tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/swaziland-20387/articlesSwaziland – The Conversation2022-06-06T15:07:04Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1844662022-06-06T15:07:04Z2022-06-06T15:07:04ZQueen Elizabeth II: a reign that saw the end of the British empire in Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/467177/original/file-20220606-22-vdmb9p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Queen Elizabeth II waves from the balcony of Buckingham Palace during the Platinum Jubilee Pageant.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Chris Jackson/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the UK the Queen’s official title is: <a href="https://royalcentral.co.uk/uk/what-are-elizabeth-iis-titles-172181/">Elizabeth the Second</a>, by the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of Her other Realms and Territories Queen, Head of the Commonwealth, Defender of the Faith.</p>
<p>There has been a lot of political and social change during her <a href="https://theconversation.com/taking-a-look-back-at-the-evolution-of-sport-during-queen-elizabeths-platinum-jubilee-184119">70 years on the throne</a>. None less than in what was once her African empire. </p>
<p>Famously, she was in Kenya (then pronounced by the British as “Keenya”), at the luxury Tree Tops game lodge, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-africa-16904171">when her father died in 1952</a>. She returned hastily to Britain to accede to the throne <a href="https://theconversation.com/taking-a-look-back-at-the-evolution-of-sport-during-queen-elizabeths-platinum-jubilee-184119">that year</a>.</p>
<p>This was her second trip to Africa. She had accompanied her parents to South Africa <a href="https://britishheritage.com/the-royal-family-in-south-africa#:%7E:text=In%201947%20the%20Royal%20Family,Swaziland%2C%20Basutoland%20and%20the%20Bechuanaland">in 1947</a>, the monarchy’s “last hurrah” in the country before the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/national-party-np">National Party</a>, which formalised apartheid, displaced General Jan Smuts’ United Party the following year. </p>
<p>At its height, the British Empire extended over something like a third of the world, but was already in recession when the Queen came to the throne. India had been the “Jewel in the Crown”, but had proceeded to a violently partitioned independence involving the creation of predominantly Muslim Pakistan <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Independence-Day-Indian-holiday">in 1947</a>. Burma (now Myanmar) went <a href="https://www.au.edu/news/myanmar-national-day.html">in 1948</a>. There were still other territories in Asia, notably Malaya, odd outposts in Latin America and various islands in Oceania. And there was still Africa. </p>
<p>There Britain’s territories included:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>four territories in west Africa</p></li>
<li><p>four in east Africa (inclusive of Zanzibar, then still separate from Tanganyika), </p></li>
<li><p>the two Rhodesias (Zambia and Zimbabwe) and Nyasaland (Malawi)</p></li>
<li><p>the three High Commission Territories in southern Africa (Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland), </p></li>
<li><p>the island of Mauritius, and </p></li>
<li><p>the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/British-Empire/Dominance-and-dominions">Dominion of South Africa</a>.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>All are now independent, and have become republics, although all (Zimbabwe being the exception) belong to what used to be known as – but is no longer known as – the “British” <a href="https://thecommonwealth.org/our-member-countries">Commonwealth</a>.</p>
<p>It was not realised at the time, nor intended, that the Empire would begin to dissolve as fast as it did after the Queen had come to the throne. However, by the early 1970s a bulk of the Empire had gone. </p>
<p>Britain effectively scuttled in the face of early nationalist stirrings (Ghana); the expense in blood, money and prestige of confronting armed struggle and violence (Malaya and Kenya); the increasing cost of demands for “development” in the colonies; the foreign policy disaster of Suez; and London’s developing sense that it should reorient its trade to a uniting Europe. </p>
<p>In fact, the decolonisation process had started half-a-century before. Ironically, it was South Africa which provided the constitutional precedent for the decolonisation process which was to take place so rapidly during the reign of Elizabeth II.</p>
<h2>The story of the dominions</h2>
<p>The rot (if that is the right word) started at the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10314616608595335?journalCode=rahs18">1911 Imperial Conference </a>, the first of several meetings of the British Prime Minister and his counterparts in the four <a href="https://www.britannica.com/summary/Decline-of-the-British-Empire">“dominions”</a> (Australia, Canada, South Africa and New Zealand). These were all countries of white settlement, territories to which Britain had exported population since the end of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Napoleonic-Wars">Napoleonic wars</a>. </p>
<p>Some went as “explorers”, more as traders, and some (notoriously to Australia) were <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/australia-day">dispatched as convicts</a>. The majority went to make a new life, many escaping hunger and misery at home.</p>
<p>Fearful of a repeat of the loss of their American empire, the British governments of the day conceded “self-government” to British settlers, albeit in fits and starts. An early marker was laid down with by the <a href="https://www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/evolutionofparliament/legislativescrutiny/parliament-and-empire/collections1/parliament-and-canada/british-north-america-act-1867/">North America Act of 1867</a> which created confederation in Canada. </p>
<p>As dominions, such settler states enjoyed “self-government” over their internal affairs. But, they lacked total independence as Britain continued to control their foreign affairs, and notably, the right to take them into a war. </p>
<p>South Africa had become a “dominion” at <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/union-south-africa-1910">Union in 1910</a>, and <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Louis-Botha">Prime Minister Louis Botha</a> attended the imperial conference of the following year. In response to the growing assertiveness of the four dominions, the British government made a significant concession. </p>
<p>It retained the right to declare that the dominions would join it in declaring war against an enemy state. But it conceded that they would have the right to decide their level of support for the war effort. The British were wholly confident that Australia, Canada and New Zealand would display their loyalty for “the mother country” in any European conflict. </p>
<p>However, a question hung over South Africa. Its government headed by Botha and <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Jan-Smuts">Jan Smuts</a>, two former Boer generals who had recently been fighting against the British. This was answered in 1914. When it came to the crunch, Botha and Smuts <a href="https://en.unesco.org/courier/news-views-online/first-world-war-and-its-consequences-africa">threw South African troops into the First World War</a> without any hesitation. </p>
<p>They subsequently took to the field in uniform to crush an Afrikaner Nationalist rebellion against fighting “Britain’s war”. Yet when the war was over, a Nationalist government led by another former Boer general,<a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/james-barry-munnik-hertzog"> Barry Hertzog</a>, led the way in securing a further concession from the British at the <a href="https://www.open.ac.uk/researchprojects/makingbritain/content/imperial-conference">Imperial Conference in 1926</a>. </p>
<p>This time round, the dominions gained the right to run their own foreign policies, to have separate diplomatic representation in countries around the world, and importantly, to decide for themselves whether to side with Britain in the event of another war. </p>
<p>All this was confirmed by the <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1931/4/pdfs/ukpga_19310004_en.pdf">Statute of Westminster of 1931</a>. Come 1939, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/South-Africa/World-War-II">Smuts won a critical vote</a> in the Union Parliament to lead South Africa into the Second World War against Nationalist opposition. But, they took their revenge by defeating him <a href="https://theconversation.com/remembering-south-africas-catastrophe-the-1948-poll-that-heralded-apartheid-96928">in the 1948 election</a>. </p>
<p>Although Nationalist desire for South Africa to cut ties with Britain and become a republic ran deep, caution initially prevailed, and formally, the Queen remained head of state, represented by a governor-general as her viceroy. But when faced with hostility to apartheid by African states, Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/south-africa-withdraws-commonwealth">led South Africa out of the Commonwealth</a>. </p>
<p>By 1961 it was also <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/union-south-africa-movement-towards-republic">a republic</a>.</p>
<h2>Decolonisation</h2>
<p>This began with the Gold Coast, which achieved “self-government” in 1951 before moving rapidly to independence as Ghana <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/gold-coast-ghana-gains-independence">in 1957</a>. Government was now firmly in African hands. But, the imperial legacy remained in the form of a governor-general, who represented the Queen as the country’s formal head of state and sovereign. But this was not to last long. </p>
<p>The time of the Great White Queen sitting at the heart of Empire had long gone, and Ghana transitioned to the status of a <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Ghana/Independence">republic in 1960</a> with <a href="https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/nkrumah-kwame">Kwame Nkrumah</a> becoming its first president and head of state. Albeit with local variations, this was the route followed in virtually every other British African territory over the course of following two decades.</p>
<p>By the late 1970s, every formerly British African state, bar <a href="https://thecommonwealth.org/our-member-countries/lesotho">Lesotho</a> and Swaziland (now <a href="https://thecommonwealth.org/our-member-countries/kingdom-eswatini">Eswatini</a>) whose own monarchs replaced the Queen as head of state, had become a republic. </p>
<p>The exception which proved the rule was Rhodesia. White Rhodesians, a tiny proportion of the territory’s population, had obtained self-government <a href="https://www.eisa.org/wep/zimoverview2.htm">in 1923</a>, yet Britain had retained nominal sovereignty. As one African government after another swept to freedom, the Rhodesians wanted to follow suit to retain white rule, but fearing African reaction, Britain had declined to grant full independence unless an incoming government had a democratic mandate. </p>
<p>Ian Smith’s Rhodesian Front party rebelled and unilaterally declared independence <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Zimbabwe/Rhodesia-and-the-UDI">in 1965</a> and although the white settlers famously thought themselves more British than the British themselves, declared in 1970 that they no longer recognised the Queen as head of state and declared Rhodesia a republic. This never gained international recognition, and a conservative politician, <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137318299_7">Christopher Soames</a> returned briefly as governor and the Queen’s representative in 1980. </p>
<p>The last British governor in Africa, he waved goodbye when Rhodesia transitioned to independence as the Republic of Zimbabwe <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Zimbabwe">in 1980</a>.</p>
<h2>Looking to the future</h2>
<p>Britain’s relationships with its former African colonies are now those of trade, aid and diplomacy. The Queen herself remains highly respected, and acknowledged as head of the Commonwealth. Yet once she has gone, and that cannot be long, even that status for the British monarch may go. </p>
<p>At that moment, the rout of the British monarchy in Africa will be complete.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/184466/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The decolonisation process was to take place rapidly during the reign of Elizabeth II.Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1453312020-09-03T15:50:45Z2020-09-03T15:50:45ZBook shines light on Dennis Brutus, one of South Africa’s most underrated poets<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/355798/original/file-20200901-18-1s7reif.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A younger Dennis Brutus, president of the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee in Montreal, Canada in 1976.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Neil Leifer /Sports Illustrated via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Fortunately for the rest of us South Africans, the apartheid police state often shot itself in the foot. On the one hand, after a horrifying <a href="https://www.thejournalist.org.za/pioneers/henry-nxumalo/">exposé</a> of jail conditions in <a href="https://theconversation.com/journalism-of-drums-heyday-remains-cause-for-celebration-70-years-later-142668"><em>Drum</em></a> magazine at the end of the 1950s, it passed a total censorship statute on anything that went on inside prisons.</p>
<p>On the other hand, it incarcerated three of South Africa’s best poets – <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/dennis-brutus">Dennis Brutus</a> on Robben Island, <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/breyten-breytenbach">Breyten Breytenbach </a> and <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/contact-directory/jeremy-cronin-mr">Jeremy Cronin</a> in Pretoria Central – convicted for anti-apartheid activities. Surprise: after their eventual release, all the jails’ brutality and cruelties came out in graphic print for the world to read.</p>
<p>Tyrone August’s welcome, and overdue, biography – <a href="http://www.bestred.co.za/dennis-brutus-detail.html"><em>Dennis Brutus, The South African Years</em></a> – is based on the author’s doctoral dissertation at the University of the Western Cape.</p>
<p>This book both gives us readers the most thorough biography to date on Brutus, though there is nothing about where and how his seven children completed school and made their lives. The book focuses on how Brutus’ poems were influenced by the poets he read at school and university. Hopefully it will aid his poems becoming more prominent in future anthologies of South African poems, and in school books.</p>
<p>Brutus is one of the most underrated poets of South Africa. Among this reviewer’s treasured books are two collections, inscribed and autographed in his incredibly neat calligraphy.</p>
<p>All told, Brutus published 12 collections, starting in 1963 with <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Sirens-knuckles-boots-Dennis-Brutus/dp/B0006CRN5W"><em>Sirens, Knuckles, Boots</em></a> and culminating in 2005 with <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/16155787-leafdrift"><em>Leafdrift</em></a>. In addition, Worcester State University (US) brought out a selected poetry collection <a href="https://libguides.worcester.edu/archives/Dennis-Brutus">in 2004</a> to honour his 80th birthday.</p>
<p>That none of his collections were published in South Africa testifies to apartheid police state censorship: leftists passed from hand to hand copies of his poems. This <em>samizdat</em> circulated in handwritten, typewritten, and later photocopied sheets of paper.</p>
<p>Brutus was born in 1924 in the country today named Zimbabwe; his parents returned to South Africa two years later. He started teaching in 1950 and married in the same year. The government banned him from teaching in 1961 because of his anti-apartheid activities, depriving him of earning a living.</p>
<h2>Jail and exile</h2>
<p>Brutus fled to eSwatini (Swaziland), then a British colony, in 1963. The British colonial authorities refused to grant him a residence permit. He crossed the border to Mozambique. The PIDE secret police in Portuguese colonial Mozambique handed him over to the South African police’s Special Branch that targeted political activists. </p>
<p>He was shot trying to escape, and sentenced to 18 months on <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/robben-island">Robben Island</a>. Repeated beatings, and harrowing assaults, culminated in months of solitary confinement, causing hallucinations and nervous breakdown. He finally left South Africa on a no-return exit permit in 1966 after his release.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/dennis-brutus-south-african-literary-giant-who-was-reluctant-to-tell-his-life-story-141730">Dennis Brutus: South African literary giant who was reluctant to tell his life story</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>His first job in exile in the UK was as campaign director of the <a href="http://disa.ukzn.ac.za/gandhi-luthuli-documentation-centre/role-international-defence-and-aid-fund">International Defence and Aid Fund</a>, which raised money to hire lawyers to defend political prisoners and to send subsistence allowances to their next of kin. </p>
<p>In 1971 he emigrated to the US, becoming a professor in the English Department at Northwestern University. In 1975 he co-founded the African Literature Association. From 1986 he became professor of African literature at the University of Pittsburgh. He returned to South Africa in 2005 as an honorary professor at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. Involved in wider causes than just in South Africa, such as the <a href="https://www.pambazuka.org/activism/southern-africa-southern-african-social-forum">Southern African Social Forum</a>, he died of cancer in 2009.</p>
<p>Dennis Brutus’ achievements were two-fold: as a political activist and as poet.</p>
<h2>Political activism</h2>
<p>He joined the Teachers’ League of South Africa in 1950, which was the major affiliate of the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/non-european-unity-movement-neum">Non-European Unity Movement</a>. Mostly comprising <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Coloured">Coloured </a> teachers, it focused on anti-racism and anti-imperialism issues. But he was non-dogmatic, also participating in protests of the Coloured People’s Congress, affiliated to the African National Congress. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/356057/original/file-20200902-20-1ohhsmn.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/356057/original/file-20200902-20-1ohhsmn.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=915&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356057/original/file-20200902-20-1ohhsmn.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=915&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356057/original/file-20200902-20-1ohhsmn.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=915&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356057/original/file-20200902-20-1ohhsmn.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1149&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356057/original/file-20200902-20-1ohhsmn.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1149&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356057/original/file-20200902-20-1ohhsmn.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1149&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>He hid both <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-anc-is-celebrating-the-year-of-or-tambo-who-was-he-85838">Oliver Tambo</a> and <a href="https://www.nelsonmandela.org/content/page/biography">Nelson Mandela</a> (top ANC leaders who had to go underground to avoid detention) in his home when they visited Port Elizabeth. He was also friends and worked with Eddie Daniels and Patrick Duncan of the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/liberal-party-south-africa-lpsa">Liberal Party</a>, a small non-racial political party.</p>
<p>As a sports administrator, he founded the South African Sports Association and later the South African Non-Racial Olympics Committee (<a href="https://africanactivist.msu.edu/organization.php?name=South+African+Non-Racial+Olympic+Committee#:%7E:text=The%20South%20African%20Non%2DRacial,went%20into%20exile%20in%201966.">Sanroc</a>) to lead the campaigns to get whites-only sports codes boycotted by foreign touring teams. Their first victory came in 1956, when the International Table Tennis Federation admitted as member the non-racial <a href="http://scnc.ukzn.ac.za/doc/SPORT/SPORTRAM.htm">South African Table Tennis Board</a> instead of the whites-only SA Table Tennis Union. </p>
<p>Global football followed with the same ban in 1961. <a href="https://www.joc.or.jp/english/historyjapan/tokyo1964.html#:%7E:text=The%20Games%20of%20the%2018th,introduced%20for%20the%20first%20time.">The 1964 Olympic Games in Tokyo</a> became the first to exclude whites-only or internally segregated South African sports organisations. Activists from both the Unity Movement and those aligned to the ANC built up this no-racism-in-sport movement.</p>
<p>Throughout the remaining apartheid decades, overseas protesters led demonstrations against whites-only Springbok (South African national) teams.</p>
<h2>Dennis Brutus the poet</h2>
<p>Brutus’ development as a poet was influenced by the English Romantics, including Wordsworth, Shelley and Keats. He also read Yeats, Eliot and Auden. One major challenge for scholars of his oeuvre is that censorship compelled him to publish his prose and poems under a bewildering array of noms-de-plume: Anon., J.B Booth, B.K, le Dab, D.A.B., Julius Friend, John Player, and L.N Terry.</p>
<p>What demonstrated his originality and courage was that virtually no English language poets in South Africa had published poems on politics since <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Roy-Campbell">Roy Campbell</a> in the 1920s. <a href="http://www.mwsfoundation.org.za/index.php/featured/304-welcome-to-unique-avcom">Mongane Wally Serote</a>, <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/national-orders/recipient/mandla-langa-1950">Mandla Langa</a> and <a href="http://www.apc.uct.ac.za/apc/researchers/professor-njabulo-ndebele">Njabulo Ndebele</a> were among the first literary critics to praise Brutus’ poems.</p>
<p>Probably his most widely circulated poem, <em>For a Dead African</em>, delineated the 1950s in its first stanza:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We have no heroes and no wars</p>
<p>Only victims of a sickly state</p>
<p>Succumbing to the variegated sores</p>
<p>That flower under lashing rains of hate.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>His second stanza chillingly prophesied the 1960s detentions of anti-apartheid activists:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We have no battles and no fights</p>
<p>for history to record with trite remark</p>
<p>only captives killed on eyeless nights</p>
<p>And accidental dyings in the dark.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>A topic repeated in his poem <em>In Memoriam</em> to <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24764301?seq=1">Imam Abdullah Haroun</a>, a clergyman beaten and kicked to death in detention by the Special Branch:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>because he chose not to speak / he died</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Brutus showed his political colours in print in <em>At a Funeral</em> about <a href="https://escholarship.org/content/qt6tc554rb/qt6tc554rb.pdf?t=mniomb">Valencia Majombozi</a>, who died in August 1960, shortly after graduation as a doctor, after much hardship:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Black, green and gold at sunset; pageantry and stubbled graves</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The ANC colours were then illegal. To fly them was punished by up to six months in jail.</p>
<p>Other widely printed lines come from <em>Nightsong City</em>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Sleep well my love, sleep well;</p>
<p>The harbour lights glaze over the restless docks,</p>
<p>Police cars cockroach through the tunnel streets;</p>
<p>From the shanties creaking iron-sheet</p>
<p>Violence like a bug-infested rag is tossed</p>
<p>And fear in immanent as sound in the wind-swung bell</p>
</blockquote>
<p>These relevant Brutus poems should be put up on the walls for tourists to view during the Robben Island Museum tours, which are led by former political prisoners as guides. This book should be in every library, and on your bookshelf.</p>
<p><em><a href="http://www.bestred.co.za/dennis-brutus-detail.html">Dennis Brutus: The South African Years</a> is published by Best Red, an imprint of the HSRC Press.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/145331/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Gottschalk is an ANC member, but writes this review in his personal capacities as a historian and a poet.</span></em></p>That none of his collections were published in apartheid South Africa testifies to the police state’s censorship.Keith Gottschalk, Political Scientist, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1190372019-07-15T15:17:46Z2019-07-15T15:17:46ZWhen and where do Nile crocodiles attack? Here’s what we found<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/280673/original/file-20190621-61775-4dnq9j.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Policies are usually aimed at removing problem animals. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Piet Beytell (C)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Nile crocodile is Africa’s largest, and most widely distributed, crocodile. It can be found in Egypt in the North, through Central and East Africa, down to South Africa. The largest specimens and concentrations of these crocodiles are in the lakes and rivers of Central and East Africa. </p>
<p>Research on crocodile attacks can provide insights into when and where they attack, and who they attack. This is all important information that can help inform actions to prevent attacks. But published data on Nile crocodiles are in short supply. Data only exist for 12 of the 30 African countries where bites are known to occur. Most cover short periods of time, and collection methods vary.</p>
<p>With the aim of filling in this gap – and improving safety for people and crocodiles – <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/oryx/article/synthesizing-nile-crocodile-crocodylus-niloticus-attack-data-and-historical-context-to-inform-mitigation-efforts-in-south-africa-and-eswatini-swaziland/6398E2EA56FC62E2C518071584658CD4">I’ve compiled a database</a> of crocodile attacks on people in South Africa and eSwatini (formerly Swaziland) from 1949 to the present. This is the most comprehensive list drawn up for any country on the continent. </p>
<p>My colleagues and I analysed 67 years of this data, between 1949 and 2016. We found 214 reported and verified, unprovoked attacks. Most bites happened in rivers and in the hot season. And most of the victims were young boys. </p>
<p>This data can provide valuable information to help focus efforts to prevent attacks in the region. </p>
<h2>High risk areas</h2>
<p>Only the Nile crocodile (<em>Crocodylus niloticus</em>) occurs naturally in South Africa and eSwatini, and they are formidable predators. A large adult is capable of preying on even the largest species of megafauna – like buffalo and wildebeest. At 15 feet long, big males can weigh up to 700kg, with up to 68 teeth, and are capable of staying submerged for more than an hour.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/280696/original/file-20190621-61729-12t2oea.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/280696/original/file-20190621-61729-12t2oea.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/280696/original/file-20190621-61729-12t2oea.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/280696/original/file-20190621-61729-12t2oea.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/280696/original/file-20190621-61729-12t2oea.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/280696/original/file-20190621-61729-12t2oea.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/280696/original/file-20190621-61729-12t2oea.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sergey Uryadnikov/Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>To analyse the data gathered, I worked with South African crocodile experts and fellow members of the IUCN Crocodile Specialist Group. We also looked at the status of crocodile populations in the region, and current management practices, to inform possible safety recommendations.</p>
<p>Most bites occurred in rivers in the warmer, low lying eastern parts of the study region, with the majority occurring between December and March – the summer months. <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/oryx/article/using-predator-attack-data-to-save-lives-human-and-crocodilian/75B2EE3C38F2F81F3561570CB1B0C7FF">Experts</a> speculate that crocodiles attack during this season because it is hot, wet and the breeding season. In the rainy season there are higher water levels – making crocodiles more widespread. They may also be more aggressive because it’s the breeding season and, because crocodiles are cold-blooded, in warmer weather they are more active and more hungry. </p>
<p>Most attacks happened in waterways linked with major crocodile populations, namely the St Lucia Lake system, Ndumo Game Reserve and Kruger National Park. </p>
<p>Bite victims have mostly been males (65%), contradicting the <a href="http://www.fao.org/3/i1048e/i1048e00.htm">assumption</a> that women are disproportionately at risk because they perform domestic chores like washing clothes and fetching water. </p>
<p>A key finding is that 51% of victims were young – between the ages of 0 and 15. They were most commonly bitten when they were swimming or bathing. Many were bitten when they were fishing. </p>
<p>Whether someone died from an attack depended on whether the victim was accompanied or alone, the size of crocodile involved and the age of the victim. Small children are more vulnerable to fatal attacks. Only 35% of children who survived attacks escaped without help.</p>
<h2>Closer to people</h2>
<p>Continent-wide, Nile crocodiles are not classified as a threatened species, but some regional populations are classified as <a href="http://biodiversityadvisor.sanbi.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Suricata_1_2014.pdf">vulnerable"</a>. This is based on <a href="https://bioone.org/journals/herpetologica/volume-70/issue-4/HERPETOLOGICA-D-13-00090/Population-Status-of-Nile-Crocodiles-in-Ndumo-Game-Reserve-Kwazulu/10.1655/HERPETOLOGICA-D-13-00090.short">observations</a> of <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/aqc.1132">declining</a> adult crocodile populations and nesting sites. </p>
<p>As is happening elsewhere in Africa, habitat transformation and increasing human use of waterways is having an impact on their numbers. Crocodiles are struggling to breed outside protected areas (in a region where they were once widespread) and they are also killed for medicinal use, food, and safety reasons.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/280698/original/file-20190621-61767-1489nvr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/280698/original/file-20190621-61767-1489nvr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/280698/original/file-20190621-61767-1489nvr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/280698/original/file-20190621-61767-1489nvr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/280698/original/file-20190621-61767-1489nvr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/280698/original/file-20190621-61767-1489nvr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/280698/original/file-20190621-61767-1489nvr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">JMx Images/shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Crocodiles are also being <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/wsa/article/view/64109">forced to</a> move into artificial water bodies – like dams – driving them closer to people. This is because seasonal rivers are drying up (their water is being used for irrigation and other purposes) and because of disturbances along riverbanks and pollution in rivers. </p>
<p>Illegal gillnet fishing on a number of larger crocodile-inhabited dams in South Africa are an ongoing <a href="http://www.wrc.org.za/wp-content/uploads/mdocs/TT%20615-1-14.pdf">safety concern</a>, particularly as this occurs at night, when crocodiles are most active.</p>
<h2>Safety measures</h2>
<p>Currently attack mitigation policies are very varied, and not consistently applied. During our fieldwork we saw that there is minimal outreach work in rural areas, with some better efforts by provincial conservation management groups like Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife in South Africa, and Big Game Parks in eSwatini. </p>
<p>Policies in both countries are generally reactive, focused on removing problem animals, but it is not always clear who is responsible for doing so or how to contact them. It is not the policy of conservation authorities to build protective structures outside protected areas, or pay compensation for bites. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/oryx/article/synthesizing-nile-crocodile-crocodylus-niloticus-attack-data-and-historical-context-to-inform-mitigation-efforts-in-south-africa-and-eswatini-swaziland/6398E2EA56FC62E2C518071584658CD4">our paper</a>, my co-authors and I make a few safety recommendations based on our data and experience.</p>
<p>In the high risk areas that we’ve identified, local authorities can provide safe water crossing points, water tanks or piped water, and protective enclosures. </p>
<p>Because most of the attacks affected children, educating children should be a priority, particularly in identified high-risk areas. Outreach activities could be supported with <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280731914_Don't_get_eaten_by_a_crocodile_in_South_Africa_or_Swaziland">existing material</a> that provide information on crocodile biology and behaviour and <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320383558_Don't_Get_Eaten_by_a_Croc">advice on</a> avoiding and responding to attacks.</p>
<p>Specialist teams should be formed, by government or local authorities, that are equipped and trained to capture and remove problem crocodiles. Where funds are unavailable, the US <a href="https://myfwc.com/wildlifehabitats/wildlife/alligator/">system of</a> licensing private individuals to do this could be trialled. </p>
<p>These are just a few steps that can be taken to try to help humans and crocodiles to safely coexist in the region.</p>
<p><em>Data analysis was conducted with UK-based modeller, George Powell, and in consultation with South African crocodile experts and fellow members of the IUCN Crocodile Specialist Group – Xander Combrink and Hannes Botha. All are co-authors on the paper.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/119037/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Pooley receives funding from the Lambert Bequest to Birkbeck University of London, where he is Lambert Lecturer in Environment (Applied Herpetology) in the Department of Geography. Simon is also an Honourary Researcher at the School of Life Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa, and during this research was a Visiting Researcher at WildCRU, University of Oxford, Tubney, UK. He is a member of the IUCN Crocodile Specialist Group and the IUCN Task Force on Human Wildlife Conflict. These views are personal, not representative of these organisations. </span></em></p>Research on crocodile attacks can provide insights into when and where they attack, and who they attack.Simon Pooley, Lambert Lecturer in Environment (Applied Herpetology), Birkbeck, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1131312019-03-17T07:59:51Z2019-03-17T07:59:51ZStudy shows why African refugees stay put despite end to conflict at home<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/263846/original/file-20190314-28492-e6zsms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Tens of thousands fled the DRC during fighting between rebels and government troops.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE/Dai Kurowowa</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The number of refugees in Africa has more than doubled between 2009 and 2016, from 2.1 million to <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.REFG">4.9 million</a>, according to the World Bank. Old conflicts have continued and new ones have arisen, forcing large numbers of people to rely on aid and often live in poor and dangerous conditions as refugees.</p>
<p>Our <a href="https://journals.co.za/docserver/fulltext/aa_afrus_v7_n3_a6.pdf?expires=1552384252&id=id&accname=57716&checksum=B26C264D8A4C022744B9139B41630A1D">2018 study</a> looked into the reasons why forced migrants (whether in camps or as free settlers) remain in a permanent state of refuge even though they are sometimes exposed to xenophobia, violence, poverty, hunger, intimidation, coercion and disease in the host countries. </p>
<p>The concept of the <a href="https://munin.uit.no/handle/10037/3212">refugee cycle</a> suggests that there are three phases in a refugees’ experience – pre-flight, flight, temporary settlement and resettlement (repatriation). Going by this concept, the resettlement stage is the final stage. Our <a href="https://journals.co.za/docserver/fulltext/aa_afrus_v7_n3_a6.pdf?expires=1552384252&id=id&accname=57716&checksum=B26C264D8A4C022744B9139B41630A1D">study</a> therefore examined the challenges in completing the refugee cycle.</p>
<p>The options open to a refugee, depending on the policies of host countries, are usually free settlement, shelter in a refugee camp, and returning home (where ideally they can help to create a new peace).</p>
<p>Policies in countries such as Angola, South Africa, DRC, Lesotho and eSwatini, which work through a free settlement system, often expose refugees to xenophobic violence and <a href="http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOCIALPROTECTION/Resources/SP-Discussion-papers/Labor-Market-DP/0906.pdf">many other risks</a>. This makes it difficult for refugees to become self sufficient members of the host society.</p>
<p>The voluntary return of refugees to their homelands (after peace has been re-established), is therefore an important step towards implementing durable peace-building frameworks (reconciliation and transitional peace) within their own countries. That being said, the paper identified lengthy conflicts, the loss of migration networks and cultural bereavement as some of the most important factors hindering the voluntary return of refugees to their home countries. </p>
<h2>Long standing conflicts</h2>
<p>The lengthy nature of some of Africa’s wars is one of the main hindrances to ending the “refugee cycle”. Where conflicts drag on over a long time, the future of refugees becomes highly uncertain. They may be forced to stay in a host country for as long as a generation. Under these conditions, refugees often lose the means to become independent.</p>
<p>The Somalia war for instance, is over <a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/staggers/2017/05/no-time-complacency-somalia">27 years</a> and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) – particularly the regions of South Kivu, Kasai and Tanganyika – has been in conflict <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/inpictures/fleeing-drc-uganda-africa-refugee-crisis-180301084715204.html">since the 1990s</a>. The UN Refugee Agency reported that there are over 870 000 Somali refugees in neighbouring states and over two million are internally displaced.</p>
<p>Refugee camps such as Dadaab and Kakuma in Kenya are often without any income generating and <a href="http://samponline.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/midsa1.pdf">livelihood opportunities</a>. This means refugees are unable to take care of themselves and move ahead as migrants. </p>
<h2>Loss of migration networks</h2>
<p>Another factor that makes it difficult for refugees to leave host countries or settle independently is the loss of their migration networks. These are the social networks which help inform migrants on how to get to safety and cope once there – and also how to return home once conflict has ended.</p>
<p>When conflict continues for a long time, these networks and communities are often lost. This mostly occurs when people move or die, communication infrastructure is destroyed, conditions change and information loses its relevance, among other factors.</p>
<p>Studies among Burundian refugee groups in Tanzania found that most of the displaced people were likely to find it difficult to reclaim their family land if repatriated. Many refugees therefore chose to <a href="https://munin.uit.no/handle/10037/3212">remain in Tanzania</a>. </p>
<h2>Cultural bereavement</h2>
<p>The third factor working against the end of the refugee cycle is cultural bereavement. This means the loss of connection with the cultural, linguistic and traditional institutions of the home country. In such situations, over a long period of time refugees change their language and religious beliefs to such an extent that they become strangers to their own nationalities and cultural belief systems. </p>
<p>A good example of this is how Rwandan refugees in the DRC who fled the 1959-1962 Rwandan revolution and the 1994 genocide became part of their <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/uscr-country-report-rwanda-statistics-refugees-and-other-uprooted-people-jun-2001">new Congolese community</a>. As a result, they have not been able to return to Rwanda even after an end to the conflict in their country.</p>
<p>Residing in refugee-like circumstances in South Kivu, these Rwandan refugees have remained in DRC. In Uganda, despite the 2003 agreement to <a href="https://www.uantwerpen.be/en/research-groups/iob/publications/working-papers/wp-2017/wp-201706/">repatriate 25,000 Rwandan refugees</a>, only 850 accepted to return with the majority of them returning back to Uganda almost immediately after repatriation.</p>
<h2>Voluntary repatriation</h2>
<p>Ideally, the voluntary return of refugees to their homelands not only marks an end to their suffering in foreign lands, but also relieves the host country of many burdens. Voluntary repatriation is also critical for the return of <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/the-return-of-refugees-and-idps-and-sustainable-peace/">sustainable peace</a> because it’s difficult to plan for long-term peace without including the needs of the displaced and securing their involvement. </p>
<p>After an end to the civil war in Sierra Leone in 2004, for example, the UN refugee agency successfully completed a three-year <a href="http://www.irinnews.org/news/2004/07/22/repatriation-refugees-after-civil-war-finally-ends">repatriation operation</a> of over 178,000 Sierra Leone refugees. Much of the post conflict reconstruction that has since occurred in Sierra Leone, Uganda and Rwanda wouldn’t have been possible without the repatriation of millions of war displaced. </p>
<p>It’s therefore crucial for humanitarian agencies to address the issues that make it difficult for displaced persons to voluntarily return home.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/113131/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sikanyiso Masuku does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The lengthy nature of some of Africa’s wars is one of the main hindrances to ending the “refugee cycle”.Sikanyiso Masuku, Postdoctoral Researcher at Institute for Democracy Citizenship and Public Policy in Africa, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1114322019-02-14T14:05:30Z2019-02-14T14:05:30ZAbolition of Angola’s anti-gay laws may pave the way for regional reform<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/258690/original/file-20190213-90485-eqs4qk.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The change in leadership is one of the factors that led to the decriminalisation of homosexual relationships in Angola. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Angola has <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/01/23/angola-decriminalizes-same-sex-conduct">decriminalised</a> consensual same-sex acts between adults in private. </p>
<p>An erstwhile <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Angola">Portuguese colony</a>, Angola inherited an ancient colonial statute – <a href="https://www.plataformamedia.com/en-uk/news/politics/interior/new-angolan-criminal-code-decriminalizes-homosexuality-10484571.html">dating back to 1886</a> – that criminalised “indecent acts” and persons habitually engaging in “acts against nature”. These formulations have widely been interpreted as a ban on homosexual conduct.</p>
<p>Punishment upon conviction included confinement in an asylum for the “mentally insane”. It could also lead to jail time with hard labour, and disqualification from <a href="https://www.loc.gov/law/help/criminal-laws-on-homosexuality/homosexuality-laws-in-african-nations.pdf">practising a profession</a>. Portugal abolished a similar offence in 1983. It then adopted far-reaching constitutional protections against discrimination based on sexual orientation. Its former colony has taken a long time to reach this point.</p>
<p>The Angolan National Assembly voted of 155 to 1 to abolish the provision criminalising homosexual relationships <a href="https://www.angop.ao/angola/en_us/noticias/politica/2019/0/4/Members-Parliament-approve-new-Angolan-Criminal-Code,462e956d-0b3f-4a1d-8f9b-ee9b5b81ae1e.html">on January 23</a>. It went further, making a criminal act against another person because of their “sexual orientation” an aggravating <a href="http://www.parlamento.ao/documents/506145/0/PROP.+LEI+C%C3%93DIGO+PENAL.pdf">factor in sentencing</a>. The new <a href="http://www.parlamento.ao/documents/506145/0/PROP.+LEI+C%C3%93DIGO+PENAL.pdf">Penal Code</a> (in article 214(1) also made discrimination against people on the basis of sexual orientation an offence, with punishment of up to two years’ imprisonment. It is homophobia, not homosexual acts, that will be punished in future. </p>
<p>This is a great step forward for Angola’s lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ) community. And the decision could have tremendous significance beyond the country’s borders – by spurring change in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), of which Angola is a member. </p>
<p>That’s because Angola’s move means those SADC states which actively criminalise same sex activity are officially in the minority. And <a href="http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ab_r6_dispatchno74_tolerance_in_africa_eng1.pdf">data shows</a> that attitudes towards homosexuality in the region are becoming less negative.</p>
<h2>Tipping point in SADC?</h2>
<p>Decriminalisation in Angola brings SADC, which has 16 member states, to a tipping point. Two countries in the region – the Democratic Republic of Congo and Madagascar – never made same-sex conduct <a href="https://www.loc.gov/law/help/criminal-laws-on-homosexuality/homosexuality-laws-in-african-nations.pdf">criminal</a>.</p>
<p>Three others have unequivocally abolished such laws in the last two decades or so - South Africa in 1998, invalidating all <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/1998/15.html">convictions since 1994</a>; Mozambique in <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2015-06-29-mozambique-scraps-colonial-era-homosexuality-and-abortion-bans">2015</a>; and Seychelles in <a href="http://www.seychellesnewsagency.com/articles/5198/Seychelles+parliament+passes+bill+to+decriminalize+sodomy">2016</a>. In a fourth, Malawi, the situation is ambivalent. In 2012 then President Joyce Banda committed to <a href="https://76crimes.com/2012/05/18/malawi-president-aims-to-repeal-anti-homosexuality-law/">repeal</a> all laws that criminalised same-sex sexual relations. But, a 2012 moratorium on arrests and prosecutions was <a href="https://www.nyasatimes.com/malawi-court-rejects-moratorium-on-gays-police-can-arrest-homosexuals/">suspended in 2016</a>. A court ordered review of the constitutionality of “sodomy laws” is <a href="https://76crimes.com/2014/06/16/3-in-malawi-prisons-await-ruling-on-sodomy-law/">ongoing</a>.</p>
<p>In Lesotho and Namibia, the situation is not very clear. There is no explicit legal prohibition. But it’s assumed that same sex sexual acts remain a <a href="https://www.loc.gov/law/help/criminal-laws-on-homosexuality/homosexuality-laws-in-african-nations.pdf">common law crime</a>. This leaves a minority of seven states – Botswana, Comoros, Mauritius, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe – in which the legal prohibition is clear. People are prosecuted for same sex relations in these countries. But, cases are infrequent these days.</p>
<p>But, litigation is underway to challenge these laws in <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/group-challenges-criminalisation-of-same-sex-relationships-in-botswana-20180530">Botswana</a>. And, in Mauritius, the Law Reform Commission already in 2007 recommended that “sodomy laws” be <a href="http://lrc.govmu.org/English/Documents/Reports%20and%20Papers/53%20iss-hum-071009.pdf">abolished</a>.</p>
<p>There is evidence to suggest that southern Africa is relatively fertile ground for legal reform in this domain. In <a href="http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ab_r6_dispatchno74_tolerance_in_africa_eng1.pdf">its 2016 survey</a> independent African research network Afrobarometer found that tolerance towards homosexual persons in the region was higher than in any other part of the continent. In the survey, an average of 32% respondents in southern African countries expressed a favourable view towards having neighbours who are homosexual. This contrasts with an average of 21% across Africa. </p>
<p>Although there will be many obstacles to achieving region-wide decriminalisation, there is also much to build on in terms of popular support and lessons learned from Angola’s experience. </p>
<h2>How Angola got here</h2>
<p>Various factors contributed to decriminalisation in Angola. The most important was the change in political leadership <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2019-01-16-angola-president-lourencos-grace-period-is-over">in September 2017</a>. This led to the political will to take on an issue that doesn’t necessarily enjoy popular support.</p>
<p>Angola’s new <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/who-is-angolas-new-president-joao-lourenco/a-40218458">President João Lourenço</a> has shown some willingness to engage in a <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/angola-president-holds-unprecedented-talks-with-civic-groups-20181205">more inclusive politics</a>. Since he took over power in September 2017, an openly LGBT organisation was for the first time officially registered. And, Parliament all-but-unanimously <a href="https://portugalinews.eu/new-angolan-criminal-code-decriminalizes-homosexuality">decriminalised same-sex acts</a>.</p>
<p>Organised civil society, including Angola’s first ever LGBT organisation <a href="https://www.mambaonline.com/2018/06/21/angola-registers-its-first-lgbt-affirming-civil-rights-group/">Iris Angola</a>, also played an important role. National efforts were supported by pan-African NGOs such as <a href="https://www.hivsharespace.net/organization/african-men-sexual-health-and-rights-amsher">African Men for Sexual Health and Rights</a>.</p>
<p>The close relationship between Angola and other states in the <a href="http://www.sussex-academic.com/sa/titles/politics_ir/Ashby.htm">Lusophone world </a> also contributed. Brazil, for example, is a major socio-cultural influence – and its sexual minorities have traditionally enjoyed high levels of acceptance, to the extent that <a href="https://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/p/pod/dod-idx/recent-supreme-court-ruling-on-same-sex-unions-in-brazil.pdf?c=iij;idno=11645653.0001.103;format=pdf">same sex unions are recognised</a>. In all likelihood, Angolans also closely followed the abolition of similar offences in Mozambique. </p>
<h2>More than just decriminalisation</h2>
<p>While decriminalisation is an important part of securing a world in which LGBTQ people coexist on an equal footing with others, the mere absence of criminal sanction is not enough. </p>
<p>In 2014 the African Union’s major human rights body, the <a href="http://www.achpr.org/about/">African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights</a>, adopted <a href="http://www.achpr.org/sessions/55th/resolutions/275">Resolution 275</a>. This called on state parties to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights to refrain from, investigate and punish acts of violence and discrimination against people based on their sexual orientation and gender identity. Angola’s legal reforms are in line with this resolution.</p>
<p>Other SADC states should draw on Angola’s example by not only abolishing same-sex prohibitions (where they still exist). But, they must also adopt anti-discrimination legislation. A good starting point is the context of employment law. South Africa, Mozambique, Mauritius and Botswana have already explicitly prohibited discrimination in the workplace.</p>
<p>This is an area of human rights protection in which Southern Africa is well placed to take a firm lead, and achieve region-wide decriminalisation and anti-discrimination laws. Closer collaborative links should be forged between states and non-state actors to work towards this goal. And, greater openness and genuinely inclusive politics should be cultivated.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/111432/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Frans Viljoen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Angola’s new President João Lourenço has shown some willingness to engage in more inclusive politics.Frans Viljoen, Director and Professor of International Human Rights Law, Centre for Human Rights, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1082712019-01-15T12:55:36Z2019-01-15T12:55:36ZHow harvesting natural products can help rural people beat poverty<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/253685/original/file-20190114-43520-isy8w4.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ornamental craft made from palm leaves and pine cone in grass baskets are sold in Eswatini. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Deepa Pullanikkatil</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Every day, people around the world harvest natural products like fungi, plants, bark, flowers, honey and nuts. These <a href="http://www.fao.org/docrep/w7715e/w7715e07.htm">non-timber forest products</a>, as they are known, can play an <a href="https://www.iucn.org/sites/dev/files/import/downloads/ntfps_int_l_ws_proceedings_en_part_1.pdf">important role</a>
– particularly for people living in rural areas.</p>
<p>Products like honey and nuts can be sold. Plants and plant fibre can be used to create furniture, cloth and crafts; herbs processed to make herbal remedies and leaves and flowers sold for ornamental uses. All this contributes to income generation and is a valuable resource for alleviating poverty in rural communities.</p>
<p>Yet Non-Timber Forest Products (or NTFPs) don’t often feature in discussions about poverty reduction and alleviation. One of the reasons for this is probably the lack of qualitative studies on the topic; the kind which feature stories from people who have used them to escape poverty. Users’ voices haven’t been heard enough to help scholars and policymakers understand the links between these products and poverty alleviation, and to harness these in poverty reduction strategies. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783319755793">In our new book published by Springer</a>, <em>Poverty Reduction Through Non-Timber Forest Products</em>, we have tried to fill this gap. Interviewees from Mexico, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Peru, Brazil, Portugal, Italy, Nepal, India, China, Uganda, Swaziland, Malawi, Cameroon, Mozambique and elsewhere shared their stories of using various products to create small enterprises and earn money. </p>
<p>Many have also been able to survive shocks such as crop failure, illness, retrenchment and the loss or estrangement of a family’s sole breadwinner. This shows how non-timber forest products can act as “<a href="https://www.povertyandconservation.info/en/importance-non-timber-forest-products-rural-livelihood-security-and-safety-nets-review-evidence">safety nets</a>”.</p>
<p>Non-Timber Forest Products are dwindling worldwide; climate change and overuse of land are contributing to this trend. But such products are still common in many parts of the world and – while there is no one-size-fits-all solution for poverty alleviation – they should be studied and considered in governments’ poverty reduction plans.</p>
<p>Our findings suggest that trade in these products should be promoted among poor people. Governments and development partners need to offer the necessary training, support and access to markets and finance to ensure this happens.</p>
<h2>Stories from Africa</h2>
<p>There are many ways in which Non-Timber Forest Products can be used as an income source. Several approaches are examined and profiled in our book.</p>
<p>In Uganda, for instance, we focused on a small-scale women’s industry called <a href="https://easyafricdesigns.com/our-team/">Easy Afric Design</a> which uses bark cloth made from the fig tree to create handbags and folders. </p>
<p>The women had to overcome the stigma of using bark cloth as a raw material, as it has historically been used for burials. To show other women that the material could be used for more than its traditional purpose, founder Sarah Nakisanze wrapped the bark cloth around her as a skirt. </p>
<p>Now, several rural women work for the company from their homes, making products from bark cloth. This empowers women who didn’t have any other source of income. Many have been able to save money to send their children to secondary school and to purchase assets. </p>
<p>In Swaziland, we profiled Paul Dlamini. He harvests medicinal plants from indigenous forests and sells them in his herbalist shops around the country. With this income he set up a five roomed house, educated nine children and employed several people. He has been able to educate his children beyond his own level of schooling, and to improve his family’s livelihood.</p>
<p>We also share stories from Cameroon and Malawi of people who produce honey and have used the income from their sales to lift themselves out of poverty. The farmer who launched the Malawian initiative, Arnold Kasumbu has become so successful that he now trains other farmers, as well as university students.</p>
<p>Raul Sebastião Nhancume, from Mozambique, had to drop out of school due to poverty and later learnt to use palm (<em>Hyphaene coriacea</em>) leaves to make furniture for a living. Now he has two employees in his furniture manufacturing workshop and sells his products in Mozambique and South Africa. With the income from furniture making, he was able to buy school supplies and uniforms for his two children and has also built a two bedroom brick home. </p>
<p>By investing their earnings into children’s education, many of the people we interviewed were looking to ease inter-generational poverty and improve younger generations’ opportunities. </p>
<h2>Successful approaches</h2>
<p>Some countries have made inroads in using their Non-Timber Forest Products trade for poverty alleviation. As we outline in the book, Brazil and India have provided training, marketing support and certification for NGOs using these products. Other countries could learn from these approaches.</p>
<p>A deeper understanding of how Non-Timber Forest Products can become income sources, as provided through people’s own stories, helps to inform poverty reduction strategies in ways that broad statistics and data can’t.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/108271/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Deepa Pullanikkatil does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Non-Timber Forest Products don’t often feature in discussions about poverty reduction and alleviation.Deepa Pullanikkatil, Co-Director Sustainable Futures in Africa (SFA) Network (Funded by Scottish Funding Council and allocated to the University of Glasgow), Consultant based at CANGO in Eswatini and Co-Founder -Abundance, University of GlasgowLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1019432018-09-17T12:51:55Z2018-09-17T12:51:55ZHow playing on swings can help children understand physics<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/232911/original/file-20180821-149463-i45ft6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Swings can be educational tools.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> KHONTHO8/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>To children in Zimbabwe, they’re <em>mzeerere</em>. Kids in Eswatini call them <em>mjikeni</em>; their South African counterparts refer to the <em>mswinki</em>. The words may be different, but the experience is the same: children love to play on swings.</p>
<p>What they may not realise is that they’re learning while playing. The swing allows children to physically experience a wide range of physics concepts: <a href="https://www.physicsclassroom.com/class/1DKin/Lesson-1/Speed-and-Velocity">velocity</a>, <a href="http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/hbase/gpot.html">gravitational potential energy</a> – the sort of energy that allows a large swinging mass to be used to break down buildings – weightlessness, period of swing and the rush of wind resistance.</p>
<p>Many of these concepts, then, are known to children – in their vernacular languages. But in some cases, like acceleration or angular velocity or acceleration, there may be no equivalent term in their own language. This means that formal school physics comes with its own terms; language far removed from children’s out-of-school experiences on the playground.</p>
<p>Research and the sort of educational approach used in, for instance, Montessori and similar have shown that play is a valuable form of learning. Practical experience causes learning in more than just the mind; it develops skills.</p>
<p>I wanted to know whether trainee physics teachers at a South African university had ever understood the link between playground experiences and formal physics concepts during their own school days. This could imply they are likely to show the same link to their students. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/18117295.2018.1479620">My study</a> showed that there was no deliberate explanation of the link between play and science. This is a shortcoming of teacher training programmes. Teachers must be able to analyse and explain the application of science principles in the games that children like to play and use this knowledge in the learning and teaching of science. </p>
<p>The way science is currently taught in southern African countries ignores the fact that the whole environment is a laboratory for learning.</p>
<h2>Teachers’ experiences</h2>
<p>The integration of out-of-school experiences with formal school science is one of the missing links in the teaching of science. Science is all around us in our out-of-school experiences. Play is a major activity that occupies the minds, time and energies of people at school age. </p>
<p>My study focused on the experiences of pre-service teachers at the University of Limpopo in South Africa. Eight student teachers were interviewed after I’d established that they grew up playing on swings. They were also able remember how they learned about the concepts in formal physics. I wanted to know if there was a link between these two things for them.</p>
<p>The student teachers told me that their own physics teachers never referred to pupils’ playground experiences when discussing concepts like the pendulum. This meant the pupils didn’t easily connect swing play with the idea of the pendulum.</p>
<p>It’s not just swings that provide valuable Physics lessons. Several other playground games directly apply Physics principles that children struggle to understand in school. For instance, the see-saw directly applies the moments of forces. The bicycle has many physics principles of motion, balance, forces, velocity ratios and mechanical advantage. </p>
<p>When it comes to the swings, children often create their own games. They’ll twist the swing, then allow it to unwind. They’re experiencing angular momentum; the idea of masses in circular motion. Players make themselves dizzy on the swing, then stagger and fall – the winner is whoever remains standing. In this way they relate physical balance of the body to its rotation.</p>
<p>Jumping from the swing to land as far away as possible from its resting position allows players to experience projectile motion, range, height and wind friction. The farthest jump wins the game. This implies that the concept of distance measurement is tacit in children’s playfield experiences.</p>
<h2>Finding different words</h2>
<p>In all these experiences, children develop words in their languages to communicate various aspects of the game. While the words may differ from the terms used in physics as a school subject, the concepts are the same. For example, <em>“nako”</em> is time in the Sepedi language and it is used to mean the time for the swing to go from one extreme to the other. In physics, this concept is known as period of swing and relates to the frequency of a swinging object. </p>
<p>The “lessons” learned on a swing mean that a Pedi child, for instance, will carry a deeper understanding of the pendulum (“<em>nako</em>”) into their school lessons. That same child will understand the physics of <em>mswinki</em> better, too. School and play become a continuum.</p>
<p>But this is only true if teachers are able to identify the value of swing play to learning, and to explicitly draw links between the two. My research suggests this isn’t happening very often.</p>
<h2>Teaching the teachers</h2>
<p>My research suggests that it’s important to rethink science education so that it becomes more relevant to children’s lived experiences in play, work and around the house.</p>
<p>Teacher training needs to go beyond the content of science to include applications in learners’ everyday experiences. This enables science to enrich the lives of learners.</p>
<p>Out-of-school experiences are also practical problem-solving opportunities where the systematic scientific method is constantly applicable. Schools without laboratories can benefit by changing teachers’ and learners’ mindsets to recognise the world as one big laboratory and science as an unending systematic engagement with the real world. </p>
<p><em>Author’s note: Professor Israel Kibirige co-authored the research study on which this article is based.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101943/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>This work was supported by the Department of Higher Education (grant number R792).</span></em></p>The way science is currently taught in southern African countries ignores the fact that the whole environment is a laboratory for learning.Francis Mavhunga, Lecturer, Physics Education, University of EswatiniLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/926952018-03-05T15:00:13Z2018-03-05T15:00:13ZTraditional African medicine and conventional drugs: friends or enemies?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/208655/original/file-20180302-65522-t1neoh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Herbs, roots and plants can have health benefits. But they can also interact negatively with Western medicines.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Michel Piccaya/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Africa is home to an extensive and diverse medicinal plant life. This includes commonly used herbs like Rooibos (<em>Aspalathus linearis</em>), Devil’s claw (<em>Harpagophytum procumbens</em>), Buchu (<em>Agathosma betulina</em>), Cape Aloe (<em>Aloe ferox</em>) and Hoodia (<em>Hoodia gordonii</em>).</p>
<p>These plant - or herb-based treatments have been a <a href="https://scialert.net/fulltext/?doi=rjphyto.2010.154.161">key part</a> of the continent’s traditional medicinal practices for thousands of years. <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3252714/">Up to 80%</a> of people in some areas regularly use traditional medicines and consult traditional health practitioners. In some areas, traditional treatments are <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17052873">the main</a> or only treatment because they are accessible, affordable and culturally accepted.</p>
<p>Numerous traditional African medicines are <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378874108002808">undeniably beneficial</a> in treating disease or maintaining good health. Some have even been the source of many prescription medicines. But there are challenges. These include the fact that many consumers automatically assume “natural equals safe”. Another problem arises when people use traditional or herbal remedies together with prescribed medicines. </p>
<p>Part of <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22612723">the research</a> my colleagues and I do at North-West University in South Africa is focused on understanding these combinations. Which are harmful? Which could be beneficial? We’re <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29268027">looking at</a> what’s known as “interactions” – the effect herbal medicines may have on the normal uptake, breakdown or activity of prescribed medicines. </p>
<p>Knowledge is key. Scientists need to conduct proper research to understand such interactions. Consumers need to be taught about these interactions, whether good or bad, and to tell their healthcare providers about everything they’re taking. </p>
<h2>Understanding interactions</h2>
<p>Prescriptions of traditional African medicines tend to be secretive. They’re based on knowledge passed from generation to generation of traditional healers. This can result in vague doses. Patients <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1517/17425255.2015.1064110">have been known</a> to overuse some remedies while self-medicating. This can have severe health consequences. <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2213422014000262">These include</a> stomach upsets, liver damage and even kidney failure. Some widely used natural health plant products which have been associated with adverse health effects because of misuse include <em>Aloe vera</em>, Echinacea (<em>Echinacea purpurea</em>) and Green tea (<em>Camellia sinensis</em>). </p>
<p>All of these natural remedies are generally considered “safe”, or even healthy by consumers since their use is not regulated or restricted. Nothing indicates to the user that “too much of a good thing” could be dangerous.</p>
<p>Thanks partly to efforts by the World Health Organisation, access to Western medicine – especially for diseases like HIV/AIDS – <a href="http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/95461/1/AFR_RC50_20.pdf">is increasing</a> across Africa. More and more people tend to be using traditional medicine in combination with prescription medicines. Often none of their healthcare providers know about this and so cannot warn about possible interactions.</p>
<p>Some traditional African medicines may interfere with the normal metabolism of drugs. For example, St. John’s Wort is a natural remedy frequently used for depression. But it’s <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15914127">been shown</a> to increase the removal of medicines, such as some oral contraceptives, from the body. This can lead to ineffective levels of the prescribed medicine, putting women at risk of pregnancy when they think they are protected.</p>
<p>On the other hand, the interaction could also result in reduced clearance of a drug. This may lead to higher levels of the prescribed medicine in the body, which produces negative side effects and could even lead to toxicity. </p>
<p>These interactions happen at a metabolic level. So even herbal products that are safe when used on their own <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17425255.2018.1421171?needAccess=true&journalCode=iemt20">may pose a risk</a> when taken in combination with Western medicine – that is, synthetic pharmaceutical agents.</p>
<p>Some of the best known examples of drug interactions are the effects of citrus, particularly grapefruit juice, and alcohol of many prescribed medicines. These combinations should be avoided.</p>
<p>Another example of particular importance in Africa is Cancer bush (<em>Sutherlandia frutescens</em>). It is widely used in the treatment of diseases such as HIV/AIDS and TB, especially in countries like Zambia, Swaziland, Zimbabwe and South Africa, as it is believed to generally improve quality of life in these patients. But it has <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3876690/">been shown</a> to lower the plasma levels of the antiretroviral drug, atazanavir, to sub-therapeutic levels when they’re taken together, reducing its anti-HIV efficacy.</p>
<p>This traditional remedy <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27155670">can also interfere</a> with isoniazid therapy, which is used as a preventative measure in TB treatment.</p>
<p>Despite these known interactions, policy makers still <a href="https://www.omicsonline.org/open-access/african-traditional-medicine-use-amongst-people-living-with-hivaids-insubsaharan-africa-in-the-era-of-antiretroviral-therapy-.php?aid=79780">promote the use</a> of these herbal remedies in the management of HIV/AIDS and associated illnesses. Clearly more public engagement is needed so patients understand the risks of interaction.</p>
<h2>And the good news</h2>
<p>But it’s not all bad news. Interactions between African traditional medicines and prescribed medicines can potentially be exploited for good.</p>
<p>One of the biggest problems in the development of new medicines is the low uptake of these compounds into the body, or its quick removal. In some studies, traditional medicines have been shown to have the ability to increase uptake or decrease the metabolism of prescription drugs. Applying these effects could enable the development of new herb-drug combinations with increased efficacy and reduced side-effects.</p>
<p>But studies that characterise and evaluate the healing properties or potential toxicity and drug interactions of traditional African medicines are very limited. This is further complicated by the fact that so many medicinal plants (more than 5000) are being used. So healthcare practitioners have limited information and often can’t make proper recommendations to patients who use such traditional remedies.</p>
<p>Whether positive or negative drug interactions are at play, African countries need to improve their regulation around traditional medicines. Only a few, among them Nigeria, Cameroon and South Africa, <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2213422014000262">have incorporated</a> traditional African medicines into their adverse drug reaction reporting systems.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/92695/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chrisna Gouws works for the North-West University. She receives funding from the National Research Foundation (NRF) of
South Africa and the South African Medical Research Council (MRC). Opinions expressed and conclusions arrived at, are those of the author and are not necessarily to be attributed to the NRF or the MRC.</span></em></p>Numerous traditional African medicines are undeniably beneficial in treating disease or maintaining good health.Chrisna Gouws, Senior Lecturer, North-West UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/885962017-12-19T12:33:19Z2017-12-19T12:33:19ZIndigenous languages must feature more in science communication<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199677/original/file-20171218-27585-mo3y8b.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Introducing rural and indigenous communities to science, through experiments and communication, is vital.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Felipe Figueira</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>There is no denying that English is one of the world’s major languages. It’s the mother tongue of nearly <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=mmTun9zaCTcC&pg=PT76&lpg=PT76&dq=370+million+people+speak+english&source=bl&ots=O_5aGHJmFZ&sig=qWISnyvwREBXhe8CvBE7BpLQXiY&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiojMy_45XYAhXnIcAKHTxYCCYQ6AEISjAH#v=onepage&q=370%20million%20people%20speak%20english&f=false">370 million people</a>. English is also very frequently used by scientists in academic journals and book chapters, along with other common languages like French, Spanish and Portuguese.</p>
<p>But what about the billions of people who speak very little English, or none at all? How can we improve their access to scientific information and knowledge? </p>
<p>In a bid to tackle this issue, along with other factors of marginalisation such as distance from urban areas and ethnic exclusion, we and our colleagues created the <a href="http://projetoimagine.ufsc.br/en/conheca-o-projeto-imagine/">Imagine Project</a> at the Federal University of Santa Catarina in Brazil. According to a <a href="http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0023/002322/232205e.pdf">UNESCO report</a>, people living in remote areas and those belonging to ethnic and linguistic minorities are the most vulnerable in terms of access to education. Rural children are four times less likely to ever attend school than their urban counterparts from similar economic backgrounds.</p>
<p>Giving these groups the opportunity to learn and to hear about science is an essential way of including them as citizens.</p>
<p>Imagine Project is <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/515198c">an initiative</a> that aims to take scientific knowledge out of the laboratory and share it particularly with rural and indigenous communities. As part of a competition linked to our work we recently translated four winner scientific videos, about different topics such as astronomy and pharmacology, into a number of languages. These feature in the videos as subtitles.</p>
<p>The languages include Tsonga (also known as Changana and spoken in Mozambique, South Africa, Swaziland and Zimbabwe) and Guarani, an indigenous language from Brazil, Paraguay, Bolivia and Argentina. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/Aa7TwlpxtVM?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Science made accessible - thanks to translation into a variety of languages.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This and similar initiatives are crucial if scientists are to properly communicate the knowledge they’ve produced; sometimes with the very communities they study or which are affected, in their own languages. </p>
<p>The combination of knowledge and communication – along with a few other fundamental conditions such as liberty and respect – leads to social, cultural and technological development. That is why it is so important for people whose job is to generate knowledge to share their findings with ordinary people.</p>
<h2>Opening up science</h2>
<p>Open communication has long been seen as a fundamental condition for scientific development. The advent of the internet made even greater, more open communication possible. A scientist can write an article that is available in an online journal or record a video that’s uploaded to YouTube. But what about scientists who don’t speak English, or users who might be interested in what’s being shared but don’t speak English?</p>
<p>It is a general rule of the so-called “hard sciences” that all widely read, high impact scientific journals are in English. For research to be considered internationally, it needs to be in English. Yet, science cannot be properly communicated or popularised unless language barriers are tackled. We knew this when we launched the Imagine Project in 2013. Initially, the project focused on creating a series of hands-on scientific activities to be carried out in rural communities. These involved working scientists, high school students and teachers. </p>
<p>Then our team generated open educational resources in Portuguese that were translated and published online in English, Spanish and French. We are continuously producing new material, including PDF protocols and documentary <a href="https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCmPNIIXVm5v_x1I_sMSfxKA">videos</a> showing our field experiences.</p>
<p>In 2017 we scaled up our ambitions and created <a href="http://imaginepangea.paginas.ufsc.br/en/">Imagine-PanGea</a>, a multilingual science popularisation competition. We were supported by three major organisations that work to popularise science: <a href="http://www.africangong.org/">African Gong</a>, which is pan-African; <a href="http://www.redpop.org/">RedPop</a>, which works in Latin America and the Caribbean; and <a href="http://portal.sbpcnet.org.br/">SBPC</a>, the Brazilian Society for the Advancement of Science.</p>
<p>There have been similar competitions elsewhere in the world that required entrants to work in either English or French. We created a video competition for African and Latin American graduate students across scientific disciplines, asking that their research be presented in a three minute video in either English, French, Portuguese or Spanish. There were 55 entrants.</p>
<p>The three overall winners and the best presentation from each continent had their videos translated into a range of languages. The videos were then widely publicised through the organisations that supported the competition.</p>
<h2>Tough translation</h2>
<p>A network of institutions and people representing different regions of Africa and Latin America were involved in this initiative. Their home languages and those of the people they worked decided what languages we’d translate videos into. We also relied on them to be our translators – and they didn’t always find this an easy task.</p>
<p>Many of the scientific terms used in the videos did not exist in the indigenous languages we’d chosen. In these instances, we kept words in French, English, Portuguese or Spanish. For example, Portuguese words can be found in the middle of the Guarani subtitles.</p>
<p>Further translations are underway into, <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-017-05731-0">among others</a>, Yoruba from Nigeria and Umbundo and Kimbundo from Angola. </p>
<p>The competition was based entirely on voluntary work. We had practically no funding. For the next edition, we’re hoping to find some kind of sponsorship, particularly to offer winners material prizes like goods, money or travel expenses to attend an international scientific meeting.</p>
<p>We are trying to find new translators for Quechua (an Andean language), Berber (from North Africa), Chinese and as many indigenous languages we can get. For this to happen, we’ll need to find more volunteer translators.</p>
<p>This is a new way of thinking about science communication: it’s the kind of people we reach, not the number, that matters. And it’s worked. When the Imagine project was launched, we were told that indigenous Brazilian people would be not interested in learning basic science such as genetics and molecular biology. The critics have been proved wrong. </p>
<p>The Guarani people we’ve worked with have flourished, conducting experiments with DNA and telling the team they want to learn more. In parallel with the Imagine Project, our university has introduced undergraduate degrees specifically to attract people from indigenous nations. In addition, a certain number of places are reserved across all degrees for indigenous Brazilians.</p>
<p>Our long term goal is to get more indigenous and rural people to become real scientists. This is already happening in Brazil: one of our collaborators, Joana Mongelo, is the first Guarani science master’s graduate in the south of the country.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88596/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The combination of knowledge and communication, along with a few other fundamental conditions such as liberty and respect , leads to social, cultural and technological development.Andre Ramos, Full Professor of Genetics, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)Marina Empinotti, PhD candidate - Communication Studies, University of Beira InteriorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/851112017-11-20T13:44:21Z2017-11-20T13:44:21ZWhy a proper record of birds in Africa is so important – for Europe<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/189977/original/file-20171012-31375-rlbuy4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Carefully tracking the migration habits of birds like the Barn Swallow can help to conserve these species.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Most of Europe’s birds head south each year around September to escape the northern winter. Some species only migrate as far south as southern Europe. But most cross the <a href="http://www.birdlife.org/europe-and-central-asia/news/protecting-mediterraneans-migratory-birds">Mediterranean Sea to Africa</a>. And many species cross the Sahara Desert to destinations in West Africa such as Nigeria and in East Africa, such as Kenya. Some travel as far south as South Africa. </p>
<p>These European birds are <a href="http://www.ebcc.info/index.php">diligently monitored</a>. Every April, during the breeding season in the early part of the northern summer, teams of citizen scientists in most European countries gather vast amounts of data on the distribution and densities of breeding – for almost every bird species. Thousands of citizen scientists are involved. They diligently generate the data in their leisure time.</p>
<p>Europe is also completing its <a href="http://www.ebba2.info/">second atlas</a> of breeding birds. This provides a map, for each species, of the places where it has actually been recorded breeding. With this information resources can be dedicated to protecting the areas where birds breed, and to improving their breeding habitat.</p>
<p>But all this effort is worth little unless it is matched by carefully planned initiatives in the non-breeding season, in Africa. The problem is that there’s not much accurate or up-to-date knowledge about distributions and migration routes in non-breeding areas.</p>
<p>Development – cities, agriculture, mining and industry – is changing the face of Africa. The impact of climate change is predicted to hit Africa <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cif-green/2009/nov/28/africa-climate-change">harder than any other continent</a>. These factors will certainly affect the bird species that migrate to and from Europe to breed; for many species, more than half the year is spent in Africa. </p>
<p>If Europe is going to reap the benefits of conservation measures at home, the greatest need for research in ornithology that’s relevant to conservation is an understanding of where “their” birds migrate to when they head off to Africa.</p>
<p>That’s where the African Bird Atlas comes in. </p>
<h2>Tracking sometimes subtle shifts</h2>
<p>Southern Africa has had atlas projects for <a href="http://www.adu.uct.ac.za/adu/past-projects/sabap1">birds</a>, <a href="http://www.adu.uct.ac.za/adu/past-projects/safap">frogs</a>, <a href="https://www.sanbi.org/news/sanbi-launches-suricata-new-publication-series">reptiles</a> and <a href="https://www.news.uct.ac.za/article/-2013-05-13-africas-first-butterfly-atlas-takes-wing-1">butterflies</a>. Only the bird atlas was truly comprehensive: almost every corner of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland and Zimbabwe was visited by citizen scientists who collected and compiled all the data.</p>
<p>The first bird atlas was developed in the late 1980s. The participants generated seven million records of bird distribution – a project described as the biggest biodiversity project conducted on the African continent. </p>
<p>A <a href="http://sabap2.adu.org.za">second bird atlas</a> was initiated in 2007 to cover South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland. This project is ongoing. In August 2017, its database reached 10 million records. It has sister projects, using the same protocol, running in <a href="http://kenyamap.adu.org.za/">Kenya</a> and <a href="http://nigeriabirdatlas.adu.org.za/">Nigeria</a>. Europe focuses on the breeding season, but work on the African bird atlas continues throughout the year. This allows us to gather precious data on the timing of the arrival and departure of migrant birds.</p>
<p>Other countries in Africa such as Ethiopia and Zambia have had bird atlas projects. These were mostly undertaken by expatriate birdwatchers from Europe and North America. While most of the distribution maps produced by these projects are well out of date, they remain incredibly valuable because they help show how distributions have changed. </p>
<p>The two bird atlas projects in southern Africa are a quarter century apart. Many species have shown massive changes in distribution. The <a href="http://bo.adu.org.za/content.php?id=294">Glossy Ibis</a> has expanded westwards. The <a href="http://bo.adu.org.za/content.php?id=281">Maccoa Duck</a> has decreased to the point where it ought to be listed as a threatened species.</p>
<p>The timing of migration is also changing. This is especially true for long-distance migrants. Comparisons between the two bird atlas projects have revealed <a href="http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/279/1733/1485">subtle shifts</a> in the timing of migration to and from South Africa of the iconic bird of the European spring, the Barn Swallow – <a href="https://english.stackexchange.com/questions/320830/a-swallow-does-not-make-a-summer-or-a-spring">famous for the saying</a> “one swallow does not make a summer”. </p>
<h2>A vital project</h2>
<p>So who can get involved in gathering information for the bird atlas, and why should they?</p>
<p>Anyone with a good ability to identify birds in their home can be a citizen scientist for the project. People who think they fit the criteria are encouraged to register as an observer on the project’s <a href="http://sabap2.adu.org.za">website</a>.</p>
<p>The guidelines for participation are all there, including a description of the protocol which needs to be followed. In a nutshell, this involves spending a minimum of two hours in a grid cell, about 9 km square, making a bird list which is as comprehensive as possible. We are currently looking for citizen scientists from across the continent.</p>
<p>All of this work is enormously important for Africa itself. For example, in planning species conservation and setting priorities for action, the first questions asked are: “Where does the species occur?” and “Is this range changing?” Only proper fieldwork through a project like the bird atlas can assure that the answers are not guesswork.</p>
<p>Also, biodiversity tourism – including bird tourism – has huge potential for <a href="https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/1882unwtowildlifepaper.pdf">sustainable employment</a> in Africa. But bird tourism is best planned if there is access to comprehensive distribution maps, especially in the field guides. </p>
<p>And the African Bird Atlas will also be of tremendous use to Europe. A 2014 review showed that Europe’s long distance migrants to Africa are <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ibi.12118/abstract">in decline</a>. The weak link in the annual cycle is not clear. The same review <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ibi.12118/abstract">points out</a> that we “understand little about distributions patterns” in Africa, and recommends that this is a priority for further research.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/85111/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The Second Southern African Bird Atlas Project, which Les Underhill leads, has received funding from the South African National Biodiversity Institute.</span></em></p>If Europe is going to reap the benefits of conservation measures at home, its experts need an understanding of where “their” birds migrate to when they head off to Africa.Les Underhill, Professor, Biodiversity Informatics, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/870202017-11-14T13:27:52Z2017-11-14T13:27:52ZSouthern Africa is slipping again after coming close to eliminating malaria<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/194542/original/file-20171114-27625-6lfukr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Brant Stewart/RTI</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>In the last five years, South Africa, Botswana, Namibia and Swaziland have all been on the verge of eliminating malaria. In fact, progress had been so good that the southern African region had been tipped to be malaria free by 2018. But a spike in cases this year means that it’s unlikely to meet the target. A new target has been set for 2020. The Conversation Africa’s Health and Medicine editor Candice Bailey asked Professor Rajendra Maharaj to explain why.</em></p>
<p><strong>Why has there been a spike in malaria cases in southern Africa? Is it unusual?</strong></p>
<p>Over the last few years there has been a downward trend in the number of malaria cases globally. There was a <a href="https://theconversation.com/parts-of-southern-africa-are-within-tantalising-reach-of-eliminating-malaria-49848">marked decrease in cases</a> in South Africa and in several other countries in the region including Swaziland, Botswana and Namibia. This trend was so encouraging that the region had become comfortable with the idea that it would reach the target of eliminating malaria by 2018. South Africa, for example, experienced a serious epidemic in the 1999/2000 malaria season where over 62 000 cases were recorded but with reinforced interventions, the cases decreased to under 5 000 in 2016.</p>
<p>The countries in the region achieved this by implementing evidence-based indoor residual programmes and improving diagnostics and treatment, introducing artemisinin-based combination therapy.</p>
<p>But this year <a href="http://www.nicd.ac.za/index.php/update-malaria/">figures</a> in some parts of South Africa were triple what they were last year. The reality is that in only some parts of the country will we have eliminated malaria. Although the number of cases reported from KwaZulu-Natal increased, it’s still possible to reach the 2020 goal but the same can’t be said for Mpumalanga and Limpopo. These two areas receive many imported cases from Mozambique and Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>This spike is not restricted to South Africa. It has happened in all <a href="http://www.nicd.ac.za/index.php/malaria-advisory-april-2017/">southern African countries</a>. But the increase has been the greatest in Namibia and Swaziland.</p>
<p>We have yet to confirm what caused the spike in the region. We know that the mild winter conditions created fertile ground for mosquito breeding. But we still need to understand what’s behind the increase in cases so that we can tackle the problem. </p>
<p>There are many questions. For example, was there a failure in the case management? Was there a relaxed attitude to implementing all the planned interventions? We still need to answer these questions. There are several possible reasons for the spike.</p>
<p>One possibility is the sub-optimal insecticide spray coverage contributed to the increased transmission. Another is the Malaria Control Programme was ill prepared for the epidemic. At one point this year there was as shortage of drugs in the province and these had to brought in as a matter of urgency after the epidemic struck. </p>
<p>A third possibility is that with heavy rains preceding a very dry period, there were many suitable pools for breeding and the hot conditions were ideal for mosquito breeding.</p>
<p><strong>How does the region handle malaria control currently. Are there weaknesses in the strategy?</strong></p>
<p>To control malaria, countries in the region use one of two strategies: <a href="http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/177242/1/9789241508940_eng.pdf?ua=1&ua=1">indoor residual spraying</a> (IRS) and the use of <a href="http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs094/en/">Long-lasting Insecticide Treated Nets</a> (LLINs). These are either used in isolation or as part of an integrated programme. South Africa uses indoor residual spraying and little larval control measures that targets the breeding sites of mosquitoes. In Swaziland, Botswana and Namibia the focus has been on indoor spraying but net coverage has achieved high levels in these countries. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/194533/original/file-20171114-27576-2q1xcw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/194533/original/file-20171114-27576-2q1xcw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194533/original/file-20171114-27576-2q1xcw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194533/original/file-20171114-27576-2q1xcw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194533/original/file-20171114-27576-2q1xcw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194533/original/file-20171114-27576-2q1xcw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194533/original/file-20171114-27576-2q1xcw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">e f b z.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/usaid_images/8720623278/in/photolist-ehBttL-ktf152-aLqs2z-ehBHes-djKSj7-ihPrTc-djKPuy-djKRVS-b2Ny-a9HWsi-djLCYw-djKQDa-djLC2R-djKSqW-djKQkw-a9HWqt-djLBPv-4WNzs8-djLDc7-djKRLh-a9HWnp-4eGFuv-djLBff-bBV1gw-4WWzeo-4oLZhA-e4pxqP-e4v9kd-djLBHy-djLBnV-e4v9Bf-e4pxmp-djKPXm-fM26KC-djKQ7Y-e4px6a-djKPMB-8epoks-PCRVkh-PYNcgA-8aWBAw-cEWd6J-9F6YgH-5CqSWZ-zriZB-aadUW7-xwvXaf-LTeexd-GYQjQC-HKWsQb">USAID/flickr</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The World Health Organisation <a href="http://www.who.int/heli/risks/vectors/malariacontrol/en/index6.html">recommends</a> the use of integrated mosquito control where more than one method is used.</p>
<p><strong>What are the other challenges in controlling malaria in the region? And why does the focus need to change?</strong></p>
<p>The region’s most powerful and effective vector control strategy has been spraying houses with the powerful insecticide DDT through the indoor residual spraying. But the impact of indoor residual spraying is often diluted due of <a href="http://www.who.int/malaria/publications/atoz/insecticide-resistance-implications/en/">insecticide resistance</a> to the currently used insecticides. Insecticides should be used on a rotational basis or in a mosaic spray pattern to mitigate resistance developing.</p>
<p>In areas where there’s been high levels of transmission, it was found that the spray coverage for insecticides recommended by the World Health Organisation wasn’t optimal. It’s <a href="http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/177242/1/9789241508940_eng.pdf?ua=1&ua=1">recommendation</a> is that 80% of the houses in a malaria infected community should be sprayed. But the region is not achieving this coverage.</p>
<p>Another cause for concern is that there are an increasing number of people refusing to have their homes sprayed with insecticide. This may be due to a lack of awareness of the need to have the houses sprayed. The reasons for this are unclear, but its suspected to be linked to the disease burden being low. </p>
<p>Participating in the indoor residual spraying programme is purely voluntary. People can’t be forced to have their homes sprayed as there is no legislation in place to compel them to have their houses sprayed. If people refuse, there’s nothing that can be done except to educate the homeowner to gain permission to spray. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.who.int/heli/risks/vectors/malariacontrol/en/index6.html">DDT</a> is the cheapest insecticide. It has a long residual life on the market and as a result countries with limited resources use it as a tool to control vectors. There is very little resistance to DDT in the region but there is enormous political pressure to move away from using DDT.
What is needed in these countries are robust public awareness campaigns informing people that, even when there have the is no disease, malaria can resurge as long as there are vector mosquitoes in the area. </p>
<p>There is evidence from developing countries in other parts of the world that elimination can be achieved. Sri Lanka is the latest country to <a href="http://www.searo.who.int/mediacentre/releases/2016/1631/en/">achieve elimination</a>. They had a very strong vector control programme that succeeded in reducing the caseload significantly. Once this was achieved proper case management further reduced the case numbers. </p>
<p>And when there were no local cases an intensive surveillance programme was implemented. Although elimination was achieved, entomological surveillance and disease surveillance was strengthened.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87020/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rajendra Maharaj does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A spike in the number of malaria cases in southern Africa means that the region will not meet its initial target of eliminating malaria by 2018.Rajendra Maharaj, Unit Director of the Office of Malaria Research , South African Medical Research CouncilLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/782072017-05-24T15:05:18Z2017-05-24T15:05:18ZWhy resilience matters for schools trying to thrive in tough situations<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/170749/original/file-20170524-25614-1rp3vb5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Schools can offer their pupils valuable support systems even if they're short on resources.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Akintunde Akinleye</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Many schools in Southern Africa are functioning in tough situations. Poverty, a lack of resources and poor or non-existent basic services all combine to make a less than ideal environment for education. But a number of schools in Namibia, Swaziland, Lesotho and South Africa display incredible resilience – a concept steeped in indigenous knowledge systems.</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation Africa’s education editor Natasha Joseph asked Professor Liesel Ebersöhn to explain the role of resilience in education.</em></p>
<p><strong>What is “resilience”, in an educational setting?</strong></p>
<p>Resilience in schools involves a process where teachers, principals, families, students and district officials know and use strategies that help teachers to teach and students to learn.</p>
<p>Resilience becomes relevant in education as soon as there is a shock to the education system that requires intervention. After that shock, resilience can ensure better than projected outcomes for students and teachers.</p>
<p>In a postcolonial, transforming society – like <a href="https://theconversation.com/factcheck-is-south-africa-the-most-unequal-society-in-the-world-48334">highly unequal</a> South Africa – such “shocks” or challenges are chronic. They don’t let up. They are also cumulative, coming from a variety of fronts. </p>
<p>In South Africa these barriers include a limited number of trained teachers; an unreliable supply of teaching materials; and multilingualism – either teachers and pupils don’t share home languages, or they do but converse only in English for the purpose of teaching and learning.</p>
<p>School systems, in conjunction with health and welfare systems, may not be responsive enough to identify pupils who are vulnerable because of health or socio-economic needs. Even if they can, the services available might be really limited. A lack of physical infrastructure like buildings, electricity, water and sanitation in schools limits opportunities for teachers to teach, and for students to learn and develop. </p>
<p>Schools that have supportive strategies in place can offer buffers. They can promote positive outcomes – for pupils and teachers. </p>
<p><strong>Can you tell us about a school in southern Africa whose resilience is allowing it to flourish? How does that resilience manifest itself?</strong></p>
<p>I’ve conducted research in rural Swaziland and Lesotho, urban Namibia and four of South Africa’s nine provinces around school-community resilience.</p>
<p>At many of the schools I visited that are functioning in challenging contexts, teachers draw on their cultural heritage – their indigenous knowledge systems – to provide care and support. This promotes resilience.</p>
<p>Teachers in these schools don’t go into “fight or flight” mode in response to the sorts of shocks I’ve described. They flock together. They tap into each other’s relationships to access and use available resources. For instance, I met a primary school teacher in an Eastern Cape informal settlement who asked a relative to connect her to a friend working as a nurse at the neighbourhood clinic. Now when the teacher sees that a child is sick she doesn’t feel helpless or frustrated: she calls the nurse directly and refers that child and family for health care. </p>
<p>In cases where teachers suspect a family may require financial support they can refer them to their “insider” link; someone who can help with identifying and completing the necessary forms. It can be hard for families with high rates of illiteracy to access the help they need, so these connections are vital.</p>
<p>So the flocking starts with an identified problem. Then teachers think about which resources they need to address this need, and who could connect them with a person who’s a custodian of this resource or service. In this way a network is created. Its purpose is to pragmatically access resources. </p>
<p>What they’re doing fits into a theory in indigenous knowledge systems that’s called <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-007-6368-5_6#page-1">Relationship Resourced Resilience</a>. This explains how individuals connect in times of hardship to share limited resources. They do so by providing social support to one another with positive outcomes for the collective, not only the individual.</p>
<p>This resilience response is robust. It continues to be used in urban and rural settings, by elders and young people, as well as men and women.</p>
<p><strong>What is it that these schools are doing differently?</strong></p>
<p>Schools that are able to show resilience are those that tap into age-old practices. These have stood the test of time and the absence of formal, policy-level structures to provide social support.</p>
<p>This social support is relational, collective and pragmatic. Teachers use existing relationships to tap into resources. For example, they might use reciprocal donations. These are in the form of skills in exchange for money, or for goods like food, or shared savings in societies to provide funds for school uniforms, or festivities, or transport. The cultural use of relationships is aimed at collective buffering against shocks and ultimately collective well-being.</p>
<p><strong>Are there obvious and visible differences in these schools’ results?</strong></p>
<p>The positive outcomes that have <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13540602.2014.937960">been measured</a> relate to resilient school communities’ subjective health and well-being documented over a ten-year time frame with teachers and students in primary and secondary schools, and in urban and rural schools.</p>
<p>At these schools, teachers continue to show up, teach and support each and their students. Parents and caregivers bring their children to schools that follow this resilience formula: research <a href="http://repository.up.ac.za/handle/2263/44067?show=full">shows</a> that such schools have higher enrolment numbers, which means they get more government funding for teacher posts and so enjoy lower student-teacher ratios.</p>
<p>Parents, caregivers and school-community volunteers offer their services to such schools. They assist with cultivating gardens to supplement the school nutrition programme. They follow up on students who don’t attend school and encourage them to return, and participate in after-school programmes that provide well-being and development opportunities for young people to engage in arts, culture, sports, and homework. </p>
<p>Neighbourhood businesses link with such schools to provide computers for teacher professional development and student training. They provide funds for counselling centres, books for libraries and jungle gyms for crucial development through play.</p>
<p><strong>What lessons can be taken from your research?</strong></p>
<p>Social support is an indigenous knowledge system in southern Africa. It has been used over time to combat challenges and compensate for the absence of equal services. It has also been used to access available opportunities, and connect people to adaptive pathways. It is a strategy that promotes positive outcomes for many even amid ongoing scarcity. It has been refined and has proven to be robust as a response to shocks. Social support is used organically in some schools – even in the absence of formal intervention. </p>
<p>In other schools that are struggling to adapt to ever-present hardships, systematic interventions grafted onto existing indigenous knowledge about social support <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Liesel_Ebersoehn2/publications?sorting=recentlyAdded&editMode=1">could promote resilience.</a></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/78207/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Liesel Ebersöhn receives funding from Nelson Mandela Children’s Fund (NMCF), the South African National Research Foundation, Synergos, and the Kim Samuel Foundation . </span></em></p>Schools that have supportive strategies in place can offer buffers. They can promote positive outcomes – for pupils and teachers.Liesel Ebersöhn, Director: Centre for the Study of Resilience, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/755662017-04-04T14:04:19Z2017-04-04T14:04:19ZWe’re closer to learning when humans first daubed arrows with poison<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163457/original/image-20170331-31763-1vgslll.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The San's arrows may look dainty, but when tipped with poison they are lethal for hunting.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Fred Dawson/Flickr</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Exactly when did human beings start tipping their weapons with poison to hunt prey? This is a question at the forefront of recent archaeological research. </p>
<p>In southern Africa San (or Bushman) hunter-gatherer groups, such as the /Xam of the Western Cape and the Ju/wasi and Hei//om of Namibia, used poisoned arrows for hunting during the <a href="http://www.sahumanities.org/ojs/index.php/SAH/article/view/362">19th and 20th centuries</a>. The origins of this technology, though, may be far older than we thought.</p>
<p>Recently, traces of the poison <a href="http://www.medicinenet.com/ricin/article.htm">ricin</a> were found on a 24 000 year-old wooden poison applicator at Border Cave in South Africa’s Lebombo mountains. If this identification is correct it would mean that people in southern Africa were among the first in the world to harness the potential of plant-based poisons. </p>
<p>South Africa has provided plenty of evidence of behaviours that could be attributed to cognitively complex <em>Homo sapiens</em>. This includes early evidence of hafted <a href="https://www.academia.edu/4561170/Quartz-tipped_arrows_older_than_60_ka_further_use-trace_evidence_from_Sibudu_KwaZulu-Natal_South_Africa">projectile technology</a>, the selection of aromatic plants for <a href="http://in-africa.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Wadley-et-al-2011-Science-MSA-bedding-Sibudu.pdf">bedding materials</a>), and the use of ochre as an <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=KJn93toAAAAJ&sortby=pubdate&citation_for_view=KJn93toAAAAJ:_FxGoFyzp5QC">insect repellent</a>.</p>
<p>The early use of poison is one more indicator of an advanced repertoire of behavioural and technological traits that have characterised our species from the earliest times. The problem is that it’s not easy to identify the remnants of ancient poisons. Organic molecules, including those that make up different poisons, degrade over time and seldom resemble their parent compound. For this reason it is often very difficult to accurately identify ancient organic residues.</p>
<p>Now a team of archaeologists and organic chemists from the Universities of the Witwatersrand, Pretoria and Johannesburg has <a href="http://www.sajs.co.za/potential-identifying-plant-based-toxins-san-hunter-gatherer-arrowheads/madelien-wooding-justin-bradfield-vinesh-maharaj-dwayne-koot-lyn-wadley-linda-prinsloo-marlize">published</a> details of a method that can – with reasonable accuracy – identify plant-based toxins and other unique chemical markers present on archaeological artefacts . </p>
<p>This may allow scientists to infer the presence of toxic plant ingredients applied to ancient weapons. It adds to our growing appreciation of the full complexity of early human populations – in southern Africa as well as in the world. </p>
<h2>Testing the method</h2>
<p>Anyone who’s watched BBC nature documentaries will <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=826HMLoiE_o">recall</a> scenes of small groups of Bushman hunting antelope with their delicate little bows and arrows. This flimsy equipment was able to bring down large game because of poison. </p>
<p>The most well known source of arrow poison in southern Africa is a beetle larva known as Diamphidia. The Diamphidia grub is still used today by traditional hunters living in the Kalahari. The grub is eviscerated between the hunter’s fingers and its entrails applied directly to an arrowhead’s base. The poison, known as diamphotoxin, can bring down a fully-grown giraffe. </p>
<p>But <a href="http://www.sahumanities.org/ojs/index.php/SAH/article/view/362">historical records</a> indicate that many other, different plant ingredients were used. The particular ingredients and recipes used to make arrow poison <a href="http://www.sahumanities.org/ojs/index.php/SAH/article/view/362">differed</a> between groups and locations. </p>
<p>A recent <a href="http://www.pnas.org/content/109/33/13214.abstract">archaeological discovery</a> at Border Cave (on South Africa’s border with Swaziland), revealed trace amounts of a substance still adhering to a 24 000 year-old wooden poison applicator. This substance was <a href="http://www.pnas.org/content/109/33/13214.abstract">identified</a> as by-products of the poison ricin. Ricin is produced by the castor bean plant, from which castor oil originates. This discovery, though not without its detractors, sparked <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1040618215014111">renewed interest</a> in identifying poison ingredients on archaeological artefacts in various parts of the world.</p>
<p>This is where our research comes in.</p>
<p>Our <a href="http://www.sajs.co.za/potential-identifying-plant-based-toxins-san-hunter-gatherer-arrowheads/madelien-wooding-justin-bradfield-vinesh-maharaj-dwayne-koot-lyn-wadley-linda-prinsloo-marlize">paper</a> presented the results of a pilot study designed to accurately detect minute amounts of organic compounds from poisonous plants found on archaeological artefacts. We used an analytical technique known as ultra performance liquid chromatography – mass spectrometry (UPLC-MS) – to characterise the organic compounds present in 11 species of poisonous plant found in southern Africa. </p>
<p>To test the reliability of our detection technique and our ability to accurately identify the most likely plant source of identified compounds, we conducted a blind test. Three plant extracts were prepared following a known poison recipe and applied to a modern arrowhead. The plants used in this recipe were known to only one of the authors. Once the poison coating on the arrowhead had dried, a small amount was scraped off and analysed using UPLC-MS. </p>
<p>We were able to identify two of the three plants used in the poison recipe; identification of the third, belonging to the euphorbia taxa, was not definitive.</p>
<p>Finally, a 90-year-old poisoned arrowhead from Namibia was analysed following the same protocol. The results showed that our method can be used tentatively to identify toxins based on comparative overlays with fresh plant material. Furthermore, the method is able to identify non-toxic compounds that may be unique to specific species of plants. This means the plant in question could be identified even in the absence of known toxins.</p>
<h2>Opening new doors</h2>
<p>Our study’s importance lies in the ability to recognise organic components of ancient plant-based poisons that may be hundreds – or even thousands – of years old. This is particularly impressive in instances where several ingredients were mixed together to prepare an arrow poison and where only minute amounts of this poison survive on the implement. </p>
<p>No historical information exists on the variety of plants used (nor, indeed, the recipes) for arrow poisons in the eastern half of southern Africa. Also, apart from the single discovery at Border Cave, we have no idea when people started using poisons to assist in hunting. Hopefully this new method can help to address both of these issues and build on existing scholarship of Africa’s indigenous knowledge systems.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/75566/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Justin Bradfield does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The early use of poison is one more indicator of an advanced repertoire of behavioural and technological traits that have characterised our species from the earliest times.Justin Bradfield, Postdoctoral Research Fellow (Evolutionary Studies Institute), University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/698142016-12-07T07:51:02Z2016-12-07T07:51:02ZHow the EU could spur African growth, instead of making more bad trade deals<p>Before the election of Donald Trump ripped up the global rulebook on trade, the European Union entered into an old school-style deal with many African countries. </p>
<p>After nearly a decade of negotiations, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), comprising Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland, signed the <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/sadc/index_en.htm">Economic Partnership Agreement</a> (EPA) with the 28 members states of the EU. When the process of ratification is complete, Mozambique is <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/development-policy/news/new-african-economic-partnership-enters-into-force-critics-still-unconvinced/">slated to become the sixth member</a> of the agreement. </p>
<p>The EPA is designed to be asymmetrical in the African countries’ favour. The European Commission has <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/development-policy/news/new-african-economic-partnership-enters-into-force-critics-still-unconvinced/">insisted</a> that the EU has “never accepted such a degree of asymmetry in a trade deal before”. </p>
<p>But some European and African delegates continue to question the <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201607131066.html">fairness of the deal</a>, not least because the African countries already benefit from duty-free access to the European single market through the “<a href="http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/april/tradoc_150983.pdf">Everything but Arms</a>” initiative of the Commission.</p>
<p>The EU will grant all signatories of the deal 100% free access to its common market, except South Africa, which will have custom duties on <a href="http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1555">1.3% of its exports</a>.</p>
<h2>Will it work?</h2>
<p>The granting of free access to the vast EU market is lauded as a coup for the continued economic progress of the developing nations involved. While there is no reason to believe the motivations of the European Union are anything but sincere, whether it will have the intended effect is still unclear. </p>
<p>The rationale of the agreement has been showcased by the EU as a tool to spur economic growth. The argument goes that removing duty on “intermediate goods” – such as automotive parts and electronics that are used in the manufacturing of more specialised consumer goods – can now be imported on the cheap.</p>
<p>The EU claims that the agreement will protect African production activities from liberalisation, allowing domestic industries the time to mature. The textile industry has garnered particular interest where South African labour unions have been very <a href="http://www.industriall-union.org/a-turnaround-for-south-africas-textile-industry">vocal</a> against further trade liberalisation. Countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya – both showing promise of becoming established textile-producing hubs – are also grappling with various hurdles from European customers who are <a href="http://www.mckinsey.com/industries/retail/our-insights/east-africa-the-next-hub-for-apparel-sourcing">perceived</a> as “more demanding with respect to lead times, order sizes, and quality”.</p>
<p>An influx of cheaper, higher quality products such as textiles from the EU are likely to reduce trade between African nations, prevent manufacturers from making more diverse products, and limit industrialisation. Even South Africa’s inter-regional textile exports, despite boasting a more established and sophisticated industry, represent a <a href="http://city-press.news24.com/Business/textiles-turn-to-exports-20160610">mere</a> 12% to 14% of total exports. </p>
<p>Giving European imports the duty-free treatment will leave African producers struggling: local businesses will be unable to sell their wares at competitive prices, while the agreement will limit the whole continent’s efforts to move up the industrial value chain, and produce a greater quantity of final consumption goods.</p>
<p>As a result, Africa will remain, contrary to the envisaged ambitions of the EPA, a perpetual supplier of raw materials with a poorly diversified economy.</p>
<h2>Divide and conquer</h2>
<p>Signatory countries are also at risk of destabilising their fragile economies by losing the ability to collect duties on imported goods.</p>
<p>Botswana, according to the latest World Bank figures, relies on such tariffs to fill <a href="http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GC.TAX.IMPT.ZS?locations=BW">47% of its state coffers</a>, Namibia <a href="http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GC.TAX.IMPT.ZS?locations=NA">for 22%</a>, while Lesotho, a landlocked country within a country (South Africa) earns nearly 70% of its total tax revenue at its borders.</p>
<p>The Wilson Center, a US think tank, supports the <a href="http://www.herald.co.zw/why-african-countries-are-refusing-trade-pacts/">criticism flung at the EPA</a>, claiming the agreement is inherently flawed because of EU envoys’ “<a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/EPA%20Article.pdf">divide and conquer</a>” tactics when negotiating with African countries. </p>
<p>As part of this approach, EU negotiators trigger the fear of losing preferential access to the EU market in their counterparts, which forces the African states to the table under the assumption that they are left with <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2000224260/kenya-now-at-the-mercy-of-eu-on-trade-deal">no choice</a> but to participate in EPA talks. </p>
<p>This strategy can be seen in the behaviour of the European Commission towards other African nations. Recently, the Commission announced that Kenya, on the cusp of being declared a “middle-income” country, would lose tariff-free access to the EU market if the country <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/east-african-states-delay-signing-of-eu-trade-deal/a-19537689">did not ratify</a> the East Africa EPA.</p>
<p>Tanzania faces a <a href="http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=694034453&Country=Uganda&topic=Economy&subtopic=Regional+outlook&subsubtopic=Economic+growth&oid=1021301086&flid=1164413300">similar</a> predicament if <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201608020829.html">its status</a> as a developing nation is reviewed.</p>
<h2>The case of Mozambique</h2>
<p>Instead of pursuing unhelpful trade deals, Europe should work to help address the African continent’s deepest structural problems. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.marinemegafauna.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Illegal-Fishing.-The-Case-of-Mozambique.pdf">fishing industry</a> in Mozambique serves as a poignant example. The country, disproportionately reliant on its fisheries for both foreign reserve income and feeding its citizenry, is losing up to <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2016-07-18-theres-a-crisis-in-our-oceans-illegal-fishing-dwarfs-ivory-and-rhino-horn-poaching">US$65 million</a> from its economy every year because of illegal fishing.</p>
<p>Through a series of deals in 2013, Mozambique <a href="https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/IPR-Mozambique-Oct2013-Summary.pdf">undertook major investments</a> to upgrade its previously inadequate maritime surveillance powers and <a href="http://www.worldfishing.net/news101/industry-news/mozambique-tackles-illegal-fishing">safeguard</a> the country’s coastlines.</p>
<p>The government bought patrol vessels, and improved monitoring, training and technology capabilities. But it is now facing <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3567677/Britain-gave-84-million-year-Mozambique-set-fishing-fleet-instead-country-bought-military-patrol-boats-France.html">criticism</a> over how the deal was secretly financed and further questioning over why it is <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2016-07-18-theres-a-crisis-in-our-oceans-illegal-fishing-dwarfs-ivory-and-rhino-horn-poaching">failing</a> to put the new fleet to good use.</p>
<p>An EPA offers little hope of alleviating the plight of fisheries, especially in light of <a href="http://www.srfood.org/images/stories/pdf/officialreports/20121030_fish_en.pdf">research</a> that shows that fisheries agreements conducted between the EU and island nations in the Pacific during the 1990s generated seven times more value for European states than for the <a href="https://www.greenpeace.org.au/blog/fishing-for-a-fair-deal-in-the-pacific-and-why-the-eu-must-change-their-game/">island nations</a>.</p>
<p>But a joint initiative on fishing would instead have the potential to increase export revenue and serve as a catalyst for job generation. A concerted effort between the EU and host nations on the issue of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing alone could add 300,000 jobs and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/jun/29/tackling-illegal-fishing-in-western-africa-could-create-300000-jobs">generate</a> US$3.3 billion in revenue. It could also boost income from selling foreign rights by a factor of eight.</p>
<h2>Southern Africa as a dumping ground</h2>
<p>The EU’s incessant pursuit of EPAs are uncreative and may prove inadequate in promoting African economic self-reliance. </p>
<p>The most likely scenario for the agreement signed with the SADC is that the African countries involved will become a dumping site for European goods of superior quality to domestic products. Local consumers will no doubt <a href="https://www.google.fr/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=4&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwjdof3Yut3QAhVF0hoKHSbhCsoQFggrMAM&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nielsen.com%2Fcontent%2Fdam%2Fnielsenglobal%2Fde%2Fdocs%2FNielsen%2520Global%2520Brand-Origin%2520Report%2520-%2520April%25202016.pdf&usg=AFQjCNGyZUXOx5LFMAljFmuX1sWGXW5MLw&bvm=bv.139782543,d.d2s">favour</a> these relatively cheaper goods over locally produced goods. This will have a direct affect on local trade and manufacturing prowess. </p>
<p>Instead of chasing new EPAs, the EU should <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2013/apr/26/development-delivery-aid-agencies">concentrate</a> on providing the skills and structures to assist host nations, becoming development partners rather than dictators of unfavourable terms.</p>
<p>The EPA is a fruitless attempt to reach a seemingly beneficial agreement, which risks become yet another unpopular global trade policy. The EU would do well to consider helping countries such as Botswana, Mozambique and Lesotho with the problems they actually have, rather than striking deals that are bound to fail.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/69814/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>André Breedt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A deal intended to help southern African countries develop could instead turn them into an EU dumping ground for cheap goods.André Breedt, PhD Student Economics, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-SorbonneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/664472016-10-06T20:14:31Z2016-10-06T20:14:31ZAfrican citizens have very low levels of trust in how elections are run<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140142/original/image-20161003-20239-843tin.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The charred interior of the Gabon's parliament after it was burned in post-election protests in Libreville.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Edward McAllister/Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Only one-third of Africans think that votes in elections are always <a href="http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Policy%20papers/ab_r6_policypaperno35_electoral_management_in_africa1.pdf">counted fairly</a>. That’s a problem, as a disputed poll can be a flash point for protests. It also diminishes the public’s faith in democratic processes.</p>
<p>But in citizens’ eyes, problems start long before the polls close. Concerns go back to who gets a fair shot at competing for office, who feels safe in expressing their preferences, and how trustworthy the whole process is.</p>
<p>With at least 25 African countries conducting <a href="https://www.ndi.org/electionscalendar">national elections in 2016-2017</a>, great attention is being focused on election management bodies. These are typically national electoral commissions which are crucial players in electoral processes.</p>
<p>They are also vitally important in shaping public perceptions of how well democracy is working. Poor electoral management can enable election fraud. And, even if it doesn’t swing an election, it can produce political alienation, public mistrust, protest and violence.</p>
<p>The most recent example is Gabon, where bloody clashes erupted after President Ali Bongo claimed a disputed <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37252778">re-election victory</a>. Earlier, in Kenya, opposition calls for electoral commission reforms <a href="http://www.kenyanz.com/articles/tired-of-hypocrisy-in-cord-iebcmustfall-265">sparked demonstrations</a> and a violent reaction from security forces. In the Republic of the Congo, election malpractices led to <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/congo-police-exchange-fire-militia-reports-160404073833646.html">violent protests</a>. In Ghana <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/mar/25/ghana-gripped-by-economic-anxiety-as-election-countdown-gathers-pace">pre-election anxieties</a> are high amid questions about the electoral commission’s revision of the voter roll for the <a href="http://ghanaelection2016.ghanaweb-news.com/">general election</a> in December.</p>
<p>On average across 36 African countries surveyed by <a href="http://www.afrobarometer.org">Afrobarometer</a>, a pan-African, non-partisan research network, in 2014/2015, citizens had a generally positive view of the quality of their elections, with 65% assessing their most recent national elections as “completely free and fair” or “free and fair, but with minor problems.” </p>
<p>Despite these generally positive evaluations, many of those surveyed found components of the election process wanting. Just half of respondents said they trusted their electoral commission “somewhat” (25%) or “a lot” (25%) (see Figure 1 below).</p>
<p><strong>Figure 1: Trust in national electoral commissions</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140120/original/image-20161003-20221-6usv0d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140120/original/image-20161003-20221-6usv0d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=704&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140120/original/image-20161003-20221-6usv0d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=704&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140120/original/image-20161003-20221-6usv0d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=704&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140120/original/image-20161003-20221-6usv0d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=885&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140120/original/image-20161003-20221-6usv0d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=885&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140120/original/image-20161003-20221-6usv0d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=885&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Figure 1 Respondents were asked: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: National Electoral Commission?</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Afrobarometer</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In a number countries perceptions were far less positive. These included Sudan (29%), Morocco (34%), Gabon (37%) and Algeria (43%). </p>
<p>Our results mirror the assessments of election quality by experts from <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2016">Freedom House</a> and the Perceptions of Electoral Integrity <a href="https://sites.google.com/site/electoralintegrityproject4/projects/expert-survey-2">Index</a>.</p>
<h2>Violence as a factor</h2>
<p>Some of the lowest levels of trust were expressed in countries that had experienced closely contested elections in 2016. They included Gabon (25%), São Tomé and Príncipe (31%), and Ghana (37%). Four in 10 citizens (43%) believed the opposition was “sometimes,” “often,” or “always” prevented from running for office, and an alarmingly high 44% said that voters were “sometimes,” “often,” or “always” threatened with violence (Figure 2 below). </p>
<p><strong>Figure 2|Threats of violence at the polls</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140165/original/image-20161003-20213-gpub3x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140165/original/image-20161003-20213-gpub3x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=696&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140165/original/image-20161003-20213-gpub3x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=696&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140165/original/image-20161003-20213-gpub3x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=696&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140165/original/image-20161003-20213-gpub3x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=874&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140165/original/image-20161003-20213-gpub3x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=874&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140165/original/image-20161003-20213-gpub3x.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=874&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Respondents were asked: In your opinion, how often do the following things occur in this country’s elections: Voters are threatened with violence at the polls?</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Afrobarometer</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>If voters consider violence part of the election process – as they did at high rates in Nigeria, Egypt, Côte d'Ivoire, Zimbabwe, and Kenya – this may limit citizens’ desire to express their own views. Suppression of the opposition and fear of violence at the polls have effects that are not visible, even in a fair vote count. </p>
<p>Consider those who stay home because the party they support is being harassed or they fear being attacked. These are silent voices that could tip the balance in a close election. Other substantial concerns included the bribery of voters and biased media coverage.</p>
<p>More fundamentally, such barriers to competition and participation may weaken public perceptions that elections serve their intended purposes. Half of those surveyed said that elections do not work well as mechanisms to ensure that people’s views were represented (50%) and that voters were able to remove nonperforming leaders from office (51%) (Figure 3).</p>
<p><strong>Figure 3: Performance of elections in Africa</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140122/original/image-20161003-20243-c2nlql.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140122/original/image-20161003-20243-c2nlql.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140122/original/image-20161003-20243-c2nlql.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=298&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140122/original/image-20161003-20243-c2nlql.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=298&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140122/original/image-20161003-20243-c2nlql.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=298&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140122/original/image-20161003-20243-c2nlql.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=374&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140122/original/image-20161003-20243-c2nlql.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=374&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140122/original/image-20161003-20243-c2nlql.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=374&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Figure 3 Respondents were asked: Think about how elections work in practice in this country. How well do elections:
1. Ensure that members of Parliament/National Assembly representatives reflect the views of voters?
2. Enable voters to remove from office leaders who do not do what the people want?</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Afrobarometer</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Countries with the highest levels of dissatisfaction with the representation and accountability performance of elections included Gabon, Morocco, Sudan, Nigeria, Swaziland, and Madagascar.</p>
<h2>Election flaws are rarely fixed</h2>
<p>Good election management is about ensuring honest and fair political competition. Anything short of that threatens to negate the purpose of holding elections in the first place. Without reliable, scientific survey data to challenge partisan claims, it has been too easy for incumbents to label opposition parties and civil society organisations as “spoilsports”, “troublemakers”, and in extreme cases “traitors” when they raise election quality concerns. </p>
<p>The Afrobarometer survey revealed that ordinary citizens have many concerns about election processes. These were often the same concerns voiced by opposition parties and civil society in protests and post-election petitions.</p>
<p>Despite significant public discontent, shortcomings in the quality of elections are rarely addressed after elections. Post-election protests may be met with government-sponsored repression, and courts often throw petitions out as unsubstantiated or find no way to mitigate the election flaws. </p>
<p>In addition, international observers often pass the buck by saying that although there were flaws in the process these did not determine the outcome of the election. The net effect is that election flaws are rarely fixed. In the worst cases ruling parties exploit them in subsequent elections.</p>
<p>For election authorities honestly promoting better elections, it is necessary to demonstrate high levels of transparency throughout the process and to engage stakeholders directly. Citizens are clearly the key stakeholders in elections.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/66447/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Penar is affiliated with Afrobarometer.</span></em></p>National electoral commissions are crucial in shaping public perceptions of how well democracy is working. Poor electoral management can enable fraud and produce political alienation.Peter Penar, Researcher and PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science, Michigan State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/654572016-09-26T06:47:55Z2016-09-26T06:47:55ZWomen support democracy less than men in parts of Africa – why?<p>In much of the world, democracy is seen as a force for good, and in development terms, it has <a href="http://www.nber.org/papers/w11993">important implications</a> for the welfare of citizens. </p>
<p>Increasing the legitimacy of a democracy must by its nature happen through demand from citizens. But surprisingly, <a href="https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/wp2014-044.pdf">my research</a> has highlighted that women in Sub-Saharan African countries are less likely to support democracy than men. </p>
<p>Why do African women reduce the much-needed legitimacy of democracy in their home countries? Research has <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X14000060">accounted for</a> education, employment, age, and geographical location, among other things. Yet the gender gap in support for democracy remains. </p>
<h2>Burundi, Swaziland and Mauritius</h2>
<p><a href="http://afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis/analyse-online">Afrobarometer</a> surveys conducted between 2012 and 2013 in Burundi, Mauritius, and Swaziland shed light on the extent of the problem. </p>
<p>In Burundi, 36% of female interviewees disagreed with the statement that “Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government”. The figure for male interviewees was 16%.</p>
<p>In Swaziland, 61% of women disagreed with the statement, compared to 47% of men. </p>
<p>Mauritius, meanwhile, records a lower difference between men and women. Only 17% of the women surveyed responded in the negative when asked about support for democracy, compared to 13% of men. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/139054/original/image-20160924-29912-75ur9f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/139054/original/image-20160924-29912-75ur9f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/139054/original/image-20160924-29912-75ur9f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=321&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139054/original/image-20160924-29912-75ur9f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=321&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139054/original/image-20160924-29912-75ur9f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=321&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139054/original/image-20160924-29912-75ur9f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139054/original/image-20160924-29912-75ur9f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139054/original/image-20160924-29912-75ur9f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Women’s support for democracy in Burundi, Mauritius and Swaziland.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Afrobarometer</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Why don’t women support democracy?</h2>
<p>My colleague Stephan Klasen and I have highlighted the importance of <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13545701.2015.1103379?journalCode=rfec20">gender discrimination</a> in social institutions as a way of explaining the democracy gender gap in Sub-Saharan Africa. We argue that in more egalitarian societies, women have more faith in democracy, possibly because the political system provides a way to support their autonomy and rights.</p>
<p>What do we mean by social institutions? These are long-lasting norms, traditions, and codes of conduct that find expression in traditions, customs and cultural practices in a given country. </p>
<p>They may be formal or informal laws, and guide people’s behaviour and interactions. We argue that inequality in social institutions deprives women of autonomy and bargaining power in the family. It also limits women’s access to the market, public spaces and resources. The way women are treated in their daily life reflects their ability to shape their own lives, and to gain or lose independence. </p>
<h2>Discrimination against women</h2>
<p>The recent OECD compilation of the <a href="http://www.genderindex.org/">Social Institutions and Gender Index</a> reveals that Burundi belongs to the group of countries with the <a href="http://www.genderindex.org/country/burundi">highest gender discrimination</a> within families. <a href="http://www.genderindex.org/country/swaziland">Swaziland</a> has high levels of gender discrimination, while <a href="http://www.genderindex.org/country/mauritius">Mauritius</a> has low levels of discrimination. </p>
<p>Formal laws in Burundi and Swaziland guarantee equal access to public space but informal norms and cultural practices make this difficult by requiring, for instance, a woman to be accompanied by a male relative for access to some public spaces. Women in Mauritius are better off, enjoying full access to public spaces with no informal constraints. </p>
<p>In Burundi, laws do not guarantee <a href="http://www.girlsnotbrides.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Minimum-age-of-marriage-in-Africa-March-2013.pdf">equal legal age of marriage</a>: for women is it 18, for men, 21. The law secures equal parental authority during marriage, but customary, traditional or religious laws and practices can diminish women’s parental authority. Laws in Burundi <a href="http://www.genderindex.org/country/burundi">do not guarantee</a> the same <a href="http://fride.org/descarga/The_issue_of_inheritance_for_women_in_Burundi.pdf">inheritance rights</a> to husbands and wives, allocating more rights to widowers than to widows. </p>
<p>In Swaziland, the laws <a href="http://www.girlsnotbrides.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Minimum-age-of-marriage-in-Africa-March-2013.pdf">guarantee equal age of first marriage</a>: 18 years old for both men and women. The laws also protect gender equality for parental authority during marriage, and gender equality for inheritance. Unfortunately, <a href="http://www.irinnews.org/news/2013/01/29-1">informal practices</a> mean some women get married when they are younger than the legal age. Similar practices reduce parental authority for women during marriage, and disfavour equal inheritance for widows. </p>
<p>In Mauritius, formal laws guarantee <a href="http://www.girlsnotbrides.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Minimum-age-of-marriage-in-Africa-March-2013.pdf">equal legal age</a> of marriage, also at 18. Likewise, parental authority during marriage is equally distributed between men and women. There are no customary, religious or cultural practices that constrain women from fully enjoying their legal rights. But legal gender equality in inheritance is undermined by <a href="http://www.genderindex.org/sites/default/files/datasheets/MU.pdf">informal norms and practices</a>.</p>
<h2>Happy women = strong democracy</h2>
<p>Social institutions are simply more woman-friendly in Mauritius than they are in Burundi and Swaziland. This could explain why the gender gap in support for democracy is lower in Mauritius than it is in Burundi and Swaziland. </p>
<p>Policies that promote inclusive social institutions are good drivers of democracy. And the overall level of support for democracy can be raised by giving women equal rights in the eyes of the law, and in society at large. </p>
<p>Women will enjoy such policies individually, but families, communities and society will be better served too.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/65457/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Maty Konte does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>If women aren’t given their full rights, they’re less likely to believe in democratic institutions.Maty Konte, Research Fellow, United Nations UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/658482016-09-22T17:11:40Z2016-09-22T17:11:40ZWhy military and market responses are no way to save species from extinction<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/138793/original/image-20160922-22527-1rd8dop.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Markets and militarisation as responses to wildlife threats are dangerous because they often fail.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The arrival of climate change brings with it large-scale <a href="http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/campaigns/climate-change/impacts/habitat_loss/">habitat loss</a> and unprecedented <a href="http://www.iucnredlist.org/">species extinctions</a>. The booming black and grey markets in already-threatened animals, including the <a href="http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/157301/25542141/1413203999027/W-TRAPS-Elephant-Rhino-report.pdf">rhino</a>, <a href="https://peerj.com/articles/2354/">elephant</a>, and <a href="http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2016/03/1160317-pangolins-united-states-endangered-species-act/">pangolin</a>, are worsening matters. </p>
<p>Responding to the threats, the world relies on the Conference of the Parties (COP) of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, better known as <a href="https://cites.org/cop17">CITES</a>. Based on an agreement between 182 countries, CITES’ <a href="https://www.cites.org/eng/disc/what.php">aim</a> is to: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>ensure that international trade in specimens of wild animals and plants does not threaten their survival.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>At CITES COP17, which will meet in South Africa, delegates are likely to retain bans on cross-border trade in rhino horn and elephant ivory. But CITES faces requests by South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe to <a href="http://www.chronicle.co.zw/zimbabwe-sadc-brace-for-tough-cites-negotiations/">allow</a> elephant ivory trade. Lifting that ban is <a href="http://www.bdlive.co.za/africa/africannews/2016/09/21/botswana-breaks-ranks-with-neighbours-on-ivory-trade-ahead-of-un-meeting">opposed</a> by Botswana, Kenya and Tanzania. There is an even more controversial <a href="https://cites.org/eng/cop/17/prop/index.php">proposal</a> by Swaziland’s King Mswati to sell his feudal monarchy’s rhino horn stock.</p>
<p>A second danger to CITES’ integrity and its ability to protect wildlife is the <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00045608.2014.912545">militarisation of conservation</a> through an anti-poaching arms race.</p>
<p>Markets and militarisation as responses to wildlife threats are dangerous. This is because they often fail. In addition, they rarely lead to alliances with the forces in society - especially neighbours of conservation sites - who are vital to defending threatened species. </p>
<h2>Militarisation is not the answer</h2>
<p>In the pursuit of conservation, southern Africa is witnessing new platoons of <a href="http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=14227:sandf-deploys-in-kruger-national-park&catid=87:border-security&Itemid=188">soldiers</a> and <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/thetimes/2013/05/20/rhino-rangers-up-their-game">paramilitary-trained rangers</a>, with <a href="https://www.sanparks.org/about/news/?id=55388">military leaders</a> heading anti-poaching efforts. New technologies including <a href="http://insideunmannedsystems.com/hunter-becomes-hunted-drone-wildlife-monitoring/">drones</a> and <a href="https://www.sanparks.org/about/news/?id=55378">military-grade helicopters</a> along with <a href="https://www.sanparks.org/about/news/?id=56814">new partnerships with military firms</a> are all entering the region’s parklands, ostensibly to save them. </p>
<p>There is little public discussion about the merits of militarisation within CITES or mainstream conservation. This is despite the fact that NGOs such as <a href="http://www.conservation.org/Pages/default.aspx">Conservation International</a>, the <a href="http://www.nature.org/">Nature Conservancy</a> and <a href="http://www.worldwildlife.org/">World Wildlife Fund</a> were <a href="http://www.worldwatch.org/system/files/EP176A.pdf">exposed</a> by WorldWatch researcher Mac Chapin a dozen years ago for disastrous adventures in military conservation. These included what he described as</p>
<blockquote>
<p>a disturbing neglect of the indigenous peoples whose land they are in business to protect.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Though many poachers are indeed armed, dangerous and participants in global organised crime, we disagree that more firepower is needed to stop commercial poaching. Green militarisation is a short-sighted response with severe long-term implications.</p>
<p>In recent years several hundred suspected poaches have been killed <a href="http://opais.sapo.mz/index.php/sociedade/45-sociedade/24255-289-mocambicanos-mortos-e-300-detidos-por-caca-furtiva-em-africa.html">in South Africa</a> and <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2016-03-16-botswanas-shoot-to-kill-policy-against-suspected-poachers">dozens in Botswana</a>. Many of these deaths result from controversial shoot-on-sight policies and practices (whether official or unofficial), where suspected poachers are killed without the opportunity to surrender.</p>
<p>This not only violates human rights but <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00045608.2014.912545">generates hostility to conservation</a> in economically-marginalised border communities. These are the very areas from which conservation needs local ownership if it is to be effective.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/138811/original/image-20160922-22514-1gfhwxc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/138811/original/image-20160922-22514-1gfhwxc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/138811/original/image-20160922-22514-1gfhwxc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/138811/original/image-20160922-22514-1gfhwxc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/138811/original/image-20160922-22514-1gfhwxc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/138811/original/image-20160922-22514-1gfhwxc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/138811/original/image-20160922-22514-1gfhwxc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/138811/original/image-20160922-22514-1gfhwxc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Killing poachers not only violates human rights but generates hostility to conservation in economically-marginalised border communities.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">David W Cerny/Reuters</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Worse, green militarisation has opened the doors of conservation to private defence corporations. The most caricatured must be Ivor Ichikovitz’s <a href="http://www.paramountgroup.com/">Paramount Group</a>, thanks in part to his <a href="http://www.janes.com/article/43211/poachers-beware-parabot-is-after-you-aad141">celebrated</a> <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iJji0kzrDfw">Mbombe Parabot</a>, the CGI African “superhero” cyborg-robot.</p>
<p>These firms seek to create new markets for their hardware and services, markets they actively work to enlarge by exploiting conservation to showcase their hardware at <a href="http://www.paramountgroup.com/media-centre/news/parabot-in-jordan-to-celebrate-special-forces-protecting-our-world/">military tradeshows</a>.</p>
<p>This also amounts to a perverse form of “greenwashing”. As the firms bedazzle us with their well-advertised commitment to environmental protection, we are left blind to the destruction they leave in their wake in conflict zones around the world. </p>
<h2>Putting a price on conservation</h2>
<p>Likewise, the ideology known as the <a href="http://www.foei.org/resources/publications/publications-by-subject/forests-and-biodiversity-publications/financialization-of-nature">financialisation of nature</a> is based on the view that a market problem, like the threat of extinction posed by poachers, can be treated best with a market solution. Trade in wildlife is especially <a href="http://thestudyofvalue.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/WP5-Nadal-and-Aguayo-Leonardos-Sailors-2014.pdf">vulnerable</a> to this logic.</p>
<p>Swaziland’s proposed international rhino horn marketing strategy is still firmly <a href="http://blueandgreentomorrow.com/2016/09/20/calls-king-swaziland-withdraw-trade-rhino-horn/">opposed</a> by leading environmental experts. South Africa still ostensibly supports the ban. But it is under pressure from rhino-horn factory-farming ranchers like <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/kwazulu-natal/meet-the-worlds-largest-rhino-breeder-2064943">John Hume</a> who owns 1400 rhino. This is more than Kenya’s entire rhino population. If Swaziland is allowed an exemption, Hume and other rhino breeders are likely to move animals across the border for horn harvesting and lucrative sales.</p>
<p>Neither green militarisation nor legalisation of cross-border trade in rhino horn and ivory are just or sustainable responses to wildlife loss. We must do better than this. And we can in several ways.</p>
<h2>Historic moment to rethink conservation</h2>
<p>The only surefire strategy to stop commercial poaching is drastically reducing demand. Wildlife <a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/may/17/rhino-horn-considered-cure-all-and-aphrodesiac-now/">fetches</a> staggering prices. A kilogram of rhino horn, for example, fetches US$60,000 – more than gold, diamonds and cocaine. Until buyers lose interest or shift to a new fad (as <a href="http://www.forbes.com/2008/11/26/jews-feathers-fashion-oped-cx_rl_1127laneri.html">happened</a> a century ago to ostrich feathers), there will never be a shortage of people willing to procure wildlife, even risking their lives to do so. </p>
<p>CITES, to its credit, has done a great deal to prioritise demand reduction especially in Asia, where the largest markets exist. And to their credit, South African and Namibian authorities are finally naming and shaming smugglers they catch. Even proponents of green militarisation often agree that reducing demand is the single most important response. But it is vital to do so with cultural sensitivity to avoid the appearance of yet another western imposition.</p>
<p>Just as necessary is the need to address commercial poaching through more productive, respectful relations with communities surrounding parks. After all, these are the very communities that can help make conservation efforts successful over the long haul. </p>
<p>We have an historic opportunity to rethink conservation. There is an opportunity to make it less exploitative and more inclusive of the needs and perspectives of communities that often suffered injustice when parks were carved from indigenous lands. </p>
<p>More broadly, because <a href="http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/17836/1/EoD_HD059_Jun2013_Poverty_Poaching.pdf">poverty is routinely a driver of poaching on the supply side</a>, we are reminded once more of the need to address global inequality.</p>
<p>There are precedents. Successful campaigning by local social movements and their global allies - including sanctions against corporations profiteering from racism - brought an end to apartheid 25 years ago. A decade ago, non-violent protests by civil society <a href="http://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/passages/4761530.0010.011/--tac-in-the-history-of-rights-based-patient-driven-hivaids?rgn=main;view=fulltext">ended</a> the patent control by big pharmaceutical companies over AIDS medicines, resulting in a subsequent rise in life expectancy from 52 to 62 in South Africa alone. </p>
<p>Saving the rhino and elephant could be just as feasible, if popular movements are built - movements that avoid militarised and market paths.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/65848/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Libby Lunstrum receives funding from the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Patrick Bond does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Military responses to combat poaching are a problem. They marginalise communities where poachers come from and can have longer term implications.Libby Lunstrum, Associate Professor of Geography, York University, CanadaPatrick Bond, Professor of Political Economy, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/649022016-09-05T18:04:54Z2016-09-05T18:04:54ZDehorning rhinos: why there may be a case for doing it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136603/original/image-20160905-4795-1w06dyk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Dehorning is practised on many South African private reserves and is seen as a way of deterring poachers.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Keith Somerville</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The large bull rhino was about a hundred metres away. The jeep carrying the darting team moved closer, there was a popping sound and the bull twitched and moved off with a dart clearly visible in his upper leg. Within two minutes he was down on his knees. The dehorning team approached quickly, attached blinkers to cover his eyes as a group of ranch hands held him down and attached a rope to his back leg.</p>
<p>Things then happened quickly but with an assured and rapid routine. The vet monitored the rhino’s vital signs – it was sedated but not unconscious and not obviously alarmed or in any pain. The dehorners measured and recorded the circumference and height of the horn and calculated how much to remove.</p>
<p>Once the measurements were done, a line was carefully drawn around the large front horns and the smaller rear ones leaving about four or five centimetres below the cut line to ensure growth would continue and there would be no damage to the horn bed where it joins the skull. A battery driven saw was then used to cut through the horn, which took little more than a minute. Someone sprayed cold water on to the horn to prevent over-heating and burn injuries.</p>
<p>Then the horn was off. The team cleaned up the edges of the horn stump and gathered up any shaving or horn dust and sealed them in marked bags. The two horns were measured, weighed and marked with indelible ink. When a rhino is first dehorned DNA samples are taken for future identification.</p>
<p>The main horn from the first rhino I saw dehorned weighed 565g, the smaller horn 67g and the shavings 45g. This would be worth an estimated US$40 000 in Vietnam and China, the main markets for poached ivory horn. That’s according to rhino owner John Hume and Kruger Park Chief Ranger Nicholus Funda, who gave me the latest estimates of horn prices. The horns and shavings from dehorned rhino are kept in a bank safe or secure depository. </p>
<p>Dehorning is practised on many South African private reserves and is seen as a way of deterring poachers. It has even been used on some parks and conservancies in Zimbabwe and Namibia, according to a study on the effects of <a href="http://www.rhinoresourcecenter.com/index.php?s=1&act=refs&CODE=ref_detail&id=1342738800">dehorning</a>. Dehorning itself is not hugely controversial - what is, is whether the harvested horn should be sold. This will be debated, with vehement arguments on both sides, at the CITES <a href="https://cites.org/eng/news/pr/cites_cop17_venue_dates_south_africa_2016">conference in Johannesburg</a> in September 2016. </p>
<h2>A ranch full of rhinos</h2>
<p>The dehornings I witnessed took place at a huge rhino ranch at Klerksdorp in South Africa’s North West province, belonging to the world’s most successful breeder of <a href="http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2016/01/160122-Hume-South-Africa-rhino-farm/">rhinos</a>, John Hume. His 8,000 hectare property carries 1,405 rhinos, only 17 of which are black rhinos. He has successfully bred 951 rhinos over the last 25 years. South Africa has 18,796 white rhinos and 1,916 <a href="https://www.savetherhino.org/rhino_info/thorny_issues/poaching_crisis_in_south_africa">black rhinos.</a></p>
<p>But 5,424 rhino have been poached in South Africa since 2006, and some feel this may be an underestimate as not all carcasses will have been found. According to the Kruger National Park’s Nicholus Funda, different groups are involved, from poor Mozambican peasants to local South Africans to rogue professional hunters and even former vets and senior wildlife officials from the Kruger National Park.</p>
<p>Hume’s ranch is not a national park or sanctuary but a massive breeding operation. He, and other private rhino breeders in South Africa, are dehorning their animals to deter poachers. </p>
<p>Dehorning doesn’t totally stop poaching as there is still a band of horn left which could be hacked off. But evidence from peer-reviewed studies has <a href="http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2016/01/160122-Hume-South-Africa-rhino-farm/">shown</a> that dehorning, when widely advertised, does deter poachers. They will seek to find the most <a href="https://www.environment.gov.za/sites/default/files/docs/studyon_dehorning_african_rhinoceros.pdf">lucrative targets</a> according to a study and will generally avoid farms and ranches with dehorning and good security. Even so, Hume has had attempted incursions by poachers.</p>
<p>The horn grows back on the rhinos and Hume dehorns his every 18 months to two years. The same <a href="https://www.environment.gov.za/sites/default/files/docs/studyon_dehorning_african_rhinoceros.pdf">study</a> of dehorning suggests there is no long-term impact of dehorning, as long as all rhinos in an area are dehorned. In the wild, there could be reduced ability of cows to defend calves from predators like hyenas and lions. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136606/original/image-20160905-4768-1bkhnwq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136606/original/image-20160905-4768-1bkhnwq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136606/original/image-20160905-4768-1bkhnwq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=295&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136606/original/image-20160905-4768-1bkhnwq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=295&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136606/original/image-20160905-4768-1bkhnwq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=295&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136606/original/image-20160905-4768-1bkhnwq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=371&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136606/original/image-20160905-4768-1bkhnwq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=371&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136606/original/image-20160905-4768-1bkhnwq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=371&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">John Hume’s 8,000 hectare property carries 1,405 rhinos.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Keith Somerville</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But on ranches, there is no obvious change in behaviour or <a href="https://www.environment.gov.za/sites/default/files/docs/studyon_dehorning_african_rhinoceros.pdf">health</a>. When I saw the two dehornings there seemed to be no great trauma involved and the rhino were on their feet and walking away in less than 15 minutes.</p>
<p>The horn is made of keratin, the same substance as hair and fingernails. Rhino horn has been used in <a href="https://africacheck.org/reports/medical-claims-for-rhino-horn-youre-better-on-an-aspirin-or-biting-your-nails/">Chinese traditional medicine</a> for millennia and now is believed, erroneously, in Vietnam to cure both <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/05/why-does-a-rhino-horn-cost-300-000-because-vietnam-thinks-it-cures-cancer-and-hangovers/275881/">cancer and hangovers</a>. It is chemically complex, containing large quantities of sulphur-containing amino acids, particularly cysteine, but also tyrosine, histidine, lysine, and arginine, and the salts calcium carbonate and <a href="http://www.rhinoresourcecenter.com/index.php?s=1&act=refs&CODE=ref_detail&id=1342738800">calcium phosphate</a>. </p>
<h2>The debate rages on</h2>
<p>There is currently a ban on the international trade in rhino horn. As a result the booming demand in China and Vietnam has created a huge and lucrative black market with horn <a href="http://www.earthtouchnews.com/environmental-crime/illegal-trade/top-10-shocking-figures-of-the-illegal-rhino-horn-trade">fetching $60,000 a kg</a>.</p>
<p>Hume believes that rhinos in the wild will only be saved through a combination of good security and dehorning, at least on private ranches. A few national parks and reserves want to dehorn and there is a lobby for a regulated and closely monitored legal trade in rhino horn. </p>
<p>This view is strongly opposed by many conservation and animal rights NGOs which means that this approach is unlikely to get sufficient support from governments to end the 39 year old CITES ban on <a href="http://www.bornfree.org.uk/get-involved/past-events/why-the-rhino-horn-trade-ban-needs-to-stay/">trade</a>.</p>
<p>The issue will be debated at the CITES Conference in Johannesburg at <a href="https://cites.org/eng/news/pr/cites_cop17_venue_dates_south_africa_2016">the end of September</a>, when Swaziland applies to be allowed to trade in rhino from legal stocks and natural mortality. But no change is remotely possible at this stage. </p>
<p>Hume and a growing number of rhino breeders and conservationists who support dehorning and controlled trade have a mountain to climb to prove it can be done. What is clear, though, is that dehorning is a useful tool that can reduce the attraction of a rhino to poachers without any ill-effects for the rhino.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64902/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Somerville received funding for the research trip from the conservation NGO the Comamis Foundation, based in Switzerland.- <a href="http://www.comanis.ch/en/home/home2.htm">http://www.comanis.ch/en/home/home2.htm</a></span></em></p>A few national parks and reserves want to dehorn rhinos and there is a lobby for a regulated and closely monitored legal trade in rhino horn. But this is met by opposition from many.Keith Somerville, Visiting Professor, University of KentLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/571822016-04-03T13:56:55Z2016-04-03T13:56:55ZImportant lessons for Africa as strong institutions win out over a strong man<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/117186/original/image-20160403-3932-10vcgn9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">King Mswati III of Swaziland. His word is law, above all other laws in the tiny kingdom.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Carlo Allegri</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The executive announces on prime-time TV that it will comply with an adverse ruling from the judiciary. The president apologises for a <a href="http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/Public%20Protector's%20Report%20on%20Nkandla_a.pdf">scandal</a> over the use of public money on his private home, and says he will pay back the personal benefits gained.</p>
<p>His reassurance to voters, to the legal profession and to market rating agencies, confirms that the country he runs is a robust democracy. His actions affirm the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-ghanaian-parliament">memorable words</a> of US President Barack Obama in his address to the Ghanaian Parliament: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Africa doesn’t need strongmen, it needs strong institutions. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>These events in South Africa last week, when President Jacob Zuma addressed the nation to say that he accepted a damning <a href="https://theconversation.com/zuma-court-ruling-south-africans-witness-a-massive-day-for-democracy-57070">Constitutional Court judgment</a> against him, stand in strong contrast to the actions of other leaders on the continent. </p>
<h2>Contrasts</h2>
<p>Contrast Zuma’s response with the history of the Afrikaner nationalists <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/daniel-francois-malan">DF Malan </a> and <a href="http://www.abebooks.co.uk/book-search/title/a-history-of-southern-africa/author/eric-a-walker/">Hans Strydom</a>, who perverted the 1910 constitution to remove coloured and Indian men from the common voters’ roll during the 1950s.</p>
<p>And more significant for 2016, contrast the South African executive’s reaffirmation of its compliance with adverse judicial rulings to the king of Swaziland, King Mswati III, and the president of Eritrea, Isaias Afwerki, whose word is law, above all other laws.</p>
<p>Contrast it with Democratic Republic of the Congo President <a href="http://qz.com/569612/dr-congos-joseph-kabila-is-taking-a-slippery-path-to-a-third-term/">Joseph Kabila’s “slippage”</a>, where the constitutionally-prescribed end of his term of office recedes like a mirage ever further into the future.</p>
<p>Zuma’s phrases describing the Constitutional Court <a href="http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/home.htm">judgment </a> as “helpful” and providing guidance to the government were less important. Calling a defeat a learning experience is a common sense public relations tactic.</p>
<p>But the fact remains that the core of <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/pebble.asp?relid=21831">Zuma’s message</a> is powerful for both South Africa and the rest of the continent’s rulers, both democratic and authoritarian.</p>
<p>The same applies to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/dramatic-night-in-south-africa-leaves-president-hanging-on-by-a-thread-57180">media conference</a> called by Gwede Mantashe, secretary-general of the governing African National Congress (ANC), later in the evening on April Fools’ Day. The secretary-general is the party boss, the <a href="http://www.iloveindia.com/indian-heroes/sardar-patel.html">Sardar Patel</a> behind the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/nehru_jawaharlal.shtml">Jawaharlal Nehru</a>. </p>
<p>Mantashe’s decision to call the adverse Constitutional Court judgment “a victory for our young democracy” was important. It signals to party hacks and sycophants to dump their rhetoric of denouncing judges as “counter-revolutionary” and smearing the Public Protector, Thuli Madonsela, as <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2014-09-08-madonsela-accused-of-being-a-cia-spy">a CIA agent</a>. His choice of words indeed discredits and silences such smears.</p>
<p>Naturally, as the hard man of the ANC headquarters, Mantashe <a href="http://www.enca.com/south-africa/constitutional-court-did-state-zuma-must-resign-says-mantashe">rejected opposition parties’ calls</a> for Zuma to resign. No party, he said, does what its opponents tell it to do. He repeatedly emphasised that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the ANC does not revolve around one leader.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Certainly the ANC is probably the only ruling party in Africa with the power to <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=5904">recall a sitting president</a>. Mantashe made it clear that whether the ANC gains or loses votes in the municipal elections late this year, Zuma will not be singled out as the cause of this.</p>
<h2>Politically weakened</h2>
<p>Behind the public saving of face, Zuma has undoubtedly been politically weakened by dragging out the <a href="http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/Public%20Protector's%20Report%20on%20Nkandla_a.pdf">Nkandla scandal</a> for so long.</p>
<p>Until now, he has won about two-thirds of the votes against Kgalema Motlanthe and others when push came to shove. But as soon as the 2016 municipal elections are out of the way, candidates and lobbying will emerge all the way to the ANC’s 2017 national conference, which will choose Zuma’s successor.</p>
<p>By that time, Zuma will face a string of further very serious test cases. The <a href="http://hsf.org.za">Helen Suzman Foundation</a> and others have brought court applications to declare the heads of key prosecution and investigative authorities unfit to hold office, and to rule that the president’s appointments were irrational.</p>
<p>There is a great deal to play for and the road ahead is likely to be rocky. The <a href="http://section27.org.za/2016/03/helen-suzman-foundation-raid/">Suzman Foundation</a> was recently <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2016-03-21-helen-suzman-foundation-says-break-in-not-ordinary">raided by plainclothes men armed with guns</a>, earphone communications and handcuffs, who stole all its computers. On the face of it, this creates the impression that the raiders appear too lazy to apply for search warrants. Such incidents raise concern about lawless actions of securocrat overreach, which are incompatible with the rule of law and democracy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/57182/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Gottschalk is an ANC member. He writes this in his professional capacity as a political scientist.</span></em></p>In the words of US President Obama: Africa doesn’t need strongmen, it needs strong institutions. In this light, the South African president’s acceptance of a court ruling against him is a good thing.Keith Gottschalk, Political Scientist, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/550752016-02-21T13:45:10Z2016-02-21T13:45:10ZSouthern Africa is hobbled by the language and legacy of its histories<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/112245/original/image-20160221-25894-1jb4zpq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Cattle drink water from an almost dry dam in South Africa. The drought in the region is one of a number of troubling issues that remain largely hidden from public sight.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Rogan Ward</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>One of the many intriguing ideas of the Austrian philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein, was this:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the limits of my language means the limits of my world.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Does this explain the failure to see the gathering gloom across southern Africa?</p>
<p>Consider three issues that should be troubling about the region but which remain largely hidden from public sight.</p>
<p>First, agriculture production is in crisis. As the UN World Food Programme recently reported, 49 million people in southern Africa will be affected by the worst and most severe drought in <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-africa-drought-idUSKCN0VO1DG">35 years</a>.</p>
<p>Secondly, a torrent of migration continues: much, but not all, is drawn to South Africa where, as the New York Times recently claimed, there may be <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2015-05-06-do-5-million-immigrants-live-in-sa">5 million migrants</a>.</p>
<p>Thirdly, political instability is pervasive. Less obvious instances of this are Swaziland where domestic politics, for all the claims to Swazi exceptionalism, remains feudal. In nearby Lesotho the struggle for scarce resources has brought murder to the very streets of the capital.</p>
<p>Diplomatically, these places are called “trouble spots”, but it is more difficult to choose a euphemism when talking about Zimbabwe. On any political (let alone, actuarial) chart that country’s president – now in the 92nd year of his life – should be discussed in the past tense. And, if this opinion is judged to be too hard on a man who was once regarded as a liberation hero, it needs to be pointed out that diplomats in Harare openly speak nowadays of the “post-Mugabe era”.</p>
<h2>Three inter-linked languages</h2>
<p>Invariably these, and other, challenges to regional order are addressed by three inter-linked languages – each has differing priorities while each relies on the same analytical categories.</p>
<p>These have their origins in the late-19th Century capture of the region’s politics by a language which aimed to secure the primacy of sovereign-centered states. Its primary goal was not to promote nationalism - this was to come later - but to advance the cause of British imperialism.</p>
<p>The fact that sovereign-centered borders remain the primary categories in ordering the region is testimony to the power of this language. And this points to one of history’s many ironies: the intense nationalism of the liberation movement, if anything, reinforced the hold of colonial mapping.</p>
<p>As the call for liberation deepened, southern Africa (and much the rest of the world) was seized by the language of the Cold War. Here, a simple binary thinking – encouraged by irrational fear of global destruction – turned the region into a mirror of the global divide. The east/west divide became a code for the politics between black-ruled states and the residue of colonial thinking.</p>
<p>At the Century’s end, a new language arose. This promoted the market: it argued that the purpose of the sovereign state was to service global capital in the belief that economic growth will trickle down to the benefit of all.</p>
<p>Here, too, historical irony was at work – the region’s sovereign states mattered, but only because markets matter more!</p>
<p>Carried by nice-sounding words – accountability, governance, rights-based regimes and the like – the force of market-centered language trumped an idea that, perhaps, was ripe to rethink the analytical categories that had organised the region for a century and more.</p>
<p>But this language effectively paralysed regional multilateralism that had promised growth, protection of rights and security.</p>
<p>There is no better example of this paralysis than the 2011 decision by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) heads of state to disband the SADC Tribunal – effectively a regional court. This happened after the judges, drawn from the region, held that Mugabe’s land seizures violated the rule of law.</p>
<p>As was pointed out at the time, its disbandment reflected SADC’s priorities – the subordination of new understandings of regional order and multilateralism to the sovereign interests of <a href="http://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/42461/Nathan_Disbanding_2013.pdf?sequence=1">individual states</a>.</p>
<h2>The need to move beyond sovereign-centered grammar</h2>
<p>This example shows that changing the sovereign-centered grammar of southern Africa – and the resulting politics – will not be an easy task.</p>
<p>But can we speak about the region in a different way? Will this make a difference?</p>
<p>The drought, especially, suggests that the region’s lived reality is increasingly at some distance from the categories used to explain it. Moreover, as a flight to Maputo recently reminded me, places which are often thought to be at the edges of the region are only a heartbeat away from places that are said to be at region’s centre.</p>
<p>Very often this inter-connectedness and the region’s seeming vulnerability give rise to security fears. Often, too, these are constructed by the categories which are readily at hand.</p>
<p>These must, however, be recognised for what they are – burdens of a sagging language.</p>
<p>To meet southern Africa’s mounting challenges requires not more of the sovereign sameness, persistence with the old categories, but an imagining of a regional future that looks beyond the familiar, the routine, the everyday. In short, it requires a new language.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/55075/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
One of the many intriguing ideas of the Austrian philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein, was this: the limits of my language means the limits of my world. Does this explain the failure to see the gathering gloom…Peter Vale, Professor of Humanities and the Director of the Johannesburg Institute for Advanced Study (JIAS), University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/498482015-11-01T11:07:52Z2015-11-01T11:07:52ZParts of southern Africa are within tantalising reach of eliminating malaria<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/100338/original/image-20151030-16554-1qj7h1i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A young girl plays inside a mosquito net in Kibera, Nairobi. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Stephen Morrison</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em><em>This article is part of a series The Conversation Africa is running as part of the SADC malaria week. You can read the rest of the series <a href="https://theconversation.com/africa/topics/sadc-malaria-week">here</a>.</em></em></p>
<p>There has been a concerted international effort since the early 2000s to tackle malaria. This has led to dramatic reductions in the disease. </p>
<p>World Health Organisation estimates show that in 2015 there were <a href="http://www.who.int/malaria/media/malaria-mdg-target/en/">214 million</a> malaria cases and 438,000 deaths globally. This is a 37% decrease in the incidence rate of malaria compared to 15 years ago and a 60% reduction in deaths.</p>
<p>Most of the gains have happened in Asia and “fringe” areas in Africa, which is at the periphery of distribution of the disease. But the challenge is that sub-Saharan Africa still shoulders 89% of existing cases and 91% of deaths from the disease. </p>
<h2>How successes have been achieved</h2>
<p>Africa has historically had a high transmission rate. Southern Africa has been particularly successful in reducing its case load. The Seychelles and Mauritius have completely eliminated malaria. They have had no new local transmissions in recent years – only some imported cases that were locally diagnosed and treated.</p>
<p>In South Africa there was an exceptional peak of <a href="http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?pid=S0256-95742013001000029&script=sci_arttext&tlng=es">64,622 cases</a> in 2000. Since then case numbers have dwindled to between 6000 and 10,000 in recent years. </p>
<p>This reflects reductions in several of South Africa’s neighbouring countries such as Botswana, Namibia, and Swaziland – where malaria mortality rates are close to zero. </p>
<p>These four countries are in the pre-elimination and elimination stages. Malaria incidence in all of them makes up less than five cases per thousand people. This means they are within sight of eliminating malaria – a tantalising target that South Africa hopes to reach <a href="http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?pid=S0256-95742013001000035&script=sci_arttext&tlng=en">by 2018</a>.</p>
<p>But that reward is proving hard to achieve despite the dedicated efforts by the national malaria control programs in each country. </p>
<h2>The reasons why full elimination is so difficult</h2>
<p>The standard tools used almost universally for malaria control are: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>providing households with insecticide-treated bednets (ITNs);</p></li>
<li><p>indoor residual spraying (IRS) of insecticides against mosquitoes that enter households; and</p></li>
<li><p>dedicated efforts to detect malaria cases and treat them with effective anti-malarial drugs. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>When these three tools are used in combination, they have resulted in the reversal and decline in malaria cases almost globally. But what was once an effective approach to harvest the low-hanging fruit to achieve relatively quick success have now become blunt tools. </p>
<p>The interventions now lack the surgical precision to clear up what is known as “residual malaria”. These are the portion of cases that pop up for reasons that are not always known and do not yield to persistent use of the traditional tools.</p>
<p>A major contributing factor, especially in the case of South Africa, is the large numbers of migrants and visitors from high-transmission malaria countries further north. Although Gauteng, South Africa’s economic hub, was never a problem province, it now has the highest number of cases in the country.</p>
<p>The cases are through infected people entering the country and becoming ill once they have arrived, or vehicles returning from high-transmission countries with malaria-infected mosquitoes hitching a ride.</p>
<p>There are other reasons too. </p>
<p>Some countries do not have a policies to deal effectively with the particular life stages that infect mosquitoes. Malaria parasites have a complex life cycle involving different forms having different target organs and functions. Only one stage – the sexual gametocytes – are able to infect mosquitoes that leads to infecting other people. </p>
<p>Although doctors prescribe medication that kills the numerous asexual parasites in the blood which then cures infected people of the malaria symptoms, it does not effectively inactivate the sexual gametocytes that infect mosquitoes, at least in Africa where the deadliest species of malaria parasite is most common.</p>
<p>There are also chronic systemic challenges. These include a shortage of manpower, funding, lost skills that are not replaced, and a mindset still geared to the decades-long traditional approach to combat malaria. </p>
<h2>New frontier</h2>
<p>Entering the elimination stage is a relatively new frontier for the southern African countries. </p>
<p>There are more hazy possibilities that come into play with residual malaria. This includes the unknown role of secondary vectors. Traditional malaria control tools have targeted a very limited set of mainly <a href="http://www.parasitesandvectors.com/content/3/1/72">three mosquito species</a> with known behaviour. </p>
<p>Addressing these three species has resulted in successes. But with residual malaria we may be dealing with unknown secondary vector mosquitoes that previously played a minor role but now keep the disease ticking over.</p>
<p>Also, across the world there are increasing numbers of countries where mosquito populations are building resistance to available insecticides used for spraying. What is more concerning is that malaria parasites are also developing resistance to the only, and best, available anti-malarial compound, artemisinin.</p>
<p>This resistance is currently still confined to geographic pockets in southeast Asia, but precedents exist where such resistance rapidly spreads to other parts of the globe.</p>
<p>Another concern is loss of political will to continue the high financial and other demands associated with effective malaria programs – and donor fatigue. </p>
<p>Most of the money being poured into malaria control at global scale comes from international donors. Once again precedent has shown that in the face of diminishing returns such donors lose commitment.</p>
<h2>The last lap</h2>
<p>Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland – unlike many other African countries confronted with particular economic and political challenges – are very likely to achieve zero local transmission. </p>
<p>The lessons learnt in South Africa and its neighbours is of great importance. There is some urgency in cementing these successes. </p>
<p>But then the real challenge will emerge: the will of national governments to continue funding a program that has achieved its goal. The moment it weakens its defences, malaria is likely to rebound extremely quickly in the face of migration and importation from high-transmission neighbouring countries that are still fighting to bring malaria under control.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/49848/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Professor Leo Braack received funding from Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and University of Pretoria for research on malaria.</span></em></p>Several countries within southern Africa are on the brink of eliminating malaria. But there are several challenges ahead.Leo Braack, Research Chair, Integrated Vector Management in the Vector Control cluster at the Centre for Sustainable Malaria Control , University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/490632015-10-15T04:13:59Z2015-10-15T04:13:59ZOf a cruel king and the bitter battle for the soul of South Africa’s democracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/98426/original/image-20151014-15147-xdd0kx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">AbaThembu King Buyelekhaya Dalindyebo is fighting a 12-year jail sentence for arson and other crimes. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Sumaya Hisham</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Foundation essay: Our foundation essays are longer than usual and take a wider look at key issues affecting society.</em></p>
<p>Earlier this month, South Africa’s Supreme Court of Appeal upheld King Buyelekhaya Dalindyebo of the AbaThembu’s conviction for arson, kidnapping, assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm and defeating the ends of justice. AbaThembu’s most famous son was <a href="https://www.nelsonmandela.org/content/page/biography">Nelson Mandela</a>.</p>
<p>The king had shown no mercy to those he found guilty when they came before his <a href="http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/bills/2012-b01tradcourts.pdf">traditional court</a>, which functions in terms of customary laws and customs. He <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2010-02-25-terror-in-the-name-of-tradition">punished them harshly</a>, including by flogging and burning their homes.</p>
<p>First sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment in December 2009, Dalindyebo recently enjoyed limited success in his appeal against the conviction of culpable homicide before the Supreme Court of Appeal. He is now to serve a reduced sentence of 12 years. He and his supporters insist that they will appeal to the Constitutional Court. </p>
<p>Surely, the courts can withstand the test and declare patently illegal conduct, even by a king, as such. The <a href="http://www.justice.gov.za/sca/judgments/sca_2015/sca2015-144.pdf">Supreme Court of Appeal</a> was clear in this regard:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>His behaviour was all the more deplorable because the victims of his reign of terror were the vulnerable rural poor, who were dependent upon him. Our Constitution does not countenance such behaviour. We are a constitutional democracy in which everyone is accountable and where the most vulnerable are entitled to protection.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Testing the limits of royal impunity</h2>
<p>Of significance is that Dalindyebo is testing the degree of impunity with which traditional leaders can act. He is testing the extent to which they can be exempted from the democratic parameters established by the Constitution for all governing authorities. </p>
<p>Since the early days of <a href="http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/why-king-dalindyebo-is-not-above-the-law/">negotiating</a> the Constitution, traditional leaders have argued that customary law and the institution of <a href="http://www.ucr.nl/about-ucr/Faculty-and-Staff/Social-Science/Documents/Barbara%20Oomen/001_Oomen%202005%20Chiefs%20.pdf">traditional leadership</a> should not be subject to rights under the Constitution.</p>
<p>At the time they lost. The Constitution therefore <a href="http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/chp12.html">reads</a> that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The institution, status and role of traditional leadership, according to customary law, are recognised, <em>subject to the Constitution</em>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Yet traditional leader organisations have constantly pushed back against subjection to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, in particular. They advocated for legislation that shored up their <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2010-02-25-terror-in-the-name-of-tradition">position</a> or simply did as they pleased in their “domains”. This is part of why <a href="http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/law/2015/05/29/bakgatla-case-with-far-reaching-implications-before-top-court">challenging legislation</a> or traditional leader <a href="https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/SACQ49.pdf">misconduct</a> through the courts has become the ultimate tool of those ordinary people living under autocratic and abusive traditional leaders.</p>
<h2>Bid for more unaccountable powers</h2>
<p>The new <a href="http://www.gcis.gov.za/newsroom/media-releases/statement-cabinet-meeting-26-august-2015">Traditional and Khoisan Leadership Bill</a> will attempt to give <a href="http://beta.iol.co.za/news/politics/khoisan-bill-a-continuation-of-apartheid-1924469">traditional leaders</a> more unaccountable and unconstitutional powers. If passed, government departments will simply delegate such powers to traditional leaders without going through the legislative process through which ordinary people and civil society can challenge them.</p>
<p>Dalindyebo’s attempt to push the argument for a traditional leader exemption is certainly the most flagrant. But it is by no means unique. This is obvious from the quick move by former president of the <a href="http://contralesa.org/">Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa</a>, <a href="http://www.labour.gov.za/DOL/about-us/profile-of-the-deputy-minister-phathekile-sango-holomisa-mp">Nkosi Patekile Holomisa</a>, to <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Beware-King-Dalindyebos-dissenters-told-20151011">defend</a> Dalinyebo’s illegal actions as simply being in the exercise of his duty.</p>
<p>Equating traditional courts to state courts, as the <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africans-braced-for-new-confrontation-with-government-over-controversial-law-42829">Traditional Courts Bill of 2008/2012</a> would have done, Holomisa argues that criminal arrest is an inappropriate penalty for “judicial officers” who have “the power to impose sanctions on wrongdoers”. He insists that Dalindyebo should not have been held personally liable for institutional conduct. </p>
<p>Holomisa therefore supports an appeal to the Constitutional Court to:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… clarify the powers of traditional authorities and courts.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Holomisa’s reasoning is terribly flawed. The <a href="http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/chp01.html">rule of law</a> requires that “judicial officers” be held accountable when they act outside of or contrary to the law. Dalindyebo’s conduct was not merely in excess of his legal powers, as in when a judge erroneously jails a person for ten years instead of only three.</p>
<p>His conduct was contrary to the very essence of being an officer of the court, responsible for protecting people’s rights. It was also contrary to the nature and scope of punishments that the law empowers him to impose. Such behaviour cannot take shelter under the label of “judicial officer” and perpetrators are criminally liable.</p>
<p>As the <a href="http://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/the-state-vs-king-dalindyebo-the-sca-judgment">Supreme Court of Appeal</a> eloquently put it:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The lesson that cannot be emphasised enough is that persons in positions of authority such as the appellant [king] are obliged to act within the limits imposed by the law and that no one is above the law. The Constitution guarantees equal treatment under the law. The appellant [king] behaved shamefully and abused his position as king. The period of imprisonment he is to serve is no more than just deserts for what, given his position of authority, are after all particularly heinous crimes.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Pandering to the whims of kings</h2>
<p>Most importantly, the ANC government has made Dalindyebo’s and Holomisa’s arguments possible. The government panders to traditional leaders with statements such as that traditional authority is <a href="http://www.customcontested.co.za/communal-land-tenure-policy-undermines-rights-of-ordinary-people/">moral authority</a>, and moral authority is superior to political authority. </p>
<p>The problematic steps taken by the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform to make traditional leaders effective owners of <a href="http://www.plaas.org.za/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/PLAAS%20Rural%20Report%20Book%203%20-%20Tara%20-%20Web.pdf">customarily held land</a> only strengthen claims like Dalindyebo’s when he tried to declare <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2010-02-25-terror-in-the-name-of-tradition">secession</a> with 60% of South Africa’s <a href="http://www.bdlive.co.za/articles/2010/01/25/is-this-sa-s-mad-king-george">territory</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/98427/original/image-20151014-15127-1auvcq2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/98427/original/image-20151014-15127-1auvcq2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98427/original/image-20151014-15127-1auvcq2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98427/original/image-20151014-15127-1auvcq2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98427/original/image-20151014-15127-1auvcq2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98427/original/image-20151014-15127-1auvcq2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98427/original/image-20151014-15127-1auvcq2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Swaziland’s absolute monarch, King Mswati III, rules with an iron first.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Siphiwe Sibeko</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The governing ANC opens up space for traditional leaders’ quest for power, exempt from the constraints of the rule of law, to become viable by <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2010/10.html">passing laws</a> that benefit them at the expense of the rights of ordinary people. This all makes it more difficult for the state to rein in traditional leaders who abuse their powers. The <a href="http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/2015/07/25/king-mswati-s-tyranny-in-swaziland-shows-some-cracks">autocracy</a> of King Mswati in Swaziland should be a <a href="http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/countries/africa/swaziland">warning</a> to us all.</p>
<h2>Battle for the soul of democracy</h2>
<p>Dalindyebo has tried everything to <a href="http://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/the-state-vs-king-dalindyebo-the-sca-judgment">evade and delay justice</a>: secession, <a href="http://www.dispatchlive.co.za/politics/dalindyebo-can-attend-anc-rally-da/">politics</a> and appeals. His supporters want someone else to serve his sentence on <a href="http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/fa6657004a1cc18bb391fba53d9712f0/Tradition-allows-a-stand-in-to-serve-kings-jail-term---Contralesa-20150610">his behalf</a>. </p>
<p>These efforts to evade justice are yet another salvo in the battle for the soul of South Africa’s democracy: the notion that every citizen is entitled to fearless protection of their citizenship and other <a href="http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/chp02.html">democratic rights</a>. And no person, whether king or ordinary citizen, is entitled to special treatment under the law.</p>
<p>South Africans must reject Holomisa’s suggestion in his defence of Dalindyebo’s egregious abuse of power that these core democratic values are contrary to the <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Beware-King-Dalindyebos-dissenters-told-20151011">“African way of life”</a>.</p>
<p>As we await the revised <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africans-braced-for-new-confrontation-with-government-over-controversial-law-42829">Traditional Courts Bill</a>, we should beware that underlying attempts by the government to convince us that all traditional leaders are <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/pebble.asp?relid=19719">benevolent</a> – and, therefore, need minimal oversight and accountability – is a fiction.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/49063/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sindiso Mnisi Weeks, LLB DPhil, is a Senior Research Associate at the Centre for Law and Society at the University of Cape Town where she was previously a senior researcher in the Rural Women’s Action-Research Programme and led the research, advocacy, and policy work on traditional courts in 2009-2012.</span></em></p>By challenging the courts, King Dalindyebo is testing the degree of impunity with which traditional leaders can get away.Sindiso Mnisi Weeks, Assistant Professor, School for Global Inclusion and Social Development, UMass BostonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/475782015-09-15T18:05:24Z2015-09-15T18:05:24ZAfrican democracy update: satisfaction remains elusive for many<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/94823/original/image-20150915-16993-1kwtru8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">King Mswati III, centre, with his regiments at Ludzidzini royal palace during the annual Reed Dance in August. Swaziland ranks among the worst in Africa for its level of democracy. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Siphiwe Sibeko</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/AFRICAN_CHARTER_ON_DEMOCRACY_ELECTIONS_AND_GOVERNANCE.pdf">African Union Charter</a> on Democracy, Elections and Governance expresses the commitment of signatory governments to “human rights and democratic principles”.</p>
<p>Many African nations that have <a href="http://www.achpr.org/instruments/charter-democracy/ratification/">signed or ratified</a> the charter bind themselves to a representative system of government, and free and fair elections. </p>
<p>As the <a href="http://www.au.int/">African Union</a> and international community work to support African countries to fulfil their commitments to democracy, the perceptions of ordinary citizens provide an important window on progress and remaining challenges. </p>
<p>A new analysis by <a href="http://www.afrobarometer.org/">Afrobarometer</a>, a non-partisan research network, released in observance of the <a href="http://www.un.org/en/events/democracyday/">International Day of Democracy</a>, suggests the extent to which African countries put democratic ideals into practice varies widely.</p>
<p>Afrobarometer is currently implementing its <a href="http://www.afrobarometer.org/surveys-and-methods/survey-schedule">Round 6 surveys</a> (2014-2015) in 36 countries across Africa, including many of the continent’s most democratic countries, but also many that are rated as only “partly free” or “not free” by <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/">Freedom House</a>. As of now, Afrobarometer has data from the first 28 countries. Data from the remaining eight will be available later this year.</p>
<p>Based on 41,953 face-to-face interviews in these 28 countries, the analysis shows that on average, barely half of surveyed citizens consider their country a “full democracy” or “a democracy with minor problems.” There are 54 countries in Africa.</p>
<p>Less than half are “fairly” or “very” satisfied with how democracy is working in their country, a decrease from the previous survey round completed in <a href="http://www.afrobarometer.org/publications/pp11-demand-democracy-rising-africa-most-political-leaders-fail-deliver">2011-2013</a>. Other bedrocks of democracy, such as free and fair elections and freedoms of speech, association, and electoral choice, are not yet universal realities, the survey data indicate. </p>
<h2>Variable supply of democracy</h2>
<p>On average, across the 28 surveyed countries, a slim majority (52%) of survey respondents perceive their country to be either a full democracy (18%) or a democracy with only minor problems (34%). </p>
<p>A significant minority say they live in “a democracy with major problems” (27%) or “not a democracy” at all (10%). Countries differ considerably in the extent of democracy that their citizens perceive.</p>
<p>Majorities give favourable assessments in 15 countries, led by Mauritius (76%), Botswana (75%), and Namibia (72%). This is reflected in Figure 1 below.</p>
<p>But at the other extreme, only one-third of citizens in Swaziland and Nigeria share this positive assessment. Importantly, Nigerians’ negative assessments were captured in December 2014. This was some three months before the country’s historic electoral <a href="https://theconversation.com/buharis-victory-in-nigerian-election-has-global-significance-39416">transition</a>.</p>
<p>On the flipside, Burundians’ relatively positive assessments were recorded in September and October 2014, before the violent 2015 <a href="https://theconversation.com/burundis-fraught-elections-are-over-but-the-violence-is-not-46162">election period</a>. Overall, in ten of the 28 countries, more citizens say their country is not a democracy or is a democracy with major problems than hold the more favourable view. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/94810/original/image-20150915-16993-15xvuvl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/94810/original/image-20150915-16993-15xvuvl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=763&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94810/original/image-20150915-16993-15xvuvl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=763&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94810/original/image-20150915-16993-15xvuvl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=763&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94810/original/image-20150915-16993-15xvuvl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=959&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94810/original/image-20150915-16993-15xvuvl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=959&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94810/original/image-20150915-16993-15xvuvl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=959&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Satisfaction with democracy varies just as widely. Across 28 countries, only 46% of citizens say they are “very satisfied” or “fairly satisfied” with the way democracy works in their country (Figure 2). 43% say they are “not very satisfied” or “not at all satisfied”.</p>
<p>Satisfaction runs highest in Namibia (72%) and Botswana (68%) but falls below one-third of citizens in seven countries, including Madagascar (11%), Togo (25%), and Cape Verde (26%).</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/94811/original/image-20150915-16979-172v9ir.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/94811/original/image-20150915-16979-172v9ir.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=700&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94811/original/image-20150915-16979-172v9ir.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=700&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94811/original/image-20150915-16979-172v9ir.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=700&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94811/original/image-20150915-16979-172v9ir.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=880&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94811/original/image-20150915-16979-172v9ir.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=880&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94811/original/image-20150915-16979-172v9ir.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=880&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Across the same 28 countries, satisfaction with democracy decreased from half in the Round 5 survey in 2011-2013 to 46%. Seven countries saw declines in satisfaction of more than 10 percentage points. The most dramatic was a 32 percentage point drop in Sierra Leone (Figure 3). </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/94812/original/image-20150915-16971-1dhx2x6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/94812/original/image-20150915-16971-1dhx2x6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94812/original/image-20150915-16971-1dhx2x6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94812/original/image-20150915-16971-1dhx2x6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94812/original/image-20150915-16971-1dhx2x6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=484&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94812/original/image-20150915-16971-1dhx2x6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=484&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94812/original/image-20150915-16971-1dhx2x6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=484&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But, satisfaction increased markedly in six countries, led by Mali (a 19 percentage point increase) and Tunisia (an 18 percentage point increase) (Figure 4).</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/94879/original/image-20150915-29645-lhe2ht.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/94879/original/image-20150915-29645-lhe2ht.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=380&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94879/original/image-20150915-29645-lhe2ht.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=380&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94879/original/image-20150915-29645-lhe2ht.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=380&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94879/original/image-20150915-29645-lhe2ht.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=478&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94879/original/image-20150915-29645-lhe2ht.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=478&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94879/original/image-20150915-29645-lhe2ht.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=478&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Elections and political freedoms</h2>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/94814/original/image-20150915-16979-1f3tpy1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/94814/original/image-20150915-16979-1f3tpy1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=486&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94814/original/image-20150915-16979-1f3tpy1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=486&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94814/original/image-20150915-16979-1f3tpy1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=486&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94814/original/image-20150915-16979-1f3tpy1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=611&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94814/original/image-20150915-16979-1f3tpy1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=611&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94814/original/image-20150915-16979-1f3tpy1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=611&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Afrobarometer report</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A bare majority of 51% of citizens say they are “completely free” to speak their minds. Another 26% feel “somewhat free”, while 22% say they are “not at all” or “not very” free to say what they think.</p>
<p>At 77% and 73% respectively, Malawi and Ghana top the list of citizens who say they enjoy complete freedom of expression in their countries. Majorities share this view in 18 of the 28 countries. Freedom of speech is perceived as most limited in Swaziland. Here only 18% of citizens say they are completely free. Togo came in at (26%), Zimbabwe (27%), Nigeria (28%), Burkina Faso (31%), and Côte d’Ivoire (31%). </p>
<p>Citizens are somewhat more confident in their freedom of political association. In half of the countries, no more than one in ten citizens say they are “not very” or “not at all” free. On average across 28 countries, 15% say they lack freedom of association, 21% feel “somewhat free,” and 62% feel “completely free.” </p>
<p>The most dramatic exceptions are Swaziland, where 73% of citizens say they do not enjoy freedom of association, and Zimbabwe where 41% say they are not free. </p>
<p>Voting freedom is reported to be considerably more robust. Nearly three-quarters (73%) say they are completely free to vote as they choose, while 18% feel at least “somewhat free”.</p>
<p>But, while 80% or more say they are completely free in 12 countries, in several others confidence is considerably more circumscribed. This includes Zimbabwe (35% completely free), Nigeria (49%), Côte d’Ivoire (54%), Burundi (55%), and Swaziland (56%). </p>
<p>So while overall confidence in voting freedom is high, it is clear that citizens in a number of countries still face significant barriers to voting for the candidate of their choice.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/47578/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Halley Penar is research assistant for Afrobarometer. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kangwook Han is is research assistant for Afrobarometer. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thomas Bentley is is research assistant for Afrobarometer. </span></em></p>Satisfaction with democracy varies widely in Africa. Across 28 countries, only 46% of citizens say they are “very satisfied” or “fairly satisfied” with the way democracy works in their countries.Peter Penar, Researcher and PhD Candidate in the Department of Political Science , Michigan State UniversityKangwook Han, PhD Student in the Department of Political Science, Michigan State UniversityThomas Bentley, PhD student in the Department of Political Science , Michigan State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.