tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/nobel-peace-prize-2016-32081/articlesNobel Peace Prize 2016 – The Conversation2016-10-12T02:21:28Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/667102016-10-12T02:21:28Z2016-10-12T02:21:28ZGetting to yes in Colombia: What it would take to reintegrate the FARC<p>The Nobel Committee has awarded Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos the Nobel Peace Prize.</p>
<p>His key accomplishment was the Sept. 26 signing of the <a href="http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/procesos-y-conversaciones/Paginas/Texto-completo-del-Acuerdo-Final-para-la-Terminacion-del-conflicto.aspx">Colombian peace agreement</a> between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, as known as FARC. The signing marked the formal end of 52 years of civil war. In the words of Humberto de la Calle, the former chief government negotiator, the time had come to believe in <a href="http://currenthistory.com/Article.php?ID=1300">peace</a>. </p>
<p>But, not everyone agreed. </p>
<p>In a referendum on Oct. 2, <a href="http://plebiscito.registraduria.gov.co/99PL/DPLZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ_L1.htm">50.2 percent</a> of the participating electorate voted to reject the peace agreement. The voter participation rate was 37.4 percent, with urban centers overrepresented at the polls.</p>
<p>Deciding how to treat the remaining 7,000 FARC guerrillas was a polarizing subject. Some saw the provision of stipends, support and training to demobilize FARC fighters as an investment in security. Others who opposed the peace accords <a href="http://www.eltiempo.com/politica/partidos-politicos/proceso-de-paz-antes-que-darle-plata-piden-que-la-guerrilla-aporte/16496885">framed it</a> as a form of <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/how-colombias-voters-rejected-peace">rewarding</a> – rather than punishing – individuals for their acts of violence.</p>
<p>Government and FARC negotiators are determining how to adjust the agreement in hopes of achieving a “yes” from the electorate in a future vote. Our combined two decades of research with former combatants and conflict-affected groups in Colombia provide insight into why reintegration is both challenging and significant.</p>
<h2>Reconstructing lives and livelihoods</h2>
<p>The process by which former fighters lay down their weapons, leave armed groups and transition back into civilian society is called disarmament, demobilization and <a href="http://unddr.org/what-is-ddr/introduction_1.aspx">reintegration</a>. </p>
<p>However, as researcher Sami Faltas <a href="http://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/13344928/5d16fcf2.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAJ56TQJRTWSMTNPEA&Expires=1475696708&Signature=roWR1vvKEM7jBnNH6kZpzFkn33k%3D&response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DDDR_without_Camps_The_Need_for_Decentral.pdf">writes</a>, “unlike disarmament and demobilization, reintegration cannot be imposed or centralized. … For this reason, it is usually the weakest link in the DDR chain.”</p>
<p>Although the current reintegration debate in Colombia focuses largely on the FARC, our research covers the experiences of many of the armed actors in the conflict. These include guerrilla fighters from the FARC and National Liberation Army, as well as paramilitary groups.</p>
<p>Reintegration requires former combatants to imagine a civilian life for themselves after a period of time when their livelihood, sense of identity and community came from affiliation with an armed group.</p>
<p>Disarming and demobilizing ex-combatants often causes them to worry about their security. A former paramilitary member <a href="http://ijtj.oxfordjournals.org/content/1/1/66.short">told us</a>, “We know that we’re being tracked down by the armed groups. They send murderers. That’s why I can’t just show my face around town. They’ll kill me.”</p>
<p>Ex-combatants also worry about economic security and their ability to support their families. For some, making money was part of their motivation for joining an armed group. As Vladimiro <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/258862/summary">explained</a>, “In my barrio, when anything is missing – when anyone’s been robbed – everyone starts looking at the people who don’t have jobs. I hated that feeling that everyone suspected me.” </p>
<p>For him, joining the paramilitaries meant receiving a salary and carrying a gun, both of which translated into respect when he walked down the street. The stipend for demobilized combatants is modest, and they become one more poorly paid male among many as they transition to civilian life.</p>
<h2>Gender matters</h2>
<p>The urgent need to guarantee physical and economic security for demobilizing combatants is frequently tied to former fighters’ understanding of masculinity. The peace agreement addressed <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/08/19/the-colombian-peace-agreement-gives-gender-issues-a-central-role-heres-why-this-is-so-important/">aspects of gender</a>. However, it did not explicitly address masculinity or adequately provide for the security of former combatants.</p>
<p>Former paramilitaries <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/258862/summary">have said</a> that their affiliation with these groups helped them “feel like a big man in the streets of their barrios” and allowed them “to go out with the prettiest young women.” In the words of one <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/258862/summary">former paramilitary</a>, “in this country, the man who has a weapon is a man who has power.” Reintegration thus requires reimagining masculinity in a time of transition.</p>
<p>Not all fighters in Colombian armed groups are male. Female fighters, whose exact numbers are difficult to estimate, have joined armed groups for a <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09592310802462547">variety of reasons</a>. Some joined because of past experiences with <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/colombia0903/10.htm">violence in Colombia</a>. Or, they felt the armed group <a href="https://www.mcgill.ca/isid/files/isid/14754830701693011.pdf">offered more protection</a> and a more secure livelihood than in civil society. Some were attracted to the possibility of achieving more <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09592310802462547">agency and equality</a>. </p>
<p>While some women experienced forms of gender equality within the FARC, they have also reported experiences of coercion and violence. These have <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/03/24/women-in-the-farc-have-had-a-mixed-experience-you-wouldnt-know-that-from-the-new-york-times/">included</a> forced contraception, forced abortion, and separation from children and families. While some armed groups allowed open sexual relations between combatants, sex for female fighters was at times an exchange <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/03/24/women-in-the-farc-have-had-a-mixed-experience-you-wouldnt-know-that-from-the-new-york-times/">for protection</a> by higher-ranking males in the group.</p>
<p>When trying to reintegrate, female fighters also deal with stereotypes that portray them as having violated expectations of a peaceful, nurturing femininity. Official DDR programs at times box women into restrictive, narrowly conceived gender roles. </p>
<p>For example, Joshua Mitrotti, the head of the Colombian Agency of Reintegration, <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/09/farc-deal-female-fighters/501644/">said</a> female former combatants have “sometimes lost their feminine features,” and that the program puts “a strong focus on accompanying them and helping them again reconstruct those feminine features they want to reconstruct.” Mitrotti did not elaborate on what a return to “feminine features” may entail for these former combatants.</p>
<h2>Stigma and its consequences</h2>
<p>The stigma associated with ex-combatants can complicate their employment prospects, social relationships and sense of identity during the transition to civilian life. The stigma partly stems from people’s concerns that former combatants may slide back into violence, or be recycled into a new armed group or criminal network. </p>
<p>A <a href="http://cdn.ideaspaz.org/media/website/document/53c8560f2376b.pdf">2014 study</a> by Fundación Ideas Para La Paz, an independent think tank in Colombia, confirmed that dissatisfaction with reintegration programs and their failure to meet demobilizing combatants’ economic needs can lead to their re-recruitment into armed groups. Weak <a href="http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/early/2016/05/09/0022002716644326.full.pdf+html">family ties</a> and <a href="http://cmp.sagepub.com/content/early/2015/11/20/0738894215614506.abstract">social bonds</a> between ex-combatants and the communities into which they enter further affect ex-combatant recidivism.</p>
<p>Collectively, these insights suggest that when disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs fail to provide former combatants with an adequate route back into civilian life, the alternatives for these individuals may involve a return to violence. The provisions outlined in the peace agreement included stipends for a fixed period of time, as part of a comprehensive program of reintegration. This assistance may help former combatants with the transition into civilian life.</p>
<h2>Justice in transition</h2>
<p>Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration are not solely a security issue. Reintegration is also a component of peace-building and justice after armed conflict.</p>
<p>Demobilizing fighters represents a dual challenge: On the one hand, they are reconstructing relationships and identities as they reintegrate into civil society. On the other hand, they are frequently viewed as violent perpetrators who inspire fear in those around them. The broader communities to which they return may rightly demand some accountability for the harms these combatants have caused. </p>
<p>The accountability provisions of the peace accord addressed violence through a <a href="http://www.eltiempo.com/politica/proceso-de-paz/amnistia-para-las-farc-no-aplicara-en-crimenes-de-guerra-y-lesa-humanidad/16682515">tiered system</a>. Demobilizing rank-and-file FARC fighters are eligible for amnesty, provided they were not involved in war crimes or crimes against humanity. Those who exercised command responsibility or were otherwise involved in these grave crimes, including torture, kidnapping and sexual violence, among others, must face the Tribunal for Peace. </p>
<p>At the tribunal, former fighters who confess and fully accept responsibility are eligible for five- to eight-year “sentences of restriction of liberty,” which have a restorative and reparative function, rather than punitive. Those who do not accept responsibility and are found guilty are eligible for sentences of 15 to 20 years.</p>
<p>Critics of these provisions of the peace accord include the former Colombian president and current senator, Álvaro Uribe, his supporters and José Miguel Vivanco, the head of the Americas desk at Human Rights Watch. In a much-quoted <a href="http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/paz/pacto-de-justicia-colombia-una-pinata-de-impunidad-denu-articulo-607243">statement</a>, Vivanco dubbed certain provisions of the accord “a piñata of impunity.”</p>
<p>What these objectors miss is the complex definitions of justice among conflict-affected individuals and demobilizing combatants alike. The <a href="http://plebiscito.registraduria.gov.co/99PL/DPLZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ_L1.htm">geographic distribution</a> of the referendum votes suggests that people in regions that experienced high rates of violence voted in favor of the peace accords. </p>
<p>Our research with conflict-affected individuals and former combatants highlights the broader range of justice that operates in war-torn regions of Colombia. It is not simply a dichotomy between criminal justice and jail time, or impunity for the damage former FARC members have done. </p>
<p>What the “no” vote revealed is the deep gap that exists between certain urban centers – whose inhabitants see the war as distant, past and currently a subject for television series – and people in regions of the country in which the living legacies of war are a part of daily life. In those areas, the peace accords were embraced not for their perfection, but for their promise. </p>
<p><em>The names of interviewees have been changed for their safety.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/66710/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>A portion of Kimberly Theidon's research was funded by the Wenner Gren Foundation and the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies at Harvard University. This article represents her views, not those of her funders. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>A portion of Roxanne Krystalli's research in Colombia has been supported by funding from the Social Science Research Council Dissertation Proposal Development Fellowship. This article represents her views, not those of the Social Science Research Council or any other entities.</span></em></p>Scholars share their research with former combatants in Colombia, after a majority of Colombians voted against a peace deal. Can understanding reintegration help peace negotiations move forward?Kimberly Theidon, Professor of International Humanitarian Studies, Tufts UniversityRoxanne Krystalli, Ph.D. Candidate, The Fletcher School, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/667292016-10-08T03:31:55Z2016-10-08T03:31:55ZWill Nobel Prize help or hurt Colombia’s peace process?<p>First the illusion of peace, then a rejected peace deal, and now a Nobel prize. For Colombians, the last couple of weeks have pulled feelings between the extremes of disappointment, rage, hope… and now, joy? </p>
<p><em>Semana</em> magazine has called this a <a href="http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/premio-nobel-de-paz-a-juan-manuel-santos-y-una-semana-de-infarto/498055">week of heart attacks</a>, and it bears noting that it included, on top of everything else, a <a href="http://www.goal.com/en/match/paraguay-vs-colombia/2161463/report">last-minute football victory</a> over Paraguay in the World Cup qualifiers. </p>
<p>After four years of negotiations between the government of Juan Manuel Santos and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a <a href="http://www.acuerdodepaz.gov.co/">historical peace agreement</a> was finally <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-37477202">signed with pomp and circumstance</a> in the Caribbean city of Cartagena on September 26. Only to be rejected one week later by a razor-thin margin through plebiscite. </p>
<p>The shocking <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/02/colombia-referendum-rejects-peace-deal-with-farc">victory of the No camp</a> – by a difference of 60,374 votes (50.23% of the total) – disappointed not only half of Colombians <a href="http://www.elespectador.com/comunidad-internacional-se-declara-triste-resultado-de-articulo-658231">but also most of the international community</a>. </p>
<p>A cloud of uncertainty descended on Colombia. Murky feelings and gloom rapidly possessed Colombians. Social networks became a combat ring. No-voters claim that the agreements desperately needed some changes to be acceptable. Yes-voters wrote on Facebook that the blood was on No-voters hands if even one Colombian more died in this civil conflict. Hashtags proliferated: <em>#AcuerdosYa</em>, <em>#SiPorLaPaz</em>, <em>#PazALaCalle</em>. </p>
<p>Then, after what locals are calling <em>el guayabo electoral</em> (electoral hangover) wore off, division and disappointment slowly transformed into something akin to hope, as students in Bogota, Cali, and other cities organised marches for peace – <a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/news/thousands-of-colombians-march-to-salvage-peace-deal/">the largest such spontaneous public demonstrations</a> in Colombia’s history. </p>
<p>It looked like the Orange Revolution or the Arab Spring, and it saw Yes and No voters coming together to send a message to national leaders: a new agreement must be signed, and representatives from both wings must come together to figure out how to get there.</p>
<p>It was in this scenario of expectation, division, uncertainty and hope that Colombians received the news about their president joining the exclusive gallery of the Nobel Peace Prize laureates. </p>
<p>The question is, does it matter at all?</p>
<h2>Untangling peace</h2>
<p>The same questions that plagued Colombia after the plebiscite remain. There was no Plan B for a rejection of the agreement. Will guerrillas jump back into war? Is it really possible to renegotiate any of the points of the agreement? Who will decide which points are open for discussion? How long will it take for another agreement to be reached? Will the ceasefire stand? </p>
<p>Colombia now has a Nobel Peace Prize laureate. And the peace process itself is not dead. The Nobel could work as a boost, as a motivator to move these processes forward, and to push the actors involved. </p>
<p>But this will not happen automatically; it will require real leadership on both sides of the aisle. The text of the agreement is still the solid base from which to launch new negotiations, but the key to untying this knot includes engaging leaders of the No campaign – through sound and efficient mechanisms and in a fair period of time – to collectively decide on the key points that could be discussed with the FARC. </p>
<p>Then the government must again sit down with the FARC to evaluate the possibility of rethinking specific clauses. This process itself is not easy. The points agreed to on September 26 are the <a href="http://colombiapeace.org/2016/08/16/explaining-colombias-peace-plebiscite/">result of many years of bargaining</a>, shifting positions and <a href="http://lasillavacia.com/hagame-el-cruce/las-farc-ha-cedido-mas-que-el-gobierno-en-la-habana-56254">ceding territory</a>. It is frankly hard to imagine that there will be significant concessions at this point. </p>
<p>Perhaps the momentum of hope granted by the Nobel Committee to Colombian actors will materialise in a willingness to yield more in the next round of negotiations, in order to achieve a more consensual peace. But will the FARC agree to harsher sanctions, which was <a href="https://theconversation.com/colombias-peace-plebiscite-the-case-for-yes-and-the-case-for-no-66325">the rallying cry of the No camp</a>? </p>
<h2>No more myth-making</h2>
<p>Throughout the peace process, the opposition camp inflated resistance by creating and perpetuating myths that exploit a set of fears. While the premises of these fears are not necessarily true, they nonetheless motivated the vote of many people. </p>
<p>For example, there was the idea that a gender perspective in the accords was the beginning of a dictatorship of <a href="http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/ideologia-de-genero-una-estrategia-para-ganar-adeptos-por-el-no-al-plebiscito/488260">something called “gender ideology”</a>, in which homosexuality would threaten the existence of the traditional Christian family model. The No camp also said that by signing the agreement, Colombians were submitting to something called “<a href="http://www.eltiempo.com/politica/proceso-de-paz/significado-del-castrochavismo/16715527"><em>castrochavismo</em></a>” that would unavoidably transform the country into the next Venezuela. </p>
<p>These myths persist today, and they tap into the growing backlash to recent social advances around <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-36166888">gay marriage, transgender rights, and women’s rights</a>. To be effective, any political efforts must work toward breaking these myths and focusing on the points that are actually relevant to establishing peace. </p>
<p>Liberal versus conservative social values are not, ultimately, what the peace agreement is about. It’s about replacing war with democratic process, about the politics of peace.</p>
<h2>Leadership not vanity</h2>
<p>In spite of resistance by some sectors, the award seems to be <a href="http://www.eltiempo.com/politica/proceso-de-paz/reacciones-en-redes-por-nobel-de-paz-para-juan-manuel-santos/16720937">well accepted through the nation</a>. It reinforces the mood of unity and hope that Colombians have been trying to build in recent days. </p>
<p>At a minimum, the Nobel creates a more appropriate atmosphere for the necessary next steps to fix what the plebiscite broke, preserving momentum for advancing with the peace process. </p>
<p>But it will take selfless leadership, unmoved by political ambition, without regard to vanity and ego, and only with an honest and original concern for Colombia, to move forward. This is more difficult than it sounds. Some Colombians have always suspected that Santos’ real goal during this peace process was to secure the Nobel. Cynically, then, you might ask: now that he has it, what’s still at stake? </p>
<p>In the end, most people don’t care about his motivation; what they really care about is finding a way out of this mess, about lifting the cloak of uncertainty that has fallen after the No-vote win. It is up to the president to take advantage of this moment. </p>
<p>If the award creates the conditions for moving forward, then Colombians joyfully welcome their second-ever Nobel Prize. If the moment is lost, division will lead them down the tortuous road of a rough negotiation with little expectation of success. </p>
<p>Its worst consequence, and the one that Colombians want most to avoid, is the opposite of peace and almost unthinkable: a return to combat.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/66729/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Oscar Palma does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A week of extreme emotions in Colombia ends with a Nobel Peace Prize for its president. But will it help the country avoid descending back into civil war?Oscar Palma, Professor of International Relations. Coordinator of the Security and Conflict Research Group, Universidad del RosarioLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/666892016-10-07T20:22:14Z2016-10-07T20:22:14ZSantos got the Nobel Prize for not giving up on peace – here’s why all Colombians won<p>Only days after the people of Colombia voted to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/10/03/colombia-just-voted-no-on-its-referendum-for-peace-heres-why-and-what-it-means/">reject</a> a historic peace deal he spent years negotiating, the Colombian president, Juan Manuel Santos, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-37585188">received the Nobel Peace Prize</a> for his efforts to end the country’s decades-long war with the FARC guerrilla movement. </p>
<p>The no vote came a week after the government and the FARC had signed a peace deal, and after they had declared a bilateral ceasefire and the end of all hostilities at the end of August. Nevertheless, the Nobel Peace Prize Committee has given Santos and his fellow negotiators a vote of confidence – one that they have earned through years of dogged and determined work.</p>
<p>Santos became president in 2010 after serving as defence minister under his presidential predecessor Alvaro Uribe. Those years were marked by a hardline military approach against the FARC, whom Uribe labelled as “narco-terrorists” that had to be defeated militarily. Previous peace talks had <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1752015.stm">failed</a> and had left many Colombians feeling betrayed by the FARC. </p>
<p>Uribe’s hawkish policy weakened the FARC considerably, including by killing some of the group’s leadership figures, and it made urban areas safer. But it also pushed the conflict towards the country’s peripheries and <a href="http://www.3quarksdaily.com/3quarksdaily/2014/02/the-margins-at-the-centre-of-the-farcs-future.html">across its borders</a>, contributing to huge refugee flows and a humanitarian crisis that went largely unnoticed in many of Bogota’s comfortable government offices. </p>
<p>This era was also overshadowed by severe human rights abuses committed by members of the armed forces, including the “<a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-32280039">false positives</a>” scandal, in which peasants were killed and then dressed up as guerrilla fighters to artificially inflate the body count.</p>
<p>The Uribe administration had stuck to the line that the FARC were narco-terrorists, not insurgents, and that they therefore should never be talked to. At some points they had <a href="http://www.economist.com/blogs/americasview/2011/05/armed_conflict_colombia">denied the existence of an armed conflict</a> altogether. But when Santos was elected president in 2010, the government changed course, accepting that it <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Researching-Terrorism-Peace-and-Conflict-Studies-Interaction-Synthesis/Tellidis-Toros/p/book/9781138018174">needed to engage the FARC in dialogue</a>. </p>
<p>In 2012, I was <a href="https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2015/06/field-intuitive">carrying out fieldwork</a> at the Colombia-Venezuela border, one of the country’s most war-torn regions, when peace talks between the Colombian government and the FARC were publicly announced. At that time, the displaced people, ex-combatants, military officials, indigenous leaders and other local people I spoke to greeted the news with deep scepticism. </p>
<p>On the ground, it was easy to see why. While the world applauded the start of formal talks, the FARC actually intensified its armed attacks, perhaps to ensure that it would enter the negotiations in a position of strength. The upshot was that even as the talks began, some of Colombia’s marginalised communities were even more vulnerable to violence than before. </p>
<h2>Balancing act</h2>
<p>When the peace accord was rejected in the October 2 plebiscite, Santos accepted the result and reached out to the opposition – in particular to Uribe – to bring them to the negotiating table and discuss how the accord can be made tolerable for all Colombians. He affirmed that he would remain committed to peace until his last day in office. </p>
<p>Already steps have been taken to try and preserve order. The government and the FARC have now agreed to <a href="http://europe.newsweek.com/colombia-president-santos-extends-farc-ceasefire-resurrect-peace-deal-506231?rm=eu">extend the ceasefire</a> until at least October 31. Together with the UN, they are currently discussing how the FARC’s planned demobilisation process and the <a href="http://colombiapeace.org/">mechanisms to verify it</a> can be adjusted to the situation after the no vote.</p>
<p>One of the no campaign’s principal arguments was that the deal as signed offers FARC members legal impunity. However, it does include <a href="http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/herramientas/Documents/summary-of-colombias-peace-agreement.pdf">sophisticated transitional justice mechanisms</a>, according to which those involved in atrocious crimes will be held accountable for their deeds, including through prison sentences. Finding new terms with which the FARC’s leadership agree will be tricky to say the least. </p>
<p>Then there are the country’s other armed groups. Colombia’s armed forces support the government’s efforts for peace. Contrary to previous years, today’s Colombian Head of the Army described his troops as <a href="https://twitter.com/COMANDANTE_EJC/status/784404340475854848">“architects of peace”</a>. Yet while guaranteeing the ceasefire with the FARC, they have to continue military operations against other violent groups such as the ELN. As long as the FARC’s fighters aren’t concentrated in what were supposed to be demobilisation zones, this is a difficult task. A minor mistake could <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-momentous-peace-deal-with-the-farc-so-what-next-for-colombia-64452">easily spark an escalation</a>. </p>
<p>One might think that the Nobel committee’s decision to award Santos the prize makes this situation more explosive by fueling resentments among those who rejected the peace deal. The country had already become deeply polarised during the run-up to the plebiscite; in the aftermath of the no vote, it’s only getting worse. However, the committee decided not to extend the prize to the FARC’s leader, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-36610281">Timoschenko</a>, which many had speculated they might; a wise decision in such a tense context.</p>
<p>Overall, the prize could serve as a catalyst for a more unifying peace process. In what could be considered a conciliatory gesture, even Uribe congratulated Santos and <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/nobel-peace-prize-colombian-president-juan-manuel-santos-says-award-should-inspire-people-to-cement-a7350626.html">expressed his hope</a> that it might provide an impetus to find a new accord that all parties can accept. </p>
<p>For those who voted for the deal – now mired in frustration, anger and despair – the Nobel committee’s gesture offers sorely needed encouragement. As a friend from crisis-ridden Norte de Santander said to me, people might now be re-energised to continue to “sow peace”.</p>
<p>The prize might also encourage FARC members to adhere to the peace process instead of abandoning it. Amid the uncertainty around whether the deal’s provisions were really coming into effect, there was a heightened risk for them to cut and run, joining criminal groups, forming their own new gangs, or joining up with dissident elements such as the FARC’s <a href="https://www.stratfor.com/situation-report/colombia-farc-section-says-it-will-not-demobilize?utm_source=Twitter&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=article">Front 1</a>. These risks remain, but that the peace efforts have now been internationally recognised may give them new hope for a better life as civilians.</p>
<h2>The work goes on</h2>
<p>The prize will embolden the Colombian government to continue efforts not only with the FARC, which remains committed to achieving peace through dialogue instead of weapons, but also with the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-37505149">ELN</a>. </p>
<p>The ELN and the government have announced the beginning of formal peace talks too, but as of now this group still controls vast areas of Colombian territory where the state is barely present, if at all. When I asked locals in the war-torn department of Arauca earlier this year what they thought about the peace process, they replied that nothing would really change for them since they live under the ELN’s rule.</p>
<p>The award might also help reduce the impact of many other armed groups that operate in Colombia. Before the plebiscite, violent right-wing and criminal groups had already started to fill the <a href="https://theconversation.com/colombias-deal-with-the-farc-could-bring-peace-or-create-a-power-vacuum-48130">power vacuums</a> left by the FARC, and they were taking advantage of the uncertainty to impose their own rules. They may be less able to intimidate vulnerable communities with violent threats and instead face more <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pech.12184/abstract">non-violent resistance</a> from a civil society reassured by the prize’s moral significance. </p>
<p>But above all, the prize puts Colombia and its leaders under more external moral pressure than ever before. The world will be watching Santos and his successors closely, making it even more important that a peace deal is not only achieved on paper but actually implemented. This includes not only demobilising the FARC, but bringing <a href="http://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.er/">basic services, education and economic opportunities</a> to <a href="http://www.politics.ox.ac.uk/materials/publications/15409/securing-peace-in-the-borderlands-colombia.pdf">Colombia’s marginalised regions</a>. Otherwise, new grievances will draw the country back into war. </p>
<p>Through this Nobel Peace Prize award, not only Santos, but all Colombians have won a place in history. After all, <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/15423166.2015.1082437?journalCode=rjpd20">peacebuilders across the country</a> have been fighting for the end of war for decades – long before Santos took up his presidency. And hopefully, the weight of history will be a constant reminder to strive for truly sustainable peace. </p>
<p>Future generations should not remember the award as a cynical comment on a failed peace. As the Nobel Committee pointed out and as Santos accepted, the prize should indeed be a tribute to the struggle to end the modern world’s longest civil war – and an encouragement to those who hope for a lasting consensus among Colombia’s divided people.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/66689/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Annette Idler receives funding from the University of Oxford’s ESRC Impact Acceleration Account (IAA)
Global Challenges Research Fund (GCRF) 2016 top-up scheme.</span></em></p>The voters may have said no to the deal struck with the FARC, but Juan Manuel Santos and his fellow negotiators intend to keep going.Annette Idler, Director of Studies, Changing Character of War Programme, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/667162016-10-07T19:30:51Z2016-10-07T19:30:51ZColombian president wins Nobel prize for rejected peace deal: what was the committee thinking?<p>What were the Nobel peace prize committee members thinking? Just a few days after it became clear that the peace agreement that Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos negotiated with the FARC literally <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-colombia-voted-no-to-peace-with-farc-66416">cannot be given away</a>, they award him the pre-eminent global prize for peace?</p>
<p>This is the reward for the biggest political miscalculation since David Cameron decided to gamble his own, his party’s, his country’s and Europe’s future on a Brexit referendum?</p>
<p>We shouldn’t be surprised. The committee likes to court controversy. It <a href="http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/">gave US President Barack Obama the prize one year into his presidency</a>, before he had really achieved anything on the foreign policy front. The committee has also awarded statesmen well acquainted with violence – from <a href="http://nobelpeaceprize.org/en_GB/laureates/laureates-1973/">Henry Kissinger</a> to <a href="http://nobelpeaceprize.org/en_GB/laureates/laureates-1994/">Arafat, Peres and Rabin</a>. Mahatma Gandhi’s nomination was <a href="http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/themes/peace/gandhi/">rejected multiple times</a>.</p>
<p>So I for one am going to insist that I am not surprised by the choice this year, even if others were. The main pundit who follows the prize process <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-colombia-peace-nobel-idUSKCN12313A?il=0">dropped Santos from his shortlist</a> after the Colombian referendum result. (“Colombia’s off any credible list”, said Kristian Berg Harpviken, head of the Peace Research Institute, Oslo, on Monday.) Santos disappeared from most prediction markets around the same time.</p>
<p>What was the reasoning? There are some critics who think that the Nobel Prizes are becoming <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-nobel-prizes-controversial-push-for-popularity-66118">too focused on media buzz</a>. Perhaps the committee members were just looking for headlines?</p>
<p>I suspect this was not the reason. But there are other possibilities.</p>
<h2>A consolation prize for Norway?</h2>
<p>For several years now, <a href="http://www.aftenposten.no/meninger/kronikk/Fredsprisens-grasoner-573540b.html">there has been discussion in Norway</a> about the prize’s role in promoting Norwegian foreign and economic policy interests. </p>
<p>Norwegian support has, after all, been <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-37206714">absolutely central</a> to the long and complex negotiations in Cuba between Colombia and the FARC. The rejection of the deal <a href="http://www.newsinenglish.no/2016/10/03/colombian-no-big-blow-for-norway/">was seen in Norway</a> as a setback not just to the peace process in Colombia, but to Norway’s own efforts to support that process. </p>
<p>Perhaps the committee saw the opportunity to give the prize to Santos as a chance to lift Norwegian spirits.</p>
<h2>A catalyst for change</h2>
<p>Perhaps, more charitably, the committee saw this as a chance to change the narrative around the peace deal – to give Santos and the supporters of the deal a boost, and the courage they will need to renegotiate the deal and win public support. </p>
<p>For now, with the former Colombian president and opposition leader Álvaro Uribe signalling his <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/colombian-rivals-uribe-and-santos-confer-after-peace-pacts-rejection-1475700108">willingness to work with President Santos</a>, peace has a chance. But there is also a danger that international meddling could cause a backlash by reactionary forces in Colombia. </p>
<p>Already, there are those who think that peace advocates beyond Colombia’s borders fail to understand the nefarious criminal nature of FARC, and, having not lived with its violence for decades as they have, are too willing to forgive and forget the hurts it has caused. For these critics, the referendum risked “<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/03/world/colombia-peace-deal-defeat.html?_r=0">giving the country away</a>” to the FARC.</p>
<p>So there is a danger that the peace prize will just reinforce the notion that supporters of the accords were more in touch with the thinking of international elites than with local citizens. That perspective does, however, overlook a key fact: that the rural regions that have borne the brunt of the violence <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/10/03/colombia-just-voted-no-on-its-referendum-for-peace-heres-why-and-what-it-means/">actually voted overwhelmingly to approve the peace deal</a>.</p>
<h2>Your peace is bigger than ours</h2>
<p>There is another possibility. Perhaps, quite simply, the Nobel committee members’ understanding of “peace” is bigger than that of the average gambler’s, and even than that of the leading pundit.</p>
<p>Perhaps, reading the <a href="http://nobelpeaceprize.org/en_GB/about_peaceprize/">passage in Alfred Nobel’s will</a> that calls for a prize to the person who has “done the most or the best work for fraternity between nations, for the abolition or reduction of standing armies and for the holding and promotion of peace congresses”, they concluded that peace is not an end-state, but a process.</p>
<p>In this sense, President Santos has won an award for trying – for the heroic effort to end, once and for all, Colombia’s blood 50-year war.</p>
<p>Looking back at decisions in recent years, this seems to be the explanation closest to the heart of the matter. In recent years, the prize has consistently sought to expand and enhance the public’s conception of peace. </p>
<p>In 2014, <a href="http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2014/">Kailash Satyarthi and Malala Yousafzai</a> won for their struggle against the suppression of children and young people. In 2012, <a href="http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2012/">it was the European Union itself</a>, for the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights. In 2011, it was <a href="http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2011/">Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Leymah Gbowee, and Tawakkol Karman</a>, for their struggle for women’s safety and rights.</p>
<p>Each citation expanded the substantive scope of “peace” – and each focused on the struggle for, or advancement of, peace, rather than its perfect realisation. This year, President Santos was rewarded for his “resolute efforts” to bring the Colombian civil war to an end. Not for the end in itself.</p>
<p>For that reason, I can only applaud the committee’s thinking. The award this year is, like those others in recent years, an ode to peace. It is a statement of faith that peace is possible. And it is a recognition that it is the efforts of individuals – like President Santos – acting together, that make it so.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/66716/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Cockayne does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Why would anyone award a prize to a rejected peace deal?James Cockayne, Head of Office at the United Nations, United Nations UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.