tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/south-african-military-24214/articlesSouth African military – The Conversation2024-02-04T11:52:08Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2193432024-02-04T11:52:08Z2024-02-04T11:52:08ZSouth Africa’s military is expected to do more than ever with tighter budgets: how the force has declined over 30 years
<p>The South African National Defence Force marks 30 years this year, having been established on <a href="https://scholar.ufs.ac.za/items/85cca040-8e52-43ae-8451-942ca1874d11">27 April 1994</a>. It’s as old as the country’s <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/south-african-general-elections-1994">constitutional democracy</a>, the result of a negotiated political settlement that ended apartheid. The <a href="http://www.dod.mil.za/">defence force</a> consists of the <a href="http://www.army.mil.za/Pages/Home.aspx">army</a>, <a href="https://www.saairforce.co.za/">air force</a>, <a href="http://www.navy.mil.za/Pages/Home.aspx">navy</a>, and <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/sa-defence/sa-defence-sa-defence/joining-the-south-african-national-defence-force/">military health service</a>.</p>
<p>It’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-military-is-set-for-personnel-reforms-why-it-matters-178064">an amalgamation</a> of the former apartheid era South African Defence Force, the militaries of the former nominally independent Bophuthatswana, Transkei, Ciskei and Venda, and the former liberation armies of the African National Congress and the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania. It’s currently <a href="https://www.military.africa/2023/04/top-10-strongest-militaries-in-africa/">ranked third</a> in Africa, after Egypt and Algeria. </p>
<p>Where does the defence force find itself after three decades? How does it measure up to its <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/wp-content/uploads/Repository/A-Guide-to-the-SANDF/A-guide-to-the-SANDF-chapter-6-The-SANDF.pdf">mandate</a> of defending the country against external aggression, promoting security externally and internally, and supporting the population and government as needed? </p>
<p>The defence force has been expected to safeguard the country against external threats while simultaneously responding to political calls to assist with <a href="https://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za/pub/article/view/1037">peace and security operations</a> in other African countries. It has also been called on to support the South African Police Service in <a href="https://theconversation.com/military-not-a-magic-bullet-south-africa-needs-to-do-more-for-long-term-peace-164717">policing</a> a <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-police-are-losing-the-war-on-crime-heres-how-they-need-to-rethink-their-approach-218048">crime-ridden</a> society. </p>
<p>A mismatch has developed between what is expected of the military, and its budget and capabilities. Its budget declined to about 1% of gross domestic product (GDP) in the past decade. This is far too low compared to global average military spending of <a href="https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2023-04/2304_fs_milex_2022.pdf">2.2% of GDP</a>. </p>
<p>As a researcher who has studied the defence force as a foreign policy instrument for almost three decades, I’m not surprised it is often described as <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-to-lead-new-military-force-in-the-drc-an-expert-on-what-its-up-against-219264">“institutionally overstretched”</a>. It has been in decline for some time, especially since 2000, as its <a href="https://static.pmg.org.za/170512review.pdf">budgetary allocation</a> from treasury has shrunk.</p>
<h2>Figuring out its primary role</h2>
<p>The government’s policies after 1994 committed the defence force primarily to safeguarding the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The purchasing of new military equipment was based on the <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/defence-review1998.pdf">South African Defence Review of 1998</a>. The review elaborated on the <a href="https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/155722/SouthAfrica1996.pdf">1996 White Paper for Defence</a> on such matters as posture, doctrine, force design, force levels, logistical support, armaments, equipment, human resources and funding. </p>
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<p>This White Paper stipulated that the force design should be a high-technology core force, sized for peacetime, but expandable to meet any emerging threat. To this end, cabinet decided in November 1998 to buy <a href="https://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za/pub/article/view/1037">new military equipment</a>. This was the infamous arms deal, mired in <a href="https://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/the-arms-deal-what-you-need-to-know-2/">corruption</a>. The equipment included nine Gripen fighter aircraft, 12 Hawk aircraft, 30 light utility helicopters, four patrol corvettes and three submarines.</p>
<p><a href="https://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za/pub/article/view/45">Critics</a> felt that the corvettes, submarines and Gripen jet fighters could be regarded as offensive weapons. That would not align with South Africa’s foreign policy, specifically pertaining to <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/peacemissions1.pdf">participation in international peace missions</a> with the emphasis on cooperative defence and regional peacekeeping.</p>
<p>It was eventually decided that the defence force should be <a href="https://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za/pub/article/view/1037">designed primarily to protect the country from external enemies</a>. It would also promote peace and security in Africa, as secondary functions. </p>
<p>Things have not quite panned out that way. Since 1998, the defence force has featured prominently as an instrument in South Africa’s foreign policy. Its so-called secondary functions have become <a href="https://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za/pub/article/view/1037">the primary function</a>. But it has received no additional armour and personnel for this additional role.</p>
<p>The post-1994 government sought to rid the country of its apartheid-era image of being a <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0021909620946851">pariah and a destabilising factor</a> in its neighbourhood. Instead, it was to be identified with the <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0021909620946851">promotion of human rights, peace and development</a> in Africa.</p>
<p>The force became the <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/monusco#:%7E:text=The%20new%20mission%20has%20been,in%20its%20stabilization%20and%20peace">fifth largest troop-contributing nation</a> to the UN’s peacekeeping operation in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). It also plays a <a href="https://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za/pub/article/view/1404">pivotal role</a> in the Southern African Development Community mission in conflict-ridden northern Mozambique.</p>
<p>It has been in the <a href="https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/4846/">DRC since 1999</a>.
This UN mission will now be terminated after more than <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20231219-un-to-launch-gradual-withdrawal-of-peacekeepers-from-dr-congo">24 years</a>, and be replaced by troops from the Southern African Development Community, <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-to-lead-new-military-force-in-the-drc-an-expert-on-what-its-up-against-219264">led by the South African National Defence Force</a>.</p>
<p>But soldiers in the field haven’t always received good <a href="https://mg.co.za/news/2022-01-13-soldiers-plead-for-more-air-support-in-mozambiques-battle-against-insurgents/">logistical support</a>, especially in Mozambique. And poor coordination with the Department of International Relations and Cooperation has sometimes <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/is-south-africas-defence-force-up-for-new-thinking">left the country embarrassed</a>.</p>
<p>Among other peacekeeping missions, since 1994 the defence force has also been deployed to: </p>
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<li><p><a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/mono/10.4324/9781003021063-6/1998-south-africa%E2%80%93lesotho-operation-boleas-crisis-feliciano-de-s%C3%A1-guimar%C3%A3es">Lesotho, 1998</a>: restoring democracy and political stability, supported by the Botswana military</p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://www.accord.org.za/publication/south-africas-peacekeeping-role-burundi/">Burundi, 2003</a>: peacekeeping alongside Mozambique and Ethiopia as part of the African Union Mission in Burundi</p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/4846/">Sudan, 2005</a>: as part of the United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur.</p></li>
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<h2>Constraints</h2>
<p>Budgetary constraints have posed a growing challenge. Between 1995 and the 1998 the defence budget was <a href="https://static.pmg.org.za/170512review.pdf">cut by 11.1%</a>.</p>
<p>In 2015, the defence force was <a href="https://static.pmg.org.za/170512review.pdf">24% underfunded</a> in terms of its size and shape. <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/daily-news/international-news/world-military-expenditure-continues-to-climb-while-african-defence-expenditure-drops/#:%7E:text=South%20Africa's%20military%20spending%20fell,the%20military%20budget%20in%202022">Defence spending in 2022/23</a> was 8.4% lower than in 2021, and 21% lower than in 2013.</p>
<p>The country’s ailing economy and low growth put severe <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2023/06/15/cf-south-africas-economy-loses-momentum-amid-record-power-cuts">pressure on government finances</a>. </p>
<p>Because of the budgetary constraints, the serviceability and functionality of high-tech equipment – especially the Gripens, frigates and submarines – couldn’t be sustained. </p>
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<p>The hollowing out of the armed forces was laid bare in 2023. The defence minister, Thandi Modise, disclosed that a staggering 85% of the air force’s aircraft fleet was out of action, leaving the country <a href="https://www.da.org.za/2023/10/exposed-south-african-air-force-in-critical-condition-as-85-of-fleet-remains-grounded">vulnerable to external security threats</a>.</p>
<p>By 2013, only two of the 26 Gripen fighter aircraft and three of the 24 Hawk aircraft were <a href="https://www.da.org.za/2023/10/exposed-south-african-air-force-in-critical-condition-as-85-of-fleet-remains-grounded">available for service</a>. </p>
<p>The funding crisis is so severe that some defence analysts are now proposing to <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2023-10-25-the-south-african-air-force-has-become-an-expensive-dysfunctional-luxury/">reduce the air force to a mere air wing</a> of the defence force, which would have fewer than 75 aircraft.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.vryeweekblad.com/nuus-en-politiek/2023-02-10-poor-state-of-sas-naval-fleet-to-be-on-full-display-at-joint-exercise/">navy is in no better position</a>. All frigates, the navy’s primary combat and patrol vessels, are in urgent need of repair. The three submarines that were part of the 1999 arms deal also came with a limited number of spare parts, like the frigates. Sometimes none of the submarines are serviceable. </p>
<h2>Problems at home</h2>
<p>Border protection and support for <a href="http://www.sun.ac.za/english/faculty/milscience/sigla/Documents/Briefs/Briefs%202023/SIGLA%20Brief%2011%202023.pdf">police operations</a> are now some of the force’s main activities. These include <a href="http://www.sun.ac.za/english/faculty/milscience/sigla/Documents/Briefs/Briefs%202023/SIGLA%20Brief%2011%202023.pdf">internal or domestic operations</a> such as helping the police in combating gang warfare, fighting illegal mining syndicates, preventing the torching of commercial trucks, guarding power plants, and combating cash-in-transit heists. These responsibilities can now even be regarded as among the military’s primary functions. </p>
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<p>Two issues drive the increased role in domestic security. One is the declining capacity of the police. Secondly, politicians see the military as an instrument for policing roles and <a href="http://www.sun.ac.za/english/faculty/milscience/sigla/Documents/Briefs/Briefs%202023/SIGLA%20Brief%2011%202023.pdf">other functions</a> – all contributing to the degeneration of South Africa’s defence capability.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219343/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Theo Neethling receives funding from the National Research Foundation. </span></em></p>South Africa’s defence force has been in decline for some time as its budget has shrunk while its duties have changed.Theo Neethling, Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2143932023-09-29T12:31:48Z2023-09-29T12:31:48ZSouth Africa has one of the strongest navies in Africa: its strengths and weaknesses<p><em>The deaths of three members of the South African Navy (<a href="http://www.navy.mil.za/Pages/Home.aspx">SA Navy</a>) <a href="http://www.dod.mil.za/media/statements/Pages/SANavyIncidentKommetjie.aspx">on 20 September 2023</a>, when a freak wave swept them off the deck of the submarine SAS Manthatisi, has put the spotlight on the organisation and its work. André Wessels is a military historian; his latest <a href="https://naledi.co.za/product/a-century-of-south-african-naval-history/">book</a> is A Century of South African Naval History: The South African Navy and its Predecessors 1922-2022. The Conversation Africa asked him for insights.</em></p>
<h2>How big is South Africa’s navy? How does it compare?</h2>
<p>The South African Navy has always been one of the strongest naval forces in sub-Saharan Africa. </p>
<p>Egypt has the <a href="https://naledi.co.za/product/a-century-of-south-african-naval-history/">strongest navy in Africa</a>, and Algeria is the second strongest as it has been steadily building <a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/algeria/navy-modernization.htm">up its</a> naval forces. The Moroccan navy is also strong, as is the Nigerian navy, which has acquired <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/nigerian-navy-commissions-large-number-of-new-vessels/">a large number of naval vessels</a>, mostly patrol ships and smaller patrol craft. </p>
<p>Thanks to its submarine capabilities, the SA Navy can be regarded as one of the strongest on the continent. However, with its present ten “major” warships, the SA Navy is not in the same league as, for example, Brazil (about 100 ships), Russia (550), India (250) and China (600).</p>
<p>According to <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/only-one-of-sa-navys-four-frigates-operational-no-submarines-serviceable/">sources</a> that are in the public domain, the SA Navy at the moment has three submarines, four frigates, one multi-mission inshore patrol vessel (with another to be commissioned in the near future, and a third under construction), one survey ship (with a new one under construction), one combat support ship, and a number of smaller craft (most of them in reserve). In terms of its number of warships, this is the smallest that the navy has been since the mid-1950s.</p>
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<p>Severe financial restrictions have put its capabilities under strain. For example, it has had to curtail anti-piracy patrols (<a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/operation-copper-extension-to-cost-r154-million/">“Operation Copper”</a>) in the Mozambique Channel due to the unavailability of ships.</p>
<h2>Can it protect the country’s territorial waters?</h2>
<p>Submarines provide South Africa with a crucial deterrent potential. And the navy can also do patrol work with its surface vessels (if they are able to go to sea). But it has a limited anti-submarine warfare capability, and is not able to project much power across long distances. </p>
<p>The government needs to gradually increase defence spending from the present less than 1% of GDP to at least 1.8%, which is what countries globally on average spend on defence. That will enable the navy to increase training opportunities, send more ships out to sea, and perhaps even acquire much-needed larger offshore patrol vessels.</p>
<p>South Africa is a maritime state, given that all its borders are on the ocean bar its northern one. The country needs a small but well-equipped navy that can defend it, underpin its diplomatic efforts, and assist other state departments in various ways.</p>
<h2>What’s its role?</h2>
<p>Geographically South Africa is a large <a href="https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/peninsula/">peninsula</a> on the strategic Cape sea route. Some <a href="https://sanavymuseum.co.za/2022/03/30/the-south-african-navy-a-very-brief-history/">90% of its trade</a> flows through its harbours. The navy must assist in ensuring the integrity of the country as an independent state, by patrolling its territorial waters and acting as a deterrent against foreign military aggression and maritime crime. Its <a href="https://sanavymuseum.co.za/2022/03/30/the-south-african-navy-a-very-brief-history/#:%7E:text=In%20accordance%20with%20the%20SA,well%2Dtrained%20and%20disciplined%20navy.">core business</a> is “to fight at sea”, with its official mission “to win at sea”. Its <a href="https://sanavymuseum.co.za/2022/03/30/the-south-african-navy-a-very-brief-history/#:%7E:text=In%20accordance%20with%20the%20SA,well%2Dtrained%20and%20disciplined%20navy.">vision</a> is</p>
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<p>to be unchallenged at sea. </p>
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<p>The navy can also play a role in humanitarian relief operations, search-and-rescue operations and <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/EJC146027">peace support operations</a>. </p>
<p>In the course of its history, the SA Navy has performed these and many other tasks. For example, in 1993 it facilitated the <a href="https://giftofthegivers.org/disaster-response/bosnia/726/">sending of a mobile hospital and relief supplies</a> to Bosnia-Herzegovina, by <a href="https://giftofthegivers.org/">Gift of the Givers</a>, the disaster response NGO. The navy has also helped provide food and medical aid to countries ravaged by conflict or drought, for example when the combat support ship SAS Drakensberg took supplies to Bangladesh <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/EJC146027">in 1991</a>. The navy has also <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/final-voyage-for-veteran-ship-20011010">rescued the crew members</a> of many yachts that have been caught in storms or were in need of other assistance off the South African coast and elsewhere, for example during the 2014 Cape-to-Rio Transatlantic Yacht Race. </p>
<p>The navy is also responsible for hydrographic survey work along the South African coast. It maps the ocean floor so that reliable charts can be drawn up, making it safe for merchant and other ships to sail along the coast and visit ports. </p>
<p>In addition, the navy has an important diplomatic role in sending warships (<a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/EJC146027">“grey diplomats”</a>) on flag-showing visits to other countries. </p>
<p>But under <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/only-one-of-sa-navys-four-frigates-operational-no-submarines-serviceable/">financial constraints</a>, the navy has been hard-pressed to fulfil its obligations. For example, it has for several years not been able to take part in flag-showing visits to other countries because of the unavailability of ships. In general, less time has also been spent at sea. </p>
<h2>What is the history of the SA Navy?</h2>
<p>The navy can trace its history back to <a href="https://naledi.co.za/product/a-century-of-south-african-naval-history/">1 April 1922</a>, when the SA Naval Service was established. This became the Seaward Defence Force in 1939 when the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/World-War-II">Second World War</a> broke out, and the SA Naval Forces in 1942. It played a <a href="https://sanavymuseum.co.za/2022/03/30/the-south-african-navy-a-very-brief-history/">small but important role</a> in the Allied war effort against Nazi Germany, patrolling the South African coastal waters. It also sent warships to the Mediterranean and Far Eastern war zones.</p>
<p>On 1 January 1951, the Naval Forces were renamed the SA Navy. In accordance with the <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230376366_5">Simon’s Town Agreement</a> (1955), the navy <a href="https://sanavymuseum.co.za/2022/03/30/the-south-african-navy-a-very-brief-history/">acquired</a> the Simon’s Town Naval Base from Britain (1957), and was strengthened by the acquisition of a number of destroyers, frigates, patrol boats and minesweepers, and later also a replenishment ship (1967) and three submarines (1970-1971). </p>
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<p>But by then, the ruling National Party’s apartheid policy had led to South Africa’s growing international isolation. The United Nations’ <a href="https://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/un_arms_embargoes/south_africa/un-arms-embargo-on-south-africa">mandatory arms embargo</a> against the country (1977) had obvious detrimental consequences for the then South African Defence Force (SADF), and in particular the navy. For example, it did not receive the submarines and frigates that it had ordered from France.</p>
<p>In the meantime, the navy <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/EJC146027#page=5">assisted the other arms of the defence force</a>, in particular the SA Army’s Special Forces, during the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/namibian-struggle-independence-1966-1990-historical-background">Namibian war of independence</a>, which spilled over into Angola. The navy’s submarines and strike craft, as well as other ships, assisted the South African Special Forces <a href="https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90-00965R000302080013-8.pdf">in operations</a> “behind enemy lines”.</p>
<p>The end of this conflict in 1989, and of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/question/How-did-apartheid-end">freedom struggle in South Africa in 1994</a>, led to a new dawn. On the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/45346383?seq=4">eve of the 1994 elections</a> the SADF was renamed the SA National Defence Force (SANDF). </p>
<p>In due course the navy was transformed into a navy of and for all the people of South Africa. All cultural groups, as well as an increasing number of women, would henceforth be represented in the navy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214393/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>André Wessels in the years c 2012-2017 received funding from the NRF, but at the moment no longer receives any funds from the NRF. </span></em></p>South Africa is a large peninsula on the strategic Cape sea route. Some 90% of its trade flows through its harbours. The navy defends the country’s sovereignty and national interests.André Wessels, Senior Professor (Emeritus) and Research Fellow, Department of History, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1647172021-07-26T15:24:04Z2021-07-26T15:24:04ZMilitary not a magic bullet: South Africa needs to do more for long term peace<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/413119/original/file-20210726-26-vb3azi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African Defence Force troops on patrol in Alexandra, Johannesburg, following recent violence and looting. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In a show of force unprecedented since South Africa became a democracy in 1994, the South African National Defence Force has <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/sandf-forces-continue-to-arrive-in-kzn-following-a-week-of-violence-faae84c3-64b0-474b-9716-f5147c86fcb6">commissioned 25,000</a> soldiers for deployment across KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng, the two provinces most affected by <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/22/south-africa-unrest-death-toll-jumps-to-more-than-300">recent riots and large scale looting</a>. </p>
<p>President Cyril Ramaphosa announced the deployment of the troops to <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/speeches/address-president-cyril-ramaphosa-acts-violence-and-destruction-property">support the country’s police</a>, who had been overwhelmed by the scale of the violence.</p>
<p>Governments usually deploy the military as the last line of defence when they face an insurrection or <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/columnists/qaanitah_hunter/qaanitah-hunter-an-insurrection-or-not-why-governments-confusion-doesnt-solve-sas-crises-20210721">revolt</a>. The threat of or use of military force is the ultimate arbiter to quell unrest that threatens state stability or the safety of citizens, as seen in Nigeria, where the deployment of the army on internal security operations <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-use-of-nigerian-soldiers-in-civil-unrest-whats-in-place-and-whats-missing-149283">has increased dramatically since 1999</a>.</p>
<p>In South Africa, the military has recently been deployed to <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-army-is-being-used-to-fight-cape-towns-gangs-why-its-a-bad-idea-120455">counter gang violence</a> on the Cape Flats and during the <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-military-is-not-suited-for-the-fight-against-covid-19-heres-why-138560">COVID-19 pandemic</a>. In all these instances, there are concerns about how effective it is in these roles. </p>
<p>In South Africa, for now, the deployment of the army troops to assist the police has brought about an <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/07/21/explainer-what-caused-south-africa-s-week-of-rioting//">uneasy calm</a>. But what South Africans are seeing is a negative peace – where a degree of normality returns, but in which the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/422690?seq=2#metadata_info_tab_contents">underlying causes of the conflict remain</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-army-is-being-used-to-fight-cape-towns-gangs-why-its-a-bad-idea-120455">The army is being used to fight Cape Town's gangs. Why it's a bad idea</a>
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<p>The military may help create a more stable and secure environment, curb violence and unrest in the short term, but this is unlikely to result in a <a href="https://www.redalyc.org/pdf/4135/413546002004.pdf">sustainable and lasting peace</a>. The cultural and structural issues underlying the violence need to be <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-07-15-whats-behind-violence-in-south-africa-a-sociologists-perspective/">addressed</a>. These relate to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/pandemic-underscores-gross-inequalities-in-south-africa-and-the-need-to-fix-them-135070">inequalities</a> and injustices embedded in the structure of society. </p>
<p>The military is no magic bullet.</p>
<h2>Concerns about army deployment</h2>
<p>There are many concerns around the use of the military internally in domestic operations within the borders of one’s own country.</p>
<p>The first concerns the government’s use of the military <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10246029.2019.1650787">against its own citizens</a>. As seen in both Nigeria and South Africa, the military is typically not trained or equipped to deal with civil unrest and has limited experience in riot control.</p>
<p>One risk is that communities might deliberately act out in ways that <a href="http://www.hsrc.ac.za/en/news/general/SANDF-covid-19">provoke the soldiers</a>, which could result in excessive use of force. This can affect trust in the military, affecting the legitimacy of the state. The South African government has already faced criticism for its heavy handed and highly militarised approach during the <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/SouthAfrica/News/un-human-rights-office-highlights-toxic-lockdown-culture-in-sa-20200428">early phase of lockdown in 2020</a>. However, in general the population has a far higher level of trust in the military <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ab_r6_dispatchno90_south_africa_trust_in_officials.pdf">than in other state institutions</a>.</p>
<p>The second risk pertains to prominence given to the military when faced with situations of civil unrest. Giving the military a prominent role in political decision-making in dealing with civil unrest can <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-army-is-being-used-to-fight-cape-towns-gangs-why-its-a-bad-idea-120455">lead to a culture of militarism and militarisation</a>. This results in the increased political reliance and economic investment in the military to assist with solving societal problems.</p>
<p>This can undermine attempts at finding more constructive approaches at conflict resolution. </p>
<h2>Achilles’ heel</h2>
<p>The army will inevitably be called in again to support the police. Whether the soldiers can provide this support given their <a href="https://theconversation.com/covid-19-south-africas-neglected-military-faces-mission-impossible-133250">limited capacity</a> is the big question. Those deployed are predominantly from the infantry, of which there are only 14 battalions, not all of which can deploy internally. Then there are the commitments to peacekeeping operations and the border, and now to Mozambique. </p>
<p>In its present form, the military cannot adequately respond to the threats facing the country internally and externally, due to the way it is <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-mulls-future-of-its-military-to-make-it-fit-for-purpose-146423">structured, funded and trained</a>. The military is structured for <a href="https://courses.lumenlearning.com/boundless-sociology/chapter/war-and-terrorism/">conventional warfare</a>. This requires expensive equipment and training and does not allow sufficient flexibility to perform the functions it actually does.</p>
<p>South Africa needs a military that is more capable of responding to all the challenges facing the country. These include <a href="https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/DCAF_BG_15_Gendarmeries%20and%20constabulary-type%20police_0.pdf">a mix of military and policing functions</a>. This would mean restructuring the military to be able to put more boots on the ground. What is needed is more infantry troops, trained and equipped for the tasks they are required to do. This is less costly than preparing for conventional warfare, and using the army in collateral roles as it does now.</p>
<p>These changes would ensure that it could meet roles like peacekeeping, border control, support for the police and countering terrorism more effectively. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-mulls-future-of-its-military-to-make-it-fit-for-purpose-146423">South Africa mulls future of its military to make it fit-for-purpose</a>
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<p>Beyond this is the need to address the current <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-07-14-south-africas-tipping-point-how-the-intelligence-community-failed-the-country/">inefficiencies in the state security cluster</a>. Clearly there is a lack of visionary leadership, accountability and oversight, to enable these sectors to function more effectively.</p>
<p>The lack of <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/unrestsa-ministers-cele-and-dlodlo-at-odds-over-intelligence-report-20210720">effective intelligence</a> has meant that both the military and police were unable to put preemptive defensive measures in place to tackle the recent violence and looting, which has left <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/22/south-africa-unrest-death-toll-jumps-to-more-than-300">more than 330 people dead</a>.</p>
<h2>Comprehensive approach</h2>
<p>A more comprehensive approach to security is required. As indicated by soldier-scholar Laetitia Olivier in relation to gang violence, what is needed is a coordinated and comprehensive plan to <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-soldiers-wont-end-gang-violence-a-co-ordinated-plan-might-120775">address the twin challenges of security and economic development</a>. </p>
<p>Security and economic development are intertwined; the <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/%EF%BF%BCthe-security-development-nexus-and-the-imperative-of-peacebuilding-with-special-reference-to-the-african-context/">one cannot be achieved without the other</a>. To date, the government has failed on both accounts, which has led to the current crisis.</p>
<p>What is needed is a clear national security framework to repurpose the military in terms of its most likely <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/south-africas-security-sector-is-in-crisis-reform-must-start-now">future roles, missions and goals</a>. These are the roles which the military is currently performing, but it doesn’t have the force design and structure best suited for the tasks.</p>
<p>Tough decisions have to be made in terms of personnel, rejuvenation and equipping the military for its future roles and functions, given the current security threats facing the citizens of South Africa. This does not imply more investment in defence, but better use of the resources available.</p>
<p>More than ever before, decisive leadership is needed from politicians, military leadership and civil society to march the South African National Defence Force in the right direction.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/164717/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lindy Heinecken does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The army may help create a more stable and secure environment in the short term, but this is unlikely to result in sustainable and lasting peace.Lindy Heinecken, Chair of the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1535012021-02-02T14:53:36Z2021-02-02T14:53:36ZThe incredible journey of the toyi-toyi, southern Africa’s protest dance<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/380292/original/file-20210123-13-a5vl9o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Africa's Economic Freedom Fighters toyi-toyi at an anti-Israel protest.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">PHILL MAGAKOE/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="http://www.bbc.com/travel/story/20181112-is-this-south-africas-12th-official-language">toyi-toyi</a> is a high-kneed, foot-stomping dance, rhythmically punctuated by exhaled chants and call and response. </p>
<p>It can be observed at almost any kind of protest in South Africa and Zimbabwe today. In South Africa, university students toyi-toyi when they protest against fees, while township residents might toyi-toyi when they object to the presence of ‘foreigners’. In Zimbabwe, the opposition party toyi-toyis to protest the ruling party’s abuses, while ruling party supporters might toyi-toyi when they want to evict white farmers.</p>
<p>Where did this ‘dance’ come from? Many people associate it with the South African <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/township-uprising-1984-1985">township protests</a> of the 1980s, when young men toyi-toyied as they confronted police or attended political funerals and protests. These images filled the world’s TV screens, becoming one of the most recognisable performances of the anti-<a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-apartheid-south-africa">apartheid</a> struggle. </p>
<p>But its origins are in fact much further away, and they tell us about a much longer, global history of political and military struggle. This story played out across Africa, moving from north to south, all the way from Algeria to South Africa, with stops in Tanzania, Zambia, Angola, and Zimbabwe along the way. </p>
<h2>Military camps</h2>
<p>We explored this history in our <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03057070.2020.1804123">research</a>. Our interest in the toyi-toyi did not come from its recent uses, but from our efforts to understand the liberation armies that <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Southern-Africa/Independence-and-decolonization-in-Southern-Africa">fought</a> against colonial and white minority rule in every southern African country from the 1960s. </p>
<p>These armies have an extraordinary history shaped by the alliances of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Cold-War">Cold War</a> era. They were made up of mostly young men, who left their rural homesteads and townships for training camps that might be in the Soviet Union or Cuba, Algeria or Tanzania, Angola or Zambia. </p>
<p>We wanted to understand what this experience was like and what kinds of armies it made. We focused on ‘military culture’ – that is, the ideas, practices and traditions that give an army character and meaning for soldiers – and how it was instilled through training in all these different places. </p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">TRIGGER WARNING: VIOLENCE. The toyi-toyi’s relationship with protest music.</span></figcaption>
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<p>The toyi-toyi proved a great way of understanding how these men learned what it meant to be a soldier, and how those ideas were transmitted over thousands of kilometres and through dozens of military camps. When the toyi-toyi eventually arrived in South Africa’s townships it was something very different from what it had been at the start of its long journey. </p>
<h2>Algerian roots</h2>
<p>We <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03057070.2020.1804123">interviewed</a> <a href="https://readingzimbabwe.com/books/lest-we-forget-histories-of-the-zimbabwe-people-s-revolutionary-army-zpra">members</a> of the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary <a href="https://www.xlibris.com/en/bookstore/bookdetails/579630-z-p-r-a">Army</a> (ZPRA, also referred to as Zipra, the armed wing of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union or Zapu). We learned that the toyi-toyi’s origins were located in the training camps set up to support African liberation movements in Algeria in the mid-1960s. </p>
<p><em>Toyi-toyi</em> was thought to be an Arabic phrase and it formed part of the songs and chants that recruits learned. For them, the toyi-toyi was a military drill – certainly not a ‘dance’ – that they associated with achieving the high level of toughness and fitness required to survive guerrilla war. Its foreign language chants and novel movements expressed the international character of the armed liberation struggle itself. </p>
<p>From Algeria, the toyi-toyi moved southward, through training camps in Tanzania and then into Zambia, and in the process it changed. </p>
<h2>Zimbabwean nationalism</h2>
<p>It began to take on a nationalist character – the Arabic slogans were replaced with slogans in Zimbabwe’s main languages and they were refocused around expressions of loyalty to the party and its leader. This was at a time when there were many divisions that threatened the movement. The toyi-toyi became a way of instilling loyalty and discipline as well as physical strength as many more soldiers started to fight inside Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>The military toyi-toyi required hours of high-kneed running in difficult terrain while carrying heavy packs and weapons. ZPRA veterans told us how they had suffered from the toyi-toyi’s demands but they also stressed that it had given them tremendous pride in their toughness and helped them to face the terrible demands of the battlefield. They remembered the toyi-toyi as an essential part of their military culture. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/380421/original/file-20210125-15-1e8xn3w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A group of protesters with banners; in the foreground a group appears to be marching in the same style, knees raised very high." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/380421/original/file-20210125-15-1e8xn3w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/380421/original/file-20210125-15-1e8xn3w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380421/original/file-20210125-15-1e8xn3w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380421/original/file-20210125-15-1e8xn3w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380421/original/file-20210125-15-1e8xn3w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380421/original/file-20210125-15-1e8xn3w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380421/original/file-20210125-15-1e8xn3w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Zimbabwean protesters in Harare, demonstrating against the disappearance of a journalist.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">JEKESAI NJIKIZANA/AFP via Getty Images</span></span>
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<p>The toyi-toyi had, however, a different standing in other liberation armies. We can see how the toyi-toyi tells us about how military cultures were remade over time in one army – it can also tell us about how such cultures were transmitted from one liberation army to another. </p>
<h2>The toyi-toyi arrives in South Africa</h2>
<p>The main South African liberation army, <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/umkhonto-wesizwe-mk">uMkhonto we Sizwe</a> (MK), learned the toyi-toyi from ZPRA, in <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03057070.2017.1262639?journalCode=cjss20">shared</a> military camps in Angola and Zambia and on the Zimbabwean battlefield. The spread of the toyi-toyi in MK shows how extensive these interactions were. </p>
<p>But MK soldiers had very different <a href="https://www.ifwemustdie.co.za">reactions</a> to it. Some denounced the toyi-toyi as a mindless, brutal physical exercise and blamed it for instituting a repressive military culture in MK.</p>
<p>These critical views of the toyi-toyi did not stop it from spreading throughout MK camps in Angola and from there southwards again into South Africa. One of the main routes for the toyi-toyi’s arrival in the South African townships was through <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/za/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/politics-general-interest/robben-island-and-prisoner-resistance-apartheid?format=PB&isbn=9780521007825">MK soldiers</a> who had been captured, held in the infamous <a href="https://www.robben-island.org.za/stories">Robben Island prison</a> and subsequently released in South Africa. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/politics-and-fashion-the-rise-of-the-red-beret-128333">Politics and fashion: the rise of the red beret</a>
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<p>These men were heroes to many young people in the townships. Performing the toyi-toyi was a means through which young men and women could link their protest to the glories of the armed struggle – now in the form of an at times joyous, at times menacing ‘dance’ rather than a military drill. </p>
<p>The toyi-toyi has continued to change its meanings – it has taken on many different political roles for people with no connection to the liberation struggles. By tracing its journey, we can learn how liberation movements’ militaries were made – and also how they spread into a much wider political culture which remains significant today.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/153501/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jocelyn Alexander receives funding from the Leverhulme Trust, RPG-2019-198. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>JoAnn McGregor receives funding from The Leverhulme Trust</span></em></p>South Africa’s famous toyi-toyi was adopted from Zimbabwean troops, who learned it in Algeria – showing the interconnected nature of Africa’s liberation struggles.Jocelyn Alexander, Professor, University of OxfordJoAnn McGregor, Professor, University of SussexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1217542019-08-15T13:05:47Z2019-08-15T13:05:47ZSoldiers won’t stem gang violence because South Africa’s army is in a sorry state<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/288027/original/file-20190814-136186-1grx23m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African National Defence Force soldiers in Mitchells Plain on the Cape Flats, Cape Town. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The initial response to the recent deployment of the South African army to areas of Cape Town hit hard by gang violence evoked relief that peace and stability would be <a href="https://www.thesouthafrican.com/news/cape-town-murders-weekend-how-many-cape-flats-sandf/">restored to the area</a>. </p>
<p>But this has been replaced with a much more nuanced view. Some community leaders claim the deployment has fallen well short of <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/capeargus/news/public-seminar-to-explore-army-presence-on-cape-flats-30360488">residents’ expectations</a>. The “lock-down operation” needed to target and identify the culprits behind the violence has not occurred. </p>
<p>Despite their limited mandate, the army has just too few soldiers to patrol the ten suburbs that are home to <a href="http://www.capetalk.co.za/articles/356316/expectations-on-sandf-deployment-were-overinflated-says-expert">over 1 million people</a>. Less than 300 soldiers are on the streets of the Cape Flats, not the 1320 <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2019-07-19-army-deployment-to-the-western-cape-to-cost-r234m/">mentioned by President Cyril Ramaphosa</a>. This figure allows for rotation of troops.</p>
<p>Also, the soldiers will be there for less than the three months, as the deployment is authorised <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2019/07/cape-town-army-deployment-long-term-solution-190719105227447.html">only until 16 September 2019</a>. </p>
<p>The result is that people in the affected areas are fast realising that <a href="https://city-press.news24.com/News/army-or-no-army-residents-live-in-fear-20190803">the army is not the solution</a>. This echoes previous cases were soldiers were deployed to <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/security/civil-security/op-fiela-ii-aims-to-shut-down-crime-hotspots/">crime hot-spots in the country</a> but failed to have a measurable impact. </p>
<p>But, even if more soldiers are requested, the South African National Defence Force simply doesn’t have the capacity to deploy them. This is because it is severely overstretched in terms of both personnel and <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/330025/south-africas-army-has-run-out-of-money-heres-how-bad-things-have-got/">financial resources</a>. </p>
<p>Of the 37 000 in the army, less than half serve in the 14 infantry battalions. One battalion is tied up in peacekeeping operations and 15 companies are deployed on the borders (far short of the 22 required). Some military analysts claim that the army is 8.5 infantry battalions short (roughly 8500 members) to <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/sandf-personnel-strength/">perform their current tasks</a>. </p>
<h2>Capacity problems</h2>
<p>A great deal has been <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-army-is-in-steady-decline-and-nothings-being-done-to-fix-it-74712">written on the military’s financial woes</a>. In my analysis the real problem lies with its force structure and design. These have driven up personnel costs to unacceptable levels.</p>
<p>In terms of the defence budget the ideal expenditure ratio is <a href="https://theconversation.com/money-has-little-to-do-with-why-south-africasmilitary-is-failing-to-do-its-job-81216">40 % personnel, 30% operations and 30% capital expenditure</a>. Some claim this is closer to 80:5:15 in reality, leading to the defence force being labelled a <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-01-30-the-sandfs-real-challenge-its-become-a-welfare-not-a-warfare-agency/">welfare, rather than a warfare agency</a>. </p>
<p>The ideal ratios in terms of expenditure differ by country. This is influenced by mission priorities, tasks and service. The army, for example, is more personnel than capital intensive, <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/sandf-personnel-strength/">compared to the navy and air force</a></p>
<p>It has enough people, but they are just not deployable. There are numerous reasons for this. The approach associated with the contract-based “flexible service system” of short, medium and long term service <a href="http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/docs/2004/appendices/040810dodstrategy.htm">has not materialised</a>.</p>
<p>The result is an escalation in personnel expenditure, the retention of people who are no longer fit for their post profile due to age and health, a high ratio of general officers to other ranks, and rank inflation making the armed forces top heavy. Senior ranks are very expensive with extensive salary and pension costs.</p>
<p>Added to this the military has been unable to reduce the number of people in the full-time force through rationalisation and <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/sandf-personnel-could-be-trimmed-by-ten-thousand/">rightsizing</a>, or to rejuvenate its full-time and reserve forces.</p>
<p>Another challenge is the age profile. In 2003 the defence force introduced the military skills development programme to rejuvenate the full-time and reserve forces. The programme was to provide an adequate number of young, fit and healthy personnel for the full time forces; and to serve as a feeder for the Reserve Force. This has not happened due to financial restraints and lack of career planning, leaving the reserves <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/opinion/1921038/sa-look-after-your-soldiers">understaffed and underfunded</a>.</p>
<p>The consequence is an ageing force with average troop age of 38 years and the Reserve Force age of <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/opinion/1921038/sa-look-after-your-soldiers">around 40 years</a>. The average age of an infantry soldier should be around <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/sandf-personnel-strength/">23-25 years</a>.</p>
<h2>Redesigning the defence force</h2>
<p>The other factor affecting the capacity of the military is its force design. The South African National Defence Force is structured, funded and
trained for its primary, <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/sa-defence/sa-defencesa-defence/feature-sandf-outlines-threats-priorities">not secondary tasks</a>. Using the military continuously in internal
secondary roles has stretched it beyond capacity and contributed to its <a href="http://thebrenthurstfoundation.org/workspace/files/2011-07-south-african-defence-brenthurst-paper-.pdf">downward spiral of decline</a>.</p>
<p>There is a clear “disconnect between the defence mandate, government expectation and <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-01-07-south-africas-military-at-a-crossroads">resource allocation”</a>. If the government is serious about providing security for its citizens, it is crucial to fix the structure and design of the force, which have eroded its capacity to function optimally. Failure to do so will have dire implications for the defence force’s ability to carry out its mandate – to protect the country and its citizens as required by the Constitution.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/121754/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lindy Heinecken does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Using the military continuously in internal roles for which it is not structured, funded or trained simply speeds up its decline.Lindy Heinecken, Chair of the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/909512018-02-05T14:20:51Z2018-02-05T14:20:51ZWhy treating water scarcity as a security issue is a bad idea<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/204583/original/file-20180202-162077-e1tfhf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=38%2C118%2C1801%2C1084&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Helen Zille, the Premier of the Western Cape in South Africa, has made two startling claims about the <a href="https://theconversation.com/whats-driving-cape-towns-water-insecurity-and-what-can-be-done-about-it-81845">water crisis</a> in the province. She says there will be anarchy when the taps run dry, and that normal policing will be <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2018-01-22-from-the-inside-the-countdown-to-day-zero/#.WnLXMq6Wbcs">inadequate</a>. </p>
<p>She stated this as fact. Neither claim has any basis in truth. But they reflect an <a href="https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/87/2/993/2235528">“elite panic”</a>: society’s elite’s fear of social disorder. We see this when public officials and the media draw on stereotypes of public panic and disorder, or, in Zille’s words, “anarchy”. </p>
<p>Research <a href="https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2002/08/020808075321.htm">shows</a> that mass hysteria and lawlessness during disasters is actually remarkably rare. Yet elite panic can lead to security taking priority over public safety. Preventing criminal activity is then treated as more important than protecting people from harm.</p>
<p>The more society’s response leans towards security, the closer the situation gets to “securitisation”. In the field of security studies, securitisation is the notion that nothing is a threat until someone <a href="http://www.e-ir.info/2011/10/09/does-security-exist-outside-of-the-speech-act/">says</a> it is. This “framing” happens in many ways, including the words politicians choose to describe a situation. A militarised response, for example, can be triggered by an issue being portrayed as a threat so severe that it requires extraordinary measures beyond normal political processes. </p>
<p>Zille’s characterisation of the water crisis is a classic example of this process. A major part of her communication about the preparation for Day Zero has been about securing the province and outlining the police and military strategy <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-01-24-zille-police-army-will-help-secure-day-zero-water-distribution-points">to prevent criminal activity</a>.</p>
<p>This approach gets in the way of more constructive responses to disaster. It can even trigger the very disorder it seeks to avoid. In other words, a self-fulfilling prophecy occurs which has serious consequences for a community and the humanitarian response to a disaster.</p>
<h2>False framing</h2>
<p>According to Zille, the day Cape Town runs out of water is a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IFiPfLGNu3g">“disaster of disasters”</a>. It</p>
<blockquote>
<p>exceeds anything a major City has had to face anywhere in the world since the <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2018-01-22-from-the-inside-the-countdown-to-day-zero/#.WnLXMq6Wbcs">Second World War or 9/11</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The panic in her tone, and her choice of examples, are telling. The Second World War and 9/11 were not natural disasters, they were consequences of war and terrorism. By invoking these national security events she frames the threat as one that needs to be managed using extraordinary means. </p>
<p>Zille imagines</p>
<blockquote>
<p>many other foreseeable crises associated with dry taps, such as conflict over access to water, theft of water, and other criminal acts associated with water, not to mention the outbreak of disease.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>She has asked President Jacob Zuma to declare a national state of disaster. It would enable the country’s intelligence agencies, the South African National Defence Force and the South African Police Service to make a shared plan with the province and the private sector</p>
<blockquote>
<p>to distribute water, defend storage facilities, deal with potential outbreaks of disease, and keep the peace.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Military and disaster</h2>
<p>It’s not uncommon for the military to get involved in disaster relief. During the Fukushima/Daichi disaster following the tsunami that struck Japan in 2011, the Japanese military played a critical role in providing aid and relief. But they were not there to <a href="http://fukushimaontheglobe.com/the-earthquake-and-the-nuclear-accident/whats-happened/the-japan-us-military-response">defend or guard</a> people and property.</p>
<p>The South African National Defence Force played a similar role during <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/mozambique/mozambique-natural-disasters-floods">serious floods in Mozambique</a> in 2000, and again during flooding <a href="http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=arti%20cle&id=37789:job-done-in-mozambique-sandf-safely-back-home&catid=111:sa-defence&Itemid=242">in 2015</a>. </p>
<p>But Zille’s intention to involve the military and State Security Agency in Cape Town’s disaster management is different. </p>
<p>They won’t be there in a humanitarian capacity, such as setting up infrastructure or distributing water, but to guard against anarchy. Her aim is to legitimise security measures, or, more bluntly, the use of force. </p>
<p>Her approach should be resisted.</p>
<h2>Lessons from Hurricane Katrina</h2>
<p>Author and humanitarian worker Malka Older, who studied the disaster response in the US to <a href="http://www.revue-rita.com/traitdunion9/securitization-of-disaster-response-in-the-united-states-the-case-of-hurricane-katrina-2005.html">Hurricane Katrina in 2005</a>, found that an obsession with security was legitimised through unsupported claims of widespread violence and looting.</p>
<p>She writes: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The story of Hurricane Katrina is one of security overtaking and overriding disaster management from preparedness through response.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>She concludes that the shift from safety to security – where armed guards were sent to shelters and distribution points – actually reduced the city’s capacity to respond to the disaster. The security emphasis tied up human resources. And the focus turned away from helping those affected by the flooding to controlling them. </p>
<p>On top of this, the securitised response reflected prejudices about race and class. Jamelle Bouie, chief political correspondent for Slate Magazine and a political analyst for CBS News, has <a href="http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2015/08/hurricane_katrina_10th_anniversary_how_the_black_lives_matter_movement_was.html">argued that</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Black collective memory of Hurricane Katrina, as much as anything else, informs the present movement against police violence, ‘Black Lives Matter.’</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Thinking differently</h2>
<p>Water scarcity, like any issue, can be thought of in several ways. </p>
<p>It can be imagined as a hardship that many Capetonians in poor, black townships have <a href="https://www.groundup.org.za/article/water-restrictions-its-nothing-new-us-say-residents-informal-settlements/">endured all their lives</a>.</p>
<p>People can consider staying calm and being resilient and resourceful as they make plans to source and store water. They can even imagine a new community spirit as they find ways to <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-southern-africa-can-learn-from-other-countries-about-adapting-to-drought-90876">share this scarce resource</a>, help the most vulnerable and receive help from around the country. </p>
<p>Part of this imagining depends on leaders staying level headed. Citizens need public communication, not scaremongering that equates the worst case scenario with objective reality. They don’t need to be paralysed by a mindset of suspicion and dread.</p>
<p>Cape Town’s leaders should remain calm and help the people to act collectively in a democratic spirit.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/90951/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joelien Pretorius does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Mass hysteria and lawlessness during disasters are remarkably rare, contrary to Western Cape Premier Helen Zille’s prediction of anarchy when Cape Town’s taps run day.Joelien Pretorius, Associate Professor in Political Studies, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/892482017-12-18T17:03:17Z2017-12-18T17:03:17ZThe ANC has a new leader: but South Africa remains on a political precipice<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199756/original/file-20171218-27554-19f1lki.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Cyril Ramaphosa, the new president of South Africa's governing party, the ANC, and potentially the country's future president. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Siphiwe Sibeko</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Rumours that President Jacob Zuma has instructed the South African National Defence Force to draw up plans for implementing a <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1756940/sa-presidency-rejects-reports-of-state-of-emergency-regulations-draft/">state of emergency</a> may or may not be true. Nonetheless they are evidence of South Africa’s febrile political atmosphere.</p>
<p>But any assumption that <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/anc-conference/anc54-breaking-ramaphosa-elected-anc-president-12453127">the election</a> of <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/cyril-matamela-ramaphosa">Cyril Ramaphosa</a> as the new leader of the African National Congress (ANC), after winning the race against Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, will place South Africa on an even keel are misplaced. Indeed, the drama may only be beginning.</p>
<p>It’s useful to look back to 2007 when President Thabo Mbeki unwisely ran for a <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/i-asked-mbeki-to-stand-for-a-third-term-to-stop-zuma-kasrils-20171108">third term as ANC leader</a>. His unpopularity among large segments of the party provided the platform for his <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Politics/Zuma-sweeps-to-resounding-victory-20071218">defeat by Zuma</a> at Polokwane. Within a few months the National Executive Committee of the ANC latched onto an <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAKZHC/2008/71.html">excuse</a> to ask Mbeki to <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/thabo-mbeki-resigns-south-africa%E2%80%99s-second-democratic-president">stand down as president of the country</a> before the end of his term of office. Being committed to the traditions of party loyalty he complied, resigning as president some eight months before the Constitution required him to do so.</p>
<p>The question this raises is whether South Africa should now expect a repeat performance following the election of a new leader of the ANC. Will this lead to a party instruction to Zuma to stand down as president of the country? And if it does, will he do what Mbeki did and meekly resign?</p>
<p>There’s a big difference between the two scenarios: Mbeki had no reason to fear the consequences of leaving office. Zuma, on the other hand, has numerous reasons to cling to power. This is what makes him, and the immediate future, dangerous for South Africa, and suggests the country faces instability.</p>
<h2>Why Zuma won’t go</h2>
<p>It is not out of the question that Zuma may say to himself, and to South Africa, that he is not going anywhere. He is losing <a href="https://theconversation.com/dramatic-night-in-south-africa-leaves-president-hanging-on-by-a-thread-57180">court case</a> after <a href="https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21732538-judges-keep-finding-against-south-africas-embattled-president-jacob-zuma-loses-two">court case</a>, and judicial decisions are increasingly narrowing his legal capacity to block official and independent investigations into the extent of <a href="http://ewn.co.za/Topic/State-Capture">state capture</a> by business interests close to him.</p>
<p>With every passing day, the prospects of his finding himself in the dock, <a href="https://theconversation.com/president-zuma-loses-bid-to-dodge-783-charges-but-will-he-have-the-last-laugh-85703">facing 783 charges</a>, including of corruption and racketeering, also increase. </p>
<p>Zuma will have every constitutional right to defy an ANC instruction to stand down as state president until his term expires following the next <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/newsmaker-2019-elections-results-will-be-credible-20171015-2">general election in 2019</a>, and the new parliament’s election of a new president. In terms of the <a href="http://www.treasury.gov.za/legislation/bills/2002/b16.pdf">South African Constitution</a>, his term of office will be brought to an early end only if parliament passes a vote of no confidence in his presidency, or votes that, for one reason or another, he is unfit for office.</p>
<p>But today’s ANC is so divided that it cannot be assumed that a majority of ANC MPs would <a href="https://theconversation.com/whats-happening-inside-the-anc-not-parliament-is-key-to-why-zuma-prevails-82399">back a motion of no confidence</a>, even following the election of <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201712040357.html">Ramaphosa</a> as the party’s new leader. </p>
<p>In other words, there is a very real prospect that South Africa will see itself ruled for at least another 18 months or so by what is termed <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2007-06-27-anc-debates-two-centres-of-power">“two centres of power”</a>, with the authority and the legitimacy of the party (formally backing Ramaphosa) vying against that of the state (headed by Zuma).</p>
<h2>Throwing caution to the wind</h2>
<p>As if that is not a sufficient condition for political instability, we may expect that Zuma will continue to use his executive power to erect defences against his future prosecution. He will reckon to leave office only with guarantees of immunity. Until he gets them, Zuma will defy all blandishments to go. And if he does not get what he wants, he may throw caution to the wind and go for broke.</p>
<p>Hence, perhaps, the possibility that he is prepared to invoke a state of emergency.</p>
<p>The grounds for Zuma imposing a state of emergency would be specious, summoned up to defend his interests and those backing him. They would be likely to infer <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-pressure-mounts-on-south-africas-jacob-zuma-he-blames-an-old-enemy-western-intelligence-agencies-69599">foreign interference</a> in affairs of state, alongside suggestions that <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/zuma-again-denounces-the-monopoly-of-white-economic-power-11988619">white monopoly capital</a>, whites as a whole as well as nefarious others were conspiring to prevent much needed <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-12-15-know-your-candidate-dlamini-zuma-beats-the-ret-drum/">radical economic transformation</a>. Present constitutional arrangements would be declared <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-south-africans-should-be-worried-by-anc-talk-of-a-colour-revolution-87019">counter-revolutionary</a> and those defending them doing so only to protect their material interests. </p>
<p>After a matter of time, such justifications would probably be declared unconstitutional by the judiciary. It is then that there would be a confrontation between raw power and the Constitution. If such a situation should arise, we cannot be sure which would be the winner.</p>
<h2>South Africa’s army</h2>
<p>It is remarkable how little the searchlight that has focused on state capture has rested on the Defence Force. Much attention has been given to how the executive has effectively co-opted the <a href="https://theconversation.com/leaked-emails-ramaphosas-hypocrisy-on-spying-by-the-south-african-state-83605">intelligence</a> and <a href="http://www.ngopulse.org/article/2016/09/29/political-interference-weakening-rule-law-sa">prosecutorial service</a>, as well has how the top ranks of the police have been selected for political rather than <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/15/world/africa/south-africa-police-commissioner-under-investigation-is-suspended.html">operational reasons</a>. </p>
<p>It seems to have been assumed that South Africa’s military is simply sitting in the background, observing political events from afar. But is it? Where would its loyalties lie in the event of a major constitutional crisis? </p>
<p>The danger of the present situation is that South Africa might be about to find out.</p>
<p>Were the military to throw its weight behind Zuma the country would be in no-man’s land. Of course, there would be a massive popular reaction, with the further danger that the president himself would summon his popular cohorts to <a href="https://theconversation.com/anc-military-veterans-and-the-threat-to-south-africas-democracy-76118">“defend the revolution”</a>. </p>
<p>And South Africans should not assume that Zuma would be politically isolated. Those who backed Dlamini-Zuma did so to defend their present positions and capacity to use office for personal gain. If they were to rise up, the army would then be elevated to the status of defender of civil order.</p>
<p>What is certain is that in such a wholly uncertain situation the economy would spiral downwards quickly. Capital would take flight at a faster rate than ever before, <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=10658">employment</a> would collapse even further, <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=10334">poverty</a> would become even further entrenched. </p>
<h2>Reasons to be hopeful</h2>
<p>Is all this too extreme a scenario? Hopefully yes. There are numerous good reasons why such a fate will be averted. </p>
<p>Zuma’s control over the ANC is waning, as is his control over various state institutions, notably the National Prosecuting Authority. And the country has a checks and balances in place: there is a vigorous civil society, the judiciary has proved the Constitution’s main defence and trade unions and business remain influential. </p>
<p>Even so, it remains the case that what transpires now that the ANC’s national conference is over will determine the fate and future of our democracy. South Africa is approaching rough waters, and a Jacob Zuma facing an inglorious and humiliating end to his presidency will be a Jacob Zuma at his most dangerous.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89248/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall receives funding from the National Research Foundation.</span></em></p>South Africa’s ruling ANC has a new leader - Cyril Ramaphosa. But this doesn’t mean that the country is out of the woods. Political instability remains a real possibility.Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/812162017-07-19T18:22:22Z2017-07-19T18:22:22ZMoney has little to do with why South Africa’s military is failing to do its job<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178679/original/file-20170718-10316-wlsu7w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A soldier with the 9th South African Infantry Battalion during a biennial training exercise with the US military in the Eastern Cape.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">US Army/ Taryn Hagerman</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Much has been said about the size of South Africa’s <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/07/16/sandf-unable-to-meet-mandate-due-to-reduced-budget">defence budget</a>, the tension between commitments and capabilities, and the need to arrest the decline in <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-army-is-in-steady-decline-and-nothings-being-done-to-fix-it-74712">defence</a>. Despite the fact that the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) is still a major player in <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/general/112885/south-africas-military-power-vs-the-world-in-2016/">Southern Africa</a>, it has real problems.</p>
<p>For one, directing vital peacekeeping funds, which should be part of the defence budget, away from the military to the
national budget, is a <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-06-30-00-diverted-funds-puts-soldiers-at-risk">major problem</a>.
But, it’s time for the <a href="http://www.dod.mil.za/">SANDF</a> to face some serious realities. </p>
<p>Firstly, it should not place its hope in the rollout of the current <a href="http://www.gov.za/documents/south-african-defence-review-2014">Defence Review</a>. The review doesn’t provide an honest outline of the threats and vulnerabilities facing the country, defence capabilities needed, military organisation or the cost to taxpayers.</p>
<p>The review saw the light in 2014 when the country’s economic outlook was substantially better. It was deliberately drafted without considering the costs and threats facing the country. As nothing more than an honest internal analysis of the state of South African defence, the document is of little strategic significance.</p>
<p>Secondly, in view of the social, educational and other economic realities, there is no fat in the national budget for defence. It needs to accept the reality that it is not to receive a cent more than what’s already allocated. For the foreseeable future, defence spending will remain at about 1% of GDP. South Africa cannot afford the 2% of GDP that’s accepted for defence spending across the world. </p>
<p>In addition, the SANDF also confronts a number of critical political realities. It is, for all practical purposes, the face of South African foreign policy in Africa and is, to a large extent, functioning in a domestic political conundrum shaped by the policy and political cravings of the governing party and its elite.</p>
<p>It’s also subject to the political expressions of policy documents such as the <a href="http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/Executive%20Summary-NDP%202030%20-%20Our%20future%20-%20make%20it%20work.pdf">National Development Plan</a>, which aims to eliminate poverty and reduce inequality by 2030. The Force is also hostage to the factional battles within the governing African National Congress (ANC), as reflected in the fallout over such slogans as <a href="http://www.fin24.com/Economy/radical-economic-transformation-zuma-vs-ramaphosa-20170502">“radical economic transformation”</a>. Like all sectors of the society, defence is also victim to the political manoeuvring, underpinning the current national executive’s need for survival.</p>
<h2>Political whims trump strategy</h2>
<p>For the SANDF, these realities unfold along the lines of a need to be everything for everybody, with little strategic guidance and priorities forthcoming <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-06-11-op-ed-the-sandfs-misguided-role-in-africa/#.WW8LPoSGOos">from the political domain</a>. In practice, this means that there’s no emphasis on defence priorities and that the demands for the Defence Force to “assist” unfolds through a process of adhocracy. </p>
<p>Generals, functioning in a self sanctioning institutional culture of misplaced political loyalty, stretch the defence capacity to please their political masters. In the process, they oversee the breakdown of the institution they command, because there are limits to what a defence force can do.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178811/original/file-20170719-13593-de0czj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178811/original/file-20170719-13593-de0czj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=365&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178811/original/file-20170719-13593-de0czj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=365&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178811/original/file-20170719-13593-de0czj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=365&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178811/original/file-20170719-13593-de0czj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=458&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178811/original/file-20170719-13593-de0czj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=458&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178811/original/file-20170719-13593-de0czj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=458&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Jacob Zuma and government ministers visit a border gate and temporary army base.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Politicians don’t necessarily understand the borders of these limitations and, if not clearly outlined, this may have disastrous consequences for the military as an institution.</p>
<p>From a theoretical perspective, there are two broad approaches to deal with a problematic defence budget. The so-called interests-driven approach accepts the need to prioritise defence commitments in line with national interests, which the Force needs to extend or protect.</p>
<p>The priorities should provide a clear indication of what funding level is required to execute the defence function. This approach, though, has to be content with the reality that no country in the world has the capacity to fund all its defence priorities.</p>
<p>The budget driven approach, in contrast, takes the national budget as a point of departure. The question that drives this approach is what can be done with the money allocated for defence. This is the question central to South Africa’s defence budget woes.</p>
<p>An analysis of the structure of South African defence spending provides a better understanding of the military’s budgetary problems. As a guideline, defence forces around the world accept that the budget, irrespective of its size, ought to be divided between personnel, operational and capital expenditure, more or less in equal portions. </p>
<p>In reality this boils down to between 30 and 35% for operational and capital expenditures and 35 to 40% for personnel. This represents the first major challenge in South Africa’s defence budget: almost 80% of it is for <a href="http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2017/enebooklets/Vote%2019%20Defence%20and%20Military%20Veterans.pdf">personnel expenses</a>. </p>
<p>The rest is allocated for operational expenditure, with only limited money available for any capital projects. It’s no surprise then that the Defence Force complains about the maintenance of equipment, infrastructure, training, administration and force preparation. </p>
<p>The truth is: if personnel are the problem; they are also the solution. The failure of the defence force over many years to implement an <a href="http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/pentagon/2015/06/11/up-or-out-carson-pentagon/71067386/">up-or-out personnel management system</a> is very much at the heart of its budgetary problems. The nature of military work relies on the availability of young people. In a typical military hierarchical personnel system, most of them must be out by age 30.</p>
<h2>The veterans burden</h2>
<p>Another problem is the way in which the defence budget has been taxed with veterans’ affairs. Since the Ministry of Defence was renamed the <a href="http://www.dod.mil.za/ministry/minister.htm">Ministry of Defence and Military Veterans</a>, the <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/legis/num_act/aaa2011311.pdf">Veterans Act, Act 18 of 2011</a> has been adopted. The name change is significant. </p>
<p>This is to a large extent a reflection of the intimate link between the executive and the military veterans of <a href="https://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02424/04lv02730/05lv02918/06lv02985.htm">Umkhonto we Sizwe</a>, the former armed wing of the governing ANC. This is embodied in the appointment of <a href="https://www.pa.org.za/person/emmanuel-ramaotoana-kebby-maphatsoe/">Kebby Maphatsoe</a> as the deputy minister of Defence and Military Veterans. </p>
<p>In line with the Veterans Act, a new body has been created to deal specifically with military veterans’ affairs. The new <a href="http://www.archivalplatform.org/registry/entry/south_africannational_militaryveterans_associationsanmva/">South African National Military Veterans Association</a> is a public entity, state-funded, and accountable to the department. The SANDF is now increasingly financially and socially directly responsible for military veterans.</p>
<h2>Time for hard choices</h2>
<p>Thus, the problem is not in the size of the budget; the problem is how that budget is divided. A bigger defence budget is not the solution. Almost every problem in the SANDF is personnel related. </p>
<p>Money has very little to do with many of the challenges the military faces. Yet, its leadership sees the lack of money as its single most important challenge. Searching for the solution in the budgetary domain is the easy way out. </p>
<p>Blame it on a lack of money and no thinking is required; no innovation; no initiative; no dynamism; no drive. All one has to do is drift along. The solution is rooted in difficult political and strategic decisions about the future of the Defence Force. Decisions that will address, among other things, the professionalism and effectiveness of the organisation, the oversized bureaucratic corporate army in Pretoria, and the age brackets of serving personnel. More specifically, the SANDF should not be allowed to spend more than 40% of its budget on personnel!</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/81216/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abel Esterhuyse is an associate professor of strategic studies at the Faculty of Military Science at Stellenbosch University</span></em></p>One of the problems bedevilling South Africa’s army is being compelled to be everything to everybody. Its strategic direction is compromised by generals who pander to the whims of politicians.Abel Esterhuyse, Associate Professor of Strategy, Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/747122017-04-05T14:54:52Z2017-04-05T14:54:52ZSouth Africa’s army is in steady decline and nothing’s being done to fix it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162694/original/image-20170327-3308-1koppcw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Africa's army currently has about 80,000 active personnel.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Flickr/Spc. Taryn Hagerman, US. Army Africa </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) is in a “critical state of decline” and is largely incapable of carrying out its constitutional duties.</p>
<p>This sobering fact is set out in the <a href="http://www.gov.za/documents/south-african-defence-review-2014">Defence Review</a>, South Africa’s new defence policy finalised in March 2014. The Review noted that the army couldn’t afford its main operating systems, was unable to meet standing defence commitments, lacked critical mobility and was “too poorly equipped and funded to execute the widening spectrum of tasks to the desired level”. It concluded that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>left unchecked, and at present funding levels, (the decline of the SANDF) will severely compromise and further fragment South Africa’s defence capability.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Three years later the situation remains the same.</p>
<p>The South African constitution says that the SANDF’s <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10246029.2015.1124794">primary function</a> is to protect the country’s territorial integrity, provide border security and to support peacemaking operations in Africa.</p>
<p>Currently the army has about <a href="http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=36949:sandf-not-meeting-staffing-targets&catid=111:SA%20Defence&Itemid=242">80,000 active personnel</a>. <a href="http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=south-africa">Global Firepower</a> ranks the SANDF’s military capabilities and available firepower 5th in Africa and 46th in the world.</p>
<p>Over the past two decades the SANDF has been sent to <a href="http://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/sa-soldiers-applauded-peace-keeping-efforts-africa">peacekeeping missions</a> in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan. There was also the <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/200-SA-soldiers-took-on-3-000-rebels-SANDF-20130325">questionable deployment</a> to the Central African Republic in 2013 where 15 soldiers lost their lives. In addition, the navy has been involved in protecting South Africa’s territorial waters and maritime interests as well as contributing to the <a href="http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=25142:south-african-navy-helps-catch-pirates&catid=108:maritime-security&Itemid=233">fight against piracy</a>.</p>
<p>Over the years thousands of soldiers have also been deployed to protect the country’s borders. And the army has taken part in the crime fighting <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2015-09-07-the-numbers-behind-operation-fiela">Operation Fiela</a>.</p>
<h2>Under funded</h2>
<p>The army’s dire situation has arisen because the government hasn’t provided sufficient funds for the SANDF over the past two decades.</p>
<p>In 1994 the <a href="http://www.gov.za/documents/south-african-defence-review-2014">spending on defence</a> was around 3% of the GDP. This declined steadily to 1.54% of the GDP in 2004–5 and around 1.2% of the GDP since 2014. The <a href="http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=39213:mapisa-nqakula-wishes-for-a-defence-budget-that-is-two-percent-of-gdp&catid=111:sa-defence&Itemid=242">minister of defence believes</a> that a defence budget of about 2% of the GDP – <a href="http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS">in line with countries</a> such as Turkey, France and United Kingdom – would help it rebuild its capacity.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162702/original/image-20170327-3276-1uxbom5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162702/original/image-20170327-3276-1uxbom5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162702/original/image-20170327-3276-1uxbom5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162702/original/image-20170327-3276-1uxbom5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162702/original/image-20170327-3276-1uxbom5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162702/original/image-20170327-3276-1uxbom5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162702/original/image-20170327-3276-1uxbom5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">South African soldiers on patrol in Bangui, Central African Republic in
2013.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Luc Gnago</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The cost of the SANDF <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10246029.2015.1124794">taking part in peace missions</a> isn’t an issue as these are covered by funding from the National Treasury and the Department of International Relations and Cooperation. The challenge is to fund <a href="http://www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org/Files/Brenthurst_Commisioned_Reports/Brenthurst-paper-201107.pdf">“day-to-day maintenance”</a> including equipment, infrastructure, training, administration and force preparation.</p>
<p>In particular, the SANDF’s infrastructure is falling apart. In March 2014, <a href="http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=33889">only 38% of the army’s facilities</a> and only half of the soldiers’ living quarters were in decent conditions. Some of the bases are in such a poor state that they are “unsuitable for human habitation”.</p>
<p>The Defence Review stressed the need for immediate intervention to stop the critical decline and </p>
<blockquote>
<p>create a firm foundation to … develop a sustainable defence capability appropriate to South Africa’s international status, strategic posture and its inescapable continental leadership role.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In addition, it warned that “even with an immediate intervention, it could take at least five years to arrest the decline and another five years to develop a limited and sustainable defence capability.” </p>
<p>During the intervening three years the government has shown no urgency to help the SANDF develop into a capable force. There’s been no significant increase in funding for the army since 2014.</p>
<p>The writers of the Defence Review operated under instructions from then Defence Minister Lindiwe Sisulu to <a href="https://www.africandefence.net/plan-b-for-south-africas-military/">“pursue a long-term framework”</a>. This was based on the assumption the government would provide the necessary funds to implement the review’s recommendations. Since then Sisulu has been moved to another portfolio and the army’s budget has not gone up.</p>
<p>Today the SANDF “doesn’t have the <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/local/2017/03/14/SA-army-too-broke-to-prevent-cross-border-crime">money or manpower</a> to step up security of the country’s porous borders.” According to the Minister of Defence, Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula</p>
<blockquote>
<p>there are huge expectations from us but budget cuts remain a problem.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>According to the latest budget figures, <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2017-02-23-defence-budget-under-siege/">spending on Defence and State Security</a> will amount to R54bn in 2017-18, up from R52bn in 2016. In 2018-19, spending is set to increase to R56bn and R60bn in 2019-20. </p>
<p>But these increases are not enough to arrest the decline, let alone rebuild the capacity of the SANDF and implement the review’s recommendations.</p>
<p>Recently, President Jacob Zuma, <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/local/2017/03/14/SA-army-too-broke-to-prevent-cross-border-crime">surprised to hear about the army’s financial woes</a>, encouraged Mapisa-Nqakula to bring the issue up at a cabinet meeting.</p>
<p>This raises the question whether he even read the 341-page review document. </p>
<h2>Neglect likely to continue</h2>
<p>Lacklustre economic growth means that no significant budget increases are likely in the foreseeable future. In a challenging environment, the government and the Department of Defence have two options: find extra money or scale down. Both options are set out <a href="http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/dfencereview_2014.pdf">in the review:</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>There must be either a greater budget allocation or, a significantly scaled-down level of ambition and commitment which is aligned to the current budget allocation. In short, there are two strategic options available for government: budget must be determined by policy or, budget must drive policy.‘</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Defence analyst <a href="https://www.africandefence.net/plan-b-for-south-africas-military/">John Stupart argues</a> that South Africa doesn’t have a plan B. At the same time, the policy that exists is “simply unachievable”.</p>
<p>But something will have to change, and quickly. Stupart argues that South Africa’s strategic needs could be met by a smaller, well trained and highly capable defence force equipped with modern weapons and tactical know-how. The alternative is that a large, over-staffed and badly trained military slides “into decline and, ultimately, obsolescence”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/74712/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Savo Heleta does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>South Africa’s army is in a dire situation because the government hasn’t provided sufficient funding over the past two decades, hampering its ability to fulfil its duty.Savo Heleta, Manager, Internationalisation at Home and Research, Nelson Mandela UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/533912016-01-26T04:05:09Z2016-01-26T04:05:09ZWhy South Africa’s plans to militarise humanitarian work are misguided<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/109049/original/image-20160122-417-19ufjhc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African National Defence Force soldiers help to unload maize for flood victims in
Mozambique.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The South African Defence Review, the country’s new defence policy, was approved in March 2014. It guides policy-making for the next two to three decades. </p>
<p>The promotion of stability and peace in Africa is a priority for South Africa. The <a href="http://www.gov.za/documents/south-african-defence-review-2014">Defence Review</a> says it will contribute to the prevention and resolution of conflict by integrating its diplomatic, military and other efforts. In some instances this will be supported by appropriate military capabilities that strengthen the country’s capacity to influence international developments. </p>
<p>South Africa’s involvement is informed by a desire to support conflict management, peace-building and reconstruction in Africa. There are also geopolitical, security and economic interests at play.</p>
<p>The Defence Review took three years to complete. One would expect this to have been enough time to come up with a sound policy document. But there are two major problems with the role envisaged for the <a href="http://www.dod.mil.za/">South African National Defence Force</a> in relation to African peace and stability.</p>
<h2>“Armed” humanitarian assistance</h2>
<p>The first is the plan to involve the country’s military in providing</p>
<blockquote>
<p>critical humanitarian assistance and reconstruction capabilities during and immediately after military operations.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The <a href="https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/OOM_HumPrinciple_English.pdf">four principles</a> which guide humanitarian activities in conflict zones are:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>humanity,</p></li>
<li><p>neutrality,</p></li>
<li><p>impartiality, and</p></li>
<li><p>independence. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Using armed forces to distribute humanitarian assistance in conflict or complex post-conflict areas violates the humanitarian principles. This includes foreign peacekeepers. The review does not even acknowledge humanitarian principles. This is an odd omission as they have been endorsed by the <a href="http://www.southafrica-newyork.net/speeches_pmun/view_speech.php?speech=3647798">government</a>. And they are crucial in any debate about engagement in conflict zones.</p>
<p>Humanitarian and military actors differ profoundly in terms of their training. This includes differences in skills, aims, mandates, agendas, operational methods and institutional cultures. Because of this, the responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance rests primarily with humanitarian and aid organisations. </p>
<p>The role of peacekeepers is to contribute to creating stability and security. They are also tasked with ensuring freedom of movement for local and international humanitarian aid workers.</p>
<p>South African peacekeepers will endanger humanitarian efforts if they get involved in humanitarian work. Instead of helping bring peace, stability and relief, they will compromise the work of humanitarian organisations.</p>
<h2>Developmental peacekeeping</h2>
<p>The second problem with South Africa’s new defence policy is the plan to engage in “developmental peacekeeping.” The review notes that the defence force</p>
<blockquote>
<p>can contribute greatly to socio-economic development by employing its diverse capabilities, such as its planning capability, in line with peace-operation forces.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The SANDF’s capabilities for socio-economic development are questionable. The force is in a critical state of <a href="http://www.gov.za/documents/south-african-defence-review-2014">decline</a>. Its myriad problems include high HIV/Aids infection rates, skills and equipment shortages, indiscipline and an ageing force. </p>
<p>The army has limited capacity to meaningfully assist South Africa’s own development and growth, let alone post-conflict reconstruction and development in Africa’s conflict zones.</p>
<p>But the real problem is the envisaged involvement of the military in socio-economic development in war torn countries. Post-conflict reconstruction <a href="http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lang=en&id=112187">takes place</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>in synergy with peacekeeping and peace-enforcement. On a practical level this would mean that post-conflict reconstruction practitioners and resources are deployed alongside peacekeepers. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>In short, peacekeepers are supposed to contribute to the establishment of stability and security that enables reconstruction and development.</p>
<h2>Irresponsible and misguided policy-making</h2>
<p>South Africa needs to do more to help Africa’s war-torn countries stabilise and recover. But it is puzzling that the new policy would envisage the defence force being involved in humanitarian assistance and reconstruction and development in complex crises.</p>
<p>It is even more puzzling that this irresponsible and misguided thinking is part of a defence policy that will steer the defence force in the next few decades.</p>
<p>This could have been avoided if the defence review committee had consulted the literature on aid and development in conflict and post-conflict settings, and particularly these two documents:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the UN’s Civil-Military Guidelines and Reference for <a href="http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/47da82a72.pdf">Complex Emergencies</a>, and</p></li>
<li><p>South Africa’s own Revised White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace <a href="https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/16893/">Missions</a>.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>South Africa needs to engage in Africa in a strategic and pragmatic way. It also needs to ensure that tasks and responsibilities are delegated correctly. The defence force’s modest peacekeeping capabilities must be used properly. Most importantly, the guiding principle of any engagement should be “do no harm”.</p>
<p>Humanitarian work in Africa should be left to humanitarian and aid agencies. Reconstruction and development should be left to the New Partnership for Africa’s <a href="http://www.nepad.org/">Development</a>, development organisations and local actors.</p>
<p><em>This article is based on my <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10246029.2015.1124794">paper</a> published in African Security Review.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/53391/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Savo Heleta does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The South African military’s capabilities for socio-economic development are questionable, even in its own country. The force is in critical decline, but is expected to aid humanitarian efforts.Savo Heleta, Manager, Internationalisation at Home and Research, Nelson Mandela UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.