tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca/topics/ttip-12692/articlesTTIP – The Conversation2018-08-08T20:49:27Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1008692018-08-08T20:49:27Z2018-08-08T20:49:27ZHow Canada inspired the Frenchman who helped unite Europe<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230970/original/file-20180807-191025-mgskxn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The son of a cognac maker, Jean Monnet became a champion of a unified Europe after finding inspiration for a harmonious federalist model in Canada. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Fondation Jean Monnet</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (<a href="http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/">TTIP</a>) initiative between the European Union and the United States has stalled under U.S. President Donald Trump. Trump, in fact, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/may/05/donald-trump-brexit-uk-leaving-european-union">has expressed strong and persistent support for Brexit</a> and breakaway movements in a number of EU member states, and he has articulated hopes for the disintegration of the entire union. </p>
<p>Lately, he even described the EU <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/15/politics/donald-trump-european-union-foe/index.html">as a “foe” of the United States.</a> </p>
<p>In contrast, Canada-EU relations have intensified over time, and are likely to continue to do so in the years to come with the full implementation of the <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/">Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement</a> known as CETA.</p>
<p>The partnership model of CETA actually embodies the early visions of European and transatlantic integration. Trump’s adversarial approach to Europe does not. What has evolved into today’s EU was heavily inspired by North America, and wider transatlantic integration was the ultimate goal of European unity.</p>
<p><a href="https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/jean_monnet_en.pdf">Jean Monnet</a> (1888-1979) is viewed as the chief architect of the <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3Axy0022">European Coal and Steel Community</a> (ECSC), the precursor of the EU. He spent his early years working as an agent for his father, a cognac producer. In the search for new emerging markets that the bigger and more renowned brandy firms from Cognac had not yet tried to reach, <a href="https://utorontopress.com/ca/jean-monnet-and-canada-3">Monnet came to Canada in the early 1900s</a>. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230111/original/file-20180731-136664-1jak9e6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230111/original/file-20180731-136664-1jak9e6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=793&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230111/original/file-20180731-136664-1jak9e6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=793&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230111/original/file-20180731-136664-1jak9e6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=793&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230111/original/file-20180731-136664-1jak9e6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=996&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230111/original/file-20180731-136664-1jak9e6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=996&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230111/original/file-20180731-136664-1jak9e6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=996&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Monnet at Niagara Falls, Ont.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Fondation Jean Monnet, Lausanne, Switzerland)</span></span>
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<p>Monnet travelled from Montréal to Vancouver Island, and visited numerous destinations between 1907 and 1914. </p>
<p>In Canada, Monnet was exposed to the country’s unique form of federalism, and he became convinced that it was possible to achieve lasting political change from the narrow-minded nationalism that had plagued Europe throughout the centuries. </p>
<p>In particular, the optimism he observed in the new economic union among economically and ethnically diverse people seemed to form his perceptions on “change.” Because the people Monnet met in Canada were immigrants, newly arrived from Europe, Monnet concluded that change was also possible in Europe. </p>
<h2>Life in the U.S.</h2>
<p>Later in life, Monnet also spent a significant amount of time in the United States. He lived in San Francisco during the 1920s and in Washington, D.C. in the 1940s. <a href="https://archive.org/details/monnetamericans00clif">Some have argued that Monnet</a>, at least until after the Second World War, had more extensive knowledge of Canada and the United States, and more friends in North America, than he did in either France or elsewhere in Europe. </p>
<p>Monnet felt inspired by what he referred to as the American temperament, or by the <a href="https://archive.org/details/MonnetJeanMemoirs">“America on the move”</a> attitude. All in all, his early impressions of North America, coupled with his economic and political savvy, are likely to have been major considerations for Monnet when, in the post-Second World War period, he forged the ECSC, the genesis of a new European confederation, the EU.</p>
<p><a href="http://aei.pitt.edu/14365/">Monnet’s vision for European integration</a> was never in opposition to co-operation with North America. In an article written in 1961 in the now-defunct French magazine <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/R%C3%A9alit%C3%A9s_(French_magazine)">Réalités</a>, Monnet argued for the creation of a far-reaching “Atlantic Community” in which the European nations, together with the United States, would share common institutions based on a genuine delegation of powers. </p>
<p>The article, entitled “Western Unity: The Cornerstone of World Peace,” was written when Monnet was president of the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/div-classtitlemonnet-and-the-action-committee-the-formative-period-of-the-european-communitiesdiv/A8F81D1604BF4F71F8BAF7C3BFA253F9">Action Committee for a United States of Europe</a>. </p>
<p>It demonstrates that for Monnet, wider transatlantic cooperation was not perceived to be in conflict with the interests he advanced for European unity. On the contrary, European unity was seen as a precondition for a “true” Atlantic community, a fusion of the Old World and the New World in which Europe and North America could act as equal partners. </p>
<h2>Canadians and Europeans</h2>
<p>CETA is the first major preferential-trade agreement that the EU has negotiated with a large, industrialized, developed country. The <a href="http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/index.aspx?lang=eng">Canadian government</a> presents CETA as a progressive trade deal that upholds and promotes the values that Canada shares with the EU. </p>
<p>Through CETA, Canada and the EU are in line with Monnet’s vision for an Atlantic community. Currently, the U.S. seems unwilling to join this community. However, that might change. </p>
<p>It’s an era in which unpredictability seems to be the new normal, after all. Following <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/index_en">European Commission President Jean Claude Juncker’s </a> recent visit to Washington, Trump proclaimed that the EU and the U.S. were launching a <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-eu-meeting-live-stream-joint-statements-jean-claud-juncker-white-house-rose-garden-2018-07-25/">“new phase in the relationship.”</a> </p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1979/03/17/archives/jean-monnet-90-architect-of-european-unity-dies-jean-monnet-dead-at.html">Monnet, an eternal optimist</a>, was always convinced that ultimately, the United States too would delegate powers of effective action to common institutions, even on political questions.</p>
<p>Monnet’s focus on closer transatlantic integration and his enthusiasm for the co-operative dynamism of the New World in North America is inspiring given his background in the Old World. He was clearly confident that federalism and multi-level governance was the way towards a prosperous and peaceful future.</p>
<p>What would he make of Trump? Probably not much, but there’s little doubt the indefatigable Frenchman would have enjoyed working with the Canadians towards the thriving “Atlantic Community” he’d envisioned.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/100869/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Trygve Ugland does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In the early 1900s, young Frenchman Jean Monnet travelled Canada and was inspired by its unique form of federalism. It helped fuel his interest in a unified Europe and a transatlantic community.Trygve Ugland, Professor of Politics and International Studies, Bishop's UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1003572018-08-01T10:07:52Z2018-08-01T10:07:52ZBrexit: champagne, parmesan, prosecco and feta could soon be at the centre of negotiations<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229972/original/file-20180731-136673-2fb4l1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As <a href="https://howmanydaystill.com/its/brexit-6">Brexit day</a> creeps closer, one issue that remains unresolved is the way that food names will be protected in Britain and the EU. From parmesan and feta to cornish pasties and Bavarian beer, the EU is fiercely protective over protected designations of origin (PDOs) or protected geographical indications (PGIs). </p>
<p>A number of highly popular products are protected under this legal framework that dictates certain products can only be produced in certain regions. So champagne must be produced in the Champagne region of France and prosecco in a small pocket of north-eastern Italy. These are products with big market shares in the UK, with consumer loyalty being built up and consolidated through the use of these reputable geographical names.</p>
<p>The issue is also important to the UK. Many British products <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/protected-food-name-scheme-uk-registered-products">are also protected</a> under the EU regime. It helps protect both their quality and value. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229859/original/file-20180730-106496-ouznts.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229859/original/file-20180730-106496-ouznts.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229859/original/file-20180730-106496-ouznts.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229859/original/file-20180730-106496-ouznts.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229859/original/file-20180730-106496-ouznts.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229859/original/file-20180730-106496-ouznts.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229859/original/file-20180730-106496-ouznts.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Accept no imitations.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com">Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>But when the UK leaves the EU, it will no longer be under the laws that govern the protective status of these products. The government’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/britains-brexit-plan-revealed-experts-react-99862">recently launched white paper</a>, which outlined the UK’s plans for Brexit, declares that Britain will set up its own protection of geographical names to provide for continuous protection of UK products within the UK. But it doesn’t mention any continuation of the EU’s protection scheme.</p>
<p>Some in Brussels <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/feb/15/eu-fears-influx-of-british-champagne-once-brexit-ends-food-naming-rules">have expressed</a> fear that British producers will start exploiting previously protected European names. Yet, rather ironically, British products would not lose their status in the EU (and could still seek new EU registrations in the future), since the EU allows for the protection of geographical names from non-EU countries. It’s an imbalance which <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/uk-regional-specialities-eu-protect-trade-deal-europe-cheese-food-drink-wine-a8312171.html">seems to please British negotiators</a>.</p>
<p>So, the European Commission fears that after Brexit the high level of protection that European products currently enjoy in the UK under EU law may evaporate. The white paper proposal rather contrasts with <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/draft_agreement_coloured.pdf">the commission’s proposal</a>, which suggests that the UK continue protecting geographical indications, as it does under the EU.</p>
<h2>US interference</h2>
<p>But the EU’s desire that post-Brexit Britain keep its protection of geographical indications is bound to collide with US strategic interests. The US position is an important factor to take into account in the Brexit negotiations. If the UK signs a trade deal with the US, it will likely clash with a lot of EU regulations – including provisions governing the use of geographical names for food and beverages. </p>
<p>The US plays by different rules when it comes to the protection of these names. There are numerous US food companies that freely use European geographical expressions (including parmesan and feta for cheese) to identify products that have not been produced in the relevant European locations. In the US, these <a href="http://www.commonfoodnames.com/">are considered</a> to be generic names that describe the products and cannot be monopolised by anyone, not even by the producers coming from the relevant European geographical area.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229860/original/file-20180730-106496-u7nrwy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229860/original/file-20180730-106496-u7nrwy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229860/original/file-20180730-106496-u7nrwy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229860/original/file-20180730-106496-u7nrwy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229860/original/file-20180730-106496-u7nrwy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229860/original/file-20180730-106496-u7nrwy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229860/original/file-20180730-106496-u7nrwy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Is it feta or ‘Greek-style cheese’?</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com">Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>That is why the US <a href="https://www.foodmanagement.today/us-lobbying-uk-to-drop-name-protections-in-post-brexit-trade-deals/">is lobbying</a> the UK to abandon the EU’s protection of geographical indications, namely to allow US food and beverage companies to enter the British market by freely using European names. A US-UK trade deal would likely be contingent on the UK dropping the EU-level protection of geographical indications. But this, in turn, would scupper the prospects of a trade deal with the EU – an even bigger trading partner for the UK.</p>
<h2>Sticking point</h2>
<p>The EU has continuously placed great emphasis on the protection of its geographical names during trade negotiations. It proved to be a big <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/ambassador-charles-ries-why-a-uk-us-trade-deal-will-be-difficult-2018-1?IR=T">sticking point</a> in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations. France and Greece, for example, threatened to veto a deal with the US unless it upheld their geographical indications. More recently, Italy’s minister for agriculture <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/14/italy-could-try-to-block-the-eu-canada-trade-deal-to-protect-its-famous-foods.html">noted</a> that Italy may not ratify the EU’s trade deal with Canada because, in his view, it does not adequately protect Italian geographical names.</p>
<p>It is therefore not a stretch to say that the entire Brexit deal could hinge on the issue of geographical indications. There is no doubt that providing a level of protection in the UK which is comparable to the current EU scheme – for example, via a mutual EU/UK recognition scheme – would facilitate an agreement not only on the specific issue of geographical names, but also of the entire Brexit deal. This would, however, make favourable trade agreements between the UK and the US less likely. The battle over geographical indications will surely go on.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/100357/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The EU has repeatedly placed great emphasis on the protection of geographical names like champagne and parmesan during trade negotiations.Enrico Bonadio, Senior Lecturer in Law, City, University of LondonMarc Mimler, Lecturer in Law, Bournemouth UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/781162017-05-22T15:35:41Z2017-05-22T15:35:41ZWhy the EU’s Singapore ruling does not lead to a smoother Brexit road for Britain<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/170350/original/file-20170522-25020-11jm1pa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The UK's future trade deals will be subject to EU member state approval. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The UK’s vote for Brexit was all about taking back control. Indeed, when the UK leaves the EU, control over a variety of policy areas is likely to change hands. The problem is that it will not necessarily be into the UK government’s hands. A <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/news/singapore-trade-deal-cannot-be-concluded-by-eu-alone-ecj-rules/">recent decision</a> by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) regarding a key EU trade deal with Singapore shows yet again how control over post-Brexit trade might be subject to the whims of the EU’s member states and their regional governments.</p>
<p>Europe’s top court ruled that all member states and their regional parliaments must sign off on the trade deal being negotiated by the EU and Singapore. This has direct implications for Brexit as it could affect the path for acceptance of any future agreement between the UK and the EU post-Brexit. It dashes hopes that the EU institutions would have the final say in negotiating trade deals.</p>
<p>If the EU could conclude free trade agreements on its own, with ratification handled by EU institutions only, then any negotiated agreement would go through predictably and quickly. If, on the other hand, member states, or even member state regional authorities, are required to approve agreements, then the whole process of negotiating new agreements will be prolonged, and possibly held hostage by national and sub-national political interests. </p>
<p>This happened in 2016 when the small Belgian province of Wallonia delayed the ratification <a href="https://theconversation.com/who-are-the-walloons-and-why-are-they-blocking-europes-free-trade-deal-with-canada-67718">of the Canada-EU trade agreement</a>. The recent ECJ ruling was much anticipated, as a precedent for future trade deals. </p>
<p>A post-Brexit deal with the UK requiring ratification by the EU Commission, EU parliament, 27 national parliaments and endless regional entities (depending on the details of 27 different national constitutions) would take quite a while, with <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/dr-ioannis-glinavos/nodeal-brexit-and-fear_b_15422298.html">significant consequences</a> for cross-channel trade.</p>
<h2>Details, details …</h2>
<p>In the <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/singapore/index_en.htm">recent Singapore case</a>, the ECJ ruled that the EU can have exclusive power under the Treaty of Lisbon to ratify a number of trade agreements (albeit not the one with Singapore). As a result the Wallonia incident should be seen as an unlikely event, rather than the norm. But it still does not bode well for Britain. </p>
<p>The court held that only those free trade agreements dealing with standard trade issues are the exclusive domain of EU institutions. Those that involve non-direct foreign investment and a system on dispute settlement between investors and governments (known as ISDS), however, need the approval of member states.</p>
<p>Some commentators <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/a5fc16e8-3a45-11e7-821a-6027b8a20f23?segmentid=acee4131-99c2-09d3-a635-873e61754ec6">have welcomed</a> the decision. They see it as an incentive, and even precursor, for the EU to drop ISDS elements from its trade deals altogether. The so-called Investor State Dispute Settlement element of trade deals allows companies to sue national governments if they pass laws that affect their bottom lines. It is considered by many as unnecessary encroachment on national sovereignty. In fact, it was resistance to ISDS that was the primary reason for Wallonian objection to the Canada trade deal, and it has been the number one reason campaigners <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-ttip-will-live-on-but-not-for-the-eu-61718">have raged against TTIP</a>, the US-EU trade treaty under negotiation. </p>
<h2>Taking back control</h2>
<p>But it is not possible to see the Singapore decision as a win-win, easing procedural steps to a Brexit deal, while at the same time, eliminating distasteful ISDS from EU trade agreements. This is because the EU will probably insist on them in any future UK-EU deal. It is all to do with control. </p>
<p>The EU is upfront about <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/apr/21/leaked-documents-eu-tough-line-brexit-negotiations">its desire to maintain</a> the jurisdiction of the ECJ over EU nationals and their businesses operating in the UK post-Brexit. Prime Minister Theresa May, on the other hand, has made “freedom from EU law” <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-latest-theresa-may-european-court-eu-uk-jurisdiction-leave-council-citizens-talks-brussels-a7694361.html">one of the banners</a> of her electoral campaign. Indeed, the spurious claim of repatriating legal powers from the EU was a <a href="http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/briefing_control.html">central theme of the Leave campaign</a> during the UK referendum.</p>
<p>The reason why the Singapore decision does not make it easier for Brexit therefore is that (in the event of loss of jurisdiction by the ECJ over the UK) the EU is likely to insist upon some sort of supra-national mechanism for dispute resolution post-Brexit. ISDS will be the only tool available to the EU to ensure adequate standards of treatment for European business interests in the UK. And this will require the more cumbersome ratification process envisaged by the ECJ decision. </p>
<p>So, contrary to what <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/16/boost-brexit-free-trade-deal-chances-landmark-eu-court-ruling/">has been reported</a> in much of the financial press on this issue, things did not get any easier for the UK with the EU’s ruling on Singapore. Difficulties could arise in the ratification of a future EU-UK trade deal – not just its negotiation. Wallonia could yet end up taking control of the UK’s post-Brexit future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/78116/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ioannis Glinavos does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It’s likely that a future UK-EU trade deal will be subject to approval by all EU member states and their sub-national parliaments.Ioannis Glinavos, Senior Lecturer in Law, University of WestminsterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/722432017-02-02T02:57:30Z2017-02-02T02:57:30ZTrump’s trade policy is more predictable and less isolationist than critics think<p>In his first full week in office, President Donald Trump unleashed a whirlwind of actions that have deep ramifications for U.S. trade. Although critics have labeled the actions “<a href="http://www.newsweek.com/donald-trump-united-nations-trade-nafta-tpp-549407">unpredictable</a>,” “<a href="http://www.nationalreview.com/article/444321/trumps-foreign-policy-isolationism-america-first-not-countrys-interest">isolationist</a>” and “<a href="http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/analysis-trump-s-america-first-vision-could-upend-postwar-consensus-n714741">chaotic</a>,” they provide an instructive outline of his new trade policy. </p>
<p>The president began the week by <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/23/presidential-memorandum-regarding-withdrawal-united-states-trans-pacific">signing</a> a memorandum directing the United States’ withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Later in the week, he <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jan/27/the-guardian-view-on-the-trump-may-meeting-they-are-playing-with-fire">met</a> with British Prime Minister Theresa May to discuss greater bilateral cooperation, including a post-Brexit <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/01/22/theresa-may-donald-trump-hold-talks-trade-deal-cuts-tariffs/">trade deal</a>.</p>
<p>His new envoy to the United Nations, Nikki Haley, called for reform of that organization. She even issued a blunt <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/27/politics/haley-un-first-day/">warning</a>: “For those who don’t have our backs, we’re taking names.”</p>
<p>As if these developments were not complicated enough, President Trump <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/27/executive-order-protecting-nation-foreign-terrorist-entry-united-states">signed</a> an executive order on Friday requiring the “<a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/29/politics/donald-trump-executive-order-statement/">extreme vetting</a>” of citizens of seven Muslim majority countries seeking to enter the United States. The related <a href="https://theconversation.com/trumps-order-barring-refugees-flies-in-the-face-of-logic-and-humanity-72061">travel ban</a> sparked <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/29/politics/us-immigration-protests/">protests</a> at airports around the country.</p>
<p>While it still remains unclear how President Trump’s trade policy will evolve, his first full week has provided some good indications of what to expect in the next four years. The new policy is also more nuanced and consistent than his critics have given him credit for. </p>
<h2>Shift from multilateralism to bilateralism</h2>
<p>As shown by his handling of the TPP, the United Nations and Anglo-American relations, President Trump harbors a strong distrust of the existing multilateral system. This system covers not only the United Nations, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the World Bank but also regional efforts such as the TPP, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).</p>
<p>This shift away from multilateralism is a major departure from the Obama administration. While President Barack Obama <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/mr-obama-goes-to-new-york-the-president-and-the-restoration-ofmultilateral-diplomacy/">went</a> out of his way to team up with other nations, President Trump wants none of this.</p>
<p>Instead, he prefers bilateral negotiations that will maximize the United States’ bargaining strengths, drawing on the country’s superpower status and 300-million-strong market. Such one-on-one negotiations will also ensure a dedicated focus on those core issues that are important to both sides.</p>
<p>Although some commentators and pundits may characterize this changing approach as isolationist, the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/23/presidential-memorandum-regarding-withdrawal-united-states-trans-pacific">presidential memorandum</a> concerning TPP withdrawal made it clear that the administration will continue to negotiate trade deals with other members of the partnership. Those deals will just have to be negotiated through the bilateral route.</p>
<h2>Preference for the ‘John Wayne’ approach</h2>
<p>Going hand in hand with a renewed emphasis on bilateral negotiations is the administration’s <a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/dec/6/donald-trump-rattles-us-businesses-with-twitter-th/">preference</a> for hard bargaining and ultimatums. Stemming from President Trump’s <a href="http://theowp.org/reports/the-problems-with-donald-trumps-foreign-policies/">penchant</a> for negotiation from strength, this preference will likely result in a lot of saber-rattling between the United States and its trading partners.</p>
<p>While the embrace of this “John Wayne” approach will undoubtedly make the United States unpopular within the international community, hardball tactics will enable the country to obtain more of its demands while offering fewer concessions. These tactics, in turn, will allow President Trump to keep his campaign promise of putting <a href="http://www.freep.com/story/opinion/columnists/brian-dickerson/2017/01/21/trump-america-first/96865480/">America first</a>.</p>
<p>At times, the administration will surely make missteps by overplaying its hand. For example, President Trump’s repeated insistence that Mexico will pay for his proposed border wall appears to have backfired after Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/25/politics/mexico-president-donald-trump-enrique-pena-nieto-border-wall/index.html">canceled</a> a previously scheduled face-to-face meeting. The two eventually <a href="http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/01/27/trump-speaks-mexico-president-after-meeting-cancelled/97139096/">settled</a> for a phone conversation.</p>
<p>For countries with complicated politics such as China and India, strong-arm tactics and hard bargaining could also complicate the negotiations. In these countries, things could easily get out of control with the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/15/world/asia/trump-taiwan-china.html">increasingly nationalistic</a> populace. </p>
<p>If the Chinese and Indian populace fails to get the correct signals and overreacts, their leaders may find their hands are tied, even if President Trump offers to provide follow-up private clarifications.</p>
<p>For China especially, such complications could arise if the administration <a href="http://www.forbes.com/sites/sarahsu/2016/11/14/how-far-can-trump-go-on-chinese-trade-policy">insists</a> on naming the country a currency manipulator and slapping its imports with a 45 percent tariff. Such <a href="http://fortune.com/2016/11/10/donald-trump-china-trade/">drastic measures</a> could not only lead to a mutually destructive <a href="http://www.vox.com/world/2016/11/22/13676356/trump-trade-war-china">trade war</a> but also undesirable <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-trade-idUSKBN13I2DO?il=0">WTO complaints</a> or even penalties against the United States.</p>
<h2>Reduced regional emphasis</h2>
<p>Under the Trump administration, trade deals are unlikely to be developed through a region-based approach, whether through the bilateral or multilateral route. Within Asia, for example, Cambodia and Laos are just not as important as Japan and South Korea.</p>
<p>Instead, the deals the administration negotiates are likely to be more opportunistic. They could emerge in Asia, Europe and the Middle East at the same time without the constraints imposed by a region-based trade policy.</p>
<p>This nongeographical yet ironically global approach stands in sharp contrast to the Obama administration’s “<a href="http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/content/obama-administrations-pivot-asia">pivot to Asia</a>.” President Obama was not only eager to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/president-obama-the-tpp-would-let-america-not-china-lead-the-way-on-global-trade/2016/05/02/680540e4-0fd0-11e6-93ae-50921721165d_story.html?utm_term=.df3befdec1b8">rewrite</a> the trade rules for the Asia Pacific region, but he emphasized the region’s importance by <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/02/15/us.clinton.asia.trip/">sending</a> his first secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, to Asia on her first state visit.</p>
<p>For the Trump administration, it will still be interesting to see where newly confirmed Secretary of State Rex Tillerson will visit first. That trip, however, may not be as indicative of the administration’s policy focus as Secretary Clinton’s was.</p>
<h2>Trump’s trade policy takes shape</h2>
<p>The Trump administration’s new trade policy is still at its infancy. So it will continue to evolve. A raging debate concerning its expediency and sustainability will also continue, especially in this highly polarized post-election environment.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, this policy is not as “<a href="http://www.newsweek.com/donald-trump-united-nations-trade-nafta-tpp-549407">unpredictable</a>” and “<a href="http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/analysis-trump-s-america-first-vision-could-upend-postwar-consensus-n714741">chaotic</a>” as many critics have claimed. Instead, the policy is more nuanced and consistent. It can be traced back to not only the president’s campaign promises but also his early <a href="https://theconversation.com/america-has-never-been-truly-isolationist-and-trump-isnt-either-71689">open letters</a> in the mass media.</p>
<p>For those who strongly believe in the multilateral trading system, which dates back to the end of the Second World War, his policy will undoubtedly undermine the stability of this system. This policy could also lead to new tensions and confrontations in the international trade arena.</p>
<p>We will just have to wait and see as President Trump’s new trade policy slowly takes shape.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/72243/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter K. Yu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Trade under Trump will mean more bilateral agreements, hard bargaining and ultimatums, a sharp departure from Obama’s multilateral, win-win approach.Peter K. Yu, Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Center for Law and Intellectual Property, Texas A&M UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/719312017-02-01T03:42:05Z2017-02-01T03:42:05ZWhat does ‘America first’ mean for American economic interests?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/155064/original/image-20170131-3285-1bqo5o3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">America first, but at what cost?</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Trump paper via www.shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In his <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/01/20/donald-trumps-full-inauguration-speech-transcript-annotated/?utm_term=.8efe9dc46192">inauguration speech</a>, Donald Trump used the phrase “America first” to describe his approach to governance. </p>
<p>Trump’s speech, of course, was <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2016/04/27/opinions/trump-america-first-ugly-echoes-dunn/">not the first time</a> that we have heard this phrase. Historically, <a href="https://theconversation.com/trumps-america-first-echoes-from-1940s-59579">politicians and activists</a> have used the idea of putting America first to advocate for policies ranging from strict immigration to foreign policy isolationism. </p>
<p>But what did the new president intend to say by borrowing this well-worn but vague phrase? What does it really mean, in economic terms, to put America first?</p>
<h2>The history of ‘America first’</h2>
<p>Today, what unites “America first” populists is a rejection of the idea that the country’s self-interest is inextricably bound to the prosperity and liberty of the broader world. </p>
<p>According to this way of thinking, the world outside is full of more threats than opportunities, and America would do well to guard itself against pernicious influences from abroad. Worse, America’s generosity is <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/28/politics/donald-trump-speech-pennsylvania-economy/">constantly being abused</a> by <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-14/how-donald-trump-could-wipe-420-billion-off-china-s-exports">Asian exporters</a>, <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-28/trump-s-visa-ban-order-the-view-from-a-worried-middle-east">Middle Eastern miscreants</a> and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/04/25/enough-with-the-complaints-of-european-free-riding-already/">European free-riders</a>. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, we’ve seen before where such a foreign policy approach can lead.</p>
<p>During the Great Depression, the United States and the countries of Europe found themselves caught in a spiral of increasing trade protection and currency devaluation. This period of <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Adjusts-Domestic-Sources-Economic-Interwar/dp/0691017107/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1485552534&sr=8-1&keywords=who+adjusts">“beggar-thy-neighbor” policies</a>, in which one country’s protectionist moves trigger tightened borders from trade partners, was to no one’s economic benefit. More to the point, the deepening economic crisis that ensued, combined with the declining economic interdependence of the great powers, <a href="http://www.investopedia.com/articles/markets/022516/economic-conditions-helped-cause-world-war-ii.asp">likely contributed</a> to the outbreak of war in 1939.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, inside the United States, the year 1940 saw the creation of the “<a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/01/trump-america-first/514037/">America First Committee</a>,” which opposed entry into the Second World War. This movement attracted supporters of all political stripes and motivations, but some of its leaders were uncomfortably sympathetic with the fascist parties of Europe. It is with this movement that the phase “America first” is most associated today.</p>
<p>Of course, it is no longer the 1930s, and we shouldn’t press the analogy too far. In all likelihood, despite the <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21709028-how-contain-vladimir-putins-deadly-dysfunctional-empire-threat-russia">ominous behavior of Russia</a>, world war is not on the horizon. But this doesn’t mean that adopting a narrow understanding of American self-interest will be any less dangerous for the nation’s (and the world’s) economic future.</p>
<h2>The rise of ‘enlightened self-interest’</h2>
<p>At the end of World War II, when the “America first” rhetoric had been discredited, U.S. leaders set about creating a <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Forgotten-Foundations-Bretton-Woods-International/dp/1501704370/ref=sr_1_4?ie=UTF8&qid=1485551734&sr=8-4&keywords=bretton+woods">new international system</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/neoliberalisms-failure-means-we-need-a-new-narrative-to-guide-global-economy-69096">They envisioned</a> the U.S. as leading a world order that embodied democracy, open trade and growing prosperity. This vision was founded on generous programs such as the Marshall Plan and on institutions like the United Nations, the World Bank and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which morphed into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. </p>
<p>Of course, the <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Cold-War-New-History/dp/0143038273/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1485552290&sr=8-1&keywords=cold+war">exigencies of the Cold War</a> led to many abuses and mistakes in the years that followed. But the basic idea that “enlightened self-interest” required an internationalist and benevolent United States ensuring an open, prosperous and democratic world <a href="http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2017/02/09/what-trump-is-throwing-out-the-window/">was largely accepted</a>, at least in principle, by both parties. </p>
<p>This consensus found particular resonance in trade as the world shifted in the postwar period from unilateral to multilateral commercial policies. Under the aegis of the GATT/WTO, trade policy came to be set by the give-and-take of international negotiation rather than the individual decisions of national governments. </p>
<p>These international negotiations required that each country <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm">open its domestic markets</a> in return for improved market access abroad. The growing trade openness that resulted from this system <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Global-Capitalism-Fall-Twentieth-Century/dp/039332981X/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1485552358&sr=8-1&keywords=global+capitalism+its+fall+and+rise+in+the+twentieth+century">helped undergird</a> America’s postwar prosperity as well as the economic miracles in Europe and East Asia.</p>
<h2>Trump’s new protectionism</h2>
<p>The administration’s resurrected “America first” rhetoric implies that the internationalism and “enlightened self-interest” that built the postwar order, and that was still recognizable in Obama’s foreign policy, was a gigantic mistake. </p>
<p>Several of Trump’s campaign aides <a href="http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory/trump-advisers-start-america-policies-nonprofit-45148833">have even used the phrase</a> to christen a new group, “America First Policies,” to advocate on behalf of their new populist vision.</p>
<p>It is a vision that rejects the give-and-take of take of international agreements, the generosity of foreign aid and the conviction that what is good for our friends is good for America. It replaces these ideas with a narrow understanding of self-interest, one that risks exchanging long-run benefits for short-term satisfaction. </p>
<p>Take, for example, the Trump administration’s trade policy. During his first 10 days in office, the president took three extraordinary steps in a protectionist direction. </p>
<p>First, and most significantly, he <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/us/politics/tpp-trump-trade-nafta.html?_r=0">withdrew</a> the United States from the <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/tpp-7972">Trans-Pacific Partnership</a> (TPP) agreement, formally ending years of U.S. negotiations for expanded markets in Asia. The TPP would have created a free trade zone between the United States and 11 Pacific nations. </p>
<p>It is true that the administration is considering a new <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2017/01/japans-abe-to-meet-trump-on-february-10-with-agenda-spanning-security-trade/">bilateral agreement with Japan</a>, the most important of the prospective TPP member states apart from Canada and Mexico, both of which are already in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). </p>
<p>Even so, the strategic fallout from America’s rejection of TPP is likely to be significant. It sends a signal to countries in the region that the U.S. is unwilling to act as a buffer against the economic power of a <a href="https://theconversation.com/china-will-be-the-winner-if-us-backs-out-of-the-tpp-63328">rising China</a>, quite an ironic message from a president so enamored with <a href="https://www.thestreet.com/story/13953199/1/cramer-trump-s-anti-china-rhetoric-puts-qualcomm-nxpi-deal-at-risk.html">anti-Beijing rhetoric</a>. It also needlessly sacrifices a potentially useful bargaining chip in future negotiations with China. </p>
<p>Second, President Trump threatened to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/26/trump-calls-for-20-tax-on-mexican-imports-to-pay-for-border-wall">slap a 20 percent tariff</a> on Mexico, and possibly on other countries that run a large trade surplus with the United States. This threat, along with others made by Trump’s closest advisers, calls into the question the future of NAFTA, which has ensured open borders in North America for more than 20 years. Trump, for his part, <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/22/politics/trump-renegotiate-nafta/">has promised to renegotiate the trade deal</a> or even pull the U.S. out of it. </p>
<p>While President Trump cannot permanently raise tariffs without congressional approval, he may be able to <a href="http://money.cnn.com/2017/01/23/news/economy/trump-tariff-power/">do so temporarily</a>. In the event that he does, Mexico and other countries will certainly retaliate. The resulting trade war could deny America access to foreign markets in a way that we haven’t seen since the end of World War II.</p>
<p>Third, the new administration backed a Republican proposal in Congress that would incorporate “<a href="http://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/trump-declares-partnership-with-hill-gop-embraces-tax-proposal">border adjustment</a>” into a broader reform of corporate income taxes. This proposal, while less troubling than the two actions above, could have even longer-term consequences. </p>
<p>To improve the trade balance, the tax reform would allow U.S. companies to write off the value of their exports but would also require them to pay taxes on the inputs that they import. The problem is that this tax reform would likely violate America’s <a href="http://www.politico.com/story/2016/12/republican-tax-reform-trade-war-232251">WTO commitments</a>, inviting in the process legal action and retaliation.</p>
<p>Moreover, the president’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/28/us/politics/annotating-trump-immigration-refugee-order.html">new executive order</a> on immigration can also be seen as a symptom of “America first” thinking. It exchanges the talents of foreign workers, the goodwill of the Muslim world and the American tradition of nondiscrimination for the elusive promise of increased security. The gains, if any, will be small and temporary, while the <a href="http://www.cnbc.com/2017/01/30/trump-immigration-ban-could-have-catastrophic-impact-on-us-commentary.html">costs will be much larger</a> and more enduring.</p>
<h2>America first puts America last</h2>
<p>To see what is wrong with Trump’s “America first” economic policy, we need to return to the basics. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://modeledbehavior.com/2010/08/24/consensu-among-economists/">overwhelming majority of economists</a> agree that prosperity requires countries to specialize in what they are good at producing, rather than trying to make and consume everything domestically. And the only way that specialization can work is if countries <a href="https://www.amazon.com/International-Economics-Theory-Policy-Pearson/dp/0133423646/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1485552719&sr=8-1&keywords=krugman+and+obstfeld">trade with one another</a> and also allow a degree of capital and even labor mobility. </p>
<p>Since an open international system requires mutual consent, it also demands that the world’s most powerful country think beyond the moment and make temporary sacrifices to preserve the structure of economic relations that has benefited it so much in the past. And it demands that that country encourage others to remain open, use its foreign aid and internal market to promote development abroad and lead with its ideas. </p>
<p>In this sense, the old internationalism of “enlightened self-interest” is the only real way to put America first. </p>
<p>If the United States reverts to protectionism and isolationism, Trump may find satisfaction in punishing China for its exchange rate policy or in preventing some factories from moving to Mexico. </p>
<p>But the loss of American commitment to economic internationalism will probably signal the demise of the postwar system, a system that may be imperfect but that has brought prosperity and peace to millions. And if that happens, the first victim will be the United States itself.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/71931/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Charles Hankla does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Trump’s ‘America first’ rhetoric implies that the internationalism and ‘enlightened self-interest’ that built the postwar order was a big mistake. The evidence and basic economics disagree.Charles Hankla, Associate Professor of Political Science, Georgia State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/718452017-01-24T16:53:50Z2017-01-24T16:53:50ZTrump, trade and the TPP: Seven essential reads<p><em>Editor’s note: The following is a roundup of archival stories.</em></p>
<p>Donald Trump made his antipathy to current U.S. trade deals a key part of his campaign and launched his presidency by beginning to rip them up. </p>
<p>He said he plans to <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-nafta-timing-idUSKBN1572NL">renegotiate</a> the 23-year-old North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) – “at the appropriate time” – and on Jan. 23 <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/01/23/president-trump-signs-order-to-withdraw-from-transpacific-partnership/?utm_term=.2d09841eb7c1">formally pulled the U.S.</a> out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-01-23/trump-said-to-meet-with-dow-ceo-liveris-labor-leaders-on-monday">Trump also warned</a> he would impose a “very major border tax” on U.S. companies that ship jobs overseas. </p>
<p>What does all this mean? We plumbed our archive to offer some context on the complex topic of trade. </p>
<h2>TPP primer</h2>
<p>When people argue about trade deals, for and against, the reasons tend to be economic or about the threat to someone’s job. Marina v. N. Whitman, a professor of business administration and public policy at the University of Michigan, <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-tpps-demise-threatens-us-national-security-and-pax-americana-67514">argues the stakes are even higher</a>. The U.S. decision to exit the TPP weakens national security and even threatens the “Pax Americana” that helped maintain global stability since World War II, she writes. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“At stake is a principle much broader than the struggle between China and the United States for the ‘soft power’ inherent in the competition over trade agreements… A U.S. failure to authorize the TPP could be the coup de grâce for the Pax Americana.” </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Rachel Rothschild, who researches the history of environmental science and diplomacy at NYU, sees it differently, arguing the TPP has too many “glaring deficiencies.” It also <a href="https://theconversation.com/heres-a-problem-with-the-tpp-that-hillary-clinton-ignores-at-her-peril-62818">departs from a half-century of progress</a> tying environment and human rights to major diplomatic agreements on nuclear weapons and Soviet influence. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“We are facing the rise of another political and economic power with strikingly different values than our own, including support for democracy, the free market and environmental protections. The possibility that other countries could follow China’s example would hinder U.S. attempts to promote basic rights around the world, similar to the issue of containing Soviet communism at the outset of the Cold War.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>As for the economic issues, Greg Wright of the University of California, Merced, and Emily Blanchard of Dartmouth <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-trump-right-that-the-tpp-will-destroy-millions-of-jobs-and-cede-us-sovereignty-62085">examined the evidence behind claims</a> that the TPP would lead to millions of job losses. The truth is more complex.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“The simple truth is that trade agreements change the composition of jobs in the economy. Some workers will be happier with their new jobs, and others will not. Whatever the job losses from the TPP, a roughly equal number will be created.”</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Helping the losers of trade</h2>
<p>Whether or not past trade deals have on balance created more jobs than they’ve lost, the focus lately has been on those who feel left behind and whether we’ve done enough to soften the blow. We haven’t, writes Michigan’s Whitman. That’s why the program designed to help them, often dubbed “burial insurance,” <a href="https://theconversation.com/want-to-help-free-trades-losers-make-adjustment-assistance-more-than-just-burial-insurance-67036">needs significant reform</a>. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Studies suggest that the American labor market is not as fluid and flexible as we thought. Job losers were not able to find new ones as quickly as expected nor command the same level of wages when they did. This finding is consistent with other research indicating that the in-country mobility of blue-collar American workers has been falling.”</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Lessons from NAFTA</h2>
<p>Trump and others say NAFTA is the root of the problem. While it’s unclear when the president will begin renegotiating that massive trade agreement, Harley Shaiken of the University of California, Berkeley, explains <a href="https://theconversation.com/annals-of-free-trade-will-tpp-learn-from-our-nafta-past-or-are-we-condemned-to-repeat-it-42005">what we can learn from it</a>. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“By strengthening investment protection and largely ignoring worker protections, real wages in Mexican manufacturing continued to slide in the wake of NAFTA, declining almost 20 percent from 1994 to 2011 while productivity grew almost 80 percent. This loss for Mexican workers also contributed to a sharp downward pressure on manufacturing wages in the U.S.”</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Free trade in peril</h2>
<p>With the TPP and other international trade agreements in trouble and a protectionist American president in power, globalization and free trade seem to be in peril. But <a href="https://theconversation.com/does-tpps-slow-death-mean-the-world-is-now-unsafe-for-trade-deals-64577">it’s still important to fight for them</a>, writes Charles Hankla of Georgia State University.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“The rejection of these important agreements could risk becoming merely the first step in a gradual erosion of support for the global economic architecture. This architecture, so carefully created and maintained by the United States after 1945, has contributed mightily to international prosperity and peace. Maintaining it is of critical importance.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Could Trump’s protectionist policies lead to a trade war? Marc-William Palen, a trade historian at the University of Exeter, reminds us of a few – and their <a href="https://theconversation.com/do-protectionist-policies-like-trumps-lead-to-trade-wars-56532">painful consequences</a>. One example:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“When the Republicans passed the even more protectionist Dingley Tariff in 1897, Canada decided that the best response was a double dose of tariff retaliation and closer trade ties with the British Empire rather than the United States. It took nearly a century after this for free trade between the U.S. and Canada to develop.”</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/71845/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Trump formally pulled out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and signaled his intention to begin renegotiating NAFTA. Here’s some context.Bryan Keogh, Managing EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/707172016-12-21T16:31:56Z2016-12-21T16:31:56ZAnthill 8: Goodbye 2016, hello 2017<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/151265/original/image-20161221-4085-7yn44z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Happy new year.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In what has been a year of political turmoil, violence and vitriol, The Conversation’s contributors have sought to explain the reasons behind and the consequences of key events. </p>
<p>From the victory of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/eu-referendum-2016">Brexit</a> campaign that now sees the UK preparing to start negotiations on leaving the European Union, to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/2016-us-presidential-election-23653">election of Donald Trump</a> as US president, it has been a <a href="https://theconversation.com/eu-referendum-how-the-polls-got-it-wrong-again-61639">sobering year for pollsters</a>, and for those whose preferred political currency is <a href="https://theconversation.com/sorry-michael-gove-we-really-do-need-experts-heres-why-62000">hard facts</a>. </p>
<p>But 2017 could see even more shocks to the political establishment, particularly in Europe where key elections are scheduled in both <a href="https://theconversation.com/french-election-2017-meet-the-candidates-69436">France</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/merkels-party-slumps-in-berlin-election-but-dont-count-her-out-for-2017-65639">Germany</a>.</p>
<p>In this year’s final <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/podcasts/the-anthill">The Anthill podcast</a>, we’re saying goodbye to 2016 and looking ahead to some of the economic and political trends that will influence our lives over the next 12 months. </p>
<p>First, we take a critical look at <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/globalisation-30443">globalisation</a>. Many of 2016’s upheavals have been a backlash against the world’s economic system, which has clearly benefited some more than others. Kingston University economist Steve Keen explains how many of the people who voted for Trump and Brexit have been left worse off by what is dubbed globalisation. </p>
<p>We also ask him what this heralds for 2017 and beyond. And we discuss the future of trade deals with University of Bath international trade expert Maria Garcia. She points out the important difference between rhetoric and reality when it comes to what we can expect from Trump and European leaders. </p>
<p>In the second part of this episode, we’ve pulled together a panel of experts to discuss the big political events to come in 2017 – and help figure out how both our leaders and we as citizens can try to make it a better year than 2016.</p>
<p>Reader in European politics at the University of Westminster, Patricia Hogwood, looks ahead at the challenges facing the European Union, while Andy Price, head of politics at Sheffield Hallam University, mulls over how best to approach the next steps of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/brexit-negotiations-29088">Brexit negotiations</a>. And journalism professor at City University of London, Jane Singer, helps us, as consumers of media, work out how to better hold our leaders to account in 2017. </p>
<p>Thanks for listening. </p>
<p><em>The Anthill theme music is by Alex Grey for Melody Loops. A big thank you to City University London’s Department of Journalism for the use of their studios.</em></p>
<p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/podcasts/the-anthill">Click here</a> to listen again to any of the episodes of The Anthill on themes from <a href="https://theconversation.com/anthill-7-on-belief-69448">belief</a>, to <a href="https://theconversation.com/anthill-3-rooting-for-the-underdog-62368">underdogs</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/anthill-4-fuel-64021">fuel</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/anthill-6-into-the-darkness-67267">darkness</a>, or subscribe wherever you get your podcasts from.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/70717/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Where do we go from here? After a dramatic year, we look ahead to some key economic and political trends that will influence our lives over the next 12 months.Laura Hood, Senior Politics Editor, Assistant Editor, The Conversation (UK edition)Annabel Bligh, Business & Economy Editor and Podcast Producer, The Conversation UKGemma Ware, Head of AudioLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/704512016-12-15T12:29:39Z2016-12-15T12:29:39ZHow Eastern Europe is best placed to hit the ground running after a hard Brexit<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/150296/original/image-20161215-13648-n8po5a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>One of the biggest unknowns when it comes to Brexit is how it will effect the rights of EU citizens and businesses based in the UK. Many fear that a hard Brexit will result in a legal <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/11/21/theresa-may-cbi-corporation-tax-brexit-live/">cliff-edge</a>, leaving many without the legal protections of the European Union – whether it’s remaining resident or having free access to the single market.</p>
<p>Who’s in control of the Brexit process – <a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-in-the-supreme-court-heres-what-it-all-means-69738">whether it’s government or parliament</a> – and <a href="https://theconversation.com/never-mind-article-50-heres-why-article-127-could-be-crucial-to-keeping-britain-in-the-single-market-70304">whether it will be “hard” or “soft”</a> are therefore questions that increasingly are the subjects of legal battles. </p>
<p>And when it comes to the intricacies of international law, there are other deals at play that could leave some unexpected EU member state nationals (and businesses) in a better position than others in the event of a hard Brexit. There are a few Eastern European countries, in particular, which have <a href="http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/221#iiaInnerMenu">treaties with the UK</a> that were signed after the fall of communism, but before their accession to the EU. </p>
<p>This means that nationals from Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and other European states from the Baltics to the Balkans are protected by deals that are separate from their EU membership. They will therefore have greater rights in the event of a hard Brexit than those from, say, France or Germany – something that may come as a surprise to many a Leave voter, whose stance on the EU was motivated by <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-huge-political-cost-of-blairs-decision-to-allow-eastern-european-migrants-unfettered-access-to-britain-66077">concerns about immigration</a> from Eastern Europe.</p>
<h2>Treaties already in place</h2>
<p>The agreements in question are known as Bilateral Investment Treaties. Ironically, they operate under the same logic of national sovereignty and independence in trade and investment matters that the Leave campaign was partially based upon. </p>
<p>While the EU has exclusive <a href="https://www.iisd.org/itn/2016/08/10/can-eu-member-states-still-negotiate-bits-with-third-countries-stefanie-schacherer/">rights</a> in these areas now, these old treaties are still in operation. They have created a series of problems for nations which concurrently need to satisfy expectations arising from EU and international law. </p>
<p>Greece, for example, has been the victim of this, being <a href="http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2015/10/20/digging-up-the-past-can-greece-handle-another-psi-challenge/">repeatedly sued</a> in investment tribunals in recent years by those who suffered losses in the country’s debt relief arrangements. The claimants in these cases have been EU nationals trying to enforce rights arising from BITs, and not EU law.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/150306/original/image-20161215-26045-3hknm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/150306/original/image-20161215-26045-3hknm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/150306/original/image-20161215-26045-3hknm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/150306/original/image-20161215-26045-3hknm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/150306/original/image-20161215-26045-3hknm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/150306/original/image-20161215-26045-3hknm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/150306/original/image-20161215-26045-3hknm3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The law’s the law.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">shutterstock.com</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>These treaties offer rights, protections and standards to investors that are in some ways superior to those enjoyed under EU law. And these rights will survive Brexit. <a href="http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2218">Romania’s BIT with the UK</a> is an example of the types of rights treaties give. Signed in the summer of 1995, it promises to create favourable conditions for investment, reciprocally. </p>
<p>These conditions include the fair and equitable treatment of Romanian businesses investing in the UK, freedom from discrimination, full protection and security. Crucially, the treaty guarantees treatment of Romanian investors that is no less favourable than that afforded to UK nationals. This is enhanced by a commitment to match potential superior treatment offered to any other nation’s investors. </p>
<p>Not only, therefore, are Romanian investors to be treated equally to domestic ones, but if anyone else obtains a better deal (for example, the US when it agrees its post-Brexit deal), their protections will increase. Those who fall within the treaty definition of “investor” therefore enjoy a lasting privileged position.</p>
<h2>Domino effect</h2>
<p>To top it all, any dispute between an investor and the host government is not a matter for domestic courts, but is destined for an international investment tribunal. These are the same tribunals that <a href="http://jids.oxfordjournals.org/content/5/3/475">Greece and Argentina</a> have faced, battling claims for compensation by investors who lost out from the countries’ debt defaults. And these are the same tribunals that some Leave campaigners vowed to protect Britain from, by promising that Brexit would <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-ttip-will-live-on-but-not-for-the-eu-61718">save the country from the TTIP trade deal</a>. </p>
<p>The presence and nature of investor-state dispute settlement clauses – whereby businesses can sue governments – in post-Brexit trade agreements is likely to be a major issue for British negotiators in the years to come. As the recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/ceta-was-brexit-rather-than-the-walloons-behind-trade-deal-stutter-67800">debacle over the CETA trade deal between the EU and Canada</a>, and resistance to TTIP demonstrate, ceding authority to private arbitration panels to adjudicate disputes is not easy to square with protestations of sovereignty and democratic legitimacy.</p>
<p>A hard-Brexit is the dream of many on the Leave side of the referendum. It allows them to imagine a situation where the UK, free from any encumbrances, launches into a world of free trade and investment deals. </p>
<p>Such a world, however, is likely to see Eastern European companies given better treatment than major commercial partners in the West, a swap of the supposed dominion of European Courts for that of investment tribunals, and a labyrinth of interlocking agreements that rapidly raise protections for foreign companies above those available to local ones. An interesting prize for leaving the EU indeed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/70451/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ioannis Glinavos does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Britain has a number of bilateral treaties with Eastern European countries that will remain after Brexit.Ioannis Glinavos, Senior Lecturer in Law, University of WestminsterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/686922016-11-14T12:05:30Z2016-11-14T12:05:30ZWhat Trump means for US trade and globalisation<p>Trade was one of the cornerstones of Donald Trump’s campaign for the US presidency. And, as observers across the board scurry to make sense of what a Trump presidency will actually look like, it is likely to be an area of US foreign policy that will receive significant attention from the president-elect in the next four years.</p>
<p>Trump promised a <a href="https://www.donaldjtrump.com/policies/trade/">radical trade agenda</a>. He vowed to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade deal, which has not yet been ratified, and renegotiate the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) – America’s trade deal with Canada and Mexico – “to protect US workers”. He pledged to aggressively challenge countries that violate international trade agreements and, in particular, bring cases against China for using unfair subsidies and currency manipulation.</p>
<p>In many ways, Trump’s tough stance is not too dissimilar to that adopted by the likes of Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton during <a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/news/canadian-nafta-remarks-rile-obama-campaign/">their own presidential campaigns</a>. Trade bashing is, in fact, a fairly well-established practice among US presidential candidates. </p>
<p>The difference this time, though, is that Trump may be a president who is actually willing to deliver on this rhetoric. Not necessarily because he actually opposes free trade, but because, unlike many promises made during his campaign, those relating to trade policy could be achieved with relative ease. </p>
<p>While <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-difficult-would-it-be-to-repeal-obamacare-for-good-55544">repealing Obamacare</a> or <a href="http://www.climatechangenews.com/2016/11/09/the-paris-agreement-will-survive-president-trump/">withdrawing from the Paris Climate Change Treaty</a> would be politically contentious and involve lengthy and complex legislative processes, most of Trump’s trade policy proposals <a href="http://nationalinterest.org/feature/donald-trump-vs-hillary-clinton-the-trade-policy-paradox-18243?utm_content=buffera42c6&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer">are bureaucratic in nature</a>. With the exception of the renegotiation of NAFTA (which requires an agreement with Mexico and Canada), Trump’s trade policy is perfectly feasible.</p>
<p>By far the most significant commitment would be a rejection of the TPP. The TPP, a free trade agreement which encompasses most Pacific Rim economies (but excludes China), ranks among an emerging group of large, regional trade agreements that are significant not just in terms of the size of the economies they represent, but also in terms of their geopolitical and economic importance. As well as TPP, these include the EU-US <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/ttip-12692">Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership</a>, or TTIP, and the China-backed Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which would include ASEAN economies and India (but not the US). </p>
<p>These big regional trade agreements were designed by the US as tools to reassert US leadership in global economic governance by countering the growing influence of China and promoting US “<a href="https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2016/february/ambassador-froman-gives-remarks">rules of the road</a>” on trade.</p>
<h2>A no-brainer</h2>
<p>Despite this, doing away with TPP would be a no-brainer for Trump. It would be fairly easy to achieve; the Obama administration has already confirmed that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/nov/12/tpp-trade-deal-congress-obama">it won’t seek to push the agreement in the lame-duck session</a> and, for Trump, once sworn in, it would simply be a matter of not putting it to a vote before Congress. Most importantly, it would also be a hugely and immediately <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/2016-08-31-us-election-note-trade-sapiro.pdf">popular move domestically</a>. </p>
<p>Free trade – and the free trade agreements which promote it – have become politically toxic in Western liberal democracies. In the US, globalisation and free trade are blamed for job losses in the manufacturing sector and wage depression more generally. As a result, Trump had huge support in Rust Belt states, where (mostly white) blue-collar workers are a key constituent and <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/11/trumps-road-to-victory/507203/">tipped the balance of votes in his favour</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/145783/original/image-20161114-5105-133xj0p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/145783/original/image-20161114-5105-133xj0p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=344&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145783/original/image-20161114-5105-133xj0p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=344&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145783/original/image-20161114-5105-133xj0p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=344&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145783/original/image-20161114-5105-133xj0p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145783/original/image-20161114-5105-133xj0p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145783/original/image-20161114-5105-133xj0p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Trump won Rust Belt states like Ohio.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/140641142@N05/29525445392/in/photolist-LZ4Cgj-KvduPd-KeAB87-KkZ9yY-Jrr8Sv-Jrr8q8-KdAtyA-KdAtuY-KjZVuf-Jrr8oe-KdAtp7-Jrr8k8-KdAtdf-Jrr8jB-Jrr8gv-KiVa2b-KiV9RG-KeQvCF-KiV9wJ-KiV9sA-KiV9mJ-KiV9bo-KiV8WL-KiV8NQ-JqhSsq-KiV8Ed-KiV8ob-JqhSgU-JqhS8Y-KiV7Td-JqhRVU-JqhRK3-Jq3wjY-Jq3wdA-Jq3w6S-Jq61f2-Jq3w2o-Jq5Ye8-KiEGbq-Jq5Y5v-KiEG6f-Jq5XCt-KdSnVZ-Joby1E-JocYeM-KjDAea-JocPX6-KcFS3Z-KgLEts-KjCLwM">dankeck/flickr</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The assumption that putting an end to free trade will restore manufacturing jobs to these parts of America is <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/08/03/donald-trumps-big-lie-about-the-global-economy/">to a large degree incorrect</a>. But the presidential candidates did nothing to dispel them. To do so would be tantamount to electoral suicide. </p>
<p>And this phenomenon is not unique to the US. It can also be found in Europe, where there is <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-ttip-trade-deal-is-lost-at-sea-60132">mounting opposition to TTIP</a>, but also the EU’s recent struggles to get its member states <a href="https://theconversation.com/who-are-the-walloons-and-why-are-they-blocking-europes-free-trade-deal-with-canada-67718">to sign off on CETA</a>, the EU-Canada trade deal.</p>
<h2>Reforming the fundamentals?</h2>
<p>Opposition to trade agreements is not just a by-product of the populism that now pervades politics in the US and Europe and feeds off anti-globalist sentiment. It also taps into legitimate concerns about the continued relevance of free trade and the idea of an international trading system exclusively designed to promote economic liberalism – that is, to remove government constraints on economic operators and markets. Ironically, it is the US that has been one of economic liberalism’s biggest proponents since World War II. </p>
<p>But not everyone has evenly benefited from free trade and economic liberalisation. And so there are growing calls to manage the effects of globalisation. Some have called for the development of policies which would <a href="http://rodrik.typepad.com/dani_rodriks_weblog/2007/10/what-would-a--1.html">redistribute its costs</a> by re-investing in areas which have lost out from globalisation. Others have advocated a shift in emphasis of trade agreements away from economic liberalisation <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/whats-behind-the-revolt-against-global-integration/2016/04/10/b4c09cb6-fdbb-11e5-80e4-c381214de1a3_story.html">and towards issues such as labour and environmental protection</a>. </p>
<p>Of course, Trump does not propose to go that far. There is no sign of reforming the fundamentals of the international trading regime. Trump’s promise is far more basic. It is one based on a retreat from free trade with, perhaps, a dash of old-fashioned economic isolationism. That being so, Trump discarding the TPP in the short to medium-term is a fairly safe bet.</p>
<p>The irony is inescapable. The TPP was designed by the US specifically to counteract its waning influence in Asia and combat the rise of China. The TTIP was espoused as an essential tool to consolidate trade rules that reflect the US’s interests and values. And yet the likelihood is that both agreements may eventually be destroyed by a president whose entire sales pitch has been based on reasserting the US’s greatness on the global stage. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, China – which only decided to pursue its own big regional trade agreements as a response to the TPP – <a href="http://www.bilaterals.org/?china-led-asia-pacific-trade-deal">is on the verge of finalising its RECP</a> pan-Asia-Pacific trade deal. This would represent around 40% of global GDP and would not only firmly cement its position of leadership in the region, but also strengthen its role as a rule-maker in the global trading system.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/68692/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Billy Melo Araujo receives funding from British Academy.</span></em></p>Trade bashing is a well-established practice among US presidential candidates. The difference with Trump is that he may actually deliver on his rhetoric.Billy Melo Araujo, Lecturer - EU and International Economic law, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/685712016-11-10T02:56:52Z2016-11-10T02:56:52ZTrump can kill trade deals but he can’t kill globalisation<p>2016 will go down as a watershed year for all the wrong reasons: Britain’s EU exit faces strong opposition; Syria remains plunged in civil war; and in the wake of the US election politics in the two major Anglosphere democracies are now deeply polarised. </p>
<p>In Britain and the US, the majority of voters have embraced candidates and movements that eschew globalisation, immigration and free markets. Instead, they preach nationalism, closed borders and protectionism.</p>
<p>But it is hyperbolic to suggest that the post-2008 financial crisis era is beginning to look very much like the 1930s in the wake of the Wall Street crash. This is not a clash between fascism, communism and democracy. But what the Brexit and US presidential votes do show is that modern democracies have proven incapable of dealing adequately with income inequality, unemployment and declining opportunity.</p>
<p>With Trump as president, US policy is likely to become more unpredictable, but the business of government and policy implementation must go on nevertheless. </p>
<p>Despite Republican majorities in Congress, Trump will not be able to treat the legislature as a mere rubber stamp. In the US system, Congress holds the whip hand. Moreover, Trump is at war with so many senior Republicans, he is unlikely to enjoy a smooth ride. Where congressional Republicans and Trump do agree is that tax cuts are needed.</p>
<h2>Unchartered waters</h2>
<p>In this respect, we are really navigating unknown waters as to how Trump will behave in office as president. Trump has no public sector background. He will be the first US president to enter the office without any gubernatorial or congressional experience, or any previous role in an administration. </p>
<p>Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush served as state governors; John F. Kennedy and Barack Obama were junior senators (Obama also served as a state senator from 1996); George H.W. Bush served in multiple roles, including the vice presidency. In the post-war period, only Eisenhower comes close to Trump as a political cleanskin. But Eisenhower had a substantial military career, a reputation as a war hero, and had been a key adviser to both the military and the Department of Defense before and after World War II.</p>
<p>Trump’s victory has been built on his image as a Washington outsider. But his isolationist, nationalist and protectionist policies are not new; the first US Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, was an unabashed protectionist, viewing American infant industries as central to the US’s commercial rivalry with industrial Britain. </p>
<p>On defence and trade policy, Trump is close to many of the positions articulated by the America First movement in the 1930s and 1940s. Substantial figures, such as Charles Lindbergh and future president Gerald Ford, sought to keep America out of the second world war. But once Washington entered the war, it did not make the same mistake it made after Versailles in 1919; instead, the US became a global economic and military superpower, eschewing the isolationism of 1920–41.</p>
<p>As a self-declared neo-isolationist, one of the keys to Trump’s victory was his denunciation of the free-trade orthodoxy that has dominated Washington’s economic agenda since the Bretton Woods conference of 1944, which created the IMF, World Bank and, later, the GATT, the predecessor to the World Trade Organisation.</p>
<p>Let’s take a look at the state of play of the US’s current and mooted free trade negotiations. We’ll also briefly canvass how President Trump is likely to deal with Janet Yellen and the Federal Reserve.</p>
<h2>The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)</h2>
<p>The TPP was initiated under George W. Bush’s administration, but President Obama pushed the 12-member bloc, obtaining fast-track trade promotion authority from Congress in June 2015. This allowed him to press forward with the finalisation of the agreement, which was released in October 2015. However, Trump’s opposition to TPP, along with Hillary Clinton’s second thoughts about her support for it means the deal is unlikely to pushed through during Obama’s final weeks in office.</p>
<p>In November 2015, Trump declared TPP “insanity”. Trump’s anti-TPP campaign demonstrated how he and the Tea Partyists had so convincingly vanquished the traditionally pro free trade Republican Party. By July this year, <a href="http://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/republican-platform-panel-tpp-225364">Republicans began to erase all trace of TPP support</a> from their websites. By September, staunch TPP supporters <a href="http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/09/pro-trade-republicans-switch-sides-in-tpp-fight.html">Marco Rubio and Pat Toomey performed a volte-face</a>; having praised the TPP, now they sought to bury it. Both Obama and Hillary Clinton were depending on the pro-TPP Republicans to get the pact through Congress.</p>
<p><strong>Verdict:</strong> Dead in the water. Many Australians will applaud Trump for killing the TPP, as it was <a href="https://theconversation.com/ratifying-the-tpp-may-be-tough-but-australia-needs-it-48663">far from popular</a>.</p>
<h2>The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)</h2>
<p>NAFTA was a product of the Reagan-Bush years, building on its 1998 predecessor, the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUSTA). George H.W. Bush’s administration did most of the heavy lifting, but Bill Clinton pushed NAFTA through Congress in 1993, expending considerable political capital as he faced off against the unions, the Democrats’ biggest supporters.</p>
<p>Trump has labelled NAFTA “the worst trade deal ever”. True, NAFTA may have destroyed 879,000 US jobs, <a href="http://www.epi.org/publication/briefingpapers_bp147/">according to one study</a>. But it also provided a low cost labour base for both the US and Canada, as they strove to compete with Asian manufacturing and the EU’s newly opened eastern periphery.</p>
<p><strong>Verdict:</strong> No happily ever NAFTA. Likely to stay, but regulatory changes will be made.</p>
<h2>The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)</h2>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-the-transatlantic-trade-and-investment-partnership-37258">TTIP</a> may be dead already, mostly due to the fact that it’s as popular as Hillary Clinton. It is in Europe that TTIP has found its strongest opponents, with <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-usa-ttip-idUSKCN11N0H6">thousands protesting</a> against it.</p>
<p>Clinton, Sanders and Trump’s position against TTIP coalesced early, as it was clear it was a vote loser within all three candidates’ voter bases. In a pitch to Sanders supporters, Clinton declared <a href="http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/699362/TTIP-European-Union-crisis-Hillary-Clinton-EU-US-trade-deal-CETA-President-Donald-Trump">she would quash any deal that hurt American jobs</a>. </p>
<p>Clinton’s opposition to free trade deals demonstrated how decisive both the Sanders and Trump campaigns had been in shaping the narrative of the anti-free trade debate. Equally, the union base of the Democratic Party had always opposed FTAs. Had Clinton won the election, it is likely she would have attempted to revive TTIP during her tenure, as both the EU and US had pushed for a transatlantic FTA in some form since 1990.</p>
<p><strong>Verdict:</strong> This is an <a href="http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/64604-this-parrot-is-no-more-it-has-ceased-to-be">ex-parrot.</a></p>
<h2>A UK-US free trade deal?</h2>
<p>President Obama infamously intervened in the UK Brexit debate earlier this year, declaring Britain would go “to the back of the queue” if it left the EU and sought a FTA with the US. Theresa May, Boris Johnson and Liam Fox will be hoping that President-elect Trump will welcome a special free trade relationship.</p>
<p>During the campaign, Trump advisers indicated that he would be willing to discuss a FTA with the UK. Indeed, Trump <a href="http://www.politico.com/story/2016/06/brexit-us-britain-trade-deal-224776">stated</a> that Britain would “always be at the front of the line” when it came to trade deals. This would be critical to Brexit Britain; the US is the UK’s largest third-country market, with more than £30 billion in exports.</p>
<p>But the UK also enjoys a trade surplus in goods and services with the US, and Trump’s administration is unlikely to grant substantial concessions to an ally that already makes substantial hay from its existing tariff arrangements.</p>
<p>In other words, why would President Trump do a deal that gives UK firms more access to the US market?</p>
<p><strong>Verdict:</strong> Boris needs to grab that American passport of his, head for Washington and start speed-dating. Soon.</p>
<h2>Audit the Fed!</h2>
<p>What future for Janet Yellen, Federal Reserve Chair? The Donald has expressed his dislike of the Federal Reserve chair on more than one occasion.</p>
<p>In September 2016, Trump took aim at Yellen’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-a-world-of-low-rates-what-else-can-the-rba-and-central-banks-do-61981">near zero interest-rate policy</a>, arguing it existed <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-27/trump-slams-yellen-s-fed-again-this-time-on-a-much-bigger-stage">only to make Obama look good</a>. Janet Yellen wasn’t about to take this lying down. In a press conference, <a href="http://fortune.com/2016/09/21/janet-yellen-fires-back-at-donald-trumps-attacks/">she responded – implicitly</a> – to Trump, arguing that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“I can say emphatically that partisan politics plays no role in our decisions…We do not discuss politics at our meetings.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It’s unknown whether Trump would seriously attempt to remove Yellen. But in May this year, <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-says-he-would-replace-janet-yellen-supports-low-interest-rates-1462465158">he did state</a> that he would “most likely” replace her as she was “not a Republican”. In September, Trump’s position hardened; he said <a href="http://money.cnn.com/2016/09/21/news/economy/janet-yellen-donald-trump/">he would audit the Fed and replace Yellen</a> in the first 100 days of his administration.</p>
<p>There are precedents; in 1981, US Treasury Secretary Donald Regan <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/1982/10/24/magazine/reaganomics-and-the-presidents-men.html?pagewanted=all">began to brow-beat Fed Chair Paul Volcker</a> for maintaining his tight monetary policies as the Reagan administration sought to introduce wide ranging tax cuts. Despite Reagan’s early support for Volcker (a Carter appointee), by 1987, the President had had enough; he ended Volcker’s tenure, bringing in Alan Greenspan.</p>
<p><strong>Verdict:</strong> Anyone looking for a central bank chief? Used for one term only. Low, low interest rates.</p>
<h2>Another brick in the wall</h2>
<p>Trump’s triumph is partly built upon faulty and drastically over-simplified conceptualisations of the operation of the US and the global economy. Corporations, banks, finance and even consumers are no longer “national” entities. They have not been for many years. Manufacturing and services are not local but global. This complex web of interdependence has manifested itself over many decades.</p>
<p>Globalisation has even brought jobs back to America; but in the post-GFC environment, this has produced US jobs that, <a href="http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-income-inequality-20140812-story.html">on average, pay 23% lower</a> than they did prior to 2008.</p>
<p>Mexican walls, Chinese trade negotiations and bans on Muslims: if Trump were to implement some of these initiatives it may have some impact upon people movements. But low-tech manufacturing jobs en masse are not coming back to America. The US used to build vast numbers of radios and TVs; these have not been made in America for a long, long time. Similarly, Apple is not about to repatriate iPhone production and establish manufacturing onshore. And US corporations are not about to stop doing business with the rest of the world.</p>
<p>This is the brutal reality that Trump cannot smash, but his supporters appear to believe he can. He is wrong and they are wrong. And they will be bitterly disappointed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/68571/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Remy Davison's Chair is funded by the EU Commission.</span></em></p>Many of the US’s current and mooted free trade negotiations are now dead in the water, but that doesn’t mean it’s game over for free trade.Remy Davison, Jean Monnet Chair in Politics and Economics, Monash UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/670362016-10-25T02:32:51Z2016-10-25T02:32:51ZWant to help free trade’s losers? Make ‘adjustment assistance’ more than just burial insurance<p>If there’s one thing that <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/04/4-politically-controversial-issues-where-all-economists-agree/255600">nearly all economists agree on</a>, it’s that getting rid of trade restrictions is generally good for a country’s economy. </p>
<p>Doing so leads to a <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/cea_trade_report_final_non-embargoed_v2.pdf">higher national income</a>, faster economic growth, higher productivity and more competition and innovation. Freer trade also tends to lower prices and improve the quality of the goods that are particularly important in the budgets of poorer families.</p>
<p>But you certainly wouldn’t know it from the current political landscape. Hillary Clinton <a href="http://www.ontheissues.org/2016/Hillary_Clinton_Free_Trade.htm">has repudiated</a> the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) she once hailed as the gold standard of trade deals. Donald Trump <a href="http://money.cnn.com/2016/07/06/news/economy/trump-nafta">would go much further</a> and not only tear up the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) but <a href="http://fortune.com/2016/07/25/donald-trump-free-trade-wto/">consider withdrawing</a> from the World Trade Organization (WTO) as well.</p>
<p>So what has made free trade – which still <a href="http://www.voanews.com/a/survey-americans-largely-support-free-trade/3499026.html">gets the support</a> of most Americans – such a political pariah?</p>
<p>A major explanation is that there are losers as well as winners from its effects. The winners may be far more numerous, yet the impact on the losers, from lost jobs and lower wages, is more intense and personal.</p>
<p>I’ve been a steady and vocal proponent of the view that freer trade’s benefits far outweigh its costs. When the former president of the United Auto Workers, Owen Bieber, called me “that free-trade bitch at GM” in the early 1990s, I <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=lryyypm3mRAC&pg=PA236&lpg=PA236&dq=that+free-trade+bitch+at+GM&source=bl&ots=n7842le-NS&sig=hSGCdNVf0AFOsfy6WAyTx2jChxM&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj93466zuLPAhVKaT4KHXVKA6oQ6AEIHjAA#v=onepage&q=that%20free-trade%20bitch%20at%20GM&f=false">took it</a> as a compliment. While I still believe the research (mine included) supports lowering restrictions on trade, we haven’t called enough attention to the “losers,” partly because we underestimated how much they’d be hurt.</p>
<h2>Where liberalizing trade went wrong</h2>
<p>Both Trump and Bernie Sanders <a href="http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/manufacturing-jobs-are-never-coming-back/">have made opposition to freer trade</a> key to their platforms, often citing the loss of over 4.5 million manufacturing jobs since 1994.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.ddorn.net/papers/Autor-Dorn-Hanson-ChinaShock.pdf">Recent research</a> indicates that China’s unforeseen emergence in the 1990s as a global competitor in the world markets can be blamed for at least 20 percent of that, significantly more than <a href="http://www.nber.org/papers/w1906">earlier estimates</a>. </p>
<p>A <a href="http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/REST_a_00587#.WA4XNqOZOV4">just-published paper</a> that estimates the effects of NAFTA on blue-collar workers, not only in goods industries but service industries as well, found similar results. Particularly vulnerable were the footwear and oil and gas industries and the states of North and South Carolina.</p>
<p>Both studies suggest that the American labor market is not as fluid and flexible as we thought. Job losers were not able to find new ones as quickly as expected nor command the same level of wages when they did. This finding is consistent with <a href="http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2016/0701/Why-this-time-free-trade-has-hit-American-workers-so-hard">other research</a> indicating that the in-country mobility of blue-collar American workers has been falling.</p>
<p>In other words, while the overall welfare effects of trade liberalization are generally positive, the impact on some subgroups, particularly the less well-educated, are negative and much larger.</p>
<p>And the United States <a href="https://www.oecd.org/unitedstates/United%20States_final_EN.pdf">is less generous</a> than other rich countries in providing both reemployment assistance and income support to workers hurt by these changes. </p>
<p>The primary U.S. program aimed at mitigating this negative impact is known as trade adjustment assistance (TAA). That its intended recipients call it “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/02/03/obamas-proposal-to-help-workers-who-lose-out-on-trade-deals-probably-wont-win-democratic-votes/">burial insurance</a>” sort of sums up its image problem.</p>
<h2>Softening the blow of free trade</h2>
<p>Trade adjustment assistance has gone through a variety of forms since its origins in the 1950s, but today <a href="https://www.doleta.gov/tradeact/factsheet.cfm">it provides displaced workers</a> with relocation assistance, subsidized health insurance and extended unemployment benefits. A <a href="http://blogs.wsj.com/briefly/2015/06/15/5-questions-on-trade-adjustment-assistance/">typical condition</a> of aid is that recipients have to enroll in a job training program.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://piie.com/publications/chapters_preview/3979/05iie3979.pdf">idea came in 1954</a>, when the head of the Steelworkers Union first suggested helping workers adversely affected by imports. Eight years later, Congress turned the idea into law as a <a href="https://piie.com/commentary/speeches-papers/reforming-trade-adjustment-assistance-keeping-40-year-promise">crucial carrot</a> to win the backing of the AFL-CIO for the <a href="https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-76/pdf/STATUTE-76-Pg872.pdf">Trade Expansion Act</a>, which gave the president the <a href="http://naldc.nal.usda.gov/download/IND43861850/PDF">unilateral authority</a> to cut many tariffs by up to 50 percent over a five-year period.</p>
<p>All the aid provision did, however, was provide workers with temporary and severely delayed supplements to their unemployment compensation. It was little used because the eligibility requirements were so strict. </p>
<p>The TAA program was formally established as part of the <a href="http://legcounsel.house.gov/Comps/93-618.pdf">Trade Act of 1974</a>, which created the so-called “fast-track” process limiting Congress to a simple up-or-down vote on negotiated trade deals and set up a permanent trade office. The program eased eligibility requirements, specifying only that “imports contributed importantly” to a job loss, and offered expanded unemployment insurance. As a result, the number of petitions under the program surged, mainly from the auto, steel, textile and apparel industries, and most were certified for payment. </p>
<p>Despite this, the trade assistance earned the epithet “burial insurance” by many in the labor movement. As a <a href="http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Hrg95-87.pdf">Republican senator put it</a> in 1978:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Adjustment assistance has often been scornfully, but accurately, called burial assistance – arriving only in time to dispose of the victim.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p><a href="http://legcounsel.house.gov/Comps/93-618.pdf">Ronald Reagan put the program</a> high on his hit list when he became president in 1981. The size of individual payments was reduced and capped at 52 weeks, joining a training program became a requirement for aid. And far fewer petitioners received aid.</p>
<h2>TAA limps on</h2>
<p>Over subsequent years the program (including various offshoots) grew and shrunk but continued to be used primarily to win congressional authorization of various trade agreements.</p>
<p>The Clinton administration created <a href="https://www.doleta.gov/programs/factsht/nafta.cfm">NAFTA-Transitional Adjustment Assistance</a> – for those who lost jobs, hours or wages due to increased imports from or shifts of production to Mexico or Canada – to win labor votes for the North American trade deal. </p>
<p>That helped NAFTA <a href="http://articles.latimes.com/1993-11-18/news/mn-58150_1_trade-pact">win narrow approval</a> in 1993, but the main result of the new program was overlap and confusion with the original and led to declining support for free trade throughout the ‘90’s.</p>
<p>President George W. Bush reformed the assistance programs as he tried to muster support for a <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm">new round of trade negotiations</a> early in his first term. The <a href="https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-107hr3009enr/pdf/BILLS-107hr3009enr.pdf">Trade Act of 2002</a> eliminated NAFTA-TAA as a separate program, reauthorized the fast-track process and established a health tax credit and partial wage insurance for older, lower-paid displaced workers who found new jobs but at less pay than the old ones. </p>
<p>These changes – which made TAA the most generous and expensive it’s ever been – <a href="https://piie.com/publications/chapters_preview/3979/05iie3979.pdf">failed to satisfy organized labor</a>, which still tended to see the program as burial insurance and unable to make up for the loss of “good manufacturing jobs.” A <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/aid-for-workers-untouched-by-debate-over-trade-deal-1431277766">study commissioned by Congress</a> concluded that workers who took trade assistance fared no better, in terms of employment and earnings, than those who got regular unemployment insurance. </p>
<p>Another big change came in 2009 when for the first time trade assistance was reauthorized on its own, rather than in conjunction with other trade initiatives, as part of the <a href="https://www.dol.gov/recovery/implement.htm">American Recovery and Reinvestment Act</a>. It expanded the program, most notably by extending it to service sector workers.</p>
<p>Since then, it has been reauthorized several times, usually as part of a trade package. Most recently, a 2015 bill <a href="https://theconversation.com/fast-track-overcomes-key-hurdle-but-obstacles-remain-as-trade-deals-hang-in-balance-42221">restored fast-track</a> for President Barack Obama – aimed at helping him seal the TPP trade deal he was working on – and also reauthorized the TAA program through 2022, but included “sunset” provisions.</p>
<h2>Rethinking trade adjustment assistance</h2>
<p>The TPP, which <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-tpp-idUSKCN0VD08S">was agreed to earlier this year by 12 Pacific Rim countries</a>, is aimed at reducing tariffs but, much more significantly, it would remove other national barriers to finance and investment as well as trade in goods, services and digital transactions. Among these changes are harmonization of national regulations and protection of intellectual property. </p>
<p>That agreement, which still requires ratification by the Senate, <a href="https://theconversation.com/can-free-trade-and-tpp-survive-rise-of-the-new-right-56241">is now on the rocks</a> after the populist candidacies of Trump and Sanders seized on anti-trade sentiment and gave it a powerful voice.</p>
<p>While this won’t save the TPP, rethinking how we assist those hurt by free trade is important so that at a minimum – once the anti-globalization views now ascendant have attenuated and the U.S. budget can accommodate increases in discretionary programs – future agreements don’t leave so many workers feeling left behind. Tinkering isn’t enough.</p>
<p>It starts with crafting policies that encourage a more flexible labor force, while at the same time providing a safety net for those who have to do the flexing. The Danes <a href="http://denmark.dk/en/society/welfare/flexicurity">have coined a word</a> for such policies: “flexicurity.” Rather than trying to protect jobs toppled by economist Joseph Schumpeter’s “<a href="http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/CreativeDestruction.html">winds of creative destruction</a>,” government policies should ease and speed the transition to new and sturdier ones.</p>
<p>So in terms of the TAA, a crucial change would be to make training and other programs for the reemployment of displaced workers more effective and wage insurance for those who have found new jobs but at significantly lower salaries than the old ones more generous, in both amounts and duration. It is also critical to extend such measures to all workers displaced by change – such automation and changes in consumers’ tastes – not just trade.</p>
<p>Marketing will also have to play a role, from changing the name to delinking such provisions from political horse-trading over trade deals.</p>
<p>That way, perhaps government assistance for the losers from free trade could be thought of as something that lifts them up rather than puts them in the ground.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/67036/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marina v. N. Whitman is affiliated with National Bureau of Economic Research (trustee); Peterson Institute for International Economics (trustee emerita); American Academy of Arts and Sciences; Institute for Advanced Study (trustee emerita). </span></em></p>Trade adjustment assistance, dubbed ‘burial insurance’ by those it’s supposed to help, needs to be significantly reformed so that future trade deals don’t have so many workers feeling left behind.Marina v. N. Whitman, Professor of Business Administration and Public Policy, University of MichiganLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/645772016-09-01T20:24:27Z2016-09-01T20:24:27ZDoes TPP’s slow death mean the world is now unsafe for trade deals?<p>It seems that the world has become unsafe for trade agreements. In particular, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/tpp-7972">Trans-Pacific Partnership</a> (TPP), a major new trade deal among the United States and 11 other Pacific Rim nations, has become a political lightning rod for both the left and the right. </p>
<p>As if to highlight that fact once again, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell <a href="http://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/mcconnell-comment-tpp-ends-obamas-chance-close-deal">said</a> recently that he would not bring the TPP to a vote until after the new president takes office in January. </p>
<p>That’s bad news for the trade agreement – and for President Barack Obama, who sees its passage as the final plank in his foreign policy legacy and who <a href="http://fortune.com/2016/08/17/obama-tpp-congress-lame-duck-trade/">is pushing hard</a> for a vote during Congress’ post-election lame duck session. </p>
<p>But the <a href="https://theconversation.com/heres-a-problem-with-the-tpp-that-hillary-clinton-ignores-at-her-peril-62818">controversial Asian pact</a> is not the only trade agreement potentially on the chopping block. Last month, the European Union’s trade commissioner, Cecilia Malmström, <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-canada-trade-talks-falter-auguring-ill-for-bigger-deals-1472511958?mod=e2tw">decided</a> not to fast-track the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) due to the anti-trade climate prevailing on the continent. </p>
<p>And France’s President François Hollande <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/aug/30/france-demands-end-to-ttip-trade-talks-matthias-fekl">just declared</a> that his country would not support moving forward with the gigantic Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) being negotiated between the U.S. and the EU. His announcement came on the heels of a statement by Germany’s vice chancellor that <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ttip-trade-deal-agreement-failed-brexit-latest-news-eu-us-germany-vice-chancellor-a7213876.html">TTIP “has failed.”</a></p>
<p>It seems that every time we get closer to the conclusion and ratification of a trade deal, a new barrier emerges to block any progress. What, then, are we to make of the tremendous obstacles confronting these three major agreements? </p>
<h2>The times they are a-changin’</h2>
<p>First and foremost, opposition to trade is a sign of the times. The Great Recession, among other events, has generated strong pushback against globalization and liberal exchange, something that seems to have caught political elites around the world off guard.</p>
<p>The Doha Round of the World Trade Organization (WTO) had already <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-wto-still-matters-34624">come apart</a> well before the recession. Its failure meant that a multilateral deal, one that would have committed nearly all of the world’s countries to the same trade agenda, was no longer possible. </p>
<p>At the heart of Doha’s collapse were the interests of the newly rising BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – which could not be reconciled with those of the U.S. and the EU. The failure of the WTO, in its turn, gave new impetus to regional agreements such as TTIP and TPP.</p>
<p>Initially, these regional agreements, along with their more modest bilateral cousins (deals between only two nations), were treated with <a href="http://www.cfr.org/world/termites-trading-system/p15840">suspicion</a> by free traders, who feared that they would carve up the global trading system into inefficient blocs. But, in time, such agreements presented themselves as the best, and only, way forward in a more complex, multipolar economic environment. </p>
<p>Still, TTIP and TPP are more than just victims of the general skepticism for globalization that has arisen in the past few years. They are also the collateral damage from political events in the world’s major trading countries. </p>
<h2>Illiberalism on the rise</h2>
<p>First among these is the <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/brexit-9976">U.K.’s Brexit vote</a>, which is likely to result in the country’s withdrawal from the EU. Brexit, which is itself the fruit of growing illiberalism in England and Wales, has distracted European leaders to such a degree that TTIP and CETA have moved onto the back burner. </p>
<p>Moreover, in the United States, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/can-free-trade-and-tpp-survive-rise-of-the-new-right-56241">success of Donald Trump</a> in mobilizing the anti-globalization working class has made Republicans in Congress, who typically support trade as good for business, <a href="https://theconversation.com/free-trade-is-once-again-tearing-apart-the-republican-party-57698">wary of trade deals</a>. It has also led Hillary Clinton to distance herself from previous statements supporting TPP made during her tenure at secretary of state.</p>
<p>Another problem facing TPP and TTIP is their <a href="https://theconversation.com/pacific-trade-deals-outlook-clouded-by-patent-disputes-elections-as-talks-enter-final-stage-45812">unprecedented scope</a>. Not only do these agreements create free trade blocs that encompass much of the world’s economic output, but <a href="https://ustr.gov/tpp/">they also touch on a variety of issues</a> from internet freedom to generic drug prices to the right of private investors to sue states for compensation. Many of the most controversial elements of the agreements relate to these issues rather than to the traditional components of trade protection.</p>
<h2>What happens next?</h2>
<p>What would be the consequences if these agreements fail? </p>
<p>Economically, the U.S. is already tightly linked with both <a href="https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/other-initiatives/asia-pacific-economic-cooperation-apec/us-apec-trade-facts">Asia</a> and <a href="https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/europe-middle-east/europe/european-union">Europe</a>. The TPP agreement would essentially expand the Pacific trade bloc beyond NAFTA to include nine additional countries, most significantly Japan. Similarly, TTIP would deepen the already significant economic interdependence that traverses the Atlantic.</p>
<p>The loss of these agreements would certainly have negative economic effects on all sides, as least in the aggregate (since some jobs would be saved by the reduced competition). Agreements this large cannot be jettisoned <a href="http://bookstore.piie.com/book-store/6642.html">without consequences</a>.</p>
<p>That said, given the deep connections that already exist among Asia, North America and Europe, the purely economic results of killing the agreements are likely to be important, but not enormous. More serious would be the geostrategic implications. </p>
<p>A rejection of TTIP by either side could signal a reduced U.S. presence in Europe, a particular concern in the face of increasing Russian assertiveness. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, an end to TPP could encourage a number of Asian countries, unsure of America’s future in the region, to <a href="https://theconversation.com/china-will-be-the-winner-if-us-backs-out-of-the-tpp-63328">move into China’s growing sphere of influence</a>. It is no surprise that this last argument is the one <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/president-obama-the-tpp-would-let-america-not-china-lead-the-way-on-global-trade/2016/05/02/680540e4-0fd0-11e6-93ae-50921721165d_story.html?utm_term=.d44962edcefc">being made</a> most aggressively by the Obama administration.</p>
<h2>Long live free trade?</h2>
<p>If TTIP and TPP are not likely to be approved any time soon, does this mean that they are already dead?</p>
<p>A President Trump would certainly kill the agreements. If, however, Hillary Clinton becomes the next president, as the <a href="http://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2016/president/us/general_election_trump_vs_clinton-5491.html">polls seem to indicate</a>, their future is <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-progressives-should-rescue-the-tpp-trade-deal-60304">harder to predict</a>. Clinton seems to be, at heart, a believer in open markets, but the current political situation <a href="http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016-election/awkward-trade-fight-coming-hillary-clinton-n637586">makes it hard</a> for her to say so directly. </p>
<p>If elected, Clinton’s statements during the campaign would make it difficult for her to support TPP out of the gate, especially with strong opposition from Bernie Sanders supporters. As envisioned by Cato trade analyst <a href="http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-president-hillary-could-reverse-course-tpp-17476">Simon Lester</a>, she may well try to renegotiate a portion of the agreement as political cover and then resubmit it to Congress for approval. </p>
<p>By this point, if Trumpism has been defeated, Republicans may have a greater appetite for foreign trade. The question, of course, is whether the other TPP signatory countries will be willing to reopen portions of the agreement that have already been concluded.</p>
<p>Similarly, in Europe, it seems unlikely that much progress will be made until the Brexit issue is resolved and growth starts to pick up. </p>
<p>Despite all the obstacles, however, I believe that it is important to keep moving forward on free trade. The rejection of these important agreements could risk becoming merely the first step in a gradual erosion of support for the global economic architecture. </p>
<p>This <a href="http://press.princeton.edu/titles/1322.html">architecture</a>, so carefully created and maintained by the United States after 1945, has contributed mightily to international prosperity and peace. Maintaining it is of critical importance.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64577/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Charles Hankla does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Most Western trade agreements – past and present – appear to be in doubt amid an anti-globalization backlash.Charles Hankla, Associate Professor of Political Science, Georgia State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/617182016-06-30T10:17:42Z2016-06-30T10:17:42ZWhy TTIP will live on – but not for the EU<p>The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership – also known as TTIP – could be the next casualty in the Brexit fallout. But not in the way you might expect. The controversial trade agreement between the EU and United States could well fall apart, only for the UK to pick up the pieces for its own trade deal.</p>
<p>For the UK, leaving the European Union means leaving the numerous trade deals it is party to. This includes the free trade it has with the 27 other EU members and the EU’s agreements <a href="https://fullfact.org/europe/how-many-free-trade-deals-has-eu-done/">with 50 other countries</a>. It also means exclusion from the deals currently being negotiated – an agreement with Japan and, of course, TTIP. But for the EU, Brexit could mean the end of TTIP altogether.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/about-ttip/">idea behind TTIP</a>, billed as an ambitious and comprehensive trade and investment agreement, is to promote growth in Europe and the US by opening up the US to EU firms and vice versa. It will do so by cutting the red tape of regulation that firms face when exporting, and would set new rules to make it easier and fairer to export, import and invest overseas. </p>
<p>Sounds like a great thing overall then? Not necessarily. <a href="https://stop-ttip.org/what-is-the-problem-ttip-ceta/">Many have expressed concerns</a> over the openness of the negotiations, the content of the deal and the influence of big business into drafting and approving standards. </p>
<h2>Sticking points</h2>
<p>The two main sticking points are a clause called the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-secret-ttip-trade-deal-could-enable-companies-to-sue-countries-50543">investor-state dispute settlement</a>, which would allow companies to sue states directly for alleged violations of the terms of the deal, and also how it will affect the legal protections of agricultural products. It might sound trivial but trade in agricultural products is a major issue for negotiators trying to satisfy say, on the one hand, French wine and cheese producers and, on the other hand, American GM crop growers and enhanced meat producers. </p>
<p>The EU gives strong legal protection for numerous products – particularly in the form of designated origins (Cornish pasties <a href="https://theconversation.com/cornish-pasties-from-colorado-what-an-eu-us-trade-deal-could-mean-for-regional-delicacies-35932">must come from Cornwall</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-europe-and-the-us-are-locked-in-a-food-fight-over-ttip-45279">Feta cheese from Greece</a>, for example). This gives them a competitive advantage in a big market – which is why the US opposes it. </p>
<p>There are also concerns about <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/sep/05/eu-gm-food-imports-us-canada">food safety and quality</a>, especially around modified food products available in the US, but currently banned in Europe. These concerns have to be weighed up against the huge market that European exporters would have access to in the US. It is a market that currently has big restrictions to it – British lamb and venison cannot currently be exported to the US, for example.</p>
<h2>Trade champions</h2>
<p>Due to long and organised resistance, the project, which started in June 2013, <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-ttip-trade-deal-is-lost-at-sea-60132">has been faltering</a>. No agreement has yet been reached, nor does it seem close to being found on the most contentious issues. Brexit might be the final nail in the coffin. </p>
<p>It is <a href="http://www.politico.eu/article/trade-agenda-will-wobble-but-continue-despite-brexit/">widely acknowledged</a> that the main driver for TTIP has been the UK. The reason for this is that successive British governments have seen their role as the bridge between an economically liberal US and a protectionist and traditional EU. </p>
<p>The UK had been a foothold of Anglo-Saxon capitalism in a Europe that is dominated by governments which are very protective over their industries and generally play a large role in their economies. Once this bridge with the UK is severed, what is there to ensure that reluctant European policymakers will push through a deal in the face of widespread popular resistance? </p>
<p>Without the British push towards liberalisation the deal risks dying a quick death, contrary to recent proclamations from both the EU and the US that a deal is expected by the <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/ttip-obama-says-trade-deal-should-be-signed-by-the-end-of-the-year-a6999456.html">end of the year</a>.</p>
<p>There is an ironic twist in the fate of TTIP, however. Once it leaves the EU, the UK is likely to pursue its own trade deal with the US. And it is extremely unlikely to differ from TTIP for a few reasons. </p>
<p>First, trade deals take a lot of time to negotiate. The EU is having such a hard time concluding deals not because it is bureaucratic and sclerotic, but because it has to negotiate a long series of contentious issues. Second, considering Britain’s long history of championing openness and free trade, coupled with the economic struggles it will face in a post-Brexit world, who can seriously argue that issues like the environment and small farmers will be a negotiating priority? </p>
<p>We are heading for <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/ttip-brexit-uk-steroids-disastrous-global-justice-now-war-on-want-a7099986.html">TTIP on steroids</a>. Contrary to the hopes of <a href="http://www.tuaeu.co.uk/vote-no-to-ttip/">some Leave supporters</a>, Brexit might save Europe from TTIP, but not Britain.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/61718/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ioannis Glinavos does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The controversial trade agreement between the EU and United States could well fall apart, only for the UK to pick up its pieces.Ioannis Glinavos, Senior Lecturer in Law, University of WestminsterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/617822016-06-29T10:48:44Z2016-06-29T10:48:44ZWhy UK could be doomed to years without proper access to world trade<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/128565/original/image-20160628-7825-x9iokb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Uh-oh. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.shutterstock.com/s/no+deal/search.html?page=2&thumb_size=mosaic&inline=354865640">Phoenixman</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>While most discussion since the Brexit vote has focused <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36639261">on how</a> the UK will negotiate the terms of its new trading relationship with the EU, much less has been said about the rest of the world. </p>
<p>Brexiters <a href="http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/campaign">have tended</a> to believe that the UK could continue to enjoy the access to foreign markets that it currently receives through the EU’s trade agreements with over 50 countries; and that for other markets it would simply resume independent membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the body through which 162 states set the rules for world trade. </p>
<p>In fact, this is highly uncertain. It will require a long and complex process of negotiation, for which the UK is under-prepared and has little leverage. </p>
<p>Since the UK joined the single market in 1973, Europe has negotiated tariffs and other international trade rules on the country’s behalf – both in bilateral and regional agreements and at the WTO. Upon leaving the EU, the UK will become responsible again for its own international trade negotiations. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/128653/original/image-20160629-15277-14z5w2c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/128653/original/image-20160629-15277-14z5w2c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/128653/original/image-20160629-15277-14z5w2c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=721&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128653/original/image-20160629-15277-14z5w2c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=721&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128653/original/image-20160629-15277-14z5w2c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=721&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128653/original/image-20160629-15277-14z5w2c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=906&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128653/original/image-20160629-15277-14z5w2c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=906&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128653/original/image-20160629-15277-14z5w2c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=906&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Obama: tough talk.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.shutterstock.com/cat.mhtml?lang=en&language=en&ref_site=photo&search_source=search_form&version=llv1&anyorall=all&safesearch=1&use_local_boost=1&autocomplete_id=&searchterm=obama&show_color_wheel=1&orient=&commercial_ok=&media_type=images&search_cat=&searchtermx=&photographer_name=&people_gender=&people_age=&people_ethnicity=&people_number=&color=&page=1&inline=103839932">Rena Schild</a></span>
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<p>Regardless of <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/27/brexit-what-happens-next-another-big-choice-on-europe-with-boris/">whether</a> the UK stays in the European single market as a Norway-style member of the European Economic Area, it will lose access to the EU’s existing foreign trade agreements – as well as those currently under negotiation, including the <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/index_en.htm">Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)</a> with the US. </p>
<p>The UK will need to renegotiate all of these agreements. It is unclear whether this will be feasible, how long it will take and what terms will result. Barack Obama, for one, <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/23/eu-referendum-what-the-world-is-saying---britains-historic-decis/">has indicated</a> that the US would not negotiate such a deal with the UK, though there <a href="http://www.politico.com/story/2016/06/brexit-us-britain-trade-deal-224776">have also been</a> warmer noises from other Americans.</p>
<h2>Trading places</h2>
<p>The default assumption has been that in a worst case scenario in which the UK loses preferential access to former trading partners, it could still rely on the WTO’s rules and <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm">most-favoured-nation tariff rates</a> to obtain a minimum level of guaranteed access. Yet this is not automatic and will depend on the UK successfully becoming an independent member of the WTO. </p>
<p>These are entirely new and uncharted waters. Just as there is no clear process for leaving the EU, there is likewise no established process for a former-EU member to re-establish itself as an independent member of the WTO. </p>
<p>Roberto Azevedo, the director-general of the WTO, <a href="https://next.ft.com/content/745d0ea2-222d-11e6-9d4d-c11776a5124d">has indicated</a> that resetting the terms of the UK’s membership could take years if not decades, and that the UK would be naïve to expect smooth sailing or quick results. Negotiations over the terms of a country’s WTO membership can easily become contentious and get hung up for years. </p>
<p>Russia’s recent accession negotiation took 20 years, while China’s took 15. Further complicating matters is the WTO’s fractious environment – the Doha Round of trade talks has broken down in <a href="http://www.ibtimes.com/doha-round-negotiations-2015-us-calls-end-global-trade-talks-opposition-expected-2223508">repeated stalemate</a> since 2001. The consensus-based process means it takes very little to impede an argument, and the UK will have to negotiate terms with, and gain the assent of, all 161 other WTO members. </p>
<p>At a minimum, resetting the terms of its WTO membership will involve renegotiating commitments that the UK shares as part of the EU. These would include agriculture subsidy levels and low-tariff quotas, which allow a specified volume of goods to enter at lower tariff rates. Other countries may use this as an opportunity to turn the screw and demand additional trade concessions from the UK.</p>
<p>The danger is that this process may take longer than the two years available to the UK to renegotiate its relationship with the EU once it triggers <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/article/36634702/article-50-the-simplest-explanation-youll-find">Article 50</a> of the Lisbon Treaty. The UK risks being left in limbo – out of the EU but without its commitments at the WTO yet agreed and potentially without access to the full rights of WTO membership. This could profoundly disrupt the UK’s access to global markets. </p>
<h2>Long memories</h2>
<p>There is no reason for WTO members to give the UK an easy ride – quite the opposite, in fact. As part of the EU, the UK <a href="http://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/AN_EPA29_Economic-Partnership-Agreements-in-Africa_EN.pdf">demanded</a> a pound of flesh from African, Caribbean and Pacific countries in the recent Economic Partnership Agreements; these countries may now seek payback. </p>
<p>Then there are late WTO joiners such as China and Russia who were required to make far greater concessions than existing members; they too may now seek to extract additional concessions from the UK in return. Desperate to cement its position in the WTO and no longer able to rely on the combined power of the EU, the UK lacks significant bargaining leverage. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/128567/original/image-20160628-7825-1vkblo9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/128567/original/image-20160628-7825-1vkblo9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/128567/original/image-20160628-7825-1vkblo9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128567/original/image-20160628-7825-1vkblo9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128567/original/image-20160628-7825-1vkblo9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128567/original/image-20160628-7825-1vkblo9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128567/original/image-20160628-7825-1vkblo9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128567/original/image-20160628-7825-1vkblo9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">No free lunches.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.shutterstock.com/cat.mhtml?lang=en&language=en&ref_site=photo&search_source=search_form&version=llv1&anyorall=all&safesearch=1&use_local_boost=1&autocomplete_id=&search_tracking_id=VfVcstBCOlOHZSkIvL-zlA&searchterm=no%20deal&show_color_wheel=1&orient=&commercial_ok=&media_type=images&search_cat=&searchtermx=&photographer_name=&people_gender=&people_age=&people_ethnicity=&people_number=&color=&page=1&inline=312887789">Billion Photos</a></span>
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<p>The UK’s position is further weakened by the fact that since it has not conducted independent trade negotiations in over 40 years, it has no skilled and experienced negotiators. Research has <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=PpAgDAAAQBAJ&lpg=PT1&ots=d18yhHZ66T&dq=hopewell%20breaking%20the%20wto&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q=hopewell%20breaking%20the%20wto&f=false">shown that</a> countries without specialised expertise and technical capacity are severely disadvantaged in trade negotiations and less likely to secure a favourable deal. </p>
<p>Given the lack of strategic planning regarding the trade implications of Brexit, the UK appears woefully unprepared for the challenge of negotiations to come. The end result is likely to be trade terms that are less favourable than at present.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/61782/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>If Brexiters thought that making new international tariff deals and joining the WTO would be a cakewalk, they’re in for a shock.Kristen Hopewell, Senior Lecturer in International Political Economy, The University of EdinburghMatias E. Margulis, Lecturer in Politics, University of StirlingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/606532016-06-09T10:11:10Z2016-06-09T10:11:10ZWhy we shouldn’t dismiss Bilderberg conspiracies so lightly<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/125752/original/image-20160608-3481-1bjwodj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Dresden, the setting of Bilderberg 2016.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/jiuguangw/5976844838/in/photolist-a79TJW-vPKH61-gmhNRE-FLEWhX-a37Yqo-8Wjg7L-snTiba-8UodLg-fUACgb-9BxfaB-7HtRoD-8FrtBi-aNJZ7F-8Wjg3S-atiA4K-cCRpeS-5cwwgF-96ryaw-b3gQpZ-9Dwz8y-8G4mmD-2gqCXA-9vZpZW-cCRrYm-p48FzV-tTgfyj-r7RSgh-nYKqxP-hBHseg-vV3mHz-eatQ3i-iencKd-8VJGew-MtxvS-6q5Muw-w72cgi-pAn5sy-6x4RC8-6xdCyU-susvhd-6LLZoa-7Ft8AE-bDaqeH-n56gyi-7E7Dqk-6w6hHF-6urrwF-e1zDtF-qbbd1b-6Mnb3R">Jiuguang Wang</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>We live in an age of conspiracies about a world shaped by shadowy plots, secret organisations and deals made behind closed doors. And while they are often viewed as the fictions of sad people wearing anoraks and tin foil hats, they can relate to the real business of global politics. Conspiracy theories surround the likes of TTIP, Davos, the CIA, and this week, the <a href="http://www.bilderbergmeetings.org/">Bilderberg</a> meeting.</p>
<p>Haven’t heard of Bilderberg? That’s because security is very heavy, journalists are not invited, and all participants are forbidden from talking about the discussions. This year’s meeting starts on June 9 and takes place in the rather pleasant looking <a href="https://secure.gn.apc.org/members/www.bilderberg.org/phpBB2/viewforum.php?f=32&sid=c76d2bd7ad4b24cf286e13df1a2443d5">Taschenbergpalais in Dresden</a>. Other details, however, are kept under wraps. </p>
<h2>A mad world?</h2>
<p>People have been suspicious of the meeting since its inception in 1954 at the Hotel De Bilderberg in Oosterbeek, Netherlands. Since at least the mid-1960s, the meetings have been seen by commentators on the right and left as one of the places where the <a href="http://educate-yourself.org/nwo/">New World Order</a> does its business. Like <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/blogpost/post/bohemian-grove-where-the-rich-and-powerful-go-to-misbehave/2011/06/15/AGPV1sVH_blog.html">Bohemian Grove</a>, the <a href="http://www.conspiracy-gov.com/the-new-world-order/trilateral-commission/">Trilateral Commission</a> and <a href="http://www.conspiracies.net/area-51-conspiracy-theories/">Area 51</a>, Bilderberg attracts the paranoia of conspiracy theorists who claim that a varied collection of people spend time talking about how to enslave us. There are plenty of <a href="http://www.bilderberg.org/">websites</a> with colourful hotlinks making connections between Bilderberg and the Illuminati, the Freemasons, the death of Diana and so on. It’s a spiralling world of madness.</p>
<p>Or is it? Rather famously, Adam Smith (beloved of free-marketeers) once said: “People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.” So imagine what really happens in those hotels, in between the heavy meals and the raids on well-stocked minibars.</p>
<p>The official line is that the informal discussions concern megatrends and major issues facing the world. Last year, the <a href="http://www.bilderbergmeetings.org/conferences.html">topics discussed</a> included artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, chemical weapons threats, Greece, Iran, NATO, Russia, terrorism and the US elections. Because the meeting is private, the people who take part don’t have to worry about repeating particular policy or party lines. They can instead explore scenarios and say what they really think, because there are no agendas, no resolutions, no votes and no statements issued at the end of the meeting.</p>
<p>That makes it sound like a rather pleasant policy seminar. <a href="http://bilderbergmeetings.org/participants2015.html">Last year</a>, it was a place where top politicians from different parties and countries could chat with each other, as well as executives from Google, BP, Shell, Deutsche Bank and other big companies. Fed with presentations and canapés, they can explore problems in a way that they rarely get an opportunity to during their hectic day jobs. The leaders of the free world do need to stop and think sometimes.</p>
<h2>A narrow spectrum</h2>
<p>But some conspiracy theorists do have a point. These politicians and businessmen (because they are, mostly, men) do have common interests after all. These are the success stories of transatlantic post-war capitalism. What do they know of the <a href="http://qz.com/701543/bilderberg-meeting-dresden-precariat/">“precariat”</a> they’re supposed to be discussing?</p>
<p>If you spend much of your life occupying the first class compartment on aeroplanes, it doubtless becomes logical to assume that there is some virtue to the system that put you there. Your fillet steak always tastes better if it has been accompanied by a small side-helping of self-congratulation. So the 120-150 members of the elite who get together every year – two thirds of the participants from Europe and the rest from North America – are undoubtedly not terribly motivated to change much.</p>
<p>That is doubtless why most of the invitees tend to be <a href="http://www.bilderbergmeetings.org/participants.html">from a narrow spectrum of occupations and positions</a> – CEOs, finance ministers and heads of state. Some critics have attended in the past – journalists Will Hutton in 1997, Jonathan Porritt in 1999 – but they are few and far between. The conversations are therefore unlikely to explore radical reforms which might endanger the power and privileges of those who already have seats at the table.</p>
<p>Conspiracy theorists give conspiracy theories a bad name. Conspiracies do exist, and this is one of them. Politics, at this sort of elite level, is precisely a conspiracy in the sense that Adam Smith meant it. When these people gather once a year, they do not engage in withering self-criticism, but instead reinforce the assumptions that they collectively make about the best sort of economic and political order. This is exactly the sort of process that the psychologist Irving Janis described as “<a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/3791464?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">groupthink</a>”, where dissent is marginalised and consensus amplified.</p>
<p>If the participants at Bilderberg really want to explore global challenges, talking to each other is the last thing that they should be doing. We already know that the <a href="https://www.versobooks.com/books/2153-the-new-rulers-of-the-world">powerful organise the world</a> for us – it is common knowledge. What Bilderberg exposes is that what goes on at endless summits and conferences across the globe is a mountain of smugness that is much more frightening than anoraks muttering about the Illuminati.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/60653/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Martin Parker does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>They may not be the Illuminati but there is a different kind of conspiracy at play at the secretive annual Bilderberg meeting of global elites.Martin Parker, Professor of Organisation and Culture, University of LeicesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/601322016-06-07T13:47:25Z2016-06-07T13:47:25ZThe TTIP trade deal is lost at sea<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/125156/original/image-20160603-11598-zeblkr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=2%2C43%2C1620%2C952&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Trading up?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/oneeighteen/5885529695/in/photolist-9Y5SVV-e7nKJB-hTvC5N-58KevF-gibiAV-bCpAfz-duWhHs-qfhdRY-4f4abi-ntEmgy-5Xocue-qeN59x-9aVJja-4afocQ-gqp7md-nx5Chg-hD9cR2-Gwu3g8-pr55G4-fVjYzH-mDd9rD-8xhWxK-e6BJBL-knX6U2-jkuypv-nQZbo9-qw31RM-BB2VR-cKibz-cq6xCy-aDibxn-2hTLe-7BHtDb-i2bLd-pKc96h-ecyYta-kjfAHx-bqXNkj-brFVLd-qi6rnQ-4GkAh-5Fe22m-675AJ7-5LDsTX-pYP4Tt-aFSswr-59LgJa-raXuQm-direVC-qC7fMz">Louis Vest/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The future of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the US and European Union seems bleak. Beset by doubts and stumbling alongside the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/eu-referendum-2016">UK’s referendum on EU membership</a>, the TTIP is starting to look like an awful lot of effort for unremarkable gains. US president Barack Obama may have given the negotiation process <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/ttip-obama-says-trade-deal-should-be-signed-by-the-end-of-the-year-a6999456.html">a shot in the arm</a> in recent weeks, but there is a good possibility that a deal will not be struck during his administration. After that, all bets are off.</p>
<p>So why has such a major piece of international deal-making found it so hard to make headway, and what are the chances of a deal ever being done?</p>
<p>Well, the first reason for the impasse is that no one can agree on what it should cover. It is deeply complex, but there are essentially two choices: should TTIP only apply to the tariffs that countries place on imports, or should it also address other barriers to business, mostly technical regulations on things like car safety, or the procedures for testing new chemicals?</p>
<p><a href="http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/ZS/ZS-%20CESifo_Forum/zs-for-%202014/zs-for-%202014-4/forum-%204-14-%20panel2.pdf">Estimates for the economic benefit</a> to the EU from a tariffs-only deal come out at just 0.3% of GDP for the EU as a whole. If we abolish all non-tariff barriers, then we get a 4% boost. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/125150/original/image-20160603-11605-16494gf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/125150/original/image-20160603-11605-16494gf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/125150/original/image-20160603-11605-16494gf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/125150/original/image-20160603-11605-16494gf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/125150/original/image-20160603-11605-16494gf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/125150/original/image-20160603-11605-16494gf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/125150/original/image-20160603-11605-16494gf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/125150/original/image-20160603-11605-16494gf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Hitting hard enough to ring the bell?</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/stevensnodgrass/8265087493/in/photolist-4MvEJX-aKR2AV-aCXpje-dAmJyv-ciuCsm-6Kmi2z-obmpn-4943kT-5mKNdR-6AkB6i-55BV23-aqBSz9-gp5Kw-bMxcX">Steve Snodgrass/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Race to the bottom</h2>
<p>That makes it seems like an easy decision from an economic point of view, but it’s highly contested. </p>
<p>The reason for the logjam is clear. Going far enough to make it economically valuable drags into play all sorts of political and social issues. Our reading of <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/index_en.htm">the draft texts</a> is that it won’t, in fact, lead to significant harmonisation or even mutual recognition of existing rules. There are procedures to make sure future regulations are as compatible as possible, but there is nothing explicit to say that regulatory decision making powers will be transferred. Indeed, it is hard to see the US Congress accepting anything else. That might seem like an effective compromise, but of course, any weakening of the approach to non-tariff barriers may in turn dampen the economic advantages. </p>
<p>The less complicated route – a TTIP which only removes tariffs – would bring very limited gains. Both EU and US tariffs are generally very low, except for cars, chemicals and agriculture. Their removal would have only a small effect. </p>
<p>At its heart, the far more valuable non-tariff route drags up fears, founded or unfounded, of a regulatory race to the bottom on things like food safety, and objections from NGOs about the loss of domestic policy power on things like health or government procurement. Crucially, TTIP has also raised the (contested) possibility of <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-secret-ttip-trade-deal-could-enable-companies-to-sue-countries-50543">major corporations suing states</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/125509/original/image-20160607-15038-n3wzoq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/125509/original/image-20160607-15038-n3wzoq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/125509/original/image-20160607-15038-n3wzoq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/125509/original/image-20160607-15038-n3wzoq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/125509/original/image-20160607-15038-n3wzoq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/125509/original/image-20160607-15038-n3wzoq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/125509/original/image-20160607-15038-n3wzoq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/125509/original/image-20160607-15038-n3wzoq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">TTIP for the chop? NHS fears have sparked protest.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/wdm/14473847638/in/photolist-oksS9N-o41fDd-o42aDa-okdf7e-onfMq2-okdf8B-okdfdB-o42aMX-o42aND-GAU9rC-GDf4rz-GAU9Ky">Global Justice Now/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Healthy debate</h2>
<p>So on the one hand, the European Commission claimed that TTIP could not be used to undermine the <a href="http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/june/tradoc_154617.pdf">UK’s National Health Service</a> yet the barrister hired by the Unite union <a href="http://www.unitetheunion.org/uploaded/documents/MBTTIPAdvice20111511-25674.pdf">concluded that</a>: “TTIP poses a real and serious risk to future [UK government] decision-making in respect of the NHS.”</p>
<p><a href="http://ccsi.columbia.edu/2015/05/19/investor-state-dispute-settlement-public-interest-and-u-s-domestic-law/">It is generally agreed</a> that past provisions to settle disputes between companies and countries were abused by arbitrators answerable to no one. EU member states have also signed many bilateral investment agreements which do allow firms to sue governments. For example, the state-owned Swedish energy firm Vattenfall has twice demanded compensation for German environmental policy changes under an <a href="http://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/state-of-play-vattenfall-vs-germany-II-leaving-german-public-dark-en.pdf">old investment treaty</a>.</p>
<p>To avoid this, the EU’s latest proposals on so-called Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) – tabled as part of the the TTIP talks – are intended to allow firms to demand compensation in very limited circumstances, for example where “<a href="http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-5652_en.htm">fair and equitable treatment</a> has been denied or contracts broken”. </p>
<p>But critics still question such guarantees because no one knows how an ISDS tribunal, even if it was a properly constituted court, would interpret any legal text intended to protect public policy objectives. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/125159/original/image-20160603-11598-bnkcj6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/125159/original/image-20160603-11598-bnkcj6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/125159/original/image-20160603-11598-bnkcj6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/125159/original/image-20160603-11598-bnkcj6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/125159/original/image-20160603-11598-bnkcj6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/125159/original/image-20160603-11598-bnkcj6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/125159/original/image-20160603-11598-bnkcj6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/125159/original/image-20160603-11598-bnkcj6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Blue sky thinking? State dispute settlements divide opinion.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/stevec77/107868154/in/photolist-awRrL-n6pBSa-ahY38n-5Y1vbY-df4Dik-df4vu5-5hRM84-cK7i35-5QY9bH-61qvMQ-h13vDR-fvHbD4-4xBsjc-pS9WnQ-u2VRQM-fvH5Yk-bE824i-dwbZdf-afaBTj-bVX5dF-4xFCqN-49HGS-saq3Nm-ncLsog-5asRCj-pij2jm-8hie83-ot7y2w-6N9E3e-9483JD-CRCDz-afTasu-a8obRR-t2pj4-5fd29H-7Fix7n-85JcNK-egcpLi-7FhpsV-4aZii7-5Y1viS-85Jfhi-85Mq8j-eFwZ3Q-39vDPu-afaC1J-9SPCGS-ajjxMq-bAKFRm-etjK2">Steve Calcott/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>And why is ISDS needed at all if there are already legal remedies in place (as used by Vattenfall)? Two arguments have been given. First, small EU firms may have problems with individual US states and ISDS is an effective form of redress. Second, and somewhat paradoxically, the EU sees the flaws in the existing ISDS system, where the “judges” are private commercial lawyers often meeting in secret and costs that <a href="http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN06777.pdf">average $4m per party per case</a>. The EU trade commissioner, Cecilia Malmström, proposed a formal system of courts that enshrined the <a href="http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-5652_en.htm">“right to regulate”</a>, but critics, and campaigners, are still dubious.</p>
<h2>Access points</h2>
<p>There is another obstacle. In short, governments love handing out contracts for public works to domestic companies; it keeps local industries happy, and maybe a few political donors too. No huge surprise then that after 13 rounds of negotiations the TTIP impasse on public procurement remains.</p>
<p>Both the EU and US are parties to the World Trade Organisation’s plurilateral <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/memobs_e.htm">agreement on government procurement</a> but the EU’s big picture was for TTIP to trade access to European state agriculture spending for inroads into highly protected US procurement markets, particularly at the state level. But the US steadfastly refuses to concede to market access demands, due to its traditional and entrenched domestic lobby groups – the steel industry, small and medium-sized firms, and disadvantaged communities. </p>
<p>It’s a missed opportunity. We could have increased transparency with a standardised e-procurement system and tender forms. Much more could be gained through harmonising definitions of integrity and conflict of interest concepts, along with strengthening corruption control measures. It’s a win-win for improving the governance of public procurement markets – but negotiations have been dominated by intractable trade issues and the fears of ISDS.</p>
<p>In such a confrontational atmosphere, it is doubtful that a meaningful TTIP can be concluded. Sceptics’ doubts may be exaggerated, but they still reflect genuine public alarm. The general confusion is highlighted by supporters of a <a href="https://www.foe.co.uk/blog/eu-s-pursuit-ttip-reason-enough-leave">UK exit from the EU</a>, who argue both that the UK could sign a TTIP deal very quickly after Brexit, <em>and</em> that that leaving the EU is the only way to stop it. In any case, unless a deal is rushed through before the end of 2016, prospects for a deal are bleak. Of the likely presidential candidates, neither Hillary Clinton nor Donald Trump are likely to make TTIP a top priority in a future US administration. Meanwhile, public opinion – and crucially the German government – move closer to outright opposition.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/60132/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A landmark trade deal between the US and Europe has been left floundering. So what has killed progress?Peter Holmes, Reader in Economics, University of Sussex Business School, University of SussexKamala Dawar, Lecturer in Commercial Law, University of SussexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/571812016-06-07T11:42:48Z2016-06-07T11:42:48ZYes, the EU values businesses over people – but is Britain any better?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/125361/original/image-20160606-25976-17dx2ov.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>With the EU referendum campaign entering its final phase, most of the arguments seem to be about the short-term implications for British politics and the wider economic consequences of leaving the union.</p>
<p>But one topic has been generally absent from discussions so far, even though it has featured prominently in the <a href="http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/uk/2016-uk-settlement-process-timeline/">negotiations between the UK and the EU</a> and in the relevant <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/502291/54284_EU_Series_No1_Web_Accessible.pdf">government White Paper</a>: the objective of fostering competitiveness within a reformed EU. </p>
<p>The idea is that European companies should be able to beat international competitors by offering better products, at low prices. It also implies direct competition between companies within the European single market. More importantly, though, it requires governments to do all they can to support national companies. </p>
<p>That sounds like common sense, but the question is how you go about helping businesses thrive and whether you are compromising your responsibilities towards citizens to do it. Businesses like reduced regulation, weaker social protection for workers and tax breaks – but do ordinary people?</p>
<h2>Business first</h2>
<p>After negotiating a special place for the UK in the EU earlier this year, David Cameron claimed to have <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/502291/54284_EU_Series_No1_Web_Accessible.pdf">“secured a firm commitment”</a> from the EU that it would push the competitiveness agenda harder. </p>
<p>And there are clear signs of strong dedication to these goals. There is a plan, for example, to make sure new laws meet the needs of small businesses wherever possible, something which grants business interests a degree of superior status that should upset any democratically minded person. There is also a significant drive to prepare the <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-the-transatlantic-trade-and-investment-partnership-37258">Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership</a> – a wide reaching deal between the US and the EU that would lower social and environmental standards.</p>
<p>The UK and the EU both want to engender a “climate of entrepreneurship” in Europe because they claim that economic progress comes from the genius of entrepreneurs alone, who need to be left alone to thrive.</p>
<p>They both work on the assumption that regulation is intrinsically problematic. So-called red tape, they believe, stifles entrepreneurial activity. They also view taxation (especially if it is imposed on companies or their owners and shareholders) as undermining the competitive advantage of national economies in the global race.</p>
<h2>People second</h2>
<p>But this narrow interpretation of competitiveness assumes, and at the same time stipulates as universal truth, that economic imperatives ought always to override other concerns. The needs of businesses override the need to protect the environment and the rights of employees. They also override the necessity to raise the revenue it takes to fund essential public services that improve living standards.</p>
<p>Dissent seems futile, because according to Donald Tusk, president of the European Council, “everyone agrees on the need to further work on better regulation and on lessening the burdens on business”. </p>
<p>In other words, <a href="http://wickedissues.blogspot.co.uk/2016/02/four-frameworks-to-understand-public.html">debates around social policies and the design of public services</a> are only seen as reasonable as long as they don’t affect business interests and help to fill the gaps that markets alone cannot.</p>
<p>These views further the trajectory of the EU towards a predominantly economic model of integration. Hopes that the EU might evolve into a haven of social well-being appear less likely to be fulfilled than ever.</p>
<h2>Two sides of the same coin</h2>
<p>But the EU, for all its obsession with pleasing businesses, does continue to hold the UK back from some of its more radical attempts to prioritise business interests over <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-brexit-would-be-bad-for-employment-rights-55890">employment rights</a>. It has, for example, stopped the UK from repealing the <a href="http://www.hse.gov.uk/contact/faqs/workingtimedirective.htm">working time directive</a> or <a href="https://theconversation.com/leaving-eu-would-be-bad-for-women-but-staying-in-doesnt-look-too-great-either-60280">undermining parental leave</a>.</p>
<p>Within the EU, the UK’s drive towards an ever stronger focus on competitiveness with less regulation (or protection of social standards) is at least slightly slowed. That’s why the outcome of the EU referendum is still important. Even if the two sides have a similar agenda, the UK would probably slide further without the restraints placed on it by EU regulation.</p>
<p>Moreover, other EU countries could put pressure on the EU to move away from its obsession with competition. Member states could push for more investment in sustainable industries, green energy and modern public transport – even if they don’t seem that interested at the moment.</p>
<p>This would be more likely if governments less enthralled by the idea of ever more competition came to power in countries with sufficient clout to alter the course of European integration. That’s an outcome arguably more likely than the UK itself becoming such a country – particularly if it were outside the EU.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/57181/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Enrico Reuter does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The idea that the British government would do a better job of protecting its people after Brexit doesn’t stand up to much scrutiny.Enrico Reuter, Lecturer in Public and Social Policy, University of YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/599432016-05-26T07:48:56Z2016-05-26T07:48:56ZFact Check: is Brexit the way to escape TTIP?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/123948/original/image-20160525-25231-rgydxx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">'If Steve McQueen can do it ..."</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.shutterstock.com/cat.mhtml?lang=en&language=en&ref_site=photo&search_source=search_form&version=llv1&anyorall=all&safesearch=1&use_local_boost=1&autocomplete_id=&searchterm=prison%20break&show_color_wheel=1&orient=&commercial_ok=&media_type=images&search_cat=&searchtermx=&photographer_name=&people_gender=&people_age=&people_ethnicity=&people_number=&color=&page=1&inline=232763653">Gabriele Maltini</a></span></figcaption></figure><blockquote>
<p>You have been issuing tweets asking if I am a TTIP denier. I say to you that I am working flat out to persuade voters to support Brexit. If the campaign succeeds, TTIP in the UK will be dead in the water._</p>
</blockquote>
<p><em>David Davies MP, <a href="https://twitter.com/DavidTCDavies">open letter</a> to <a href="http://www.peoplesnhs.org">The People’s NHS</a>, May 18</em></p>
<p>The <a href="http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1391">Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)</a> between the US and EU is a profound and ambitious project. Its effect will be felt in every corner of the two economies. It <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/what-is-ttip-and-six-reasons-why-the-answer-should-scare-you-9779688.html">aims at</a> further reducing trade barriers and encouraging the international flow of investment and production across the Atlantic. </p>
<p>Like the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-32498715">Trans-Pacific Partnership</a> (TPP) recently agreed between the US and 11 other Asia-Pacific countries, TTIP represents a new generation of trade liberalisation treaties designed to make up <a href="http://in.reuters.com/article/uk-trade-wto-idINKBN0G41LJ20140804">for the failure of</a> the World Trade Organisation (WTO) to agree new global tariff reductions – as well as an attempt to spur it into action. </p>
<p>Critics say TTIP will further transfer national economic sovereignty to international institutions and threatens the likes of the <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/ttip-france-threatens-to-walk-away-from-negotiations-a6675486.html">film industry</a> in France; the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/feb/22/ttip-deal-real-serious-risk-nhs-leading-qc">National Health Service</a> in the UK; and European <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/caf1573c-f539-11e3-91a8-00144feabdc0.html">financial services</a>, <a href="http://www.euractiv.com/section/agriculture-food/news/ttip-the-downfall-of-eu-agriculture/">agricultural products</a> and <a href="https://stop-ttip.org/what-is-the-problem-ttip-ceta/">consumer protection</a>. They are not swayed by the prospect of more efficiently allocating resources or enhanced competitiveness. In an echo of the deadlock at the WTO, the battle lines have been drawn between economic libertarianism and anti-globalism; between the multinationals who would benefit and vulnerable smaller businesses and their employees. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/123949/original/image-20160525-25222-19kgyhu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/123949/original/image-20160525-25222-19kgyhu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/123949/original/image-20160525-25222-19kgyhu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/123949/original/image-20160525-25222-19kgyhu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/123949/original/image-20160525-25222-19kgyhu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/123949/original/image-20160525-25222-19kgyhu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/123949/original/image-20160525-25222-19kgyhu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/123949/original/image-20160525-25222-19kgyhu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">NHS protests in UK.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/wdm/14473847638/in/photolist-oksS9N-o41fDd-o42aDa-FMth3Z-GAU9rC-GDf4rz-GAU9Ky-p84VSD-okdf7e-onfMq2-okdf8B-qYEnFt-okdfdB-o42aMX-o42aND">Global Justice Now</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The British agenda</h2>
<p>Within the EU and world politics, the UK tends to take a liberal stance in favour of the free market. TTIP is an opportunity to promote this agenda, and is a much better fit with the UK’s economic profile than many of its EU neighbours. Should the UK vote to leave the union, it would inevitably weaken the EU’s enthusiasm for TTIP. </p>
<p>But that does not mean the UK is an indispensable player in the game. Since the start, the European Commission has led the negotiation from Europe’s side. Member states and other relevant players are only consulted, for which Brussels <a href="http://corporateeurope.org/international-trade/2015/02/ttip-investor-rights-many-voices-ignored-commission">has been</a> heavily criticised. </p>
<p>A vote for Brexit in the EU referendum would enable the UK to pursue its liberal agenda with other world powers without the restraints of the EU. Despite <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-36115138">US rhetoric</a> that the UK would be left at the “back of the queue” for trade negotiations in the event of a Brexit, it would not be difficult for the two countries to strike a similar deal to TTIP given their common political and economic outlook. </p>
<p>Having said that, the UK would have little leverage in such a negotiation both because it would have reduced bargaining power without the support of the EU and because the US sees TTIP and TPP as new standards for international economic law without much space for compromise. In parallel, the UK would have a freer hand to establish a unique independent position in trade negotiations with the likes of China and other Asian powers – albeit amid much uncertainty. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/123951/original/image-20160525-25226-rxtfvi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/123951/original/image-20160525-25226-rxtfvi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/123951/original/image-20160525-25226-rxtfvi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=441&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/123951/original/image-20160525-25226-rxtfvi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=441&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/123951/original/image-20160525-25226-rxtfvi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=441&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/123951/original/image-20160525-25226-rxtfvi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=554&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/123951/original/image-20160525-25226-rxtfvi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=554&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/123951/original/image-20160525-25226-rxtfvi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=554&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Back of the queue?</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.shutterstock.com/cat.mhtml?lang=en&language=en&ref_site=photo&search_source=search_form&version=llv1&anyorall=all&safesearch=1&use_local_boost=1&autocomplete_id=&search_tracking_id=wUyaH_jceMSc97ACHsM5iQ&searchterm=US%20and%20UK&show_color_wheel=1&orient=&commercial_ok=&media_type=images&search_cat=&searchtermx=&photographer_name=&people_gender=&people_age=&people_ethnicity=&people_number=&color=&page=1&inline=256855804">ImageFlow</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Verdict</h2>
<p>It is technically true that the UK would probably not be a part of TTIP in the event of a Brexit. But TTIP would continue and the UK’s free-market approach to international trade would make it highly likely to promptly negotiate a similar deal with the US – and probably other countries. Far from leaving TTIP “dead in the water” from the UK’s perspective, a Brexit is more likely to move the country to pursue the same goals in uncharted waters instead. </p>
<h2>Review</h2>
<p><em>Sam Fowles, researcher in international law and politics, Queen Mary University of London</em></p>
<p>I broadly agree with this author’s characterisation of the issue. As an indication of successive UK governments’ attitude to trade, I would add that the country is already a party to around 90 <a href="http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/221">bilateral investment treaties</a> with many other countries including China, Argentina, South Africa and India. These all contain provisions similar to the controversial aspects of TTIP. </p>
<p>My only reservation would be the author’s statements about the campaign against TTIP. He says it is “not swayed by the prospect of more efficiently allocating resources or enhanced competitiveness”. Many of the critics of TTIP <a href="http://www.polity.co.uk/book.asp?ref=9781509501014">argue</a> the opposite – that it will not efficiently allocate resources and will damage competitiveness. They believe that by enhancing the political power of multinationals, it will increase trends towards monopoly and will have little real economic benefit. </p>
<p>I also wouldn’t agree that you can characterise the debate as merely “economic libertarianism and anti-globalism”. We have seen opposition in the UK parliament from economic libertarians like <a href="http://www.conservativehome.com/platform/2016/04/peter-lilley-yes-i-believe-in-free-trade-but-heres-why-we-must-protect-our-nhs-from-ttip.html">Peter Lilley</a>, who worry about TTIP’s effect on sovereignty and democracy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/59943/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sam Fowles has received funding from Mishcon de Reya, but the views expressed in this piece are entirely his own. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Zhongdong Niu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Conservative MP David Davies has been telling anti-TTIP activists that a leave vote is how they can torpedo the deal.Zhongdong Niu, Lecturer in Law, Edinburgh Napier UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/580982016-04-20T10:12:37Z2016-04-20T10:12:37ZWhat is the Canada trade model and could it work for a post-Brexit UK?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/119319/original/image-20160419-13923-1m5h0zz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/davebloggs007/14584518883/in/photolist-odMtm8-ndqncV-jubx1Z-EmnKCq-nSdequ-anPbyz-buaomD-qwGo4C-gUXDY8-A33BJ6-psXGtb-xo9qPS-5mFADJ-4WUDUC-9Z14Fe-q9LB8x-vajiSS-vBRvZu-vGS4hv-pDJsTN-cvthaQ-7fpFAv-aRJBQi-r3wVzo-pZRa77-9rCepR-fCnMBQ-fC8u7i-D53zH9-mxVZc7-phAjnC-pPAZu2-96eTSD-bXdSxj-dpS1CJ-nTgvmZ-AxRExp-aLYpiv-zaTYDQ-92SNhn-pZRaP9-51yJvk-pdvHNc-mxzJ9b-DwXCsM-6NU2Kp-oLCB3r-xtfrbX-nS9znE-pUoYQj">davebloggs007</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>It has been suggested that, in the event of a Brexit, the UK could negotiate a partnership with the European Union similar to that enjoyed by Canada.</p>
<p>Boris Johnson has suggested that it would be relatively easy for the UK to set up a comprehensive free trade agreement with the EU after Brexit that would be similar to the proposed <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/">Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement</a> (CETA). That’s the “Canada model”, at least according to Johnson. </p>
<p>Johnson’s argument overlooks the fact the CETA talks have dragged on for years – and still have not resulted in a functioning agreement. Some of the academics and diplomats who spoke at a conference I organised on the CETA talks in 2011 were cautiously optimistic that the agreement would be in place within a year or two. Now, five years later, CETA is still not in place. </p>
<p>What’s more, CETA provides for far less than total free trade between the Canada and the EU. It will remove most duties between the EU and Canada by 2023, but some tariff barriers will be left in place. </p>
<h2>A very long engagement</h2>
<p>In the event of Brexit, it may take years for Johnson’s idea to be implemented. Proposals for free trade between Canada and Europe have, after all, been around for decades.</p>
<p>In a sense, this idea is simply a new version of the very old dream of free trade within the British Commonwealth. This was <a href="http://www.erudit.org/revue/jcha/1998/v9/n1/030500ar.html">once favoured by Canadians fearful of US domination</a>. But in the 1960s and 1970s, the demise of the Commonwealth as a meaningful political actor and the relative economic decline of Britain nudged the idea of Canada-UK free trade to the backburner. </p>
<p>Following the <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02722010409481207">imposition of some trade barriers by the US</a> in the early 1970s, Canadian interest in European partners increased. By this time, the discussion was about a trade deal linking Canada with the EEC as a whole – an option that was equally appealing to Canada’s two main linguistic groups. </p>
<p>Free trade with Europe has been a perennial idea in Canada. It is one that is particularly popular with those who are concerned about the country’s economic dependence on the US. Canadians across the political spectrum – even those on the left who are normally sceptical of trade agreements – support the concept.</p>
<p>Even with this widespread enthusiasm, it has taken years to agree to an actual deal. The planning for the talks that eventually led to CETA being drawn up began at a Canada-EU summit in Ottawa in March 2004. The negotiations concluded in August 2014, when the text of the 1,600-page agreement was finalised. It now sits in front of the European Parliament, awaiting approval by MEPs.</p>
<p>Alas, the ratification of the agreement has taken almost two years. The treaty needed to be translated into no less than 24 languages and must now be approved by all 28 EU member nations, as well as by the EU parliament.</p>
<p>Some of the poorer nations in Eastern Europe have threatened to <a href="http://www.embassynews.ca/news/2016/01/27/eu-turns-the-screws-on-canada-over-visas/48165">veto CETA</a> because Canada continues to insist their citizens have to have a visa to travel there. Some of the leaders of the Socialists and Democrats bloc in the European parliament have threatened to vote against ratification if Canada does not lift the visa requirement on Bulgarian and Romanian visitors. </p>
<h2>Everyone loves Canada</h2>
<p>Johnson and other advocates of the so-called Canada model should reflect carefully on the time it has taken to translate the idea of Canada-EU trade into an actual agreement in principle. In negotiating an equivalent trade deal with the EU, the UK might expect similar delays.</p>
<p>To be fair, the UK’s political system makes it somewhat easier to negotiate international trade deals than is the case in the Canadian federation, which gives the governments of the ten provinces a say in such matters. At one point in 2015, it was not entirely clear whether Newfoundland and Labrador was going to give the deal the green light. Since trade policy within the UK is entirely under the control of Westminster, the British trade negotiators might be able to negotiate a deal somewhat faster.</p>
<p>However, British diplomats operating in Brussels might have a chilly reception if there is widespread resentment towards the UK after Brexit. Canada’s diplomats, in contrast, were able to take advantage of their country’s largely positive national brand image in their own negotiations.</p>
<p>For Canada, free trade with the EU is something of a luxury, since the country already has largely free access to the US market and can find customers for its natural resources in Asia. For Britain, which is far more dependent on trade with Europe, lengthy negotiations for a trade agreement with the EU could cause economic paralysis. Brexit campaigners who speak of the Canada model should reflect carefully about the fundamental differences between the Canadian and British economies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/58098/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Smith does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It has taken years to get CETA in place, and it still doesn’t work as intended.Andrew Smith, Senior Lecturer in International Business, University of LiverpoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/537572016-01-28T11:22:33Z2016-01-28T11:22:33ZWhy a new trade deal has put GM crop concerns in the spotlight<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/109477/original/image-20160128-3039-11de3mh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">TTIP is coming</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.shutterstock.com/pic-273428492/stock-photo-ttip-american-and-european-flag-in-front-of-a-map-of-europe.html?src=csl_recent_image-2">John Kehly</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Civil society groups have been voicing concerns about the upcoming Euro-American trade deal the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) since it was <a href="http://www.euintheus.org/press-media/ttip-launch-with-president-obama-at-g8-a-powerful-demonstration-of-our-determination-to-shape-an-open-and-rules-based-world-says-president-barroso/">announced</a> three years ago. </p>
<p>The list of worries includes companies being able to constrain public policy; the potential for weaker consumer and health and safety standards; and the secrecy around the negotiations. Genetically modified (GM) products are one subject on the table, since they fall within TTIP’s broader remit to tackle areas where the US and EU approaches are furthest apart and have therefore been ignored by <a href="http://useu.usmission.gov/transatlantic_relations.html">previous efforts</a> to harmonise regulations. Not surprisingly, perhaps, the potential effect on how GM is regulated is of serious concern. </p>
<p>In the US <a href="http://phys.org/news/2013-06-gmo-corn-soybeans-dominate.html">the share</a> of GM crops, particularly maize and soybeans, has grown steadily over the years – even though support for the technology is not universal. The US has no specific legislation over GM crops, but approves them either through the Food and Drug Administration or via national environmental policy processes, depending on the variety and purpose. </p>
<p>Approvals use a science-based risk assessment, which focuses on whether scientists have identified sufficient risks to justify a ban. Although the federal authorities are the most important in this area, municipal authorities also have jurisdiction over GM to some extent, and some Californian municipalities <a href="http://ecowatch.com/2015/12/26/yurok-tribe-bans-gmos/">have banned</a> cultivation, for example. On the other hand, attempts at both federal and state level to force consumer products to carry GM labels have failed.</p>
<h2>The European approach</h2>
<p>In the EU, applications to approve new crops go to the relevant member state and are then passed to the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). The EFSA makes a recommendation to the European Commission (EC), which in turn makes a recommendation that is subject to a vote by the member states. These recommendations are based on the <a href="http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Al32042">precautionary principle</a> – meaning that approvals might be refused if the science is not sufficiently certain about the level of risk involved. </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/seeds-of-doubt-why-consumers-weigh-up-gm-produce-and-turn-it-down-50106">As things stand</a>, only one GM crop has EU approval for cultivation. Imports of consumer products and animal feeds with GM ingredients are permitted, but they <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/gmo/traceability_labelling/index_en.htm">must be</a> labelled if the GM content is above 0.9%; and non-GM foods and feeds can display labels signalling that they are GM free. </p>
<p>The reason why so few GM products are permitted is that strong opposition in some member states, including Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, Poland and Italy, led the EC to suspend its approval processes in 1998. To get around this, new regulations introduced last April include opt-out measures so that even if a product is approved at EU level, individual member states <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-europe-will-let-member-states-opt-out-of-gm-crops-50873">can still</a> decide not to allow cultivation or use the product in food or animal feeds in their national territory. This is designed to break the deadlock and allow more pro-GM areas like Spain, Portugal and the English part of the UK to take up these products.</p>
<p>These changes to the rules are linked to a World Trade Organisation (WTO) <a href="http://nwrage.org/content/factbox-key-findings-wto-ruling-gmos">2006 ruling</a> against the EU’s approach to granting GM approvals, following pressure from US farming groups and GM manufacturers. The WTO found that most EU member states were unduly slow to deal with approval applications for new GM crops and that a previous pan-EU moratorium on new applications contravened the rules of international trade. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/109379/original/image-20160127-26792-6jnfot.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/109379/original/image-20160127-26792-6jnfot.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/109379/original/image-20160127-26792-6jnfot.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109379/original/image-20160127-26792-6jnfot.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109379/original/image-20160127-26792-6jnfot.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109379/original/image-20160127-26792-6jnfot.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109379/original/image-20160127-26792-6jnfot.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109379/original/image-20160127-26792-6jnfot.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Fruit shoot.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.shutterstock.com/pic-189324287/stock-photo-genetic-modification-of-fruit-with-a-syringe-full-of-chemicals.html?src=csl_recent_image-1">ddsign</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Other US trade agreements</h2>
<p>When it comes to predicting what TTIP could mean for the very different approaches to GM in the US and EU, people often look to the other ambitious US trade deal in the making, the <a href="https://ustr.gov/tpp/overview-of-the-TPP">Trans-Pacific Partnership</a>, which involves 11 other Pacific Rim countries. From the parts of TPP <a href="https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text">published so far</a>, environmental groups like Ecowatch <a href="http://ecowatch.com/2015/11/05/tpp-text-atttack-food-labeling-laws/">are concerned</a> that the section on sanitary and phytosanitary standards could weaken national resolve to control GM through labelling. </p>
<p>Though it doesn’t mention prevention of GM labelling as such, it includes commitments to prevent undue delays on imports of agricultural goods; to limit inspections; and accept that different systems can achieve the same outcome. Meanwhile, the sections on intellectual property include a 10-year data-exclusivity requirement for new agricultural chemical products. This appears to provide an additional economic incentive for GM producers to develop products and push for greater market share. </p>
<p>TPP also pushes for each country to recognise the other signatories’ certification systems for organic products, which raises an analogy with the US-South Korea <a href="https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta">free-trade agreement</a> of 2011. Following the agreement Korea <a href="http://www.non-gmoreport.com/articles/jan2006/korea.php">was forced</a> to adapt its zero tolerance against GM, which had previously meant that to be considered organic in that South Korea, products had to have a 100% guarantee that there was no GM contamination in them. Since certain non-GM organic products from the US could not give that 100% guarantee, they had not previously qualified as organic in Korea. The trade deal meant that if products were labelled organic in the US, they had to be accepted as organic in South Korea. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/109380/original/image-20160127-26817-ilx0uk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/109380/original/image-20160127-26817-ilx0uk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/109380/original/image-20160127-26817-ilx0uk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109380/original/image-20160127-26817-ilx0uk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109380/original/image-20160127-26817-ilx0uk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109380/original/image-20160127-26817-ilx0uk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109380/original/image-20160127-26817-ilx0uk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109380/original/image-20160127-26817-ilx0uk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">What Korea has to swallow …</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.shutterstock.com/s/korea+food/search.html?page=4&thumb_size=mosaic&inline=339006191">Sarunyu L</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Because most EU members still oppose GM, it seems highly improbable that the US will be able use the TTIP negotiations to force Europe to dramatically change its position. But GM labelling, which is voluntary in the US, might be the area where the Americans try to exert the most pressure. </p>
<p>TTIP is no doubt generating heated debates behind closed doors. Because the final outcome will depend on trade-offs and linkages across the whole agreement, it is impossible to say how this will affect GM at this stage. And even once we have a published agreement, it will take years before we see how it is implemented and interpreted in practice – just like it will with TPP. All we can say is that it has the potential to have a substantial effect on current regulation. Many people are therefore watching developments closely. </p>
<p><em>For more coverage of the debate around GM crops, <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/gm-food">click here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/53757/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Maria Garcia does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The upcoming TTIP trade agreement could force EU to liberalise GM regulations such as labelling.Maria Garcia, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/505432015-11-12T11:15:21Z2015-11-12T11:15:21ZHow the secret TTIP trade deal could enable companies to sue countries<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/101685/original/image-20151112-9396-77n3fc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The ink is dry and the full text of the major trade deal between the US and 11 Pacific Rim countries, the Trans-Pacific Partnership or TPP, has been <a href="https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text">released to the public</a>. And it contains plenty of lessons that can be applied to the ongoing negotiations between the US and European Union over the <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-the-transatlantic-trade-and-investment-partnership-37258">Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership</a>, or TTIP, geared toward removing trade barriers between the two. </p>
<p>One of the most controversial elements of TPP is the “investor-state dispute settlement” clause (or ISDS) – and the inclusion of intellectual property <a href="https://medium.com/the-trans-pacific-partnership/investment-c76dbd892f3a">under its remit</a>. Should a similar clause be included in the TTIP, companies could use it within the EU to usurp the will of both national and EU courts. And this could be very costly indeed.</p>
<p>ISDS provisions are common in trade agreements. Their <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21623756-governments-are-souring-treaties-protect-foreign-investors-arbitration">original purpose</a> was to provide a level of security for foreign investors who were planning to invest in developing countries with a record of government instability and, in some cases, a history of expropriation of foreign-owned national resources. The ISDS legal mechanism enabled investors to obtain compensation under such circumstances.</p>
<p>Now ISDS clauses are a standard part of most major trade agreements, even those agreed between developed countries, which have well-established property protections under their national constitutions. Both the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the US, Canada and Mexico and the 1993 Hong Kong-Australia Investment Protection Agreement include them. So, while the ongoing EU-US negotiations are not public, it seems likely that if such as clause appeared in the TTP, it will also be included in the TTIP. </p>
<h2>IP intrusion</h2>
<p>Especially worrying from a legal perspective is that the TTP’s <a href="https://medium.com/the-trans-pacific-partnership/investment-c76dbd892f3a">investment chapter</a> classifies intellectual property as a type of investment. If a similar clause appeared in the TTIP, investors would be able to take EU governments to court in the event of their intellectual property being “expropriated”. This is despite the fact that, as all IP lawyers know, intellectual property is not a type of investment.</p>
<p>Intellectual property is a system of exclusive rights – for authors (copyright), inventors (patents), and traders (trade marks). It is granted by a state or supra-state actor, such as the EU, in order to recognise and encourage further creativity, research and development, and trade. </p>
<p>But intellectual property law does not protect a person’s investment, as such. It is designed to protect what results from that investment. So creative works of art, literature, music and film are covered by copyright; new inventions are protected by patents; and logos and brand names are viewed as trade marks. Yet, if a person’s investment does not result in a new original work or a new invention, then there is no IP protection. There is, in effect, nothing to protect. </p>
<p>By viewing IP as an investment, the TPP and, potentially, the TTIP run the risk of undermining the right of the EU and individual countries to make legal and judicial decisions regarding the limits of IP protection. If an ISDS clause is included in the TTIP, it would mean that if the EU, or one of its member states, decides to pass more flexible IP laws – be it to enable free speech or restrict branding in the interests of public health – those governments could run the risk of being sued by companies.</p>
<h2>The precedent is set</h2>
<p>We know this is a danger because the intrusion of ISDS into the field of IP law has already begun. In 2013, the American pharmaceutical company Eli Lilly filed a legal action against Canada at a NAFTA court. Eli Lilly <a href="http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/disp-diff/eli-statement-declaration.aspx?lang=eng">argued</a> that the Canadian courts’ invalidation of two of their patents – due to insufficient evidence of the drugs’ stated benefits – was a violation of the treaty’s expropriation rules. </p>
<p>The use of ISDS to challenge the invalidation of patents is a clear attack on the principle that national courts have the right to determine matters of patent validity falling under national legislation. It is accepted within the international patent system that a court invalidating a patent cannot be an example of expropriation, as the court has decided that the patent should never have been granted in the first place. Eli Lilly made an investment, but they did not produce something patentable under Canadian law. Despite this, the ISDS dispute continues, and will prove costly for Canada to defend.</p>
<p>A similar challenge has been brought against Australia in the field of trademarks by Phillip Morris Tobacco. Since 2012, Australia has had a system of plain packaging for cigarettes. It has led to plummeting smoking rates, illustrating the impact of removing branding from cigarettes. </p>
<p>Tobacco companies objected to this move, however, and challenged it under Australian trademark law. The High Court of Australia found that the state had acted legally in restricting the use of tobacco company trade marks in this way. Under substantive trade mark law, that ought to have been the end of the story. Yet, under the ISDS provisions of the Hong Kong-Australia Investment Protection Agreement, Australia <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/australia-faces-50m-legal-bill-in-cigarette-plain-packaging-fight-with-philip-morris-20150728-gim4xo.html">now faces a massive claim for compensation</a> for this alleged expropriation of investment.</p>
<p>There are therefore inherent dangers in ISDS provisions. And while we do not know what is taking place behind the closed-door TTIP negotiations, we should warn against the inclusion of intellectual property within any potential ISDS provisions.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/50543/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Luke McDonagh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The full text of the TPP trade deal is now public and offers some worrying lessons for how TTIP could turn out.Luke McDonagh, Lecturer in Law, City, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/483612015-10-07T10:09:42Z2015-10-07T10:09:42ZWe may have cinched TPP, but is US trade a lost cause?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/97493/original/image-20151006-7335-15t4kr9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">About 98% of US exporters are small businesses. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Cargo ship via www.shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>President Barack Obama, with <a href="http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/246418-obama-to-sign-fast-track-trade-legislation">fast-track negotiating powers</a> in his back pocket, managed to seal the biggest trade agreement of the World Trade Organization era this month. </p>
<p>The passage of fast-track, agreed by Congress in June to allow a straight up-or-down vote on trade deals, means the <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-negotiators-reach-landmark-pacific-trade-deal-so-whats-next-48641">Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement</a> involving the US and 11 other countries stands a strong chance of passage, at least in the US. </p>
<p>The TPP encompasses 40% of global trade, links the US with mostly Pacific countries including Singapore, Japan and Australia, and is the biggest US trade deal since at least 1995. </p>
<p>But large, much-trumpeted trade agreements like the <a href="https://theconversation.com/five-things-you-need-to-know-about-the-trans-pacific-partnership-48653">TPP</a> and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with Europe belie a troubling trend: US trade with the world, and the Pacific in particular, has been declining. Is it too late to turn the tide? </p>
<h2>A steady decline in trade</h2>
<p>The US share of the Asia-Pacific region’s imports declined about <a href="http://www.rollcall.com/issues/58_4/Asia-Pacific-Exporting-Will-Expand-Economy-216054-1.html">43%</a> from 2000 to 2010. Clawing that back would mean the need to export an additional <a href="http://www.thirdway.org/report/boatloads-of-growth-recapturing-americas-share-of-asia-pacific-trade">US$600 billion</a> annually by 2020. </p>
<p>Meanwhile other countries have filled the gap. Part of the problem is that the US has a history of being reluctant to enter into regional trade agreements. </p>
<p>The US’ oldest trade agreement is with Israel, an <a href="https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/open_door_trade_report.pdf">accord</a> that celebrated its 30th anniversary last month. Since then, the US <a href="http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tpp/bta/fta/c26474.htm">has signed</a> just 14 regional trade agreements involving about 20 countries (18 more are currently being deliberated).</p>
<p>But during the same 30-year period, the world has seen <a href="http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicPreDefRepByEIF.aspx">256</a> new trade agreements, as registered with the World Trade Organization (see chart), with 132 of them being implemented just in the last decade.</p>
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<p>These regional trade agreements, when the US is not involved, create barriers and constraints that have an effect on market opportunities and <a href="http://fortune.com/2014/09/08/us-economic-competitiveness/">profits</a> of US companies. It is common to see tariffs that are five times higher in foreign markets than the US average. </p>
<p>Another way to look at it is that the US ranked 130 of 138 nations in terms of the amount of “<a href="https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/open_door_trade_report.pdf">tariffs faced</a>” by the country’s exports – that is, US companies face higher tariffs than nearly all our trading partners.</p>
<h2>Trade’s familiar battle lines</h2>
<p>The battle lines on TPP – which still stands a chance of being blocked by Congress – seem to be the same as for most trade agreements. Special interest groups don’t like the potential undermining of US regulations. Labor unions argue that jobs will be lost to low-salaried countries. And many argue that these agreements help only large corporations.</p>
<p>Is this really true? Not really. Barriers to exporting significantly hurt small and medium-sized US enterprises as well. Such SMEs, with fewer than 500 employees, sales of less than $33.5 million and a small geographic footprint, represent <a href="http://blog.trade.gov/2015/04/08/profile-of-u-s-exporters-highlights-contributions-of-small-and-medium-sized-businesses/">98%</a> of US exporters. Exporting is their best bet for growth.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, indications are that SMEs are slowly <a href="http://fortune.com/2014/09/08/us-economic-competitiveness/">decaying</a>, and the lack of trade is partly to blame. In a global competitiveness <a href="http://www.hbs.edu/competitiveness/research/Pages/research-details.aspx?rid=18">survey</a>, small businesses were found to be declining as a job creation vehicle, were more pessimistic about the business environment than large firms and were the businesses most affected by the decline in US global competitiveness.</p>
<h2>A not-so-rosy picture</h2>
<p>Why doesn’t the US government do more? Perhaps it is hubris. </p>
<p>The US is still the world’s <a href="https://www.uschamber.com/international/international-policy/benefits-international-trade-0">largest</a> exporter, with $2.35 trillion sent annually around the world. Some 38 million Americans have jobs because of trade. So even with the decline in overall manufacturing output since 1979, the US is doing well globally. And some of the decline has been offset by service exports ($710 billion). </p>
<p>Sound rosy? Not really.</p>
<p>While the US is consistently <a href="http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-2014-2015/report-highlights/#rankings">ranked</a> as one of the most competitive of the world’s 200 <a href="http://globaledge.msu.edu/global-insights/by/country">countries</a> and, by most accounts, is also perceived as the leader in foreign <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2015-06-09/measuring">policy</a> and world affairs, the country has not proactively engaged in worldwide trade agreements at the pace of other nations. This hurts large corporations and small businesses alike.</p>
<p>In looking at the chart, covering 1960 to 2015, it’s pretty easy to see that the proliferation of trade agreements follows the same rate as the increase in cross-border trade. Meanwhile, world production has not increased as much. We trade more across borders than we make relative to the past.</p>
<h2>Are we in or out?</h2>
<p>Based on my research, this “global supply chain effect” will continue. Just to stay competitive, companies’ global supply chains will have to become <a href="http://www.mhprofessional.com/product.php?isbn=0071827420">43%</a> more global by 2023. A primary reason is to keep up with the in- and out-flows from the Asia-Pacific region.</p>
<p>Can the US keep up? With the US engaging in fewer regional trade agreements than much of the rest of the world, it stands to reason that US companies will continue to lose out. Research that I have done backs this up. A lack of trade agreements adds to the negative “country effect” – that is, how much residing in a specific locale affects business performance. Results show that about 6% of the performance of companies depends on such <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/smj.2422/abstract">country effects</a>.</p>
<p>Either the US is in the “in group” or it has to face the “out group” consequences. Naturally, trade among countries in a trade agreement increases, while trade with countries outside it stays flat or may even decline.</p>
<p>These country effects have serious consequences, particularly for <a href="http://www.tradingeconomics.com/united-states/balance-of-trade">consumer products</a>, which are often sold like generic commodities with low profit margins. Regional trade agreements, if negotiated properly and timely signed, can help bring down <a href="http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/international_trade/">costs</a> and increase profit margins, especially for SMEs. The net gain is an increased positive country effects vis-à-vis competitors.</p>
<p>So let’s hope Congress doesn’t delay in approving TPP. But let’s also hope that the next president takes advantage of the six-year renewal of fast-track and picks up the pace of negotiating new trade deals so America’s workers and small businesses don’t get left behind.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/48361/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tomas Hult receives funding from U.S. Department of Education, National Science Foundation, and Michigan Economic Development Corporation. He is also Executive Director of the Academy of International Business, President of the Sheth Foundation, and serves on the US District Export Council.</span></em></p>The signing of the Trans-Pacific Partnership belies the fact that the US’s share of trade in the region has been declining for some time.Tomas Hult, Byington Endowed Chair and Professor of International Business, Michigan State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/465922015-09-03T10:07:10Z2015-09-03T10:07:10ZWhy US may be ready to resolve Feta dispute to clinch trade deal with EU<p>Next month, the European Union and the United States will likely resume their negotiation of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). This ambitious and far-reaching <a href="https://ustr.gov/ttip">agreement</a> will affect not only two of the world’s largest trading powers, but also other members of the international community.</p>
<p>One area that has <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/07/24/us-eu-usa-trade-cheese-idUKKCN0PY14B20150724">tripped up</a> these high-stakes trade talks concerns the labeling of cheese and other foodstuffs. In many countries, specific laws exist to protect what is generally referred to as “geographical indications.”</p>
<p>These indicators identify the geographical source from which a product derives its essential quality, reputation or other characteristics. Examples include Champagne sparkling wine, Scotch whisky, Feta cheese, prosciutto di Parma, Café de Colombia, Idaho potatoes and Darjeeling tea.</p>
<p>Thus far, the EU and the US <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/25/business/energy-environment/bridging-the-cheese-gap-food-trade-united-states-european-union-ttip.html">disagree</a> over how these indicators are to be protected. Greater protection will affect not only product labeling but also exports and jobs. </p>
<p>Although these two trading powers are unlikely to resolve their disagreement soon, the US may be more willing to increase protection of geographical indications than many expect.</p>
<h2>The fight between Old and New Worlds</h2>
<p>Historically, the protection of geographical indications has been the subject of heated debates and controversy among members of the international community.</p>
<p>Countries in the “Old World” – primarily those in Europe – advocate for strong protection of geographical indications. They remain concerned about their consumers being confused as to the origin and unique qualities of the products identified by these indicators. They also argue that unauthorized use will tarnish the indicators’ established reputations while diluting the products’ authenticity on the international market.</p>
<p>By contrast, countries in the “New World” – such as Australia, Canada, Chile and the US – oppose strong protection of geographical indications. They contend that most products can be replicated almost anywhere today, thanks to modern agricultural and manufacturing techniques.</p>
<p>They also claim that several geographical indications – such as Champagne, Feta and Gouda – have long become generic terms on their soil. In some cases, names similar or identical to these indicators have already been registered as trademarks. A prohibition on the commercial use of geographical indications – such as using Champagne for sparkling wine not made in that region of France – would therefore <a href="https://www.specialtyfood.com/news/article/cheese-industry-embattled-over-eu-naming-proposal/">damage businesses</a> while creating consumer confusion.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/93698/original/image-20150902-14061-upbb2d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/93698/original/image-20150902-14061-upbb2d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/93698/original/image-20150902-14061-upbb2d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/93698/original/image-20150902-14061-upbb2d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/93698/original/image-20150902-14061-upbb2d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/93698/original/image-20150902-14061-upbb2d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/93698/original/image-20150902-14061-upbb2d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Cognac is one of the relatively few foods offered some geographical indication protection.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Cognac glass via www.shutterstock.com</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Growing international protection</h2>
<p>Since 1994, the so-called <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm">TRIPS Agreement</a> of the World Trade Organization (WTO) has introduced international minimum standards for the protection of geographical indications. The WTO also offers expanded protection to wines and spirits.</p>
<p>In addition, other multilateral and regional efforts have been undertaken to protect geographical indications. A case in point is the <a href="http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/registration/lisbon/">Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and Geographical Indications</a>. Despite the continuous differences between the Old and New Worlds, the scope of this agreement was recently <a href="http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2015/article_0009.html">expanded</a> at the World Intellectual Property Organization in Geneva.</p>
<p>Thus far, the US has not offered independent protection to geographical indications. Instead, it allows these indicators to be protected as trademarks, certification marks or collective marks.</p>
<p>For instance, Brunello di Montalcino, Cognac, Darjeeling and Jamaica Blue Mountain coffee are all currently <a href="http://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/ip-policy/geographical-indications/geographical-indications-faqs">protected</a> as certification marks in the US. Federal and state laws also offer <a href="http://www.ttb.gov/wine/ava.shtml">additional protection</a> to appellations of origin for wines. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/93696/original/image-20150902-14045-1ll8213.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/93696/original/image-20150902-14045-1ll8213.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/93696/original/image-20150902-14045-1ll8213.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/93696/original/image-20150902-14045-1ll8213.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/93696/original/image-20150902-14045-1ll8213.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/93696/original/image-20150902-14045-1ll8213.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/93696/original/image-20150902-14045-1ll8213.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Vintners in Napa Valley have been among those arguing the US should adopt geographical indications.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Napa Valley via www.shutterstock.com</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The slowly evolving US position</h2>
<p>Although the US has a longstanding skepticism toward protecting geographical indications, at least five reasons exist to suggest the country’s increasing willingness to strengthen protection in this area.</p>
<p>First, the protection of geographical indications has already received growing support from US industries. Napa Valley Vintners, for example, has strongly advocated for such protection on behalf of its member wineries. In 2007, this trade group successfully <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/02/idUS28885+02-May-2012+BW20120502">secured</a> protection for “Napa Valley” as a US geographical indication in the EU.</p>
<p>A 2013 <a href="http://www.origin-gi.com/images/stories/PDFs/English/papers/Geographical_Indications_in_the_United_States_-_Supporting_Memo_FINAL_WEB.pdf">industry study</a> also provided a long list of potential US geographical indications. This list included not only well-known wine-producing regions, but also lesser-known regions such as Alexandria Lakes in Minnesota, the Bell Mountain in Texas, the Kanawha River Valley in West Virginia and the Old Mission Peninsula in Michigan.</p>
<p>Second, in addition to the TTIP, the US continues to negotiate bilateral and regional trade agreements with countries that have offered strong protection of geographical indications. During these negotiations, <a href="http://www.dairyreporter.com/Markets/US-EU-can-reach-compromise-on-geographical-indications-EDA">compromises</a> on how to protect these indicators will inevitably be reached. Indeed, many US free trade agreements already include provisions addressing the potential conflict between the trademark system and the protection of geographical indications.</p>
<p>Third, stronger protection of these indicators would offer significant trade benefits to US exporters. Such protection would harmonize labeling standards while reducing marketing costs. If US products are of recognized qualities or reputations, enabling foreign consumers to quickly select these products would also enhance sales.</p>
<p>After all, the US, like Europe, has its own geographical indications. These indicators include Idaho potatoes, Florida oranges, Vidalia onions, Napa Valley wines and Washington State apples.</p>
<p>Fourth, greater protection of geographical indications would benefit US consumers by enabling them to purchase authentic products locally. Many Americans now travel abroad and have a better understanding of foreign cuisines and cultures. After tasting Parmigiano-Reggiano in Italy or sipping Darjeeling tea in India, they would certainly appreciate finding the same products in home grocery stores. </p>
<p>Finally, European countries and industries continue to shame the US into offering stronger protection of geographical indications. In January 2013, for instance, the champagne lobby strongly <a href="http://www.wine-searcher.com/m/2013/01/obama-inauguration-irks-champagne-producers">protested</a> the listing of “Korbel Natural Russian River Valley Champagne” on the menu of the inauguration dinner for the second term of the Obama administration. As the lobby’s spokesperson emphatically <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/10/obama-inauguration-champagne-french_n_2448408.html">declared</a>, “Champagne only comes from Champagne, France,” not Sonoma County in California.</p>
<p>In sum, although the US is unlikely to volunteer to strengthen protection of geographical indications, it may be willing to do so if the EU offers the right concessions in other areas of trade or investment. Thus, the TTIP negotiations – despite the ongoing challenges – can serve as an important platform for the two trading powers to narrow their differences.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/46592/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The US may be closer than people think to a deal over geographical indications, laws that protect products based on their location such as Champagne, Darjeeling tea and prosciutto di Parma.Peter K. Yu, Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Center for Law and Intellectual Property , Texas A&M UniversityIrene Calboli, Professor of Law, Texas A&M UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/452792015-08-07T15:05:24Z2015-08-07T15:05:24ZWhy Europe and the US are locked in a food fight over TTIP<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/91035/original/image-20150806-5266-u0ci1m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Black Forest ham, Asiago, Gorgonzola, Gouda, and many other European geographical indications for foodstuffs are at the centre of a TTIP food fight. They are all protected from imitation by other companies in many countries of the world. Not in the US though. And as the details of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership are negotiated, the EU wants to stop American manufacturers from being able to falsely label their products with their protected names. </p>
<p>Part of the EU’s <a href="http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32012R1151">legal framework</a> for protecting regional food products is that they have acquired a strong reputation among consumers the world over. Favourable climates and centuries-old manufacturing techniques rooted in their protected areas have contributed to build up this renown. They are intellectual property rights that identify “products with a story”.</p>
<p>The US plays by different rules, however. There are numerous American companies that use European geographical and traditional names (including Parmesan, Asiago and feta for cheese) to identify products that have not been produced in the relevant European locations – and often do not have the same quality as the originals. This lack of protection – European negotiators stress – allows an unacceptable exploitation of Europe’s cultural heritage, as well as costing EU manufacturers large amounts of revenue.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/91037/original/image-20150806-5260-1w9kjfr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/91037/original/image-20150806-5260-1w9kjfr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/91037/original/image-20150806-5260-1w9kjfr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/91037/original/image-20150806-5260-1w9kjfr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/91037/original/image-20150806-5260-1w9kjfr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/91037/original/image-20150806-5260-1w9kjfr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/91037/original/image-20150806-5260-1w9kjfr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Feta: accept no non-Greek imitations.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">shutterstock.com</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The US is, however, resisting these claims. Its negotiators maintain that their food producers have been using and trademarking European geographical names for many decades, and it would now be unfair to ask them to stop.</p>
<p>The US also claims that many of the geographical terms, such as Parmesan, Fontina, feta, Gouda and Edam, have become the generic names of the relevant products, and cannot be monopolised by anyone, including the European producers located in those areas. Indeed, most US consumers <a href="http://www.commonfoodnames.com/the-issue/our-mission/">don’t even know</a> that these terms are actually geographical names. To them they just describe the characteristics of a product.</p>
<p>EU-style legal protection – the US argument goes – would give European food producers unfair advantage in the marketplace. It would amount to a trade barrier, which would force many US producers to go through an expensive re-brand, and would increase final prices for consumers. It would take a heavy toll on the US cheese market in light of the US$21 billion in US cheese production that <a href="http://www.foodmanufacturing.com/news/2015/02/us-dairy-industry-concerned-geographical-indications-and-common-food-name-issues">uses European-origin names</a>.</p>
<h2>Finding a solution</h2>
<p>A similar situation arose between the EU and Canada in negotiations over their trade deal, the <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/">Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement (CETA)</a>. Though not yet ratified, they reached a compromise last year after more than four years of negotiations that could offer hope to TTIP negotiators.</p>
<p>CETA does not give European food producers strong exclusive rights over all their geographical indications. Rather, it leaves Canadian competitors a certain degree of freedom to use European geographical names. For example, while this treaty strongly protects certain European wines and spirits such as Champagne, Bordeaux and Cognac, several other names have been offered only limited protection. Canadian food producers are left free to use the English and French translated version of some European terms, such as St George cheese, Black Forest ham, Tiroler bacon, as well as Munich and Bavarian beer.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/91053/original/image-20150806-5245-1ehr5vs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/91053/original/image-20150806-5245-1ehr5vs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=258&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/91053/original/image-20150806-5245-1ehr5vs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=258&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/91053/original/image-20150806-5245-1ehr5vs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=258&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/91053/original/image-20150806-5245-1ehr5vs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/91053/original/image-20150806-5245-1ehr5vs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/91053/original/image-20150806-5245-1ehr5vs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Gouda: protected, kind of.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Megan Clement</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>CETA also allows Canadian cheese manufacturers that were established after 2013 to lawfully use some European geographical indications, such as Fontina, Asiago, feta, Gorgonzola and Münster, accompanied by terms like “style”, “type” or “kind”. Plus, CETA protects several EU geographical names in Canada as compound names (which is also what happens in Europe). So, Edam Holland and Gouda Holland are protected (not just Edam and Gouda), as is Mortadella Bologna and Brie de Meaux (not just mortadella or brie).</p>
<p>So, even though CETA does not give European producers the same level of protection over their geographical names as they have in the EU, it has been welcomed. Limited protection is better than none at all. And, the treaty will also eliminate customs duties for the European farming and food sector, with nearly 92% of EU agriculture and food products <a href="http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-542_en.htm">to be exported to Canada duty-free</a>.</p>
<p>While Europeans negotiators hope to reach a similar result in negotiations over TTIP, it is not certain whether their US counterparts will relent and grant European food products even the limited protection they have under CETA. American resistance to the EU’s geographical indicators seems very strong. Last year 55 US senators <a href="http://www.commonfoodnames.com/senators-urge-negotiators-to-defend-common-names/">sent a letter</a> to the US Trade Representative (the government agency tasked with conducting trade negotiations) urging that it be made clear to the EU that the US will reject any TTIP proposal that would restrict in any way the ability of US producers to use their existing names. This includes those that use European geographical terms, which are perceived by US consumers as the common names of food products, especially cheeses.</p>
<p>Thus, the row between Europe and the US over geographical name protection does not seem close to an end.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/45279/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Enrico Bonadio does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>An important sticking point in TTIP negotiations has US and European representatives fighting over food labels.Enrico Bonadio, Senior Lecturer in Law, City, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/438572015-07-29T05:21:09Z2015-07-29T05:21:09ZIs the NHS under threat from free trade?<p>The National Health Service is one of the biggest and <a href="http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2013/01/nhs-even-more-cherished-monarchy-and-army">most popular</a> arms of the UK public service. Attempts to privatise healthcare provision have been <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2012/jan/15/labour-opposition-nhs-privatisation-plans">fiercely resisted</a> and <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/oct/01/david-cameron-nhs-budget-pledge-2015-election">all major political parties</a> present themselves as protectors and champions of the NHS. But what if politicians’ ability to decide medical and public health policies was taken away from them – and the NHS was forced to compete against private companies in a free market?</p>
<p>That’s one of the fears about the major free trade agreement being negotiated between the EU and the USA. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-the-transatlantic-trade-and-investment-partnership-37258">Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership</a> (TTIP) seeks to cut tariffs and regulations that act as barriers to trade between the countries involved. </p>
<p>For the health sector, it holds the potential to change the rules that currently protect patients and healthcare professionals, define competition in the provision of medical services and structure public health policy. But how much of the noise being made by <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/mar/25/mps-denounce-government-ttip-plans">health community actors</a> is scaremongering and how much warrants greater attention?</p>
<h2>Lack of transparency</h2>
<p>The major concerns about TTIP are not solely about what the agreement says but also about the way in which it is being negotiated. The health sector faces the same fundamental problem in organising and preparing a response to TTIP as every other sector: until a final text is agreed it is impossible to assess the impacts. Put simply, we don’t yet know what TTIP says.</p>
<p>The lack of transparency in the negotiations has been <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-33422086">heavily criticised</a> and the European Commission (the EU’s executive body) has recently responded by publishing its <a href="http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-14-306_en.htm">official negotiating mandate</a>. However, the current draft of the compromise text remains unavailable to all except those involved in negotiations and members of the European parliament (MEPs), who are only able to view it in designated reading rooms. </p>
<p>The lack of documentation makes assessing TTIP’s content difficult – but already a number of potential threats to the NHS have been identified. The central concern is that the agreement could open the NHS up to American suppliers and healthcare companies, liberalising the market and increasing the privatisation of health services.</p>
<p>Under EU law, health is classed as a “service of general economic interest”, meaning that it could theoretically be understood as a market activity and that barriers to free competition between private, public and UK and US-based service providers could be challenged in court. Indeed it is feasible that industry and even some elements of national governments favour <a href="http://www.epha.org/IMG/pdf/LSE_study-TTIP_International_Trade_Law_Health_Systems_and_Public_Health_website.pdf">exploiting the benefits</a> in terms of increased exports of goods and services associated with healthcare.</p>
<p>However, the worst-case scenario looks unlikely for the time being. Those documents that have been released to date have generally included an exclusion for publicly funded health services – and the commission’s negotiating team has consistently stated there is no intention to use TTIP in this way.</p>
<p>The NHS European office, which provides a crucial link between EU policy and NHS organisations, has done extensive work on the TTIP and in 2014 <a href="http://www.nhsconfed.org/resources/2014/11/the-transatlantic-trade-and-investment-partnership-and-the-nhs-separating-myth-from-fact">issued a briefing</a> that presents the “evidence of reassurance” on this point. It supports the inclusion of a specific exemption for health but is measured in its assessment of the risks, listing a number of public statements from both the commission and UK politicians that pledge to protect health.</p>
<h2>Investor protection</h2>
<p>Another, arguably far more worrying, element of TTIP is the way it would allow companies to sue the government if policies hurt their profits or investments. This Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism would use controversial private arbitration panels made up of lawyers to oversee such lawsuits behind closed doors. This would undermine the UK and EU legal systems and make judicial review impossible.</p>
<p>The ISDS is particularly worrying for the NHS in light of two important legal cases. In <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/analysis-and-features/big-tobacco-puts-countries-on-trial-as-concerns-over-ttip-deals-mount-9807478.html">Philip Morris v Australia</a>, a large tobacco firm is currently using the courts to challenge a ban on branding on cigarette packaging.</p>
<p>In Achmea v Slovakia, a company investing in health insurance services sued the Slovakian government over plans to establish a single health insurance company. In this matter, the tribunal ruled it <a href="http://www.finance.gov.sk/en/Default.aspx?CatID=10&id=76">did not have jurisdiction</a> over the democratic process – but the case for compensation remains open and the company <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-12-10/achmea-wins-arbitration-against-slovakia-over-insurance">won a previous suit</a> in 2012. </p>
<p>If it becomes easier to sue governments in this way, they might be put off taking action to protect public health or improve service provision that risks damaging companies’ profits.</p>
<h2>Caution and vigilance</h2>
<p>Other potential risks posed by the TTIP include the negative health impacts from reduced tariffs on unhealthy foods and less stringent standards for the approval of drugs. There might also be delays to patient access to medicines because higher intellectual property (IP) standards in the US could mean cheaper copies of “originator” drugs are banned for longer.</p>
<p>However, equally possible is the potential for TTIP to increase access to medicines currently held up by duplicated regulatory procedures, to facilitate the trade of superior health technologies and to improve healthcare standards.</p>
<p>The TTIP does not have to include the ISDS in its current form. In fact, the divisions over the mechanism are so deep that the European parliament recently <a href="http://healthgovernance.ideasoneurope.eu/2015/06/12/european-parliament-ttip-debacle/">postponed a vote</a> on whether to include ISDS in its draft report.</p>
<p>Until the final wording of the treaty is released, those worried about TTIP can do little but remain vigilant, press for greater transparency and recognise the ever-more-apparent impact of trade upon healthcare provision.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/43857/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ellie Brooks is a consultant for the European Public Health Alliance, Europe's leading NGO advocating for better health, and a PhD candidate at Lancaster University, where she is supported by the Economic and Social Research Council. </span></em></p>There’s plenty of noise but also some genuine concerns about how the TTIP trade agreement could force healthcare privatisation.Ellie Brooks, PhD candidate, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.