tag:theconversation.com,2011:/es/topics/hakainde-hichilema-30460/articles
Hakainde Hichilema – The Conversation
2023-04-05T15:44:56Z
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/202964
2023-04-05T15:44:56Z
2023-04-05T15:44:56Z
Kamala Harris’s visit underscores the tricky choices Zambia is making about international allies
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/519556/original/file-20230405-19-3ws3in.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zambia president Hakainde Hichilema and US vice-president Kamala Harris in Lusaka. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Salim Dawood/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>US vice-president Kamala Harris’s <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/03/31/remarks-by-vice-president-harris-and-president-hichilema-of-zambia-in-joint-press-conference/">recent visit</a> to Zambia is an example the country’s increased engagement with western nations. It gave fresh impetus to the view that Zambian president Hakainde Hichilema is strongly aligning the country to the west. </p>
<p>This has been evident from his <a href="https://fizambia.com/speech-delivered-by-president-hakainde-hichilema-at-the-mining-indaba-2022/">pro-business rhetoric</a>, <a href="https://theafricadebate.com/he-hakainde-hichilema">western education</a> and <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2022/08/31/pr22297-imf-executive-board-approves-new-extended-credit-facility-arrangement-for-zambia#:%7E:text=to%20Copy%20Link-,IMF%20Executive%20Board%20Approves%20New,Facility%20(ECF)%20Arrangement%20for%20Zambia&text=The%20IMF%20Board%20approves%20SDR,resilient%2C%20and%20more%20inclusive%20growth">re-engagement with multilateral financial institutions</a> and partners <a href="https://www.openzambia.com/politics/2022/4/7/president-hichilema-hails-good-bilateral-relations-with-the-uk">in the UK</a>, the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/03/31/remarks-by-vice-president-harris-and-president-hichilema-of-zambia-in-joint-press-conference/">US</a> and the <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/pt/press-room/20220616IPR33213/president-of-zambia-to-european-parliament-zambia-is-back-in-business">European Union</a>.</p>
<p>But this re-engagement has stopped short of a full pendulum swing. For example, the country <a href="https://africa.cgtn.com/2022/10/14/leading-lights-zambias-hichilema-keen-to-promote-deeper-ties-with-china/">retains strong ties to China</a>.</p>
<p>Hichilema came to power in August 2021 on a promise of domestic economic revival, good governance and a business friendly approach. He set out a new direction for the country’s foreign policy in his <a href="https://zambiahighcommission.ca/wp/inauguration-speech-by-the-president-of-the-republic-of-zambia-his-excellency-mr-hakainde-hichilema-delivered-on-tuesday-24th-august-2021-at-the-national-heroes-stadium-lusaka/">inauguration speech</a>. This emphasised economic diplomacy and partnerships across the emerging geopolitical divide between western countries, and China and Russia.</p>
<p>Hichilema’s support for democratic institutions and good governance has unlocked some investment. But this will take time to translate into tangible benefits for citizens. At the same time, China is recalculating the nature of its economic engagement with Zambia. This could mean a potential shortfall of investment in the short term when it is needed most.</p>
<p>The US is keen to address this gap and support ongoing reforms. Harris <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/03/31/remarks-by-vice-president-harris-and-president-hichilema-of-zambia-in-joint-press-conference/">announced</a> a US$16 million grant for new Zambian programmes. These include anti-corruption and other reform efforts. She also announced a memorandum of understanding on commercial projects and trade.</p>
<p>Her visit has been widely interpreted as part of America’s efforts to counter what it perceives as <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/U.S.-Strategy-Toward-Sub-Saharan-Africa-FINAL.pdf#page=5">Chinese influence on the continent</a>. Most African leaders don’t share such a polarised view. They are keen to assert their own agency and choose international partners on a <a href="https://theconversation.com/when-two-elephants-fight-how-the-global-south-uses-non-alignment-to-avoid-great-power-rivalries-199418">more pragmatic basis</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/03/zambias-developing-international-relations">My new paper</a> argues that Zambia’s interests are best served by remaining neutral on global geopolitics. It must maintain relations with partners in the east and the west, as well as nurture economic ties with its neighbours.</p>
<h2>US courting Zambia</h2>
<p>Zambia is important to the US for several reasons relating to global issues. These include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the effectiveness of the <a href="https://clubdeparis.org/sites/default/files/annex_common_framework_for_debt_treatments_beyond_the_dssi.pdf">G20 Common Framework for Debt Treatments</a> </p></li>
<li><p>as a democratic state and potential African ally for western powers on the continent </p></li>
<li><p>as a valuable producer of natural resources required for the global green transition, especially copper, cobalt, nickel and manganese. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The importance of Zambia has been underlined by successive high-level visits. These include US treasury secretary Janet Yellen meeting Hichilema on debt restructuring in Lusaka <a href="https://zm.usembassy.gov/u-s-treasury-secretary-janet-yellen-visits-zambia-strengthens-u-s-zambia-ties/">in January</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/when-two-elephants-fight-how-the-global-south-uses-non-alignment-to-avoid-great-power-rivalries-199418">When two elephants fight: how the global south uses non-alignment to avoid great power rivalries</a>
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<p>The developing relationship extends beyond finance. In 2022, US Africa Command <a href="https://www.africom.mil/article/34379/us-africa-command-visit-launches-new-us-zambia-security-cooperation">announced</a> a security cooperation agreement with Zambia, for which it established an office at the US embassy in Lusaka. Since 2014, the US government has invested over US$8 million in assistance for <a href="https://www.africom.mil/article/34379/us-africa-command-visit-launches-new-us-zambia-security-cooperation">training Zambian battalions</a> before deployment to the United Nations peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic.</p>
<p>Zambia has also caught the attention of western partners by repeatedly voting against the war in Ukraine <a href="https://developmentreimagined.com/2022/04/08/africanvotesonukraine/">in the UN</a>. In doing so, it broke ranks with larger players in southern Africa.</p>
<p>However, Zambian officials have pointed out to me that the vote is against the war, and not against Russia itself. The former Soviet Union, of which Russia was part, was the first to recognise Zambia as an independent state <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/zambia-gains-independence-britain">in 1964</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man wearing a suit and tie speaks into a small microphone at a podium." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/519310/original/file-20230404-1269-9ynrlj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/519310/original/file-20230404-1269-9ynrlj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/519310/original/file-20230404-1269-9ynrlj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/519310/original/file-20230404-1269-9ynrlj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/519310/original/file-20230404-1269-9ynrlj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/519310/original/file-20230404-1269-9ynrlj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/519310/original/file-20230404-1269-9ynrlj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Hakainde Hichilema condemned Russia’s war in Ukraine in June 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">© European Union 2022</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>Hichilema has been keen to maintain relations with all partners. This has been most acute in his management of the relationship with Zambia’s “<a href="https://news.cgtn.com/news/2022-05-31/President-Xi-hails-all-weather-friendship-between-China-Zambia-1aueerNVIkg/index.html">all-weather friend</a>”, China.</p>
<h2>Positive neutrality</h2>
<p>Hichilema has taken an assertive approach to international relations. He has retained Zambia’s tradition of “<a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/03/zambias-developing-international-relations/introduction">positive neutrality</a>”. While he has resuscitated relations with western partners, especially the US and the UK, his government has also maintained important relationships with China.</p>
<p>Successive Zambian leaders have had to balance the macro-economic importance of China with negative local perceptions. The relationship with China is a domestic political issue of growing importance. Many Zambians are suspicious of, or even hostile to, Chinese enterprises, citing unfair labour practices and <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2020/06/05/china/china-zambia-murder-intl-hnk/index.html">human rights violations</a>.</p>
<p>But Hichilema has maintained Zambia’s relationship with China. A phone call with president Xi Jinping <a href="http://sv.china-embassy.gov.cn/exp/Hoy/202206/t20220601_10697300.htm">in May 2022</a> was instrumental in unlocking China’s positive engagement in an ongoing multilateral debt negotiation. It also positioned Zambia at the forefront of Beijing’s own “<a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2022-12/2022-12-15-africa-china-debt-distress-vines-et-al.pdf">new development paradigm</a>”. </p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/us-china-tensions-how-africa-can-avoid-being-caught-in-a-new-cold-war-201679">US-China tensions: how Africa can avoid being caught in a new Cold War</a>
</strong>
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<p>This aims to support small and medium-sized enterprises, human capital investments and green energy development, and emphasise foreign direct investment flows rather than loan financing.</p>
<p>Hichilema’s self-styled “chief marketing officer” approach has also unlocked new investments and development support from a diversified mix of partners. These include Brazil, India, Japan, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates.</p>
<p>The most concerted effort has been to reinforce Zambia’s regional relationships. Hichilema has made multiple regional visits – Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Malawi, Ethiopia, Eswatini, Kenya, South Africa, Tanzania, Namibia and Rwanda have been on his itinerary. These far outnumber his engagements outside Africa. He has entered bilateral arrangements with neighbours on agriculture, manufacturing and mining.</p>
<p>The US has recognised the attention Hichilema has placed on the development of regional value chains. In 2022, the US endorsed a memorandum of understanding with Zambia and the DRC to <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-releases-signed-memorandum-of-understanding-with-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-and-zambia-to-strengthen-electric-vehicle-battery-value-chain/">develop electric vehicle batteries</a>. Such international support could be critical for overcoming industry scepticism about infrastructure and regulatory deficiencies.</p>
<h2>Looking forward</h2>
<p>Harris’s visit is significant in maintaining the momentum of US engagement in Zambia, continuing efforts to unlock the debt process and supporting the economic value of democracy. New investment announcements will be welcomed by a Zambian administration keen to show results from its economic diplomacy.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/africa-can-use-great-power-rivalry-to-its-benefit-here-is-how-172662">Africa can use great power rivalry to its benefit: Here is how</a>
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<p>But the US should expect Hichilema to maintain a neutral course on geopolitics, especially in its relationship with China. Hichilema stressed <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/03/31/remarks-by-vice-president-harris-and-president-hichilema-of-zambia-in-joint-press-conference/">during the press conference</a> with Harris that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>good relations with the United States (do) not preclude good relations with China, and vice versa.</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/202964/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christopher Vandome does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
President Hichilema’s self-styled ‘chief marketing officer’ approach has unlocked new investments from a diverse mix of partners.
Christopher Vandome, Senior Research Fellow, Chatham House and PhD candidate, International Relations, University of the Witwatersrand
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/190659
2022-09-19T13:17:25Z
2022-09-19T13:17:25Z
Tanzania and Zambia want to upgrade the ‘Uhuru Railway’ – but can they?
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485344/original/file-20220919-3283-dnkebc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">July 1976: President Nyerere (right) watches as President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia greets Chinese Vice-Premier Sun Chien at the handing over ceremony of the Tanzania-Zambia railway. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Keystone/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Half a century ago, the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (Tazara) stood out as a crucial symbol of Africa’s struggle for independence. The 1,860km-long railway connects Kapiri Mposhi in Zambia with Dar es Salaam at the Indian Ocean. </p>
<p>In November 1965, the unilateral declaration of independence by Rhodesia’s <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ian-Smith">racist regime</a> had left newly independent Zambia extremely vulnerable to its hostile southern neighbour. Zambia, a landlocked country, remained highly dependent on transport routes through Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa. It relied on these to import essential goods such as oil and coal, and to export copper, its biggest source of revenue. </p>
<p>To address this vulnerability, then president <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenneth-kaunda-the-last-giant-of-african-nationalism-and-benign-autocrat-left-a-mixed-legacy-146408">Kenneth Kaunda</a> sought an alternative route to the sea. He found an ally in Tanzania’s <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/supplement/founder-of-sino-tanzanian-friendship-a-great-immortal-3781194">Julius Nyerere</a>. The idea of the “Freedom Railway” (Reli ya Uhuru in Kiswahili) was born.</p>
<p>The two leaders tried to solicit funding. But the World Bank, several western governments and the Soviet Union declined. Nyerere and Kaunda turned to Beijing. </p>
<p>The Tazara became China’s biggest foreign aid project, costing about US$415 million at the time. It was financed through a combination of interest-free loans and commodity credit arrangements.</p>
<p>Tazara’s construction between 1970 and 1975, and inauguration in 1976, were steeped in anti-imperialist narratives that emphasised Sino-African solidarity. The network significantly boosted China’s influence across Africa and deepened its social, political, cultural and economic ties with Tanzania and Zambia. The railway is still frequently invoked by officials on both sides as the <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/2461_663310/201507/t20150728_468571.html">cornerstone</a> for the “all-weather friendship” between Africa and China.</p>
<p>Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Tazara transported a significant share of copper and mining inputs for Zambia’s state-owned mines. The railway increased the mobility of the rural population in both countries. Trading centres and small businesses emerged at its dozens of stations.</p>
<p>The railway recorded its peak performance in 1977/78, when it transported 1.27 million tonnes of cargo. But it never came close to its design capacity of 2.5 million tonnes per year.</p>
<p>From the late 1980s onwards, liberalisation of the transport sector and the privatisation of Zambia’s mines resulted in fierce competition from road transporters.</p>
<p>The eventual demise of white minority regimes in the region further diminished Tazara’s geopolitical significance. Despite longer distances, a higher proportion of Zambia’s trade started to move along the southern corridors via South Africa’s efficient ports. </p>
<p>Inadequate management structures and chronic under-investment in infrastructure and rolling stock have amplified the steady decline of Tazara’s cargo and passenger services since the 1990s. The shareholding governments had to regularly inject funds for outstanding salaries and urgent repairs.</p>
<h2>Signs of renewal</h2>
<p>In recent years, political will to refurbish the Freedom Railway – not least to reduce the expensive wear and tear on roads – has grown. However, tight public finances have prevented a major recapitalisation.</p>
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<p>In August 2022, Zambia’s President Hakainde Hichilema made his first visit as head of state to Tanzania. After meetings with his counterpart Samia Suluhu Hassan, they <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/tanzania-zambia-agree-to-upgrade-tazara-to-sgr-level-3901174">announced</a> that the two governments had agreed to rehabilitate Tazara. They sought to upgrade its tracks from Cape gauge (1,067mm) to standard gauge (1,435mm) through a public-private partnership. </p>
<p>An upgrade to standard gauge would enable the Uhuru railway to interlink with Tanzania’s new standard gauge railway. The standard gauge tracks have meanwhile reached the Dodoma region. Contracts for extensions to Tabora (about 740km to the north-west of Dar es Salaam) and Mwanza (about 350km further north) have already been awarded. An inter-governmental agreement between Rwanda and Tanzania to build a line from Isaka (on the Tabora-Mwanza route) to Kigali was signed in 2018. Further connections to Burundi, the DRC and Uganda are planned. </p>
<p>But upgrading Tazara to standard gauge would be expensive and hence less attractive for a private investor. It would also pose connectivity challenges in Zambia. Zambia’s national network still operates on Cape gauge, as do South Africa’s and Zimbabwe’s.</p>
<p>A senior Tanzanian official with knowledge of the matter told me that the standard gauge upgrade was part of a long-term plan under the African Union’s <a href="https://au.int/en/agenda2063/overview">Agenda 2063</a>. The immediate objective is to rehabilitate the existing infrastructure.</p>
<h2>Ups and downs</h2>
<p>Since its inauguration, Tazara’s impact has gone beyond the immediate goal to remedy Zambia’s transport emergency. The railway transformed the livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of Tanzanians and Zambians who lived – or decided to settle – along its route. This is meticulously documented by the historian Jamie Monson in her formidable book <a href="https://iupress.org/9780253223227/africas-freedom-railway/">Africa’s Freedom Railway</a>. </p>
<p>Economically however, Tazara’s glorious days have long passed. </p>
<p>In the 2014/2015 financial year Tazara conveyed only 87,860 metric tonnes of cargo. According to its own estimates, it needs to transport at least 600,000 tonnes a year to cover its costs. </p>
<p>The situation has improved slightly since then, as a new management team brought down travel times and attracted new clients. Tazara’s governing bodies also decided to allow private operators to use its tracks.</p>
<p>Yet, the challenges for the company remain huge. The biggest one is the outdated, in some cases inoperative, infrastructure. Dilapidated tracks, bridges and buildings, a dysfunctional signalling system and insufficient rolling stock prevent Tazara from meeting market demands. </p>
<p>The Tazara Authority is also grappling with crippling debts.</p>
<p>In 2016, the shareholding governments – under the rigid control of the late President John Magufuli – rejected a 30-year concession proposed by a Chinese consortium. Irreconcilable differences about the terms and conditions arose which I documented in an article titled <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X21000446">“Win-win” contested</a>.</p>
<p>Evidently, the times have changed. China is now a global political and economic powerhouse. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00083968.2020.1868014">Faced with massive overcapacity in its home market</a>, the country’s construction and railway firms are seeking opportunities elsewhere. For Chinese firms Tazara is no longer an aid project but an investment opportunity.</p>
<h2>New momentum</h2>
<p>Under Hichilema and Hassan there seems to be new momentum for the privatisation of the Freedom Railway. This is for several reasons.</p>
<p>Hichilema has long been considered a free marketeer. Hassan, for her part, has markedly departed from Magufuli’s confrontational approach to foreign investors. She has openly called for more <a>public-private partnerships</a>. </p>
<p>In addition, there is the factor of mounting fiscal pressure felt in Lusaka and, in recent years, also in Dodoma. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/sep/02/crisis-hit-zambia-secures-13bn-imf-loan-to-rebuild-stricken-economy">Under Zambia’s recently agreed International Monetary Fund rescue package</a> all state expenses will be put to utmost scrutiny. </p>
<p>For its part, Tanzania’s sovereign debt has rapidly increased since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. The <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/tanzania-risks-debt-distress-world-bank-3734468">World Bank adjusted its assessment of the country’s risk of debt distress</a> from low to moderate early this year. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/03056244.2021.1950669">As I recently argued in</a> the Review of African Political Economy, Africa’s current debt crisis is likely to lead to a new wave of privatisations across the continent.</p>
<p>China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation was recently <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3189645/50-years-chinese-role-africas-freedom-railway-zambia-tanzania">tasked with conducting yet another feasibility study for Tazara’s rehabilitation</a>. It sent a 40-person delegation to visit Tazara in early September 2022. </p>
<p>The train towards privatisation seems to be picking up speed.</p>
<p>But the issue of incompatibility between old and new networks shows that Africa’s current “<a href="https://archive.uneca.org/stories/africa%E2%80%99s-railway-renaissance-needs-public-private-partnerships">railway renaissance</a>” requires profound regional and continental coordination and planning. Integrating Africa’s railways will be a monumental task, considering that the greater part of the continent’s network still operates on Cape or metre gauge – a colonial legacy that hampers railway inter-connectivity to this day.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/190659/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tim Zajontz does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Tazara upgrade requires huge capital but new tracks could be incompatible with the existing Southern Africa rails.
Tim Zajontz, Lecturer (Freiburg) & Research Fellow (Stellenbosch), University of Freiburg
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/166513
2021-08-22T12:18:26Z
2021-08-22T12:18:26Z
Why Edgar Lungu and his party lost Zambia’s 2021 elections
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/417234/original/file-20210820-23-ksl8vn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zambia's new president Hakainde Hichilema.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Patrick Meinhardt / AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Hakainde Hichilema’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-58226695">election victory</a> is the third time an opposition leader has unseated an incumbent president in Zambia <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1991/11/02/world/zambian-voters-defeat-kaunda-sole-leader-since-independence.html">since 1991</a>. The victory bequeaths on the new president and his party, the United Party for National Development (UPND), the immense task of restoring the rule of law, fixing the ailing economy and uniting a divided nation.</p>
<p>Hichilema won the poll with 59.38% of the vote. He secured a 1 million-vote lead over his closest rival and incumbent, Edgar Lungu of the Patriotic Front. Lungu polled <a href="https://zambiaelections2021.org.zm//home/results_by_constituency">38.33%</a>.</p>
<p>The election was effectively a referendum on Lungu and the conduct of his party during his tenure from 2015 to 2021. Zambians opted to believe in the campaign promises of his opponent. Hichilema promised to <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2021/06/hakainde-hichilema-zambians-want-change-we-dont-count-how-many-times-we-run/">grow the economy</a> to alleviate people’s suffering, restore the rule of law, <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/94754/zambias-hakainde-hichilema-weve-never-seen-such-levels-of-corruption/">end corruption</a> and that, unlike his opponents, he was not contesting to secure a job.</p>
<h2>Contested candidacy</h2>
<p>Lungu’s candidature was controversial and highly contested. He completed his predecessor, the late <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2014/10/30/the-death-of-president-michael-sata-and-issues-of-the-health-of-african-leaders/">Michael Sata’s</a> unfinished term in 2016. He then served a full five-year term after beating, Hichilema in elections held that same year <a href="https://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/2884/">by a narrow margin</a>. </p>
<p>In 2021 Lungu was contesting for office in what some argued would effectively be a third term. The Constitutional Court was thrice petitioned to declare him ineligible. The court ruled in Lungu’s favour on all the occasions. It found that he had <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/zambian-court-throws-out-second-challenge-lungu-re-election-bid-2021-06-11/">served only a year</a>, not a full presidential term, between 2015 and 2016 after Sata’s death. This made him eligible to contest the polls in 2021. </p>
<p>In the end it was the ballot box that ended his tenure. The arrogance of power displayed by the Patriotic Front in defying the concerns of the country’s citizens in the way it ran the affairs of state drove voters to voice their displeasure.</p>
<p>There were a number of reasons the electorate decided to back his opponent.</p>
<p>Zambians were irked by the decline of democracy under Lungu, as shown by intimidation, harassment and arrests of members of the <a href="http://archive.ipu.org/hr-e/196/zambia.pdf">oposition</a>, and <a href="https://www.news24.com/channel/Music/News/activist-musician-who-fled-to-south-africa-arrested-as-he-arrives-home-in-zambia-20180517">critics</a> of the government. <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/03/zambia-activists-in-court-on-escalating-crackdown-on-human-rights/">Human rights violations</a> were on the rise.</p>
<p>In December 2020, a state prosecutor and a United Party for National Development supporter were <a href="http://www.hrc.org.zm/index.php/multi-media/news/369-hrc-calls-for-inquest-to-establish-identity-of-individuals-responsible-for-shooting-to-death-of-a-state-prosecutor-and-a-suspected-upnd-sympathiser">shot dead</a> when police fired on a crowd that had gathered near police headquarters to protest the harassment of Hichilema.</p>
<p>The Lungu government even tried to amend the constitution. Experts said this would have taken parliament’s oversight over the executive, creating a <a href="https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/sajpd/vol5/iss1/7/">constitutional dictatorship</a>.</p>
<p>Levels of <a href="https://www.u4.no/publications/zambia-overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-2020">corruption</a> also reached unprecedented levels.</p>
<p>In 2018, the Financial Intelligence Centre reported acts of corruption estimated at about <a href="https://www.fic.gov.zm/component/attachments/download/64">$284 million</a>. That same year, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and the UK withheld aid worth about <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zambia-corruption-idUSKCN1VH1S7">$34 million</a> because they were concerned about corruption and financial mismanagement.</p>
<p>In 2019, the <a href="https://www.fic.gov.zm/component/attachments/download/95">money laundering and terrorist financing trends report</a> of Zambia’s Financial Intelligence Centre disclosed that public officials had influenced the awarding of contracts. Corruption linked to public sector procurement was a major contributor to proceeds of crime. </p>
<h2>Misplaced priorities</h2>
<p>Zambians went to the 2021 polls in the midst of a <a href="http://saipar.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Charles.Lascu_.AFRODAD-1.pdf">second debt crisis</a> created under the Lungu government. The <a href="https://www.themastonline.com/2021/02/20/its-true-cost-of-living-has-gone-up-says-wina/">cost of living</a> had also soared as the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-05-27/zambian-inflation-jumps-to-18-year-high-on-meat-and-fish-prices">annual inflation rate</a> was the highest in about two decades.</p>
<p>Lungu built his campaign on the <a href="https://chinaafricaproject.com/2021/08/09/president-edgar-lungu-commissions-new-chinese-built-airport-as-part-of-a-last-minute-campaign-push/">physical infrastructure</a> his government put up and increased <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/ozabs-uk-zambia-economy-idAFKBN28R1LU-OZABS">government control</a> of Zambia’s mines.</p>
<p>He promised to roll out more infrastructure if reelected. But for many in Zambia economic conditions were tough. The economy got worse and many remained <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/100265/zambia-will-the-economic-slide-hurt-lungu-in-the-august-polls/">jobless and disgruntled</a> on his watch. </p>
<p>Unemployed young people and households <a href="https://www.jctr.org.zm/uploads/1/1/8/1/118170975/final_bnnb_statement_11.08.2021.pdf">struggling</a> to meet basic needs against escalating prices of essential commodities <a href="https://cuts-lusaka.org/pdf/policy-brief-are-zambians-feeling-the-crunch-a-perception-survey-of-debt-and-the-economy.pdf">blamed the government</a> for the worsening conditions.</p>
<p>Some analysts attributed Zambia’s economic woes to <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/707aed78-27ef-4e11-95a3-792b2b91da55">undisciplined debt accumulation</a> to <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/6866-zambias-looming-debt-crisis-is-china-to-blame">finance the projects</a> Lungu boasted about.</p>
<p>The combination of high government debt and a weak economy meant that Zambia couldn’t service its debts. Lungu’s government had a fallout with international financial markets after it defaulted on debt repayment <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/11/23/zambia-becomes-africas-first-coronavirus-era-default-what-happens-now.html">in 2020 </a>. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) had refused to bailout Zambia in 2016 over concerns about <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/zambia-braces-for-imf-crunch-talks/a-56496748">government’s commitment</a> to economic reforms.</p>
<p>The IMF <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/imf-zambia-idUSL1N2MX1J1">resumed talks</a> with Zambia to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/imf-zambia-idUSL1N2MX1J1">reform the economy</a> in February 2021, but a deal was <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/66687/zambia-imf-debt-talks-unlikely-to-stop-lungu-from-trying-to-pawn-copper-to-china/">unlikely</a> until after the election. </p>
<h2>Failed reelection strategy</h2>
<p>In <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/100265/zambia-will-the-economic-slide-hurt-lungu-in-the-august-polls/">past elections</a> the Patriotic Front used infrastructure and the tribalism trump card to beat Hichilema. </p>
<p>But, this failed in 2021. </p>
<p>While Hichilema maintained popularity in his traditional stronghold in Zambia’s south-west region, he also broke into Lungu’s stonghold in the north-east, and gained unprecedented support. His campaign message to end corruption, restore the rule of law and the economy resonated among the majority of voters across Zambia.</p>
<p>His pick of Vice President and running mate in <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Mutale_Nalumango">Mutale Nalumango</a> also helped him break into Lungu’s core constituency. The educator and former vice president of the Secondary Schools’ Teachers Union of Zambia served as Movement for Multiparty Democracy Member of Parliament for Kaputa in Northern Zambia from 2001 to 2011. </p>
<p>Hichilema’s break into Lungu’s core constituency saw Lungu <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20210815-zambia-election-president-cries-foul-as-opposition-leads-in-early-vote-count-lungu-hichilema-unfair">cry foul</a> that the 2021 election was not free and fair.</p>
<h2>Restoring a fractured country</h2>
<p>Hichilema has his work cut out for him. He has to endear himself to the whole country and prove that he is a national leader. This will enable him to clear his name of accusations that he is a <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2021/04/07/distinguishing-the-tribe-from-the-tribalist-every-tribe-is-good-but-every-tribalist-is-bad-the-dying-of-upnd/">tribalist</a>. </p>
<p>He also faces the daunting task of undoing the culture of violence and extortion in the political arena by party “cadres” - unemployed men who extort money, provide informal security for party elites, and disrupt opposition events. Hichilema will have to tame his own party cadres, and restore sanity through impartial application of the law to set Zambia back on the path of democratic consolidation. </p>
<p>The task that will make or break Hichilema’s leadership, however, is fixing the economy. He has spoken large about this since he stepped on to the political stage, claiming he was best suited to fix Zambia’s economic problems. </p>
<p>Potential supporters of Zambia’s economy, such as the IMF, demand <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2021/03/04/pr2159-zambia-imf-staff-completes-virtual-mission-to-zambia">austerity</a> to restore its economic fortunes and set it on a path of recovery. Hichilema will have to balance austerity and the high expectations of the many unemployed young people and struggling people who voted for him.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/166513/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Changwe Nshimbi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Zambia’s new president will have to balance austerity and the high expectations of the many unemployed young people and struggling people who voted for him.
Chris Changwe Nshimbi, Director & Research Fellow, University of Pretoria
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/165760
2021-08-09T14:04:29Z
2021-08-09T14:04:29Z
Four priorities for Zambia after the 2021 elections
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/415101/original/file-20210808-17-1mt4xmk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Might the 2021 Zambian elections usher in another period of economic growth?</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Salim Dawood/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Whoever wins Zambia’s 2021 general elections will face two key challenges: reviving the country’s democratic credentials and stimulating the economy. To achieve this, the new administration must have at least four priorities. These are regaining credibility with the international financiers, fighting corruption, curtailing the dominance of the executive branch of government, and ending the reign of terror by political party vigilantes, known as “cadres”.</p>
<p>On 12 August, Zambians <a href="https://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/3600/">will elect</a> the president, 156 members of parliament and 117 district council leaders. The elections take place in an increasingly contentious environment.</p>
<p><a href="https://pantheon.world/profile/person/Edgar_Lungu/">Edgar Lungu</a>, who has been president <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37086365">since 2015</a> after his predecessor Michael Sata died in office, has shown <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/06/zambia-killings-and-brutal-crackdown-against-dissent-set-the-tone-for-august-election/">increasingly autocratic tendencies</a>. He is running for a controversial <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/zambian-court-throws-out-second-challenge-lungu-re-election-bid-2021-06-11/">third term</a> that opponents argue is unconstitutional since he already has been elected twice, in the 2015 and 2016 general elections. The <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/zambian-court-throws-out-second-challenge-lungu-re-election-bid-2021-06-11/">Constitutional Court dismissed</a> the claim since Lungu’s first term was only one year.</p>
<p>The run-up to the polls has been characterised by <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/75948/zambias-new-voters-register-is-a-scam/">accusations</a> that the voters’ register has been manipulated to disadvantage strongholds of the main opposition party, the <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.zm/taxonomy/term/165">United Party for National Development (UPND)</a>, led by veteran politician <a href="https://cisp.cachefly.net/assets/articles/attachments/58535_hh_profile.pdf">Hakainde Hichilema</a>. He lost in 2016 by <a href="https://theconversation.com/zambia-post-elections-president-lungu-has-his-work-cut-out-for-him-64058">only just over 100,000 votes</a> in an election deemed unfair by <a href="https://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/zambia-091516.html">international observers</a>. </p>
<p>The military has been <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/zambia-election-idAFL8N2P80RH">deployed on the streets</a> due to excessive pre-election violence that underscores how competitive the election is. </p>
<p>Following a tactic used by Sata in the <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2011/03/13/pf-pvt-system/">2011 elections</a>, Hichilema has mobilised <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/article-preview/id/13501/Eyes_on_the_count">20,000 election agents</a> from his party to assist a <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/13501/Eyes_on_the_count">parallel vote tabulation</a> process to help monitor fraud. Such a tabulation is a <a href="https://www.ndi.org/pvt">common methodology</a> based on observing a random sample of polling stations to independently verify election results. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, a recently passed Cyber Security and Cyber Crimes Bill is <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2021/02/23/csos-demand-for-withdrawal-of-cyber-security-and-cybercrimes-bill/">making citizens wary</a> of how internet and digital communications could be <a href="https://www.accessnow.org/as-contentious-election-nears-rights-groups-urge-zambia-to-keepiton/">interrupted</a> as election results roll in. </p>
<p><a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/000203971605100306">A repeat</a> of the aftermath of the 2016 elections could occur. Specifically, if Lungu claims an outright victory – passing the 50% threshold, thus avoiding the need for a second round of voting – Hichilema will likely contest the elections in the courts. This may result in clashes in the cities.</p>
<p>Whoever wins the elections will face two key challenges: reviving the country’s democratic credentials and stimulating the economy. This will require the new administration to focus on four priorities.</p>
<h2>Regaining trust of financiers</h2>
<p>Economic debt is Zambia’s biggest challenge. Under Lungu, the debt ballooned from <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2021/08/05/zambia-heads-towards-a-pivotal-election">36% to 110% of GDP</a>. Zambia <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/nov/25/zambias-default-fuels-fears-of-african-debt-tsunami-as-covid-impact-bites">defaulted</a> on repaying $42.5 million in interest on a Eurobond in November 2020.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/african-governments-have-developed-a-taste-for-eurobonds-why-its-dangerous-165469">African governments have developed a taste for Eurobonds: why it's dangerous</a>
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<p>The negative impacts of debt servicing have been <a href="https://cuts-lusaka.org/pdf/policy-brief-are-zambians-feeling-the-crunch-a-perception-survey-of-debt-and-the-economy.pdf">deeply felt across Zambian households</a>. Multiple factors <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2020/11/14/zambia-is-starting-to-look-like-zimbabwe-the-failure-next-door">contributed</a> to the rising debt – including volatile copper prices, drought in 2019, and COVID-19.</p>
<p>The shift by the government towards sovereign financing and Chinese loans since 2012 severely compounded the debt crisis. There has been <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/6866-zambias-looming-debt-crisis-is-china-to-blame.pdf">a lack of transparency</a> about the Chinese loans. This has been made worse by concerns about <a href="https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/782221512459934813/zambia-economic-brief-how-zambia-can-borrow-without-sorrow">corruption</a> in the use of Eurobond funding for large-scale infrastructure projects. These two factors have <a href="https://www.barrons.com/news/zambia-default-test-case-for-africa-debt-relief-01614247805">undermined efforts by the IMF</a> to negotiate debt relief on behalf of commercial creditors.</p>
<h2>Fighting corruption</h2>
<p>Regaining trust, especially with Western donors, requires fighting corruption that has <a href="https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/CPI2020_Report_EN_0802-WEB-1_2021-02-08-103053.pdf">become endemic under Lungu</a>. </p>
<p>In 2017, it was uncovered that the government procured <a href="https://www.themastonline.com/2017/11/11/procurement-corruption-from-fire-tenders-to-ambulances/">42 fire trucks for US$42 million</a>. In the same year, the country’s <a href="https://diggers.news/local/2018/06/01/zambia-lost-k4-5bn-to-financial-crimes-in-2017-fic/">Financial Intelligence Centre</a> revealed that billions of Zambian kwacha had been laundered through high level corruption and tax evasion. In 2018, several bilateral donors <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zambia-corruption/zambia-says-donors-withholding-nearly-34-million-over-mismanagement-idUSKCN1M02TD">halted US$34 million in funding</a> for education and social welfare programmes due to mismanagement. </p>
<p>And, in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, US$17 million in <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/blog/cpi-2020-zambia-medical-supply-scandal-anti-corruption-key-electoral-issue">procurement irregularities</a> by the Ministry of Health were uncovered.</p>
<h2>Curbing executive dominance</h2>
<p>Lungu’s government attempted to remove legislative oversight over <a href="https://cuts-lusaka.org/pdf/policy-brief-effect-of-the-constitution-of-zambia-amendment-bill-10-2019-on-public-financial-management-and-debt-management.pdf">contracting public debt</a> via a failed constitutional reform known as <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.zm/sites/default/files/documents/bills/The%20Constitution%20of%20Zambia%20%28Ameement%29%20Bill%202019.pdf">Bill Number 10</a>. </p>
<p>First introduced in mid-2019, the bill’s other provisions included reducing the National Assembly’s powers to impeach the president. It also allowed for judges to be removed through a tribunal appointed by the president, rather than through the extant <a href="https://www.southernafricalitigationcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/An-Analysis-of-Zambias-Proposed-Constiutional-Amendments-Relating-to-the-Judiciary.pdf">Judicial Complaints Commission</a>. Established in 2006, the commission receives complaints against judicial officers and submits recommendation for action to the independent <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3758963">Director of Public Prosecutions</a>.</p>
<p>Civil society organisations and legal experts <a href="https://diggers.news/local/2020/06/03/reject-bill-10-in-zambians-interest-csos-urge-mps/">opposed</a> the attempt to create a “<a href="https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/sajpd/vol5/iss1/7/">constitutional dictatorship</a>”. </p>
<p>In October 2020, UPND members of parliament walked out of the National Assembly to prevent the bill from being passed. But Lungu’s party has <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2020/11/17/pf-makes-tabling-of-bill-10-in-2021-an-election-issue/">vowed to reintroduce</a> the bill after the elections.</p>
<p>Other forms of executive interference include using the <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/zambia/freedom-world/2021">Independent Broadcasting Authority</a> to shut down privately owned news outlets that are critical of the government. This contributes to an already biased media environment.</p>
<h2>Tackling party cadres</h2>
<p>Finally, there is <a href="http://webcms.uct.ac.za/sites/default/files/image_tool/images/433/IDCPPA.WP27SeekingsSiachiwena.pdf">mounting disenchantment</a> with the Patriotic Front in the party’s traditional strongholds of Lusaka and cities in the <a href="https://www.cbt.gov.zm/?page_id=4454">Copperbelt Province</a>. </p>
<p>This is due to the party having <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/107675/zambia-young-urban-and-disgruntled-pf-supporters-can-lungu-woo-them-back/">alienated the urban youth</a> and middle classes because of its repression of civil society, and <a href="https://www.effective-states.org/wp-content/uploads/working_papers/final-pdfs/esid_wp_136_hinfelaar_resnick_sishuwa.pdf">surveillance on the University of Zambia</a> campus. But the Patriotic Front’s <a href="https://www.eisa.org/pdf/JAE18.1Mukunto.pdf">cadres</a> – typically unemployed men hired to extort money, provide informal security for party elites, and disrupt opposition events – are a particular nuisance for urban market traders, minibus and taxi operators. </p>
<p>For instance, they charge extra fees to allow minibuses to pick up customers in particular areas, or threaten violence against traders who refuse to pay them <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/oa-edit/10.4324/9781003008385-2/formal-informal-interface-lens-urban-food-systems-gilbert-siame-douty-chibamba-progress-nyanga-brenda-mwalukanga-beverly-musonda-mushili-wiza-kabaghe-garikai-membele-wilma-nchito-peter-mulambia-dorothy-ndhlovu">illegal fees to sell from market stalls</a>. </p>
<p>Although they <a href="https://www.eisa.org/pdf/JAE18.1Mukunto.pdf">have existed for decades in Zambia</a>, cadres have become <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0022343319884990">increasingly violent and extortionary</a> under the Patriotic Front.</p>
<p>The extortion deprives the city councils of <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/oa-edit/10.4324/9781003008385-2/formal-informal-interface-lens-urban-food-systems-gilbert-siame-douty-chibamba-progress-nyanga-brenda-mwalukanga-beverly-musonda-mushili-wiza-kabaghe-garikai-membele-wilma-nchito-peter-mulambia-dorothy-ndhlovu">revenue from the markets and bus stations</a>. It has generated a culture of fear and frustration among the urban poor. </p>
<p>But the opposition United Party for National Development <a href="https://www.eisa.org/pdf/JAE18.1Mukunto.pdf">has its own cadres</a> who are equally violent. If elected, Hichilema should enable the police to better regulate the cadres. He must also hold councillors elected on his party ticket accountable if they condone cadre activity.</p>
<h2>Back to the future or a new beginning?</h2>
<p>These four priorities are not new. In 2001, Zambia was massively indebted, politically polarised, and led by a deeply corrupt president – <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-late-zambian-president-fredrick-chiluba-a-legacy-of-failed-democratic-transition/">Frederick Chiluba</a>. He tried (and failed) to change the constitution to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/may/07/chrismcgreal">run for a third term</a> as leader of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy. </p>
<p>Chiluba’s successor, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/aug/19/zambia">Levy Mwanawasa</a>, also from the Movement for Multiparty Democracy, reversed Zambia’s decline. From 2001 until 2008, the country enjoyed a period of <a href="https://ebrary.ifpri.org/utils/getfile/collection/p15738coll2/id/131180/filename/131391.pdf">economic growth</a>. This was mostly due to good macroeconomic management that involved <a href="https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/90774">fighting corruption</a>. But, when Mwanawasa died in 2008, his successor, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Rupiah-Banda">Rupiah Banda</a>, created a more restrictive political environment. This <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0010414012437166">contributed to the popularity of the Patriotic Front</a>.</p>
<p>If this year’s election results in a new leader, the onus will be on Hichilema to do a better job than his predecessors at stopping the cycle from repeating itself.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165760/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Danielle Resnick receives funding from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). </span></em></p>
Whoever wins the elections will face two key challenges: reviving the country’s democratic credentials and stimulating the economy.
Danielle Resnick, Senior Research Fellow, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/165776
2021-08-09T14:04:09Z
2021-08-09T14:04:09Z
Zambians go to elections amid turmoil. What’s at stake
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/415184/original/file-20210809-21-g4ifkl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Hakainde Hichilema (C), leader of the Zambia opposition party United Party for National Development. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/NIC BOTHMA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As Zambia prepares to go to the general polls on 12 August, it does so in a context of political decay. It’s also in the midst of a serious <a href="https://www.economist.com/leaders/2020/11/12/how-to-stop-zambia-from-turning-into-zimbabwe">economic crisis</a> and the unfolding <a href="https://theconversation.com/latest-data-from-lusaka-morgue-analysis-shows-spike-in-covid-19-deaths-163438">COVID-19 pandemic</a>. </p>
<p>Tensions have escalated for months. In addition to <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr63/4057/2021/en/">forceful police conduct</a>, and the prevention of the opposition to campaign, supporters of the ruling party Patriotic Front and the opposition United Party for National Development have <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2021/06/14/saccord-advises-pf-upnd-to-stop-political-violence/">fought each other</a>. Recently, two Patriotic Front cadres were <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2021/08/01/the-human-rights-commission-condemns-kanyama-killings/">killed</a> in clashes with the opposition in Lusaka. Violence has also occurred between factions within the political parties. </p>
<p>What is at stake in Zambia’s poll and why are the elections so volatile?</p>
<p>The last elections in 2016 were characterised by growing mistrust <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/000203971605100306">and a drift towards political violence</a>. The 2016 election was a tight race between the incumbent Edgar Lungu and opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema. Allegations of election fraud followed. And intolerance with the opposition manifested in the <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2017/09/the-real-reasons-zambia-opposition-leader-was-released-from-jail/">imprisonment of the opposition leader</a> Hichilema over treason for almost four months. </p>
<h2>A dismal picture</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://makanday.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Report-of-the-Committee-on-voting-pattern-and-electoral-violence.pdf">final report</a> of the Commission of Inquiry into the election-related violence is a depressing read. </p>
<p>Based on witness testimonies, it tells the story of attacks against people, death, harassment, property destruction, displacement and pervasive hate speech. The commission was appointed by the president, but he’s not acted on its important recommendations. These include depoliticising the police, restoring trust in electoral management bodies and ensuring space for independent media. </p>
<p>This election features the two same players and a highly polarised electorate. Frustration is growing among the opposition supporters who deem the last election as stolen.</p>
<p>Since 2016, the situation is further aggravated by the concentration of political power in the hands of President Edgar Lungu. His grip on power has increased and the quality of democracy has declined. </p>
<p>Zambia was historically a politically stable country, despite failure to <a href="https://brill.com/view/title/57421">fully consolidate democracy</a> after the peaceful transition to multiparty politics in 1991. But Zambia is now labelled as an <a href="https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/de/39/de39af54-0bc5-4421-89ae-fb20dcc53dba/democracy_report.pdf">“electoral autocracy”</a>. It’s even been <a href="https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/de/39/de39af54-0bc5-4421-89ae-fb20dcc53dba/democracy_report.pdf">listed</a> among the world’s top 10 countries that are turning into autocracies.</p>
<p>The human rights situation has also deteriorated. <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr63/4057/2021/en/">Violations</a> of human rights –- such as police brutality and unlawful crackdowns on dissent -– have frequently occurred during the last five years.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.zm/sites/default/files/documents/acts/Public%20Order%20Act.pdf">Public Order Act</a>, a legacy from colonial times, has been misused to severely restrict the rights of individuals and organisations to protest or organise political rallies. A legislated pretext to apply force to break up peaceful assemblies.</p>
<p>The election also takes place in a context where <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2021/08/zambia-in-a-fair-election-lungu-cant-win-in-an-unfair-one-he-cant-lose/">discontent </a>with President Lungu and the ruling Patriotic Front party has grown. When incumbents, such as Lungu, fear electoral defeat, the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/british-journal-of-political-science/article/when-do-governments-resort-to-election-violence/2BE13A1FC0696CC41757F2E733A59B32">risk of violence generally rises</a>. </p>
<h2>Politics of fear</h2>
<p>Survey data by <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/">Afrobarometer</a>, the independent African survey group, indicates a <a href="http://idcppa.uct.ac.za/pubs/wps/27">decline in support for the ruling party</a>. Recent polls in Zambia placed the incumbent as victor. But these polls were <a href="https://democracyinafrica.org/how-not-to-rig-an-election-zambias-dodgy-opinion-poll/">questioned</a> on grounds of their credibility.</p>
<p>Another sign of popular discontent is that violence has been playing out in traditional strongholds of the ruling party. Urban areas are common sites of resistance, but resistance has also happened in rural areas where the ruling party dominates. For instance, in <a href="https://www.znbc.co.zm/news/mpulungu-violence-suspects-arrested/">Mpulungu</a> in the Northern Province.</p>
<p>On August 1st, in an unprecedented move, President Lungu <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/1/zambia-deploys-army-to-curb-violence-ahead-of-elections">deployed the army</a> onto the streets to safeguard the election and restore order. This signals the breakdown of the rule of law. In addition, the legitimacy and capacity of the police has been severely undermined. </p>
<p>But Zambia also follows a pervasive <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2020.1742112">securitisation</a> of elections. Rulers rely on a discourse of politics of fear to justify coercive interventions. Similar securitisation closely accompany elections elsewhere on the continent. </p>
<p>Reports of violence have circulated for some time. Even if tensions have escalated, they largely remain isolated incidents. Regardless of the scale of the violence, and who may be behind it, the discourse is one of politics of fear. Thus, there are suspicions that the army will be used to intimidate opposition voters and depress turnout. Not to ensure electoral security. </p>
<h2>Looking to the future</h2>
<p>What is worrisome is that even if Zambians desire political change, <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/07388942211026319">research</a> indicates that fear of facing electoral violence lowers support for democracy. </p>
<p>Another key concern is that the capacity and legitimacy of critical conflict-mitigating institutions – such as civil society organisations and the judiciary – have gradually eroded. At critical junctures in Zambia’s political history, formal and informal institutions played an important role in reducing tensions and solving political disputes. For instance, during the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-history-explains-election-violence-kenya-and-zambia-tell-the-story-131405">transition to multiparty elections in 1991</a>, and an <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/106/425/611/48589?login=true">unconstitutional presidential third term bid</a> in 2001 by second president Frederick Chiluba. </p>
<p>The shrinking democratic space, and deteriorating political situation, have reduced the opportunities for constructive intervention. It has also limited the ability of civil society actors and the judiciary to act independently in election-related disputes.</p>
<p>Regardless of who wins the election, key priorities for the country involve combating the economic crisis and the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Another critical challenge that lies ahead will be to move away from the politics of fear that permeate the elections. The government must restore citizen trust in the tarnished institutions that for long have kept Zambia at peace.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165776/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span> The Swedish Research Council (grant 348-2013-5408 and 2016-05833) and Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (grant P16-0124:1) funded this research.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>The Swedish Research Council (grant 348-2013-5408 and 2016-05833) and Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (grant P16-0124:1) funded this research.</span></em></p>
Frustration is growing among opposition supporters who believe the last election was stolen.
Johan Brosché, Associate Professor, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University
Kristine Höglund, Professor of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/159730
2021-05-04T13:24:14Z
2021-05-04T13:24:14Z
Why Zambia’s upcoming poll risks tipping the balance against democracy
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/397557/original/file-20210428-13-1thnp7y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Image of a polling station sign in Kasama, Northern Province, in 2015.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Nicole Beardsworth</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Zambia is one of the fastest eroding democracies in the world. This is according to the Varieties of Democracy Project (V-dem), one of the most trusted sources of information on indicators of democratic progress or regression. The project’s 2020 <a href="https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/de/39/de39af54-0bc5-4421-89ae-fb20dcc53dba/democracy_report.pdf">report</a> notes that Zambia has registered a remarkably rapid decline in the quality of democracy since the last election in 2016. </p>
<p>Nor is there great optimism about the next set of elections, due to take place in less than four months. Observers have serious concerns ahead of the polls. One of the main ones is about the quality of the <a href="https://www.themastonline.com/2021/02/27/2021-elections-a-scam-voter-numbers-inflated-in-provinces-likely-to-vote-for-pf-sishuwa/">voters’ roll</a>.</p>
<p>The electoral commission decided in 2020 to <a href="https://diggers.news/local/2020/10/08/sadc-elections-monitoring-body-objects-to-new-voters-register/">scrap</a> the voters’ roll that had been in use for over a decade. It then allocated just 38 days to register more than 8 million people in the middle of the rainy season. </p>
<p>The commission <a href="https://twitter.com/NixiiB/status/1354048226404528129">has refused</a> to make the roll available for an independent audit, ignoring widespread calls to do so. Such an audit of the roll was allowed in 2016.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://ccmgzambia.org/">Christian Churches Monitoring Group</a> – the most reputable local election observation organisation – set about trying to verify the existence of voters and check them against the new roll. But it had to abandon its efforts after the <a href="https://ccmgzambia.org/ccmg-statement-on-cancellation-of-the-people-to-list-test/">electoral commission warned</a> that this contravened local legislation. </p>
<p>The limited information available in the public domain suggests that the registration process has indeed been skewed towards regions that vote for the ruling party.</p>
<h2>2016 voting patterns and the 2021 register</h2>
<p>Zambia appears to have become more politically polarised along ethnic lines since 2016. This is in part due to regional voting patterns which appeared – on the surface at least – to have split cleanly along ethno-regional lines. </p>
<p>In 2016, support for the ruling Patriotic Front and President Edgar Lungu was drawn predominantly from the largely Bemba-speaking north and Nyanja-speaking east of the country. The Patriotic Front’s support has traditionally come from Bemba-speakers. But Nyanja-speaking easterners have rallied around the Patriotic Front following Lungu’s rise. He originates from the east, has backing from prominent Nyanja-speakers and has elevated easterners in cabinet and government.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/397031/original/file-20210426-13-1h1p67s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/397031/original/file-20210426-13-1h1p67s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397031/original/file-20210426-13-1h1p67s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397031/original/file-20210426-13-1h1p67s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397031/original/file-20210426-13-1h1p67s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=531&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397031/original/file-20210426-13-1h1p67s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=531&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397031/original/file-20210426-13-1h1p67s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=531&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Figure 1: The ruling Patriotic Front party’s vote share in the 2016 Presidential race.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In comparison, the main opposition party’s support was drawn substantially from the Tonga-speaking southern and Lozi-speaking western regions. The so-called Bantu Botatwe (affiliated groups from the south and west) have long supported political parties that represent their economic and political interests, but these parties have never come to power or sponsored a president. </p>
<p>These regional patterns of support have not gone unnoticed in Lusaka. Since the 2016 elections, there has been a growing rhetoric of distrust from the ruling party towards the south and west of the country. <a href="https://diggers.news/local/2019/08/06/katuba-voted-for-a-tribe-i-feel-sad-to-be-tonga-says-pfs-moonga/">Senior</a> members of the ruling party have increasingly made <a href="https://diggers.news/local/2020/10/29/lungu-must-act-on-dora-before-tribalism-triggers-violence-tiz/">disparaging remarks</a> against citizens from those regions. </p>
<p>In addition, the cabinet and senior positions in the <a href="https://diggers.news/local/2021/02/04/mwenye-condemns-segregative-appointments-explains-his-legal-opinion-against-lungu-musa/">civil service</a> and <a href="https://zambiareports.com/2021/04/15/president-lungu-swears-7-judges-3-courts/?">judiciary</a> appear to have been skewed towards people who come from the north and east. </p>
<p>By comparison, there is almost no representation of people from the south and west of the country.</p>
<p>Crucially, an analysis of the new 2021 voters’ roll by Zambian academic Dr Sishuwa Sishuwa – recently <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2021/04/irony-and-panic-as-zambias-authoritarianism-turns-to-intellectuals/">threatened</a> with arrest for sedition by a key ruling party figure – suggests that significantly more citizens have been registered for the next poll in regions that support the ruling party. Meanwhile, far fewer voters have been registered in opposition-supporting regions. </p>
<p>These dynamics are important, and worrying. For a long time Zambia has had a policy of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1959945">regional</a> balancing in key government appointments. This has largely held regional grievances <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2011.610585">in check</a>. </p>
<p>But perceptions of persecution of groups who have historically supported the opposition are deepening, and may well become more entrenched with the elections.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/397033/original/file-20210426-19-1j9pni0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/397033/original/file-20210426-19-1j9pni0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397033/original/file-20210426-19-1j9pni0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397033/original/file-20210426-19-1j9pni0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397033/original/file-20210426-19-1j9pni0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397033/original/file-20210426-19-1j9pni0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397033/original/file-20210426-19-1j9pni0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Figure 2: Opposition UPND’s vote share in the 2016 Presidential race.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Credibility gap</h2>
<p>In 2016, Lungu cleared the 50% electoral threshold with just 13,000 votes, with Hakainde Hichilema <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/000203971605100306">close</a> at his heels. Given the clear disparities in the recent registration numbers across regions, it is difficult to interpret them as anything but an attempt to pack the voters’ roll with ruling party supporters. This also serves to disenfranchise opposition voters. </p>
<p>The reluctance of the electoral commission to subject the roll to an independent audit – as it did in 2016 – increases these suspicions.</p>
<p>The Catholic Church, a key player in the country’s politics, has expressed <a href="https://www.vaticannews.va/en/africa/news/2021-03/zambia-bishops-concerned-about-august-elections.html">deep reservations</a> about the registration process. The Christian Churches Monitoring Group has also <a href="https://ccmgzambia.org/ccmg-statement-on-analysis-of-the-voters-register/">highlighted major gaps</a> and deficiencies with both the process and the registration rates. </p>
<p>Hichilema has <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/75948/zambias-new-voters-register-is-a-scam/">noted his serious concern</a> with the register. This distrust of the election commission runs deep within the opposition, which may well lead to increased tensions ahead of and following the polls.</p>
<p>There are additional worries too. The government has used COVID-19 restrictions to curtail the <a href="https://diggers.news/local/2020/10/26/chingola-police-nab-27-upnd-cadres-for-unlawful-assembly-on-independence-day/">opposition’s</a> ability to campaign. This includes <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2020/10/07/zambia-police-denies-upnd-and-ndc-permit-to-hold-a-protest-against-ecz/">demonstrations</a> or party meetings even in <a href="https://diggers.news/local/2020/11/02/ndola-police-nabs-3-upnd-officials-for-holding-private-meeting/">private homes</a>. </p>
<p>The electoral commission’s January statement appeared to suggest that movement restrictions during campaigns would be <a href="https://twitter.com/NixiiB/status/1354048226404528129">enforced</a>. </p>
<p>There’s increasing concern about heavy-handed tactics by the police who have repeatedly used excessive force to disperse opposition gatherings. Two people were killed in Lusaka late last year when police <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-23/zambian-police-fire-teargas-as-opposition-leader-questioned">opened fire on a crowd</a> of opposition supporters. </p>
<p>Arrests for insulting or defaming the president have increased. Since March 2020, at least six people, including a 15-year-old boy, have been <a href="https://diggers.news/local/2020/11/24/police-nab-kitwe-man-for-insulting-lungu/">arrested</a> over such offences. This has reduced space for dissent alongside <a href="https://rsf.org/en/zambia">shrinking</a> space for media and non-governmental organisations wary of running afoul of the government’s agenda.</p>
<p>In 2019 the government set about trying to change the constitution to further strengthen the presidency relative to the judiciary and legislature. It <a href="https://presidential-power.net/?cat=131">failed</a> in late 2020, catching the administration by surprise. </p>
<p>In the wake of this, the ruling party introduced a new Cyber Security and Cyber Crime law. It has been roundly <a href="https://www.themastonline.com/2021/03/21/church-asks-lungu-not-to-sign-cyber-bill-into-law/">criticised</a> as failing to meet basic <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-04-05-free-speech-zambias-new-internet-law-fails-basic-human-rights-scrutiny/">human rights</a> standards, further <a href="https://www.themastonline.com/2021/03/01/cyber-insecurity-potential-impact-of-the-cyber-security-and-cyber-crimes-bill-of-2021-on-an-already-shrinking-civic-space-in-zambia/">shrinking civic space</a> and placing whistleblowers and journalists at unjustified risk. </p>
<h2>Looking ahead</h2>
<p>The divide between the opposition United Party for National Development and ruling Patriotic Front continues to widen, and distrust runs deep. Concerns with the electoral commission’s management of the process have most outside observers worried about the diminishing likelihood of a fair election.</p>
<p>The increasing <a href="https://diggers.news/local/2021/03/19/our-officers-fear-cadres-to-protect-their-jobs-police/">impunity</a> of ruling party-aligned “cadres” and their politicised accusations against <a href="https://twitter.com/2021Zambian/status/1382304037253550081">civil servants</a> and citizens is a growing concern, as much of the violence surrounding the <a href="https://diggers.news/local/2019/11/13/kambwili-kampyongos-hate-speech-influenced-violence-in-2016-elections-reveals-report/">2016 election</a> was perpetrated by these groups of <a href="https://diggers.news/local/2020/10/05/2021-polls-could-be-marred-by-violence-if-govt-doesnt-act-on-inquiry-avap/">young men</a> who are sponsored by politicians. </p>
<p>Zambia’s status as a peaceful, democratic and free country is increasingly at risk. The 2021 election holds the potential to tip the balance if politicians aren’t careful and the international community pays little heed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/159730/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicole Beardsworth works for the University of Pretoria. She is also an Honorary Research Fellow in Politics at the University of Warwick, where she receives funding from the Global Challenges Research Fund and the Institute for Advanced Studies to conduct research on the Zambian elections.</span></em></p>
Distrust of the electoral commission runs deep in the opposition, which may well lead to increased tensions ahead of and following the polls.
Nicole Beardsworth, Lecturer, University of the Witwatersrand
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/79533
2017-06-18T09:22:56Z
2017-06-18T09:22:56Z
Zambia slides towards authoritarianism as IMF props up government
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/174033/original/file-20170615-17797-jcowfe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">There are fears that Zambia is slipping into authoritarian rule under President Edgar Lungu.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/unwomen/21661333080/in/photolist-PsKWzy-PsKWoG-PRmWiv-PsKWh9-Q2zAHX-Q2B2EZ-PsKWGN-z18ZE1-TdUtB3-T3FdvQ-PsKWeo-NN5hNR-qHthiB-yWkPxC-zfWUXE-PsKWb7-PRmW1g-PPGwUt-NJk7PM-Pr8cGN-PLXcT1-Pr8dwU-PLXdJj-Pr8dWG-PLXdmq-PZUXSV-PPGw6z-Pr8dcf-PPGwnM-PLXd4b-PPGwAT-PPGvxR-PPGuED-PLXddu-Pr8bs3-NHzeNL-PPGvix-PPGugc-Pr8ceJ-tK1rT3-Pr8eP3-PPGu4D-PLXcFY-NJtFx6-PJZwzY-NJtGqZ-PJZwTJ-NJtG3K-PXLFMX-M4Gq5L">UN Women/Flickr</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The speaker of the Zambian National Assembly, Patrick Matibini, has <a href="http://www.enca.com/africa/zambias-parliament-suspendes-48-opposition-lawmakers">suspended 48 opposition legislators</a> for 30 days as a punishment for unauthorised absence from the parliament. Their offence? To have been missing for President Edgar Lungu’s state of the nation address in March.</p>
<p>The suspension of the MPs does not come as <a href="https://theconversation.com/we-need-to-talk-about-zambia-as-it-falls-from-grace-under-president-lungu-77520">a great surprise</a>. Hardliners from the ruling Patriotic Front have been pushing for something along these lines for some time. The ruling party was quick to try and disassociate itself from the Speaker’s actions. But, as Zambian commentators have pointed out, the action fits into a broader web of measures designed to intimidate those who question the president’s authority. </p>
<p>The most significant was the arrest of opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema, who remains in jail on trumped up <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2017/05/20/zambia-s-political-climate-and-treason-trial-of-hichilema-worrying-eu-mps//">treason charges</a>.</p>
<p>While the latest development in Zambia’s growing political crisis doesn’t come as a shock, it will disappoint those who were hoping that Lungu would be persuaded to moderate his position. Instead, it appears that the International Monetary Fund’s decision to <a href="http://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2017/06/11/pr17214-zambia-imf-staff-concludes-visit">go ahead with a bail out</a> package despite the government’s democratic failings has emboldened the president to pursue an authoritarian strategy.</p>
<p>As a result, a swift resolution to the current political standoff seems unlikely.</p>
<h2>Roots of the crisis</h2>
<p>For some time Zambia was considered to be one of the more competitive democracies in Africa. But a period of backsliding under Lungu has raised concerns that the country’s inclusive political culture is <a href="https://theconversation.com/we-need-to-talk-about-zambia-as-it-falls-from-grace-under-president-lungu-77520">under threat</a>. The current impasse stems from the controversial elections in 2016 when Lungu won a narrow victory that <a href="http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFKCN10Q163">remains contested</a> by the opposition United Party for National Development.</p>
<p>Hichilema, the leader of the United Party for National Development, has stated that his party will not recognise the legitimacy of Lungu’s victory until its electoral petition against the results is heard in court. The initial petition was <a href="http://allafrica.com/view/group/main/main/id/00045643.html">rejected by the Constitutional Court</a>. But its decision was made in a way that had all the hallmarks of a whitewash. The UPND subsequently appealed to the High Court. Hichilema’s decision to make his party’s recognition of the president conditional on the petition being heard was designed both as an act of defiance, and as a means to prevent the government from simply sweeping electoral complaints under the carpet.</p>
<p>Until the court case is resolved, the opposition is committed to publicly challenging the president’s mandate by doing things like <a href="https://diggers.news/guest-diggers/2017/06/14/the-wholesale-suspension-of-upnd-mps-legal-but-undemocratic/">boycotting his addresses to parliament</a>. In response, members of the ruling party have accused the United Party for National Development of disrespect and failing to recognise the government’s authority. It is this that appears to lie behind Hichilema’s arrest on treason charges.</p>
<h2>Punishing parliamentarians</h2>
<p>The suspension of United Party for National Development legislators needs to be understood against this increasingly authoritarian backdrop. It is one of a number of steps taken by those aligned to the government that are clearly designed to intimidate people who <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/called-professor-nic-cheeseman-causes-zambia-controversy/">don’t fall into line</a>. Other strategies include public condemnation of the government’s critics and proposals to break-up the influential Law Society of Zambia.</p>
<p>Efforts by the <a href="http://en.rfi.fr/africa/20170614-zambian-government-played-no-part-suspension-opposition-mps-says-spokesman">president’s spokesman</a> to disassociate the regime from the suspensions have been unpersuasive. The official line of the ruling party is that the speaker of parliament is an independent figure and that he made the decision on the basis of the official rules. It’s true that the speaker and the parliamentary committee on privileges, absences and support services have the right to reprimand legislators for being absent without permission. </p>
<p>Nonetheless the argument is disingenuous for two reasons. The speaker is known to be close to the ruling party, a fact that prompted Hichilema to <a href="https://diggers.news/guest-diggers/2017/06/14/the-wholesale-suspension-of-upnd-mps-legal-but-undemocratic/">call for his resignation</a> earlier this year. And the committee’s decisions are clearly driven by the Patriotic Front because it has more members from it than any other party.</p>
<p>The claim that the suspension was not government-led lacks credibility. This is clear from the fact that Patriotic Front MPS have been the most vocal in calling for action to be taken against boycotting United Party for National Development MPs.</p>
<h2>IMF lifeline for Lungu</h2>
<p>There are different perspectives on the crisis in Zambia. Some people invoke the country’ history of more open government to argue that Lungu will moderate his position once the government feels that the opposition has been placed on the back foot. Others identify a worrying authoritarian trajectory that began under the presidency of the late Michael Sata. They conclude that things are likely to get worse before they get better.</p>
<p>One of the factors that opposition leaders hoped might persuade President Lungu to release Hichilema and move discussions back from the police cell to the negotiating chamber was the government’s desperate need for an economic bail out. Following a period of bad luck and bad governance, Zambia faces a <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2017/04/03/zambia-facing-debt-crisis-fundanga/">debt crisis</a>. Without the assistance of international partners, the government is likely to go bankrupt. This would increase public dissatisfaction with the Patriotic Front and undermine Lungu’s hopes of securing a <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/zambia-president-lungu-third-term/">third term</a>.</p>
<p>But the willingness of the IMF to move towards the completion of a <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-10/zambian-leader-sees-swift-subsidy-cuts-in-1-2-billion-imf-deal">$1.2 billion rescue package</a> suggests that authoritarian backsliding is no barrier to international economic assistance. In turn, IMF support appears to have emboldened the government to continue its efforts to intimidate its opponents.</p>
<p>IMF officials, of course, will point out that they are not supposed to take political conditions into account and that their aim is to create a stronger economy that will benefit all Zambians. This may be true, but the reality is that by saving the Lungu government financially the IMF is also aiding it politically. Whatever its motivation, the agreement will be interpreted by many on the ground as tacit support for the Patriotic Front regime, strengthening Lungu’s increasingly authoritarian position.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/79533/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nic Cheeseman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
The IMF’s decision to go ahead with a bailout package for Zambia, despite the government’s democratic failings, could embolden the president to pursue an authoritarian strategy.
Nic Cheeseman, Professor of Democracy, University of Birmingham
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/77520
2017-05-13T10:18:22Z
2017-05-13T10:18:22Z
We need to talk about Zambia as it falls from grace under President Lungu
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/168980/original/file-20170511-32613-b4m53n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zambian President Edgar Lungu has been criticised for turning the country into a dictatorship. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Rogan Ward</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Zambia has often been ignored by the international media. One reason for this neglect is that it’s been comparatively unexceptional, on a continent with more than its fair share of extremes. </p>
<p>Since the reintroduction of multiparty politics in <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03056249208703954">1991</a>, the country has neither been a clear democratic success story like <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africans-are-learning-that-theyre-not-that-exceptional-after-all-75884">Ghana or South Africa </a>, nor a case of extreme authoritarian abuse, as in Cote d’Ivoire and Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>Instead, Zambia has occupied a middle ground lacking a hook with which to sell coverage of the country, journalists have tended to steer clear. But in the last few months things began to change. First, the opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema was arrested on trumped up <a href="https://zambiareports.com/2017/04/14/us-eu-condemn-hichilema-arrest-treason-charge/">treason charges</a>. </p>
<p>Shortly after, the <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2017/04/23/catholic-bishops-condemn-hh-arrest-say-zambia-is-now-a-dictatorship/">Conference of Catholic Bishops</a> released a strongly worded criticism of the government that concluded</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Our country is now all, except in designation, a dictatorship</p>
</blockquote>
<p>As a result, the country has returned to the headlines, and whether one agrees with the bishops’ evaluation or not, one thing is clear: it’s time to start talking about Zambia.</p>
<h2>Democratic success</h2>
<p>Until now, Zambia’s progress under multi-party politics has been <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/109/434/51/72291/Parties-Platforms-and-Political-Mobilization-The">quietly impressive</a>. </p>
<p>Although the level of corruption has <a href="http://lusakavoice.com/2016/01/09/political-corruption-and-poverty-in-zambia-observation-and-facts-part-1/">remained high</a>, and a number of <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2016-09-01-zambias-general-elections-africas-flagship-democracyunder-scrutiny">highly controversial</a>, elections, the country has consistently pulled back from the brink when authoritarian rule appeared a possibility.</p>
<p>Things appeared to be going downhill, for example, when Zambia’s second president, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Frederick-Chiluba">Frederick Chiluba</a>, manipulated the constitution to prevent his predecessor, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Kenneth-Kaunda">Kenneth Kaunda</a>, from running against him on the grounds that he was <a href="http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a8ae28.html">not really Zambian</a>. This strategy was clearly illegitimate. After all, Kaunda had run the country for over two decades.</p>
<p>But, Chiluba’s position was weaker than he understood and he overplayed his hand by trying to secure an <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1162462.stm">unconstitutional third-term</a>. He ultimately left office when his second term expired at the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/20/world/africa/20chiluba.html">end of 2002</a>.</p>
<p>While Zambians have been willing to defend their new democracy, political leaders have shown a greater willingness to share power than in many nearby states. On the one hand, presidents from a number of different ethnic groups have occupied State House, which has helped to manage tension. On the other, opposition parties have been able to use populist strategies to attract support in urban areas and build effective political machines. As a result, Zambia is one of the only countries on the continent – along with Benin, Ghana, Madagascar, and Mauritius – that has experienced <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-38403553">two transfers of power</a>.</p>
<p>Over the last year, though, things have changed.</p>
<h2>Zambia’s fall from grace</h2>
<p>According to the Conference of Catholic Bishops – one of the most influential bodies in the country – Zambia doesn’t deserve to be called a democracy. Instead, under the leadership of <a href="http://www.herald.co.zw/meet-zambian-president-edgar-chagwa-lungu/">President Edgar Lungu</a> and the <a href="https://www.revolvy.com/topic/Patriotic%20Front%20(Zambia)&item_type=topic">Patriotic Front</a> it has become a <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2017/04/23/catholic-bishops-condemn-hh-arrest-say-zambia-is-now-a-dictatorship/">dictatorship</a> - or getting there. </p>
<p>This statement needs to be taken seriously for two reasons. First, the bishops rarely speak out publicly. Second, many catholic leaders were seen to be sympathetic to the governing Patriotic Front, when it won <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2011-09-30-the-puzzle-that-is-michael-sata">power under Michael Sata in 2011</a>. So, their actions cannot simply be put down to party political bias.</p>
<p>So what has changed? The bishops identify a number of recent developments as causes for concern. </p>
<p>First, they point to the treatment of opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema. Not only was his arrest conducted in an unnecessarily brutal manner, but the government has not yet provided any evidence to substantiate the <a href="https://www.daily-mail.co.zm/hh-goes-to-high-court/">treason charge</a>. Instead, it appears that his detention is punishment for refusing to recognise the legitimacy of the president, who Hichilema believes won the last election unfairly.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/168979/original/file-20170511-32593-19fh27e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/168979/original/file-20170511-32593-19fh27e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/168979/original/file-20170511-32593-19fh27e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/168979/original/file-20170511-32593-19fh27e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/168979/original/file-20170511-32593-19fh27e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/168979/original/file-20170511-32593-19fh27e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/168979/original/file-20170511-32593-19fh27e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Zambia’s opposition leader and presidential hopeful Hakainde Hichilema.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Rogan Ward</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For obvious reasons, his detention and the question of whether he will be released, has been the focus of recent media coverage. But for the Bishops, Hichilema’s arrest is clearly just the tip of the iceberg. The worries expressed in their statement are less about the fate of the opposition leader, and more about the systematic weakening of the state.</p>
<p>For example, the bishops lament the fact that the <a href="http://www.judiciaryzambia.com/constitutional-court/">Constitutional Court</a> failed to effectively hear the opposition’s election petition, believing the judiciary have <a href="https://cruxnow.com/global-church/2017/04/27/zambian-bishops-say-people-live-fear-police-brutality-increases/">“let the people down”</a>. </p>
<p>They also note that the politicization of the police force has resulted in the violation of citizens’ rights and that, partly as a result, the media has become entrapped in a “culture of silence”. The Bishops suggest that the political manipulation of these institutions has enabled the government to launch attacks on a number of <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/democratic-backsliding-in-zambia/">civil society groups</a> that have dared to challenge its authority, including the <a href="http://www.laz.org.zm/">Law Association of Zambia</a>.</p>
<p>While the charges against Hichilema may have triggered the Bishops to act, their letter is underpinned by a deeper and broader concern about the declining quality of governance under President Lungu.</p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>This is not the first time that a Zambian president has sought to consolidate their authority my manipulating state institutions. Nor is it the first time that opposition leaders have been arrested, or civil society groups intimidated. In the recent past, these moments of high political tension have often been resolved peacefully and it’s not impossible that a similar thing will happen this time.</p>
<p>For example, the president may decide to release Hichilema and to pull back from the prohibition of the Law Society of Zambia in the wake of considerable criticism. If the recent spate of attacks has been designed to intimidate his rivals, Lungu may feel that his goal has already been achieved and that he has little to gain by following through with his threats.</p>
<p>But even if this were to happen, it’s unlikely that it would signal a period of a more accountable government, or that Lungu will cede his quest to remain in office. Many things have changed since Chiluba failed to secure a third term in office almost twenty years ago.</p>
<ul>
<li><p>First, key civil society groups such as the trade unions have been weakened by privatisation, informalisation and unemployment. </p></li>
<li><p>Second, the Constitutional Court that’s responsible for interpreting the constitution was handpicked by Lungu, and is highly unlikely to oppose him.</p></li>
<li><p>Third, Lungu’s case is more complicated than Chiluba’s. In 2001, the second president had served two fill terms in office and wanted one more. Today, Lungu is arguing that he should be allowed to have a third term because his first period in office did not count, as he was just serving out the final year of Michael Sata’s term following his <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/zambia/11366872/Five-things-you-probably-didnt-know-about-Zambias-new-president.html">untimely death in office</a>. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>This reading of the <a href="http://www.parliament.gov.zm/sites/default/files/documents/amendment_act/Constitution%20of%20Zambia%20%20%28Amendment%29%2C%202016-Act%20No.%202_0.pdf">constitution </a> is highly questionable. The clause that stipulates that a period in office only counts as a full term if it’s longer than three years is limited to a set of cases that doesn’t include the way that Lungu actually came to power. But, it is less clear-cut than Chiluba’s power grab.</p>
<p>All of this means that <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/article-preview/id/11970/Lungu%27s_way_and_the_highway">Lungu is likely to get his way</a>. But, his third term will not come without a cost. Opposition protests are inevitable, as is some civil society criticism. If past form is anything to go by, Lungu’s government will respond with threats and intimidation, fuelling public fears that Zambian politics has become significantly more violent since the 2016 election campaign. Given this, the Bishops’ recent letter is unlikely to be their last, and we need to talk about Zambia for some time to come.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77520/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nic Cheeseman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
The world’s media, which has in the past found Zambia uninteresting, are suddenly paying more attention to the impoverished nation, for all the wrong reasons.
Nic Cheeseman, Professor of Democracy, University of Birmingham
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/64058
2016-08-22T08:08:54Z
2016-08-22T08:08:54Z
Zambia post elections: President Lungu has his work cut out for him
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/134772/original/image-20160819-30400-3ny64d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Edgar Lungu supporters at a pre-election rally. The level of polarisation before Zambia's polls was unprecedented.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Stella Mapenzausw</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>President <a href="http://www.zambiahighcomdelhi.org/news_detail.php?newsid=15">Edgar Lungu</a> of the Patriotic Front (PF) has been declared winner of the most closely fought election Zambia has witnessed since adopting a multiparty system in 1990. </p>
<p>Lungu polled <a href="https://www.elections.org.zm/general_election_2016.php">50.35%</a> in the August 11 election. He had a 100,530 vote lead over his closest rival, <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2008/09/19/hhs-curriculum-vitae/">Hakainde Hichilema</a> of the United Party for National Development (UPND). Hichilema polled 47.63%.</p>
<p>Lungu’s victory bequeaths on him and his party the immense task of post-election socioeconomic management and governance.</p>
<p>It is now common for political contestants to spar on economic issues. In this election attention was focused on some of the major <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201210230768.html">infrastructure projects</a> rolled out by Lungu’s predecessor, the late <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/29/michael-sata">Michael Sata</a>. While Lungu’s supporters could point to his accomplishments, few gave serious thought to the debt Zambia has accumulated to finance those projects. </p>
<p>Zambia’s <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-17/zambia-debt-costs-set-to-soar-after-terribly-wrong-budget-call">mountain of debt</a> must be serviced. For the president the big question is: how? Lungu should neither consider victory to mean business as usual in the management of the economy nor an opportunity to waste or plunder. One need not look too closely to see the <a href="http://www.tradingeconomics.com/zambia/corruption-rank">corruption</a> and waste of public resources in the past five years of the PF’s rule.</p>
<p>A better way for Lungu to celebrate victory would be to seriously reflect on both the accomplishments and the misuse of the PF’s past term in office. He should also develop a concrete agenda to steer Zambia forward.</p>
<h2>Uniting a country fractured along regional lines</h2>
<p>Rallying supporters and opponents in the post-election period is a necessary task for the victor. However, the level of polarisation leading to Zambia’s 2016 polls was unprecedented. In addition to violence, divisive language in the media and by politicians, the voting patterns clearly reveal a country split between the south-west and north-east. Support for Lungu was largely concentrated in the north-east and for Hichilema in the south-west. </p>
<p>One of Zambia’s founding president Kenneth Kaunda’s nation-building strategies after independence was promoting social cohesion through internal migration. As a consequence, many of the country’s citizens from its 72 tribes and languages intermarried. Lungu can build on the foundation established by Kaunda’s <a href="https://politicalmatter.org/2016/04/19/one-zambia-one-nation-the-legacy-of-kenneth-kaunda-by-derrick-m-muwina/">“One Zambia, One Nation”</a>. </p>
<p>But the onus of uniting Zambia is not solely the president’s. Apart from appealing to the population, he should extend the olive branch to his arch-rival Hichilema as well as to smaller parties’ presidents. In turn, they should also publicly appeal to constituents and the nation and prove that they are genuine in their aspiration to lead Zambia.</p>
<h2>Fixing the electoral system</h2>
<p>It took the Electoral Commission of Zambia four days after the polls had closed to announce the final results. Voters elected four categories of office bearers – from president to local government officials. They also voted in a referendum on a new Bill of Rights. The election was the first of its kind. Numerous malpractices and irregularities were reported. </p>
<p>The main opposition party alleged outright <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2016/08/15/hh-accuse-ecz-colluding-pf-rig-elections-pf-leads-24-constituencies-left/">rigging</a> claiming that the electoral commission had connived with PF to steal the vote. The UPND – and indeed any other party with reservations – has seven days to petition the results with Zambia’s <a href="http://www.judiciary.gov.zm/index.php/court-structure/constitutional-court">Constitutional Court</a>. </p>
<p>But whether they petition or not, the commission’s credibility is sullied. The African Union Election Observation Mission to Zambia, headed by former Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan, declared the polls <a href="http://www.au.int/en/pressreleases/31222/arrival-statement-african-union-election-observation-mission-republic-zambia%E2%80%99s">peaceful and satisfactory</a>. But other election observer missions from organisations such as the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa reported that the elections were conducted <a href="https://eisa.org.za/pdf/zam2016eom0.pdf">“on an unlevelled playing field”</a>.</p>
<p>The August 2016 elections were held under a <a href="https://www.elections.org.zm/legal_framework.php">legal framework</a> and electoral rules introduced just a few months earlier. This posed management challenges associated with new and untested provisions. </p>
<p>Additionally, <a href="https://eisa.org.za/pdf/zam2016eom0.pdf">the electoral institute</a> identified several other issues with the framework. These included high election registration fees and the requirement for all candidates to be holders of Grade 12 certificates. These have the potential to lock out young and female candidates. </p>
<p>The commission’s apparent lack of efficiency and transparency was exhibited in several ways:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Delays in releasing election results led some opposition parties to question the commission’s neutrality and its leadership</p></li>
<li><p>Even before the election, media reports suggested that there were foreigners on the voters’ roll and blamed this on the country’s electoral commission</p></li>
<li><p>The commission also delayed releasing the voters’ roll to stakeholders, raising doubts about the roll’s validity. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>But clearly, Lungu will have to work on more than just the mechanics of the electoral system. He will also have to address the issue of the commission’s leadership. If there is any lesson he can learn from <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-protests-idUSKCN0Y01B2">Kenya</a>, it is that vacillating on changing the face of the commission only agitates discontented supporters of the losing party further. Reforming the electoral system should involve collaboration between all stakeholders.</p>
<h2>Ordinary Zambians show the way</h2>
<p>On the whole, Zambians have once again demonstrated commitment to preserving peace and nurturing the country’s nascent democracy. The turn was probably made at the death of an incumbent president <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/aug/19/zambia">Levy Mwanawasa</a> in 2008 and cemented after the death of another, <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/zambia/11194490/Zambia-president-Michael-Sata-dies-in-London.html">Sata</a>, in 2014. The peaceful conduct of Zambians through these trying times defies logic in an African country. The 2016 elections reportedly had a <a href="http://www.coastweek.com/3933-Zambia-vote-peaceful-amid-high-voter-turnout-reports-polls-body.htm">high voter turnout</a> too. </p>
<p>The conduct of Zambia’s general population thus suggests one thing. The national leadership should rise to the occasion and move the country in the right direction. To do this Lungu should build a team of selfless political, technocratic and civic leaders to steer Zambia for the next five years. Certainly, he will also need the support of the opposition parties, big and small.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64058/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Changwe Nshimbi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Zambia’s Edgar Lungu shouldn’t consider his presidential victory to mean business as usual in the management of the economy; nor an opportunity to waste and plunder.
Chris Changwe Nshimbi, Research Fellow & Deputy Director, University of Pretoria
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