold a credible ballot in 2019. In order to conduct a credible election in Nigeria, four key issues are very important. First, the government needs to completely defeat Boko Haram. Second, the conflict between herdsmen and farmers must be addressed and third, electoral commission must strengthen the electronic voting system introduced in 2015 and finally the formation of insurgent groups for the purpose of the election must be prevented. </p>
<p>An election that is not free and fair risks negatively compromising Nigeria’s already fragile economy, and sparking further conflict.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/97300/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Nigeria is far from ready to hold a credible ballot in 2019.Olayinka Ajala, Associate Lecturer and Conflict Analyst, University of YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.