tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/mmusi-maimane-16804/articlesMmusi Maimane – The Conversation2021-04-06T13:31:21Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1580712021-04-06T13:31:21Z2021-04-06T13:31:21ZFormer opposition leader Tony Leon pushes South Africa’s hot buttons in new book<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/393119/original/file-20210401-15-1vrpm07.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Tony Leon celebrates
at the Democratic Alliance's final election rally held in Johannesburg, in April 2004. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Tony Leon is the most prolific of all former leaders of the Democratic Alliance (DA), South Africa’s main opposition party, as befits the chair of a communications company. </p>
<p>In his latest and fifth book, <a href="https://www.loot.co.za/product/tony-leon-future-tense/jrxh-7080-g790"><em>Future Tense: Reflections on my Troubled Land</em></a>, he comes across as articulate and persuasive.</p>
<p>The Democratic Alliance has, ever since its original founding as the <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-democratic-alliance-at-60-big-strategic-questions-lie-ahead-117129">Progressive Party in 1959</a>, opposed injustices committed by the apartheid government. Today, its support is overwhelmingly from demographic minorities. Its current challenges include ensuring black people are more visible among its top leadership. </p>
<p>Recent turmoil included veteran party leader <a href="https://www.da.org.za/people/helen-zille-2">Helen Zille</a> propelling <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/mmusi-aloysias-maimane">Mmusi Maimane</a> into the leadership of the party. The other was Tony Leon’s role in <a href="https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/south-africa/2019-10-22-mmusi-maimane-inconsistent-and-conflict-averse/">pressuring Maimane to resign</a> after a series of DA tactical errors culminated in electoral losses <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-2019-poll-showed-dangerous-signs-of-insiders-and-outsiders-121758">in 2019</a>. </p>
<p>The new and most useful content in his book is in chapters 2 and 3. They provide the first insider account of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/imposter-syndrome-explains-why-first-black-leader-of-south-africas-main-opposition-party-quit-125826">ousting of Maimane</a>, the party’s first black leader, <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2019-10-23-breaking-da-leader-mmusi-maimane-quits/">in October 2019</a>. His meteoric rise and that of former DA parliamentary leader <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/lindiwe-mazibuko">Lindiwe Mazibuko</a>, and the attempted recruitment of <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/dr-mamphela-aletta-ramphele">Mamphela Ramphele</a>, the outspoken liberation struggle activist, were viewed as the DA expanding out of its former limits, to gain African voters. Their departures deflated such hopes.</p>
<p>Leon also delves into the accompanying turmoil within the DA because of the choices made by <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-liberals-are-failing-to-wrap-their-heads-around-race-127029">Zille</a>, who has retained senior positions in the party and refused to relinquish power. </p>
<p>Leon mulls over the DA’s biggest challenge: “how to maintain its majority support among minorities, and increase its meagre voter share among the black majority” (page 21).</p>
<p>These remain unsolved conundrums for the party even after two decades of democracy. <a href="https://www.thoughtco.com/racial-classification-under-apartheid-43430">African</a> voters comprise four-fifths of the electorate. For the DA to ever become the ruling party, even in a coalition, it must win over more than just <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/race-and-ethnicity-south-africa">racial minorities</a> voters.</p>
<h2>Strengths</h2>
<p><em>Future Tense</em> raises classical political issues that have been debated for over two centuries. One of the biggest is: what is the optimal blend of markets and the state in the economy? </p>
<p>A pragmatic – and not dogmatic – answer would surely be different between different countries, and between different times.</p>
<p>For example, during the 1950s, socialists like <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/national-orders/recipient/jawaharlal-nehru-1889-1964">Jawaharlal Nehru</a> in India and <a href="http://nasser.bibalex.org/Common/NasserLife_en.aspx?lang=en">Gamal-Abdel Nasser</a> in Egypt knew what to do for unemployment: the state should found steel mills and textile mills to employ tens of thousands of people.</p>
<p>But in 2021, an automated and robotic steel and textile mill typically each employ far fewer workers. Jobs now lie in tourism, computer coding, and digital industries such as designing websites. These require accomplished skill sets. With protracted unemployment standing at a horrific 42% (and reaching 93% in a small country town such as Touws Rivier) this is a hot button for South Africa.</p>
<p>Another hot button topic Leon touches on is the issue of affirmative action. He points to what he sees as a contradiction – the fact that the country’s <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/constitution/chapter-2-bill-rights#7">Bill of Rights</a> enshrines non-racialism, yet the government pursues a policy of affirmative action. </p>
<p>Leon points out that the mechanistic enforcement of affirmative action for demographic proportionality (black people are the majority) has the consequence that “Indian” police officers (from a demographic representing 3% of South Africans) are banned from being promoted to all top tiers where there are fewer than 34 posts. This is the opposite of a non-racial society where any individual can be promoted solely on merit.</p>
<p>Much of <em>Future Tense</em> is taken up with summarising two decades of media exposés of corruption in the African National Congress (ANC) government, and the descent into kleptocracy under Jacob Zuma’s presidency between <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/profiles/president-jacob-zuma-0">May 2009 and January 2018</a>. Leon ascribes the main cause to the ANC policy of <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321223498_The_African_National_Congress_ANC_and_the_Cadre_Deployment_Policy_in_the_Postapartheid_South_Africa_A_Product_of_Democratic_Centralisation_or_a_Recipe_for_a_Constitutional_Crisis">cadre deployment</a>. The practice makes sure that key government positions are held by party loyalists. This is similar to what the USA calls the “spoils system”. It’s been criticised as valuing party loyalty over ability, competence and probity. </p>
<p>Leon also ascribes the cause of corruption to the ANC removing the power of the Public Service Commission to promote civil servants solely on merit. </p>
<p>The weight of his arguments may be judged by the fact that the government is now publicly discussing restoring the remit of the Public Service Commission on this issue.</p>
<p><em>Future Tense</em> also discusses foreign policy. The ANC’s historical allies were the Soviet Union (Russia) and Cuba. The US, the UK, Germany and other EU states remain South Africa’s major investment and trading partners. Leon, a former ambassador to Argentina, argues that the ANC’s cold war vintage rhetoric and stances do not succeed in optimally managing the complexities of these global realities.</p>
<h2>Criticisms</h2>
<p><em>Future Tense</em> repeatedly reminds readers of how many dire predictions and prophecies of South Africa’s future have come a cropper.</p>
<p>The book offers its readers both the virtues of the liberal vision and its limitations. Virtues of the liberal vision include support for individual human rights, accepting doubt and uncertainties, and tolerating dissenting opinions. Limitations are that it sometimes opposes state interventions in the market to mitigate social injustices, and redressing some of the issues raised by identitarian politics.</p>
<p><em>Future Tense</em> has more than a chapter on millionaire and billionaire emigration from South Africa. They are supposedly driven out mostly by state affirmative action, preferential procurement and other economic policies, as well as the crime wave. But it doesn’t have even one sentence about the immigration of two million working class Africans from other countries, and what this might tell us. Leon’s closeness to the plutocratic classes is matched by his distance from acquaintance with working class realities.</p>
<p>He gives an example of how affirmative action caused the emigration of one white University of Cape Town postdoctoral fellow. But he does not mention how the university has attracted top scholars from other African countries.</p>
<p>One chapter explicitly, and the book as a whole, is suffused with the perspectives and arguments of private wealth and investment bankers.
But the contrasting arguments of the labour movement, including the Congress of South African Trade Unions, the biggest labour federation, and the research done by the NGOs supporting it, appear only in a sentence or two for dismissal.</p>
<p>Similarly, this book and the Democratic Alliance, which the author once led and is still associated with, give readers the impression that they judge South Africa’s foreign policy by the degree to which it complies with the foreign policy of the <a href="https://www.nato.int/">North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</a> countries, and have a tin ear for the importance of pan-African empathies.</p>
<p>There is no nuanced perception that western powers selectively invoke human rights violations against their targeted regimes, while enthusiastically selling armaments to human rights violators they view as business friendly.</p>
<p><em>Future Tense</em> is a good read, and should be on everyone’s bookshelf. This reviewer hopes that former South African president Thabo Mbeki and the incumbent Cyril Ramaphosa will not leave everything to their biographers, but will also write up their own memoirs. It is good to have both former presidents, as well as former leaders of the official opposition, tell us in their own words their perspectives on what happened.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/158071/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Gottschalk is an ANC member, but writes this in his professional capacity as a political scientist.</span></em></p>Leon mulls over the Democratic Alliance’s biggest challenge: ‘how to maintain its majority support among minorities, and increase its meagre voter share among the black majority’.Keith Gottschalk, Political Scientist, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1502962020-11-19T14:38:03Z2020-11-19T14:38:03ZSouth Africa’s main opposition party caught in an unenviable political bind<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/370049/original/file-20201118-15-12vkytv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A real problem for the Democratic Alliance is that it cannot hope to displace the dominant African National Congress.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Kevin Sutherland</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The results of the recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-by-elections-in-south-africa-say-about-the-ruling-party-and-the-state-of-opposition-150314">municipal by-elections</a> have confirmed that the Democratic Alliance (DA), South Africa’s leading opposition party, is in trouble. Whereas the governing African National Congress (ANC) retained 64 wards, won six new ones and lost just two, the DA retained 14, won just two new ones, and lost nine, mainly to smaller opposition parties. And the party has been making headlines for all the wrong reasons.</p>
<p>Although it ran a slick virtual federal congress <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-10-31-south-africas-slickest-political-show-goes-virtual-in-impressive-style/">in October</a> at which <a href="https://www.pa.org.za/person/john-henry-steenhuisen/">John Steenhuisen</a> trounced <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/my-youth-age-and-race-are-a-great-advantage-for-any-leader-mbali-ntuli-20201026">Mbali Ntuli</a> by securing the <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2020/11/01/john-steenhuisen-elected-da-s-new-leader">backing of 80%</a> of those who voted in a party leadership contest, it attracted <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/columnists/adriaanbasson/adriaan-basson-why-is-the-da-afraid-to-let-ntuli-debate-steenhuisen-in-public-20201026">negative headlines</a> by preventing the pair from holding virtual “town halls” in the lead-up to the vote. It then restricted viewership of the two contestants’ debate at the congress itself to its members, rather than to the public at large. </p>
<p>The congress also turned down the proposal that the party appoint a deputy leader, a position which Ntuli might confidently have been expected to fill (and thereby posture as future leader-in-waiting).</p>
<p>This congress took place following a string of high-profile resignations by prominent <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/moodey-resigns-from-da-laments-partys-defence-of-white-interests-4a7a1af0-ef42-4a11-8bbf-a47cd7525113">black members</a> of the party since <a href="https://theconversation.com/imposter-syndrome-explains-why-first-black-leader-of-south-africas-main-opposition-party-quit-125826">the resignation as leader</a> of Mmusi Maimane after the 2019 general election. The party registered a first decline in its percentage vote <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-2019-poll-showed-dangerous-signs-of-insiders-and-outsiders-121758">since 1994</a>.</p>
<p>Steenhuisen’s election was matched by the congress simultaneously making a contentious change to its policies. It now <a href="https://www.da.org.za/2020/09/da-is-the-party-of-economic-inclusion">renounces the use of “race”</a> as a means of identifying and empowering categories of people who suffered historical disadvantage under apartheid. This was merely the latest shift in the party’s long-running agonising about how to tackle racial disadvantage.</p>
<h2>Politics of ‘race’</h2>
<p>First introduced during the years of <a href="https://www.uj.ac.za/newandevents/Pages/DAmovestoattractmoreblackvoters20111034.aspx">Helen Zille’s leadership</a>, in a bid to attract black support and enable the DA to grow, the forswearing of “race” at the congress was now hailed as a return to <a href="https://theconversation.com/liberalism-in-south-africa-isnt-only-for-white-people-or-black-people-who-want-to-be-white-125236">liberal principles</a>. The party’s head of policy, <a href="https://www.pa.org.za/person/amanda-ngwenya/">Gwen Ngwenya</a>, <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-09-08-da-policy-conference-ditching-race-based-policies-amid-a-racial-storm/">described the move</a> as the abandonment of</p>
<blockquote>
<p>a false binary option of choosing between non-racialism or redress.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Instead, she said, the party was introducing an economic justice policy which would implement both (basically by substituting educational, social background and income criteria for “race”).</p>
<p>Since the congress, the DA has been widely accused of <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-south-africas-white-liberals-dodge-honest-debates-about-race-127846">“race denialism” </a>. For instance, University of Johannesburg professor of politics Steven Friedman, commenting on the message of the US elections for South Africa, argued that the elections showed it was impossible to make non-racialism a reality if race and racism <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/columnists/2020-11-10-steven-friedman-growing-racial-divide-in-us-sends-important-message-to-sa/">remain a reality</a>. </p>
<p>He did not state it explicitly, but this was a clear dig at the DA. Yet Friedman might well be one of those who in a university context might be happy to argue that “class” criteria should trump “racial” ones for admission of students. In short, as sociologist Gerry Mare has indicated in a celebrated book, <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Declassified-Moving-Beyond-Dead-End-Africa/dp/1431420204"><em>Declassified</em></a>, there is a fundamental contradiction involved in attempting to overcome apartheid-era disadvantage by using apartheid era “race thinking”.</p>
<p>This is a contradiction which progressives continue to wrestle with, and the DA cannot be fairly criticised for attempting to overcome it in policy terms. </p>
<h2>The DA’s dilemma</h2>
<p>Critics would probably accept this but would then likely introduce a qualification: the DA has introduced the change in policy for the wrong reasons. In other words, it is attempting to assuage white racism in the party by eliminating racial criteria from its policy for counteracting historical disadvantage. “Heads you win”, would claim the DA, “tails we lose”.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, there is a substantial issue here. The very real problem for the DA is that it can never aspire to displacing the dominant ANC, whether on its own or as part of a wider opposition coalition, without attracting more black votes.</p>
<p>Under the leadership of <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/anthony-james-tony-leon">Tony Leon</a>, it established itself as the major party of opposition by capturing the racialised constituency of the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/national-party-np">National Party</a>, leading ultimately to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/partys-woes-signify-historical-dilemma-of-south-africas-liberals-126358">latter’s demise</a>. Yet the DA’s 1999 <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/sundayindependent/das-history-of-identity-crises-1611459">“fight back!”</a> electoral slogan inevitably alienated potential black voters. This forced the party to realise that its only sure route to growth was attracting black African support.</p>
<p>This was to become the project of the Zille leadership, and was to prove not unsuccessful. The DA support base continued to grow through <a href="https://pari.org.za/book-launch-election-2019-change-and-stability-in-south-africas-democracy/">successive elections</a>. A significant segment of primarily black middle class support became attached to the party’s base among racial minorities. This provided the platform for Maimane’s elevation to the leadership.</p>
<p>Yet it’s now clear that the experiment has gone badly awry. Although the DA can correctly claim to have become the most racially diverse party in South Africa, it is regularly <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2016-01-28-das-black-leaders-live-with-racism/">accused of racism</a>. This may or not be fair, but it’s politics.</p>
<p>The outcome of the DA’s recent turmoil has been a classically South African one: the formation by former DA Johannesburg mayor Herman Mashaba of what is, in essence, a black liberal party (<a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/herman-mashaba-launches-new-party-promises-to-bring-back-the-scorpions-88402191-dd03-43d9-b239-aed5b1649c36">Action SA</a>) to match the “white” one. </p>
<p>The omens are that this will drain black support from the DA as well as attracting votes of blacks wanting to desert the ANC. Its rise will confirm the DA on what many see as its likely future trajectory: as primarily representing South Africa’s racial minorities and defending its redoubt in the Western Cape in the <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/electoral-commission-welcomes-start-public-consultations-draft-wards-local-government">2021 local government elections</a>.</p>
<h2>Unenviable position</h2>
<p>The problem for the DA is not one of policy. There is real substance in its commitment to substituting “non-racial” for racial criteria for overcoming the historical disadvantages associated with being black. The real challenge is the one that has always confronted liberalism in South Africa’s racially structured society: liberalism has never been able to detach itself from its image among blacks that it is a cover for white interests and white “leadership”. </p>
<p>An established narrative argues that <a href="https://iop.harvard.edu/fellows/lindiwe-mazibuko">Lindiwe Mazibuko</a>, Mmusi Maimane, <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/contact-directory/public-works-and-infrastructure-ministry/patricia-de-lille-ms">Patricia De Lille</a>, Herman Mashaba – black people who all achieved leadership positions within the DA – were all undermined by a <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/sundayindependent/analysis/da-is-still-looking-after-white-interests-14949941">backroom white leadership cabal</a>. The cabal allegedly wanted to control them as puppets on a string. So now, the narrative continues, under Steenhuizen, decent man that he may be, the party is simply reverting to type: a party for whites, led by whites.</p>
<p>Although the DA seemingly possesses an uncanny ability to shoot itself in the foot, its real dilemma is how to escape a vicious circle. When it sought to attract black voters by <a href="https://www.da.org.za/2018/08/das-position-on-economic-empowerment">endorsing</a> <a href="http://www.economic.gov.za/about-us/programmes/economic-policy-development/b-bbee">“black empowerment”</a>, it alienated white voters to the right and classic liberals. When it abandons “racial criteria” as a proxy for disadvantage, it alienates its potential support base among the black middle class.</p>
<p>The DA occupies an unenviable political space from which there is no obvious route of escape.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/150296/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The problem for the Democratic Alliance is not one of policy. There is real substance in its commitment to substituting racial criteria for overcoming historical disadvantage.Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1503142020-11-18T09:18:07Z2020-11-18T09:18:07ZWhat by-elections in South Africa say about the ruling party and the state of opposition<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/369843/original/file-20201117-15-phxb01.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The governing party's good performance may signal confidence in the leadership of President Cyril Ramaphosa. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Special significance is often attached to by-elections. They are regarded as barometers of change in the political mood of a country. For parties, they can be early indicators of possible new trends in public opinion. </p>
<p>In South Africa by-elections are held only at municipal level. General municipal elections are normally held about 15 months after national and provincial elections. In the past the local elections have not been trendsetters. Rather their results have caught up with the national and provincial trends of 15 months earlier.</p>
<p>On November 11, 95 <a href="https://mg.co.za/politics/2020-11-11-super-wednesday-by-elections-all-the-data-and-who-is-contesting-what/">by-elections were held</a> in all nine of South Africa’s provinces, representing about 2.2% of the total 4,400 wards in the country. </p>
<p>Voter turnout was very low. This isn’t unusual. Local government elections in South Africa have traditionally been characterised by low voter turnout. In the first two elections after 1994, only 48% voted, followed by 50% in 2006, and the highest level ever of 58% was reached <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/132680/2016-elections-voter-turnout-at-58/">in 2016</a>. National and provincial elections, on the other hand, attained voter turnout percentages in the <a href="https://www.thesouthafrican.com/news/south-africa-elections-2019-latest-voter-turnout-figure/">mid-70s</a>. </p>
<p>The low turnout means that by-elections cannot be compared with the main elections to identify trend-changes. Low voter turnout makes any comparisons expressed in percentages unreliable. That means that the by-elections don’t provide a preview of what to expect in the countrywide municipal elections to be held next year. </p>
<p>But some useful insights can nevertheless be gleaned about the parties – the governing African National Congress, the Democratic Alliance as the main opposition party, and the smaller opposition party, the Economic Freedom Fighters. In the 2019 national and provincial elections, the ANC’s national support declined by about 5% and the DA’s by about 1%. The smaller EFF and Freedom Front Plus increased their support. </p>
<p>Though a very small and unrepresentative sample of the national situation, these by-elections followed the 2019 trends in the case of the DA but not in the cases of the ANC and EFF.</p>
<h2>Insights</h2>
<p>The Eastern Cape and Northern Cape provinces each held the most (about 20) by-elections. The Eastern Cape was traditionally an ANC stronghold until it lost the Nelson Mandela Bay metropolitan council in 2016. The Northern Cape is geographically the biggest province but also the most sparsely populated. The ANC has controlled the provincial government since 1994 but it is one of the DA’s strongest provinces as opposition. </p>
<p>Two local councils (Renosterberg and Phokwane, <a href="https://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/seven-municipalities-to-hold-by-elections-in-n-cape/">both in the Northern Cape</a>) were dissolved and therefore by-elections were held in all their wards. </p>
<p>The five by-elections in Johannesburg – the economic capital of the country – also deserve attention.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.elections.org.za/content/Elections/Municipal-by-elections-results/">results</a> can be seen in this table:</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/369818/original/file-20201117-15-175sn5x.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/369818/original/file-20201117-15-175sn5x.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=216&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369818/original/file-20201117-15-175sn5x.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=216&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369818/original/file-20201117-15-175sn5x.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=216&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369818/original/file-20201117-15-175sn5x.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=272&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369818/original/file-20201117-15-175sn5x.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=272&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369818/original/file-20201117-15-175sn5x.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=272&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Supplied by author</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The immediate impression the results create is their stability. Only about 10% of the seats changed hands between the parties. The ANC stands out as the most stable party, with a net gain of three seats while it contested more than 70% of all the seats. This could be interpreted in a number of ways. </p>
<p>The first is that the results reflect an endorsement of the leadership of President Cyril Ramaphosa as the head of the party. The second is that, though the ANC government’s management of the COVID-19 pandemic lockdown has been publicly criticised, and the economy has <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202006100926.html">suffered badly</a>, this appears not to have had a negative impact on the party’s electoral fortunes.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa’s support might have offset the negativity against the party. Noteworthy is the fact that the ANC lost its seat in Nkandla in KwaZulu-Natal <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2020-11-12-ifp-snatches-nkandla-ward-from-anc-in-kzn-by-election/">to the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)</a>. Nkandla is the home of former president Jacob Zuma.</p>
<h2>The Economic Freedom Fighters</h2>
<p>The absence of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), the third largest party, in the results is a noteworthy feature of these elections. The party is the official opposition in the North West and Limpopo provinces, but did not make any impact on the ten by-elections there.</p>
<p>In the general elections last year, the EFF increased its support base in KwaZulu-Natal by about <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-05-10-in-kwazulu-natal-the-story-of-these-elections-belongs-to-eff-and-ifp/">9%</a>. But the party did not feature in the results of the 12 by-elections held in that province. </p>
<p>This is unsurprising. It does not have a good track record at local government level and it does not perform well in the election of ward councillors. The party’s prominence has also been affected by the fact that its kingmaker role in the Johannesburg, Tshwane and <a href="https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2018-08-30-eff-kingmaker-strategy-means-it-abdicates-any-duty-for-governance/">Nelson Mandela Bay</a> metropolitan councils did not come to fruition.</p>
<h2>The Democratic Alliance</h2>
<p>Two weeks before the by-elections the Democratic Alliance received extensive <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/da-concedes-painful-losses-in-by-elections-25b63539-b5a4-562c-a1e9-db16fba8ce77">media coverage</a> following its Federal Congress and election of new leadership. But this doesn’t seem to have given it any advantage.</p>
<p>The party gained two seats in the elections from the ANC in the Walter Sisulu council in the Eastern Cape and Matjhabeng in the Free State. But it lost five seats to the ANC (in Emfuleni, Johannesburg, Madibeng, Renosterberg and Phokwane). It also lost one seat each to Al-Jama-ah in Johannesburg, GOOD in George, the Patriotic Alliance in Johannesburg, and to the Freedom Front Plus (FF+) in the North West province.</p>
<p>It means that the DA’s main contender in these elections was the ANC. This does not <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-11-12-anc-passes-by-election-test-while-da-sheds-votes-left-and-right/">support analysis</a> that emphasises the DA’s losses of white support to the FF+ in this election. The resignations of its former leader Mmusi Maimane, Johannesburg mayor Herman Mashaba, Gauteng leader <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2020-09-03-from-john-moodey-to-funzela-ngobeni--five-da-resignations-in-2020/">John Moodey</a> and Tshwane regional leader Abel Tau – all from Gauteng – might explain why almost half of its losses were in this province. </p>
<p>Another trend was that it lost four seats to small parties. They all represent different forms of minorities in the country. The DA contends that it is a <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/fm/opinion/state-of-play/2020-11-05-natasha-marrian-da-reset-a-long-shot/">party for minorities</a>. This is clearly under pressure but one cannot generalise about it.</p>
<p>Take for example George in the Western Cape, where there were four by-elections. The DA lost one seat to Patricia de Lille’s GOOD party but retained the other three wards. The loss, however, received more attention than the three wins. </p>
<p>The FF+ had been involved in only one by-election victory in the North West against the DA. It can’t, therefore, be claimed that there was a general shift in support from the DA to the FF+ on the basis of only one case. (Earlier by-elections, however, followed the same trend as the 2019 provincial election.) </p>
<p>As a possible indication of a decline in a party’s support, analyses focus on the fact that some of the majorities are now much lower than in 2019. As indicated earlier, a comparison between the majorities in 2016 and now cannot be made, because of the big differences in the voter turnout percentages. </p>
<h2>Looking ahead</h2>
<p>Next year’s municipal elections will be a test for all the main parties, in each case for reasons of their own. The by-elections have demonstrated that despite the COVID-19 pandemic disruptions, the democratic basics are healthy. The opposition is becoming more diverse and fluid – and the possibility of coalition governments at local level is increasing. A major test will be the three metropolitan councils which the ANC lost in 2016.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/150314/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dirk Kotze does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Local government elections in South Africa have traditionally been characterised by low voter turnout.Dirk Kotze, Professor in Political Science, University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1278462019-12-16T13:37:03Z2019-12-16T13:37:03ZHow South Africa’s white liberals dodge honest debates about race<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/306555/original/file-20191212-85391-bs6ima.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Former leader of the Democratic Alliance, Mmusi Maimane. The politics of race in the party ended his tenure.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Nic Bothma</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The ideological position of the Democratic Alliance, South Africa’s main opposition party, on how to achieve racial justice and equality in post-apartheid South Africa is morally confused. </p>
<p>John Steenhuisen, its new interim national leader, <a href="https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/cape-times/20191118/281526522887911">says that</a> the party does not believe in the use of race categories to address racialised inequality. As far as he is concerned, affirmative action and black economic empowerment policies indicate that post-apartheid South Africa is <a href="https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/cape-times/20191118/281526522887911">“obsessed with race”</a>.</p>
<p>He is <a href="https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/cape-times/20191118/281526522887911">convinced that</a> to bring about transformation in post-apartheid South Africa,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>we don’t need to resort to crude racial classification.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But in my view it is morally and intellectually dishonest to disavow a race discourse as identity politics gone awry in a country that is divided along racial lines, socially and economically. </p>
<p>White South Africans make up 7.8% of the country’s population. But <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/24/business/south-africa-economy-apartheid.html">they own</a> more than 90% of the country’s wealth. And a <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/capetimes/news/blacks-own-the-least-land-report-13145254">government land audit</a> in 2017 showed that white people own 72% of the land, followed by coloureds at 15%, Indians at 5% and Africans at 4%. (The <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-apartheid-south-africa">racial delineations used here were adopted under apartheid</a>, which distinguished between various race groups. Broadly, Indians referred to South Africans descended from people who came to the country from the Indian subcontinent, many as indentured labour, while coloureds referred to people of mixed race.)</p>
<p>And according to <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=12744">Stats SA</a>, in addition to having worse employment outcomes, Africans also earn the lowest wages. </p>
<p>To imply, as the Democratic Alliance does, that there is a moral equivalence between apartheid’s use of race categories and their continued use by the democratic government is a deliberate distortion of reality. </p>
<h2>Race categories</h2>
<p>The apartheid regime used race categories as part of a white supremacist project. This was underpinned by a racist <a href="https://www.nature.com/scitable/forums/genetics-generation/america-s-hidden-history-the-eugenics-movement-123919444/">eugenics vision</a> of creating a racist white utopia in southern Africa, through racial segregation. The government introduced a range of laws to advantage white people and disadvantage black people. One of the most pernicious was the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/group-areas-act-1950">Group Areas Act</a>. This segregated social groups by race, making it a crime for social groups to interact. </p>
<p>The logic of the continued use of the race categories <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/employment-equity-act-employment-equity-amendment-bill-comments-invited-21-sep-2018-0000">post-apartheid</a> has been to achieve the liberal objective of correcting historically unjust racial inequalities. It is a truism to point out that race-conscious policies would be unnecessary if post-apartheid South Africa were racially just and equitable society. But it is not. </p>
<h2>False claims to a liberal tradition</h2>
<p>The Democratic Alliance <a href="https://www.news24.com/Analysis/10-questions-to-helen-zille-its-a-fight-between-nationalists-and-liberalists-20191007">claims</a> the liberal tradition as its brand of politics.</p>
<p>But true liberals know that liberal democracy cannot function successfully in a society without social justice. John Rawls, the esteemed American social justice <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rawls/">philosopher-warrior</a>, advocated for the principle of redress in the face of undeserved social inequalities.</p>
<p>A liberal theory of justice disavows a society that rewards people for privilege, or for being born in a certain social class. Honest modern-day interlocutors, such as George Fredrickson, an American historian of race, <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691167053/racism">argue</a> that black people in power in post-apartheid South Africa cannot</p>
<blockquote>
<p>adequately compensate blacks for three and a half centuries of expropriation, exploitation, and deprivation to the extent that would be required to make them truly equal to the whites.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2019-11-15-00-steenhuisen-promises-team-work">Democratic Alliance</a> is of the view that to effectively address the legacy of apartheid, race has to be removed in redress as a proxy. It brands this as a form of liberalism. </p>
<p>But it is quite the converse, and simply a denial of the current realities of South Africa. It was partly this realisation that led Mmusi Maimane, the Democratic Alliance’s former party leader, to resign from his leadership position. According to <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/news/2019-10-27-rise-of-the-zillenators-helen-zilles-allies-set-to-take-top-jobs-at-the-da/">Maimane</a>, the party</p>
<blockquote>
<p>is not the vehicle best suited for achieving racial justice and equality. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>In his resignation speech, Maimane effectively conceded that the party’s brand of politics is white liberalism – a prominent strand within the liberal tradition.</p>
<h2>Hypocrisy</h2>
<p>In post-apartheid South Africa, the spectrum of white liberalism ranges from white political organisations like the Democratic Alliance to <a href="https://www.afriforum.co.za/en/about-us/">Afriforum</a> and <a href="https://solidariteit.co.za/en/who-are-we/">Solidariteit</a>. The latter is historically a white trade union, while Afriforum portrays itself as a “civil society” organisation. </p>
<p>Afriforum’s campaign to end farm murders can be traced back to apartheid racist propaganda of <a href="https://findwords.info/term/swart%20gevaar">“Swart Gevaar”</a> – a racist narrative that characterises black people as criminals and a danger to whites and their interests. </p>
<p>In my view white liberals in South Africa are in denial, and hence refuse to accept a liberal truism that whites do not deserve the privileged position resulting from centuries of black exploitation and oppression. Pointing that out is not synonymous with victimising whites. Rather, it’s a first step towards a just society built on liberal values of fairness and equality.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/127846/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mandisi Majavu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There is no moral equivalence between apartheid’s use of race categories and their continued use by the democratic government.Mandisi Majavu, Senior Lecturer, Department of Political and International Studies, Rhodes UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1270292019-11-14T15:30:38Z2019-11-14T15:30:38ZSouth Africa’s liberals are failing to wrap their heads around race<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/301744/original/file-20191114-26229-1scidwy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s official opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), is reeling from self-inflicted political damage. Its newly elected parliamentary leader <a href="https://www.pa.org.za/person/john-henry-steenhuisen/">John Steenhuisen</a> recently appealed to his colleagues to “stop the political hara-kiri that’s going on in the DA – <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2019-10-28-steenhuisen-says-big-blue-wobbly-jelly-da-needs-to-find-its-spine-again/">pulling out entrails to show everybody”</a>.</p>
<p>This follows the <a href="https://theconversation.com/partys-woes-signify-historical-dilemma-of-south-africas-liberals-126358">departure</a> of two more prominent black members, party leader Mmusi Maimane and Johannesburg mayor Herman Mashaba, apart from national chair Athol Trollip, who is white. Other black members the party has shed include Cape Town mayor <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/de-lille-resigns-as-cape-town-mayor-quits-da-20181031">Patricia de Lille</a>, forced out last year, and former parliamentary leader Lindiwe Mazibuko, who <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2014-05-10-lindiwe-mazibuko-quits-da-as-parliamentary-leader">left under duress in 2014</a>. </p>
<p>The recent resignations come in the wake of the <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/breaking-helen-zille-wins-da-federal-council-chair-vote-20191020">election</a> of former party leader Helen Zille to the powerful position of chairperson of the DA’s federal council. </p>
<p>She and other contenders for the post promised to return the party to a vague <a href="https://twitter.com/helenzille/status/1156067508136415234">“classical liberalism”</a>. What this would mean in light of the history of the party is left unexplained. It does seem that the dominant bloc in the Democratic Alliance wants to convince some South African voters that a version of liberalism exists which is untouched by history and context. Judging by recent events, they also seem to insist that liberalism has not and cannot be adapted to <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2019-10-31-helen-zille-calls-for-da-to-dump-race-analysis/">address the problem of racism</a>. </p>
<p>This reflects a growing dearth in political imagination in South Africa’s white liberal establishment in recent years.</p>
<h2>Success and new complexities</h2>
<p>The current malaise was triggered by the Democratic Alliance’s slightly poorer results in the May 2019 national election. It attracted <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/NPEDashboard/App/dashboard.html">20.8% compared with 22.2% in 2014</a>. </p>
<p>At the heart of the party’s problems lies what can be called “white denialism” – the inability to acknowledge the continuing repercussions of race and racism in the country. This has affected its analytical capacity to the point of endangering its electoral fortunes. </p>
<p>“Losing” more black leaders shows a greater concern with keeping the party as a base for white interests than growing it to a possible future government.</p>
<p>It wasn’t always like this. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/301763/original/file-20191114-26243-aa7n8q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/301763/original/file-20191114-26243-aa7n8q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=742&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301763/original/file-20191114-26243-aa7n8q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=742&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301763/original/file-20191114-26243-aa7n8q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=742&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301763/original/file-20191114-26243-aa7n8q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=933&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301763/original/file-20191114-26243-aa7n8q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=933&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301763/original/file-20191114-26243-aa7n8q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=933&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mmusi Maimane, former leader of the Democratic Alliance.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Nic Bothma</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Democratic Alliance was one of the political success stories of the democratic era. In its previous manifestation as the Democratic Party, it managed to grow from a mere 1.7% in the first racially inclusive election in 1994 to <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/NPEDashboard/App/dashboard.html">12.4% </a>in the 2004 national elections, demolishing the former party of apartheid, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/partys-woes-signify-historical-dilemma-of-south-africas-liberals-126358">National Party</a>. </p>
<p>But with success come new dynamics and complexities.</p>
<p>The boost in growth was among white South Africans, leading to the party routinely being labelled <a href="https://www.news24.com/Columnists/MahlatseGallens/da-has-its-work-cut-out-to-show-its-not-a-white-party-with-a-black-leader-20180413">“white”</a>, and its relevance in a context of a majority of black voters was questioned. </p>
<p>Commendably, significant efforts ensued under Zille to recruit black leaders and break the white glass ceiling in the party. In the 2011 local government election, the <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/da-no-party-for-racists-says-zille-1430039">slogan was</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>reconciliation, redress, delivery and diversity.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>With the promotion of young stars such as Mazibuko and Maimane, and the merger with De Lille’s Independent Democrats <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2010-08-16-anc-shrugs-off-daid-merger">in 2010</a>, the Democratic Alliance’s complexion changed. </p>
<p>But this brought the question of race to the fore.</p>
<h2>Racial liberalism</h2>
<p>For many people who live the experience of being racialised as “black” in the world, it is impossible to negate the effects of race – both negatively, as a system of oppression, and positively, as a source of resistance and identity. As Maimane put it poignantly,</p>
<blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.heraldlive.co.za/news/2019-10-23-flashback-what-mmusi-maimane-said-when-he-was-elected-in-pe/">if you don’t see I’m black, you don’t see me</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>These views ran head-long into the Democratic Alliance’s historical white denialism, sparking an intense political battle for the party’s soul. Hence, when Steenhuisen talks about the <a href="http://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/steenhuisen-to-contest-position-of-interim-party-leader/">“slavish race-based obsession of the last few years”</a>, he is sniping at black leaders’ attempt to turn the party away from its legacy of race-blindness.</p>
<p>The white liberal establishment, both inside and outside the party, holds on to its race-blindness by distorting the South African idea of “non-racialism”. Non-racialism is a political concept that hails from the first half of the 20th century, and is included in the country’s democratic constitution. It envisages a society beyond race that would be achieved through anti-racist action.</p>
<p>As a counter position, the Democratic Alliance has defanged non-racialism by presenting it as <a href="https://democracyworks.org.za/race-the-das-elephant-in-the-policy-room/">“colour-blindness”</a>. This convenient misrepresentation of non-racialism fits with what Jamaican philosopher Charles W Mills calls <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/25501942?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">“racial liberalism”</a>, the most prominent version of liberalism which has been pivotal to Western political thinking.</p>
<p>Racial liberalism has historically been characterised by a double standard, which is reflected in its role in the crimes of colonialism. Only some human beings could lay claim to the essential values of the rule of law and equality in the eyes of the colonial state. Hence, white and male privilege was entrenched. </p>
<p>In the Democratic Alliance’s case, its original predecessor the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/progressive-federal-party-pfp">Progressive Party </a> clung to the 19th century British colonial position of a <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/liberal-party-south-africa-lpsa">qualified franchise for black people</a> until the 1970s.</p>
<h2>Liberalism and historical injustice</h2>
<p>Mills makes the case for a colour-conscious liberalism. Extending this idea to other differences such as gender, this translates into a liberalism that actively acknowledges and advances the correction of historical racial, gender and other injustices. Such an agenda must be driven from the vantage points of those who have been wronged, that is, black people and women.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/liberalism-in-south-africa-isnt-only-for-white-people-or-black-people-who-want-to-be-white-125236">Liberalism in South Africa isn't only for white people -- or black people who want to be white</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The Democratic Alliance’s black leaders embarked on the crafting of what could be called an African liberalism in 2013. Its parliamentary caucus, led by Mazibuko, <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/lindiwe-got-it-wrong-zille-1607434">supported affirmative action</a> on the basis of race and gender during the consideration of the <a href="https://www.cliffedekkerhofmeyr.com/en/news/press-releases/2013/Employment/newly-tabled-employment-equity-amendment-bill-will-enforce-stricter-compliance-with-employment-equity.html">Employment Equity Amendment Bill</a>. A black parliamentarian said at the time that “there is no way that you can solve a problem caused by race without referring to race”. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/301765/original/file-20191114-26237-8y6sjn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/301765/original/file-20191114-26237-8y6sjn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=663&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301765/original/file-20191114-26237-8y6sjn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=663&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301765/original/file-20191114-26237-8y6sjn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=663&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301765/original/file-20191114-26237-8y6sjn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=833&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301765/original/file-20191114-26237-8y6sjn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=833&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/301765/original/file-20191114-26237-8y6sjn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=833&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Helen Zille heads the DA’s powerful federal council.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Efe-EPA/Nic Bothma</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The white liberal establishment was outraged, including the Institute of <a href="https://irr.org.za/media/articles-authored-by-the-institute/towards-non-racial-aa-in-employment-2013-politicsweb-27-november-2014">Race Relations</a>. Former party leader Tony Leon sounded the bugle about an <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2013-11-14-is-black-the-das-new-true-blue">offence against liberal values</a>. The caucus was called to order. A policy conference followed where race was acknowledged as a “<a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/da-rejects-race-quotas-1611643">proxy for disadvantage</a>” but with no corrective mechanism, apart from “expanding opportunities”.</p>
<p>Mazibuko resigned under pressure and was replaced by Maimane. But the contestation intensified. Maimane <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2019/10/23/maimane-and-zille-s-political-bromance-how-it-all-came-to-an-end">called out</a> Zille when she tweeted positive comments about colonialism. Black Democratic Alliance members’ stances on public incidents involving race caused further upset.</p>
<h2>Lost opportunity</h2>
<p>The slight decline in Democratic Alliance votes in the 2019 election has been attributed to far-rightwing white supporters <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-who-why-and-what-of-south-africas-minority-afrikaner-party-116913">shifting their votes to the Freedom Front Plus</a>. Instead of regarding this as an opportunity to confront the party’s racial legacy and advance more inclusive politics, it was used to rid the party of Maimane, at the <a href="https://dailyfriend.co.za/2019/10/01/storm-forecast-winde-with-brighter-prospects/">instigation of the Institute of Race Relations</a>.</p>
<p>This was another one of those watershed moments, akin to when the apartheid regime passed <a href="http://psimg.jstor.org/fsi/img/pdf/t0/10.5555/al.sff.document.leg19680605.042.000.000_final.pdf">a law banning inter-racial parties</a> in the 1960s. At the time, the Progressive Party – the Democratic Alliance’s original permutation – <a href="http://paton.ukzn.ac.za/Collections/liberal.aspx">ejected its black members</a> to become white. Its other option was to disband and reorganise. It chose white politics then, as it does now.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/127029/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christi van der Westhuizen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The white liberal establishment, both inside and outside the Democratic Alliance, holds on to its race-blindness by distorting the South African idea of “non-racialism”.Christi van der Westhuizen, Associate Professor, Centre for the Advancement of Non-Racialism and Democracy (CANRAD), Nelson Mandela UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1263582019-11-11T14:10:11Z2019-11-11T14:10:11ZParty’s woes signify historical dilemma of South Africa’s liberals<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300847/original/file-20191108-194675-amzxe3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Helen Zille's return to the top echelons of the Democratic Alliance has been slammed as an attempt to make the party white again.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Nic Bothma</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2019-10-20-helen-zille-wins-vote-top-da-job/">return of Helen Zille</a>, the former leader of South Africa’s official opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), to active politics as chair of the party’s federal executive led to many allegations that the party is dominated by a shadowy kitchen cabinet of <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/politics/2195945/maimane-was-an-ethically-upright-man-forced-to-leave-da-because-of-white-people-eff/">white people</a>.</p>
<p>Zille’s election to head the DA’s highest decision-making body in between national congresses was soon followed by the <a href="https://city-press.news24.com/News/double-whammy-for-da-as-maimane-and-trollip-resign-20191023">resignations</a> of Herman Mashaba, the DA mayor of Johannesburg; Mmusi Maimane, the party’s national leader; and Athol Trollip, its national chairman. Mashaba had charged that Zille’s return set the party on a <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2019-10-21-joburg-mayor-herman-mashaba-resigns/">rightwing path</a>. </p>
<p>Yet, rather than focusing on personalities to understand the DA’s problems, it is better to return to the dilemmas of liberals in South Africa’s tragic history of the politicisation of race. This tendency persisted even after the country became a democracy in 1994. In essence, liberalism has always been reluctant to grant black people equality unless they achieve certain designated standards.</p>
<h2>Segregation frames the liberal dilemma</h2>
<p>Following the country’s formation in 1910 as a union of <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/union-south-africa-1910">four territories </a> (historically, two British colonies and two Boer republics), it was accepted among white people, including those of more liberal persuasions, that people of different “races” should live separately to preserve white people’s <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-apartheid-south-africa">culture and languages</a>.</p>
<p>This was used to justify the grossly unequal division of land which resulted in the black majority being left with just 7% of the land. This was confirmed by the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/natives-land-act-1913">1913 Land Act</a>. </p>
<p>The assumption which went with this was that black people were destined to remain in rural areas, and that any movement (such as migration for work on white mines, factories or farms) would be temporary. </p>
<p>But, by the end of the 1920s, liberals were beginning to get uneasy. It was becoming increasingly clear that the fates of black people and white people were irrevocably entangled, economically and politically.</p>
<p>The fundamental dilemma for “liberal segregationists” was that they based their politics on the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/179767?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">Cape qualified franchise</a>. Its basic supposition was that black people (and only men) were worthy of the vote – only if they achieved a certain level of <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/segregation-fallacy-and-other-papers-disfranchisement-cape-native">“civilisation”</a>. In practice, this meant ownership of property and or educational qualifications. </p>
<p>But this presented the problem that the few black people who acquired education showed that black people were equal to whites. If black equality was accepted, the white minority would be <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/segregation-fallacy-and-other-papers-disfranchisement-cape-native">“swamped”</a>. </p>
<p>Assuming power in 1948, the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/national-party-np">National Party</a> formalised apartheid. It sought to negate this danger by arguing that potential equality between people of different races was irrelevant. It argued that black people and white people were culturally different, cultural mixing would cause cultural conflict. </p>
<p>This led to a number of targeted policies. To avert the dangers of racial mixing, the flow of black people to urban areas should be averted, the entry of black people into the white polity should be blocked off completely, and black politics should be diverted to black <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/homelands">“homelands”</a>. These were ten mainly rural areas where black people were required to live, along ethnic group lines. </p>
<p>It was only the tiny <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/liberal-party-south-africa-lpsa">Liberal Party</a> which had by now fully accepted the political implications of racial equality, and argued for a universal franchise. The majority liberal response, elaborated by the DA’s forerunners (from the Progressive Party onwards), was to retain the notion of black people having to attain a certain level of “civilisation” to qualify for the vote.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/liberalism-in-south-africa-isnt-only-for-white-people-or-black-people-who-want-to-be-white-125236">Liberalism in South Africa isn't only for white people -- or black people who want to be white</a>
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<p>One reason was that any attempt to sell the idea of the universal franchise to the white electorate was doomed to failure. When universal franchise eventually arrived, in the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/south-africas-first-democratic-elections">election of 1994</a>, the then Democratic Party, albeit now advocating votes for all, secured a mere 2% of the vote. The National Party – fighting for “group rights” – swept up 20%.</p>
<p>Subsequently, in 1999, under Tony Leon, the DA, then known as the Democratic Party, adopted the ambiguously phrased <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/sundayindependent/das-history-of-identity-crises-1611459">“fight back”</a> campaign slogan. It argued that the governing ANC was embarking on implementing apartheid in reverse through affirmative action policies. It captured the major portion of the National Party’s white vote. Thus the party of apartheid was condemned to a deserved, albeit lingering death.</p>
<h2>Maimane’s burden</h2>
<p>Under Zille, the DA embarked on an electoral expansion programme, recognising that if it was going to grow and become a serious competitor for power, it would have to capture a sizeable portion of the overwhelming majority black vote. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300850/original/file-20191108-194661-x12khb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300850/original/file-20191108-194661-x12khb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300850/original/file-20191108-194661-x12khb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300850/original/file-20191108-194661-x12khb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300850/original/file-20191108-194661-x12khb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300850/original/file-20191108-194661-x12khb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300850/original/file-20191108-194661-x12khb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Mmusi Maimane grew the DA’s support among the majority black voters.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Kim Ludbrook</span></span>
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<p>This realisation eventually led to the selection of Maimane as the DA’s national leader <a href="https://theconversation.com/first-black-leader-breathes-life-into-south-african-opposition-41275">in 2015</a>. He saw his task as rendering the DA’s liberalism more appealing to black voters by taking it in what he saw as a more inclusive direction. This would be through recognising <a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/we-believe-race-is-a-proxy-for-disadvantage--mmusi">race as an indicator of disadvantage</a>. </p>
<p>It didn’t go down well with the DA’s established base, which saw it as an assault upon the party’s professedly nonracial values. It was therefore Maimane who, as leader, was to be blamed for the <a href="https://www.biznews.com/leadership/2019/05/09/elections2019-national-vote-da-ff">DA’s loss of votes</a>, for the first time since 1994, in the 2019 election.</p>
<p>The recent internal party inquest, headed by Leon, decided that it was imperative for Maimane to go, arguing that under his watch, in a bid to attract black voters, the DA <a href="https://www.news24.com/Analysis/analysis-leadership-and-race-da-review-panel-a-devastating-blow-for-mmusi-maimane-20191022">had strayed from its liberal principles</a>. </p>
<p>The DA should, therefore, return to its liberal foundations and confirm its attachment to policies which would effect redress of historical racial inequalities without using race as a proxy for disadvantage. Yet South Africa’s black voters are unlikely to dissociate disadvantage from the colour of their skin.</p>
<h2>Difficult choices</h2>
<p>It is unsurprising that this turn of events should lead to Maimane’s resignation. If the party wants to return to growth, then its analysis is almost certainly wrong. Stronger emphasis on a “non-racial liberalism” is unlikely to appeal to rightwing white voters. It is equally unlikely to appeal to black voters, who view forms of racial redress as the only sure route to greater racial equality. </p>
<p>Black aversion to the DA is likely to increase even more if the party replaces its former black leader with someone, however talented and principled, who is white. The DA is having to struggle with South Africa’s toxic history of black oppression. Yet it remains the case that that history has left it with the dilemma that liberals in South Africa have never been able to solve: how to deal with “the native question” if the natives in question doubt the capacity of liberalism to bring about substantive racial equality.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/126358/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall has received funding from the National Research Foundation</span></em></p>The Democratic Alliance’s problems can be traced back to the politicisation of race, which has persisted even after the dawn of democracy in 1994.Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1258262019-10-24T08:10:35Z2019-10-24T08:10:35Z‘Imposter syndrome’ explains why first black leader of South Africa’s main opposition party quit<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/298504/original/file-20191024-170467-y93g1f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mmusi Maimane, former leader of South Africa's main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kim Ludbrook/EPA-EFE</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The politicians who run South Africa’s official opposition, the Democratic Alliance (DA), have probably never heard of “imposter syndrome”. If they had, they might have a better grasp of the problems which confront their party – and its first black leader might not have been forced to resign.</p>
<p>“Imposter syndrome” is a state of mind in which a successful and competent person doubts their achievements and harbours a persistent fear that they should not be enjoying success and will soon be exposed as a “fraud”. It was identified by two American psychologists <a href="https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/The-Imposter-Phenomenon-in-High-Achieving-Women%3A-Clance-Imes/5e006cbe27488f165e9dc913274b10a4b4df0d2d">in a 1978 article</a>, which found that the problem was widespread among high-achieving women, far more so than among men.</p>
<p>Since then, others have connected the dots to explain why people should feel this way. The syndrome, they suggest, is a product of prejudices that insist that some groups should monopolise important tasks and the skills and responsibilities which go with them. The women with “imposter syndrome” were doing well at jobs that, according to the prejudices among those who controlled their society, only men could do. They were, therefore, sure that men were judging them. And so, in a sense, they began to judge themselves despite the fact that they were clearly good at what they did.</p>
<p>This does not apply only to women who are doing jobs usually monopolised by men. It could equally apply to black people occupying positions that were held only by whites and whose “imposter syndrom” reacts to the prejudice which insists that only whites belong in the role.</p>
<p>This will probably shape how people operate in their “imposter” roles. They could be reluctant to express views or take decisions that might offend others in the organisation because they are convinced that the people who used to monopolise the role will dismiss them as a fraud.</p>
<p>It is also possible that, in a way, the people who suffer from the syndrome really are imposters. People who are drawn from a group that did not occupy the post in the past may have ways of doing things that are unlike those of the traditional office holders: women may do some things differently from men, black people may do things differently from whites. They are then likely to be labelled as frauds by others despite the fact that what they are doing may be as effective as – or more effective than – the “traditional” way of doing things.</p>
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<p>All of this is directly relevant to this week’s resignation of<a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/mmusi-aloysias-maimane"> Mmusi Maimane</a>, who in 2015 became the first black leader of the traditionally white Democratic Alliance (DA).</p>
<h2>Depends on who is doing the judging</h2>
<p>Maimane was forced out of the party leadership because a DA committee consisting of three white men held him (and some of its white leaders) responsible for the fact that the DA is losing ground in elections. Whether their judgement was fair is hotly debated. But key for “imposter syndrome” is the judgement the panel passed on Maimane. He was, they said, <a href="https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/south-africa/2019-10-22-mmusi-maimane-inconsistent-and-conflict-averse/">“indecisive” and “conflict averse”</a>.</p>
<p>Given what we know about “imposter syndrome”, it is not hard to see why a committee composed entirely of members of the group that has run the party since it began should judge him this way. If Maimane was indecisive, it may be because he feared deep down that, if he did decide, he would be called out as a fraud by the people who ran the party – this happened anyway, despite his supposed indecision. It is even easier to see why someone conscious of being judged by people constantly testing whether he is “one of us” would want to avoid conflict.</p>
<p>It is also possible that Maimane was an “imposter” in the second sense – that what appeared indecisive and “conflict averse” was actually a different, and perhaps more effective, way of doing things.</p>
<p>The committee’s complaint that he was averse to conflicts may well say more about them than about him. Why is enjoying conflict a virtue? Should we not rather value people who avoid conflict? People with a different value system could see a “conflict averse” person as a “peace lover” or a “conciliator”. And “indecisiveness” could mean a refusal to take decisions the review committee and the rest of the party establishment want him to take, not a failure to decide.</p>
<p>The committee’s verdict on Maimane may be less an indictment of him than a judgement on it and the traditional DA leadership it represents. It suggests not an iota of sensitivity to the possibility that a black person elected to lead a traditionally white organisation may find it difficult to be decisive if she or he is subject to constant doubts about whether they really fit the role. Nor is it alive to the possibility that Maimane may have been doing things differently but better and that the organisation’s white leadership may have found that difficult.</p>
<p>All this has implications way beyond the DA. </p>
<h2>Widespread problem</h2>
<p>“Imposter syndrome” is quite likely widespread in South Africa among women and black men who hold senior positions in organisations that were led by men or white people.</p>
<p>The reason would be much the same as it is in the DA – most white-led or male-led organisations tend to think that they can absorb people who were excluded and promote them to leadership positions without changing the organisation. The way in which whites or men ran it in the past is assumed to be the only possible way it could run, and changing it would mean “lowering standards”. So, the black men or the women who occupy these posts become “imposters” if they want to do things differently, even if that would strengthen the organisation.</p>
<p>At the same time, the prejudices of groups who dominate can be very strong – so strong that the targets of the biases start to wonder deep down whether they are really unfit for the task. In South Africa, white men running large organisations and taking on complicated technical tasks has been the norm for decades and so people come to assume that only they could do these jobs. It is no surprise that black people and women who are perfectly capable of doing them wonder deep down whether they are really up to the task.</p>
<p>So, whether or not Maimane was good at leading the opposition, his resignation is important because it highlights one of the core problems of democratic South Africa - the assumption that the only way to do anything is the way white men did it in the past, and the damaging attitudes that produces on both sides of the divide.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/125826/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Friedman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Mmusi Maimane’s resignation highlights one of the core problems of democratic South Africa - the assumption that the only way to do anything is the way white men did it in the past.Steven Friedman, Professor of Political Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1255942019-10-21T15:13:08Z2019-10-21T15:13:08ZSouth Africa’s main opposition party shows signs of serious strain<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/297933/original/file-20191021-56194-1wuhp7c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Helen Zille's election as head of the Democratic Alliance's federal council has rattled many.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Nic Bothma</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, <a href="https://www.iol.co.za">elected</a> a new chairperson of its federal council this past weekend. Its choice – <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/helen-zille">Helen Zille</a>, former leader of the party, and former Premier of the Western Cape province – has sent shock waves through the party.</p>
<p>The immediate fallout from her reelection to the top DA post was the <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2019-10-21-joburg-mayor-herman-mashaba-resigns/">resignation of Herman Mashaba</a>, the DA mayor of South Africa’s largest city, Johannesburg. He decried Zille’s win as signalling a takeover of the party by rightwing elements.</p>
<p>Mashaba’s resignation is puzzling. A self-made businessman as well as a former chairman of a rightwing think tank, the <a href="https://www.freemarketfoundation.com/">Free Market Foundation</a>, his criticism of Zille seems misplaced. His views on economic issues are on the right of the political spectrum. And Mashaba sounds even more conservative than Zille on the issue of <a href="https://city-press.news24.com/Voices/herman-mashaba-timid-government-is-failing-to-deal-with-issue-of-undocumented-immigrants-20190910">undocumented immigrants</a>.</p>
<p>Zille was elected to the party’s top post because she remains popular among the DA’s membership base. She is also the last top DA leader with anti-apartheid struggle credentials dating back to the 1980s <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/end-conscription-campaign-ecc">End Conscription Campaign</a> and the veteran human rights organisation the <a href="https://www.blacksash.org.za/">Black Sash</a>.</p>
<p>But she’s also a hugely controversial figure. The reasons for this stem from comments she has made on Twitter in recent years, including a series in which she <a href="https://theconversation.com/zille-tweeting-and-inanity-more-reasons-for-white-south-africans-to-shut-up-75326">defended the legacy of colonialism</a>. </p>
<p>Her posts prompted stinging criticism from the DA’s national leader, <a href="https://www.enca.com/elections-2014/maimane-a-personal-profile">Mmusi Maimane</a>, as well as other black members of the party.</p>
<p>Zille’s appointment, Mashaba’s resignation and signs that there is a <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2019-10-17-da-election-review-recommends-maimane-step-down">concerted campaign</a> within certain quarters of the party to get rid of Maimane all point to a political party that’s in deep turmoil. This affects the DA’s strength as official opposition nationally.</p>
<h2>Tensions in the DA</h2>
<p>The DA can best be described, mostly, as a broad church of liberals. One point on its spectrum are what could be called “equal-opportunity liberals”. Mainly white liberals, this group tends to oppose affirmative action, arguing that it violates the principle that opportunities should be allocated on merit.</p>
<p>Another faction comprises “affirmative action or diversity liberals”. The group is mainly black and supports race-based affirmative action as a way of addressing the past injustices of apartheid.</p>
<p>These camps are divided – not entirely, but significantly – along colour lines. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/liberalism-in-south-africa-isnt-only-for-white-people-or-black-people-who-want-to-be-white-125236">Liberalism in South Africa isn't only for white people -- or black people who want to be white</a>
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<p>As well as policy, there are other dimensions to tensions within the party. </p>
<p>One is around the coalitions it established in three cities after elections in 2016 when neither the ANC nor the DA won sufficient support to run the councils.</p>
<p>In <a href="http://www.jonathanball.co.za/component/virtuemart/how-to-steal-a-city-detail?Itemid=6">Nelson Mandela Bay</a> the DA took over running the highly corrupt council by <a href="https://www.news24.com/elections/voices/what-a-coalition-could-mean-for-the-future-of-gauteng-south-africa-and-the-big-3-20190507">establishing a coalition</a> with a much smaller party, the United Democratic Movement. The partnership was fraught and finally collapsed in 2018 amid a great deal of acrimony.</p>
<p>In the cities of Tshwane, home to the country’s capital Pretoria, and Johannesburg, <a href="https://www.news24.com">the DA’s</a> toehold on power has been even more fragile. The DA is in a tactical alliance in both councils with the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) – the third largest party in the country, which presents itself as politically radical and to the left of the DA and ANC.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/da-review-report-agreeing-to-eff-support-in-joburg-tshwane-was-a-mistake-20191021">DA and EFF’s tactical alliance</a> involves the EFF supporting the DA’s mayors on a vote-by-vote basis, or abstaining from voting.</p>
<p>This appears to limit the DA from completely instituting the clean governance which it has made the showcase of its rule. </p>
<p>Another dimension to the DA’s current situation is that the party has two centres of power. Zille, as the newly elected chair of the federal council, the party’s highest decision-making structure in between its federal congresses, holds arguably the most powerful post in the DA. Maimane, as leader of the party, will be bound by the policy and strategic choices of the federal council led by Zille.</p>
<h2>What next</h2>
<p>It would be strategic for Zille and Maimane to immediately and seriously negotiate the relationship between themselves and between their posts. It will also be strategic for Zille to let a professional public relations officer handle her Twitter account in future.</p>
<p>Part of leadership is about making tough choices. One of these will be: does the DA relinquish power in Nelson Mandela Bay, in Johannesburg and in Tshwane, rather than taint its brand as the clean-up party? </p>
<p>If it fails to make these hard decisions it risks sliding even further in the polls. The party secured only 20.8% of the national poll in elections earlier this year.</p>
<p>This result is no doubt what’s brought the present tensions to a head – and not only about the future of Maimane. Other failures that have been pointed out include the DA losing Afrikaner voters to the rightwing Freedom Front Plus (FF+).</p>
<p>In 15 months the party will be in full campaigning mode for the local government elections in 2021. It will therefore need to finalise its leadership posts, its candidates, and its policies in the intervening months. </p>
<p>As well as preventing Afrikaner voters from swinging back to the Freedom Front Plus, the DA also needs to strategise how it plans to win back black votes, and win more of them than ever before. </p>
<p>For example, it needs to spell out its alternative options to affirmative action and black economic empowerment. This debate often goes under the title of “race as a proxy for disadvantage” – mostly economic disadvantage.</p>
<p>All told, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-democratic-alliance-at-60-big-strategic-questions-lie-ahead-117129">60-year-old </a> DA faces an interesting and complex year ahead. As the party grows larger, the coalition of viewpoints within it must also grow. Maybe it could learn a few lessons from the governing African National Congress, which brings together nationalists, communists and the labour movement, among other persuasions, in a veritable <a href="https://repository.up.ac.za/handle/2263/41039">broad church</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/125594/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Gottschalk is an ANC member, but writes this article in his professional capacity as a political scientist.</span></em></p>All signs point to the Democratic Alliance being in deep turmoil which will affect its strength as South Africa’s official opposition.Keith Gottschalk, Political Scientist, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1252372019-10-17T07:24:41Z2019-10-17T07:24:41ZA centrist political alliance in South Africa? Yes, but hard to get<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/297064/original/file-20191015-98678-1knve72.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African president Cyril Ramaphosa (L) is congratulated by Democratic Alliance leader Mmusi Maimane after being elected president.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Nic Bothma</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Is there the possibility that political centrists in South Africa’s governing party, the African National Congress (ANC), and its main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), could merge? </p>
<p>The question arises because there could be merit in the ANC under President Cyril Ramaphosa shedding elements obstructive to economic reform, while the DA under Mmusi Maimane could free itself from the baleful influence of an alleged old guard of whites seeking to impose an inappropriate version of liberalism upon a party attempting to widen its appeal to black South Africans.</p>
<p>Such a realignment of a governing party with the opposition would not be the first in South African history. Back in 1931, Prime Minister <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/james-barry-munnik-hertzog">JBM Hertzog</a>, leader of the ruling National Party, was facing a political crisis. His support was eroding as South Africa confronted the Depression.</p>
<p>Compounded with the worst drought in the country’s history, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/20780389.1990.10417176">the Depression</a> had seen unemployment reach crisis proportions, especially among poor Afrikaners – a major constituency of the National Party. Hertzog responded to the loss of political support by forging a coalition with the South African Party of General Jan Smuts, who joined him in wanting to rescue the economy.</p>
<p>The fortunes of the economy were strongly linked to <a href="https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-the-history-of-the-gold-standard-3306136">the gold standard</a>. Aided by the belated decision to follow Great Britain by taking South Africa off the gold standard, the economy soon began to show signs of recovery. </p>
<p>Hertzog’s and Smuts’ settlement of their political differences culminated in the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/hertzog-and-smuts-form-coalition">“fusing”</a> of their parties into the United Party in 1934.</p>
<p>However, this alienated so-called purists within the National Party under DF Malan. They crossed the floor into opposition, retaining the name and claiming the legacy of the National Party.</p>
<h2>Ramaphosa and Hertzog</h2>
<p>What has this ancient history got to do with 2019? Well, quite a lot, as the situation facing Ramaphosa today is not that different from Hertzog’s in 1931. Ramaphosa, too, faces an economic crisis and a loss of popular trust and support. </p>
<p>But there is also an important difference. In 1931 the South African parliament was operating under the Westminster system (minus black participation). As long as Hertzog and Smuts could take their parliamentary supporters with them, they could join their parties.</p>
<p>They did this by agreeing that the sitting members of parliament (MPs) would keep the seats they had won in the 1929 election. Today it is far from clear that Ramaphosa and Maimane could combine in the same way.</p>
<p>Under the Westminster-type system in 1931, MPs represented political parties, yet were elected by constituencies. If for any reason they chose to leave their political party, they retained their seats in parliament until the next election. At this point they would need to win reelection. And, as some of Malan’s supporters discovered in 1934, by opposing their former party they risked defeat.</p>
<p>MPs today lack that degree of independence. South Africa’s <a href="http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/SAConstitution-web-eng.pdf">Constitution</a> lays down that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>A person loses membership of a legislature … if that person ceases to be a member of the party which nominated that person as a member of the legislature (Annexure A, para. 13, 23A (1)).</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This implies that the political dynamic of coalition or “fusion” lies outside rather than inside the parliamentary arena. Put another way, even if Ramaphosa and Maimane both commanded majorities for coalescence among their parties’ MPs, the party machineries outside parliament might deprive pro-coalition MPs of their party memberships. </p>
<p>It would seem to follow that the MPs would then lose their seats in parliament and be replaced by individuals nominated by the party.</p>
<p>To achieve coalescence, control of party machinery appears to be more important than MPs’ support. Hertzog and Smuts dominated their parties in 1931 in a way that neither Ramaphosa nor Maimane does in 2019.</p>
<p>Both Ramaphosa and Maimane would need to win major battles outside parliament before securing a working alliance within parliament. There’s no guarantee that they could do either of those things. In any such political crisis, the losers would resort to the courts, not only to win their side of the political battle but to win control of their parties’ assets.</p>
<h2>Difficult mission</h2>
<p>It doesn’t mean that the formation of a centrist political alliance is impossible. But it does suggest that Ramaphosa would need to win a confrontation with the faction allied to his predecessor and nemesis, former President Jacob Zuma, that continues to occupy key positions in the ANC. Then he would have to try to bring labour federation Congress of South African Trade Unions and the South African Communist Party to the table. </p>
<p>Equally, it might demand that Maimane retain his leadership of the DA in the looming battle at the party’s Federal Council, and show he retains majority support among the party’s membership.</p>
<p>It all makes Ramaphosa’s ability to do a Hertzog much more difficult than it sounds at first.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/125237/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall has received funding from the National Research Foundation.</span></em></p>South Africa’s parliamentary system would make it difficult to achieve a fusion of parties.Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1252362019-10-17T07:24:36Z2019-10-17T07:24:36ZLiberalism in South Africa isn’t only for white people – or black people who want to be white<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/297078/original/file-20191015-98678-1dkpish.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of the Democratic Alliance in South Africa gather earlier this year to listen to the party's leaders.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Epa/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Liberalism is meant to be about freedom for all individuals, regardless of race. But linking liberalism to whiteness as is happening now is not new in South Africa. Most activists who fought for black freedom dismissed liberalism as a white ideology designed to tame black people, not to free them. </p>
<p>This was hardly surprising, since many white liberals spoke and acted as if liberalism was exactly that: the political philosopher Richard Turner <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/archive-files2/rejul72.8.pdf">wrote in the early 1970s</a> that white liberals believed that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>although blacks are not biologically inferior, they are culturally inferior. They may be educable, but they need whites to educate them. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>All of this implied that liberalism was not for black people who were proud to be black.</p>
<p>This background is essential if we want to understand the current conflict in South Africa’s official opposition, the Democratic Alliance (DA), and how it might have to end if liberalism is to survive and grow in the country’s democratic era.</p>
<h2>History of the Democratic Alliance</h2>
<p>The DA was originally a party for white, English-speaking, liberal suburbanites – it traces its ancestry back to the Progressive Party, formed in 1959 to contest elections at a time when only whites could vote. </p>
<p>After the 1999 general election, when it ran a campaign urging voters to “Fight Back” against the governing African National Congress (ANC), it picked up support from Afrikaans-speaking whites and those members of racial minorities (“Coloured” and Indian people) who feared the ANC.</p>
<p>Some years later, it began a campaign to recruit black African membership which was reasonably successful, although the party has never attracted many black African votes. According to a sympathetic estimate, it attracts <a href="https://www.news24.com/elections/news/da-claims-significant-shift-of-new-black-voters-to-the-party-but-numbers-suggest-otherwise-20190511">5% of the vote among the racial majority</a>. This culminated in the election of its current black leader, Mmusi Maimane, <a href="https://theconversation.com/first-black-leader-breathes-life-into-south-african-opposition-41275">in 2015</a>.</p>
<p>Few if any of its white leaders bargained for the likelihood that black members would, because of their differing experiences, see the DA’s role through different eyes. And so, they were shocked when black DA parliamentarians supported forms of race-based affirmative action which white liberals tend to oppose on the grounds that it violates the principle that jobs should be allocated by “merit”. </p>
<p>These tensions were hidden by the fact that the party was growing – until this year when it suffered setbacks in May’s general election which saw it <a href="https://www.biznews.com/leadership/2019/05/09/elections2019-national-vote-da-ff">lose five seats</a> in parliament. This was followed by <a href="https://www.thesouthafrican.com/news/da-by-election-losses-in-mpumalanga-bethal-october-2019/">severe losses</a> in municipal by-elections to its right and left. This has brought deep internal divisions into the public eye. </p>
<p>Race is the fault line. Prominent black DA figures label attempts to remove Maimane – plus the return of key white figures to important roles in the party – as an attempt by whites to force black members into a subordinate position. </p>
<p>This impression has been greatly enhanced by the fact that researchers at the South African Institute of Race Relations, a research organisation which has long been a fixture in the white liberal firmament, <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/think-tank-launches-campaign-to-save-das-direction-and-future-20191007">are campaigning</a> for Maimane’s replacement by a white leader on the grounds that this will show that the DA elects people on merit rather than race. </p>
<p>The claim that “merit” means choosing whites and that black incumbents always lack merit is a deeply rooted prejudice among many white South Africans.</p>
<h2>Liberalism debate</h2>
<p>Liberalism plays a core role in the dispute. This is because (mostly white) opponents of the party’s direction under Maimane claim it is now too close in worldview to the ANC and insist that the DA has strayed from its liberal roots and must rediscover them. The view was best summed up by former leader Helen Zille, who has emerged from retirement to contest a powerful position in the party. <a href="https://www.news24.com/Analysis/10-questions-to-helen-zille-its-a-fight-between-nationalists-and-liberalists-20191007">In her view</a>, the single and most important internal issue in the DA</p>
<blockquote>
<p>is the clash between racial nationalism and democratic liberalism.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It is not hard to see why that view appears to black DA supporters (and critics) as an expression of prejudice. Everyone knows that all the “racial nationalists” are black and that just about all the “democratic liberals” are white and so Zille’s understanding of liberalism seems to match Turner’s diagnosis.</p>
<p>“Racial nationalism” is wanting measures which will actively redress decades of legalised racial domination – “democratic liberalism” is expressing the view of the suburbs that black people should rely on hard work and the market, a convenient view from people who did so well out of legalised racial deprivation that they could afford to denounce it as someone else’s doing.</p>
<p>But aren’t Zille and her DA allies right to assume that liberalism is a (mainly) white view of the world? No. </p>
<p>South Africa has had, and still has, many black liberals; the problem for the white DA leadership is not that they are nationalists but that their liberalism is influenced by their experience as black South Africans.</p>
<h2>Black liberalism</h2>
<p>Black liberalism has deep roots in South Africa. During the 1950s, the short-lived Liberal Party boasted among its leadership black liberals such as <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/henry-selby-msimang">Selby Msimang</a> and <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/jordan-kush-ngubane">Jordan Ngubane</a>, both of whom began political life in the ANC. Under their influence, its branches in Natal province rallied to the cause of black farmers who were forced off their land by apartheid. </p>
<p>This was a liberal issue – the denial of property rights on racial grounds. But it was also a burning issue for many black people in Natal because of its campaign, the party attracted a substantial black membership in the province.</p>
<p>The Liberal Party was divided – its Cape branch harboured many of the prejudices which Turner criticised. But its Natal and Transvaal branches’ support for votes for all adults (the Cape group wanted educational and property qualifications which would have denied most black people the vote) and its support for civil disobedience (and in some cases armed insurrection) to defeat apartheid showed that a liberalism which spoke to the black experience was possible in South Africa. </p>
<p>Strains of liberal thought could also be found within the historic liberation movements, the ANC and the Pan-Africanist Congress.</p>
<p>Today, a liberalism led by black people who do not wish to become white may be even more possible. The black professional and business class has grown substantially over the last quarter of a century. Many of its members don’t feel at home in any of the political parties. While many may find liberalism unappealing, a substantial number might endorse it enthusiastically as long as it does not confuse whiteness with liberalism.</p>
<h2>Opportunity amid travail</h2>
<p>The DA’s current travails may be an opportunity for South African liberalism. For some time, political gossip has had it that parts of its white rump want to break away and form a “liberal” party in which white suburbanites can feel at home. But a far more credible breakaway may be one led by its black members who could seek to link up to other liberal currents in black South Africa to form a party whose liberalism would reflect the black experience.</p>
<p>Whether that happens or not, black liberalism in South Africa is not a contradiction in terms. A party which expresses it could become an important fixture in the country’s politics.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/125236/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Friedman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Race is the fault line. Prominent black DA figures label attempts to remove leader Mmusi Maimane as an attempt by whites to force black members into a subordinate position.Steven Friedman, Professor of Political Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1251692019-10-15T08:33:40Z2019-10-15T08:33:40ZA turbulent transition: South Africa’s opposition party faces a rocky future<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/296710/original/file-20191011-96252-11z9080.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mmusi Maimane, leader of South Africa's main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Elections are moments of reckoning. They can either project a party onto a new trajectory or force a party into introspection.</p>
<p>South Africa’s main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), has experienced both scenarios in the last two decades. In the <a href="https://www.da.org.za/why-the-da/history">1999 elections</a> it increased its support by <a href="https://elections.thesouthafrican.com/south-africa-election-results-1999/">almost 8%</a>. For the next 14 years – until 2016 – the DA consistently increased its support in all the elections. Then in 2019 the tide turned and the party lost about 1.5% at the polls. This saw it losing five parliamentary seats, bringing its number of MPs down to <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/NPEDashboard/app/dashboard.html">84 in the 400 seat National Assembly</a>.</p>
<p>A year before the 2016 election, Mmusi Maimane introduced a new epoch in the DA’s history as the first black person to lead the party.</p>
<p>That in itself introduced a transition phase in the party, and a period of turbulence. </p>
<p>The DA is different to South Africa’s governing party, the African National Congress (ANC), in a number of critical respects. While the ANC represents a broad church of interests, the DA is a blended party made up of disparate extant parties. Between 1977 and 1989 it was known as the Progressive Federal Party. Then from 1989 to 2000 it was called the Democratic Party. In 2000 it merged with other parties to become the DA. The party’s name changes are reflected in its membership composition. </p>
<p>During the early 1990s the then Democratic Party participated actively in the country’s constitutional negotiations. It promoted a federal dispensation and made important contributions to formulations around human rights. After the 1994 election it declined to join the unity government but preferred to <a href="https://www.enca.com/opinion/twenty-years-too-late-da">play the role of a critical opposition</a>.</p>
<p>Because it’s a blend of political influences the transition it is facing has, inevitably, had an existential effect on the party.</p>
<p>This is what it’s experiencing at the moment. </p>
<p>In the last number of weeks Maimane’s leadership has become the main focus of attention. But there are other tensions too. The most important is who will take over as the chair of the Federal Council, the party’s governing body between congresses. The former party leader, Helen Zille, has entered the fray <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/p1-helen-zille-says-she-wants-to-be-next-da-federal-council-chairperson-20191004">for the position</a>.</p>
<h2>The party’s transition</h2>
<p>For more than a decade Zille led a drive to transform the party’s identity. Whereas her predecessor Tony Leon’s notion was that the DA should be a critical opposition party, she relaunched it as a <a href="https://www.news24.com/MyNews24/YourStory/DA-We-didnt-copy-Obama-20081117">party of government</a>.</p>
<p>Her role as the mayor of Cape Town since 2006, and later as Premier of the Western Cape province, were the manifestations of this new identity.</p>
<p>Zille, but more so her successor, Maimane also sought to shift the party’s philosophical base. The DA, and its antecedents were all cut from the cloth of <a href="https://irr.org.za/reports/books/between-two-fires-holding-the-liberal-centre-in-south-african-politics">classical South African liberalism</a>. </p>
<p>Its main principles were: individuals form the core of a society; a free market economy and a minimum state with a strong private sector have to provide opportunities for the individual; universal human rights have to protect these principles; and opportunities have to be determined by an individual’s personal merits and not by a shared group identity. </p>
<p>The party also believed in economic growth as the panacea for most social or developmental problems.</p>
<p>The philosophical changes pursued particularly by Maimane have been towards a hybrid form of social democracy with some liberal components. </p>
<p>This shift has seen the party accepting affirmative action in several contexts, such as in employment (in the form of employment equity), in economic restructuring (in the form of black economic empowerment) and land reform. This is in stark contrast to its traditional “open opportunities society” vision. This has led to a standoff between the traditional liberals and new members of the party who support the country’s transformation agenda aimed at redressing past injustices.</p>
<p>Finally, the party’s transition also involves a change in its internal balance of power. Since its time as the Progressive Federal Party in the 1980s, its constituency was concentrated in the Western Cape, followed by Gauteng. </p>
<p>But this has dipped and there’s been less of a focus on the Western Cape while under Maimane’s leadership there’s been a definite shift towards Gauteng as well as a deliberate effort to galvanise support in other provinces. </p>
<h2>Turbulence</h2>
<p>What are the symptoms of this turbulence?</p>
<p>The first is the potpourri of individuals with strong personalities, ambitions and who are not always willing to be team players. </p>
<p>A number of examples illustrate this. There was the former parliamentary leader, Lindiwe Mazibuko, who clashed with Zille and Maimane, <a href="https://www.news24.com/Analysis/analysis-race-redress-and-liberalism-how-the-da-lost-its-way-20191010">and then resigned</a>. </p>
<p>Another is the very divisive break of Patricia de Lille, the DA’s mayor of Cape Town, with her Metropolitan Council and executives. And then there was the resignation of Gwen Ngwenya as the party’s policy head because of differences with party leaders, citing what she called an <a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/opinion/how-race-poisoned-the-da">“liberal slide-way” in its policies</a>. </p>
<p>Another symptom of, and contributing factor to, the turbulence has been the DA’s relationship with the radical Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) since the 2016 municipal elections. The party entered into a “strategic cooperation” in municipalities in Johannesburg, Tshwane and Nelson Mandela Bay, after elections that saw them <a href="https://www.news24.com/elections/voices/what-a-coalition-could-mean-for-the-future-of-gauteng-south-africa-and-the-big-3-20190507">unseat their common rival, the ANC</a>.</p>
<p>But the cooperation wasn’t built on a firm foundation. The EFF <a href="https://www.polity.org.za/article/eff-withdraws-support-for-da-anc-2019-07-02">announced</a> the end of cooperation with any other party at municipal level in July 2019. This led the DA’s local governments into a phase of perpetual uncertainty. It particularly affected the Tshwane government.</p>
<p>More philosophical but with tangible policy implications, the intensity of the debate on liberalism has also been symptomatic of the turbulence in the DA. </p>
<p>On the one hand are the proponents of the liberal vision of society in which individuals’ opportunities and life are determined by their personal qualities. </p>
<p>On the other hand is the liberal vision that accepts a society with structural inequalities, such as South Africa, cannot be addressed at the individual level, but only collectively. </p>
<p>These two trends don’t directly correlate with a black and white binary in the DA. But it has underscored issues of racial identity or even narrow nationalism in the party.</p>
<h2>What now</h2>
<p>The 2019 election results are closely associated with the ongoing turbulence. Maimane’s leadership in particular has been a factor. He’s been criticised for several reasons. </p>
<p>One goes back to his performance during the campaign and thereafter, when he continued to attack President Cyril Ramaphosa. But the public mood was going the other way. A significant number of DA supporters in Gauteng and the Western Cape gave their national votes to the ANC. This was presumably in support of Ramaphosa, because of his strong anti-corruption stance. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/what-the-four-da-candidates-vying-for-james-selfes-position-have-to-offer-20191005">two main contenders</a> to replace James Selfe as the DA’s federal council chairperson are Zille and Athol Trollip. </p>
<p>They represent two very different options. A win for Trollip would strengthen Maimane’s position. A success for Zille could be seen as part of a fight-back campaign by the Western Cape party establishment to regain lost ground. </p>
<p>What do all of this mean for the DA? The party has made steady progress as the official opposition despite new parties entering the fray. It also presented an alternative to the ANC and the EFF. Both are preoccupied with internal matters. This means that it’s a critical moment for multiparty politics to build trust with the public again.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/125169/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dirk Kotze does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Because it’s a blend of political influences the transition it is facing has, inevitably, had an existential effect on the Democratic Alliance.Dirk Kotze, Professor in Political Science, University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1171292019-05-16T09:26:24Z2019-05-16T09:26:24ZSouth Africa’s Democratic Alliance at 60: big strategic questions lie ahead<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/274629/original/file-20190515-60532-7moy05.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Democratic Alliance has transformed itself from an overwhelmingly white party to a majority black party. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>At the one extreme, South Africa’s governing party, the African National Congress (ANC), celebrates every possible historic anniversary of its life and struggles. At the opposite extreme, the main opposition Democratic Alliance (DA) has so far not said one word that 2019 marks its diamond jubilee – its 60th anniversary.</p>
<p>The DA was <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/south-african-general-elections-1961">founded in 1959</a> by <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/helen-suzman">12 MPS as a breakaway </a> from the now deceased United Party. One of them was Helen Suzman, who became world famous for opposing apartheid, maximising the opportunities offered by Parliamentary question time. Its first name was the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Progressive-Party-political-party-South-Africa">Progressive Party</a> – one of five names it would call itself over the next six decades. </p>
<p>The DA has risen to become the official opposition. Following recent elections in the country it has 84 members of Parliament.</p>
<p>The DA seems to be the eighth-longest surviving party in Africa. It is a respected member of both the <a href="https://liberal-international.org/">Liberal International</a> and the <a href="https://www.africaliberalnetwork.org/">African Liberal Network</a>.</p>
<p>The DA has spent the last 60 years in opposition nationally. But it’s gained a toehold in local and provincial government. It has governed the Western Cape province for a decade, the City of Cape Town for 13 years, and more recently Tshwane, Johannesburg and Midvaal in Gauteng, the country’s economic hub, among other cities.</p>
<p>This remarkable history merits a snapshot. The DA is the only party from the apartheid parliament to survive – and indeed flourish – in the democratic parliament since 1994. Alongside the <a href="https://www.sacp.org.za/">South African Communist Party</a>, and the now deceased <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/liberal-party-south-africa-lpsa">Liberal Party of South Africa</a>, it is the only party to transform itself from an overwhelmingly white party into a majority black party.</p>
<h2>A short history</h2>
<p>After it was launched as the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/organisations/democratic-alliance-da">Progressive Party in 1959</a>, the architect of apartheid and then Prime Minister <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/hendrik-frensch-verwoerd">Hendrik Verwoerd </a>, called an early whites-only <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/south-african-general-elections-1961">election in 1961</a>. Only <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Helen-Suzman">Helen Suzman</a> retained her seat. </p>
<p>The “Progs”, as everyone called them, also included a few Coloured members since they were founded. (“Coloureds” is an apartheid-era term for mixed-race persons, plus Khoisan descendants). This so enraged the apartheid government that it passed the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/prohibition-of-political-interference-act%2C-act-no-51-of-1968">Prohibition of Political Interference Act</a> in 1968, which forced parties to be segregated. The Liberal Party dissolved; the Progs’ few Coloured members resigned. When the law was repealed in 1985, some rejoined.</p>
<p>In 1974 the Progs won six seats in Parliament, changed their name in 1975 to the Progressive Reform Party, then to the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Progressive-Federal-Party">Progressive Federal Party</a> in 1977. In that year they also modernised their policy to advocate universal franchise and went on to win seats in Parliament. They became the official opposition until 1987, when the racist <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02424/04lv02730/05lv03188/06lv03198.htm">Konservatiewe Party</a> (to the right of the apartheid regime) overtook them in numbers of MPs. </p>
<p>In 1989 the Progressive Federal Party changed its name to the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/democratic-party-dp">Democratic Party</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/274635/original/file-20190515-60554-qusuad.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/274635/original/file-20190515-60554-qusuad.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/274635/original/file-20190515-60554-qusuad.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/274635/original/file-20190515-60554-qusuad.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/274635/original/file-20190515-60554-qusuad.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/274635/original/file-20190515-60554-qusuad.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/274635/original/file-20190515-60554-qusuad.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Helen Suzman was a lone liberal voice in the apartheid Parliament.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Attila Kisbenedek</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Throughout these decades Suzman used Parliament to relentlessly expose the atrocities of apartheid, and did whatever she could to ameliorate the plight of political prisoners from the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan Africanist Congress(PAC), Liberal Party, and Azanian People’s Organisation (<a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/azanian-peoples-organization-azapo">Azapo</a>). </p>
<p>During the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (<a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/convention-democratic-south-africa-codesa">Codesa</a>) negotiations to establish democracy, which started in December 1991, the party played an important role in ensuring that the rule of law, human rights, and other democratic prerequisites were entrenched in the country’s new constitution.</p>
<p>The party again increased its votes under Tony Leon’s leadership to become the official opposition in 1999. In 2003 it adopted its fifth name, the <a href="https://www.da.org.za/why-the-da/history">Democratic Alliance</a>, or DA.</p>
<p>In 2007 the DA negotiated a coalition that replaced the ANC in governing the City of Cape Town. In the general 2009 elections the party won the Western Cape province. In 2016, it negotiated a <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africans-come-off-second-best-as-politicians-play-havoc-with-coalitions-102671">tactical voting alliance</a> with the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) which enabled it to appoint the mayors of Tshwane (the executive capital) and Johannesburg, the largest city. </p>
<p>The DA, led by Mmusi Maimane, peaked in the 2016 municipal elections, winning <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/lgedashboard2016/leaderboard.aspx">26.9% of the vote</a>.</p>
<p>The DA won 20.8% of the 2019 general election – a 2 percentage point drop compared with the <a href="https://www.enca.com/news/official-election-2019-results-announced">last national poll</a>. It has been allocated 84 seats in Parliament’s National Assembly. The provincial election result saw it retain control of the Western Cape province. </p>
<h2>Changes</h2>
<p>Over the last decade the party has transformed its leadership and elected representatives that are a much better reflection of the country’s demographic make up. </p>
<p>In policy terms the DA is a mix of liberal and social democratic. On the one hand, it has a reputation as being anti trade unions and its <a href="https://cdn.da.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/22160849/A4-Manifesto-Booklet-Digital.pdf">2019 election manifesto</a> effectively called for halving sectoral minimum wages. </p>
<p>On the other hand, it has proposed leaving social grants in place as well as doubling the child care grant to R800 a month. It claims its research indicates that mothers with child grants have a better record of getting jobs than those without. It also proposes paid state internships for unemployed school-leavers. </p>
<p>Like all modern political parties, the DA has a youth wing, <a href="https://www.da.org.za/get-involved/da-youth">DAY</a>, and a womens’ wing, <a href="https://www.da.org.za/dawn">DAWN</a>.</p>
<h2>Policies and challenges</h2>
<p>The DA’s drop in the latest election suggests it has lost some Afrikaner voters to the Vryheid Front Plus, a party on the right of the political spectrum which totally opposes land expropriation without compensation, and fights for “the white and coloured victims of affirmative action”. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-who-why-and-what-of-south-africas-minority-afrikaner-party-116913">The who, why and what of South Africa's minority Afrikaner party</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<p>The DA needs to debate strategic choices. Should it adopt policies like those of the 1990s Tony Leon to win back Afrikaner voters? Or should it adopt policies and strategies which will win over bigger numbers of black voters?</p>
<p>Under apartheid, the party’s racist opponents jeered that the acronym PFP stood for “Packing for Perth” when many white South Africans emigrated to Australia. The DA turned that on its head by founding <a href="https://www.da.org.za/get-involved/da-abroad">DA Abroad</a> to enrol members among South Africa’s diaspora.</p>
<p>But despite its endurance, the DA still hasn’t found a firm foothold to grow its votes in South Africa’s changing political landscape.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/117129/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Gottschalk is an ANC member, but writes this article in his professional capacity as a political scientist and historian.</span></em></p>Despite its endurance, the Democratic Alliance still hasn’t found a firm foothold to grow the votes in South Africa’s changing political landscape.Keith Gottschalk, Political Scientist, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1165432019-05-06T14:04:57Z2019-05-06T14:04:57ZLocal radio is plugging gaps in South Africa’s mainstream media coverage<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/272748/original/file-20190506-103045-nwynul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Local communities have taken advantage of campaign trail visits by leaders such as President Cyril Ramaphosa.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Epa/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Beyond the choreographed photo opportunities and big rallies, there is a local dimension to South Africa’s election campaign that is going largely unnoticed by the national media. As a result, important insights into political dynamics are being missed.</p>
<p>Media coverage is dominated by the speeches and activities of the national party leaders, analysts’ commentary and opinion polls. If communities appear, it is when violent protests erupt as did in <a href="https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/south-africa/2019-04-08-support-and-sympathy-for-alex-residents-as-protests-continue/">Alexandra</a>, near Johannesburg. They also appear in carefully scripted events designed to show that leaders are in tune with the electorate: Mmusi Maimane of the opposition Democratic Alliance (DA) poses <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2019/05/02/maimane-on-campaign-trail-in-stanger">outside a shack</a>, the governing African National Congress’s Ace Magashule peers into somebody’s fridge. <a href="https://www.news24.com/Columnists/Redi_Tlhabi/redi-tlhabi-ancs-poverty-porn-parade-a-reflection-of-its-detachment-from-the-people-20190113">A poverty porn parade,</a> one commentator has called it.</p>
<p>And yet after the big party roadshow has moved on, the election campaign continues at community level. Inevitably, as local politicians weigh in to rally support for their parties, they have to address local issues.</p>
<p>Research has shown that the mainstream media have a blind spot when it comes to community perspectives. Leading academic <a href="https://www.biznews.com/briefs/2012/10/14/miners-voices-absent-from-initial-marikana-coverage-analysis-by-jane-duncan">Jane Duncan’s well known research</a> into coverage of the 2012 <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/marikana-massacre-16-august-2012">Marikana massacre</a> in which police shot 34 striking miners dead, showed how the media ignored the voices of the striking miners. This led to a serious distortion of initial reporting. <a href="https://theconversation.com/voices-of-the-poor-are-missing-from-south-africas-media-53068">Other research </a>has focused on the wider absence of poor people’s voices from media coverage.</p>
<p>A new initiative hosted by the <a href="http://wits.journalism.co.za/wits-radio-academy/">Wits Radio Academy</a> seeks to draw on community radio reporting to help fill the gap. The <a href="https://localvoices.co.za/">LocalVoices</a> initiative supports community radio reporters by publishing their stories on its website and associated social media to give them a wider platform. This means these reports can be read by a wider audience and are available for reuse by participating radio stations.</p>
<p>The project was launched in collaboration with the <a href="https://www.childrensradiofoundation.org/">Children’s Radio Foundation</a>, <a href="https://africacheck.org/">Africa Check</a>, the Media Development and Diversity <a href="https://www.mdda.org.za/">Agency</a> and the <a href="https://www.osf.org.za/">Open Society Foundation</a>.</p>
<h2>Community radio in South Africa</h2>
<p>South Africa’s community radio sector is large, with well over 200 stations and a weekly listenership of around <a href="https://docs.google.com/viewerng/viewer?url=https://brcsa.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/BRC-RAM-Release-Presentation_February-2019-FINAL.pdf&hl=en">8.3m people </a> -– 25% of the regular adult audience. Despite their significant reach, a lack of resources and skills have fuelled chronic instability in many.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, the LocalVoices project has shown that the stations have thrown themselves into the political discussion with gusto. Many host political debates between parties and the communities whose votes they seek.</p>
<p>Local events have also given smaller political parties the opportunity to be heard. There are a record 48 parties on the ballot and many of the smaller parties haven’t commanded much national attention. </p>
<p>Sometimes, the topics have been surprising. For instance, Durban’s Vibe FM hosted an election debate on <a href="https://localvoices.co.za/2019/04/09/local-arts-finance-becomes-election-issue/">local arts funding</a>.</p>
<p>But community engagement with the political process goes beyond debates, using the opportunity to press for local issues to be addressed. Clearly, disaffection runs very deep, and a wide range of issues regarding the poor provision of basic services - from roads to schools. For example, issues around water have been prominent.</p>
<p>Water shortages were central to a party debate hosted on <a href="https://localvoices.co.za/2019/04/12/water-shortages-take-centre-stage-at-the-sekhukhune-elections-debate-2/">Sekhukhune Community Radio</a> in Limpopo, and <a href="https://localvoices.co.za/2019/04/24/indwedwe-municipality-accused-of-sabotaging-water-supply/">Ndwedwe</a>, outside Durban.</p>
<p>Even though it’s clearly a major concern in many communities, the issue of water hasn’t been highlighted by political parties.</p>
<h2>Tactics</h2>
<p>Of significance also are the tactics being used by communities to gain politicians’ attention.</p>
<p><a href="https://localvoices.co.za/2019/03/22/ekuvukeni-community-in-ladysmith-abandon-meeting-with-mec-kaunda/">Nqubeko FM in Ladysmith has reported</a> how the community of Ekuvukeni demanded that President Cyril Ramaphosa should intervene over a series of local demands, including broken sewage pipes and water supply. They made the demand after refusing to listen to the provincial minister for community safety. </p>
<p>When Ramaphosa later visited a small coal mining town, Dannhauser, 75 km away, a delegation from Ekuvukeni hopped onto a bus to <a href="https://localvoices.co.za/2019/04/18/residents-crash-school-opening-to-question-ramaphosa/">put their concerns to him</a>. They failed to address him on that day, but Ramaphosa did later <a href="https://localvoices.co.za/2019/04/23/ramaphosa-visits-ladysmith/">visit Ekuvukeni</a>, and promised to attend to their problems.</p>
<p>Similarly, a community called Marikana, outside Potchefstroom in the North West Province, refused to let the mayor hold an election debate, insisting he come and listen to them at a community meeting instead. <a href="https://localvoices.co.za/2019/04/10/marikana-communitys-election-tactic-to-get-housing/">According to Aganang FM</a>, he came and promised to address their housing needs. He even promised to start taking action before the election.</p>
<h2>Doing democracy differently</h2>
<p>The strong <a href="https://www.municipaliq.co.za/">upsurge</a> in community protests in the first months of the year has been widely noted by the national media. But local radio reports have shed light on the fact that it’s been incorrect to assume that protests are always violent.</p>
<p>Instead, it becomes clear that communities are using a wide range of tactics to draw attention to their issues. The opportunity is clear: usually aloof politicians are on the ground, appealing for votes, and this presents a chance to hold them to account. Time and again, one sees communities threatening to withhold their votes.</p>
<p>In other words, communities are using the election to “do democracy” in a different form, beyond exercising the vote.</p>
<p>The LocalVoices project shows up the weaknesses of mainstream media coverage, which focuses too strongly on the big names, the major drama and the grand narrative. Individually, the radio stories have mainly local significance. But, read together, new nuance and important patterns and dynamics emerge.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/116543/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Franz Krüger is Director of the Wits Radio Academy, which initiated the project discussed. The Wits Radio Academy received funding from the Open Society Foundation for the project. </span></em></p>Community radio stations have thrown themselves into the political discussion with gusto.Franz Krüger, Adjunct Professor of Journalism and Director of the Wits Radio Academy, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1161802019-05-01T09:42:33Z2019-05-01T09:42:33ZSouth Africa’s black middle class is battling to find a political home<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/271553/original/file-20190429-194627-1inzf5y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">None of South Africa's political parties are offering middle class black people a home.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s black middle class is growing numerically – and growing politically restive. But does it see the world differently from others? Does this translate into voting behaviour? </p>
<p>These questions require close consideration because the black middle class is already a critical constituency in some of the country’s wealthier provinces such as Gauteng, and is looking for a political home that’s stable and serves its class interests.</p>
<p>The post-apartheid project was meant to unlock the economic energies of all South Africans. But sluggish economic performance, coupled with a decade of <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-09-14-00-definition-of-state-capture">state capture</a> and the scorn former President Jacob Zuma felt towards <a href="https://www.news24.com/Archives/City-Press/Zuma-scolds-clever-blacks-20150429">“clever blacks”</a>, has left the black middle class angry and wary. </p>
<p>They are angry at their exclusion from mainstream economic activity, where “boardroom racism” and a <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-african-business-must-tackle-its-deeply-rooted-prejudice-94686">racial ceiling are clearly at work</a>. And they are wary that unless they are members of the governing African National Congress (ANC’s) “charmed circle”, their chances of accessing state funds – normally required to help grow and stabilise the indigenous bourgeoisie after liberation – are at best slender. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2019-03-10-anc-poll-says-it-is-winning-white-voters/">recent survey</a> conducted for the ANC and which the party has not released publicly, asked over 3 000 Gauteng voters a range of questions about attitudes to politics past and present. The survey <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2019-03-10-anc-poll-says-it-is-winning-white-voters/">showed</a> that there are stresses and strains in the body politic in general, many of which are most acutely felt by the black middle class.</p>
<p>As a young man from Johannesburg put it in a focus group:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The one thing that is changing that is killing the ANC is the individuals inside. There literally is a clique, if you belong to this clique within the party, you will be all right and if you are against any of their ideas, you are pushed to the side.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The implications for the ruling party are clear: if its policy of appointing party loyalists to government positions <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321223498_The_African_National_Congress_ANC_and_the_Cadre_Deployment_Policy_in_the_Postapartheid_South_Africa_A_Product_of_Democratic_Centralisation_or_a_Recipe_for_a_Constitutional_Crisis">(cadre deployment</a> and state capture (or even overt patronage) remain the order of the day, the black middle class will simply withdraw all support from the ANC. This would be a dire indictment of the ruling party.</p>
<h2>Definition challenges</h2>
<p>Many academics, correctly, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03057070.2017.1379700">spend a lot of time</a> worrying about the precision of various definitions of (middle) class. These range from occupation to income and education to consumption, through to subjective self-identification. They also correctly bemoan the clumsiness of survey attempts to measure class <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OqkBEv58wzs">in all its nuances</a>. </p>
<p>While accepting the weaknesses of most definitions, we nonetheless need to develop and use what we can to try to understand if such a class exists, and what its political behaviour might be.</p>
<p>In this case, we started with a household income in excess of R11 000 a month. This is scarcely a princely income, but analysed in the context of <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/race-and-ethnicity-south-africa">“black African”</a> income generally, it certainly includes the “middle stata”. </p>
<p>To make the definition more nuanced we included those who self-identified as upper-middle class (or, in less than 2% of cases, “upper class”). </p>
<p>As the voting intention graphic below shows, even with this rough and ready definition, there seem to be different political dynamics at play for the black middle class.</p>
<h2>Voting patterns</h2>
<p>The graph makes a number of key issues clear. Firstly, the ANC has held – or regained - the loyalty of the majority of black middle class Gautengers, but only just. Where 63% of non-middle class black Africans in Gauteng (who were registered to vote) told us they will vote ANC, this dropped to 56% among the black middle class. Their loyalty is remarkable, given the past decade.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/271485/original/file-20190429-194609-18v3jfm.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/271485/original/file-20190429-194609-18v3jfm.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=437&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271485/original/file-20190429-194609-18v3jfm.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=437&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271485/original/file-20190429-194609-18v3jfm.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=437&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271485/original/file-20190429-194609-18v3jfm.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=550&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271485/original/file-20190429-194609-18v3jfm.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=550&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271485/original/file-20190429-194609-18v3jfm.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=550&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Part of the reason is the state of the Democratic Alliance (DA), the leading opposition party. The DA should be the natural home for an emergent and ambitious middle class, with its talk of equal opportunities, its general dislike of <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Economy/Cadre-deployment-contradicts-NDP-DA-20130508">cadre deployment</a> and its strident attacks on ANC corruption. However, the DA is deeply divided - over race. </p>
<p>The DA committed policy <em>seppuku</em> as the election approached, with its members and <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/mmusi-maimane-feels-pressure-as-white-privilege-race-row-rocks-da-20180506">commentators freely attacking party leader</a> Mmusi Maimane over the issue for fear of alienating their traditional, rather tribal, white voter base. Any mention of race, or redress, or race-based inequality, it seems, was to be banished - while asking those at the receiving end of racism to vote DA. </p>
<p>The signal to black middle class South Africans was clear: fears that the DA remained a “white” party, or a party in hock to white interests, remained; and they were unlikely to be terribly welcome. This remarkable pre-election behaviour split the uneasy alliance of those previously opposed to Zuma and everything he and the ANC represented before Cyril Ramaphosa became the party leader. It seems to have driven those who dipped their toes in DA waters back to the ANC fold, or into the arms of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) or - for a significant number - into the political wilderness.</p>
<p>The ANC has never been able to sustain a strong appeal to higher educated or higher income voters. The DA has now fallen back dramatically in these areas, and the graphic makes it clear that the EFF hold more appeal to black middle class voters than the DA. Whether this is because of their <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/politics/2121794/malemas-membership-of-exclusive-inanda-club-divides-opinion/">strident opposition</a> to racism, or is done to fire warning salvos across the bows of both ANC and DA, the result is that the DA and EFF are fighting for the same small portion of black middle class votes - which are unavailable to the ANC - albeit from vastly different ideological positions. </p>
<p>The ANC continues to enjoy the lion’s share of black middle class votes from those willing to vote. But for how long?</p>
<h2>The apathy</h2>
<p>While 67% of black middle class voters do intend to vote, a third will stay at home on 8 May, cursing all political parties for failing to represent their interests, according to the survey. Chunks of the black middle class may vote, but far from enthusiastically. And a great many will not vote.</p>
<p>Among those who said they would vote, according to our survey results, 17% “don’t know” (or won’t tell) who they will vote for – even though many had previously overcome their unhappiness at the perceived “whiteness” of the DA:</p>
<p>And, as commentator Nkateko Mabasa <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2019-04-23-as-i-experience-class-mobility-will-i-protect-my-interests-like-the-das-black-middle-class/?utm_medium=email&utm_source=SaveLater&utm_campaign=daily-email-alert">puts it</a>, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>although most black South Africans will continue to regard the DA as a white party … there is a growing number of black middle-class liberals who are tired of being ashamed for being regarded as “coconuts” [black on the outside, white on the inside].</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Maimane was a very powerful magnet for black middle class voters, but as his party rounded on him over race, white privilege and the need to maintain the white vote, Ramaphosa has inevitably exerted his own magnetic pull. He is charismatic and emblematic of what the black middle class can achieve. It is therefore no surprise that DA support in this key segment has all but evaporated. </p>
<p>Those who will never forgive the ANC its past sins are either opting out or voting EFF. The question for the future is whether any current party can reflect the needs and aspirations of the black middle class - who, importantly, are black as well as middle class - or whether they represent the social base of some not-yet formed political party.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/116180/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Everatt received funding from donors for this survey, conducted on behalf of the African National Congress (Gauteng).</span></em></p>The black middle class are angry at their exclusion from mainstream economic activity.David Everatt, Head of Wits School of Governance, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1018282018-08-22T13:27:09Z2018-08-22T13:27:09ZWhy South Africa’s main opposition isn’t gaining traction against the ANC<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/232883/original/file-20180821-149466-3b48vq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Democratic Alliance leader, Mmusi Maimane is struggling to grow the party further.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Nic Bothma</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>After more than two decades in power, South Africa’s ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC) is in severe trouble. The euphoria around the appointment of the new president Cyril Ramaphosa is <a href="https://theconversation.com/enough-promises-its-time-the-anc-acted-on-south-africas-big-economic-issue-100975">rapidly fading</a> as he increasingly encounters <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1997772/ramaphosa-and-his-hitman-gordhan-accused-of-foul-play-report/">resistance</a> from within the party to a thorough cleansing of the state.</p>
<p>On top of this the financial crises in key public utilities seem to be getting worse while <a href="https://theconversation.com/enough-promises-its-time-the-anc-acted-on-south-africas-big-economic-issue-100975">key economic indicators</a> like unemployment, production and inflation are rapidly deteriorating.</p>
<p>You would think that amid all of this the prospect of the official opposition, the Democratic Alliance (DA), displacing the ANC at the next election would be getting better. But the latest polls indicate that the DA’s support has <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/politics/2018-03-08-poll-shows-da-support-is-in-doldrums/">shrunk</a> since the last election. The party’s prospects of equalling its performance at the last national poll – when it obtained <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/politics/2018-03-08-poll-shows-da-support-is-in-doldrums/">23%</a> of the national vote – look dim. </p>
<p>What, then, is going on?</p>
<p>There are a whole host of reasons to point to. The first is that Ramaphosa, despite his initial post-Zuma popularity having been punctured, remains a far more <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1979125/ramaphosa-sees-a-boost-in-approval-rating/">impressive and weighty</a> figure than the DA’s leader, Mmusi Maimane. </p>
<p>Part of Maimane’s problem is that DA’s attraction to many has been its claim to represent cleaner and more efficient government. But these claims are being severely tested as it faces the dilemmas and temptations of running the three major metros it took control over after the <a href="https://www.news24.com/elections/news/who-won-what-in-which-metro-20160806">2016 local government elections</a>. </p>
<p>It gained control by forging awkward coalitions with the <a href="https://www.news24.com/Books/coalition-country-a-toxic-homecoming-for-the-eff-20180501">Economic Freedom Fighters</a> (to whose principles it’s bitterly opposed) and other smaller parties. This has meant that its hold on power has often looked fragile, and it’s had to engage in all sorts of wheeler-dealing. Necessary, but not good for the image. Meanwhile, the party allowed its fight with its Cape Town mayor, <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/politics/2018-06-27-patricia-de-lille-prevails-in-court-fight-with-da/">Patricia De Lille</a>, to drag on for far too long.</p>
<p>And then of course there is <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/politics/2018-05-09-can-mmusi-maimane-steer-the-da-through-sas-maelstrom-of-race/">the issue of race</a>, which divides the party all the way to the very top. </p>
<p>The DA was founded on principles of liberalism. Its ideological position comes with the assertion that the individual, not the group, is the primary unit of society, and that freedom and equality are realised through the freedom of the individual. That’s not sitting very well within many of its newly found black supporters. </p>
<p>On top of this, the DA’s classic liberalism has run up against the problem of how to address racial disadvantage on an individual basis in a society where fundamental rights and material goods have been allocated by race historically. Either the DA breaches its liberal principles by accepting the need to address racial disadvantage frontally. Or, if it doesn’t, it sends out the message to black voters that it’s not really committed to addressing racial inequality.</p>
<p>This tension played out recently when the party became embroiled in an internal spat over whether or not to support <a href="http://www.dti.gov.za/economic_empowerment/bee.jsp">Black Economic Empowerment</a>, an affirmative action policy. </p>
<h2>Growth or principles?</h2>
<p>Until recently the DA’s share of the vote in the country has increased with every election. That growth came at the <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/columnists/2018-08-14-carol-paton-das-growth-creates-identity-crisis-around-race-and-liberalism/">cost</a> of having to dilute its core liberal principles, as it sought to expand its appeal beyond its white base to black, coloured and Indian voters. </p>
<p>In 2013 the party <a href="http://www.politicsweb.co.za/party/the-das-policy-on-race--helen-zille">accepted</a> that race should become a basis for redress. In 2015, it <a href="http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politics/the-das-new-values-charter">adopted</a> freedom, fairness and equality of opportunity into its constitution. </p>
<p>Subsequently Maimane has also suggested the party needs to adopt affirmative action by pushing hard for the DA to accept the need for “greater diversity” in its composition. This was a way of saying that more black people are <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/politics/2018-05-09-can-mmusi-maimane-steer-the-da-through-sas-maelstrom-of-race/">needed</a> in leadership positions without actually using those words. </p>
<p>The more recent internal <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/sunday-tribune/news/da-dumps-bee-16408087">spat</a> about Black Economic Empowerment also points to these tensions. </p>
<p>Head of policy Gwen Ngwenya <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/sunday-tribune/news/da-dumps-bee-16408087">announced</a> that the DA has ditched Black Economic Empowerment in favour of real empowerment from the bottom. But many among the party’s newer influx of members realise that they would never be where they are today if it was not for a policy engineered by the ANC – for all its failings.</p>
<p>True, the DA pumps out the message that the children of a black millionaire do not deserve a special hand up from the state. However, without a clearly stated policy about how it is going to pave the way for “equality of opportunity”, it’s going to have to work hard to rid itself of its unwanted reputation of being primarily a party protective of white interests. </p>
<p>Liberalism, conclude many black people, works for white people only.</p>
<h2>No easy way out</h2>
<p>The problem for the DA is that there is no easy way out of the dilemmas it faces. It comes with the territory of being the major party of opposition and drawing the major body of its support from a white racial minority. Its problem is that on the route to power, principle is always likely to become fudge. </p>
<p>This points to the still greater problem that the DA has to confront (and this is the great unsayable). No opposition party in any country in southern Africa has yet managed to displace a liberation movement. This is despite the fact that the record in government of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/southern-africas-liberation-movements-can-they-abandon-old-bad-habits-101197">region’s liberation movements</a> has been dismal, and the vehicle for the rise of corrupt “party-state” elites. Look no further than Zimbabwe, where in 2008, the opposition Movement for Democratic Change won a parliamentary majority before crashing into the rocks of ZANU-PF intransigence.</p>
<p>The great question which hangs over South African politics is what the ANC would do if it really did lose its majority.</p>
<p>How the DA resolves its dilemmas around race will dictate how it will react in such a situation, for without mass black support it would lack any chance of confronting the ANC were the latter to trash the constitution and maintain its hold on state power.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101828/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall receives funding from the National Research Fund </span></em></p>South Africa’s official opposition, the Democratic Alliance needs to face its racial dilemmas.Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/966692018-06-10T08:54:26Z2018-06-10T08:54:26ZMandela centenary: South Africans must not let trifles undermine his legacy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/221789/original/file-20180605-119888-6yrt84.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nelson Mandela embodied South Africa's long, arduous journey to freedom and equality.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>This year marks a century since liberation struggle hero and global statesman Nelson Mandela was born. Throughout 2018, celebrations and events are being <a href="https://www.nelsonmandela.org/nelson-mandela-100">held in his honour</a>.</p>
<p>The centenary is a good chance for South Africans to reflect on Mandela’s selfless leadership, which embodies the country’s odyssey towards a better society. He is one of those, to paraphrase the Tanzanian author Issa Shivji, whom history continues to remember because his “ideals and actions remained <a href="https://africasacountry.com/2018/05/revolutionary-intellectuals">aligned with the people”</a>.</p>
<p>A better society is about harmonious coexistence, where equality is the organising principle; and all have a fair chance at opportunities to enhance their well-being. Mandela knew that this doesn’t occur by chance, but through a historical process that’s in <a href="https://www.eskimo.com/%7Emsharlow/politics/documents/manifesto.pdf">“perpetual evolution”</a>. His leadership laid a foundation for a better society. </p>
<p>But, over two decades later, <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/Report-03-10-06/Report-03-10-062015.pdf">poverty and inequality</a> continue to stratify South Africa along racial lines. The country still has a long way go in achieving the ideals he stood for, as enshrined in the <a href="http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/SAConstitution-web-eng.pdf">Constitution</a>. </p>
<p>Mandela’s imaginative foresight in leading the country to democracy is distinctly indelible in history. That’s why it’s worth repeating as part of the centennial celebrations of his life and legacy, lest trifles trump history and spawn national amnesia.</p>
<h2>The meaning of Mandela</h2>
<p>Mandela’s essence lay in service to humanity. In the parlance of the theory of the state, he represented the “whole”, <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books/about/The_Making_of_the_Modern_State.html?id=uT3IAAAAQBAJ&redir_esc=y">“not (his) own personal will”</a>. This was an exception to many post-colonial African leaders’ rule. His struggle for justice was always altruistic, pursued for the good of humanity.</p>
<p>After many years of colonialism and apartheid, democracy finally became the principle of organising South African society in 1994. Mandela’s incarceration for 27 years after being convicted of terrorism was not in vain. History has vindicated him: the United Nations later declared <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-apartheid-south-africa">apartheid</a> a <a href="http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/cspca/cspca.html">crime against humanity</a>. The policy of racial segregation and oppression could not be sustained, and was dismantled to give way to <a href="http://overcomingapartheid.msu.edu/unit.php?id=65-24E-6">inclusive democracy</a>.</p>
<p>The hallmark of this was his inauguration as the first black democratically elected president of South Africa. This earth shattering moment marked the intersection of fate with choice, where – in the words of the former prime minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru –</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the soul of a nation, long suppressed, finally <a href="https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/jawaharlalnehrutrystwithdestiny.htm">found utterance</a>. It enhanced the profundity of a nation’s history, following its tryst with destiny.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Tale of two speeches</h2>
<p>Mandela’s <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/content/statement-nelson-mandela-his-inauguration-president">inaugural speech</a> powerfully instilled in the new South African nation optimism about its future. Its major thread was reconciliation and unity. </p>
<p>The speech secured the commitment to cross the Rubicon to democracy. It was a corollary of one he made in 1964, which galvanised national consciousness about the insidiousness of the apartheid system and the significance of the struggle for a democratic society. </p>
<p>The two speeches were made in different historical epochs in the fight against racial oppression. Both show the same imagination of humanity’s future, where social equity as a function of equality is the organising principle for common existence.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/221772/original/file-20180605-119875-1qug6mm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/221772/original/file-20180605-119875-1qug6mm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221772/original/file-20180605-119875-1qug6mm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221772/original/file-20180605-119875-1qug6mm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221772/original/file-20180605-119875-1qug6mm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221772/original/file-20180605-119875-1qug6mm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221772/original/file-20180605-119875-1qug6mm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Nelson Mandela, South Africa’s first black president.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">/Flickr/PresidenciaRD</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Mandela’s approach in shepherding a fledgling democracy was that – for it to take root – the highest office in the land should represent, <a href="https://www.mercurynews.com/2016/11/14/nov-14-readers-letters-h-l-menckens-words-sum-up-2016-election/">more and more closely, the inner soul of the people</a>. He brought to the office of the president the ideals that shaped his political beliefs. He did not exact retribution against those who had jailed him. Instead, he invited them to work with him in building a non-racial, prosperous society.</p>
<p>This showed the magnanimity of his personality as a leader. He led the task of reconciling South Africans, and allayed the fears of many, especially of the white populace. He created the opportunity for the post-apartheid state to evolve. </p>
<h2>Amnesia and distortions</h2>
<p>But, are the <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/pretoria-news/news/lets-use-mandelas-centenary-to-find-the-madiba-in-each-of-us-13491593">centennial celebrations</a> of Mandela’s legacy being used as the opportunity to adequately tell South Africa’s history – especially for younger generations to understand the painful path traversed by the progenitors of the liberation struggle?</p>
<p>I would argue not, since the falsehood that Mandela <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2013-12-09/was-mandela-right-to-sell-out-black-south-africans-">“sold out”</a> persists. </p>
<p>The extreme view among mainly young South Africans, inspired by the radicalism of demagoguery, is that Mandela went beyond reaching out to whites during the multiparty negotiations that ended apartheid. This view suggests the concessions he and the ANC achieved amounted to political freedom <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-south-africa-should-undo-mandelas-economic-deals-52767">without economic power</a> – “selling out”. </p>
<p>But this argument is simply wrong. It ignores the context of that time, and is also oblivious of the complexities of what it takes to build a united nation out of a pariah state. The very delicate transition required ingenuity – not populism – to avert the possibility of plunging the country into war. </p>
<p>The concessions made were necessary to secure political stability. The military solution that Mandela’s detractors would have preferred wouldn’t have been an option. Besides the lethal implications of war, the country’s liberation armies wouldn’t have stood up to the apartheid state’s military. </p>
<p>The only option was to dismantle apartheid through negotiations. This had to be done in a way that appealed to many across the political spectrum and colour line. These are facts of history that shaped post-apartheid South Africa thus far. But they do not seem to be fully appreciated. </p>
<p>The centenary of Mandela’s life offers an excellent chance to bring these facts to the fore, once and for all.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/96669/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mashupye Herbert Maserumule received funding from the National Research Foundation. He is affiliated with the South African Association of Public Administration and Management. He is the Chief Editor of the Journal of Public Administration.</span></em></p>Nelson Mandela’s centenary celebrations provide a chance to debunk the lie that he sold out black South Africans.Mashupye Herbert Maserumule, Professor of Public Affairs, Tshwane University of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/946462018-04-11T07:14:23Z2018-04-11T07:14:23ZHow the law can help change racist minds in South Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/214076/original/file-20180410-587-1m2kst.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Much recent news and public discourse might seem to indicate that South Africa’s non-racial <a href="https://www.scholaradvisor.com/essay-examples/descriptive-essay-south-africa-rainbow-nation/">rainbow</a> is fading. Racism, its expression and its consequences, seem to be all around.</p>
<p>First prize goes to former real estate agent <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/vicki-momberg-sentenced-to-an-effective-2-years-in-prison-for-racist-rant-20180328">Vicki Momberg</a>. She was recently sentenced to a <a href="https://theconversation.com/jail-time-for-south-african-woman-using-racist-slur-sets-new-precedent-94179">three year</a> jail term (one year suspended) for the vicious racial abuse of black traffic officers and police emergency call centre operators attempting to help her after a smash and grab incident. </p>
<p>Then there is the <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2018-03-02-britain-must-intervene-in-sa-land-debate-says-member-of-european-parliament/">land reform debate</a>. Its enormous complexity is swept aside by both black populist politicians demanding the return of land “stolen” by whites and the white right claiming that white farmers are <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/SA-farmers-under-siege-20000906">under siege and fear for their lives</a>. </p>
<p>In reply to <em>Business Day</em> columnist Peter Bruce’s stating that the extent of farm murders has been grossly exaggerated, a white correspondent to the newspaper <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/letters/2018-04-05-letter-bruce-should-bury-hatchet/">cited</a> approvingly the man generally accepted as the architect of the brutal policy of apartheid, <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/hendrik-frensch-verwoerd">Hendrik Verwoerd</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Verwoerd felt that the only way whites in SA would survive would be if some system could be devised to that they could maintain control of their destiny within a Western framework. Otherwise, they would simply be overwhelmed… Now we are experiencing what Verwoerd predicted. Whites are being bullied incessantly and deprived of their assets by black politicians.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>How on earth should South Africans deal with all this? There is, frankly, no easy answer to this question. But here are a few considerations.</p>
<h2>Complex problem</h2>
<p>Journalist Joshua Carstens, writing on <em>News24</em>, suggested that Momberg’s crude racism was <a href="https://www.news24.com/Columnists/GuestColumn/changing-peoples-minds-and-hearts-about-race-lessons-from-vicki-momberg-20180406">“simply the tip of an iceberg”</a>. He had no quarrel with her sentence, but wondered whether it would work. He argued that while it might be possible to regulate people’s behaviour,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>you can’t legalise people’s minds and hearts. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Unexpressed racism may be even more dangerous if it is left lurking below the surface. He went on to encourage like-minded whites to take a stronger stand against racism in their private lives. </p>
<p>Nothing wrong with that at all. Indeed, its sentiment is highly commendable. But, would it really be better if racists displayed their honesty by roundly abusing black people? Or is it better if they curb their lips for fear of joining Momberg in jail? </p>
<h2>Legislation changing minds</h2>
<p>It’s wrong, I think, to suggest that legislation cannot change minds. True, it might often take the long haul. But laws do more than reflect social norms: they mould them.</p>
<p>The law is meant to entrench what society thinks is right. If it prescribes that racism, sexism or homophobia are wrong, there is probably a better chance that people will come to accept it in genuine democracies (especially over the generations). But the law can also be used to effect structural change.</p>
<p>Take for instance <a href="http://www.dti.gov.za/economic_empowerment/bee.jsp">black economic empowerment</a> and <a href="https://www.labourguide.co.za/employment-equity/summary-of-the-employment-equity-act-55-of-1998-issued-in-terms-of-section-25-1">equity employment legislation</a>. Their pros and cons are much debated, yet it seems difficult to deny that without them, South Africa would have a much stronger white minority profile today than it would without them. </p>
<p>For all their faults, such laws and associated state pressures for “demographic representivity” would seem to have been a necessary element in decolonising society. This is not to deny that they come with numerous difficulties. </p>
<p>This is shown by the case of Mark Lamberti, chief executive officer of Imperial Holdings. He called Adila Chowan, a Muslim Indian woman who had become group financial manager at the company’s subsidiary, a <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/former-amh-employee-wins-race-and-gender-discrimination-case-20180402">“female employment equity”</a> candidate in the presence of other senior managers. Lamberti was convicted in the High Court of impairing her dignity and ordered to pay her costs and yet to be decided damages.</p>
<p>Lamberti has responded by insisting that he is <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1880989/mark-lamberti-resigns-from-eskom-board-following-court-judgment/">not a racist</a>. Whether or not his actions were racist were not dealt with by the court; the <a href="https://www.biznews.com/leadership/2018/04/06/chowan-imperial-lessons-judgement-sa-corporate-executives/">judgment</a> was that he had offended the complainant’s dignity. Whether or not one’s view is that he was racist and/or sexist, it is beyond doubt that his behaviour was thoroughly crass. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, it points to a dilemma.</p>
<h2>Constructive ambiguity</h2>
<p>Equity employment is designed to promote fairness in the workplace and black upward mobility in the face of white structural privilege. But the irony is, as Chowan has so bravely <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-04-06-00-my-victory-should-help-all-women">highlighted</a>, black and female candidates resent being labelled as equity employment candidates. </p>
<p>They point out, correctly, that it is demeaning to any black or woman appointee to say that they got the job because they were black or female. They want to be recognised as having been appointed on merit. Yet the problem is that without such goads as equity employment legislation, progress towards racial equality in the workplace would almost certainly be a lot slower.</p>
<p>South Africa’s main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, is <a href="https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/sunday-times/20180408/281569471299652">wrestling with this very issue </a>. The party has long claimed that it has become <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/maimane-stands-firm-on-diversity-20180407">increasingly racially diverse</a> as the governing ANC has in practice and much rhetoric withdrawn from non-racialism. Yet although the DA now has a black leader in Mmusi Maimane, there has been rising discontent among its black membership that the party is still dominated by a <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2016-01-28-das-black-leaders-live-with-racism">conservative old guard of whites</a>.</p>
<p>This has led to calls for the introduction of race-based quotas, which many in the party have resisted. They complain that such group determined racial categorisation would run against the DA’s liberalism, which is based on the advancement of individual rights. </p>
<p>Reportedly, the party’s senior leadership arrived at a compromise proposal for putting to the DA’s federal congress which committed it to taking,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>active steps to promote and advance diversity… without recourse to rigid formulae or <a href="https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/sunday-times/20180408/281569471299652">quotas</a>. </p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Complex problem</h2>
<p>What should be drawn from all this? Probably many things. But one certainty is that more humility is necessary from all those engaged in the debate. People must accept that there are no easy answers. The project of rendering South Africa more equal is one of enormous complexity, fraught with as many philosophical problems as structural and political ones. </p>
<p>Alas, there will be more Mombergs, more Lambertis and more people seeking to revive Verwoerd and render his memory respectable. There will be more black populism in response. </p>
<p>Yes, it’s almost certainly going to be a rough ride, but those South Africans who don’t believe or don’t want to believe that a better South Africa is possible should be honest about it – and bugger off elsewhere.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/94646/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall receives funding from National Research Foundation</span></em></p>Unexpressed racism may be even more dangerous if it’s left lurking below the surface.Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/946652018-04-09T16:00:21Z2018-04-09T16:00:21ZIs South Africa’s opposition party ready to challenge for power in 2019 elections?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/213870/original/file-20180409-114092-ulv0dx.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mmusi Maimane, leader of South Affrica's main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, briefs the media after its conngress.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Supplied</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Democratic Alliance (DA), South Africa’s main political opposition party, has held its <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2018/04/07/da-congress-begins-in-tshwane">national congress</a> and declared its readiness for the 2019 elections. It considers these its <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/2019-elections-das-most-important-ever-maimane-20180408">most important to date</a>.</p>
<p>Apart from electing a <a href="https://www.enca.com/south-africa/diverse-da-s-new-leadership-more-of-the-same">not-so-new leadership</a>, the congress was marked by robust debate about setting a political agenda for the future. It reflected on key issues such as <a href="http://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/da-reiterates-stance-land-reform/">land reform</a> and promoting <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2018/04/08/da-resolves-to-promote-and-advance-diversity-in-its-own-ranks">diversity</a> in its ranks.</p>
<p>It also addressed the need to recreate the <a href="https://www.news24.com/Video/SouthAfrica/News/elections-2019-they-will-try-and-divide-us-on-the-basis-of-race-mmusi-maimane-20180407">party’s image</a> in preparation for the 2019 general elections. The DA must stand strong and not be divided on the <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/maimane-stands-firm-on-diversity-20180407">basis of race</a>, said Mmusi Maimane, who was re-elected unopposed as federal leader.</p>
<p>Born from a <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/organisations/democratic-alliance-da">merger</a> between the former Democratic Party’s amalgamation with the New National Party and the Federal Alliance, the DA sought to become a “party for the people” on the platform of non-racialism and a formidable opposition to the governing African National Congress (ANC). The DA espouses liberal politics and has claimed a long history of resistance to apartheid, most notably through its hero Helen Suzman who was a thorn in the flesh of successive apartheid regimes. Yet, the party struggles to lose the label of a <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2013-04-15-the-lost-and-revised-history-of-the-da-coming-soon-to-a-soapbox-near-you/#.Wstm6C97G8U">“white party” that would bring back apartheid</a>.<br>
The DA is potentially in a good position to become a challenger for power. The dominant ANC suffered a loss of legitimacy under the leadership of Jacob Zuma, most evident in its steady loss of electoral support. It is fighting to regain ground after it emerged quite bruised from the <a href="https://theconversation.com/major-shift-in-south-african-politics-as-the-da-breaks-out-of-its-cape-enclave-63619">2016 local government elections</a>. It lost the key metropolitan municipalities of Tshwane, Johannesburg and <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-battle-for-nelson-mandela-bay-has-captured-south-africas-attention-63063">Nelson Mandela Bay</a> where it dominated since 1994. </p>
<p>The governing party is trying to repair its image by riding on the <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/business/234439/heres-what-is-waiting-for-south-africa-when-ramaphoria-is-over/">positive sentiment</a> that has accompanied President Cyril Ramaphosa’s leadership – of both the ANC and the country.</p>
<p>But history might be against the ANC. It has been shown that dominant parties tend to break down due to a <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-south-africas-nelson-mandela-bay-may-be-the-ancs-mini-waterloo-58010">crisis of legitimacy</a>. Weak political leadership, corruption, factional battles and governance, all of which have recently plagued the ANC, have been known to favour <a href="http://www.policy-network.net/pno_detail.aspx?ID=5025&title=Challenger+parties+and+the+decline+of+the+European+left">challenger parties</a>. </p>
<h2>Challenging for power</h2>
<p>It would seem that the 2019 general elections may be the opportunity for the DA to emerge as a credible <a href="http://www.policy-network.net/pno_detail.aspx?ID=5025&title=Challenger+parties+and+the+decline+of+the+European+left">challenger for power</a>. It is the largest opposition party with a track record in governance. But, one will also need to consider the potential impact of the Economic Freedom Fighters <a href="https://www.effonline.org/">(EFF)</a> which – like the DA – will campaign in ANC strongholds for votes.</p>
<p>The DA still has a lot of work to do, most notably around race and representation. More specifically, it needs to break down perceptions that it is a white party. These perceptions were evident in its failure to win outright majorities in the 2016 local government elections; it had to rely on coalitions to oust the ANC from power in key municipalities. </p>
<p>In building the DA as a sound alternative to the ANC, Maimane has claimed that the DA rather than the ANC now embodies the <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-04-07-read-maimane-addresses-the-da-at-its-federal-congress">non-racial vision of Nelson Mandela</a>. </p>
<h2>Racialised politics</h2>
<p>Yet, a racialised dynamic continues to find expression within the internal dynamics of the DA, as shown by talk of a <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/sipho-hlongwane/it-s-about-time-the-democratic-alliance-black-caucus-spoke-out_a_21897537/">“black caucus”</a> in its ranks. It indicates that racial prisms shape internal party dynamics.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/213869/original/file-20180409-114121-1nx0zt7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/213869/original/file-20180409-114121-1nx0zt7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=325&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/213869/original/file-20180409-114121-1nx0zt7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=325&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/213869/original/file-20180409-114121-1nx0zt7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=325&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/213869/original/file-20180409-114121-1nx0zt7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/213869/original/file-20180409-114121-1nx0zt7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/213869/original/file-20180409-114121-1nx0zt7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mmusi Maimane was reelected unopposed as leader of Democratic Alliance, South Africa’;s main opposition party.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Supplied</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Significantly the party’s former parliamentary leader, Lindiwe Mazibuko, has urged it to reflect on </p>
<blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/mazibuko-rips-into-das-white-males-1975033">“a culture that isolates black members and leaders”</a>. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>She was responding to the <a href="https://www.da.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Pledge-Against-Racism-1.pdf">DA’s anti-racism pledge</a> that all new members would be required to sign. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-04-08-da-federal-congress-trollip-wins-da-federal-chair-race-but-next-hurdle-surviving-a-motion-of-no-confidence-is-already-in-sight/#.WspIsS97G8U">debate on diversity</a> at the congress shaped the contest between mayors Solly Msimanga and Athol Trollip for the position of party federal chairperson. In celebrating his victory, Trollip proclaimed that he was <a href="https://m.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/trollip-humbled-that-da-election-wasnt-all-about-race-20180408">“humbled that the DA election was not all about race”</a>. </p>
<p>Given the reports about the narrow margin of Trollip’s victory, it’s possible his win could have been the result of political pragmatism. Potentially, some members may have voted for him so that the party could <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/the-da-votes-msimanga-looks-confident-but-many-crossing-fingers-for-trollip-20180407">demonstrate unity</a> ahead of the <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/motion-against-trollip-postponed-for-two-weeks-20180329">motion of no confidence</a> against him brought by the EFF in his capacity as Nelson Mandela Bay’s mayor.</p>
<h2>The battle of ideas</h2>
<p>Maimane avers that the <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-04-07-read-maimane-addresses-the-da-at-its-federal-congress">DA remains committed</a> to creating a non-racial and equal South Africa in which each person will have equal opportunity, regardless of background. He draws on the vision of <a href="https://thebestofafrica.org/revisiting-liberalism-in-africa/">African liberalism</a>.</p>
<p>He has <a href="https://www.da.org.za/2018/04/building-african-liberal-agenda/">highlighted</a> the need to carve out a new agenda for African liberalism:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>As African liberals, we know that poverty is the greatest threat to individual freedom, because civil liberties mean nothing if there is no food on the table. A hungry person cannot claim freedom. This is why we believe in social welfare and a growing economy that lifts people out of poverty.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The ANC similarly seeks to secure “political hegemony in society” through what it posits as the <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/sites/default/files/5th-National-Policy-Conference-Report-Final.pdf">“battle of ideas”</a>. </p>
<p>Through the battle of ideas, the DA may now move to further lay claim to Mandela’s and the ANC’s historic mission of creating a non-racial, non-sexist and democratic post-apartheid society. The DA has reclaimed the vision of Nelson Mandela and placed African liberalism at the core of its ideological battle of ideas. The extent that they will win the vote in ANC strongholds remains to be seen given a lack of political trust towards the DA in those areas. </p>
<h2>Towards a party for all</h2>
<p>The challenge for the DA seems to be ironing out issues of representation, voice, and feelings of black marginalisation within its own party structures before embarking on the 2019 election campaign. </p>
<p>This would require the party to decisively solve its internal divisions and put an end to such labels as “black caucus”, which effectively undermine its message of non-racialism and stated quest to be a party for all South Africans.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/94665/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joleen Steyn Kotze receives funding from the National Research Foundation and the Konrad Audenauer Stiftung.</span></em></p>The Democratic Alliance is potentially in a good position to challenge the ANC, which governs South Africa, for power.Joleen Steyn Kotze, Senior Research Specialist in Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery at the Human Science Research Council and a Research Fellow Centre for African Studies, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/908612018-01-31T08:19:20Z2018-01-31T08:19:20ZCape Town water crisis: crossing state and party lines isn’t the answer<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/203808/original/file-20180129-41419-4x8vlt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mmusi Maimane is leading efforts to combat the water crisis. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Mark Wessels (Pool)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Mmusi Maimane, the leader of South Africa’s main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, that governs the City of Cape Town and the Western Cape Province, now leads the task team to <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-01-25-analysis-mmusi-maimanes-war-cry-defeat-day-zero/#.Wm7k8pP1XPA">“defeat” Day Zero</a>, the day on which Cape Town’s water is predicted to run out. This is currently set for April 12.</p>
<p>The DA’s <a href="https://www.thesouthafrican.com/defeat-day-zero-da-four-point-plan/">plan to keep the taps running</a> comes amid infighting within the Cape Town Metropolitan Council, where <a href="http://www.capetownetc.com/news/motion-no-confidence-de-lille-looms/">mayor Patricia De Lille</a> has been stripped of responsibility for <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2018-01-19-de-lille-loses-her-power-to-deal-with-cape-towns-water-crisis/">responding to the water crisis</a>. </p>
<p>While many were impressed to see Maimane, <a href="https://www.westerncape.gov.za/your_gov/97">Helen Zille’s</a> provincial government and the city’s leadership presenting a united front <a href="http://therepublicmail.co.za/2018/01/24/maimane-intervene-in-cape-town-water-crisis/">against the water crisis</a>, others pointed out that this was not Maimane’s show to run, saying that it <a href="https://twitter.com/pierredevos/status/956136662362402816">crossed the “line”</a> between the DA as a political party, and the relevant organs of state.</p>
<p>This is correct. As a <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/person-details/1626">Member of Parliament</a>, Maimane has oversight powers that allow him to investigate how the city or province handle the water crisis. But for an MP to head a governmental task team pushes the boundaries of the <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/who-we-are">separation of powers</a>, in terms of which day-to-day running of government should be left to executive officials.</p>
<p>By swooping in from his position in national government to take control of the situation, Maimane also ignored a set of constitutional principles which allow higher-level governments to intervene in running a city only in limited circumstances, such as when a municipality <a href="https://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/30097/08chapter8.pdf?sequence=9">fails to deliver</a> basic services based on national delivery standards.</p>
<p>The DA <a href="https://twitter.com/zilevandamme/status/956166188274454528?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">disagrees</a>. It argues that Maimane hasn’t taken over any governmental offices, but, as party leader, is merely <a href="https://twitter.com/zilevandamme/status/956166989092925441?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%22%3EJanuary%2024,%202018%3C/a%3E%3C/blockquote%3E%20%3Cscript%20async%20src=%22https:/platform.twitter.com/widgets.js%22%20charset=%22utf-8%22%3E%3C/script%3E">coordinating</a> the actions of the DA-run city and province. </p>
<h2>Tensions between party and State</h2>
<p>This brings into play the line between political parties and government which, in South Africa, appears to be crossed on a regular basis.</p>
<p>South Africans tend to associate government officials with the political parties to which they belong. For instance, many people simply think of the ANC <em>as being</em> the national government. They don’t distinguish between ANC officials acting in their capacity as party members, or when they’re acting as members of government.</p>
<p>This is problematic, since it undermines the perceived independence of state institutions and diminishes accountability of state officials. It creates the impression that government institutions can be accessed and influenced through party structures. This leads to potentially corrupt situations, such as where a political party’s donors expect to be rewarded with government business.</p>
<p>Some countries, such as the US, have legislation which places a <a href="https://hatchact.uslegal.com/">strict separation</a> between party and state to the point where civil servants are not allowed to campaign for political parties or run for election. And state officials are not allowed to wear party regalia or discuss party business in their government offices. This is not only meant to reduce opportunities for corruption, but also to ensure that people feel that government works for, and is accountable to, all citizens, regardless of which party they support.</p>
<p>Since winning the first democratic elections in 1994, the ANC has often been accused of using state structures to <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/opinion/anc-blind-to-dangers-of-conflating-party-and-state-2023793">further the party agenda</a>. And its MPs are further often accused of placing party loyalty <a href="https://www.pa.org.za/blog/party-loyalty-patronage-and-future-south-african-p">above the national interest</a>. </p>
<p>The most dramatic recent example of this was when the Constitutional Court was asked to direct the Speaker of Parliament to allow ANC members to vote in secret on a motion of no confidence <a href="https://www.enca.com/south-africa/concourt-to-rule-on-secret-ballot-case">against President Jacob Zuma</a>. The fear was that the party might punish ANC MPs who voted in favour of the motion.</p>
<p>At the time, former President Thabo Mbeki wrote an <a href="https://www.thesouthafrican.com/mps-have-a-responsibility-to-the-people-not-their-political-parties-mbeki/">open letter</a> in which he reminded ANC members of Parliament that they were accountable to the people of South Africa, not the ANC.</p>
<p>The principle of accountability is the most important reason for keeping political parties and the state separate. </p>
<p>While the state is held accountable through a range of institutions and laws, similar measures don’t exist to make political parties act in the public interest.</p>
<h2>Shadow governments</h2>
<p>The same applies on local government level.</p>
<p>South African cities are run by elected local governments, through legal structures, such as the ward committees established by the <a href="http://mfma.treasury.gov.za/MFMA/Legislation/Local%20Government%20-%20Municipal%20Structures%20Act/Local%20Government%20-%20Municipal%20Structures%20Act,%20No.%20117%20of%201998.pdf">Municipal Structures Act</a>. These structures don’t always function well. Where they break down, the provision of basic municipal services suffers and residents’ concerns are not addressed.</p>
<p>But instead of trying to strengthen, fix or change dysfunctional structures, people often bypass them. This weakens them even further. One way in which this happens is when people resort to having their grievances solved through political party structures, such as local party branches.</p>
<p>When party structures become the most efficient way to solve local government problems, shadow governments are created. These shadow governments are not directly accountable to residents.</p>
<p>This means that it becomes easier for internal party politics to infiltrate city affairs. It also creates opportunities for corruption. </p>
<p>A <a href="http://www.heraldlive.co.za/news/2017/10/21/how-to-steal-a-city/">recent book</a>, ‘How to steal a city’ by Crispian Olver, about the last days of the former ANC local government in Nelson Mandela Bay, sets out <a href="https://theconversation.com/two-books-that-tell-the-unsettling-tale-of-south-africas-descent-87044">in detail</a> how this happens. Olver explains how the ANC sent in senior party members to “clean up” governance in the city. But the book also shows how provincial ANC structures tried to prevent the then mayor from acting against corrupt city council members.</p>
<h2>Sidelining structures</h2>
<p>By taking control of the water situation in Cape Town as leader of the DA Maimane has effectively sidelined the people and structures that are constitutionally supposed to be in charge.</p>
<p>However good his intentions may be, this is a blatant example of shadow governance. His actions have undermined accountability and participatory democracy and weakened the city’s ability to govern in the interests of all of its residents.</p>
<p>No political party should lead a response to an urban governance crisis. The city, provincial and national governments must cooperate <em>as government</em>, across party lines and through the relevant legal and constitutional structures and processes, to ensure effective and accountable service delivery.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/90861/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marius Pieterse receives funding from the National Research Foundation (NRF). </span></em></p>Opposition leader Mmusi Maimane’s takeover of responsibility for tackling the Western Cape water crisis blurs party and state lines.Marius Pieterse, Professor of Law, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/838292017-09-12T15:13:00Z2017-09-12T15:13:00ZBestiality and BS: Lessons from South Africa’s sleazy political climate<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/185484/original/file-20170911-1373-bpl46u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa unwittingly fell for an old trick used to discredit politicians. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>There is a famous polling story, commonly attributed to US President Lyndon B. Johnson. Attacking his rival in Texas, where the vote was close, Johnson used the sucker-punch tactic. As <a href="https://masscommons.wordpress.com/2012/03/15/fear-loathing-on-the-campaign-trail-make-them-deny-it/">re-told</a> by famous American journalist Hunter S Thompson, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The race was close and Johnson was getting worried. Finally he told his campaign manager to start a massive rumour campaign about his opponent’s life-long habit of enjoying carnal knowledge of his own barnyard sows.
“Christ, we can’t get a way calling him a pig-fucker,” the campaign manager protested. “Nobody’s going to believe a thing like that.</p>
<p>I know, Johnson replied. But let’s make the sonofabitch deny it.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>South African Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa just fell for the same trick, albeit a more mundane: "he sleeps around (with humans)”. Whether it was apartheid era <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/09/03/ramaphosa-sex-scandal-a-well-resourced-operation-against-me">“stratkom” style dirty trick</a> at work or the usual dirty game of electioneering, Ramaphosa was forced onto the back foot.</p>
<p>Instead of ignoring or laughing at the claims, he <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/sundayindependent/news/ramaphosa-in-womanising-e-mail-shock-11056138">went to court</a> to prevent a Sunday paper from publishing. Then he engaged the issue and revealed a <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/news/2017-09-02-ramaphosa-speaks-out-im-not-a-blesser-but-i-did-have-an-affair/">long-past affair</a> of little interest to anyone. How did his advisers think this necessary in the sleazy moral climate created by Jacob Zuma’s ANC? </p>
<p>The challenge for voters is that there are multiple election-related battles happening simultaneously within the ANC. There is a fight for the <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-09-01-00-anc-presidential-race-wide-open">post-Zuma leadership</a>, fairly obviously. </p>
<p>But there is also Zuma’s own fight for <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/spytapes-case-court-rules-that-zuma-charges-be-reviewed-2015740">safety from prosecution</a> for alleged fraud, money laundering, corruption and racketeering once he steps down. His <a href="https://www.enca.com/south-africa/dlamini-zuma-indicates-she-is-ready-for-presidency">chosen candidate</a> – Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma – isn’t attractive to voters, according to polls. The one attribute she can play on is the mantra <a href="https://www.thesouthafrican.com/dlamini-zuma-tweeted-about-why-sa-needs-a-female-president-twitter-responded-with-a-roast/">“we need a woman as president”</a>. That explains why Ramaphosa was attacked as a <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/08/16/ramaphosa-s-ex-wife-abuse-claims-seek-to-prevent-him-from-becoming-president">wife-beater</a>, and when that didn’t stick, as a sequential <a href="http://www.enca.com/south-africa/the-blesser-explainer"><em>blesser</em></a> (sugar daddy). </p>
<h2>What the polls say</h2>
<p>Leadership polls in the <a href="http://www.enca.com/south-africa/presidents-popularity-at-an-all-time-low-enca-ipsos-poll">public domain</a> – of all voters, not just ANC voters – suggest that this election is Ramaphosa’s to lose. Among potential voters from all parties, he has overtaken the main opposition Democratic Alliance’s Mmusi Maimane, to lead Dlamini-Zuma by a considerable margin. Dlamini-Zuma seems to be on an ineluctably downward spiral, matched only by her ex-husband. Her campaign urgently needs an injection. Becoming an MP and presumably thereafter a minister is part of the attempt to do just that, as will the rumoured appointment as Higher Education Minister and <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/09/10/report-nzimande-s-future-in-balance-as-dlamini-zuma-set-to-become-mp">bestower</a> of more or less free education for all, if it occurs.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/185810/original/file-20170913-23138-iyb1cq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/185810/original/file-20170913-23138-iyb1cq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=380&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185810/original/file-20170913-23138-iyb1cq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=380&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185810/original/file-20170913-23138-iyb1cq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=380&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185810/original/file-20170913-23138-iyb1cq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=478&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185810/original/file-20170913-23138-iyb1cq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=478&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185810/original/file-20170913-23138-iyb1cq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=478&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p>But the problem is Ramaphosa. If Dlamini-Zuma needs a bounce, he needs his bubble burst. The ANC’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/anc-policy-conference-shows-shifting-balance-of-power-80705">mid-year policy conference</a>, which begun with Zuma proxies’ braggadocio, gave Ramaphosa a major bounce in the polls to the point where he is on a continued upward trend. The party’s <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/anc-tightens-leadership-nomination-process-ahead-of-elective-conference-20170130">December elective conference</a> is suddenly very close. A repeat performance would secure Ramaphosa’s position; and leave current president Zuma looking very fragile indeed. Cue the smears.</p>
<p>If Dlamini-Zuma remains burdened by “that” name – and focus groups make it clear that the name is a curse, not a blessing – then attacking Ramaphosa for philandering and beating his wife is meant to take the gloss off his campaign and, crucially, influence women voters. Who wants a(nother) president who cheats on his wife? Who wants a president who apparently beat a former wife <a href="http://www.702.co.za/articles/268641/hope-ramaphosa-cyril-never-lifted-a-finger-to-me-he-wouldn-t-beat-a-woman">(despite her strenuous denials)</a>? These are all intended to dent Ramaphosa’s appeal to women voters. Above all, their aim is to reinforce the “<a href="http://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/the-time-for-a-female-president-is-now--ancwl">we need a woman president</a>” mantra – which is the central and only message of the Dlamini-Zuma campaign. </p>
<h2>The 2019 national elections</h2>
<p>All this is being fought out in the ANC, even if simultaneously in the full glare of a willing media. But the ANC nowadays is merely a player in the game – a big one, but most certainly not too big to fail.</p>
<p>There is still, in 2019, the <a href="http://www.702.co.za/articles/251032/anc-stands-to-lose-majority-in-2019-research">real national election</a> where South African citizens go to vote. This may be Zuma’s major miscalculation. All evidence suggests that the national leadership have not learned the <a href="https://theconversation.com/sharp-tongued-south-african-voters-give-ruling-anc-a-stiff-rebuke-63606">lesson of the 2016 municipal elections</a>, which is core to all polling: do not take your voters for granted. </p>
<p>The ANC has failed to find its mythical reset G-spot, and its post-election post-mortem seems to have found nothing needed correcting barring the removal of some peskily ethical ministers. The <a href="http://ewn.co.za/Topic/Gupta-leaks">#Guptaleaks</a> – the thousands of leaked emails exposing the extent of the powerful Gupta family’s capture of the state – and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-has-lost-a-key-line-of-defence-against-corruption-what-now-75549">cabinet re-shuffling</a> plus simple cravenness of the entire ANC project, have worsened since 2016.</p>
<p>The ANC is still the “mothership” – the famous <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/organisations/african-national-congress-anc">liberation party</a>, settled deep in the heart and subconscious of many South Africans. But the same lovers of history are judging the present, and will vote accordingly. They did so in 2016. The warning seems to have passed unheeded.</p>
<p>The cloak and dagger cleverness being unleashed by all sides in the ANC struggle assumes one thing – that the party will win in 2019. Polls suggest that at the moment, the ANC remains the majority party. But that is voter sentiment right now – it does not measure voter intention in 2019. Moreover, winning and being a majority party are very different – just ask the ANC in Johannesburg post-2016, for example. A <a href="https://www.ipsos.com/en-za/ipsos-poll-voters-uncertain-pre-2019">recent IPSOS</a> poll found the following:</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/185458/original/file-20170911-1323-m2eiv0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/185458/original/file-20170911-1323-m2eiv0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=266&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185458/original/file-20170911-1323-m2eiv0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=266&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185458/original/file-20170911-1323-m2eiv0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=266&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185458/original/file-20170911-1323-m2eiv0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=335&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185458/original/file-20170911-1323-m2eiv0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=335&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185458/original/file-20170911-1323-m2eiv0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=335&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<h2>Nice guys don’t win</h2>
<p>Maimane’s coy slip of his <a href="http://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/anc-polling-below-50--mmusi-maimane">own poll</a> – that the ANC was polling below 50% – may represent a 2016-2018 downward trend. If that happens attacks on Ramaphosa will come from the main opposition DA as well. This doesn’t mean the DA will win. Maimane neatly said nothing of how his party was faring – but the messy business of bartering their way to provincial power via unshaky coalitions may be the future for an ANC that has truly toppled itself from the moral high ground. </p>
<p>Ramaphosa is clearly trying to chart a more moral and honest path than his predecessor. Where Zuma faced a rape trial and repeated evidence of infidelity, Ramaphosa initially fell for the sucker-punch (hence the failed interdict against <em>The Sunday Independent</em>) and then took the route of quiet dignity. </p>
<p>If Ramaphosa can lose that initial twitchiness, maintain the dignity, but toughen up for far worse muck that will be thrown at him, the country’s most famous buffalo farmer may yet prevail.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/83829/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Everatt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Instead of ignoring his accusers, South Africa’s Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa entertained them, tried to silence them through court, and then revealed a long-past affair of little interest.David Everatt, Head of Wits School of Governance, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/823222017-08-10T17:24:47Z2017-08-10T17:24:47ZOpposition parties have found the ANC’s Achilles heel: Jacob Zuma<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/181667/original/file-20170810-27688-ho88uv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Jacob Zuma celebrates winning the eighth vote of no confidence against him.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Mike Hutchings</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Just when many thought that President Jacob Zuma’s fate was sealed, he emerged victorious against a motion of no confidence in him - for the eighth time. The fanfare associated with his expected loss was largely in sync with the increasing public discontent with his leadership.</p>
<p>On the day of the no confidence vote political parties slugged it out: the ANC was on the defensive, barraged with the opposition parties’ critique of Zuma, who is <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-20/jacob-zuma-blamed-for-south-africa-s-woes">blamed for the morass</a> the country finds itself in.</p>
<p>Cautiously couched, and with an eye on winning over ANC MPs who hold the majority of seats in parliament, the opposition’s fusillade sought to <a href="https://www.jacarandafm.com/news/news/no-confidence-debate-top-10-quotes/">delink Zuma from the party</a>. This made sense as a strategy: after all the ANC has abdicated the responsibility of holding Zuma to account for far too long. In tabling yet another motion of no confidence the opposition appropriated this duty. </p>
<p>The latest motion offered the ANC a chance to make a distinction between itself and its ethically compromised president, and to reclaim its position as a leader of society. It created – albeit unwittingly – the opportunity for the ANC to repackage its sullied image. </p>
<p>But it failed to seize the moment. Instead, it settled for a Pyrrhic victory. Those faithful to Zuma took turns in their deification histrionics of political showmanship and demagoguery fixated on imagined “enemies of the state” and the illusion of <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/rdm/news/2017-08-08-zumavote-a-regime-change-agenda--anc-mps-launch-vigorous-defence-of-zuma/">“regime change” </a>. These falsehoods are peddled to deflect attention from the real dangers to the country’s democracy: a dearth of <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-needs-moral-leaders-not-those-in-pursuit-of-selfish-gain-76244">ethical leadership</a> and the <a href="http://pari.org.za/betrayal-promise-report/">capture of the state</a> under Zuma.</p>
<p>Opposition parties took advantage of this. They might not have won the vote of no confidence. But they came away emboldened for trying.</p>
<h2>Opposition parties gaining the upper hand</h2>
<p>The opposition parties are getting smarter in exploiting the ANC’s vacuous leadership. In the latest motion of no confidence debate, they managed to frame the narrative in a way that reminded ANC members about the nobility of the historical foundation of the party, and the reason for its existence. In other words, the opposition parties were teaching the ANC about the ANC.</p>
<p>This featured prominently in the <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/rdm/news/2017-08-08-zumavote-a-regime-change-agenda--anc-mps-launch-vigorous-defence-of-zuma/">speeches</a> of Democratic Alliance’s Mmusi Maimane, Economic Freedom Fighters’ Julius Malema, and United Democratic Movement leader Bantu Holomisa. </p>
<p>The danger for the ANC in not being decisive about Zuma is that, over time, the opposition parties may usurp its political capital and project themselves as genuine custodians of its foundational values. In fact, this appears to be their strategy. Some in the ANC are aware of this which probably explains why 26 of them put the public interest first and voted for the motion. </p>
<p>This is what’s required if the party is going to survive in the long term. Acting in the public interest is a strategic political investment. </p>
<p>Despite the fact that some ANC broke ranks, the motion failed to pass. Of the 384 MPs who voted, 177 said they do not have confidence in Zuma – 46% of the total votes. In all 198 (52%) maintained their confidence in Zuma, <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/08/08/zuma-survives-no-confidence-vote">while 9 (2%) abstained</a>. Statistically, the motion was lost by 6%. When abstentions are factored in, by 4%. </p>
<p>Immediately after Speaker of National Assembly Baleka Mbete ,announced the results, Zuma couldn’t wait to ascend the podium in a style reminiscent of his ascension to the <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2007-12-18-zuma-is-new-anc-president">ANC’s throne in 2007</a> after President Thabo Mbeki had earlier <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/president-thabo-mbeki-sacks-deputy-president-jacob-zuma">sacked him</a> as the Deputy President of the Republic. </p>
<h2>A victory, but at what cost</h2>
<p>It is all celebrations in the <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2017-08-08-zuma-supporters-celebrate-his-win-outa-considers-legal-action/">Zuma coterie</a>. The vote means that the network of his kindred spirits – those at the centre of the <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/download-the-full-state-of-capture-pdf-20161102">capture of the state</a> and profiting from the public purse handsomely – is protected.</p>
<p>But aren’t these celebrations about a trifle? A closer look at the votes reveals something interesting: at least 26 ANC MPs agreed with the opposition parties that Zuma should step down as the president of the Republic. The celebrations are therefore more likely to be a requiem for the possible atrophy of the ANC, whose indecisiveness makes it complicit in creating this peril.</p>
<p>Indeed, as leader of the governing party and of the country Zuma should be worried about the outcome. His legitimacy in his own party has plummeted. Coupled with the negative sentiments about him in broader society, the picture is now gloomier for the ANC. He won the vote and secured the throne. But, at what cost? </p>
<p>The outcome of the no confidence vote has laid bare a fractured ANC. Each time Zuma survives, the ANC loses the battle of regaining people’s trust. </p>
<p>The opposition parties are aware of this, and are exploiting it. Their strategic political gaze hasn’t simply been about reaching the required threshold to oust the president – after all they don’t have sufficient numbers in parliament.</p>
<p>Instead, their motions of no confidence are about obliterating the political credibility of the ANC, using Zuma’s disastrous leadership as a means to this end. They exploit, to their strategic political advantage, the increasing perception that the people of the country are being ignored and are misunderstood by the ANC government. This, in a democracy that came about as a result of the sacrifices of the people, some of whom paid the ultimate price during the liberation struggle.</p>
<p>What emerged in the debate wasn’t about the public interest. Rather it was about protecting the oligarchy. This is surreal. Parliament as the legislative authority is supposed to represent the interest of the people. Hasn’t it sunk into the political conscience of the ANC, after 23 years of its governing the country, that leadership of public affairs should always be driven by the public interest?</p>
<p>In a democracy public discontent is understood as an opportunity to listen closely to what the people want. The ANC will be punished severely at the polls if it continues to fail to understand this.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/82322/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mashupye Herbert Maserumule received funding from National Research Funding(NRF). He is affiliated with the South African Association of Public Administration and Management (SAAPAM).</span></em></p>South African President Jacob Zuma, should be worried about the outcome of the no confidence vote in him. His legitimacy in the ANC and the country has plummeted.Mashupye Herbert Maserumule, Professor of Public Affairs, Tshwane University of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/799512017-06-27T09:37:36Z2017-06-27T09:37:36ZSouth Africa’s main opposition party can’t cure its foot-in-mouth syndrome<p>South Africa’s main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), has been on a steep upward climb since 2004. It has increased its share of the vote in every national poll to reach <a href="http://www.elections.org.za/resultsNPE2014/">22.23% in 2014</a>; it has also greatly expanded its support at the municipal level, where in 2016 it secured 26.9% of the vote and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/a4d6f4c2-5a03-11e6-9f70-badea1b336d4">ousted the ANC</a> from control of major urban centres, such as Johannesburg, Pretoria and Port Elizabeth. </p>
<p>The DA has also broadened its support beyond its traditional Western Cape stronghold to build a national presence; a victory in the province of Gauteng, home to Johannesburg and South Africa’s economic hub, now looks <a href="http://www.news24.com/Columnists/GuestColumn/analysis-anc-can-go-under-50-in-gauteng-in-2019-20160908">far from inconceivable</a> in 2019.</p>
<p>This was all made possible by the DA’s impressive progress under the leadership of Helen Zille, former mayor of Cape Town and now premier of the Western Cape. She stood down in 2014, partly in recognition of the fact that a society where politics is still defined by race would only have so much room for a party with a white leader. Her successor, Mmusi Maimane, the party’s first black leader, is trying to win support from previously <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/728d9512-3bd4-11e7-ac89-b01cc67cfeec">indifferent or hostile</a> black communities. He seeks to reposition the DA as a party not merely at ease with the new South Africa, but genuinely enthusiastic about it. </p>
<p>Maimane <a href="http://www.news24.com/elections/news/we-are-not-a-white-party-maimane-20160306">claims</a> the DA has jettisoned the historical baggage which caused it to be viewed as the party of privileged white suburbia. Given that black Africans make up 80% of South Africa’s population, the toxicity of that image is self-evident. The DA’s campaign to build black support may still be in its infancy, but the 2016 elections showed that progress has indeed been made, particularly among the urban black population.</p>
<p>Still, the challenge remains formidable – and Zille, who once seemed to understand what the DA needed to do to win, has suddenly made it much harder.</p>
<h2>Don’t go there</h2>
<p>Having made way for Maimane several years ago, Zille crashed back into the debate recently with a <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-39302739">now-infamous spurt of tweets</a> in which she suggested that people bear in mind that colonialism left some positive legacies. Coming from a senior member of a party with a racially narrow electoral base in a still racially fractured society, this was at best idle self-indulgence, and at worst self-destructive small-mindedness. </p>
<p>In the space of a few minutes, Zille undid years of work. She reinforced the entrenched suspicion about the DA: that, at heart, it is nostalgic for the days of white minority rule, and is unable to comprehend how it is received in the black communities which endured settler colonialism, empire and apartheid. Her idle tweets lend credence to the idea that the DA simply does not or cannot feel black South Africans’ pain, and that it instead caters to the narrow prejudices of wealthy whites. It takes a wrecking ball to the edifice maintained by Maimane – and indeed, by Zille herself.</p>
<p>When challenged, Zille bafflingly kept it up. Yes, she was technically correct when she <a href="http://www.heraldlive.co.za/news/2017/03/29/dont-like-colonialist-legacy-dump-fancy-cars-says-defiant-zille/">insisted</a> that she didn’t defend colonialism per se. But her protestations are unconvincing; to <a href="http://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/maimanes-project-is-mission-critical-for-our-count">quote</a> a senior party colleague, John Steenhuisen, her behaviour is “utterly inexplicable”. She is experienced enough to know that perceptions are crucial in politics, and that her words reflect not only on her, but on her party.</p>
<p>So why did Zille think it necessary to open this debate now? With all that’s going on in South Africa, what makes this issue so urgent? </p>
<p>Perhaps she simply sees it as her prerogative to voice any sentiment she likes under her constitutional right to freedom of speech. But there’s simply no need to exercise that right in all circumstances, no matter the cost. What of her obligations to respect party policy and to do nothing which brings the DA into disrepute? </p>
<p>After all, as premier of the Western Cape, she is as conspicuous a figure as any in the party, so the original tweets and her subsequent justifications can hardly be dismissed as the ramblings of a minor functionary. And it’s far from unreasonable for those outside the party to conclude that her sentiments are shared more widely among her comrades. </p>
<h2>Turning back the clock</h2>
<p>Crucially, Zille’s behaviour grants the ANC a welcome reprieve just as it goes into meltdown over the various problems with <a href="https://theconversation.com/jacob-zumas-brazen-venality-may-be-exhausting-even-his-anc-allies-75629">Jacob Zuma’s benighted presidency</a>. Now the party leadership can implore its constituency to cling to nurse for fear of something worse, ceaselessly deploying the Zille tweet in the months and years ahead to contrast itself with a supposedly racist and backward-looking rival. </p>
<p>And where the racist accusation cannot be personally levelled at DA figures, an alternative ANC narrative will quickly surface – namely that the DA’s senior black figures are little more than marionettes, their strings pulled by white puppeteers.</p>
<p>The DA leadership knows how vulnerable it is to that criticism, and is taking action accordingly. While Zille initially <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/politics/2017-06-03-da-leader-mmusi-maimane-suspends-helen-zille-from-da/">refused to apologise</a> – an action bordering on extreme egotism – she eventually issued an unconditional apology for her behaviour on June 13, and has now been <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-06-15-the-art-of-the-apology-why-zilles-climbdown-was-a-significant-political-moment/#.WUqNZWjyvIU">removed</a> from any further role in the party’s internal structures. </p>
<p>While she remains premier of the Western Cape, her official sanction was a crucial victory for Maimane. Had Zille gone unpunished, his credibility would have been shattered. Still, it may yet prove too little, too late. For all the progress the party has made, it can only win power with a clear-headed strategy to attract many, many more black votes. </p>
<p>With her idle, tone-deaf musings, Zille has shaken her party’s structures, taken the heat off the ANC and undermined Maimane’s project. Her reputation is unlikely to survive, and the damage she’s done could take years to repair.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/79951/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Hamill does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With the ANC in crisis, the Democratic Alliance seemed to be getting it right. But then came a flurry of inexplicably tactless tweets.James Hamill, Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, University of LeicesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/788472017-06-05T16:39:08Z2017-06-05T16:39:08ZDemocracy is looking sickly across southern Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/172262/original/file-20170605-16869-1kz7k3i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A woman votes in Zambia. Beyond multi-party systems and regular elections, many countries resemble very little of true democracies.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GovernmentZA/Flickr</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Politics are in shambles across the world. Populism and political gambles are making headlines from London to Washington. Southern Africa is no exception. If it’s any comfort, this suggests that there’s nothing genuinely typical about African versions of <a href="https://www.dandc.eu/en/article/populism-common-southern-africa-where-former-liberation-movements-have-become-dominant">political populism</a>. Nor are the flaws in democracy typically African. </p>
<p>This might put some events into wider perspective. But it’s nonetheless worrying to follow the current political turmoil in some southern Africa countries.</p>
<p>The regional hegemon, South Africa, is embroiled in domestic policy tensions of unprecedented proportions since it became a democracy. And the situation in the sub-region is not much better. </p>
<p>The state of opposition politics and democracy is in a shambles too. The fragile political climate and the mentality of most opposition politicians hardly offer meaningful alternatives. This is possibly an explanation – but no excuse – for the undemocratic practices permeating almost every one of the region’s democracies. </p>
<p>Beyond multi-party systems with regular elections, they resemble very little of true democracies.</p>
<h2>South African hiccups</h2>
<p>At the end of May the dimensions of “state capture” in South Africa were set out in a report published by an <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017/05/26/FULL-REPORT-%E2%80%98How-South-Africa-is-Being-Stolen%E2%80%99-a-report-on-state-capture">academic team</a>. </p>
<p>It shows how deeply the personalised systematic plundering of state assets is <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-05-26-betrayal-of-the-promise-the-anatomy-of-state-capture/">entrenched</a>. Additional explosive evidence was presented only days later through thousands of leaked e-mails. Dubbed the “Gupta Leaks”, they document a mafia-like network among Zuma-loyalists and the Indian Gupta family. </p>
<p>The evidence points to massive influence, if not control, over political appointments, the hijacking of higher public administration and embezzlement of <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/sundaytimes/stnews/2017/05/28/Here-they-are-The-emails-that-prove-the-Guptas-run-South-Africa">enormous proportions</a>.</p>
<p>Some 65% of South Africans want Zuma to <a href="http://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/65-of-south-africans-want-zuma-to-resign--ipsos">resign</a>. An all-time low approval rating of 20% makes him less popular among the electorate than even <a href="http://time.com/4785127/michael-temer-nicolas-maduro-donald-trump/">US President Donald Trump</a>. Despite this – combined with growing demands from within the party that he steps down – the ANC still backs its president. </p>
<p>But divisions within the party are deepening, with some in its leadership demanding an <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/88337066-4797-11e7-8519-9f94ee97d996">investigation</a> into the Gupta patronage network. </p>
<p>For his part, Zuma is focused on pulling strings to secure Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as <a href="https://www.theelephant.info/dispatches/2017/03/10/zuma-succession-the-businessman-vs-the-ex-wife-or-is-it-all-smoke-and-mirrors/">his successor</a> as president of the party. The other front-runner candidate is Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa. </p>
<p>Zuma’s assumption appears to be that, once in office, his former wife would not endorse any legal prosecution of the father of her children. </p>
<p>But the country’s official opposition party, Democratic Alliance (DA), isn’t reaping the benefits of the ANC’s blunders. It has its own problems, which are constraining the gains it might otherwise be making from the ANC’s mess. </p>
<p>The party is divided over what to do about its former leader and Premier of the Western Cape province, Helen Zille following a tweet in which she defended the legacy of colonialism. The comment whipped up a storm of protest and for weeks the party had been at pains on how to deal with the scandal. </p>
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<p>DA leader Mmusi Maimane finally announced that Zille had been suspended from the party and that a disciplinary hearing would decide what further <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-40143710?ocid=socialflow_twitter">political consequences</a> she might face. But a resilient Zille immediately challenged <a href="http://m.news24.com/news24/SouthAfrica/News/das-u-turn-on-zille-suspension-20170603">the decision</a>. </p>
<p>Whatever the outcome, the DA’s image is damaged. Its aspirations to be the country’s new majority party has been dealt a major blow. </p>
<h2>Regional woes</h2>
<p>In Angola, 74-year-old Jose Eduardo dos Santos, who has been in office since 1979, has decided to select a <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-3995176/Angolas-President-Dos-Santos-stand-2017-state-radio.html">successor</a>. The scenario will secure that the family “oiligarchy” will remain in control of politics and the country’s economy, while the governing People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) uses the state apparatus to ruthlessly suppress any meaningful <a href="https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/the-mercury/20170221/281706909446949">social protests</a>.</p>
<p>In contrast Robert Mugabe – reigning in Zimbabwe since independence in 1980 - shows no intention of retiring. He was nominated again as the Zimbabwe African Nation Union/Patriotic Front’s (ZANU/PF) candidate for the 2018 <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-africa-30365706/mugabe-confirmed-as-zanu-pf-candidate-for-2018-election">presidential elections</a>. But everyone is anxiously following the party’s internal power struggles over the ailing autocrat’s <a href="http://www.thezimbabwean.co/2017/04/zimbabwes-make-break-moment/">replacement</a>. Fears are that the vacuum created by his departure might create a worse situation. </p>
<p>While the regime’s constant violation of human rights is – as in Angola – geared towards preventing any form of meaningful opposition, there are concerns that the unresolved succession might add another violent dimension to local politics.</p>
<p>Zambia’s democracy also looks sad. The country’s main opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema of the United Party for National Development (UPND) is on trial for high treason. Hichilema has been embroiled in a personal feud with President Edgar Lungu of the governing Patriotic Front (PF) for years. He was arrested in early April after obstructing the president’s motor cavalcade. The charge of high treason is based on the accusation that he <a href="https://zambiareports.com/2017/04/09/hichilema-willfully-put-pres-lungus-life-danger-state-house/">wilfully put President Lungu’s life in danger</a>. </p>
<p>The trial is feeding growing concerns over an increasingly autocratic regime. The once praised democracy, which allowed for several <a href="https://www.themastonline.com/2017/05/15/its-time-to-start-talking-about-zambia-says-cheeseman/">relatively peaceful transfers</a> of political power since the turn of the century, is <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2017/05/16/birmingham-university-professor-cheesemans-ignorance-democracy-shocking-regrettable/">now in decline</a>.</p>
<p>Lesotho is also in a mess. It provides a timely reminder that competing parties seeking to obtain political control over governments are by no means a guarantee for better governance. Aptly described as a <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-06-02-00-lesothos-groundhog-day-election">“Groundhog Day election”</a>, citizens in the crisis-ridden country went to the polls for the third time since 2012 with no new <a href="http://africanarguments.org/2017/06/02/lesothos-night-before-the-elections-photo-of-the-weekexplainer/">alternatives or options</a>. </p>
<p>Their limited choice is between two former prime ministers aged 77 (Tom Thabane) and 72 (Pakalitha Mosisili). The likely election result is another fragile coalition government – provided the military accepts the result. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the biggest challenge for relative political stability in the region might still be in the making: President Joseph Kabila, whose second term in office in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) ended in December 2016, is still hanging on with the promise that he’ll vacate the post by end of this year. </p>
<p>Despite a constitutional two-term limit, his plans remain a matter of speculation. In a recent interview, he was characteristically <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/die-lage-am-samstag-aggressiver-nationalismus-plus-atomraketen-a-1150544.html">evasive</a>. He refused to give a straight answer on whether he’s still considering <a href="http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/kabila-says-he-never-promised-to-hold-elections-in-drc-20170603">another term</a> and flatly denied that he had promised anything, including elections. </p>
<p>Kabila’s <a href="http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2016/12/21/Up-to-20-dead-as-Congo-police-protesters-clash-over-president/6411482288306/">extended stay in office</a> threatens to exacerbate an already explosive and violent situation, with potentially devastating consequences.</p>
<p>His continued reign would not only provoke further bloodshed at home. Any spill-over will challenge the Southern African Development Community’s willingness and ability to find solutions to regional conflicts in the interests of <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-southern-africa-can-learn-from-west-africa-about-dealing-with-despots-71722">relative stability</a>. A stability which is at best fragile and indicative of the crisis of policy in most of the regional body’s member states.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/78847/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Henning Melber is a member of Swapo since 1974. </span></em></p>Democracy is in a parlous state in many countries in southern Africa. Autocrats hold onto power, while electorates have little to choose from at the polls.Henning Melber, Extraordinary Professor, Department of Political Sciences, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/752332017-03-27T12:47:49Z2017-03-27T12:47:49ZSouth Africa: Helen Zille’s folly and the simplicities of debate<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162642/original/image-20170327-3276-j5nx4j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Premier of the Western Cape Helen Zille.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Mike Hutchings</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It’s remarkable how a South African politician as intelligent as Helen Zille, premier of the Western Cape and former leader of the opposition Democratic Alliance (DA), did something so unutterably stupid. I am referring, of course, to her notorious tweet stating that not everything about <a href="https://www.enca.com/south-africa/zille-to-answer-for-colonialism-tweets">colonialism was bad</a>. </p>
<p>Surely she should have realised that such an assertion was likely to cause an uproar if delivered in un-nuanced style in 140 characters. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"842260539644497921"}"></div></p>
<p>After all, whether Zille likes it or not, South Africa is going through a period in which the politics of race has become <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2017-03-20-zilles-tipping-point-colonial-creatures-and-the-concealing-of-black-history/#.WNjgaVV949c">acutely sensitive</a>. This manifests in many ways, including the foregrounding of discussions about <a href="https://theconversation.com/decolonisation-involves-more-than-simply-turning-back-the-clock-62133">“coloniality”</a>. In such circumstances, she should have had the political nous to appreciate that her tweeted musings were unlikely to get a measured response from the twitterati. </p>
<p>The responses have been sadly predictable. The major reaction, largely by black respondents, have condemned her for what she didn’t say, asserting that she issued a robust and uncomplicated defence of colonialism. </p>
<p>The fact that she was implying that there were some good outcomes of colonialism – whether intended or not, despite the bad that it inflicted – was buried under a rubble of popular outrage. What she failed to appreciate was, as the late <a href="http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/rmhttp/radio4/transcripts/1979_reith2.pdf">Ali Mazrui, prolific Kenyan writer and philospher</a>, put it:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Africans are not necessarily the most brutalised of
peoples, but they are almost certainly the most humiliated in modern history.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>So inviting black South Africans, in such a casual manner, to differentiate the legacies of colonialism (let us say, for argument’s sake, slavery, forced labour, racism versus long term advances in education, health and infrastructure) is asking an awful lot. </p>
<p>It’s a bit like saying that the brutalities inflicted on the labourers who built the pyramids have been cancelled out because they eventually contributed to the making of the contemporary <a href="https://theconversation.com/egypt-hopes-to-lure-back-wary-tourists-with-3d-scanned-pyramids-and-an-underwater-museum-53711">Egyptian tourist industry</a>. </p>
<p>It’s also putting forward a crude “balance sheet” approach to colonialism which historians, for very good reason, have long abandoned – so complex have been the debates about the colonial impact. </p>
<p>Similarly, Zille can scarcely complain that various hacks from the governing ANC have jumped on the bandwagon to condemn her as racist or <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/news/opinion/zille-has-exposed-da-for-what-it-really-is-8325460">white supremacist</a>, and to claim that her tweet reveals the underbelly of the DA as the vehicle of those who want to restore apartheid. </p>
<p>Such accusations have no intellectual credulity. But they have considerable political salience. No wonder the leader of the DA Mmusi Maimane was so <a href="https://www.da.org.za/2017/03/colonialism-like-apartheid-wrong-cannot-justified/">furious</a>.</p>
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<p>His biggest fear is that Zille’s tweet will damage his efforts to make the DA attractive to black voters. </p>
<h2>No leg to stand on</h2>
<p>Zille can’t reasonably complain if the DA’s <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017/03/16/BREAKING-Zille-faces-disciplinary-action-from-DA-after-controversial-tweets1">disciplinary tribunal</a> asks her to stand down as premier of the Western Cape, the only province not controlled by the ANC, or even chooses to expel her from the party.</p>
<p>Zille has written that she would welcome being charged. She would then face a DA disciplinary process which will follow due process of law, offer her a fair trial, and reach a conclusion consistent with the DA’s principles and those of the South African constitution. </p>
<p>Doubtless she will put up a robust defence, asking the tribunal to consider what she did say, rather than what she didn’t say. Yet she will need to put up a stronger case than the one she put forward in an article published on the <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2017-03-20-from-the-inside-lessons-from-singapore/#.WNjW-FV949c">Daily Maverick</a> website.</p>
<p>In it she lauded the progress made in Singapore. While pointing out the authoritarian nature of the Singaporean regime under its first post-colonial ruler, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/lee-kuan-yew-who-led-singapore-into-prosperity-over-30-year-rule-dies-at-91/2015/03/22/00f7ccbe-d0d4-11e4-a62f-ee745911a4ff_story.html?utm_term=.a6315a7ba14a">Lee Kuan Yew</a>, she argued that the Singapore he created was developmentally progressive. He did this by rendering it hugely attractive to foreign investment, while enthusiastically embracing innovation and technology.</p>
<p>Ironically, she scarcely mentioned the colonial legacy at all, save that of the “British trade union practices” which Lee Kuan Yew was to <a href="http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-lees-authoritarian-legacy-may-fall-short-for-new-2015mar23-story.html">crush</a>. Nothing about the role of Singapore under colonialism as an entreprot for the export of colonial products grown in Malaya under conditions of coerced labour. </p>
<p>She said nothing about the divisive ethnic politics pursued by the British. In the post war years these resulted in communal violence between <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/2642213?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">Chinese and Malays </a>. Also nothing about the racist insouciance of the British colonial community – one reason why they were so easily booted out of Singapore by the Japanese during the <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4241644/The-moment-Britain-surrendered-Singapore-Japan-1942.html">Second World War</a>.</p>
<p>So yes, Singapore may have been a developmental success, but that owes far more to its post-colonial practices and its globally strategic location than anything to do with its colonial record. </p>
<p>Nor is it a credible defence of her tweet to state, as she did in the article, that Nelson Mandela had praised the legacy of the <a href="http://citizen.co.za/news/news-national/1463257/zille-uses-madiba-justify-colonialism-tweet/">mission schools</a>. It’s indisputable that he had a case for saying so, but context is everything. </p>
<p>Boarding a plane and sending a tweet out for public consumption that could be so easily (and willfully) misconstrued was politically, plain daft – and it may turn out to have been, politically suicidal.</p>
<p>It’s a tragedy if Zille’s remarkable career goes down in flames for a momentary indiscretion. It’s hugely sad if the mud of the calumny that she’s racist was to stick to her reputation. Yet she stands guilty of being trite and racially myopic.</p>
<p>Ultimately, she faces an unappetising prospect: fighting to stay on as premier and damaging the electoral prospects of the party she’s done so much to render a credible opposition. Or choosing to voluntarily resign in defence of her dignity.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/75233/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall receives funding from the National Research Foundation</span></em></p>For Western Cape Premier Helen Zille to invite black South Africans, in a casual manner, to differentiate the legacies of colonialism is asking a lot.Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/697682017-01-08T19:22:31Z2017-01-08T19:22:31ZFive political leaders to watch in 2017<p>The world is in fluid political times, and the opportunity for emerging figures to make their mark is considerable. </p>
<p>Here are five political leaders from around the world who are emerging as significant talents and possible contenders for influence in 2017 and beyond.</p>
<hr>
<p>Front National (FN) leader Marine Le Pen has been in the national eye for most of her life. She <a href="http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/715289/who-is-marine-le-pen-france-national-front-president-eu">began campaigning</a> with her father, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Jean-Marie-Le-Pen">Jean-Marie Le Pen</a>, the party’s fiery former leader, at age 13. </p>
<p>For much of its existence, FN has been associated with neo-Nazism, anti-Semitism and Holocaust denial, and struggled to speak to a genuinely national audience. But recently it has become a significant force in national politics. It has capitalised on France and Europe’s economic malaise and growing anti-immigration sentiment.</p>
<p>Since taking over the party leadership in 2011, Marine Le Pen has sought to make FN a credible political force while retaining its deeply nationalistic and socially conservative core. Her aim was to take FN into the political mainstream by shearing it of its more outrageous policies and rhetoric. The most potent symbol of this was the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34009901">expulsion of her father</a> from FN in 2015 following offensive remarks about the Holocaust.</p>
<p>FN won more than 6.8 million votes in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/french-regional-elections-no-one-can-dismiss-le-pen-as-an-also-ran-now-51616">2015 regional elections</a>, vindicating her belief that it is no longer a fringe party. The combination of nationalism, anti-immigration, anti-EU sentiment and scepticism about economic liberalism seems tailor-made for the times. </p>
<hr>
<p>Renho, as she is known, is the leader of Japan’s largest opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). She is the first woman to hold that office, and is notable also for her mixed parentage: her father is Taiwanese while her mother is Japanese. </p>
<p>Prior to entering politics in 2004 she was a journalist, coming to prominence as the news anchor for one of the major broadcasters.</p>
<p>She was elected leader of the DPJ in September 2016 and has a considerable challenge in front of her. Although Japan has been an electoral democracy since 1947, the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has had a virtual monopoly on government. In the current <a href="https://theconversation.com/abes-early-election-gambit-pays-off-35366">LDP leader</a>, Shinzo Abe, she faces one of the strongest and most effective political leaders in post-war Japanese history. </p>
<p>For some, Renho is the face of a changing Japan. Her mixed parentage – still a rarity in the country – and gender give her distinct electoral appeal. Others see in her difference a weakness on which conservatives can seize to stymie DPJ ambitions. </p>
<p>There was considerable criticism relating to her nationality in the lead-up to her <a href="http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/09/07/national/renho-nationality-accusations-spur-debate-dual-citizenship/#.WFHEjCN96X0">election in September</a>, which gives a sense of the potential volatility of the issue. </p>
<p>In more concrete terms, the DPJ continues to lack a unifying policy vision or ideological purpose beyond the desire to push the LDP from government. Renho’s challenge in 2017 is to develop a coherent policy platform that can unify the DPJ, and which can be used to contest the LDP’s electoral dominance. </p>
<p>Given Abe’s ongoing problems <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/why-japans-economy-is-laboring-1459929574">with economic reform</a> and his ambitions for <a href="http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2016/07/17/editorials/abes-amendment-strategy/#.WFHHrSN96X1">controversial constitutional change</a>, she has much with which to work.</p>
<hr>
<p><a href="http://time.com/4428312/mmusi-maimane-south-africa-elections/">Often compared to Barack Obama</a> due to his charismatic presence and oratorical skills, Maimane is the first black South African to lead the Democratic Alliance (DA), the major opposition party. </p>
<p>The 36-year-old has led the DA <a href="https://theconversation.com/first-black-leader-breathes-life-into-south-african-opposition-41275">since May 2015</a>. The election of a young man born in Soweto demonstrated not only that the party had broadened its base beyond its traditional constituency of <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34443820">liberal white South Africans</a>, but that it was a political force to serve the interests of South Africa as a whole. </p>
<p>Maimane’s central political message is to deliver on a post-racial vision of South Africa. As yet it is not clear whether this will have enough resonance in a country that, in more than two decades since apartheid’s demise, has grown sceptical about that vision’s reality.</p>
<p>Since coming to power in 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) has been the dominant force in South African politics. Under President Jacob Zuma, however, its popularity has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/28/jacob-zuma-gains-reprieve-despite-calls-for-his-resignation">declined precipitously</a>. Corruption appears to have become endemic, the economy has stalled – <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/06/world/africa/south-africa-election-anc.html">South Africa</a> is no longer Africa’s largest economy – and inequality has increased. </p>
<p>Under Maimane the DA had its <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36997461">best-ever result</a> in the August 2016 municipal elections. It significantly increased its share of the vote, directly at the expense of the ANC. </p>
<p>In 2017, Maimane must consolidate that advantage as the DA positions itself to challenge for national power in the 2019 national elections.</p>
<hr>
<p>In hindsight it was obvious. Hillary Clinton was a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/nov/09/hillary-clinton-election-president-loss">weak candidate</a> whose establishment credentials alongside her decades in the public limelight added further baggage. These problems were not offset by a cautious and dull pick <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/hillary-clinton-picks-tim-kaine-for-running-mate-1469232934">for her running mate</a>.</p>
<p>One name <a href="http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2016/07/5_reasons_njs_cory_booker_is_not_hillary_clintons.html">overlooked for the role</a> was the junior senator from New Jersey, Cory Booker. But his is one of the first names people mention as possible Democratic contenders to take on Donald Trump in 2020. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.booker.senate.gov/?p=about_senator">Booker</a> began political life as a Newark City councillor in 1998 and became mayor in 2006. He was elected to the US Senate in 2013 <a href="http://www.politico.com/story/2013/10/cory-booker-new-jersey-senate-election-098436">to fill a vacancy</a>, then won the ordinary election in November 2014. </p>
<p>Politically, Booker represents the Democratic Party’s pragmatic centre. He is animated by social issues but capable of working effectively both with Republicans and big business. </p>
<p>Beyond his ability to mobilise African-American voters, Booker also has the capacity to bring together <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21701130-senator-new-jersey-thinks-americans-must-love-one-another-or-die-cory-booker">progressive and more centrist tendencies</a> in the US electorate. Given the tenor of the incoming Trump administration, this will put him in good stead for <a href="https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2016/11/16/candidates-who-could-run-democrats-and-republicans/hxdFmFwXHg64rEEaIgKa9I/story.html">any potential 2020 bid</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>It may appear odd to identify as a person to watch in 2017 a political figure who came to prominence on the back of the losing campaign in the <a href="http://www.politico.eu/article/nicola-sturgeon-wins-sympathy-but-not-support-for-scotlands-eu-plight/">2014 Scottish referendum</a>. But Scottish First Minister Nicola Sturgeon is one of Britain’s most capable and strongly supported political leaders.</p>
<p>More importantly, the June 2016 Brexit vote undermined one of the crucial reasons Scotland <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/25/scotland-eu-leave-uk-european">chose to remain in Britain</a>, and has dealt Sturgeon an interesting and potentially advantageous hand.</p>
<p>Like many left-of-centre British politicians she was politicised by the Thatcher government, joining the Scottish National Party (SNP) in 1986, aged 16. She entered the Scottish parliament in 1999, following its establishment. As deputy leader she played a prominent and effective role before <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-25333635">succeeding Alex Salmond</a> in the top job in November 2014. </p>
<p>The 2015 UK general election confirmed her place as a <a href="http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/13211668.Poll_shows_Sturgeon_is_now_the_most_popular_politician_across_Britain/">leading figure in British politics</a>. Her strong performance in the televised election debates boosted her national profile. Success at the ballot box confirmed her instincts as leader: the SNP trounced Labour, traditionally the dominant force in Scotland, winning <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/election-2015-scotland-32635871">56 of 59 Scottish seats</a>.</p>
<p>The SNP’s nationalist focus, its scepticism about unfettered globalisation and its strong social welfare programs <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/may/21/how-alex-salmond-nicola-sturgeon-pulled-off-political-triumph-lifetime">give it</a> a useful platform in the current political climate. Scottish independence remains an emotive force for political mobilisation. </p>
<p>Sturgeon’s challenge in 2017 and beyond is to capitalise on this, while convincing the British parliament to allow a second referendum vote and getting the EU to accept an independent Scotland. No small task.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/69768/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nick Bisley is a member of the Australian Institute of International Affairs' national executive. AIIA receives funding from the Commonwealth Government.</span></em></p>Here are five political leaders from around the world who are emerging as significant talents and possible contenders for influence in 2017 and beyond.Nick Bisley, Executive Director of La Trobe Asia and Professor of International Relations, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.