tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/tajikistan-21516/articlesTajikistan – The Conversation2020-05-21T13:33:19Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1384982020-05-21T13:33:19Z2020-05-21T13:33:19ZHow Central Asia’s authoritarian regimes have used coronavirus to their advantage<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/336773/original/file-20200521-102632-1s618y9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C10%2C790%2C488&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Business as usual for the Tajik president, Emamoli Rakhmon, at the new year 'Nowruz' celebration in March.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Press service of the president of Tajikistan.</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The authoritarian Central Asian state of Tajikistan <a href="https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-finally-confirms-its-first-15-coronavirus-cases">admitted to its first cases of COVID-19</a> in late April. This followed a World Health Organization (WHO) decision to dispatch a team to investigate previous claims that the country was coronavirus-free.</p>
<p>To the west, Tajikistan’s near neighbour Turkmenistan, known as the North Korea of Central Asia, continues <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/10/turkmenistan-coronavirus-pandemic-denial-strongman-berdimuhamedov/">to report no COVID-19 cases</a> and has <a href="https://rsf.org/en/news/coronavirus-limits-turkmenistan">avoided use of the word coronavirus</a> as much as possible in order to deter the spread of information about the pandemic. <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/coronavirus-turkmenistan-ban-masks-word-a9438266.html">Turkmen police</a> have reportedly arrested citizens found to be discussing coronavirus in public, or wearing protective masks. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, in Belarus – which has earned the moniker of <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X2QERR5wyks">“Europe’s last dictatorship”</a> – the president, Alexander Lukashenko, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2020/03/30/europe/soviet-strongmen-coronavirus-intl/index.html">advocated vodka, hockey, and folk medicine</a> against the virus and in April <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-belarus/nobody-will-die-from-coronavirus-in-belarus-says-president-idUSKCN21V1PK">reassured Belorussians</a> that “nobody will die from coronavirus in our country”. As of May 21, Belarus has already registered more than <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/belarus/">32,000 coronavirus cases and 179 deaths</a>. </p>
<p>Censorship, repression, and disinformation are hardly new strategies for post-Soviet regimes. Just like many of their counterparts <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/28/authoritarians-exploiting-coronavirus-undermine-civil-liberties-democracies/">elsewhere in the world</a>, Central Asia’s authoritarian strongmen have weaponised the pandemic to further consolidate their hold on power – those, that is, who have acknowledged the virus threat in the first place.</p>
<p>Just as COVID-19 has offered opportunities to authoritarian – and would-be authoritarian – leaders, so it also presents significant challenges. Authoritarian rule is sustained by a <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/how-dictatorships-work/8DC095F7A890035729BB0BB611738497">range of tools and mechanisms</a>, from coercion to co-option, but can rarely survive a major crisis without offering something more. Authoritarian regimes often <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/ia/authoritarianism-and-securitization-development-africa">define</a> this “something more” as strength and stability, and this has also been the case during COVID-19. For example, Kazakhstan’s state and state-aligned media has been replete with references to <a href="https://kazakh-tv.kz/en/view/central_asia/page_211350_central-asia-keeps-up-the-fight-with-covid19">“discipline”</a> in recent weeks.</p>
<p>A global pandemic can play into the hands of authoritarian rulers in this regard, but it can also leave them dangerously exposed.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/337546/original/file-20200526-106848-yt3pco.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/337546/original/file-20200526-106848-yt3pco.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/337546/original/file-20200526-106848-yt3pco.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=270&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/337546/original/file-20200526-106848-yt3pco.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=270&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/337546/original/file-20200526-106848-yt3pco.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=270&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/337546/original/file-20200526-106848-yt3pco.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=339&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/337546/original/file-20200526-106848-yt3pco.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=339&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/337546/original/file-20200526-106848-yt3pco.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=339&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html">Data from Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>When repression isn’t enough</h2>
<p>In Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, authorities have enforced lockdown and quarantine measures in a typical Soviet military style. Soldiers equipped with guns and armoured vehicles are patrolling public spaces and restricting the movement of citizens and traffic between, and within, cities.</p>
<p>In Uzbekistan, the <a href="https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2020/04/06/covid-diary/">General Prosecutor’s office</a> recommended that citizens keep personal diaries of who they meet, when and where. Given the <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/uzbekistan/freedom-world/2020">extensive power of the General Prosecutor’s Office</a>, such a “recommendation” should be perceived by Uzbek citizens as an obligation.</p>
<p>Kazakhstan is actively using <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/kazakhstan-experiments-with-surveillance-technology-to-battle-coronavirus-pandemic/">intellectual facial recognition technologies</a> and a video camera system called <em>Sergek</em>, which means “sharp eye” in Kazakh, to catch and fine citizens who violate quarantine restrictions.</p>
<p>The Kazakhstani authorities are planning to introduce a new mobile application, developed by the Ministry of Health Care and local government of Nur-Sultan city, called <a href="https://vlast.kz/obsshestvo/38384-svoboda-vo-vrema-cp.html">Smart Astana</a> to track physical movement of citizens who are in quarantine. In the context of these Central Asian regimes in particular, the use of such technologies presents a high risk of data abuse and manipulation by the authorities. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/336724/original/file-20200521-102667-g0ujw2.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/336724/original/file-20200521-102667-g0ujw2.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336724/original/file-20200521-102667-g0ujw2.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336724/original/file-20200521-102667-g0ujw2.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336724/original/file-20200521-102667-g0ujw2.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336724/original/file-20200521-102667-g0ujw2.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336724/original/file-20200521-102667-g0ujw2.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Entry post to Nur-Sultan city, the capital of Kazakhstan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Saltanat Janenova</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Despite the risks, citizens from Central Asian countries have flooded social media with photos and videos complaining about the devastating conditions in hospitals and <a href="https://cabar.asia/en/i-fear-to-be-infected-how-ca-authorities-meet-and-quarantine-their-citizens/">quarantine facilities</a> within days of the outbreak. Some 170 people being held in quarantine at a former US military base in Kyrgyzstan complained of bad smells, a lack of heating, and <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyz-quarantine-quarters-called-horribly-cold-and-dirty-/30499760.html">“horribly cold and dirty” conditions</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://rsf.org/en/news/kazakh-journalists-harassed-over-covid-19-reporting">Kazakhstan</a>, <a href="https://www.voanews.com/press-freedom/media-restrictions-blow-covid-19-coverage-kyrgyz-journalists-say">Kyrgyzstan</a> and <a href="https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistans-coronavirus-information-lockdown-prompts-questions">Uzbekistan</a> swiftly enforced state of emergency legislation prohibiting photo and video recordings in medical institutions and quarantine facilities. They threatened people who disobeyed with prosecution for “spreading false information”. Some civic activists, bloggers and journalists have <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/kazakhstan-kazakh-activists-coronavirus-human-rights-economy/30542645.html">already been imprisoned</a> on the same charge. </p>
<h2>Trust issues</h2>
<p>In <a href="https://www.economist.com/asia/2020/04/23/life-carries-on-as-usual-in-tajikistan-and-turkmenistan">Tajikistan, Turkmenistan</a> and <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/04/22/belarus-denies-danger-coronavirus-outbreak-football-matches/">Belarus</a>, governments have continued to operate as if business were carrying on as usual. They have denied the pandemic and given a green light to large celebrations such as the New Year (“Nowruz”) celebrations at the end of March in <a href="https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-feast-in-the-time-of-coronavirus">Tajikistan</a>, World Health Day in April in <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/turkmenistan-celebrates-world-health-day-unwisely/">Turkmenistan</a>, and a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-52574749">military parade in Belarus</a> in May. </p>
<p>In the absence of a strong government public health response, many <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/05/05/russias-post-soviet-neighbors-belarus-and-turkmenistan-face-coronavirus-as-leaders-deny-problem-a70188">Turkmens and Belarussians are limiting their contacts</a> and avoiding mass gatherings voluntarily. </p>
<p>More widely, there has been a gradual loss of public trust in Central Asian <a href="https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007%2F978-3-030-03008-7_55-1">governments’ competence</a> in recent years, resulting from weak policy implementation capacity, rampant corruption, and limited citizen engagement. </p>
<p>In this context, the authoritarian governments in the former Soviet bloc have responded to the pandemic by reinforcing their grip on power even further. Temporary measures introduced during the emergency, such as harsh legislative measures and new surveillance tools, are likely to remain a permanent feature of the new normal. But at the same time, the pandemic has left these regimes dangerously exposed to the risks of rising public discontent unless they take measures to regain the trust of their citizens.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/138498/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Saltanat Janenova is also affiliated with the Graduate School of Public Policy, Nazarbayev University (Kazakhstan). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan Fisher receives research funding from the Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council and WhatsApp (Research Awards for Social Science and Misinformation) and has previously received funding from the AHRC, British Academy, ESRC, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. He is a Visiting Fellow at the Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Study, Stellenbosch University, and is a Research Fellow in the Centre for Gender and Africa Studies at the University of the Free State.</span></em></p>Censorship, repression and disinformation have characterised Central Asian responses to COVID-19.Saltanat Janenova, Teaching Fellow in Public Policy and Management, University of BirminghamJonathan Fisher, Director, International Development Department, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1105022019-03-18T20:44:16Z2019-03-18T20:44:16ZBreeding young men for export in poor countries<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257070/original/file-20190204-193199-1584lpc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Because male migrants earn more money to send back home than females, families in some post-communist countries are strongly tempted to use sex-selective abortion to improve their lives. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Johann Walter Bantz/Unsplash</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Large-scale migration from the poorest countries of Europe, and parts of Asia, began immediately <a href="http://origins.osu.edu/article/1989-twenty-years-end-communism-and-fate-eastern-europe">following the collapse of communism in 1990.</a></p>
<p>State pensions and public health provisions are paltry in these countries, and domestic job opportunities scarce.</p>
<p>That means the migration of young people has become an important part of household survival strategies as younger family members leave and then send wages back home. Those wages are known as “remittance” income. </p>
<p><a href="https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2018_en.pdf">The majority of all international migrants are male</a>. The reasons for this may be partly cultural and partly economic. </p>
<p>Male migrants generally earn higher wages. And there’s some evidence that reality is serving as an incentive for families in these struggling economies to use <a href="https://www.unfpa.org/gender-biased-sex-selection">sex-selective abortion to try to improve their lives.</a></p>
<h2>Sons responsible for their parents</h2>
<p>The lack of domestic jobs in post-communist countries makes bearing sons even more important to the security of parents as they age. Even before international migration was possible, responsibility for aging parents resided with adult sons. </p>
<p>And so in the absence of functioning social security and health systems, and with the lack of local jobs, the motivation for bearing sons has undoubtedly increased. </p>
<p>In fact, among women aged 40 and older in 2002, 40 per cent had at least one son living abroad. My calculations, using data from the Albania Institute of Statistics and the 2012 World Bank Living Standards Monitoring Survey, suggest that each additional male birth increases <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3283200">the number of sons residing abroad by about 0.18 per cent</a> </p>
<p>The data also show that more than 50 per cent of women with sons abroad had received remittances in the previous year. Only 23 per cent of daughters residing abroad had sent wages back home.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257071/original/file-20190204-193203-di3lcc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257071/original/file-20190204-193203-di3lcc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257071/original/file-20190204-193203-di3lcc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257071/original/file-20190204-193203-di3lcc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257071/original/file-20190204-193203-di3lcc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257071/original/file-20190204-193203-di3lcc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257071/original/file-20190204-193203-di3lcc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Albanian university students protest outside the education ministry in Tirana in December 2018 demanding lower tuition fees and a bigger education budget. Increasing numbers of male babies are being born in the eastern European nation.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/ Hektor Pustina)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Within migrant-sending countries, the availability of prenatal technology and sex-selection abortion has made the economic incentives to bear sons more apparent. </p>
<p>Masculinized sex ratios at birth have been well-documented for <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2012.00513.x">Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia</a>, <a href="https://www.whijournal.com/article/S1049-3867(11)00013-2/pdf">for Nepal</a> and for Albania, where increasing numbers of male babies are being born into both Christian and Muslim families.</p>
<h2>Male-to-female birth ratio not typical</h2>
<p>In both more traditional and tribal Albanian regions of the country, and in its urbanized central and south regions, there are more male births than the biological norm of 105:100 male-to-female live births. According to the 2011 census, the ratio for children under five was 109 boys to 100 girls, while the ratio for children aged five to nine was 119:100.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257075/original/file-20190204-193220-1q2vj1p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257075/original/file-20190204-193220-1q2vj1p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257075/original/file-20190204-193220-1q2vj1p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257075/original/file-20190204-193220-1q2vj1p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257075/original/file-20190204-193220-1q2vj1p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257075/original/file-20190204-193220-1q2vj1p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257075/original/file-20190204-193220-1q2vj1p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257075/original/file-20190204-193220-1q2vj1p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In this 2016 photo, a woman breaks down after seeing the body of her son, a migrant worker who died in his sleep in a village in Nepal. The number of Nepali workers going abroad has more than doubled since the country began promoting foreign labour in recent years.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Niranjan Shrestha)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>International migration and increased household size also appear to be household survival strategies that transcend cultures, religion and recent economic history.</p>
<p>And the prevalence of multiple generations living in one household appears to be common to countries that are receiving lots of remittance income. </p>
<p>Nepal, for example, does not share the recent communist history of some eastern European or mid-Asian countries, but it also has both a high fraction of GDP from remittance income (<a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS">28.3 per cent in 2017)</a>) and a high number of multiple-generation households. </p>
<p>More than 95 per cent of Nepalis <a href="https://nepal.iom.int/jupgrade/images/stories/CoM/LabourMigration_for_Employment-A_%20StatusReport_for_Nepal_201516201617_Eng.PDF">obtaining permits to migrate are male</a>. Remittance income in 2017 was greater than the sum of official development assistance and foreign direct investment.</p>
<p>The economic motives for son preference, therefore, appear to trump religious and cultural considerations. As mentioned, wages of unskilled males, after all, are much higher in destination countries than at home.</p>
<h2>Brides live with in-laws</h2>
<p>The trend underscores the difficult lives of women in countries that are reliant on remittance income from the boys and men who have gone abroad.</p>
<p>Cultural norms that dictate brides go live with the family of their new husbands are particularly strong in <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0147596712000881">Albania, Armenia, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan</a>. </p>
<p>In Tajikistan, young men leave to work in Russia within months of marrying. The newlywed bride resides with the young groom’s parents and bears responsibility for most domestic <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233715176_Tajik_Male_Labour_Migration_and_Women_Left_Behind_Can_They_Resist_Gender_and_Generational_Hierarchies">tasks in the new household</a>. But remittance money is sent by the young man to his parents, not to his wife.</p>
<p>Daughters <a href="https://glm-lic.iza.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/glmlic-wp040.pdf">seldom work,</a> and are not welcomed back into their birth homes in the <a href="http://www.iom.tj/pubs/abandoned_wives_English.pdf">event of divorce</a>. <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0351.2007.00305.x">Children receive relatively little schooling, since resources are focused on the oldest generations.</a></p>
<h2>Why is this happening?</h2>
<p>Nearly 30 years after market liberalization began, most post-communist countries have failed to create environments in which private sector employment thrives. </p>
<p>As a result, remittances from international migration remain a major source of household income. Household members are sent abroad to provide a steady flow of international currency to support those remaining. </p>
<p>Wage gaps among the countries in the region are a key driver for international migration. Wages are much higher in nearby Russia than in Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan, for example. They are also much higher in Italy and Greece than in Albania. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257080/original/file-20190204-193206-1vt1sv9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257080/original/file-20190204-193206-1vt1sv9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257080/original/file-20190204-193206-1vt1sv9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257080/original/file-20190204-193206-1vt1sv9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257080/original/file-20190204-193206-1vt1sv9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257080/original/file-20190204-193206-1vt1sv9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257080/original/file-20190204-193206-1vt1sv9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Protesters, one of them holding a Kyrgyz national flag, are seen during a protest in Barskoon, Kyrgyzstan in 2013. Hundreds of protesters stormed the office of the Kumtor gold mine run by a Canadian-based company, demanding its nationalization and more social benefits.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Abylay Saralayev)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In 2013, remittances reached a high of 49 per cent of <a href="https://www.news.tj/en/news/world-bank-tajikistan-world-s-most-remittance-dependent-country">GDP in Tajikistan</a>. </p>
<p>In 2017, Kyrgyzstan was the country most dependent on remittances. Nearly 33 per cent of the country’s 2017 GDP came from this <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS">this source</a>. And in Albania from 2008-2017, remittances averaged <a href="https://www.bankofalbania.org/rc/doc/Remitancat_Revista_eng_12103.pdf">9.1 per cent of GDP</a>.</p>
<p>Migration and remittances provide many benefits to receiving households and countries. Migrants provide insurance against shocks to household income, such as poor harvests or illness of household members. As well, they improve the spending power of remaining household members.</p>
<h2>Eases pressure to create jobs</h2>
<p>But there are several less desirable effects of reliance on remittance income. Governments are less pressed to create jobs, for example. Those who might foment unrest — young unemployed males — are outside the country. They’re not around to participate in protests to demand better living conditions and job opportunities.</p>
<p>Remittances are not often spent on investments in children’s education or to start up new businesses in home countries. Instead, the money largely goes to housing and the purchase of imported goods. This does not create long-run growth or generate tax revenue for the construction of social safety nets.</p>
<p>The value of remittances varies with economic and political conditions in <a href="https://eurasianet.org/kyrgyzstans-national-bank-governor-analyzes-effects-of-russian-downturn">migrant-receiving countries</a>. As well, migration may have major demographic consequences.</p>
<p>The nature of markets for unskilled labour is likely important. For example, female Tajik migrants in Russia are concentrated in low-paying service industry jobs. To take such jobs, they must speak Russian. Males are concentrated in the construction sector, where Russian language knowledge is less essential, and wages much higher.</p>
<h2>How the West can affect change</h2>
<p>Through tax-financed contributions to organizations including the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, western nations can support policies that reduce reliance on migration. </p>
<p>Institutional environments that foster private sector job creation may both reduce the importance of international remittances and increase the relative status of women in society. </p>
<p>There is <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/696073">evidence from Vietnam</a> that changes in local labour market conditions may also change attitudes towards female children. </p>
<p>As a condition of concessional international loans, the boards of international organizations should press hard for reforms that will create jobs domestically. </p>
<p>Breeding young men for export has never been and should never be a successful economic development strategy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/110502/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Louise Grogan receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC).</span></em></p>Breeding young men for export has never been a successful economic development strategy. Policies that improve local labour market opportunities could increase the status of women.Louise Grogan, Professor, University of GuelphLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/757222017-04-05T13:16:45Z2017-04-05T13:16:45ZWhy China’s $1 trillion new Silk Road plan is being greeted coolly by the West<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163873/original/image-20170404-5725-jxkgva.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A bridge too far?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-illustration/two-words-china-europe-united-by-135128720?src=5Bf5oxzjnZe_-wcNh3H1-A-1-18">sibgat</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Beijing is gearing up for a major diplomatic offensive in May as it welcomes Vladimir Putin among 20 international leaders for <a href="http://english.cctv.com/2017/01/17/ARTIdF912TLb6wOkkYQNBoTg170117.shtml">a summit</a> on building a “new Silk Road” to bring China closer to the world. This is the One Belt, One Road project – the centrepiece of Chinese international engagement. </p>
<p>It involves a US$1 trillion (£804 billion) <a href="http://gandhara.rferl.org/a/china-central-asia-obor/28112086.html">mega-investment</a> to transform China’s transport and trade links through Eurasia and South-East Asia. <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-new-silk-road-is-all-part-of-its-grand-strategy-for-global-influence-70862">The aim</a> is for China to become a global pillar of trade and free markets and secure its place as a 21st-century superpower. </p>
<p>So far, however, no Western leaders have confirmed their attendance at the summit. What should we read into this, and what does it mean for the success of the project?</p>
<p>One Belt, One Road was <a href="http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpfwzysiesgjtfhshzzfh_665686/t1076334.shtml">unveiled by</a> Chinese president Xi Jinping four years ago. It aims to increase the country’s influence at a time when Europe is still struggling with the consequences of the financial crisis and the US is revising its role as promoter of economic liberalism under the Trump administration. </p>
<p>The project has two strands – “one road”, which is road and rail connections, and “one belt”, which is about the sea. The sea element is focused on everything from a <a href="http://www.aninews.in/newsdetail-MTY/MzA2MTcw/china-039-s-one-belt-one-road-policy-picks-up-pace.html">harbour development</a> in Malaysia to a new free trade agreement <a href="http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/australianz/china-new-zealand-to-expand-free-trade-agreement-cooperate-on-one-belt-one-road">with New Zealand</a>, while the land part has primarily focused on Central Asia as the most realistic route to Europe. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163901/original/image-20170404-5729-1ejecsk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163901/original/image-20170404-5729-1ejecsk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163901/original/image-20170404-5729-1ejecsk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=326&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163901/original/image-20170404-5729-1ejecsk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=326&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163901/original/image-20170404-5729-1ejecsk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=326&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163901/original/image-20170404-5729-1ejecsk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163901/original/image-20170404-5729-1ejecsk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163901/original/image-20170404-5729-1ejecsk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Google Maps</span></span>
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</figure>
<h2>Unlocking Central Asia</h2>
<p>China’s routes through five former Soviet states are currently beset with border delays, hefty customs fees, poor roads and railways, and formidable geographic hurdles – notably mountain ranges in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. </p>
<p>There should also be benefits to these landlocked republics from tackling these difficulties. Better links to Europe and the Middle East and potential access to seaports point to greater trading opportunities and extra revenues from transit fees to and from China. Each republic has been enthusiastic about participating, and there have so far been <a href="http://gandhara.rferl.org/a/china-central-asia-obor/28112086.html">railway lines completed</a> from China to Iran and Afghanistan via the region. </p>
<p>Other planned investments include a <a href="http://24.kg/archive/en/bigtiraj/174939-news24.html/">new highway</a> connecting the north and south of Kyrgyzstan and a <a href="http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2016-07/21/content_38929557.htm">highway</a> between it and Uzbekistan. There is also the “Angren-Pap” <a href="http://www.railwaygazette.com/news/infrastructure/single-view/view/two-presidents-open-angren-pap-railway.html">railway tunnel</a> in Uzbekistan, the Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan <a href="http://en.trend.az/business/energy/2422311.html">gas pipeline</a> and the “Dushanbe-Kulyab-Khorog-Kulma-Karokurum” <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/tajik-leader-in-china-building-roads/">highway</a> in Tajikistan. </p>
<p>China’s diplomatic relations with the republics are very warm – in some cases more so than those of Russia, which can sometimes behave like the overlord it once was. Yet problems may loom for One Belt, One Road all the same. </p>
<p>Investments may be slowed down by unfinished border demarcation and disputes in several unsettled areas, especially between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. There is also a cautious and sometimes hostile attitude towards Chinese migrants and workers from local people, especially <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-36163103">in Kazakhstan</a>. This is a potential problem given that the price of investment from Beijing is often Chinese companies winning contracts and supplying labour and equipment. </p>
<p>The Chinese may therefore have to extend their diplomatic efforts to Central Asian people more generally. The leaders of the five republics may also need to be more transparent with their citizens about how they plan to carry One Belt, One Road forward, contrary to the frequently opaque business operations in the region. </p>
<p>Russia is closely interested despite hosting no initiatives to date. Relations between China and Russia tend to be “coldly cordial”, turning on mutual support on some international issues such as Syria, and peaceful coexistence in Eurasia. </p>
<p>Chinese investments in Central Asia are a potential flashpoint, since Russia keeps Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and possibly <a href="http://www.rferl.org/a/qishloq-ovozi-tajikistan-mulls-eeu-feels-pull-of-russia/27893070.html">soon Tajikistan</a> in its orbit through the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Russia can benefit from improved connectivity and therefore stability in the region, but it wants guarantees that One Belt, One Road won’t undermine the economic relevance of the EEU. </p>
<p>Russia and China adopted a <a href="http://china-trade-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/The-Belt-and-Road-Initiative/Joint-Statement-on-Cooperation-on-the-Construction-of-Joint-Eurasian-Economic-Union-and-the-Silk-Road-Projects/obor/en/1/1X000000/1X0A3ABV.htm">joint statement</a> on EEU and Silk Road projects in 2015, but it was vague and cautious. The Chinese will be pleased that Putin is attending next month’s summit, but his enthusiastic backing would be better. </p>
<h2>The Western dimension</h2>
<p>The EU has been remarkably silent on One Belt, One Road. This is despite the project’s obvious geopolitical and economic importance – trade with China <a href="http://english.gov.cn/news/top_news/2016/04/01/content_281475318738444.htm">was</a> US$593 billion in 2015 – and the existence of a <a href="http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-2258_en.htm">EU-China Connectivity Platform</a>. Europe’s attitude can partly be explained by Brexit; rising nationalism in several European states; compatibility with European labour norms and standards; the still unclear degree of Chinese companies’ involvement; and the general distraction of the eurozone crisis. </p>
<p>The EU also seems unable to speak with a single voice to China, with member states usually preferring bilateralism or <a href="http://councilforeuropeanstudies.org/critcom/161-framework-and-economic-relations-between-china-and-ceec/">sub-regional frameworks</a> of cooperation. And from an economic point of view, One Belt, One Road is potentially a double-edged sword. Connectivity should benefit everyone, but more competitive Chinese goods flooding Europe is a potential threat unless EU members can coordinate their response. Increased connectivity may also encourage illegal traffickers, organised crime and counterfeiters. </p>
<p>Other Western nations have been lukewarm, too. When New Zealand <a href="http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/australianz/china-new-zealand-to-expand-free-trade-agreement-cooperate-on-one-belt-one-road">announced</a> its involvement with One Belt, One Road last month, it was one of few Western states to have done so (<a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-hungary-idUSKBN0ON01W20150607">Hungary</a> and the <a href="http://www.czech.cz/cz/Aktuality/Czech-Republic-and-China-ink-investment-boosting-m">Czech Republic</a> are on board). <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/e30f3122-0eae-11e7-b030-768954394623">Australia declined</a> to follow suit, despite a visit from the Chinese premier on the same trip. </p>
<p>Evidently China still has much work to do to persuade the world of the merits of its big initiative. Political and security issues could yet prove insurmountable unless Beijing can win round neighbours and major rivals alike. </p>
<p>This will need both political and diplomatic patience, and next month’s summit is more likely to be about bridge building than major new announcements. The irony is that while One Belt One Road is aimed at facilitating infrastructure and connectivity, its implementation looks like a long and very bumpy road.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/75722/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Filippo Costa Buranelli is affiliated with the Higher Education Academy.</span></em></p>China’s One Belt, One Road initiative is holding international summit in Beijing, but no Western leaders have said they are coming yet.Filippo Costa Buranelli, Lecturer, International Relations, University of St AndrewsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/649452016-09-07T13:54:31Z2016-09-07T13:54:31ZAfter 25 years of independence, Tajikistan is a bastion of torture and repression<p>As Tajikistan marks 25 years since its independence from the Soviet Union, the fragile peace it has made has been offset by a brutal crackdown on the opposition and an impending economic crisis.</p>
<p>The Central Asian republic was <a href="http://countrystudies.us/tajikistan/8.htm">born</a> amid political turmoil, and quickly descended into a <a href="http://www.un.org/events/tenstories/06/story.asp?storyID=600">civil war</a> that cost more than 50,000 lives and turned some 250,000 people into refugees. A peace agreement in 1997 formally brought the war to an end, but the president, Emomali Rahmon, who came to power during the fighting, has now eradicated the opposition with whom he negotiated the accord; this year, he won a referendum <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/23/tajikistan-votes-to-allow-president-emomali-rahmon-to-rule-indefinitely">allowing him to rule indefinitely</a>.</p>
<p>Order has returned since the chaos of the war ended, but memories of the peace are receding. The real dividends have gone to the president, his circle, and a few hundred families who are closely tied to the regime.</p>
<p>To many Tajiks, this year’s anniversary celebrations won’t feel all that celebratory. They will be tightly managed by the state, with no room for spontaneous public participation, critical comment or dissent. Approximately half the working-age male population will be absent from these celebrations, as they have migrated to Russia and other countries for work, and many of the country’s women, children and elderly citizens will have little enthusiasm for the anniversary when their economic prospects are so bleak.</p>
<p>Inflation and the depreciation of the currency have made the ordinary Tajik poorer this year. Around half of the country’s income depends on Tajiks working abroad and sending money home, but according to <a href="http://www.eurasianet.org/node/79401">Russia’s Central Bank</a>, the amount of money transferred from Russia to Tajikistan fell precipitously from $3.8 billion in 2014 to $1.28 billion in 2015. The <a href="http://www.asiaplus.tj/en/news/remittance-flows-tajikistan-reportedly-decline-221-percent">National Bank of Tajikistan</a> reports that the figure slid a further 22% in the first half of 2016.</p>
<p>National economic development is painfully slow. The <a href="http://www.casa-1000.org/MainPages/CASAAbout.php">highest hydroelectric dam in the world</a> is due to be built in Rogun before the end of the decade to export electricity to South Asia. But what resources Tajikistan has are generally used for the benefit of the few, not the many – look at the aluminium industry, for example, whose profits are <a href="https://blogs.exeter.ac.uk/excas/2014/05/22/camelflage-tajik-president-emomali-rahmon-and-james-fabiani-hide-expensive-washington-lobbying-secrets/">channelled into secretive offshore accounts</a>.</p>
<p>Worse still, the apparent pacification of the country conceals the by turns banal and brutal ways in which control is maintained. </p>
<p>The media is supressed; business is co-opted. The government has gradually discredited the last remaining political opposition, accusing it of links to Islamist terrorism as a pretext for crushing it. Political prisoners are <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-and-central-asia/tajikistan/report-tajikistan/">arbitrarily arrested, abused and tortured</a> in Tajikistan’s prisons, and their lawyers and relatives are intimidated and detained. A recent Human Rights Watch <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/tajikistan#5f08d5">report</a> found that “torture remains widespread in the criminal justice system” and that the police “routinely use torture to coerce confessions and deny detainees access to counsel”.</p>
<p>In recent weeks, a group of leading Tajikistani civil society and human rights activists <a href="http://blogs.exeter.ac.uk/excas/2016/08/22/statement-by-the-representatives-of-tajikistans-civil-society-about-status-of-political-prisoners/">appealed</a> to the UN and international community to publicly demand that the government complies with its own laws and international commitments.</p>
<p>Of particular concern to these activists is the status of prisoners linked to the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRPT), whose leader signed the <a href="http://www.c-r.org/accord-article/key-elements-tajikistan-peace-agreement">1997 peace agreement</a>.</p>
<h2>Beyond the pale</h2>
<p>Despite years spent carefully toeing a moderate line in the face of electoral fraud and repression, the IRPT was <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/tajikistan">banned in 2015</a>. This summer, two political prisoners linked to the party, <a href="http://www.eurasianet.org/node/80171">Kurbon Mannonov</a> and Nozimdzhon Tashripov, died in Tajikistan’s prisons. The health of another prisoner, former deputy chairman of the IRPT Mahmadali Hayit, is also in danger, and on <a href="http://www.rferl.org/content/tajikistan-opposition-politician-family-members-missing/27939830.html">August 22</a>, his wife and son were taken from their home by men in plain clothes and have not been seen since. On <a href="http://www.rferl.org/content/jailed-tajik-politicians-lawyer-remanded-yorov-hayit/27952368.html">August 29</a>, Hayit’s lawyer was remanded in custody.</p>
<p>One of the few IRPT leaders to have escaped imprisonment is its chairman, <a href="http://centralasiaprogram.org/blog/2016/01/27/interview-with-muhiddin-kabiri-leader-of-the-islamic-renaissance-party-of-tajikistan-in-exile/">Muhiddin Kabiri</a>, who went into exile in 2015. A genial man who maintained a persistently moderate stance in opposition, Kabiri is now wanted in Tajikistan on charges of terrorism. Given the obvious political motive for the campaign against the party and the government’s abuse of its members, it is astonishing that INTERPOL agreed to a Tajik request to put out a global “<a href="http://www.interpol.int/notice/search/wanted/2015-63685">red notice</a>” for his arrest.</p>
<p>Western states’ public expressions of concern about all this mean little without serious threats to end military aid and security co-operation. As things stand, the West seems happy to keep spending <a href="http://www.eurasianet.org/node/77751">millions of dollars</a> a year on Tajik border security, counter-terrorism and military training. These governments are apparently <a href="http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2015/09/29/us-looks-away-as-tyranny-steals-a-march-in-central-asia/6">unwilling to accept</a> that providing military aid and security training to a country that behaves like Tajikistan is ineffective, and perhaps even counter-productive.</p>
<p>The Tajik government, which obviously gives itself full credit for the fact that civil war has not returned, must be held responsible for the increasingly brutal authoritarianism and the economic decay which has marred the post-war era. INTERPOL, which claims to uphold international human rights standards, should make sure it is not <a href="https://www.fairtrials.org/policy-report-interpol-and-human-rights/">exploited</a> to serve the government’s political motives.</p>
<p>Tajikistan’s recovery and relative stability since the civil war should be a cause to celebrate – but a peace managed with such means is no peace at all.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64945/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Heathershaw receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Edward Lemon has received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council. </span></em></p>Tajikistan, a longstanding human rights violator, has been cracking down harshly on what’s left of its political opposition.John Heathershaw, Associate Professor in International Relations, University of ExeterEdward Lemon, PhD Candidate in Politics, University of ExeterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/544242016-04-11T13:29:03Z2016-04-11T13:29:03ZHow big a threat is Islamic State in Central Asia?<p>The self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS) is seen as a growing threat throughout much of the world, its influence extending to <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-islamic-state-is-moving-its-egyptian-battle-from-sinai-to-cairo-46439">North Africa</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/catch-up-why-islamic-state-targeted-paris-and-why-its-changing-tack-50731">Europe</a>, and even as far as <a href="https://theconversation.com/jakarta-attacks-is-islamic-states-presence-in-south-east-asia-overstated-52735">Indonesia</a>. Yet for the post-Soviet Central Asian republics the potential consequences of the rise of radical Islamism are not clear.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/10/opinion/jihads-new-frontier-tajikistan.html?_r=4">For some</a>, IS is simply the latest version of the “Islamic threat” to Central Asian security. The <a href="http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-releases/2015/europe/syria-calling-radicalisation-in-central-asia.aspx">International Crisis Group</a>, for example, links growing support for violent extremism with the last few decades’ <a href="http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/03/19/reviving-central-asia-s-religious-ties-with-indian-subcontinent-jamaat-al-tabligh">Islamic revival</a> in Central Asia. Others in the media <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/how-many-tajik-isis-recruits-were-arrested-in-turkey/">have been more sceptical</a> about the influence of IS in the region, and the attitude of some Western officials has, more than anything, been rather <a href="http://www.eurasianet.org/node/73836">cheerful</a>. </p>
<p>Yet Central Asian governments have continued to use the “war on terror” as an excuse to <a href="http://www.eurasianet.org/node/74061">crack down on opposition</a>, whether Islamic or otherwise. Oppressive security policies towards Islam in Central Asia are often just short-sighted “fixes” that do little to address the long-term structural problems, and if anything, only aggravate them. In their attempts to deal with perceived threats to civil stability, Central Asian governments may actually end up deepening the very problem they seek to resolve.</p>
<h2>What is the threat?</h2>
<p>Very little is known about IS’s involvement in the countries of Central Asia – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. What we hear is often alarming, or perhaps alarmist.</p>
<p>Kyrgyz authorities cite a raid they mounted on the home of alleged terrorists in July 2015 as <a href="http://www.eurasianet.org/node/74326">evidence of an IS cell in the capital, Bishkek</a>. The recent defection to IS <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/tajikistan/11636529/Missing-Tajikistan-police-chief-defects-to-the-Islamic-State.html">of Tajik special forces commander</a>, Gulmorod Khalimov, was also understood as an example of “radicalisation”. While the full context of these events has not been made clear, it’s doubtful that they indicate a broad trend of IS activity in the region. In the case of Khalimov, at least, his defection was probably more tied to his falling out <a href="http://blogs.exeter.ac.uk/excas/2015/05/31/halimov/">with the regime</a> than to any jihadist conviction.</p>
<p>Estimates of the number of Central Asians recruited by IS vary. Most are <a href="http://centralasiaprogram.org/blog/2015/02/23/islamic-state-messaging-to-central-asians-migrant-workers-in-russia/">migrant labourers</a> with little religious background, recruited from Russia and other intermediary countries. Unlike wealthier Muslims in Europe and in neighbouring Middle Eastern states, in remote Central Asian villages, where the internet is less accessible, residents have less opportunity to join IS.</p>
<h2>Why are Central Asians joining IS?</h2>
<p>Despite limited opportunities and their small numbers, the Central Asian recruits who have joined the extremist group deserve attention. </p>
<p>The absence of widespread political violence in Central Asia since the 1990s may explain why recruitment is lower in this region than in the Middle East and North Africa, where war and brutality have been common features for many years. But violence is more than physical. Threats to a person’s ethnic and gender identity and to their daily survival can be, and have been, just as much of an incentive. </p>
<p>There also appears to be a link between domestic violence and sympathy for violent extremism, which is particularly visible in the highly <a href="https://www.kirkensnodhjelp.no/contentassets/2b68cbff89b84558b78ffe9fe4b2a250/semiotics-forced-marriages-domestic-violence--final-report.pdf">patriarchal societies</a> that prevail in much, but not all, of Central Asia.</p>
<p>This points to another crucial factor, which is altogether more personal, more gendered and probably more important: feelings of alienation and exclusion. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-32960340">Noah Tucker</a>, who has surveyed the social media accounts of Uzbek IS recruits, notes that “young people who go want to belong to something bigger than themselves, often in a situation in which they feel isolated and alone. They are looking for meaning in their lives, for something significant to be a part of.” In many cases, rather than a gradual process of becoming more and more religious, the shift in opinion to support of jihad occurs rapidly.</p>
<h2>The politics of counter-radicalisation</h2>
<p>It seems that IS’ political ideas about the repression of Muslims, at home and abroad, are more important for many <a href="http://centralasiaprogram.org/blog/2015/02/23/islamic-state-messaging-to-central-asians-migrant-workers-in-russia/">Central Asian recruits</a> than its religious beliefs and practices. The political ideas of IS can be held by someone with little or no knowledge of Islamic moral code and with no commitment to its practice in prayer, worship or other rituals. </p>
<p>This distinction between politics and religion – a distinction found neither in the extremist ideology itself, nor in much secular analysis of it — is narrow but important. The existence of this distinction is crucial to make sense of why IS attracts many Muslims, and even some non-Muslims, with little or no knowledge of Islam.</p>
<p>The politics of counter-radicalisation are far more significant than radicalisation itself to Central Asia, which has, so far, been free of IS-inspired terror attacks. Authoritarian governments in the region have increasingly used the hysteria surrounding IS as a pretext to crack down on their non-violent religious and political opponents. </p>
<p>In Tajikistan, for example, the country’s only real opposition party, the Islamic Revival Party (IRPT), was banned and its leaders charged with terrorism offences in September 2015. And then in January 2016, the <a href="http://www.eurasianet.org/node/76696">IRPT’s</a> exiled leader travelled to Iran and met with the country’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. At first glance, this supposed connection with violent extremism and move to associate with the regime in Iran, widely <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/28/un-summit-isis-iran-not-invited-state-sponsor-terrorism-label">condemned as a state sponsor of terror groups</a>, may seem like evidence of radicalisation – but in reality, the IRPT (very moderate Sunni) and Khameini (a highly conservative Shia) don’t share much religious common ground.</p>
<p>Even so, it is bad news for Central Asia that political and religious opposition can only exist in exile, and with foreign support. Central Asia’s counter-radicalisation policies may end up being a greater threat to democracy than IS-inspired radicalisation itself.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/54424/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Heathershaw receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK and the British Council in the USA. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Montgomery has received funding from American Councils, IREX, and the British Council.
He is affiliated with CEDAR--Communities Engaging with Difference and Religion. </span></em></p>Islamic State has been spreading its influence beyond the Middle East – and Central Asia could be in the firing line.John Heathershaw, Associate Professor in International Relations, University of ExeterDavid W. Montgomery, Visiting Scholar at the Ali Vural Ak Center for Global Islamic Studies, George Mason UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/490342015-10-14T05:29:18Z2015-10-14T05:29:18ZWhat are Russia’s grand designs in Central Asia?<p>While international attention has focused on Russian military operations in Ukraine and Syria, Moscow has also been <a href="http://www.rferl.org/content/afghanistan-russia-dostum-seeks-military-help/27293696.html">involved</a> in a flurry of diplomatic and security initiatives to address the growing instability in northern Afghanistan. </p>
<p>But its moves to bolster regional security are more than just a response to local security concerns. Russia has a broader strategy that could leave it as the dominant security actor across much of Eurasia.</p>
<p>Even before the shock of the <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/afghanistan-city-of-kunduz-largely-under-taliban-control-1443447706">Taliban occupation of Kunduz</a> in late September, Russian officials were concerned about the fragile security situation in northern Afghanistan, including the rise of Islamic State in northern Afghanistan and its potential spread to Central Asia and thence to Russia’s large Muslim community. As if to emphasise the domestic threat, on October 12 Russian police announced that they had <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/12/isis-trained-russians-foiled-moscow-terror-attack">uncovered a terrorist plot in Moscow</a> apparently involving a group of Central Asian militants.</p>
<p>Insecurity in Afghanistan may pose a potential security threat for Moscow, but it is being seized upon as a major geopolitical opportunity. Against a backdrop of failed Western policies across much of Russia’s southern flank, Moscow is moving quickly to fill a security vacuum in the region. It is strengthening existing alliances to consolidate its hold over former Soviet republics in Central Asia and reshaping the security dynamics of the region around its own favoured security groupings – the <a href="http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/int/csto.htm">Collective Security Treaty Organisation</a> (CSTO) and the <a href="http://www.sectsco.org/EN123/">Shanghai Cooperation Organisation</a> (SCO).</p>
<p>The first step has been a series of meeting with Central Asian leaders, all on the front line in case of renewed Afghan insecurity. A meeting between Russian president Vladimir Putin and Emomali Rakhmon, the president of Tajikistan, led to promises of <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/10/07/us-russia-tajikistan-defence-idUSKCN0S10TT20151007">more attack helicopters</a> to bolster the existing Russian military based in the country, which has become the hub of a <a href="http://www.rferl.org/content/tajikistan-far-outpost-of-great-powers/27141036.html">well-developed defence system</a> against cross-border infiltration.</p>
<h2>Crisis and opportunity</h2>
<p>Putin also took time out of his birthday celebrations in Sochi to meet Almazbek Atambayev, the president of Kyrgyzstan, a country that has become the linchpin of Russia’s security strategy in the region. Until 2014 Kyrgyzstan hosted a US airbase, but as I <a href="https://ore.exeter.ac.uk/repository/bitstream/handle/10871/18208/Lewis%20Russia%20and%20Kyrgyzstan%202015.pdf?sequence=1">explored in a recent paper</a>, Russia has been remarkably successful in ousting the Americans and turning Kyrgyzstan into a dependable ally in the region.</p>
<p>If Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are relatively relaxed about an enhanced Russian military presence, the Uzbek president, Islam Karimov, is instinctively allergic to talk of renewed Russian influence and <a href="http://www.academia.edu/4058733/Uzbekistan_s_challenging_withdrawal_from_the_CSTO">pulled out of the Russian-led CSTO in 2012</a>. </p>
<p>Now the northern Afghan crisis offers an opportunity to bring Uzbekistan back into Moscow’s embrace. A delegation from the Russian MOD, led by deputy minister Anatoly Antonov, has recently <a href="http://www.uzmetronom.com/2015/10/07/tovarishhi_po_oruzhiju.html">paid the country its first high-level visit since 2007</a>.</p>
<p>There was no coverage of the Russian visit in Uzbekistan’s heavily censored press. Instead, the <a href="http://www.ng.ru/cis/2015-10-08/1_ashabad.html">newpapers led on a summit</a> with neighbouring Turkmen president, Gurmanguly Berdymukhamedov. The two presidents both have serious security concerns about Afghanistan, but both want to manage them without Russian assistance. Both states have appalling human rights records, limiting the potential for Western aid, and it may be hard to refuse Russian offers of help if unrest grows along their borders with Afghanistan.</p>
<h2>Friends reunited</h2>
<p>Afghan officials have also been in Moscow, seeking assistance. Vice-president and Uzbek warlord, Abdul Rashid Dostum, has sought to revive old ties during a recent visit, also paying a side visit to the influential Chechen strongman Ramzan Kadyrov, <a href="http://www.rferl.org/content/afghanistan-russia-dostum-seeks-military-help/27293696.html">to share experiences of “fighting terrorism”</a>. If the Afghan situation worsens significantly, Dostum offers the potential for Moscow to build up a further band of loyal forces in the north of Afghanistan, in an effective re-run of its Taliban-era support for the Northern Alliance.</p>
<p>Other Afghan government officials attended a conference of SCO members and observers on Afghanistan in Moscow. The chief of Russia’s general staff, first deputy defence minister, Valery Gerasimov, took time out to give a speech that highlighted the failure of US policy in the Middle East, leaving little doubt that Moscow now sees Afghanistan through the same geopolitical prism as it frames Syria. Russian intelligence officials regularly claim that IS is part of a <a href="http://www.eurasianet.org/node/75486">broader US plot to destabilise Central Asia and Russia</a> from the south.</p>
<p>Still, there is no appetite for Russia to get involved in Afghanistan in the way it has in Syria. There are still bitter memories of the humiliating Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. But an anti-IS stance in the region provides Russia with the opportunity to consolidate its presence in Central Asia and become the centre of new alliances in the region – with SCO partners such as China, and with Iran – and to sponsor anti-Taliban and anti-IS forces in northern Afghanistan.</p>
<p>More intriguingly, some Russian officials see Moscow’s new strategic initiatives in Syria and Afghanistan as a chance to carve out a significant role in a wider region. State Duma speaker, Sergei Naryshkin, has been talking of a “<a href="http://www.eaeunion.org/?lang=en">Greater Eurasia</a>”, linking Russia not only to former Soviet republics, but more widely to a range of allies in Syria, Iran, India and China. </p>
<p>This may be just another of Russia’s historical spatial fantasies for now, but in a rapidly changing international environment, Moscow will try to use its dominance in Central Asia as a first step towards shaping a new regional security order.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/49034/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Lewis has received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council project 'Rising Powers and Conflict Management in Central Asia'.</span></em></p>A renewed security focus on Afghanistan is part of Vladimir Putin’s plan to re-energise Russia’s vision of a ‘Greater Eurasia’.David Lewis, Senior Lecturer, Politics, University of ExeterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.