tag:theconversation.com,2011:/es/topics/east-african-community-22702/articlesEast African Community – The Conversation2023-12-11T14:51:17Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2195002023-12-11T14:51:17Z2023-12-11T14:51:17ZEast Africa’s troops are leaving the DRC: what went wrong and what comes next<p><em>The East African Community <a href="https://theconversation.com/east-african-troops-hope-to-bring-peace-in-the-drc-but-there-may-be-stumbling-blocks-195937">deployed a regional force</a> for the first time into eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2022. Just over a year later, the troops have <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/it-s-official-the-eac-troops-are-leaving-eastern-dr-congo-4445094">started withdrawing</a> amid <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67239214">tension</a> with the host state. We asked <a href="https://www.ipinst.org/by/jenna-russo">Jenna Russo</a>, who has covered the conflict and interventions in the DRC for more than a decade, what happened with the regional force and where the DRC goes from here.</em></p>
<h2>What was the mandate of the East African Community’s intervention in the DRC?</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.eac.int/communique/2537-communiqu%C3%A9-of-the-22nd-ordinary-summit-of-the-east-african-community-heads-of-state">July 2022 decision</a> to deploy an East African Community Regional Force to eastern DRC was prompted by renewed violence from the <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">armed group, M23</a>. </p>
<p>However, the scope of the force’s mandate has been a point of contention between the East African Community and the Congolese government. <a href="https://www.eac.int/statements/2791-status-of-the-east-african-community-regional-force-in-eastern-democratic-republic-of-congo">According to the regional bloc</a>, the regional force was to oversee the withdrawal of armed groups – including M23 – from areas in eastern DRC. There are estimated to be more than <a href="https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/democratic-republic-of-the-congo/#:%7E:text=More%20than%20120%20militias%20and,against%20humanity%20and%20war%20crimes.">120 armed groups</a> in this region. It was also to ensure that a <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/53-armed-groups-in-dr-congo-commit-to-end-war-4046010">ceasefire</a> negotiated in December 2022 was observed. </p>
<p>The Congolese government wanted a more <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/tshisekedi-gives-ultimatum-to-eacrf-4229574">assertive posture</a>, but the regional force has refused to engage in offensive operations. </p>
<p>It’s not clear how the two parties came to interpret the force’s mandate so differently, and this has been a major point of contention throughout its deployment.</p>
<h2>What were the force’s challenges and achievements?</h2>
<p>It’s much easier to speak of the force’s challenges than its achievements, which have been limited. It did experience some <a href="https://theconversation.com/east-african-troops-hope-to-bring-peace-in-the-drc-but-there-may-be-stumbling-blocks-195937">early victories</a>, in particular the December 2022 <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/53-armed-groups-in-dr-congo-commit-to-end-war-4046010">ceasefire</a> that included 53 armed groups. However, these and other efforts have been largely ineffective, with violence growing over the past year. And M23, the principal target of the intervention, has taken over new areas in the eastern region, including <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20231203-east-african-regional-force-begins-withdrawal-from-drc">some where the east African troops were stationed</a>.</p>
<p>It’s not only the DRC government that has been critical of the east African regional force. Many community members <a href="https://www.voaafrica.com/a/drc-downs-eac-protest/6923424.html">have expressed their anger</a> at the force’s lack of effectiveness. In some cases, this has led to riots and outbreaks of violence against the force. </p>
<p>There is also an overall <a href="https://theconversation.com/peace-in-the-drc-east-africa-has-deployed-troops-to-combat-m23-rebels-whos-who-in-the-regional-force-204036">lack of trust</a> in foreign forces, given the history of military and economic meddling by the DRC’s neighbours. The exploitation of the DRC’s natural resources by regional actors has been <a href="https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/22074/UNEP_DRCongo_MONUSCO_OSESG_final_report.pdf#page=3">well documented</a>. Further, some members of the East African Community Regional Force, including Burundi and Uganda, have <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/case/116">illegally occupied</a> areas of DRC territory.</p>
<p>Frustrations are also high over continued insecurity following years of intervention, including nearly 25 years of <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/monusco">UN peacekeeping</a> in the country. Yet, violence continues to grow, with <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/sadc-fails-to-signal-military-deployment-to-dr-congo-4426108">more than six million people</a> currently displaced in the east.</p>
<p>The military presence of the east African force was <a href="https://theconversation.com/east-african-troops-hope-to-bring-peace-in-the-drc-but-there-may-be-stumbling-blocks-195937">intended to complement a political process</a> that also involved the regional bloc’s leadership. However, this political process has stalled amid mounting tension between the DRC and Rwanda. <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/4/rwanda-backing-m23-rebels-in-drc-un-experts">Accusations of Rwanda’s support for M23</a> remain a crucial point of discord between the two countries. Rwanda officially <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/03/31/rwanda-denies-supporting-m23-rebel-group-in-eastern-drc//">denies</a> these accusations. </p>
<p>While the East African Community has expressed its intention to remain engaged politically even after its troops withdraw, overcoming regional political tensions remains a major obstacle.</p>
<h2>What prompted the exit from the DRC?</h2>
<p>After just over a year, the DRC government decided not to renew the mandate of the East African Community Regional Force past its 8 December 2023 expiration. President Felix Tshisekedi has accused the force of not only being ineffective but even of <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20231203-east-african-regional-force-begins-withdrawal-from-drc">colluding with rebels</a>. </p>
<p>The more likely reason for the force’s exit, however, is Tshisekedi’s dissatisfaction with its unwillingness to use proactive force against M23. This posture would entail the force undertaking offensive operations to neutralise non-state groups in partnership with government forces. </p>
<p>Similar frustrations have been directed at the UN peacekeeping operation, which also <a href="https://monusco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/pr-the_government_of_the_democratic_republic_of_the_congo_and_monusco_sign_a_disengagement_plan_for_the_withdrawal_of_the_mission.pdf">begins its drawing down in December 2023</a>. While most of the benchmarks identified for the UN mission’s withdrawal have not been met, the government has made it clear the mission is no longer welcome in the country. In the <a href="https://www.congoresearchgroup.org/en/2023/02/23/a-majority-of-congolese-reject-east-african-community-regional-force/">eyes of the government and many community members</a>, if foreign forces cannot tamp down non-state armed groups, they should leave the country.</p>
<h2>What comes next?</h2>
<p>Though the east African force and UN peacekeepers will begin leaving the country this month, this is not the end of foreign forces in the DRC. The Southern African Development Community, which the DRC is a part of, <a href="https://theconversation.com/southern-african-troops-versus-m23-rebels-in-the-drc-4-risks-this-poses-218282">has agreed to provide troops</a>. While the exact timing of their deployment has not yet been specified, it may correspond with the east African force’s withdrawal to ensure continuity of presence.</p>
<p>Underpinning the southern African deployment is the DRC’s renewed hope that the force will provide more robust operations. Tshisekedi noted that this regional bloc had resolved to help the DRC “<a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/drc-signs-an-agreement-for-the-deployment-of-sadc-troops--4437868">annihilate</a>” its enemies. The country’s deputy prime minister for foreign affairs, Christophe Lutundula, similarly <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/drc-signs-an-agreement-for-the-deployment-of-sadc-troops--4437868">stated</a> that the force would </p>
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<p>support the Congolese army in fighting and eradicating the M23 and other armed groups.</p>
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<p>Even if southern African forces are willing to engage offensively, the chances of them facilitating longer term peace in the country are small. </p>
<p>This is because such operations rest on the DRC government’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/protests-against-un-in-eastern-congo-highlight-peace-missions-crisis-of-legitimacy-187932">flawed assumption</a> that it can achieve peace through <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2021.1992272">sheer military force</a>. The lack of sustained political engagement by the main parties to the conflict has undermined numerous attempts at peace. </p>
<p>The DRC is not the only accountable party in this situation – Rwanda carries its fair share of responsibility. But unless the government can facilitate a viable political process, more boots on the ground – whether international, regional or bilateral – are unlikely to bring the peace that the Congolese people seek.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219500/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jenna Russo is the Director of Research at the International Peace Institute (IPI), and Heads IPI's Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations.</span></em></p>Chances of longer term peace are small because of the DRC’s assumption that it can achieve peace through sheer military force.Jenna Russo, Researcher and lecturer, City University of New YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2170182023-12-06T13:44:46Z2023-12-06T13:44:46ZDRC elections: three factors that have shaped Tshisekedi’s bumpy first term as president<p>Africa’s second-largest country by land mass, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), is <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/08/27/dr-congos-president-felix-tshisekedi-to-seek-re-election/">scheduled to go to the polls on 20 December 2023</a>. President Felix Tshisekedi will be seeking re-election. However, his first tenure has been decidedly mixed. </p>
<p>Tshisekedi’s first term has been defined by three major factors: questions over the legitimacy of his 2019 election victory, violence in eastern DRC and the state of the country’s economy.</p>
<p>I have <a href="https://www.qmul.ac.uk/history/people//academic-staff/profiles/loffmanreuben.html">researched extensively and taught</a> on contemporary Congolese politics for 15 years. In my view, while Tshisekedi has had some successes, including the DRC’s joining of the East African Community and a modest upturn in economic growth since the pandemic, much work remains to improve the lives of Congolese citizens.</p>
<h2>Legitimacy questions haunt the presidency</h2>
<p>Tshisekedi has been president since January 2019 after an election that one of his then opponents, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/6/19/drc-opposition-candidate-threatens-to-boycott-december-vote">Martin Fayulu</a>, claimed was stolen. These claims were supported by a <a href="https://cic.nyu.edu/resources/who-really-won-the-congolese-elections/">Congo Research Group</a> and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/2b97f6e6-189d-11e9-b93e-f4351a53f1c3">Financial Times</a> analysis of voting data that found Fayulu had won the election. The courts, however, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/20/drc-court-confirms-felix-tshisekedi-winner-of-presidential-election">upheld</a> Tshisekedi’s win.</p>
<p>The upcoming election is also mired in controversy. DRC’s electoral commission has promised a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/congo-election-chief-promises-rebrand-amid-concerns-over-december-vote-2023-10-17/">rebrand</a> in an effort to shake off the irregularities of the 2018 poll. It has registered <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/congo-registers-around-439-million-voters-december-general-election-2023-05-22/">nearly 44 million voters</a> in the country of 102 million people. </p>
<p>However, Fayulu, as well as the United States, the European Union and other international election observers <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/6/19/drc-opposition-candidate-threatens-to-boycott-december-vote">have raised doubts about the accuracy of voter records</a>. Fayulu has threatened to boycott the 2023 elections if the voter lists are not redone and audited.</p>
<p>The electoral commission cleared <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/twenty-four-candidates-sign-up-congolese-presidential-race-december-2023-10-08/">24 candidates</a> to run for president. They include 2018 presidential contender Moïse Katumbi, Nobel Peace Prize winner Denis Mukwege and Augustin Ponyo, a former prime minister. The campaign period has officially began and already there are plans to <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/tshisekedi-katumbi-race-takes-shape-in-drc-presidency-poll-4451764">rally opposition support</a> behind Katumbi.</p>
<p>Given the controversies involved in this election, as well as in his assumption of office in 2019, Tshisekedi will need to work hard both to win the upcoming poll and do so in a way that citizens believe to be credible.</p>
<h2>Violence in eastern DRC</h2>
<p>While eastern DRC was unstable <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691194080/the-war-that-doesnt-say-its-name">before</a> Tshisekedi came into power, the <a href="https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/unicef-condemns-latest-attack-eastern-dr-congo-act-horrific-brutality#:%7E:text=Eastern%20DRC%20has%20been%20plagued,among%20the%20top%20three%20globally.">escalation of violence since 2022</a> has made it a defining feature of his presidency.</p>
<p>At least <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/what-is-driving-violence-eastern-congo-2023-01-31/">120 armed groups are active in the region</a>. One of the most significant of these armed groups is the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/what-is-driving-violence-eastern-congo-2023-01-31/">M23</a>. In March 2023, M23 violence led to the displacement of about 500,000 people. In recent weeks, it has broken a <a href="https://www.voaafrica.com/a/renewed-fighting-breaks-truce-in-congo/7321665.html">months-long truce</a> and resumed attacks in eastern DRC. </p>
<p><a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/monusco">International</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/peace-in-the-drc-east-africa-has-deployed-troops-to-combat-m23-rebels-whos-who-in-the-regional-force-204036">regional</a> peacekeepers have been trying to address the conflict in eastern DRC. Yet, their presence points to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-un-is-under-attack-in-eastern-congo-but-drc-elites-are-also-to-blame-for-the-violence-187861">failure</a> of the Congolese government to deal with the violence on its own.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/drc-is-president-tshisekedis-state-of-siege-a-cover-up/a-57426558">state of siege</a> announced by Tshisekedi in the eastern region’s provinces of North Kivu and Ituri in 2021 <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/05/drc-authorities-must-end-state-of-siege/">worsened</a> the human rights situation there. The military took over key state posts from civilian leaders. This despite the Congolese army being <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-democratic-republic-congo">linked to violence</a> in the region. </p>
<p>It was meant to last one month, butt the siege was extended many times by Tshisekedi’s government. Two years on, there has been <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/05/drc-authorities-must-end-state-of-siege/">no “meaningful public debate” about it</a>. In the run-up to the December elections, Tshisekedi announced he would “<a href="https://www.trtafrika.com/africa/dr-congo-to-end-state-of-siege-in-ituri-north-kivu-15377066">gradually ease</a>” the siege. Such interventions have made it difficult for Congolese people to believe that Tshisekedi’s policies have resulted in a more peaceful Congo.</p>
<h2>Economic growth and prospects</h2>
<p>Tshisekedi has registered some success in managing the Congolese economy. The country’s GDP growth rate went down during the pandemic but has made a modest recovery. It <a href="https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/COD/democratic-republic-of-congo/gdp-growth-rate#:%7E:text=Democratic%20Republic%20of%20Congo%20gdp%20growth%20rate%20for%202022%20was,a%202.65%25%20decline%20from%202019.">increased to 8.92% in 2022 from 6.20% in 2021</a>, with the <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/drc/overview">mining industry</a> being a major driver. </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/drc-is-set-to-become-7th-member-of-the-east-africa-trading-bloc-whats-in-it-for-everyone-179320">In 2022</a>, the DRC joined the East African Community as its seventh member. Tshisekedi’s hope was that this move would <a href="https://www.eac.int/press-releases/2402-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-joins-eac-as-its-7th-member">promote trading relationships and reduce tensions with the DRC’s neighbours</a>. Entry gives the DRC access to a market of <a href="https://www.eac.int/gender/75-sector/investment-promotion-private-sector-development/162-184-706-market-size-access-trade-policies#:%7E:text=The%20internal%20EAC%20market%20has,population%20of%20over%20460%20million.">146 million consumers</a> and means it can start importing <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-60901159">more goods from its east African neighbours</a>. </p>
<p>The DRC also signed a mining deal with <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/18/uae-signs-deal-to-develop-mines-in-eastern-dr-congo">the United Arab Emirates in July 2023</a>. The deal is worth US$1.9 billion and involves developing at least four mines in Congo’s northeast region. Such deals are important because <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/drc/overview">mining is the main driver of economic growth in the DRC</a>.</p>
<p>Tshisekedi also <a href="https://africa.businessinsider.com/local/markets/this-dollar850-million-investment-aims-to-fast-track-congos-copper-exports/y86zk27">broke ground on a new road</a> cutting through Zambia to Tanzania to speed up the movement of Congolese exports. The DRC is landlocked – the new road will cut about 240km from the journey between some of the country’s copper and cobalt mines, and a port in Tanzania. </p>
<p>But Tshisekedi’s economic record isn’t all positive.</p>
<p>The upcoming election is causing financial problems for the state. It’s expected to cost about <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/congo-election-chief-promises-rebrand-amid-concerns-over-december-vote-2023-10-17/">US$1.1 billion</a>. <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/drc/overview">The World Bank predicts</a> that the election will widen the country’s fiscal deficit in 2023 to -1.3% of GDP. Further, foreign exchange pressures caused by spending on security and pre-election processes have seen the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-07-12/congo-struggles-to-steady-franc-amid-conflict-election-spending?leadSource=uverify%20wall">Congolese franc slide 20% against the dollar</a>.</p>
<p>Tshisekedi’s government is looking to increase revenues from a much anticipated re-negotiation of a China-DRC mining deal. The president is under pressure to get more from the deal, <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/whether-drc-china-mining-deal-will-be-restructured-remains-uncertain-/7118892.html">which is worth US$6.2 billion</a>. Tshisekedi wants a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/congo-hike-stake-copper-cobalt-venture-with-china-2023-05-24/">70% stake</a> in the Chinese-Congolese firm Sicomines, up from the original 32%. </p>
<p>The Chinese deal is one way in which Tshisekedi’s economic achievements could have impacted the lives of Congolese people given the hoped-for investment in schools, roads and hospitals. However, its unclear how many of these infrastructure projects have been implemented. At the same time, the country’s mining industry has been plagued by allegations of <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/window-opportunity-build-critical-mineral-security-africa#:%7E:text=The%20Sino%2DCongolais%20des%20Mines,in%20exchange%20for%20infrastructure%20investments.">human rights abuses</a>. </p>
<h2>What next</h2>
<p>In his presidential campaign, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/congos-tshisekedi-kicks-off-re-election-bid-with-vow-consolidate-achievements-2023-11-19/">Tshisekedi has emphasised</a> his administration’s economic and diplomatic achievements rather than the situation in eastern DRC.</p>
<p>However, the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/04/opposition-candidates-jostle-for-position-before-drc-election">pushback</a> from opposition candidates on these achievements means Tshisekedi will need to campaign hard to win. An election that is seen as illegitimate will only further damage Tshisekedi’s credibility, especially given the amount of money the Congolese government is spending on it.</p>
<p>One of the best things Tshisekedi could do for his country now would be to run a free and fair election. This would go a long way towards rescuing his troubled term in office so far.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217018/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Reuben Loffman has received funding from the British Academy, the Economic and Social Research Council, the Arts and Humanitaties Research Council, and the Presbyterian Historical Society. He is affiliated with the Labour Party. </span></em></p>Plenty remains to be done to improve the lives of Congolese citizens.Reuben Loffman, Lecturer in African History, Queen Mary University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2172012023-11-10T09:18:21Z2023-11-10T09:18:21ZVisa-free travel for Africans: why Kenya and Rwanda have taken a step in the right direction<p>President William Ruto of Kenya recently <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67254349">announced</a> that Kenya’s borders would be open to visitors from the entirety of Africa, with no visas required, by the end of 2023. He said</p>
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<p>When people cannot travel, business people cannot travel, entrepreneurs cannot travel, we all become net losers.</p>
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<p>A few days later, President Paul Kagame of Rwanda <a href="https://apnews.com/article/rwanda-visa-africans-actfa-africa-09edb93691babd5e0cebd2e131fd7ecb">followed suit</a>, saying all Africans would be able to enter Rwanda without visas.</p>
<p>Neither Kenya nor Rwanda will be the first. By the end of 2022, <a href="https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/africa-visa-openness-report-2022#page=38">Benin, The Gambia and Seychelles</a> had already implemented a system of visa-free access for all Africans. Perhaps more will follow soon. Some regions, some sub-regional groups and some bilateral arrangements have also resulted in visa-free access and even passport-free access in certain cases. </p>
<p>Within the broader East African Community, Uganda, Rwanda and Kenya <a href="https://immigration.go.ug/services/interstate-pass">allow</a> cross border travel without passports. Botswana and Namibia recently <a href="https://www.tralac.org/blog/article/15940-botswana-and-namibia-concluded-an-agreement-on-the-movement-of-persons.html">signed</a> a similar agreement. </p>
<p>Despite this progress, by the end of 2022 <a href="https://www.visaopenness.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/VOI%E2%80%932022_final2_9dec22.pdf#page=12">only 27%</a> of African routes allowed Africans to travel visa-free. </p>
<p>Actions such as those of Kenya and Rwanda take the African Union’s agenda further. Regularising freer movement of people across African borders is one of the continent’s great developmental challenges. It is one of the flagship projects of the African Union’s <a href="https://au.int/agenda2063/flagship-projects">Agenda 2063</a>. </p>
<p>But even if all African countries no longer required visas from Africans, this would not necessarily give the visitors a right to apply for jobs, establish a business or build a home in the receiving country. The 2018 African Union Free Movement of Persons protocol <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10220461.2021.2007788">aims</a> for full free movement, through three phases – entry, residence and establishment. This includes full economic rights, including employment. It has not been widely ratified, however. </p>
<p><a href="https://nsi.org.za/publications/analysis-trends-patterns-migration-africa/">Our new study of migration trends</a> underscores the potential contributions of migration to economic development in the countries of origin and destination. This is realised through the transfer of skills, knowledge and remittances. The study also shows that intra-African migration is firmly rooted in geographical, social and economic ties. Movement is predominantly within regions, and moderately between them.</p>
<h2>Free trade and movement of people</h2>
<p>African Union policies support freer intracontinental trade, investment and movement of people to promote the continent’s economic, social and political development. The continent has <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10220461.2021.2007788">made progress</a> on the aspects of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement that deal with trade and investment. There hasn’t been much progress on the free movement of people. And yet the success of the trade agreement requires freer movement of people.</p>
<p>This interdependence between trade and free movement of people was the focus of the recent <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20231031/8th-pan-african-forum-migration-pafom8-kicks">Pan-African Forum on Migration</a> held in Gaborone, the Botswana capital. The forum brings together African Union member states, the continent’s regional economic communities, UN agencies and intergovernmental organisations <a href="https://www.iom.int/pan-african-forum-migration-pafom">to deliberate on migration and human mobility issues</a> in Africa. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/free-movement-of-people-across-africa-regions-are-showing-how-it-can-work-197199">Free movement of people across Africa: regions are showing how it can work</a>
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<p>The conference noted that most African countries had failed to ratify the African Union’s <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36403-treaty-protocol_on_free_movement_of_persons_in_africa_e.pdf">Free Movement of Persons protocol</a>. At the same time, there was evidence of improvements in policies and practices at national, bilateral and multilateral levels that facilitate the freer movement of Africans.</p>
<p>Apart from recent announcements by Rwanda and Kenya, other instances would be a growing number of <a href="https://theconversation.com/free-movement-of-people-across-africa-regions-are-showing-how-it-can-work-197199">reciprocal</a> arrangements between countries.</p>
<h2>Regional migration a norm</h2>
<p>The history of African statehood, with strong social ties across national boundaries, makes regional mobility a norm rather than an exception. This can be seen from the migration routes, mostly found within the same regions and which proceed in both directions. </p>
<p>For example, Burkina Faso to Côte d’Ivoire is the largest migrant route in the continent and within the Economic Community of West Africa (<a href="https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/africa/regional-economic-communities-rec/economic-community-west-african-states">Ecowas</a>) – the economic bloc of 15 west African states. Côte d’Ivoire to Burkina Faso is equally popular. This trend is ubiquitous throughout the continent, except within the <a href="https://www.sadc.int/">Southern African Development Community</a> region, where most migrant routes tend to lead to South Africa.</p>
<p>Among the major regional economic communities, Ecowas has the most intense regional migration. It is followed by the Southern African Development Community and the East African Community. By contrast, Ecowas has the least inter-regional migration while the East African Community has the most.</p>
<p>Variations in development across Africa mean that some countries experience contrasting patterns, particularly in extra-continental migration. While most African migrants migrate to and from other parts of the continent, in middle income countries such as South Africa, Kenya and Nigeria extra-continental emigration is greater.</p>
<p>Immigration and emigration are generally <a href="https://nsi.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/An-analysis-of-trends-and-patterns-of-migration-in-Africa.pdf#page=6">low in low income countries</a> and higher in middle income countries. In rich countries, people tend not to emigrate. The relatively low level of migration in Africa follows this pattern.</p>
<p>Only <a href="https://nsi.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/An-analysis-of-trends-and-patterns-of-migration-in-Africa.pdf#page=11">14% of total world emigrants</a> come from Africa. The average migrant density, or percentage of migrants living on the continent, is 1.89% compared to a global average of <a href="https://nsi.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/An-analysis-of-trends-and-patterns-of-migration-in-Africa.pdf#page=6">3.6%</a> where Europe and North America are at 12% and 16% respectively. African migration is thus not only comparatively low compared with the global averages, but characteristically depicts low income.</p>
<p>High income countries tend to have more immigrants than emigrants. The converse is true for low income regions. Africa as a whole has more emigrants than immigrants, confirming the link between migration and development. </p>
<h2>Legal restrictions matter little</h2>
<p>Much migration in Africa is impervious to legal constrictions or definitions of national boundaries, and even to logistical constraints. Government dictates succeed in making much of this migration irregular but fail to stop it. Though regional integration and liberalisation of migration rules are helpful, they do not yet solve this challenge.</p>
<p>The main migrant sending country to Kenya is Somalia, despite not being in the same regional economic community. And despite efforts by the government of Kenya to deter Somali migrants to Kenya. The main destination country for Nigerian emigrants in Africa is Cameroon, even though it does not belong to Ecowas.</p>
<p>While African migration governance reforms are making <a href="https://theconversation.com/free-movement-of-people-across-africa-regions-are-showing-how-it-can-work-197199">considerable progress</a> it will still be a while till they catch up and are able to deal fairly and rationally with the reality of migration patterns in Africa.</p>
<p><em>Michael Mutava of the New South Institute authored the report on which this article is based.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217201/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alan Hirsch is employed as a research fellow at the New South Institute where he supervised some of the research on which this article is based.</span></em></p>Regularising freer movement of people across African borders is one of the continent’s great developmental challenges.Alan Hirsch, Research Fellow New South Institute, Emeritus Professor at The Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2065842023-08-16T10:52:31Z2023-08-16T10:52:31ZKenya and the US are negotiating a trade deal that could be a model for Africa - but its position on workers needs a rethink<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528871/original/file-20230529-15-3m933z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Provisions for mandatory inspections to ascertain labour practices are controversial. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Noor Khamis/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The US and Kenya announced a <a href="https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2022/july/united-states-and-kenya-announce-launch-us-kenya-strategic-trade-and-investment-partnership?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery">trade and investment partnership</a> in July 2022. Talks have been progressing on the way forward in nine areas, including agriculture, anti-corruption, digital trade, environment and climate change action, and workers’ rights and protections. </p>
<p>The Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership (STIP) will be the first significant trade partnership between the US and a country in sub-Saharan Africa. Countries in the region currently rely on the <a href="https://agoa.info/">African Growth and Opportunity Act</a> (Agoa), which offers duty- and quota-free access to the US market. The new deal is seen as a <a href="https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Summary_of_U.S.-Kenya_Negotiating_Objectives.pdf#page=4">model</a> for future agreements between the US and other sub-Saharan African countries.</p>
<p>The labour provisions proposed under the Kenya-US deal are not new. They have become standard features of all US free trade agreements since first appearing in the <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/103rd-congress/house-bill/3450/text">North American free trade agreement of 1994</a>. </p>
<p>Kenya and the US <a href="https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2022/july/united-states-and-kenya-announce-launch-us-kenya-strategic-trade-and-investment-partnership?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery">undertake</a> to work together:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>to advance and protect labour rights through enforcement of and compliance with labour laws, promotion of social dialogue, and cooperation in other areas of mutual interest on labour and employment priorities, including with respect to forced labour in global supply chains.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>There is currently very little information regarding the potential scope of the labour provisions. But there is reason to believe they will borrow heavily from <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10046">precedents</a> of the <a href="https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement">US-Mexico-Canada Agreement</a>. </p>
<p>Under the USMCA, Contracting Parties commit to four core international labour standards. These are: freedom of association and collective bargaining; elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour; effective abolition of child labour; and elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.</p>
<p>I have recently authored a <a href="https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3.sourceafrica.net/documents/120016/Econews-Africa-The-Kenya-United-States-Free.pdf">paper</a> on the labour issues raised in the proposed free trade deal between the US and Kenya. I have also studied China’s <a href="https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol35/iss1/5/">bilateral treaties</a> and reviewed its <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5305/procannmeetasil.105.0521">trade deals</a> with African countries. </p>
<p>Ordinarily, a trade agreement that aims at promoting workers’ rights should be welcomed. Kenya faces <a href="https://achpr.au.int/en/state-reports/concluding-observations-and-recommendations-kenya-combined-8th-11th-period">numerous obstacles</a> to effective protection of the rights of workers despite having many <a href="https://www.ilo.org/ifpdial/information-resources/national-labour-law-profiles/WCMS_158910/lang--en/index.htm">laws with this aim</a>. But the imposition of stringent labour standards via a trade agreement raises concerns about:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>additional international obligations</p></li>
<li><p>high implementation costs</p></li>
<li><p>sovereignty</p></li>
<li><p>hidden motives</p></li>
<li><p>uneven playing field.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>In my opinion, the inclusion of strong labour provisions in the STIP may have very little to do with protecting workers in Kenya. It may be more about sidelining China in Africa, protecting U.S. jobs, and enhancing US soft power in the region.</p>
<h2>1. International obligations</h2>
<p>The controversy over the issue of trade and labour standards is not new. Nearly thirty years ago, developing countries rejected attempts by some industrial nations to subject labour standards to World Trade Organisation rules and disciplines. Introducing them through a free trade pact implies contracting states will be required to adopt and enforce global labour laws. Including labour provisions in the STIP will have the effect of imposing <a href="https://www.bruegel.org/sites/default/files/wp-content/uploads/imported/publications/bp_trade_jan09.pdf#page=29">additional commitments</a> on Kenya beyond its current obligations as a member of the World Trade Organisation. Quite apart from the cost of implementation, imposing labour commitments through the backdoor of a trade agreement exposes Kenya to costly dispute settlement procedure and possible trade sanctions in event of a breach.</p>
<h2>2. Sovereignty</h2>
<p>The Kenyan parliament would likely play a very limited role in shaping the scope and content of the labour provisions of the trade agreement. In contrast, the US Congress plays a <a href="https://www.congress.gov/114/plaws/publ26/PLAW-114publ26.pdf">significant role</a> in shaping the labour provisions of all pacts involving the US. </p>
<p>The limited input of Kenyan workers in the design of the labour provisions of the agreement is also a concern. By contrast, US workers and labour unions have had the opportunity to express their views on these issues. In its Strategic Plan FY 2022 – FY 2026, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) state that advancing a worker-centered trade policy “will require extensive engagement with unions, worker advocates, and underserved communities to ensure that workers’ perspectives and values play an integral and respected role in the development and implementation of U.S. trade policy.”</p>
<h2>3. Hidden motives</h2>
<p>It’s the US <a href="https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-15-160.pdf#page=10">view</a> that poor labour standards distort global markets and are a barrier to US businesses and workers competing on a level playing field. </p>
<p>The deal with Mexico and Canada prohibits them from importing goods from countries that use forced or compulsory labour, including forced or compulsory child labour. It provides for mandatory inspection of facilities to be sure of compliance in those countries. </p>
<p>Labour provisions in Kenya could therefore have a direct impact on its trade with China, member states of the East African Community and other African states. It could mean that entities that are neither American nor Kenyan are inspected.</p>
<h2>4. Uneven playing field</h2>
<p>While the US has the capacity and resources to monitor labour conditions in Kenya and to enforce relevant provisions of the STIP, neither the Kenyan government nor its private sector has the capacity to do so in the US. So the spotlight will be on Kenya while labour rights violations in the US are likely to be swept under the carpet.</p>
<p>Despite a plethora of laws and regulations purporting to protect workers in the US, violations are commonplace, particularly among migrant workers. Forced labour and human trafficking of migrant farm workers in the US is <a href="https://www.justice.gov/usao-mdfl/pr/owner-farm-labor-company-sentenced-118-months-prison-leading-multi-state-conspiracy">rampant</a>. </p>
<p>Until <a href="https://www.dhs.gov/news/2023/01/13/dhs-announces-process-enhancements-supporting-labor-enforcement-investigations">recently</a>, migrant workers in the US were <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2023/02/27/unfair-competition-under-the-usmca-the-case-of-migrant-workers-on-us-farms/">coerced</a> into continuing to work despite violations of their rights.</p>
<h2>5. High implementation costs</h2>
<p>The cost of implementing labour provisions is significant. Substantial resources will be required to amend laws, appoint and train inspectors, and monitor compliance. Maintaining good records, establishing labour-management committees and providing arbitration services comes with costs.</p>
<p>Under the deal with Mexico and Canada, a decision made by a Party on the provision of enforcement resources does not excuse a Party’s failure to comply to enforce its labor laws. </p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>Workers are the bedrock of the global economy and deserve full protection. Including labour provisions in the STIP could transform Kenya’s labour laws. It could also put pressure on China to take workers’ rights in <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/are-rights-abuses-tarnishing-china-s-image-in-africa-/6560353.html">Africa</a> and <a href="https://qz.com/africa/749177/kenyan-rail-workers-are-protesting-against-their-chinese-employer-for-a-raise-to-5-a-day">Kenya</a> more seriously. </p>
<p>But the idea of embedding robust labour obligations in a trade agreement between Kenya and the US is <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/trade-talk-should-labor-standards-be-included-free-trade-agreements-the-united-states">highly controversial</a> and should be weighed carefully.</p>
<p>Such bilateral agreements must be scrutinised to ensure that their benefits for Kenya and Kenyan workers outweigh their costs. It’s important too that labour standards are without <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/35757572/">protectionist motive or effect</a>. </p>
<p>If the Kenya-US deal must contain labour provisions, I have five proposals to make: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>Kenya must reject pressure to replicate the labour provisions in the US-Mexico pact. They might not be a good template. </p></li>
<li><p>The labour provisions should include rights enshrined in core international human rights instruments most of which are <a href="https://www.aclu.org/issues/human-rights/treaty-ratification#:%7E:text=Despite%20its%20ostensible%20position%20as,the%20Convention%20on%20the%20Rights">yet to be ratified by the US</a>. </p></li>
<li><p>The issue of implementation costs and capacity constraints must be addressed upfront with binding long-term commitment on the US to provide necessary technical assistance and bear the implementation costs.</p></li>
<li><p>The failure of the US government to address labour rights and migrant rights violations in the US, including in the agriculture sector, must also be on the table. </p></li>
<li><p>A human rights and sustainability impact assessment of the labour provisions is necessary. Such an impact assessment should take into account vulnerable workers in Kenya including female workers, workers with disability, child workers, as well as workers in the rural areas.</p></li>
</ul><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206584/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Uche Ewelukwa Ofodile does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The idea of embedding robust labour obligations in the Kenya-US agreement is highly controversial.Uche Ewelukwa Ofodile, Professor of International Law, Intellectual Property Law and Food Law, University of ArkansasLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2098842023-07-21T07:13:53Z2023-07-21T07:13:53ZZimbabwean migrants: South Africa’s anti-immigrant sentiments are hindering policy reform<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538522/original/file-20230720-17-fba5cm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Effective African economic development depends on economic integration and free movement of people.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GettyImages</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The South African Minister of Home Affairs, Aaron Motsoaledi, recently <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPPHC/2023/490.pdf">lost a court case</a> that anyone could have anticipated was unwinnable. He probably expected to lose it too. He lost it on humanitarian and technical grounds. It prevents him from terminating the South African government’s concession to refugees from neighbouring Zimbabwe nearly fifteen years ago.</p>
<p>In April 2009, South Africa provided legalised shelter for Zimbabweans hit by economic and political crisis in their country across the Limpopo River. The <a href="http://www.dha.gov.za/index.php/statements-speeches/506-remarks-by-minister-malusi-gigaba-on-the-announcement-of-the-zimbabwean-special-dispensation-permit-in-pretoria-12-august-2014">Zimbabwe Dispensation Project</a> was the first form of a policy to temporarily accommodate Zimbabwean refugees. It became the Zimbabwean Special permit in 2014 and after 2017 it was known as the <a href="http://www.dha.gov.za/index.php/immigration-services/gazetted-extension-of-zep">Zimbabwe Exemption Permit</a>. Zimbabweans who had arrived during the crisis period of 2008-09 had full freedoms, but no rights to citizenship even for their children, for as long as the permits allowed.</p>
<p>In 2021, Home Affairs decided to end the special dispensation after a period of grace lasting till the end of 2022 to allow Zimbabweans to regularize their circumstances. Some were expected to be able to obtain residence and work rights based on their skills and occupations, and others were to return to Zimbabwe. The number of people affected by the ruling is estimated at around 178 000 who remained on their ZE permits. Children born in South Africa were expected and allowed to obtain Zimbabwean citizenship and were not allowed South African citizenship.</p>
<p>178 000 is a relatively small number compared with the total number of immigrants in South Africa, <a href="https://africacheck.org/fact-checks/spotchecks/are-there-15-million-undocumented-immigrants-living-south-africa-no-another">estimated at 3.96 million by StatsSA</a>. Many of the registered Zimbabweans are educated and skilled. Most have been successfully living in South Africa for 15 years. Why not simply regularize all the law-abiding Zimbabweans living under the permit?</p>
<p>Elsewhere in Africa and <a href="https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/ejml16&div=4&g_sent=1&casa_token=&collection=journals">around the world </a> larger numbers of irregular migrants have been regularised. In South Africa, <a href="https://scholars.wlu.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1063&context=samp">Mozambican refugees</a> were regularized after the end of the Mozambican civil war. But the current <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/anti-foreigner-sentiment-wont-solve-south-africas-labour-woes">anti-migrant sentiment</a> in South Africa made such a course difficult for the Minister of Home Affairs. This is why he opposed a court action he pretty much knew he would lose.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-free-movement-of-people-is-an-au-ambition-whats-standing-in-its-way-100409">The free movement of people is an AU ambition: what's standing in its way</a>
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<p>I have been studying migration policy on the continent, including the African Union’s adoption of a protocol on the free movement of people in 2018 which <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-free-movement-of-people-is-an-au-ambition-whats-standing-in-its-way-100409">I have argued</a> could facilitate economic growth and the trade integration. </p>
<p>Migration policy in South Africa seems constantly in flux. Most of the <a href="http://www.dha.gov.za/WhitePaperonInternationalMigration-20170602.pdf">immigration policy white paper</a> passed by cabinet in 2017 has never been implemented. Policy documents and a <a href="https://pmg.org.za/call-for-comment/1138/">law amendment on labour migration</a> published a year and a half ago are still in limbo. A promised new white paper on immigration has not yet been published. Some of the proposals could have simplified migration rules such as a proposal to replace the critical skills list with a points system, while others such as the quota system proposed in the draft law would have added further complexities.</p>
<p>Will any reforms be implemented before the general election of 2024? Probably not. This is the fundamental problem. Immigration policy is so highly politicised that the government seems afraid to move. <a href="https://nsi.org.za/projects/migration-governance-reform/">Our programme of research </a> seeks to show how South Africa could learn positive lessons on migration reform from other African countries and elsewhere. </p>
<h2>Hostility to migration</h2>
<p>While politicians <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports98/sareport/Adv5a.htm">frequently voice sentiments </a> hostile to migration and migrants, sensible policies in practice and on the table are shrouded in camouflage and occasionally sneaked through. One example is the <a href="https://www.southafrica-usa.net/homeaffairs/permit_corporate.htm">corporate labour permit</a>, another is the rising number of <a href="http://www.dha.gov.za/index.php/immigration-services/exempt-countries">African countries with visa-free access to South Africa</a>. Access to skilled employees needed from beyond our borders is being simplified. Reforms will be hidden behind a veil of hostility to foreigners.</p>
<p>This is hardly unique to South Africa. In the UK, while the government threatens to deport illegal migrants to Rwanda and stakes its fate on “stopping the boats” in deference to its political base, “long-term immigration … <a href="https://blog.ons.gov.uk/2023/05/25/international-migration-hits-new-high-in-2022-but-there-are-signs-of-change/">rose to 1.2 million</a> for the year ending December 2022, an increase of 221,000 from the previous year”.</p>
<p>Similarly, Georgia Meloni who was elected Prime Minister of Italy at least in part for her anti-immigrant views, has set aside work permits for 425 000 non-EU migrants to immigrate into Italy up to 2025. Laura Boldrini, of the centre-left Democratic Party, <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/07/08/italy-grants-work-permits-425k-non-eu-migrant-workers/">said the high quotas</a> were a surrender and </p>
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<p>a bitter dose of reality for those who have built their political careers by demonising immigration as a national security threat.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.guilford.com/books/The-Age-of-Migration/Haas-Castles-Miller/9781462542895">A textbook on migration</a> warns us, when it comes to migration policies, “not to equate political rhetoric with policy practice”. It is not surprising that in many countries migration policies seem confused or incomprehensible. Migration policy reform seems elusive in the context of such opacity.</p>
<p>And yet, effective African economic development depends on economic integration. Most countries are pretty small, especially economically, and effective integration entails the movement of persons across borders without excessive hindrances.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/free-movement-of-people-across-africa-regions-are-showing-how-it-can-work-197199">Free movement of people across Africa: regions are showing how it can work</a>
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<p>Not all African governments, even of richer countries, have been as hesitant as South Africa to reform migration policies. Members of both the East African Community and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have made greater progress than the regions at the southern and northern ends of the continent. Countries in Africa can learn not only from experiences in the EU or in South America, but also from other African countries and regions.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://nsi.org.za/about/">New South Institute</a> is running the <a href="https://nsi.org.za/projects/migration-governance-reform/">Migration Governance Reform in Africa</a> project, or MIGRA. The rationale and framework for the MIGRA project are set out in <a href="https://nsi.org.za/publications/migration-governance-reform-first-report/">our new working paper </a>.</p>
<p>We are studying migration policy and practice in four African countries, South Africa, Mozambique, Kenya and Nigeria, and in four regional organisations, <a href="https://www.sadc.int/">SADC</a>, <a href="https://www.eac.int/">the EAC</a>, <a href="https://ecowas.int/">ECOWAS</a> and the African Union. We believe that countries and regions in Africa can learn as much from each other as they can from experiences elsewhere. Papers on these eight cases will be published over the next year or so, as they are completed, and we will also be preparing other forms of media to engage in conversation with the wider public as well as with policymakers.</p>
<p><a href="https://nsi.org.za/publications/migration-governance-reform-first-report/">The work we have already done </a> shows us some exciting examples of reform on the African continent. In east and west Africa there are many ways to allow cross border migrants access for different periods and reasons. Even in southern Africa the recent <a href="https://www.tralac.org/blog/article/15940-botswana-and-namibia-concluded-an-agreement-on-the-movement-of-persons.html">agreement between Namibia and Botswana on travel</a> by citizens of the two countries across their common border with identity documents alone shows what progress is possible. Visa-free travel is proliferating in Africa, as the recent bilateral agreement between South Africa and Kenya shows. There are many more examples.</p>
<p>Our project grows as much out of optimism about recent developments on migration governance around the African continent, as from the frustration and confusion about migration policy in many places. Perhaps it will make a small contribution to improving the practice, and maybe even the political rhetoric. And perhaps the South African cabinet will decide to grant the Zimbabwean exemption permit holders and their children <a href="https://scholars.wlu.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1063&context=samp">the same kind of amnesty that was offered to 220 000 Mozambican refugees</a> in December 1996.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209884/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alan Hirsch is Leader of the Migration Governance Reform Program of the New South Institute; Emeritus Professor of Development Policy and Practice at the Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance, University of Cape Town; and Research Associate at School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.</span></em></p>Immigration policy is so highly politicised that the South African government seems afraid to move.Alan Hirsch, Research Fellow New South Institute, Emeritus Professor at The Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2055862023-06-26T13:56:58Z2023-06-26T13:56:58ZMilitary interventions have failed to end DRC’s conflict – what’s gone wrong<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533552/original/file-20230622-29-mfl86e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Soldiers on patrol in Goma, eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, in November 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Guerchom Ndebo/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>For 30 years, the Democratic Republic of Congo has suffered from communal violence, armed conflict and insecurity. Diverse actors have tried to stop it but conflict has intensified, particularly in the eastern provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri and Tanganyika. Regular armed forces and non-state armed groups have been involved in the violence. </p>
<p>In mid-April 2023, it was reported that there were <a href="https://www.radiookapi.net/2023/04/18/actualite/securite/est-de-la-rdc-266-groupes-armes-locaux-et-etrangers-recenses-par-le-p">252 local and 14 foreign armed groups</a> in the eastern Congolese provinces. </p>
<p>The Congolese state’s inability to guarantee security has created fertile ground for armed groups to emerge. Aside from violence, they engage in various illicit activities, like exploiting mineral riches. </p>
<p>Weakened by decades of kleptocratic rule and armed uprisings, the Congolese state relies on support from regional and global actors. The United Nations peacekeeping and stabilisation mission has been in the DRC for more than 20 years. In February 2023, the UN force (MONUSCO) had <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/monusco">16,316</a> men and women from 62 countries operating as intervention troops, staff officers and mission experts.</p>
<p>The East African Community completed <a href="https://www.eac.int/communique/2720-communiqu%C3%A9-of-the-20th-extra-ordinary-summit-of-the-east-african-community-heads-of-state">its deployment of troops</a> in <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/eacrf-troops-now-fully-deployed-in-drc-4191138">April 2023</a>. No sooner had they settled down than the DRC asked the Southern African Development Community to “<a href="https://www.sadc.int/sites/default/files/2023-05/EN%20-%20Communique%20of%20the%20SADC%20Organ%20Troika%20Summit%20Plus%20SADC%20Troika%20and%20TCC%2008%20May%202023%20Final_0.pdf#page=5">restore peace and security in eastern DRC</a>”.</p>
<p>More than a decade of <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Felix-Ndahinda">research</a> on identity politics, indigeneity, human rights, transitional justice and peacebuilding in the region informs my view on its prospects for peace. This revolving door of military interventions raises questions about whether domestic and international actors involved genuinely examine past failures and draw useful lessons from them. Contemporary crises often reemerge from unresolved prior crises. This is the case here. </p>
<p>I argue that the DRC is being shortsighted, driven by populist pressures and political calculations. It’s making the <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">M23 rebel movement</a> the single convenient target of its actions, instead of resolving its deeper and broader problems. </p>
<h2>Disrupting the peacekeepers</h2>
<p>Many of the issues that the DRC government and other regional actors have undertaken to address are well known and documented. The UN <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/document-search?keys=&field_padate_value%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=&field_pacountry_tid=Democratic+Republic+of+the+Congo&field_paregion_tid%5B%5D=15">Peacemaker</a> database lists 19 agreements concluded since the Sirte Agreement of 1999. This preceded negotiations to end the second Congo war in 2003. </p>
<p>The DRC has committed to guarantee security for different communities, to resolve identity, citizenship and land issues, to oversee the return of refugees, and to a demobilisation process that addresses the concerns of belligerents. </p>
<p>The East African Community force’s <a href="https://www.eac.int/communique/2504-communiqu%C3%A9-the-third-heads-of-state-conclave-on-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-the-nairobi-process">mandate</a> was formulated with this in mind. The force would, in collaboration with Congolese military and administrative authorities, stabilise and secure the peace in DRC. The <a href="https://www.eac.int/communique/2720-communiqu%C3%A9-of-the-20th-extra-ordinary-summit-of-the-east-african-community-heads-of-state">initial deployment</a> of Kenyan, Burundian, Ugandan and South Sudanese troops was projected to grow to between 6,500 and 12,000 soldiers in eastern DRC.</p>
<p>The idea was to reduce tensions by enforcing a ceasefire and a withdrawal of armed groups to initial positions. Local armed groups would be demobilised in an orderly way through a political process involving talks with Congolese authorities. Finally, foreign armed groups would be repatriated.</p>
<p>What came to be known as the <a href="https://www.eac.int/communique/2504-communiqu%C3%A9-the-third-heads-of-state-conclave-on-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-the-nairobi-process">Nairobi process</a> framed the resolution of the M23 crisis within a broader goal of peacemaking. All domestic and regional armed groups active in eastern DRC would be disarmed and the emphasis was on dialogue. </p>
<p>Before long, it went wrong. DR Congo president Felix Tshisekedi bluntly <a href="https://twitter.com/StanysBujakera/status/1656066871488020480">criticised</a> the East African Community force and suggested that it might be asked to leave. </p>
<p>It seems that a comprehensive peace strategy is not an immediate priority for Congolese authorities. They have an eye on elections. These are planned for December 2023, and the current president is seeking a second term. Tshisekedi’s administration has turned the fight against the M23 and its alleged backers into a tool of <a href="https://twitter.com/PatrickMuyaya/status/1600082788895449090">popular mobilisation</a> in support of its policies. Therefore, military and diplomatic success on this front remains its priority.</p>
<h2>Towards sustainable peace</h2>
<p>Authorities in the DRC have also <a href="https://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/un-peacekeepers-expected-to-leave-dr-congo-in-six-months-authorities/">announced</a> that UN peacekeepers in the country would be withdrawn by December 2023. </p>
<p>Congolese authorities have criticised the East African force and the UN mission for their unwillingness to fight the M23. The M23 is seen as representing nothing more than a masked <a href="https://twitter.com/StanysBujakera/status/1572365176770535424">Rwandan</a> (and at times <a href="https://twitter.com/StanysBujakera/status/1545118793801900039">Ugandan</a>) intervention in the DRC, and as such the biggest threat to Congolese territorial integrity. </p>
<p>The DRC’s counter strategy is to recognise some local armed groups as resistant patriots (Wazalendo) to be officially supported in fighting an external aggression. Several public officials are on <a href="https://afrique.lalibre.be/76281/rdc-le-blanchissement-des-groupes-armes-par-les-autorites-congolaise-frustre-le-processus-de-nairobi-et-luand/">record</a> expressing their support for these Mai Mai-Wazalendo fighters. </p>
<p>None of the triggers of the DRC’s recurrent crises can be addressed in this atmosphere. It’s impossible to imagine scenarios where sustainable peace can be achieved without first addressing land rights, equal citizenship claims and inclusive governance institutions catering to the needs of the entire Congolese population. </p>
<p>Enforcement of a comprehensive strategy that addresses belligerence and the disarmament of all armed groups through a combined military and political dialogue strategy, as imagined under the Nairobi process, should be the main priority of any peace initiative. Peace between peoples and countries in the region requires a genuine commitment to addressing all local, regional and international dimensions of the crises in eastern DRC.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205586/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Felix Mukwiza Ndahinda does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A comprehensive strategy does not seem to be an immediate priority for Congolese authorities with an eye on elections.Felix Mukwiza Ndahinda, Honorary Associate Professor, College of Arts and Social Sciences, University of RwandaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2040362023-04-27T12:06:03Z2023-04-27T12:06:03ZPeace in the DRC: East Africa has deployed troops to combat M23 rebels – who’s who in the regional force<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522646/original/file-20230424-14-adtvfi.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Sudanese soldiers prepare for deployment to the Democratic Republic of Congo. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Samir Bol/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The East Africa Community (EAC) has <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/eacrf-troops-now-fully-deployed-in-drc-4191138">completed the deployment</a> of its regional force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to oversee the withdrawal of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">rebel group, M23,</a> from the eastern part of the country. </p>
<p>The last contingent was of <a href="https://adf-magazine.com/2023/04/fully-deployed-regional-force-starting-to-impact-eastern-drc/">South Sudanese soldiers</a> who joined troops from Kenya, Burundi and Uganda.</p>
<p>Formed in 2012 as a splinter group of the armed militia <a href="https://www.c-r.org/accord/cross-border-peacebuilding/congo-rwanda-and-national-congress-defence-people">National Congress for the Defence of the People</a>, the M23 briefly occupied the city of Goma the same year. It was quickly routed by forces operating as part of the UN peacekeeping mission, Monusco.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-m23s-on-and-off-insurgency-tells-us-about-drcs-precarious-search-for-peace-182520">M23 re-emerged</a> in 2022, prompting the east African region to send in troops.</p>
<p>While eastern DRC contains over 100 armed groups, the M23 has drawn the region’s attention. This is not only because the conflict could spill across borders, but also because the M23 is <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/eu-urges-rwanda-to-stop-supporting-m23-rebels-in-dr-congo-/6899260.html">widely seen</a> as <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/4/rwanda-backing-m23-rebels-in-drc-un-experts">backed by Rwanda</a> (<a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/dr-congo-accuses-rwanda-of-backing-militia-violence-3828930">a claim Rwanda denies</a>). Thus, a rise in tension could <a href="https://theconversation.com/rwanda-and-drcs-turbulent-past-continues-to-fuel-their-torrid-relationship-188405">reignite fighting</a> between Rwanda and DRC, and draw in the broader region.</p>
<p>The EAC’s forces could be important in bringing the threat posed by the M23 under control, given the regional dimensions to this conflict. But their involvement is complicated.</p>
<p>On the one hand, neighbouring countries often have a better understanding of local political and security contexts than international actors. They also have more direct interest in the outcome of conflict, potentially leading to more sustained engagement.</p>
<p>On the other hand, neighbouring countries have their own interests, which means their actions may not always be in the best interests of the country they’re meant to help. Such risks are especially pronounced in the DRC. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/conflict-in-the-drc-5-articles-that-explain-whats-gone-wrong-195332">Conflict in the DRC: 5 articles that explain what's gone wrong</a>
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<p>The country’s history has been <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-conflicts-intertwined-over-time-and-destabilised-the-drc-and-the-region-185432">rife with meddling</a> by its neighbours, including some members of the EAC regional force. The two Congo wars – <a href="https://www.easterncongo.org/about-drc/history-of-the-conflict/">in 1996-1997 and 1998-2003</a> – brought numerous foreign forces to Congolese soil. </p>
<p>While some neighbouring countries came to support the DRC government, others backed the rebels during the two wars, and actors from multiple sides <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2009/10/report-exploitation-resources-democratic-republic-congo-challenged-security">have pillaged DRC’s natural resources</a>. <a href="https://www.congoresearchgroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/version-anglaise-sondage-gec-ebuteli-deuxieme-note-thematique-force-regionale.pdf#page=4">Public distrust</a> in the regional force is, therefore, high.</p>
<p>Based on <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2021.1992272">lessons learned</a> from previous interventions in the DRC, it’s not clear whether the EAC regional force will help the DRC find peace this time around or contribute, deliberately or otherwise, to its instability.</p>
<p>Here is a short overview of the players in the regional force and their connections to the DRC.</p>
<h2>Kenya</h2>
<p>Kenya has <a href="https://www.eac.int/eac-partner-states/kenya">relatively more economic resources</a> than some other EAC members and a less complicated history with the DRC. While Kenya has had troops in the country <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/monuc/facts.shtml">since 1999</a> as part of the UN peacekeeping operation, it has been less tangled in previous conflicts in the DRC. </p>
<p>Kenya deployed its troops as part of the regional force in November 2022 after the the M23 enlarged its territorial hold in Congo’s eastern region. </p>
<p>Kenyan president <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/11/02/kenya-sends-troops-to-dr-congo-to-fight-rebels//">William Ruto has stated</a> that defeating the M23 is important for the region. Stability in the DRC is also in <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/kenya-why-we-deployed-our-troops-in-drc-4017620">Kenya’s economic interests</a>. It accelerated investments into the DRC after the latter <a href="https://theconversation.com/drc-is-set-to-become-7th-member-of-the-east-africa-trading-bloc-whats-in-it-for-everyone-179320">joined the regional bloc in 2022</a>. </p>
<h2>Burundi</h2>
<p>Burundi has a <a href="https://theconversation.com/burundis-gatumba-massacre-offers-a-window-into-the-past-and-future-of-the-drc-conflict-191351">tangled history with the DRC</a>. It was involved in the two Congo wars and has been <a href="https://www.equalrightstrust.org/ertdocumentbank/DRC%20v%20Burundi,%20Rwanda%20and%20Uganda.pdf#page=1">accused by the DRC</a> of occupying its border provinces and violating human rights and international law during these conflicts.</p>
<p>Burundi formally deployed troops to Goma in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/22/burundi-sends-troops-to-drc-for-regional-peacekeeping-force">August 2022</a>. A <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/more-burundi-troops-arrive-in-goma-4161608">second battalion</a> was deployed seven months later. But a Burundian rights group has <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/burundi-secretly-sent-troops-to-dr-congo-rights-group-3894150">claimed that Burundi</a> has been conducting secret operations against Burundian opposition groups within DRC for some time. <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/22/burundi-sends-troops-to-drc-for-regional-peacekeeping-force">The group also expressed concern</a> that Burundi may use its membership of the regional force to continue operations against its opponents. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/east-africas-peace-mission-in-the-drc-why-its-in-burundis-interest-to-help-203486">East Africa’s peace mission in the DRC: why it’s in Burundi’s interest to help</a>
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<h2>Uganda</h2>
<p>Uganda <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/uganda-troops-join-eac-force-in-drc-4180430">deployed troops</a> to the force in March 2023. Before this, it conducted <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/1/after-air-raids-uganda-sends-troops-into-drc-to-hunt-adf">joint operations</a> with Congolese national forces against the rebel Allied Democratic Forces, a Uganda-based, Islamic State-allied group that has been <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230309-more-than-40-killed-in-suspected-eastern-dr-congo-rebel-attacks">particularly violent towards civilians</a>. </p>
<p>Despite their common foe, Uganda and DRC have a history of tension. Uganda’s military intervention in the DRC in the 1990s was found by the <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/case/116">International Court of Justice</a> to be “of such magnitude and duration” that it was considered “a grave violation” of the prohibition on the use of force in terms of the UN Charter. The court ordered Uganda to pay US$325 million for its illegal occupation. Uganda made its first payment of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/12/uganda-pays-first-installment-of-325m-war-reparations-to-drc#:%7E:text=Uganda%20has%20paid%20%2465m,Ugandan%20troops%20occupied%20Congolese%20territory.">US$65 million</a> in September 2022. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-conflicts-intertwined-over-time-and-destabilised-the-drc-and-the-region-185432">How conflicts intertwined over time and destabilised the DRC – and the region</a>
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<p>Ugandan troops have found some early success in their deployment. This includes the area of Bunagana, where they were able to <a href="https://apnews.com/article/congo-drc-rwanda-m23-rebels-uganda-bunagana-58787acda1f5ebc0ee2b3de2cbb12491">regain control</a> of the town that had been held for months by the M23. Nevertheless, Uganda’s involvement in the <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2001/sc7057.doc.htm">illegal exploitation of DRC’s natural resources</a> in the 1990s and early 2000s raises concerns about its presence among the local population. </p>
<h2>South Sudan</h2>
<p>South Sudan is the most recent EAC member state to deploy troops to the DRC after some <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/277626/east-africa-force-in-drc-kenyas-on-the-ground-so-where-are-the-others/">initial logistical delays</a>. South Sudan’s history with the DRC is less contentious than Uganda’s and Burundi’s. However, its national forces have a <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/03/un-experts-tell-human-rights-council-violence-against-civilians-persists#:%7E:text=Based%20on%20investigations%20undertaken%20in,and%20State%2Dsponsored%20extrajudicial%20killings.">history of human rights abuses</a> against their own population. </p>
<p>Despite South Sudan president Salva Kiir’s instruction that his troops not “<a href="https://jubaecho.com/president-kiir-flags-off-720-troops-headed-for-drc/">go and rape women and girls</a>”, their presence within the <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/analysis/the-role-progress-and-challenges-of-the-eac-regional-force-in-the-eastern-drc/">crowded theatre could increase the risk</a> of human rights abuses. </p>
<h2>Risky, but necessary?</h2>
<p>Despite these risks, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/east-african-troops-hope-to-bring-peace-in-the-drc-but-there-may-be-stumbling-blocks-195937">EAC regional force</a> may be the DRC’s best chance of defeating the M23. Monusco <a href="https://theconversation.com/protests-against-un-in-eastern-congo-highlight-peace-missions-crisis-of-legitimacy-187932">has struggled</a> to mitigate the M23 or the numerous other rebel groups operating in the eastern region. </p>
<p>One advantage for the EAC is that it’s leading both the political and military responses to the M23, which were previously led by different actors. The M23 threat requires both a political and military response, and ensuring these two prongs remain closely integrated is essential. </p>
<p>So far, though, the M23 has not respected the timelines for withdrawal set as part of the political process, including the most recent <a href="https://ntrtv.com.tr/no-retreat-by-m23-rebels-from-eastern-drc-on-deadline/">30 March 2022 deadline</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/east-african-troops-hope-to-bring-peace-in-the-drc-but-there-may-be-stumbling-blocks-195937">East African troops hope to bring peace in the DRC but there may be stumbling blocks</a>
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<p>This lack of progress has led Angolan president João Lourenço – who is <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/221187/rwanda-and-drc-start-peace-talks-mediated-by-angola/">mediating peace talks</a> between the DRC and Rwanda – to announce the deployment of 500 Angolan troops to the volatile east. Kinshasa said the Angolan troops would be there “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/angola-deploy-troops-congos-rebel-hit-east-2023-03-17/#:%7E:text=LUANDA%2C%20March%2017%20(Reuters),approved%20the%20deployment%20on%20Friday.">not to attack but to help maintain peace</a>”. Sadly, there is not yet much peace to be maintained.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204036/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jenna Russo is the Director of Research for the International Peace Institute (IPI) and the Head of IPI's Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations. </span></em></p>The region’s forces are seen as important in addressing the long-running conflict in the DRC – but their involvement is complicated.Jenna Russo, Researcher and lecturer, City University of New YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1971992023-01-19T11:09:38Z2023-01-19T11:09:38ZFree movement of people across Africa: regions are showing how it can work<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/503191/original/file-20230105-20-dgv9h1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A border crossing between Uganda and Kenya at Malaba. The two countries have made strides in improving mobility between them.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Brian Ongoro/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The end of January 2023 will mark five years since the African Union Free Movement of Persons protocol <a href="https://au.int/en/treaties/protocol-treaty-establishing-african-economic-community-relating-free-movement-persons">was signed by the African Union</a>. A parallel initiative to the <a href="https://au-afcfta.org/">African Continental Free Trade Agreement</a>, it was designed to reduce barriers to Africans crossing African borders. The benefits of freer movement include trade, investment, cultural understanding and scientific cooperation. Along with several colleagues at the New South Institute , Alan Hirsch is <a href="https://tapronto.com.br/projetos/gapp/wordpress/projects/migration-reform/">researching</a> pathways towards freer movement. He explains what lies behind the hesitancy of countries to commit to the protocol. And points to ways in which the initiative can move forward.</em> </p>
<h2>Why the hesitancy?</h2>
<p>There are several factors. </p>
<p>One of the key ones is the fear among member states that the Free Movement of Persons Protocol would suddenly come into force as soon as the parliaments of 15 out of 55 member states had ratified it.</p>
<p>But, in fact, only the first of the protocol’s three phases will come into force and only for the countries that had ratified it. In addition, the protocol’s safeguards allow countries to suspend it if their concerns cannot be dealt with through normal immigration procedures.</p>
<p>The fear among leaders is that implementation would trigger political instability. Several of Africa’s richer countries appear to be concerned that once the protocol comes into force, they will experience <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10220461.2021.2007788">a sudden influx of low-skilled economic migrants</a> from poorer countries. </p>
<p>In fact, the protocol has safeguards against this. Still, the perception remains, and very few richer countries have signed the protocol, let alone ratified it.</p>
<p>Some feel that adequate systems of population registration, passporting, the exchange of criminal records, extradition arrangements, and similar forms of cooperation in or between many countries are not yet in place.</p>
<p>Even the term “free movement” is confusing. Even though the protocol specifically refrains from referring to movement independent of the laws of the host state, some countries seem to fear that unregulated movement on their territory will be the outcome.</p>
<p>In my view, the roadmap that accompanied the Free Movement of Persons Protocol was too ambitious. It added to the unnecessary panic.</p>
<h2>What are the safeguards against big influxes?</h2>
<p>First, states that join the protocol can express reservations about certain elements of the agreement. </p>
<p>Second, they can add procedures for certain categories of migrants. </p>
<p>Third, in some circumstances, the protocol can be suspended. </p>
<p>And fourth, states are allowed to withdraw altogether from the protocol.</p>
<p>In addition, the protocol distinguishes between visa-free entry for short-term visitors, and the right to longer-term stays and employment and residence. </p>
<p>The protocol’s implementation process has three phases. At the beginning, only Phase I would be activated for countries that fully ratified it. It allows visitors visa-free access for three months. </p>
<p>Phase II allows residence and will only come into force after the African Union’s Executive Council considers the implementation of the first phase and agrees to enforce Phase II.</p>
<p>Phase III affords the right to establish a business. This too would only come into force after the African Union’s Executive Council considers the implementation of the prior phases and agrees to move forward.</p>
<p>In any of these phases, a host government may require foreigners to apply for a work permit and may manage those work permits with domestic legislation. </p>
<p>I can see how government officials would find it difficult to understand how all the pieces fit together. In many countries the responsibility for migration, work permits and security are divided between several government departments which do not necessarily work very well together, and security concerns tend to predominate. </p>
<h2>What role do regional blocs play?</h2>
<p>Some regional blocs have already advanced quite far in lifting restrictions in cross-border movements. The two most advanced regions are the East African Community (EAC) and the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS). In some cases they allow <a href="https://immigration.go.ke/temporary-permit/">passport-free cross-border travel</a> within the region. They have even been moving towards adopting regional passports.</p>
<p>What is interesting and important is that there is nothing in the AU Free Movement of Persons protocol that prevents unconventional paths forward. In each region, it is possible for some member countries to move ahead without the participation of all the members of the regional group. </p>
<p>A recent <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/41587-doc-African_Integration_Report_2021_-_Final_Design.pdf">report</a> notes that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>There is ongoing migration from the national passport to an EAC passport but not all states are issuing the regional passport. The EAC citizens of Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda move freely between the three countries using either their national identity cards or the EAC passport. This is a result of removal of mobility restrictions enacted by Heads of State in 2013. On the other hand, Tanzania and Burundi require a passport for East Africans. Free movement has enabled the EAC to make significant progress in the area of social integration. Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda have also facilitated the right of establishment, the right of residence and access to the labour market for their citizens across the three states.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The protocol does not exclude these forms of “variable geometry” within regional economic communities. On the contrary: it would seem to be a valuable form of progress, which could eventually bring other members of the economic community into the fold. Some countries which have already achieved a high level of mutual trust lead the way, and others follow when they can.</p>
<p>Indeed, because of the proximity of countries in regional groupings and their greater familiarity with each other, I think it likely that free movement will advance first among groupings within regional communities. </p>
<p>In the future, there may well be scope for agreements on the movements of persons between like-minded regional economic communities — inter community agreement, as it were.</p>
<h2>What could encourage uptake of the protocol?</h2>
<p>It is easier to work with countries in the neighbourhood, which already have close relationships and generally enjoy more mutual understanding. Engaging with more distant countries could be facilitated by using common standards for documentation, exchanging information, and agreeing on procedures for dealing with undesirable immigrants, such as criminals. Other mechanisms for promoting understanding should also be strongly supported: for example, cultural exchange programmes.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, processes at a continental level should be encouraged, and bringing the free movement process closer to the free trade area process would be positive, especially if this regularly brings officials from across the continent into common conversations about freer movement.</p>
<p>Already African countries are moving forward, often at their own initiative. The just-published <a href="https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/africa-visa-openness-report-2022">Africa Visa Openness Report 2022</a> notes that 27% of all intra-African travel routes require no visa at all for citizens of African countries. This is up from 25% in 2021 and 20% in 2016. In 2022, 24 African countries — over 40% — offered eVisas to Africans and other travellers, up from nine African countries — 17% of the continent — in 2016.</p>
<p><em>This article first appeared in a similar form as an appendix to the <a href="https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/africa-visa-openness-report-2022">Africa Visa Openness Report 2022</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197199/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alan Hirsch is Leader of the Migration Governance Reform Program of the New South Institute; Emeritus Professor of Development Policy and Practice at the Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance, University of Cape Town; and Research Associate at School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.</span></em></p>It’s likely that free movement will advance first among groupings within regional communities.Alan Hirsch, Research Fellow New South Institute, Emeritus Professor at The Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1959372022-12-09T07:31:24Z2022-12-09T07:31:24ZEast African troops hope to bring peace in the DRC but there may be stumbling blocks<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499498/original/file-20221207-26-fw7v41.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kenyan troops fly the flags of the East African Community and Kenya in Goma, eastern DRC. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Augustin Wamenya/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The East African Community decided to deploy troops in one of its member states for the <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/can-the-east-african-community-stabilise-eastern-drc">first time</a> in June 2022. The deployment in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) will test the regional body’s ability to respond to complex conflicts. </p>
<p>Already, the regional bloc has scored some early victories. Most significantly, on 6 December, following peace talks in Nairobi, Kenya, 53 of the over 100 armed groups operating in the DRC <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/53-armed-groups-in-dr-congo-commit-to-end-war-4046010">agreed to a ceasefire</a>. </p>
<p>The DRC – which joined the East African Community in April 2022 – has been trapped in <a href="https://theconversation.com/conflict-in-the-drc-5-articles-that-explain-whats-gone-wrong-195332">cycles of violence</a> for nearly three decades. The reasons include ethnic intolerance, illegal exploitation of the country’s vast natural resources and a Congolese elite that benefits from the chaos. </p>
<p>The most recent wave of conflict follows the reemergence of the armed group <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">March 23 Movement (M23)</a>. International forces drove the group out of the country in 2013. Its resurgence this past year has led to heightened levels of violence and mass displacement. </p>
<p>This has prompted the East African Community to mobilise a <a href="https://www.easfcom.org/index.php/en/about-easf">regional force</a> that could comprise up to 12,000 troops from member states. It will operate under <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/africa/military-deployments-in-east-dr-congo-4009492">Kenyan command</a>, with a six-month renewable mandate to support the DRC’s national forces in containing, defeating and eradicating negative forces in the restive eastern region. </p>
<p>This is the second time regional actors have deployed a military force to tamp down an M23 insurgency. Following the armed group’s initial uprising in 2013, the 12-member <a href="https://icglr.org/">International Conference on the Great Lakes Region</a> proposed an intervention brigade. It was eventually brought under the <a href="https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/background">umbrella</a> of the UN peacekeeping mission, MONUSCO. It became known as the Force Intervention Brigade.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.eac.int/communique/2504-communiqu%C3%A9-the-third-heads-of-state-conclave-on-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-the-nairobi-process">June decision</a> to deploy an east African force may feel like déjà vu. While some factors are different now, not all developments are promising.</p>
<p>For more than a decade, my <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2021.1992272">research </a> has focused on armed conflict settings, with an in-depth analysis of the DRC. In my view, while the current Congo crisis is unlikely to be resolved without military force, any hope for success requires that operations remain closely tied to a political process.</p>
<h2>What’s changed?</h2>
<p>One difference between the East African Community’s intervention now and the 2013 Force Intervention Brigade mission is the merging of political and military processes.</p>
<p>The East African Community will retain authority over the regional force, while also leading the <a href="https://www.eac.int/communique/2695-the-third-inter-congolese-dialogue-under-the-eac-led-nairobi-process">ongoing political dialogue</a>. </p>
<p>One of the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2021.1992272">downfalls</a> of previous military responses in the Congo is that they haven’t been adequately linked to a political process. When the Force Intervention Brigade was deployed, it was intended to be the “teeth” of a <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/drc-framework-agreement2013">regional political agreement</a>. However, these military and political interventions were never fully integrated. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that the east African region’s effort to integrate the two processes will succeed. Decades of violence indicate just how intractable the conflict is. For instance, so far there has been no indication that Rwanda will cease (or even acknowledge) <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">its support of the M23</a>. The international community hasn’t done much to call for accountability on this front. </p>
<p>Further, the DRC has refused to enter into dialogue with the M23, which it considers a terrorist organisation, for fear that this will embolden other armed groups. </p>
<h2>Crowded theatre</h2>
<p>Deploying a force overseen by the East African Community presents the challenge of communication and coordination with other actors in the region. The confusion this can create was seen in the <a href="https://theglobalobservatory.org/2021/12/ugandan-congolese-troops-joint-operations-monusco/">2021 deployment</a> of Ugandan forces to the DRC to combat the armed group, the Allied Democratic Forces. This confusion largely had to do with the extent of the UN peacekeeping mission’s mandate to support operations involving foreign forces. </p>
<p>While the mission has indicated its intention to partner with the east African regional force, the practicalities for doing so remain unclear. </p>
<p>There is also a concern that the east African force could elevate the risk of human rights violations. <a href="https://civiliansinconflict.org/publications/research/the-sum-of-all-parts/">Past reports</a> have documented the potential harm to civilian protection that can arise from crowded theatres. Actors may interpret their civilian protection obligations in different ways. And it may not be clear who is accountable for violations. </p>
<p>As opposed to the UN peacekeeping mission, the east African force doesn’t have a protection mandate. It is unclear to what extent it will prioritise civilian harm mitigation in its planning and operations. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/protests-against-un-in-eastern-congo-highlight-peace-missions-crisis-of-legitimacy-187932">Protests against UN in eastern Congo highlight peace mission's crisis of legitimacy</a>
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<p>Violations against civilians could undermine the east African force’s legitimacy, which is already likely to be weak given the <a href="https://theconversation.com/sexual-exploitation-by-un-peacekeepers-in-drc-fatherless-children-speak-for-first-time-about-the-pain-of-being-abandoned-188248">history of abuses</a> committed by foreign forces in the Congo. Already, Kinshasa has <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/dr-congo-agrees-to-eac-force-deployment-no-rwandan-army-3852276">refused</a> to allow Rwanda to deploy troops as part of the regional force. Other contributing countries have a <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/can-the-east-african-community-stabilise-eastern-drc">history of supporting</a> armed groups in the region. And the political economy of war in the Congo has been of benefit to a number of its neighbours. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202211260015.html">noted</a> by Daniel Levine-Spound, a researcher with the Center for Civilians in Conflict (<a href="https://civiliansinconflict.org/">CIVIC</a>) based in the Congo:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Because many of the countries involved in the force have recently undertaken military operations on Congolese soil, there is a significant amount of mistrust and uncertainty among civilians that the force will need to overcome.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This will require adequate engagement with civil society organisations and prioritising civilian safety in military operations. </p>
<h2>The task ahead</h2>
<p>The M23 of today is not the same M23 of 10 years ago. It has more <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">sophisticated weaponry and tactics</a>, and a more centralised command and control. </p>
<p>Additionally, it’s operating more strategically than in 2013. The boldness of the group’s 2013 march directly on Goma – the capital of North Kivu in eastern DRC – elicited a swift response from the region and the international community. This ultimately led to the group being routed into neighbouring Uganda and Rwanda. </p>
<p>While M23 is currently operating within the vicinity of Goma, it has avoided taking the city. It has instead focused on taking over larger areas of surrounding territory and could gain control over both roads into Goma. </p>
<h2>Next steps</h2>
<p>Whether the east African regional force is up to the task remains unclear. </p>
<p>Its member states’ proximity to the conflict may lead to more sustained political will to tamp down the violence and find a political resolution. Yet, the countries’ individual interests in the conflict mean that not all players will have the DRC’s best interest at heart. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2021.1992272">Previous experience</a> casts doubt on the effectiveness of bringing in foreign military forces to resolve unrest in the Congo. These interventions have in some cases increased violence against civilians, led to the exploitation of natural resources and undermined Congolese authority over its own territory. </p>
<p>A successful intervention will require that neighbouring countries remain accountable to support the security and sovereignty of the Congo.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195937/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jenna Russo is the Director of Research and Head of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations at the International Peace Institute.</span></em></p>There are advantages to a regional force overseen by the East African Community – particularly as the bloc is leading new political talks.Jenna Russo, Researcher and lecturer, City University of New YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1952202022-11-28T12:27:46Z2022-11-28T12:27:46ZEast African Court of Justice – what it is and what its powers are<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497004/original/file-20221123-14-81cjvc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Kenyan judicial nominee to the East African Court of Justice, Charles Nyachae, is sworn in before a summit of regional leaders in Kampala in 2018.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kenya Presidential Communication Service</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Martha Karua, the running mate of Raila Odinga, the losing candidate in Kenya’s 2022 presidential election, continues to dispute William Ruto’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/5/kenyas-supreme-court-upholds-rutos-win-in-presidential-election">slim victory</a> over him. According to the <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/people/martha-karua-3813480">politician and lawyer</a>, the Kenyan electoral commission and the country’s supreme court </p>
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<p>failed Kenya’s democracy and infringed on the human rights of Kenyans when they ratified President William Ruto’s win. </p>
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<p>This is why she <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2022-11-04-details-of-karuas-petition-at-east-african-court-of-justice-over-ruto-win/">intends</a> to bring the matter before the East African Court of Justice. </p>
<p>As the judicial organ of the East African Community, the court was set up in 2001 to ensure the adherence to law in the interpretation and application of and compliance with the treaty that binds the regional bloc of seven countries. These are Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.</p>
<p>For everybody concerned with the progress of regional integration, challenging Kenyan presidential elections in the regional court is good news. It is not necessarily about what the court will say about the quality of the elections, but about the decision’s long-term implications. </p>
<p>Every decision sheds light on the regional bloc’s basic values. Case law shows countries how to live up to those values. And a high-profile case creates awareness of the court’s mandate and mission.</p>
<p>The regional court needs and deserves public attention. Unlike most of the regional institutions in Africa, it hasn’t been captured by political elites. It is a court of the people with a broad jurisdiction. </p>
<p>Initially, the regional court limited itself to <a href="https://www.eacj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Plaxeda-Rugumba-2010-8-judgment-2011.pdf">declarations of treaty violations</a>. With time, it moved to order <a href="https://www.afronomicslaw.org/2019/10/22/east-african-court-of-justice-a-midwife-of-the-political-federation-the-new-case-law-on-the-remedies-awarded-by-the-court">more robust remedies</a>, such as compensation for aggrieved parties. It also started instructing governments to take certain actions to remedy violations. </p>
<p>I have studied the development of the East African Court of Justice over the last few years. My view is that the court has been a keen promoter of the rule of law, democracy and human rights. It has also challenged the elitist legacy of regional integration in East Africa and shaken up the top-down decision-making processes in the East African Community. The court did so by engaging with civil society and national judiciaries, thus bringing the regional bloc closer to the people.</p>
<h2>A court of the people</h2>
<p>The East African Court of Justice is a very accessible court. Any person who is a resident of the bloc can file a petition – <a href="https://www.eacj.org/?page_id=33">the treaty</a> calls it individual reference (Article 30). Anybody can challenge treaty violations in the court directly without first engaging their national authorities or courts. There is no need to demonstrate any personal interest in the outcome of the case – it can be filed in the public interest. </p>
<p>The court has encouraged individuals to use it through a generous approach to the litigation costs. There are no filing fees and even a losing applicant does not have to pay any instruction fees to the state’s attorney general.</p>
<p>Moreover, the court has gone to great lengths to be physically closer to the people. Even though it is seated in Arusha, in northern Tanzania, there is no need to travel there to file a case. The court operates an electronic filing system and is establishing sub-registries in all capitals of the bloc. It’s also holding hearings in national judiciaries’ court stations across the region.</p>
<p>The court did not decide a single case in the first couple of years of its existence. As the cases finally started coming in the mid-2000s, the court experienced a backlash which limited its accessibility. In 2007, Kenyan politician <a href="https://www.eacj.org/?cases=application-no-01-no-02-of-2010-appellate-division">Anyang’ Nyong’o and 10 other applicants</a> brought a petition about flawed processes of election to the East African Legislative Assembly. The court agreed with the applicants. </p>
<p>It was apparently inconceivable to the national governments that the court they had created would dare to oppose them. Politicians rushed to put the court in its place. They introduced the time frame for individual references, making it harder to approach the court.</p>
<h2>What cases are most common?</h2>
<p>Cross-border trade disputes make up only a few of the court’s cases. In one <a href="https://africanlii.org/ea/judgment/east-african-court-justice/2018/71">case</a>, a private company won US$20,000 as compensation for Burundi custom authorities unlawfully seizing a truck carrying perishable goods.</p>
<p>Awarding of damages is, however, a new practice. The majority of cases concern violation of the bloc’s values, most notably the commitments to the rule of law and human rights. A <a href="https://www.eacj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/NO._1_OF_2007.pdf">groundbreaking judgement</a> was handed down in 2007 in the James Katabazi case. A group of treason co-accused in Uganda had been rearrested after being granted bail by their country’s court. The regional court denounced the rearrest as a violation of the rule of law.</p>
<p>Other cases followed. For example, the East African Court of Justice has <a href="https://www.eacj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Plaxeda-Rugumba-2010-8-judgment-2011.pdf">ruled</a> against secretive detention without trial of a Rwandan army officer accused of committing crimes against national security. And it <a href="https://www.eacj.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Referene-No.2-of-2017.pdf">ruled</a> in favour of the Media Council of Tanzania against legislation which granted a government minister sweeping powers to </p>
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<p>prohibit or otherwise sanction a publication of any content that jeopardises national security or public safety.</p>
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<p>But what is interesting in the context of the upcoming petition from Kenya is an <a href="https://www.afronomicslaw.org/2020/11/30/eacj-first-instance-court-decides-martha-karua-v-republic-of-kenya-the-litmus-test-for-eacj-jurisdiction-and-supremacy">earlier judgement</a> – in 2020 – in favour of Martha Karua. After unsuccessfully contesting a gubernatorial seat in Kirinyaga, she filed an electoral petition with Kenyan courts. It was dismissed on procedural technicalities and she was never heard on the merits. According to the <a href="https://www.eacj.org/?cases=martha-wangari-karua-v-the-attorney-general-of-the-republic-of-kenya-2-others">East African Court of Justice ruling</a>, Kenya violated the right to access justice, and hence the principle of the rule of law. </p>
<h2>Only as strong as its partners</h2>
<p>The court holds great potential for justice in the region, but it is only as strong as its partner states allow it to be. The partner states are under treaty obligation (Article 38) to implement the court’s judgements without “undue delay”. If a state fails to do so, the applicant can go back to the court, since the failure to implement a judgement is in itself a rule of law violation, a violation of the treaty and contempt of court. </p>
<p>The enforcement of a judgement depends ultimately on the given state’s commitment to the rule of law. And <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iHBZkMgWpQk">as stated</a> by the former Kenyan chief justice, David Maraga, it is herein that the greatness of any nation lies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195220/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tomasz Milej does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The East African Court of Justice has been a keen promoter of the rule of law, democracy and human rights.Tomasz Milej, Professor, Department of Public Law, Kenyatta UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1953322022-11-25T08:25:28Z2022-11-25T08:25:28ZConflict in the DRC: 5 articles that explain what’s gone wrong<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497329/original/file-20221125-12-e7oxfk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Troops drive through Goma in eastern DRC in November 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Augustin Wamenya/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>For nearly three decades, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been embroiled in violence. Millions of people have been killed, and an estimated 5.6 million others displaced by civil wars, local feuds and cross-border conflicts.</p>
<p>Studies have identified several reasons for the persistence of war, especially in the volatile east of the country. These include ethnic intolerance, the illegal exploitation of the country’s vast natural resources and a Congolese elite that benefits from the chaos.</p>
<p>Neighbouring countries – including Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/259540/kenyan-peacekeepers-arrive-in-drcs-volatile-east/">most recently Kenya</a> – are locked in the ongoing conflict, which has been termed one of <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna34958903">world’s deadliest</a> since the second world war. Much of the current violence is centred in Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu provinces, which lie on the DRC’s eastern border. Combined, they are about seven times the size of Rwanda.</p>
<p>Consolidating peace efforts across the vast territory has proved difficult. Scholars writing for The Conversation Africa have highlighted a range of factors driving the conflict – and the challenges in the way of addressing them.</p>
<h2>1. The birth of M23</h2>
<p>Since the 1990s, armed groups have been part of the political economy of eastern Congo. Communities created self-defence militias in response to foreign-backed armed groups accused of using war to loot the country’s riches.</p>
<p>Over time, armed mobilisation turned into a goal in itself: to make money, to express political power or simply for the youth to cope with the chaos. Today, more than 120 armed groups are present in eastern DRC. </p>
<p>One of these is the <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">March 23 Movement (M23)</a>. Kasper Hoffmann and Christoph Vogel analyse the development of M23 since its beginnings in 2012. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-m23s-on-and-off-insurgency-tells-us-about-drcs-precarious-search-for-peace-182520">What M23's on-and-off insurgency tells us about DRC's precarious search for peace</a>
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<h2>2. Regional dynamics</h2>
<p>The DRC has accused Rwanda of violating its sovereignty by supporting M23. A United Nations report supported this contention. Kigali, however, has dismissed the findings as “false allegations”. </p>
<p>Tensions between Rwanda and DRC date back to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Many of the perpetrators of this violence, which killed about a million Rwandans, fled to the DRC, at the time called Zaire. The post-genocide Rwandan government launched military operations in a bid to force the perpetrators back home to face justice. Rwanda believes the DRC continues to provide refuge for those behind the 1994 massacre. Jonathan Beloff explains why both nations hold old suspicions of each other. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/rwanda-and-drcs-turbulent-past-continues-to-fuel-their-torrid-relationship-188405">Rwanda and DRC's turbulent past continues to fuel their torrid relationship</a>
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</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>3. The lingering effects of colonialism</h2>
<p>Colonial ways of governing indigenous populations sowed seeds of ethnic tension in present-day Congo. Jacob Cloete’s research set out to establish whether a conflict in North Kivu in 1993 that grabbed headlines was the starting point of the current violence in eastern Congo. He argues, however, that it was the culmination of a much older one rooted in Belgian and German colonialism. As he explains:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Based on a racist notion popular among African colonialists at the time, the two colonial administrations gave privileged status to some of the local population based on ethnicity.</p>
</blockquote>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-conflicts-intertwined-over-time-and-destabilised-the-drc-and-the-region-185432">How conflicts intertwined over time and destabilised the DRC – and the region</a>
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</p>
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<h2>4. Questioning the UN’s intervention</h2>
<p>Over three decades of war, the Congo has received tens of billions of dollars in humanitarian aid and hosts one of the largest United Nations peacekeeping missions. The mission was established in 1999, and its mandate expanded in 2010 to include the protection of civilians. </p>
<p>The UN mission has long been blamed for failing to stabilise the country despite more than two decades of intervention. But as Delphin Ntanyoma explains, the UN is being blamed for what should be the DRC government’s responsibility: de-escalating violence and finding long-term solutions.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-un-is-under-attack-in-eastern-congo-but-drc-elites-are-also-to-blame-for-the-violence-187861">The UN is under attack in eastern Congo. But DRC elites are also to blame for the violence</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>5. Rewarding rebellion</h2>
<p>Christopher P. Davey’s research into the Banyamulenge – a sub-group of the Congolese Tutsi ethnic group who originally come from the province of South Kivu in eastern DRC – adds to debate on the factors driving Congo’s violence. He argues that the Banyamulenge’s experiences illustrate how violence in the Congo multiplies across borders, blurs the lines between victim and perpetrator, and is used to win a place in government rather than to overthrow it. Davey notes that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I believe that to stop the cycle of violence, the DRC and its regional allies need a new status quo that doesn’t reward rebellion but decreases its appeal. </p>
</blockquote>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/burundis-gatumba-massacre-offers-a-window-into-the-past-and-future-of-the-drc-conflict-191351">Burundi's Gatumba massacre offers a window into the past and future of the DRC conflict</a>
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</em>
</p>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195332/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Consolidating peace efforts across the vast territory has proved difficult for close to three decades. Scholars explain why.Julius Maina, Regional Editor East AfricaKagure Gacheche, Commissioning Editor, East AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1898042022-09-23T10:11:40Z2022-09-23T10:11:40ZUhuru Kenyatta failed to turn Kenya into as big an international player as he could – here’s why<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/482493/original/file-20220902-3755-hm5l3f.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Uhuru Kenyatta signs a treaty integrating DRC into the East African Community in June 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tony Karumba/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>One of the notable achievements of Uhuru Kenyatta’s nine-year tenure as president was that he invigorated Kenya’s foreign policy. </p>
<p>A year after his 2013 inauguration, his government launched a <a href="https://www.kenyaembassy.org.tr/uploads/Kenya_Foreign_Policy.pdf">document</a> that outlined Kenya’s diplomatic engagements and foreign relations. It was the country’s first written foreign policy since independence.</p>
<p>Its themes can be distilled into four objectives and practices: regional and continental cooperation; promoting Kenya’s economic interests; revival of pan-Africanism; and an aggressive approach to foreign policy, including a plethora of high-level visits. </p>
<p>It was indeed a dynamic performance. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, in my view, based on the country’s mixed outcomes and foreign policy losses, it’s evident that the Kenyatta government’s foreign policy was not focused, consistent or effectively coordinated. Consequently, it failed to create a regional balance of power favourable to Kenya’s interests. </p>
<p>And while the country became more visible globally and actively engaged in international matters, the returns from this visibility have been dismal – save for an <a href="https://theconversation.com/uhuru-kenyattas-economic-legacy-big-on-promises-but-weak-on-delivery-188698">increased debt burden</a>. </p>
<h2>Regional and continental cooperation</h2>
<p>In the 2014 <a href="https://www.kenyaembassy.org.tr/uploads/Kenya_Foreign_Policy.pdf">Kenya Foreign Policy</a> document, Kenyatta affirmed that Kenya would seek to promote sub-regional and regional integration. </p>
<p>In his <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/134839269/H-E-President-Uhuru-Kenyatta-Inaugural-Address">inauguration speech</a> in 2013, he said his government would strengthen regional ties through the free movement of people, goods and investment. He underscored the importance of deepening relations with the <a href="https://www.eac.int/">East African Community</a> and Africa as a whole to: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>deliver on the promise of independence and liberation from our colonial past.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>However, critics faulted Kenyatta for using a pan-African approach to overcome the initial global isolation and non-receptiveness Kenya faced from traditional allies like Britain and the US. This chilly reception from the UK and US followed Kenyatta’s election as president despite his facing <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/kenya/kenyatta">an International Criminal Court (ICC) case</a>. </p>
<p>As a result, the president’s policy on global politics retracted to operating through the continental body, the African Union. </p>
<p>Kenya became an active contributor to the union’s programmes. In 2014, the country gave <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/counties/article/2000103662/kenya-pledges-sh130m-to-africas-heritage-preservation">US$1.1 million</a> to support the <a href="https://awhf.net/">African World Heritage Fund</a>. </p>
<p>In 2015, Kenyatta was elected the chairperson of the <a href="https://au.int/en/organs/aprm">African Peer Review Mechanism</a>. This is a voluntary assessment and monitoring system that evaluates and advises African Union member states on their progress in achieving good governance. </p>
<p>Moreover, Kenya was among the countries that contributed troops to the <a href="https://amisom-au.org/kenya-kdf/">African Union Mission in Somalia</a>.</p>
<p>Despite all this activity, Kenyatta failed to effectively exert influence and drive regional integration to Kenya’s advantage.</p>
<h2>Pan-Africanism</h2>
<p>A notable element in Kenya’s foreign policy under Kenyatta was the renaissance of pan-Africanism. In his first address to the African Union Summit in 2013, he <a href="https://www.kenyaembassyaddis.org/wp-content/uploads/speeches/presidential/INAUGURAL_STATEMENT_BY_HIS_EXCELLENCY_HON_UHURU_KENYATTA_PRESIDENT_OF_THE_REPUBLIC_OF_KENYA.pdf">said</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Pan-Africanism has sparked a Kenyan renaissance.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The president said he had received tutelage on pan-Africanism from his father, Jomo Kenyatta, Kenya’s first president. </p>
<p>Arguably, this pan-African reinvigoration into Kenya’s foreign policy was motivated by the existential threats of global sanctions that the regime faced. Yet, Kenyatta’s election against the backdrop of the cases at The Hague turned Kenya into an icon of resistance following what was perceived as the unfair targeting of Africa by the ICC.</p>
<p>During Kenyatta’s inauguration, Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/09/controversy-kenya-uhuru-kenyatta-uganda">praised Kenyans</a> for rejecting western neo-colonialism. This was in reference to calls by diplomats that Kenyans should not elect people with cases to answer at the ICC. </p>
<p>The African Union convened an extraordinary summit that <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/kenya-leads-push-for-immunity-for-leaders-at-world-court-1399762">declared support</a> for Kenyatta and his deputy William Ruto, who was also facing charges at The Hague. </p>
<h2>Economic interests</h2>
<p>Kenyatta’s foreign policy of economic prosperity was pursued and achieved via a triple approach. </p>
<p>First was through encouraging trade ties with traditional allies like the UK, US and some countries in western Europe. Second was through a diversification of economic relations to include new markets in the form of a “look east” policy. </p>
<p>Third was through emphasising intra-African trade. Kenya signed trade agreements with states not considered traditional allies, such as Nigeria and Ghana. Additionally, the country quickly signed the <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20180321/au-member-countries-create-history-massively-signing-afcfta-agreement-kigali">African Continental Free Trade Area agreement</a> in March 2018. </p>
<p>But questions have arisen on whether Kenya has the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uhuru-kenyattas-economic-legacy-big-on-promises-but-weak-on-delivery-188698">financial capacity</a> to meet present and future economic obligations. </p>
<h2>Assertive foreign policy</h2>
<p>Kenya hosted a wide range of high-level international meetings. Subjects ranged from climate change to trade. Kenyatta also received high-level delegations <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-moi-put-foreign-policy-at-the-centre-of-his-presidency-134048">reminiscent of former president Daniel Moi’s era</a>. His guests included the pope and leaders of India, Israel, US, UK, China and Japan. </p>
<p>From Africa, Kenyatta hosted leaders from Ghana, Ethiopia, Somalia, Uganda and Rwanda, among many others. </p>
<p>By July 2022, a month to the election that would end his term in office, Kenyatta had made <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/how-uhuru-kenyatta-won-over-world-leaders-charm-offensive-3866492">158 official foreign trips</a>. In contrast, his predecessor Mwai Kibaki made just 33 foreign trips over 10 years of leadership. </p>
<p>The country’s foreign policy during Kenyatta’s second term, which began in 2017, is what I would describe as aggressive or assertive. The country took advantage of any international opportunity that arose to make its mark. </p>
<p>In February 2022, Kenya addressed a UN Security Council meeting on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Its envoy to the UN, Martin Kimani, <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/national/article/2001438419/amb-martin-kimanis-full-speech-on-russia-ukraine-tension">came out strongly</a> in defence of Ukraine. He stated that the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter">Charter of the United Nations</a> was fading due to “the relentless assault of the powerful”. Kimani compared Ukraine’s plight to Africa’s colonial legacy. </p>
<p>Kenya’s aggressive foreign policy direction earned Kenya a <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/kenya-wins-un-security-council-seat-1443488">seat at the UN Security Council</a> as a non-permanent member. </p>
<p>But this aggressive foreign policy also portrayed Kenya as a nation that “wants everything”. This earned it some opposition regionally. For instance, states like Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti and Tanzania <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001227877/details-of-how-amina-mohamed-lost-african-union-commission-election">didn’t vote for Kenya</a> in its bid to chair the African Union Commission.</p>
<p>Kenyatta should have streamlined his priorities and made his foreign objectives sharper so as not to appear to be a “Jack of all trades” in foreign affairs. Many foreign interests were projected with little coordination; few were accomplished. </p>
<p>In some cases, the country’s goodwill was squandered in the pursuit of self-interest. </p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>The post-Kenyatta government needs to fast-track the realisation of East African Community objectives. It needs to support South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo’s active participation in regional integration. The new Ruto regime should also maintain a non-disruptive relationship with Rwanda and Tanzania. </p>
<p>In the Horn of Africa, Kenya needs to diplomatically endeavour to reduce Ethiopia’s growing influence in the leadership of the <a href="https://igad.int/">Intergovernmental Authority on Development</a>. </p>
<p>Under Kenyatta, Kenya’s foreign policy practice within the African Union was more “lone ranger”. The Ruto regime will need to forge closer ties with regional powers like Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa to make it easier for Kenya to push through its agenda at the African Union. </p>
<p>It will also need to renegotiate its foreign debts and re-examine <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/economy/kenya-s-debt-repayments-to-china-shoot-to-sh73-5-billion-3821246">Kenya-China agreements</a> to re-organise debt repayments.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/189804/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Wilfred Nasong'o Muliro received funding from the African Leadership Centre, London and the Social Science Research Council (SSRC). He is affiliated with the International Relations Society of Kenya (IRSK). He teaches International Relations and Diplomacy at the Technical University of Kenya</span></em></p>Kenya’s new president needs to forge closer ties with regional heavyweights to create a balance of power that favours his country.Wilfred Nasong'o Muliro, Lecturer International Relations and Security, Technical University of KenyaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1872302022-07-31T06:48:50Z2022-07-31T06:48:50ZChange of guard in Kenya: the 5 reasons neighbours watch every step<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474710/original/file-20220718-51582-8wqqu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Uhuru Kenyatta (centre) holds hands with opinion polls' favourites, Deputy President William Ruto (left) and former Prime Minister Raila Odinga.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/kenyas-president-uhuru-kenyatta-raise-their-clasped-hands-news-photo/1185035291?adppopup=true">Tony Karumba/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/change-of-guard-in-kenya-the-5-reasons-neighbours-watch-every-step-187230&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p><em>Kenya’s President Uhuru Kenyatta – whose final term in office ends after the 9 August polls – has been a key figure in east Africa. Over the last nine years, he has <a href="https://www.comesa.int/continental-trade-regime-dominates-comesa-business-summit/">tried to create markets</a> and address issues like <a href="https://www.president.go.ke/2022/07/05/president-kenyatta-rallies-igad-leaders-to-address-regional-peace-and-security-challenges/">peace</a>, <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20200210/president-kenyatta-assumes-chair-african-leaders-malaria-alliance-set">malaria</a> and <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/science-health/kenya-chair-of-au-climate-change-committee-3711336">climate change</a>. Within the East African Community, he signalled the end of an era on 21 July when he <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/burundi-s-ndayishimiye-elected-chair-of-east-african-community-3888810">handed over</a> the bloc’s leadership to his Burundian counterpart, Evariste Ndayishimiye. International relations scholar Nicodemus Minde explores five reasons neighbouring states follow the change of guard in Nairobi very keenly</em>.</p>
<hr>
<h2>1. Participatory politics and term limits</h2>
<p>Kenya’s democratic trajectory has always been viewed by east African neighbours as the <a href="https://gsdrc.org/document-library/democratization-sequencing-and-state-failure-in-africa-lessons-from-kenya/">bellwether</a> for being fairly participatory. The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/01/kenyan-supreme-court-annuls-uhuru-kenyatta-election-victory">annulment</a> of President Kenyatta’s electoral victory on 1 September 2017 also offered <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/magazines/people-power/why-annulment-of-election-in-kenya-leaves-uganda-looking-ugly-1716964">crucial lessons</a> to neighbours.</p>
<p>As court reversed Kenyatta’s win, John Magufuli (Tanzania’s president at the time) had <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/magufuli-criticised-as-tanzania-bans-rallies--1351138">banned</a> all political party activities, ushering in an era of brutal dictatorship. In Rwanda, President Paul Kagame had just been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/20/rwanda-vote-gives-president-paul-kagame-extended-powers">declared winner</a> with 98.8% of the votes. </p>
<p>In neighbouring Burundi, President Pierre Nkurunziza had controversially extended his stay in power through a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44110338">“third term”</a>. Over in Uganda, President Yoweri Museveni was just clocking 31 years in office and showing no signs of letting go. The other East African Community member state, South Sudan, was still embroiled in a civil war.</p>
<p>Only Tanzania has enjoyed periodic transitions, albeit through the one-party dominant system. </p>
<p>Kenya has experienced many democratic transitions since the reintroduction of multiparty politics in 1992. Despite its ethnic cleavages, Kenyan elections have been competitive. In 2002, there was a transition from the independence party, the Kenya African National Union, to the opposition National Alliance Rainbow Coalition. </p>
<p>Since the 1990s, Kenya has been the only country in east Africa to transfer power smoothly from a ruling party to the opposition. </p>
<h2>2. Political and economic network</h2>
<p>Kenya has always projected itself as a regional economic hub and an international political player. It has the <a href="https://eac.opendataforafrica.org/apps/atlas/Kenya/GDP">largest</a> economy in east Africa, almost double that of <a href="https://eac.opendataforafrica.org/apps/atlas/United-Republic-of-Tanzania/GDP">Tanzania</a> and nearly three times that of <a href="https://eac.opendataforafrica.org/apps/atlas/Uganda/GDP">Uganda</a>.</p>
<p>Tanzania, which previously had lukewarm relations with Kenya, has benefited immensely from <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/85686/kenya-tanzania-kenyatta-and-hassan-agree-to-reset-diplomatic-trade-ties/">rapprochement</a> between Presidents Samia Hassan and Kenyatta. Recent <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/business/tanzania-kenya-trade-approaches-1-billion-mark-3712876">reports</a> indicate that bilateral trade hit US$905.5 million in the first 11 months of 2021 as their trade relations improved.</p>
<p>Over the years, Kenya has been Uganda’s biggest trading partner. Uganda <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/kenyan-exports-to-bloc-rise-but-uganda-remain-tops-3556720">accounted</a> for 29.3% of Kenya’s exports to Africa in 2020. Kenya’s exports to the East African Community increased from Ksh140.4 billion ($1.28 billion) in 2019 to Ksh158.3 billion (US$1.44 billion) in 2020. </p>
<p>Kenya has also maintained close economic ties with Rwanda and South Sudan.</p>
<h2>3. Transit trade</h2>
<p>The landlocked countries in the region rely heavily on Kenya’s seaport and transport corridor. The maritime port of Mombasa serves parts of Tanzania, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda, South Sudan and Uganda. These countries often <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/eac-watching-kenyan-elections-with-more-than-passing-interest--1367444">follow very keenly</a> how elections unfold in Kenya. </p>
<p>Kenya’s bungled 2007/8 political transition came as a surprise to many regional traders whose <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/eabc-welcomes-kenya-post-election-chaos-compensation">transit goods</a> were destroyed along the transport corridor. The <a href="http://www.ttcanc.org/page.php?id=11">Northern Corridor</a> and the <a href="https://www.lapsset.go.ke/">Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia-Transport Corridor</a> that run through Kenya are designed as key commercial arteries for landlocked countries in the region.</p>
<h2>4. Regional integration</h2>
<p>In February this year, presidential candidate William Ruto made a diplomatic <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/news/ruto-cows-talk-triggers-row-with-drc-3719470">gaffe</a> when he said the DRC did not have a single cow. He was speaking about Kenya’s dairy and beef investments. </p>
<p>The storm that erupted showed how quickly regional relations could sour. The remark epitomised the <a href="https://podcasts.google.com/feed/aHR0cHM6Ly9hbmNob3IuZm0vcy80Mjk1NTVkYy9wb2RjYXN0L3Jzcw/episode/ZTQ0NmUyMmYtOGFjNS00ZWIxLWI2N2UtNmRhNmMxZGY3Njcw?sa=X&ved=0CAUQkfYCahcKEwiwlIXMxvr4AhUAAAAAHQAAAAAQCg&hl=en-KE">low priority</a> assigned to the east Africa policy agenda among Kenyan presidential candidates – Raila Odinga included.</p>
<p>The DRC became the seventh member of the East African Community in April this year. President Kenyatta has steered the regional agenda, including the admission of the DRC. In June he hosted the east African leaders to <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/kenya-immediate-deployment-of-eac-regional-force-to-drc-3849952">discuss</a> the tensions between Rwanda and the DRC. He has also taken political leadership in stabilising Somalia and South Sudan. </p>
<p>The neighbouring states may wish to have as Kenya’s next president a person who continues to seek solutions to the conflicts of the region.</p>
<h2>5. An ally as Kenya’s president</h2>
<p>Who do the east African leaders want to be Kenya’s next president? Today’s personal friendships can be used to advance or safeguard bilateral interests tomorrow. In July 2021, Museveni <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/africa/2021-07-06-dp-ruto-chief-guest-at-museveni-vaccine-facility-launch/">hosted</a> Ruto as the chief guest when laying the foundation of a new vaccine facility. Museveni’s action was interpreted as an <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202107110019.html">endorsement</a> for Ruto.</p>
<p>Museveni has had a tepid relationship with Odinga since 2007 when Odinga’s supporters uprooted the railway line during the post-election violence, disrupting exports to Uganda. In an apparent attempt to heal old wounds and appear even-handed, Museveni <a href="https://ubc.go.ug/2022/05/20/president-museveni-hosts-kenyan-presidential-aspirant-raila-odinga/">hosted</a> Odinga in May this year. The two later said they discussed ways of strengthening relations between Kenya and Uganda.</p>
<p>Odinga had flown to Uganda from South Sudan, where, as the African Union High Representative for Infrastructure Development, he had gone to commission a 3.6km bridge that will connect Juba to the rest of the east Africa region. He was <a href="https://twitter.com/RailaOdinga/status/1527206963783802881?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">received</a> there by President Salva Kiir. At the event, Odinga talked of his presidential bid, pledging to reopen the <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/kenya-south-sudan-form-team-on-elemi-triangle-conflict-1421416">troubled border</a> with South Sudan and prioritise construction of a Mombasa-Juba highway, if he won the 9 August elections. President Kenyatta had in May 2018 appointed Odinga as his special envoy to South Sudan in the effort to reconcile Kiir and his vice-president, Riek Machar.</p>
<p>In Tanzania, the late Magufuli was a key ally of Odinga’s, thanks to a friendship forged when both were <a href="https://ke.opera.news/ke/en/politics/2abc5ad1ea4df0478aebd7afb77a5023">works ministers</a> in their countries. Magufuli’s support for Odinga against Kenyatta in the 2013 and 2017 polls led to a <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202103190647.html">perfunctory</a> relationship with Kenyatta and <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/president-magufuli-s-absence-at-uhuru-kenyatta-fete-raises-eyebrows-1378612">tense</a> relations between the two countries. </p>
<p>His successor Hassan was quick to restore friendly terms. But Tanzania, just like Rwanda and Burundi, has not shown any signs of leaning towards one candidate. Many Tanzanians have however been <a href="https://www.kenyans.co.ke/news/76471-wajackoyah-fever-reaches-tanzania">excited</a> by rank outsider George Wajackoyah’s eccentric promises.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187230/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicodemus Minde previously received funding from the Social Science Research Council. </span></em></p>Kenya’s ethnic-based politics often leads to electoral violence that hurts regional trade.Nicodemus Minde, Adjunct Lecturer, United States International University - Africa, United States International UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1825202022-05-22T12:36:21Z2022-05-22T12:36:21ZWhat M23’s on-and-off insurgency tells us about DRC’s precarious search for peace<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/462773/original/file-20220512-16-na032.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A peacekeeper protects civilians who fled violent clashes between the army and the ex-rebels of the "M23" in eastern DRC in January 2022.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Glody Murhabazi/AFP via GettyImages</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since March 2022, fighting has escalated in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) between the army and the rebel group <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10220461.2014.942207?journalCode=rsaj20">March 23 Movement</a>, more widely known as M23. The group allegedly attacked army positions near the border with Uganda and Rwanda. In addition, a UN helicopter crashed in the combat zone leaving eight peacekeepers dead. </p>
<p>These events made headlines worldwide and <a href="https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2022-03-29/statement-attributable-the-spokesperson-for-the-secretary-general-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-scroll-down-for-french">led to a reaction</a> from the United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres.</p>
<p>The uptick in fighting between M23 and government troops in fact started in <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/renewed-fighting-flares-in-eastern-congo/a-59789397">late 2021</a>. Moreover, it is only one of several ongoing armed confrontations in eastern DRC. The <a href="https://www.congoresearchgroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Inside-the-ADF-Rebellion-14Nov18.pdf">Allied Democratic Force</a>, an insurgent Islamist group with Ugandan roots, continues to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/28/at-least-20-civilians-killed-in-attack-in-eastern-congo-report">massacre people</a> despite ongoing joint Uganda-DRC operations. Another is the proxy war in the <a href="https://www.gicnetwork.be/mayhem-in-the-mountains/">highlands of Uvira and Fizi</a>, not far from Burundi. And in Ituri at the northeastern tip of the DRC, different armed groups including the CODECO factions continue to <a href="https://www.gicnetwork.be/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/GIC_Violence-and-Instability-in-Ituri.pdf">wreak havoc</a>.</p>
<p>Yet, the clashes in March 2022 were the most serious in 10 years between the Congolese army and the M23. This raises important questions about timing and context, which we explore in this article. </p>
<p>Both of us have researched <a href="https://riftvalley.net/publication/contesting-authority">conflict dynamics</a> in eastern Congo for many years. This includes the role of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21647259.2014.910384">armed groups in society</a>, the interplay of <a href="https://www.congoresearchgroup.org/en/2022/01/03/report-rebels-doctors-and-merchants-of-violence-how-the-fight-against-ebola-became-part-of-the-conflict-in-eastern-drc/">armed mobilisation with a recent Ebola outbreak</a>, and the overall <a href="https://kivusecurity.nyc3.digitaloceanspaces.com/reports/39/2021%20KST%20report%20EN.pdf">fragmentation of belligerents</a>.</p>
<p>As part of this research, we have also analysed the development of the M23 since its early beginnings in 2012 until today. In our view, it is likely that the group’s upsurge in activities since late 2021 is a reaction to Kinshasa’s attempts to end insecurity in the east. The M23 may feel threatened while at the same time seeking to strengthen its position in the event of any negotiations. </p>
<h2>Security a priority</h2>
<p>President Félix Tshisekedi has made security in eastern Congo one of his main priorities. He has tried different strategies to accomplish this. These include <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/now-the-east-african-community-tackles-the-eastern-drcs-rebels">negotiations</a> with armed groups, a <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/joint/diplomacy-a-peace/dr-congo-strategy-for-former-combatants-led-by-government/">demobilisation and disarmament</a> programme and declaring a <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20210501-dr-congo-declares-a-state-of-siege-over-worsening-violence-in-east">state of siege</a> in the provinces of North Kivu and Ituri. </p>
<p>But, as <a href="https://www.gicnetwork.be/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/10_GIC_It-Takes-More-Than-Two-to-Tango_WEB-2.pdf">recent research highlights</a>, this combination of tactics have rarely worked well in the past. </p>
<p>It is therefore unlikely that the current flurry of initiatives will end the M23 and other rebellions for good, as long as the underlying historical issues fuelling violence remain unaddressed.</p>
<h2>The rise of M23</h2>
<p>Formed in April 2012, the M23 has always been perched at the <a href="https://riftvalley.net/publication/cndp-m23">intersection between local, national, and regional power dynamics</a>, where it partakes in different struggles for control over territory, people and resources. These struggles are linked to the security concerns of <a href="https://riftvalley.net/publication/stable-instability">different political and cross-border military networks</a>, which rassemble both state and non-state actors.</p>
<p>The M23 rapidly shot to international notoriety when it <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2012/11/23/m23-fighters-capture-goma-in-the-dr-congo">occupied the city of Goma</a>, capital North Kivu province, for 10 days in November 2012. This followed eight months of intense fighting in Rutshuru area of North Kivu province. </p>
<p>These events were a massive embarrassment to the international community which had invested billions of dollars in peace and statebuilding in the DRC, especially through its <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/monusco">UN peacekeeping mission</a>. But the mission was reduced to <a href="https://www.latimes.com/world/la-xpm-2012-dec-22-la-fg-un-congo-20121223-story.html">bystanders</a> as the M23 marched into Goma. </p>
<p>While the rebels withdrew after strong international pressure, they continued to control key strategic sites, such as the Bunagana border post to Uganda. These provided them with significant income from taxation.</p>
<p>Ultimately, the group’s ability to challenge the Congolese government and the UN became its undoing.</p>
<p>In 2013, a new component to the UN peacekeeping mission was charged with dismantling eastern DRC’s armed groups. It was called the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB). It was composed of regional armies and made the M23 its first and prime target. Internal tensions also triggered a split inside the M23, leaving the group weakened <a href="https://apnews.com/article/41f50e43c95e4bf89439f5a07f561028">exiled in Uganda and Rwanda</a>. </p>
<p>After its defeat, the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/congo-signs-peace-deal-with-m23-rebels-in-nairobi/a-17292474">M23 signed a peace deal with the government</a> in December 2013 in which it agreed to demobilise its fighters and transform itself into a political party. </p>
<p>However, led by commander Sultani Makenga, <a href="https://information.tv5monde.com/afrique/rdc-les-autorites-rwandaises-refutent-les-accusations-de-soutien-aux-attaques-rebelles-du">parts of the group returned to the DRC already in late 2016</a>. This was a predictable outcome as the peace deals failed to address the conflicts underlying issues. </p>
<h2>History of rebellion</h2>
<p>An important feature of the genealogy of armed groups to which the M23 belongs is that they have been led mainly by Tutsi commanders from North Kivu. Historically, these commanders have entertained close ties with the Rwandan military. In the early 1990s, as reported to one of us in multiple interviews, several joined the Rwandan Patriotic Front in its struggle to overthrow the extremist Hutu regime in Rwanda, which carried out the genocide in Rwanda.</p>
<p>A major driving force of rebellions such as the M23 has been the <a href="https://riftvalley.net/publication/cndp-m23">insecure position of the Tutsi community in North Kivu</a> due to a complex combination of interconnected causes. The first is the divide and rule policies of the colonial state (1885-1960) and the regime of Mobutu Sese Seko (1965-1997). In the 1990s, the Mobutu regime fuelled longstanding conflicts between Kinyarwanda-speaking populations, both Hutu and Tutsi, and other communities in eastern Congo by denying the latter citizenship rights of the latter, <a href="https://ccs.ukzn.ac.za/files/mamdani.kivu.pdf">which sparked violent conflicts in the east</a>.</p>
<p>Second is the political propaganda that falsely label all Kinyarwanda-speakers in eastern DRC as “immigrants” rather than “citizens” despite the fact that several Kinyarwanda-speaking communities have been in DRC <a href="https://www.editions-harmattan.fr/livre-banyarwanda_et_banyamulenge_violences_ethniques_et_gestion_de_l_identitaire_au_kiwu_jean_claude_willame-9782738447098-10986.html">since long before colonisation</a>. </p>
<p>It also has not helped that the Tutsi have been involved in several foreign-backed rebellions, in particular the RCD-Goma during 1998–2003.</p>
<p>Finally, members of the Tutsi economic élite have bought large tracts of land in a context where many peasants have become victims of land-grabbing by local élites. </p>
<p>All these factors have produced widespread resentment of the Tutsi, and Kinyarwanda-speaking communities in general. Conversely, the Tutsi from North Kivu, deplore the failure of the Congolese state to respect and protect them as citizens. This has led many Kinyarwanda-speakers to support successive rebellions as a means to seek protection against armed groups hostile to them.</p>
<h2>What the future may hold</h2>
<p>After the first clashes in March and April this year, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/m23-rebel-group-declares-unilateral-ceasefire-eastern-congo-2022-04-01/">the M23 declared multiple unilateral ceasefires</a>. It also announced it was willing to lay down its arms for good. Then in April it promised to withdraw from the areas it had occupied after the fighting in late March and asked for a <a href="https://twitter.com/HeritierBarak/status/1513080458149511169">dialogue with the Congolese government</a>. </p>
<p>These declarations happened at the onset of yet another round of talks between armed groups and the Congolese government in Nairobi under the aegis of <a href="https://www.president.go.ke/2022/04/28/president-kenyatta-urges-stakeholders-to-nurture-peace-in-dr-congo/">Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta</a>. The Congolese government framed these talks as the last chance for armed groups to surrender. Accompanied by this threat was an <a href="https://english.news.cn/20220422/732a9fadcaed4bdc907056e8da2fdfdc/c.html">announcement of yet another regional force</a> to be set up to fight armed groups. </p>
<p>But, fighting subsequently broke out again between the Congolese army and M23 units. Both sides accused each other of instigating the clashes. As result, the main faction of the M23, led by Sultani Makenga, was <a href="https://medafricatimes.com/26532-drc-in-nairobi-peace-consultations-continue-without-the-m23-branch-known-as-makenga.html">ejected</a> from the Nairobi talks.</p>
<p>On a broader regional level, the M23’s return coincides with <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/200378/drc-time-is-running-out-for-tshisekedi-says-researcher-christoph-vogel/">several significant developments</a>. These include negotiations leading to the DRC joining the East African Community and Uganda’s military intervention north of the M23’s area operation to combat the Allied Democratic Front. </p>
<p>Moreover, after half a decade of frictions marked by border closures, bilateral relations between Rwanda and Uganda seem to rapidly improving. This is in spite of geopolitical rivalry and competition over trade and infrastructure projects in eastern DRC. </p>
<p>On the ground in North Kivu, other Congolese armed groups have recently declared a new ad-hoc <a href="https://twitter.com/PierreBoisselet/status/1524078548109213696?s=20&t=N0bzCk-ZQ3jiz2s_7bVGMA">coalition</a>, allegedly brokered by Congolese army officials. This is aimed at fighting the M23.</p>
<p>Thus, the M23 rebellion finds itself in the tiny but highly strategic border triangle between eastern DRC, Rwanda and Uganda, and at the centre of fast-paced and interlaced local and regional security and diplomatic developments.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/182520/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kasper Hoffmann receives funding from the Danish International Development Agency and the Social and Economic Research Council of the United Kingdom. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christoph Vogel does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Recent clashes put eastern Congo’s M23 into the headlines again, but many other security problems persist in the area as diplomats struggle to tackle the underlying causes.Kasper Hoffmann, Adjunct assistant professor, University of CopenhagenChristoph Vogel, Research Director of the Insecure Livelihoods Project, Ghent UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1807042022-04-11T13:46:42Z2022-04-11T13:46:42ZTanzania’s Hassan has put out positive signals: deeper change is yet to come<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456382/original/file-20220405-22-hkn2vr.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Tanzania's President Samia Hassan holds up her COVID-19 vaccination card in July 2021.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Stringer/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>After the death of President John Magufuli on 17 March 2021, Vice-President Samia Suluhu Hassan became Tanzania’s sixth president, and the first woman in the office. </p>
<p>She may have been an “<a href="https://theconversation.com/tanzanias-hassan-has-made-changes-but-the-ruling-party-retains-a-tight-grip-179497">accidental president”</a> but she seems to have set Tanzania on a change of course compared to the approach taken by her predecessor. Her government has enhanced diplomatic relations, approached the COVID-19 pandemic differently and increased the number of women in high political office. </p>
<p>The extent to which this will bring <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-60765848">institutional</a> rather than merely rhetorical change is unclear. Detractors will point to her lack of commitment to broader <a href="https://theconversation.com/tanzanias-hassan-faces-her-first-political-test-constitutional-reform-165088">constitutional change</a> as evidence of the latter.</p>
<p>Given that Hassan has marked her first year in office, it is fair to consider some of her government’s achievements and what these indicate about her main priorities for the remainder of her term. Tanzania’s next election is in 2025.</p>
<p>Within six months of taking office, Hassan had <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/president-samia-drops-three-cabinet-ministers-appoints-new-ag-3548044">reshuffled her cabinet</a>. This was viewed as an attempt to increase her grip on power within the ruling party, Chama cha Mapinduzi. Soon after, she announced her intention to run for a second term. </p>
<p>She also publicly received a <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/tanzania-starts-vaccine-campaign-in-covid-19-u-turn/a-58689170">COVID-19 vaccination</a> in a marked divergence from the <a href="https://theconversation.com/tanzanias-new-president-faces-a-tough-to-do-list-157973">attitudes</a> of her predecessor. </p>
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<p>Hassan also made headlines by <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/news/tanzanias-first-female-president-samia-suluhu-addresses-un-general-assembly-calls-global">calling out</a> gross global vaccine inequities at the UN General Assembly. Her government has additionally steered the country out of an economic <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/tanzanias-covid-denialism-harms-its-economic-future">crisis</a> that was in large part caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. </p>
<h2>Economic gains</h2>
<p>As a result of taking a more measured and less bombastic approach than her predecessor, Hassan’s government has had notable successes in improving <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202104080804.html">diplomatic and economic ties</a>.</p>
<p>Her government has also set about improving continental and regional economic relations. It <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/africa/tanzania-ratifies-treaty-for-africa-free-trade-area-3544944">ratified</a> the African Continental Free Trade Area and has overseen <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/tanzania-tips-balance-of-trade-in-its-favour-under-samia-3537688">increased trade</a> with neighbouring Kenya. Hassan also signed Tanzania on to a <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/tanzania-emerges-stronger-as-it-marks-one-year-of-samia-3755824">trade deal</a> between the East African Community and the European Union in February 2022 that had been blocked by her predecessor. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/tanzania-is-getting-a-political-remake-as-president-hassan-eyes-the-2025-polls-177761">Tanzania is getting a political remake as President Hassan eyes the 2025 polls</a>
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<p>While this may see the re-emergence of <a href="https://www.southcentre.int/question/why-the-epa-is-not-beneficial-to-tanzania/">reservations</a> at such agreements, not least from former presidents, they mark a clear change of tone under Hassan. They signal a move away from the outspoken rhetoric of <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/12725/is-magufulis-economic-nationalism-working/">economic nationalism</a> under Magufuli, even if that softened through his first term in office.</p>
<p>It has even been suggested that Tanzania’s improved ties with investment partners means that the country is well positioned to enhance global gas exports in light of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This is a position that Hassan has <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/03/21/africa/africa-leaders-ukraine-response-cmd-intl/index.html">acknowledged</a>. Significant <a href="http://gasprocessingnews.com/news/tanzania-says-construction-of-lng-plant-to-start-in-2022.aspx">progress</a> has already been made in rolling out plans for a liquefied natural gas plant since the change of government. The facility is expected to be complete by 2028. </p>
<h2>Action on women</h2>
<p>Many were rightly critical of Hassan’s <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-58306708">clumsy comments</a> in 2021 when she described Tanzania’s women footballers as having “flat chests”. This chimed more with her predecessor’s well-documented <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-09-03-tanzanias-female-vice-president-is-camouflage-for-magufulis-wrongs-say-activists/">misogynistic attitudes</a>. </p>
<p>But her actions have spoken louder than her words. This is evidenced in her progressive move to lift a long-standing ban on <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/nov/26/tanzania-to-lift-ban-on-teenage-mothers-returning-to-school">teenage mothers</a> returning to school to complete their studies. </p>
<p>She has also overseen an increase in the number of women in the <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/tanzania-president-samia-makes-mini-cabinet-reshuffle-3767810">cabinet</a> – they are now nine out of 25 – and in more prominent positions. <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/tulia-ackson-elected-tanzania-speaker-3701650">Speaker Tulia Ackson</a> replaced Job Ndugai, one of a number of Magufuli loyalists to lose his position. <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/africa/stergomena-tax-appointed-tanzania-s-first-woman-defence-minister-3548904">Stergomena Tax</a> became the country’s first female defence minister. </p>
<p>These appointments have sparked <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/tanzania-first-female-defense-minister-ignites-gender-debate/a-59214644">important discussions</a> on the role of women in Tanzanian politics, especially on social media. It may also demonstrate a more progressive and even <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2021/04/tanzania-has-a-female-president-does-it-have-a-feminist-president/">feminist foreign policy</a> moving forward.</p>
<h2>Addressing the one-party spiral</h2>
<p>Under Magufuli, it had been argued that Tanzania was returning to a system closer to the days of the <a href="https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/etudes-de-lifri/tanzanias-2020-election-return-one-party-state">one-party state</a>. This seems to be changing under Hassan, at least rhetorically. She has highlighted the need for <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/tanzania-president-samia-suluhu-hassans-100-days-in-office/a-58015991">changes to political conduct</a> and clean politics.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/tanzania-must-face-up-to-calls-for-reform-if-it-wants-to-keep-the-peace-172967">Tanzania must face up to calls for reform if it wants to keep the peace</a>
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<p>She has <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/samia-meets-opposition-leader-tundu-lissu-3719746">met with</a> Tundu Lissu, an exiled political opponent who fled to Belgium after a near fatal shooting in 2017. Additionally, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-60616800">terrorism charges</a> against Freeman Mbowe, the chairman of the opposition party Chadema, were dropped. The ban on four Swahili language newspapers, instituted under the previous regime, was also <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/02/17/tanzania-ends-ban-four-newspapers">lifted</a>.</p>
<h2>Cautious optimism</h2>
<p>The signs so far appear encouraging. According to the 2021 <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Summary%20of%20results/summary_of_results-tanzania-afrobarometer_round_8-8dec21.pdf">Afrobarometer survey</a>, Tanzanian’s top four priorities for the government are: health (top priority for 23.2% of respondents), water supply (16.3%), infrastructure and roads (15.1%), and electricity (6.3%). </p>
<p>Hassan’s recently outlined <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/tanzanias-president-samia-suluhu-hassan-a-boon-for-women/a-61177159">priorities</a> seem to reflect this list.</p>
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<p>Citizens expect good schools where their children can go to learn. They are waiting for health centres to be built, water supply, and rural electrification. This constitutional exercise is very costly.</p>
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<p>However, the lack of commitment she has expressed on restarting <a href="https://theconversation.com/tanzanias-hassan-faces-her-first-political-test-constitutional-reform-165088">constitutional changes</a> – which stalled under former president Jakaya Kikwete in 2014 – has led some to question if structural change is on her agenda. </p>
<p>Leading opposition figures argue that without constitutional amendments, the unchecked power of the president and the ruling party, Chama cha Mapinduzi, will make mounting a credible electoral challenge in 2025 difficult.</p>
<p>Deeper structural and constitutional transformation in Tanzania may fail to materialise in Hassan’s <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/constitutional-reforms-to-wait-until-after-2025-says-task-force-3755532">first term in office</a>. Whether it will happen under her leadership will become clearer with time, but change is needed to reunite a <a href="https://theconversation.com/tanzanian-election-leaves-a-highly-polarised-society-with-an-uncertain-future-149191">still fractured</a> country. We could look to proximate examples from <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/one-year-tanzanian-president-hassan-whats-changed">Kenya and South Africa</a> where constitutional reforms helped foster a deeper sense of national unity.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/180704/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rob Ahearne does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>President Samia Hassan has set Tanzania on a change of course – time will tell if the pattern holds and addresses the country’s challenges.Rob Ahearne, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, University of East LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1793202022-03-23T12:13:45Z2022-03-23T12:13:45ZDRC is set to become 7th member of the east Africa trading bloc: what’s in it for everyone<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/452234/original/file-20220315-17-1w168gs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">DRC President Felix Tshisekedi waves an official copy of the nation's Constitution during his swearing in on January 24, 2019. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/democratic-republic-of-the-congos-newly-inaugurated-news-photo/1087921674">TONY KARUMBA/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Shortly after his <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46819303">controversial</a> electoral victory in early 2019, the President of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) Felix Tshisekedi sought to get his country admitted into the East African Community. <a href="https://www.eac.int/press-releases/151-international-relations/2373-democratic-republic-of-congo-inches-closer-to-joining-eac">Recently</a>, the East African Community ministers recommended the DRC’s admission, a decision set to be <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/news/east-africa/drc-finally-joins-eac-next-week-three-years-after-application-3755792">formalised</a> by the bloc’s presidents when they meet on 29 March. Regional integration expert Jonathan Ang'ani Omuchesi discusses key points of the decision.</em></p>
<h2>What’s the state of East African Community integration?</h2>
<p>East African Community is one of the most vibrant and best performing blocs in Africa. This is according to the <a href="https://www.integrate-africa.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/ARII2019_technical_report_EN.pdf">African Regional Integration Index</a> which ranks blocs on five aspects of integration - trade, productive, macroeconomic, infrastructural and movement of people.</p>
<p>Currently, it has six members: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. </p>
<p>East Africa’s integration is envisioned under <a href="https://www.eac.int/integration-pillars">four pillars</a>. These are the customs union, the common market, the monetary union, and the political federation. So far, the bloc has been implementing protocols on a customs union and a common market. These have <a href="https://mocu.ac.tz/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/OMUCHESI-JONATHAN-ANGANI_The-Interaction-Between-Intra-regional-Investment.pdf">helped improve</a> trade and investments in the region since 2006 and boosted country relations. </p>
<p>Under the customs union protocol taxes on goods produced within the region have been eliminated. East Africa is also applying a <a href="https://www.eac.int/documents/category/eac-common-external-tariff">common external tariff</a> on imports from outside the region. </p>
<p>In the long run, an operational customs union should open up the regional economy so that small economies are able to gain access to industries that would otherwise be out of their reach. </p>
<p>For its part, the purpose of a common market is to ease cross-border movement of goods, persons and workers. It’s implementation has <a href="https://media.africaportal.org/documents/Promise_and_Efficacy_of_E_African_Community1.pdf">seen</a> the east African governments harmonise immigration procedures and order border posts to operate for 24 hours. Some of the governments in the region, <a href="https://www.eac.int/working-in-east-africa">notably</a> Rwanda and Kenya, have also waived the work permit fee for citizens from the region. </p>
<p>The bloc is now preparing the ground for its third pillar, the <a href="https://www.eac.int/monetary-union">monetary union</a>. This began with the adoption and signing of the East African Monetary Union Protocol on 30 November 2013. The <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/dp/2015/afr1506.pdf">protocol</a> set a timeline of 10 years within which the partner states need to have a common currency. That’s in 2023, a deadline that’s unlikely to be met. There has been mixed progress in the implementation of agreed action on this front. </p>
<h2>How do countries get admitted?</h2>
<p>The criteria for admission into the bloc is provided under Article 3 of the East African Community <a href="https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/2487/download">treaty</a> signed in 1999. The regional law provides the following grounds for admission of a new member:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>acceptance of the Community as set out in the East African Community Treaty;</p></li>
<li><p>adherence to universally acceptable principles of good governance, democracy, the rule of law, observance of human rights and social justice;</p></li>
<li><p>potential contribution to the strengthening of integration within the East African region;</p></li>
<li><p>geographical proximity to and interdependence between it and the partner states;</p></li>
<li><p>establishment and maintenance of a market driven economy; and</p></li>
<li><p>social and economic policies being compatible with those of the Community.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>So far, the body has had <a href="https://www.eac.int/eac-history">three</a> admissions: Rwanda and Burundi in 2007 and South Sudan in 2016. The DRC shares borders with Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and South Sudan. There has been <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/lawyer-sues-to-block-congo-s-admission-to-eac-bloc-3445788">opposition</a> to its plan to join the East African Community due to its past human rights record. </p>
<h2>What does the East African Community gain?</h2>
<p>The DRC’s admission would give the bloc its <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/tshisekedi-launches-construction-congos-first-deep-water-port-2022-01-31/">first port</a> on the Atlantic coast. At the moment, the region relies on Indian Ocean-based seaports of Kenya and Tanzania for trade with the rest of the world. The challenge of <a href="https://www.ics-shipping.org/press-release/change-in-piracy-threats-in-indian-ocean-prompts-re-think-of-high-risk-area/">intermittent</a> piracy off the Somalia coast has exposed the need for an alternative trade route. </p>
<p>The DRC is also set to significantly expand the regional trading bloc’s size. The DRC’s geographical area is far much larger than all the six East African states put together. The DRC has a geographical area of 2.4 million sq km while the bloc is about 1.8 million sq km. The additional geographical area - known uniquely for its copper, coltan, cobalt, tin and other minerals - is set to boost East Africa’s profile as an investment destination. </p>
<p>On a world stage, the East African Community gains a bigger clout with the DRC’s huge population (consumer base) of <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=CD">about</a> 90 million people and an economy of <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=ZG">nearly US$50 billion </a>. It is <a href="https://www.eac.int/eac-quick-facts">estimated</a> that the bloc has a population of 177 million people and an economy of US$193.7 billion. </p>
<h2>What’s in it for the DRC?</h2>
<p>The DRC is already doing substantial trade with the East African Community bloc which could <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/eac-scorecard-drc-admission-win-trade-rows-slow-business-3669232">benefit</a> from lower or eliminated tariffs. Goods produced in the DRC will no longer be subjected to customs taxes at any of the region’s border points.</p>
<p>It already has established trade relations with <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/world-bank-drc-rwandas-most-promising-trade-partner#:%7E:text=By%202019%2C%20Rwanda%20had%20exported,the%20report%20noted%20in%20part.">Rwanda</a>, <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/drc-and-burundi-agreements-3472358">Burundi</a> and <a href="https://gltfp.comesa.int/uganda-and-democratic-republic-of-congo-develop-a-simplified-trade-regime-tool-kit/">Uganda</a>. For imports, parts of the DRC rely on the trade corridor that runs from Mombasa port via Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. These connections are set to firm up as national agencies of the East African governments ease tariffs and administrative barriers on the new bloc member.</p>
<h2>Does it matter that this is the third bloc the DRC is joining?</h2>
<p>Generally, membership in more than one customs union is technically impossible. Firstly, one country cannot apply different common external tariffs. Secondly, integration agenda differs from one bloc to the next meaning overlapping membership may lead a country to conflicting obligations. According to the World Trade Organisation, the practice <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/scope_rta_e.htm">hurts global trade liberalisation</a>, especially when affected traders have to meet multiple sets of rules.</p>
<p>But <a href="http://repository.eac.int/bitstream/handle/11671/24273/en-epa-overlapping-memberships-2005.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">analysis</a> of the treaties of the Southern African Development Community, the East African Community and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa shows they do not preclude members from maintaining prior trade arrangements or entering into new ones.</p>
<p>The DRC is already a member of the Southern African Development Community and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa. But it won’t be the only East African Community country with overlapping membership of regional blocs. Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi are members of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa while Tanzania is a member of Southern African Development Community. </p>
<p>The East African Community, for instance, has not been able to establish a full customs union since it had to allow Tanzania to grant preferences to its southern Africa partners. </p>
<p>The three blocs are currently <a href="https://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/continental-interregional-integration/tripartite-cooperation/">harmonising their agenda and laws</a> with the aim of integrating their economies and markets.
This fits into the broader objective of the <a href="https://au.int/">African Union</a>, of accelerating economic integration of the continent.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179320/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan Ang'ani Omuchesi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The admission of DRC will extend the East African Community bloc’s reach to the Atlantic Ocean.Jonathan Ang'ani Omuchesi, Lecturer In Governance and Regional Integration, Catholic University of Eastern AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1755302022-01-31T13:49:32Z2022-01-31T13:49:32ZKenya’s potato drama: farmers can only meet standards if there are some<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/443394/original/file-20220131-126279-bc4jsc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kenya imports potatoes from various countries for high-end consumers and market segments.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>It all started as the mere <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/corporate/companies/kfc-runs-out-of-potatoes-for-chips-3671470">lack of potato chips</a> at a global fast food chain that couldn’t keep up with demand during the festive season. It then became apparent that big fast-food players don’t serve Kenyan-grown potato chips because of perceived poor quality. The social media outrage decrying missed business opportunities while disputing poor quality forced the <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/counties/nyandarua/farmers-boon-in-looming-ban-on-imported-potatoes-3684302">government</a>, <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/counties/nyandarua/farmers-boon-in-looming-ban-on-imported-potatoes-3684302">fast food players and farmers</a> into action. We asked agricultural development researcher Timothy Njagi Njeru and economist X.N. Iraki to explain the context for the controversy.</em></p>
<hr>
<h2>Why were consumers outraged?</h2>
<p><strong>Timothy Njagi Njeru:</strong> The Kenyan public was outraged by KFC’s <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/corporate/companies/kfc-runs-out-of-potatoes-for-chips-3671470">admission</a> that it was facing potato supply shortages due to delays from overseas suppliers. KFC imports potatoes from Egypt and the delay was caused by the disruption in global supply chains due to the pandemic. KFC could not buy Kenyan potatoes because they do not meet the firm’s quality standards. So it could not serve its signature dish – potato chips and chicken. </p>
<p>But Kenyans saw this as a failure to support local farmers. Some saw the insistence on standards as an <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20220104-no-fries-with-that-kenya-s-kfc-in-hot-oil-over-non-kenyan-potatoes">excuse</a> not to purchase locally. They pointed out that Kenya is a <a href="https://fpeak.org/">major exporter</a> of fresh produce to the European market. </p>
<p><strong>X.N. Iraki:</strong> This row left my head spinning. It seems to me that few members of the public in Kenya knew that potatoes used to make chips by fast food chains are imported. We just ate and enjoyed the chips. Curiously it’s KFC that disclosed this. The story quickly morphed from shortage to quality, that KFC can’t get quality potatoes in the Kenyan market. </p>
<h2>What determines the quality of potatoes?</h2>
<p><strong>Timothy Njagi Njeru:</strong> A number of factors: seed quality, production system, environmental and climatic factors, handling and storage. Certified seed guarantees the characteristics of a specific variety, such as the seed being disease-free, and the potato’s texture, size and shape. </p>
<p>The other determinant is where and how the potato is grown. Soil type and quality, altitude, rainfall and temperature affect the growing environment. Inputs such as fertiliser, manure and agrochemicals affect the plant’s health and the output from the crop. Harvesting is also critical for potatoes. Bruised potatoes have a low shelf life and are not preferred by consumers. </p>
<p>After harvesting, potatoes are sorted for packaging. Storage is critical. Dark, cold storage prevents the potatoes from sprouting and changing colour, and help maintain freshness. </p>
<p>Finally, transport can also affect quality. The recommended bags reduce the chances of bruising.</p>
<h2>What are the standards for assessing potato quality?</h2>
<p><strong>Timothy Njagi Njeru:</strong> The <a href="https://www.ams.usda.gov/grades-standards/potatoes-grades-and-standards">US standards</a> are common for assessing potatoes at the international market. They classify potatoes as US No 1, US commercial and US No 2. These standards are guided by the potato’s size, colour, aroma and cleanliness. </p>
<p>Kenya and the East African Community do not have a standard for potatoes sold to consumers. However, a <a href="https://law.resource.org/pub/eac/ibr/eas.748.2010.html">standard for potato seed</a> does exist and Kenya has regulations for <a href="https://npck.org/irish-potato-regulations-2019/">potato packaging</a>. </p>
<p>The common practice in Kenya when grading potatoes is usually by variety, size of the potato and cleanliness, which is assessed physically as free from physical damage, disease or sunburn. However, this is very subjective and basically a negotiation between the buyers and producers. </p>
<p><strong>X.N. Iraki:</strong> The US department of agriculture standards also look at disease or damage by other causes.</p>
<h2>Whose role is it to ensure quality in Kenya?</h2>
<p><strong>Timothy Njagi Njeru:</strong> Potato is a scheduled crop under the <a href="http://kenyalaw.org:8181/exist/kenyalex/actview.xql?actid=No.%2016%20of%202013">Crops Act, 2013</a>. This means that the <a href="https://www.agricultureauthority.go.ke/index.php/en/">Agriculture and Food Authority</a> should provide regulations for the crop. Seed quality plays a critical role in the potato available to consumers. <a href="https://www.kephis.org/">Kenya Plant Health Inspectorate Services</a> regulates seed quality. County governments are charged with crop development and marketing. </p>
<p>Ideally, the Agriculture and Food Authority should be working with County governments to ensure that the production and marketing standards are in place and monitored. This has been a massive gap in the past, although the working relations between the Authority and County governments has improved in recent years. The potato value chain also has the National Potato Council of Kenya, a multi-stakeholder organisation to organise and coordinate potato value chain activities. </p>
<p>These institutions have made significant efforts in lobbying for more effective policies and bridging data gaps. But Kenyan consumers are blissfully unaware of the lack of formal standards. </p>
<h2>What must Kenya do to meet consumer-driven standards?</h2>
<p><strong>Timothy Njagi Njeru:</strong> In the past, this has always been a challenge due to the informality of agricultural markets. However, as the country is developing cold chain storage under the <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/news/blow-for-farmers-maize-locked-out-of-receipt-system-3692586">Warehouse Receipts System</a>, an opportunity to start introducing standards for more formal markets should be explored. The system is an internationally accepted means to assure quality of produce. </p>
<p>Kenya imports potatoes from various countries for high-end consumers and market segments. These standards should be made known to farmers so that those who can meet them can participate in these markets. It’s not acceptable to claim that farmers do not meet set quality standards when they are unknown. </p>
<p>Finally, the country needs to strengthen agricultural extension and marketing systems. Farmers must learn about opportunities and what they can do to take advantage of them. Nyandarua county government has already <a href="https://twitter.com/NyandaruaCG018/status/1484584659119976458">announced a partnership</a> with one fast food franchise to explore purchasing potatoes locally. The next step is to build the capacity of farmers and provide the required infrastructure to ensure that farmers can meet the set standards.</p>
<p><strong>X.N. Iraki:</strong> We must start with the farmers. They have to get quality seeds, use the right fertilisers and pesticides if they have to, store potatoes properly and transport them without damage. Regulators must do their work to enforce the standards. If this is done, farmers can access non-traditional markets that will pay a premium for higher quality produce and improve their incomes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/175530/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Kenya should develop market standards that guide the quality of potatoes sold in local markets.Timothy Njagi Njeru, Research Fellow, Tegemeo Institute, Egerton UniversityXN Iraki, Associate Professor, Faculty of Business and Management Sciences, University of NairobiLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1745572022-01-25T17:11:18Z2022-01-25T17:11:18ZKenya Airways is in financial trouble (again). Why national carriers have a hard time<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/440007/original/file-20220110-21-12u2lye.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nicolas Economou/ NurPhoto via </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/kenya-airways-boeing-787-8-dreamliner-aircraft-as-seen-on-news-photo/1177219448?adppopup=true">Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.kaa.go.ke/airports/our-airports/jomo-kenyatta-international/">Jomo Kenyatta International Airport</a> in Nairobi, Kenya, offers flights to over 56 destinations in 39 countries. This should be a remarkable feat in these waning days of the <a href="https://covid19.who.int/">COVID-19 global pandemic</a>. </p>
<p>Standing out among the brightly coloured aircraft on the field is the black, red, and green tail of the Kenyan flag. This aircraft livery belongs to the national flag carrier of Kenya, <a href="https://www.kenya-airways.com/ke/">Kenya Airways</a>. The airline, proclaimed <em>The Pride of Africa</em> under its name, was founded in 1977 following the <a href="https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/022/0016/004/article-A010-en.xml">breakup</a> of the East Africa Community and the dissolution of East African Airways, a joint venture between Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. </p>
<p>In 2019, Kenya Airways <a href="https://www.kenya-airways.com/uploadedFiles/PRESS_RELEASE%20-%20Kenya_Airways_Full_Year_2019_Results%20.pdf">carried</a> over 5.1 million passengers while its low-cost subsidiary, Jambojet, transported an additional 726,000. These were operational milestones to be celebrated by the airline and the country. But these cheery figures have not changed the airline’s fortunes. </p>
<p>Kenya Airway’s losses <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/africa/2021-03/23/c_139830277.htm">tripled</a> to $333 million in the 12 months to December 2020 as COVID-19 containment measures cut passenger levels to their lowest level since 1999. </p>
<p>Kenya’s national airline isn’t alone in its struggles. Over the last two decades that I have been <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057%2F9780230100060_6">studying</a> the sector, national carriers have gone to the wall in ever greater numbers. For instance, Delta Air Lines, one of the world’s largest carriers, <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/delta-calls-2021-year-of-recovery-after-first-loss-in-11-years-2021-1#:%7E:text=Delta%2C%20the%20first%20U.S.%20airline,quarter%2C%20or%20%241.19%20per%20share">posted</a> a 2020 annual loss of $12.4 billion.</p>
<p>While it is helpful to keep both Kenya Airways and Delta Air Lines in mind when it comes to the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on international airlines, it does not answer the larger question of why airlines seem to go from one crisis to another. To understand this issue, it is necessary to look at the nature of the airline industry, the factors that shape it, and the challenges it faces to achieve profitability.</p>
<h2>Tale of two Airlines</h2>
<p>In recent years, Kenya Airways has received a series of government bailouts, and is reported to be <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/economy/state-plans-sh146bn-kq-bailout-drops-takeover-3662198">seeking further government support</a> due losses linked to COVID-19. It even sought to raise funds by requesting permission to run the profitable Jomo Kenyatta International Airport. This <a href="http://www.parliament.go.ke/sites/default/files/2019-06/Report%20on%20the%20inquiry%20into%20the%20proposed%20KQ%20PIIP%20to%20KAA.pdf">request</a> was blocked by Parliament, citing possible loss of jobs and public revenue.</p>
<p>Previously, the Kenya government’s decision to bring a <a href="https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/5b149604-9a0b-4a0d-9ce8-2d19c814c270/PPPStories_Kenya_KenyaAirways.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CVID=lHIovml">strategic investor</a> on board, in 1995, paid off with short-lived profitability before the airline plunged back to losses.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, US airlines received <a href="https://www.baltimoresun.com/bal-bz.hancock30sep30-column.html">direct bailouts</a> for the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack of $15 billion and COVID-19 <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/14/business/coronavirus-airlines-bailout-treasury-department.html">package</a> of $25 billion. In between these bailouts, financial crisis led to the bankruptcy of all of the major US carriers that <a href="https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20150514006564/en/America%E2%80%99s-Largest-Airlines-Received-Benefits-Worth-US71.48-Billion-New-Study-Shows">benefited</a> from restructuring debt and pension fund bailouts. </p>
<p>In short, the history of airline bailouts across the world is long and costly.</p>
<p>The COVID-19 pandemic is simply the latest major setback for the industry. The International Air Transport Association, the international trade lobby group for airlines, has described the pandemic as the <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/economy-business_pandemic-threatens-global-airline-industry-financial-losses/6198746.html">worst shock</a> to air travel and the aviation industry since the second world war. In its <a href="https://www.iata.org/contentassets/c81222d96c9a4e0bb4ff6ced0126f0bb/iata-annual-review-2020.pdf">Annual Review 2020</a>, it reported that global revenue per passenger kilometre declined 66% and airline operating revenue went down 60% to a post-tax industry loss exceeding $118 billion. </p>
<p>Without government aid to airlines around the world of <a href="https://www.iata.org/en/iata-repository/publications/economic-reports/airline-industry-economic-performance---november-2020---report/">more than $173 billion</a>, many of these airlines would have failed. </p>
<h2>Vulnerabilities</h2>
<p>The truth is that airlines hold a special place in the heart of people because they often carry the name and the flag of the countries they represent. But this emotional attachment isn’t enough to ensure the financial sustainability of national airlines. Kenya Airways, South African Airways, and Ethiopian Airlines have survived against the odds, but the cost has been high.</p>
<p>When the Wright Brothers first flew in 1903, it was not clear that commercial air travel would one day become a common practice. In fact, most governments had to intervene directly or indirectly with financial support to foster the development of their national airlines. Many governments owned these carriers outright while others used various subsidies to support their operations. </p>
<p>But in 1978 major changes were triggered by the US <a href="https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/95/s2493">Airline Deregulation Act</a>. This law liberalised commercial airline industry, ending the US federal government role in setting fares, awarding routes and controlling new market entry. Internationally, the US began to push for changes as well. </p>
<p>As a result, governments around the world began to withdraw from ownership and support roles. The market was now expected to determine the fate of airlines and it has often not been kind to the global airline industry. </p>
<p>Major economic recessions in the early 1980s and 1990s were followed by the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the global financial crisis of 2008. In each case, the global airline industry posted <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057%2F9780230100060_6">record</a> losses. Airlines went bankrupt or merged with other carriers to survive. </p>
<p>Apart from big shock events, airlines are vulnerable for a number of additional reasons.</p>
<p>The first is that the industry is very sensitive to economic cycles. When economic activity slows down, the airline industry is one of the first to feel the impact.</p>
<p>Also, airlines need very expensive assets like airplanes, and highly trained personnel, including pilots, flight attendants and mechanics, to carry out safe and high quality operations. </p>
<p>Third, airlines require a substantial infrastructure to support their activity. These include airports, air traffic systems, and facilities for training and maintenance. </p>
<p>But those that have survived – and the new ones that have taken off – have done so because of rising demand across the world. According to the International Air Transport Association’s <a href="https://www.iata.org/contentassets/c81222d96c9a4e0bb4ff6ced0126f0bb/iata-annual-review-2018.pdf">Annual Review 2019</a>, the global airline industry carried almost four billion passengers and 64 million tonnes of cargo in 2018. The pandemic has <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/04/21-years-of-airline-passenger-traffic-growth-erased-in-2020-travel-report.html">returned</a> the airline industry to the levels of 1999.</p>
<h2>Hard to be an airline</h2>
<p>Airlines offer the fastest and safest form of long distance travel, provide direct and indirect employment, and contribute to tourism and economic development.</p>
<p>For these reasons, nations and regions have an interest in the health and welfare of airlines.</p>
<p>But how many airlines is too many or too few? </p>
<p>There is no simple answer to this question. High-income countries with large domestic traffic bases like the US can support a handful of carriers to transport the bulk of their commercial passengers. Countries without a large domestic base of traffic like the UAE must rely on attracting international and connecting traffic. </p>
<p>But lower income countries struggle to support a single carrier. Examples of airline bankruptcy during the Pandemic include Air Mauritus, Avianca (Colombia), LATAM (Chile), and Philippine Airlines.</p>
<p>In Africa, it may take a region to support an airline because the industry needs a large base of potential customers and sizeable investment in assets and infrastructure.</p>
<p>In 1999 African countries signed <a href="https://afcac.org/en/images/Documentation/yd_eng.pdf">Yamoussoukro Decision</a> that commits members to liberalising air services. The Single African Air Transport market and the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/36085-doc-qa_cfta_en_rev15march.pdf">African Continental Free Trade Area</a> expanded the vision. Liberalising air service agreements would allow airlines to draw on a larger base of potential passengers, trained workers, and government resources.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/corporate/companies/kenya-airways-saa-now-plan-to-launch-regional-airline-2023-3630180">Talks</a> between Kenya Airways and South African Airways are a tangible expression of the vision of creating a regional carrier structure strong enough to weather the unpredictable winds of the aviation industry. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/airline-tie-up-for-kenya-and-south-africa-possible-rewards-and-risks-174628">Airline tie-up for Kenya and South Africa: possible rewards, and risks</a>
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<p>Hopefully, in the future, African countries can put aside purely national aspirations and rise up to make the goal of a single sky with a few strong, safe airlines a reality</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/174557/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dawna L. Rhoades, does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The aviation industry requires very expensive assets but is sensitive to economic cyclesDawna L. Rhoades,, Professor of Management , Embry-Riddle Aeronautical UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1747202022-01-16T07:20:23Z2022-01-16T07:20:23ZAfrican countries are stuck on the free movement of people. How to break the logjam<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/440252/original/file-20220111-17-eh047t.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">African countries are still fixated on individual economic interests</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons/Flickr</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Most African countries signed onto the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36403-treaty-protocol_on_free_movement_of_persons_in_africa_e.pdf">Free Movement of Persons protocol</a> in Addis Ababa in January 2018. Its <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36403-treaty-protocol_on_free_movement_of_persons_in_africa_e.pdf">rationale</a> was set out clearly: the free movement of people – as well as capital goods and services – would promote integration and herald in a host of other benefits. These included improving science, technology, education, research and fostering tourism. </p>
<p>In addition, it would facilitate inter-African trade and investment, increase remittances within the continent, promote the mobility of labour, create employment and improve the standards of living.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep29589?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">Research supports</a> the developmental premises of the protocol. </p>
<p>The protocol was the codification of the commitment to free movement made by African countries in declaring the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/37636-treaty-0016_-_treaty_establishing_the_african_economic_community_e.pdf">establishment of the African Economic Community</a> in Abuja in 1991. Free movement is also one of the key goals for <a href="https://www.africa.undp.org/content/rba/en/home/blog/2015/10/23/he-Sustainable-Development-Goals-and-the-African-Union-s-Agenda-2063-A-comparative-analysis.html?utm_source=EN&utm_medium=GSR&utm_content=US_UNDP_PaidSearch_Brand_English&utm_campaign=CENTRAL&c_src=CENTRAL&c_src2=GSR&gclid=Cj0KCQiA8vSOBhCkARIsAGdp6RRNJIhm8dz7g2h6MMUakU9G7sGDwb0CZMQtEA4bnNNA1QEC9Tv6VRkaAihJEALw_wcB">Africa’s Agenda 2063</a>. </p>
<p>And yet, four years after its ratification, only a handful of relatively small African states have fully ratified the Free Persons protocol. Over 30 countries signed the protocol in January 2018. But only Rwanda, Niger, São Tomé and Principe, and Mali have fully ratified it.</p>
<p>In 2018 <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-free-movement-of-people-is-an-au-ambition-whats-standing-in-its-way-100409">I noted</a>, that driving the protocol forward would not be straightforward. Unfortunately, progress has been slower than most observers expected at the time. It has become a real concern for African policymakers. </p>
<p>After <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2021.2007788">recent research</a>, including fieldwork in Africa and Europe on the slow progress of the protocol, I identified some revealing patterns in policymaking and implementation. After reflection it is possible to make some suggestions about how to move the process forward.</p>
<h2>Slow progress</h2>
<p>It is striking that there have been significant advances towards free movement by many African countries on a unilateral basis. This has been as a result of a range of innovative visa-openness and travel document solutions being adopted. But most of the countries at the vanguard of this movement are relatively poor, or small island states. </p>
<p>For example, Benin and Seychelles offer visa-free access to all African visitors with appropriate travel documents. The two are listed as the most liberal African countries according to the <a href="https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/2019-visa-openness-index-report">2019 Visa Openness Index</a> of the African Development Bank.</p>
<p>Senegal and Rwanda have a combination of visa-free access and visa on arrival policies for all Africans. Comoros, Madagascar and Somalia offer visa on arrival policies for all Africans.</p>
<p>Richer and larger African countries are the laggards in opening their borders. </p>
<p>Some regional economic communities, such as the East African Community and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), have strong multilateral border opening agreements. But these are unevenly implemented.</p>
<p>In other regions, notably the Southern African Development Community (SADC), there’s been a heavier reliance on bilateral agreements within multilateral frameworks.</p>
<p>The reluctance of many African countries, especially the larger, richer countries, derives from several concerns. </p>
<p>The first is that they are sensitive to citizens who fear that foreigners might take their economic opportunities. This issue is especially present in highly unequal countries where populist politicians can stir up emotions. </p>
<h2>What needs to be done</h2>
<p>In my view, the threat of xenophobic mobilisation can be reduced if legitimate concerns are addressed.</p>
<p>For <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2019/12/05/african-countries-are-struggling-to-build-robust-identity-systems">example</a>, many countries in Africa have inadequate systems of civil registration. Many also have inadequate identity documentation systems. This makes it difficult for home countries of migrants to vouch for their citizens to the satisfaction of host countries.</p>
<p>When it comes to data on criminal and security issues, it’s important that information is well-managed and shared with partner countries when necessary. There should also be agreement on repatriation processes.</p>
<p>All these concerns are opportunities for cooperation. Systems can be developed in collaboration between countries, and officials trained in poorer countries. This should ideally be as part of regional or continental processes.</p>
<p>At present it seems easier to move forward on a regional basis than at a continental level. Smaller groupings seem to be able to move forward more easily. Where there is regional leadership and consistent internal or external support, progress can be made even in fragile states. </p>
<p>Slow progress in the adoption of the continental free movement protocol may be due to misunderstandings or concerns about the implementation process. Some key stakeholders believe that the protocol is not sufficiently understood and that publicising and championing it will lead to more ratifications.</p>
<p>My view, however, is that the implementation process set out in the implementation roadmap which accompanied the protocol isn’t clear. Clarification and practical commitment to address some of the underlying concerns is more likely to take the process forward.</p>
<p>In addition, free movement across the continent could be promoted by encouraging regional groupings – and even ad hoc groupings – to move forward, even if they are moving ahead of other countries. </p>
<p>When groups of countries agree to move forward together within the framework of the protocol, they should be expected to mutually open their borders when the preconditions are met. Reasonable preconditions could be specified in a revised roadmap or implementation guide.</p>
<p>Another strategy for driving the process forward, as suggested <a href="https://ecdpm.org/talking-points/connecting-people-markets-africa-2021/">recently</a> , is that the free movement process could be more explicitly and organisationally linked to the free trade process. </p>
<p>In addition, the initiative needs a proactive process to enable poorer countries on the continent to progressively meet the preconditions for higher levels of integration at appropriate standards. This would entail the establishment of technical committees of senior officials of the member states and experts from the region at both the regional and continental levels to address issues holding the free movement project back. </p>
<p>It would also require setting out a process to support poorer countries in achieving agreed preconditions for integration. </p>
<p>There are already several initiatives around foundational prerequisites – such as civil registration and identity documents – that could be harnessed. An example is the <a href="https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/325451527084344478-0190022018/original/ID4DProgramFlyerV52018.pdf">World Bank’s ‘Identification for Development</a>’. </p>
<p>Another is the EU’s work on migration management in Africa. This could be extended beyond its preoccupation with emigration to Europe. </p>
<p>But to be a part of a credible continental strategy, the initiatives should be led and owned by African countries and regional organisations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/174720/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alan Hirsch received a Bradlow Fellowship through the South African Institute of International Affairs which allowed him to undertake the research on which this article is based.</span></em></p>African countries are struggling to implement the African Union’s protocol on free movement four years after its ratification.Alan Hirsch, Professor and Director of The Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1551452021-04-20T12:30:44Z2021-04-20T12:30:44ZHow Rwanda can use fiscal policies to improve health outcomes<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/384477/original/file-20210216-17-19uobba.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Rwanda’s health sector has seen many reforms over the past <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(14)60574-2/fulltext?rss=yes">two decades</a>, which have greatly improved public health indicators. Communicable diseases have declined and the <a href="https://bmcpregnancychildbirth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12884-017-1581-4">maternal mortality</a> rate fell from 1,071 deaths per 100,000 live births in 2000 to 210 in 2015.</p>
<p>But noncommunicable diseases are a <a href="https://www.who.int/ncds/surveillance/steps/Rwanda_2012_STEPS_Report.pdf">growing problem</a>. Overweight, obesity and associated nutrition related diseases are becoming <a href="https://www.who.int/nmh/countries/rwa_en.pdf?ua=1">more prevalent</a> in Rwanda. </p>
<p>Globally, the rapid increase in consumption of <a href="https://www.who.int/elena/titles/bbc/ssbs_adult_weight/en/">sugar sweetened beverages</a> has been identified as a major contributor to the rise of obesity and noncommunicable disease such as type 2 diabetes. </p>
<p>In several countries taxation on sugar sweetened beverages has <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23288604.2019.1669122">emerged</a> as a cost-effective strategy to combat obesity and noncommunicable diseases. <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/29531419/">Research</a> has shown that people buy and consume sugary drinks less when their price is increased through taxation.</p>
<p>Rwanda has an excise tax of <a href="https://taxsummaries.pwc.com/rwanda/corporate/other-taxes#:%7E:text=Excise%20taxes&text=Soda%20and%20lemonade%3A%2039%25.">39%</a> on soft drinks. Its main purpose is to generate revenue. Because it applies to all soft drinks, irrespective of sugar content, the tax as it stands is unlikely to reduce consumption of sugary drinks. </p>
<p>We <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/16549716.2021.1883911">looked at</a> what might influence the ability of the government to use the soft drinks tax to achieve public health goals.</p>
<p>We found that competing priorities stand in the way of imposing a sugary drinks tax. The government has progressive, cross-sectoral policies to address the growing burden of noncommunicable diseases. But other <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/51017">policies</a> support the growth of local sugar production and the sugary drinks industry. And the country’s <a href="http://www.rwandafda.gov.rw/web/fileadmin/national_food_and_nutrition_policy_.pdf">food policies</a> generally focus more on food production to make sure people have livelihoods and enough quality food.</p>
<h2>Existing taxes</h2>
<p>The existing excise tax of 39% on soft drinks is well above the 20% tax rate <a href="https://www.who.int/dietphysicalactivity/publications/fiscal-policies-diet-prevention/en/">recommended</a> by the World Health Organisation. But it hasn’t had a significant impact on the price or consumption of sugar sweetened drinks compared to non-sugary beverages. This is likely because it applies equally to sugary and non-sugary carbonates. </p>
<p>Still, the tax is a good starting point for policies that put public health first.</p>
<p>The position and economic importance of the sugar sweetened beverage industry in Rwanda is likely to be a barrier to the adoption of such taxation. This has been the case in many <a href="https://globalizationandhealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12992-019-0495-5">low- and middle-income countries</a>. Concerns about the economic and job implications of a sugary drinks tax may hinder or delay the adoption of such a policy. Opponents of a sugary drinks tax in <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-south-african-food-companies-go-about-shaping-public-health-policy-in-their-favour-143368">South Africa</a> argued that it would result in significant job losses – despite evidence to the contrary. The country increased taxes on sugar-sweetened beverages in 2018. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-south-african-food-companies-go-about-shaping-public-health-policy-in-their-favour-143368">How South African food companies go about shaping public health policy in their favour</a>
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<p>The East African Community can influence markets and companies through trade mechanisms and coordinated regulations. Its secretariat has a <a href="https://ideas.repec.org/p/pot/fiwidp/60.html">technical working group</a> on excise tax coordination. So, interventions at a regional level could be another way of achieving the public health goals. </p>
<p>The policy landscape related to sugary drinks taxation in Rwanda is influenced by many factors and is evolving. The existing policy landscape, at domestic and regional levels, provides opportunities to strengthen sugary drinks taxation. But these are matched by a complex political landscape with competing priorities. Action must be taken to improve support for this intervention and the successful adoption of a policy. </p>
<h2>Recommendations</h2>
<p>We believe the government could use soft drinks tax more effectively as a <a href="https://www.who.int/dietphysicalactivity/publications/fiscal-policies-diet-prevention/en/">public health tool</a> without undermining employment and national development. Producers could redesign their production or invest in more healthy products.</p>
<p>It will need the cooperation of government ministries, regulatory authorities, civil society and consumer organisations, as well as academia and research institutions. The East African Community could also play a part by adopting regional regulations. </p>
<p>The role of private actors, such as the beverages industry, in the development of nutrition-related health policies should remain limited to avoid undue influence.</p>
<p>Rwanda should amend the excise tax to target sugar content so that people reduce their consumption of sugary drinks and turn to healthier options. </p>
<p>Different taxes linked to the sugar content of beverages should be adopted such as the ones adopted in countries like Mexico, the United Kingdom and South Africa. These <a href="https://gh.bmj.com/content/4/4/e001317">resulted</a> in increased prices of sugary drinks and encouraged producers to reformulate their products to reduce the sugar content.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/155145/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ruhara Mulindabigwi Charles does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Rwanda’s food policies focus on production to make sure people have livelihoods and enough nutritious food. Not much attention is given to overnutrition.Ruhara Mulindabigwi Charles, Coordinator of Postgraduate Programmes, School of Economics, University of RwandaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1567972021-03-11T16:27:26Z2021-03-11T16:27:26ZWhy maize is causing trade tensions between Kenya and its neighbours<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/389050/original/file-20210311-18-6mg6eo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Two men work their maize crop in Uganda's Kapchorwa district. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">WALTER ASTRADA/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>There was confusion in the East African grain market this week after <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-06/kenya-bans-corn-imports-effective-immediately-on-health-concerns">Kenya banned</a> maize imports from Tanzania and Uganda. The Agriculture and Food Authority said the reason for the ban was that levels of mycotoxins in the maize from the two countries were above safety limits. But in less than a week the Kenyan government <a href="https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/kenya-backtracks-on-corn-import-ban-seeks-ratification-of-rules-1.1575394">appeared to backtrack</a> and <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/markets/commodities/tough-kenya-lifts-tanzania-uganda-maize-imports-ban-3318540">announced</a> that it had asked its East African Community trading partners to pass sanitary and phytosanitary standards on farm produce before it reached Kenya. We asked Timothy Njagi Njeru, a development economist and research fellow with a special focus on agricultural development and innovation in sub-Saharan Africa, to shed light on events.</em></p>
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<h2>What’s the issue?</h2>
<p>Kenya initially imposed the ban because <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-06/kenya-bans-corn-imports-effective-immediately-on-health-concerns">it said</a> grain from Tanzania and Uganda had high levels of mycotoxins. </p>
<p>Mycotoxins are poisonous compounds produced by certain types of moulds that grow on foodstuffs such as cereals and nuts in warm and humid conditions, either before or after harvest. Aflatoxins are among the most poisonous mycotoxins and can grow in the soil as well as on the foodstuffs. <a href="https://www.who.int/foodsafety/FSDigest_Aflatoxins_EN.pdf">Research</a> has shown that mycotoxins can damage DNA and cause cancer in animals. </p>
<p>Under the East African Community’s common market – which all three countries belong to – <a href="https://aflasafe.com/wp-content/uploads/pdf/TPP-8-Aflatoxin-Standards-for-Food.pdf">safe rules have been</a> which set standards for aflatoxins in maize. These vary from one jurisdiction to another. The East Africa Community’s standard is 10 parts per billion, the US’s is 20 parts per billion while the EU standard is four parts per billion. </p>
<p>In the East African Community, each country enforces the safety standard. In Kenya, the ministries of agriculture and health are mandated to enforce food safety standards. These ministries collaborate with the customs authority to police food imports. The Agriculture and Food Authority, under the Ministry of Agriculture, carries out checks to ascertain the levels of aflatoxins in the food supply system.</p>
<p>But the systems put in place for testing are flawed. For example, Kenya does not have a standard method for sampling and testing for aflatoxins. This is critical because aflatoxin levels can differ between grain collected from the same sack. This was illustrated a <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/millers-query-kebs-standards-after-ban-on-5-maize-flour-brands-221880">few years back</a> when various government laboratories came under scrutiny over results showing different levels of aflatoxins for grain samples collected from an imported consignment. </p>
<p>Another challenge is that laboratories don’t all use the same protocols.</p>
<p>It gets murkier. Currently, important actors such as large grain milling companies conduct their own tests. </p>
<p>Standardising the sampling methodology would make the results more consistent. Credibility of the results enhances food safety and certainty for maize traders and consumers. </p>
<h2>What’s the significance of what’s happened?</h2>
<p>Events of the last few days has <a href="https://businessfocus.co.ug/kenyas-maize-ban-not-just-trade-issue-uganda-cancer-institute-boss/">raised awareness</a> about food safety standards in the region. Discerning maize consumers in Tanzania and Uganda are likely to take a greater interest in the aflatoxin standards and how they are applied to their domestic markets. </p>
<p>The developments are also significant for farmers in both countries, but more especially Tanzania. Farmers in Uganda mainly grow maize as a [cash crop](https://businessfocus.co.ug/ugandas-top-10-most-exported-crops-revealed/#:~:text=Ugandan%20farmers%20are%20currently%20counting,from%20US%2470.17m%20(Shs259.), and Kenya is a key market destination. In Tanzania, Kenya is a niche market offering better prices than <a href="https://ratin.net/assets/uploads/files/63683-quarterly-gha-cross-border-trade-bulletin-january-2021.pdf">domestic prices</a>. Any interruption in trade to Kenya would mean that farmers faced huge losses. </p>
<p>Third, this could potentially be a big win for food safety in Kenya. The government intervening to ensure food safety will increase awareness among producers and consumers. If sustained, Kenya will make progress on food safety in the food supply chains. </p>
<p>It is clear from Kenya’s statement <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/markets/commodities/tough-kenya-lifts-tanzania-uganda-maize-imports-ban-3318540">lifting</a> the temporary ban that authorities intend to take a tough stance in policing maize imports. Maize importers will now be required to register, and incoming consignments must be accompanied by a certificate of conformity with aflatoxin levels. </p>
<p>Along with this, traders must provide details of their warehousing.</p>
<h2>Is imported maize a problem for Kenya from a food safety standpoint?</h2>
<p>The high levels of aflatoxins in imports from the region are associated with the fact that produce isn’t properly dried. For instance, Ugandan produce is regularly harvested and immediately transported to <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022474X19301377">Kenya from the farm</a>. Maize should be dried to 13% moisture level before storage. Some of the maize is thought to have up to 18% moisture content, implying that once the maize is harvested, it is immediately sold and shipped to Kenya from these countries. </p>
<p>Kenya relies on maize from Uganda and Tanzania to meet its demand each year. According to the <a href="https://kilimo.go.ke/food-balance-sheet/">Ministry of Agriculture’s data</a>, Kenya imported about 277,350 tons of maize (3.1 million 90kg bags) in 2020. About 95% of this came from Uganda and Tanzania. This year, it was estimated that the country would need to import similar amounts to be food secure. </p>
<p>Kenya’s maize production was about 3.8 million tons (42 million bags). Some of this also <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-50407159">contains aflatoxins</a>. The main reason for local contamination remains poor storage and transportation, as well as contamination from the soil, especially in the lower altitude areas (lower eastern region) that have humid and damp conditions. </p>
<p>For this reason, aflatoxins in the maize supply systems cannot be solely blamed on imports from the two countries. </p>
<p>But there’s a focus on imports now because Kenya is doing much more than its neighbours to combat aflatoxins in the food supply chain. Kenya already has a plant to develop <a href="https://aflasafe.com/aflasafe/what-is-aflasafe/">aflasafe</a>. Aflasafe is a fungus, in the same family as the aflatoxin-causing fungi, that is applied to plants and the soil and stops harmful fungi from taking hold of the grain. In addition, consumer awareness of the dangers of <a href="https://www.devex.com/news/kenyans-love-maize-but-aflatoxins-are-making-it-dangerous-96279">aflatoxins is higher in Kenya</a>. Similarly, the checks for aflatoxins in the food supply system are more regular in Kenya.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/156797/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Timothy Njagi Njeru does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The government intervening to ensure food safety will increase awareness among producers and consumers.Timothy Njagi Njeru, Research Fellow, Tegemeo Institute, Egerton UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1203362019-07-19T12:10:28Z2019-07-19T12:10:28ZUnderstanding the political economy of maize in Kenya<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/284730/original/file-20190718-116543-14luaa8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Kenyan women removes maize from husks.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Stephen Morrison</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Maize is the cheapest source of calories among the cereal grains, making up about <a href="http://www.tegemeo.org/images/downloads/conferences/RCT_Conference/Diversity%20in%20Maize%20Production%20Environments%20and%20Practices.pdf">65% of total food calories</a> consumed by households in Kenya. To meet this demand, maize is produced on 40% of the total crop area – mainly by smallholders.</p>
<p>Kenya’s annual production target has been 40 million bags or approximately 3.6 million tons. However, over the past decade, the average production has been well <a href="http://www.tegemeo.org/images/downloads/breakfast_forums/COP%202018_Food%20Assessment_2018.pdf">below 40 million bags</a>, with the exception of 2012, 2013, 2015 and 2018. Last year saw the highest <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/201809120141.html">production of 46 million bags</a>. </p>
<p>At the same time, demand is growing driven by population growth and stands at above <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-05/16/c_138063905.htm">50 million bags in 2019</a>. It has been projected to reach 60 million bags by 2025.</p>
<p>The gap between demand and domestic production has placed maize at the centre of the food security debate. </p>
<p>This year’s projected production is unlikely to hit the 40 million target. Given this, there is an on-going debate on whether to <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/oped/opinion/How-to-avert-a-maize-shortage-crisis/440808-5145318-2x6udm/index.html">import maize from outside the East African Community region</a> to plug the gap. </p>
<p>Importing from within East African Community is the first logical step in view of a 50% common external tariff designed to protect local producers. However, countries can seek exemption and import duty free from elsewhere when a pressing need arises. Kenya also has a total ban on GMO products meaning that it can only import from GMO free countries.</p>
<p>The import debate has increasingly taken a political tone with politicians from maize producing regions in Kenya totally <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/news/MPs-want-Kiunjuri-sacked-maize-cartels/1056-5192132-uewadi/index.html">against any imports</a>. They argue that imports would likely depress producer prices in the middle of the main season for harvesting. Farmers usually sell immediately after harvest.</p>
<p>But government’s response is that there’s a need to import given the expected shortfall.</p>
<p>It is my position that a key sticking point is contested data, with different stakeholders providing different numbers that support their arguments. The Ministry of Agriculture is the institution mandated to generate data on food security. But it has capacity gaps and doesn’t do this well. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.tegemeo.org/">Tegemeo Institute</a>, where I work as a research fellow, is recognised as a credible source of data in agriculture. However, the Ministry of Agriculture can decide whether or not to use the data, which it does on and off. </p>
<p>The current debate is stirred by interests among the political class, elite business people. The use of evidence is not in their interest. </p>
<h2>The production landscape</h2>
<p>Policies on maize have always been contested in a market characterised by <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2018-10-29-millers-threaten-to-raise-unga-price-to-sh100/">lobbying from farmers, millers, and consumers</a>.</p>
<p>Ideally, farmers and millers will make a reasonable profit and consumers will get affordable prices. But the Kenyan case is far from ideal. Farmers have perennially <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001302504/farmers-to-wait-longer-for-better-maize-prices">agitated</a> for higher prices due to high production costs. In response, government has intervened by setting maize prices, usually above market rates, for the strategic food reserve. The <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/LegalNotices/2015/LN15_2015.pdf">strategic food reserve</a> was set up to stabilise food supply and food prices. </p>
<p>On the other hand, consumers want to <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2001299576/millers-to-govt-we-can-t-sell-unga-at-sh75">buy cheap maize flour</a>, squeezing the government between producer and consumer demands.</p>
<h2>Challenges galore</h2>
<p>Despite the importance of maize, productivity has stagnated and is now about <a href="http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QC">only 1.6 tons/ha</a>, leaving Kenya trailing behind other maize producers on the continent. Ethiopia, for example, is <a href="http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QC">twice as productive</a>, with a productivity of 3.7 tons/ha. Ethiopia managed to attain <a href="http://www.ifpri.org/publication/agricultural-growth-ethiopia-2004-2014-evidence-and-drivers">high productivity</a> through improving access to extension services, use of modern inputs and improving rural infrastructure. </p>
<p>The productivity of Kenyan maize farmers has stagnated because farm sizes have <a href="https://www.canr.msu.edu/fsg/publications/presentations-pdfs/Muyanga_Jayne_Tegemeo_12-05-2017.pdf">declined to uneconomical sizes</a>. This has mainly been caused by population increase and urbanisation, which have led to increased land subdivisions in rural areas. In addition, Kenya’s <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/business/seedsofgold/How-to-correct-acidic-soils-for-better-maize--production/2301238-4128484-848iluz/index.html">soil quality is declining</a> while smallholder farmers often plant unsuitable varieties, have low use of complementary inputs, and sub-optimal use of <a href="http://www.tegemeo.org/images/downloads/conferences/RCT_Conference/Tim_maize%20bundles.pdf">inorganic fertilizers</a>. </p>
<p>Added to all these are the effects of unpredictable and unfavourable <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/news/No-rain-this-season--weatherman-says/539546-5073986-3ykge3/index.html">weather patterns</a> compounded by limited access to water <a href="https://waterfund.go.ke/watersource/Downloads/001.%20Irrigation%20Potential%20and%20Achievements.pdf">for irrigation</a>, and increased pest and diseases prevalence such as the <a href="http://www.fao.org/emergencies/resources/documents/resources-detail/en/c/179179/">Maize Lethal Necrotic Disease</a> and <a href="http://www.kilimo.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Armyworm-Ad-Artwork.pdf">Fall Army Worm</a>.</p>
<p>Most farmers <a href="https://www.tegemeo.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&layout=edit&id=673">rely on public sector extension systems</a>. Without access to proper extension services, Kenyan farmers have no access to information on how to improve productivity. </p>
<p>There are also market failures, exemplified by the poor distribution between deficit and surplus regions. This means that the market is unable to signal or provide incentives for traders to address supply issues. This implies that the government must intervene to correct the market failure.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-kenyans-are-going-hungry-months-after-a-bumper-maize-crop-113929">Why Kenyans are going hungry months after a bumper maize crop</a>
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<p>Yet there is little to show for government attempts at resolving these issues over the years. Key interventions in the past included a fertiliser subsidy, food subsidy, and producer price support. A <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/counties/Kiunjuri-Mandago-to-lead-taskforce-on-maize/1107872-4815070-65odur/index.html">task force</a> appointed last year to find solutions to the challenges has yet to present its report.</p>
<h2>Is there a deficit?</h2>
<p>In the latest controversy, millers have accused <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/news/Release-maize-or-it-will-be-imported/539546-5111424-109tkb4/index.html">farmers of hoarding</a> maize to drive prices higher, a claim which <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001321298/farmers-caution-on-maize-imports">farmers reject</a>. <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/counties/rift-valley/2019-04-18-maize-price-shoots-to-sh3200-farmers-warn-against-cheap-imports/">Farmers</a> and <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/markets/marketnews/Millers-doubt-Kenya-has-21m-bags/3815534-5071226-wdr63bz/index.html">millers</a> disagree on what is the level of maize held in storage. </p>
<p>More alarming are the <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001333542/rift-in-government-over-maize-imports">different positions taken</a> over the available maize stocks by the Ministry of Agriculture and the Strategic Food Reserves board, two institutions key to maintaining food security in the country.</p>
<p>Recent projections by <a href="http://www.tegemeo.org/images/downloads/PressReleases/press%20release_17-04-19.pdf">Tegemeo Institute</a> show that the country has enough stocks to get to the start of the harvest period in 2019, even under the most pessimistic scenario. The harvest is now expected to be in August rather than July because of delayed rains. </p>
<p>The outlook suggests a deficit for the full season. Government recently estimated the deficit at 12.5 million bags while clarifying that it <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2019-07-11-government-yet-to-authorise-maize-imports-says-ps/">has not authorised any importation</a>. The ministry is doing the <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/oped/opinion/Delay-maize-imports-spells-doom/440808-5187948-1189engz/index.html">right thing in terms of preparedness</a> based on <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/oped/opinion/How-to-avert-a-maize-shortage-crisis/440808-5145318-2x6udm/index.html">recent history</a>. However, this pronouncement was met with scepticism especially by political leaders from the maize producing regions who have insisted the data is inaccurate.</p>
<p>The size of the deficit matters because it determines whether maize can be imported from outside the East African Community. Like Kenya, other East Africa Community countries also experienced bad weather. Their production is expected to be below normal production. However, early indications are that <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/markets/marketnews/Tanzania-Kenya-maize-import-window/3815534-5188016-20i3ckz/index.html">Tanzania has sufficient stocks</a> to fill the deficit that Kenya faces. Moreover, additional stocks could come from Uganda. </p>
<h2>When to import</h2>
<p>It is only after factoring in the inflows from the region that a decision can be made whether imports from outside the region are needed. And such a decision should be guided by three principles. First is verifiable data on the deficit, second is the timing of the importation which should not coincide with the harvesting season in Kenya and, third, is to ensure decisions to import should not be delayed until the stock in the country is depleted. </p>
<p>Finally, all these decisions and processes should be transparent. This would include making public the importers and volumes permitted for importation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/120336/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Timothy Njagi Njeru does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Understanding the political economy around maize production puts into context debates on key interventions in the value chain.Timothy Njagi Njeru, Research Fellow, Tegemeo Institute, Egerton UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1181352019-06-05T12:39:01Z2019-06-05T12:39:01ZMore work lies ahead to make Africa’s new free trade area succeed<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/277925/original/file-20190604-69059-1afywat.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The port of Mombasa in Kenya, which was the first country, with Ghana, to ratify the African Continental Free Trade Agreement in 2018.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>At a time when the global trade regime is under attack, the African Union (AU) is celebrating the establishment of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which came into effect <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20190429/afcfta-agreement-secures-minimum-threshold-22-ratification-sierra-leone-and">on 30 May</a>. </p>
<p>After being ratified by the required minimum 22 nations, all the member states of the AU are now legally bound to allow African goods to be traded without restraint throughout the continent. </p>
<p>This is an impressive achievement. AfCFTA not only covers the entire continent, but has proceeded at a record pace. It was <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/34055-ext_assembly_dec_1x_e26_march.pdf">signed on 21 March 2018</a>. Its entry into force underlines African leaders’ commitment to pan-African economic integration – a <a href="https://archive.org/details/africamustunite00nkru/">goal as old as African independence</a> in the 1960s. </p>
<p>Intra-regional trade has long been minimal in Africa, standing at <a href="https://www.tralac.org/news/article/13489-african-trade-statistics-yearbook-2017.html">13% for intra-imports and 17% for intra-exports</a> over the last seven years. Earlier continental trade initiatives, such as the <a href="http://repository.uneca.org/handle/10855/14129">1980 Lagos Plan of Action</a> and the <a href="http://www.dirco.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/africa/aec.htm">1991 African Economic Community</a>, have lagged far behind their ambitions. </p>
<p>However, the practical implications of the continental free trade area are <a href="https://issafrica.org/amp/iss-today/will-free-trade-be-africas-economic-game-changer">not immediate</a>. Significant work is required to deliver tangible results. Negotiations on tariffs, time lines and the seat of the AfCFTA Secretariat are still ongoing. And without effective public policies, liberalising trade risks having negative implications for many people on the continent.</p>
<h2>African trade to date</h2>
<p>Establishing regional economic communities across the continent has produced a complex pattern of overlapping but inconsequential <a href="https://ecdpm.org/publications/political-economy-africas-regional-spaghetti-bowl-synthesis-report/?utm_source=ECDPM+Newsletters+List&utm_campaign=bb4d47f899-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_05_27_01_19&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_f93a3dae14-bb4d47f899-388797801">trade regimes</a>. The only functioning <a href="https://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/integration-milestones/customs-union/">customs union</a> on the continent remains the 109 year-old <a href="https://www.sacu.int/show.php?id=394">Southern African Customs Union</a>, an imperial relic that is dominated by South Africa.</p>
<p>The last large-scale attempt to liberalise trade in Africa - the <a href="https://www.tralac.org/resources/by-region/comesa-eac-sadc-tripartite-fta.html">Tripartite agreement</a> covering most of eastern and southern Africa - was launched in 2015. Only four out of 27 countries ratified it, and the agreement was yet another hyped but ultimately stillborn initiative.</p>
<p>After a disappointing track record of African trade agreements, the AU is convinced that AfCFTA is finally the silver bullet. Indeed, there are some encouraging signs that the stars are aligning favourably.</p>
<p>At a time when the World Trade Organisation has proclaimed the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-46395379">worst crisis in global trade since 1947</a>, and in a context of China and the US waging <a href="https://www.ft.com/us-china-trade-dispute">trade disputes</a>, African governments are collectively swimming against the stream.</p>
<p>The AU leadership has been eager to push a <a href="https://au.int/agenda2063/overview">long-term integration agenda</a> and an <a href="http://ipss-addis.org/research/policy_periodicals/the_au_reform_agenda-_what_areas_of_reform_are_mos.php">institutional reform agenda</a>. But it has struggled with what Rwandan President Paul Kagame, in his role as AU chairperson in 2018, <a href="http://www.rci.uct.ac.za/sites/default/files/image_tool/images/78/News/FInal%20AU%20Reform%20Combined%20report_28012017.pdf">called</a> a “crisis of implementation”.</p>
<p>The reform process aims to focus the AU on fewer priorities and to make the <a href="https://au.int/en/commission">AU Commission</a> more efficient in steering integration. It also seeks to make the AU central budget financially independent from international partners. This plan has struck a chord with many member states and the AU Commission. Creating a continental free trade area fits well into the strategy.</p>
<h2>Why AfCFTA is different</h2>
<p>Adherence to AfCFTA has become a competition for the title of “who is the best pan-Africanist”. This peer pressure to jump on the train <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/Nigeria-now-close-to-signing-African-trade-pact/2560-5133532-a9cs0m/index.html">before it leaves the station</a> is behind the agreement’s rapid ratification.</p>
<p>The free trade area aspires to a membership of 55 highly diverse countries. This seems arbitrary from an economic point of view. However, it corresponds to and will likely benefit from an increasingly recognised and institutionalised “continentalist” interpretation of Africa. </p>
<p>AfCFTA is also vague enough to appeal to advocates of both trade liberalisation and economic protectionism. At this stage it is still possible for it to become either a stepping stone towards global integration, or a barrier against businesses from outside the continent.</p>
<h2>Obstacles to overcome</h2>
<p>In practice, trade in Africa did not change overnight on 30 May. Three key obstacles must still be overcome. If they’re not, the deal may follow the same path as the ill-fated agreements that have gone before it.</p>
<p>Firstly, AfCFTA has put the cart before the horse. Although it is now in force, many of the actual rules <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Keys_to_success_for_AfCFTA.pdf">still need to be agreed upon</a>. The process of negotiating rules of origin, tariff schedules, and service sector concessions will be long and cumbersome.</p>
<p>African states often lack the expertise or capacity to conduct such negotiations. International partners like the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/africa-europe-alliance-eu-supports-african-continental-free-trade-area-eu50-million_en">European Union</a> and <a href="https://www.giz.de/de/downloads/AfCFTA%20Factsheet%20%20EN%2002112019.pdf">Germany</a> have flocked to the AU Commission in large numbers to support AfCFTA.</p>
<p>Their support will likely be fragmented through the deployment of consultants and technical assistance. This does not bode well for the ownership of AfCFTA by AU member states and the AU Commission.</p>
<p>Secondly, AfCFTA is facing challenges regarding its governance. The details of its secretariat are yet to be thrashed out. What we do know is that the secretariat will be a <a href="https://www.tralac.org/documents/events/tralac/2800-tralac-annual-conference-presentation-the-afcfta-secretariat-beatrice-chaytor-auc-march-2019/file.html">semi-autonomous organ of the AU</a>, and that six countries are <a href="https://www.viportal.co/kenya-leads-quest-to-host-acfta-secretariat/">competing to host it</a>.</p>
<p>The likely geographical distance from AU headquarters in Ethiopia will complicate coordination with the continental body’s policy agenda. Budget cuts to the AU’s Department of Trade and Industry further hamper the transitory facilitation of AfCFTA.</p>
<p>Finally, the free trade area will invariably pose economic challenges in AU member states. The promise of free trade agreements is to create wealth through increased competition, the equalisation of wages and the substitution of domestic labour with imported goods. </p>
<p>International experience shows that the gains tend to be <a href="https://voxdev.org/topic/firms-trade/integrated-and-unequal-effects-trade-inequality-developing-countries">unequally distributed</a>, especially if a free trade area involves a large amount of diverse economies. Entire economic sectors and communities can be heavily affected by the <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/448862/REA_FreeTradeAgreements.pdf">downsides</a>: wage cuts, unemployment and environmental degradation.</p>
<p>Questions abound. How will governments manage AfCFTA’s winners and losers when existing social protections are weak, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-voice-of-africas-informal-economy-should-be-heard-52766">informal markets dominate</a> many sectors? Will governments still respect the agreement even if it hurts some of their businesses and state companies? And how will they deal with the loss of customs revenue? Nigeria’s <a href="https://dailypost.ng/2019/05/27/settle-problem-home-dont-bring-african-union-obasanjo-tells-nigeria/">internal disputes</a> and <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2019/05/30/muhammadu-buhari-has-big-ambitions-for-nigerian-manufacturing">protectionism</a> are a case in point</p>
<p>The road ahead to an effective free trade agreement that delivers results to Africans is still long.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/118135/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Africa’s new continental free trade area, the AfCFTA, is a remarkable achievement. However, decisive diplomatic, technical and social action is needed for it to succeed.Frank Mattheis, Senior research fellow, University of PretoriaUeli Staeger, PhD researcher, International Relations/Political Science, Graduate Institute – Institut de hautes études internationales et du développement (IHEID)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1142282019-04-04T14:22:49Z2019-04-04T14:22:49ZScorecards can help measure health outcomes. An East Africa case study<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266839/original/file-20190401-177184-mb55af.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Doctors at a hospital in Kisumu, Kenya.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Information is important for high level managers to make informed decisions. The advance of information and communication technology means that information is generated in abundance and at a fast pace. But this has led to managers facing information overload. This is particularly true in the health domain – a sector fragmented with information systems from a variety of data sources. </p>
<p>One way round the problem is to visually present the information from different sources on a single screen. This can enable data managers to monitor a comprehensive set of performance indicators at a glance and make informed decision.</p>
<p>A tool that enables this is the scorecard, or dashboard, which gives a full view of an organisation’s performance by using a “traffic light” visualisation to link short and long term goals. This concept was introduced by <a href="https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?num=8831">Robert Kaplan and David Norton</a> in 1996 and has since been used by managers in various sectors.</p>
<p>I conducted a <a href="https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=8102381">study</a> over four years to understand how scorecards could be used in the East Africa Community to strengthen regional collaboration and address common health agendas. During the study a regional scorecard was developed, made up of indicators measuring health performance of partner states based on set targets.</p>
<h2>The scorecard</h2>
<p>The developed scorecard was used in the six partner states that make up the East African Community. These are Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. </p>
<p>The research was part of the larger global <a href="http://www.hisp.org/">Health Information System Program</a>. The initiative has been ongoing for the last 20 years and involves software development and country implementation of District Health Information Software in several countries in Africa, Asia, South America and Europe. I am part of the global network and have been engaged in implementing and evaluating health information systems in several of these projects in Africa. </p>
<p>The East African Community scorecard was first used to monitor maternal and child health care. </p>
<p>A set of indicators measuring countries’ maternal and child health care performance were selected in the design of the regional scorecard. Data populating the selected indicators were periodically pulled from the national level health information system. </p>
<p>For example, one indicator included in the scorecard measured the percentage of women who visit health facilities at least four times during pregnancy. This indicator was based on World Health Organisation (WHO) <a href="https://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/news/antenatal-care/en/">recommendations</a> which have since been increased to eight visits. </p>
<p>The scorecard was designed and developed by regional and national health information systems experts as well as officials responsible for maternal and child health policies in the partner states’ ministries of health. The development process entails a series of face to face meetings complimented with off-site discussions. Members from health information initiatives were also part of the implementation process.</p>
<p>The regional scorecard measured the countries’ performance by displaying a red colour where performance was off track, a yellow colour for progress but requiring more effort, and the green colour indicating the target achieved. </p>
<p>The first regional scorecard was launched on 2015 in the East African Community. The event brought together ministers in the region responsible for health, selected parliamentarians, the academia and development partners. </p>
<p>Using a colour coded approach, the scorecard managed to capture the attention of leaders from the region by quickly identifying the indicators with poor performance as well as those that needed more drive to achieve agreed targets. </p>
<p>By arranging the countries together while showing their performance, the scorecard generated a competition element among leaders. For example, while progress was observed from Rwanda and Tanzania in reducing child mortality, progress towards maternal health goals was slow across the rest of the region. </p>
<p>This awareness prompted ministers of health and parliamentarians to commit resources to areas with lower performance. </p>
<p>In addition, the leaders of the East African Community endorsed the first regional scorecard, and asked for it to be produced <a href="https://healthdata.eac.int">annually</a>.</p>
<h2>Lessons learnt</h2>
<p>A few useful lessons were learnt from the research. It showed that the scorecard was:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>An effective communication tool. By using the traffic light display, managers could track performance of several indicators. Its visualisation enabled information to be understood at a glance.</p></li>
<li><p>Useful as the basis for performance benchmarking: understanding areas that affect the success or failure of the organisation is of a paramount importance in the management of complex system like health sector. </p></li>
<li><p>A good advocacy tool. It can be used in discussions among technical and non-technical stakeholders in viewing the progress and address challenges.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>Based on the experience in East Africa Community we believe the scorecard can be useful in creating awareness among high level managers and engaging them in a broader discussion on improving the maternal and child health care. Managers can rely on the scorecard to quickly inform them of the performance of their organisation as well as what progress is being made towards a defined set of targets.</p>
<p>We are working on a third version of the scorecard for the East Africa community to be integrated into other health programmes such as HIV and TB.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/114228/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Wilfred Senyoni does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>East African countries use a scorecard to monitor maternal and child health progress in the region.Wilfred Senyoni, PhD Candidate in Information Systems, University of OsloLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1142022019-03-25T13:58:59Z2019-03-25T13:58:59ZEast Africa should intervene to defuse Rwanda-Uganda war of words<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/265541/original/file-20190325-36270-kd865o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Presidents Paul Kagame (right) and Yoweri Museveni observe a minute of silence during a genocide memorial.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Ricky Gare</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The verbal exchanges between presidents Paul Kagame of Rwanda and Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, between their ministers and between their media have been escalating. In the aftermath, borders remain closed and trade and movement of people has been disrupted. </p>
<p>Historically the presidents of Rwanda and Uganda – and their countries – have been close allies. Kagame was among the “originals” of the National Resistance Movement that <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1986/01/30/world/rebel-sworn-in-as-uganda-president.html">started a rebellion</a> in 1981 . He and many other Rwandan fighters contributed significantly to Museveni’s <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1166507?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">seizure of power</a> in 1986. In return, Uganda gave crucial support to the Rwandan Patriotic Front <a href="https://observer.ug/features-sp-2084439083/96-special-series/35981--museveni-how-i-supported-rpf-in-rwandas-1994-liberation-war">during the civil war in Rwanda</a>. Without it, Kagame would probably not have taken power in 1994. </p>
<p>Again, during the first Congo war in 1997 the two were close allies in support of the rebellion that toppled Mobutu Sese Seko and brought Laurent Kabila <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3557264?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">to power in 1997</a>. </p>
<p>At the end of the 1990s things changed, and the unthinkable happened. The two friends clashed on several occasions <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/great-african-war/044430BB49F3381D4C9B2C1C330A40C0">during the second Congo war</a>. They fell out against the background of political differences on how to handle the war. But just as important was the competition between the countries over the <a href="https://www.economist.com/international/1999/08/19/old-friends-new-war">exploitation of Congolese natural resources</a>. </p>
<p>Hundreds of their soldiers were killed in 1999 and 2000. The entente cordiale never fully recovered.</p>
<p>A semblance of peace was restored in the early 2000s, but only after Clare Short, the then UK Secretary of State for International Cooperation, summoned the two to London in 2001 to avoid all-out war between Rwanda and Uganda. </p>
<p>A new round of hostilities erupted in 2017. These escalated considerably in early 2019. The Ugandan leadership <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/ea/Plot-to-topple-Museveni-claims-army-boss/4552908-4978284-yrcy61z/index.html">alleges that there are external efforts to topple the regime</a>. In response, the Rwandan Foreign Minister has <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/100-rwandans-held-uganda">claimed</a> that hundreds of Rwandans were illegally deported from Uganda and that many have been arrested and tortured. In early March, Ugandan nationals and vehicles were <a href="https://observer.ug/news/headlines/60008-ugandan-nationals-vehicles-denied-entry-into-rwanda">denied entry</a> at Gatuna border post.</p>
<p>Although a military confrontation remains implausible, today’s situation is reminiscent of the worst days between the two neighbours. Leaders of the region need to do more to avert a violent scenario. </p>
<h2>Why relations went sour</h2>
<p>In February 2017 a Rwandan news agency, Rushyashya, which was considered to be close to the intelligence services, claimed that a <a href="https://theugandan.com.ug/rwanda-accuses-museveni-french-of-training-kayumba-nyamwasas-rebels-in-kibaale/">Uganda-backed rebel force was being set up</a> at a training camp to the west of Kampala. It was said to be put in place by the exiled opposition movement Rwanda National Congress with the support of a Rwandan businessman who fell out with Kagame and set up a large tobacco development investment in northern Uganda.</p>
<p>Things came to a head at the end of October, when nine people were arrested and charged in Uganda with conspiracy in the kidnap and illegal deportation to Rwanda of an exiled former military officer six years ago. Lieutenant Joël Mutabazi was sentenced to life imprisonment in Rwanda <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/ea/Ugandan-officers-charged-with-abducting-Rwanda-refugees/4552908-4927982-jxmljvz/index.html">on several counts related to subversion</a>.</p>
<p>Then in mid-December, the Ugandan intelligence <a href="http://www.inyenyerinews.org/justice-and-reconciliation/national-exclusive-cmi-detains-top-rwanda-patriotic-front-official/">detained</a> a high ranking Rwanda Patriotic Front official for “alleged espionage and activities which threaten national security”.</p>
<p>There <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2017/12/04/frenemies-for-life-has-the-love-gone-between-uganda-and-rwanda/">have also been other bones of contention</a>. These include air traffic rights, priorities on the construction of the new standard gauge railway, energy projects and French support for the training of Ugandan military units.</p>
<p>A number of incidents showed that relations continued to deteriorate throughout 2018. In early January, a former operative of Uganda’s intelligence agency <a href="https://www.thegrapevine.co.ug/i-was-paid-usd100000-to-kill-museveni/">wrote</a> to Museveni to claim that he had been offered US$100,000 by Rwandan agents to assassinate him. And Ugandan nationals <a href="https://chimpreports.com/more-ugandans-fired-from-rwandan-jobs/">claimed</a> they were being arbitrarily sacked in Rwandan media, schools and banks. </p>
<p>For its part, Kigali again <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Rwanda-Uganda-tensions/2558-4341084-mldncsz/index.html">accused</a> Kampala of illegally detaining and torturing its citizens and of harbouring dissidents intent on destabilising Rwanda. Suspected Rwandan agents <a href="https://www.glpost.com/suspected-rwandan-agents-flee-kampala-as-military-intensifies-crackdown-at-ugandan-borders/">fled</a> Kampala because of a crackdown by Ugandan security forces.</p>
<h2>Distrust</h2>
<p>Museveni and Kagame know each other very well. Nevertheless, the distrust between them is considerable. They both seem to genuinely believe that the other is bent on destabilising their respective regimes. </p>
<p>Earlier this month Kagame <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/opinions/rwanda-everything-kneeling">lashed out</a>, claiming Uganda “had been undermining Rwanda since 1998”. He added that, faced with attempts to destabilise the country, “no one can bring me to my knees”. Museveni responded on the same day with a <a href="https://www.vanguardnews.ug/once-we-mobilize-you-cant-survive-museveni-responds-to-kagame/">pointed warning</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Those who want to destabilise our country do not know our capacity. Once we mobilise, you can’t survive. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The Rwandan government has <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/rwanda-warns-citizens-against-travel-uganda">advised its citizens</a>) not to travel to Uganda for safety reasons, and a week later effectively <a href="https://www.256businessnews.com/uganda-accuses-rwanda-of-imposing-trade-embargo/">closed the border</a>. This left hundreds of trucks stranded. Even ordinary Rwandans who used to go to Uganda for purchases, schools or medical care were prevented from crossing into Uganda. And to prevent them from using unofficial crossings, the Rwandan army destroyed makeshift bridges and arrested those attempting to pass. </p>
<p><a href="https://observer.ug/news/headlines/60027-ugandan-drivers-locked-in-trucks-at-gatuna-chanika-borders">Unconfirmed reports mentioned</a> the deployment of Rwandan troops along the border. In mid-March, Ugandans started to <a href="https://command1post.com/index.php/2019/03/13/ugandans-shut-down-hotels-shops-in-kigali/">shut down their businesses</a> in Kigali because of a lack of supplies.</p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>Where does this lead? </p>
<p>Both governments continue to trade accusations and take hostile unilateral actions. They aren’t even talking to one another directly to find solutions. In addition to impeding trade and the movement of people, the impasse is an obvious setback to cooperation and integration within the East African Community. Yet their neighbours Kenya and Tanzania remain silent. </p>
<p>Kenya’s president Uhuru Kenyatta met both Kagame and Museveni on the same day. But <a href="https://observer.ug/news/headlines/60093-uhuru-kenyatta-meets-kagame-museveni">nothing concrete</a> seems to have come from the bilateral talks. There’s been no follow-up. And no roadmap has emerged. Yet Kenyatta and Tanzanian President John Magufuli, as leaders of countries that control access to landlocked Uganda and Rwanda, have a powerful lever in their hands. </p>
<p>And if leaders of the East African Community prove unable to tackle this potentially destructive issue, then perhaps the African Union – which was chaired by Kagame until January – should take the lead.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/114202/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Filip Reyntjens does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A military confrontation between Uganda and Rwanda remains implausible. But the stand-off between the two countries is reminiscent of the worst days between them.Filip Reyntjens, Emeritus Professor of Law and Politics Institute of Development Policy (IOB), University of AntwerpLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.