tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/state-capture-25993/articlesState capture – The Conversation2024-02-12T02:20:48Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2229952024-02-12T02:20:48Z2024-02-12T02:20:48ZA slide in global corruption rankings is bad for ‘Brand NZ’ – what can the government do?<p>In 2010, then US secretary of state Hillary Clinton <a href="https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/clinton-nz-punches-way-above-its-weight/IIL2CO557CQ7WFK7WVJHJRFH7U/">famously described</a> New Zealand as a country that “punches way above its weight”. She was referring to our role in international relations, global security and natural disaster responses. But she was also talking about the country’s international reputation for being clean, green, safe and honest.</p>
<p>New Zealand has long enjoyed the economic and reputational benefits of these attributes. But recent rankings measuring the country’s international influence, transparency and corruption have started to tell a different story.</p>
<p>Between 2021 and 2023, New Zealand dropped ten places – from 16 to 26 – on the <a href="https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/politics/2023/03/new-zealand-takes-another-plunge-in-global-soft-power-rankings.html">Global Soft Power Index</a>. This measures a country’s influence abroad (among nation states, societies and international corporations) through its use of non-coercive measures.</p>
<p>Also, for the first time in a decade, New Zealand has <a href="https://www.transparency.org.nz/blog/new-zealands-score-slips-in-latest-corruption-perceptions-index-now-ranked-third">dropped to third place</a> in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI), which <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/news/how-cpi-scores-are-calculated">measures perceived levels</a> of corruption in the public sector. </p>
<p>That puts New Zealand five points below Denmark in first spot, and two below Finland. What’s going on, and what are the political and economic implications?</p>
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<h2>Brand New Zealand</h2>
<p>According to the 2023 Anholt-Ipsos <a href="https://www.ipsos.com/en/nation-brands-index-2023">Nation Brand Index</a>, New Zealand is the 14th most valuable country brand in the world, valued at close to <a href="https://www.stuff.co.nz/business/industries/130054566/new-zealands-brand-worth-440-billion-but-what-exactly-is-brand-nz">half a trillion New Zealand dollars</a> in 2022 by brand valuation and strategy company Brand Finance.</p>
<p>Indeed, “Brand New Zealand” – a carefully crafted and closely curated mix of national storytelling, strategic marketing and cross-sector investment – was a key driver behind the NZ$68.7 billion in exports of goods in 2023. On top of that, it drives a large part of the NZ$15 billion spent by tourists, and NZ$6 billion generated by overseas students.</p>
<p>Brand New Zealand is a precious commodity in its own right, which has taken many decades to build. But it can be quickly squandered, particularly through poor governance.</p>
<p>Enjoying levels of trust in public institutions <a href="https://ogp.org.nz/latest-news/ogpnz-26-july-2022-update-latest-trust-and-confidence-results">above the OECD average</a> has meant New Zealand takes pride in being recognised among the <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/02/these-are-the-20-least-corrupt-countries-on-earth/">least corrupt countries</a> around the world.</p>
<p>The corruption ranking in turn affects the cost of accessing finance by countries, which eventually trickles down to household mortgages. It also influences public policies, public and private investment decisions, and market entry decisions by international firms (such as Ikea and Amazon).</p>
<p>Since 2014, New Zealand has dropped six points in its CPI score, three times more than Denmark or Finland. That’s not a trend we’d want to see continue.</p>
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<h2>Perceptions matter</h2>
<p>Corruption, defined as the misuse of authority for personal or organisational gain, reflects illegal activities which are purposefully hidden from the public and uncovered only through investigation, persecution or when a scandal erupts.</p>
<p>The CPI is based on expert assessment and opinion surveys from many different corruption studies by reputable global institutions, including the World Bank, the World Economic Forum, and the Economist Intelligence Unit.</p>
<p>A higher CPI score implies a lower level of perceived corruption. The aggregation of different indices makes the CPI more reliable than any single source.</p>
<p>New Zealand’s country credit risk rating – measured by the Economist Intelligence Unit, and which represents the single largest component of a country’s CPI score – has not dropped (yet). </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/return-of-the-consultocracy-how-cutting-public-service-jobs-to-save-costs-usually-backfires-218990">Return of the ‘consultocracy’ – how cutting public service jobs to save costs usually backfires</a>
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<p>But its two-point CPI slide from 87 to 85 is driven by perceptions among business leaders, as captured by the most recent World Economic Forum’s executive opinion survey taken in August 2023.</p>
<p>The survey asks those leaders to report on any pressures to make undocumented extra payments or bribes, and instances of untoward diversion of public funds to groups, firms or individuals.</p>
<p>CEO of Transparency International New Zealand, Julie Haggie, <a href="https://www.transparency.org.nz/blog/new-zealands-score-slips-in-latest-corruption-perceptions-index-now-ranked-third">attributes the 2023 drop</a> in business leaders’ confidence to three specific factors:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>several high-profile cases of COVID-19 subsidy fraud and tax evasion by businesses</p></li>
<li><p>the government’s insufficient response to a rise in scamming, as well as a lack of transparency around government spending on outside consultation contracts and infrastructure projects</p></li>
<li><p>and a heightened focus on appropriate spending of public funds during a cost-of-living crisis when most New Zealanders are doing it tough.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Trust in government</h2>
<p>New Zealand’s CPI score (85) still warrants an A grade. But the long-term slide should not be ignored. We need to understand it as part of a <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/news/cpi-2023-asia-pacific-stagnation-due-to-inadequate-anti-corruption-commitments">wider trend</a> of stagnation across the Asia Pacific. </p>
<p>In 2023, the region received a failing grade, with an average CPI score of just 45 – dragged down by North Korea (CPI: 17), Myanmar (20) and Afghanistan (20). </p>
<p>Transparency International also highlighed the “slow decline” of top performing countries in the region – New Zealand, followed by Singapore (CPI: 83), Australia and Hong Kong (both 75). </p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/australias-ranking-in-global-anti-corruption-index-remains-steady-but-shows-we-cannot-be-complacent-222259">Australia's ranking in global anti-corruption index remains steady – but shows we cannot be complacent</a>
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<p>New Zealand’s latest CPI score may not yet reflect any erosion of public trust brought on by the coalition government’s <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/programmes/the-detail/story/2018923991/the-treaty-of-waitangi-articles-principles-changes">policies around revisiting</a> the Treaty of Waitangi principles. But it must still be mindful of the fragility of general trust in public institutions and the government. </p>
<p>Damaging that trust can have unintended consequences for our international reputation. It could <a href="https://theconversation.com/perceptions-of-corruption-are-growing-in-australia-and-its-costing-the-economy-176562">potentially cost</a> the country thousands of jobs, drive away talent, and dampen export growth.</p>
<p>There is a tension here, too. Cutting public spending by between 6.5% and 7.5%, as government agencies have been <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/507659/the-public-service-agencies-asked-to-cut-spending">told to do</a>, may be viewed positively by business leaders. But it can also erode public trust in government.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/artificial-intelligence-and-corporate-social-responsibility-can-strengthen-anti-corruption-efforts-177883">Artificial intelligence and corporate social responsibility can strengthen anti-corruption efforts</a>
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<h2>Turning the trend around</h2>
<p>To halt or reverse the slide, New Zealand might look to Australia. While it placed 14th in the latest Transparency International ranking (with a CPI score of 75), Australia has gained two points under the Albanese Labor government.</p>
<p>This <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-a-decade-of-decline-australia-is-back-on-the-rise-in-a-global-anti-corruption-ranking-198305">marked a turnaround</a> in previously declining CPI scores. It was driven by the establishment of a new federal anti-corruption commission, and significant changes to whistle-blowing protection.</p>
<p>As New Zealanders learn about the sometimes messy inner power dynamics of a three-way coalition, one thing is clear: the government would be wise to assure the domestic and international public that there is no risk of state capture by specific interest groups, such as tobacco, the military industrial complex, or foreign property developers.</p>
<p>State capture by vested interest groups is a form of public corruption and would likely significantly affect New Zealand’s declining CPI score. Again, public perceptions count as much as reality in such cases.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222995/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matevz (Matt) Raskovic does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>New Zealand has dropped six points on the main global index of perceived corruption. To turn that around, the government must guard against state capture by vested interests.Matevz (Matt) Raskovic, Associate Professor of International Business & Strategy, Auckland University of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2219002024-01-27T06:07:13Z2024-01-27T06:07:13ZJacob Zuma, the monster South Africa’s ruling ANC created, continues to haunt it<p>Former South African president Jacob Zuma is <a href="https://www.bing.com/ck/a?!&&p=23cde356c2361300JmltdHM9MTcwNTg4MTYwMCZpZ3VpZD0zMGZhN2Y5OS00MWYwLTYxYjctMjZmMS02Y2ZlNDAxMDYwYmYmaW5zaWQ9NTI0Ng&ptn=3&ver=2&hsh=3&fclid=30fa7f99-41f0-61b7-26f1-6cfe401060bf&psq=uMhkonto&u=a1aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuc2FiY25ld3MuY29tL3NhYmNuZXdzL3p1bWEtdXJnZXMtc291dGgtYWZyaWNhbnMtdG8tdm90ZS1mb3ItbmV3bHktZm9ybWVkLXVta2hvbnRvLXdlc2l6d2Uv&ntb=1">endorsing</a> the uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK) Party, the latest rival to the governing African National Congress (ANC) for the <a href="https://www.eisa.org/election-calendar/">upcoming national elections</a>. By doing so, he not only challenges the ANC politically, but also claims its heritage.</p>
<p>The new party – which media reports say is <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/news/politics/2024-01-07-zuma-exposed-as-brains-behind-establishment-of-mk-party/">Zuma’s brainchild</a> – uses the name of the ANC’s former military wing. The party’s launch coincided with the 62nd anniversary of the real <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/umkhonto-wesizwe-mk">uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK)</a>, formed on <a href="https://www.bing.com/ck/a?!&&p=04fd21d4aee3a8f1JmltdHM9MTcwNTg4MTYwMCZpZ3VpZD0zMGZhN2Y5OS00MWYwLTYxYjctMjZmMS02Y2ZlNDAxMDYwYmYmaW5zaWQ9NTI3Mw&ptn=3&ver=2&hsh=3&fclid=30fa7f99-41f0-61b7-26f1-6cfe401060bf&psq=uMhkonto&u=a1aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuc2FoaXN0b3J5Lm9yZy56YS9hcnRpY2xlL3Vta2hvbnRvLXdlc2l6d2UtbWs&ntb=1">16 December 1961</a> to fight the apartheid government. </p>
<p>Zuma could not have been more daring. Yet the ANC obfuscates, criticising him instead of acting decisively and expelling him. Meantime, he actively campaigns to unseat it. Why?</p>
<p>I have studied and written extensively about the politics of the ANC and its alliance partners – the Congress of South African Trade Unions (<a href="http://www.cosatu.org.za/">Cosatu</a>) and the South African Communist Party (<a href="https://www.sacp.org.za/">SACP</a>). I was also one of the editors of the <a href="https://www.hsrcpress.ac.za/books/the-zuma-administration">book</a> The Zuma Administration: Critical Challenges. </p>
<p>In my view, the reason the ANC is cagey about taking him on, is because the party tied itself in knots <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/0fc7bb4c-b027-11e3-b0d0-00144feab7de">defending Zuma’s bad behaviour</a> in the past. The ANC created the Zuma problem. The party and its <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/index.php/site/q/03lv02424/04lv02730/05lv03161.htm">alliance partners</a> abetted his kleptocracy and facilitated his <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/">capture of the state</a>. They created Zuma as a <a href="https://www.rusi.org/publication/jacob-zuma-after-battle-polokwane">populist with a penchant for rabble-rousing</a>. Now they are paralysed and can’t act against him.</p>
<p>The ANC also <a href="https://www.bing.com/ck/a?!&&p=ce02ce879565061cJmltdHM9MTcwNTg4MTYwMCZpZ3VpZD0zMGZhN2Y5OS00MWYwLTYxYjctMjZmMS02Y2ZlNDAxMDYwYmYmaW5zaWQ9NTE3NA&ptn=3&ver=2&hsh=3&fclid=30fa7f99-41f0-61b7-26f1-6cfe401060bf&psq=support+for+zuma&u=a1aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2l0aXplbi5jby56YS9uZXdzL3NvdXRoLWFmcmljYS9wb2xpdGljcy9hbmMtd29udC1hY3QtYWdhaW5zdC16dW1hLWZvci1ub3ctcmVwb3J0Lw&ntb=1">fears</a> that if it expelled him, he could portray himself as a victim.</p>
<p>Decisive action against him would require the party to face up to its own demons. It would be exposed as having enabled him. </p>
<p>The ANC’s reluctance to take him on or fire him is rooted in the events of 2005. Then South African president Thabo Mbeki <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/president-thabo-mbeki-sacks-deputy-president-jacob-zuma">fired Zuma as his deputy</a> after the latter was mired in corruption allegations. Zuma’s use of this to build a case that he was a victim still haunts the ANC. It fears a repeat so close to the 2024 elections. </p>
<p>Zuma’s political pursuits now depend on a new party whose electoral strength is yet to be tested. It pales in comparison with the support he got in the past. </p>
<p>My arguments is that the political cost of not expelling him – in terms of lost votes – is greater than the cost of expelling him. By not acting against him, the ANC is failing to “renew” itself as it has <a href="https://renewal.anc1912.org.za/">promised</a> to do. This makes the party look weak and may cost it electoral support.</p>
<h2>Zuma and the ANC</h2>
<p>The ANC knew Zuma was likely to turn out this way, from as early as 1997, when it elected him deputy president to Thabo Mbeki, paving his way to the highest office in the land.</p>
<p>South African author and journalist Mark Gevisser <a href="https://www.everand.com/book/641542878/Thabo-Mbeki-The-Dream-Deferred">writes</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Mbeki and those around him began to worry that Zuma possessed a dangerous combination of unhealthy ambition and poor judgment.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>They were right.</p>
<p>Because of this fear, he was at first not considered for the position of deputy president. Instead, Mbeki offered the position to Inkatha Freedom Party leader <a href="https://theconversation.com/mangosuthu-buthelezi-was-a-man-of-immense-political-talent-and-contradictions-181081">Mangosuthu Buthelezi</a>. However, through Zuma’s machination, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00344890902944387">this was foiled</a>. He eventually became the deputy president. But he was bitter that he had been initially overlooked for the position.</p>
<p>During <a href="https://www.hsrcpress.ac.za/books/the-zuma-administration">Mbeki’s presidency</a>, relations between the ANC and its <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/index.php/site/q/03lv02424/04lv02730/05lv03161.htm">alliance partners</a> became frosty. </p>
<p>The contestation was around the Mbeki government’s free market economic policies, which Cosatu and the SACP <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/04d23130-a8dc-11dc-ad9e-0000779fd2ac">condemned</a> as a neo-liberal agenda that deviated from the ANC’s aim of <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/index.php/site/q/03lv02039/04lv02103/05lv02120/06lv02126.htm">socio-economic transformation and empowerment</a> of those previously marginalised when it came to power in 1994.</p>
<p>Zuma exploited this to position himself as the centre around which <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2010-09-03-coalition-of-the-wounded-turn-on-zuma/">those allegedly wounded by Mbeki</a> could coalesce.</p>
<h2>The rise of Zuma the populist</h2>
<p>In Zuma, the <a href="https://www.hsrcpress.ac.za/books/the-zuma-administration">alliance</a> saw someone who could represent its ideological position in the country’s policy choices. Yet, he was part of the ANC leadership that adopted Mbeki’s economic strategy and was never known to espouse leftist politics. To their dismay, he proved not to be their <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-04-20-replacing-mbeki-with-zuma-did-not-solve-our-problems-nzimande/">ideological ally in office</a>.</p>
<p>Later the same year Zuma was <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-a-decade-on-a-new-book-on-zumas-rape-trial-has-finally-hit-home-85262">accused of raping</a> the daughter of a friend. He was acquitted but was tainted as immoral.</p>
<p>This alone should have disqualified him from any leadership position. But it did not matter to his allies, who ensured he became the president of the ANC <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2007-12-18-zuma-is-new-anc-president/">in 2007</a>, and that of the country <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/jacob-zuma-presidency-2009-2017-march">in 2009</a>. He was, to the alliance, an <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/232871908_Understanding_the_'Zuma_Tsunami'">unstoppable tsunami</a>.</p>
<p>The ANC bashed the judiciary as counter-revolutionary for unfavourable judgments against Zuma. The party claimed his prosecution was political persecution <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/27756284?seq=2">at Mbeki’s behest</a>. Then ANC Youth League leader Julius Malema declared they were prepared to <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/we-will-kill-for-zuma-404646">kill and die for Zuma</a>. </p>
<h2>Leading with impunity</h2>
<p>Zuma’s eventual ascendancy to the presidency of the country in 2009 was <a href="https://www.alterinter.org/?Working-class-politics-or-populism-the-meaning-of-Zuma-for-the-left-in-SA">hailed,</a> by the alliance left – Cosatu and the SACP, as</p>
<blockquote>
<p>a victory against the neo-liberal orthodoxy of Mbeki.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Zuma did not deliver on this expectation. Yet he continued to enjoy the support of the tripartite alliance. </p>
<p>He went on to <a href="https://www.bing.com/ck/a?!&&p=905b9cd41887a59aJmltdHM9MTcwNTg4MTYwMCZpZ3VpZD0zMGZhN2Y5OS00MWYwLTYxYjctMjZmMS02Y2ZlNDAxMDYwYmYmaW5zaWQ9NTE5NQ&ptn=3&ver=2&hsh=3&fclid=30fa7f99-41f0-61b7-26f1-6cfe401060bf&psq=betrayal+of+the+promise+report&u=a1aHR0cHM6Ly9wYXJpLm9yZy56YS93cC1jb250ZW50L3VwbG9hZHMvMjAxNy8wNS9CZXRyYXlhbC1vZi10aGUtUHJvbWlzZS0yNTA1MjAxNy5wZGY&ntb=1">subvert</a> the criminal justice system to avert prosecution for his corruption charges. </p>
<p>The judiciary <a href="https://theconversation.com/are-judges-in-south-africa-under-threat-or-do-they-complain-too-much-45459">pushed back</a> but earned the wrath of the ANC and its alliance partners.</p>
<p>They always closed ranks to shield Zuma from accountability. He survived numerous motions of no confidence in parliament for, among other things, <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2012-11-08-parties-to-file-motion-of-no-confidence-against-zuma/%22">“dangerously flawed judgment”</a> relating to his <a href="https://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/president-zuma-appoints-new-national-director-public-prosecutions-25-nov-2009">appointment of Menzi Simelani</a> as head of the National Prosecuting Authority, despite evidence that he had lied to a presidential commission of inquiry.</p>
<p>Among the notable no-confidence votes against which the ANC-dominated parliament shielded Zuma was over his use of public money to renovate his private homestead <a href="https://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2016/11.pdf">at Nkandla</a>. </p>
<p>The stage was set for Zuma to wreak havoc with impunity. The alliance left only started to move away from him when it became obvious that he had outsourced the running of the country to his friends, <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/how-gupta-brothers-from-india-landed-south-africas-ruling-party-in-its-biggest-crisis-397138">the Gupta family</a>. It was too late.</p>
<p>In 2015, he <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKCN0UO0KO/">sacked</a> the finance minister Nhlanhla Nene, only to replace him with an obscure Gupta-sanctioned appointee, with an eye on the national treasury.</p>
<p>The market tailspinned into and the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/5c0da8b2-9eb5-11e5-b45d-4812f209f861">rand plummeted</a>. Yet the ANC still defended him in parliament.</p>
<p>Towards the end of 2016, the public protector released a <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/state-capture-report-public-protector-14-october-2016">damning report</a> showing how the state had been captured at Zuma’s behest. Again, the ANC foiled attempts to remove him.</p>
<p>He only resigned on <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43066443?utm_source=Media+Review+for+February+15%2C+2018&utm_campaign=Media+Review+for+February+15%2C+2018&utm_medium=email">14 February 2018</a>. This was not so much for his misdemeanours but because he was no longer the president of the ANC.</p>
<h2>What needs to happen</h2>
<p>The ANC’s indecisiveness does it no good. Its claim that he has <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fuu_FEGQc0A">“walked away”</a> from the party and is therefore no longer a member is wishful thinking. He has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/zuma-says-he-will-not-vote-anc-south-africas-election-2023-12-16/">made it clear</a> he will remain an ANC member.</p>
<p>The only way to terminate his membership is to expel him. This should have happened much earlier, at least before the ANC’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-anc-marks-its-112th-year-with-an-eye-on-national-elections-but-its-record-is-patchy-and-future-uncertain-221125">112th anniversary festivities </a> earlier this month. They could have used the platform to explain the decision to cleanse the party of those who debase it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221900/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mashupye Herbert Maserumule received funding from National Research Foundation(NRF). He is affiliated with the South African Association of Public Administration and Management(SAAPAM).</span></em></p>The ANC tied itself in knots defending Zuma’s destructive bad behaviour in the past. Acting against him now would require it to own up to its sins.Mashupye Herbert Maserumule, Professor of Public Affairs, Tshwane University of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2168482023-11-01T16:24:28Z2023-11-01T16:24:28ZSouth Africa’s medium-term budget reflects difficult and contested decisions<p>The <a href="https://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/mtbps/2023/">medium-term budget policy statement</a> presented by South Africa’s finance minister, Enoch Godongwana, to parliament on 1 November 2023 is intended to provide a preview of government’s public finance plans over the next three years. It does not actually commit government to anything, either in law or in practice. Nevertheless, it is a crucial document because it presents what the National Treasury intends to be the broad, financial foundation for the functioning of national, provincial and local governments in the near future.</p>
<p>This year’s statement is particularly important for two reasons. The first is that South Africa’s fiscal situation is arguably at its worst in the post-apartheid era. The second is that any decisions taken, especially about the 2024/25 fiscal year, could affect how South Africans view the current government when voting in next year’s elections.</p>
<p>The crucial background to this year’s statement is that South Africa’s national debt levels relative to the size of the economy have increased substantially since 2008. The statement emphasises that the increase was approximately 47 percentage points from 2008. The three main reasons are the <a href="https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/great-recession-and-its-aftermath">global financial crisis</a> that started in 2007, continued slow economic growth partly as a result of <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/">state capture</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-power-outages-some-improvement-but-a-long-way-to-go-before-the-grid-is-stable-215840">power outages</a>, and the COVID-19 pandemic. </p>
<p>Additional reasons include lower tax collection, other major expenditure increases such as the “free higher education” policy <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/zuma-announces-free-higher-education-for-poor-and-working-class-students-20171216">announced</a> unexpectedly at the end of 2017, and <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-02-23/a-14-billion-bailout-for-eskom-leaves-south-african-power-crisis-unresolved">large transfers</a> to the state-owned power utility Eskom in response to its worsening financial position.</p>
<p>As things stand, national debt is expected to reach almost 75% of GDP by next year. Before the COVID-19 pandemic such levels would have been considered unsustainable by many economists and international financial institutions. The sustainability of national debt – how much a country can borrow without leading to a crisis later – drives a lot of thinking about country’s public finances. </p>
<p>But it’s not a science. What was almost unthinkable about debt levels before the COVID-19 pandemic has now become almost normal. Many countries have experienced large increases in their overall debt levels and the resultant debt service costs.</p>
<p>Some so-called radical economists <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/columnists/2020-05-11-duma-gqubule-sa-ticks-all-the-boxes-to-be-guided-by-modern-monetary-theory/">claim</a> that there are few limits on government expenditure. But this is, unfortunately, a luxury that <a href="https://academic.oup.com/cje/article-abstract/47/3/555/7127028">may only be true</a> for much wealthier countries with greater economic and political power – like the US. </p>
<p>On the other side of the spectrum, recent scaremongering <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/finance/727902/south-africa-risks-running-out-of-money-by-march-2/">statements that the country could “run out of cash”</a> are absurd and misleading. </p>
<p>The question for South Africa is what to do about high and growing levels of debt. A sustainable debt path isn’t just about reducing debt to a particular level. The process of how it’s done is also crucial. Cutting spending in a way that creates social harm and reduces economic growth is self-defeating. Raising taxes too much can also be counter-productive. But letting debt rise indefinitely will mean borrowing costs become impossible to meet without dramatic spending or taxation measures.</p>
<p>The result inevitably involves difficult trade-offs. But because these are contested, within government and by different interest groups, the consequences and details are often concealed or given a misleading spin. </p>
<h2>The devil in the detail</h2>
<p>A few examples from this year’s statement illustrate this – and the divisions within government itself.</p>
<p>The first is the issue of government spending on salaries.</p>
<p>In the past the National Treasury and some economists have sought to suggest that this kind of spending is inherently “unproductive”. In reality, even from a narrow economic perspective, that is incorrect. Such spending funds the work of teachers who are responsible for educating future generations, nurses whose job includes keeping people in the labour market healthy and alive, and police officers whose presence should contribute to keeping crime in check.</p>
<p>For many years there has been an arm-wrestling match between the treasury and other parts of government responsible for determining public sector wage agreements. The way this has been “resolved” is by the treasury budgeting for the wage increases it believes are appropriate, the other parts of government agreeing to higher wage agreements, and the treasury then forcing departments to cut the total number of employees in order to keep total wage costs down.</p>
<p>Although the treasury accompanies its stance by <a href="https://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/mtbps/2023/2023%20MTBPS%20presentation%20-%20Staying%20the%20course%20for%20growth%20and%20sound%20public%20finances.pdf">promising</a> that “essential” or “labour intensive” departments and sectors will be protected, it has never provided any detailed information to actually show that is happening. The consequence is a form of “austerity by stealth” in relation to staff available to provide public services.</p>
<p>The much better solution would have been for a social compact on wage increases and public sector employment. That would require compromise from the treasury but also public sector trade unions. Unable to reach that kind of mature solution, the arm-wrestling continues every year with the general public being the losers. </p>
<p>This year the treasury budgeted for an increase of less than 2% but the <a href="https://www.dpsa.gov.za/thepublicservant/2023/04/01/public-sector-unions-accept-2023-24-wage-offer/">actual outcome</a> was 7.5%. Some of this will be covered by funds taken from other important expenditure items, while the rest will come from cutting public sector posts.</p>
<p>A seemingly positive development is that the statement now makes provision for a continuation of the <a href="https://www.gov.za/services/social-benefits/social-relief-distress">Social Relief of Distress Grant</a> that was introduced during COVID-19. This is one of the only sources of support to millions of South Africans who are unable to find employment. </p>
<p>The 2023 budget made no provision for the continuation of the grant: the treasury planned to end it in March 2024, immediately before the 2024 elections. Earlier this year I <a href="https://pmg.org.za/files/230301_Dr_Muller_Submission.pdf">argued to Parliament</a> that such a decision would be inequitable and could also unduly influence electoral outcomes. </p>
<p>While it seems sense has prevailed with treasury now planning more than R50 billion ($2.65bn) for such spending over the next two years, it remains to be seen what is proposed in the 2024 budget. </p>
<p>Another example relates to crucial public employment programmes. In a recent speech the president <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/speeches/address-president-cyril-ramaphosa-nation-economic-progress">cited</a> his Presidential Employment Initiative as a major success – although without providing any detailed evidence. The treasury proposes to extend this to 2024/25, which seems like a good thing. But it plans to do so by cannibalising funds for other public employment schemes like the Expanded Public Works Programme and Community Works Programme: arguably a case of “robbing Peter to pay Paul”. And it seems intent on continuing the costly and <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-employment-tax-incentive-is-not-a-success-story-168124">ineffective Employment Tax Incentive</a>. </p>
<p>Lastly, there is the thorny issue of taxes. The major cause of an increase in national debt levels this year is a shortfall in taxation revenue of almost R60 billion ($3.2bn). Only if you read the detail in the medium term budget statement does it turn out that a large part of this is due to private sector investment in decentralised renewable energy generation capacity. This isn’t fully explained, but is likely to be due to value added tax refunds linked to tax incentives introduced in the 2023 budget. In other words: it is the result of a policy proposed by the treasury itself.</p>
<h2>Watch this space</h2>
<p>While the minister and the treasury have provided an indication of current thinking, the crucial details and commitments of government’s fiscal plans will only be clear when the budget itself is tabled next year. And those will only be cemented <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-the-nitty-gritty-of-south-africas-annual-budget-72901">when approved by Parliament</a>. </p>
<p>Some political parties have suggested that the 2024 election may be the most important one since 1994: the same is arguably true of the 2024 budget.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216848/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Seán Mfundza Muller receives funding from the Council on Higher Education for a project on the impact of the free higher education policy. He previously worked for the Parliamentary Budget Office and has also received project funding from the Financial and Fiscal Commission.</span></em></p>South Africa’s fiscal situation is arguably at its worst in the post-apartheid era but the proposed solutions are contentious.Seán Mfundza Muller, Senior Research Fellow, Johannesburg Institute for Advanced Study, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2146482023-09-29T15:56:49Z2023-09-29T15:56:49ZAziz Pahad: the unassuming South African diplomat who skilfully mediated crises in Africa, and beyond<p><a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/funeral-category-2-honour-mr-aziz-pahad-29-sep-2023-0000">Aziz Goolam Pahad</a>, who has died at the age of 82, was a South African anti-apartheid activist, politician and deputy minister of foreign affairs in the post-1994 government. </p>
<p>Together with a small group of foreign policy analysts, I worked with Aziz over the span of 30 years, shaping the post-apartheid South African government’s approach to international relations and its foreign policy. We spent countless hours debating foreign affairs and the numerous crises and challenges government had to face as a relative “newcomer” in continental African and global affairs. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/aziz-goolam-pahad#:%7E:text=Aziz%20Pahad%20was%20born%20on,University%20of%20the%20Witwatersrand%2C%20Johannesburg.">Aziz</a> was generous with giving his time to formulate positions that would allow for the unlocking of a crisis. He remained open to intellectual challenges throughout his career. He was a keen participant in <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2015.1090912">academic research projects</a> dealing with <a href="https://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/items/eb0f44d3-a550-4740-8db1-6463330b0f82">foreign policy</a>.</p>
<p>He made a monumental contribution to the struggle against apartheid and colonial oppression in South Africa, the continent and the Middle East. And he contributed significantly to the development and execution of a progressive African-centred foreign policy doctrine. Sadly, towards the end of his career as a diplomat he witnessed the <a href="https://www.pulp.up.ac.za/images/pulp/books/edited_collections/foreign_policy/SA%20Foreign%20Policy%20Book%20Chapter%201.pdf">slow decline</a> of South Africa’s <a href="https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/suedafrika/18180.pdf">stature and influence</a> in global affairs. </p>
<h2>The Mandela and Mbeki years</h2>
<p>Under presidents <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/nelson-mandela-presidency-1994-1999">Nelson Mandela</a> (1994-1999) and <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/profiles/former-president-thabo-mvuyelwa-mbeki">Thabo Mbeki</a> (1999-2008), South African diplomats who’d sharpened their skills during many years of exile became sought-after as facilitators and mediators. Under their guidance Africa converted the Organisation of African Unity into the African Union, and reset relations with the international community via the New Partnership for Africa’s Development. </p>
<p>South African diplomats were articulate and visible in the corridors of the United Nations and in gatherings such as the Group of 7, Group of 20 and the Non-Aligned Movement. They were able to advance Africa’s quest for peace and development. In Africa, political and security crises, particularly in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan and Burundi, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3518768">were given attention</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-and-russia-president-cyril-ramaphosas-foreign-policy-explained-198430">South Africa and Russia: President Cyril Ramaphosa's foreign policy explained</a>
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<p>However this “golden era” of South Africa’s foreign policy, as fellow scholar Chris Landsberg calls it, was unable to withstand the corroding effects of foreign meddling in African affairs. Neither could it withstand the <a href="https://pari.org.za/betrayal-promise-report/">grand corruption</a> which reached its apogee in South Africa under former president <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/profiles/president-jacob-zuma-0">Jacob Zuma</a> (May 2009 - February 2018). </p>
<h2>Preparatory years</h2>
<p>Aziz was born <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/aziz-goolam-pahad">on 25 December 1940</a> in the former Transvaal, the current North West province in South Africa. His parents were <a href="https://theconversation.com/essop-pahad-a-diligent-communist-driven-by-an-optimistic-vision-of-a-non-racial-south-africa-210413">Amina and Goolam Pahad</a>, activists in the Transvaal Indian Congress, a political organisation established in the early 1900s by Mahatma Gandhi and others. The congress became involved in the broader anti-apartheid struggle in later years. His elder brother, Essop, also became an activist. Essop passed away <a href="https://theconversation.com/essop-pahad-a-diligent-communist-driven-by-an-optimistic-vision-of-a-non-racial-south-africa-210413">in July</a>.</p>
<p>In 1963, Aziz completed a degree in sociology and Afrikaans at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg. As an activist, he was served with a <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/aziz-goolam-pahad">banning order</a> and arrested on several occasions. After the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/rivonia-trial-1963-1964">Rivonia Trial</a> from 1963 to 1964, in which ten leaders of the African National Congress (ANC) were tried for sabotage designed to overthrow the apartheid system of racial oppression, he and Essop left South Africa and went into exile.</p>
<p>Aziz spent some time in Angola and Zimbabwe but lived mostly in London. He completed a master’s degree in politics and international relations <a href="https://www.sussex.ac.uk/broadcast/read/61351">at the University of Sussex</a>. He worked full-time for the exiled ANC and supported the development of the <a href="https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/anti-apartheid-struggle-south-africa-1912-1992/">Anti-Apartheid Movement</a>.</p>
<p>Even before his return to South Africa in 1990, he contributed to the transition from apartheid to democracy, a role well described in his book <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books/about/Insurgent_Diplomat_Civil_Talks_or_Civil.html?id=mbR9BAAAQBAJ&redir_esc=y">Insurgent Diplomat: Civil Talks or Civil War?</a>. </p>
<p>Aziz worked closely with Thabo Mbeki, at the time head of the exiled ANC’s international relations department, and a small team of academics in formulating the ANC’s position on foreign policy. The <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/anc_foreign_policy_perspective_in_a_democratic_south_africa.pdf">paper</a> formed part of preparations by the ANC and its <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/index.php/site/q/03lv02424/04lv02730/05lv03161.htm">alliance partners</a>, the <a href="https://www.sacp.org.za/">South African Communist Party</a> and the <a href="http://www.cosatu.org.za/">Congress of South African Trade Unions</a>, for governing the country. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-foreign-policy-new-paper-sets-the-scene-but-falls-short-on-specifics-188253">South Africa's foreign policy: new paper sets the scene, but falls short on specifics</a>
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<p>The foreign policy paper provided a broad roadmap for diplomats post-apartheid. It eventually shaped government’s more formal foreign policy of 2011, entitled Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu. In the mid-1990s, Aziz was instrumental in the establishment, with support from the German government, of an ANC-aligned think-tank called the <a href="http://www.globaldialoguefoundation.org/">Foundation of Global Dialogue</a>, run by foreign policy expert and academic <a href="https://www.africanbookscollective.com/authors-editors/garth-le-pere">Garth le Pere</a> and myself. It lives on as the <a href="https://igd.org.za/">Institute of Global Dialogue</a>, based at the University of South Africa.</p>
<h2>Role in government</h2>
<p>Following the victory of the ANC in South Africa’s first democratic election in 1994, Aziz was elected to parliament. From there, he was appointed by President Mandela as deputy minister of foreign affairs. He was re-elected to parliament in 1999 and 2004, and kept his position as <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/contact-directory/aziz-goolam-hoosein-pahad-mr-0">deputy minister of foreign affairs </a> throughout the Mandela and Mbeki presidencies. </p>
<p>Holding the post for 14 years meant that he was able to create and nurture a wide network of political, academic and diplomatic connections. This enabled him to play an unassuming but key mediating and facilitation role dealing with major crises on the continent and beyond.</p>
<p>But Aziz also showed his activist roots when he <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/war-can-be-averted-says-pahad-101327">spoke out against</a> the American-led <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Iraq-War">invasion of Iraq in 2003</a> and the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/everyone-says-the-libya-intervention-was-a-failure-theyre-wrong/">Nato-led invasion</a> of Libya and assassination of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. He supported the <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/press-statements/president-mourns-passing-former-deputy-minister-foreign-affairs-aziz-pahad">Palestinian struggle</a> for recognition over many decades.</p>
<p>Aziz resigned from government and parliament in 2008, shortly after Mbeki was removed as president of the ANC <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2007-12-18-zuma-is-new-anc-president/">in 2007</a>.</p>
<h2>The ‘diplomat-scholar’</h2>
<p>In retirement, Aziz remained active as a “diplomat-scholar”. He played a prominent role, with his brother Essop, in a small but influential think-tank, the <a href="https://www.facebook.com/ConcernedAfricansForum/">Concerned Africans Forum</a>. In 2015 he headed the short-lived South African Council on International Relations.</p>
<p>The council was established by the government as a body of experts and a sounding board for senior decision-makers. However, its semi-autonomous identity brought it into conflict with the ruling party’s foreign affairs structures. Politicians allowed it to wither away. </p>
<p>In 2018 the administration of President Cyril Ramaphosa asked Aziz to lead a commission of experts <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-04-17-pahad-panel-missteps-noted-but-no-overhaul-of-sa-foreign-policy-on-the-cards/">to review South Africa’s international relations</a>. In a sad repeat of the council’s demise, the commission was never given a proper hearing and its value remains untapped.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-its-time-south-africas-foreign-policy-was-driven-by-ideas-again-50407">Why it's time South Africa's foreign policy was driven by ideas (again)</a>
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<p>This is perhaps illustrative of the reality of policy-making in dynamic settings such as South Africa’s foreign affairs. The essence of Aziz’s contribution to a progressive African-oriented worldview was ultimately ignored by the foreign policy mandarins. </p>
<p>The country will miss having a “diplomat-scholar” of his calibre to turn to for sage advice.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214648/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anthoni van Nieuwkerk is affiliated with Umlambo Foundation.</span></em></p>South Africa will miss having a “diplomat-scholar” of his calibre to turn to for sage advice.Anthoni van Nieuwkerk, Professor of International and Diplomacy Studies, Thabo Mbeki African School of Public and International Affairs, University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2121182023-09-18T14:25:31Z2023-09-18T14:25:31ZCorruption in South Africa: would paying whistleblowers help?<p>Whistleblowing is an important tool in fighting corruption. In South Africa, the <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202204/state-capture-commission-report-part-iv-vol-iv.pdf">commission of inquiry into state capture</a> recommended that the government should provide financial rewards for whistleblowers who report corruption. </p>
<p>The issue was in the headlines again following the <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/just-in-babita-deokaran-six-accused-plead-guilty-to-murder-of-whistleblower-20230822">sentencing of six men</a> for the 2021 murder of prominent whistleblower Babita Deokaran. </p>
<p>The Department of Justice and Constitutional Development invited public comments on a <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/invitations/20230629-Whistleblower-Protection-Regime.pdf">discussion paper</a> on proposed reforms for whistleblower protection. It proposes that whistleblowers should be given legal assistance and that a fund be created to support those who suffer severe financial hardship for reporting corruption. This fund will be financed by a levy on all employees’ salaries, similar to the <a href="https://www.sars.gov.za/types-of-tax/unemployment-insurance-fund/#:%7E:text=How%20much%20do%20you%20need,employer">Unemployment Insurance Fund levy</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/whistleblowers-are-key-to-fighting-corruption-in-south-africa-it-shouldnt-be-at-their-peril-168134">Whistleblowers are key to fighting corruption in South Africa. It shouldn't be at their peril</a>
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<p>I am a <a href="https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3317-9057">legal scholar</a> with a research interest in public sector corruption and municipal governance. I presented papers at international conferences in <a href="https://urbanlaw.wixsite.com/iculc2023/schedule-1">May</a> and <a href="http://jurisdiversitas.blogspot.com/p/blog-page.html">June</a> 2023 on whistleblower protection and money incentives.</p>
<p>In my view, whistleblowers should be entitled to financial support – which may or may not include rewards as well. But rewarding whistleblowers has potential costs as well as benefits. It should not be seen as the silver bullet that will stop corruption. Lawmakers need to be aware of possible weaknesses of money reward systems, so they can build in safeguards when developing legislation.</p>
<h2>Rewarding whistleblowers</h2>
<p>Three ways to support whistleblowers are financial support, compensation and money rewards. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/16549716.2022.2140494">Financial support</a> means covering the reasonable expenses a person incurs when reporting corruption. They can be legal expenses, or expenses for accommodation and travel to court proceedings.</p>
<p>Compensation is meant to make up for the losses they suffer from retaliatory actions such as unfair dismissals or defamation. </p>
<p>The third option is more controversial. Money rewards or incentives are payments made on top of compensation and financial support. The idea is to reward whistleblowers financially for being good citizens.</p>
<p>Globally, only <a href="https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/assets/uploads/helpdesk/Whistleblower-Reward-Programmes-2018.pdf">about 22 countries</a> use money incentives for whistleblowing. One possible reason there are so few could be a lack of clear evidence as to whether reward systems contribute much to fighting corruption.</p>
<p>Money rewards <a href="https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/assets/uploads/helpdesk/Whistleblower-Reward-Programmes-2018.pdf">are commonly</a> used:</p>
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<li><p>to “buy” useful information from the whistleblower (this is done in Kenya, Lithuania, Malaysia, and Pakistan)</p></li>
<li><p>when the information given leads to a successful penalty or recovery of funds (Canada, Ghana, Hungary, Republic of Korea, Montenegro, Nigeria, Slovakia, the UK and the US)</p></li>
<li><p>when the information is instrumental to institute criminal proceedings (Ghana, Slovakia and Ukraine)</p></li>
<li><p>when whistleblowers are able to recover funds through legal action on behalf of the state (the US). </p></li>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-corporate-whistleblowers-dont-get-enough-protection-what-needs-to-change-201006">South Africa's corporate whistleblowers don't get enough protection: what needs to change</a>
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<p>In South Africa, individuals can <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/1977-051.pdf#page=7">institute private prosecutions</a>, but are entitled to recover only their expenses involved in the prosecution if they are successful. They don’t receive a reward.</p>
<p>The US and Ghana use more than one model. This may be to provide for some flexibility depending on the type of offence concerned, the information provided and the overall interests of justice.</p>
<p>The South African government could also offer non-monetary incentives for whistleblowers. These might include national awards such as the <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/national-orders/order-baobab-0#:%7E:text=The%20Order%20of%20the%20Baobab%20is%20awarded%20to%20South%20African,is%20awarded%20for%20exceptional%20service">Order of the Baobab</a> or the <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/national-orders/order-luthuli-0">Order of Luthuli</a> for service to democracy. </p>
<p>The City of Cape Town recently <a href="https://www.capetown.gov.za/Media-and-news/Cape%20Town%20announces%20Civic%20Honours%20recipients">announced</a> that it would award the Mayor’s Medal to Athol Williams, a state capture whistleblower, for his dedication and sacrifice to South Africa. </p>
<h2>The case for financial rewards</h2>
<p>There are a number of benefits to rewards.</p>
<p>The first is that money incentives lead to an <a href="https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/assets/uploads/helpdesk/Whistleblower-Reward-Programmes-2018.pdf">increase in the number of whistleblowing reports</a>. However, <a href="https://www.academia.edu/download/58344623/Whistleblower-Reward-and-Systems-Implementation-Effects-on-Whistleblowing-in-Organisations.pdf">some studies</a> emphasise that there’s no guarantee the number of successful prosecutions will increase too.</p>
<p>Secondly, whistleblower reports can save state resources which would otherwise be spent on investigations. Criminal investigations can be fast tracked if people come forward with evidence to support their allegations. </p>
<p>Thirdly, money incentives can increase public awareness of corruption and whistleblowing, if there’s media coverage. This could counteract the stigma that whistleblowers are snitches.</p>
<p>Lastly, money rewards can help disrupt the activities of organised crime networks. Governments can fuel distrust among accomplices by offering rewards to the first self-reporting offender. In South Korea, for example, money incentives were useful in <a href="https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/assets/uploads/helpdesk/Whistleblower-Reward-Programmes-2018.pdf#page=4">weakening cartels</a> that monopolised the sugar market in the early 2000s.</p>
<h2>The dangers</h2>
<p>One danger is that money rewards could lead to an increase in unreliable reports. That would increase the workload of the government and use state resources fruitlessly. A possible counter measure could be to introduce stiff penalties for frivolous and malicious reports.</p>
<p>In some countries, such as Ghana, money rewards are only given to people who report corruption to specified government institutions. Usually, though, whistleblowers are expected to first report within their institutions. The downside is that they could wait until the corrupt activities are serious enough to warrant reporting externally. Rewards could thus undermine internal reporting channels. </p>
<p>Where people have an opportunity to get a substantial monetary reward, a “lottery mindset” might set in. People might report simply to get their hands on a reward. That could create distrust in the work environment and the functionality of the institution might suffer.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/corruption-in-south-africa-whistleblower-protection-law-is-being-reformed-but-it-may-not-go-far-enough-209916">Corruption in South Africa: whistleblower protection law is being reformed - but it may not go far enough</a>
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<p>Lastly, money rewards could <a href="https://www.academia.edu/download/58344623/Whistleblower-Reward-and-Systems-Implementation-Effects-on-Whistleblowing-in-Organisations.pdf">commoditise whistleblowing</a>. People might no longer blow the whistle out of public service. This might encourage certain criminal activities such as cyber hacking and breaches of privacy to get information that could be traded for these rewards. </p>
<h2>What needs to happen</h2>
<p>First of all, South African lawmakers should review current laws. Some existing provisions could be slightly adapted to provide for rewards. For example, the <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/national-environmental-management-act">National Environmental Management Act</a> already provides for whistleblowers to receive a reward where their information is instrumental to the imposition of a fine. The police also regularly provide <a href="https://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/n-west-police-offer-reward-information-police-murder">financial rewards</a> to informants.</p>
<p>Lawmakers should carefully weigh up the pros and cons of whistleblower rewards in the fight against corruption. But whistleblowers should get both support and compensation. No one should be penalised for being a good citizen. Whistleblower rewards can save state resources, but care should be taken to ensure they don’t create new opportunities for malfeasance.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212118/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Johandri Wright receives funding from the National Research Foundation and the University of the Western Cape. </span></em></p>Whistleblowers should be entitled to financial support. But that has potential costs as well as benefits.Johandri Wright, Postdoctoral Fellow, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2096382023-07-26T14:55:22Z2023-07-26T14:55:22ZEskom and South Africa’s energy crisis: De Ruyter book strikes a chord but falls flat on economic fixes<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539018/original/file-20230724-25-jlzet7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The former chief executive of South Africa’s power utility, Eskom, has written a scathing critique of the ruling party’s practices that have seriously damaged the country’s economy. </p>
<p>Andre de Ruyter’s book <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Truth-Power-Three-Years-Inside-ebook/dp/B0C577RTRQ">Truth to Power</a> is not the first exposé of the country’s <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/site/files/announcements/682/OCR_version_-_State_Capture_Commission_Report_Part_IV_Vol_III_-_Eskom.pdf">political and economic woes</a> under the African National Congress. But it strikes a sensitive chord because of the impact of recurring power cuts on the economy and <a href="https://theconversation.com/power-cuts-in-south-africa-are-playing-havoc-with-the-countrys-water-system-197952">daily life</a>, a crisis De Ruyter was hired to deal with.</p>
<p>Beyond his description of Eskom’s corruption and ineptitude is a subtler message that is equally disturbing. It’s De Ruyter’s prescription to end the state’s involvement in the economy, which he sees as a major obstacle to economic growth. In its place, he advocates a socially unhinged liberalisation of the economy (p231) in which the market is left to its devices. He observes that: </p>
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<p>Wherever governments have allocated resources, it has been an abysmal failure. </p>
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<p>What De Ruyter fails to grasp, though, is that what he advocates has been a core part of the ANC’s policies for over 25 years. </p>
<p>My view, based on 30 years of <a href="https://www.amazon.com/African-Miracle-Leadership-Colonial-Development/dp/0325000689#:%7E:text=Book%20details&text=The%20book%20examines%20the%20relationship,more%20resources%20and%20talent%20failed.">research</a>, writing and teaching the political economy of Africa, is that this would roll back whatever gains have been realised so far in redressing the segregated economy of colonial and apartheid eras. His version of neo-liberalism or unfettered market ideology and policy that emphasises the value of open markets with minimalist state regulations would worsen people’s living conditions. </p>
<p>My current research focuses on the relationship between democracy and development. States can and sometimes do use public policy to – in the <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/asias-next-giant-9780195076035?cc=us&lang=en&">words</a> of the late American political economist and scholar Alice H. Amsden – “govern the market”. Botswana’s post-colonial experience, discussed in <a href="https://experts.umn.edu/en/publications/an-african-miracle-state-and-class-leadership-and-colonial-legacy">my 1999 book</a>, is most relevant to South Africa. At independence in 1966, Botswana had <a href="https://experts.umn.edu/en/publications/an-african-miracle-state-and-class-leadership-and-colonial-legacy">little infrastructure and few opportunities</a>. But thanks to its first two presidents, Botswana has achieved a middle income country status as it has grown significantly for the past 50 years.</p>
<p>If the government of South Africa made good use of the state in governing and disciplining the market, it is highly likely that unemployment in the country would not be <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1129481/unemployment-rate-by-population-group-in-south-africa/">what it is today</a>. Similarly, if the government of independent Botswana had followed De Ruyter’s prescription, the country would likely have become another basket case. </p>
<p>What South Africa needs is not neo-liberalism, but a new social contract between government, labour and business to create productive jobs and redress social injustices. Such a contract would include concrete milestones on targeted investments in productive sectors. It would demand that labour militancy and disruption meanwhile be kept at the minimum. </p>
<h2>De Ruyter’s key claims</h2>
<p>De Ruyter identifies four of the major causes of the country’s energy crisis. </p>
<p>First is the <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-ruling-party-has-favoured-loyalty-over-competence-now-cadre-deployment-has-come-back-to-bite-it-199208">deployment</a> of ANC party activists, or cadres, in state-owned enterprises. Many were not only ill-equipped for their jobs but sought to profit from their assignments through irregularities. This created criminal networks that destroyed some national enterprises.</p>
<p>Second is a coalition of actors he calls the “coal mafia” in control of coal supply to Eskom. They exported high quality coal and supplied low grade coal to Eskom. This led to regular collapses of Eskom’s power stations.</p>
<p>Third, he accuses the Minster of Minerals and Energy, Gwede Mantashe, a former leader of the National Union of Mineworkers, of blocking the transition to green energy.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/corruption-in-south-africa-former-ceos-explosive-book-exposes-how-state-power-utility-was-destroyed-206101">Corruption in South Africa: former CEO's explosive book exposes how state power utility was destroyed</a>
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<p>Fourth, De Ruyter claims the ANC government failed to retain experienced white engineers. The young white and black engineering graduates may be well trained but lack hands-on experience. Eskom was therefore left with a shortage of experienced engineers at a time when it needed them the most.</p>
<p>What is clear from both De Ruyter’s account and the findings of the Zondo Commission into <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/550966842/Judicial-Commission-of-Inquiry-Into-State-Capture-Report-Part-1#">state capture</a> is that the ANC leadership, particularly in the last two decades, sanctioned the abuse of public authority. In fact, some of the leaders flouted the ethical principles of the ANC itself by joining the ultra wealthy as inequality in the country deepened. </p>
<h2>Neo-liberalism will not deliver</h2>
<p>De Ruyter’s prescribed remedies amount to the repackaging of economic apartheid. The beneficiaries of racist policies and the ANC’s neo-liberalism would be put on steroids. His remedies are based on the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4005615">policies</a> the World Bank imposed on the rest of Africa in 1981, policies that devastated the continent. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539517/original/file-20230726-27-n0i7kq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539517/original/file-20230726-27-n0i7kq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=920&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539517/original/file-20230726-27-n0i7kq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=920&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539517/original/file-20230726-27-n0i7kq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=920&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539517/original/file-20230726-27-n0i7kq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1156&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539517/original/file-20230726-27-n0i7kq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1156&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539517/original/file-20230726-27-n0i7kq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1156&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p>He also blindly condemns the role of government in development (p112) and advocates the privatisation of the energy sector, knowing well that the white business establishment would be the biggest beneficiary of such reforms. </p>
<p>De Ruyter’s dismissal of the role of an activist state in the economy – one that governs the market– ignores the positive economic role of governments in such countries as <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/asias-next-giant-9780195076035?cc=us&lang=en&">South Korea</a>, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv346sp7">Taiwan</a> and <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Japan-Governs-Rise-Developmental-State/dp/0393314502">Japan</a>.</p>
<p>Then there is his view about the <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-relief-grant-how-it-can-be-used-to-help-young-people-into-jobs-196512">basic income grant</a> for the poor, a policy which he says will entrench dependency on the state even further (p115). </p>
<p>He forgets that past segregationist policies gave nearly 87% of the land to white South Africans and heavily subsidised their education. They also subjected black workers to white exploitation, laying the foundations of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-needs-a-fresh-approach-to-its-stubbornly-high-levels-of-inequality-87215">income and wealth inequality</a> that persists today between whites and blacks. </p>
<h2>What went wrong with the ANC government?</h2>
<p>Regardless of the weaknesses in De Ruyter’s contentions, the South African government’s record during the past two decades has been dreadful. One of the most precious assets the ANC brought into power in 1994 was the trust of the majority of citizens. </p>
<p>To preserve and reinforce this vital asset required a three-pronged strategy.</p>
<p>First, the state should have been more productively involved in the economy and efforts to eliminate corruption in order to improve social services for the poor majority. </p>
<p>The second task was to revitalise the economy by protecting and reforming old productive industries and investing in new enterprises. </p>
<p>Third, the ANC and its appointees should have been models of integrity in public service.</p>
<p>But successive ANC administrations, particularly since 2004, betrayed the trust of the majority in three ways. </p>
<p>First, the aspiring black elite’s rush to mimic the lifestyle of the former “master” clearly signalled that the liberation mindset essential for reconstruction and development was no longer fashionable. </p>
<p>Second, the government’s unrealistic belief that it could navigate the dominant neo-liberal global economic policies that laid to waste old industries such as textiles, thus preempting the possibility of a developmental state. </p>
<p>Third, the moral decline of the ANC leadership most cruelly exposed by the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/marikana-massacre-16-august-2012">Marikana massacre</a> and <a href="https://witspress.co.za/page/detail/State-Capture-in-South-Africa/?k=9781776148318">state capture</a> underscored the party’s impotence.</p>
<h2>Seeing beyond the nightmare</h2>
<p>It is widely acknowledged that neo-liberal policies and corruption are companions in the contemporary developing world. Thus, what South Africa needs is not an extreme version of neo-liberalism, but a new social pact that creates productive jobs and achieves transformative social justice. Only then can South Africa hope for an African renaissance.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209638/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abdi Ismail Samatar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>South Africa needs a new social contract whose core aim is the creation of dynamic economy.Abdi Ismail Samatar, Extraordinary Professor, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2104132023-07-26T14:31:46Z2023-07-26T14:31:46ZEssop Pahad: a diligent communist driven by an optimistic vision of a non-racial South Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539332/original/file-20230725-17-w2ef8i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Essop Pahad was a confidant of former president Thabo Mbeki.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Bongani Mnguni/Foto24/Gallo Images/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The death of South African freedom struggle stalwart <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/contact-directory/essop-goolam-pahad-mr">Essop Pahad</a> (84) <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2023-07-06-essop-pahad-close-confidant-of-thabo-mbeki-dies-aged-84/">on 6 July 2023</a> prompted <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/opinions/analysis/tribute-chirpy-and-thoughtful-essop-pahads-legacy-will-forever-be-remembered-in-sas-history-20230706">tributes</a> from his former comrades. There were also less respectful obituaries referring to him as Thabo Mbeki’s “<a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/obituaries/obituary-essop-pahad-mbekis-consigliere-would-fight-you-intellectually-too-20230707">consiglieri</a>”, because of his role as the former president’s “right-hand man”.</p>
<p>Any examination of Pahad’s full political record will take you back to the heroic phases of South Africa’s liberation history, when prospects for a democratic South African government seemed very remote. As a teenager in the 1950s he was busy in the Transvaal Indian Youth Congress. This was the equivalent of the youth league of the liberation movement, the African National Congress (ANC), for Indian South Africans. In those days, reflecting apartheid’s distinctions, even radical resistance to it was racially differentiated.</p>
<p>He was one of a small group of activists who, in the 1950s and early 1960s, made a decisive contribution in pulling the <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/index.php/site/q/03lv03445/04lv03446/05lv03465.htm">Congress Alliance</a> – a front of organisations allied to the ANC – leftwards, and encouraging an optimistic vision of a future non-racial South Africa.</p>
<p>In my own <a href="https://jacana.co.za/product/red-road-to-freedom/">research</a> on the South African Communist Party’s history, groups like the Transvaal Indian Youth Congress were game-changers. They were influential despite their small organised followings. Understanding Pahad’s political ascent helps to illuminate the history of the South African left and the wider liberation movement in which it immersed itself. He belonged to a political network constituted as much by friendships as shared ideas.</p>
<p>At the congress’s annual general meeting in 1958 he proposed a resolution on sport. Sadly, that is all the meeting’s agenda tells us. I’d like to think it was about cricket and its segregation, a key preoccupation for young Indian activists at that time, for Pahad was a lifelong cricket fan.</p>
<p>In old age he was a regular visitor to the Long Room at the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/place/wanderers-cricket-stadium-johannesburg">Wanderers Cricket Stadium</a> in Johannesburg, one reward for becoming a notable that he would enjoy. As a student at Sussex University between 1965 and 1970, he once organised a party for the visiting West Indian test side. Inheriting a family ethic of generous hospitality, he provided such a warm reception for the visitors that the following day they were <a href="http://cricmash.com/society-and-politics/mbeki-pahad-and-the-1966-west-indians">so badly hungover they lost their match</a>.</p>
<h2>The early years</h2>
<p>Pahad’s childhood was politically configured. His parents Goolam and Amina Pahad belonged to the group that directed the Indian congresses in the mid-1940s into confrontation with a government seeking to dispossess Indian landowners. Goolam was a successful businessman and he owned property in <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/destruction-sophiatown">Sophiatown</a>. Pahad employed ANC leader <a href="https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/sisulu-walter-1912-2003/">Walter Sisulu</a>, supporting his efforts to become an estate agent.</p>
<p>Through Sisulu, the Pahads became friendly with the angry young men who would become ANC leaders in 1949, often providing them with food and a place to sleep so they could avoid late <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/pass-laws-south-africa-1800-1994">night pass law</a> arrests for being in town after the curfew.</p>
<p>Even without guests, the Pahads’ apartment would have been crowded. Goolam and Amina Pahad had moved to the inner city of Johannesburg shortly after Essop’s birth in 1939 in <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/essop-goolam-pahad">Schweitzer-Reneke</a>, in today’s North West province. They wanted good schooling for their five sons.</p>
<p>Both Essop and his younger brother <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/contact-directory/aziz-goolam-hoosein-pahad-mr-0">Aziz</a> did well enough to obtain entry to the University of the Witwatersrand. This was despite or perhaps because of their participation in one of the Congress Alliance-sponsored “Cultural Clubs” that were set to protest the introduction of the inferior <a href="https://www.zinnedproject.org/news/tdih/anc-protest-bantu-education-act/">Bantu Education</a> for the black majority.</p>
<p>The clandestine Communist Party’s key theoretician <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/national-orders/recipient/michael-alan-harmel-posthumous">Michael Harmel</a> led the club that they joined. Perhaps through his agency, Pahad joined the party. The Transvaal Indian Youth Congress was led by party members and its political affiliations were very evident in its journal, New Youth. Pahad remained politically animated as a university student, joining the Transvaal Indian Youth Congress’ executive.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-communists-have-shaped-south-africas-history-over-100-years-165556">How communists have shaped South Africa's history over 100 years</a>
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<p>In mid-1962 <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/safricas-once-exiled-anti-apartheid-veteran-essop-pahad-dies-84-2023-07-06/">he was arrested</a> for trying to organise a strike, a contribution to the ANC’s continuing effort to secure a national constitutional convention. By this time he had formed a friendship with <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/contact-directory/thabo-mvuyelwa-mbeki-mr-0">Thabo Mbeki</a>, whom he got to know after they met at the Rand Youth Club, a key assembly point for activists, sponsored by Sisulu. Mbeki was then staying in Johannesburg, <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/thabo-mbeki-1942-timeline">completing his A-levels through correspondence</a> after expulsion from Lovedale College for leading a class boycott.</p>
<h2>Exile years</h2>
<p>Pahad’s friendship with Mbeki deepened when he joined him in Britain after his departure from South Africa in 1964, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/safricas-once-exiled-anti-apartheid-veteran-essop-pahad-dies-84-2023-07-06/">prompted by a banning order</a>. Mbeki was enrolled at Sussex University and he persuaded Pahad to register. Pahad would complete <a href="https://www.sussex.ac.uk/broadcast/read/61351">an MA and a doctorate at Sussex </a> between 1965 and 1971, producing a workmanlike dissertation about the South African Indian Congresses.</p>
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<span class="caption">Essop Pahad addresses a protest meeting in Amsterdam in 1985.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sepia Times/Universal Images Group/Getty Images</span></span>
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<p>Mbeki also <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/opinions/columnists/guestcolumn/excerpt-while-thabo-mbeki-moved-quietly-essop-pahad-would-stand-up-and-shout-20230707">introduced him to Meg Shorrock</a>, whom he married in 1966. That year with Mbeki he helped establish a non-racial ANC Youth and Student Section. He was immersed in campus student politics as well as organising Vietnam solidarity events. He spent a year in 1973 at the <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/index.php/site/q/03lv02424/04lv02426/05lv02626.htm">Institute of Social Sciences</a> in Moscow.</p>
<p>Pahad’s most conspicuous activity during his exile was his deployment in Prague at the <a href="https://www.servantleader.co.za/essop">World Marxist Review</a>; acknowledgement by the Communist Party of his status as a reliable theoretician. He and Meg lived in Prague between 1975 and 1985, and their two daughters were born there, attending Czech schools. I interviewed them in 2018 because I was exploring the South African Communist Party’s Czech connections.</p>
<p>The Pahads remembered a happy period of their life. They found plenty to admire in post-Prague Spring Czechoslovakia, though they both perceived that the Czech party had lost public support. Back in London, Pahad would work closely with Mbeki, acting as an intermediary in the discreet diplomacy that Mbeki was conducting with South African officials and businessmen.</p>
<h2>Right-hand man</h2>
<p>Pahad would return to South Africa in 1990 following the unbanning of the liberation movements, making a new home for his family in Johannesburg. Unlike Mbeki, Pahad remained a communist. One view of his continuing affiliation is that he remained in the party at Mbeki’s behest to watch over its internal affairs, but there is no reason to doubt his continuing commitment to communism. At that time Mbeki’s future succession to the presidency was uncertain and the party was one key constituency. But it is true that Pahad’s subsequent political career would be defined by his status as Mbeki’s trusted friend, his best man as it were, a function he actually performed at Mbeki’s wedding <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/pahad-gives-his-perspective-418057">in 1974</a>.</p>
<p>So, during the <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/national-orders/recipient/nelson-rolihlahla-mandela">presidency of Nelson Mandela</a> (10 May 1994-16 June 1999) he served as Mbeki’s “parliamentary counsellor”. He was essentially responsible for keeping the ANC House of Assembly caucus in order, and after Mbeki’s accession to the presidency, Pahad became a <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/contact-directory/essop-goolam-pahad-mr">minister in the president’s office</a>. </p>
<p>These were not posts that would define him as a policymaker. Rather his reputation as a member of government was as an “enforcer” quelling rebellion. “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/sep/23/mbeki.southafrica">Who the fuck do you think you are, questioning the integrity of the government, the ministers and the president?</a>”,
he admonished the ANC members of the Select Committee on Public Accounts who wanted a full inquiry into the corrupt 1999 <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4006895">multi-billion-rand arms contract</a>.</p>
<p>Subsequently he was a vigorous defender of Mbeki’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-mbekis-character-and-his-aids-denialism-are-intimately-linked-54766">positions on HIV and Aids</a>. Pahad himself believed that Mbeki was unfairly characterised as an Aids “denialist”.</p>
<h2>Diligent</h2>
<p>When Pahad was given a job, he did it efficiently. He surprised even his critics with the diligence with which he supported the offices placed under his authority as minister, for example urging municipalities to “mainstream” disability rights. </p>
<p>Characteristically loyal, he resigned when Mbeki was displaced <a href="https://www.gcis.gov.za/content/newsroom/events/pahad-briefs-media-cabinet-resignations-24-sep-08">in 2008</a>.</p>
<p>In retirement he presided over the <a href="http://www.sadet.co.za/">South African Democratic Education Trust</a>, the incubator of a remarkably non-partisan multi-volume history of the liberation struggle, founded his own journal, <a href="https://journals.uj.ac.za/index.php/The_Thinker/about/editorialTeam">The Thinker</a>, and remained actively engaged on the editorial board of <a href="https://print.media.co.za/new-age/">New Age</a>, the newspaper funded by the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22513410">Gupta family</a>, which stands accused of <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-itll-take-for-the-guptas-to-face-corruption-charges-in-south-africa-184952">orchestrating industrial scale corruption</a> under former president Jacob Zuma.</p>
<p>He had <a href="https://amabhungane.org/stories/guptaleaks-how-ajay-gupta-was-trusted-with-crafting-sas-global-image/">invited Ajay Gupta</a> to join the International Marketing Council in 2000, an appointment that he subsequently regretted. He may have had other personal regrets but unlike many of his comrades, he rarely spoke about his own political journey. </p>
<p>His life had its own integrity, defined by fixed loyalties and enduring friendships; not such a bad epitaph.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210413/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tom Lodge does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>When Essop Pahad was given a job, he did it efficiently. He surprised even his critics with his diligence.Tom Lodge, Emeritus Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies, University of LimerickLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2098832023-07-18T14:32:55Z2023-07-18T14:32:55ZNelson Mandela’s legacy is taking a battering because of the dismal state of South Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538003/original/file-20230718-27-ey48jj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nelson Mandela, the late first president of democratic South Africa, is credited with the relatively peaceful transition from apartheid rule.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Per-Anders Pettersson/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The multiple concerns about the dismal state of South Africa – including a <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2023/06/15/cf-south-africas-economy-loses-momentum-amid-record-power-cuts">stagnant and failing economy</a>, a seemingly incapable state, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/state-capture-report-chronicles-extent-of-corruption-in-south-africa-but-will-action-follow-174441">massive corruption</a> – have led to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/rule-of-law-in-south-africa-protects-even-those-who-scorn-it-175533">questioning</a> of the political and economic settlement made in 1994 to end apartheid. The settlement is <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Nelson-Mandela">strongly associated with Nelson Mandela</a>, who oversaw its progress to a successful conclusion. He subsequently underpinned it by promoting reconciliation with white people, especially Afrikaners, the former rulers.</p>
<p>The questioning of the 1994 settlement, and therefore Mandela’s legacy, has different dimensions, running through diverse narratives. One, associated with a faction of the governing African National Congress (ANC) that claims to stand for “<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-ret-and-what-does-it-want-the-radical-economic-transformation-faction-in-south-africa-explained-195949">radical economic transformation</a>”, is that the settlement was a “sell-out” to “<a href="https://theconversation.com/white-monopoly-capital-an-excuse-to-avoid-south-africas-real-problems-75143">white monopoly capital</a>”. Another is the inclination to lay the blame for state failure <a href="https://theconversation.com/rule-of-law-in-south-africa-protects-even-those-who-scorn-it-175533">on the constitution</a>, thereby deflecting responsibility for massive governance failures away from the ANC.</p>
<p>Yet another stems from the frustrations of recent black graduates and the mass of black unemployed for whom there are <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/Media%20release%20QLFS%20Q4%202022.pdf">no jobs</a>. There are also huge numbers of people without either <a href="https://apsdpr.org/index.php/apsdpr/article/view/372/739">adequate shelter</a> or <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=16235#:%7E:text=More%20than%20half%20a%20million,high%20risk%20of%20acute%20malnutrition.">enough to eat</a>. South Africans want someone to blame. While their search regularly targets a wide range of usual suspects, it also leads to a questioning of what Mandela really left behind. </p>
<p>It does not help that Mandela continues to be lionised by many, if not most, white people, who despite much grumbling about the many inconveniences of life in South Africa have largely continued to prosper.</p>
<p>This means that those of us who are social scientists and long-term observers of South Africa’s politics and history need to think carefully about how we think critically about Mandela’s legacy.</p>
<h2>Questioning Mandela’s legacy</h2>
<p>From a historian’s view the questioning of Mandela’s legacy is normal. Historians are always asking new questions and reassessing the past to gain new insights about the role important political leaders play.</p>
<p>This has posed particular problems for Mandela’s biographers. Biography has always had a problematic relationship with history as a discipline. This partly stems from history’s reluctance to endorse “Great Men” versions of the past. Partly from the more generic problem of assessing individuals’ role in shaping wider developments. Thus it has been with Mandela. Nonetheless, the six or seven <a href="https://www.google.com/search?q=Mandela+biopgraphies&rlz=1C1GCEA_enZA1007ZA1007&oq=Mandela+biopgraphies&gs_lcrp=EgZjaHJvbWUyBggAEEUYOTIJCAEQABgNGIAEMgkIAhAAGA0YgAQyCQgDEC4YDRiABDIJCAQQABgNGIAEMggIBRAAGA0YHjIICAYQABgNGB4yCAgHEAAYDRgeMggICBAAGA0YHjIKCAkQABgFGA0YHtIBCDQ5NjNqMWo3qAIAsAIA&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8">significant biographies of Mandela</a> may be said to revolve around the following arguments.</p>
<p>First, Mandela played a critical role in preventing a descent into total civil war. It was brutal enough as it was. Narratives at the time often suggested that the period 1990-94 was a “<a href="https://www.news.uct.ac.za/article/-2019-07-09-sas-transition-to-democracy-miracle-or-mediation">miracle</a>”, a difficult but “peaceful transition to democracy”. But this was misleading. <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/index.php/site/q/03lv02167/04lv02264/05lv02335/06lv02357/07lv02372/08lv02379.htm">Thousands died</a> in political violence during this time.</p>
<p>Mandela’s biographers argue that his initiating negotiations with the regime from jail, independently of the ANC, was crucial. Without his actions, the apartheid state would not have come to the party. This, even though by the time FW de Klerk, its last president, came to power, it was seeking a route to a settlement. </p>
<p>Second, Mandela played his cards carefully in steadily asserting his authority over the ANC. Although the ANC in exile had carefully choreographed the imprisoned Mandela as an icon around which international opposition to apartheid could be mobilised, there remained much questioning within the organisation following his release about his motivations and wisdom. Also whether he should replace the ailing <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-anc-is-celebrating-the-year-of-or-tambo-who-was-he-85838">Oliver Tambo</a> as its leader. That he proceeded to convince his doubters by constantly proclaiming his loyalty to the ANC, its militant “line” and his subjection to its discipline while simultaneously edging it towards negotiations is said to have been key to his establishing his claim to leadership. This was necessary to convince his doubters within the ANC that it could not defeat the regime on the field of battle. Hence there was a need for compromise with the regime.</p>
<p>Third, Mandela is credited with successfully steering the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/convention-democratic-south-africa-codesa">negotiations which led to South Africa’s democracy</a>. That he played a limited part in negotiating much of the nitty-gritty of the new constitution is acknowledged. Yet, this is combined with recognition of his acute judgment of when to place pressure on the regime to secure concessions and when to adopt a more conciliatory line. Generally, it is agreed that the ANC outsmarted the apartheid government during the negotiations. Praise is correctly showered on Mandela for his role in bringing both the far right, under <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/index.php/site/q/03lv02424/04lv02426/05lv02691.htm">Constand Viljoen</a>, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/buthelezis-retirement-wont-end-ethnic-traditionalism-in-south-africa-102213">Mangosuthu Buthelezi</a>’s quarrelsome Inkatha Freedom Movement <a href="https://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/sites/g/files/toruqf5601/files/Policy_Note_ID137.pdf">into the 1994 election at the very last moment</a>, without which it would have lacked legitimacy.</p>
<p>Fourth, while today it is recognised that a narrative of the time – that South Africans had negotiated the finest constitution in the world – was overcooked, the negotiations resulted in the country becoming a constitutional democracy. </p>
<p>We now know, of course, that the ANC has subverted much of the intention of the constitution and undermined many of its safeguards. <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-ruling-party-has-favoured-loyalty-over-competence-now-cadre-deployment-has-come-back-to-bite-it-199208">Its cadre deployment policy</a> of appointing loyalists to key state institutions has severely diminished the independence of the state machinery. Furthermore, the ANC has merged party with state. Above all, it has severely weakened the capacity of parliament to <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-parliament-fails-to-hold-the-executive-to-account-history-shows-what-can-happen-192889">hold the president and ministers accountable</a>. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/">State Capture Commission</a> has laid bare the mechanics of all this in great detail. It has placed huge responsibility for this upon the ANC. Nonetheless, it is widely recognised by civil society that the constitution and the law still provide the fundamental basis for exacting political accountability. This is confirmed by the many judgments the Constitutional Court has <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-south-africas-constitutional-court-protecting-democracy-107443">rendered against the government</a>.</p>
<p>Fifth, while his critics often argue that Mandela leant over too far to appease whites, the counter-argument is that this grounded democracy. At the beginning of his <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/318431.Long_Walk_to_Freedom">autobiography</a>, Mandela presents the struggle in South Africa as a clash between Afrikaner and African nationalisms. His role during negotiations can be viewed through the prism of his conviction of the need to reconcile these, as one could not defeat the other. Without reconciliation, however imperfect, there could be no making of a new nation. After all, what was the alternative? </p>
<h2>Capturing Mandela’s legacy</h2>
<p>There is never going to be a final assessment of Mandela’s legacy. How it is regarded will continue to change, depending on the destination South Africa travels to. If it really does become a “<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-political-risk-profile-has-gone-up-a-few-notches-but-its-not-yet-a-failed-state-170653">failed state</a>”, as the doomsters predict, there will be much need for reexamination of whether this failure has its roots in the constitutional settlement which Mandela did so much to bring about. For the moment, however, Mandela continues to inspire South Africans who place their hopes in constitutional democracy. What other hopes do they have?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209883/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There is never going to be a final assessment of Mandela’s legacy. How it is regarded will continue to change, depending on the destination South Africa travels to.Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2077692023-07-02T09:17:26Z2023-07-02T09:17:26ZZondo at Your Fingertips: new book offers an accessible and condensed version of South Africa’s ambitious corruption inquiry<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534104/original/file-20230626-25-j2fluj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Ramaphosa, right, receives the final report of the State Capture Commission from Judge Zondo in 2020. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Anti-corruption activist <a href="https://shadowworldinvestigations.org/team_member/paul-holden/">Paul Holden</a> has done South Africa a great favour by summarising the work of the judicial commission that probed massive corruption under former president Jacob Zuma. No one except academics will read the commission’s 4,750 page report, but many will read Holden’s book, <a href="https://jacana.co.za/product/zondo-at-your-fingertips/">Zondo at your Fingertips</a>.</p>
<p>Holden is a former director of investigations at <a href="https://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/">Corruption Watch</a>, the South African corruption watchdog. He has worked with the investigative organisations <a href="https://shadowworldinvestigations.org/">Shadow World</a> and <a href="https://www.opensecrets.org.za/">Open Secrets</a> for many years. He seeks to expose how corrupt individuals, aided by auditors and banks, not only looted the state but came to control it and pervert it into a kleptocracy.</p>
<p>The author, who has also lived in the UK, tells us that the Zondo commission was globally unique:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>There are only a handful of examples of any state or quasi-judicial inquiry being given the task and resources to delve so deeply into the corruption of the ruling party … something like the scale, importance and independence of the Zondo Commission could never happen in the United Kingdom. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Holden has written a good and solid book, selecting and explaining the significant Zondo findings. It is useful for South Africans in getting a grasp of the commission’s report. Overall, this book is recommended for your bookshelf and every library.</p>
<p>If South Africans are lucky, the multi-volume report will be read through by prosecutors, who have the power to formulate charges and get the courts to issue warrants of arrest.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="Book cover with the words: Zondo at your fingertips" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532714/original/file-20230619-23-7kewfk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532714/original/file-20230619-23-7kewfk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=921&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532714/original/file-20230619-23-7kewfk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=921&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532714/original/file-20230619-23-7kewfk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=921&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532714/original/file-20230619-23-7kewfk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1158&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532714/original/file-20230619-23-7kewfk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1158&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532714/original/file-20230619-23-7kewfk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1158&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
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<p>But the historical odds are stacked against this. The country has had over a dozen big commissions of inquiry. Not many people landed up in jail as a consequence. </p>
<h2>How the story is told</h2>
<p>Holden starts by telling us that the commission, headed by then deputy chief justice <a href="https://www.concourt.org.za/index.php/13-current-judges/72-deputy-chief-justice-ray-zondo">Raymond Zondo</a>, heard 1,731,106 pages of documentary evidence, which it summarised in a transcript of 75,099 pages. The commission’s 19-volume report totals 4,750 pages. It heard 300 witnesses over 400 days of hearings, spread over four and a half years between 2018 and 2021. </p>
<p>Only the report of the <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/trc/">Truth and Reconciliation Commission</a>, which probed human rights abuses by both the apartheid regime and the liberation movement during the struggle for freedom in South Africa, has been comparable in <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/trc/report/">length and scope</a>. It sat from 1996 and submitted its <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Truth-and-Reconciliation-Commission-South-Africa">final report in October 2003</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-democracy-or-a-kleptocracy-how-south-africa-stacks-up-111101">A democracy or a kleptocracy? How South Africa stacks up</a>
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</em>
</p>
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<p>The book is well structured in 10 parts. These include a chapter on the capture of state institutions such as the South African Revenue Service, the capture of state-owned enterprises such as South African Airways, the failures of the president, the African National Congress, and parliament, and a chapter on what money went where.</p>
<h2>Commissions of inquiry</h2>
<p>The most ambitious commission of inquiry set up in South Africa was the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Set up in 1996 after the end of apartheid, it offered amnesty in exchange for information about atrocities.</p>
<p>No one who refused to apply for amnesty, or whose amnesty application was refused by the commission, was in fact prosecuted. A quarter of a century lapsed before the families of some detainees who’d been tortured to death found pro bono lawyers who <a href="https://www.newframe.com/long-read-the-unfinished-business-of-the-trc/">instituted the reopening of inquests and other litigation</a> – with zero support from the government.</p>
<p>The great majority of the recommendations of commissions of inquiry, such as the <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/comm-mrk/docs/20150710-gg38978_gen699_3_MarikanaReport.pdf">Farlam Commission</a> into the massacre of striking miners and other killings at Marikana, North West province in 2012, remain unimplemented and ignored by the government. Sceptics argue that commissions of inquiry merely provide governments with a pretext to <a href="https://www.enca.com/opinion/parking-hot-potato-are-commissions-inquiry-ineffective">stall any remedial actions for years</a>, until the politics of the front page has moved onto other issues.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-has-a-new-chief-justice-an-introduction-to-raymond-zondo-179315">South Africa has a new Chief Justice: an introduction to Raymond Zondo</a>
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<p>Holden notes that Judge Zondo ordered the government to lay charges with the police against Dudu Myeni, former chair of South African Airways, for revealing the identity of a witness. But no arrest or prosecution has yet occurred. Likewise, the commission’s recommendations to the <a href="https://lpc.org.za/">Legal Practice Council</a>, to explore whether certain lawyers who enabled corruption should be struck off the roll, and to the auditors’ regulatory entity, to do the same with some auditors, have not yet resulted in action.</p>
<p>However, the author concludes, on the positive side, the <a href="https://www.npa.gov.za/asset-forfeiture-unit#:%7E:text=Empowered%20by%20the%20Prevention%20of,the%20private%20and%20public%20sector.">Asset Forfeiture Unit</a>, which is empowered to seize assets which are the proceeds of crime, successfully froze the Optimum coal mine to prevent it being sold on to cronies of the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48980964">Guptas</a>, the Indian family accused of orchestrating mass corruption in South Africa. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.siu.org.za/">Special Investigating Unit</a> took up numerous cases against multinational companies to recoup state funds and got billions of rand refunded. The <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/news/investigative-directorate-move-npa-says-president">Investigative Directorate</a> of the <a href="https://www.npa.gov.za/">National Prosecuting Authority</a> made numerous arrests; prosecutions are pending.</p>
<h2>Recommendations</h2>
<p>Holden notes that the Zondo Commission made a number of recommendations. Key among these are to professionalise all appointments to the boards of state-owned enterprises, and prevent cabinet ministers from appointing political cronies and other unqualified or compromised persons. The same applies to <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-has-a-plan-to-make-its-public-service-professional-its-time-to-act-on-it-187706">professionalising civil service</a>, provincial, and municipal procurement officials.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/whistleblowers-are-key-to-fighting-corruption-in-south-africa-it-shouldnt-be-at-their-peril-168134">Whistleblowers are key to fighting corruption in South Africa. It shouldn't be at their peril</a>
</strong>
</em>
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<hr>
<p>Holden also summarises the commission’s enhanced proposed protection for whistle blowers, and to grant them compensation for losses they suffered. He notes that Zondo also flagged the deployment of party loyalists to key state positions as a violation of the constitution’s section 197 (3).</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207769/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Gottschalk is a member of the ANC, but writes this review in his professional capacity as a political scientist.</span></em></p>The Zondo Commission was globally unique in scope and scale. The book selects and explains its key findings and recommendations.Keith Gottschalk, Political Scientist, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2061362023-06-18T11:19:56Z2023-06-18T11:19:56ZGold fraud: the Goldenberg scam that cost Kenya billions of dollars in the 1990s – and no one was jailed<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528027/original/file-20230524-15-ipamm.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/mar/16/kenya.jeevanvasagar">Goldenberg scandal</a> in the early 1990s is Kenya’s largest documented gold fraud. The scheme involved Goldenberg International Limited, which pretended to export gold and diamonds, and in exchange received substantial subsidies from the government for “earning” foreign exchange. Kenyan businessman Kamlesh Pattni – who was at the centre of the scandal and was charged with fraud but <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/economy/court-formally-terminates-goldenberg-case-2031264">eventually acquitted</a> – was recently <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/23/gold-smuggler-pattni-kenya-zimbabwe">named</a> in a new investigation into gold fraud. This time his operation is allegedly being run through Zimbabwe from his base in Dubai. Economists Roman Grynberg and Fwasa Singogo, who have <a href="https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/304991797.pdf">researched</a> the Goldenberg case, and <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Fwasa-Singogo-2">the gold mining industry and its role in illicit financial flows in Africa</a>, unpack the issue.</em></p>
<h2>What was the Goldenberg scandal?</h2>
<p>The scandal centred on two companies: Goldenberg International and Exchange Bank Limited. Both were owned and directed by businessman <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/CommissionReports/Report-of-the-Judicial-Commission-of-Inquiry-into-the-Goldenberg-Affair.pdf#page=32">Kamlesh Pattni</a> and his partner James Kanyotu, the director of intelligence in the Kenyan police force. The two were licensed by the government to export gold and diamonds from Kenya. But they did not. They just collected an inflated subsidy.</p>
<p>The Goldenberg scandal occurred at a time of <a href="https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/002/1995/133/article-A001-en.xml">severe economic austerity</a> in Kenya in the early 1990s. The country’s economy was characterised by long periods of macroeconomic instability and dwindling foreign reserves. </p>
<p>Economic policy was inward-looking. It leaned towards the protection of local industries and the retention of foreign exchange. This period also coincided with the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Kenya-African-National-Union">one-party state that began in 1982</a> and was marked by political oppression. </p>
<p>As a result, donors gradually reduced support and investment evaporated. Foreign debt payments became irregular and the government increasingly fell back on local borrowing. </p>
<p>The Kenyan government turned to international financial institutions for cheaper loans. These were provided, but were conditional on <a href="https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/304991797.pdf#page=2">economic reforms</a>, such as measures intended to stimulate trade. </p>
<p>Coincidentally, or otherwise, Goldenberg International applied to the Kenyan government in <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/CommissionReports/Report-of-the-Judicial-Commission-of-Inquiry-into-the-Goldenberg-Affair.pdf#page=33">July 1990</a> for certain privileges that spoke directly to the economic needs of the country. The company received a monopoly on exports of gold and diamonds from Kenya. </p>
<p>It was also given a subsidy of 35% of the value of these exports – 15% more than the official rate at the time. </p>
<p>Goldenberg managed to defraud the Kenyan state of between <a href="https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/304991797.pdf#page=1">US$600 million and US$1.5 billion</a> in <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/wtr06-2b_e.pdf#page=1">subsidies</a>. Subsidies can be direct (such as cash payments) or indirect (such as tax breaks). Goldenberg’s subsidy was in monetary form, on condition that the company proved foreign exchange gains through exporting non-traditional commodities. </p>
<p>The fraud was that Kenya had <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/CommissionReports/Report-of-the-Judicial-Commission-of-Inquiry-into-the-Goldenberg-Affair.pdf#page=44">insignificant amounts of known gold deposits and absolutely no diamonds</a>. Government officials authorised payments for fictitious exports.</p>
<p>Goldenberg’s main transactions were recorded between <a href="https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper117.pdf#page=1">1991 and 1993</a>. The <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/CommissionReports/Report-of-the-Judicial-Commission-of-Inquiry-into-the-Goldenberg-Affair.pdf#page=312">2003 Judicial Commission of Inquiry</a> into the scandal estimated that Goldenberg pilfered a <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/CommissionReports/Report-of-the-Judicial-Commission-of-Inquiry-into-the-Goldenberg-Affair.pdf#page=379">total of KSh158.3 billion</a> (US$2.3 billion at the time). However, the exact amount remains in the area of speculation. </p>
<h2>What institutional gaps enabled the fraud?</h2>
<p>The architects of the Goldenberg scandal abused a number of <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/CommissionReports/Report-of-the-Judicial-Commission-of-Inquiry-into-the-Goldenberg-Affair.pdf#page=32">trade policies</a>. These included the <a href="http://kenyalaw.org:8181/exist/kenyalex/actview.xql?actid=CAP.%20482">Export Compensation Act</a>, <a href="http://supplychainfinanceforum.org/techniques/pre-shipment-finance/">Pre-shipment Finance</a> and the Retention Scheme.</p>
<p>There’s inherently nothing wrong with these measures, which are intended to stimulate trade. But they were implemented in the context of a corrupt political system and became <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/CommissionReports/Report-of-the-Judicial-Commission-of-Inquiry-into-the-Goldenberg-Affair.pdf#page=364">instruments of fraud</a>.</p>
<p>Another significant aspect of the fraud was Kenya’s exchange rate system. The difference between official and parallel exchange rates, and the depreciating Kenyan shilling, allowed Goldenberg to earn illegal returns on foreign exchange. </p>
<p><a href="http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/CommissionReports/Report-of-the-Judicial-Commission-of-Inquiry-into-the-Goldenberg-Affair.pdf#page=135">Cheque kiting</a> is another tool that was used. It’s a form of cheque fraud that utilises the time it takes for a cheque to clear to use non-existent money in an account. </p>
<p>Officials at the highest levels of government were heavily involved in authorising payments to Goldenberg. </p>
<p>Under the rules to obtain subsidies, Goldenberg had to get signatories from the customs department that exports had occurred; from the Central Bank of Kenya that revenue had arrived; from the ministry of minerals that production had occurred; and from the ministry of finance for final authorisation. </p>
<p>As was alleged in a recent <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/14/six-secrets-uncovered-by-al-jazeeras-gold-mafia-investigation">Al-Jazeera exposé on gold fraud in Zimbabwe</a>, where Pattni’s name has featured, corrupt and well-paid senior government officials in Kenya played a part in the plunder of the nation during the Goldenberg years. </p>
<p>An audit ordered by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank into cheque kiting and forex fraud <a href="https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper117.pdf#page=9">in April 1993</a> sparked the unravelling of the Goldenberg scandal.</p>
<p>No one ever went to jail for this grand fraud despite <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/CommissionReports/Report-of-the-Judicial-Commission-of-Inquiry-into-the-Goldenberg-Affair.pdf">years of inquiry</a> and the <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/economy/court-formally-terminates-goldenberg-case-2031264">prosecution of some of the parties involved</a>. </p>
<h2>What was the cost to Kenya?</h2>
<p>The government of Kenya received no benefit as there were no official export earnings from the sale of gold and diamonds. </p>
<p>There are no reliable estimates as to the scandal’s effect on Kenyans to date, largely because the payments made and money siphoned <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000065911/goldenberg-scandal-still-a-mystery-decades-later">couldn’t be easily accounted for</a>.</p>
<h2>What are the lessons learned?</h2>
<p>The judges in the judicial review of the Goldenberg scandal blamed the International Monetary Fund and World Bank for setting the <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/esaf/exr/">context</a> that enabled the abuse of subsidies.</p>
<p>In a world where more people and nations are subject to sanctions if they trade in US dollars, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/14/six-secrets-uncovered-by-al-jazeeras-gold-mafia-investigation">gold</a> has become a way to evade economic restrictions. It isn’t easily detected in developed country jurisdictions. For instance, since 2019, trade in gold in <a href="https://ahvalnews-com.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/ahvalnews.com/node/36566?amp">Venezuela</a> and <a href="https://financialtribune.com/articles/domestic-economy/98593/77-rise-in-irans-non-oil-trade-with-turkey">Iran</a> has increased drastically with Turkey despite US sanctions. </p>
<p>The use of physical gold traded through a country like the United Arab Emirates – Pattni now operates out of Dubai – evades the financial sanctions imposed on nations like Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>Regulatory frameworks governing trade in gold are weaker than the ones governing the entry of US dollars into the global banking system. To address this, the international community must put pressure on <a href="https://taxjustice.net/faq/what-is-a-secrecy-jurisdiction/">secrecy jurisdictions</a> to align their gold trade and anti-money laundering regulatory frameworks with global best practices. </p>
<p>Both Kenya and Zimbabwe have had long reputations of being politically risky, mired in corruption and having unsound policies. Political connections are also important in doing business. </p>
<p>Deliberate and continuous efforts to curb corruption, have stable and sound policies, and establish solid independent institutions are needed for these countries to have some semblance of accountability. If not curbed, the systemic greed of the political elite and those politically connected will continue to lead countries into ruin and citizens to destitution. Competing limited resources will continue to end up in the pockets of a select few and not cater to the public good so often championed in policy pronouncements.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206136/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In a world where economic sanctions make trade in US dollars almost impossible, gold has offered a way to evade these restrictions.Roman Grynberg, Adjunct Professor, Griffith UniversityFwasa K Singogo, Research Associate, Indaba Agricultural Policy Research Institute (IAPRI)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2074222023-06-18T09:03:34Z2023-06-18T09:03:34ZSouth Africa’s ruling party is performing dismally, but a flawed opposition keeps it in power<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531661/original/file-20230613-15-2s16ef.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The African National Congress has lost electoral support but remains dominant. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Phill Magakoe / AFP via Getty Images.</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2023-05-18-likelihood-of-stage-8-load-shedding-extremely-high-says-eskom/">power cuts continue</a>, the <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=16162#:%7E:text=After%20rallying%20in%20the%20third,quarter%20(October%E2%80%92December).&text=Growth%20was%20dragged%20lower%20mainly,manufacturing%20and%20general%20government%20services.">economy falters</a>, <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=16312#:%7E:text=The%20prevalence%20of%20underemployment%20increased,2022%20at%205%2C6%25.">unemployment rises</a> and the <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/markets/2023-05-18-rand-weaker-as-investors-watch-us-debt-ceiling-talks/">currency tumbles</a>, South Africa’s political commentators tend to agree that support for the governing African National Congress (ANC) will <a href="https://www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org/publications/survey-of-voter-opinion/">fall under 50%</a> in the <a href="https://www.eisa.org/election-calendar/">2024 national and provincial elections</a>. If the party avoids a defeat, it could lead to a <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-votes-in-2024-could-a-coalition-between-major-parties-anc-and-eff-run-the-country-204141">coalition government</a>. </p>
<p>It’s only logical to expect that governance failures of this magnitude would send large numbers of dissatisfied voters into the arms of opposition parties.</p>
<p>But as scholars who have <a href="https://scholar.google.co.za/citations?user=mIg6syEAAAAJ&hl=en">studied</a> South African voter behaviour <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=HFiwmhYAAAAJ&hl=en">for decades</a>, we warn opposition parties that they cannot count on disillusionment to drive voters towards them. Unless they convince dissatisfied voters that they provide a credible alternative, the ANC may still win a majority of votes come 2024.</p>
<p>How is this possible? Our argument is based on the confluence of two trends that have characterised South African elections for at least the past two decades. One is a decline in support for the ANC. The other is a steady decline in voter turnout.</p>
<h2>Decline in ANC support and voter turnout</h2>
<p>In 2006, 65% of all respondents in a nationally representative public opinion survey told <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/">Afrobarometer</a>, the independent African survey network, that the country was “headed in the right direction”, and <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/survey-resource/south-africa-round-3-data-2006/">52% “felt close” to the ANC</a>. By 2018, however, those numbers had plunged to just 27% for those feeling the ANC was on the right path, and <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/survey-resource/south-africa-round-7-questionnaire/">29% who felt close to the party</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-2019-poll-showed-dangerous-signs-of-insiders-and-outsiders-121758">South Africa's 2019 poll showed dangerous signs of 'insiders' and 'outsiders'</a>
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<p>The decline in ANC election-day support over the same period has been far more modest. Though it receded from its <a href="https://results.elections.org.za/dashboards/npe/app/dashboard.html">historical high of 70%</a> in April 2004, it still won 58% of the vote <a href="https://results.elections.org.za/dashboards/npe/app/dashboard.html">in 2019</a> and retained its dominance of the policy-making process. That was despite massive and widely publicised corruption over years of <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/site/information/reports">“state capture”</a> – the deliberate diversion of state resources for private gain under former president Jacob Zuma (<a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/profiles/president-jacob-zuma-0">May 2009- February 2018</a>).</p>
<p>The second trend relates to voter turnout. When measured as a proportion of eligible voters – the international standard – election day participation has declined much more sharply. It’s down by almost 40 percentage points, from a high of 86% in 1994 to just 49% in the last general election <a href="https://jacana.co.za/product/election-2019/">in 2019</a>. We believe that this drop in voter turnout helps the ANC stay in power despite its dismal governance record. The 2019 turnout rate of 49% compares poorly to other countries. Unlike other established democracies, the gap between eligible and registered voters has <a href="https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/voter-turnout-trends-around-the-world.pdf">steadily increased in South Africa</a>. </p>
<p>The sharp downward trend in turnout is intimately related to the much more modest downward trend in ANC support. </p>
<p>In a new study (based on the 2019 South African Comparative National Election Study <a href="https://u.osu.edu/cnep/">post-election survey</a>, whose dataset is available to researchers) we found that 44% of respondents who said they had voted for the ANC in 2014 were dissatisfied with its performance in government by the time of the <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/content/Elections/Election-Report--2019-National-and-Provincial-Elections/">2019 election</a>. </p>
<p>But dissatisfied ANC voters switched their vote only if they held positive views of an opposition party. They were much more likely to switch if they believed that any opposition party was sufficiently competent to manage government affairs, or if they held a favourable view of the party leader, or saw it as broadly inclusive.</p>
<p>The problem for the opposition was that relatively few people held these views. </p>
<h2>Opposition failures</h2>
<p>Among disillusioned 2014 ANC voters, fewer than half felt in 2019 that any opposition party “would do a good job running the national government if elected”. Of these, 49% gave this credit to the main opposition <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Democratic-Alliance-political-party-South-Africa">Democratic Alliance (DA)</a>, and 46% gave it to the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), the third largest party. Only 41% of disillusioned former ANC voters thought the populist, <a href="https://effonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/FINAL-EFF-CONSTITUTION-02.03.2020.pdf#page=8">radical leaning</a> EFF “would look after the interests of all people in South Africa” and just 34% said so about the liberal DA. Just 26% rated any opposition leader more favourably than ANC leader Cyril Ramaphosa. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-african-president-cyril-ramaphosas-credibility-has-been-dented-putting-his-reform-agenda-in-jeopardy-189802">South African president Cyril Ramaphosa’s credibility has been dented, putting his reform agenda in jeopardy</a>
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<p>For some, the ANC was the “devil they knew” and they remained loyal to it. But an equally large proportion decided not to vote on election day. Their negative views of opposition parties, which they felt were ill-equipped to lead, govern or represent them, made them abstain, rather than switch votes.</p>
<p>Falling turnout is also related to declining interest in politics and increasing disillusionment with democracy – clearly things to be concerned about. But this analysis shows that voter abstention is also a result of dissatisfied ANC voters who feel they have no alternative. Unless opposition parties do something drastically different, dissatisfied voters are likely to boycott elections rather than switch to another party.</p>
<h2>No viable alternative</h2>
<p>For many years, scholars of democracies dominated by one party have tended to explain the ANC’s hegemony as due to, among others, its <a href="https://openuctpress.uct.ac.za/uctpress/catalog/view/9/10/49">control of state resources</a>, which enables it to shape the rules of party funding and provide patronage, or <a href="https://www-tandfonline-com.ez.sun.ac.za/doi/pdf/10.1080/714000181">strong group identities</a>, or <a href="https://www.proquest.com/docview/2348203380?parentSessionId=Vz3FoBcIgd10y5Ge7JqaIzPwEr7q%2BSGrXVYlXQrp1LA%3D&pq-origsite=primo&accountid=14049">voters</a> who are unwilling to hold the party to account. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-has-changed-its-electoral-law-but-a-much-more-serious-overhaul-is-needed-204820">South Africa has changed its electoral law, but a much more serious overhaul is needed</a>
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<p>These arguments capture parts of the larger picture. Our analysis, however, points a finger at the opposition parties and the role they play in sustaining the ANC’s dominance. The evidence shows that erstwhile ANC supporters who are dissatisfied with its performance in government are willing to at least consider switching. </p>
<p>But, for that to happen, they must see one or more opposition parties, or their leading candidates, as an effective or legitimate alternative. Otherwise, withdrawal from the electorate becomes a rational option and the ANC may continue to win decisive election-day majorities from a shrinking electorate.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207422/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Collette Schulz-Herzenberg receives funding from the National Research Foundation. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Mattes is co-founder and senior adviser to Afrobarometer, and has previously worked as a consultant to Citizen Surveys. He receives funding from the South African National Research Foundation.</span></em></p>Dissatisfied ANC voters were much more likely to switch their votes if they held positive views of an opposition party. However, the problem for the opposition is that few people held these views.Collette Schulz-Herzenberg, Senior Lecturer in Political Science, Stellenbosch UniversityRobert Mattes, Professor in Government and Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, and Adjunct Professor in the Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance, University of Cape Town, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2061012023-05-24T13:42:03Z2023-05-24T13:42:03ZCorruption in South Africa: former CEO’s explosive book exposes how state power utility was destroyed<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527785/original/file-20230523-19-yugb19.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Former Eskom CEO Andre de Ruyter.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">PenguinRandomHouse</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>One repeated theme of the <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.co.za/book/truth-power-my-three-years-inside-eskom/9781776390625#:%7E:text=De%20Ruyter%20candidly%20reflects%20on,to%20speak%20truth%20to%20power">memoir</a> Truth to Power: My Three Years Inside Eskom, by Andre de Ruyter, former CEO of South Africa’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-electricity-supply-whats-tripping-the-switch-151331">troubled power utility</a>, Eskom, is that “negligence and carelessness had become cemented into the organisation”. </p>
<p>Dirt piled up at even the newest power stations until it damaged equipment, which stopped working – and some equipment disappeared beneath a layer of ash.</p>
<p>Integrity had been displaced by greed and crime: </p>
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<p>Corruption had metastasised to permeate much of the organisation. </p>
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<p>As a political scientist who has, among other topics, followed corruption and kleptocracy, this book ranks among the more informative.</p>
<p>De Ruyter (or his ghost writer) delivers a pacey, racy adventure <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.co.za/book/truth-power-my-three-years-inside-eskom/9781776390625">thriller</a>. Chapter after chapter reads like a horror story about Eskom, whose failure to generate enough electricity consistently for <a href="https://theconversation.com/power-cuts-and-food-safety-how-to-avoid-illness-during-loadshedding-200586">the past 15</a> years has <a href="https://www.investec.com/en_za/focus/economy/sa-s-load-shedding-how-the-sectors-are-being-affected.html">hobbled the economy</a>. </p>
<p>The book is also a sobering indication that parts of South Africa now fester with organised crime.</p>
<p>This book merits its place alongside <a href="https://www.loot.co.za/product/crispian-olver-how-to-steal-a-city/jywy-5080-g730?PPC=Y&gclid=EAIaIQobChMIgZaS7pbE3QIVS7DtCh0EGQXfEAAYASAAEgLszPD_BwE&gclsrc=aw.ds">How to Steal a City</a> and <a href="https://jacana.co.za/product/how-to-steal-a-country-state-capture-and-hopes-for-the-future-in-south-africa/">How to Steal a Country</a>. These two books chronicle how corruption undermined respectively a city and a country to the level where they became dysfunctional.</p>
<h2>Brazen looting</h2>
<p>Another take-away is the devastating indictment of De Ruyter’s immediate predecessors as CEO, <a href="https://www.eskom.co.za/heritage/matshela-koko/">Matshela Koko</a> and <a href="https://www.eskom.co.za/heritage/brian-molefe/">Brian Molefe</a>. They appear as incompetent managers who ran into the ground what the Financial Times of London had praised as the world’s best state-owned enterprise as recently as 2001. Both <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/live-former-eskom-boss-matshela-koko-arrested-on-corruption-charges-20221027">Koko</a> and <a href="https://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/molefe-singh-back-in-palm-ridge-specialised-commercial-crimes-court/">Molefe</a> have been charged with corruption – at Eskom and the transport parastatal Transet, respectively.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/explosive-revelations-about-south-africas-power-utility-why-new-electricity-minister-should-heed-the-words-of-former-eskom-ceo-201508">Explosive revelations about South Africa's power utility: why new electricity minister should heed the words of former Eskom CEO</a>
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<p>The standard joke about corruption is “Mr Ten Percent” – meaning a middleman who adds 10% onto the price of everything passing through his hands. Under Koko and Molefe, this had allegedly ballooned into “Mr Ten Thousand Percent”. </p>
<p>For example, De Ruyter writes that Eskom was just stopped in the nick of time from paying a middleman R238,000 for a cleaning mop. </p>
<p>Corruption focused on the procurement chain. One middleman bought knee-pads for R150 (US$7,80) and sold them to Eskom for R80,000 (US$4,200). Another bought a knee-pad for R4,025 (US$209) and sold it to Eskom for R934,950 (US$48,544). The same applied to toilet rolls and rubbish bags. One inevitable consequence of corruption on such a scale was that Eskom’s debt, which was R40 billion (US$2.076 billion) in 2007 (the year that former president Jacob Zuma came to power), ballooned to R483 billion (US$25 billion) by 2020 – which incurred R31 billion (US$160 million) in annual finance charges.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="Book cover showing a Caucasian man." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527730/original/file-20230523-27-r4nxs8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527730/original/file-20230523-27-r4nxs8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=920&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527730/original/file-20230523-27-r4nxs8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=920&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527730/original/file-20230523-27-r4nxs8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=920&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527730/original/file-20230523-27-r4nxs8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1156&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527730/original/file-20230523-27-r4nxs8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1156&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527730/original/file-20230523-27-r4nxs8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1156&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p>De Ruyter reveals that the “presidential” cartel (meaning one of the local mafias) pillaged Matla power station, the “Mesh-Kings” cartel Duvha power station, the “Legendaries” cartel Tutuka power station, and the “Chief” cartel Majuba power station. He writes that the going rate for bribes at Kusile power station is R200,000 (US$10,377) to falsify the delivery of one truckload of good quality coal. <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/special-investigating-unit-secure-another-preservation-order-matter-related-corruption">Kusile</a> is one of the two giant new coal-fired power stations which Eskom is relying on to end power cuts.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-bailout-of-eskom-wont-end-power-cuts-splitting-up-the-utility-can-as-other-countries-have-shown-200490">South Africa's bailout of Eskom won't end power cuts: splitting up the utility can, as other countries have shown</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<p>The book says a senior officer at the <a href="https://www.saps.gov.za/dpci/index.php">Hawks</a>, the police’s priority crimes investigation units, tipped off De Ruyter how he was blocked in all his attempts to combat corruption at Eskom. Senior police officers, at least one prosecutor, and a senior magistrate, have also been bribed by the gangs. </p>
<h2>Noncomformist</h2>
<p>Eskom had 13 CEOs and acting CEOs in 13 years. Twenty-eight candidates, most of them black, rejected head-hunters’ offers to become CEO of Eskom. De Ruyter who was previously CEO of Nampak, took a pay cut (to R7 million) to accept the job, in the hope of accelerating Eskom’s transition from coal to renewables.</p>
<p>At the time of his appointment some commentators alleged that he was an African National Congress (ANC) cadre deployed to Eskom. The ANC’s <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321223498_The_African_National_Congress_ANC_and_the_Cadre_Deployment_Policy_in_the_Postapartheid_South_Africa_A_Product_of_Democratic_Centralisation_or_a_Recipe_for_a_Constitutional_Crisis">cadre deployment</a> policy is aimed at ensuring that all the levers of power are in loyal party hands – often regardless of ability and probity. But De Ruyter came <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/politics/anc-claims-de-ruyter-is-trying-to-tarnish-its-image-ahead-of-elections-in-2024-20230426">into conflict</a> with the ruling party.</p>
<p>What caught De Ruyter out was the viciousness of the political attacks on him: smears of racism and financial impropriety. He had to devote many hours of office time to refuting them: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>occupying that seat at Megawatt Park comes with political baggage. </p>
</blockquote>
<p><a href="https://za.geoview.info/eskom_megawatt_park,32555009w">Megawatt Park</a> is Eskom’s head office in Johannesburg. </p>
<p>The book’s early chapters summarise how he was one of those Afrikaners with Dutch parents, who did not conform entirely to apartheid norms. The Afrikaner <em>volk</em> imposed the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/apartheid">apartheid</a> regime onto South Africa for 42 years. In his high school years he became a card-carrying member of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Progressive-Federal-Party">Progressive Federal Party</a>, a liberal anti-apartheid opposition party, antecedent of the Democratic Alliance, which is now the official opposition to the governing party. </p>
<h2>Poisoning</h2>
<p>De Ruyter’s book mentions organising a routine Eskom stakeholders’ meeting at a guesthouse in Mpumalanga province. </p>
<p>To save time, he ordered that food be served on plates to table places, instead of buffet arrangements. The guesthouse management refused, due to fear of facilitating poisoning one or more guests – only buffet arrangements could thwart that. </p>
<p>He says that in Tshwane (Pretoria), the seat of government, the National Prosecution Authority no longer orders takeaway lunches for delivery to their premises. Instead, standard procedure is that a staff member buys lunches for all at random take-away shops. </p>
<p>This sinister development culminated in De Ruyter himself being poisoned with cyanide in his coffee in his office, demonstrating how mafia-type gangs had recruited at least one Eskom headquarters staff member.</p>
<h2>Unintended consequences</h2>
<p>In several places De Ruyter also touches on other issues. The unintended consequence of some government policies, such as localisation and <a href="https://www.treasury.gov.za/comm_media/press/2022/2022110801%20Media%20Statement%20-%20PPP%20Regulations%202022.pdf">preferential procurement</a>, is that it costs Eskom two and a half times more to pay for each kilometre of transmission cable than it costs <a href="https://www.nampower.com.na/">Nampower</a> Namibia’s power utility, just across the border. </p>
<p>What stands out from this memoir is that the success of a company demands that a CEO, managers, artisans, guards, and cleaners all take the attitude that the buck stops with them – seven days a week – and act accordingly.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206101/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Gottschalk is a member of the African National Congress, but writes this review in his professional capacity as a political scientist.</span></em></p>The book shows how parts of South Africa now fester with organised crime.Keith Gottschalk, Political Scientist, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2048182023-05-10T13:24:09Z2023-05-10T13:24:09ZNamibia and South Africa’s ruling parties share a heroic history - but their 2024 electoral prospects look weak<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/524080/original/file-20230503-15-wxlrrh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Presidents Hage Geingob, left, and Cyril Ramaphosa at the Union Buildings in Tshwane.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Namibian president Hage Geingob used his <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-state-visit-president-hage-geingob-republic-namibia-20-apr-2023">recent state visit</a> to South Africa to also address a meeting of the national executive committee of the governing party, the African National Congress (<a href="https://www.anc1912.org.za/">ANC</a>). This underscored the ANC’s historic ties to Namibia’s governing party, South West Africa People’s Organisation (<a href="https://www.politicalpartydb.org/wp-content/uploads/Statutes/Namibia/Namibia_Swapo_1998.pdf">Swapo</a>).</p>
<p><a href="https://www.iol.co.za/the-star/news/no-phala-phala-talk-between-ramaphosa-and-hage-geingob-2ca0db5e-074f-44d2-838f-05f39fd54b2c">According to President Cyril Ramaphosa</a>, who also heads the ANC, the party had a “wonderful engagement” with Geingob, who <a href="https://www.facebook.com/DrHageGeingob/">posted on Facebook</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>As former liberation movements, we learn from one another, a manifestation of the deep bonds of solidarity formed during our struggle against oppression.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>As political scientists and sociologists, we both followed individually and jointly the performance of the two organisations since the days of the liberation struggles. We have continuously analysed and commented on trends in their governance of the countries.</p>
<p>In our view, the nostalgic reminiscences of the parties’ days as liberation movements serve as a heroic patriotic history turned into a form of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03056244.2018.1500360">populism</a>. Such romanticism uses the merits of the past to cover failures in the present. It also is a potential threat to the achievements of <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/000203971404900105">constitutionalism</a>. </p>
<p>Geingob’s visit came at a time when both governments under the former liberation movements, Swapo and the ANC, face an erosion of their political legitimacy. With elections in 2024 <a href="https://www.eisa.org/calendar2024.php">in both countries</a>, their challenges are similar.</p>
<p>Both face tough choices about how best to handle the challenges when entering the election year. They have, since moving into office, disappointed expectations, not least in their <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-31-years-after-independence-namibians-arent-in-a-festive-mood-157151">failures</a> to fight <a href="https://www.ufs.ac.za/docs/default-source/news-documents/opinion_politicsandcorruption_gb1.pdf?sfvrsn=3cd06c20_0">corruption</a>. Voters in South Africa and Namibia will in 2024 pass their verdict at the ballot boxes.</p>
<p>How they perform will shape the future of democracy in both countries.</p>
<h2>History with lasting bonds</h2>
<p>South African-Namibian relations have a special history. </p>
<p>After the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/World-War-I">first world war</a>, the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Treaty-of-Versailles-1919">Treaty of Versailles</a> officially ended the war between Germany and the Allied powers. It turned the German colony South West Africa into a <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/mandate-League-of-Nations#ref13450">C-mandate of the new League of Nations</a>. Its administration was delegated to South Africa. It effectively <a href="https://open.uct.ac.za/bitstream/item/9690/thesis_hum_1997_getz_tr.pdf?sequence=1">annexed</a> the territory and <a href="https://www.unmultimedia.org/avlibrary/asset/2040/2040311/">entrenched apartheid</a>. </p>
<p>This led the national liberation movement <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/SWAPO-Party-of-Namibia">Swapo</a> to take up arms. Recognised by the UN General Assembly as the
<a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/189617?ln=en">“sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people”</a>, Swapo and the ANC, which had likewise launched an armed struggle, became <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/Thula_Simpson_abstract.pdf">close allies</a>. Both received <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40283233?seq=8">wide international support</a>.</p>
<h2>From liberation movements to governments</h2>
<p>Under UN supervised elections <a href="http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2225_89.htm">in November 1989</a>, Swapo obtained an absolute majority (58%). Independence was proclaimed on 21 March 1990. The date was chosen by the elected Constituent Assembly in recognition of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Sharpeville-massacre">the Sharpeville massacre</a> in 1961 – when apartheid police murdered 69 unarmed black people protesting against being forced to carry <a href="https://www.facebook.com/ApartheidMuseumSA/posts/heres-what-a-dompas-which-literally-means-dumb-pass-looked-like-during-the-apart/10157134498674628/">identity documents</a> controlling their movement. Released only weeks earlier from prison, Nelson Mandela attended the ceremony as the <a href="https://kapweine.ch/en/independence-from-namibia/">celebrated guest of honour</a>.</p>
<p>Apartheid in South Africa came officially to an end through the result of the first democratic elections in 1994. Like Swapo, the ANC emerged as the <a href="https://www.eisa.org/wep/sou1994results1.htm">majority party (62.7%)</a>. It indicated the success of the democratic settlements in both countries that Swapo and the ANC led processes leading to the drawing up of final constitutions. These embedded accepted democratic principles: free and regular elections, independent judiciaries, bills of fundamental human rights, and the separation of powers of the three branches of government.</p>
<p>Since then, both countries have continued to rank among the top African democracies. Regular elections were largely free and fair. Judiciaries have remained independent and have served as a check on executive power. Both parties initially increased their majorities. Crucially, however, the parliaments dominated by <a href="https://ippr.org.na/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/IPPR%20Opinion%20No%2021%20-parliament.....pdf">Swapo</a> and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-parliament-fails-to-hold-the-executive-to-account-history-shows-what-can-happen-192889">ANC</a> have failed to hold governments to account on major issues.</p>
<h2>Popularity in decline</h2>
<p>Support for the ANC peaked at nearly 70% in the third democratic election <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40607814">in 2009</a>, but by the 5th election <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/south-africas-2019-general-election-post-analysis">in 2019</a>, it had fallen to 57.5%. Even this was regarded as a triumph, put down to the personal <a href="https://www.ipsos.com/en-za/cyril-ramaphosa-popular-amongst-south-africans-political-parties-questionable">popularity of its latest leader, Cyril Ramaphosa</a>.</p>
<p>In the run-up to the elections in 2024, surveys predict the ANC will lose its absolute majority, and be forced to <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/234405/south-africa-shock-poll-shows-anc-heading-towards-2024-coalition/">form a coalition to remain in power</a>. It is also anticipated that it will lose its majority <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/mercury/news/anc-prospects-are-dim-for-2024-elections-c5f442f2-7913-454d-a38f-e041e475a2db">in several provinces</a>. It may even lose Gauteng, the country’s economic hub, and KwaZulu-Natal. It has long lost control of the Western Cape to the opposition <a href="https://www.eisa.org/pdf/JAE9.2Africa.pdf">Democratic Alliance</a>.</p>
<p>In Namibia, Swapo has fared comparatively better. By <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2014-12-02-namibias-swapo-win-elections-geingob-voted-as-president/">2014</a>, it had consolidated its political dominance into a whopping 80% of votes for the National Assembly, and 86% of votes for its directly elected <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/290429183_From_Nujoma_to_Geingob_25_years_of_presidential_democracy">presidential candidate Hage Geingob</a>. But the National Assembly and presidential elections <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00358533.2020.1717090">in 2019</a> marked a turning point. With 65.5% the party lost its two-third majority.</p>
<p>For both, ANC and <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/352737011_Namibia's_Regional_and_Local_Authority_Elections_2020_Democracy_beyond_SWAPO">Swapo</a>, the loss of control over the regional, provincial and <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/democracy-beyond-swapo-in-namibia/">local levels of government</a> has turned politics into a matter of alliances, with shifting coalitions. Politics has become a negotiated commodity.</p>
<p>Principles are regularly traded for power, eroding the trust which citizens place in politicians and democracy. For all that they continue to dominate central government. But, their dominance is being steadily eroded by their lacklustre performance in power and failures in delivery of basic services. <a href="https://f3magazine.unicri.it/?p=402">State capture</a> has become a form of governance.</p>
<h2>2024 and the limits to liberation</h2>
<p>It is too early for any reliable predictions regarding the 2024 election results. While many assume that the ANC will lose its absolute majority, it has an uncanny ability to defy expectations. But even if it squeaks home, its credibility is likely to be further damaged. Unless he is shuffled aside by the ANC (a possibility whispered quietly in dark corners as the brightness of his image dims), Ramaphosa is likely to remain in office as South Africa’s president. But he could be <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-votes-in-2024-could-a-coalition-between-major-parties-anc-and-eff-run-the-country-204141">compelled to lead a coalition government</a>.</p>
<p>Swapo’s electoral prospects seem less bleak, even though it is thought that the opposition will make gains. Geingob’s two terms as state president ends. <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/03/13/namibian-president-names-netumbo-nandi-ndaitwah-woman-successor//">Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah</a> Swapo’s first female candidate, might become the head of state. But in both countries, those holding office will face an uphill battle.</p>
<p>Numerous <a href="https://www.hsrcpress.ac.za/books/limits-to-liberation-in-southern-africa">analyses</a> have explored how former liberation movements in southern Africa have failed the ideals of the liberation struggle when in power, even becoming undemocratic and increasingly corrupt. They have transited <a href="https://www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org/news/when-liberation-movements-don-t-liberate-and-what-africans-can-do-about-it/">from dominance to decline</a>. In many ways, this was to be expected.</p>
<p>Few parties can retain power for decades without losing their popularity. Yet in southern Africa, liberation movements’ loss of popularity is combined with accusations that they have betrayed the promises of freedom. They have <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02589346.2017.1282337">displayed a democratic deficit</a>. By dismissing accountability for the lack of delivery they have squandered their trust and support. </p>
<p>How Swapo and the ANC respond to any further decline will define the future of democracy. Opposition parties are expected to play an increasing role. But the former liberation movements might benefit from their <a href="https://www.eisa.org/pdf/JAE5.1Chiroro.pdf">fragmentation and dilemma</a>. After all, opposition parties have so far offered <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-african-voters-are-disillusioned-but-they-havent-found-an-alternative-to-the-anc-171239">little if any credible alternatives</a> which promise more well-being for the ordinary people.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204818/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Henning Melber is a member of Swapo since 1974. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>How Swapo and the ANC respond to any further decline in electoral support will define the future of democracy in both countries.Henning Melber, Extraordinary Professor, Department of Political Sciences, University of PretoriaRoger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2023662023-03-28T15:28:33Z2023-03-28T15:28:33ZPaul Mashatile, South Africa’s new deputy president, has a critical task: to bring back a sense of stability<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/517666/original/file-20230327-20-x9uext.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Paul Mashatile, the deputy president of South Africa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Foto24/Gallo Images/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In a recent <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/speeches/statement-president-cyril-ramaphosa-changes-national-executive">cabinet reshuffle</a> President Cyril Ramaphosa appointed Paul Mashatile, the deputy president of South Africa’s governing party, the African National Congress (ANC), as the country’s deputy president. The tradition in the ANC since democracy in 1994 has been for its elected deputy president to ascend first to the deputy presidency of the country, and eventually to become head of state. So Mashatile, an <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-has-a-new-deputy-president-in-paul-mashatile-what-he-brings-to-the-table-200089">experienced politician</a>, may also be destined for top office.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa’s cabinet reshuffle took place in a climate of growing <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-has-been-warned-that-it-faces-an-arab-spring-so-what-are-the-chances-187634">restlessness</a> across the nation about the many failures of the state, high levels of corruption and <a href="https://theconversation.com/link-between-crime-and-politics-in-south-africa-raises-concerns-about-criminal-gangs-taking-over-198160">organised crime</a>. </p>
<p>As a political scientist and researcher on security governance matters, I have been considering the role Mashatile could play in responding to the security crisis. </p>
<p>He will serve on two cabinet structures that are crucial to safety and security in the country. Through this he could contribute to rebuilding <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africans-have-low-trust-in-their-police-heres-why-178821">trust</a> that the public has lost in the law enforcement and criminal justice system. </p>
<h2>Justice, crime prevention and security</h2>
<p>One of Mashatile’s <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2023-03-14-ramaphosa-appoints-mashatile-to-chair-cabinet-security-cluster/">tasks</a> is to chair the <a href="https://www.saps.gov.za/resource_centre/publications/naidoo_makananisa_integrated_presentation.pdf">Justice, Crime Prevention and Security</a> cabinet committee. This committee coordinates the work of the ministers who are collectively charged with ensuring safety and stability in the country. During the devastating <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-deadly-july-2021-riots-may-recur-if-theres-no-change-186397">July 2021 unrest</a>, the ministers contradicted each other. They also failed to show a united front against the violence that engulfed several provinces, particularly KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng.</p>
<p>With deft leadership, Mashatile can assist Ramaphosa to address the legacy of poorly coordinated security services. The former minister in the presidency, <a href="https://www.news24.com/citypress/politics/security-cluster-needs-unity-gungubele-20220730">Mondli Gungubele</a>, acknowledged this problem on the anniversary of the deadly July 2021 riots. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-has-a-new-deputy-president-in-paul-mashatile-what-he-brings-to-the-table-200089">South Africa has a new deputy president in Paul Mashatile: what he brings to the table</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The Justice, Crime Prevention and Security cluster was among several cabinet “clusters” established during former president Thabo Mbeki’s tenure. This has cemented a tradition of intergovernmental cooperation ever since. It oversees the work of the following core ministries and departments:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>police</p></li>
<li><p>state security</p></li>
<li><p>justice and correctional services </p></li>
<li><p>home affairs</p></li>
<li><p>defence and military veterans</p></li>
<li><p>finance.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Mashatile will have to contend with a labyrinth of structures responsible for safety. The operational work of the cluster is coordinated by the directors-general of these departments through the National Joint Operational and Intelligence Structure (<a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/national-joint-operational-and-intelligence-structure-natjoints-0700-update-20-mar-2023">NATJOINTS</a>). </p>
<p>While the NATJOINTS operates at national level, its activities are decentralised to provincial structures (<a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/all-hands-on-deck-w-cape-saps-sandf-metro-police-on-high-alert-amid-planned-national-shutdown-20230319">PROVJOINTs</a>). They coordinate security operations at a provincial level. They work with municipal law enforcement and emergency services, and advise the provincial governments on measures they are taking to keep the public safe. </p>
<h2>The National Security Council</h2>
<p>Mashatile will also serve on the <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/notices/2020/20200310-gg42482proc13-COnstitution-NSC.pdf">National Security Council</a>, which is chaired by the president.</p>
<p>The entity is mandated to coordinate a <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-03-01-sas-proposed-national-security-strategy-more-hot-air-or-a-potential-democratic-opening/">national security strategy</a>. It also oversees the annual formulation of a budget and priorities by the country’s <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-01-27-the-ssa-can-improve-but-misconceptions-about-the-role-of-intelligence-services-need-to-be-cleared-up/">intelligence services</a>. It is responsible for coordinating the work of the security services, law enforcement agencies and relevant organs of state to ensure national security. In addition, it receives coordinated, integrated intelligence assessments from the national security structures, and mandates these structures to attend to matters of national security as required.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-needs-strategic-leadership-to-weather-its-storms-its-presidents-have-not-been-up-to-the-task-194296">South Africa needs strategic leadership to weather its storms. Its presidents have not been up to the task</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>There is a significant <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/notices/2020/20200310-gg42482proc13-COnstitution-NSC.pdf">overlap of the membership</a> of the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security cluster of ministers, and the National Security Council. Besides the president and deputy president, the council includes all the ministers who are part of the Police, State Security and Justice cabinet committee, as well as the ministers of home affairs, defence and military veterans, international relations, and cooperative governance and traditional affairs. </p>
<h2>How Mashatile could bring stability</h2>
<p>Ramaphosa has entrusted important functions to his deputy. This suggests a level of confidence and cooperation between the two men, rather than a <a href="https://sundayworld.co.za/news/politics/block-mashatile-ramaphosa-warned/">rivalry</a>. Neither can afford to let the ANC fail in government, as this would augur badly for its <a href="https://www.biznews.com/thought-leaders/2023/02/09/anc-crisis-polls-steep-loss-support-elections">prospects</a> in the 2024 general elections. </p>
<p>Mashatile should prioritise getting a few key systems in place. The visibility and effectiveness of the police in day-to-day policing must improve. He must oversee strategies to combat organised crime, which is strangling so many areas of public life. He must also work to secure the resources to implement the recommendations of the <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/">Zondo Commission on state capture</a>. </p>
<p>With confidence in the state <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/migrated/files/publications/Dispatches/ad474-south_africans_trust_in_institutions_reaches_new_low-afrobarometer-20aug21.pdf">as low as it is</a>, and the public deeply traumatised by high levels of <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2023-02-09-sona-2023-sas-soaring-murder-rate-underscores-need-for-ramaphosa-to-ensure-better-leadership-in-policing/">violent crime</a>, Mashatile must put in extra effort to boost public confidence in the justice, crime prevention and security sector. </p>
<p>He can do this by listening to what key stakeholders have to say about the security of the country. Young people bear the brunt of the epidemic of violence – physical and structural. Attending to their security and <a href="https://theconversation.com/idle-and-frustrated-young-south-africans-speak-about-the-need-for-recreational-facilities-176921">wellbeing</a> is crucial for the country’s future.</p>
<p>He also needs to be more strategically visible than his predecessor, David Mabuza, who <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/politics/government/david-mabuza-the-man-from-mpumalanga-who-quit-as-deputy-president-before-some-argue-ever-starting-20230304">resigned</a> from the position. Mabuza’s job description was almost identical to that of Mashatile’s. Yet he <a href="https://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/ramaphosa-urged-to-appoint-a-competent-deputy-president/">left office with many questioning</a> if he had made any impact. </p>
<h2>New broom</h2>
<p>Mashatile could be the new broom that sweeps clean. Ramaphosa’s apparent confidence in him suggests that he has some latitude to do so. </p>
<p>It is said the job of a deputy president, in practically any country, is <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/elections/articles/2021-01-20/what-does-the-vice-president-do">waiting</a> to replace the president. While Mashatile waits in the wings, he has the opportunity to make a difference and make South Africa a more secure place for the public.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/202366/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sandy Africa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Mashatile could be the new broom that sweeps clean. Ramaphosa’s apparent confidence in him suggests that he has some latitude to do so.Sandy Africa, Associate Professor, Political Sciences, and Deputy Dean Teaching and Learning (Humanities), University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2006962023-02-26T13:19:21Z2023-02-26T13:19:21ZSouth Africa has been grey listed for not stopping money laundering and terrorism funding. What it means<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/512279/original/file-20230225-2133-7jtilj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Africa provides fertile ground for money laundering and terrorism funding.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The Financial Action Task Force <a href="https://www.treasury.gov.za/comm_media/press/2023/2023022401%20Media%20statement%20-%20Response%20to%20FATF.pdf">has placed South Africa</a> on a list of countries under increased monitoring, commonly known as the <a href="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/Increased-monitoring-february-2023.html#:%7E:text=When%20the%20FATF%20places%20a,as%20the%20%E2%80%9Cgrey%20list%E2%80%9D.">grey list</a>, after it failed to address all of the shortcomings on money laundering and the <a href="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/topics/Terrorist-Financing.html">financing of terrorism </a>that the task force identified in its 2019 evaluation of the country. The decision has serious implications for the country, more specifically its financial services sector as well as its ability to attract investment. The Conversation Africa’s political editor Thabo Leshilo talks to Philippe Burger, an economics professor and the dean of the Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences at the University of the Free State, about what the grey listing means for South Africa.</em> </p>
<h2>What does grey listing mean?</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/topics/high-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions.html">Grey listing</a> refers to a country being placed on a list of countries under increased monitoring by the <a href="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/the-fatf/what-we-do.html">Financial Action Task Force (FATF)</a>, the global money laundering and terrorist financing watchdog. The FATF <a href="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/topics/mutual-evaluations.html">evaluates </a> each member country’s implementation and effectiveness of measures to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/countries/detail/South-Africa.html">South Africa </a> has been placed on FATF’s grey list because it does not have sufficient mechanisms in place to monitor and combat money laundering and terrorist financing activities.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/invisible-trillions-review-global-capitalism-operates-beyond-the-rule-of-law-and-threatens-democracy-199311">Invisible Trillions review: global capitalism operates beyond the rule of law and threatens democracy</a>
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<p>The country undertook to work with the FATF to identify strategies and time frames to <a href="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/Increased-monitoring-february-2023.html">improve its monitoring mechanisms</a>. Specifically, it undertook to work with the FATF on <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/treasury-listing-south-africa-financial-action-task-force-24-feb-2023-0000#:%7E:text=Government%20notes%20the%20Financial%20Action,earlier%20today%2C%2024%20February%202023.">eight specific topics</a>. These include increased investigation and prosecution of money laundering and terrorist financing activities. It’ll also enhance its capacity to identify, seize and confiscate the proceeds of such crimes. </p>
<p>South Africa also needs to improve its terrorist financing risk assessment to inform its strategy to counter the financing of terrorism activities. In addition, it needs to ensure the effective implementation of targeted financial sanctions, and create effective mechanism to identify individuals and entities targeted by such sanctions.</p>
<h2>What are the implications?</h2>
<p>Though the FATF does not explicitly require increased due diligence, grey listing will nevertheless in effect require increased due diligence. Banks dealing with cross-border financial flows and companies wanting to invest in South Africa will have to vet their clients and the sources of client income better before they invest. This can be costly and, therefore, discourage investment. <a href="https://www.resbank.co.za/content/dam/sarb/publications/reviews/finstab-review/2022/financial-stability-review/second-edition-2022-financial-stability-review-/Presentation%20%20Second%20Edition%202022%20Financial%20Stability%20Department%20(Dr%20Nicola%20Brink).pdf#page=17">The increased risk</a> associated with South Africa could also result in higher interest rates and cost of capital.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-provides-fertile-ground-for-funders-of-terrorism-heres-why-194282">South Africa provides fertile ground for funders of terrorism. Here's why</a>
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<p>The higher costs that domestic and international companies will incur when they trade or invest across South African borders will put upward pressure on the cost of living of ordinary South Africans. However, of probably even more significance to ordinary South Africans is that the grey listing will likely deter foreign investment, which is needed to stimulate economic growth and job creation. </p>
<h2>Which other countries are grey listed?</h2>
<p>In being grey listed South Africa joins a list of countries, none of which are known as paragons of governance. Some, such as the <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/100215/why-cayman-islands-considered-tax-haven.asp#:%7E:text=In%20addition%20to%20having%20no,are%20therefore%20considered%20tax%20neutral.">Cayman Islands</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/panama-papers-show-how-easy-it-is-to-finance-terror-using-u-s-shell-companies-57539">Panama</a>, are known <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-are-tax-havens-the-answer-explains-why-the-g-7-effort-to-end-them-is-unlikely-to-succeed-163125">tax havens</a> that potentially attract laundered money. Others are known as war zones or countries with jihadist and Islamist terror groupings operating on their land. These include Syria, Yemen, Mali, Nigeria, and Mozambique. The list also includes countries with very weak governments, such as Haiti and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.</p>
<h2>What needs to happen for the grey listing to be lifted?</h2>
<p>South Africa needs to work with the FATF to identify strategies and time frames to improve its monitoring mechanisms. It must then implement these improvements at the latest by January 2025. This might require improved legislation and better monitoring mechanisms to red-flag potential money laundering and terrorist funding flows. </p>
<p>Although the country recently made a belated effort to <a href="https://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/economy/south-africa-greylisted/">improve its legislation </a> to avert being grey listed, it will need to do more. Doing so will require a dedicated focus from the government to</p>
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<li><p>pass additional relevant legislation, </p></li>
<li><p>fund the investigative authorities to combat money laundering and terrorist financing activities, and </p></li>
<li><p>ensure the effective and speedy prosecution of individuals and institutions undertaking such crimes. </p></li>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/sandton-terror-alert-time-for-south-africa-to-improve-its-intelligence-sharing-channels-with-the-us-194542">Sandton terror alert: time for South Africa to improve its intelligence sharing channels with the US</a>
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<p>With the recent history in South Africa of <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/">state capture</a> for private gain by individuals, some of whom are themselves probably guilty of money laundering, the onus will be on the government to show that it is serious about implementing effective legislation and mechanisms to combat money laundering and terrorist funding. Thus, to get out of the rut of grey listing the country will have to fight the rot of money laundering and terrorist funding. The jury, or in this case the Financial Action Task Force, is still out on whether it will succeed in doing so.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200696/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Opinions disclosed in this article by Philippe Burger are made in his private capacity and do not represent the views of any of the institutions from which he received research funding. Philippe Burger received funding from the National Research Foundation as rated researcher. He is also a Non-Resident Senior Research Fellow, United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER), in which capacity he is the lead for the Macro-Fiscal workstream for the SA-TIED II project. He is also a 2016/17 Fulbright Exchange Scholar.</span></em></p>In being grey listed South Africa joins a list of countries with poor governance. Others are war zones or countries with jihadist terror groupings operating on their land.Philippe Burger, Dean: Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences, and Professor of Economics, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2003862023-02-24T11:29:29Z2023-02-24T11:29:29ZSouth Africa’s intelligence agency needs speedy reform - or it must be shut down<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/512012/original/file-20230223-2271-8qc43o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mondli Gungubele, former minister in the Presidency, was in charge of intelligence.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Siyabulela Duga/GCIS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/intelligence-white-paper">civilian intelligence service</a>, the State Security Agency, is a broken institution. It is meant to provide intelligence to forewarn the country about national security threats. </p>
<p>Powerful individuals aligned to former president <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/profiles/president-jacob-zuma-0">Jacob Zuma</a>, presumably at his behest, repurposed the institution to help him maintain his grip on <a href="http://www.saflii.org/images/state-capture-commission-report-part-5-vol1.pdf">power</a>. It was one of many institutions that were repurposed for improper personal or political gain during his tenure (May 2009 to February 2018): a process that has become known as <a href="http://www.saflii.org/images/state-capture-commission-report-part-5-vol1.pdf">state capture</a>. </p>
<p>His successor, President Cyril Ramaphosa, <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2022/10/24/ramaphosa-vows-to-overhaul-ssa-as-per-zondo-commission-recommendations">promised</a> in 2022 to reform the agency so it would serve its original mission. He committed to returning it to the pre-2009 era of having separate domestic and foreign branches, each led by its own director-general. </p>
<p>This decision is a major positive development. The Zuma administration <a href="http://www.saflii.org/images/state-capture-commission-report-part-5-vol1.pdf">merged the two branches</a> and abused the centralised model to protect the president from criticism. </p>
<p>Dismantling this architecture of abuse is happening too slowly, however, with no transitional plan having been announced publicly. Such a plan should include appointing interim heads for the domestic and foreign branches, rather than relying on people in acting positions. The government’s underestimation of the time needed to restructure the intelligence agency could have potentially serious, even dangerous, consequences. </p>
<h2>What went wrong</h2>
<p>The government under Zuma established the State Security Agency in 2009 as an <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/merger-of-spy-agencies-led-to-cabinet-ministers-giving-ssa-operatives-illegal-instructions-20210915">amalgamation</a> of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Intelligence_Agency_(South_Africa)">National Intelligence Agency</a>, the domestic intelligence service, and the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_African_Secret_Service">South African Secret Service</a>, the foreign service.</p>
<p>At that stage, the directors general and other intelligence entities <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9LCm2Ds5V0I">reported directly</a> to the Minister of Intelligence. A coordinating mechanism ensured overall coherence. But in 2021 Ramaphosa <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/ramaphosa-does-away-with-intelligence-ministry-ssa-to-report-directly-to-him-20210805">dissolved</a> the ministry. The agency now reports to the Minister in the Presidency.</p>
<p>The intelligence agency during the Zuma era concentrated too much power in one entity, specifically a super director-general. Hence, it took very little to capture the entire entity for abusive purposes. Officials loyal to the former president used this merged structure to turn the agency into a <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/high-level-review-panel-state-security-agency-9-mar-2019-0000">protective service</a> for him and those close to him politically.</p>
<p>Testimony before the state capture commission showed how the agency’s resources were <a href="http://www.saflii.org/images/state-capture-commission-report-part-5-vol1.pdf">used</a> to improve the fortunes of the governing African National Congress under Zuma’s leadership, by providing his supporters with resources to campaign on his behalf. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/zumas-abuse-of-south-africas-spy-agency-underscores-need-for-strong-civilian-oversight-154439">Zuma's abuse of South Africa's spy agency underscores need for strong civilian oversight</a>
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<p>Despite his administration’s stated objective of integrating the two services, they continued to operate on separate tracks. In fact, the merger <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/high-level-review-panel-state-security-agency-9-mar-2019-0000">eroded</a> the very essence of the intelligence mandate – of forewarning the state of national security threats. The failure of intelligence ahead of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-deadly-july-2021-riots-may-recur-if-theres-no-change-186397">July 2021 riots</a> is a glaring example.</p>
<p>During the Zuma years, the focus on protecting the president led to the intelligence agency <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/high-level-review-panel-state-security-agency-9-mar-2019-0000">prioritising</a> domestic intelligence by spying on citizens at the expense of foreign intelligence. Officials with ill intent also undermined the agency’s intelligence gathering <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/high-level-review-panel-state-security-agency-9-mar-2019-0000">capacity</a>.</p>
<h2>The plan to fix it</h2>
<p>Following Ramaphosa’s promises, then Minister in the Presidency Mondli Gungubele had <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/minister-mondli-gungubele-state-nation-address-debate-14-feb-2023-0000">committed the presidency</a> to ongoing reforms.</p>
<p>He highlighted the unbundling into foreign and domestic branches. This was one of the key recommendations of the 2018 High-Level Review Panel on the State Security Agency’s <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/high-level-review-panel-state-security-agency-9-mar-2019-0000">report</a>. </p>
<p>This would be done through an intelligence laws amendment bill that the intelligence agency intends to introduce to parliament by the end of the current financial year.</p>
<p>This was not the first time Gungubele had made this promise. He did so in May 2022, <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/speeches/address-minister-presidency-responsible-state-security%2C-mondli-gungubele%2C-occasion-2022-23-budget-vote-debate%2C-parliament%2C-cape-town">saying</a> that the bill had been finalised and would be submitted to parliament in September of that year. So it should surprise no one if the new timeline isn’t followed once again.</p>
<p>A new bill should ensure that the new heads of domestic and foreign intelligence have more discretionary power, reducing the power of the director-general. Doing so should make it more likely that this person will confine themselves to an oversight role rather than becoming involved in operational matters.</p>
<h2>The problem with the plan</h2>
<p>The fact that the State Security Agency has been absorbed into the presidency – which is also <a href="https://salaamedia.com/2023/02/19/analysis-ramaphosa-is-building-a-super-presidency-while-ministers-sit-at-home/">accumulating</a> other government entities and functions – could be a gift to any president intent on repeating the abuses of the Zuma administration.</p>
<p>One of the biggest dangers is a delay in appointing leaders of the domestic and foreign intelligence branches. They need direction. The head of the foreign branch was <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/security/national-security/mcbride-suspended-as-ssa-foreign-branch-head/">suspended</a> in July 2021 and the head of the domestic branch <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/ssa-without-a-head-of-domestic-intelligence-after-mahlodi-sam-muofhe-leaves-20210804">left</a> after his contract expired at the end of the same month.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-provides-fertile-ground-for-funders-of-terrorism-heres-why-194282">South Africa provides fertile ground for funders of terrorism. Here's why</a>
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<p>The agency told me that they cannot appoint permanent heads until the bill to restructure the agency becomes a law, and its disestablishment is complete.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/b25a-2011-130416a.pdf">2011 bill</a> that established the amalgamated agency took <a href="https://pmg.org.za/bill/184/">20 months</a> to be signed into law. It would make sense to have a transitional plan, appointing individuals on two-year contracts.</p>
<p>The Zuma administration was characterised by many <a href="https://www.ru.ac.za/perspective/2013archive/zumathekingofacting.html">acting appointments</a> in key positions across government, including the State Security Agency and the <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/zuma-to-appoint-npa-head-by-end-of-august-20150429">National Prosecuting Authority</a>. Relying so heavily on acting appointments weakened the government structures, to enable state capture.</p>
<p>People in acting positions are unable to take strong positions as they lack the security of tenure to do so. But the domestic and foreign branches need strong positions to safeguard South Africa’s security and stability.</p>
<h2>Why this matters</h2>
<p>The result of an intelligence service that is not fit for purpose is that the country is vulnerable to security threats from within and without. South Africans are living with the disastrous consequences – such as <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-09-21-south-africas-organised-crime-climbs-to-italys-levels-racing-past-mexico-somalia-and-libya/">rising organised crime</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/sandton-terror-alert-time-for-south-africa-to-improve-its-intelligence-sharing-channels-with-the-us-194542">Sandton terror alert: time for South Africa to improve its intelligence sharing channels with the US</a>
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<p>Going back to separate foreign and domestic services is the last chance civilian intelligence has to re-establish its credibility. </p>
<p>The current round of restructuring the State Security Agency cannot fail. If it does it will have to be shut down and restarted from scratch. </p>
<p>The South American country Colombia did just that. In 2011, the government there <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/americas/colombias-troubled-intelligence-agency-shuttered/2011/11/28/gIQA7mnzTO_story.html">shut down</a> the Administrative Department of Security (DAS), after it went rogue and engaged in criminal activities under the guise of fighting the war on drugs. </p>
<p>Unless the Ramaphosa administration expedites the State Security Agency’s restructuring, then the Colombian option will be the only one that makes sense for the agency. </p>
<p>*This story has been updated to reflect that Mondli Gungubele has since been appointed as Communications Minister in the SA cabinet.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200386/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span><a href="mailto:jane.duncan@glasgow.ac.uk">jane.duncan@glasgow.ac.uk</a> receives funding from the British Academy and Luminate.</span></em></p>Having an intelligence service that is not fit for purpose means the country is vulnerable to security threats from within and outside the country.Jane Duncan, Professor of Digital Society, University of GlasgowLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1993112023-02-15T08:38:29Z2023-02-15T08:38:29ZInvisible Trillions review: global capitalism operates beyond the rule of law and threatens democracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508894/original/file-20230208-15-42994g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Achieving greater transparency and accountability in democratic governance and in capitalist economics must occur simultaneously. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Secrecy has become as important for corporations as transparent and taxable profits used to be, according to Raymond W. Baker in his new <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/60978837-invisible-trillions">book</a> Invisible Trillions. Global capitalism, he argues, operates beyond the rule of law. This contributes to extreme inequality that threatens liberal democracy.</p>
<p>Deals in the financial secrecy system account for half of global economic operations. This is far beyond illicit transfers of funds through corporate under-pricing and overpricing of exports and imports, or the drug and other criminal networks 50 years ago. Tax havens, “shell companies”, anonymous trust accounts, fake foundations and new digitised money laundering technologies have proliferated. Add to that falsified trade. All of this is facilitated by international lawyers, accountants and financial strategists based mostly in rich countries. </p>
<p>The book’s timely contribution is how financial secrecy threatens both free enterprise and political freedoms. Both are critical to dealing with current inequalities afflicting humanity and to meeting challenges in public health, climate, and elsewhere.</p>
<p>Baker indicts the United States as the biggest user of the financial secrecy system, and the biggest recipient of dirty money from around the world. A key indication of the cost of this is that gaps between top and average wages in the US have shot up from 20 to 1 in 1960 to 350 to one today. Had this not occurred, Baker told me he estimates, the middle class would now be better off by US$50 trillion. </p>
<h2>Pioneering work</h2>
<p>A <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Capitalisms-Achilles-Heel-Free-Market-System/dp/1119086612">pioneer</a> in exposing illicit financial flows, Baker is a member of the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/40545-doc-IFFs_REPORT.pdf">High-Level Panel</a> on the subject commissioned by the African Union (AU) and UN Economic Commission for Africa. It was chaired by former South African president Thabo Mbeki from 2011 to 2015. It is suspended pending further funding. Invisible Trillions should spur renewed work by the panel.</p>
<p>The panel’s <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/40545-doc-IFFs_REPORT.pdf">2015 report</a> estimated that in the previous half-century, Africa lost over a US$ trillion in illicit money flows. This is about what Africa received in official development assistance over the same period. Baker made a similar finding in his <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Capitalisms-Achilles-Heel-Free-Market-System/dp/1119086612">2005 book</a>, Capitalism’s Achilles Heel. </p>
<p>He began his career as an entrepreneur in Nigeria after independence, applying his 1960 Harvard MBA to launch several successful local businesses in the 1960s and 1970s. After relocating to Washington, DC in the 1980s, he became a guest fellow at the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/">Brookings Institution</a>. He eventually founded <a href="https://gfintegrity.org/">Global Financial Integrity</a> in 2006. The research institute continues to produce seminal research and policy analysis on all aspects of the secretive world of illicit financial flows.</p>
<h2>Clean up must begin from above</h2>
<p>Baker is cogently critical not only of the complicity of the US and its corporations, but also law firms, auditors and consulting companies that abet tax avoidance, concentration of wealth, and corruption of government officials. He accuses the US and China, which together account <a href="https://statisticstimes.com/economy/united-states-vs-china-economy.php">for over 40% of the world’s nominal GNP</a>, of knowingly exploiting secrecy in global economic relations. </p>
<p>Little wonder that 193 members of the United Nations have pledged to halt illicit financial flows, but with little discernible effect. Meanwhile, the COVID pandemic, the war in Ukraine and climate change worsen inequality within and among nations.</p>
<p>Concise and accessible, Invisible Trillions has three parts:</p>
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<li><p>Democratic Capitalism at Risk</p></li>
<li><p>Corroding the Commons</p></li>
<li><p>Renewing Democratic Capitalism.</p></li>
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<h2>Rogue capitalism</h2>
<p>I found Baker’s criticisms of capitalism in the US to be reasonable, his indictments of corruption and authoritarianism illuminating, and his emphasis on fairness, justice, equity and human rights hopeful. America’s leading democracy scholar, <a href="https://politicalscience.stanford.edu/people/larry-diamond">Larry Diamond of Stanford University</a>, wrote the book’s foreword. As he asserts:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Only radical improvements across the globe in financial transparency and accountability and in regulatory capacity and integrity can break this cycle of political decay and despair. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Baker, however, carefully avoids analysis of the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2018/11/06/united-states-isnt-democracy-and-was-never-intended-be/">structural deficiencies</a> of US democracy. He defers to others to build on his analysis of how secretive concentrations of wealth became possible with the complicity of banks, corporations and “complicit governments” in key chapters of Part II.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
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<p>Although the book is mainly about the “rogue capitalism” of the US, it includes the impact of secrecy on economic behaviour further afield, using seven country case studies. Featured are the two dictatorships – Russia and China – plus a flawed pluralistic democracy, South Africa, an example of <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-state-capture-commission-nears-its-end-after-four-years-was-it-worth-it-182898">state capture</a>. Other examples of where secrecy serves autocrats are Guatemala, Venezuela, Myanmar and Iran.</p>
<p>The South African case shows well the role played by foreign corporations, international lawyers and public relations firms in corruption. Baker concludes Part II with a very short chapter, “Hiding in Silos”. It is critical of western attempts to spread the rule of law while ignoring</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the degree to which the capitalist system (is) operating increasingly beyond the rule of law.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This sets up Part III, in which he proposes ways and means for “Renewing Democratic Capitalism”.</p>
<h2>Renewing democratic capitalism</h2>
<p>In Baker’s view, democracy is self-correcting, but capitalism is not. His main message is: reform capitalism or forfeit democracy.</p>
<p>His suggestions focus on the US and its potential for either causing disaster or preventing it. This will depend, he argues, on the US government requiring greater transparency, accountability and governance reforms by corporations.</p>
<p>He advocates forcing banks and other financial institutions to once again separate lending and investing. And audit firms should not offer costly financial advice – another conflict of interest.</p>
<p>Baker recommends government action on increasing minimum wages to $15 an hour, ensuring universal healthcare, waiving student debt, and a reckoning with “race”. He also urges a reducing inequality among nations. In sum, an agenda much like that of the Biden administration.</p>
<p>Unless national Democratic majorities continue to grow and press effectively for <a href="https://www.amacad.org/ourcommonpurpose/report">bi-partisan democratic reforms</a>, it is difficult to imagine the country playing the kind of constructive democratic role at home or abroad that Baker calls for.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199311/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John J Stremlau does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Raymond W. Baker says the estimated hundreds of billions of dollars in hidden wealth a decade ago has skyrocketed to trillions today.John J Stremlau, Honorary Professor of International Relations, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1992192023-02-08T11:00:18Z2023-02-08T11:00:18ZState capture in South Africa: time to think differently about redress and recovering the stolen loot<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508584/original/file-20230207-13-4il90j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Matshela Koko, former acting group CEO of Eskom, testifies at the state capture commission in 2021. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> Luba Lesolle/ Gallo Images via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africans are plunged into darkness daily by <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-12-12-dark-dumb-and-dangerous-inside-south-africas-perfect-electrical-storm/">rolling power cuts</a>. These are a stark reminder of the destruction that years of state capture wreaked on Eskom, the state-owned <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/judicial-commission-inquiry-state-capture-report-part-4-volume-4-29-apr-2022-0000">power utility</a>. </p>
<p>Eskom’s inability to meet the energy needs of citizens and the economy is now the undeniable example of how state capture made parastatals and other state institutions ineffective. The country urgently needs action to recover the stolen funds and fix the economy. </p>
<p>So far, President Cyril Ramaphosa has offered only a few general targets, and outcomes have been dissatisfying. For example, the “<a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/speeches/address-president-cyril-ramaphosa-response-state-capture-commission-report%2C-union-buildings%2C-tshwane">total of R2.9 billion</a>” that he said law enforcement agencies have recovered is only a small fraction of the estimated <a href="https://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/south-africa/state-capture-scorecard-r500bn-looted-zero-assets-recovered/">R500 billion</a> stolen through state capture. Impunity lies at the root of this mess.</p>
<p>The culture of impunity has lingered since the presidency of <a href="https://pari.org.za/betrayal-promise-report/">Jacob Zuma</a>. If it is to be replaced with a new era of integrity and accountability, a lot more needs to be done. But what, and how exactly?</p>
<p>In my <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/full/10.2989/CCR.2022.0001">paper</a> I answer this question by proposing a workable, constitutionally congruent plan. I lay the foundations for a new anti-corruption redress system which would help government to recover the money and restore dignity to the people of South Africa.</p>
<p>The starting point in my argument is that the constitutional <a href="https://civicsacademy.co.za/what-is-the-separation-of-powers/">separation of powers</a> – the division of state authority and core functions – includes a fourth branch of state. It’s best described as the “integrity and accountability branch” and it should include the <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/full/10.2989/CCR.2022.0001">prosecuting authority</a>. </p>
<p>When the special role of the prosecuting authority is thus understood, prosecutorial policy can be harnessed to begin recovering the illegal profits of state capture. This should start urgently – pending the necessary legislative intervention – with the use of the internationally recognised redress tool, the non-trial resolution. This tool can be adjusted to fit the South African constitutional context.</p>
<h2>Non-trial resolutions reimagined</h2>
<p>Non-trial resolutions are mechanisms to resolve corruption cases without the need for a full criminal trial. Criminal trials entail an onerous burden of proof, “beyond reasonable doubt”. They also tend to be protracted and costly to run. Economic corruption cases are especially difficult to prosecute, given the complex nature of the fraud, which tends to cross international borders. </p>
<p>Non-trial resolutions take various forms and are used <a href="https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/WorkingGroups/workinggroup2/2021-September-6-10/CAC-COSP-WG.2-2021-CRP.1.pdf">extensively internationally</a>. They include a plea bargain, a deferred prosecution agreement, a non-prosecution agreement and a more <a href="https://assets-global.website-files.com/5e0bd9edab846816e263d633/5f15e0a4a35dd9b7abd817b1_FACTI%20BP6%20Foreign%20bribery.pdf">informal declination to prosecute</a> (for example, by way of letter).</p>
<p>To ensure localised fit and legitimacy, these instruments should collectively be termed “anti-corruption redress” mechanisms. In my <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/full/10.2989/CCR.2022.0001">article</a>, I explain how and why it would be constitutional to start concluding such non-trial resolutions with state capture offenders pending the legislative introduction of the anti-corruption redress system I propose. </p>
<p>For now, prosecutorial policy (for example, by way of directives) could be issued to make use of a potentially valuable section of the <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/1998-032.pdf">National Prosecuting Authority Act, 1998</a>: section 38. It allows the prosecuting authority to use specialists (such as forensic and legal experts) in “specific cases”. </p>
<p>State capture is surely a “specific case” deserving special attention. Section 38 could thus be used to conclude deferred prosecution agreements, or other types of anti-corruption redress agreements. These would be concluded with people or entities who report their illegal profits themselves, or who are identified by whistle-blowers. This way, money can start flowing back into the public purse sooner rather than later.</p>
<p>These agreements would set out the redress deliverables (such as paying back the money back by a certain date and rehabilitating the pillaged entity) and other rights and obligations of the parties. At this stage, no penalties for wrongdoing should be imposed – that needs legislative backing because the law presumes innocence.</p>
<p>But, to reiterate, recouping the ill-gotten profits of state capture can start (via prosecutorial policy). This component of my proposal is inspired by former Constitutional Court judge Johan Froneman’s formulation of the “no profit, no loss principle” in the <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2015/7hoa.pdf">2014 case of All Pay 2</a>. </p>
<p>The nub of this principle is that although penalties cannot be imposed without the proper application of the law, public accountability means that there is no right to profits unlawfully gained. The Zondo Commission <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/site/information/reports">reports</a> provide details of who gained illegally.</p>
<h2>Legislative reform</h2>
<p>While the disgorgement (surrender) of the illegal profits gets underway as described above, the foundations can be laid for more comprehensive legislative reform. This is the third component of my proposal. I suggest that the country doesn’t need entirely new legislation on non-trial resolutions as suggested in the <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/site/files/announcements/673/OCR_version_-_State_Capture_Commission_Report_Part_1_Vol_I.pdf">Zondo reports</a>. </p>
<p>Rather, it should simply amend section 38 of the <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/national-prosecuting-authority-act#:%7E:text=The%20National%20Prosecuting%20Authority%20Act,provide%20for%20matters%20connected%20therewith">National Prosecuting Authority Act, 1998</a> to introduce the fully fledged anti-corruption redress system. As part of this system, there would be an anti-corruption redress body – perhaps a commission as a subset of the prosecuting authority’s existing <a href="https://www.npa.gov.za/specialised-commercial-crime-unit">Specialised Commercial Crimes Unit</a>. It would need to be staffed with the right mix of experts. Cases would be determined on the lower civil standard of proof: “a balance of probabilities”. </p>
<p>The legislative intervention should provide for administrative fines (basically civil monetary penalties). These should be a percentage of the unlawful benefit the party gained from the corrupt deal. Administrative fines are already used in the country’s <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/competition-act-guidelines-determination-administrative-penalties-prohibited-practices-17">competition</a> and <a href="https://cer.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Fourie-M-SAJELP-Paper-June-2009-Final.pdf">environmental</a> law regimes. They can improve deterrence and enhance redress. </p>
<p>The proposed commission would determine the appropriate redress measures in a given case. It would weigh factors in the “redress balance” such as the extent of the harm, repeat offending, willingness to make reparations and good faith. So, for example, there might be an agreement to defer (delay) criminal prosecution if the offender displays good faith, cooperates and meets all repayment (and other reparation) obligations. The findings of the commission would be <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/full/10.2989/CCR.2022.0001">open to review by a tribunal of record</a> – much like the competition tribunal.</p>
<p>In conclusion, the proposed anti-corruption redress system is fundamentally about the right mix of retributive and restorative justice to restore the dignity of the people of South Africa. It would help rebuild public trust in government, reduce impunity and usher in an era of enhanced integrity and accountability. Now is the time to make this happen.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199219/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lauren Kohn received funding from the Oppenheimer Memorial Trust for her Doctoral Project. </span></em></p>The culture of impunity that has lingered since the presidency of Jacob Zuma has to give way to a new era of integrity and accountability.Lauren Kohn, Scholar & Legal Expert: Administrative & Constitutional Law, Department of Public Law (UCT); Attorney of the High Court of SA; Young Research Fellow (UCT); Founder: www.SALegalAdvice.co.za, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1992082023-02-07T09:02:12Z2023-02-07T09:02:12ZSouth Africa’s ruling party has favoured loyalty over competence - now cadre deployment has come back to bite it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508636/original/file-20230207-17-m2lqtf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supra Mahumapelo, former premier of North West Province, former president Jacob Zuma and current president Cyril Ramaphosa at an ANC celebration in 2016.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Thulani Mbele/Sowetan/Gallo Images/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321223498_The_African_National_Congress_ANC_and_the_Cadre_Deployment_Policy_in_the_Postapartheid_South_Africa_A_Product_of_Democratic_Centralisation_or_a_Recipe_for_a_Constitutional_Crisis">Cadre deployment</a> is one of the best-known policies of the African National Congress (ANC), which has governed South Africa since the end of apartheid <a href="https://www.britannica.com/question/How-did-apartheid-end">in 1994</a>. And many of the party’s woes over the past decade can be traced back to it. </p>
<p>The concept of “deployment” has a strong military association. Conventionally, it is about tactical deployment of troops or infrastructure during military operations. In this instance it is used to describe how the ANC places people in strategic positions at various levels of government.</p>
<p>“Cadre” refers to a dedicated, highly motivated and trained member of an organisation or party. Not all members of such an organisation are, therefore, cadres. During its years as an underground organisation when many of its members were in exile, the ANC used the term to describe members who were ideologically schooled in party thinking. The term is much more loosely applied today.</p>
<p>Cadre deployment is part of official ANC policy. It is applied at national, provincial and local level. </p>
<p>But there is growing <a href="http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S2077-49072021000100015">discontent</a> in the country about it. Many blame it for the widespread corruption and mismanagement in government. The main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), has gone to court to have the policy declared illegal and <a href="https://cdn.da.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/27130536/2.-Founding-Affidavit-Signed.pdf">against the constitution</a>. </p>
<p>It is unrealistic to argue that there should be no political involvement in important appointments in the public service. It happens in almost all political systems. Take, for example, the American president’s role in <a href="https://www.senate.gov/legislative/nominations/SupremeCourtNominations1789present.htm">nominating all new judges of the Supreme Court</a>. The Senate must confirm these appointments, but the nomination process is a party political one. This is not regarded as unlawful or unconstitutional.</p>
<p>So why the deep concern about it in South Africa? Can the practice be reconciled with the democratic tradition?</p>
<h2>The problem with cadre deployment</h2>
<p>One of many components of any effective democracy is regular changes in government. Changes in which party governs a country are accompanied by changes in the top political appointments in the public service. This avoids party appointees becoming entrenched in their positions. </p>
<p>The problem for South Africa is that only one party has run the national government since 1994. It means that a rotation of senior officials with different political orientations has not happened. It also means that specific views and practices have become entrenched, and the procedural protection provided by checks and balances have become ineffective. Merit as a prerequisite for senior appointments was replaced by party loyalty. </p>
<p>More recently, the ANC is experiencing the public’s unhappiness with this state of affairs. It has already <a href="https://theconversation.com/local-council-turmoil-shows-south-africa-isnt-very-good-at-coalitions-128489">lost its majority in major cities</a> such as Johannesburg, the country’s economic hub; Tshwane, the seat of government; and Nelson Mandela Bay, in the Eastern Cape, the party’s historical stronghold.</p>
<p>Behind this loss of support are state capture, poor service delivery and a decline in state institutional capacity.</p>
<p>The common denominator in all of them is cadre deployment. </p>
<h2>The ANC and cadre deployment</h2>
<p>Cadre deployment as an ANC policy is used for two purposes. The first is to appoint its members to key public positions. The second is internally in the ANC, for members who move from one position to another. In the past, it used to be an honour for a member to claim that he or she was deployed as a cadre. That’s because it suggested that the member is disciplined, obeys the ANC’s instructions and is not motivated by personal interests. That honourable association with the policy has turned into a negative perception for the public in general. </p>
<p>Over the last two decades, the policy has increasingly come under attack for justifying the appointment of key people who are not necessarily qualified for their positions, and who even act in their own interests. Even in the case of qualified persons, their appointments happened under the cloud of privileged treatment and not a level playing field.</p>
<p>Cadre deployment has also become contentious within the ANC itself because of growing factionalism. This practice influences who are appointed as cabinet ministers and senior managers of state-owned enterprises and the public service.</p>
<p>Discontent with the way the policy has been implemented has led to some proposed changes. </p>
<p>In October 2022 the cabinet <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/remarks-acting-minister-public-service-and-administration-mr-tw-nxesi-cabinet-approval">adopted</a> the “National Framework towards the Professionalisation of the Public Sector”. It <a href="https://www.polity.org.za/article/cabinet-wants-ancs-cadre-deployment-policy-ditched-2022-10-27">agreed that</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>the cadre deployment practices must be reconsidered for merit-based recruitment and selection in the public sector.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Earlier, in August 2022, President Cyril Ramaphosa signed legislation that prevents city managers and senior municipal officers from <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/politics/parliament/depoliticising-municipalities-ramaphosa-signs-law-barring-municipal-managers-from-political-office-20220818">holding office in any political party</a>. </p>
<p>The two decisions are important steps in separating the powers of the political executive and the public service. Enforcement of this new principle will not be easy, but it sets an alternative for cadre deployment.</p>
<h2>Big challenges</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/notices/2018/20180713-gg41772_gen396-SCAPcomms-Rules.pdf">Zondo Commission</a>, which investigated corruption, fraud, maladministration and unethical conduct during former president Jacob Zuma’s administration, concluded that cadre deployment <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202206/electronic-state-capture-commission-report-part-vi-vol-ii.pdf">contributed towards state capture</a>.</p>
<p>This conclusion adds a judicial aspect to criticism of the policy, and also questions its moral justification.</p>
<p>The DA was motivated by the commission’s report to challenge cadre deployment in court. The party wants to have the policy declared unlawful and against the constitution. </p>
<p>The case is significant in many respects. </p>
<p>Firstly, it has created an opportunity for the DA to challenge the ANC on how it has structured the relationship between the party, government and state. The cadre deployment policy can show how the three became conflated at an early stage of the ANC’s tenure in power.</p>
<p>Abuse of cadre deployment, moreover, puts the ANC’s record of governance and service delivery in the spotlight. Given the policy, the ANC cannot claim that its bad governance record is primarily due to bad officials or individual problems. Cadre deployment means that the party has to take responsibility for the poor standard of governance – not just implicated individual officials. </p>
<p>This line of thinking has emerged as a contentious matter in the question of <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/opinion/eskoms-problems-primarily-due-to-failure-of-ancs-policies-%206e135683-9a9f-4be0-af4f-7d53fd651b2a">who should carry responsibility for the failures of the power utility, Eskom</a>.</p>
<p>Secondly, the court case gives the DA an opportunity to link cadre deployment to state capture in general, and the ANC’s abuse of government powers. This allows it to challenge the ruling party’s moral claim to be the main agent for transforming South Africa into a democratic and humane society. </p>
<p>Thirdly, the court case presents a serious predicament for the ANC. Many of its members joined the party because of the job opportunities that cadre deployment provides. If the ANC distances itself from the policy it will lose some of its attraction.</p>
<h2>The end of an era?</h2>
<p>It is very likely to lose momentum. The decline in support for the ANC suggests that coalition governments will become increasingly common in the country. It’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-stable-national-coalition-government-in-south-africa-possible-but-only-if-elites-put-countrys-interests-first-193828">possible that the ANC will have to share power</a> in the national sphere after the <a href="https://www.eisa.org/calendar2024.php">2024 general election</a>. Governing in coalitions will make it virtually impossible for cadre deployment to continue in its current form. </p>
<p>The implication of these changes in power relations is that cadre deployment in its ANC format will have to make way for a different relationship between the governing parties and senior public servants. </p>
<p>Instead of regular government rotations, the diversification of government in the form of coalitions will also serve as necessary checks and balances on the political-bureaucratic relations and transform cadre deployment into a more acceptable practice.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199208/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dirk Kotze does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The decline in support for the ANC suggests that coalition governments will become increasingly common in the country, affecting its appointment policy.Dirk Kotze, Professor in Political Science, University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1981602023-02-06T14:58:00Z2023-02-06T14:58:00ZLink between crime and politics in South Africa raises concerns about criminal gangs taking over<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/507613/original/file-20230201-8719-bz77s1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African President Cyril Ramaphosa receives reports of the of the state capture commission from Justice Raymond Zondo. The reports found exposed massive state corruption involving private individuals and companies. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A <a href="https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/GI-TOC-Strategic-Organized-Crime-Risk-Assessment-South-Africa.pdf">report</a> by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime (Gitoc) released in September 2022 argues that South Africa has increasingly become a centre of organised crime, transcending national boundaries.</p>
<p>The picture emerging from the report is that there are organised networks inside and outside the state that enable, facilitate and exploit opportunities for private gain. Or, they exercise unfair advantage in economic activity in the public and private sectors, using coercive methods. Some actively go about <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-needs-stronger-security-in-place-to-stop-the-sabotage-of-its-power-supply-187889">sabotaging critical infrastructure</a> to benefit from this.</p>
<p>The areas of public life where criminals exploit or intimidate their way into influence are growing. In recent times grand-scale crime has seeped through to <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/global-health/terror-and-security/mystery-murdered-whistleblower-babita-deokaran-who-uncovered/">healthcare</a>, <a href="https://mg.co.za/opinion/2023-01-13-shooting-at-fort-hare-university-highlights-corruption-at-south-african-universities/">education</a> and <a href="https://www.mining.com/eskom-ceo-de-ruyter-survives-alleged-poisoning-attempt/">parastatals</a>. Speaking out against malfeasance comes at a high price.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/crime-covid-and-climate-change-south-african-tourism-faces-many-threats-but-its-resilient-192505">Crime, COVID and climate change - South African tourism faces many threats, but it’s resilient</a>
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<p>This is apart from the scores of <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-06-27-the-underworld-runs-the-anc-assassinations-analysis-shows-stark-reality-of-violence-in-kzn/">political assassinations of local activists</a> and officials, either for political gain or sheer vengeance against those who dare to call out corruption. </p>
<h2>Mafia state</h2>
<p>There is no doubt that there is a growing ecosystem of organised crime overwhelming the state and public life in the country. And, because political actors or state institutions are so often implicated in it, some commentators are even asking if South Africa is becoming a <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-11-10-00-the-mafia-state-is-in-full-swing/">“mafia state”</a>. </p>
<p>The term “mafia state” refers to the interpenetration of governments and organised crime networks. In his influential 2012 article, <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2012/04/25/mafia-states-pub-47954">Mafia States</a>, Venezuelan journalist and writer Moises Naim said: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>In a mafia state, high government officials actually become integral players in, if not the leaders of, criminal enterprises, and the defence and promotion of those enterprises’ businesses become official priorities.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>There is no single prototype for when a state can be labelled a mafia state. The concept is best thought of as a spectrum. The most extreme cases involve politicians at the highest levels taking direct control of organised crime operations. Other characteristics are collusion between crime syndicates and powerful political figures, money laundering to hide illicit proceeds, and the use of violence and intimidation to protect those involved.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/GI-TOC-Strategic-Organized-Crime-Risk-Assessment-South-Africa.pdf">Gitoc report</a> shies away from using the label “mafia state” to describe South Africa. What it does make clear is that there is a proliferation of crime networks that involves not just criminal “kingpins” and politically connected individuals but also ordinary people. They become part of this “value chain”, for different historical reasons. But South Africa may be reaching a point where the link between crime and politics is sustained because there are role-players who do not want to see it changing. </p>
<h2>Fighting corruption</h2>
<p>The prevalence of criminal elements within the state does not mean that the whole of the state has become a criminal enterprise. But it is true that many state institutions, have been targeted by criminals, with the collusion of people on the inside.</p>
<p>South Africans are not resigned to the criminalisation of the state, and are actively challenging it. Many of the revelations about fraud, corruption and nepotism come from principled whistle-blowers within state structures. Others come from the relatively free media, and voices in civil society and politics. Some of the malfeasance has been revealed by <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-08-15-the-zondo-report-has-clearly-fingered-the-enablers-of-state-capture-now-its-time-for-reparations/">inquiries initiated by the executive</a> itself. This is the case with the Zondo Commission, which <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/">probed state capture</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/using-the-south-african-army-to-fight-crime-is-a-bad-idea-heres-why-85627">Using the South African army to fight crime is a bad idea: here's why</a>
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<p>Poor communication strategies make it difficult for ordinary citizens to assess how the state is responding to these challenges. A case in point is the government’s decision to <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/opinions/columnists/mpumelelo_mkhabela/mpumelelo-mkhabela-when-did-eskom-crisis-become-a-national-security-crisis-requiring-the-army-20230111">deploy the military</a> to beef up security at several electricity generation facilities. It remains to be seen whether the deployment will be able to stop the acts of sabotage that the ESKOM senior management claim to be a major factor in the worsening energy crisis. </p>
<p>As with the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-lies-behind-social-unrest-in-south-africa-and-what-might-be-done-about-it-166130">July 2021 riots</a>, sparked by the jailing of former president Jacob Zuma for contempt of court, there are <a href="https://mg.co.za/news/2022-12-15-gordhan-calls-out-mantashes-bizarre-accusations-applauds-de-ruyters-efforts-at-eskom/">conflicting public pronouncements</a> from cabinet ministers on critical sectors and services affected by crime.</p>
<h2>The political economy of organised crime</h2>
<p>The South African economy has a formal sector (“first economy”) and an informal sector (“second economy”). Economists call this a <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/05/south-africas-economy-in-5-charts/">dual economy</a>. To this should be added a “third economy” – the illicit economic activities described above, that have seeped into the formal and informal economies. </p>
<p>The overlap between the licit and the illicit economy in South Africa is complex. Even big, multinational companies may also <a href="https://www.pplaaf.org/cases/bain.html">covertly engage in illicit operations</a> in spite of appearances. On the other hand, criminals often exploit vulnerable people where the state has failed to meet basic needs: they offer jobs, opportunities and income, a phenomenon seen not only in South Africa, but <a href="https://www.thebrokeronline.eu/poverty-and-unemployment-encourage-organized-crime-d6/">across the African continent</a>. </p>
<h2>Looking forward</h2>
<p>Part of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-needs-stronger-security-in-place-to-stop-the-sabotage-of-its-power-supply-187889">reset</a> South Africa needs to untangle political and crime networks is better policing and security strategies. The state must be able to assert its authority in the interests of the majority, law-abiding citizens who want to live honest lives in a climate of certainty.</p>
<p>If the crime-politics nexus is being deliberately sustained through the collusion of influential actors within the state, then it is going to be much harder to dismantle. </p>
<p>The resources being spent to address crime will be ineffective. The spectre of corrupt, pliable or compromised people in the criminal justice sector will make the future more unstable. Violence and threats against those who stand up against organised crime will become more commonplace. </p>
<p>The reports of the <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/site/information/reports">Zondo Commission</a>, the <a href="https://www.siu.org.za/investigation-reports/">Special Investigating Unit</a>, whistle-blower reports, work by <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-investigative-journalists-helped-turn-the-tide-against-corruption-in-south-africa-93434">investigative journalists</a>, research by <a href="https://pari.org.za/betrayal-promise-report/">academics</a>, <a href="https://issafrica.org/research/southern-africa-report/investigating-corruption-in-south-africa-cooperation-or-conflict">think tanks</a> and <a href="https://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/">civil society organisations</a>, all go some way towards showing how the slide towards a criminal state can be halted. The criminal justice system must bring criminals to book, not give way to impunity. </p>
<p>But more important than combating crime is asking the difficult questions about how ordinary people end up involved in organised crime, and why the country’s democracy is becoming <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africans-hold-contradictory-views-about-their-democracy-159647">more polarised</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/many-kenyans-have-embraced-vigilante-cops-an-ineffective-police-force-is-to-blame-196449">Many Kenyans have embraced vigilante cops – an ineffective police force is to blame</a>
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<p>If the dire <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-is-trapped-again-what-kind-of-leaders-can-set-the-country-free-187704">socio-economic conditions</a> persist, there is every likelihood that organised criminals will continue to exploit the contradictions in society, and organised crime markets will expand. </p>
<p>The stakes are high. Stopping South Africa from becoming a “mafia state” ought to be a priority for everyone. This will become a key issue of concern to voters ahead of the 2024 national general elections.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198160/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sandy Africa is affiliated with the University of Pretoria's Faculty of Humanities, which partnered with the Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime (GITOC), the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) to launch GITOC's 'Strategic Organised Crime Risk Assessment: South Africa' in September 2022.</span></em></p>South Africans are actively challenging the criminalisation of the state. Many of the revelations about fraud, corruption and nepotism come from principled whistle-blowers within the state.Sandy Africa, Associate Professor, Political Sciences, and Deputy Dean Teaching and Learning (Humanities), University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1991062023-02-04T13:35:05Z2023-02-04T13:35:05ZRobberies surge as criminals take advantage of South Africa’s power outages<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/507867/original/file-20230202-7334-5x6ocd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The acute energy crisis in South Africa has adversely affected all aspects of the society. Regular and lengthy power outages – which started <a href="https://www.eskom.co.za/heritage/history-in-decades/eskom-2003-2012/#:%7E:text=His%20low%2Dkey%20approach%20came,the%20integrity%20of%20the%20grid">in 2007</a> are also contributing to an escalation in the levels of criminal activity, especially street crime. The most recent <a href="https://www.saps.gov.za/services/crimestats.php">quarterly crime statistics</a> – have undermined an <a href="https://mg.co.za/business/2023-01-21-blackouts-add-to-risk-of-recession/">ailing economy</a> and <a href="https://www.citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/load-shedding-impacting-food-security-sa/">food security</a>, as well as <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/statement-minister-health-impact-loadshedding-provision-healthcare-services-and">health</a> and <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/education-sector-concerned-as-impact-of-load-shedding-cuts-down-valuable-teaching-studying-time-20220920#:%7E:text=%22Load%20shedding%20is%20disruptive%20to,reliant%20on%20technology%2C%20said%20Cembi.">educational</a> outcomes.</p>
<p>It has become evident that power cuts added to a significant increase in all robbery categories – for July to September 2022 – compared to the same period in 2021. This corresponded with the most severe power cuts the country had ever experienced.</p>
<p>In addition, the police service’s <a href="https://www.saps.gov.za/services/downloads/Annual-Crime-2021_2022-web.pdf">annual crime data</a> for the period 2012/13-2021/22 shows there was a spike in robberies in 2015. This was a year of <a href="https://mybroadband.co.za/news/energy/470217-scary-load-shedding-statistic-revealed.html">more power cuts</a> (35 days) than previous years.</p>
<p>Based on claims data, <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/energy/626974/increase-in-home-break-ins-during-longer-load-shedding-periods/">insurance companies</a> are suggesting a strong link between power cuts and property crime in wealthier areas. In addition, a growing number of <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2022-07-08-load-shedding-worsens-crimes-in-communities-cpfs/">reports</a> from both rich and poor parts of the country link power cuts to increases in interpersonal crime, particularly <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-07-06-criminals-are-enjoying-load-shedding-say-cape-town-communities-affected-by-crime/">robberies</a>.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://sandtonchronicle.co.za/317525/stay-alert-with-these-load-shedding-safety-tips/">police</a> and the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gCASycCNR6M">police minister</a> have publicly linked power cuts to robbery and other crimes in recent months. </p>
<p>So, how are the power cuts contributing to increases in robberies?</p>
<p>It is not possible to provide a definitive answer to this question as no rigorous studies showing causality between power cuts and robbery occurrence in the country have been undertaken. But one can look to crime prevention and policing theory, and studies from other countries, to provide insights into the possible link between power outages and robbery. This theory advocates that power outages (the power utility, Eskom, calls these “loadshedding”) undermine crime prevention measures. This is especially so at night as these measures are largely dependent on street lighting. Power outages also undermine the effectiveness of policing as patrols and other police services are curtailed.</p>
<h2>Electricity and crime</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.saferspaces.org.za/understand/entry/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design-cpted">crime prevention through environmental design theory</a> is helpful.</p>
<p>It uses two principal measures – target hardening; and surveillance and visibility.</p>
<p><strong><a href="https://www.college.police.uk/guidance/neighbourhood-crime/interventions-situational-crime-prevention">Target hardening</a></strong> uses measures such as locked doors, gates, fencing, alarm systems, CCTV cameras and burglar bars in and around buildings to deter criminals. It is widely accepted in the <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/449230">criminology literature</a> that target hardening has the potential to reduce the risk of home invasions and business robberies in some contexts. These measures should ideally be combined with other crime prevention interventions. </p>
<p>In South Africa, <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/trending/587286/how-criminals-are-taking-advantage-of-increased-load-shedding-in-south-africa/">private security companies</a> have suggested that criminals have taken advantage of the fact that many home and business security systems are compromised during power outages. </p>
<p>Yet, robberies tend to be more prevalent in <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Policing-and-Boundaries-in-a-Violent-Society-A-South-African-Case-Study/Lamb/p/book/9780367748142">poorer urban areas</a> in the country, where residents cannot afford to install such security systems. And most robberies take place in <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00038-018-1129-z">public spaces</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africans-are-feeling-more-insecure-do-ramaphosas-plans-add-up-176991">South Africans are feeling more insecure: do Ramaphosa's plans add up?</a>
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<p><strong><a href="https://www.saferspaces.org.za/understand/entry/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design-cpted">Surveillance and visibility</a></strong> assumes that people are likely to be discouraged from robbing others in public spaces, where their actions will be clearly seen by others (“eyes on the street”) and they may be identified and caught by police.</p>
<p>This can include the presence of people in the area, either going about their normal daily activities or actively patrolling, and the presence of CCTV cameras. Lighting in public spaces, especially at night, is nonetheless an essential requirement for visibility and surveillance to be effective. <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1745-9133.2004.tb00058.x?casa_token=D1oCV46o9fMAAAAA:Oxla0S7kylB_6vXk0XFOSrp9M-acEsmQKTDZl1NEf9WK2Z5L-Qlp-v7xiYEZ7PCExTOoLT67suQlVzI">Studies</a> from other countries have shown that street lighting and CCTV cameras are effective in reducing robberies. </p>
<p>Power outages, particularly at night, clearly undermine visibility. This is evident from the many <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-07-06-criminals-are-enjoying-load-shedding-say-cape-town-communities-affected-by-crime/">reports</a> of people being targeted by criminals while walking in the streets after dark.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/power-cuts-in-south-africa-are-playing-havoc-with-the-countrys-water-system-197952">Power cuts in South Africa are playing havoc with the country's water system</a>
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<p><a href="http://wikinight.free.fr/wp-content/uploads/Securite/Securite%20des%20biens%20et%20personnes/Preventing_Crime_what_works_what_doesn_t_what_s_promising.pdf#page=227">Systematic reviews</a> of policing research have shown that regular and visible police patrols, mainly when directed at crime hot spots, are an effective crime prevention intervention. Obviously, police cannot satisfactorily patrol at night during power outages. This makes the work of South Africa’s police more <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2022-09-22-police-have-got-injured-because-of-darkness-bheki-cele-says-about-load-shedding/">dangerous</a>. </p>
<p>In response to a <a href="https://pmg.org.za/committee-question/98/">parliamentary question</a> about the impact of power outages on the work of the South African Police Service (SAPS), Bheki Cele, the police minister, responded that:</p>
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<p>(It) has an adverse effect on service delivery in the SAPS … on all communication and network operations, including the registering of case dockets … A number of stations cannot function at night because there are no lights … </p>
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<p>There have also been reports of some <a href="https://mybroadband.co.za/news/security/467675-problems-crash-10111-emergency-call-centre-in-major-city.html">police emergency call centres</a> being uncontactable during power outages.</p>
<h2>No easy solutions</h2>
<p>There are no practical short- to medium-term crime prevention alternatives for the authorities to pursue during power outages, other than exempting high crime areas from the outages. That might not be possible in such a severe <a href="https://theconversation.com/power-cuts-in-south-africa-trend-to-get-off-the-grid-is-gathering-pace-but-total-independence-is-still-a-way-off-197924">electricity crisis</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/eskom-ceo-quits-why-finding-a-new-head-for-south-africas-struggling-power-utility-wont-end-the-blackouts-196667">Eskom CEO quits: why finding a new head for South Africa's struggling power utility won't end the blackouts</a>
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<p>One positive development has been <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/weekend-argus/news/delft-residents-take-to-the-streets-as-crime-increases-during-load-shedding-9ed50a9e-36dd-4613-ba87-c93731ce1ae7">increased community patrols</a> in some areas. Regrettably, some of this community crime prevention work has led to acts of <a href="https://www.capetalk.co.za/articles/463481/mec-urges-public-to-leave-justice-to-the-law-as-vigilante-attack-leaves-5-dead">vigilantism</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199106/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Guy Lamb receives funding from Norwegian Research Council, the British Academy and FCDO . He is affiliated with South Africa's National Planning Commission. </span></em></p>Security companies suggest that criminals take advantage of the fact that many home and business security systems get compromised during power outages.Guy Lamb, Criminologist / Senior Lecturer, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1966732022-12-15T14:46:13Z2022-12-15T14:46:13ZIs South Africa better off with or without Cyril Ramaphosa?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/501305/original/file-20221215-17-13xluz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=10%2C57%2C974%2C621&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Cyril Ramaphosa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS/Flickr</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>President Cyril Ramaphosa came to the helm of South Africa’s governing party, the African National Congress (ANC) <a href="https://theconversation.com/who-is-cyril-ramaphosa-a-profile-of-the-new-leader-of-south-africa-89456">in 2017</a> on an anti-corruption, or anti-state capture, platform. The ANC’s 54th elective conference gave him a mandate of renewing the party, and simultaneously reversing the <a href="https://pari.org.za/betrayal-promise-report/">state capture</a> phenomenon that had characterised much of the country 10 years under his predecessor Jacob Zuma. </p>
<p>But, now, he himself has been caught up in controversy over the theft of thousands of American dollars allegedly kept in contravention of foreign exchange rules at his <a href="https://theconversation.com/ramaphosa-scandal-looks-set-to-intensify-the-ancs-slide-ushering-in-a-new-era-of-politics-185719">Phala Phala farm</a> in Limpopo in 2020. He also allegedly failed to properly report the theft to the police.</p>
<p>This sparked an attempt to have him impeached for allegedly violating the country’s constitution. But, the ANC’s overwhelming majority in parliament saw the impeachment motion being <a href="https://www.news24.com/citypress/politics/drama-defiance-retraction-mps-back-ramaphosa-against-impeachment-20221213">defeated</a>.</p>
<p>This has led to many to ask whether the country would be better off with or without Ramaphosa. </p>
<p>This is not an easy question. But it is one that has been on the minds of many in the country since the eruption <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2022-06-01-arthur-fraser-lays-criminal-charges-against-ramaphosa-says-he-stole-4m/">in June</a> of the Phala Phala scandal.</p>
<p>Given that South Africa runs a party political system at a national level, Ramaphosa emerges through the organisational culture of the governing ANC. The party, specifically its successive leadership after the <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2007-12-18-zuma-is-new-anc-president/">2007 Polokwane conference</a>, has presided over the weakening of state institutions and a <a href="https://theconversation.com/state-capture-in-south-africa-how-the-rot-set-in-and-how-the-project-was-rumbled-176481">general collapse of state capacity</a>.</p>
<p>These have had eroded social cohesion in South African society as seen by accelerated levels of <a href="https://theconversation.com/pandemic-underscores-gross-inequalities-in-south-africa-and-the-need-to-fix-them-135070">inequality</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/xenophobia-is-on-the-rise-in-south-africa-scholars-weigh-in-on-the-migrant-question-181288">xenophobia</a> and ethnic chauvinism. To ask, therefore, whether South Africa would better off with or without Ramaphosa is to also ask whether the country would be better off without the ANC.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/anc-in-crisis-south-africas-governing-party-is-fighting-to-stay-relevant-5-essential-reads-196580">ANC in crisis: South Africa's governing party is fighting to stay relevant - 5 essential reads</a>
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<p>For a period the ANC <a href="https://www.eisa.org/wep/sou1994results1.htm">represented</a> the aspirations of many black people in reversing the political and economic design of colonialism and apartheid. To this extent, it can be said to have encompassed the South African nation. But it has become too inward-looking, at the expense of the development aspirations of the nation <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-anc-insists-its-still-a-political-vanguard-this-is-what-ails-democracy-in-south-africa-141938">it claims to lead</a>. </p>
<p>Interestingly Ramaphosa straddles these transitions of the ANC. At the beginning of the democratic dispensation in 1994, as a trade unionist, he was an important architect of the country’s constitutional framework. But, now as president of both the party and the republic, he’s embroiled in a scandal over his private business interests. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-anc-insists-its-still-a-political-vanguard-this-is-what-ails-democracy-in-south-africa-141938">The ANC insists it's still a political vanguard: this is what ails democracy in South Africa</a>
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<p>Its an untenable position to be in given the anti-corruption ticket that catapulted him to the helm of the party. </p>
<p>I’ve been researching and observing the ANC and its governance performance over 15 years. My view on these questions is that given the organisational culture that comes with the ANC, and its impact on both government and on South African society, the country would indeed be better off without Ramaphosa. This is regardless of his <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2022/12/02/ramaphosa-s-ability-to-fight-corruption-now-questionable-corruption-watch">anti-corruption campaign</a> which has, in any case, been <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-african-president-cyril-ramaphosas-credibility-has-been-dented-putting-his-reform-agenda-in-jeopardy-189802">weakened by Phala Phala</a>. </p>
<h2>Of Phala Phala and the ANC</h2>
<p>Given that the Phala Phala matter weakens his anti-corruption campaign, the party can either save the president, as it did when it <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/south-africas-parliament-debate-ramaphosa-farmgate-report-2022-12-13/">voted this week against tabling</a> the report of the parliamentary panel on Phala Phala for discussion. Or, it can hang him out to dry, thus beginning a series of events that weakens the electoral fortunes of the party altogether. </p>
<p>The decision to save him is, of course, premised on the idea that the South African “nation” is inseparable from the ANC. And that equally, the ANC is inseparable from the state. These assumptions increasingly don’t hold true in the country. Voters, especially in urban South Africa, are <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2022-07-29-if-the-anc-becomes-a-rural-party-it-will-be-the-end-of-the-anc-makwetla/">diversifying their votes</a>.</p>
<p>I agree with the Director of the New South Institute, Ivor Chipkin when <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2022-12-04-phala-phala-is-not-a-crisis-for-south-africa-it-is-a-crisis-for-cyril-ramaphosa-and-the-anc/">he says:</a>.</p>
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<p>the ANC is not the nation…the party is not the state {and} institution matter more than individuals.</p>
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<p>It has become increasingly clear that the country needs to start thinking of life without the ANC in charge. And that coalitions, albeit unstable in the immediate run, might be desirable to avoid the cliff edge that South Africa stands on.</p>
<h2>Looking forward</h2>
<p>I think that the ANC will continue to be a strong political force in the foreseeable future, even though it has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/10/world/africa/south-africa-election.html">weakened in successive election</a> at local, provincial and national level. </p>
<p>There are now real prospects that the party will poll just above 50% needed to form a national government in 2024. This puts the prospect of a <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-stable-national-coalition-government-in-south-africa-possible-but-only-if-elites-put-countrys-interests-first-193828">national coalition government</a> within view. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/can-the-anc-survive-the-end-of-south-africas-heroic-epoch-57256">Can the ANC survive the end of South Africa's heroic epoch?</a>
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<p>The ANC should now show leadership by providing the necessary architecture – including new laws and regulations – to manage coalitions so that they can serve the country well. </p>
<p>This would complement the recent amendment of the Electoral Act enabling independent candidates to run for elections at national and <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/cabinet-approves-law-to-allow-independent-candidates-to-contest-as-mps-and-mpls-f8f496d7-39c0-4733-8f71-dfaea11c2a8f">provincial level</a>.</p>
<p>Of course, this possibility is not without its weakness: legislative access or easier entry for independent candidates to contest elections is a zero-sum game for the ANC. But the development of South Africa requires, not the renewal of the ANC, but the enablement of coalitions. </p>
<p>Coalitions are a necessary part of diversifying South Africa’s political culture. This is not about bringing contestation for its own sake, but to find a party political culture that aligns with the country’s constitutional framework. </p>
<p>The future of South Africa hangs in the balance. The country can either continue on its current downward spiral, with a <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/lifestyle/598212/young-people-plan-to-leave-south-africa-as-brain-drain-concerns-grow/">growing brain drain</a>, or it can change direction to upward development trajectory. </p>
<p>Either way, this is about much more than the ANC. </p>
<p>Too much time has been spent discussing the societal spill overs from the party’s organisational and <a href="https://theconversation.com/vacuum-of-ideas-at-anc-policy-conference-bodes-ill-for-south-africas-governing-party-188259">intellectual problems</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/196673/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thapelo Tselapedi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It has become increasingly clear that the country needs to start thinking of life without Ramaphosa - and the ANC - in charge.Thapelo Tselapedi, Politics lecturer, Rhodes UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1959492022-12-07T14:39:13Z2022-12-07T14:39:13ZWhat is RET and what does it want? The Radical Economic Transformation faction in South Africa explained<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499500/original/file-20221207-3544-nqjswm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Loyalists of the ANC's Radical Economic Transformation (RET) at the Olive Convention Centre in Durban. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Rajesh Jantilal/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It has been standard for some years, in any analysis of South Africa’s governing party, the African National Congress (ANC), to refer to the <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2022-01-11-the-ret-faction-wants-total-control-of-everything-in-the-state-and-society-as-an-end-in-itself/">“radical economic transformation”</a> (RET) faction. Yet, there has been little serious analysis of what it is. </p>
<p>The RET is difficult to define. It has no clear shape, leadership, membership, rules or policies. It is rather an aggregation of the aggrieved and aspirant within the ANC, linked by a set of broadly shared attitudes towards the state and power. Nor, in conventional terms, is the faction particularly “radical”. The “economic transformation” it seeks is the displacement of white racial domination, rather than the overturn of capitalism.</p>
<p>Despite its vagueness, the RET has become central to the contemporary ANC. It is destined to remain a powerful bloc within the party, and under President Cyril Ramaphosa, a constant constraint on his leadership and any effort to reform the economy and promote clean governance. For that reason, it needs to be understood.</p>
<h2>Growth and composition</h2>
<p>Its origins lie in the <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/zuma-like-a-tsunami-wave-20050307">“tsunami wave”</a> which led to the defeat of Thabo Mbeki as ANC president <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2007-12-18-zuma-is-new-anc-president/">in 2007 by Jacob Zuma</a>, followed by Zuma’s elevation as state president in 2009. During Zuma’s presidency (<a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/contact-directory/jacob-gedleyihlekisa-zuma-mr">9 May 2009 – 14 February 2018</a>), the RET faction overlapped heavily with his support base, which was drawn heavily from KwaZulu-Natal, his home province. Yet it was also closely aligned to ANC heavyweights in the other provinces, notably those dominated by the then <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/sundayindependent/news/anc-suspensions-death-of-the-premier-league-9492a864-f3f0-4792-a94a-7c6a9080a0e6">“premier league”</a> – provincial premiers in three mainly rural provinces Mpumalanga, Free State and North West. Simultaneously it drew heavily on the support of black business lobbies doing business with the state, notably at provincial and local government levels. </p>
<p>By implication, the RET faction was often implicated in the corrupt practices referred to as <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/state-capture-report-public-protector-14-october-2016">“state capture”</a>. Yet there was more to it than that. While various “Indian” business people who were tied to Zuma, especially in KwaZulu-Natal, were on the periphery of the RET, the faction itself was largely Africanist politically, protesting a continuation of white power under a veil of democracy.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/factionalism-and-corruption-could-kill-the-anc-unless-it-kills-both-first-116924">Factionalism and corruption could kill the ANC -- unless it kills both first</a>
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<p>The faction also drew energy from black professionals fighting against what they depicted as white domination of their professional spheres, and the radical black student lobbies which emerged during the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvmd84n8?turn_away=true">“RhodesMustFall”</a> and <a href="https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/south-africa-student-protests-explained/">“Fees must fall”</a> protest waves of the late Zuma period. </p>
<p>By the time of the <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/anc54-breaking-ramaphosa-elected-anc-president-12453127">December 2017 ANC elective conference</a>, the RET faction was strongly anti-Cyril Ramaphosa and <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-does-ramaphosas-victory-mean-for-south-africas-economy-89420">pro-Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma</a> in the race for the ANC presidency. The narrowness of Dlamini-Zuma’s defeat has provided it with a strong oppositional presence within the ANC during the Ramaphosa presidency, hampering his efforts at reform. </p>
<h2>Understanding the RET faction</h2>
<p>If it is difficult to pin down who belongs to the RET, it is equally difficult to define what they want. Nonetheless, four broad themes emerge.</p>
<p>First, the motive behind the faction seems to be black economic empowerment, but not the empowerment originally envisaged by Thabo Mbeki with its carefully regulated industrial charters <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40283176#metadata_info_tab_contents">and targets</a>. The RET version was a generalised insistence that the state machinery (government departments, provincial and local administrations, and state-owned enterprises) be leveraged to allocate contracts to black businesses. </p>
<p>This is justified by attacks upon <a href="https://theconversation.com/white-monopoly-capital-good-politics-bad-sociology-worse-economics-77338">“white monopoly capital”</a>, arguing that the South African economy has changed very little since democracy in 1994, and that white business is covertly determined upon maintaining white power. </p>
<p>The second thrust, closely related to the first, is a generalised attack on the constitutional settlement of 1994-96. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-its-wrong-to-blame-south-africas-woes-on-mandelas-compromises-96062">“Mandela compromise”</a> is criticised as having done little to ease the poverty and unemployment of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/economic-policy-remains-hotly-contested-in-south-africa-this-detailed-history-shows-why-138378">black population</a>.</p>
<p>The RET is highly ambivalent about the constitution’s defence of property rights but has little respect for the other laws, rules and regulations which the <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/saconstitution-web-eng.pdf">constitution</a> puts in place. By implication, the judiciary is regarded as suspect, as its function is to <a href="https://theconversation.com/rule-of-law-in-south-africa-protects-even-those-who-scorn-it-175533">see that the constitution is enforced</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/can-the-anc-survive-the-end-of-south-africas-heroic-epoch-57256">Can the ANC survive the end of South Africa's heroic epoch?</a>
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<p>Third, an overlap with the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), which depicts itself as <a href="https://blackopinion.co.za/2019/12/30/the-effs-%EF%BB%BFmarxist-leninist-fanonist-thought-as-founded-by-mngxitama/">Marxist-Leninist-Fanonist</a>, sees the RET faction driving the call for the state to extend its right to the <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-05-31-expropriation-without-compensation-anc-eff-toenadering-on-state-land-custodianship-its-all-about-the-politics/">compulsory expropriation of land</a>. The impetus comes from the fact that, despite the government’s programme of land reform, a hugely disproportionate amount of land suitable for agriculture remains in <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201802/landauditreport13feb2018.pdf">white hands</a>. The faction, like the EFF, appears to admire the Zimbabwean land reforms of the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14725843.2022.2032591?journalCode=cafi20">early 2000s</a>, which saw mass expropriation of white farms, but rarely advocates this openly.</p>
<p>Fourth, the RET faction is a strong supporter of state enterprises. Although the faction would not object to the transfer of state enterprises into black hands, privatisation is feared as likely to result in acquisition of state businesses by white companies. </p>
<p>In any case, the RET faction is heavily embedded within the state owned enterprises. Their operatives allocate valuable contracts to black <a href="https://www.gov.za/tenderpreneurship-stuff-crooked-cadres-fighters">“tenderpreneurs”</a> – business people who feed on government contracts. By implication, it is opposed to all versions of “structural reform” touted by the Ramaphosa government and lobbies attached to “big business”.</p>
<h2>What the RET faction wants</h2>
<p>Trying to work out precisely what the RET faction wants is difficult because it has <a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/the-ret-manifesto">no agreed manifesto</a>. However, three problems stand out:</p>
<p>First, it remains unclear what the RET faction would put in place of the existing constitution. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-anc-insists-its-still-a-political-vanguard-this-is-what-ails-democracy-in-south-africa-141938">The ANC insists it's still a political vanguard: this is what ails democracy in South Africa</a>
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<p>Should the constitution be reworked, and if so, how? What are the specific flaws in the constitution as it stands? For the moment, all we are left with are generalised attacks on the judiciary for individual judgements the RET dislikes, demands for changes of the expropriation clause in the constitution, and so on.</p>
<p>Second, the RET faction has no general plan for land reform. Crucially, it ignores the increasing domination of agriculture by <a href="https://theconversation.com/land-reform-in-south-africa-is-failing-ignoring-the-realities-of-rural-life-plays-a-part-190452">huge agri-businesses</a>.</p>
<p>These mega-firms are hugely complex operations. It is one thing to expropriate small white farms; quite another to engage in a battle with huge corporations which probably incorporate foreign as well as local ownership. And what would happen to food production if the state were to take them over?</p>
<p>Third, it is common knowledge that South Africa’s parastatals are failing. <a href="https://mybroadband.co.za/news/investing/461772-eskoms-failure-in-four-charts.html">Eskom</a>, the power utility, can’t deliver enough electricity and is burdened by <a href="https://mg.co.za/business/2022-10-26-mtbs-government-to-take-a-chunk-of-eskoms-debt/">unpayable debt</a>. <a href="https://www.news24.com/fin24/companies/transnet-decline-inside-business-big-battle-for-private-rail-20221129">Transnet</a>, the transport parastatal, is in chaos, unable to maintain infrastructure needed for business to operate efficiently. The public railway system is a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-60202570">shambles</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/africas-oldest-surviving-party-the-anc-has-an-achilles-heel-its-broken-branch-structure-150210">Africa's oldest surviving party – the ANC – has an Achilles heel: its broken branch structure</a>
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<p>South African Airways, the national airline, has collapsed financially and is being propped up by <a href="https://www.news24.com/fin24/companies/the-days-of-bailouts-are-gone-saa-to-start-flying-ahead-of-takatso-deal-20210922">state funding</a>. The Post Office is <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2022-10-05-ag-highlights-sapo-mess-as-it-faces-collapse/">unable to deliver the post</a>. The reasons for these failures are many, ranging from the ANC’s systematic undervaluation of technical ability to run complex operations, its <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321223498_The_African_National_Congress_ANC_and_the_Cadre_Deployment_Policy_in_the_Postapartheid_South_Africa_A_Product_of_Democratic_Centralisation_or_a_Recipe_for_a_Constitutional_Crisis">political deployment strategy</a>, and the mass looting of state bodies that took place <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-state-capture-commission-nears-its-end-after-four-years-was-it-worth-it-182898">under Zuma</a>. </p>
<p>Turnaround strategies have failed. The difficult question for the RET (and the ANC at large) is: if not privatisation, then what?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195949/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Despite its vagueness, the RET has become central to the contemporary ANC. It is destined to remain a powerful bloc within the party, and a constant constraint on Ramaphosa leadership.Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1948262022-12-02T13:03:04Z2022-12-02T13:03:04ZCorruption in South Africa: new book lifts the lid on who profits - and their corporate enablers<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/496463/original/file-20221121-26-3p10v6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The new <a href="https://jacana.co.za/product/the-unaccountables/">book</a> The Unaccountables: The Powerful Politicians and Corporations who Profit from Impunity is welcome for the way it contextualises corruption. It shows how politicians and bureaucrats could not implement corruption without their corporate and professional enablers – the accountants, auditors and advocates who make it all possible.</p>
<p>The book is the result of a decade of research by <a href="https://www.opensecrets.org.za/">Open Secrets</a> and other NGOs. It is edited by Michael Marchant, Mamello Mosiana, Ra’eesa Pather and Hennie van Vuuren (a blend of investigative journalists and activists) and has 11 named contributors. Analytically, it covers four overlapping issues:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>crimes such as stealing public funds and evading tax </p></li>
<li><p>culpable negligence by professionals such as auditors </p></li>
<li><p>serial failure by regulatory authorities </p></li>
<li><p>moral and political issues such as inequality and corporate tax avoidance.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Corporate corruption</h2>
<p>Readers who are diligent in taking in the daily media will remember most of the high profile cases summarised in this book. But not all. It reveals that the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-deaths-of-144-mentally-ill-patients-and-south-africas-constitutional-democracy-91433">Life Esidemeni tragedy</a>, in which 144 patients died after being placed in inadequate facilities run by NGOs in 2015, had one apartheid precedent. During the 1960s the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/National-Party-political-party-South-Africa">National Party</a> regime outsourced the psychiatric care of 11,000 patients (9,000 of them black) to the British company Intrinsic Investments: 207 died (p.50). </p>
<p>The book fills some gaps in media reports. These tend to focus on those who are despised by the plutocratic, wealthy establishment – the ruling African National Congress politicians and their cronies. The media are comparatively reluctant to cover crimes committed by fellow denizens of their plutocratic stratosphere, such as auditors, accountants and advocates. For example, global media coverage of Hong Kong focuses on Chinese repression of freedom of expression – but overlooks its role as a tax shelter and corporate secrecy hideout for front companies and money laundering:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>a long-running failure to hold the powerful and wealthy to account for the crimes that they profit from. Economic crimes and corruption are committed by a small band of the powerful, but they pose fundamental threats to democracy and social justice. They result in the looting of public funds, the destruction of democratic institutions, and ultimately … the human rights of millions of people. (p.12)</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Fear of those with money to bring defamation litigation, or who decide on corporate advertising spending in the media, aggravates this situation.</p>
<p>This book is structured around apartheid profiteers, war profiteers, state capture profiteers, welfare profiteers, failing auditors, conspiring consultants, and bad lawyers.</p>
<p>The authors note how over 500 global corporations negotiated, thanks to their tax accountants, with Luxembourg, a tax haven, paying only 1% tax on their profits (p.254). They seem to have missed the case of Ireland, where such tax is one thousandth of 1% on profits. Such tax shelters pervade the west, especially <a href="https://thecommonwealth.org/our-member-countries">Commonwealth countries</a>.</p>
<p>The book calls for action to end such tax avoidance. But it does not spell out what it would entail. It would require the South African government to negotiate an international coalition to campaign through the United Nations, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and the African Union, to find enough allies to mitigate such a global power structure – class power in its purest form.</p>
<p>US president Joe Biden’s proposal that globally, corporate tax should have <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/biden-offers-drop-corporate-tax-hike-proposal-source-2021-06-03/">a floor of 15%</a> provides a good start for such campaigns.</p>
<h2>Regulation failure</h2>
<p>This book gives welcome attention to a long-neglected problem in South Africa. That is the serial failure of regulatory authorities to hold companies or professionals to account. One instance too recent for this book to cover is that the minerals and energy minister, Gwede Mantashe, has fired from the National Nuclear Regulator a civil society representative, on the grounds that he is <a href="https://www.news24.com/fin24/economy/eskom/mantashe-fires-anti-nuclear-activist-from-regulatory-board-20220225">anti-nuclear</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="Book cover with the words 'The Unaccountable' over images of several punidentifiable men walking." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/496457/original/file-20221121-19-rl2eao.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/496457/original/file-20221121-19-rl2eao.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=929&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496457/original/file-20221121-19-rl2eao.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=929&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496457/original/file-20221121-19-rl2eao.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=929&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496457/original/file-20221121-19-rl2eao.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1167&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496457/original/file-20221121-19-rl2eao.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1167&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496457/original/file-20221121-19-rl2eao.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1167&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p>Since the minister’s portfolio and performance contract require him to promote nuclear power, it is a conflict of interests for him to interfere in the regulator of nuclear safety. The regulator should fall under the environmental affairs department, as in other countries. This is a topical example of the abuse of power, and defanging a regulatory authority.</p>
<p>The book underscores that the Independent Regulatory Board of Auditors (IRBA) refuses to name and shame. It abuses secrecy to protect the names and reputations of auditors guilty of conspiring with their corporate clients to conceal the truth (p.272):</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the IRBA’s desire to protect its members overshadows its responsibility. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Since at least the first world war, pacifists have denounced the military-industrial complex as the merchants of death. The <a href="https://www.gov.za/national-conventional-arms-control-committee-ncacc-statement-south-african-arms-sales-regulation">National Conventional Arms Control Committee</a> is supposed to oversee South African exports of armaments and munitions. This is to ensure the country does not violate international treaties. It is not known to have refused any permits to export armaments to countries at war, even when they indiscriminately bomb civilians, as in Yemen.</p>
<p>The authors call for its statutory framework to be drastically toughened up.</p>
<h2>Apartheid profiteers</h2>
<p>The historical chapter of the book, on apartheid profiteers, holds no surprises. Of course, <a href="https://www.sanlam.co.za/Pages/default.aspx?gclid=Cj0KCQiA4OybBhCzARIsAIcfn9m5OBZxhgPlZPIjzU68Z0C7CSAqA8Eqkui60NBY7q8qkcX4Hw3vu_UaAlITEALw_wcB&gclsrc=aw.ds">Sanlam</a>, the insurance giant, and <a href="https://www.naspers.com/">Naspers</a>, the media behemoth, were always part of the Afrikaner nationalist movement, led by the secretive <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Afrikaner-Broederbond">Broederbond</a>. Of course, individual Afrikaner businessmen donated to the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/national-party-np">Nasionale Party</a>, which formalised apartheid in 1948, as did the military-industrial complex. All those companies manufacturing armaments had only one monopoly buyer – the South African Defence Force:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>a significant portion of the business elite kept the taps open to the party at the height of domestic repression and foreign wars (p.25). </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The authors do a thorough job of exposing all the Swiss, Belgian and Luxembourg bankers who comprised the sanction-busting front companies. It exposes the late <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mobutu-Sese-Seko">Mobutu Sese Seko</a> of Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) for providing false end user certificates to enable <a href="https://www.armscor.co.za/">Armscor</a>, the apartheid-era state arms procurement company, to smuggle in weaponry (p.42).</p>
<p>The book revisits the controversial <a href="https://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/the-arms-deal-what-you-need-to-know-2/">1999 arms deal</a>. It explains how bribes were described in corporate paperwork as consultancy fees. The arms deal was the first opportunity of the post-apartheid military to buy big-ticket weapons after a quarter-century of arms sanctions, which the post-apartheid military lacked the budget to maintain in service. </p>
<p>Since then, the amount wasted in the arms deal has been dwarfed by the billions spent by <a href="https://www.transnet.net/Pages/Home.aspx">Transnet</a>, the rail, ports and pipelines parastatal, on corrupt locomotive contracts. The same for <a href="https://www.prasa.com/">Prasa</a>, the passenger rail parastatal, and <a href="https://www.eskom.co.za/">Eskom</a>, the power utility, contracts.</p>
<p>Overall, it is a book that should be on the bookshelf of every thinking South African.</p>
<p><em>Updated to clear confusion created by the absence of an index in the advance proof sent to the author.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194826/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Gottschalk is an ANC member, but writes this review in his professional capacity as a political scientist.</span></em></p>The new book is structured around apartheid profiteers, war profiteers, state capture profiteers, welfare profiteers, failing auditors, conspiring consultants and bad lawyers.Keith Gottschalk, Political Scientist, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1942962022-11-17T14:11:11Z2022-11-17T14:11:11ZSouth Africa needs strategic leadership to weather its storms. Its presidents have not been up to the task<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/495594/original/file-20221116-22-xqzgnr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C37%2C1778%2C1197&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Africa's democratic era presidents, Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, Kgalema Motlanthe, Jacob Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Penguin Random House South Africa</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa is in a state of crisis. Its current reality is necessarily shaped by historical events, not least the outcomes of the political settlement process that led to the end of apartheid <a href="https://www.britannica.com/question/How-did-apartheid-end">in 1994</a>.</p>
<p>Unlike other countries in southern Africa, where political independence came after gruesome liberation wars, the leaders of the African National Congress (<a href="https://www.anc1912.org.za/">ANC</a>), which led the liberation struggle and has been the governing party since 1994 – alongside other political and social movements – managed to negotiate a transition to democracy. There were many “wins”, including assent to the election of a majority-led government and the enactment of policies that would ensure broad-based <a href="http://www.thedtic.gov.za/financial-and-non-financial-support/b-bbee/broad-based-black-economic-empowerment/">economic transformation</a>.</p>
<p>This transition may be seen as a point in history where the nation navigated one of its greatest crises. But its current leadership is confronted with multiple challenges. These range from <a href="https://databankfiles.worldbank.org/data/download/poverty/33EF03BB-9722-4AE2-ABC7-AA2972D68AFE/Global_POVEQ_ZAF.pdf">extreme poverty</a> and high <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/Media%20release%20QLFS%20Q2%202022.pdf">unemployment</a> to the severe undermining of democratic institutions by <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/">corruption and state capture</a>. </p>
<p>These “wicked problems” are so difficult and complex that there is no single, silver-bullet answer. There is only a range of clumsy solutions, all of which are imperfect. The policy-making puzzle, therefore, is as much about recognising the nature of the problem as seeking to mitigate risks. </p>
<p>Our new <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.co.za/book/presidents-mandela-ramaphosa-leadership-age-crisis/9781776095940">book</a>, The Presidents: From Mandela to Ramaphosa, Leadership in an Age of Crisis, assessed the leadership of South Africa’s five post-apartheid presidents – <a href="https://www.eisa.org/wep/souoverview8.htm">Nelson Mandela</a>, <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/profiles/former-president-thabo-mvuyelwa-mbeki">Thabo Mbeki</a>, <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/node/111">Kgalema Motlanthe</a>, <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/profiles/president-jacob-zuma-0">Jacob Zuma</a> and <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/profiles/president-cyril-ramaphosa%3A-profile">Cyril Ramaphosa</a>. We wanted to see what lessons can be learned, especially in relation to their strategic abilities. Strategy is one of the critical leadership attributes necessary to cope with the strong headwinds that leaders often encounter.</p>
<p>We concluded that there has been a shortage of truly strategic leadership in South Africa in this period, with a few exceptions. Thus, the country has been unable to grapple with the underlying structural problems that are the fundamental cause of its socio-economic precarity. </p>
<h2>Strategic thinking</h2>
<p>What do we mean by “strategy”? Here we defer to former UK member of parliament and now (UK) Times columnist <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/profile/matthew-parris?page=1">Matthew Parris</a>. He says,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>although the meaning has become diluted through promiscuous and often inappropriate use … strategy remains the best word we have for expressing attempts to think about actions in advance, in the light of our goals and capacities.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Many leaders, governments and organisations confuse planning with strategy. So this is an apt consideration to keep in mind: have South Africa’s post-1994 presidents addressed the fundamental question of what is wrong with the society and its economy, in a strategic way? </p>
<p>Here’s how the country’s five post-apartheid presidents have fared on strategy.</p>
<h2>Five different styles</h2>
<p>Mandela, the first president of a democratic South Africa, made big strategic choices – not necessarily the right ones, but certainly ones that were befitting of the times. </p>
<p>A primary strategy choice faced Mandela at the very advent of the democratic era. He opted for national reconciliation as his political motif. It was strategic in the sense that the alternative was to drive a strong transformational agenda without seeking to get the powerful and privileged white minority on board. </p>
<p>Crudely put, he could have opted for redemption and even revenge, rather than reconciliation. </p>
<p>This was accompanied by a deep personal commitment to the rule of law and constitutionalism. He used his presidential power to drive that message and execute that strategy, leaving the detail of management of policy and government to his number two, Thabo Mbeki.</p>
<p>The transition from his government’s Reconstruction and Development Programme (<a href="https://www.gov.za/faq/finance-business/where-do-i-get-copy-reconstruction-and-development-programme-rdp">RDP</a>) to the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (<a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/growth-employment-and-redistribution-macroeconomic-strategy-south-africa-gear">GEAR</a>) macroeconomic strategy is another debatable case in point. </p>
<p>The RDP was the ANC government-in-waiting’s flagship programme for socio-economic transformation. It was an essentially Keynesian public investment-focused plan for improving public services such as housing, healthcare and electricity to the black majority. The shift to GEAR was deeply contested. Left-of-centre commentators and players within the broader ANC-led alliance saw it as a neo-liberal approach to fiscal and monetary policy that would constrain the government’s ability to drive redistribution of wealth and opportunity. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/495318/original/file-20221115-16-v7q0ty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/495318/original/file-20221115-16-v7q0ty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=916&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/495318/original/file-20221115-16-v7q0ty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=916&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/495318/original/file-20221115-16-v7q0ty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=916&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/495318/original/file-20221115-16-v7q0ty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1151&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/495318/original/file-20221115-16-v7q0ty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1151&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/495318/original/file-20221115-16-v7q0ty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1151&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p>When his turn came as president (1999-2008), Mbeki strove to step up to the strategic standards that Mandela had set. His <a href="https://theconversation.com/mbekis-dream-of-africas-renaissance-belied-south-africas-schizophrenia-58311">vision for Africa</a>, in which Africans would take control of their destiny, was strategic. So was his determination to confront the <a href="http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/speeches/1998/mbek0529.htm">“two nations”</a> problem – one prosperous and white, the other poor and black. </p>
<p>The shift to GEAR was executed with strategic purpose and an iron fist. There were negative consequences, especially in the long term. But few, if any, big strategic choices can be win-win; there will invariably be a downside. The question is whether the leader understands and then confronts the dilemma, and in doing so can articulate the upside and recognise its intrinsic value, one that justifies the downside. </p>
<p>Mbeki was a flawed visionary. His legacy is scarred by his inexplicable <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-mbekis-character-and-his-aids-denialism-are-intimately-linked-54766">lack of judgment on HIV/AIDS</a>, and his stubborn refusal to accept that his government should provide antiretroviral treatment. </p>
<p>Motlanthe, who succeeded him, in his modest way, also recognised the strategic imperative of his short, caretaker time as president – (<a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/profiles/former-president-kgalema-motlanthe">25 September 2008 to 9 May 2009</a>): to consolidate authority in democratic government and to stabilise an unstable body politic in the context of the palace coup that had taken place within the ANC. </p>
<p>Even Zuma, his successor, in his own mendacious and deviously self-serving way, had strategic intent: to <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/">capture the state</a> for venal personal gain. He executed it with a ruthless sense of purpose.</p>
<p>Current president Cyril Ramaphosa appears to be the least strategic of them all. His failure to grasp the strategic nettles inhibits his presidency. On issues such as the transition away from coal, the government stake in state-owned enterprises or the need for a basic income grant, Ramaphosa has dithered, seeking to wait until sufficient consensus has formed or putting in place cumbersome consultation processes, before reaching a clear decision. </p>
<p>He gets things done; he gets there in the end, but his design and use of process is that of a master tactician, not a strategist. He has not risen to the leadership heights required by the gravity of the historical moment. This requires leadership that would unshackle government from the congealing embrace of the ruling ANC and its fractious factions. A leader who would rise above the daily throng to inspire ordinary citizens with a compelling narrative of hope and change, underpinned by iron determination to take brave decisions and to execute them with a sense of purpose and urgent expedition. </p>
<h2>Circling the problem</h2>
<p>The crises that confronted these five presidents have been very different, with varying levels of intensity and composition. Each has faced big challenges, that could inevitably not be resolved only by their executive office. Undoubtedly, part of strategic and visionary leadership is the ability to identify existing and potential allies who are willing to invest what is required to drive a transformative agenda. </p>
<p>All have responded to “what went wrong”. But, because of limitations to their strategic leadership, none has fully met the challenge of confronting “what is wrong” head-on. Their ability to address the question of “what is wrong” has been constrained by the very real demands to put out fires, and keeping the boat afloat without an eye on the navigation system. And where they have focused on navigating the rough seas to get to the destination of a more equal, inclusive South Africa, the vessels of governance with a mandate to steward these transitions have not always delivered.</p>
<p>Mandela, Mbeki and now Ramaphosa have circled the problem (while Zuma weakened the state’s capability). But perhaps because it is such a wicked problem, and the structural difficulties run so deep, they have failed to define a strategic course that would confront the underlying structural conditions, consigning South Africa to an uncertain and worrisome future. </p>
<p><em>This is an edited extract from the authors’ <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.co.za/book/presidents-mandela-ramaphosa-leadership-age-crisis/9781776095940">new book</a> The Presidents: From Mandela to Ramaphosa, Leadership in an Age of Crisis</em>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194296/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Calland is employed by the University of Cape Town, is a Fellow of the University of Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership, is a partner of political risk consultancy The Paternoster Group, and serves as a member of the Advisory Council for the Advancement of the South African Constitution (CASAC).
</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mabel Dzinouya Sithole is employed by the University of Cape Town, contributes regularly to policy advocacy with the Southern African Liaison Office, and other civil society organisations in the region. She advises organisations such as the Ford Foundation on the design of leadership development programmes in Africa and across the globe. </span></em></p>Mandela, the first president of a democratic South Africa, made big strategic choices – not necessarily the right ones, but certainly ones that were befitting of the times.Richard Calland, Associate Professor in Public Law, University of Cape TownMabel Dzinouya Sithole, Programme Officer - Building Bridges, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.