tag:theconversation.com,2011:/es/topics/caliphate-11299/articlesCaliphate – The Conversation2022-10-31T09:59:15Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1921372022-10-31T09:59:15Z2022-10-31T09:59:15ZFive things you need to know about the Ottoman empire<p>For centuries empires were the dominant form of political organisation. In the west there is some degree of familiarity with the British, French and German empires, and the empires of Spain and Portugal. Not to mention the Romans or the Greeks. But one empire that sometimes gets forgotten, outside Turkey, is the Ottoman. </p>
<p>On the 100th anniversary of its end on <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abolition_of_the_Ottoman_sultanate">November 1 1922</a>, we look at five things you need to know about it.</p>
<h2>1. What was its size and how long did it last?</h2>
<p>The Ottoman empire lasted almost 600 years, from the early 1300s until the aftermath of the first world war. The word Ottoman derives from the Arabic version of Osman – <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Osman-I">the name of its first ruler</a>. The empire had a humble beginning as a provincial principality in Anatolia (now part of Turkey). </p>
<p>What transformed it into a rising and sizeable force in world politics was the gradual expansion into the lands of the declining Byzantine empire. This process came to a conclusion in 1453 with the conquest of Constantinople, the capital of the <a href="https://guides.loc.gov/byzantine-empire">Byzantine empire</a>. </p>
<p>Constantinople was renamed Istanbul and it became the seat of a new rising empire. In the 15th century the city became a vibrant centre of trade and architectural innovation. A period of steady expansion followed and the empire extended over parts of the Middle East along the Red Sea, northern Africa, the Balkans and eastern Europe and up to the walls of the city of Vienna. </p>
<h2>2. How much power did it have?</h2>
<p>The height of the empire’s power came in the 16th century with the rule of Süleyman the Magnificent, one of the empire’s <a href="https://archive.org/details/SULEYMAN2/page/n1/mode/2up">longest-running sultans </a>. A testament to the power of the empire is the fact that Süleyman acquired the nickname “magnificent” in the west. Within the Ottoman empire he was known as “the lawgiver”. </p>
<p>During his reign, the empire acquired a new legal code and underwent a period of cultural renaissance powered by a blend of Christian, Islamist and <a href="https://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/suly/hd_suly.htm">Arabic elements</a>. The empire also offered safe passage to Sephardic Jews fleeing persecution in the Iberian Peninsula (Spain and Portugal). </p>
<p>By the early 16th century, the Ottoman empire had one of the largest Jewish communities in the word. Constantinople, the city wasn’t officially renamed Istanbul until 1930, became a real blend of cultures. And throughout the renaissance, the Ottomans became the biggest trade partner of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2021/oct/22/the-ottomans-by-marc-david-baer-review-when-east-mixed-with-west">western Europe</a>. </p>
<h2>3. What was its effect and relationship with Europe?</h2>
<p>The walls of the city of Vienna marked the apex of the Ottoman’s empire power and the beginnings of its slow and gradual demise. The empire became a subject of admiration in the European courts. Its cultural life attracted the attention of western <a href="https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=25911">European thinkers and artists</a>. Its military organisation and might captured the attention of theorists and politicians alike. The Ottomans became one of the key subjects of the 18th and 19th century aesthetic and scientific movement known as <a href="https://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/euor/hd_euor.htm">Orientalism</a>. </p>
<p>Crucially, the Ottoman Empire was in part a European empire. Its reach extended over lands such as the Balkans and southeastern Europe that now firmly belong in Europe. And, despite its diminishing power in the 18th and 19th century, Christian and Muslim populations across the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean lived alongside one another in relatively tolerant societies. </p>
<p>This begins to change from the middle of the 19th century due the empire’s centralisation of power and administration, away from its diverse and far-flung parts. By the early 20th century, the European provinces of the empire become sites of violence and ethnoreligious conflict. The turning point is the <a href="https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/balkan_wars_1912-1913">Balkan wars (1912-3)</a> which cut off from the empire some of its most diverse and richest provinces in southeastern Europe.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/492145/original/file-20221027-21-fz1v6m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A map in yellow and brown showing Turkey and the Ottoman Empire." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/492145/original/file-20221027-21-fz1v6m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/492145/original/file-20221027-21-fz1v6m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492145/original/file-20221027-21-fz1v6m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492145/original/file-20221027-21-fz1v6m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492145/original/file-20221027-21-fz1v6m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=639&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492145/original/file-20221027-21-fz1v6m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=639&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492145/original/file-20221027-21-fz1v6m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=639&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A map of the Ottoman Empire in 1683, and Turkey today.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Peter Hermes Furian/Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>4. What was its relationship with the Arab world?</h2>
<p>The Ottoman empire extended its reach across parts of what is now known as the Arab world from Cairo to Algiers. For a long time, the Ottoman grip in the Middle East was minimal. The key preoccupations were with the protection of key trade outposts and the holy cities of Islam. Having mutual trade links and economies led different regions to exist happily as one unit, and retain loyalty to the Ottoman <a href="https://aeon.co/essays/ottoman-cosmopolitanism-and-the-myth-of-the-sectarian-middle-east">empire</a>. </p>
<p>With the outbreak of the first world war, however, this started to change. The rise of Arab nationalism and the dynamics of the war propaganda fomented movements across the Arab world that actively sought to break with the Ottoman state. </p>
<h2>What is its influence on modern Turkey?</h2>
<p>The defeat of the Greek army in Anatolia in 1922 by the forces of Turkish nationalism marked the de facto collapse of the Ottoman empire and the emergence of a new successor state, modern Turkey. The Greek-Turkish war became a rallying cry for anti-colonial pan-Islamist movements across the Middle East and India. </p>
<p>But Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Turkey’s founder and first leader, wanted to make a radical break from the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/princeton-scholarship-online/book/21217/chapter-abstract/180872127?redirectedFrom=fulltext">Ottoman heritage</a>. He moved the capital of the new state from Constantinople to Ankara and initiated a series of rapid reforms such as the change of the alphabet and <a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/1924/03/08/the-abolition-of-the-caliphate">the abolition of the khalifate</a>, the idea of an absolute monarchy over the Islamic world. Despite the radical break with the imperial past, a debate between tradition and modernisation continued to shape the evolution of Turkish political life. </p>
<p>In the past few decades Turkey has been witnessing the return of a political and cultural movement that pushes back against the western, secular orientation <a href="https://icsr.info/2019/05/23/erdogan-and-the-last-quest-for-the-greenmantle/">of the country</a> and looks back selectively at the Ottoman past as a guide for the present. The decision by Erdogan’s government to convert the famous Byzantine temple <a href="https://theconversation.com/hagia-sophia-has-been-converted-back-into-a-mosque-but-the-veiling-of-its-figural-icons-is-not-a-muslim-tradition-144042">Hagia Sophia back into a mosque</a> in 2020, despite <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/07/1068151">widespread international condemnation</a>, offers a tangible example of a nod to the Ottoman past in <a href="https://soundcloud.com/internationalhistorynow/episode-3-cultural-crises-in-the-pandemic-hagia-sophia-as-a-mosque">modern Turkey</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192137/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Georgios Giannakopoulos does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Ottoman empire once stretched from Vienna to Cairo, an expert explains its power.Georgios Giannakopoulos, Visiting Research Fellow, King's College London/ Lecturer in Modern History, City University of London, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1836722022-06-01T14:48:55Z2022-06-01T14:48:55ZIslamic State: how western European states are failing to protect 28,000 children born to foreign fighters<p>The Irish national and former soldier, <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/tags/lisa-smith/">Lisa Smith</a>, has been <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-61634100">found guilty</a> by the Special Criminal Court in Dublin, of joining Islamic State (IS). Smith left Dundalk in 2015, bound for Syria. On her return to Ireland in 2019 she was charged with <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/news/crime-and-law/courts/district-court/lisa-smith-sent-forward-for-trial-on-terrorism-charges-1.4318699">membership of an unlawful terrorist group</a> and financing terrorism. She was found guilty of the first charge but not guilty of the second. Smith now awaits sentencing. </p>
<p>Like thousands of women and girls around the world, Smith travelled to Syria to live in the IS caliphate. She married a British jihadi and gave birth to their child in Raqqa. As IS fell, she and her two-year-old daughter fled to the camps controlled by Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northern Syria. </p>
<p>Following attacks on the camps in 2019, Smith and her daughter were detained by Turkey, then <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-50619857">deported</a> back to Ireland. She was arrested at Dublin airport. </p>
<p>Smith’s situation is all too familiar. What sets it apart from other, similar cases is the Irish state’s response. At a time when most western European states are refusing to repatriate IS-affiliated nationals, <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/irish-is-bride-lisa-smith-to-appear-in-court-after-deportation-from-turkey-11877906">Ireland has accepted responsibility</a> for Smith and her daughter.</p>
<p>Our research shows that refusal to repatriate not only contravenes international legal obligations to <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-rights-do-the-children-of-islamic-state-have-under-international-law-112322">safeguard children</a>, it is also counterproductive to <a href="https://academic.oup.com/jcsl/advance-article/doi/10.1093/jcsl/krac013/6574642">national security</a> aims. Such measures can prevent return, rehabilitation and reintegration of individuals who may want to leave a violent armed group and who do not, or no longer, constitute a threat.</p>
<h2>One in four IS affiliates are women and children</h2>
<p>It is <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13463.doc.htm">estimated</a> that between 2013 and 2018, 41,490 foreign citizens across 80 countries became affiliated with IS. Approximately 13% of them are women and 12% are children. In other words, one in four of IS’s affiliates are women and children. </p>
<p>According to <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/11/1050561">UN reports</a>, around 28,000 children of foreign fighters are living in SDF-controlled camps in Syria. Half of the children are under the age of five, and 80% are under 12. </p>
<p>The conditions within these camps are deplorable. There is overcrowding and an absence of medical care. Infrastructure is poor. Food, clean water and sanitation are inadequate, and children lack access to education. And violence is a serious issue. </p>
<p>This situation should be of vital concern to the international community. <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights">Universal rights</a> to protection from violence and inhuman or degrading treatment and to provision of healthcare, education and decent standards of living are being seriously compromised. </p>
<p>Furthermore, <a href="http://collections.unu.edu/eserv/UNU:6409/Cradled_by_Conflict.pdf">studies</a> show that the camps are breeding grounds for radicalisation and recruitment, as well as abduction by armed groups. There have been <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ctc/content/secretary-general%E2%80%99s-isil-reports">repeated warnings</a> by the United Nations Security Council that failure to address this situation presents a serious threat to long-term international and regional security.</p>
<p>Many <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/extremism-watch_us-backed-syrian-forces-hand-over-34-children-fighters-russia/6204768.html">Central Asian</a> states have repatriated hundreds of their nationals, mostly women and children. Most western states, by contrast, have sought to <a href="https://theconversation.com/repatriation-of-dutch-children-in-syria-now-unlikely-but-it-shouldnt-be-a-political-choice-137960">avoid responsibility</a>. </p>
<p>The UK, France, Belgium, <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-to-do-about-islamic-state-supporters-still-in-syria-denmarks-decision-sets-a-worrying-trend-161971">Denmark</a> and others, have <a href="https://files.institutesi.org/Instrumentalising_Citizenship_Global_Trends_Report.pdf">stripped citizenship</a> from those they consider a threat to national security. They have also often used legal mechanisms to prevent repatriation. </p>
<p>The French Conseil d’Etat has rejected claims for repatriation on the basis that this would necessitate intervention in a foreign territory, which is outside its judicial remit. And <a href="https://academic.oup.com/jcsl/advance-article/doi/10.1093/jcsl/krac013/6574642">we have explored</a> the Belgian Appeals Court’s ruling that Belgian authorities, including diplomatic and consular services, have no legal obligation to repatriate children or their mothers. This ruling overturned a decision by a lower court that held that Belgium should do everything it could to facilitate repatriation. </p>
<p>We are of the view, however, that diplomatic protection as a mechanism under international law, with its connection to nationality, seems unlikely to provide a solution in a manner acceptable generally to governments. Further, its individualised nature means it is not appropriate for dealing with a collective, international problem that involves many thousands of people and many different countries.</p>
<h2>Repatriation is a safeguarding issue</h2>
<p>It is true that the legal situation is complicated. When it comes to children, the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-rights-child">Convention on the Rights of the Child</a> (CRC) is the central, international treaty and all states other than the US are party to it. </p>
<p>Under the CRC, the rights of children are to be respected at all times, including during emergencies and armed conflict. Children have rights to birth registration, names and nationality and, as far as possible, to be cared for and to know their parents. States are required to take all possible measures to provide children with the rights to education, the highest attainable standard of health, freedom from disease and malnutrition, access to clean drinking water, social security, a standard of living adequate for physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development as well as rest, play and leisure. </p>
<p>Some <a href="https://www.ejiltalk.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/CRC_C_85_D_79_2019_E-1.pdf">UN human rights bodies</a> have argued that the CRC dictates that states have obligations to protect the rights of child nationals in Syrian camps. The implication is that they ought to repatriate the children concerned in order to safeguard them. But the law is unclear on whether states owe obligations outside their territory in this situation and <a href="https://www.ejiltalk.org/repatriating-the-children-of-foreign-terrorist-fighters-and-the-extraterritorial-application-of-human-rights/">legal experts</a> have cast doubt on the soundness of the reasoning in these decisions. </p>
<p>Using nationality as the basis for repatriation is also difficult. <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Terrorism/UNSRsPublicJurisdictionAnalysis2020.pdf">Human rights bodies</a> have asserted that states of nationality are best placed to provide protection. But few children have birth registration documents and many have parents of different nationalities. This raises questions as to which state should bear the responsibility of repatriation. States wield significant legal control over nationality and citizenship – these are therefore vulnerable to manipulation to suit national, political priorities.</p>
<p>Regardless of the legal technicalities, this is a situation that urgent needs to be resolved. There is no international law that unequivocally requires states to repatriate children. But the principles that children should be protected, provided for, and – by inference – should not be subjected to the conditions within the camps of Syria, is one that all states are committed to under the CRC. </p>
<p><a href="https://academic.oup.com/jcsl/advance-article/doi/10.1093/jcsl/krac013/6574642?login=true">We have argued</a> that when children experience this kind of extreme circumstance – hunger, lack of access to socioeconomic opportunities, abandonment and exposure to violence – they are left with few choices and can be compelled to become involved in extremism. Exclusionist, national policies that leave children stigmatised and rejected further <a href="https://academic.oup.com/jcsl/advance-article/doi/10.1093/jcsl/krac013/6574642?login=true">pave the route to involvement</a> with criminal networks and radical groups as children seek new support networks.</p>
<p>The children of IS are have been left to suffer as a result of the decisions and actions of their parents. Their human rights, under international law, continue to be violated. We need to recognise their victimhood.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/183672/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Western European states are ignoring the international legal rights of children and using national security arguments to avoid responsibility for them.Alison Bisset, Associate Professor in International Human Rights Law, University of Reading, University of ReadingSaeed Bagheri, Lecturer in International Law, University of ReadingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1785112022-05-06T12:32:38Z2022-05-06T12:32:38ZBillions spent on overseas counterterrorism would be better spent by involving ex-terrorists<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/461093/original/file-20220503-28209-o2b2fh.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Machmudi 'Yusuf' Hariono, left, a former Indonesian terrorist, holds a book about former terrorists with an Islamic jihadist.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Courtesy of Yusuf Hariono</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>For decades, the U.S. government has sent aid to countries plagued by terrorism, believing that the money could help other nations tackle extremism. Money matters, but it alone isn’t enough to prevent terrorism.</p>
<p>An explosion <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/22/world/asia/afghanistan-mosque-attack.html">at a mosque</a> in northern Afghanistan killed more than 30 people on April 22, 2022, just days after blasts at schools in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/19/world/asia/afghanistan-kabul-schools-attacked.html">Kabul killed six</a>.</p>
<p>These were the latest in a long string of terrorist attacks in Afghanistan. The <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/afghanistan-tops-2021-global-survey-of-islamic-state-casualties-/6415735.html">Islamic State conducted</a> 365 terrorist attacks in Afghanistan that caused 2,210 casualties in 2021 alone.</p>
<p>The United States, meanwhile, has spent approximately <a href="https://usafacts.org/articles/how-much-did-the-us-spend-in-aid-to-afghanistan/">US$91.4 billion</a> on foreign aid to Afghanistan since 2001, while other countries gave <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-did-billions-in-aid-to-afghanistan-accomplish-5-questions-answered-166804">billions more</a>. Most of this money went toward Afghanistan’s military. </p>
<p>The U.S. <a href="https://www.foreignassistance.gov">spent more than</a> $1.1 billion on Afghanistan in fiscal 2021, and $1 billion on aid in fiscal 2020.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://jsis.washington.edu/people/frederick-bernard-loesi/">a doctoral candidate</a> researching how to get militants to adopt more moderate positions and stop committing violence, I have spoken with 23 former Indonesian terrorist detainees since October 2020 to study their experiences. These people planned, facilitated or otherwise took part in bombings and attacks on civilians. </p>
<p>My research shows that international aid does not stop terrorists from carrying out violent acts, because most counterterrorism projects do not directly involve or appeal to detained and released terrorists. </p>
<h2>Speaking with terrorists</h2>
<p>I have found that listening to ex-terrorists is the best approach to understanding how and why they walk away from terrorism.</p>
<p>When I spoke with former Indonesian terrorists through video meetings and calls, they all told me that they once cared only about exterminating America and its allies. This is because they thought these countries were trying to repress Muslims worldwide. </p>
<p>They also justified their violent jihad as a way to enforce a caliphate, <a href="https://www.vox.com/2014/7/10/5884593/9-questions-about-the-caliphate-you-were-too-embarrassed-to-ask">a term</a> that refers to an all-encompassing Muslim state. </p>
<p>Less than half of the 23 former terrorists that I spoke with participated in <a href="https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/a_new_approach_epub.pdf">deradicalization programs</a>, designed to move people away from extremism, while they were in prison. But all of them were part of such programs, sponsored by nonprofit organizations and the Indonesian government, after their release. </p>
<p>All of the former terrorists also went on to receive vocational training, and some also got money from the Indonesian government and nonprofits to start small businesses. </p>
<p>Others received psychological counseling, or participated in talks on religion. Some participated in outdoor retreats organized by the Indonesian police, with hiking and other recreational activities. </p>
<p>A few of the ex-terrorists I spoke with acknowledged that the government helped them pay for their children’s school tuition. </p>
<p>These people began to shift their views, and move away from extremism, after they developed a strong sense of community support and respect for government and police authorities. </p>
<p>“I started to change when the police treated me well, and my community accepted me for who I am,” explained one female former terrorist who was a “bride” – a term used to describe a suicide bomber. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/04/indonesian-women-being-radicalised-into-would-be-suicide-bombers-report">The police captured her</a> just before she could carry out an attack in Bali in 2016. </p>
<h2>Terrorism funding</h2>
<p>Parts of Indonesia, a Southeast Asian country with the world’s largest Muslim population, are considered a <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/terrorism-havens-indonesia">haven for terrorism</a> – though the number of terrorist attacks <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ctc/news/indonesia-becomes-sixth-member-state-brief-ctc-developments-july-2019-follow-visit">has recently declined</a> there. It remains a transit and destination hub for Islamic militants. </p>
<p>Indonesia received <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1881/FY-2020-CBJ-State-and-USAID-Supplementary-Tables.pdf">almost $5 million in 2020</a> from U.S. Agency for International Development alone to contain violent extremism. It received the third largest amount of money from the U.S. for this kind of programming after Somalia and Bangladesh. </p>
<p>The U.S. has <a href="https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/files/file-attachments/CT_Spending_Report_0.pdf">spent an estimated</a> $2.8 trillion on counterterrorism from fiscal 2002 through 2017, according to the Stimson Center, a nonprofit think tank in Washington, D.C. </p>
<p>But even extensive international aid isn’t a sure fix for ending terrorism. </p>
<p>Afghanistan and <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-announces-humanitarian-assistance-for-iraq/">Iraq are</a> two examples of countries that receive big donations from the U.S. and other countries each year but <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/10/world/europe/war-on-terror-bush-biden-qaeda.html">still struggle with violent radicalism</a>.</p>
<p>Most of this money and work focuses on helping governments and local organizations carry out programs to fight extremism. These might include workshops for government officials focused on addressing terrorism and training sessions for women on how to start small businesses. </p>
<p>However, these programs typically do not directly involve former terrorist inmates and their families. This matters, because it mattered to the individuals I spoke with when they were included in counterterrorism projects. This is one of the big reasons they changed their ways, they told me. </p>
<h2>Aid doesn’t reach former terrorists</h2>
<p>Major donor countries like the U.S. have increasingly acknowledged <a href="https://institute.global/policy/role-aid-and-development-fight-against-extremism">the role of foreign aid</a> in fighting against extremism. Many countries, including the U.S., see that extremism can be politically destabilizing and pose international security concerns. </p>
<p>But at the same time, <a href="https://www.polisci.pitt.edu/sites/default/files/Foreign%20Aid%20as%20Counterterrorism.pdf">the incidence of terrorism in countries</a> that get large amounts of international funding, including Afghanistan, Indonesia, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/aswp.12184">Pakistan</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2012.738263">Mali</a>, shows that international aid is an insufficient counterterrorism measure.</p>
<p>In Indonesia, for example, the USAID gave $24 million from 2018 to 2023 for an anti-extremism project called Harmoni. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.sfcg.org/harmoni-towards-inclusion-and-resilience/">This project</a> carries out workshops for state officials about prison management and handling terrorist detainees, among other programs. </p>
<p>But Harmoni does not include a key constituency – <a href="https://kemlu.go.id/download/L3NpdGVzL3B1c2F0L0RvY3VtZW50cy9KdXJuYWwvSnVybmFsJTIwSHVidW5nYW4lMjBMdWFyJTIwTmVnZXJpLyhGSU5BTCklMjBKVVJOQUwlMjBWT0wlMjA2JTIwTk8lMjAyLnBkZg==">detained or released terrorists</a> and their families – in their work. </p>
<p>This kind of strategy makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to actually reform extremists.</p>
<p>This model, according to my research, is common in counterextremism projects funded by international aid. </p>
<h2>Involving terrorists</h2>
<p>Donor countries, governments and partner organizations working to prevent extremism can involve released terrorists and their families in various ways – including providing vocational, financial, psychological, religious, educational and even recreational programs. </p>
<p>Many countries still need international aid to fight terrorism, but it will work more effectively only when also embracing former terrorist convicts and their families. </p>
<p>Without targeted, inclusive interventions in extremism, I believe the world will continue to see more wasted aid when addressing terrorism.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178511/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bernard Loesi receives funding from Southeast Center, the University of Washington. </span></em></p>The US gives money to help Indonesia and other countries fight terrorism. But research shows that this money might not be effective, unless it directly reaches former extremists.Bernard Loesi, PhD Candidate, University of WashingtonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1650642021-09-23T12:30:23Z2021-09-23T12:30:23ZHow the world’s biggest Islamic organization drives religious reform in Indonesia – and seeks to influence the Muslim world<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422463/original/file-20210921-5916-rj44er.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C7%2C4881%2C3266&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A gathering during the 73rd anniversary of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), in Jakarta, Indonesia in 2019.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/participants-are-seen-at-the-bung-karno-stadium-during-a-news-photo/1090184470?adppopup=true">Eko Siswono Toyudho/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>After its return to power in Afghanistan, the Taliban are again imposing their <a href="https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2021/09/08/taliban-perpetuate-muslim-worlds-failed-governance-paradigm/">religious ideology</a>, with restrictions on <a href="https://apnews.com/article/middle-east-afghanistan-womens-rights-kabul-taliban-eee5a8c73dd5d58acfda008582ef77bb">women’s rights</a> and other repressive measures. They are presenting to the world an image of Islam that is intolerant and at odds with social changes. </p>
<p>Islam, however, has multiple interpretations. A humanitarian interpretation, focusing on “rahmah,” loosely translated as love and compassion, has been emphasized by a group <a href="https://siapabilang.com/buku-islam-otoritarianisme-dan-ketertinggalan/photo/">I have studied</a> – Nahdlatul Ulama, which literally means “Reawakening of the Islamic Scholars.”</p>
<p>Nahdlatul Ulama, or NU, was founded in <a href="https://www.baytarrahmah.org/media/2021/Yahya-Cholil-Staquf_Transcript_Regent-University_9-11_Commemoration-Speech.pdf">1926 in reaction</a> to the Saudi conquest of Mecca and Medina with their rigid understanding of Islam. It follows <a href="https://brill.com/view/book/9789004435544/BP000016.xml">mainstream Sunni Islam</a>, while embracing Islamic spirituality and accepting Indonesia’s cultural traditions.</p>
<p>Functioning in Indonesia, the country with the largest Muslim population, Nahdlatul Ulama is the world’s biggest Islamic organization with about <a href="https://www.religiousfreedominstitute.org/publication/indonesia-religious-freedom-landscape-report">90 million members and followers</a>. In terms of membership, the organization hugely outstrips that of the Taliban – yet this face of Islam has not been sufficiently recognized on the international stage.</p>
<p>In 2014, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/27/world/asia/indonesia-islam-nahdlatul-ulama.html">NU responded</a> to the rise of the Islamic State group and its radical ideology by initiating an <a href="http://sr.sgpp.ac.id/post/humanitarian-islam-fostering-shared-civilizational-values-to-revitalize-a-rules-based-international-order">Islamic reform</a>. Since then, it has elaborated on this reform that it calls “<a href="https://baytarrahmah.org/humanitarian-islam/">Humanitarian Islam</a>.”</p>
<h2>Humanitarian Islam</h2>
<p>During the past seven years, NU’s general secretary, <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-to-make-the-islamic-world-less-radical-11610665933">Yahya Cholil Staquf</a>, has organized several meetings of the organization’s Islamic scholars with a reformist agenda. They made public declarations for reforming Islamic thought on controversial issues, including political leadership, equal citizenship and relations with non-Muslims.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.baytarrahmah.org/media/2021/God-Needs-No-Defense_Reimagining-Muslim-Christain-Relations-in-the-21st-Century.pdf">The Nahdlatul Ulama declarations include crucial decisions</a> that differentiate “Humanitarian Islam” from other interpretations. First of all, they reject the notion of a global caliphate, or a political leadership that would unite all Muslims. The concept of a caliphate has been accepted by both <a href="http://www.lettertobaghdadi.com">mainstream Islamic scholars</a>, such as those in <a href="https://edinburghuniversitypress.com/book-islam-and-the-foundations-of-political-power.html">Al-Azhar</a> – Egypt’s world-renowned Islamic institution – and radical groups, such as the Islamic State group and al-Qaeda.</p>
<p>Moreover, the NU declarations emphasize the legitimacy of modern states’ constitutional and legal systems, and thus reject the idea that it is a religious obligation to establish a state based on Islamic law.</p>
<p>Additionally, these declarations stress the importance of equal citizenship by refusing to make a distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims as legal categories.</p>
<p>They call for a deeper cooperation among Muslims, Christians and followers of other religions to promote world peace.</p>
<p>Nahdlatul Ulama has taken practical steps for realizing these aims. For example, it has established a working relationship <a href="https://worldea.org/news/thomas-k-johnson-on-humanitarian-islam-and-the-ethics-of-religious-freedom-podcast/">with the World Evangelical Alliance</a>, which claims to represent 600 million Protestants, to promote intercultural solidarity and respect.</p>
<p>These NU declarations may sound insufficient from a Western liberal point of view, since they do not touch upon some issues such as LGBTQ rights. To better understand the importance of NU’s perspective and its limits requires an examination of the Indonesian context.</p>
<h2>Indonesia’s tolerant Islam</h2>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422462/original/file-20210921-15-i1g5b7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Yahya Staquf, secretary general of Indonesia's Muslim organization, Nahdlatul Ulama." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422462/original/file-20210921-15-i1g5b7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422462/original/file-20210921-15-i1g5b7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422462/original/file-20210921-15-i1g5b7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422462/original/file-20210921-15-i1g5b7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422462/original/file-20210921-15-i1g5b7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422462/original/file-20210921-15-i1g5b7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422462/original/file-20210921-15-i1g5b7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Yahya Cholil Staquf, general secretary of Nahdlatul Ulama.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/comparative-politics/islam-authoritarianism-and-underdevelopment-global-and-historical-comparison?format=PB">My research</a> on 50 Muslim-majority countries finds that Indonesia is notable because it is one of the few democracies among them.</p>
<p>Indonesia’s foundational credo, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Pancasila">Pancasila</a>, means “five principles” and basically refers to the belief in God, humanitarianism, Indonesia’s national unity, democracy and social justice. </p>
<p>About 88% of Indonesia’s population of 270 million are Muslim. Both Nahdlatul Ulama and <a href="https://maarifinstitute.org">Muhammadiyah</a>, the country’s second-biggest Islamic organization, have been respectful of these principles. Like NU, Muhammadiyah also has tens of millions of followers, and these two organizations often <a href="https://libforall.org/ini-iis-book/">cooperate against radical Islamist groups</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/profile/robert-hefner/">Robert Hefner</a>, a leading expert on Indonesia, documents in <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691050478/civil-islam">his 2000 book “Civil Islam”</a> how NU and Muhammadiyah made important contributions to the country’s democratization in the late 1990s. During this process, the leader of NU, Abdurrahman Wahid, became Indonesia’s first democratically elected president in 1999. </p>
<p>Wahid, who died in 2009, left a religious legacy, too. During my conversations, senior <a href="https://baytarrahmah.org/c-holland-taylor-biography/">NU members</a> repeatedly referred to Wahid’s reformist ideas as the main source of inspiration for Humanitarian Islam.</p>
<h2>Indonesia’s intolerant Islam</h2>
<p>Not all Islamic theories and practices in Indonesia are tolerant toward diversity. The country’s Aceh province has enforced certain rules of Islamic criminal law, including the punishment of caning for those who sell or drink alcohol.</p>
<p>Another example of religious and political intolerance is the country’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/execution-for-a-facebook-post-why-blasphemy-is-a-capital-offense-in-some-muslim-countries-129685">blasphemy law</a>, which resulted in the 20-month imprisonment of the capital city Jakarta’s Chinese Christian governor, <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/12/6/415/htm">Basuki Purnama</a> in 2017-2018, for a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/09/world/asia/indonesia-governor-ahok-basuki-tjahaja-purnama-blasphemy-islam.html">statement about a verse</a> in the Quran.</p>
<p>In January 2021, the story of a Christian female student being pressured by the school principal to wear a Muslim headscarf went <a href="https://www.facebook.com/elianu.hia/videos/3444961562268596">viral on Facebook</a>. In two weeks, the Indonesian government responded with a decree that banned <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/05/world/asia/indonesia-schools-head-scarves.html">public schools from making any religious attire compulsory</a>.</p>
<p>In short, there is a tug-of-war between tolerant and intolerant interpretations of Islam in Indonesia. Even within NU, there exist disagreements between conservatives and reformists.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, Nahdlatul Ulama reformists are becoming more influential. One example is the current minister of religious affairs, <a href="https://en.qantara.de/content/future-proofing-islam-indonesia-g20-presidency-to-focus-on-the-soul-of-islam">Yaqut Cholil Qoumas</a>, a leading NU member and the younger brother of NU’s reformist general secretary. He was one of the <a href="https://www.hudson.org/research/16679-indonesian-government-forbids-state-schools-from-requiring-muslim-headscarves">three ministers who signed </a> the joint decree banning the imposition of headscarves on students in February.</p>
<p>NU’s Humanitarian Islam movement might be crucial to promote tolerance among Indonesia’s Islamic majority. But can it have an effect beyond Indonesia?</p>
<p>[<em>Explore the intersection of faith, politics, arts and culture.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/this-week-in-religion-76/?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=religion-explore">Sign up for This Week in Religion.</a>]</p>
<h2>Influencing the Middle East</h2>
<p>This reform movement’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/01/world/asia/indonesia-islam.html">reception in the Middle East</a>, the historical center of Islam, is important if it is to have a global impact. Humanitarian Islam has been mostly ignored by scholars and governments of Middle Eastern countries, who generally see it as <a href="https://www.hudson.org/research/16463-the-battle-for-the-soul-of-islam">a competitor of their own attempts to influence the Muslim world</a>. As a nongovernmental initiative, Humanitarian Islam is different from Middle Eastern efforts to shape the Muslim world, which are mostly government-led schemes.</p>
<p>With its reformist emphasis, Humanitarian Islam may appeal to some young <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-48703377">Middle Eastern Muslims</a> who are <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-43981745">discontent</a> with their countries’ <a href="https://theconversation.com/irans-secular-shift-new-survey-reveals-huge-changes-in-religious-beliefs-145253">political and conservative</a> interpretations of Islam.</p>
<p>In order to reach a Middle Eastern audience, the Humanitarian Islam movement is launching <a href="https://arabic.baytarrahmah.org">an Arabic-language version</a> of its English website. Whether this Indonesian initiative can have an impact in the Middle East and become a truly global movement for Islamic reform remains to be seen.</p>
<p></p><hr><p></p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/418525/original/file-20210830-33-yznmc8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/418525/original/file-20210830-33-yznmc8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418525/original/file-20210830-33-yznmc8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418525/original/file-20210830-33-yznmc8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418525/original/file-20210830-33-yznmc8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418525/original/file-20210830-33-yznmc8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418525/original/file-20210830-33-yznmc8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><em>Want to learn about Islam and Muslims in America? Read our series of six articles on Understanding Islam on <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/understanding-islam-108919">TheConversation.com</a>. Or we can deliver them to your inbox over a week if you <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/understanding-islam-79">sign up for our email newsletter course</a></em></p>
<p></p><hr><p></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165064/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ahmet T. Kuru does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Nahdlatul Ulama is the world’s biggest Islamic organization, initiating a reform movement, which it is calling ‘Humanitarian Islam.’Ahmet T. Kuru, Professor of Political Science, San Diego State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1480482020-10-15T20:26:42Z2020-10-15T20:26:42ZNew York Times ‘Caliphate’ podcast controversy challenges brash methods of foreign correspondents<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/363558/original/file-20201014-21-1r0i5eu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=67%2C67%2C4835%2C3143&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The podcast Caliphate explored the war on terror and ISIS on the ground in Syria and Iraq. In this March 12, 2020 photo, a man rides a motorcycle in northwestern Syria the current focus of the 10-year civil war.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Felipe Dana)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The latest scandal to hit United States news media <a href="https://thewire.in/media/caliphate-rukmini-callimachi-new-york-times-podcast">involves Rukmini Callimachi, a dogged <em>New York Times</em> foreign correspondent</a> who is the journalist behind the <em>New York Times</em> serial podcast <em>Caliphate.</em> The scandal also puts into the spotlight the little-known dynamic between reporters and “<a href="https://www.cjr.org/special_report/fixers.php">fixers</a>” — local journalists who help foreign correspondents with reporting, finding sources and translating interviews. </p>
<p><em>Caliphate</em> examined the rise of the Islamic State terror movement, and when it premiered two years ago, it attracted widespread listenership, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/30/business/media/new-york-times-caliphate-podcast.html">earned critical acclaim</a> and was honoured with some of the industry’s top awards. As a finalist for the Pulitzer Prize for International Reporting, <a href="https://www.pulitzer.org/finalists/rukmini-callimachi-new-york-times">Callimachi was praised</a> for her “relentless on-the-ground and online reporting.”</p>
<p>But last month, the central character of the series <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/7350363/rcmp-arrests-abu-huzayfah-for-faking-past/">was arrested in Canada under a false-terrorism code</a> for allegedly spinning a tale about being a member of ISIS. According to the charge, Abu Huzayfah, whose real name is Shehroze Chaudhry, may never have even travelled to Syria, and the stories he told of murder and mayhem that gripped audiences were likely invented.</p>
<p>While there is no evidence Callimachi falsified any of her reporting, she appears to be guilty of what social scientists call “<a href="https://www.britannica.com/science/confirmation-bias">confirmation bias</a>” — and what the rest of us might call “wishful thinking.”</p>
<p>Callimachi worked largely with local journalists who spoke the local languages. According to one former colleague, who asked to remain anonymous, she often blocked her fixers from interacting with her editors: instead she presented herself as the “hero of her reporting … queen of the beat.”</p>
<p>This attitude resonates with <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670X.2019.1638292">the findings of a global survey of foreign correspondents and fixers</a> my colleague Shayna Plaut and I conducted. We found troubling signs of a power dynamic that <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228613.013.813">puts fixers in subservient positions</a> where they face more danger, receive less pay and often have little editorial agency over the resulting works of journalism.</p>
<h2>Power dynamics of reporting: Survey</h2>
<p>While Callimachi’s approach to storytelling seems modern — with her successful use of social media and her narrative style of writing that makes geopolitical issues resonate with audiences — her approach to reporting is decidedly old school. </p>
<p>Several colleagues of Callimachi from the <em>Times</em> used the term “neo-colonial” in describing her approach to dealing with fixers, referring to exerting her privilege as the outsider and treating local colleagues as support staff.</p>
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<img alt="A glass building - with The New York Times written across it. In the foreground, a yellow cab." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/363778/original/file-20201015-15-166qete.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/363778/original/file-20201015-15-166qete.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/363778/original/file-20201015-15-166qete.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/363778/original/file-20201015-15-166qete.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/363778/original/file-20201015-15-166qete.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/363778/original/file-20201015-15-166qete.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/363778/original/file-20201015-15-166qete.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">The New York Times building in New York.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Mark Lennihan)</span></span>
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<p>Callimachi hired Derek Henry Flood, a freelance journalist based in Syria, to visit the markets of a town in the country’s north and seek evidence of Abu Huzayfah’s involvement with terrorism. </p>
<p>When Flood pointed out to Callimachi that ISIS had been forced from that region two years earlier, she disregarded his warnings and sent him on the potentially dangerous assignment anyway. “She only wanted things that very narrowly supported this kid in Canada [and his] wild stories,” Flood said in a recent <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/11/business/media/new-york-times-rukmini-callimachi-caliphate.html"><em>New York Times</em></a> interview. </p>
<p>In our survey of more than 450 journalists from 71 countries — the largest study of fixers ever undertaken — we found similar <a href="https://niemanreports.org/articles/fixing-the-journalist-fixer-relationship/">disconnects between correspondents and fixers</a> over their respective roles and responsibilities. </p>
<p>While 80 per cent of fixers said they had challenged the editorial focus of their partner correspondent, only 44 per cent of journalists recalled being questioned by their fixers. </p>
<p>Similarly, only half the journalists surveyed admitted to being corrected by a fixer. But fixers said they correct correspondents 80 per cent of the time. </p>
<h2>Politics of reporting</h2>
<p>In reviewing Callimachi’s work — and in discussions with several of her colleagues — I saw evidence of a reporter who often came to her assignments with a pre-conceived idea of a good story. She encouraged local journalists working for her to bend to her vision of that story. </p>
<p>Shortly after joining the <em>Times</em>, Callimachi worked with Karam Shoumali, a Syrian journalist at the paper’s Istanbul bureau. They reported on a story about ISIS hostages and a man named Louai Abo Aljoud, who told the reporters that he was held by ISIS and “made eye contact with the American hostages being held by the Islamic State militant group” at a prison in Aleppo. If true, this would have been an important witness to an important moment, but Shoumali raised concerns about the source’s credibility. </p>
<p>As he was translating during the interview, Shoumali said certain statements did not line up with other facts. But Callimachi shot back, asking him to simply translate. Shoumali reportedly tried again to warn Callimachi about the source’s credibility. Instead of heeding the warning, she focused on connecting with the photo desk to get a picture of the main character for her story. The <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/28/world/middleeast/the-cost-of-the-us-ban-on-paying-for-hostages.html">piece ran with a prominent photo</a> on the front page of the paper.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/caliphate-podcast-and-its-fallout-reveal-the-extent-of-islamophobia-147644">‘Caliphate’ podcast and its fallout reveal the extent of Islamophobia</a>
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<p>Several of Callimachi’s other peers also raised concerns about her reporting. Chris Chivers, a long-time war correspondent, told the foreign editor that Callimachi’s approach to covering ISIS was sensational and inaccurate. According to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/11/business/media/new-york-times-rukmini-callimachi-caliphate.html">Ben Smith’s <em>Times</em> story</a>, Chivers told another editor that allowing this behaviour to continue would “burn this place down.”</p>
<p>Both the bureau chiefs in Baghdad and Beirut at the time also questioned Callimachi’s reporting and professionalism, but were overruled by senior editors. </p>
<h2>Getting bylines for ‘fixers’</h2>
<p>The words of a experienced fixer in Brazil, whom we interviewed for our survey, captures a common sentiment about the relationship between fixers and western journalists: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“[Reporters] come with a very preconceived idea of things and what they need … they have the idea, and it’s my role to try to get what they need.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Another experienced local journalist with one of the American news networks noted the neo-colonial nature of “fixing” for western media: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Unfortunately [the foreign correspondents] still look at us as ‘brown’ people with funny accents, and though I have reported and done some of the most important and daring stories for [the network], it is a struggle to get a producer credit. Meanwhile, white kids — years my junior — get their names up [in the credits].”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>More than three-quarters of the fixers in our survey said they would like to have public credit for their work, but rarely receive it. A comprehensive review of Callimachi’s output through her six years with the <em>New York Times</em> shows she rarely shared her bylines with local reporters. Many other senior foreign correspondents at the paper routinely do share bylines with people who had previously been relegated to an “Additional reporting by …” credit. </p>
<p>Because the <em>Times</em> has an ongoing investigation into Callimachi’s reporting, she was prohibited from speaking on the record to <em>The Conversation</em>. </p>
<p>Canadian federal authorities, in the meantime, are pursuing her source, Shehroze Chaudhry, under a little-used law that criminalizes terrorist hoaxes. While perpetrating hoaxes in journalism is not punishable by law, it is the kind of crime that ends careers.</p>
<p><em>This is an updated version of a story originally published on Oct. 15, 2020. It clarifies that Callimachi rarely shared bylines with local reporters. The original article also included a story about Karam Shoumali when he was at the ‘Times’ Bagdad bureau. Actually, he was with the Istanbul bureau at the time.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/148048/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Klein does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The latest scandal to hit news media involves Rukmini Callimachi, the journalist behind the New York Times podcast “Caliphate.” The scandal spotlights the dynamic between reporters and “fixers.”Peter Klein, Professor, School of Journalism, University of British ColumbiaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1476442020-10-14T18:11:48Z2020-10-14T18:11:48Z‘Caliphate’ podcast and its fallout reveal the extent of Islamophobia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/363493/original/file-20201014-13-1yszdjo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C6536%2C4362&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An anti-Islamic protester during a demonstration at Toronto City Hall on March 4, 2017.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Christopher Katsarov</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On Sept. 25, the RCMP <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/7350363/rcmp-arrests-abu-huzayfah-for-faking-past/">arrested Shehroze Chaudhry</a>, a Muslim man, for allegedly fabricating his affiliation with the Islamic State group (ISIS). Chaudhry — popularly referred to by his supposed nom de guerre, Abu Huzayfah — had been the subject of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/02/canada-isis-killer-story-police-hoax">numerous news stories</a> since 2017. </p>
<p>Most notably, in 2018, Chaudhry was the focus of Rukmini Callimachi’s award-winning <em>New York Times</em> podcast, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/podcasts/caliphate-isis-rukmini-callimachi.html"><em>Caliphate</em></a>. In it Chaudhry provided graphic details of his role within ISIS, the veracity of which is now being questioned. Chaudhry had previously been interrogated about his involvement with ISIS by Canadian national security agencies but was not charged. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, Callimachi’s misleading reporting at the <em>Times</em> prompted <a href="https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/42-1/house/sitting-297/hansard">debates in Parliament</a>, raising fears about an “ISIS terrorist” and “despicable animal … freely walking the streets of Toronto.”</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">CBC News interviewed Rukmini Callimachi in 2018 about Shehroze Chaudhry’s changing story.</span></figcaption>
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<p>The ensuing <a href="https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/tories-want-action-against-self-confessed-isis-recruit-reportedly-living-in-toronto-1.3926046">media attention</a> fed into <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/6035676/ipsos-poll-detained-isis-fighters/">panic about the risk posed by returning “foreign fighters,”</a> individuals — mainly Muslim women and men — who travelled to Iraq and Syria to support ISIS. </p>
<p>In response to the <em>Times</em> podcast, the Canadian government <a href="https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/his-confession-about-being-an-isis-executioner-enraged-canadians-now-police-say-he-made-it-up-1.5126981">reversed plans to repatriate Canadian foreign fighters</a> and their families detained in Kurdish-controlled Syrian prison camps.</p>
<h2>Callimachi’s gaffe is a symptom</h2>
<p>Chaudhry’s case has raised questions about the <a href="https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/his-confession-about-being-an-isis-executioner-enraged-canadians-now-police-say-he-made-it-up-1.5126981">abruptness of his arrest</a>, the <a href="https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/09/caliphate-huzayfah-times-callimachi-isis.html">merit of a terrorism hoax charge</a>, the substantial <a href="https://newrepublic.com/article/159561/rukmini-callimachi-fooled-fake-terrorist">role of the media in the War on Terror</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/06/29/bring-me-back-canada/plight-canadians-held-northeast-syria-alleged-isis-links">Canada’s obligations to its citizens, including 26 children, held in Syrian prison camps</a>. </p>
<p>But the reporting and policy reaction to Chaudhry’s alleged falsehoods reveals a sociopolitical climate where a different standard is applied to the threat posed by Muslims. Chaudhry’s case is not an outlier, but rather a symptom of the system. Callimachi’s faux pas is then just another story of Islamophobia.</p>
<p>Edward Said introduced the concept of <a href="https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2019/05/20/orientalism-then-and-now/">Orientalism</a> to capture how western societies imagine and produce reductive and racist representations of Muslims and Arabs. Our research on national security policies in <a href="https://doi.org/10.1108/S1521-613620200000025007">Canada</a> and the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9566.13047">United Kingdom</a> suggests that Islamophobia informs and legitimizes an Orientalist approach in the reporting of Muslim terrorism suspects and produces racialized national security policies.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-arabian-nights-stories-morphed-into-stereotypes-123983">How the Arabian Nights stories morphed into stereotypes</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<h2>Islamophobia is more than hate</h2>
<p>Chaudhry’s case reveals how Islamophobia operates beyond individualized instances of discrimination against Muslims. The view that Islamophobia is merely an “irrational fear of Muslims,” as a <a href="https://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/CHPC/Reports/RP9315686/chpcrp10/chpcrp10-e.pdf">2018 report by the House of Commons suggests</a>, is simplistic and outdated. </p>
<p>According to legal scholars <a href="https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/unblj/article/view/29035/1882524225">Reem Bahdi and Azeezah Kanji</a>, Islamophobia “is historically rooted in Orientalism, draws on and perpetuates stereotypes about a Muslim propensity for violence, … is state-driven and persists through a dialectical process of private and state action.” </p>
<p>In our research, we outline how Muslims are racialized through the War on Terror: “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0306396820951055">appearance as well as expressions attributed to Muslim bodies and Islam are framed within a social order which sees these as backward, foreign and threatening</a>.”</p>
<p>Rather than abstract disdain for Islam or Muslims, Islamophobia manifests as “<a href="https://www.plutobooks.com/9780745399577/what-is-islamophobia/">concrete social action</a>” by the national security industry, populist politicians, journalists, experts, think tanks and others who benefit from portraying Muslims as “<a href="https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/unblj/article/view/29035/1882524225">inherently violent … alien and inassimilable</a>.” </p>
<p>In this, any political movement connected to — or perceived as connected to — Islam is not only viewed as antithetical to democracy, but as a threat to democracy’s very existence. This Islamophobia was especially evident in coverage by Callimachi, whose success skyrocketed after the <em>Caliphate</em> podcast.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="InstagramEmbed" data-react-props="{"url":"https://www.instagram.com/p/Brn5RnsjPqQ","accessToken":"127105130696839|b4b75090c9688d81dfd245afe6052f20"}"></div></p>
<h2>Muslims and risk</h2>
<p>Islamophobia is useful to understand how the dangerousness and riskiness of Muslims is constructed. </p>
<p>First, Muslim beliefs and actions are thought to present the potential of regressiveness and violence. This establishes the basis of “<a href="http://jan.ucc.nau.edu/%7Esj6/mamdanigoodmuslimbadmuslim.pdf">good Muslim, bad Muslim</a>”: Muslims are considered “good” if they integrate and continuously perform their role as model citizens. But their potential of becoming a “bad” Muslim — who could radicalize toward terrorism — is never fully eradicated. </p>
<p>Through this lens, despite <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/isis-canadian-recruit-returns-1.4281860">interrogations</a> by Canadian authorities and journalists, Chaudhry was presented as an ISIS terrorist before ever being charged.</p>
<p>Second, Islamophobia represents Muslims as “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512109102435">dangerous internal foreigners</a>,” whose rights can be overlooked in the name of national security. This explains why Canadian Muslims in Syrian prisons are not even considered <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/7108763/returning-canadians-isis-suspects-rights-group/">worthy of repatriation</a> to stand trial. </p>
<p>Finally, the Orientalist framing of the bad Muslim is <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2016.1178485">the basis of counterterrorism practice</a> — and perpetuated by academic scholarship — reinforcing the status of Muslims as a “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2013.867714">suspect community</a>.”</p>
<h2>The media in the War on Terror</h2>
<p>Today, national governments, media conglomerates and security industries profit from the potential of catastrophe, and so perpetuate a present that is always “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2017.1362028">at-risk</a>.” </p>
<p>News coverage plays a significant role in normalizing constant risk; counterterrorism and counter-extremism institutions rely on this to establish their legitimacy among the public.</p>
<p>The media’s role in advancing Islamophobia cannot be understated. Media narratives that portray Muslims in <a href="https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.487.591&rep=rep1&type=pdf">dehumanizing</a> and <a href="http://doi.org/10.1177/1748048516656305">violent</a> terms establish public consensus about the danger of Muslims. </p>
<p>Incidences of terrorism by Muslim perpetrators <a href="https://doi.org/10.3390/rel9090274">receive more media attention and their motivations are linked to their ethnic and religious background</a>. This feeds into a “<a href="https://haenfler.sites.grinnell.edu/subcultural-theory-and-theorists/moral-panics/">moral panic</a>” around Muslims, where media sensationalism and governments stigmatize Muslims as <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/1741659007087270">deviant and a threat to social and moral order</a>. </p>
<p>Chaudhry’s case is not about an <a href="https://sahelblog.wordpress.com/2020/10/02/rukmini-callimachis-broken-clock-moment-in-timbuktu/">ignorant</a> or <a href="https://thebaffler.com/alienated/stalking-the-story">irresponsible</a> reporter telling a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/10/09/new-york-times-has-its-hands-full-with-review-caliphate/">poorly fact-checked story</a>. It is about the complicity of media and governments in vilifying Muslims to the point that it is reasonable to paint Muslims as terrorists before they ever stand trial. </p>
<p>Chaudhry’s alleged hoax — from its rise to an award-winning <em>New York Times</em> story to affecting Canadian national security policy — reveals a lot about Islamophobia today. This is the same Islamophobia that dehumanizes Canadian Muslims and casts them as potentially dangerous.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/islamophobia-and-hate-crimes-continue-to-rise-in-canada-110635">Islamophobia and hate crimes continue to rise in Canada</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Ultimately, Islamophobia presents real harm to Muslims. It emboldens deadly anti-Muslim violence as seen in the <a href="https://thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/quebec-city-mosque-shooting">2017 Quebec City mosque shootings</a>, the <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/mosque-stabbing-suspect-1.5732078">murder of Mohamed-Aslim Zafis</a> and most recently the <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/downtown-toronto-mosque-shut-down-violent-messages-police-investigating-muslims-council-1.5759840">violent threats made against a Toronto mosque</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/147644/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Fahad Ahmad receives funding from SSHRC and the Pierre Elliott Trudeau Foundation.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tarek Younis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The need for security agencies and the media to view and present Islam and Muslims as constant potential threats feeds into a dangerously violent and deadly Islamophobia.Fahad Ahmad, PhD Candidate in Public Policy, Carleton UniversityTarek Younis, Lecturer, Psychology, Middlesex UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1261752019-11-13T13:10:03Z2019-11-13T13:10:03ZWhat is a caliph? The Islamic State tries to boost its legitimacy by hijacking a historic institution<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300751/original/file-20191107-10930-39lr05.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An image of Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who died on Oct. 26, 2019..</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/US-Islamic-State/fee3c4433beb4f088323b85b942a5c0c/38/0">Department of Defense via AP</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Just days after the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/27/abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-isis-leader-killed-us-donald-trump">death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi</a> on Oct. 27, the Islamic State named <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50254785">Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi</a> as the new “caliph.” </p>
<p>In 2014, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/middle-east-live/2014/jun/30/isis-declares-caliphate-in-iraq-and-syria-live-updates">IS conquered vast swaths of Iraq and Syria</a> and declared itself to be the “caliphate.” </p>
<p>Defined and applied in different ways over the centuries, the fundamental idea behind the caliphate is the <a href="https://www.hachettebookgroup.com/titles/hugh-kennedy/caliphate/9780465094394/?lens=perseus">just ordering of society</a> according to the will of God. </p>
<p>The Islamic State’s caliphate was never widely recognized among the global Muslim community and no longer has significant territory. But the Islamic State still uses the history of the caliphate to push their claims.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=cQRzNv8AAAAJ&hl=en">a scholar of global Islam</a>, every time I teach my “Introduction to Islam” class, questions about the caliphate come up, in part because of IS’s claims. </p>
<h2>Caliph conundrums</h2>
<p>The leader of a caliphate is called the caliph, meaning deputy or representative. All caliphs are believed to be the successor to Prophet Muhammad. Muhammad was not a caliph; <a href="https://quran.com/33/40">according to the Quran</a> he was the last and greatest of the prophets. </p>
<p>That means no one can replace Muhammad as the messenger of God. The caliph, for example, is not always seen as holding special spiritual authority. But he is meant to preside over the caliphate in the absence of Muhammad.</p>
<p>The debate over who was the rightful representative of the prophet began immediately after his death. <a href="https://books.google.de/books?id=O36yXxCMiQIC&printsec=frontcover&dq=islam+a+brief+history&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false">While the majority supported Abu Bakr</a> – one of the prophet’s closest companions – a minority opted for his young son-in-law and cousin, Ali. </p>
<p>Abu Bakr’s supporters would come to be known as <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-the-shia-sunni-divide-78216">Sunni Muslims</a>, who believe that Muhammad did not leave instructions regarding his successor. Those who felt Ali was appointed by the prophet to be the political and spiritual leader of the fledgling Muslim community became known as Shiite Muslims. </p>
<p>Abu Bakr was the first caliph and Ali the fourth. </p>
<p><a href="https://books.google.de/books?id=EmN8tCx_jR4C&pg=PA9&dq=the+rashidun&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwisvPS13uHlAhUGjqQKHeqGB_0Q6AEIWjAH#v=onepage&q=the%20rashidun&f=false">The second and third caliphs were Umar and Uthman</a>. Under Umar, the caliphate expanded to include many regions of the world such as the lands of the former Byzantine and Sassanian empires in Asia Minor, Persia and Central Asia. Uthman is credited with compiling the Quran. </p>
<p>That al-Baghdadi adopted the name of the first caliph was no coincidence. Together, Sunni Muslims call the first four caliphs <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781118455074.wbeoe277">the Rashidun, or the “Rightly Guided Caliphs,”</a> because they were close companions or relations of Muhammad. They are also believed to be extraordinarily pious. This period lasted about 30 years. </p>
<h2>The complex history of the caliphate</h2>
<p>After rebels assassinated Uthman in A.D. 656, Ali was elected caliph. However, a civil war soon broke out between Ali and Muʿawiya ibn Abi Sufyan. The civil war ended in Sufyan’s victory and the formation of the Umayyad caliphate in A.D. 661. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/isru/hd_isru.htm">The Umayyad dynasty lasted 89 years</a>.</p>
<p>The Abbasid dynasty descended from Muhammad’s uncle, Abbas ibn Abdul-Muttalib, and succeeded the Umayyads.</p>
<p>These two caliphates oversaw the continuing expansion of the empire. <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-24774-8_2">Under them architecture, the arts and sciences flourished</a>.</p>
<p>For example, the “Dome of the Rock,” a shrine in the Old City of Jerusalem, was built under an Umayyad caliph as <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233604991_The_Dome_of_the_Rock_Origin_of_its_Octagonal_Plan">a monument</a> to the rising supremacy of their empire.</p>
<p>The Grand Library of Baghdad, also known as the “House of Wisdom,” was supported by Abbasid patronage. The “House of Wisdom” is credited with being a center of translation, scientific study and academic exchange. This period of flourishing, from the eighth to the 14th century, is often referred to as the <a href="https://books.google.de/books?id=O36yXxCMiQIC&pg=PA39&dq=islamic+golden+age&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiGvsuz4OHlAhU9wAIHHdFcBmo4FBDoAQgvMAE#v=onepage&q=islamic%20golden%20age&f=false">“Islamic Golden Age</a>.”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300754/original/file-20191107-10961-19h1cn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300754/original/file-20191107-10961-19h1cn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300754/original/file-20191107-10961-19h1cn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300754/original/file-20191107-10961-19h1cn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300754/original/file-20191107-10961-19h1cn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300754/original/file-20191107-10961-19h1cn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300754/original/file-20191107-10961-19h1cn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Dome of The Rock, in Jerusalem.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/rayinmanila/24665287394">Ray in Manila</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Both before and after the fall of the Abbasids in A.D. 1258, a succession of various empires <a href="http://teachmideast.org/articles/timeline-of-islamic-dynasties/">made overlapping and competing claims</a> to the caliphate. These included the Mamluks of Cairo and the Umayyads in Cordóba, Spain. </p>
<p>In 1517, the Turkish Ottomans amassed enough land and power throughout Asia Minor, North Africa, the Arabian Peninsula and Eastern Europe to claim the title “caliphate.” Ottoman sultans, however, were not universally recognized as caliphs. <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/declaring-caliphate-doesnt-make-one-caliph">Many Muslims believe</a> that the caliphate effectively ended after the Mongol conquest of Abbasid Baghdad in A.D. 1258.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, the Ottomans effectively held on to that title until 1924, when the Turkish nationalist and secularist Kemal Ataturk <a href="https://books.google.de/books?id=R3SYDwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=ataturk+abolished+caliphate&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi_tJ-e4eHlAhVS2KQKHTeXA4kQ6AEISDAE#v=onepage&q=ataturk%20abolished%20caliphate&f=false">abolished the caliphate</a>. </p>
<h2>Resurrecting the caliphate?</h2>
<p>The idea of the caliphate, which the Islamic State has forcefully promoted, recalls a time and a place when Islamic states flourished politically, economically and socially. It also summons up a spiritual vision of a supposedly more devout and dedicated Muslim community than exists today. </p>
<p>Other modern-day Islamists have called for a <a href="https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4287&context=gc_etds">resurrection of the caliphate,</a> or at least its ideals, as a way to recapture the vibrancy of the past. However, only violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida or the Islamic State have tried to make it a tangible reality.</p>
<p>Killing al-Baghdadi has not quashed the Islamic State’s version of the caliphate. The idea <a href="https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/islamic-state">lives on and continues to motivate</a> its members in enclaves across the globe. It is worth mentioning that the name of their new caliph is an honorific title for a member of Prophet Muhammad’s family – “al-Qurashi.” This prophetic lineage is one more way IS is trying to resurrect the history of the caliphate for its destructive purposes. </p>
<p>[ <em><a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=expertise">Expertise in your inbox. Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter and get a digest of academic takes on today’s news, every day.</a></em> ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/126175/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ken Chitwood does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Islamic State has appointed yet another ‘caliph’ after the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. What is the idea behind the caliphate?Ken Chitwood, Lecturer, Concordia College New York, Concordia College New YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1148072019-04-14T14:23:02Z2019-04-14T14:23:02ZThe rout of ISIS gives the world an opportunity to defeat its ideology<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/268821/original/file-20190411-44818-6l4p5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A U.S.-backed Syrian soldier reacts as an airstrike hits territory held by Islamic State militants outside Baghouz, Syria, in February 2019. The Islamic State group has been reduced from its self-proclaimed caliphate that once spread across much of Syria and Iraq at its height in 2014 to a speck of land on the countries' shared border. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Felipe Dana)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Islamic State (ISIS) <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/23/middleeast/isis-caliphate-end-intl/index.html">has been defeated</a> in Syria. This brings an end to the world’s most feared terrorist group and their control of physical territory over the past five years. However, despite the defeat of the “Caliphate,” the global jihadist movement is alive and well.</p>
<p>A recent report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies estimated there were approximately <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/evolution-salafi-jihadist-threat">230,000 terrorist fighters</a> across the globe supporting jihadist ideologies (ISIS and al Qaida) in 2018. That’s an increase of 400 per cent since 2001. </p>
<p>The number of countries affected by this type of ideologically inspired violence has increased across the board.</p>
<p>Consider that ISIS has expanded and is present <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/08/the-fight-is-not-over-fears-of-isis-resurgence-in-philippines">in the Philippines</a>, <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/isis-afghanistan-nangarhar-1.5044622">Afghanistan</a>, Egypt, <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/libyas-political-instability-makes-room-for-isis-to-regroup">Libya</a> and West Africa. Al Qaida has become entrenched in Yemen and has an arm <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20190305-terror-attacks-rise-mali-un">in Mali</a> that is fighting a United Nations peacekeeping mission and causing chaos across the <a href="https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/07/12/jihadists-are-trying-to-take-over-the-sahel">wider Sahel</a>. </p>
<p>Boko Haram has morphed into a regional security threat in West Africa, destabilizing <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/14/africa/nigeria-gov-boko-haram-attack-intl/index.html">Nigeria</a>, Cameroon and Chad in particular. In the Horn of Africa, the militant group <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20190323-al-shabaab-gunmen-somalia-suicide-car-bombing-terrorists">al Shabaab</a> continues to carry out frequent attacks against civilians in Somalia and Kenya. A new jihadist group has recently emerged and carried out <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/suspected-jihadists-kill-12-in-northern-mozambique-20190114">attacks in northern Mozambique</a>.</p>
<h2>The danger of underestimating jihadists</h2>
<p>The international approach to counter these groups has not been the success many would like us to believe, and underestimating the ongoing threat of jihadist ideologies to global security would be a grave mistake.</p>
<p>These groups are unified in their opposition to democracy, multiculturalism, pluralism, diversity, freedom of religion and freedom of expression, women’s rights and those of sexual minorities. They want to impose a mono-religious culture on others, and their violent acts have resulted in massive human rights violations, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/09/yazidis-isis-only-bones-remain-fear-returning-home">including genocide</a> and crimes against humanity. </p>
<p>ISIS in particular has had a negative impact on the West, <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/berlin-christmas-market-attack-terrorism-terrorist-refugees-far-right-neo-nazi-extremes-reciprocal-a7489946.html">fuelling</a> far-right groups and populism, contributing to anti-immigrant sentiments and fostering a general fear and hatred of Muslims.</p>
<p>Are we, the international community, truly ready to discuss what these terrorist groups are trying to do? Are we prepared to confront the ideology that drives their actions and political objectives?</p>
<h2>‘Ideology matters’</h2>
<p>Writing in <em>The Atlantic</em>, journalist Graeme Wood <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/03/ideology-was-behind-christchurch-tragedy/585856/">commented</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“A funny thing happened after the tragedy of Christchurch: Everyone discovered, all at once, that ideology matters. Four years ago, commentators were contorting themselves to attribute jihadism to politics, social conditions, abnormal psychology —anything but the spread of wicked beliefs that lead, more or less directly, to violence.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Indeed, decision-makers across the globe hear from experts who argue the drivers of ISIS-inspired terrorism are climate change, mental health issues, the internet and/or poverty. More often than not, they ignore the elephant in the room — ideology.</p>
<p>The real battlefront is on the ideological level. Like it or not, we must engage in this battle of ideas. Only by having rational discussions about the ideas that drive modern-day terrorist groups’ behaviour and actions will we be able to adopt and implement a global strategy to prevent and contain the problem at hand.</p>
<p>With the collapse of ISIS’s stronghold in Syria, the international community now has a historic opportunity that it cannot let pass.</p>
<p>Instead of drone attacks and assassinating ISIS members and other extremists, we should pursue justice and end impunity. Western countries in particular must bolster its democratic institutions and follow the rule of law.</p>
<p>The Kurds are now holding thousands of ISIS fighters in northern Syria and have called for the international community to set up an <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/middle-east/kurdish-administration-calls-for-tribunal-for-isis-detainees-1.3839251">international tribunal</a> to prosecute them. <a href="http://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/6287f546-0d2c-40b4-b46a-9505d9ede6c2">Germany</a>, <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/5030128/sweden-international-tribunal-isis-fighters/">Sweden</a>, <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-austria-security-islamic-state/austria-wants-islamic-state-fighters-to-be-tried-in-un-style-tribunals-idUKKCN1RM1MR">Austria</a> and a few other countries have publicly supported this initiative. Most Western countries however have been <a href="https://www.npr.org/2019/02/18/695831550/european-leaders-reluctant-to-meet-trumps-demands-to-take-back-captive-isis-figh">reluctant to repatriate their citizens</a> who joined ISIS, or prosecute them in domestic courts.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/268824/original/file-20190411-44810-18j0i9t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/268824/original/file-20190411-44810-18j0i9t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268824/original/file-20190411-44810-18j0i9t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268824/original/file-20190411-44810-18j0i9t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268824/original/file-20190411-44810-18j0i9t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268824/original/file-20190411-44810-18j0i9t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268824/original/file-20190411-44810-18j0i9t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In this 2016 photo, Kurdish Peshmerga fighters and commanders overlook Islamic State group positions during heavy fighting in Iraq.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Felipe Dana, File)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Kurdish call to bring ISIS to justice is an idea worth pursuing. </p>
<p>It is imperative that a new global strategy in countering terrorism focus on prosecuting ISIS and their leaders for crimes that are enshrined in international human rights law, while also exposing how the group was created, funded and supported.</p>
<p>Nobel Peace Prize laureate Nadia Murad recently <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/04/04/i-am-survivor-islamic-state-violence-dont-forget-us/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.08e6dea8ad2a">pronounced:</a> </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“International actors must help preserve evidence of the Yazidi genocide and other Islamic State attacks, including mass graves, documents and the testimonies of survivors. We are ready to face our captors and rapists in local and international courts, and even participate in a truth and reconciliation committee. Do not let our stories and our bravery go to waste.”</p>
</blockquote>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-canada-must-prosecute-returning-isis-fighters-105198">Why Canada must prosecute returning ISIS fighters</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Only by prosecuting these extremists will the world be able to marginalize those who carry out violent acts and those who give credence to their ideas. </p>
<p>By holding the perpetrators to account and exposing what they have done, the world will send an important signal that all countries, cultures and religions stand united against these extremists.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/114807/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kyle Matthews is affiliated with the Global Diplomacy Lab and the Canadian Global Affairs Institute. </span></em></p>Only by prosecuting extremists will the world be able to marginalize those who carry out violent acts and those who give credence to their ideas.Kyle Matthews, Executive Director, The Montréal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies, Concordia UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/809392017-07-17T06:18:23Z2017-07-17T06:18:23ZThe Islamic State is on its knees, but its legacy will long haunt the Middle East<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178129/original/file-20170713-7112-efe5vd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, painted portrait</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/home_of_chaos/14401680251">thierry ehrmann/flickr</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>After three years of violence, Islamic State has encountered a major defeat that could mean that its end is near. On July 10 2017, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi, after a successful nine-month military offensive to “liberate” the northern city of Mosul, <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/07/mosul-170710160305183.html">declared</a> “total victory” over IS in Iraq. </p>
<p>He categorically said: “I announce from here the end and the failure and the collapse of the terrorist state of falsehood and terrorism which the terrorist Daesh announced from Mosul”, using the Arabic acronym for ISIS or ISIL.</p>
<p>Almost exactly three years ago, on June 29 2014, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, the group’s self-styled caliph, proclaimed a cross-border caliphate stretching over vast swathes of northwestern Iraq and eastern Syria. </p>
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<p>Today, the Iraqi half of that territory has been almost totally eliminated (the northwestern Iraqi city of Tel Afar, close to the Syrian border, being an exception) while the Syrian half, based in the city of Raqqa, is facing imminent collapse under powerful US-backed Kurdish-led <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/06/syrian-forces-launch-offensive-to-recapture-raqqa-from-islamic-state">military offensives</a>.</p>
<p>It’s a major turning point.</p>
<p>In the summer <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/insurgents-seize-iraqi-city-of-mosul-as-troops-flee/2014/06/10/21061e87-8fcd-4ed3-bc94-0e309af0a674_story.html?utm_term=.90bdc80d8ea1">of 2014, an ISIL blitzkrieg</a> swiftly defeated Iraqi defence forces across northwestern Iraq, capturing some 40% of Iraqi territories. </p>
<p>Prior to this rapid conquest, ISIL fighters had captured the Syrian <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/01/isil-recaptures-raqqa-from-syrias-rebels-2014114201917453586.html">province of Raqqa</a> in January 2014, taking advantage of the bloody civil war let loose by pro-democracy movements. </p>
<p>But the territorial conquests could not be sustained for long. After a string of crushing military defeats throughout 2015 and early 2016 at the hands of Iraqi and Syrian armed forces, <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/06/rise-fall-isil-explained-170607085701484.html">ISIL lost</a> 65% of its Iraqi territories and 45% of captured ground in Syria. </p>
<p>When Raqqa falls – sooner or later – to Kurdish-led forces, it could mean the complete destruction of the caliphate.</p>
<h2>What went wrong with ISIL?</h2>
<p>Al-Baghdadi, whose fate is currently unknown, declared his caliphate to realise a series of “impossible” <a href="http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-isis-caliphate-collapsing-17338">objectives</a> – including restoring Islamic power under a single authority, eliminating US and Western influence on Muslim lands and laying a claim to global leadership – and called upon all Sunni Muslims from Europe to East Asia to unite under his new flag. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"884741013549527040"}"></div></p>
<p>These were the same objectives that the now-deceased <a href="http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic283413.files/al%20qaeda.pdf">al-Qaeda leader</a> Osama bin Laden boastfully proclaimed in the early 1990s.</p>
<p>They were also unrealistic goals given the policy choices and capabilities of ISIL. In his first official speech on June 29 2014, Al-Baghdadi presented a world divided into two mutually <a href="http://www.ieproject.org/projects/dabiq1.html">opposed camps</a>: Islam, and the camp of disbelief and hypocrisy. </p>
<p>He put pro-caliphate Sunni Muslims in the camp of Islam while the camp of disbelief was the abode of Shia Muslims, Jews, Christians and almost everybody else. This set the new caliphate on a collision course with the rest of the world.</p>
<p>ISIL militants, like their Wahhabi counterparts in the Gulf, also declared Shias to be non-Muslims and viewed the sheikhs, kings and emirs of the Gulf region as American surrogates, ringing alarm bells in Iran and Saudi Arabia. </p>
<p>The spectre of the threat they posed soon forced Iran, Saudi Arabia and the US to close ranks to militarily <a href="https://www.yahoo.com/news/iran-foreign-minister-hails-chapter-saudi-ties-irna-084551733.html">deter and contain</a> ISIL together, despite their differences.</p>
<h2>Lack of followers</h2>
<p>The spate of atrocities committed by ISIL fighters against the Yazidi community in Syria, who practice a non-Islamic faith, led the United Nations to <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/isil-committing-genocide-yazidis-160616112202399.html">accuse ISIL</a> of perpetrating genocidal crimes. </p>
<p>This senseless use of violence against non-Muslims alienated most Sunni Muslims, so ISIL was never able to develop much popular support. Less than <a href="http://metrocosm.com/support-isis-muslim-world-perceptions-vs-reality/">8% of Sunni Muslims</a> in the top 20 Muslim-majority countries across the Middle East, North Africa and Southeast Asia supported the ISIL caliphate. </p>
<p>In early December 2015, to ISIL’s despair, thousands of <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/muslim-clerics-condemn-terrorism_us_566adfa1e4b009377b249dea">Muslim clerics</a> from across the globe declared the caliphate a terrorist organisation and branded its supporters non-Muslims.</p>
<p>ISIL’s military defeats, loss of territories and control over resources represented further serious blows. </p>
<p>In 2014, <a href="http://www.cnbc.com/2014/06/16/how-isis-managed-to-acquire-2b-in-assets.html">the caliphate</a> had eight million Iraqis and Syrians living in its territories, assets worth nearly US$2 billion and <a href="http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/ICSR-Report-Caliphate-in-Decline-An-Estimate-of-Islamic-States-Financial-Fortunes.pdf">annual revenue</a> US$1.9 billion.</p>
<p>Two years later, after territorial losses in Iraq and Syria meant fewer people and businesses to tax, that revenue was more than halved to US$870 million. Its control over oil fields – a lucrative source of money – also shrank from 2014 to 2016.</p>
<h2>ISIL’s challenges and legacies</h2>
<p>ISIL might be on its way to becoming history, but it will certainly leave its mark. </p>
<p>Just as its emergence posed a twofold challenge (territorial as well as ideological) to the Middle East and the West, ISIL’s demise is also leaving behind the legacies of sectarian violence and killing, inter-ethnic malice and seemingly unmanageable rivalries involving regional and extra-regional powers.</p>
<p>Rightly or wrongly, many commentators saw the declaration of the cross-border ISIL caliphate as a possible <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/robert-fisk-the-old-partition-of-the-middle-east-is-dead-i-dread-to-think-what-will-follow-9536467.html">death blow</a> to the post-first world war political arrangements in the region. </p>
<p>Present-day national borders in the Middle East are the outcome of a secretly negotiated agreement between Britain and France from May 1916, known as the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Sykes-Picot-Agreement">Sykes–Picot Agreement</a>. It divided the Ottoman Arab territories of the Levant, Jordan, Iraq and Palestine between Britain and France. </p>
<p>Half a dozen Arab states were created: Iraq, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. Israel, originally created as a “homeland” for the Jewish people in 1917, declared itself a state in 1948.</p>
<p>The caliphate partially challenged British- and French-imposed national boundaries by systematically <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/06/rise-fall-isil-explained-170607085701484.html">dismantling</a> the Iraq-Syria border, redrawing the map. It also expressed its resolve to eradicate colonial legacies in the region by extending the boundaries of the caliphate. </p>
<p>This attempt to rewrite the history of the Middle East may keep destabilising the region for years to come.</p>
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<p>Ideologically, ISIL has challenged the West’s <a href="https://amirmortasawi.files.wordpress.com/2013/08/eurocentrism-modernity-religion-and-democracy-a-critique-of-eurocentrism-and-culturalism.pdf">eurocentric</a> claims to universalism, in which Western values of democracy, human rights and freedom are promoted as universal values that are applicable to all societies, regardless of cultural and racial differences. </p>
<p>Though <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Irony-Manifest-Destiny-Tragedy-Americas/dp/0802716997">criticised</a> by many people from within the West, eurocentrism is alive in the hearts and minds of many Western people. The 2003 US invasion to remodel Iraqi society on American lines is just one example.</p>
<p>ISIL rejects Western dominance over the Middle East and has sought to promote the <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/23340460.2015.1055153?journalCode=rgaf20">alternative Islamic claim</a> to universalism based on the commandments of the holy Koran. </p>
<p>The Koran instructs all humans to engage in universal morality by creating and upholding a moral order based on the values of justice, equality, truthfulness, fairness and honesty. This applies to all humans, regardless of their ethnic, cultural and racial differences. </p>
<p>Claiming a universal moral order that negates Western values could not but pit ISIL against the West. Future Islamic radical groups, if they emerge, are likely to carry on the ideological battle.</p>
<p>They may well do so in less violent ways. The Koran does not sanction brutal and inhumane methods to fulfil its commandments.</p>
<h2>The mess after ISIL</h2>
<p>The possible end of ISIL could still mean a more unstable Middle East, at least in the short term. </p>
<p>Currently, most Iraqi factions have morphed into a common front against ISIL, hiding the mistrust and rancor that persists between Shia and Sunni Iraqis, among diverse <a href="http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/13938/diverse-shiite-militias-highlight-iraq-division">militia groups</a>, and between Arab and Kurdish Iraqis. </p>
<p>If ISIL disappears, this tentative, temporary alliance may simply <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jul/10/isis-mosul-sectarian-violence-iraq-iraqis-sunnis-shias-kurds">fall apart</a>, unleashing more violence on the war-ravaged nation.</p>
<p>Syrian society is likewise polarised; along divisions between the foreign-backed pro and anti-government groups and between the rebel groups themselves. These tensions will outlive ISIS. </p>
<p>Other <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2015/10/16/a-three-sided-disaster-the-american-russian-and-iranian-strategic-triangle-in-syria/">contradictory interests</a> persist in the region, too: those of Iran, the US and Russia in Syria, and the Iran–Saudi <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20/world/middleeast/iran-saudi-proxy-war.html">competition</a> for power and influence across the Middle East.</p>
<p>The elimination of ISIL will reaffirm the region’s post-first world war political and territorial status quo but don’t expect it to bring peace to the Middle East.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80939/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mohammed Nuruzzaman previously received funding from the Kuwait Foundation for the Advancement of Sciences. He is also doing a research project on Shia - Sunni violence and Middle East regional security as a Durham Senior International Research Fellow, Durham University, UK. The project is funded by the European Union. </span></em></p>After a major defeat in Mosul, Islamic State seems to have suffered a blow that could end its goal of establishing a cross-border caliphate in the Middle East.Mohammed Nuruzzaman, Associate Professor of International Relations, Gulf University for Science and TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/665932016-10-06T06:49:47Z2016-10-06T06:49:47ZHow ISIS terrorists neutralise guilt to justify their atrocities<p>Torture, suicide bombings, beheadings, mass killings, sex slavery – these are among the horrors that <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-isis-and-where-did-it-come-from-27944">ISIS</a> uses to terrorise people and countries. While most people feel this is just a new <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/18/world/middleeast/citing-atrocities-john-kerry-calls-isis-actions-genocide.html">genocide</a> with brutal criminality practised under a fake umbrella of religion, a few extremists believe such actions are necessary to establish <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-isis-isil-islamic-state-or-daesh-40838">the religious, social and political power of the Islamic State</a>. </p>
<p>And the perpetrators of the violence? Well, they probably don’t feel guilty at all. </p>
<p>Viewing ISIS’s acts from a criminological, rather than theological, perspective offers some provocative insights into the minds of its fighters. Studies have shown that criminals commonly use five techniques to justify their acts – allowing them to effectively <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/2089195?seq=1#fndtn-page_scan_tab_contents">neutralise their guilt</a>. </p>
<h2>Denial of responsibility and injury</h2>
<p>The first recourse is the “<a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/3033965?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">denial of responsibility</a>”. In this way, terrorists might refer to forces beyond their control, relieving them of responsibility for their actions. </p>
<p>After declaring the founding of <a href="https://theconversation.com/islamic-state-versus-daish-or-daesh-the-political-battle-over-naming-50822">a new Caliphate</a> in June 2014, one of ISIS’s most senior officials, <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/31/world/middleeast/al-adnani-islamic-state-isis-syria.html">Abu Muhammad al-Adnani</a> declared a compulsory oath for all worldwide Muslims to vow their absolute allegiance to the <a href="https://www.thecairoreview.com/essays/a-portrait-of-caliph-ibrahim/">Caliph Ibrahim</a>, leader of ISIS and since 2014 the head, or caliph, of the Islamic State. This means, in effect, that the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/05/books/review/isis-inside-the-army-of-terror-and-more.html">ISIS power structure is an authoritarian one</a> in which the caliph holds total, tyrannical power over his followers.</p>
<p>Second, ISIS terrorists employ “<a href="http://cjb.sagepub.com/content/12/2/221.short">denial of injury</a>” to justify violence. This technique of neutralisation centres on the injury or harm involved in the delinquent act. Any acts of cruelty hurt people, of course, and it is hard to deny the injury done by terrorists to their victims. But terrorists may believe that their actions will not have consequences to themselves since their cruelty will lead them to paradise, a better world under the Islamic rule of ISIS. </p>
<p>In 2015, for example, the ISIS online magazine <a href="https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2016/02/dacc84r-al-islacc84m-magazine-8.pdf">Dar al-Islam</a> claimed:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the one that follows the path of Islam and then Jihad should know that the road is long … and could lead him, if Allah wants this, near him in his Paradise. </p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Just deserts and condemning the condemner</h2>
<p>The terrorists also use a technique called “<a href="http://cjb.sagepub.com/content/33/1/110.short">denial of the victim</a>”. For zealots, the population in the United States, France, Spain, United Kingdom or Germany deserves punishment; any injury is just retaliation for their society’s hatred of Muslims and Islam. Many jihadists even consider the civilians of Western countries as <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/29/world/europe/isis-attacks-paris-brussels.html">enemy fighters</a>, since they support the politicians leading the war against ISIS. </p>
<p>In an adjunct attack to the January 2016 Charlie Hebdo <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30708237">attack</a>, for instance, the perpetrator who attacked a Jewish supermarket in the surburbs of Paris, Amedy Coulibaly, justified killing a police officer and his deadly hostage-taking by claiming that the French government had decided to attack jihadists in Mali. He declared in a <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/12/world/europe/amedy-coulibaly-video-islamic-state.html">video</a> that the French population was supportive of this French military action therefore, attacking French civilians was, for him, a “normal punishment”. </p>
<p>Similarly, in a recent <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/04/world/middleeast/ramadan-isis-baghdad-attacks.html">audio message</a>, Abu Muhammed al-Adnani, the Islamic State spokesman, said: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Know that in the heart of the lands of the Crusaders there is no protection for that blood, and there is no presence of so-called civilians.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The fourth tactic used by criminals to neutralise their guilt is to “<a href="http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10611-006-9046-0">condemn the condemners</a>”. Rather than explain their actions, terrorists attack those who disapprove of their deviance. For them, the condemners – journalists, judges, police officers, and the like – are corrupted, depraved, brutal hypocrites and deviants, because they are <em>kafir</em> (non-believers). Thus the jihadists widely employ <em>takfir</em> - the branding of others as infidels who deserve death. </p>
<p>To justify such atrocities, ISIS members will call their victims infidels, crusaders, fornicators, drunkards, sodomites, and so on. This neutralisation technique allows criminals to shrug off denunciation of their actions by questioning those segments of society that critique terrorism.</p>
<h2>Appealing to higher loyalties</h2>
<p>Finally, terrorists appeal to “<a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13218719.2010.482953">higher loyalties</a>” to explain their crimes. Social control may be neutralised by sacrificing the demands of larger society for the demands of smaller social groups to which the terrorists belong, such as ISIS and its sibling groups. </p>
<p>The rhetoric of Islamic State makes much of its promises of brotherhood and friendship, and assures that ISIS endows its fighters with the gift of a shared higher meaning in life. </p>
<p><a href="https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2016/02/dacc84r-al-islacc84m-magazine-8.pdf">Dar al-Islam</a> said in a 2016 article:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>When they sacrifice their life for their religion, for their brothers and their sisters, we cry for them, really knowing that they are now with our Lord in his Paradise.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In such a situation, the terrorists can neutralise any sense of guilt by demonstrating the noble spirit of their criminal actions, carried out as a sacrifice at the request of their small, tight-knit group community (ISIS). Acting for the sake of your “siblings” in terrorism is portrayed as an honourable act of loyalty. </p>
<p>As these diverse neutralisation techniques show, it’s unlikely that even the most violent ISIS members suffer any feelings of guilt. Using total justification in their quest to achieve ISIS global domination, terrorists give themselves free reign to strike any supposed enemy, by any means necessary - even to kill innocents, non-Muslims and Muslims alike.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/66593/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bertrand Venard does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Do ISIS fighters feel guilty about the violence they perpetrate? Not likely, according to criminological research, which suggests terrorists “neutralise” their guilt, just as many other criminals do.Bertrand Venard, Professor, AudenciaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/554372016-03-02T19:05:50Z2016-03-02T19:05:50ZOut of the ashes of Afghanistan and Iraq: the rise and rise of Islamic State<p><em>Since announcing its arrival as a global force in June 2014 with the declaration of a caliphate on territory captured in Iraq and Syria, the jihadist group Islamic State has shocked the world with its brutality.</em></p>
<p><em>Its seemingly sudden prominence has led to much speculation about the group’s origins: how do we account for forces and events that paved the way for the emergence of Islamic State? In the final article of <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/understanding-islamic-state">our series examining this question</a>, Greg Barton shows the role recent Western intervention in the Middle East played in the group’s inexorable rise.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>Despite precious little certainty in the “what ifs” of history, it’s clear the rise of Islamic State (IS) wouldn’t have been possible without the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq. Without these Western interventions, al-Qaeda would never have gained the foothold it did, and IS would not have emerged to take charge of northern Iraq.</p>
<p>Whether or not the Arab Spring, and the consequent civil war in Syria, would still have occurred is much less clear. </p>
<p>But even if war hadn’t broken out in Syria, it’s unlikely an al-Qaeda spin-off such as IS would have become such a decisive actor without launching an insurgency in Iraq. For an opportunistic infection to take hold so comprehensively, as IS clearly has, requires a severely weakened body politic and a profoundly compromised immune system. </p>
<p>Such were the conditions in Goodluck Jonathan’s Nigeria from 2010 to 2015 and in conflict-riven Somalia after the fall of the Barre regime in 1991. And it was so in Afghanistan for the four decades after conflict broke out in 1978 and in Pakistan after General Zia-ul-Haq declared martial law in 1977. </p>
<p>Sadly, but even more clearly, such are the circumstances in Iraq and Syria today. And that’s the reason <a href="http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf">around 80% of all deaths due to terrorist attacks</a> in recent years have occurred in five of the six countries discussed here, where such conditions still prevail.</p>
<h2>An unique opportunity</h2>
<p>The myth of modern international terrorist movements, and particularly of al-Qaeda and its outgrowths such as IS (which really is a third-generation al-Qaeda movement), is that they’re inherently potent and have a natural power of attraction. </p>
<p>The reality is that while modern terrorist groups can and do operate all around the globe to the point where no country can consider itself completely safe, they can only build a base when local issues attract on-the-ground support. </p>
<p>Consider al-Qaeda, which is in the business of global struggle. It wants to unite a transnational <em>ummah</em> to take on far-off enemies. But it has only ever really enjoyed substantial success when it has happened across conducive local circumstances. </p>
<p>The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s provided an opportunity uniquely suited to the rise of al-Qaeda and associated movements. It provided plausible justification for a defensive jihad – a just war – that garnered broad international support and allowed the group to coalesce in 1989 out of the Arab fighters who had rallied to support the Afghans in their fight against the Soviets. </p>
<p>Further opportunities emerged in the Northern Caucasus, where local ethno-national grievances were eventually transformed into the basis for a more global struggle. </p>
<p>The declaration of independence by Chechnya in 1991 led to all-out war with the Soviet military between 1994 and 1996, when tens of thousands were killed. After a short, uneasy peace, a decade-long second civil war started in 1999 following the invasion of neighbouring Dagestan by the International Islamic Brigade. </p>
<p>The second civil war began with an intense campaign to seize control of the Chechen capital, Grozny. But it became dominated by years of fighting jihadi and other insurgents in the Caucasus mountains and dealing with related terrorist attacks in Russia. </p>
<p>In Nigeria and Somalia, Boko Haram and al-Shabaab now share many of the key attributes of al-Qaeda, with whom they have forged nascent links. But they too emerged primarily because of the failure of governance and the persistence of deep-seated local grievances.</p>
<p>Even in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda struggled to transform itself into a convincing champion of local interests in the 1990s. After becoming increasingly isolated following the September 11 attacks on the US, it failed to gain support from the Afghan Taliban for its global struggle.</p>
<p>But something new happened in Iraq beginning in 2003. The Jordanian street thug <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/07/the-short-violent-life-of-abu-musab-al-zarqawi/304983/">Musab al-Zarqawi</a> correctly intuited that the impending Western invasion and occupation of Iraq would provide the perfect conditions for the emergence of insurgencies. </p>
<p>Al-Zarqawi positioned himself in Iraq ahead of the invasion and deftly rode a wave of anger and despair to initiate and grow an insurgency that in time came to dominate the broken nation. </p>
<p>Initially, al-Zarqawi was only one of many insurgent leaders intent on destabilising Iraq. But, in October 2004, after years of uneasy relations with the al-Qaeda leader during two tours in Afghanistan, he finally yielded to Osama bin Laden’s request that he swear on oath of loyalty (<em>bayat</em>) to him. And so al-Zarqawi’s notorious network of insurgents became known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). </p>
<h2>From the ashes</h2>
<p>Iraq’s de-Ba'athification process of May 2003 to June 2004, during which senior technocrats and military officers linked to the Ba'ath party (the vehicle of the Saddam Hussein regime) were removed from office, set the stage for many to join counter-occupation insurgent groups – including AQI.</p>
<p>Without the sacking of a large portion of Iraq’s military and security leaders, its technocrats and productive middle-class professionals, it’s not clear whether this group would have come to dominate so comprehensively. These alienated Sunni professionals gave AQI, as well as IS, much of its core military and strategic competency.</p>
<p>But even with the windfall opportunity presented to al-Zarqawi by the wilful frustration of Sunni interests by <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nouri_al-Maliki">Nouri al-Maliki’s</a> Shia-dominated government from 2006 to 2014, which deprived them of any immediate hope for the future and confidence in protecting their families and communities, AQI was almost totally destroyed after the Sunni awakening began in 2006. </p>
<p>The Sunni awakening forces, or “Sons of Iraq”, began with tribal leaders in Anbar province forming an alliance with the US military. For almost three years, tens of thousands of Sunni tribesmen were paid directly to fight AQI, but the Maliki government refused to incorporate them into the regular Iraqi Security Force. And, after October 2008 – when the US military handed over management of these forces – he refused to support them.</p>
<p>The death of al-Zarqawi in June 2006 contributed to the profound weakening of the strongest of all post-invasion insurgent groups. AQI’s force strength was reduced to several hundred fighters and it lost the capacity to dominate the insurgency.</p>
<p>Then, in 2010 and 2011, circumstances combined to blow oxygen onto the smouldering coals. </p>
<p>In 2010, the greatly underestimated Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, a local Iraqi cleric with serious religious scholarly credentials, took charge of AQI and began working to a sophisticated long-term plan.</p>
<p>Elements of the strategy went by the name “breaking the walls”. In the 12 months to July 2013, this entailed the movement literally breaking down the prison walls in compounds around Baghdad that held hundreds of hardcore al-Qaeda fighters. </p>
<p>Islamic State, as the group now called itself, also benefited from the inflow of former Iraqi intelligence officers and senior military leaders. This had begun with de-Ba'athification in 2003 and continued after the collapse of the Sunni awakening and the increasingly overt sectarianism of the Maliki government. </p>
<p>Together, they developed tactics based on vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices and the strategic use of suicide bombers. These were deployed not in the passionate but often undirected fashion of al-Qaeda but much more like smart bombs in the hands of a modern army. </p>
<p>And the US military withdrawal from Iraq in late 2011, well telegraphed ahead of time, provided an excellent opportunity for the struggling insurgency to rebuild. As did the outbreak of civil war in Syria.</p>
<h2>A helping hand</h2>
<p>Al-Baghdadi initially dispatched his trusted Syrian lieutenant, Abu Mohammad al-Julani, to form a separate organisation in Syria: the al-Nusra front. </p>
<p>Jabhat al-Nusra quickly established itself in northern Syria. But when al-Julani refused to fold his organisation in under his command, al-Baghdadi rebranded AQI (or Islamic State in Iraq) Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham/the Levant (ISIS/ISIL).</p>
<p>Then, a series of events turned IS from an insurgency employing terrorist methods to becoming a nascent rogue state. These included: the occupation of Raqqa on the Syrian Euphrates in December 2013; the taking of Ramadi a month later; consolidation of IS control throughout Iraq’s western Anbar province; and, finally, a sudden surge down the river Tigris in June 2014 that took Mosul and most of the towns and cities along the river north of Baghdad within less than a week.</p>
<p>IS’s declaration of the caliphate on June 29, 2014, was a watershed moment, which is only now being properly understood. </p>
<p>In its ground operations, including the governing of aggrieved Sunni communities, IS moved well beyond being simply a terrorist movement. It came to function as a rogue state ruling over around 5 million people in the northern cities of the Euphrates and the Tigris, and defending its territory through conventional military means.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113520/original/image-20160302-25918-q1pucr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113520/original/image-20160302-25918-q1pucr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=745&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113520/original/image-20160302-25918-q1pucr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=745&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113520/original/image-20160302-25918-q1pucr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=745&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113520/original/image-20160302-25918-q1pucr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=936&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113520/original/image-20160302-25918-q1pucr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=936&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113520/original/image-20160302-25918-q1pucr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=936&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In 2010, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took charge of AQI and began working to a sophisticated long-term plan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Furqan Media</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>At the same time, it skilfully exploited the internet and social media in ways the old al-Qaeda could not do – and that its second-generation offshoot, al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), had only partially achieved. </p>
<p>This allowed IS to draw in tens of thousands of foreign fighters. Most came from the Middle East and Northern Africa, but as many as 5,000 came from Europe, with thousands more from the Caucasus and Asia. </p>
<p>Unlike the case in Afghanistan in the 1980s, these foreign fighters have played a key role in providing sufficient strength to take and hold territory while also building a global network of support.</p>
<p>But without the perfect-storm conditions of post-invasion insurgency, this most potent expression of al-Qaedaism yet would never have risen to dominate both the region and the world in the way that it does. </p>
<p>Even in its wildest dreams, al-Qaeda could never have imagined that Western miscalculations post-9/11 could have led to such foolhardy engagements – not just in Afghanistan but also in Iraq. </p>
<p>Were it not for these miscalculations, 9/11 might well have precipitated the decline of al-Qaeda. Instead, with our help, it spawned a global jihadi movement with a territorial base far more powerful than al-Qaeda ever had.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>This is the final article in our series on the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/understanding-islamic-state">historical roots of Islamic State</a>. <a href="http://bit.ly/UnderstandingIS">Download our special report</a> collating the whole the series.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/55437/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Greg Barton is co-director of the Australian Intervention Support Hub, a CVE capacity-building initiative supported by the Australian government and based at the ANU and Deakin University. He previously led an ARC Linkage grant project researching radicalisation and disengagement from violent extremism. He is currently a research professor at the Alfred Deakin Institute.</span></em></p>The final article of our series on the historical roots of Islamic State examines the role recent Western intervention in the Middle East played in the group’s inexorable rise.Greg Barton, Chair in Global Islamic Politics, Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation; Co-Director, Australian Intervention Support Hub, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/546442016-03-01T19:05:58Z2016-03-01T19:05:58ZHow the political crises of the modern Muslim world created the climate for Islamic State<p><em>How do we account for forces and events that paved the way for the emergence of Islamic State? <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/understanding-islamic-state">Our series on the jihadist group’s origins</a> tries to address this question by looking at the interplay of historical and social forces that led to its advent.</em></p>
<p><em>In the penultimate article of the series, Harith Bin Ramli traces the Muslim world’s growing disaffection with its rulers through the 20th century and how it created the climate for both the genesis of Islamic State and its continuing success in recruiting followers.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>Islamic State (IS) declared its re-establishment of the caliphate on <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/29/isis-iraq-caliphate-delcaration-war">June 29, 2014</a>, almost exactly 100 years after the heir to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, <a href="http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/archduke-franz-ferdinand-assassinated">was assassinated</a>. Ferdinand’s death set off a series of events that would lead to the first world war and the fall of three great multinational world empires: the Austro-Hungarian (1867-1918), the Russian (1721-1917) and the Ottoman (1299-1922). </p>
<p>That IS’s leadership chose to declare its caliphate so close to the anniversary of Ferdinand’s assassination may not entirely <a href="http://www.jonathanhtodd.com/2014/06/27/6-degrees-geopolitcal-separation-franz-ferdinand-isis/">be a coincidence</a>. In a sense, the two events are connected. </p>
<p>Ferdinand’s assassination and the events it brought about (culminating in the <a href="http://www.history.com/topics/world-war-i/treaty-of-versailles">1919 Treaty of Versailles</a>) symbolised the <a href="http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/17/2/463.full">final triumph of a new idea</a> of <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sovereignty/">sovereignty</a>. This modern conception was based on the popular will of a nation, rather than on noble lineage. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113015/original/image-20160226-26719-1crjex5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113015/original/image-20160226-26719-1crjex5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=826&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113015/original/image-20160226-26719-1crjex5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=826&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113015/original/image-20160226-26719-1crjex5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=826&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113015/original/image-20160226-26719-1crjex5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1038&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113015/original/image-20160226-26719-1crjex5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1038&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113015/original/image-20160226-26719-1crjex5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1038&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The heir to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, was assassinated on June 28, 1914.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/58/Archduke_Franz_Ferdinand_of_Austria_-_b%26w.jpg">Carl Pietzner [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In declaring the resurrection of a medieval political institution almost exactly 100 years later, IS was announcing its explicit rejection of the modern international system based on that very idea of sovereignty. </p>
<h2>Early secularisation</h2>
<p>Other than the Ottoman Sultanate’s <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2014-11-19/myth-caliphate">very late and disputed claim</a> to the title, no attempt has been made to re-establish a caliphate since the fall of the Abbasid dynasty at the hands of the Mongols in 1258. In other words, Sunni Islam has carried on for hundreds of years since the 13th century without the need for a central political figurehead. </p>
<p>If we go further back in history, it seems that <a href="http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100141493">Sunni political theory</a> had already anticipated this problem. </p>
<p>The Abbasid caliphs began to lose power from the mid-ninth century, effectively becoming puppets of various warlords by the tenth. And the caliphate underwent a serious process of decentralisation at the same time. </p>
<p><a href="http://ilsp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/hurvitz.pdf">Key contemporary texts on statecraft</a>, such as Abu al-Hasan al-Mawardi’s (952-1058) Ordinances of Government (<em>al-Ahkam al-sultaniyya</em>), described the caliph as the necessary symbolic figurehead providing constitutional legitimacy for the real rulers – emirs or sultans – whose power was based on military might. </p>
<p>As in the case of the <a href="http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/buyids">Shi'i Buyid dynasty (934-1048)</a>, these rulers didn’t even have to be Sunni. And they were often expected to provide legislation based on practical and functional, rather than religious, considerations. </p>
<p>The Muslim world, then, had arguably already experienced secularisation of sorts before the modern age. Or, at the very least, it had for quite some time existed within a political system that balanced power between religious and worldly interests. </p>
<p>And when the caliphate came to an end in the 13th century, both the institutions of kingship and the religious courts (run by the scholar-jurists) were able to carry on functioning without difficulty.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113020/original/image-20160226-26673-dwg0r7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113020/original/image-20160226-26673-dwg0r7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=430&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113020/original/image-20160226-26673-dwg0r7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=430&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113020/original/image-20160226-26673-dwg0r7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=430&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113020/original/image-20160226-26673-dwg0r7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113020/original/image-20160226-26673-dwg0r7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113020/original/image-20160226-26673-dwg0r7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AWilayah_Abbasiyyah_semasa_khalifah_Harun_al-Rashid.jpg">Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It was the 19th-century Muslim revivalist and anti-colonial movement known as <a href="http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e1819?_hi=3&_pos=1">Pan-Islamism</a> that was responsible for reviving the Ottoman claim to the caliphate. The idea was revived again briefly in early 20th-century British India as the <a href="http://www.britannica.com/event/Khilafat-movement">anti-colonial Khilafat movement</a>. </p>
<p>But anti-colonial efforts after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, even those primarily based on religious beliefs, have rarely called for a return of the caliphate. </p>
<p>If anything, successors of Pan-Islamism, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, have generally worked within the framework of nation states. Putting aside doubts about their actual ability to commit to democracy and secularism, such movements have generally envisioned an Islamic state along more modern lines, with room for political participation and elections.</p>
<h2>Modern utopias and old dynasties</h2>
<p>So why evoke the caliphate in the first place? The simple answer is that it has never been completely dismissed as an option. </p>
<p>In Sunni law and political theology, once <a href="http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e989?_hi=0&_pos=3182">consensus</a> over an issue has been reached, it is hard for later generations to go against it. This was why Egyptian scholar <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2009/apr/09/religion-islam-secularism-egypt">Ali Abd al-Raziq</a> was removed from his post at <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Azhar_University">Al-Azhar University</a> and attacked for introducing a deviant interpretation after he wrote an argument for a secular interpretation of the caliphate in 1925.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113021/original/image-20160226-26697-17h3h4r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113021/original/image-20160226-26697-17h3h4r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=765&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113021/original/image-20160226-26697-17h3h4r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=765&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113021/original/image-20160226-26697-17h3h4r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=765&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113021/original/image-20160226-26697-17h3h4r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=962&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113021/original/image-20160226-26697-17h3h4r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=962&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113021/original/image-20160226-26697-17h3h4r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=962&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Thinkers such as Abul Ala Mawdudi tried to place a revived caliphate within some type of democratic framework.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AAbul_ala_maududi.jpg">DiLeeF via Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As <a href="http://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-inevitable-caliphate/">many</a> <a href="http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/13267/new-texts-out-now_madawi-al-rasheed-carool-kersten">recent</a> <a href="http://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/recalling-the-caliphate/">studies</a> show, the idea of the caliphate and its revival has had a certain utopian appeal for a wide spectrum of modern Muslim thinkers. And not just those with authoritarian or militant inclinations. </p>
<p>Some leading Muslim revivalists such as <a href="http://muhammad-asad.com/Principles-State-Government-Islam.pdf">Muhammad Asad (1900-1992)</a> and <a href="http://www.meforum.org/151/islams-democratic-essence">Abul Ala Mawdudi (1903-1979)</a>, for example, have tried to place a revived caliphate within some type of <a href="https://www.academia.edu/421254/Democracy_in_Islam_The_Views_of_Several_Modern_Muslim_Scholars">democratic framework</a>.</p>
<p>But, in practice, the dominant tendency here too has really been to seek the liberation or revival of Muslim societies within the nation-state framework. </p>
<p>If anything, national aspirations and the desire to modernise society existed before the formation of the new political order after the first world war. The majority of the populations of Muslim lands welcomed the fall of the three empires, or at least didn’t feel very strongly about the survival of traditional ruling dynasties. </p>
<p>And, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, most dynasties that stayed in power did so by reinventing their states along modern, mainly secular, models. </p>
<p>But this did not always succeed. The waves of <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/september/7/newsid_3074000/3074069.stm">revolutions</a> and <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/september/1/newsid_3911000/3911587.stm">military coups</a> that swept the Middle East and other parts of the Muslim world throughout the 1950s and 1960s amply illustrate that popular sentiment identified traditional dynasties with the continuing influence of colonial powers. </p>
<p>In Egypt, under the Muhammad Ali dynasty (1805-1952), for example, the control of the then-French Canal epitomised the interdependent relationship between the dynasty and Western power. This was why <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/arabunity/2008/02/200852517252821627.html">Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918-1970)</a> made great efforts to regain it in the name of Egyptian sovereignty when he became the country’s second president in 1956.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113027/original/image-20160226-26679-ul3rf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113027/original/image-20160226-26679-ul3rf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113027/original/image-20160226-26679-ul3rf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113027/original/image-20160226-26679-ul3rf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113027/original/image-20160226-26679-ul3rf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113027/original/image-20160226-26679-ul3rf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113027/original/image-20160226-26679-ul3rf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Inauguration of the Suez Canal at Port Said, Egypt, in 1869.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3ASuezkanal1869.jpg">Public domain via Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Dissolving political legitimacy</h2>
<p>Either way, the success of the new Muslim nation states could be said to be predicated on two major expectations. The first was improvement of citizens’ lives – not only in terms of material progress, but also the benefits of freedom and the ability to represent the popular will through participatory politics. </p>
<p>The second was the ability of Muslim nations to unite against outside interference and commit to the liberation of Palestine. On both counts, the latter half of the 20th century witnessed abysmal failures and an increasing sense of frustration with Muslim leaders. </p>
<p>In many places, populism eventually gave way to authoritarianism. And the loss of further lands to Israel in the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six-Day_War">1967 Six-Day War</a> revealed the inherent weakness and lack of unity among the new Muslim nations.</p>
<p>Anwar Sadat’s peace treaty with Israel after the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/october/6/newsid_2514000/2514317.stm">1973 Yom Kippur War</a> was widely seen as an act of betrayal, for breaking ranks in what should have been a united front. His decision to do so despite lacking popular support in Egypt only revealed the extent to which the country had evolved into a dictatorship. </p>
<p>Sadat’s consequent <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/october/6/newsid_2515000/2515841.stm">assassination</a> at the hands of a small radical splinter group of religious militants acted as a warning to other Muslim leaders. Now they couldn’t simply ignore or lock away religious critics, even if the majority of the population still subscribed to the secular nation-state model. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113031/original/image-20160226-26697-q9jcf8.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113031/original/image-20160226-26697-q9jcf8.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=896&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113031/original/image-20160226-26697-q9jcf8.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=896&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113031/original/image-20160226-26697-q9jcf8.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=896&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113031/original/image-20160226-26697-q9jcf8.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1125&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113031/original/image-20160226-26697-q9jcf8.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1125&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113031/original/image-20160226-26697-q9jcf8.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1125&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Egyptian president Anwar Sadat’s peace treaty with Israel was widely seen as an act of betrayal.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3APresident_Anwar_Sadat_of_Egypt_arrives_in_the_United_States.JPEG">US Department of Defence Visual information via Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This idea was reinforced by Iran’s <a href="http://www.britannica.com/event/Iranian-Revolution-of-1978-1979">1979 Islamic Revolution</a>, as well as the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_Mosque_seizure">failed religious revolution</a> in the holy city of Mecca the same year. </p>
<p>Throughout the late 1970s and 1980s, Muslim leaders around the world increasingly made compromises with religious reactionary forces, allowing them to expand influence in the public sphere. In many cases, these leaders increasingly adopted religious rhetoric themselves.</p>
<p>Showing support for fellow Muslims in the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1987) or the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Intifada">First Palestinian Intifada</a> provided an opportunity to manage the threat of religious radicalism. National leaders probably also saw this as an effective way to deflect attention from the authoritarian nature of many Muslim states. </p>
<p>And, as demonstrated by <a href="https://kyleorton1991.wordpress.com/2015/09/12/did-saddam-hussein-become-a-religious-believer/">Saddam Hussain’s turn to religious propaganda</a> after the 1990-91 Gulf War, it could be used as a last resort when other ways of demonstrating legitimacy had failed.</p>
<h2>The longer view</h2>
<p><a href="http://www.britannica.com/event/Persian-Gulf-War">The Gulf War</a> also brought non-Muslim troops to Arabian soil, inspiring <a href="http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/military-july-dec96-fatwa_1996/">Osama bin Laden’s call for jihad</a> against the Western nations that participated in it. And it eventually led to the US invasion of Iraq. That set off a chain of events that created in the country the chaotic conditions that enabled the rise of Islamic State. </p>
<p>If the IS leadership is really an <a href="http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/mideast-crisis-iraq-islamicstate/">alliance between ex-Ba'athist generals and an offshoot of al-Qaeda</a>, as has often been depicted, then we don’t have to go far beyond the events of this war to explain how the group formed. But the rise of Islamic State and its declaration of the caliphate can also be read as part of a wider story that has unfolded since the formation of modern nation states in the Muslim world. </p>
<p>As <a href="http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/86c958c2-ff78-11e3-8a35-00144feab7de.html#axzz367SAUfPl">some commentators</a> have pointed out, it’s not so much the Sykes-Picot agreement and the drawing of artificial national borders by colonial powers that brought about IS. </p>
<p>The modern nation-state model – as much as it’s based on <a href="https://nationalismstudies.wordpress.com/2012/10/24/benedict-anderson/">a kind of fiction</a> – is still strong in most parts of the Muslim world. And, I believe, it’s still the preferred option for most Muslims today. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113024/original/image-20160226-26669-1pzyzn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113024/original/image-20160226-26669-1pzyzn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113024/original/image-20160226-26669-1pzyzn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113024/original/image-20160226-26669-1pzyzn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113024/original/image-20160226-26669-1pzyzn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113024/original/image-20160226-26669-1pzyzn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/113024/original/image-20160226-26669-1pzyzn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">People of Arak toppled the Shah’s statue in Bāgh Mwlli (central square of Arak) during 1979 revolution.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AIranian_Revolution_in_Arak.jpg">Dooste Amin [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But the long century that has passed since the first world war has been increasingly marked by frustration. It’s littered with the broken promises of Muslim rulers to bring about a transition to more representative forms of government. And it has been marked by a sense that Western powers continue to control and manipulate events in the region, in a way that doesn’t always represent the best interests of Muslim societies.</p>
<p>An extreme <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/the-arab-spring-five-years-on-a-season-that-began-in-hope-but-ended-in-desolation-a6803161.html">high point of frustration</a> was reached in the events of the so-called <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12813859">Arab Spring</a>. The wave of popular demonstrations against the autocratic regimes of the Arab world were seen as the first winds of change that would bring democracy to the region. </p>
<p>But, with the possible exception of Tunisia, all of these countries underwent either destabilisation (Libya, Syria), the return of military rule (Egypt), or the further clamping down on civil rights (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and other Gulf monarchies). </p>
<p>I would hesitate to describe IS’s declaration of a caliphate as a serious challenge to the modern nation-state model. But the small, albeit substantial, stream of followers it manages to recruit daily shows it would be wrong to take for granted that the terms of the international order can simply be dictated from above forever. </p>
<p>When brute force increasingly has the final say over how people live their lives, it becomes harder for them to differentiate between the lesser of two evils.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>This is the eighth article in our series on the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/understanding-islamic-state">historical roots of Islamic State</a>. <a href="http://bit.ly/UnderstandingIS">Download our special report</a> collating the whole the series.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/54644/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Harith Bin Ramli does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The rise of Islamic State and its declaration of the caliphate can be read as part of a wider story that has unfolded since the formation of modern nation states in the Muslim world.Harith Bin Ramli, Research Fellow, Cambridge Muslim College & Teaching Fellow, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/526552016-02-23T19:05:05Z2016-02-23T19:05:05ZThe post-colonial caliphate: Islamic State and the memory of Sykes-Picot<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/109605/original/image-20160129-27340-62w6x2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Map of the Sykes–Picot Agreement showing Eastern Turkey in Asia, Syria and Western Persia, and areas of control and influence agreed between the British and the French in May 1916.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AMPK1-426_Sykes_Picot_Agreement_Map_signed_8_May_1916.jpg">Royal Geographical Society via Wikimedia Commons</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Since announcing its arrival as a global force in June 2014 with the declaration of a caliphate on territory captured in Iraq and Syria, jihadist group Islamic State has shocked the world with its brutality.</em></p>
<p><em>Our series has been examining the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/understanding-islamic-state">historic and cultural forces behind the rise of these jihadists</a>. Today, historian James Renton looks at the fateful 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement, which was pointedly denounced by Islamic State in the first video it released.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>Ever since Islamic State (IS) spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-iraq-idUSKBN0F40SL20140630">announced the establishment of a caliphate</a> on June 29, 2014, analysts have been busy trying to explain its aims and origins. </p>
<p>Much of the discussion has concentrated on the IS leadership’s theology – an apocalyptic philosophy that <a href="https://theconversation.com/if-islamic-state-is-based-on-religion-why-is-it-so-violent-52070">seeks a return to an imagined pristine Islam</a> of the religion’s founders. But this focus has led to a neglect of the group’s self-declared political aims. </p>
<p>For all the importance of religion in the way IS functions <a href="https://theconversation.com/islamic-state-lays-claim-to-muslim-theological-tradition-and-turns-it-on-its-head-53225">and justifies itself</a>, we can fully understand the caliphate only if we pay close attention to the public explanations – the modernist manifestos – of those at the helm of its overall political purpose. </p>
<p>Viewed from this perspective, the caliphate appears primarily as an attempt to free the ummah – the global Muslim community – from the legacies of European colonialism.</p>
<p>The leaders of IS do not see their caliphate as an exercise in theocracy for its own sake, but as an attempt at post-colonial emancipation.</p>
<h2>Looking right back</h2>
<p>Certainly, the very name adopted by the declared leader of the caliphate suggests an acute preoccupation with a specifically religious mission that harks back to the early years of Islam. </p>
<p>Originally known as Ibrahim bin Awwad bin Ibrahim al-Badri al-Samarra’i (or variations thereof), he took on, long before the summer of 2014, the pseudonym Abu Bakr, the name of the first caliph (the successor to Muhammad as the religious and political leader of the ummah).</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/110935/original/image-20160210-12178-1vrnf2d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/110935/original/image-20160210-12178-1vrnf2d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=788&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110935/original/image-20160210-12178-1vrnf2d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=788&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110935/original/image-20160210-12178-1vrnf2d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=788&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110935/original/image-20160210-12178-1vrnf2d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=991&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110935/original/image-20160210-12178-1vrnf2d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=991&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110935/original/image-20160210-12178-1vrnf2d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=991&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Briton Sir Mark Sykes agreed on terms with his French counterpart, François Georges-Picot, for dividing up the region after WWI.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/6a/Mark_Sykes00.jpg">Public Domain via Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Ruling in the years 632-4, Abu Bakr put an end to dissent against the new Islamic system in its Arabian heartlands. He established the caliphate as an expansionist Muslim empire with military campaigns in, the sources suggest, present-day Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Israel-Palestine. </p>
<p>As a declaration of intent, this choice of name by IS’s leader – whose full moniker became, alongside the title Caliph Ibrahim, <a href="http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/documents/baghdadi-caliph.pdf">Abu Bakr al-Husayni al-Qurashi al-Baghdadi</a> – seems to encapsulate much of what we need to know about the new caliphate’s ambitions. </p>
<p>Al-Adnani’s <a href="https://ia902505.us.archive.org/28/items/poa_25984/EN.pdf">founding proclamation</a> made a point of celebrating the military victories of the first decades of Islam and how the ummah then “filled the earth with justice … and ruled the world for centuries”. This success, he argued, was the result of nothing more than faith in Allah and the ummah’s adherence to the guidance of the Prophet Muhammad.</p>
<p>But the conquest of land and the establishment of a Muslim empire – or state, as those behind the new caliphate prefer to call it – is a means to a very specific end. It is not an end in itself. </p>
<h2>Anglo-French infamy</h2>
<p>According to al-Adnani, the caliphate is needed to take the ummah out of a condition of disgrace, humiliation and rule under the “vilest of all people”. Al-Baghdadi, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-28116846">speaking two days after</a> he was pronounced caliph, was much more <a href="http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/documents/baghdadi-caliph.pdf">specific</a>. </p>
<p>The fall of the last caliphate – and, with it, the loss of a state – led to the humiliation and disempowerment of Muslims around the globe, he said. And this condition of statelessness allowed “the disbelievers” to occupy Muslim lands, install their agents as authoritarian rulers and spread false Western doctrines.</p>
<p>Al-Baghdadi’s vague narrative refers to the story of the dissolution after the first world war of the Ottoman Empire, which had governed much of Western Asia for four centuries. </p>
<p>In its stead, the British and French empires took over significant parts of the region and remained for decades. When their rule came to an end, these colonial states did their best to leave behind successor regimes that would serve British and French interests and those of the wider West.</p>
<p>For IS leaders, these colonial machinations have left the ummah floundering ever since because they took away the essence of power in the contemporary world: sovereignty – territorially based political independence. </p>
<p>The caliphate is urgently needed, al-Baghdadi argues, to rectify this harmful absence. A similar argument for a caliphate, though made with a very different type of state in mind, was articulated by the UK-based scholar <a href="http://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/recalling-the-caliphate/">S. Sayyid</a> in 2014.</p>
<p>The most explicit evidence of this political objective’s primacy is to be found in the new caliphate’s propaganda, which has been such an important part of the IS project. </p>
<p>To coincide with the announcement of the caliphate, IS released a video entitled “<a href="http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=d43_1404046312">The End of Sykes-Picot</a>”. Signed in May 1916, the Sykes-Picot agreement was a secret <a href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:MPK1-426_Sykes_Picot_Agreement_Map_signed_8_May_1916.jpg?uselang=en-gb">Anglo-French plan</a> for dividing the Asian Ottoman Empire into spheres of influence and zones of direct rule for the two European empires. </p>
<p>The Bolsheviks discovered the agreement in the Russian state archives soon after they took power in November 1917 and revealed its contents to the world.</p>
<h2>The Sykes-Picot agreement</h2>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/110936/original/image-20160210-12137-1v1egj7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/110936/original/image-20160210-12137-1v1egj7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=1070&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110936/original/image-20160210-12137-1v1egj7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=1070&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110936/original/image-20160210-12137-1v1egj7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=1070&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110936/original/image-20160210-12137-1v1egj7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1345&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110936/original/image-20160210-12137-1v1egj7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1345&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110936/original/image-20160210-12137-1v1egj7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1345&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">The French negotiator of the Sykes-Picot agreement, François Georges-Picot.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AFran%C3%A7ois_Georges-Picot.JPG">Public Domain via Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>The Sykes-Picot agreement did not set out the borders of the states that replaced the Ottoman Empire, as the video suggests. But this error is beside the point if we want to understand the significance of the agreement for IS, and what it tells us about its caliphate. </p>
<p>In the Middle East, Sykes-Picot became shorthand for a whole narrative of Western betrayal and conspiracy in the region. But it also came to stand for the specific European colonial process of robbing the peoples of the region of their sovereignty. </p>
<p>And it is IS’s declared goal to undo this process. This is why “The End of Sykes-Picot”, above any other possible subject matter for an inaugural film, had to accompany the declaration of the caliphate.</p>
<p>For al-Baghdadi, sovereignty and Islam cannot be separated; thus the need for an Islamic state. He cannot use the term empire, even though it more accurately describes the global expansionist aims of his caliphate. </p>
<p>This is not just a question of semantics; it goes to the heart of the purpose of IS. The caliphate is needed, its leadership contends, to end the consequences of European empire, of colonialism. It is an effort to finally break away from the colonial condition; an attempt at a new post-colonial ummah.</p>
<p>Liberty from colonialism and sovereignty go hand in hand. The post-1918 world order embodied in the League of Nations and its successor, the United Nations, places the idea of sovereignty at the centre of how we understand power today. Within this system, the absence of a state is the absence of power. </p>
<p>The military defeat of IS and its loss of territory would, of course, make sovereignty, and thus the caliphate, impossible. But this defeat will not solve the problem of the sense of powerlessness that fuelled the 2014 caliphate in the first place; it will only compound it. </p>
<p>The real long-term challenge that faces opponents of IS, therefore, is not the overthrow of the caliphate – as difficult as that might be – or even to defeat “extremism”. It is, rather, to overcome the narrative at the centre of IS’s call to arms: Muslim alienation from the world system. </p>
<hr>
<p><em>This is the seventh article in our series on the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/understanding-islamic-state">historical roots of Islamic State</a>. <a href="http://bit.ly/UnderstandingIS">Download our special report</a> collating the whole the series.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/52655/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Renton has received funding from the UK's Arts and Humanities Research Council for a monograph that he is writing on the idea of the Middle East and its consequences.</span></em></p>The leaders of Islamic State do not see their caliphate as an exercise in theocracy for its own sake, but as an attempt at post-colonial emancipation.James Renton, Reader in History, Edge Hill UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/520702016-02-17T19:18:44Z2016-02-17T19:18:44ZIf Islamic State is based on religion, why is it so violent?<p><em>Islamic State’s seemingly sudden prominence has led to much speculation about the group’s origins: how do we account for forces and events that paved the way for its emergence?</em></p>
<p><em>In today’s instalment of <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/understanding-islamic-state">our series on the origins of Islamic State</a>, religious studies scholar Aaron Hughes considers whether this jihadist group’s violence is inherent to Islam.</em></p>
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<p>Despite what we’re told, religion isn’t inherently peaceful. The assumption is largely based on the Protestant idea that religion is something spiritual and internal to the individual and that it’s corrupted by politics and other mundane matters. </p>
<p>But people kill in the name of religion, just as they love in its name. To claim that one of these alternatives is more authentic than the other is not only problematic, it’s historically incorrect. </p>
<p>The Crusades, attacks at abortion clinics, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assassination_of_Yitzhak_Rabin">some political assassinations</a>, and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Israeli_price_tag_attacks">price-tag attacks</a> – to name only a few examples – were and are all motivated by religion. </p>
<p>This is because religion is based on the metaphysical notion that there are believers (in one’s own religion) and non-believers. This distinction is predicated on “good” versus “evil”, and can be neatly packaged into a narrative to be used and abused by various groups.</p>
<h2>An imagined past</h2>
<p>One such group is Islamic State (IS), which is inherently violent and claims it mirrors the Islam of the Prophet Muhammad. In this, it’s like other reformist movements in Islam that seek to recreate in the modern period what they imagine to have been the political framework and society that Muhammad (570-632 CE) and his immediate followers lived in and created in seventh-century Arabia. </p>
<p>The problem is that we know very little about this society, except what, often, much later sources – such as the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prophetic_biography">Biography (Sira) of Muhammad</a> and the work of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Tabari">historians such as al-Tabari</a> (839-923 CE) – tell us it was like. </p>
<p>A central ideal for IS is that of restoring the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caliphate">caliphate</a>. A geopolitical entity, the caliphate was the Islamic empire that stretched from Morocco and Spain in the West, to India in the East. It symbolises Islam at its most powerful. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/111744/original/image-20160217-19239-1w8syvt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/111744/original/image-20160217-19239-1w8syvt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/111744/original/image-20160217-19239-1w8syvt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/111744/original/image-20160217-19239-1w8syvt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/111744/original/image-20160217-19239-1w8syvt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/111744/original/image-20160217-19239-1w8syvt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=468&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/111744/original/image-20160217-19239-1w8syvt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=468&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/111744/original/image-20160217-19239-1w8syvt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=468&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<p>When it was spreading across the Middle East and the Mediterranean region in the seventh century, Islam was highly apocalyptic. Many early sources, such as the second caliph <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/1508294?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">Umar’s letter to the Byzantine Emperor Leo III</a>, as well as contemporaneous non-Muslim sources, such as the mid-eighth-century Jewish apocalypse <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Secrets_of_Rabbi_Simon_ben_Yohai">The Secrets of Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai</a> and the seventh-century polemic <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Teaching_of_Jacob_">Doctrina Jacobi</a>, speak about the coming destruction of the world as we know it.</p>
<p>The destruction is to begin with a battle between the forces of good (Muslim) versus those of evil. And IS has adopted this <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/08/world/middleeast/us-strategy-seeks-to-avoid-isis-prophecy.html">apocalyptic vision</a>.</p>
<p>Again, though, it’s worth noting two things. The first is that the <a href="https://theconversation.com/cultural-muslims-like-cultural-christians-are-a-silent-majority-32097">majority of Muslims today</a> don’t buy into this apocalyptic vision; it’s mainly something recycled by groups such as Islamic State. </p>
<p>Second, such an “end of days” vision is by no means unique to Islam; we also see it in <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Temple_Mount_and_Eretz_Yisrael_Faithful_Movement">Judaism</a> and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christian_right">Christianity</a>. In these other two traditions, as in Islam, such groups certainly do not represent orthodox belief.</p>
<h2>Medieval tolerance</h2>
<p>But apocalypse aside, was Islam particularly violent in the seventh century? One could certainly point to three of the first four of Muhammad’s successors (caliphs) having been assassinated. </p>
<p>One could also point to the tremendous theological debates over who was or was not a Muslim. And such debates included the status of the soul of grave sinners. Was such a sinner a Muslim or did his sin put him outside the community of believers? </p>
<p>What would become mainstream Muslim opinion is that it was up to God to decide and not humans. But groups such as Islamic State want to make this distinction for God. In this, they certainly stray from orthodox Muslim belief. </p>
<p>While this doesn’t make them “un-Islamic”, to say groups such as IS represent medieval interpretations of Islam is not fair to medieval Islam. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/110739/original/image-20160209-12814-rxd6ox.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/110739/original/image-20160209-12814-rxd6ox.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=611&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110739/original/image-20160209-12814-rxd6ox.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=611&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110739/original/image-20160209-12814-rxd6ox.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=611&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110739/original/image-20160209-12814-rxd6ox.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=767&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110739/original/image-20160209-12814-rxd6ox.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=767&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110739/original/image-20160209-12814-rxd6ox.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=767&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Manuscript with depiction by Yahya ibn Vaseti found in the Maqama of Hariri depicts the image of a library with pupils in it, Baghdad 1237.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/2c/Maqamat_hariri.jpg">Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
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<p>The eighth century, for example, witnessed the establishment, in Baghdad, of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/House_of_Wisdom">Bayt al-Hikma (The House of Wisdom)</a>, which symbolised the so-called golden age of Islamic civilisation. This period witnessed, among other things, Muslim, Jewish and Christian scholars studying the philosophical and scientific texts of Greek antiquity. </p>
<p>These scholars also made many advances in disciplines, such as mathematics, astronomy, medicine, alchemy and chemistry, to name only a few. Within a century of its founding, Islam <a href="https://theconversation.com/islam-the-open-civilisation-confounds-closed-minds-44416">represented a cosmopolitan empire</a> that was nothing like the rigid and dogmatic interpretation of the religion seen in the likes of IS.</p>
<h2>A powerful tool</h2>
<p>Observers in the West who want to claim that Islam is to blame for IS and use it as further proof that the religion is inherently violent, ignore other root causes of the moment. </p>
<p>These include the history of European colonialism in the area; US and European support for a number of ruthless Middle Eastern dictators; and the instability created by the American invasion of Iraq after the events of September 11, 2001. </p>
<p>It’s juxtaposed against these recent events that groups such as IS dream of reconstituting what they romantically imagine as the powerful Islamic caliphate.</p>
<p>The fact is that religion’s ability to neatly differentiate between “believer” and unbeliever", and between “right” and “wrong”, makes it a powerful ideology. In the hands of demagogues, religious discourses – used selectively and manipulated to achieve a set of desired ends – are very powerful. </p>
<p>While it would be incorrect to say that the discourses used by IS are un-Islamic, it’s important to note it represents one particular Islamic discourse and that it’s not the mainstream one.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>This article is the third in <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/understanding-islamic-state">our series on understanding Islamic State</a>. <a href="http://bit.ly/UnderstandingIS">Download our special report</a> collating the whole the series.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/52070/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aaron W. Hughes does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Despite what we’re told, religion isn’t inherently peaceful. People kill in the name of their religion, just as they love in its name.Aaron W. Hughes, Philip S. Bernstein Professor of Jewish Studies, University of RochesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/532252016-02-16T18:23:45Z2016-02-16T18:23:45ZIslamic State lays claim to Muslim theological tradition and turns it on its head<p><em>How do we account for forces and events that paved the way for the emergence of Islamic State? <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/understanding-islamic-state">Our series on the jihadist group’s origins</a> tries to address this question by looking at the interplay of historical and social forces that led to its advent.</em></p>
<p><em>Today, historian of Islamic thought Harith Bin Ramli explains how Islamic State fits – or doesn’t – in Muslim theological tradition, and incidentally addresses a question often levelled at adherents of the religion living in the West.</em></p>
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<p>For Muslims around the world, it’s become an almost daily heartbreaking experience to see Islam associated with all the shades of <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/10/isis-confirms-and-justifies-enslaving-yazidis-in-new-magazine-article/381394/">cruelty</a> and <a href="http://www.raqqa-sl.com/en/">inhumanity</a> of so-called Islamic State (IS). It’s tempting <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/isis-call-it-the-un-islamic-state-say-muslim-groups-as-another-hostage-is-murdered-9731823.html">to dismiss</a> the group as lying beyond the boundaries of Islam. But this way of thinking leads down the same route IS has taken. </p>
<p>Let me explain.</p>
<p>Ever since the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632, there hasn’t been a single central authority that all Muslims have unanimously agreed on. The first generation of Muslims didn’t just disagree, they battled over the succession to leadership of the community. </p>
<p>The result of this division was the formation of the main <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/subdivisions/sunnishia_1.shtml">Sunni and Shi’i</a> theological traditions we see to this day. But the blood spilt over the issue also resulted in a general sense of concern about the consequences of political and theological differences. </p>
<p>A consensus quickly emerged over the need to respect differences of opinion. And it was considered important to “disassociate” oneself from anyone who had differing views on these key issues. But as long as the person in question affirmed the basic tenets of Islam, such as the unity of God and the prophecy of Muhammad, he or she was still considered a Muslim.</p>
<h2>Similar detractors</h2>
<p>The one dissenting theological view on this matter was held by a group known as the Kharijites. It adopted the view that dissenting or corrupt Muslim leaders, by their actions, had become “apostates” from Islam altogether. </p>
<p>Sub-factions of this group increasingly extended their definition of apostasy to include any Muslim who didn’t agree with them. They declared these Muslims infidels who could be killed or enslaved.</p>
<p>The brutality of these extreme Kharijites never attracted more than a minority of Muslims, and other Kharijites adopted <a href="http://islam.uga.edu/ibadis.html">a more peaceful position</a> more in line with the emerging consensus. </p>
<p>Widespread horror at the early divisions of the Muslim community and the terrors unleashed by Khariji extremism ensured that Islam generally embraced a pluralistic approach to differences of opinion. This emerged hand in hand with a culture of scholarship, based on the idea that the endeavour to seek the “true” meaning of scripture is an ongoing and fallible human effort. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/111278/original/image-20160212-29175-9bxy0z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/111278/original/image-20160212-29175-9bxy0z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/111278/original/image-20160212-29175-9bxy0z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=725&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/111278/original/image-20160212-29175-9bxy0z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=725&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/111278/original/image-20160212-29175-9bxy0z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=725&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/111278/original/image-20160212-29175-9bxy0z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=912&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/111278/original/image-20160212-29175-9bxy0z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=912&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/111278/original/image-20160212-29175-9bxy0z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=912&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<p>Beyond a number of issues over which there was unquestionable consensus, different interpretations could be tolerated. </p>
<p>What makes IS different to traditional Islam isn’t necessarily the religious texts the group uses. To justify their practice of slavery or war against non-Muslims, they appeal to parts of the Qur'an or prophetic traditions, or legal works that are fairly mainstream and representative of the medieval Islamic tradition. </p>
<p>But these texts – scripture or otherwise – have always been read through the mediation of past and continuous efforts of interpretation by communities of scholars. As theology scholar <a href="http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/20944/beyond-authenticity_isis-and-the-islamic-legal-tra">Sohaira Siddiqui of Georgetown University points out</a>, groups like IS deviate from mainstream Islam by their rejection of this culture of scholarly interpretation and religious pluralism, that is, the means by which the texts were interpreted. </p>
<p>This approach has roots in the group’s main theological inspiration, the Wahhabi movement. Founded on a radical interpretation of the 14th-century theologian <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-read-the-medieval-scholar-the-islamic-state-used-to-justify-al-kasasbeh-murder-37293">Ibn Taymiyya</a>, it dismissed any Muslim who didn’t subscribe to its strict interpretation of monotheism as an “apostate”. </p>
<p>It can also be traced back to radical political theorists of the 20th century, such as <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/nov/01/afghanistan.terrorism3">Sayyid Qutb</a>, who rejected the modern state and attendant ideologies, including nationalism and democracy, as “idolatrous” and not based on the rule of God. </p>
<p>By declaring the revival of the Caliphate, IS claims to have created an alternative to the prevailing political order. </p>
<h2>Harms of hastiness</h2>
<p>Adopting a simple “with us or against us” approach lets IS justify denouncing Muslim rulers as “tyrants” and the religious figures who support them as “palace scholars”. In general, Muslims who don’t “repent” and support their beliefs are at risk of being denounced as “apostates” who can be killed. </p>
<p>Effectively, the group has revived the age-old Kharijite tendency in the form of a deadly modern political ideology. </p>
<p>IS is right about one thing: the solution to the widespread problems of the Muslim world cannot lie in the reaffirmation of status quo politics and the hypocritical employment of religion to prop up corrupt and oppressive regimes. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/110885/original/image-20160210-3265-e0esfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/110885/original/image-20160210-3265-e0esfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=363&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110885/original/image-20160210-3265-e0esfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=363&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110885/original/image-20160210-3265-e0esfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=363&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110885/original/image-20160210-3265-e0esfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=456&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110885/original/image-20160210-3265-e0esfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=456&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110885/original/image-20160210-3265-e0esfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=456&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">By declaring the revival of the Caliphate, IS claims to have created an alternative to the prevailing political order.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">REUTERS/Umit Bektas</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But its dismissal of the culture of scholarly pluralism and religious tolerance seems like an easy way to select interpretations of the scripture and religious tradition to suit its political aims, not the other way round. </p>
<p>Leading Muslim religious authorities, such as the <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/en/originals/2015/02/azhar-egypt-radicals-islamic-state-apostates.html">Grand Shaykh of al-Azhar</a>, have refrained from denouncing IS as “apostates”, even though they have called for the use of <a href="http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/02/04/Al-Azhar-calls-for-killing-crucifixion-of-ISIS-terrorists-.html">full military force</a> against them. Their hesitance may be due to an awareness that such a move would simply drag the Muslim community down to the level IS wants them to be on. </p>
<p>Instead of labelling IS un-Islamic, the global Muslim community would do better to reaffirm its commitment to its culture of pluralism. This approach may also open up a crucial conversation that must take place about <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/religion-politics/">the relationship between state and religion</a> in contemporary Muslim societies. </p>
<p>Many Muslims might share the IS view that there are already many signs that the end of times is approaching. But the group departs from mainstream Muslim apocalyptic theology in two respects. </p>
<p>First, its literature seems to omit any mention of the awaited Mahdi (the Guided One) and the return of Jesus the son of Mary, who is prophesied to defeat the Great Pretender (Dajjal, or anti-Christ). And second, in contrast to the average Muslim believer who acknowledges only a limited ability to fully grasp the meaning of these prophecies, IS arrogates for itself a central role in the unfolding of such events. </p>
<p>In other words, instead of waiting for God to bring about the end of times, IS hopes to prompt it through its own actions. In this respect, it has something in common with extreme forms of <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-heilbroner/evangelicals-israel-and-t_b_391351.html">Christian</a> and <a href="http://www.timesofisrael.com/extremist-group-offers-jews-500-to-pray-on-temple-mount/">Jewish religious Zionism</a>.</p>
<p>If one were to give IS’s followers the benefit of the doubt, excluding those with mainly criminal motives, it seems that theirs is an ideology fuelled by a hasty desire for the implementation of the will of God. And an even hastier dismissal of the more careful and humble approach of other Muslims. </p>
<p>As the Qur’an states:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“<a href="http://quran.com/21/37">man was created hasty by nature</a>” (21:37), and “<a href="http://quran.com/103">all mankind is at loss, except for those who believe and advise one another concerning the Truth, and concerning patience</a>”. (103:2-3) </p>
</blockquote>
<hr>
<p><em>This article is the second in our <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/understanding-islamic-state">series on understanding Islamic State</a>. <a href="http://bit.ly/UnderstandingIS">Download our special report</a> collating the whole the series.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/53225/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Harith Bin Ramli does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>What makes Islamic State different to traditional Islam isn’t necessarily the religious texts the group uses.Harith Bin Ramli, Research Fellow, Cambridge Muslim College & Teaching Fellow, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/521552016-02-15T19:21:12Z2016-02-15T19:21:12ZUnderstanding Islamic State: where does it come from and what does it want?<p><em>Since announcing its arrival as a global force in June 2014 with the declaration of a caliphate on territory captured in Iraq and Syria, the jihadist group Islamic State has shocked the world with its brutality.</em> </p>
<p><em>Its seemingly sudden prominence has led to much speculation about the group’s origins: how do we account for forces and events that paved the way for the emergence of Islamic State?</em></p>
<p><em>In the article kicking off <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/understanding-islamic-state">our series on the genesis of the group</a> below, Professor of Modern Middle Eastern History James Gelvin cautions against easy answers. It’s a logical fallacy, he adds, to think that just because one event followed another, it was also caused by it.</em> </p>
<p><em>Far better to look at the interplay of historical and social forces, as well as recognising that outfits such as Islamic State often cherry-pick ideas to justify their ideas and behaviours.</em></p>
<p><em>Our series attempts, in a dispassionate way, to catalogue many of the forces and events that can arguably have played a part in creating the conditions necessary for these jihadists to emerge. We have tried to spread the net wide, but we make no claim to being comprehensive or having the final word on the origins of Islamic State.</em></p>
<p><em>Over the next two weeks, a selection of religious studies scholars and historians – modern and medieval – from around the world will bring their expertise to our discussion of what led to the most notorious jihadist group in recent history.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>How far back in history does one have to go to find the roots of the so-called Islamic State (IS)?</p>
<p>To the <a href="http://vm136.lib.berkeley.edu/BANC/ROHO/projects/debt/oilcrisis.html">oil shock of 1973-74</a>, when Persian Gulf oil producers used the huge surplus of dollars flowing into their coffers to finance the spread of their severe interpretation of Islam?</p>
<p>To the end of the first world war, when the victorious Entente powers sparked resentment throughout the Arab world by <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-25299553">drawing artificial national borders</a> we hear so much about today? </p>
<p>How about 632 AD, the date of the <a href="http://www.cyberistan.org/islamic/death.html">death of the Prophet Muhammad</a>, when the early Islamic community split on who should succeed him as its leader — a breach that led to <a href="http://origins.osu.edu/article/tradition-vs-charisma-sunni-shii-divide-muslim-world/page/0/0">the Sunni-Shi'i divide</a> that IS exploits for its own ends?</p>
<p>The possibilities seem endless and would make for an entertaining variation on the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six_Degrees_of_Kevin_Bacon">Six Degrees of Kevin Bacon</a> parlour game (which suggests any two people on earth are six or fewer acquaintance links apart) were the subject not so macabre. </p>
<p>But to look at any and all historical phenomena through a simple string of causes and effects is to ignore the almost infinite number of possible effects that might follow from any one purported cause. </p>
<p>It also opens the door to one of the most pernicious logical fallacies historians might commit: <em>post hoc, ergo propter hoc</em> (after this, therefore because of this). So rather than tracing the rise of IS to one or more events in the past, I suggest we take a different tack.</p>
<h2>A long line</h2>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/109578/original/image-20160129-27177-1e6zxr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/109578/original/image-20160129-27177-1e6zxr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=688&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109578/original/image-20160129-27177-1e6zxr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=688&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109578/original/image-20160129-27177-1e6zxr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=688&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109578/original/image-20160129-27177-1e6zxr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=865&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109578/original/image-20160129-27177-1e6zxr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=865&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109578/original/image-20160129-27177-1e6zxr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=865&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Muhammad Ahmad, one of a long line of self-professed redeemers of the Islamic faith.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Muhammad_Ahmad#/media/File:Muhammad_Ahmad_al-Mahdi.jpg">Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>IS is an instance of a phenomenon that recurs in most religions, and certainly in all <a href="http://www.britannica.com/topic/monotheism">monotheistic religions</a>. Every so often militant strains emerge, flourish temporarily, then vanish. They are then replaced by another militant strain whose own beginning is linked to a predecessor by nothing more profound than drawing from the same cultural pool as its predecessor.</p>
<p>In the seventh century, there were <a href="http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195390155/obo-9780195390155-0047.xml">the Kharijites</a> (the first sect of Islam), a starkly puritanical group that assassinated two of the early caliphs. Like IS, the Kharajites thought they knew best what and who were truly Islamic, and what and who were not.</p>
<p>In the 18th century, there were the followers of <a href="http://www.britannica.com/biography/Muhammad-ibn-Abd-al-Wahhab">Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab</a>, a central Arabian preacher whose followers included <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muhammad_bin_Saud">Muhammad ibn Saud</a>, the founder of the Saudi dynasty. Believing that the worship of saints and the construction of mausoleums were impious acts, ibn Saud’s army destroyed sites holy to both Sunnis and Shi‘is in Arabia and present-day Iraq, much as <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/02/isis-destruction-of-palmyra-syria-heart-been-ripped-out-of-the-city">IS targets sites from antiquity</a> today. </p>
<p>During the 19th century, <a href="http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Muhammad_Ahmad">Muhammad Ahmad</a>, a member of a religious order in what is now Sudan, proclaimed himself mahdi (redeemer of the Islamic faith), just as <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27801676">Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi</a>, inventor and leader of IS, recently proclaimed himself caliph (leader of the Islamic faith) — a more prosaic position. <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Khartoum">Ahmad’s army overran Khartoum</a>, where it massacred a British-led garrison and beheaded its commander.</p>
<p>Between Muhammad Ahmad and al-Baghdadi there were many, many others.</p>
<p>While tempting, it would be a mistake to believe that each militant group “gave rise to” the next (although later militants have sometimes drawn from or been inspired by their predecessors). That would be the equivalent of saying that <a href="http://www.britannica.com/topic/Zealot">the ancient Zealots</a> (a Jewish sect that fought the Romans) gave rise to militant Israeli settlers on the West Bank, or that <a href="http://www.history.com/topics/crusades">medieval Crusaders</a> gave rise to abortion-clinic bombers. </p>
<h2>The right stuff</h2>
<p>From time to time (it’s impossible to predict when), some figure emerges in each tradition who puts his own spin on that tradition. To be successful, that spin must capture the imagination of some of that tradition’s adherents, who then try to put it into practice. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/109589/original/image-20160129-27159-1ewvj2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/109589/original/image-20160129-27159-1ewvj2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109589/original/image-20160129-27159-1ewvj2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109589/original/image-20160129-27159-1ewvj2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109589/original/image-20160129-27159-1ewvj2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109589/original/image-20160129-27159-1ewvj2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109589/original/image-20160129-27159-1ewvj2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A newspaper featuring former al-Qaeda leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ali Jasim/Reuters</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Some spins, such as that of contemporary <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-wahhabism-in-saudi-arabia-36693">Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabis</a>, have sticking power. This is not because they are somehow “truer” than others, but because those who advocate for them are better able to mobilise resources – a core group of committed followers, for instance, military capabilities, or outside support – than others. Most do not.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27801676">Al-Baghdadi</a> is one such figure (as was al-Qaeda founder <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-10741005">Osama bin Laden</a>). His spin melds together three ideas that come from the Islamic tradition. </p>
<p>The first is <em>khilafa</em> (caliphate). Al-Baghdadi believes that Islam requires a caliphate — governance in accordance with Islamic law over territory that’s under the authority of a caliph (a righteous and knowledgeable descendant of the prophet). </p>
<p>When <a href="http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/100620153">his forces took over Mosul</a> in the summer of 2014, al-Baghdadi proclaimed himself caliph and burnished his credentials for the job by changing his name to Caliph Ibrahim al-Quraishi al-Hashimi. The last two names signify he’s a member of the tribe of Muhammad and a descendant of the prophet.</p>
<p>The second idea al-Baghdadi brought into the mix is <em>takfir</em> – the act of pronouncing Muslims who disagree with IS’s strict interpretation of Islamic law to be apostates, which makes them punishable by death. This is the reason for IS’s murderous rampages against Shi‘is; rampages that even al-Qaeda central finds counter-productive, if not repugnant.</p>
<p>Resurrecting the concept of <em>takfir</em> was the idea of <a href="http://www.cfr.org/iraq/profile-abu-musab-al-zarqawi/p9866">Abu Musab al-Zarqawi</a>, founder of al-Qaeda in Iraq. His strategy was to use the concept to tighten communal ties among Iraq’s Sunnis by mobilising them against its Shi‘is, thus making post-American-invasion Iraq ungovernable. </p>
<p>Al-Baghdadi has gone one step further, finding the concept useful in his effort to purify the territory of the caliphate which, he believes, will soon stretch across the Islamic world.</p>
<p>Finally, there is <em>hijra</em>, the migration of Muslims from <em>dar al-harb</em> (the abode of war, that is, non-Muslim majority countries) to <em>dar al-Islam</em> (the abode of Islam) – just as Muhammad and his early companions migrated from Mecca to Medina, where they established the first permanent Islamic community. </p>
<p>IS wants a great incoming of Muslims into the caliphate. This is both because it needs skilled administrators and fighters and because it considers emigration from “non-Muslim territory” to “Muslim territory” a religious obligation. </p>
<h2>A dangerous distraction</h2>
<p>According to some commentators, al-Baghdadi brought a fourth idea to the table: <a href="http://us.macmillan.com/books/9781250080905">an apocalyptic vision</a>. They base this on the name of IS’s glossy magazine, Dabiq (the site in northern Syria where, Islamic tradition has it, the Battle of Armageddon will take place), articles in the magazine and propaganda videos.</p>
<p>It’s not too much of a stretch to attribute an apocalyptic vision to IS — after all, just as every monotheism is prone to militant strains, all are prone to apocalyptic visions as well. Nevertheless, I remain unconvinced that the concept represents a significant part of IS’s worldview. </p>
<p>Whatever the future may hold, IS, like some <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/06/end-of-world-7-october-ebible-fellowship">apocalyptic Christian groups</a>, has proved itself so tactically and strategically adept that it has obviously kicked any “end of days” can well down the road (roughly the same distance al-Qaeda kicked the re-establishment of the caliphate can).</p>
<p>Further, much of the IS leadership consists of hard-headed <a href="http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/mideast-crisis-iraq-islamicstate/">former Iraqi Ba‘th military officers</a> who, if they think about an apocalypse at all, probably treat it much as Hitler’s generals treated the purported musings of Nazi true believers – with a roll of their eyes. </p>
<p>Foregrounding IS’s apocalyptic worldview enables us to disparage the group as irrational and even medieval – a dangerous thing to do. If the recent past has demonstrated one thing, it’s that IS thrives when its adversaries underestimate it.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>This is the first article in our series on the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/understanding-islamic-state">historical roots of Islamic State</a>. <a href="http://bit.ly/UnderstandingIS">Download our special report</a> collating the whole the series.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/52155/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James L. Gelvin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>How far back in history does one have to go to find the roots of the so-called Islamic State? The first article in our series on the genesis of the terrorist outfit considers some fundamentals.James L. Gelvin, Professor of Modern Middle Eastern History, University of California, Los AngelesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/536672016-01-25T15:19:22Z2016-01-25T15:19:22ZOur understanding of states, sovereignty and statelessness is being tested<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/109155/original/image-20160125-19667-bbr0pc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Refugees walk through a frozen field after crossing the border from Macedonia, near the village of Miratovac, Serbia</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Marko Djurica</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>One leg of a complicated travel schedule over the holidays imprisoned me in an airport lounge for 12 hours: caught in this liminal space, I began to think about the state, its sovereignty, and the idea of statelessness.</p>
<p>It is not the first time these thoughts have come around.</p>
<p>When the glamour of globalisation was the rage a decade or so ago, it was tempting to believe that - to invoke Leon Trotsky’s famous 1917 phrase - the world was on the edge of condemning the state and sovereignty to the <a href="http://dinafainberg.com/about/">dustbin of history</a>.</p>
<p>But I was disbelieving that globalisation could herald some kind of new market-driven nirvana where states and sovereignty would no longer count for much.</p>
<p>The idea of making both peace and paradise through the power of the purse was never really on: too many messy corners remained to be tidied up, and it is to several of these that my holiday peregrinations took me.</p>
<p>In the late-1960s, however, I was attracted to an earlier strain of post-sovereign thinking, the idea of “the global village”. This has been largely associated with Canadian media theorist, <a href="http://www.mcluhanmedia.com/m_mcl_manmessage.html">Marshall McLuhan</a>. The idea was that greater connectivity would “shrink” the world, but leave state sovereignty intact.</p>
<p>This notion of shrinking the world was recently re-captured by the acclaimed Marxist theorist, David Harvey, in the phrase <a href="http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199874002/obo-9780199874002-0025.xml">“time-space compression”</a>. We live in a “24/7” world, while geographical boundaries have been rendered meaningless.</p>
<p>In one form or another the ideas – globalisation, the global village, time-space compression - were once easily illustrated by pointing to what was happening in Europe.</p>
<p>After centuries of promoting conflict, sovereignty within Europe was demonstrably losing its grip: states previously at war were willing to surrender their dominion in order to merge, mingle and mix. Surely, this was the pathway to modernisation.</p>
<p>But Europe’s value as the proverbial case-in-point has recently been drawn into question.</p>
<p>The promise of economic prosperity for all who live within its capacious borders has been hobbled by market-inspired thinking. The very idea of Europe has been eroded by the incessant bleating by the British that their sovereignty is exceptional – destined to command the world, not be sullied by European provincialism.</p>
<p>But importantly for present purposes, events in Europe suggest something new about states, sovereignty – and the stateless.</p>
<p>Notwithstanding solemn declarations by Brussels - and separate deals with neighbouring states - it is a sure bet that the inward <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911">migration to Europe</a> will continue unabated.</p>
<p>The reason for this is plain: those dislodged by conflict in the Middle East know that Europe – a place with no internal borders – is almost within walking distance.</p>
<p>It is true, of course, that around the wider EU borders are in place. These were once the edge of what, a decade and more ago, was called <a href="http://www.movingpeoplechangingplaces.org/migration-histories/fortress-europe.html">“Fortress Europe” </a> – a ring of legislation and international law which could protect prosperous Europe from the intrusion of outsiders.</p>
<p>But it is difficult today to see how – short of war, as in the Ukraine – Fortress Europe can reassert this outer boundary of its sovereignty.</p>
<p>The lesson of this is clear: no longer bound by states, those who have become stateless seem to be seeking a place in the only space where sovereignty has little purchase on the lives of individuals.</p>
<p>There seems to be something else going on too: our understanding of states, sovereignty and statelessness is being tested.</p>
<p>Paradoxically, as the stateless seek out Europe, thousands are leaving it to join the <a href="http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/597254/ISIS-Map-Europe-Terror-Organisation-Andrew-Hosken-Caliphate-Abu-Musab-al-Zarqawi">ISIS caliphate</a>, a sovereign-free zone straddling two nominally sovereign countries – Syria and Iraq.</p>
<p>But here, law and politics clash. In effect the caliphate exercises political sovereignty, although legally it has none. So it occupies that liminal space between “what is” and “what should be”.</p>
<p>As a result, the idea of the caliphate is testing our lexicon, our grammar and our political imagination.</p>
<p>Many questions follow of which this may be the most important: short of war, how are we to deal with it if it is invariably seen as dystopian, or described a “threat”?</p>
<p>A <a href="http://www.e-ir.info/2016/01/22/neglected-yarns-and-new-beginnings-a-delhi-diary/">small conference in Delhi</a>, which came at the end of a month-long perambulation, drew me towards the understanding that we can only read state, sovereignty and statelessness as a process of social negotiation. Seldom are these notions settled: instead, they are continuously mediated by circumstances.</p>
<p>In contrast to what we have been taught - or teach our students - we live in an increasingly hybrid world. </p>
<p>In this world outcomes are produced that are not stable and so generate only doubt, not certainty.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/53667/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
In contrast to what we have been taught - or teach our students - we are living in an increasingly hybrid world.Peter Vale, Professor of Humanities and the Director of the Johannesburg Institute for Advanced Study (JIAS), University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/506172015-11-17T11:28:38Z2015-11-17T11:28:38ZWhile Paris mourns, opportunity knocks for Assad in Syria<p>While so many count their losses after the appalling terrorist attacks on Paris, one man might just be wondering if he’ll find himself on the right side of history. Over the last few days, Bashar al-Assad’s removal from power in Syria has fallen sharply down the list of international priorities. </p>
<p>On November 14, the <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-11-14/syrian-transition-plan-achieved-by-u-s-allies-kerry-says">Syria talks</a> in Vienna recognised the imperative of joint military action against Islamic State, the group that has taken responsibility for the Paris atrocities that have so far killed 129 people. <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/16/g20-barack-obama-and-vladimir-putin-agree-to-syrian-led-transition">Informal talks</a> between presidents Putin and Obama at the G20 summit in Turkey continued on this theme, while <a href="http://news.sky.com/story/1588643/france-will-intensify-is-bombing-in-syria">France redoubled</a> its airstrikes against Islamic State in Syria. </p>
<p>These developments have come as the Syrian dictator is on the ascendant. Days before the Paris attacks, his troops scored their first big victory since the Russians intervened in Syria at the end of September. They <a href="http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/11/10/syrian-army-breaks-two-year-siege-at-aleppo-air-base.html">broke the</a> siege on the Kweires air base in Aleppo province in the north of the country, which had been surrounded by IS for almost two years. Omran al-Zoubi, the Syrian information minister, spoke of defying the “terrorists”, a category that in government rhetoric includes both IS and the other rebel groups against which Assad has been fighting for the past four years. </p>
<p>Prior to this victory, Assad’s position had looked very weak. The territory the Syrian government controls is down to a strip of land in the west of the country (see rose area in map below). The area still includes Damascus and a few important military bases, but represents only a fraction of the country. </p>
<p>In Assad’s favour, the Western-backed rebel forces are scattered and divided. Their different interests and motivations lack the necessary political identity to build a stable government coalition. One thing the Arab Spring taught us is that a common goal is not always enough to create a stable country – <a href="http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/libya-as-a-failed-state-causes-consequences-options">Libya being the obvious example</a>. </p>
<p>So far the only force that has looked capable of achieving strategic military objectives bears the banner of the caliphate: IS’s <a href="http://freebeacon.com/national-security/islamic-state-gains-ground-in-syria/">conquest of Mahin</a> in central Syria earlier this month opened a clear path to the capital, for instance, and deprived the government of important arms depots. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/101710/original/image-20151112-9381-tdlfhr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/101710/original/image-20151112-9381-tdlfhr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/101710/original/image-20151112-9381-tdlfhr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=609&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101710/original/image-20151112-9381-tdlfhr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=609&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101710/original/image-20151112-9381-tdlfhr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=609&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101710/original/image-20151112-9381-tdlfhr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=765&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101710/original/image-20151112-9381-tdlfhr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=765&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101710/original/image-20151112-9381-tdlfhr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=765&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://iswresearch.blogspot.co.uk/2015/09/posture-of-syrian-regime-and-allies.html">Institute for the Study of War</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Shifting sands</h2>
<p>So what happens now? The <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-11-14/syrian-transition-plan-achieved-by-u-s-allies-kerry-says">Vienna agreement calls</a> on the warring Syrian parties to start talking by January 1 2016 and reach a ceasefire within six months. They are then to focus on drafting a new constitution with a view to holding elections in 2017 which will be closely monitored and will need to be free and fair. </p>
<p>This is likely to make a lot of difference. The nations involved – the US, UK, Russia, China, Germany and France – <a href="http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Momentum-in-Vienna-talks-on-Syria-after-Paris-massacre-433057">agreed</a> to support a “UN-endorsed ceasefire-monitoring mission” to ensure that both Assad’s supporters and those standing in opposition to him abide by it. This means that Russia and China agreed to go in under the UN blue helmets – having always been opposed to such coordinated efforts in the past. </p>
<p>The fact that Russia and the US appear to be setting aside their differences looks massive and should mean the Russians and the NATO states will cooperate. The proposed peace talks would exclude IS, which would still be open to military attacks even after a ceasefire between Assad and the rebels had been put in place. Though the Russians and US still disagree on whether Assad would lead an interim government ahead of the 2017 elections, they are mainly focused on neutralising IS before the situation gets any more critical. </p>
<p>In the weeks ahead, it looks as though Assad loyalists will now try to take the south-western part of the country from the non-IS rebels, perhaps still backed by Russian air raids. This would give the psychological boost of reversing a failed offensive earlier in the year and ensure that Assad’s forces control a continuous strip of land all the way to the Jordanian and Israeli borders. Assad’s other focus will be to secure the city of Aleppo, Syria’s largest. Where the south-west is a battle against the rebels, Aleppo is partly rebel-held and partly the domain of IS. Both battles look more achievable than before, though it could be especially drawn out – city struggles often are. </p>
<p>On the question of dealing with IS as a whole, its troops are well organised and mostly led by trained generals and officials from the former Iraqi army. Assad will need a tailor-made strategy to push them back over the Syrian-Iraqi border. Into this situation come the French IS airstrikes, which have so far concentrated on the city of Raqqa in the central north. They were backed up on Monday, November 16 by US air raids both on Raqqa and in nearby ISIS areas. </p>
<p>With French president, Francois Hollande, declaring his country at war with IS, France’s UK and German allies are now more likely to follow suit. If so, Assad will get more firepower against his enemies – and note that several groups of other moderate Syrian groups have been joining IS, which presents a wider target than IS was a few months ago. </p>
<p>The downside for Assad is that he will have to take more account of Western requests for a ceasefire against his non-IS enemies, and then the elections. If he looks more likely to defeat his enemies by military means, his bigger challenge will be to keep control of the country. He will need to gain the support of enough moderate groups by committing to a wide reform of the system and to woo the West by talking tough on IS. </p>
<p>The situation is now so much in flux that it is even harder to see what will happen in Syria than it was before Paris. But Assad has certainly been handed a big opportunity. Whether he can use it to shore up his power base will be one of the big questions in the coming months.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/50617/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Fabrizio Longarzo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Paris atrocities came just as Assad’s military position was improving. Can the dictator harness international fury at Islamic State to strengthen his position in Syria?Fabrizio Longarzo, Pre-doctoral researcher, Durham UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/415212015-07-02T04:19:48Z2015-07-02T04:19:48ZCaliphate, a disputed concept, no longer has a hold over all Muslims<p>According to the Arabic lexicon, <em>khilāfa</em> (caliphate) <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Mufradat_fi_Gharib_al-Quran">literally means</a> taking the position of others in order to perform the legal and religious rights behalf on them. It is also used in the meaning of <a href="http://corpus.quran.com/translation.jsp?chapter=2&verse=30">vicegerency</a> and <a href="http://corpus.quran.com/translation.jsp?chapter=35&verse=39">successor</a> in the Qur’an.</p>
<p>In Islam, the Prophet Muhammad is the <a href="http://corpus.quran.com/translation.jsp?chapter=33&verse=40">Seal of the Prophets</a> and no-one can take the place of the Prophet in his position as Messenger of God. However, other Muslims can represent his position as a ruler, for the Qur’an <a href="http://corpus.quran.com/translation.jsp?chapter=4&verse=59">states</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>O you who believe! Obey God and obey the Messenger, and those from among you who are invested with authority.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The first ruler for Muslims in Islamic history was the Prophet Muhammad. He became the head of state for a cosmopolite society, which consists of Jews, paganist Arabs and Muslims. However, the Prophet did not state who would be head of state after his death, nor did the Qur’an assign anyone for this job. Choosing a ruler for Muslims is a political issue; therefore it is left to people.</p>
<p>After the death of the Prophet, Muslims of Makkah <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=SGG1ngEACAAJ&dq=Kitab+al-Tabaqat+al-Kabir+Volume+3&hl=en&sa=X&ei=WieCVdaLMsXUmAXLtoDwBA&ved=0CCcQ6AEwAg">gathered</a> around Abu Bakr and Muslims of Medina around <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sa'd_ibn_Ubadah">Sa’d bin Ubada</a>. After long discussions, Abu Bakr <a href="http://www.amazon.com/The-Prophets-Biography-As-sirah-Nabawiyyah/dp/B007IGZII8">was elected</a> as the first ruler of the Muslim population. His title was Khalifatu Rasul al-Allah (Successor of Messenger of God), which can be understood as the ruler who comes after the Prophet.</p>
<p>The first four caliphs, <a href="http://www.britannica.com/biography/Abu-Bakr">Abu Bakr</a> (632–4), <a href="http://www.britannica.com/biography/Umar-I">‘Umar</a> (634–44), <a href="http://www.britannica.com/biography/Uthman-ibn-Affan">'Uthman</a> (644–56) and <a href="http://www.britannica.com/biography/Ali-Muslim-caliph">'Ali</a> (656–61) have been called <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=Ow-mV50c2TUC&printsec=frontcover&dq=God%27s+caliph&hl=en&sa=X&ei=GCuCVdPEJYaimQX41rqAAw&ved=0CB0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=God's%20caliph&f=false">“the rightly guided caliphs”</a> (Khulafa Rashidin) by Sunni Muslims.</p>
<p>The determination of a title for the new leader was difficult, for prophethood would not be used for other Muslims. Therefore, the Muslim community adopted two titles for Muslim rulers after the Prophet: the ruler of believers (amir al-mu’minin) and the deputy of God (Khalifah Allah). From the second term (Khalifah), the English term caliph is derived.</p>
<h2>Views diverged on choosing a caliph</h2>
<p>Choosing a caliph in the case of the first four personalities (Abu Bakr, 'Umar, 'Uthman and 'Ali) established three different methods: public election, designation by a previous caliph, and assigning a caliph by a council. </p>
<p>In the historical context, two different visions for choosing a leader for the Muslim community emerged: Abu Bakr was the best candidate for caliphate due to his seniority in Islam and being the most respected Companion of the Prophet, according to Sunni scholars. The Shiite claim was that 'Ali was the most suitable candidate for he was the closest relative of the Prophet and was designated as successor by the Prophet.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/85497/original/image-20150618-23256-ea5nhi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/85497/original/image-20150618-23256-ea5nhi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/85497/original/image-20150618-23256-ea5nhi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=834&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/85497/original/image-20150618-23256-ea5nhi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=834&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/85497/original/image-20150618-23256-ea5nhi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=834&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/85497/original/image-20150618-23256-ea5nhi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1049&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/85497/original/image-20150618-23256-ea5nhi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1049&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/85497/original/image-20150618-23256-ea5nhi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1049&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Since ‘Ali, the fourth caliph, the issue of who can be caliph has been divisive – some argue the caliphate ended with him.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Hakob_Hovnatanian_-_Ali_ibn_Abi_Talib.jpg">Wikimedia Commons/'Ali by Hakob Hovnatanian</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Because of the political conditions in the Arabian Peninsula, the first four caliphs were chosen from among the <a href="http://www.britannica.com/topic/Quraysh">Quraysh</a> clan. For the first time in the political history of Islam, the <a href="http://www.britannica.com/topic/Kharijite">Kharijite</a> sect, who separated from ‘Ali, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Milal_wa_al-Nihal">chose their own caliph</a>. Choosing a caliph from outside the Quraysh bloodline is a controversial issue among Muslim scholars.</p>
<p>There are two views on this matter. According to the <a href="http://www.muslimheritage.com/article/ibn-hazm-gleanings-his-thoughts-philosophy-and-science#003">first view</a>, any person who has necessary qualifications and knows Islamic principles can be a ruler and a caliph. The Kharijite and <a href="http://www.britannica.com/topic/Mutazilah">Mutazilate</a> sects hold this view. The second group (the majority of Sunni scholars) holds that a caliph must be from the clan of Quraysh.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.britannica.com/biography/Ibn-Khaldun">Ibn Khaldun</a> (1334-1406 CE) holds that the issue of politics and caliphate is related to representing God’s justice among His servants. Therefore whoever is capable of providing justice when ruling Muslims <a href="http://press.princeton.edu/titles/4744.html">can be elected as a caliph</a>. He argues that, at the beginning of Islam, caliphs were chosen from the bloodline of Quraysh and they all tried to provide justice for all the citizens in the Islamic state. Then it became a kingdom where obeying a caliph was <a href="http://press.princeton.edu/titles/4744.html">accepted as one of the pillars</a> of the Islamic creed.</p>
<h2>Sacred and essential, or baseless and redundant?</h2>
<p>The institution of caliphate had been used by various Muslim nations throughout history and it was abolished by the secular Turkish government in 1924. </p>
<p>There are three views among Muslim scholars regarding the caliphate. The first is that the caliphate is a sacred institution – it is universal and necessary for all Muslims. The second is that it is a political institution and was established according to the needs of Muslims. The third view is that there is <a href="http://press.princeton.edu/titles/4744.html">no such institution in Islam</a>, nor is there a need for it.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.worldbulletin.net/islamic-history/115375/the-last-ottoman-shaykh-ul-islam-mustafa-sabri-effendi">Mustafa Sabri Efendi</a> (1869-1954), the last Ottoman <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shaykh_al-Isl%C4%81m">Shaykh al-Islam</a> (the head of religious affairs), <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books/about/Hilafet_ve_Kemalizm.html?id=4t07nQEACAAJ&redir_esc=y">holds that</a> caliphate is religious and political leadership, and a caliph is a person who represents the Prophet. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.academia.edu/3626943/Seyyid_Bey_and_the_Abolition_of_the_Caliphate">Mehmed Seyyid Bey</a> (1873-1925), a member of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey between 1923 and 1925, agreed with Mustafa Sabri on the definition of caliphate but argued that the institution of caliphate came to an end after 'Ali ibn Abī Tālib, the fourth caliph of Islam. He based his argument on a <a href="http://quranx.com/Hadith/AbuDawud/Book-42/Hadith-51/">prophetic tradition</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The caliphate will last 30 years, then it will turn into kingdom.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Seyyid Bey believed that the caliphate has a wise purpose but it follows the requirements of the time, therefore it is an issue of administration and politics. He maintained that when the Prophet died, he did not mention anything about caliphate to his Companions, nor is it in the Qur’an.</p>
<p>Contemporary scholar <a href="http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e8?_hi=0&_pos=16">Ali Abd al-Raziq</a> holds that there is <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00263200902853355?journalCode=fmes20">no basis for the caliphate</a> in either the Qur’an or in prophetic traditions.</p>
<h2>Political revival taps into Muslim longing</h2>
<p>However, many Muslims are <a href="http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/apr07/START_Apr07_quaire.pdf">looking for a just ruler</a> or a caliph who can unite all Muslims and end all the conflicts among them. The conflicts and wars in the Muslim world probably caused them to think about the notion of caliphate.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/85501/original/image-20150618-23217-1phd8s0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/85501/original/image-20150618-23217-1phd8s0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/85501/original/image-20150618-23217-1phd8s0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=755&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/85501/original/image-20150618-23217-1phd8s0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=755&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/85501/original/image-20150618-23217-1phd8s0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=755&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/85501/original/image-20150618-23217-1phd8s0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=949&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/85501/original/image-20150618-23217-1phd8s0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=949&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/85501/original/image-20150618-23217-1phd8s0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=949&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Hizb ut-Tahrir has devoted the 62 years since its founding to an elusive global goal of reviving the caliphate.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hizb_ut-Tahrir#/media/File:Hizb_ut-Tahrir_demo_kbh.jpg">Wikimedia Commons/EPO</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Many terrorist organisations in history have exploited the desire for the unity of Muslims. For example, in mid-2006, al-Qaeda <a href="http://catholicjustwar.blogspot.com.au/2007/09/is-surge-working.html">declared</a> that the Iraqi city of Ramadi was to be the capital of a new Islamic caliphate. In 1953, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taqiuddin_al-Nabhani">Taqiuddin al-Nabhani</a> (1909–79), established the <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-hizb-ut-tahrir-37963">Hizb ut-Tahrir</a> (Party of Liberation) to <a href="https://www.cna.org/research/2007/struggle-unity-authority-islam-reviving-caliphate">revitalise the institution</a> of caliphate but he could not succeed.</p>
<p>In 1996, Taliban leader <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-13501233">Mullah Mohammed Omar</a> announced himself as the Commander of the Believers (Amir al-Mu’minin) and tried to revitalise caliphate in his person. His attempt was <a href="http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=515&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=238&no_cache=1#.VYI2rVWqpBc">recognised</a> by Osama bin-Laden pledging his personal loyalty to him as the legitimate ruler of the state of Afghanistan. </p>
<p>More recently, Islamic State <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/30/isis-announces-islamic-caliphate-iraq-syria">declared a caliphate</a> in an area straddling Iraq and Syria and announced its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, as the caliph.</p>
<p>The strong view on a caliphate is that it cannot be revitalised because of the establishment of nation states and the development of ideas of independence. Additionally, the caliphate has lost its effectiveness. Prominent contemporary scholar Fethullah Gulen <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1478-1913.2005.00104.x/abstract">holds that</a> the revival of the caliphate would be very difficult and that making Muslims accept such a revived caliph would be impossible.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>You can read other articles in the Roots of Radicalisation series <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/roots-of-radicalisation">here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/41521/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Recep Dogan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Caliphate has inspired disputes among Muslims for centuries, but attempts at revival in modern times are unlikely to succeed. Most of the world’s Muslims would not accept its authority over them.Recep Dogan, Lecturer in Traditional Islamic Studies, Charles Sturt UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/436032015-06-25T20:22:47Z2015-06-25T20:22:47ZOne year on, Islamic State is here to stay – so what next?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/86068/original/image-20150623-19397-mclym8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">At its core, Islamic State's runaway success is not down to its military capability. Rather, it is due to Iraq's political circumstances.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>June 29 marks the first anniversary of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/06/29/uk-syria-crisis-iraq-idUKKBN0F40SD20140629">announcement</a> of the Caliphate of Islamic State (IS). In response to his announcement and the atrocities IS <a href="https://theconversation.com/james-foley-islamic-state-and-the-medias-treatment-of-terrorism-30763">committed</a>, an international coalition <a href="https://theconversation.com/obamas-iraq-and-syria-strategy-risks-a-global-radical-backlash-31377">came together</a> to degrade IS from the skies and subsequently train and arm local forces in their fight against the militants. </p>
<p>Success for the international coalition hasn’t followed for three key reasons. Together, these reasons point to an urgent need to shift strategy and break what has become a stalemate.</p>
<h2>Limited US motivation</h2>
<p>Were this the first Iraq war it had been involved in, the US would have committed substantially greater resources, both diplomatic and military, to respond to the early signs of a growing militant group. But this is the third Iraq war in the last 25 years. </p>
<p>The US is exhausted. More than <a href="http://www.dpc.senate.gov/docs/fs-112-1-36.pdf">1.5 million Americans</a> were deployed to Iraq between 2003 and 2011 – and another <a href="http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/03/14/185880/millions-went-to-war-in-iraq-afghanistan.html">one million to Afghanistan</a>. Incredibly, more than a third were deployed more than once. The cost of both the Iraq and Afghanistan wars is estimated at between <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/study-iraq-afghan-war-costs-to-top-4-trillion/2013/03/28/b82a5dce-97ed-11e2-814b-063623d80a60_story.html">US$4 and US$6 trillion</a>, including future costs for health care and veterans support. </p>
<p>This may be contributing to <a href="http://www.pollingreport.com/isis.htm">opinion polls</a> that suggest Americans do not agree with a robust intervention this time around. Only 24% support a large number of troops being deployed to Iraq, while 68% prefer either none or a limited number. </p>
<p>Even the economic fundamentals of this war are against further commitment. One of the US’s many motivations for intervention in the <a href="http://www.merip.org/mer/mer171/oil-gulf-war">first</a> and <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Americas-Oil-Wars-Stephen-Pelleti%C3%8Bre/dp/0275978516">second</a> Iraq wars was purportedly to secure its energy future. Today, US oil production <a href="http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=20692">exceeds that of Saudi Arabia</a>. This reduces the political clamour for action that would otherwise encourage bipartisanship in the US.</p>
<h2>The wrong strategy</h2>
<p>We regularly hear calls for IS to be eliminated or destroyed, references to it as a terrorist organisation, and calls for boots on the ground to defeat it. These perspectives have clouded judgements and adversely affected the overall strategy. </p>
<p>At its core, IS’s runaway success is not down to its military capability. Rather, it is due to Iraq’s political circumstances. These include the <a href="https://theconversation.com/military-based-strategy-in-iraq-risks-entrenching-divisions-36842">disenfranchisement of the Sunnis</a>, the <a href="http://www.transparency.org/country#IRQ">corruption of a political class</a> and the <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/06/iraq-security-intelligence-services-quota-terrorists.html">politicisation of the government</a>. </p>
<p>This environment has created a demand for a new governance structure that protects Sunnis. IS has responded by being overtly against corruption and avoiding the much-despised style of politics associated with democracy in the Middle East by deeming democracy un-Islamic.</p>
<p>This emphasis upon the political rather than the military has been the key to IS’s rise. In focusing on the political, IS has done what no other jihadist group has managed to achieve: successful state-building. </p>
<p>As if guided by the lessons learned during the international community’s most recent state-building efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, IS’s leaders have successfully focused on the <a href="http://www.diplomatist.com/dipom12y2014/article004.html">key elements</a> critical to success – building legitimacy, ensuring security and providing basic needs. Undermining IS’s success in each of these should be at the core of any strategy to defeat it.</p>
<h2>Murky geopolitics</h2>
<p>Although IS emerged from the internal chaos of Syria and Iraq, it is now factoring into the region’s geopolitics as a military force and ideological powerhouse.</p>
<p>While IS lacks overt allies, it receives support as a proxy for the geopolitical ambitions of others. Turkey’s <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/10/turkey-united-states-syria-isis-kurds-assad.html">obsession</a> with the defeat of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has benefited IS. </p>
<p>Similarly, the dilemma of arming the rebels fighting against al-Assad, which in turn risks Syria falling to IS, has stumped Western decision-makers. In Iraq, strengthening the hand of Haider al-Abadi’s Shia government to take control of its territory conversely risks furthering the interests of Iran. There are no easy options in the Middle East.</p>
<p>Supporting one course of action will inevitably lead to an outcome vested with its own problems. However, it seems the choice taken by Western countries is incoherent but moral, rather than strategic and pragmatic.</p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>Recognising that there is little likelihood of a concerted US military and diplomatic engagement in the Middle East and acknowledging that IS functions as a state and not a terrorist organisation should lead decision-makers to drop ambitions of defeating IS. Instead, the West should focus on containing IS’s spread and seek a political strategy to weaken it from within.</p>
<p>IS has <a href="http://intelcenter.com/maps/is-affiliates-map.html">spread its militant ideology</a> far and wide. There are 35 groups said to be affiliated with IS in 17 countries from as far west as Mali and Algeria, through Egypt, Yemen, Pakistan and India, to Indonesia and Philippines in the east. Stopping the growth of these groups, and eliminating their capacity to finance, recruit and publicise their presence, should be the current priority. </p>
<p>Focusing on Iraq while IS establishes footholds in failed states such as Libya or Yemen will potentially create the same scenario as has occurred in Iraq and Syria: a growing and influential force to be reckoned with. While a rapid defeat of IS in its home territories is now unlikely, the opportunity exists to prevent its ideology from catching on in other countries. </p>
<p>In Iraq, the response should be focused on a carrot-and-stick approach. The stick is continued aerial bombardment alongside ongoing support to Iraqi military troops. The carrot is an <a href="https://theconversation.com/military-based-strategy-in-iraq-risks-entrenching-divisions-36842">enhanced federalism</a> that offers the Sunnis a deal too good to refuse. </p>
<p>Diplomatic pressure on al-Abadi to quickly and forcefully offer Sunnis their own autonomous region could draw away many of the groups that have wavered or even pledged allegiance to IS.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Denis will be on hand for an author Q&A between 3:30 to 4:30pm AEST on Friday June 26. Post your questions in the comments section below.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/43603/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Denis Dragovic does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There are three key reasons why success for the West hasn’t followed. Together, these reasons point towards an urgent need to shift strategy to avoid a stalemate.Denis Dragovic, Honorary Fellow, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/429582015-06-09T05:14:53Z2015-06-09T05:14:53ZA year into the caliphate, how has IS managed to capture so much territory?<p>The self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, also known as IS, ISIS, ISIL and Daesh, took control of Iraq’s second city, Mosul on June 9 2014. It instantly implemented a brutal rule that resulted in hundreds of deaths. Ancient relics were destroyed, and an <a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/isis-year-since-mosul-fell-islamic-states-hold-iraqs-second-city-stronger-ever-1504721">IS stronghold</a> established. Using equipment seized through fighting in Syria, the group was able to defeat an increasingly demoralised Iraqi army, many of whom fled when the group was approaching.</p>
<p>The fall of Mosul marked the beginning of a staggering year in which IS tore across the Middle East. The group had emerged from the desert that straddled the Syrian-Iraqi border just four days before taking the city; it soon made huge gains into Iraqi territory, further decimating a state that had struggled to regain a sense of autonomy since the US-led invasion of 2003. </p>
<p>The capture of Mosul and ensuing IS rampage would ultimately bring down the rule of <a href="https://theconversation.com/if-nouri-al-maliki-stays-in-office-iraq-faces-destructive-descent-into-a-long-civil-war-28023">Nouri al-Maliki</a>, who had been prime minister of Iraq since 2006.</p>
<h2>Fertile ground</h2>
<p>In the 12 years since the US-led invasion, power in Iraq has become increasingly decentralised, with the governments of first al-Maliki and now Haider al-Abadi struggling to gain control over a state that was becoming increasingly divided along tribal and sectarian lines.</p>
<p>These divisions were deepened by a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran, with both states offering support for co-religious kin across the Middle East. Along with Syria and Bahrain, Iraq became one of the primary arenas in this conflict, and the ensuing chaos helped facilitate the emergence of IS.</p>
<p>To make things worse, the Arab uprisings in the region had strained relations between states and societies to breaking point. Power seeped away from the core to the periphery, and ultimately made space for groups such as IS to <a href="http://www.e-ir.info/2015/04/10/isis-sectarianism-geopolitics-and-strongweak-horses/">grow</a>.</p>
<p>IS emerged from the embers of al-Qaeda in Iraq, facilitated, in part, by the US prison, <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/11/-sp-isis-the-inside-story">Camp Bucca</a>. It was inside Bucca, in southern Iraq, that <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-27801676">Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi</a>, now the self-proclaimed Caliph Ibrahim, developed a network of contacts that would some years later become IS.</p>
<h2>Exploiting division</h2>
<p>Although headed by a group of Salafists and supported by <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/03/isis-and-the-foreign-fighter-problem/387166/">thousands of foreign fighters</a>, the group also draws upon different facets of Syrian and Iraqi society. Across Iraq, IS was able to draw upon ex-members of the Ba'ath party and members of Sunni tribes, who historically had challenged Baghdad’s rule but had also long feared the violence of Shia militias.</p>
<p>Being able to recruit from these groups, by virtue of offering them protection against Shia militias and indeed, from the perceived discrimination of the Shia led-governments, IS was able to cultivate support from a much larger base.</p>
<h2>The road ahead</h2>
<p>Yet after seizing land and cultivating support, the group also had to govern, which has proved far more difficult in the long run. </p>
<p>Initially, IS successfully deployed a “velvet glove, iron fist” approach, fusing a <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/06/the-isis-guide-to-building-an-islamic-state/372769/">soft power</a> governance strategy with draconian punishments for those who opposed it. Fear is a key component of the IS strategy, as evidenced in the increasingly brutal methods it uses to execute opponents. As its rampage went on, mass killings of enemy combatants became a central tactic: after seizing a Syrian military base in 2014, the group posted a video of mass beheadings of the soldiers who <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2015/05/28/middleeast/isis-how-to-stop-it/">fought them</a>.</p>
<p>The point of all this is to strike fear into anyone who stands in the group’s path. The treatment of prisoners, including Shi'a Muslims, non IS-supporting Sunni Muslims, people of other faiths and ethnicities, women, homosexuals and people from “the West” has been well documented, with news of this treatment travelling quicker than the group itself. Perhaps this explains the ease with which IS has been able to seize large swathes of territory in Iraq and Syria. Equally, while IS does have a clearly defined power structure, it has proved that it can adapt quickly to changing circumstances. </p>
<p>It used military equipment seized in Syria in Iraq and was then able to seize better weapons and use them in the capture of Mosul.</p>
<p>On May 17 2015, IS captured the city of Ramadi in the <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/islamic-states-gains-reveal-new-prowess-on-battlefield-1432592298">Anbar Province of Iraq</a>. Just three days later, it took the 2,000 year-old city of <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-releases-first-video-from-inside-palmyra-showing-ancient-ruins-as-yet-unharmed-10276988.html">Palmyra</a> in Syria, highlighting its ability to operate on several fronts at once. </p>
<p>While some suggest that the fall of Ramadi shows a lack of will in the <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/defense-secretary-opens-possibility-on-strategy-shift-on-iraq-1432480411">Iraqi army</a> to fight off IS, it is perhaps equally a testament to the group’s ability to innovate. To take the town, it used what are known as vehicle-borne improvised <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/islamic-states-gains-reveal-new-prowess-on-battlefield-1432592298">explosive devices</a> (VBIEDS) – large and well-armoured vehicles laden with explosives that can withstand small-arms fire, allowing IS to penetrate strong defences.</p>
<p>Ultimately, as the start of Ramadan approaches, IS is likely to use the first anniversary since the declaration of a caliphate and the seizure of Mosul to demonstrate its continued relevance and longevity in defiance of the international coalition against it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/42958/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Mabon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>By exploiting weaknesses and divisions, the extremist group has been able to establish a brutal regime in just 12 months.Simon Mabon, Lecturer in International Relations, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/415972015-05-11T03:01:45Z2015-05-11T03:01:45ZWith jihadists among us, is IS more of a threat than communism was?<blockquote>
<p>True, it has been called, by some, a religion. But it is a religion of hatred; it derives from the darkest recesses of the human mind.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This is not Julie Bishop’s recent assessment of the variety of Islam espoused by Islamic State (IS or <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-isis-isil-islamic-state-or-daesh-40838">ISIS</a>), but rather Robert Menzies <a href="http://electionspeeches.moadoph.gov.au/speeches/1951-robert-menzies">describing communism</a> in 1951. With the threats of Nazism and Japanese imperialism defeated, Menzies tried to galvanise the nation against the newest perceived security threat - international communism - through <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Australian_referendum,_1951">a referendum</a> that would ban Australia’s Communist Party. The referendum failed.</p>
<p>Once the domestic threat was “reds under the beds”; today it is jihadists in our midst. <a href="http://www.news.com.au/national/breaking-news/timeline-in-vic-counter-terror-raids/story-e6frfku9-1227348142009">Counter-terrorism raids</a> in the suburbs, the latest <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-05-10/greenvale-terrorism-raid3a/6458724">in Melbourne on Friday</a>, and allegations of <a href="http://www.9news.com.au/national/2015/05/08/15/11/police-conduct-raids-in-melbourne-s-northern-suburbs">imminent attacks</a> reinforce the sense of threat.</p>
<p>Like the contemporary threat of radical jihadist Islam, which was the topic of the foreign minister’s <a href="http://foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/Pages/2015/jb_sp_150427.aspx?ministerid=4">recent speech</a> to the Sydney Institute, communism was seen during the Cold War as both an external and internal threat. Communism, it was said, was externally driven by the Soviet Union and <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/16/weekinreview/the-nation-fifth-column-the-evil-that-lurks-in-the-enemy-within.html">domestically sustained by a shadowy cadre</a> of radicalised individuals who rejected the political status quo. </p>
<p>Not unlike contemporary concerns about the seemingly universalist aspirations of IS, communism’s internationalist leanings were also viewed as a direct threat to liberalism’s own claims to global ideological hegemony.</p>
<p>Yet for Julie Bishop, the Cold War balance of terror, with the hands of the <a href="http://thebulletin.org/timeline">Doomsday Clock</a> locked at two minutes to midnight, was not as dangerous as the ragtag <a href="https://theconversation.com/islamic-state-theoreticians-have-honed-plans-for-battle-and-a-state-40813">caliphate of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi</a>. This was, she declared:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>a pernicious force that could, if left unchecked, wield great global power that would threaten the very existence of nation states.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>At its most literal level, this claim is unsustainable. The military planners of the West during the Cold War would have wept for joy if their strategic focus could have switched from the USSR, bristling with a nuclear arsenal, to a Middle Eastern insurgency struggling to hold a handful of cities in a region completely destabilised by earlier foreign incursions and civil war.</p>
<h2>Is sovereign nations’ future at risk?</h2>
<p>But sheer military capacity was not really what Bishop was talking about. Her real concern is the threat that IS poses not to any particular nation, but to the very notion of national sovereignty. </p>
<p>In her speech, Bishop argued that the problem is not that IS is militarily more dangerous than the Soviet Union (it clearly is not). Rather, she argued that its transnational, seemingly de-territorialised nature poses a deeper threat to the entire state system.</p>
<p>Following common usage, Bishop declared this system, based on the sanctity of the nation state’s sovereignty within internationally recognised borders, to be “Westphalian”, and hallowed by 400 years of history. By this she presumably meant Western history, given that the ceaselessly expanding global empires of Europe hardly deferred to indigenous notions of sovereignty prior to World War Two.</p>
<p>In fact, the current state system has very little to do with the substance of the <a href="http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/641170/Peace-of-Westphalia">treaties signed in Münster and Osnabrück</a> in 1648. The principle of the sanctity of the nation state’s sovereignty within its own borders is a thoroughly modern convention. It has developed for the most part for eminently sensible reasons. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, this principle has been more often honoured in the breach than in the observance. As anyone who has watched recent great power intervention in Iraq, Libya and Ukraine can attest, the principle of the sanctity of the sovereign state has already been placed under enormous strain – and not by IS.</p>
<p>Focusing not on the threat that some states pose to the sovereignty of other states, Bishop instead spoke at length about “malevolent non-state actors” operating under the rubric of “global terrorism”. Notwithstanding the fact that IS really is malevolent and terrorist, on the finer point of whether it actually represents a threat to the contemporary “Westphalian” system, Bishop’s analysis slightly misses the point. </p>
<p>Given that its first order of business has been to carve out a territorial state for which it seeks recognition, IS is hardly post-“Westphalian” in its outlook. ISIS may represent a geostrategic threat to stability in the Middle East and North Africa, but this threat is not necessarily a systemic one.</p>
<h2>Islamic State needs failed states to survive</h2>
<p>This is not to undervalue the nature of the challenge posed by IS. Although more Australians continue to be killed by bee stings, the danger posed by jihadists is very real in some countries. With IS in Syria, Iraq and Libya, now having been joined by <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-virtual-significance-of-boko-harams-pledge-of-allegiance-to-isis-38690">Boko Haram</a> in Nigeria, and with <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenya-attack-al-shabaabs-violent-radicalism-cant-be-tackled-by-force-alone-39714">al-Shabaab</a> in Somalia currently <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-global-war-for-relevance-can-al-qaeda-reclaim-the-jihadi-crown-39430">shifting its allegiances from al-Qaeda</a> to the caliphate, IS certainly represents the most coherent militant Islamist movement in the Middle East and North Africa.</p>
<p>Looking at this list of nations, however, it becomes clear that the danger is most acute in states where central governments are at their weakest. In this sense, Bishop has mistaken cause for effect. Failed or weak states have offered space for Islamic State and other militant jihadis.</p>
<p>Islamic State is not, however, the reason these states have failed. Where the “Westphalian” state is strong, the Caliphate has no hold. It has recourse only to atrocities that, while terrifying and shocking, do not pose a systemic threat.</p>
<p>Interestingly, three of the states where IS is most entrenched, namely Iraq, Libya and Syria, were until recently firmly, indeed ruthlessly, controlled by (more or less) secular dictators: Saddam Hussein, Bashar al-Assad (still technically in office) and Muammar al-Gaddafi (ostensibly the most pious of the three). Often for good reason, all of them were unpopular with the Western great powers. Crucially, however, the erosion of the sovereignty of each of these by large powers has played a significant role in weakening the hold of the state over its territories.</p>
<p>This is hardly in keeping with the notion of “Westphalian” sovereignty to which Bishop appealed. When these states were strong, radical Islamists could not find a foothold. This is not for want of trying, as Hafez al-Assad’s <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1982_Hama_massacre">massacre of the Muslim Brotherhood</a> in Syria in 1982 demonstrates.</p>
<p>In concluding her speech, Bishop stressed the importance of tight security measures, which she sees as necessary to protect nation states from transnational jihadis. This might pay a minor dividend in apprehending radicalised individuals domestically. </p>
<p>In terms of Bishop’s broader point about the international state system, however, it seems that the best way to protect nation states from ISIS or other forms of terrorism is by respecting the “Westphalian” principle of the sovereignty of nation states. In this way, unpalatable strong states might not be transformed into even more unpalatable failed states.</p>
<p>Interestingly, Bishop’s speech offered a small sign that this message might be breaking through. Two small references showed that Australia has perhaps begun to understand that ignoring national sovereignty and pursuing “regime change” is not the most productive way to deal with non-liberal polities. Whereas a few short years ago all signs pointed to an impending Western invasion of Iran, Bishop approvingly referred twice to the insights <a href="https://theconversation.com/ms-bishop-goes-to-tehran-a-story-of-good-news-and-bad-news-40463">she had garnered</a> from Australia’s apparent newest Middle Eastern ally, Iran. During the Cold War, such overtures might have been called <a href="http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/detente.htm">détente</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/41597/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matt Fitzpatrick is a member of the ALP.</span></em></p>Dire government warnings and counter-terrorism raids in our suburbs paint a picture of the worst threat Western nations have ever faced. A little historical perspective is in order.Matt Fitzpatrick, Associate Professor in International History, Flinders UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/408132015-04-28T00:40:31Z2015-04-28T00:40:31ZIslamic State theoreticians have honed plans for battle and a state<p>What is Islamic State’s (IS) political program? What is its ideology? Who are its theoreticians? The answers to these questions can be found in its propaganda.</p>
<p>IS has transformed from an ultra-minority party into one of the major political actors in the Middle East within a few months. It is tempting to explain this rapid evolution by the existence of a combination of favourable circumstances. Chief among these is the prolonged weakness of the Syrian and Iraqi governments, an obvious enabling factor for IS.</p>
<p>However, another major cause is less well known but equally decisive: the internal development of the organisation, which has been able to learn from the past failures of other jihadist movements and refine and sharpen its strategy.</p>
<h2>Learning from many years of jihadist setbacks</h2>
<p>The jihadists of IS are no small players. They follow a battle plan developed over many years by seasoned and experienced theoreticians. The British-American journalist <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Bergen">Peter Bergen</a>, who met the most famous of these, the Syrian <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mustafa_Setmariam_Nasar">Abu Musab al-Suri</a>, in the 1990s, was highly impressed by him.</p>
<p>“He was tough and very smart,” the reporter recalls in an article published in the French daily Le Monde in April 2013. Bergen saw in al-Suri a real intellectual, well versed in history, who was very serious about his objectives. He was even more impressed by him than by Osama bin Laden.</p>
<p>Abu Musab al-Suri knows what he is talking about when it comes to armed struggle. His experience dates back to the Muslim Brotherhood <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/from-the-archive-blog/2011/aug/01/hama-syria-massacre-1982-archive">uprising in Hama</a>, Syria, and its bloody suppression in February 1982 by the troops of Hafez al-Assad, the father of President Bashar al-Assad.</p>
<p>Musab al-Suri, who was among these rebels, has spent the ensuing years writing a series of articles on the uprising’s strategic aspects. These articles focus on the major errors committed by the insurgents. These include a list of 17 “bitter lessons” for future jihadists.</p>
<p>Al-Suri says that the Muslim Brotherhood’s main mistake was not to develop its strategy sufficiently before launching the uprising. A second mistake was to share too little information about its ideology and goals. A third mistake was to rely too heavily on outside support and not sufficiently develop its own resources.</p>
<p>Mistake number four was to place too heavy a reliance on mass recruitment instead of identifying and winning over elite fighters. Mistake number five was to have launched a war of attrition against the Syrian regime rather than a combination of terrorist acts and guerrilla warfare. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/Ymeaa3zKDI4?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">This online video featuring a doctor is part of Islamic State’s strategy of projecting the creation of a new order.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>IS project has solid foundations</h2>
<p>The lessons drawn by Musab al-Suri have provided the basis for creating a politico-military project as solid as it is comprehensive. Today, IS follows many of al-Suri’s advices. It has refrained from depending on foreign aid and has developed its own financial resources through kidnapping and the <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2014/08/iraq-syria-oil-smuggling-islamic-state-turkey.html">sale of crude oil</a>. </p>
<p>Its doctrine and objectives are also clearly explained to its fighters. Its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, momentarily <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/06/abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-isis">came out of hiding</a> on July 4, 2014, to present his views at the Great Mosque of al-Nuri in Mosul. His propaganda agencies broadcast news flashes on the internet.</p>
<p>After publishing several issues of IS Report, a periodical of only a few pages, IS began issuing in July of last year the online magazine Dabiq. This is a substantially more ambitious publication named after a small town in northern Syria where, according to Muslim tradition, a major battle will take place before the end of time. The IS also uses social networks intensively.</p>
<p>IS propaganda stresses the “oppression” and “humiliation” of which Muslims are victim throughout the world, but particularly in Western countries. It promises a final and liberating revenge for these humiliations. The first issue of Dabiq declared:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The time has come for those generations that were drowning in oceans of disgrace, being nursed on the milk of humiliation and being ruled by the vilest of all people, after their long slumber in the darkness of neglect – the time has come for them to rise.</p>
<p>Soon, by Allah’s permission, a day will come when the Muslim will walk everywhere as a master, having honour, being revered, with his head raised high and his dignity preserved … Whoever was heedless must now be alert. Whoever was sleeping must now awaken. Whoever was shocked and amazed must comprehend. The Muslims today have a loud, thundering statement, and possess heavy boots.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The ongoing war in Syria and Iraq is especially meaningful, as it is described as a throwback to heroic periods in the history of Islam. The setbacks suffered by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi are deemed to remind Muslims of those of the Prophet Muhammad, who was forced to leave Mecca and then defeated at the Battle of Uhud. The violence perpetrated by the IS jihadists is considered legitimate and is supposed to correspond with that of Abu Bakr, the successor of the Prophet and the first Caliph.</p>
<p>In addition to the “bitter lessons” learnt during the uprising at Hama, the jihadist theoreticians have another major source of inspiration, according to <a href="http://www.mei.edu/profile/michael-ryan">Michael W.S. Ryan</a> of the Middle East Institute in Washington and one of the best experts on jihadist movements. They are well read in the history of modern Far Eastern and Western insurgency strategists, from Mao Zedong, Che Guevara and Vladimir Ilyich Lenin to Vo Nguyen Giap, Emiliano Zapata and Ho Chi Minh. In his seminal work The Call to Global Islamic Resistance, Abu Musab al-Suri writes that he has carefully read American journalist Robert Taber’s book on Fidel Castro’s guerrilla warfare strategy during the Cuban Revolution.</p>
<p>Dabiq magazine reflects these influences. Its first issue outlines a strategy to seize power through three steps reminiscent of the methods used by Maoist China. This strategy is also echoed by another influential jihadist theoretician, Abu Bakr Naji, who has presented his views in his book <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Management_of_Savagery">The Management of Savagery</a>. </p>
<p>He argues that “Allah’s fighters” must continually attack the vital economic sectors of some key political regimes to incite these to concentrate all their forces in these areas. It will be then possible for the fighters to increase their presence in the periphery of these countries, forcing the enemy to multiply law enforcement actions to regain control of the lost ground. </p>
<h2>‘Savagery’ has a particular purpose</h2>
<p>This is when the second stage should begin, that of “savagery”, in which the violence will reach such a level that people will turn away from the government and be ready to join any force capable of restoring peace. Large parts of Iraq and Syria are now enduring this second stage, according to these theoreticians. </p>
<p>The third and last stage is the restoration of law (Sharia) and order through the establishment of a caliphate. Afghanistan is supposedly an example of a place where this final stage had taken place, with the coming to power of the Taliban after a long and bloody reign of local warlords.</p>
<p>This strategy, which is not unique to jihadism, implies that an explosion of violence will happen during the second phase of the insurgency. Jihadist theoreticians do not consider this bloodshed an act of wanton cruelty but a necessary means to achieve victory. Abu Bakr Naji chillingly writes in The Management of Savagery that jihadist fighters should “drag the masses into the battle”, which means that they must:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“make [that] battle very violent, such that death is a heartbeat away, so that the two groups will realise that entering this battle will frequently lead to death. That will be a powerful motive for the individual to choose to fight in the ranks of the people of truth in order to die well, which is better than dying for falsehood and losing both this world and the next.”</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Focus is now on rebuilding lost base as caliphate</h2>
<p>Jihadist movements share many common ideas, such as the rejection of democracy, nationalism and Western culture, but they are at loggerheads on strategy. Abu Musab al-Suri had some harsh words to say about Osama bin Laden and his taste for high-profile attacks on government institutions, security forces and symbolic buildings. He severely criticised the September 11 attacks, which, he believes, incurred the wrath of the United States against the Taliban in Afghanistan. This consequently denied the “holy war” its most precious territory and wasted the time of the jihadist movement.</p>
<p>Fourteen years on, IS’s ambition is to rebuild this territory – though now in Syria and Iraq – in the shortest possible period by <a href="https://theconversation.com/isis-does-not-have-enough-public-support-to-extend-its-caliphate-in-iraq-28940">establishing a “caliphate”</a>. This will become the central base for the spread of the international jihad.</p>
<p>In this perspective, the putative caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has recently changed the IS’s focus from “savagery” to the onset of a new order. One of his current priorities is to establish, in places where the military situation is sufficiently stabilised, a number of public services: law and order, of course, but also trade networks, food supplies, education and health care.</p>
<p>This was the background to his July 2014 speech, which he sought to spread far and wide:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Oh Muslims, hasten to your new state. We make a special call to the scholars and callers, especially the judges, as well as people with military, administrative and service expertise, and medical doctors and engineers of all different specialisations and fields.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The Islamic State knows what it wants, and it is striving to put the new “caliphate” on a permanent footing.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/40813/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Rousseau does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Islamic State is a project built on solid foundations by jihadist theorists with decades of experience. The savagery of terrorism precedes the next stage of a caliphate that delivers longed-for order.Richard Rousseau, Associate Professor of Political Science, American University of Ras Al KhaimahLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/327292014-10-21T03:33:40Z2014-10-21T03:33:40ZIslamic State lacks key ingredient to make ‘caliphate’ work: eunuchs<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/62062/original/4577rhh4-1413521375.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Ottoman Chief Eunuch was an influential figure. In this and other caliphates, eunuchs supervised the harem, the princes, the financial affairs of the palace and the mosques, as well as controlling access to the ruler. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo postcard 1912</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi proclaimed Islamic State (IS) as a Muslim caliphate on June 29, 2014, with himself as caliph, a term reserved for a successor to the prophet Muhammad (PBUH). His would be the newest caliphate in a line extending from the Rashidun Caliphate (632-661), through the Umayyads (661-750), Abbasids (750-1517) and Ottomans (1453-1924). Each of these earlier caliphates, however, had a feature that IS lacks and which may not even be possible for the newly proclaimed “state”.</p>
<p>Currently, IS is more of a marauding horde than functioning state. IS operates more like the Vandals or the Ostrogoths of European history rather than any historic caliphate. Its “citizens” are self-described warriors (jihadists) killing men, capturing women and grabbing booty as they go. Many of its fighters are foreigners from Europe, North America or other Middle Eastern countries, rather than locals who are the core citizenry for anything that can legitimately be called a state.</p>
<p>Beyond effective use of social media for recruitment, there appears to be little of the governance that makes this state a true state. IS’s goal is clear: “purifying” Islam through eliminating competing religious ideologies, whether they are held by other Muslims, such as the Shi'a, or practitioners of other religions, such as the Yazidi and Christians.</p>
<h2>What is a state without a capital?</h2>
<p>While al-Baghdadi has appeared in the Syrian provincial capital of Ar-Raqqah, IS has yet to establish a proper capital. A true state needs a central place to which taxes are paid and from which laws, regulations and other administrative functions descend. Thus far, funding for the IS seems to come largely from smuggling oil, extortion and bank robbery, and not from taxpaying citizens.</p>
<p>Creating a stable capital will be difficult. With the weaponry IS has acquired, it can fight a ground war. But previous caliphate capitals had walls to protect their seat of government from attack. Such defences would be ineffective now. As the recent air assault by the US and its allies shows, a <a href="http://kilyos.ee.bilkent.edu.tr/%7Ehistory/topkapi.html">Topkapi</a> today would be fragile in the face of modern ballistics.</p>
<p>No above-ground capital would be safe for IS. To protect its control centre from bombardment, the caliphate would need to bury itself in tunnels, like termites (or al-Qaeda). But even a buried bastille would need to be some 60 metres down to be safe from bunker-busting munitions like the GBU-57A/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator.</p>
<p>Should the IS manage to create a political state with a capital, how closely could it model its governance upon the historic caliphates it claims to emulate? In all preceding caliphates, power was demonstrated, in part, by the number of women the caliph controlled. Hundreds of women were impounded in the palace from which government decisions emanated. Most of the women were not for sexual pleasure, but simply to demonstrate dominance.</p>
<p>At the moment, IS’s systematic killing of men and taking of women performs as a predatory horde rewarding its warriors more than as an organisation developing the governance of a true caliphate. A core question is whether the new caliph will be able to maintain and control the women he acquires as well as his predecessors did. And who will handle the daily governance for the new caliphate to maintain cohesion in the state?</p>
<h2>Caliphates relied on eunuchs</h2>
<p>All previous caliphates relied on a special class of bureaucrats to provide stability and statesmanship. Those were eunuchs, who were unable to impregnate the women sequestered in the palace. Eunuchs were without family and dependent upon the caliph for support. </p>
<p>For four millennia and through many different Asian empires and caliphates, eunuchs proved themselves to be efficient governors. Their presence was, again, a sign of the power and authority of the ruler.</p>
<p>The number of women and eunuchs in the central palace during the various caliphates could be quite large. The Caliph al-Muqtadi (908-932) presided over a palace that contained 4000 women, 7000 eunuch guards and menial labourers, plus 4000 eunuch bureaucrats to administer the realm. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/62168/original/qksr54vm-1413756537.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/62168/original/qksr54vm-1413756537.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/62168/original/qksr54vm-1413756537.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/62168/original/qksr54vm-1413756537.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/62168/original/qksr54vm-1413756537.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/62168/original/qksr54vm-1413756537.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/62168/original/qksr54vm-1413756537.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Sultana Served by Her Eunuchs, 18th-century painting.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons/Charles-Amédée-Philippe van Loo (1719-95)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>When the Fatimid caliphate fell in 1171, the seat of government had 12,000 members. Only Caliph al-‘Adid and his immediate male relatives had intact testicles. The rest were women and eunuchs.</p>
<p>As long as IS persists in beheading rather than castrating the males it captures, it has little hope of resurrecting a historic caliphate. Granted IS is already acquiring women, but it has no-one to guard them for the caliph and no infertile functionaries to enact the authority of the state.</p>
<p>While it has been less than a century since the fall of the Ottoman Empire, it is clear that a key concept for continuity with the great caliphates of the past has been lost. Simply stated, if the IS doesn’t build a deeply fortified city and start producing eunuch bureaucrats, it will never have the stability and endurance of historic caliphates. The best it can hope for is to be recognised as a 21st-century predatory horde.</p>
<p>It is an academic questions as to which is more barbaric: to behead (murder) or to castrate (mutilate). But of the two choices, if IS continues along its current path, it is likely to be remembered like the Vandals – that is, as murderous marauders who get brief mention in high school history classes. </p>
<p>There is no reason to believe that the state IS aims to develop will be less barbaric than its fighters’ current “jihad”. But al-Baghdadi will have to change how his followers process prisoners if he is sincere about getting his caliphate up and running.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/32729/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi proclaimed Islamic State (IS) as a Muslim caliphate on June 29, 2014, with himself as caliph, a term reserved for a successor to the prophet Muhammad (PBUH). His would be the newest…Thomas W. Johnson, Professor Emeritus, Department of Anthropology, California State University, ChicoRichard J. Wassersug, Adjunct Professor, Australian Research Centre in Sex, Health and Society at LaTrobe University, and Department of Urologic Sciences, University of British ColumbiaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/286322014-07-07T15:42:30Z2014-07-07T15:42:30ZBad social policy, not ideology, is to blame for the Arab world’s downward spiral<p>The rapid rise of <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-isis-and-where-did-it-come-from-27944">ISIS</a> (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) to global notoriety has taken observers of Middle East politics by surprise. All of a sudden, a new Islamist political movement has stunningly upstaged former global public enemy number one al-Qaeda and establishes an Islamic state, a caliphate encompassing lands in both Iraq and Syria. </p>
<p>ISIS sees itself and its newly declared <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/07/muslim-leaders-reject-baghdadi-caliphate-20147744058773906.html">caliphate</a> as revoking the <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-why-a-century-old-deal-between-britain-and-france-got-isis-jihadis-excited-28643">historic deals</a> that were struck between European imperial powers after World War I, which gave us most of the Middle Eastern borders we know today. </p>
<p>Nothing symbolises the sorry state of Arab politics more than the march of ISIS. The Arab world at large appears to be fast descending into a political quagmire, only a few years after the euphoria of the so-called Arab Spring. The unravelling of old dictatorships in Libya, Tunisia, Egypt and Syria has opened up a pandora’s box of sectarian, ethnic and tribal divisions, old faultlines that have persisted under the heavy hand of police states for the last century. </p>
<p>And the more chaotic the region becomes, the more desperate and frustrated the search for a meaningful explanation.</p>
<h2>Bad governance</h2>
<p>From the perspective of many western governments and much of the western media, many Arab countries have never been able to govern themselves effectively. They lack structures for effective democratic governance and rule of law; they are bedeviled by corruption and are too influenced by Arab or Islamic traditions which favour paternalistic or patronage systems of rule. </p>
<p>The rise of ISIS, meanwhile, is yet another example of how many Arab states, who never really saw their independence-era nation-building projects to completion, are still being buffetted about by the whims of modern-day feudal warlords.</p>
<p>In this sense, ISIS embodies the regressive and reactionary nature of “<a href="http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2014/07/02/repression-no-cure-for-challenge-of-political-islam/">political Islam</a>”. The Arab world is of strategic interest to the West thanks to oil; at best, wealthy gulf countries fund football clubs, <a href="http://gulfnews.com/business/general/bahrain-wealth-fund-about-to-see-spectacular-growth-1.1327216">car</a> and <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2013/03/29/sport/dubai-world-cup-horse-racing/">horse</a> racing, and London <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-18716658">skyscrapers</a> – but beyond this, at least viewed from the West, it’s hard to see what the Arab region stands for in the world today.</p>
<p>But in the region itself, that narrative is read very differently indeed. </p>
<h2>Too much intervention</h2>
<p>Arab politicians and current affairs commentators alike have a fondness for conspiracy theories. Many of the woes the Arab countries have faced are often blamed on American-Israeli and perhaps also British plotting against long-term stability in the Arab countries; the old colonial “divide and rule” tactics have not been forgotten. </p>
<p>Much of this thinking stems from the tension between various states and movements (Syria, Iran, and the Lebanese Hezbollah) and Israel, with the conflict over Palestine <a href="https://theconversation.com/murder-of-three-teenagers-sends-israel-into-security-overdrive-28679">now at its most heated for years</a>. </p>
<p>In their eyes, much conflict within the Arab region (and between Sunnis and Shias in particular) is the latest in a long line of plots to weaken anti-Israeli sentiment and embroil the Arab world with internal conflict – and eventually to dismantle the resistant states and Hezbollah. In this scenario, the dark side of Gulf wealth is the funding of radical movements like ISIS.</p>
<p>The situation, then, is that many Arab peoples are so busy fighting and killing each other they are not attending to the real social challenges which are causing them real social harm: disunity, unemployment, poverty, and social inequality.</p>
<h2>Better policy needed</h2>
<p>This is the biggest missing link in the media and political debate over the ISIS crisis. Modern Islamist social movements often proclaim that “<a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12313405">Islam is the solution</a>” to all the social and political woes of Arab populations. This reflects the fact that under dictatorship, the only viable platform for political protest in the Arab world was Islamic identity; there could be no civil society and no freedom of association; after dictatorship, religious identity was the inevitable fall-back position for political organisation. </p>
<p>The pressing social problems facing Arab and Muslim populations are often overshadowed in Western media coverage by the problem of “political Islam”. Arab countries have <a href="http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2013/02/06/264749.html">some of the highest levels of unemployment</a> in the world; they have not industrialised sufficiently (or at all, in some cases) to develop their workforces’ skills and knowledge base. </p>
<p>Worse still, their reliance on rentier income from oil, gas or foreign remittances attached to those industries has lead sluggish economic growth and kept human capital poor. </p>
<p>The motivating thrust of political Islam is a sense of social dislocation, and a search for the identity and independence of the Arab nation. But the convoluted politics and thwarted economics of Arab countries make any such search terribly myopic, even disregarding the ideological extremism of Islamist movements.</p>
<p>For too long, the question of social policy in the Arab countries has been sidelined by raging political disputes, and these states badly need to start using policy to articulate a lost sense of the common good. An essential dimension of this governance reform would require Arab countries renegotiating their place within the wider political economy, and being less hostage to outside political influence of ally states (both within the Middle East and the West) and more receptive to the will of their people. </p>
<p>Until that happens, the reign of terror will prevail.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Next, read: <a href="https://theconversation.com/isis-sweeps-across-borders-and-takes-grip-of-an-iraq-collapsing-back-into-civil-war-27886">ISIS sweeps across borders and takes grip of an Iraq collapsing back into civil war</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/28632/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rana Jawad receives funding from the ESRC.</span></em></p>The rapid rise of ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) to global notoriety has taken observers of Middle East politics by surprise. All of a sudden, a new Islamist political movement has stunningly upstaged…Rana Jawad, Lecturer in social policy, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.