tag:theconversation.com,2011:/es/topics/indonesia-664/articlesIndonesia – The Conversation2024-03-27T00:47:11Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2245152024-03-27T00:47:11Z2024-03-27T00:47:11ZGangs, kidnappings, murders: why thousands of Rohingya are desperately trying to escape refugee camps by boats<p>Late last week, a boat crammed with Rohingya refugees fleeing a squalid camp in Bangladesh capsized off the coast of Indonesia. Around 75 people were rescued, including nine children, but <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-03-25/three-rohingya-found-at-sea-indonesia-aceh/103626938">more than 70 are missing and presumed dead</a>. </p>
<p>This tragedy isn’t an isolated incident. The number of Rohingya people trying to escape refugee camps by boat has skyrocketed in recent months. </p>
<p>According to the <a href="https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/myanmar">UN High Commissioner for Refugees</a>, 1,783 Rohingya refugees boarded boats from Bangladesh from January to October 1, 2023. Since then, around 3,100 people have embarked on these treacherous journeys – an increase of nearly 74%.</p>
<p>Since January 2023, around 490 Rohingya have been reported dead or <a href="https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/myanmar">missing</a>, including 280 since October 1. </p>
<p>Their attempts to reach countries like Malaysia and most recently Indonesia are <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/indonesia/rohingya-refugees-facing-hostile-reception-aceh">being met with refusals and pushbacks</a>, leaving many Rohingya stranded at sea and vulnerable to exploitation, trafficking and even death.</p>
<p>Why are so many Rohingya trying to flee in recent months? And how should the international community respond to this increasingly desperate humanitarian crisis? </p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/379050392_As_long_as_we_are_stateless_we_will_have_tension_Idioms_of_distress_amongst_Rohingya_Refugees_in_Cox's_Bazar_Bangladesh">new article</a> recently submitted for peer review, we (two Australian academics and six anonymous Rohingya activists) describe the “push factors” that have been identified in community-based research in the camps, which are forcing many people to board boats to try to reach safety. </p>
<h2>Living with constant tension</h2>
<p>The nearly 1 million Rohingya refugees now living in Bangladesh are survivors of a massive Myanmar military operation in 2017 aimed at driving them from their homes in western Rakhine state. </p>
<p>Estimates of the number of people killed during the operation range from around <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanplh/article/PIIS2542-5196(19)30037-3/fulltext">7,800</a> to <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3242696">24,000</a>. The United Nations has called it a “<a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/09/564622-un-human-rights-chief-points-textbook-example-ethnic-cleansing-myanmar">textbook example of ethnic cleansing</a>” and <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/02/1133597">genocide</a>.</p>
<p>Even before they were forced across the border, the Rohingya people had been subjected to decades of discrimination, denial of citizenship, exclusion from schools and work, restrictions on freedom of movement and <a href="https://www.amnesty.org.uk/myanmar-apartheid-against-rohingya">violence</a> from authorities. </p>
<p>Now, trapped in limbo in the refugee camps in Cox’s Bazaar, Bangladesh, they are experiencing many of the same things.</p>
<p>In 2019, we conducted on-the-ground interviews with 27 Rohingya community experts living in Cox’s Bazaar, including teachers, mothers, religious leaders, spiritual healers, youths and activists. We wanted to know how Rohingya people understand and describe the psychological impacts of genocide and displacement. </p>
<p>This understanding is important because most mental health services are based on Western terminology like “depression”, “anxiety” or “stress”. But these may not properly fit the Rohingya experience. Instead, we found the English word “tension” (in Rohingya, <em>sinta</em>) was used by many refugees, which conveys feelings of worry, concern and anxiety and captures the experience of being stateless.</p>
<p>As two anonymous adolescent Rohingya women described it to us:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>There is no opportunity to do anything, all we do is stay inside.</p>
<p>Tension is loss. We’ve lost land, children, husband, that’s why we feel tension. </p>
<p>Tension is neck pain. Tension is throat, shoulders and head pain. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>After conducting our interviews, we then developed a pictorial model of “tension”, as Rohingya is an oral language. The model (below) showed how being “opportunity-less” – from lack of work, education or freedom of movement – sits at the centre of tension. </p>
<p>Our interview subjects told us lack of opportunity leads to thinking too much, pain in the body and conflict in the family, between families and with the Bangladeshi community. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/584619/original/file-20240327-28-4jjhqs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/584619/original/file-20240327-28-4jjhqs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=530&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584619/original/file-20240327-28-4jjhqs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=530&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584619/original/file-20240327-28-4jjhqs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=530&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584619/original/file-20240327-28-4jjhqs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=666&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584619/original/file-20240327-28-4jjhqs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=666&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584619/original/file-20240327-28-4jjhqs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=666&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author provided</span></span>
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<h2>Why the situation has become even more dire</h2>
<p>The six Rohingya activists who helped us to conduct this research have since described to us how these sources of tension have worsened since 2019.</p>
<p>Like so many in their communities, they have personally experienced arbitrary arrest, fabricated legal cases and <a href="https://www.fortifyrights.org/bgd-inv-2023-08-10/">imprisonment</a> by the Bangladeshi authorities.</p>
<p>After dark, the “night government” (armed groups) roam the camps, kidnapping and demanding ransoms from families, threatening people in their <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/2417091/world">homes</a>, trafficking <a href="https://www.asianews.it/news-en/Armed-Rohingya-gangs-kill,-abduct-and-sow-fear-in-Cox's-Bazar-57510.html">drugs</a> and killing anyone who tries to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/16/armed-group-behind-rohingya-leaders-murder-bangladesh-police">speak up</a>. Women and girls are targeted for <a href="https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/closer-look/news/why-are-rohingya-women-and-girls-so-unsafe-refugee-camps-2911316">assault and trafficking</a>. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1453331896407138307"}"></div></p>
<p>The camps are also fenced off, like open-air prisons. This means the refugees are trapped when fires break out, which happens frequently. In January, a huge fire <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-02-12/rohingya-refugees-fire-coxs-bazar-january/103415134">spread quickly</a> in the congested encampments, destroying some 800 shelters and leaving 7,000 people homeless. </p>
<p>And with civil war raging inside Myanmar across the border, some Rohingya in Bangladesh have even been killed by <a href="https://www.thedailystar.net/news/cross-border/news/2-killed-ghumdhum-mortar-shell-myanmar-explodes-bangladesh-3536756">stray mortar shells</a>.</p>
<p>Bangladesh, one of the most <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/344470001_COVID-19_pandemic_dengue_epidemic_and_climate_change_vulnerability_in_Bangladesh_Scenario_assessment_for_strategic_management_and_policy_implications">densely populated and poorest</a> countries in the world, cannot address these push factors in the camps without support. International aid for the Rohingya, meanwhile, continues to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/13/un-makes-appeal-calling-for-more-than-850-mn-for-rohingya-refugees">rapidly decline</a>. </p>
<h2>What Australia and regional partners should do</h2>
<p>What can – and should – the international community do to find a durable solution to this problem?</p>
<p>As a well-resourced regional partner, Australia can play a much bigger humanitarian role not focused solely on punishing people smugglers or the refugees themselves through <a href="https://www.refugeecouncil.org.au/asylum-boats-statistics/">boat turnbacks</a>.</p>
<p>When people are faced with such dire conditions, they will move, no matter the cost. As recent refugee boat arrivals in <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-02-19/beagle-bay-residents-on-asylum-seeker-arrivals-in-wa/103483398">Australia</a> and Indonesia demonstrate, boat turnbacks and arrests fail to address the root causes of forced migration. They do not “stop the boats”.</p>
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<p>
<em>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/amid-a-worsening-refugee-crisis-public-support-is-high-in-both-australia-and-nz-to-accept-more-rohingya-199504">Amid a worsening refugee crisis, public support is high in both Australia and NZ to accept more Rohingya</a>
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<p>Here are our recommendations for what Australia, New Zealand and their regional partners should do instead to help the Rohingya people:</p>
<p>1. Exert diplomatic pressure on the Myanmar junta to recognise Rohingya citizenship and facilitate a peaceful resolution to the ongoing conflict in Rakhine state so the refugees can return home.</p>
<p>2. Address the shortfall in <a href="https://humanitarianadvisorygroup.org/the-silent-decay-of-international-aid-to-rohingya-refugees/">funding</a> to humanitarian organisations working in Bangladesh to address the immediate needs of Rohingya refugees, including food, shelter, health care, proper education and psychosocial support. Invest in the resilience of refugees.</p>
<p>3. Increase pressure on Bangladesh to improve conditions in the refugee camps and provide livelihood opportunities for Rohingya refugees. This includes advocating for policies that allow refugees to work legally and contribute to the local <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/aug/23/five-years-rohingya-refugees-2017-bangladesh-myanmar-military-crackdown">economy</a>.</p>
<p>4. Prioritise resettlement opportunities for Rohingya refugees in third countries, especially those who have been displaced since the 1990s. Resettlement offers a durable solution for those in need of international protection, providing them with the opportunity to rebuild their lives in safety and with dignity.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224515/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The number of Rohingya trying to escape Bangladesh by boat has risen 74% since October. Increasing lawlessness in the camps is one of the major push factors.Ruth Wells, Senior research fellow, Psychiatry and Mental Health, UNSW SydneyMax William Loomes, Senior Researcher, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2242842024-03-08T16:21:36Z2024-03-08T16:21:36ZRestored coral reefs can grow as fast as healthy reefs after just four years – new study<p>The coral reefs of south Sulawesi are some of the most diverse, colourful and vibrant in the world. At least, they used to be, until they were <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/rec.12866">decimated by dynamite fishing</a> in the 1990s. </p>
<p>As part of a team of coral reef ecologists based in Indonesia and the UK, we study the reefs around Pulau Bontosua, a small Indonesian island in south Sulawesi. Thirty years on, what were once large areas of thriving coral are now degraded sites are still devoid of colour, fish and other marine life. Broken skeletons of dead corals roll around on the seabed, crushing and killing any new coral larvae that try to settle and preventing the reefs from recovering naturally. </p>
<p>In many places around the world, damage like this might be described as irreparable. But at Pulau Bontosua, the story is different. Here, efforts by the <a href="https://www.buildingcoral.com/">Mars coral restoration programme</a> have brought back the coral and important ecosystem functions, as outlined by our new study, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2024.02.009">published in Current Biology</a>. We found that within just four years, restored reefs grow at the same rate as nearby healthy reefs. </p>
<p>The Mars coral restoration programme is one of the world’s largest restoration projects and has collaborated with local communities for more than a decade. Healthy coral fragments are attached to hexagonal, sand-covered steel frames called “reef stars”. These reef stars are installed on damaged reefs, where they stabilise the loose rubble, support growth of new coral and provide habitat for reef animals to move in.</p>
<h2>Speedy recovery</h2>
<p>The transplanted corals grow remarkably quickly. Within a year, fragments have developed into proper colonies. After two years, they interlock branches with their neighbours. After just four years, they completely overgrow the reef star structures and restoration sites are barely distinguishable from nearby healthy reefs.</p>
<p>The combined growth of many corals generates a complex limestone (calcium carbonate) framework. This provides habitat for marine life and protects nearby shorelines from storm damage by <a href="https://theconversation.com/coral-reefs-work-as-natures-sea-walls-it-pays-to-look-after-them-26655">absorbing up to 97% of coastal wave energy</a>. </p>
<p>We measured the overall growth of the reef framework by calculating its <a href="https://www.exeter.ac.uk/research/projects/geography/reefbudget/">carbonate budget</a>. That’s the balance between limestone production (by calcifying corals and coralline algae) and erosion (by grazing sea urchins and fishes, for example). A healthy reef produces up to 20kg reef structure per square metre per year, while a degraded reef is shrinking rather than growing, as erosion exceeds limestone production. Therefore, overall reef growth gives an indication of reef health.</p>
<p>At Pulau Bontosua, our survey data shows that in the years following restoration, coral cover, coral colony sizes and carbonate production rates tripled. Within four years, restored reefs were growing at the same speed as healthy reefs, and thereby provided the same important ecosystem functions.</p>
<p>This success is encouraging, but challenges still remain. The corals used to construct these restored reefs are predominantly branching coral types, chosen by the restoration team because they are easier to attach to the reef stars. This means that restored reefs have a lower diversity of coral types than healthy reefs, which host an abundance of boulder-like and encrusting corals as well as branching types. </p>
<p>These structural differences may affect the species of marine life that inhabit the reef. Branching corals are also notoriously sensitive to <a href="https://www.worldwildlife.org/pages/everything-you-need-to-know-about-coral-bleaching-and-how-we-can-stop-it">bleaching</a>, which happens when warmer water temperatures cause stress to corals and turn them white. Differences in the types of coral making up the reef ecosystem may therefore affect the reef’s ability to survive future heat waves. </p>
<h2>A warming world</h2>
<p>Marine heat waves are becoming <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-great-barrier-reef-has-been-bleaching-for-at-least-400-years-but-its-getting-worse-101691">more frequent and severe</a> and pose a huge threat to coral reefs and restoration efforts worldwide. Recently, thousands of <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-heroic-effort-to-save-floridas-coral-reef-from-extreme-ocean-heat-as-corals-bleach-across-the-caribbean-210974">nursery corals had to be rescued</a> when water temperatures spiked in the Florida Keys.</p>
<p>It’s imperative that coral reef restoration strategies include plans for warming waters. In some cases, efforts can be prioritised in areas where transplanted corals are less likely to encounter lethal conditions in the near future. In other cases, projects can enhance coral heat tolerance through <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-great-barrier-reef-can-repair-itself-with-a-little-help-from-science-85182">assisted evolution</a>. </p>
<p>There is some evidence that coral heat tolerance can also <a href="https://theconversation.com/remote-pacific-coral-reef-shows-at-least-some-ability-to-cope-with-ocean-warming-new-study-211852">increase naturally</a>. Whether this coral adaptation can keep pace with ocean warming will depend on global action to cut carbon emissions.</p>
<p>Outcomes of any reef restoration project will depend on environmental conditions, natural coral larvae supply, restoration techniques and the effort invested in maintaining the project. This Indonesian project shows that when conditions are right and efforts are well placed, success is possible. Hopefully, this inspires further global efforts to restore functioning coral reefs and to recreate a climate in which they can thrive.</p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ines Lange receives funding from the Bertarelli Program in Marine Science. Logistical research support for this study was provided by Mars Sustainable Solutions.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tim Lamont receives funding from the Royal Commission for the Exhibition of 1851, and the Fisheries Society of the British Isles. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tries Blandine Razak does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Artificial reef stars have been added to damaged coral reefs in Sulawesi, Indonesia. A new study shows that within just four years, restored reefs are thriving as much as healthy reefs.Ines Lange, Senior Research Fellow in Coral Reef Ecology, University of ExeterTim Lamont, Research Fellow, Lancaster UniversityTries Blandine Razak, Researcher, IPB UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2236372024-02-15T01:33:04Z2024-02-15T01:33:04ZPrabowo Subianto is poised to succeed in lifelong quest to become Indonesia’s president. This is why it’s so worrying<p>Controversial former general Prabowo Subianto, the former son-in-law of long-time authoritarian leader Soeharto, looks set to be Indonesia’s next leader after securing what appears to be a convincing victory in this week’s election. </p>
<p>It may be a month before official results are confirmed, but exit poll “quick counts” from Indonesia’s well-regarded polling companies show Prabowo <a href="https://apnews.com/article/indonesia-presidential-election-voting-dd732adb2d0f3b674fc92aee4f547c6a">winning close to 60% of the vote</a>, which would be a landslide victory. There will likely be no need for a run-off election in June. </p>
<p>The runner-up, Anies Baswedan, <a href="https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/indonesia-elections-2024-unofficial-count-prabowo-lead-4122556">appears</a> to have secured around 24 to 25% of the vote, while Ganjar Pranowo is sitting on just 17%.</p>
<p>Prabowo is therefore the clear choice of Indonesia’s voters, even though he was rejected three times in previous bids for the presidency or vice presidency; there are claims of <a href="https://apnews.com/article/indonesia-presidential-election-voting-dd732adb2d0f3b674fc92aee4f547c6a">human rights abuses</a> against him (including alleged kidnappings, forced disappearances and war crimes by troops under his command); and his campaign was marred by accusations of <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/indonesia/2024/02/12/dirty-vote-documentary-claims-jokowi-improperly-backed-election-frontrunner.html">unethical conduct and collusion</a>. </p>
<p>How did he achieve this remarkable turnaround, and what kind of leader will he be for the country?</p>
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<em>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/cute-grandpa-or-authoritarian-in-waiting-who-is-prabowo-subianto-the-favourite-to-win-indonesias-presidential-election-221858">Cute grandpa or authoritarian in waiting: who is Prabowo Subianto, the favourite to win Indonesia's presidential election?</a>
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<h2>Prabowo’s winning alliance with Jokowi</h2>
<p>A key reason for Prabowo’s convincing victory is the fact he was not running against the immensely popular incumbent Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, who had defeated him in two previous elections and still enjoys approval ratings of well over 70%. </p>
<p>Jokowi was barred by a two-term limit from running again. So, this time – to the surprise of many – he decided to throw his very considerable electoral weight behind his former rival, Prabowo.</p>
<p>Although Jokowi claimed to be neutral in the campaign and never explicitly endorsed any candidate, his position became clear when it was announced that Prabowo’s vice-presidential running mate was Jokowi’s oldest son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka.</p>
<p>Their bid was controversial from the start due to a <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-twist-in-indonesias-presidential-election-does-not-bode-well-for-the-countrys-fragile-democracy-216007">heavily criticised Constitutional Court decision</a> that made Gibran eligible to run and allegations that Jokowi had <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/13/indonesia-election-2024-president-joko-widodo-prabowo-subianto-interference-allegation">encouraged improper campaign support</a> for Prabowo and Gibran from government agencies. This led to many protests against the Prabowo-Gibran ticket in civil society, and even the release of a viral documentary called <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/indonesia/2024/02/12/dirty-vote-documentary-claims-jokowi-improperly-backed-election-frontrunner.html">Dirty Vote</a>.</p>
<p>However, it appears much of the electorate was unmoved by these scandals. After all, misbehaviour by the political elite is nothing new in Indonesia.</p>
<p>Moreover, most of Indonesia’s voters are too young to remember Prabowo’s dark past. Instead, they seemed captivated by the images of Prabowo as a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-68028295">cute grandpa</a> and Gibran as cool, which had saturated the campaign.</p>
<p>Most importantly, many saw a vote for the pair as a vote for the continuance of Jokowi’s policies and even his political influence – the next best thing for them to a third term for Jokowi.</p>
<h2>A major political shake-up</h2>
<p>This meant a large block of votes that had previously gone to Jokowi shifted to Prabowo, ensuring his victory. </p>
<p>Because Jokowi is a member of former president Megawati Soekarnoputri’s PDI-P party, his supporters would normally have backed PDI-P’s presidential candidate, Ganjar. But Jokowi sabotaged Ganjar’s campaign by implicitly supporting his rival, leaving Ganjar to run a distant third.</p>
<p>Early indications suggest that while PDI-P will remain the largest party in the national legislature, its share of the vote may slide from <a href="https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2024/02/14/20084391/quick-count-pileg-2024-litbang-kompas-data-40-persen-pdi-p-golkar-gerindra#google_vignette">20% to 18%</a>. This matters because the next-biggest parties look to be two that backed Prabowo – Golkar and Gerindra. Both received around 14% of the vote in the “quick count”, up from the last election in 2019.</p>
<p>In short, Jokowi has delivered a humiliating blow to Megawati and her party, which many will see as pay-back for Megawati’s arrogant treatment of Jokowi as a <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-SEAB-5976">mere “party functionary” during his time in office</a>.</p>
<p>It is a particularly galling outcome for Megawati, as Prabowo was her running mate when she lost the presidential election in 2009.</p>
<p>Given the controversies behind the Prabowo campaign, the losers are likely to challenge the result in the Constitutional Court. This is common after elections in Indonesia, and sometimes leads to recounts and even re-voting in some electorates.</p>
<p>However, Prabowo’s huge lead means an upset is unlikely. And, of course, Jokowi’s bother-in-law remains one of the nine judges on the Constitutional Court.</p>
<h2>So, what’s next?</h2>
<p>What can we expect from the new president? First, Prabowo will not take over immediately. Under the Indonesian system, he must wait until October to be sworn in. In the meantime, Jokowi will remain in office.</p>
<p>This means the next eight months will be a time of intense horse-trading, pay-offs and political deals, as the political and business elite – including Jokowi – manoeuvre to build a new regime and secure their places in it. </p>
<p>Oligarchs who backed Prabowo’s campaigns can expect to have cabinet seats and lucrative appointments given to them or their supporters, while Prabowo’s rivals will have to be placated or isolated. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/200-million-voters-820-000-polling-stations-and-10-000-candidates-indonesias-massive-election-by-the-numbers-222604">200 million voters, 820,000 polling stations and 10,000 candidates: Indonesia's massive election, by the numbers</a>
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<p>These negotiations will take some time, not least because Megawati and her PDI-P will still be a force to be reckoned with. Prabowo will probably work with Jokowi to try to recreate the sort of grand alliance of parties that Jokowi constructed to control the national legislature. However, this time, PDI-P may choose to go into opposition. This would force Prabowo to make a major political recalibration.</p>
<p>Second, the democratic regression that marked Jokowi’s decade in office is only likely to increase under Prabowo. Under Jokowi, core democratic institutions like the <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/indonesia-s-popular-president-accused-of-undermining-democracy-/7482068.html">Constitutional Court</a> and the <a href="https://eastasiaforum.org/2021/03/16/indonesias-corruption-eradication-commission-in-dire-straits/">Anti-Corruption Commission</a> (KPK) were undermined, restrictions on freedom of speech were <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/12/19/1144064811/indonesia-has-updated-its-criminal-code-with-a-raft-of-free-speech-restrictions">strengthened</a>, and critics of the government were <a href="https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/indonesia-is-one-of-the-worlds-largest-democracies-but-its-weaponising-defamation-laws-to-smother-dissent/">targeted for prosecution</a>. </p>
<p>Although he was reticent during the campaign, Prabowo has been <a href="https://www.channelnewsasia.com/commentary/indonesia-presidential-election-prabowo-democracy-term-limits-opposition-4085111">very clear</a> in the past that he thinks the democratic reforms that followed the fall of Soeharto in 1998, should be wound back. He is unlikely to do this immediately, but as he settles into office, a further gradual dismantling of democratic checks and balances, institutions and individual freedoms is very likely. Critics of Prabowo have good reason to be concerned.</p>
<p>Third, while the alliance with Jokowi was central to Prabowo’s victory, Prabowo has waited a very long time to finally claim the office he has sought for decades. He is 72 and a proud man in a hurry, meaning he is unlikely to be willing to be anyone’s puppet – or even partner – for long. </p>
<p>If he eventually breaks with Jokowi, it could force another major – and turbulent – reconfiguration of Indonesia’s political elite.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/even-with-a-30-quota-in-place-indonesian-women-face-an-uphill-battle-running-for-office-222387">Even with a 30% quota in place, Indonesian women face an uphill battle running for office</a>
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<h2>Implications for the West</h2>
<p>Dealing with all this will create challenges for the West, but there are other problems that diplomats will have to confront. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/indonesian/prabowo-subianto-profile-new-president-02142024141502.html">human rights abuses</a> Prabowo is alleged to be responsible for as a former Special Forces commander – including in East Timor and Papua – are serious. They meant he was denied a visa to the US for many years, and could lead to protests if he visits Western countries as president. </p>
<p>Prabowo never faced trial, although several of his men were tried and convicted. He has <a href="https://apnews.com/article/indonesia-presidential-election-voting-dd732adb2d0f3b674fc92aee4f547c6a">denied</a> any wrongdoing.</p>
<p>Prabowo’s carefully styled “cute grandpa” image will probably not last long, and Western democracies may find his more usual military-style strongman style much more difficult to deal with. He is a politician who is happy to take hardline, even fiery, nationalist positions when it suits him. He is also notoriously temperamental and quick to anger.</p>
<p>However, Prabowo spent time overseas as a child and during his army career and is more at ease internationally than many of his colleagues. And he is clever, strategic and often pragmatic, as his decision to ally with Jokowi demonstrates.</p>
<p>Many democratic countries managed to work effectively with Prabowo as Jokowi’s defence minister for the last five years. These leaders will likely take a deep breath, remember the strategic importance of Indonesia, and continue to do so for the next five, far more difficult, years.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223637/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tim Lindsey receives funding from the Australian Research Council.</span></em></p>As the former general settles into office, a further gradual dismantling of democratic checks and balances, institutions and individual freedoms is very likely.Tim Lindsey, Malcolm Smith Professor of Asian Law and Director of the Centre for Indonesian Law, Islam and Society, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2234682024-02-14T16:06:29Z2024-02-14T16:06:29ZPrabowo’s likely victory: Jokowi’s effect and a test for Indonesia’s democracy<p>Voters in the world’s third-largest democracy, Indonesia, have elected former army general Prabowo Subianto as its eighth president, despite his campaign being dogged by accusations of human rights violations and electoral fraud. According to the <a href="https://pemilu.antaranews.com/berita/3964449/kedaikopi-prediksi-pilpres-2024-satu-putaran">latest reliable polling</a>, Prabowo – Indonesia’s defence minister – secured almost 60% of the votes in what is considered as the largest and most complex single-day election in the world. This will likely mean that there will be no second round. </p>
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Baca juga:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/indonesia-will-hold-the-worlds-biggest-single-day-election-here-is-what-you-need-to-know-208673">Indonesia will hold the world's biggest single day election: here is what you need to know</a>
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<p>More than 200 million eligible voters in more than 17,000 islands cast their votes at more than 820,000 polling stations. The one-day voting process involved 5.7 million election workers, almost the size of Singapore’s population</p>
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Baca juga:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/200-million-voters-820-000-polling-stations-and-10-000-candidates-indonesias-massive-election-by-the-numbers-222604">200 million voters, 820,000 polling stations and 10,000 candidates: Indonesia's massive election, by the numbers</a>
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<p>Given the complexity of the election, General Elections Commission will announce the official result <a href="https://www.kompas.tv/lifestyle/485104/kapan-pengumuman-hasil-pilpres-dan-pileg-pemilu-2024-ini-jadwalnya-dari-kpu?page=all">on March 20</a>. But since its first direct presidential election in 2004, Indonesia has relied on quick counts to know their new president on the election day.</p>
<p>According to these preliminary results Prabowo defeated other candidates – former Jakarta governor Anies Baswedan, who is backed by Muslim conservatives, and former Central Java governor Ganjar Pranowo, who is supported by the country’s largest political party, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP).</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575625/original/file-20240214-22-i3yvxo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C1%2C374%2C249&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575625/original/file-20240214-22-i3yvxo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575625/original/file-20240214-22-i3yvxo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575625/original/file-20240214-22-i3yvxo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575625/original/file-20240214-22-i3yvxo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575625/original/file-20240214-22-i3yvxo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575625/original/file-20240214-22-i3yvxo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Workers pass a poster featuring three presidential candidates in the 2024 election.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
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<p>Prabowo’s victory is a long time in the making. This is his fourth attempt to run for the country’s top jobs. He first ran as the vice presidential candidate for Megawati Sukarnoputri, PDIP chairwoman, in the 2009 presidential election. The pair lost to the Democrat Party’s chairman, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. In the 2014 and 2019 elections, Prabowo ran against the incumbent president, Joko “Jokowi” Widodo. He lost in close elections on both occasions as Jokowi had the backing of Megawati’s party.</p>
<p>It was after his 2019 election defeat that Prabowo <a href="https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20230912225853-617-998201/cerita-prabowo-terima-tawaran-jokowi-jadi-menhan-tak-lebih-dari-1-jam">accepted the offer</a> of a job as Jokowi’s defence minister. </p>
<p>In this year’s election Prabowo teamed up with Jokowi’s eldest son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, after a <a href="https://www.liputan6.com/regional/read/5267482/jokowi-tinggalkan-rumah-di-solo-jelang-deklarasi-ganjar-pranowo-capres-pdip?page=2">dispute between Jokowi and Megawati</a> over their choice of candidates. It’s an example of how unpredictable the manoeuvres by politicians in Indonesia can be to stay in power and retain their dignity.</p>
<h2>Jokowi’s factor</h2>
<p>It is amazing to see how Jokowi rose from an unknown politician back in 2005 when he <a href="https://news.detik.com/berita/d-2723501/begini-perjalanan-politik-jokowi-si-capres-kerempeng">ran as a mayor</a> of a small city of Solo in Central Java province, to become a kingmaker in the current election.</p>
<p>The Prabowo-Gibran ticket was organised with substantial involvement from Jokowi throughout. Gibran was ruled eligible to stand as a vice-presidential candidate after the constitutional court, led by Jokowi’s brother-in-law Anwar Usman, overturned a requirement that the candidates must be at least 40 so that his 36-year-old son could run. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575622/original/file-20240214-28-r46n3t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575622/original/file-20240214-28-r46n3t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575622/original/file-20240214-28-r46n3t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575622/original/file-20240214-28-r46n3t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575622/original/file-20240214-28-r46n3t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575622/original/file-20240214-28-r46n3t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575622/original/file-20240214-28-r46n3t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Joko Widodo.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
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<p>Not surprisingly, the opposition cried foul. Many declared that the election was no longer about continuing Jokowi’s legacy but about <a href="https://twitter.com/msaid_didu/status/1756987736316322005/photo/1">saving democracy</a>. </p>
<p>Three days before the election, a film exposing alleged electoral fraud involving Jokowi went viral. The film alleged that Jokowi painstakingly rigged the election so Prabowo and his son could win. </p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Dirty Vote by activist Dandhy Dwi Laksono.</span></figcaption>
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<p>Three leading academics – Bivitri Susanti, Zainal Arifin Mochtar and Feri Amsari – who were interviewed for the movie revealed what they said were Jokowi’s various strategies. These ranged from distributing government funds to potential voters before the election to planting supporters in numerous key provinces. The film’s director, Dandhy Dwi Laksono, and the three academics <a href="https://www.liputan6.com/pemilu/read/5527648/sutradara-dan-3-pemeran-di-film-dirty-vote-dipolisikan-mahfud-paling-untuk-imbangi-situasi">have been reported to the police</a>. </p>
<h2>What does this mean for Indonesia’s democracy?</h2>
<p>Many critics <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/02/14/indonesia-elections-democracy-backsliding-prabowo-widodo/">are saying</a> that Prabowo’s likely victory is proof of Indonesia’s democratic backsliding. But it remains too early to make any judgements about any real democratic threat from the election. </p>
<p>But Prabowo’s chequered past has been widely discussed. He is the son-in-law of Indonesia long-term autocratic leader Suharto and has been accused of complicity in the <a href="https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20231213135152-4-496927/disinggung-ganjar-ini-13-aktivis-yang-hilang-tahun-1997-1998">disappearances</a> of 13 activists during Suharto’s presidency.</p>
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Baca juga:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/on-election-eve-all-3-of-indonesias-presidential-candidates-have-troubling-human-rights-records-223326">On election eve, all 3 of Indonesia's presidential candidates have troubling human rights records</a>
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<p>. </p>
<p>Democratic safeguards introduced after the fall of Suharto’s authoritarian regime in the late 1990s and the onset of what became known as the reform era are thought likely to prevent Prabowo from becoming an autocratic ruler of Indonesia.</p>
<p>First, Prabowo is not as popular as Jokowi. </p>
<p>Unlike Jokowi, whose <a href="https://jakartaglobe.id/news/jokowi-enters-final-year-in-presidency-with-80-job-approval-poll">stratospheric approval rating of 80%</a> gave him a lot of leeway to test the limit of his power, Prabowo is not that popular. Until Jokowi gave him tacit support, Prabowo consistently placed second behind Ganjar at around 20% of the vote. It’s unlikely that Prabowo could have even achieved the runner’s up position had the election been held a year ago. Prabowo’s political party, Gerindra, sits in third place, according to the quick count, behind the PDIP and Golkar. </p>
<p>Further, Prabowo’s reputation as a strongman may have attracted many people to support him – but is has simultaneously meant that many voters are wary of him. Regardless of how <a href="https://www.globalasia.org/v18no4/feature/jokowis-complex-legacy-and-the-future-of-democracy-in-indonesia_yohanes-sulaiman">corruptible political parties are</a>, it is difficult to see that they will be willingly giving up the hard-won power that they gained in the aftermath of Suharto’s dictatorship to Prabowo.</p>
<p>And, importantly, the military does not necessarily support Prabowo. As an institution, the military has always prided itself on following the rule of law and constitution, especially after the reform era. It is difficult to see that the military may want to risk its hard-won reputation and public trust to support any moves Prabowo might make if elected to undermine democracy. </p>
<p>And the experience of Myanmar next door should give them a pause:<a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/2021-Myanmar-coup-d-etat"> the 2021 military coup in Myanmar</a> has ended up plunging the entire country into a civil war. Myanmar’s powerful military, the Tatmadaw, is losing ground steadily to armed ethnic and opposition groups. </p>
<p>The other factor to bear in mind is Jokowi’s enduring popularity. There are those who think that he might be tempted by the extent of his popular support to continue to interfere in politics via his son Gibran’s vice-presidency. There are those who feel he used non-democratic means to influence the election and secure Gibran a place on the ticket. </p>
<p>Weeks before the election, civil society organisations as well as <a href="https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2024/02/04/08381211/gelombang-kritik-para-guru-besar-soal-pemilu-2024-dan-tanda-tanya-sikap?page=all">academics</a> and activists spoke out against Jokowi for what they saw as his his political manoeuvring to retain political influence. </p>
<p>Perhaps Prabowo’s victory is a blessing in disguise for Indonesian democracy if it means people will start seriously agitating for democracy – and no longer take it for granted.</p>
<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223468/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yohanes Sulaiman tidak bekerja, menjadi konsultan, memiliki saham, atau menerima dana dari perusahaan atau organisasi mana pun yang akan mengambil untung dari artikel ini, dan telah mengungkapkan bahwa ia tidak memiliki afiliasi selain yang telah disebut di atas.</span></em></p>Based on quick counts, Prabowo Subianto and his pair Gibran Rakabuming Raka won the majority of votes at almost 60%Yohanes Sulaiman, Associate Lecturer, School of Government, Universitas Jendral Achmad YaniLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2226042024-02-13T10:48:22Z2024-02-13T10:48:22Z200 million voters, 820,000 polling stations and 10,000 candidates: Indonesia’s massive election, by the numbers<p>Indonesians are going to the polls to elect a new president on Wednesday. There are three candidates running, alongside their vice presidential candidates.</p>
<p>According to opinion polls, the favourite is <a href="https://theconversation.com/cute-grandpa-or-authoritarian-in-waiting-who-is-prabowo-subianto-the-favourite-to-win-indonesias-presidential-election-221858">Prabowo Subianto</a>, leader of the Greater Indonesia Party (Gerindra), a populist and nationalist party he founded in 2008. A former army general, Prabowo has already stood unsuccessfully for president twice before. He is also the defence minister in the cabinet of the current president, Joko “Jokowi” Widodo. </p>
<p>The other contenders are Ganjar Pranowo, a former governor of the large province of Central Java and a member of Indonesia’s biggest party, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), and Anies Basweden, an independent candidate who was governor of the city of Jakarta.</p>
<p>Prabowo is the frontrunner, but it’s unclear whether he will win an absolute majority of votes in the first round. If he fails to win 50.1% of the vote, there will be a runoff election between the two leading candidates in June.</p>
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<span class="attribution"><span class="source">The Conversation</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
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<hr>
<h2>By the numbers</h2>
<p>Voters are also casting votes in parliamentary elections, <a href="https://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/2024-02/2024_Elections_FAQ_Final.pdf">which include</a>:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>580 seats in the House of Representatives (DPR), with more than 9,900 candidates </p></li>
<li><p>152 seats in the Regional Representative Council (DPD), designed to represent the regions, with around 670 candidates</p></li>
<li><p>and local parliaments in each of the 38 provinces and 416 districts.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>In total, there are over 2,700 separate electoral contests being held for around 20,500 seats. All are the responsibility of Indonesia’s independent election commission (the Komisi Pemilihan Umum, or simply KPU) to administer impartially and efficiently.</p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575151/original/file-20240212-18-j0czv9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575151/original/file-20240212-18-j0czv9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575151/original/file-20240212-18-j0czv9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=576&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575151/original/file-20240212-18-j0czv9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=576&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575151/original/file-20240212-18-j0czv9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=576&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575151/original/file-20240212-18-j0czv9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=724&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575151/original/file-20240212-18-j0czv9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=724&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575151/original/file-20240212-18-j0czv9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=724&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><span class="source">The Conversation, KPU, Perludem</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
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<hr>
<h2>Logistical nightmare</h2>
<p>Indonesia is the world’s third-largest democracy after India and the United States – and all three are holding elections this year. But since Indonesia is holding five separate polls on one day, it is often touted as the largest and most complex <a href="https://theconversation.com/indonesia-will-hold-the-worlds-biggest-single-day-election-here-is-what-you-need-to-know-208673">single-day election</a> in the world.</p>
<p>Indonesia is an archipelago with about 6,000 inhabited islands, some of them remote and with limited infrastructure. The distance from Aceh in the west to Papua in the east is some 5,100 kilometres (3,200 miles), wider than the continental US. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/cute-grandpa-or-authoritarian-in-waiting-who-is-prabowo-subianto-the-favourite-to-win-indonesias-presidential-election-221858">Cute grandpa or authoritarian in waiting: who is Prabowo Subianto, the favourite to win Indonesia's presidential election?</a>
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<p>It is a massive undertaking to organise an election of this size, from procuring polling station equipment to managing a huge election staff to ensuring the public trusts the integrity and fairness of the vote. The election commission does a remarkable job making sure the vote happens on time and the ballot counting occurs quickly and without tampering.</p>
<p>To get an idea of the size of the task facing the KPU, let’s look at the presidential election first.</p>
<p>There are 204 million registered voters in Indonesia, so the KPU has to print and distribute this many ballots across the country for the presidential vote alone, with a few million extra in case polling stations run short.</p>
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<p>The commission is then required to deliver, count and return the ballots to over <a href="https://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/2024-02/2024_Elections_FAQ_Final.pdf">820,000 domestic polling stations</a>, in addition to more than 3,000 stations overseas. Since there may be a second-round, runoff election, the KPU must be ready to repeat the whole exercise in a few months. This time it would need a different set of ballot papers showing the two final candidates.</p>
<p>But things get really complicated when it comes to the contests for Indonesia’s various national and regional parliaments, even though these get relatively little attention compared to the presidential poll.</p>
<p>The presidential election involves a simple majority count of three candidates. But the national and regional parliaments are conducted through a proportional representation system, the same used in countries like Germany and New Zealand, and for the Australian Senate. Under this system, parties win seats in proportion to the votes they receive. For example, a party winning 20% of the votes will take up around 20% of the seats in the chamber. </p>
<p>Adding to the complexity, voters in Indonesia are not compelled to vote just for a party, but can choose an individual candidate within a party’s list. So, when voters arrive at the polling station, they are presented with a huge ballot paper for the national parliament alone, which lists, on average, 118 candidates. </p>
<p>And they must also make choices for three other chambers – in addition to the presidential vote.</p>
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<h2>An unglamorous, but remarkable democratic achievement</h2>
<p>So, how well has Indonesia done in this massive task of making democratic elections work? </p>
<p>After languishing under a dictatorship and rigged elections for four decades under the rule of Soeharto, the country has done remarkably well since embracing democracy in the late 1990s.</p>
<p>In fact, Indonesia rarely receives recognition for this transformation. In a world where democracy seems increasingly under pressure, Indonesia has managed five peaceful and democratic transfers of power. In comparison to neighbouring states in Southeast Asia, where <a href="https://www.newmandala.org/civil-society-and-southeast-asias-authoritarian-turn/">one-party dominance</a> is widespread or democratic progress has been crushed under <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/myanmar-history-coup-military-rule-ethnic-conflict-rohingya">military coups</a>, Indonesia stands out as a bastion of democratic politics.</p>
<p>None of this is to say that Indonesia’s system is flawless. In fact, domestic and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00074918.2018.1549918?casa_token=UxIulMCigoYAAAAA:6CZA0rTwlhWHlfUU6Y_sxAW1P3-ClmyKNUOlPfArJjAjAddU4jwBgltG41xOeLBi44jbLeISJ6m46B4">international observers</a> have increasingly noted the reemergence of authoritarian instincts among the country’s leaders and the rise of <a href="https://www.economist.com/asia/2023/10/26/jokowi-is-building-a-political-dynasty">dynastic politics</a> in which incumbents engineer the elections of family members. </p>
<p>And this not only applies to prominent figures from the Soeharto days, such as the leading presidential contender Prabowo. Jokowi has also been <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-joko-widodo-paving-the-way-for-a-political-dynasty-in-indonesia-219499">accused</a> of paving the way for a political dynasty by using his son’s candidacy to ensure he’ll have influence in a Prabowo presidential administration.</p>
<p>But when it comes to the electoral contest itself, Indonesia’s election commission, while not perfect, has delivered reliable and trustworthy outcomes. </p>
<p>The administration of free and fair elections is an unglamorous job, but it is crucial for maintaining public trust in the political system. It also ensures that candidates and parties accept the results and are not tempted to launch coups or deliberately obstruct the post-election process. </p>
<p>Given the strains placed on the United States’ long-established democracy in recent years, Indonesia’s achievement in making elections work should not go unnoticed.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/even-with-a-30-quota-in-place-indonesian-women-face-an-uphill-battle-running-for-office-222387">Even with a 30% quota in place, Indonesian women face an uphill battle running for office</a>
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</em>
</p>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222604/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Sherlock does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>This is what it takes to organise the largest and most complex single-day election on the planet.Stephen Sherlock, Visiting Fellow, Department of Political and Social Change, Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2226112024-02-13T07:32:48Z2024-02-13T07:32:48ZHow Muslim teachings support political dynasties in Indonesia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575147/original/file-20240212-22-xlmztf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=1%2C1%2C374%2C250&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Gibran Rakabuming Raka, President Joko "Jokowi" Widodo's oldest son (right)</span> </figcaption></figure><p>President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo is the latest high-profile political figure in Indonesia to attempt to build a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20185086?seq=20">political dynasty</a>, loosely defined as a concentration of political power involving family members.</p>
<p>Jokowi’s efforts have become more evident with his first-born son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, now running as a <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-joko-widodo-paving-the-way-for-a-political-dynasty-in-indonesia-219499">vice presidential candidate</a> in the upcoming election this week, despite public outcry over his candidacy. </p>
<p>Gibran, who is 36 years old, entered the race after the Constitutional Court, led by Jokowi’s in-law, allowed a candidate under the age of 40 to run for president or vice president, as long as they had previously held public office. The previous age requirement for presidential and vice presidential candidates was at least 40. </p>
<p>This example is just the tip of the iceberg in the <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/20578911231195970">post-Suharto era</a> of Indonesian politics. The practice is entrenched within all political levels in Indonesia, especially in <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qZDcCewGRxs">political parties</a>. </p>
<p>As observers with a deep interest in politics and religion, we have also seen how political dynasties have become associated with public misperceptions about the values of leadership based on religious teachings. </p>
<h2>Tendency towards empire style</h2>
<p>Starting in the seventh century, monarchies like the Sriwijaya Kingdom on Sumatra island ruled in Indonesia. Islamic kingdoms then emerged in the 13th and ruled until the early 20th century.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575153/original/file-20240212-18-kmzng7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575153/original/file-20240212-18-kmzng7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575153/original/file-20240212-18-kmzng7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575153/original/file-20240212-18-kmzng7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575153/original/file-20240212-18-kmzng7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575153/original/file-20240212-18-kmzng7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575153/original/file-20240212-18-kmzng7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Muara Takus Temple is a cultural heritage, a legacy from the era of the Sriwijaya kingdom, located in Riau Province.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Transitioning from a monarchical to democratic society was challenging for Indonesia because it required a mindset shift from traditional Indonesian culture to modernity.</p>
<p>Indonesians’ reluctance to accept a secular state shows the critical role of <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/bki/174/4/article-p498_9.xml?language=en">religion in politics</a>. Muslims, which comprise approximately 87% of the country’s population, are the greatest advocates for religion’s continued role in politics.</p>
<p>With religious piety in Indonesia <a href="https://ejournal.uin-suka.ac.id/isoshum/sosiologireflektif/article/view/132-03/0">increasing</a> in the last decade, the role of religion in politics and governance has only grown stronger.</p>
<p>Some Muslims still view their leaders as those who gain authority from God to rule them. Muslims are obliged to pledge loyalty in accordance with the concept of <em><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20788349">bay'ah</a></em> posed by Muslim scholars. </p>
<p>Indeed, the <em>bay'ah</em> concept is inconsistent with a modern, secular state model because the pledge can only be invalidated if a ruler resigns or dies – not with the transfer of power through elections.</p>
<p>For instance, a pledge to Sultan Daud Shah, the last sultan of Aceh, became invalid for just two causes: his death or his resignation from the Dutch colonial government. If anyone attempted to elect another ruler while the sultan was still living, it would conceptually be considered an unlawful rebellion. </p>
<p>Some Indonesian Muslims also believe that in politics, blood relations are an important determining factor for leadership.</p>
<figure class="align- centre ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575155/original/file-20240212-18-ey3jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575155/original/file-20240212-18-ey3jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575155/original/file-20240212-18-ey3jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575155/original/file-20240212-18-ey3jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575155/original/file-20240212-18-ey3jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575155/original/file-20240212-18-ey3jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575155/original/file-20240212-18-ey3jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A preacher delivers a sermon after the Eid prayer in Palembang, South Sumatra.</span>
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<p>Muslim preachers often describe ideal leaders through parables, such as <em>Ratu Adil</em> (a messianic, just ruler in to Javanese folklore) or <em>Khulafa’ Rashidun</em> (the first four rulers in Islamic civilisation). </p>
<p>Among the leadership qualities typically highlighted by these narratives: absolute justice, enduring reigns, flawless personalities, religiosity, and facing little resistance or enjoying easy domination over adversaries. Someone who has these qualities is then seen as a good leader.</p>
<p>Since Indonesians still view leaders within this historical kingship framework, the descendants of a leader are assumed to inherit these qualities. </p>
<p>One example comes from Ustadz Adi Hidayat, a famous preacher affiliated with Muhammadiyah, the country’s second-largest Muslim organisation. He lists <a href="https://rejogja.republika.co.id/berita/rs3rmz291/lima-karakter-pemimpin-amanah-menurut-ustaz-adi-hidayat">five key traits</a> for a ruler. Three of them would not work in a republican setting, yet are entirely fitting for a pious king: religious faith, perfect morality and being divinely guided. </p>
<p>Another example is Gus Baha from <em>Nahdhiyyin</em> (affiliated with Nahdhatul Ulama, Indonesia’s biggest Muslim organisation), who frequently tells <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aVhwyiwHIQQ">stories of ideal</a> rulers from the past, namely the prophet Sulaiman. He replaced his father as king and was not democratically elected. </p>
<h2>Religious influence</h2>
<p>This sort of teaching provides greater understanding of Indonesians’ beliefs around democratic government. Some cannot move on from the monarchical dynasties because they will always see the need for a leader who resembles King Sulaiman, rather than a democratically elected leader, for instance.</p>
<p>These preachers inadvertently reinforce the tendency to dynastic politics in the country. </p>
<p>In recent elections, followers of the preacher’s groups justified their votes with narratives of <a href="https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20180414183724-20-290838/ketum-mui-jokowi-jadi-presiden-atas-kehendak-allah">divine guidance</a>, emphasising a leader’s sacred rule. </p>
<p>Leaders at all levels – but especially the president – are expected to embody moral perfection and excellent charisma. Even those with strong political visions can see their support wane if they lack the right persona. People also expect these qualities to persist in a leader’s family, forming a perceived dynasty.</p>
<p>Religion will always hold a crucial role in Muslim life and politics in Indonesia. Without proper education on how democratic leadership can work through a religious lens, dynasty politics will remain morally and culturally accepted in Indonesian political circles in the future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222611/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Para penulis tidak bekerja, menjadi konsultan, memiliki saham atau menerima dana dari perusahaan atau organisasi mana pun yang akan mengambil untung dari artikel ini, dan telah mengungkapkan bahwa ia tidak memiliki afiliasi di luar afiliasi akademis yang telah disebut di atas.</span></em></p>The public approval of political dynasties, especially among Muslims, is fuelled by Muslim preachers and their beliefs around what constitutes a good leader.Anggi Azzuhri, PhD candidate, Universitas Islam Internasional Indonesia (UIII)Musa Alkadzim, Mahasiswa, Universitas Islam Internasional Indonesia (UIII)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2231192024-02-12T11:47:56Z2024-02-12T11:47:56ZDeepfakes and disinformation swirl ahead of Indonesian election – podcast<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574372/original/file-20240208-28-gpe2qm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=28%2C14%2C1866%2C902&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A screenshot from a deepfake video shared on X purporting to show former Indonesian President Suharto. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://x.com/erwinaksa_id/status/1754370873992360113?s=20">Erwin Aksa via X</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Indonesia, the world’s third-largest democracy, goes to the polls on February 14 to elect a new president. It’s one of the largest elections to take place since an explosion of generative AI tools became available that can manipulate video and audio – and a number of deepfake videos have gone viral during the campaign. </p>
<p>In this episode of <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/the-conversation-weekly-98901">The Conversation Weekly</a> podcast, we look at what Indonesia’s experience is revealing about the disinformation battleground ahead in 2024, when an estimated <a href="https://theconversation.com/more-than-4-billion-people-are-eligible-to-vote-in-an-election-in-2024-is-this-democracys-biggest-test-220837">4 billion voters</a> will be eligible to vote in an election. </p>
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<p>Some of Indonesia’s deepfake videos are fairly easy to debunk. One, which went <a href="https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/indonesian/suharto-deepfake-used-in-election-campaign-01122024135217.html">viral in January</a>, shows a video of Suharto, the former president of Indonesia, endorsing his former political party, Golkar. Suharto, whose 32 years in power were marked by a brutal military dictatorship, died in 2008. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-professor-the-general-and-the-populist-meet-the-three-candidates-running-for-president-in-indonesia-217811">The professor, the general and the populist: meet the three candidates running for president in Indonesia</a>
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<p>Others are a bit more subtle. Lilik Mardjianto, a journalism lecturer at Universitas Multimedia Nusantara in Indonesia, says a few deepfakes use “factual videos but manipulate the voice using AI” to make it sound like a politician is speaking in another language. In one, Joko Widodo, the outgoing president, is depicted speaking in Mandarin. Other videos have depicted <a href="https://factcheck.afp.com/doc.afp.com.342A6RJ">two candidates</a> for the 2024 election <a href="https://factcheck.afp.com/doc.afp.com.34324G7">speaking in Arabic</a>. </p>
<p>For Nuurianti Jalli, an expert on disinformation in south-east Asia at Oklahoma State University in the US, these deepfakes, even when they’re crude, can influence the political conversation.</p>
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<p>Indonesia is a Muslim majority country, number one in the world. And having presidential candidates speaking fluent Arabic, people see it as a good reflection of Muslim leaders. So that you can see how, in Indonesia, AI-generated content can create more awareness about the presidential candidate and eventually can, perhaps create more positive perception of this candidate. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Indonesians are no strangers to disinformation spread on social media. “Hoaks”, as they’re called in Indonesia, proliferated during the last presidential election campaign in 2019. Jalli says rumours spread online also contributed to post-election violence in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/29/rights-group-10-unlawfully-killed-in-indonesia-election-riots">which ten people were killed</a> during protests against the re-election of Widodo. </p>
<p>In 2024, teams of journalists are racing to fact check claims and content ahead of the polls, including <a href="https://theconversation.com/tcid-aji-kompas-com-dan-tempo-co-luncurkan-kolaborasi-panel-ahli-cek-fakta-220238">The Conversation</a> in Indonesia.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/200-million-voters-820-000-polling-stations-and-10-000-candidates-indonesias-massive-election-by-the-numbers-222604">200 million voters, 820,000 polling stations and 10,000 candidates: Indonesia's massive election, by the numbers</a>
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<p>But Jalli says the factcheckers she’s spoken to worry they’re now playing catch-up with AI-generated hoaxes. “Everything goes viral first” and then journalists try to “debunk that after millions of people watched it”, she says. </p>
<p>Listen to Jalli and Mardjianto plus Nurul Fitri Ramadhani, politics editor at The Conversation in Indonesia on <a href="https://podfollow.com/the-conversation-weekly/view">The Conversation Weekly podcast</a>. You can also read more about disinformation in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/indonesia-election-2024-147192">Indonesian election on The Conversation</a>. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://cdn.theconversation.com/static_files/files/3074/Indonesia_Deepfakes_Transcript.docx.pdf?1709054499">transcript of this episode</a> is now available. </p>
<p><em>This episode of The Conversation Weekly was written by Mend Mariwany, and produced by Mend Mariwany and Gemma Ware. Sound design was by Eloise Stevens, and our theme music is by Neeta Sarl. Stephen Khan is our global executive editor, Alice Mason runs our social media and Soraya Nandy does our transcripts.</em></p>
<p><em>You can find us on X, formerly known as Twitter <a href="https://twitter.com/TC_Audio">@TC_Audio</a>, on Instagram at <a href="https://www.instagram.com/theconversationdotcom/">theconversationdotcom</a> or <a href="mailto:podcast@theconversation.com">via email</a>. You can also subscribe to The Conversation’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/newsletter">free daily email here</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>Listen to The Conversation Weekly via any of the apps listed above, download it directly via our <a href="https://feeds.acast.com/public/shows/60087127b9687759d637bade">RSS feed</a> or find out <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-listen-to-the-conversations-podcasts-154131">how else to listen here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223119/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>F.X. Lilik Dwi Mardjianto's research on the fact-checking audience has been supported by the Indonesian Cyber Media Association. Nuurrianti Jalli does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Disinformation experts, Lilik Mardjianto and Nuurrianti Jalli, tell The Conversation Weekly podcast about the deepfakes circulating ahead of the Indonesian election.Gemma Ware, Editor and Co-Host, The Conversation Weekly Podcast, The ConversationLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2218582024-02-11T19:05:52Z2024-02-11T19:05:52ZCute grandpa or authoritarian in waiting: who is Prabowo Subianto, the favourite to win Indonesia’s presidential election?<p>Ambitious and mercurial, with a dark past, former army general Prabowo Subianto has spent a lifetime vying for the ultimate prize in Indonesian politics. Now, with a <a href="https://www.roymorgan.com/findings/9414-indonesian-voting-intention-january-2024">large lead in the latest polls</a> ahead of this week’s election, it looks as though the <a href="https://theconversation.com/indonesias-presidential-election-may-go-to-run-off-despite-what-the-polls-say-222380">presidency is finally within his grasp</a>.</p>
<p>So, who is Prabowo and how will he change Indonesia if he wins?</p>
<h2>A rapid rise through the military ranks – and fall</h2>
<p>Prabowo Subianto Djojohadikusumo is a true Indonesian blueblood. His family claims to be descended from national hero <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Diponegoro">Diponegoro</a>, a prince of the Mataram sultanate who led the Java War rebellion against Dutch colonial forces in the 19th century. </p>
<p>Prabowo’s grandfather was the founder of Indonesia’s first state bank and a prominent member of Indonesia’s independence movement. His father was a leading economist who served as minister of finance, minister of trade and minister for research in the government. His brother is a wealthy tycoon.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574271/original/file-20240208-28-x7de32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574271/original/file-20240208-28-x7de32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=720&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574271/original/file-20240208-28-x7de32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=720&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574271/original/file-20240208-28-x7de32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=720&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574271/original/file-20240208-28-x7de32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=905&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574271/original/file-20240208-28-x7de32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=905&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574271/original/file-20240208-28-x7de32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=905&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Prabowo (standing right) with his siblings and grandparents.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span>
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<p>Prabowo, too, has long sought national prominence. An ambitious military officer serving mostly in the Special Forces (Kopassus), his marriage to a daughter of the authoritarian former president, Soeharto, fast-tracked his career. Prabowo rose to the rank of lieutenant general and, finally, the key position of commander of the powerful Army Strategic Reserve (Kostrad) in the capital, Jakarta.</p>
<p>As Soeharto’s regime began to falter amid the financial crisis of 1997, Prabowo become involved in covert operations to defend Soeharto’s army-backed and repressive <a href="https://press.anu.edu.au/publications/series/asian-studies/soehartos-new-order-and-its-legacy">New Order</a> regime against its critics. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/soeharto-the-giant-of-modern-indonesia-who-left-a-legacy-of-violence-and-corruption-164411">Soeharto: the giant of modern Indonesia who left a legacy of violence and corruption</a>
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<p>Under his leadership, the Special Forces’ “Rose Brigade” was accused of abducting and torturing more than 20 student protesters, 13 of whom are still missing, presumed dead. Prabowo has admitted to the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2014/7/18/indonesia-candidate-admits-role-in-abductions">abductions</a>, but denies being involved in any killings. </p>
<p>Prabowo never faced trial, although several of his men were tried and convicted. The allegations against him meant he was, for years, denied a visa to enter the US.</p>
<p>Prabowo also denies a wide range of earlier accusations relating to human rights abuses committed by Special Forces under his command in East Timor and Papua, including alleged torture and killings. </p>
<p>He also denies accusations he was involved in engineering the <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20120310123501/http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2004/05/13/six-years-after-may-1998-tragedy-still-unresolved.html">violent rioting</a> in the capital in 1998 that contributed to the collapse of his father-in-law’s regime, likely the result of an <a href="https://www.chicagotribune.com/1998/08/25/indonesia-army-ousts-suhartos-son-in-law/">internal military struggle to become Soeharto’s successor</a>. It seems Prabowo hoped to climb high amid the chaos at the time. </p>
<p>After Soeharto resigned in May 1998, his newly installed successor, B.J. Habibie, refused Prabowo’s request to be made head of the army, instead effectively demoting him. Prabowo is said to have responded by arming himself with a pistol and <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/ASIANOW/asiaweek/98/0724/cs6.html">driving to the palace with truckloads of soldiers</a>, but was stopped outside the president’s office.</p>
<p>Soon after, Prabowo was <a href="https://www.chicagotribune.com/1998/08/25/indonesia-army-ousts-suhartos-son-in-law/">cashiered</a> for “misinterpreting orders”, although the precise details of his dismissal still remain mysterious. He went into voluntary exile in Jordan for some years and it seemed his career was over.</p>
<h2>Three unsuccessful bids for higher office</h2>
<p>But Prabowo remained an ambitious man. By 2009, he was a wealthy business figure and had co-founded his own political party, Gerindra. He had also rehabilitated himself enough to make a formal bid for power, running for vice president in the 2009 elections on a ticket with former president Megawati Soekarnoputri. They lost in a landslide.</p>
<p>In 2014, Prabowo tried again. This time he ran as a presidential candidate against Joko “Jokowi” Widodo. Prabowo campaigned as a nationalist “strongman”, riding his horse around stadiums of cheering uniformed supporters and promising a return to the authoritarian model of the New Order. He lost both the election and a challenge to the results in the Constitutional Court.</p>
<p>In 2019, he tried once again against Jokowi, this time turning to conservative Islamists to support him. He was a strange choice as their figurehead, given he had a Christian mother and brother and, although a Muslim himself, had previously shown little public piety. In his 2014 campaign, he had even promised to protect religious minorities against Islamists.</p>
<p>Prabowo’s use of identity politics proved deeply polarising, strengthening the hand of hardline Islamist groups in Indonesia and deepening tensions between religious communities for years to come.</p>
<p>But Prabowo lost this election, too. He accused Jokowi of cheating, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/5/24/indonesias-prabowo-challenges-election-result-in-court">sparking rioting</a> in Jakarta in which eight people died. He again contested the results in a highly publicised Constitutional Court challenge, which he also lost.</p>
<p>Prabowo then made the extraordinary decision to reinvent himself again. Dumping his supporters, he took the position of defence minister in the cabinet of his rival, Jokowi. The two former foes were photographed shaking hands and sharing jokes to seal their extraordinary deal.</p>
<p>For the next four years, Prabowo dutifully performed the role of loyal minister – even when Jokowi’s government moved against some of the Islamist organisations that had backed him in his last bid for the top job.</p>
<h2>Controversial political moves</h2>
<p>Now 72, Prabowo’s ambitions are undiminished, but his tactics have, once again, changed dramatically. </p>
<p>In his current run for president, Prabowo has selected Jokowi’s son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, as his vice-presidential running mate. And Jokowi himself now backs him. (Although Jokowi has never explicitly endorsed Prabowo, Gibran’s candidacy makes Jokowi’s preferences crystal clear.)</p>
<p>Jokowi’s decision to join forces with Prabowo and his Gerindra party was driven by the fact he was prevented from running himself by the two-term presidential limit in the constitution. He therefore needed to find another way to maintain influence. Having his son as vice president would certainly suffice.</p>
<p>Jokowi is hugely popular, with approval rates still well over 70%. This means his decision to back Prabowo may – at last – deliver the presidency to the former general.</p>
<p>But building a new alliance with Prabowo has proved to be a seismic event in Indonesian politics, for two reasons.</p>
<p>First, according to the country’s election law, candidates for president and vice president must be at least 40 years old. The 36-year-old Gibran didn’t qualify.</p>
<p>Helpfully, the chief justice of the Constitutional Court was Gibran’s uncle and had been appointed by Jokowi. The court duly delivered a ruling that younger candidates could run if they had held elected office as a regional head. Gibran just happens to be mayor of the city of Solo (a position his father once held), so he was now eligible.</p>
<p>Uproar ensued, and the chief justice was demoted for his obvious conflict of interest. But, incredibly, the decision stood, and Gibran is running.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1755398254924308598"}"></div></p>
<p>Second, Jokowi is a member of the PDI-P party, which had twice nominated him for president. The party has its own candidate running for president, Ganjar Pranowo. </p>
<p>So, by backing Prabowo, Jokowi has effectively turned his back on his own party and may help defeat its candidate for the presidency.</p>
<p>His actions also pose a major threat to PDI-P’s prospects in the legislative elections (held at the same time as the presidential vote). To the PDI-P leader, former president Megawati, and many of her supporters, Jokowi is now a traitor and enemy who may inflict huge damage on their political prospects.</p>
<h2>Why this election matters</h2>
<p>Prabowo’s big lead in the polls is partly thanks to Jokowi’s support and the many government officials now openly backing him. However, Prabowo has undergone (yet another) spectacular reinvention in recent months that has helped as well. </p>
<p>His campaign team has heavily promoted him as a baby-faced <em>gemoy</em> (cute) grandpa, using viral memes, video clips and even huge screens with anime avatars of Prabowo and Gibran smiling and winking at passers-by.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="TiktokEmbed" data-react-props="{"url":"https://www.tiktok.com/@aku_chandkelvin/video/7311218296395713797?q=prabowo%20gemoy\u0026t=1707360432315"}"></div></p>
<p>But Prabowo is not cute. In fact, he has repeatedly said Indonesia’s democratic system is <a href="https://www.channelnewsasia.com/commentary/indonesia-presidential-election-prabowo-democracy-term-limits-opposition-4085111">not working</a> and the country should return to its original 1945 constitution. This would mean unravelling most of the reforms introduced since Soeharto fell, which are largely based on constitutional amendments. </p>
<p>Among other things, Indonesia’s charter of human rights would go, as would the Constitutional Court. The courts would no longer be independent, direct presidential elections would end, the two-term presidential limit would go and the president could again control the legislature.</p>
<p>Of course, these changes might not be easily done, but it is a chilling prospect if Prabowo wins. And that may happen because much of the electorate doesn’t seem to care all that much about the consequences of picking him.</p>
<p>The average age of Indonesia’s 205 million eligible voters voters is just 30, and more than half are millennials or Gen Z. This means many have no memory of Soeharto’s oppressive and abusive New Order that Prabowo seems to want to revive.</p>
<p>Young voters also seem untroubled by Prabowo’s dark past and the credible allegations of violence and human rights abuses made against him. Instead, they seem captivated by the cute Prabowo and cool Gibran imagery saturating social media, backed by the charisma of Indonesia’s most popular public figure, Jokowi.</p>
<p>If Prabowo does become president, as many now expect, Indonesia’s fragile democratic system may be the next thing he reinvents – or, more likely, dismantles.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221858/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tim Lindsey receives funding from the Australian Research Council</span></em></p>The general has repeatedly said Indonesia’s democratic system is not working and the country should return to its original 1945 constitution, which could unravel many democratic reforms.Tim Lindsey, Malcolm Smith Professor of Asian Law and Director of the Centre for Indonesian Law, Islam and Society, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2223872024-02-08T00:55:49Z2024-02-08T00:55:49ZEven with a 30% quota in place, Indonesian women face an uphill battle running for office<p>In the 2019 general election, Indonesians voted more women into the national parliament than ever before. </p>
<p>After the first election of the post-authoritarian period in 1999, women’s representation was a paltry 8.8%, so the rise to 20.9% in 2019 seemed worth celebrating. Indeed, women activists had worked long and hard to reach this point. </p>
<p>Disappointed with the results of the first two elections, they had successfully pushed for a candidate quota, requiring parties to nominate at least 30% women. </p>
<p>This will again be tested in next week’s election. But given the barriers women candidates in Indonesia face, is the quota enough to raise representation?</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/is-joko-widodo-paving-the-way-for-a-political-dynasty-in-indonesia-219499">Is Joko Widodo paving the way for a political dynasty in Indonesia?</a>
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<h2>Representation better, but not enough</h2>
<p>Under Indonesia’s open list proportional representation system, parties decide on candidate placement on the list, but voters can choose any candidate. In the past three elections, the quota has meant that in every electoral district at all three levels of parliament, women had to make up at least 30% of candidates. Additionally, <a href="https://www.insideindonesia.org/editions/edition-135-elections-2019/electoral-in-equity?highlight=WyJwcmloYXRpbmkiXQ==">one in every three</a> candidates on the party list had to be female.</p>
<p>With such a strong institutional framework, it is not surprising that enthusiasm after the 2019 election was <a href="https://www.newmandala.org/why-good-women-lose-elections/">muted</a>. Given the 2014 election had seen a slight fall in women’s representation, activists were relieved. But the result was still well below the aspirational 30% target, and below the <a href="https://data.ipu.org/women-averages">international average</a> at the time of 24.3%.</p>
<p>The results were also uneven, with more than 20% of electoral districts not electing any women to parliament. At the provincial and district level, the proportion of women elected to office was <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1868103421989720">even lower</a>, at only 18% and 15% respectively; 25 district parliaments had no women at all elected to office in 2019.</p>
<p>Why do women find it hard to be elected to office in Indonesia, and is this likely to change in 2024? </p>
<h2>Barriers of patriarchy, money and name recognition</h2>
<p>In many countries, it is said that when women run, they win. The main barrier to greater representation tends to be that women <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/25/upshot/the-problem-for-women-is-not-winning-its-deciding-to-run.html">don’t stand for office</a>. When they do, political parties don’t nominate them, or put them in unwinnable positions.</p>
<p>The quota in Indonesia gets around this problem. It encourages women to run and forces parties to nominate them. But <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/politics-and-gender/article/voting-against-women-political-patriarchy-islam-and-representation-in-indonesia/97BA1999553E22A86FF497F25E49F40B">our research</a> has revealed that women candidates in Indonesia also face significant barriers from patriarchal attitudes held by many voters about whether women should take on political leadership roles. </p>
<p>Support for women’s political leadership has even dropped over the past decade. Meanwhile, Indonesia’s electoral system allows voters to discriminate against women without having to sacrifice party choice, as they would in a majoritarian voting system like that in Australia.</p>
<p>But the challenges don’t stop there. </p>
<p>Indonesia is a new democracy and political parties receive very little public financing. Candidates are expected to raise their own funds to run their campaigns. </p>
<p>The open-list system means candidates run not just against opponents from other parties, but also against their fellow party members, making politics <a href="https://www.google.com.au/books/edition/Democracy_for_Sale/g-KEDwAAQBAJ?hl=en">highly personalised</a>. This has led to a dramatic rise in the cost of elections for individual candidates, with “money politics” coming to dominate election campaigns. </p>
<p>Given that women in Indonesia face high levels of <a href="https://www.weforum.org/publications/global-gender-gap-report-2023/economy-profiles-5932ef6d39/">economic inequality</a>, the cost of campaigns makes competing <a href="https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/campaign-costs-impeding-womens-political-representation-in-indonesia/">difficult</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/indonesia-is-one-of-the-worlds-largest-democracies-but-its-weaponising-defamation-laws-to-smother-dissent-220651">Indonesia is one of the world's largest democracies, but it's weaponising defamation laws to smother dissent</a>
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<p>Clientelism also shapes the kind of women candidates that parties choose and where they place them on their lists. Elite women and celebrities are more likely to be nominated as they can finance themselves. They also have the networks and name recognition that can garner votes. In 2019, <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1868103421991144">some 44%</a> of the women elected to the national parliament were members of political dynasties. </p>
<p>While some of these women are no doubt capable politicians, their dominance makes it harder for women candidates to come through grassroots organisations. Parties also spend less time developing women cadres to run as candidates, preferring to reach out to such “vote getters”.</p>
<h2>What about this time around?</h2>
<p>So what are the prospects for women’s representation in the upcoming elections? </p>
<p>The barriers to women’s election have not changed and are unlikely to change in the short term. As a result, incremental progress is the best that can be hoped for. </p>
<p>Several women politicians were instrumental in the passage of the <a href="https://www.kompas.id/baca/ilmu-pengetahuan-teknologi/2022/05/08/dari-senayan-mereka-perjuangkan-ruu-tpks">Anti-Sexual Violence bill</a> that passed last year. It’s possible that this increased visibility will give women a bump. </p>
<p>On the other hand, gender issues have not been central to the presidential or legislative campaigns so are <a href="https://asialink.unimelb.edu.au/insights/where-are-the-women-gender-perspectives-in-indonesias-2024-presidential-race">unlikely</a> to be uppermost in voters’ minds.</p>
<p>In fact, we may have reason to be more pessimistic. A seemingly minor change to the regulations on quota implementation means that for the first time in three elections, the requirement for a 30% candidate quota <a href="https://www.datatalk.asia/story/detail/68/women-face-tough-path-to-become-legislators.html">will not be applied</a> in every electoral district party list, but instead for the total number of women candidates of each party.</p>
<p>The changes date back to a <a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/indonesia-s-push-for-more-women-candidates-in-general-elections-faces-setback">controversial regulation</a> issued by the Indonesian Electoral Commission (KPU) in April 2023. The regulation allowed rounding down when assessing the number of women a party has on a candidate list. For example, in electoral districts with eight seats, 30% is 2.4 candidates. Previously, a party would have had to field three women candidates. Now, fractions can be rounded down if under 0.5, so in our example, parties are only required to field two women candidates.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-professor-the-general-and-the-populist-meet-the-three-candidates-running-for-president-in-indonesia-217811">The professor, the general and the populist: meet the three candidates running for president in Indonesia</a>
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<p>A coalition of democracy and gender activists appealed against this regulation to the Supreme Court, and they won. But the electoral commission has indicated it will not enforce the court’s decision in this election. Democracy activists say that this means almost 18% of party lists <a href="https://www.kompas.id/baca/polhuk/2023/11/09/17-parpol-tak-penuhi-jumlah-minimal-30-persen-caleg-perempuan">do not meet</a> the requirement for 30% women candidates.</p>
<p>It could be that these changes will have little impact. After all, we know that most candidates are elected from the <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/app5.299">first position</a> on the list. </p>
<p>However, it sets a worrying precedent for women’s representation going forward. <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/politics-and-gender/article/voting-against-women-political-patriarchy-islam-and-representation-in-indonesia/97BA1999553E22A86FF497F25E49F40B">Our research</a> shows the 30% candidate quota for women is widely supported in Indonesia. Yet, it has effectively been watered down without public discussion and against the advice of the Supreme Court. </p>
<p>The actions of the electoral commission, apparently at the direction of a <a href="https://www.kompas.id/baca/polhuk/2023/05/17/komisi-ii-dpr-tolak-usulan-kpu-soal-penghitungan-keterwakilan-perempuan">male-dominated parliamentary commission</a>, underline again how the foundational institutions of Indonesian democracy are being eroded by the political elite.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222387/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sally White receives funding from the Australian Research Council Discovery Project "Political Representation in Indonesia". </span></em></p>As the country prepares to go to the polls on February 14, will the low representation of women in parliament improve? Given the systemic barriers in place, probably not.Sally White, Research fellow, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2210672024-02-07T13:10:59Z2024-02-07T13:10:59ZIndonesians head to polls amid concerns over declining democracy, election integrity and vote buying<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572044/original/file-20240129-28-cofmi2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C603%2C5498%2C3050&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Gearing up for the election.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/IndonesiaElection/058ccdda469046b4a05ab184f9fe9154/photo?Query=indonesia%20election&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=1572&currentItemNo=3">Achmad Ibrahim/Associated Press</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In a record year for <a href="https://theconversation.com/more-than-4-billion-people-are-eligible-to-vote-in-an-election-in-2024-is-this-democracys-biggest-test-220837">elections around the world</a>, Indonesia’s Feb. 14, 2024, vote is set to be one of the largest – and it will be one of the sternest tests for democracy’s progress.</p>
<p>Voters are expected to turn out in record numbers to choose between some 20,000 national, provincial and district parliamentary representatives in what will be the world’s largest single-day election – unlike, say, in the U.S., Indonesia does not allow votes to be cast in advance.</p>
<p>While the scale of the election might seem to suggest a vibrant state of democracy in Indonesia, multiple factors – including a voting system susceptible to money politics and vote buying, <a href="https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/indonesia-election-campaign-violation-gibran-prabowo-mahfud-muhaimin-4024331">alleged violations of election rules</a>, the sheer number of down-ballot candidates, and a cacophony of political messages on social media – make it difficult for voters to know what they are voting for and to effectively express their preferences. </p>
<p>Indonesia’s General Elections Commission reports that as many as <a href="https://en.tempo.co/read/1743779/over-204-million-voters-in-2024-general-elections-electoral-roll-kpu-declares">204 million voters</a> are enrolled for the election, with about 114 million of them under 40 years of age. Polls say the <a href="https://s3-csis-web.s3.ap-southeast-1.amazonaws.com/doc/Final_Rilis_Survei_CSIS_26_September_2022.pdf?download=1">top issues for younger voters</a> include unaffordable basic goods, lack of employment opportunities, high poverty rates, expensive health services and poor education quality and service.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, there are concerns among many observers that Indonesia’s democracy has been <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/opinion/2023/03/23/is-indonesias-democracy-really-backsliding.html">backsliding in recent years</a>.</p>
<h2>Southeast Asia’s largest economy</h2>
<p><a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=JhojdBgAAAAJ&hl=en">As an expert</a> on Indonesia’s international relations, I see how the election has implications far beyond the sprawling archipelago’s borders and comes at a crucial time. Indonesia is Southeast Asia’s largest economy but faces getting caught in what economists call the <a href="https://www.adb.org/publications/escaping-middle-income-trap-innovate-or-perish#:%7E:text=The%20middle%2Dincome%20trap%20captures,productivity%20is%20relatively%20too%20low">middle-income trap</a>, where its wages are too high but productivity too low to be competitive. Indonesia also plays a crucial geopolitical role in the Indo-Pacific. Its growing <a href="https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2022/05/13/why-and-how-indonesia-must-reduce-its-economic-dependence-on-china/">economic dependence on China</a> and regional tensions over <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-chinese-warships-near-miss-in-taiwan-strait-hints-at-ongoing-troubled-diplomatic-waters-despite-chatter-about-talks-207099">territorial disputes in the South China Sea</a> have <a href="https://www.wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/when-goods-cross-borders/indonesia-should-be-at-the-heart-of-us-indo-pacific-policy">foreign policy observers and investors</a> watching the election closely.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A group of men stand smiling and waving." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572047/original/file-20240130-21-38gy0p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572047/original/file-20240130-21-38gy0p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572047/original/file-20240130-21-38gy0p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572047/original/file-20240130-21-38gy0p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572047/original/file-20240130-21-38gy0p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572047/original/file-20240130-21-38gy0p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572047/original/file-20240130-21-38gy0p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Presidential candidates. from left, Anies Baswedan and running mate Muhaimin Iskandar; Prabowo Subianto and running mate Gibran Rakabuming Raka; and Ganjar Pranowo with running mate Mahfud Mahmodin.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/IndonesiaElection/0fcba3a1931049e0a72438f9745f3994/photo?Query=President%20Widodo%27s%20son,%20Gibran%20Rakabuming,&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=50&currentItemNo=21">Tatan Syuflana/Associated Press</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The U.S. government sees Indonesia’s democracy as critical to regional stability, and at least for the last two decades, <a href="https://id.usembassy.gov/president-joseph-r-biden-and-president-joko-widodo-announce-the-u-s-indonesia-comprehensive-strategic-partnership/">U.S.-Indonesia relations</a> have been built on shared values of democracy. Yet the election takes place against a backdrop of increasing democratic fragility.</p>
<p>Telltale signs include government attempts <a href="https://en.tempo.co/read/1253615/higher-education-ministry-contacts-rectors-over-student-protests">to restrict critics and dissent</a> in a show of executive overreach, <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/indonesia/2023/11/08/chief-justice-demoted-over-gibran-ruling.html">changes in election laws</a> to tilt the playing field toward favored candidates and so-called “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/23/indonesian-leaders-son-brushes-off-nepo-baby-tag-in-solid-debate-showing">nepo babies</a>,” and voter <a href="https://www.antaranews.com/berita/3886224/tpd-amin-beberkan-potensi-intimidasi-jelang-pemilu">intimidation</a>.</p>
<p>Voters will cast their ballots for one of <a href="https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/indonesia-election-anies-baswedan-ganjar-pranowo-prabowo-subianto-4031946">the three presidential candidates</a> vying to be the next president: <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/indonesia/2024/01/30/the-economist-revises-down-prabowos-electability-to-47.html">Prabowo Subianto</a>, a former military officer and politician who is running for president for the third time; <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/indonesian-presidential-hopeful-ganjar-projects-grassroots-appeal-popularity-2023-12-13/">Ganjar Pranowo</a>, a former governor of Central Java; and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/indonesia-presidential-hopeful-promises-change-end-patronage-politics-2024-01-05/">Anies Baswedan</a>, an academic, and former culture and education minister and governor of Jakarta. </p>
<p>The three candidates <a href="https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/tech/20231026141749-37-483935/visi-misi-ganjar-mahfud-anies-imin-download-link-pdf">all promise</a> to improve living standards, accelerate economic growth and infrastructure development, protect Indonesia’s resources against foreign exploitation and territorial sovereignty, promote environmental sustainability, advance human rights and democracy, and eliminate corruption.</p>
<p>Despite their similar campaign talking points, there are some differences. On trade, for example, Subianto favors protectionism. Baswedan and Pranowo support a market-based approach and a balanced approach between protecting national industries and fostering foreign investment.</p>
<p>On one of the main issues of the day, the <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/08/28/indonesia-to-move-capital-from-jakarta-to-nusantara-but-it-wont-be-easy.html">relocation of the capital city of Indonesia</a>, Baswedan is the most critical of the candidates. He has <a href="https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/indonesian/election-willdetermine-new-capital-fate-01262024140057.html">vowed to review the project</a>, but is unlikely to stop the move even if he wins, as the plan is already formalized into law.</p>
<h2>Massive spending and vote buying</h2>
<p>While the presence of many candidates – for example, there are 300 in <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/indonesia/2024/01/11/jakarta-sees-tight-competition-for-2024-legislative-race.html">Jakarta</a> alone, including celebrities and cabinet ministers from 17 parties, vying for 21 seats in the House of Representatives – could suggest a vibrant democracy, the <a href="https://www.kompas.id/baca/english/2023/12/07/en-biaya-politik-caleg-hadapi-pemilu-2024-membengkak">massive spending</a> among them increases the risk of vote buying. Furthermore, due to the current <a href="https://en.antaranews.com/news/269187/kpu-committed-to-open-list-proportional-representation-system-dpr">open-list</a> proportional voting systems, candidates must compete against their party peers to win a seat. This system creates a fierce competition among candidates and increases the chance of vote buying. Political scientist <a href="https://www.iseas.edu.sg/rof2024/burhanuddin-muhtadi/">Burhanuddin Muhtadi</a> argues that the problem affects 10% of voters and may be enough of an issue to sway the outcome of elections. In addition, celebrity candidates and those with a large social media following and deep pockets will have an easier time gaining support.</p>
<p>A glut of campaign messaging does not lead to a more informed citizenry. Instead, citizens are heavily targeted by <a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/multimedia/graphics/2024/01/indonesia-election/index.html?shell">social media with populist overtones</a>. And despite the digital bombardment, there is actually little information about party platforms, candidate track records or policy details – a problem when the sheer number of candidates is so large.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Political candidates shake hands in Jakarta, Indonesia." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572051/original/file-20240130-19-olefie.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572051/original/file-20240130-19-olefie.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572051/original/file-20240130-19-olefie.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572051/original/file-20240130-19-olefie.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572051/original/file-20240130-19-olefie.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572051/original/file-20240130-19-olefie.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572051/original/file-20240130-19-olefie.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto, left, with running mate Gibran Rakabuming Raka, the eldest son of Indonesian President Joko Widodo.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/IndonesiaElection/91f8aacec6cd40e981f597776e81744f/photo?Query=indonesia%20joko%20and%20son&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=95&currentItemNo=2">Tatan Syuflana/Associated Press</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Financial irregularities tied to election funding have also dogged parties across the political spectrum, leading the <a href="https://www.idea.int/node/683">Association for Election and Democracy</a> to cite a worrisome trend of citizens coming to see money politics as acceptable within a competitive democracy. The other challenge during the election campaign is the <a href="https://kemitraan.or.id/press-release/buruknya-akuntabilitas-laporan-dana-kampanye-problem-serius-pengaturan-penegakan-aturan-dan-komitmen-para-capres-cawapres/">lack of accountability and transparency</a> for campaign funding.</p>
<h2>A slide toward autocracy</h2>
<p>The decline in the quality of Indonesia’s democracy has been years in the making. A 2023 report by <a href="https://www.v-dem.net/documents/29/V-dem_democracyreport2023_lowres.pdf">V-Dem Democracy Institute</a> highlights several factors in its slide toward autocracy. Limited freedom to publicly criticize the government is one reason, and numerous examples of intimidation and <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/10/16/students-continue-to-protest-jobs-law-alleged-police-brutality.html">attacks on students</a>, academics and <a href="https://en.tempo.co/read/1818020/stop-intimidation-against-activists">activists</a> who are critical of the administration have been documented.</p>
<p><a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/607612">Strategic election manipulation</a> is another form of backsliding, encompassing a range of activity geared toward tilting the electoral playing field in favor of incumbents. In a notable case, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/jokowi-indonesias-kingmaker-works-keep-influence-after-election-2023-10-14/">President Joko Widodo’s</a> 36-year-old son, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3249354/indonesia-election-2024-gibran-resorts-gotcha-questions-jargon-vp-debate-bid-trip-rivals">Gibran Rakabuming Raka</a>, mayor of Solo, was cleared by a constitutional court ruling to run for vice president. The ruling, issued by a court led by the president’s brother, stated that the age restriction for presidential candidates that they should be at least 40 years old does not apply to those who have served as mayors, regents or governors. While Widodo claims not to have intervened in the ruling, there is a clear benefit to his family.</p>
<p>Electoral intimidation is a problem disproportionately affecting civil servants and people in poor neighborhoods. <a href="https://www.antaranews.com/berita/3886224/tpd-amin-beberkan-potensi-intimidasi-jelang-pemilu">Power brokers</a> have reportedly told some civil servants to vote for particular candidates, intimating that refusal will mean being asked to serve in some remote places in Indonesia. People in areas with high poverty rates <a href="https://www.antaranews.com/berita/3886224/tpd-amin-beberkan-potensi-intimidasi-jelang-pemilu">have allegedly</a> received threats that cash transfer programs that would benefit the community will be revoked unless they vote for certain candidates. </p>
<p>All of this takes place as younger Indonesians <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/opinion/2022/10/10/analysis-csis-survey-shows-young-voters-want-change-not-prabowo.html">look for change and better lives</a>. Their hopes for a democratic future where issues important to them can be solved, as well as securing Indonesia’s role on the global stage as a democratic partner ensuring regional stability, ride on the outcome of the election.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221067/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Angguntari Ceria Sari does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As many as 204 million Indonesians are registered to vote in what will be the world’s largest single-day election in 2024.Angguntari Ceria Sari, Lecturer in International Relations, Universitas Katolik ParahyanganLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2223842024-02-05T03:40:54Z2024-02-05T03:40:54ZSovereignty is sacred: in Timor-Leste’s remote Oecusse Enclave, a border dispute threatens to open old wounds<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573320/original/file-20240205-17-gb5sa9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=4%2C2%2C954%2C715&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Michael Rose</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In September, Timor-Leste will mark a quarter century since its vote for independence from Indonesia, the conclusion of a 24-year long struggle that left few Timorese families <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indonesian_occupation_of_East_Timor#Number_of_deaths">untouched</a>. </p>
<p>Reconciliation with its giant neighbour stands out as one of Timor-Leste proudest achievements, but as 2024 begins, a long simmering border dispute, in which a border hamlet faces the prospect of its land being transferred to Indonesia, is stirring both political strife and ghosts many hoped were at rest.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/timor-leste-election-offers-an-extraordinary-lesson-in-how-to-build-a-stable-democracy-206421">Timor-Leste election offers an extraordinary lesson in how to build a stable democracy</a>
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<h2>Where is the land?</h2>
<p>The area in question is a hamlet called <a href="https://www.google.com.au/maps/place/Naktuka,+Timor-Leste/@-9.3473574,124.0538669,7268m/data=!3m1!1e3!4m6!3m5!1s0x2c550ea704aafb87:0xb7b71c467eda2f81!8m2!3d-9.3469731!4d124.0617151!16s%2Fg%2F11bx56h2nt?entry=ttu">Naktuka</a>. It’s around 1,000 hectares of rare old-growth forest and rice fields on the western edge of Timor-Leste’s <a href="https://www.google.com.au/maps/@-9.2802797,124.1371103,10.75z?entry=ttu">Oecusse</a> (also spelled Oecussi) Enclave. Oecusse is 800 square kilometres of rugged coast and mountains some 70 kilometres west of the rest of Timor-Leste. </p>
<p><iframe id="PMgKK" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/PMgKK/2/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Although Naktuka is home to only around 60 families, and a four hour drive along a coastal track from the nearest major town, to the people of Oecusse it is anything but marginal. Its <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14442210601161732">forests</a> are the domain of Oecusse’s king (<em>usif</em>), and the place he periodically <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/ocea.5240">gathers</a> the Enclave’s clans to celebrate their identity as “people of the dry land” (Atoni Pah Meto) and subjects of their legendary forebear, Lord Benu (Ama Benu). For them, Naktuka is <em><a href="https://devpolicy.org/publications/books/MRose_indigenous-spirits-and-global-aspirations-in-a-southeast-asian-borderlandDevPol.pdf">pah le’u</a></em> (sacred land). </p>
<p>However, in the wake of recent border <a href="http://timor-leste.gov.tl/?p=35443&lang=en&n=1">negotiations</a> between Indonesia and Timor-Leste, concerns have been raised over how much longer they will be free to access it. </p>
<p>At the end of 2023, Naktuka was visited by a team from the Timor-Leste’s government who oversaw the placement of around 76 metal stakes (<em>estaka</em>) along a line some 350 meters inland from the frontier. Suspicions quickly grew it was to be a new border.</p>
<p>Such a border would cede around <a href="https://www.fundasaunmahein.org/2024/01/24/land-border-agreement-with-indonesia-pragmatism-and-high-level-politics-over-sovereignty-and-community-rights/">270 hectares</a> of forest and rice fields to Indonesia.</p>
<p>Subsequent developments didn’t allay concerns. On February 1 2024, the head of the technical team working on the border said the stakes <a href="https://tatoli.tl/2024/02/01/abitante-naktuka-fo-fiar-ba-xanana-luta-too-finaliza-fronteira-terrestre/">did not</a> represent a new frontier, but were being used to assess where one might be placed. </p>
<p>Coupled with an <a href="https://www.facebook.com/CNRTMediaCenter/posts/pfbid02X7TdCALJ4MtR1RbYi4opTkfU5R8JZJNmXpNPFbX9KjhcDN9MM3GR8KmApbigmZ1Yl">announcement</a> by the CNRT Media Centre, mouth-piece of Timor-Leste’s ruling party, that a “win-win” solution could involve dividing Naktuka in half and giving away around 500 hectares, this was cold comfort. </p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/cash-for-the-winner-the-loser-for-dinner-cockfighting-in-timor-leste-is-a-complicated-game-131027">Cash for the winner, the loser for dinner: cockfighting in Timor Leste is a complicated game</a>
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<p>They even posted a <a href="https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=687045866942460&set=pcb.687045883609125">map</a> from the Indonesian <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Map-of-Land-Boundary-Division-in-Noel-Besi-Segment-Citrana-Source-The-Development_fig1_370053360">Geospatial</a> Information Agency showing how it might look.</p>
<p>In Timor-Leste, this has <a href="https://www.facebook.com/search/top/?q=naktuka">resulted</a> in an angry backlash. The signing of the border agreement, which was to have <a href="https://kemlu.go.id/portal/en/read/5667/berita/indonesia-completes-6-border-agreements-with-neighbouring-countries-in-the-last-9-years">occurred</a> in Jakarta in late January, has been postponed.</p>
<h2>A small hamlet on a divided island</h2>
<p>Recent questions over the ownership of Naktuka stem from unresolved negotiations over the border between Timor-Leste and Indonesia, created when the latter regained its independence in 2002. </p>
<p>While Naktuka is governed by Timor-Leste, in 2005, Timor-Leste <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/09/world/asia/east-timor-and-indonesia-sign-border-pact.html">signed</a> an agreement confirming the status of around 95% of its border with Indonesia, with a small number of areas to be clarified later. Naktuka was one. The reason goes back at least 120 years.</p>
<p>In 1904, when the Dutch and Portuguese moved to finalise the division of Timor, they differed in their interpretation where Oecussi’s borders should be. By 1915 the question was effectively settled. The Portuguese put down <a href="https://www.newmandala.org/the-timor-crisis-and-dom-bonaventuras-plea-for-help-houbens-archival-investigations/">milestones</a> and proceeded to govern <a href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/47/Timor_1914.png">Naktuka</a> for 50 years.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/asean-leaders-give-in-principle-support-for-timor-lestes-membership-what-does-this-actually-mean-194462">ASEAN leaders give 'in-principle' support for Timor-Leste's membership. What does this actually mean?</a>
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<p>With the Indonesian invasion of 1975, Naktuka, along with the rest of Portuguese Timor, became part of the province of <a href="https://www.loc.gov/item/97682212/">Timor Timur</a>. In 1999 it voted in Timor-Leste’s independence referendum and was <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uti_possidetis">incorporated</a>, as a former part of both Portuguese Timor and Timor Timur, into Timor-Leste. </p>
<p>Indonesia argues that as Naktuka should not (<a href="https://jusmundi.com/en/document/decision/en-boundaries-in-the-island-of-timor-the-netherlands-v-portugal-award-thursday-25th-june-1914">arguably</a>) have become part of Portuguese Timor 110 years ago, it should not be part of Timor-Leste now. Suffice to say this is not an argument that makes such sense to the people who live there today, or many of their compatriots.</p>
<p>Naktuka is remote and poor. After independence its people got on with life. Their days revolved around rice farming and their role as caretakers of the land, including the king’s forest, site of the royal feast of <em>‘seu puah</em> (the communal betel nut harvest). The population grew, slowly, and in many ways Naktuka was similar to any other hamlet in Timor-Leste.</p>
<p>And yet, periodic incidents reminded people of their limbo. In 2013, the Timor-Leste Police were <a href="https://www.easttimorlawandjusticebulletin.com/2013/01/naktuka-border-dispute-needs-diplomacy.html">prevented</a> from building a guard-post. Indonesian soldiers would come across the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x-ZkjAyCy5I">frontier</a>, often just bored, but an unpleasant reminder of the occupation. In 2012 there was even a <a href="https://www.easttimorlawandjusticebulletin.com/2013/01/indonesian-military-suspected-of.html">murder</a> which local media reported was committed by people from across the border. The Indonesian press carried the occasional article about citizens of Timor-Leste settling <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/01/22/ri-reprimands-timor-leste-over-border-area-violation.html">illegally</a> in an area they called “disputed”, but to residents was simply <a href="https://www.pinterest.com.au/pin/277815870741736776/">home</a>.</p>
<p>There’s no doubt the intentions of Timor-Leste government in seeking a permanent fix on its western border are good, but the idea it can do so by ceding land is surprisingly out of touch with reality. In Timor-Leste sovereignty is sacred, literally, as is the principle of consent and consultation on matters relating to land. Any solution to the situation in Naktuka that ignores this is very unlikely to work.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222384/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Rose does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>On a remote stretch of border between Timor-Leste and Indonesia, a dispute over a remote hamlet is stirring memories of conflict many hoped was behind them.Michael Rose, Research Associate, University of AdelaideLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2201202024-01-25T13:16:51Z2024-01-25T13:16:51ZFrom New York to Jakarta, land in many coastal cities is sinking faster than sea levels are rising<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/567456/original/file-20231228-21-99pvh5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C8%2C5991%2C3979&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Infrastructure can increase vulnerabilities to coastal cities like New York.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/new-york-city-skyline-royalty-free-image/523392100?phrase=new+york+sea+level+rise&searchscope=image%2Cfilm&adppopup=true">GlennisEhi/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.climate.gov/news-features/understanding-climate/climate-change-global-sea-level">Sea level rise</a> has already put coastal cities on notice thanks to increasing storm surges and even <a href="https://coast.noaa.gov/states/fast-facts/recurrent-tidal-flooding.html">sunny day</a> flooding at high tide. These challenges will continue to grow because global projections point to a mean sea level rise of at least one foot above year-2000 levels by the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jun/26/its-absolutely-guaranteed-the-best-and-worst-case-scenarios-for-sea-level-rise">end of this century</a>.</p>
<p>However, many cities are facing another factor making them even more vulnerable to rising waters: <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2023/05/30/land-sinking-us-subsidence-sea-level/">land subsidence</a>. </p>
<p>The three of us – <a href="https://web.uri.edu/gso/meet/pei-chin-wu/">Pei-Chin Wu</a>, <a href="https://web.uri.edu/gso/meet/matt-wei/">Meng (Matt) Wei</a> and <a href="https://web.uri.edu/gso/meet/steven-dhondt/">Steven D'Hondt</a> – are scientists at the University of Rhode Island Graduate School of Oceanography working with the U.S. Geological Survey to research challenges facing waterfront cities. Our findings indicate that <a href="https://doi.org/10.1029/2022GL098477">land is sinking</a> faster than sea levels are rising in many coastal cities throughout the world. </p>
<p>By using radar images of the Earth’s surface collected from orbiting satellites, we measured subsidence rates in 99 coastal cities worldwide. These rates are highly variable within cities and from city to city, but if they continue, many metropolises will experience flooding much sooner than projected by sea level rise models.</p>
<p>Cities in South, Southeast and East Asia are seeing the most rapid rates of subsidence. </p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Taipei is sinking: University of Rhode Island | Taiwan News | RTI.</span></figcaption>
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<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/05/16/headway/indonesia-nusantara-jakarta.html">Indonesia</a>, for example, is moving its capital 800 miles from Jakarta to Nusantara in large part because Jakarta is sinking at an alarming rate due to groundwater extraction. </p>
<p>Other regions are not immune. Our research with Tom Parsons of the U.S. Geological Survey found that most of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1029/2022EF003465">New York City</a>is sinking between 1 to 4 millimeters per year due to a combination of <a href="https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/glacial-adjustment.html">glacial rebound</a> and the weight of its more than 1 million buildings. In a city where sea level is projected to rise between 8 and 30 inches by 2050, subsidence <a href="https://www.uri.edu/news/2023/06/new-york-city-is-sinking-and-its-not-alone/">further increases its vulnerability</a> to coastal storms. </p>
<p>In the U.S., most of the cities on the Atlantic coast are subsiding due to glacial rebound. Even if the rate is low at minus-1 millimeter per year, it should be accounted. Other cities in the U.S., especially in the Gulf of Mexico, including Houston and New Orleans, also face subsidence. </p>
<p>Governments around the world are facing the challenge of coastal areas that are subsiding, and there is a shared global challenge of mitigation against a growing flooding hazard.</p>
<p>While our research continues to evolve – for example, by using machine learning to improve our monitoring capability – we urge city planners, emergency managers and other decision-makers to account for subsidence in the plans they are making today to prepare for the impacts of rising sea levels in the future.</p>
<p><em>Editor’s note: This story was updated to correct the rate at which New York City is sinking.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220120/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Pei-Chin Wu is working towards her PhD degree at the Graduate School of Oceanography at the University of Rhode Island and receives funding from the Ministry of Education in Taiwan.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven D’Hondt receives funding from Rhode Island Sea Grant.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Meng (Matt) Wei does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Land subsidence is a factor as preparations are made for rising sea levels and strengthening storms. Human infrastructure, including buildings and groundwater extraction, increases vulnerabilities.Pei-Chin Wu, Ph.D. Candidate in Oceangraphy, University of Rhode IslandMeng (Matt) Wei, Associate Professor of Oceanography, University of Rhode IslandSteven D’Hondt, Professor of Oceanography, Graduate School of Oceanography, University of Rhode IslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2209452024-01-23T05:10:48Z2024-01-23T05:10:48ZNavigating algorithmic bias amid rapid AI development in Southeast Asia<p>Artificial intelligence (AI) is no longer an emerging technology in Southeast Asia. </p>
<p>Countries across the region are aggressively adopting AI systems for everything from <a href="https://www.frontier-enterprise.com/ai-in-public-safety-a-southeast-asia-perspective/">smart city surveillance</a> to <a href="https://fintechcircle.com/insights/data-ai-lending-in-south-east-asia/">credit scoring apps</a>, promising more financial inclusion. </p>
<p>But there are growing rumblings that this headlong rush towards automation is outpacing ethical checks and balances. Looming over glowing promises of precision and objectivity is the spectre of algorithmic bias. </p>
<p>AI bias refers to cases where automated systems produce <a href="https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3457607?casa_token=6zTVIyYKU6QAAAAA:SHw5alyYksbmGu4NDhHk98Pz7CSnbZSZccSRhQXbN4LhJK1s3wY_NnCliBreXKZ5oc02255ZQeSCRw">discriminatory results</a> due to technical limitations or issues with the underlying data or development process. This can propagate unfair prejudices <a href="https://unu.edu/macau/blog-post/developing-inclusive-ai-policy-southeast-asia">against vulnerable demographic groups</a>.</p>
<p>For instance, a facial recognition tool trained <a href="https://nonprofitquarterly.org/facial-recognition-technologys-enduring-threat-to-civil-liberties/#:%7E:text=Problematically%2C%20the%20faces%20used%20to,and%20especially%20women%20of%20color.">predominantly on Caucasian faces</a> may have drastically lower accuracy at identifying Southeast Asian individuals. </p>
<p>As Southeast Asia attempts to navigate the new terrain of automated decision-making, this article delves into the swelling chorus of dissent questioning whether Southeast Asia’s AI ascent could leave marginalised communities even further behind.</p>
<h2>How bias creates discrimination</h2>
<p>In Southeast Asia, the prevalence of AI bias is evident in various forms, such as flawed speech and image recognition, as well as <a href="https://www.google.com/search?q=Southeast+Asia+skewed+credit+risk+assessments+AI&oq=Southeast+Asia+skewed+credit+risk+assessments+AI&gs_lcrp=EgZjaHJvbWUyBggAEEUYOTIHCAEQIRigATIHCAIQIRigATIHCAMQIRiPAjIHCAQQIRiPAtIBCDU2NjhqMGo5qAIAsAIA&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8#:%7E:text=The%20Prospects%20and,uploads%20%E2%80%BA%202021/01">biased credit risk assessments</a>.</p>
<p>These algorithmic biases often lead to unjust outcomes, disproportionately affecting minority ethnic groups. </p>
<p>A notable example from Indonesia demonstrates this. An AI-based job recommendation system <a href="https://kr-asia.com/the-ethics-of-ai-navigating-the-moral-landscape-in-southeast-asia">unintentionally excluded women</a> from certain job opportunities, a result of historical biases ingrained in the data. </p>
<p>The diversity of the region, with its array of languages, skin tones and cultural nuances, often gets overlooked or inaccurately represented in AI models that rely on Western-centric training data. </p>
<p>Consequently, these AI systems, which are often perceived as neutral and objective, inadvertently perpetuate real-world inequalities rather than eliminating them.</p>
<h2>Ethical implications</h2>
<p>The rapid evolution of technology in Southeast Asia presents significant ethical challenges in AI applications, due in large part to the breakneck pace at which automation and other advanced technologies are being adopted. </p>
<p>This rapid adoption <a href="https://asean.org/asean-initiates-regional-discussion-on-generative-ai-policy/">outpaces the development of ethical guidelines</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570545/original/file-20240122-21-ptg5ah.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570545/original/file-20240122-21-ptg5ah.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570545/original/file-20240122-21-ptg5ah.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570545/original/file-20240122-21-ptg5ah.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570545/original/file-20240122-21-ptg5ah.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570545/original/file-20240122-21-ptg5ah.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570545/original/file-20240122-21-ptg5ah.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Regulatory frameworks lag behind the swift pace of technological implementation in Southeast Asia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
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<p>Limited local involvement in AI development sidelines critical regional expertise and widens the democracy deficit</p>
<p>The “democracy deficit” refers to the lack of public participation in AI decision-making – facial recognition rolled out by governments without consulting impacted communities being one case. </p>
<p>For example, Indigenous groups like the <a href="https://theculturetrip.com/asia/philippines/articles/the-aeta-the-first-philippine-people#:%7E:text=In%20the%20Philippines%2C%20Aetas%20as,slash%2Dand%2Dburn%20farming.">Aeta in the Philippines</a> are already marginalised and could face particular threats from unchecked automation. Without data or input from rural Indigenous communities, they could be excluded from AI opportunities. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, biased data sets and algorithms risk exacerbating discrimination. The <a href="https://commons.princeton.edu/mg/the-high-colonial-age-1870-1914/">region’s colonial history</a> and continuous marginalisation of Indigenous communities casts <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/report-asia-and-the-pacific/">a significant shadow</a>. </p>
<p>The uncritical implementation of automated decision-making, without addressing underlying historical inequalities and the potential for AI to reinforce discriminatory patterns, presents a profound ethical concern. </p>
<p>Regulatory frameworks lag behind the swift pace of technological implementation, leaving vulnerable ethnic and rural communities to deal with harmful AI errors without recourse.</p>
<h2>Geopolitical dynamics</h2>
<p>Southeast Asia finds itself at a crucial juncture, strategically positioned at the heart of <a href="https://engagemedia.org/2022/excerpt-geopolitics-ai-southeast-asia/">AI advancements and geopolitical interests</a>. </p>
<p>Both the United States and China seemingly leverage artificial intelligence (AI) to expand their influence in the region. </p>
<p>During President Biden’s 2023 trip to Vietnam, the US government revealed initiatives for increased collaboration and investment by American corporations, <a href="https://www.newamerica.org/planetary-politics/blog/what-will-ai-mean-for-asean/">including Microsoft, Nvidia and Google</a>, in Southeast Asian countries to gain access to data and engineering talent. This data and talent is seen as crucial for training advanced AI systems. </p>
<p>At the same time, China has been rapidly investing in digital infrastructure projects in the region through its <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/12/05/how-has-china-s-belt-and-road-initiative-impacted-southeast-asian-countries-pub-91170">Belt and Road Initiative</a>, sparking concerns about <a href="https://www.iiss.org/en/online-analysis/online-analysis/2022/12/digital-silk-road-introduction/">technological colonialism</a>. </p>
<p>There are also worries that Southeast Asia may become a battleground for <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/The-Big-Story/Southeast-Asia-s-digital-battle-Chinese-and-U.S.-Big-Tech-face-off-over-1tn-market">US–China AI competition</a>, escalating security tensions and risks of an AI arms race. </p>
<p>With major powers vying for economic, military and ideological influence, Southeast Asian nations face complex challenges in managing these multifaceted interests around AI. </p>
<p>Crafting policies that balance benefits and risks, while maintaining autonomy, will be critical.</p>
<h2>The path ahead: caution mixed with optimism</h2>
<p>Considering Southeast Asia’s immense diversity of ethnicity, languages and socio-cultural traditions, the region has both <a href="https://unu.edu/macau/blog-post/developing-inclusive-ai-policy-southeast-asia">unique vulnerabilities but also tremendous opportunities</a> regarding AI ethics. </p>
<p>Constructing more inclusive technological futures requires sustained collaboration across governments, companies and community groups. </p>
<p>No single prescription can “solve” algorithmic bias, but emphasising representation, accountability and transparency will point the way. </p>
<p>In Southeast Asia, <a href="https://www.channelnewsasia.com/business/ai-explosion-merits-regulation-rein-threats-experts-say-3625266">civil society groups</a> and <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/11/artificial-intelligence-disinformation-and-the-2024-indonesian-elections/">scholars</a> are increasingly vocal about the need for guardrails on AI adoption, <a href="https://www.zdnet.com/article/new-research-initiative-aims-to-build-large-language-ai-model-for-southeast-asia/">better representation in datasets</a> and protections against automated discrimination. </p>
<p>While there are growing number of local start-ups contributing to regional specific AI-based technologies, such as <a href="https://kata.ai/">Kata.AI</a> in Indonesian language, the first natural language processing algorithms in Indonesia, or <a href="https://bindez.com/">Bindez</a> in Myanmar, more is needed to ensure local experts contribute to nuanced AI system tailored for Southeast Asia.</p>
<p>To support this vision, <a href="https://www.zdnet.com/article/singapore-urged-to-fund-support-for-ai-adoption-and-decarbonization/">more funding</a> and collaboration should be fostered not only between ASEAN members, but also with global experts on AI technology. </p>
<p>Fundamentally, the path ahead necessitates vigilance. Technologies do not stand apart from the societies shaping them. </p>
<p>Therefore, in questioning pervasive assumptions encoded in AI systems, perhaps we move closer towards the emancipatory promise of automation. Ensuring all voices are heard, not just the privileged and powerful, remains vital even in our algorithmic age.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220945/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nuurrianti Jalli tidak bekerja, menjadi konsultan, memiliki saham, atau menerima dana dari perusahaan atau organisasi mana pun yang akan mengambil untung dari artikel ini, dan telah mengungkapkan bahwa ia tidak memiliki afiliasi selain yang telah disebut di atas.</span></em></p>How should Southeast Asian countries manage algorithmic biases that often unfairly affect minority ethnic groups and women?Nuurrianti Jalli, Assistant Professor of Professional Practice, School of Media and Strategic Communications, Oklahoma State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2206512024-01-08T19:17:20Z2024-01-08T19:17:20ZIndonesia is one of the world’s largest democracies, but it’s weaponising defamation laws to smother dissent<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568147/original/file-20240108-29-ygdop8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=17%2C1052%2C2969%2C2942&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/jakarta-indonesia-november-21-2022-east-2309158677">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Two former coordinators of one of Indonesia’s most prominent human rights organisations have escaped conviction in a defamation case brought by a powerful government minister. While their astonishing acquittal is welcome, the case marked a bleak new low for freedom of expression in one of the world’s largest democracies.</p>
<p>Haris Azhar and Fatia Maulidiyanti, who had coordinated the Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence (KontraS), were accused of defamation by Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs and Investment, Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan. </p>
<p>Luhut’s statements made it clear the case was expressly intended to create a chilling effect and smother civil society criticism of the government.</p>
<p>So what is the case about, and why is it so important?</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/is-joko-widodo-paving-the-way-for-a-political-dynasty-in-indonesia-219499">Is Joko Widodo paving the way for a political dynasty in Indonesia?</a>
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<h2>A messy web of mining interests</h2>
<p>The case related to a 2021 <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1xMlnuOtBAs">YouTube video</a> in which Haris and Fatia discussed a <a href="https://ylbhi.or.id/bibliografi/laporan/ekonomi-politik-penempatan-militer-di-papua/">report</a> published jointly by a group of Indonesian civil society organisations. In the video, the pair mentioned that Luhut was “implicated” or “involved” (<em>bermain</em>) in mining in Wabu Block, in the Intan Jaya district of what is now Central Papua Province.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zf3YBmJ8324">details</a> are a bit complicated, but a key part of the dispute centred on this point about mining. </p>
<p>In 2016, Australian mining firm West Wits Mining <a href="https://announcements.asx.com.au/asxpdf/20161012/pdf/43bxf6v2rm9v2m.pdf">reported to</a> the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) that its Indonesian subsidiary Madinah Quarataa’in had entered into an agreement with another company, Tobacom Del Mandiri. They wanted to develop the Derewo River Gold Project in Intan Jaya. </p>
<p>Tobacom Del Mandiri is owned by another major Indonesian firm, Toba Sejahtra. Luhut has acknowledged he <a href="https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20230608151000-12-959378/luhut-klaim-lepas-toba-group-sejak-jadi-menteri-saham-masih-pegang">holds</a> 99% of shares in Toba Sejahtra.</p>
<p>Representatives from both Indonesian companies <a href="https://www.republika.id/posts/42691/petualangan-perusahaan-luhut-di-papua">have since said</a> the partnership did not go ahead. But given his stock portfolio, the activists had a relatively firm basis for implying Luhut was “involved” in mining in Papua.</p>
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<p>Luhut objected to this.</p>
<p>He also objected to Haris and Fatia referring to him as a “villain” (<em>penjahat</em>) and “Lord Luhut”, a favourite moniker of Indonesians online. He got the nickname because President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo has entrusted him to oversee a <a href="https://bisnis.tempo.co/read/1739767/17-daftar-jabatan-luhut-dari-jokowi-terbaru-pengarah-mrpn">seemingly endless list</a> of strategic projects. </p>
<p>Haris and Fatia were charged with defamation under the Law on Electronic Information and Transactions (commonly known as the ITE law). Unlike in Australia, defamation is a criminal offence in Indonesia. They also faced secondary fake news charges and defamation charges under the Criminal Code. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-twist-in-indonesias-presidential-election-does-not-bode-well-for-the-countrys-fragile-democracy-216007">A twist in Indonesia's presidential election does not bode well for the country’s fragile democracy</a>
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<h2>Making an example of activism</h2>
<p>Under Jokowi, there has been a dramatic escalation in abuse of the Electronic Information and Transactions Law to target activists, human rights defenders, journalists, and ordinary citizens.</p>
<p>According to Indonesian digital rights organisation SAFEnet, <a href="https://safenet.or.id/id/2023/11/koalisi-serius-mendesak-penundaan-pengesahan-revisi-kedua-uu-ite/">89 people</a> were
reported under the law between January and October 2023.</p>
<p>Public anger over the arbitrary way the law has been applied led the government to publish <a href="https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2021/06/23/19085041/skb-pedoman-uu-ite-resmi-ditandatangani-ini-isinya">guidelines</a> for law enforcers on its implementation. </p>
<p>According to the guidelines, defamation charges should not be brought when assertions are based on analysis, opinion or facts. </p>
<p>Luhut reported Haris and Fatia to police just three months after these guidelines were published.</p>
<p>The trial ran from April 2023 through to January 8 2024. During the trial, Luhut complained that being called names was <a href="https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20230608121926-12-959228/luhut-ngaku-kenal-lama-dengan-haris-saya-ingin-selesaikan-baik-baik">“deeply hurtful”</a>.</p>
<p>Delivering the court’s decision, <a href="https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20240108105148-12-1046633/haris-azhar-divonis-bebas-dalam-kasus-lord-luhut">Judge Muhammad Djohan Arifin said</a> the YouTube conversation between Haris and Fatia constituted opinion and analysis of a civil society study and their use of the word “lord” was not defamatory. </p>
<p>Prosecutors have said they will <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/indonesia/2024/01/08/two-activists-cleared-of-defaming-luhut.html">consider appealing</a> the decision. </p>
<p>Luhut claimed he reported the activists to defend his reputation. Other statements he made during the trial left no doubt as to his real motivations. </p>
<p>Luhut said he wants the case to serve as a “<a href="https://www.kompas.id/baca/polhuk/2023/06/08/luhut-bantah-tuduhan-punya-bisnis-tambang-di-papua">lesson</a>”. </p>
<p>The prosecution concluded its sentencing demand with <a href="https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20231113191500-12-1023701/jpu-kasus-lord-luhut-kutip-politikus-pengacara-haris-azhar-nilai-lucu">a quote</a> from a minor politician, Teddy Gusnaidi, stating: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>If using the label ‘activist’ means you are immune from prosecution, criminals will form NGOs (non-government organisations) to avoid consequences for their crimes.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Luhut also claimed that he <a href="https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20230608163900-12-959440/luhut-saya-mau-audit-semua-lsm-dapat-dana-dari-mana">wanted to conduct</a> an “audit” of all non-government organisations in Indonesia to determine where they get their funding. </p>
<p>This is disingenuous. </p>
<p>Indonesian civil society organisations already need government approval to
receive donor funds, and most openly publish their list of donors in their public annual reports. </p>
<p>The government also regularly subjects foreign donors to interrogation from everyone from police to intelligence agencies, about their planned activities.</p>
<h2>Increasingly authoritarian tactics</h2>
<p>Appealing to nationalistic sensibilities and raising questions about civil society organisations like this is a <a href="https://www.fidh.org/en/issues/business-human-rights-environment/laws-against-foreign-agents-the-multi-functional-tool-of">classic technique</a> of authoritarian governments. It undermines organisations critical of government and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13642987.2018.1492916">redirects focus</a> from the issues at hand.</p>
<p>Legal attacks like the one against Haris and Fatia are designed to <a href="https://experts.arizona.edu/en/publications/you-can-beat-the-rap-but-you-cant-beat-the-ride-bringing-arrests-">wear civil society down</a>. Fronting up in court every week is time consuming, emotionally draining, and takes activists away from their work. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="InstagramEmbed" data-react-props="{"url":"https://www.instagram.com/p/C0MfKbzyxG1/?img_index=1","accessToken":"127105130696839|b4b75090c9688d81dfd245afe6052f20"}"></div></p>
<p>Further, the use of judicial harassment to target activists, in contrast to cruder tactics such as cyberattacks or physical violence, is designed to lend an <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1540-5893.2012.00515.x">air of legitimacy</a> to government repression.</p>
<p>Luhut has made it clear that the goal of the case against Haris and Fatia is to silence dissent. He appears to be succeeding.</p>
<p>There is already evidence that abuse of the Electronic Information and Transactions Law is having a chilling effect in Indonesian society, with a 2022 survey finding <a href="https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1580168/survei-indikator-politik-indonesia-629-persen-rakyat-semakin-takut-berpendapat">62.9% of Indonesians</a> were afraid of openly expressing their opinions.</p>
<p>Indonesian pro-democracy groups have long been willing to speak out against the state, even under the most challenging conditions. Yet repeated charges and arrests will eventually result in self-censorship and behavioural change.</p>
<p>In the face of mounting pressure, the government finally passed a <a href="https://icjr.or.id/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Compile-RUU-ITE.pdf">revised version</a> of the law on December 5 2023.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/myanmar-crisis-highlights-limits-of-indonesias-quiet-diplomacy-as-it-sets-sights-on-becoming-a-great-regional-power-209291">Myanmar crisis highlights limits of Indonesia's 'quiet diplomacy' as it sets sights on becoming a 'great regional power'</a>
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<p>Activists have complained that, like other regressive laws enacted in Indonesia over recent years, deliberations on the revision were conducted largely <a href="https://safenet.or.id/id/2023/07/revisi-uu-ite-harus-terbuka-serius-menjawab-permasalahan-dan-tidak-boleh-terburu-buru/">behind closed doors</a>. </p>
<p>The revised law does include some improvements, including that statements made in the public interest or to defend oneself cannot be prosecuted. The maximum sentence for defamation has also been decreased to two years, yet it remains longer than provisions on defamation in the <a href="https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Details/234935/uu-no-1-tahun-2023">new Criminal Code</a>, which will come into force in 2026.</p>
<p>Activists have argued for a complete dropping of criminal charges for online defamation. Given they have proven such an effective tool for smothering dissent, there was never any chance legislators were going to simply give up this weapon. </p>
<p>Haris and Fatia may be the highest profile Indonesians charged under the Electronic Information and Transactions Law, but they will not be the last.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220651/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tim Mann does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Two human rights activists have been acquitted of defaming a powerful government minister. It’s the latest in a string of concerning authoritarian uses of Indonesian law.Tim Mann, Associate Director, Centre for Indonesian Law, Islam and Society, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2194992023-12-20T00:56:50Z2023-12-20T00:56:50ZIs Joko Widodo paving the way for a political dynasty in Indonesia?<p>Joko Widodo, popularly known as “Jokowi”, has served as Indonesia’s president for almost a decade. He is hugely popular, garnering around <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2023/10/27/can-jokowi-influence-indonesias-presidential-election/">80% in some polls</a>. But the constitution bars him from serving a third term in office.</p>
<p>Repeated proposals in recent years years to amend the constitution to allow Jokowi to run again have gained little public or political traction. This leaves him unable to contest the next presidential election in February.</p>
<p>Key powerbrokers, however, have been keen to make the most of the tens of millions of votes that Jokowi commands – and maintain his inner circle’s influence after he leaves the palace next year. </p>
<p>Perhaps their most conspicuous strategy to do this has been to install Jokowi’s son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, as vice presidential running mate for Prabowo Subianto, now ahead in the polls with a huge lead of <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/12/prabowo-subianto-opens-up-significant-lead-in-latest-indonesian-polls/">20 points</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-professor-the-general-and-the-populist-meet-the-three-candidates-running-for-president-in-indonesia-217811">The professor, the general and the populist: meet the three candidates running for president in Indonesia</a>
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<h2>Concerning legal moves</h2>
<p>Getting Gibran into that position required the co-option of one of Indonesia’s most respected judicial institutions – the Constitutional Court. </p>
<p>The main roadblock for Gibran (and Jokowi) was that the election law imposed a minimum age of 40 for presidential and vice-presidential candidates. </p>
<p>In a <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-twist-in-indonesias-presidential-election-does-not-bode-well-for-the-countrys-fragile-democracy-216007">case</a> challenging that age limit, Chief Justice Anwar Usman, Jokowi’s brother-in-law and Gibran’s uncle, intervened to ensure a majority of judges would reverse the court’s position in three previous decisions. </p>
<p>As a result, the election law was altered to permit younger candidates to stand if they had previously held office as head of a sub-national government. Gibran, 36, just happens to have served as mayor of Solo in central Java, a job his father once held, and so the decision meant he could now run for vice president. </p>
<p>The decision has trashed of the reputation of the Constitutional Court, raising questions about its continuing credibility and future, with witty hackers changing its <a href="https://www.cnnindonesia.com/teknologi/20231024105551-192-1015126/viral-mahkamah-keluarga-di-google-maps-cek-sikap-mk-dan-google">name on Google Maps to the “family court”</a>.</p>
<p>However, not all judges agreed with the decision. Three judges dissented, with some raising questions about Anwar’s behaviour and his obvious conflict of interest. Public outrage over the decision led to the court’s ethics tribunal <a href="https://jakartaglobe.id/news/jokowis-brotherinlaw-removed-as-constitutional-court-chief-justice">removing</a> him from his position as chief justice last month.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-twist-in-indonesias-presidential-election-does-not-bode-well-for-the-countrys-fragile-democracy-216007">A twist in Indonesia's presidential election does not bode well for the country’s fragile democracy</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Yet, Anwar remains one of the nine judges on the court, the decision he is accused of “fixing” stands, and Gibran’s nomination as a vice presidential candidate can probably not be reversed.</p>
<p>Worse, the national legislature has been debating amendments to the Constitutional Court statute that could enable the removal of the dissenting judges. Ironically, this might be through the imposition of a minimum age requirement on Constitutional Court judges. One of the court’s most respected judges, Saldi Isra, is under the proposed age, and appears to be a target.</p>
<h2>Jokowi picks a side</h2>
<p>From the outside, it may seem like Gibran and Prabowo are strange bedfellows. Prabowo is a former son-in-law of the dictatorial former president Soeharto. He is a cashiered former general who has long been accused of <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/indonesia-s-new-cabinet-its-human-rights-implications">serious human rights abuses</a>, including alleged killings in East Timor, Papua and even the capital, Jakarta. </p>
<p>Prabowo has never faced trial, although several of his men were tried and convicted. He has denied the allegations against him.</p>
<p>Ironically, he was also Jokowi’s bitter opponent in the past two elections, which polarised Indonesia. Prabowo’s refusal to accept his electoral defeats in 2014 and 2019 led to dramatic <a href="https://asiafoundation.org/2014/09/03/elections-boost-trust-in-indonesias-constitutional-court/">challenges in the Constitutional Court</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/indonesias-presidential-election-dispute-prabowos-plan-to-challenge-election-result-may-be-in-vain-117663">Indonesia's presidential election dispute: Prabowo's plan to challenge election result may be in vain</a>
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</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>But the enmity between Jokowi and Prabowo seemed to evaporate almost immediately after the court challenges failed, with Prabowo pragmatically accepting the job of defence minister in Jokowi’s cabinet. </p>
<p>Now, Jokowi appears to have decided that Prabowo, of all people, offers the best chance to build a dynasty to keep some sort of hold on power. Certainly few see Gibran – largely silent or inarticulate in public appearances – as serious leadership material. He is widely assumed to be a proxy for Jokowi. </p>
<p>This <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2023/03/27/the-widodo-family-indonesias-newest-political-dynasty/">dynasty-building exercise</a> has involved a massive and expensive campaign that many complain has co-opted government agencies and programs to <a href="https://en.tempo.co/read/1796080/prabowo-gibrans-campaign-team-responds-to-abuse-of-power-allegations">promote Prabowo and Gibran</a>.</p>
<p>It has also involved reinventing Prabowo, a one-time special forces general, as a <em>gemoy</em> <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/opinion/2023/12/06/will-the-gemoy-tactic-be-effective-in-wooing-gen-z-voters.html">(cute) grandpa</a>, with viral video clips showing him dancing and playing with kittens. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="TiktokEmbed" data-react-props="{"url":"https://www.tiktok.com/@rumahindonesiamaju/video/7293110875060292870?q=prabowo%20gemoy\u0026t=1702612100643"}"></div></p>
<p>Jokowi’s alignment with Prabowo (through his son) is all the more surprising given Jokowi was a longtime member of PDI-P (Indonesian Democracy Party – Struggle). PDI-P is Indonesia’s largest political party. It twice successfully nominated Jokowi for the presidency, and it has its own candidate, Ganjar Pranowo, in February’s election. Party rules require Jokowi to support him.</p>
<p>By abandoning Ganjar for Prabowo (who has his own party, Gerindra), Jokowi will effectively be stealing votes from PDI-P and declaring war on its boss, the formidable – and vengeful – former president, Megawati Soekarnoputeri, the daughter of Indonesia’s first president. She will fight hard to maintain her party’s power and influence.</p>
<h2>Is Indonesia’s democracy under threat?</h2>
<p>Despite the political chaos these moves have sparked, Jokowi’s bet that his loyalists and the general public don’t really care about constitutional crises or claims of dynasty building seems to be paying off. </p>
<p>Of course, votes could still shift in the next month and a half. However, there is a sense the momentum created by Jokowi’s support for Prabowo may make his victory inevitable. Some former critics are already quietly changing sides to ensure a share of the spoils.</p>
<p>Jokowi has previously <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/hrw-slams-jokowis-democracy-has-gone-too-far-comments-ahead-of-australia-visit/ykdprpqs0">said</a> “our democracy has gone too far”. And Prabowo has openly called for a return to the model of Suharto’s authoritarian <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/45070980">New Order</a>. </p>
<p>So, a Prabowo-Gibran victory may be good news for the elites now in power, but it will likely be bad news for Indonesian democracy. It will confirm – and probably accelerate – the regression that most observers, including <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/indonesia">Freedom House</a>, agree is already advanced under Jokowi.</p>
<p>Many voters seem untroubled by this. Indonesia’s post-Soeharto <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-05-21/activists-look-back-on-20-years-of-reform-in-indonesia/9783462">“Reformasi” wave</a> of democratisation is mere history for Indonesia’s Gen Z, who appear to have limited interest in all that was achieved two decades ago and no experience of living under authoritarianism.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1733972585908498556"}"></div></p>
<p>But the activist legal NGOs that form Indonesia’s policy “brains trust” are depressed and anxious. Certainly, some are protesting, and a few are even challenging the court decision that allowed Gibran to run. </p>
<p>However, many are intimidated by <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/are-indonesia-s-rubber-laws-limiting-freedom-speech">criminal charges that members of Jokowi’s administration have brought against critics</a> with increasing frequency in recent years. From the perspective of civil society, Jokowi’s strategists seem to have a fix in place and dark and difficult times lie ahead.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219499/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tim Lindsey receives funding from the Australian Research Council.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Butt receives funding from the Australian Research Council. </span></em></p>Jokowi’s bet the general public doesn’t really care about constitutional crises or claims of dynasty building seems to be paying off.Tim Lindsey, Malcolm Smith Professor of Asian Law and Director of the Centre for Indonesian Law, Islam and Society, The University of MelbourneSimon Butt, Professor of Indonesian Law, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2179602023-12-13T13:35:56Z2023-12-13T13:35:56ZGrowth of autocracies will expand Chinese global influence via Belt and Road Initiative as it enters second decade<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564937/original/file-20231211-23-i4omvy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Xi Jinping shakes hands with Chinese construction workers at a Belt and Road Initiative site in Trinidad and Tobago in June 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/chinas-president-xi-jinping-shake-hands-with-chinese-news-photo/169793922">Frederic Dubray/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>China currently faces <a href="https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2023/10/18/chinas-economy-may-be-growing-faster-but-big-problems-remain">daunting challenges</a> in its domestic economy. But weakness in the real estate market and consumer spending at home is unlikely to stem its rising influence abroad. </p>
<p>In mid-October 2023, China celebrated the 10-year anniversary of its <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-turns-10-xi-announces-8-new-priorities-continues-push-for-global-influence-216014">Belt and Road Initiative</a>, or BRI. The BRI seeks to connect China with countries around the world via land and maritime networks, with the aim of improving regional integration, increasing trade and stimulating economic growth. Through the expansion of the BRI, China also sought to extend its global influence, especially in developing regions.</p>
<p>During its first decade, the initiative has faced a <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2020/01/29/how-chinas-belt-and-road-became-a-global-trail-of-trouble/?sh=124d92a5443d">barrage of criticism from the West</a>, mainly for saddling countries with debt, inattention to environmental impact, and corruption. </p>
<p>It has also encountered unexpected challenges – notably the COVID-19 pandemic, which led to massive supply chain issues and restrictions on the movement of Chinese workers overseas. Yet, as the BRI heads into its second decade, global economic trends suggest it will continue to play an important role in spreading Chinese influence.</p>
<p>I’m an associate professor of global studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen, where I teach about <a href="https://hss.cuhk.edu.cn/en/teacher/1126">business-government relations</a> in emerging economies. In my new book, “<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/chinas-chance-to-lead/2C88E7D955049471664120981CDF2DFB">China’s Chance to Lead</a>,” I discuss which countries have already and are now most likely to seek out and benefit from Chinese spending. Understanding this helps explain why China and the Belt and Road Initiative are poised to benefit greatly from the global economy over the next several decades.</p>
<h2>Malaysia’s unlikely prominence</h2>
<p>In October 2013, China President Xi Jinping announced the launch of the maritime portion of the BRI during a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-24361172">speech in Jakarta</a>. At the time, Indonesia appeared to be an ideal candidate for Chinese infrastructure spending, yet it was Malaysia – surprisingly – that emerged as a far more avid participant. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564350/original/file-20231207-15-siwmcd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Aerial view of massive housing development in Malaysia" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564350/original/file-20231207-15-siwmcd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564350/original/file-20231207-15-siwmcd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564350/original/file-20231207-15-siwmcd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564350/original/file-20231207-15-siwmcd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564350/original/file-20231207-15-siwmcd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564350/original/file-20231207-15-siwmcd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564350/original/file-20231207-15-siwmcd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A view of Forest City, a condominium project launched under China’s Belt and Road Initiative, in Malaysia’s Johor state.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/this-aerial-photo-taken-on-june-16-2022-shows-a-general-news-photo/1241336726">Mohd Rasfan/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In comparison to Malaysia, Indonesia’s economy was <a href="https://www.worlddata.info/country-comparison.php?country1=IDN&country2=MYS">three times larger</a> and its population <a href="https://www.worlddata.info/country-comparison.php?country1=IDN&country2=MYS">nearly nine times bigger</a>, yet its gross domestic product per capita only was <a href="https://www.worlddata.info/country-comparison.php?country1=IDN&country2=MYS">one-third as high</a>. Indonesia also had enormous potential to increase its already substantial <a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/idn/partner/chn">natural resources exports to China</a>. Taken together, these factors point to Indonesia’s far greater demand for infrastructure that would aid its economic development. </p>
<p>Furthermore, Indonesia’s democratic institutions were more conducive to attracting foreign investment. Its checks and balances enhanced policy stability and reduced political risk. By contrast, Malaysia’s government, which was dominated by a single ruling party coalition, lacked comparable checks and balances.</p>
<p>Despite Indonesia’s numerous advantages, Malaysia attracted a far larger volume of BRI spending during its first several years. Data provided by the <a href="https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/">China Global Investment Tracker</a> indicates the value of newly announced infrastructure projects in Malaysia surged from US$3.5 billion in 2012 to over $8.6 billion in 2016. Spending in Indonesia, meanwhile, rose modestly from $3.75 billion to $3.77 billion over the same period.</p>
<p>Malaysia also enthusiastically participated in the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/china-digital-silk-road/">Digital Silk Road</a>, or DSR, launched in 2015. The DSR is the technological dimension of the BRI that aims to improve digital connectivity in Belt and Road countries. Malaysia Prime Minister Najib Razak engaged Jack Ma, the co-founder of Chinese tech giant Alibaba, as an adviser to develop e-commerce in 2016. This led to the creation in 2017 of a <a href="https://www.nst.com.my/business/2017/11/298317/%C2%A0digital-free-trade-zone-goes-live-nov-3">Digital Free Trade Zone</a>, an international e-commerce logistics hub next to the Kuala Lumpur International Airport.</p>
<p>With this foundation in place, Malaysia’s capital went on to become the first city outside China to adopt Alibaba’s <a href="https://www.wired.co.uk/article/alibaba-city-brain-artificial-intelligence-china-kuala-lumpur">City Brain</a> smart city solution in January 2018. City Brain uses the wealth of urban data to effectively allocate public resources, improve social governance and promote sustainable urban development. <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/pivotal-year-city-brain-other-middle-east-ai-news-carrington-malin-/">Dubai and other cities in the Middle East</a> followed. </p>
<p>Digital Silk Road projects in Indonesia during that period were far fewer, slower and less ambitious. They primarily involved the expansion of <a href="https://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/updates/2022-SU-IndoChina-Updated.pdf">Chinese smartphone and e-commerce firms</a> in Indonesia.</p>
<p>What accounts for these contrasting responses? The short answer: their political regimes. And understanding that could be key to the global spread of Chinese influence in the coming years.</p>
<h2>State-owned business and clientelism</h2>
<p>In the lead-up to the May 2018 election, Malaysia’s ruling party and its allies <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/186810341803700307">worried they could lose power</a> after six decades of rule. Desperate to bolster support, Najib quickly identified <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/10/what-happened-to-chinas-bri-projects-in-malaysia/">numerous infrastructure megaprojects</a> in which Chinese state-owned businesses could partner with Malaysian counterparts.</p>
<p>Indonesia, by contrast, placed far greater emphasis on projects led by private business. For example, the Indonesia Morowali Industrial Park, “<a href="https://www.wired.com/story/workers-are-dying-in-the-ev-industrys-tainted-city/">the world’s epicenter for nickel production</a>,” is one of the largest Chinese investments in Indonesia and a joint venture between private Chinese and Indonesian companies. </p>
<p>As I discuss in <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/chinas-chance-to-lead/2C88E7D955049471664120981CDF2DFB">my book</a>, when rulers in autocracies with semi-competitive elections, like Malaysia’s, have a weak hold on power, their desire for Chinese spending is amplified. This relates to <a href="https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095617734">clientelism</a>, or the delivery of goods and services in exchange for political support.</p>
<p>A higher level of state control in autocracies grants political leaders greater influence over the allocation of clientelist benefits, which aids leaders’ reelection efforts. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564351/original/file-20231207-27-yxvnt3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Najib Razak, prime minister of Malaysia, and Jack Ma Yun, founder of Alibaba Group, stand and clap" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564351/original/file-20231207-27-yxvnt3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564351/original/file-20231207-27-yxvnt3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564351/original/file-20231207-27-yxvnt3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564351/original/file-20231207-27-yxvnt3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564351/original/file-20231207-27-yxvnt3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564351/original/file-20231207-27-yxvnt3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564351/original/file-20231207-27-yxvnt3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Najib Razak, left, then-prime minister of Malaysia, and Jack Ma, Alibaba Group founder and executive chairman, attend a launch ceremony of the Digital Free Trade Zone in Kuala Lumpur.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/najib-razak-prime-minister-of-malaysia-and-jack-ma-yun-news-photo/1092858894">Thomas Yau/South China Morning Post via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Economic trends that will benefit China</h2>
<p>Even if China’s future growth is lower than the pre-pandemic period, these four features of the global economy are poised to benefit China and the Belt and Road Initiative over the next several decades. </p>
<p><strong>1. Global rise of autocracies</strong> </p>
<p><a href="https://www.v-dem.net/documents/29/V-dem_democracyreport2023_lowres.pdf">Over 60% of developing countries</a> are autocratic, according to data provided by the <a href="https://www.v-dem.net/">Varieties of Democracy Project</a>. This represented 72% of the global population in 2022, up from 46% in 2012. </p>
<p>For decades, the World Bank and affiliated regional development banks were the only game in town for development financing to low- and middle-income countries. Consequently, these global lenders could demand liberalizing reforms that were sometimes contrary to the interests of incumbent rulers, especially autocrats. </p>
<p>China’s rise has created an attractive alternative for autocratic regimes, especially since it does not impose the same kinds of conditions that often require loosening state controls on the corporate sector and reducing clientelism. Between 2014 and 2019, I find that 77% of total BRI spending on construction projects went to autocracies, and primarily to those with semi-competitive elections.</p>
<p><strong>2. Demand for Chinese infrastructure spending</strong></p>
<p>The economies of developing countries have grown <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDP_RPCH@WEO/WEOWORLD/ADVEC/OEMDC">more than twice as quickly</a> as advanced economies since 2000 and are projected to <a href="https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/research-insights/economy/the-world-in-2050.html">outpace advanced economies</a> in the decades ahead. On the eve of the Soviet Union’s dissolution in 1991, developing economies accounted for 37% of global GDP; by 2030, the International Monetary Fund projects they will account for <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/PPPSH@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD">around 63%</a>. </p>
<p>At the same time, the global infrastructure financing gap – that is, the money needed to build and upgrade existing infrastructure – is estimated to be around <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/econographics/the-global-infrastructure-financing-gap-where-sovereign-wealth-funds-swfs-and-pension-funds-can-come-in/#:%7E:text=The%20global%20infrastructure%20financing%20gap%20is%20estimated%20to%20be%20around,year%20in%20the%20infrastructure%20sector.">$15 trillion</a> by 2040. To fill this gap, the world must spend just under $1 trillion more than the previous year up through 2040, with most of this spending directed toward low-income economies.</p>
<p>Because many of these fast-growing, low-income countries are predominantly semicompetitive autocracies, China is well-positioned to expand its global influence via the Belt and Road Initiative. </p>
<p><strong>3. Emerging tech</strong></p>
<p>The advent of what is known as <a href="https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/mckinsey-explainers/what-are-industry-4-0-the-fourth-industrial-revolution-and-4ir">Industry 4.0 technologies</a>, such as artificial intelligence, big data analytics and blockchain, could enable developing countries to <a href="https://hub.unido.org/sites/default/files/publications/Unlocking%20the%20Potential%20of%20Industry%204.0%20for%20Developing%20Countries.pdf">leapfrog stages of development</a>. </p>
<p>By creating <a href="https://www.nbr.org/publication/setting-the-standards-locking-in-chinas-technological-influence/">new technical standards</a> to be used in these emerging digital technologies, China aims to lock in Chinese digital products and services and lock out non-Chinese competitors wherever its standards are adopted. </p>
<p>In Tanzania, for example, the Chinese company contracted to deploy the national ICT broadband network constructed it to be <a href="https://www.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/Chinas%20Digital%20Silk%20Road%20and%20Africas%20Technological%20Future_FINAL.pdf">compatible only with routers</a> made by Chinese firm Huawei. </p>
<p>Incorporating digital technologies into hard infrastructure projects – digital traffic sensors on roads, for example – presents more opportunities for China to use the Belt and Road Initiative to promote adoption of its technologies and standards globally.</p>
<p><strong>4. Urbanization</strong></p>
<p>Finally, the developing world’s <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/urbanization#:%7E:text=Across%20all%20countries%2C%20urban%20shares,from%2054%25%20in%202016">urban population</a> is expected to rise from 35% in 1990 to 65% by 2050. The biggest increases will likely occur in the semi-competitive autocracies of Africa. A desire for sustainable urbanization will increase the demand for infrastructure that incorporates digital technologies – once again amplifying the opportunity for China and the BRI. </p>
<p>Understanding what drives the demand for the Belt and Road Initiative, and the trends that will propel it into the future, is vital for the West to devise an effective strategy that counters China’s rising global influence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217960/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Carney does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>More autocratic governments, growing urbanization and emerging technologies will bolster the spread of Chinese influence around the world, an expert on emerging economies explains.Richard Carney, Associate professor of global studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, ShenzhenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2178112023-11-24T08:41:46Z2023-11-24T08:41:46ZThe professor, the general and the populist: meet the three candidates running for president in Indonesia<p>In just over two months, Indonesia will hold one of the biggest one-day elections anywhere on Earth. More than 200 million eligible voters will take part across Indonesia’s 6,000 inhabited islands – along with 1.75 million people in the diaspora – to elect a new president, vice president and members of the People’s Consultative Assembly at both the national and regional levels.</p>
<p>The Election Commission <a href="https://apnews.com/article/indonesia-presidential-election-candidates-457845138892d5de371bcc8ee95c7bc6">has announced three pairs of candidates</a> for president and vice president who will contest the election on February 14. The campaign period kicks off Tuesday. </p>
<p><a href="https://mediaindonesia.com/politik-dan-hukum/576423/demokrasi-indonesia-bakal-lebih-sehat-dengan-3-capres">A number of political observers</a> have said the presence of three presidential candidates, instead of the usual two, would be good for Indonesia’s political stability as it could prevent <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep26920.8.pdf">deepening polarisation among the main parties’ supporters</a>. </p>
<p>In the 2014 and 2019 elections, which featured only two candidates, Indonesia witnessed <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep26920.8.pdf">great polarisation</a> between the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03068374.2019.1672400">two camps</a>. Next year, the voters will have more alternatives.</p>
<p>On the other hand, some scholars have warned the 2024 presidential election will be <a href="https://theconversation.com/4-alasan-mengapa-pilpres-2024-bisa-jadi-ancaman-bagi-demokrasi-indonesia-216437">a test for the country’s democracy</a> because the contenders have either all run for office before or are backed by established power players. As a result, Indonesians do not really have many new candidates with fresh ideas to choose from.</p>
<p>Here is a brief rundown of the current field of candidates, and who backs them.</p>
<h2>1. Anies Baswedan, the professor</h2>
<p>Anies is the only presidential hopeful who does not represent a single political party. However, his candidacy has been endorsed by the National Democratic Party, Indonesia’s fifth-largest party, the Islamist-based National Awakening Party (PKB) and the conservative Prosperous Justice Party (PKS).</p>
<p>Prior to his political career, Anies was a well-known, US-educated scholar with a doctorate in political science. He was <a href="https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/2024-elections-the-third-candidate-anies-baswedan/">born into an academic family</a> – both of his parents are professors. He then became a lecturer himself, as well as a rector. After President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo was elected in 2014, he was appointed minister of education.</p>
<p>In 2017, Anies won the Jakarta governor election with the support of hardline Islamist groups. Anies <a href="https://theconversation.com/manuver-koalisi-anies-baswedan-apa-untungnya-memilih-cak-imin-dan-akan-kemana-ahy-212697">is known</a> for <a href="http://www.ejurnal.ubk.ac.id/index.php/communitarian/article/view/316">using religious identity issues</a> to attract support from conservative Muslim groups.</p>
<p>In an attempt to <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XN6TusC1E9Y">shed</a> the label of “identity politician”, though, Anies has chosen Muhaimin Iskandar as his running mate in next year’s election.</p>
<p>Muhaimin is the chairman of PKB, which has strong affiliations with Indonesia’s largest Muslim organisation, Nahdlatul Ulama. This group has <a href="https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3233481/indonesia-presidential-poll-can-anies-baswedan-and-running-mate-win-total-opposite-ideals">a decades-long reputation</a> as a moderate Islamic entity that promotes pluralism and tolerance.</p>
<p>A study has shown a majority of Indonesians view Anies positively, thanks to sympathetic <a href="https://ijmmu.com/index.php/ijmmu/article/view/3460">media coverage</a>. He is framed as intelligent, polite, firm and, of course, <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-981-19-9811-9_3">religious</a>.</p>
<h2>2. Prabowo Subianto, the military man</h2>
<p>Prabowo, a former army general, is the current chairman of the Gerindra Party, the second-largest in parliament. He is also the minister of defence.</p>
<p>Prabowo <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Mohamad-Rosyidin/publication/316164742_Democracy_without_justice_transitional_justice_in_Indonesia_after_the_fall_of_Suharto/links/58f44daf0f7e9b6f82e7d054/Democracy-without-justice-transitional-justice-in-Indonesia-after-the-fall-of-Suharto">has long been linked</a> to the <a href="https://griffithlawjournal.org/index.php/gjlhd/article/view/663">kidnapping</a> and <a href="https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/fora102&div=18&id=&page=">disappearance</a> of students and activists who opposed former <a href="https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/jrnatila14&div=7&id=&page=">dictator Suharto’s authoritarian regime</a> in the late 1990s, as well as other <a href="https://repository.um-surabaya.ac.id/1741/">alleged human rights abuses</a>, including in <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00472336.2019.1584636">East Timor</a> and <a href="https://books.google.co.id/books?hl=en&lr=&id=xtWSDwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA213&dq=prabowo+human+rights+abuse+papua&ots=jAIExEyK-3&sig=9sQKyGq3izuy28k8FznmJAtjwPw&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false">Papua</a>. At that time, he was the commander of the Indonesian Army special forces.</p>
<p>Prabowo, the former son-in-law of <a href="https://theconversation.com/soeharto-the-giant-of-modern-indonesia-who-left-a-legacy-of-violence-and-corruption-164411">Suharto</a>, has repeatedly denied all of the allegations.</p>
<p>The 2024 race will be Prabowo’s third attempt at winning the presidency; he previously lost twice to Jokowi. He also lost in the 2009 vice presidential race as the running mate of Megawati Sukarnoputri, who won the presidency.</p>
<p>Prabowo was once Jokowi’s rival; now he is <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-twist-in-indonesias-presidential-election-does-not-bode-well-for-the-countrys-fragile-democracy-216007">his ally</a>. In a surprise, he has picked Gibran Rakabuming Raka, Jokowi’s eldest son and the mayor of Surakarta, as his running mate. </p>
<p>The decision followed a controversial Constitutional Court <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-twist-in-indonesias-presidential-election-does-not-bode-well-for-the-countrys-fragile-democracy-216007">ruling</a> in October on the 2017 Election Law. The law says candidates for presidential or vice presidential office must be at least 40 years old, but the court ruled there could be an exception if the candidate has previously held elected office as a regional head. </p>
<p>This ruling paved the way for Gibran, who is just 36 years old, to run for vice president. He has been a mayor for nearly three years.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.controlrisks.com/our-thinking/insights/indonesia-elections-frontrunners-pick-of-presidents-son-as-running-mate?utm_referrer=https://www.google.com">Analysts argue</a> this is part of an agenda by Jokowi to establish a political dynasty. The Constitutional Court is led by Justice Anwar Usman, Jokowi’s brother-in-law, and Gibran’s uncle. Since the ruling, he has been <a href="https://www.kompas.id/baca/english/2023/11/08/en-anwar-usman-dicopot-syarat-batas-usia-diuji-lagi">dismissed dishonorably</a> for breaching the court’s ethics.</p>
<p><a href="https://katadata.co.id/ameidyonasution/berita/653e61b745907/rangkuman-hasil-survei-terbaru-capres-cawapres-siapa-unggul?page=all">Prabowo has risen in the polls</a> since picking the president’s son as his running mate.</p>
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Baca juga:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-twist-in-indonesias-presidential-election-does-not-bode-well-for-the-countrys-fragile-democracy-216007">A twist in Indonesia's presidential election does not bode well for the country’s fragile democracy</a>
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<h2>3. Ganjar Pranowo, the populist</h2>
<p>Ganjar Pranowo is a former governor of Central Java, Indonesia’s third most-populous province. He is a member of the Indonesia Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), the country’s largest political party. </p>
<p>He will be contesting next year’s election with <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/indonesia/2023/10/18/breaking-mahfud-md-tapped-as-ganjars-running-mate.html#google_vignette">Mohammad Mahfud Mahmodin</a> (commonly known as Mahfud MD), who is currently a minister in Jokowi’s government and the former chief justice of the Constitutional Court.</p>
<p>Months ago, many predicted Jokowi would throw his support to Ganjar as his successor. This is because Jokowi and Ganjar are from the same political party, come from the same hometown and have both embraced Javanese culture. <a href="https://sr.sgpp.ac.id/post/widodo-and-indonesias-changing-political-culture">In Indonesian politics</a>, the elites are usually strong defenders of their culture, and Javanese have dominated the country’s politics since colonial times.</p>
<p>Political communication scholars have also noted the populist Ganjar is the only political figure with <a href="https://news.republika.co.id/berita/rav2um384/rajin-blusukan-ganjar-dinilai-mirip-jokowi">a similar</a> “<a href="https://eudl.eu/pdf/10.4108/eai.21-10-2020.2311832">down-to-earth</a>” leadership style as Jokowi.</p>
<p>However, there’s been a twist in the plot. With his son now running with Prabowo, Jokowi is widely believed to back the former general.</p>
<p>Ganjar has consistently <a href="https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1626254/capres-2024-simak-peringkat-ganjar-pranowo-dalam-3-survei">polled</a> among the top candidates running for president in recent years, but has never been a clear favourite.</p>
<p>In March, Ganjar sparked a public outcry after <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/indonesia/2023/03/23/ganjar-calls-for-ban-on-israel-soccer-team-for-upcoming-fifa-u-20-cup.html#google_vignette">strongly opposing</a> the participation of the Israeli soccer team in the FIFA U-20 World Cup that was supposed to be held in Indonesia, citing his support for Palestinian statehood. This caused <a href="https://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/organisation/media-releases/fifa-removes-indonesia-as-host-of-fifa-u-20-world-cup-2023-tm">FIFA to strip</a> the tournament hosting rights from Indonesia.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217811/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Para penulis tidak bekerja, menjadi konsultan, memiliki saham atau menerima dana dari perusahaan atau organisasi mana pun yang akan mengambil untung dari artikel ini, dan telah mengungkapkan bahwa ia tidak memiliki afiliasi di luar afiliasi akademis yang telah disebut di atas.</span></em></p>Indonesians will go to the polls on February 14 to elect a new leader. Here are the three leading candidates and their running mates.Dadang I K Mujiono, Faculty member of International Relations Department, Universitas MulawarmanTriesanto Romulo Simanjuntak, Dosen, Universitas Kristen Satya WacanaWawan Kurniawan, Peneliti di Laboratorium Psikologi Politik Universitas Indonesia, Universitas IndonesiaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2127402023-11-03T17:32:50Z2023-11-03T17:32:50ZThe climate crisis is making gender inequality in developing coastal communities worse<p>Across the world, women and men experience the impacts of the climate crisis in different ways. These are shaped by societal roles and responsibilities and result in <a href="https://theconversation.com/climate-crisis-could-reverse-progress-in-achieving-gender-equality-127787">widening inequalities</a> between men and women. </p>
<p>Sea-level rise, storm surges and high waves in coastal area do not discriminate, but societal structures often do. This makes climate change a highly gender-sensitive issue.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/">Research</a> has long shown that coastal areas are the most directly affected by climate change. Small islands in Asia, central and South America and Africa – what many term “<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-global-south-is-on-the-rise-but-what-exactly-is-the-global-south-207959">the global south</a>” – are particularly vulnerable to land erosion and economic decline, amid livelihood losses in fisheries. </p>
<p><a href="https://environment.leeds.ac.uk/geography/pgr/11413/andi-misbahul-pratiwi">My doctoral research</a> explores how in countries where women and girls already face disproportionate inequalities relating to ethnicity, class, age and education, the climate crisis is <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-womens-environmental-action-across-the-global-south-can-create-a-better-planet-214083">making things worse</a>. In <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19480881.2010.536669">coastal areas</a>, in particular, women and girls are <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0959378006000422">ever more vulnerable</a>.</p>
<h2>Livelihoods under threat</h2>
<p>In 2017, in collaboration with the <a href="https://indonesianfeministjournal.org/">Indonesian Feminist Journal</a>, I conducted <a href="https://indonesianfeministjournal.org/index.php/IFJ/article/view/203/259">research</a> off the coast of Demak in Java, Indonesia. I found that women in coastal communities faced multiple problems, from poverty and <a href="https://wrd.unwomen.org/explore/insights/how-fisherwomen-java-rise-above-climate-change-and-increase-gender-based-violence">domestic and gender-based violence</a> to employment challenges. </p>
<p>Fisherwomen who work at sea are having to sail further out and contend with difficult conditions to find catches. One woman, Zarokah, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gzSyPW2D73o">I interviewed</a> had started fishing with her husband, two years earlier, when he could no longer find a crew to work with. They wake at 3am to head out to sea. </p>
<p>She told me a basket of tiny flying fish goes for 150,000 rupiah (£7.70) and a good haul will yield several baskets. But even when they don’t catch anything, they still have to cover the cost of supplies and equipment. <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/business/2022/10/24/warming-seas-bring-indonesias-fishermen-deadly-storms-empty-nets.html">This income is inadequate</a> when faced with a situation where fish are becoming scarcer and extreme weather prevents them from going out to sea.</p>
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<p><a href="https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/196016/">I have shown</a> how women in this area and beyond have contributed significantly to the fishing sector and coastal economies. And yet, Masnu'ah, who is the founder of a local fisherwomen’s organisation, told me that women’s economic role continues to not be recognised by their male peers and society more broadly. </p>
<p>Zarokah is still labelled a “housewife” on her ID card, despite the fact that, as she put it, “If I don’t go, my husband doesn’t go either and we cannot meet our needs.”</p>
<p>If the fisherwomen do not receive recognition for their work, they are unable to access social protections including <a href="https://www.undp.org/indonesia/news/fisherwomen-fisherman%E2%80%99s-world-improving-access-women-indonesian-fisheries">life insurance</a>. As climate change increasingly threatens the profession at large, having state support and insurance is vital. </p>
<h2>Access to amenities and healthcare</h2>
<p>It’s not just women’s livelihoods in this area that are impacted by extreme weather and any other disruptions to the fishing industry. <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/paper/2023/07/25/slow-disaster-residents-in-central-javas-sinking-village-forced-to-adapt.html">Tidal flooding</a> has also made it difficult for women and girls to access healthcare facilities. </p>
<p>Women find it difficult to access clinics because the roads are closed and isolated. One activist in Demak told me about helping a woman give birth in the middle of a tidal flood – when the houses were sinking. “It was very difficult,” she said, “because the waves were high, there were no boats. The baby died two to three days after.” </p>
<p>Research from other regions in the world show a similar pattern of increasing vulnerability. In the south-western coastal region of <a href="https://theconversation.com/bangladesh-is-undertaking-the-worlds-largest-resettlement-programme-and-the-climate-is-making-it-harder-208664">Bangladesh</a>, natural hazards, including storm surges and <a href="https://theconversation.com/climate-change-isnt-just-making-cyclones-worse-its-making-the-floods-they-cause-worse-too-new-research-182789">cyclones</a>, have long affected women significantly. Of the 140,000 people killed in the 1991 cyclone disaster, <a href="https://lib.icimod.org/record/13783/files/1337.pdf">90% were women</a>.</p>
<p>However, the impacts are broader than that. <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/15/4/3744">A recent study</a> looked at women’s lives, particularly among the ethnic Munda community, in the Khulna, Satkhira and Bagerhat districts. It found that bad management of open-water sources (ponds and canals) has led to high water salinity. Women and girls, who are responsible for family provisions, have to walk up to 3km – and sometimes as far as 5km – to find drinking water.</p>
<p>They spend long hours carrying heavy water pots, which leads to chronic pain conditions. During droughts, this task can take over three hours daily. The women and girls also face harassment from boys and men while collecting the water.</p>
<p>A 2020 study in Ilaje, a coastal region in Nigeria, found that, there too, <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0959652619338855#abs0010">women and girls</a> often bear the responsibility of ensuring there’s enough food, fuel and clean water available at home. During times of low rainfall or drought, they have to cover similarly long distances. Young girls sometimes have to leave school in order to help their mothers with these tasks.</p>
<p>Pregnant women in Ilaje, particularly, are vulnerable to health effects like malnutrition, dehydration, anemia, and other health risks related to low food and water availability during crises.</p>
<p>Due to prevailing patriarchal norms, Ilaje women lack the authority to make independent decisions within their families and in society. They don’t have control over financial matters and assets. And they are not given opportunities to participate in public spaces, in particular within community group discussions on climate change adaptation. As a result, they are unable to voice their specific concerns and needs – at both family and community levels. </p>
<p>Oceans and coastal ecosystems cover over two thirds of the planet. They <a href="https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/">play a crucial role</a> in food and energy production as well as creating employment opportunities. About <a href="https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Ocean_Factsheet_People.pdf">600 million people</a> – around 10% of the world’s population – reside in coastal areas that are less than 10 metres above sea level. </p>
<p>The central tenet of the UN’s 2030 agenda for sustainable development is to “leave no one behind”. Applying a <a href="https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/196019/">feminist political lens</a> to the climate crisis is crucial to understanding how multilayered the problems facing women and girls in rural and coastal regions around the world are. </p>
<p>Yet, social and feminist research on how the climate is changing has been <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-954X.2010.01889.x">scarce</a>. Without it, women and girls will indeed be left behind. </p>
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<img alt="Imagine weekly climate newsletter" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andi Misbahul Pratiwi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Sea-level rises and storm surges don’t discriminate, but societal structures do.Andi Misbahul Pratiwi, PhD Candidate, School of Geography, University of LeedsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2163482023-10-30T19:10:35Z2023-10-30T19:10:35ZThe number of Australian students learning Indonesian keeps dropping. How do we fix this worrying decline?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556495/original/file-20231030-29-q4pcps.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=30%2C40%2C6679%2C4426&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.pexels.com/photo/woman-using-a-laptop-with-headphones-7283630/">Karolina Grabowska/Pexels </a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Australia’s Year 12 students are in the middle of making important decisions about their futures. For many, this will involve choosing a university course and the subjects within that. </p>
<p>But if trends are anything to go by, Indonesia won’t figure in these decisions at all, despite its <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/suspicious-minds-will-closer-australia-indonesia-engagement-yield-greater-trust">enormous</a> economic, strategic and political importance to Australia. </p>
<p>Many politicians have <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/listen/programs/radionational-breakfast/3856606">spruiked</a> the importance of learning Indonesian. But to borrow the <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/costello-all-tip-no-iceberg-20070306-ge4cy8.html">words</a> of former Prime Minister Paul Keating, this is “all tip and no iceberg”. </p>
<p>In fact, you’d have to go back <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/how-advanced-australia-faring-asian-century">to the Keating era</a> to find a concerted government effort to understand Asia. </p>
<p>As Indonesia researchers, many of us got our start in that era. But since then, we’ve watched Australia’s Indonesia literacy – our knowledge of our neighbours’ language and culture – slowly die of neglect. </p>
<p>So, what’s happening? What does Australia get wrong? And is there anything we can do about it? </p>
<h2>Australia’s declining Indonesia literacy</h2>
<p>This semester, Sharyn had fewer than ten students in her introductory Indonesian course at Monash University. This course is for students without any prior knowledge on Indonesian. The intermediate Indonesian class - which includes former Year 12 students entering university - had 13 students. </p>
<p>This low number of enrolments isn’t a blip, it is part of a national trend.</p>
<p>In 1992, there were 22 Australian universities teaching Indonesian. By 2022, this number <a href="https://asiasociety.org/australia/indonesia-and-great-unrealised-opportunity-deep-partnership">was down to 12</a>. </p>
<p>There has also been a huge drop in students studying Indonesian to the end of high school. The number of Victorian high school students taking Indonesian in Year 12 has <a href="https://www.acicis.edu.au/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/202303519_LP-Deck-2022_VIC_FULL-DECK.pdf">fallen</a> from 1,061 in 2002 to 387 in 2022. In New South Wales the figure <a href="https://www.acicis.edu.au/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/20230111_LP-Deck-2023_NSW_FULL-DECK.pdf">slumped</a> from 306 to 90 over the same period. </p>
<p>There are some bright spots. Since 2014, young Australians have travelled to Indonesia under the <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/people-to-people/new-colombo-plan">New Colombo Plan</a>. For example, this year, about 400 first-year Monash students will go to Indonesia for two weeks. However most of the trip will take place in English. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/only-0-34-of-year-12s-study-indonesian-here-are-3-steps-we-can-take-towards-knowing-our-neighbour-better-184638">Only 0.34% of year 12s study Indonesian. Here are 3 steps we can take towards knowing our neighbour better</a>
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<h2>What Australia gets wrong about language</h2>
<p>A key part of the problem is previous Australian and Indonesian government campaigns to encourage Australians to learn Indonesian have missed the mark. </p>
<p>Our research <a href="https://www.melbourneasiareview.edu.au/invigorating-indonesian-studies-in-australia-through-collaborative-online-education-practices/">has found</a> campaigns that focus on the <a href="https://aiya.org.au/2014/11/19/monolingual-australia-and-the-language-of-justification/">economic</a> and <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australia-and-indonesia-towards-a-durable-partnership/">strategic importance</a> of Indonesia rarely resonate with students. </p>
<p>This is because these narratives are too esoteric and future-based for teenagers, who are often more swayed by youth and popular culture. For example, since 1998 more than 1,000 students per year <a href="https://www.acicis.edu.au/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/202303519_LP-Deck-2022_VIC_FULL-DECK.pdf">have studied</a> Japanese in Victorian high schools, in part driven by wider interest in Japanese pop culture.</p>
<h2>A monolingual mindset</h2>
<p>We also know Australia has a “<a href="https://www.languageonthemove.com/monolingual-mindset-in-the-lucky-country/">monolingual mindest</a>”. There is an attitude Australians don’t need to learn other languages. Former Prime Minister John Howard typifies this attitude, <a href="https://www.afr.com/policy/foreign-affairs/english-the-lingua-franca-of-asia-says-howard-20201119-p56g3l">arguing</a> English is the lingua franca – or common language – in Asia. </p>
<p>According to the 2018 <a href="https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/education/pisa_19963777">PISA results</a> (which compare 15-year-olds’ academic progress across countries), Australia <a href="https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/education/language-learning-and-contact-with-people-from-other-countries_a6bff0fa-en">ranked</a> second to last among OECD countries for foreign language learning. </p>
<p>The study also found 64% of Australian 15-year-olds said learning a foreign language was not part of their lives, compared to an overall OECD average of 12%. </p>
<h2>Meanwhile, China is learning Indonesian</h2>
<p>But while Australia’s Indonesian literacy is declining, China’s Indonesian literacy is <a href="https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/3191922/can-chinese-students-learning-indonesian-help-bridge-cultural-gap">on the rise</a>. In China, there are now <a href="https://www.bjreview.com/Lifestyle/202304/t20230424_800329300.html">19 universities</a> teaching Indonesian.</p>
<p>Indonesia’s Chinese literacy is also <a href="https://thechinaproject.com/2023/08/23/once-banned-mandarin-learning-in-indonesia-on-the-rise-amid-improving-ties-with-china/">on the rise</a>. There is significant <a href="https://thechinaproject.com/2023/08/23/once-banned-mandarin-learning-in-indonesia-on-the-rise-amid-improving-ties-with-china/">anecdotal evidence</a> Indonesians are starting to learn (once-banned) Mandarin as the Indonesian government seeks to improve ties with China. </p>
<p>At the same time, Indonesia has begun pushing <a href="https://badanbahasa.kemdikbud.go.id/berita-detail/3986/deklarasi-bahasa-indonesia-mendunia"><em>menduniakan bahasa Indonesia</em></a> or “to elevate Indonesian to a global status”. This means some Indonesians want to have their language widely spoken and understood globally, especially <a href="https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/indonesia-reject-malaysia-proposal-second-asean-language-2608796">in Asia</a>.</p>
<h2>Australia will fall behind</h2>
<p>Australians may continue to speak to a segment of Indonesian society through English. But if they do so, more and more conversations will take place without them. </p>
<p>It can be hard to find exact numbers on English speakers in Indonesia and how well English is spoken. There are some estimates of up to 30% – often promoted by the <a href="https://blog.cudy.co/english-proficiency-in-asia/#:%7E:text=Indonesia%3A%2030.8%25%20of%20Indonesians%20can,English%20well%20or%20very%20well.">English tutoring and teaching industry</a>. However, some academic sources <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781118791882.ch3#:%7E:text=The%20latest%20government%20statistics%20for,%2C%20and%2044.3%25%20of%20Indians.">suggest</a> only 5% of Indonesians have “a functional command of English”.</p>
<p>Research <a href="https://eric.ed.gov/?id=EJ1067936">also suggests</a> English-only speakers are at a disadvantage during discussions with non-native English speakers. </p>
<p>In business meetings, native speakers <a href="https://www.multilingual-matters.com/page/detail/Reconceptualizing-English-for-International-Business-Contexts/?k=9781800415997">are less likely</a> to accommodate or understand what is happening in non-native English interactions and more likely to interrupt. </p>
<h2>We need <em>pelangi</em> or rainbow thinking</h2>
<p>Fixing this issue will need a range of approaches, or what we have been calling <em>pelangi</em> (rainbow) thinking. </p>
<p>First, we need to revisit government investment. The high point for Indonesian studies in Australia was the mid-1990s when Keating invested significant funding into Indonesian language learning. The number of Indonesian language learners in Victoria <a href="https://www.acicis.edu.au/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/202303519_LP-Deck-2022_VIC_FULL-DECK.pdf">doubled</a> from 493 in 1995 to 1,044 in 2001. </p>
<p>Second, some of this funding should be dedicated to more innovative and sustainable approaches to language. For example, the US government funds the <a href="https://www.startalk.info">STARTALK program</a>, which provides grants for school students to study “critical need” languages, including Arabic, Chinese, Korean, Persian and Russian. </p>
<p>This program seeks to better understand the motivations and barriers to learning less commonly taught languages and then designing curricula to meet the needs of teachers and students. </p>
<p>We have <a href="https://www.melbourneasiareview.edu.au/invigorating-indonesian-studies-in-australia-through-collaborative-online-education-practices/">previously</a> argued a similar program could be successful and sustainable in Australia. But it needs adequate funding. </p>
<p>Third, Indonesian needs a proper champion. The Korean government’s <a href="https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/wpge/m_5723/contents.do">Academy for Korean Studies</a> provides significant overseas investment in research and education in Korean language and culture. The <a href="https://www.alliancefrancaise.com.au/about/fondation-af/">Alliance Française</a> has 31 branches across Australia. </p>
<p>Indonesian has not yet made a similar, robust investment. </p>
<p>In the last few decades, it’s been hard to avoid government and business officials talking about the importance of Indonesia. But it’s much harder to find a well-resourced person or organisation actually doing something about it. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/beyond-boats-beef-and-bali-albaneses-unfinished-business-with-indonesia-184547">Beyond boats, beef and Bali: Albanese's unfinished business with Indonesia</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216348/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Researchers are watching Australians’ knowledge of Indonesian language and culture slowly die of neglect.Howard Manns, Senior Lecturer in Linguistics, Monash UniversityJessica Kruk, Lecturer in Indonesian Studies and Linguistics, The University of Western AustraliaMichael C Ewing, Associate professor, The University of MelbourneSharyn Graham Davies, Director, Herb Feith Indonesian Engagement Centre, Monash UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2140702023-10-26T22:55:00Z2023-10-26T22:55:00ZBringing a shark to a knife fight: 7,000-year-old shark-tooth knives discovered in Indonesia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555981/original/file-20231026-37260-5cxl3t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=31%2C31%2C5083%2C3414&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/tiger-shark-jaw-showing-teeth-343934774">Matthew R McClure/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Excavations on the Indonesian island of Sulawesi have uncovered two unique and deadly artefacts dating back some 7,000 years – tiger shark teeth that were used as blades.</p>
<p>These finds, reported in the journal <a href="https://doi.org/10.15184/aqy.2023.144">Antiquity</a>, are some of the earliest archaeological evidence globally for the use of shark teeth in composite weapons – weapons made with multiple parts. Until now, the oldest such shark-tooth blades found were less than 5,000 years old.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550157/original/file-20230926-23-g9d5se.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Photos of two bone shards with a serrated edge and holes along the bottom" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550157/original/file-20230926-23-g9d5se.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550157/original/file-20230926-23-g9d5se.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550157/original/file-20230926-23-g9d5se.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550157/original/file-20230926-23-g9d5se.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550157/original/file-20230926-23-g9d5se.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=587&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550157/original/file-20230926-23-g9d5se.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=587&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550157/original/file-20230926-23-g9d5se.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=587&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Modified tiger shark teeth found in 7,000-year-old layers of Leang Panninge (top) and Leang Bulu’ Sipong 1 (bottom) on the Indonesian island of Sulawesi.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">M.C. Langley</span></span>
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<p>Our international team used a combination of scientific analysis, experimental reproduction and observations of recent human communities to determine that the two modified shark teeth had once been attached to handles as blades. They were most likely used in ritual or warfare.</p>
<h2>7,000-year-old teeth</h2>
<p>The two shark teeth were recovered during excavations as part of a joint Indonesian-Australian archaeological research program. Both specimens were found in archaeological contexts attributed to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/who-were-the-toaleans-ancient-womans-dna-provides-first-evidence-for-the-origin-of-a-mysterious-lost-culture-166565">Toalean culture</a> – an enigmatic foraging society that lived in southwestern Sulawesi from around 8,000 years ago until an unknown period in the recent past.</p>
<p>The shark teeth are of a similar size and came from <a href="https://oceana.org/marine-life/tiger-shark/">tiger sharks</a> (<em>Galeocerda cuvier</em>) that were approximately two metres long. Both teeth are perforated.</p>
<p>A complete tooth, found at the cave site of Leang Panninge, has two holes drilled through the root. The other – found at a cave called Leang Bulu’ Sipong 1 – has one hole, though is broken and likely originally also had two holes.</p>
<p>Microscopic examination of the teeth found they had once been tightly fixed to a handle using plant-based threads and a glue-like substance. The adhesive used was a combination of mineral, plant and animal materials.</p>
<p>The same method of attachment is seen on modern shark-tooth blades used by cultures throughout the Pacific.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555969/original/file-20231026-32800-1mgf8c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Close-up photo of a pointy yellow tooth tooth with scratches clearly visible" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555969/original/file-20231026-32800-1mgf8c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555969/original/file-20231026-32800-1mgf8c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=476&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555969/original/file-20231026-32800-1mgf8c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=476&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555969/original/file-20231026-32800-1mgf8c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=476&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555969/original/file-20231026-32800-1mgf8c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=598&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555969/original/file-20231026-32800-1mgf8c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=598&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555969/original/file-20231026-32800-1mgf8c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=598&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Scratches and a ground section on the tip of the Leang Panninge shark tooth indicate its use by people 7,000 years ago.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">M.C. Langley</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>Examination of the edges of each tooth found they had been used to pierce, cut and scrape flesh and bone. However, far more damage was present than a shark would naturally accrue during feeding.</p>
<p>While these residues superficially suggest Toalean people were using shark-tooth knives as everyday cutting implements, ethnographic (observations of recent communities), archaeological and experimental data suggest otherwise.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555970/original/file-20231026-30-epfmyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A brownish yellow bone close up with holes and grooves clearly visible" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555970/original/file-20231026-30-epfmyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555970/original/file-20231026-30-epfmyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=264&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555970/original/file-20231026-30-epfmyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=264&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555970/original/file-20231026-30-epfmyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=264&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555970/original/file-20231026-30-epfmyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=332&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555970/original/file-20231026-30-epfmyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=332&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555970/original/file-20231026-30-epfmyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=332&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Grooves and traces of red resin along the base of the Leang Panninge tooth show how the teeth were attached using threads.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">M.C. Langley</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Why use shark teeth?</h2>
<p>Not surprisingly, our experiments found tiger shark-tooth knives were equally effective in creating long, deep gashes in the skin when used to strike (as in fighting) as when butchering a leg of fresh pork.</p>
<p>Indeed, the only negative aspect is that the teeth blunt relatively quickly – too quickly to make their use as an everyday knife practical.</p>
<p>This fact, as well as the fact shark teeth can inflict deep lacerations, probably explains why shark-tooth blades were restricted to weapons for conflict and ritual activities in the present and recent past.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/evolution-of-a-smile-400-million-year-old-spiny-fish-overturns-shark-theory-of-tooth-origins-160563">Evolution of a smile: 400 million year old spiny fish overturns shark theory of tooth origins</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Shark-tooth blades in recent times</h2>
<p>Numerous societies across the globe have integrated shark teeth into their material culture. In particular, peoples living on coastlines (and actively fishing for sharks) are more likely to incorporate greater numbers of teeth into a wider range of tools.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550163/original/file-20230926-28-azgt97.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Three serrated implements with neat rows of pointy teeth attached" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550163/original/file-20230926-28-azgt97.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550163/original/file-20230926-28-azgt97.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=667&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550163/original/file-20230926-28-azgt97.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=667&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550163/original/file-20230926-28-azgt97.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=667&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550163/original/file-20230926-28-azgt97.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=838&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550163/original/file-20230926-28-azgt97.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=838&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550163/original/file-20230926-28-azgt97.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=838&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Shark teeth are widely used to edge deadly combat weapons or powerful ritual blades in the Pacific. Left: a knife from Kiribati; centre and right: weapons from Hawai'i.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.britishmuseum.org/collection/search?keyword=shark&keyword=tooth&keyword=knife">The Trustees of The British Museum</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Observations of present-day communities indicate that, when not used to adorn the human body, shark teeth were almost universally used to create blades for conflict or ritual – including ritualised combat.</p>
<p>For example, a fighting knife found throughout north Queensland has a single long blade made from approximately 15 shark teeth placed one after the other down a hardwood shaft shaped like an oval, and is used to strike the flank or buttocks of an adversary. </p>
<p>Weapons, including lances, knives and clubs armed with shark teeth are known from mainland New Guinea and Micronesia, while lances form part of the mourning costume in Tahiti. </p>
<p>Farther east, the peoples of Kiribati are renowned for their shark-tooth daggers, swords, spears and lances, which are recorded as having been used in highly ritualised and often fatal conflicts.</p>
<p>Shark teeth found in Maya and Mexican archaeological contexts are widely thought to have been used for ritualised bloodletting, and shark teeth are known to have been used as tattooing blades in Tonga, Aotearoa New Zealand, and Kiribati. </p>
<p>In Hawai‘i, so-called “shark-tooth cutters” were used <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20702769">as concealed weapons and for</a> “cutting up dead chiefs and cleaning their bones preparatory to the customary burials”.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550167/original/file-20230926-18-o9w9uq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A wooden weapon with a rounded handle and jagged tooth attachments at the other end" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550167/original/file-20230926-18-o9w9uq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550167/original/file-20230926-18-o9w9uq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=302&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550167/original/file-20230926-18-o9w9uq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=302&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550167/original/file-20230926-18-o9w9uq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=302&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550167/original/file-20230926-18-o9w9uq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550167/original/file-20230926-18-o9w9uq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550167/original/file-20230926-18-o9w9uq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A shark-tooth knife from Aua Island, Papua New Guinea. Red arrows highlight wear and damage caused by fighting.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">M. Langley and The University of Queensland Anthropology Museum</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Other shark tooth archaeological finds</h2>
<p>Almost all shark-tooth artefacts recovered globally have been identified as adornments, or interpreted as such.</p>
<p>Indeed, modified shark teeth have been recovered from older contexts. A solitary tiger shark tooth with a single perforation from Buang Merabak (New Ireland, Papua New Guinea) is dated to around 39,500–28,000 years ago. Eleven teeth with single perforations from Kilu (Buka Island, Papua New Guinea) are dated to around 9,000–5,000 years ago. And an unspecified number of teeth from Garivaldino (Brazil) is dated to around 9,400–7,200 years ago.</p>
<p>However, in each of these cases the teeth were likely personal ornaments, not weapons.</p>
<p>Our newly described Indonesian shark tooth artefacts, with their combination of modifications and microscopic traces, instead indicate they were not only attached to knives, but very likely linked to ritual or conflict.</p>
<p>Whether they cut human or animal flesh, these shark teeth from Sulawesi could provide the first evidence that a distinctive class of weaponry in the Asia-Pacific region has been around much longer than we thought.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214070/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Langley is an Associate Professor of Archaeology in the Australian Research Centre for Human Evolution at Griffith University, Brisbane. She receives funding from the Australian Research Council.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adam Brumm receives funding from the Australian Research Council.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adhi Oktaviana is a PhD Candidate at Griffith Centre for Social and Cultural Research, Griffith University, Gold Coast and Researcher at Research Centre of Archaeometry, The National Research and Innovation Agency, Jakarta</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lecturer in the archeology study program, Hasanuddin University and Chair of the Sulawesi Archaeological Research Collaboration Center. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Basran Burhan is a PhD student at Australian Research Centre for Human Evolution at Griffith University, Brisbane. </span></em></p>Archaeologists have discovered two 7,000-year-old tiger shark teeth that were once part of ritual or fighting blades on the Indonesian island of Sulawesi.Michelle Langley, Associate Professor of Archaeology, Griffith UniversityAdam Brumm, Professor, Griffith UniversityAdhi Oktaviana, PhD Candidate, Griffith UniversityAkin Duli, Professor, Universitas HasanuddinBasran Burhan, PhD candidate, Griffith UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2162572023-10-24T19:28:29Z2023-10-24T19:28:29ZTCUS senior editor Kalpana Jain explores Indigenous communities in Indonesia − and learns about their struggles to reclaim land<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555475/original/file-20231024-19-ahdx0d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Traditional grain houses inside a village chief's residential complex in West Java, Indonesia.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2023/1010/Why-protecting-Indonesia-s-Indigenous-land-is-a-balancing-act">Kalpana Jain</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/us/team">Kalpana Jain</a>, senior religion and ethics editor at The Conversation, spent part of 2023 on a trip spanning over 20,000 miles, covering seven cities in three countries, as an <a href="https://www.eastwestcenter.org/professional-development/seminars-journalism/senior-journalists-seminar">East-West Center 2023 Senior Journalists Fellow</a> to pursue issues around the role of religion and identity in the public sphere. On this trip, which included traveling near the border of Myanmar, Jain interviewed representatives from Indigenous communities, minority faith groups, journalists and activists, among many others. She reported on the rise in <a href="https://religionnews.com/2023/07/17/in-thailand-socially-engaged-buddhism-goes-beyond-meditation-to-seek-justice/">Buddhist </a>and <a href="https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/responses/in-modi-s-india-press-freedom-is-curbed-and-journalists-are-under-threat-for-doing-their-jobs">Hindu nationalism</a> as well as the role of faith groups in promoting peace and care for the environment.</em></p>
<p><em>A 2009 Nieman Fellow at Harvard, Jain pursued many social justice issues as a journalist at The Times of India. Her reporting in India led to many policy changes in the public health sector and won several awards. In 2019, she received a Pulitzer grant to pursue issues around rising Hindu nationalism in India. Jain has also worked as an editor, writer and researcher at Harvard University. Her case study on modern-day slavery is part of a Harvard course, and her book on the AIDS epidemic in India is taught at many Indian universities. She holds a master’s in theological studies from Harvard Divinity School and a master’s in public administration from Harvard Kennedy School.</em></p>
<p><em>The piece below on the Indigenous community in Indonesia, first <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2023/1010/Why-protecting-Indonesia-s-Indigenous-land-is-a-balancing-act">published in the Christian Science Monitor</a> on Oct. 10, 2023, shows the depth of expertise on The Conversation team on global issues involving religion, ethics and the impact of colonialism in today’s world. The Conversation is very proud to share it.</em></p>
<p><strong>CISUNGSANG VILLAGE, INDONESIA:</strong> Once isolated from the rest of the world, the Kasepuhan Cisungsang – an Indigenous community in Indonesia – has been inviting outsiders to get a glimpse into their lives.</p>
<p>Their village rests at the foot of Mount Halimun in western Java, a six-hour drive from the bustling megalopolis of Jakarta. When visitors arrive, a band of musicians dressed in flowing black robes and colorful headdresses greet them by playing the angklung, a traditional bamboo instrument, while young girls dance. The guests are shepherded into a spacious hut where a Kasepuhan Cisungsang representative explains that the community is led by the abah, or father, and that they’ve lived in this forested area since before Dutch colonization.</p>
<p>“Our ancestors have left us a message to protect and defend the environment,” says Raden Angga Kusuma, the abah’s eldest son and crown prince of the village. </p>
<p>Indonesia is home to an estimated 50 million to 70 million Indigenous individuals, or nearly 20% of the country’s population. However, Indigenous communities’ claims to their homeland are precarious, often hinging on a community’s ability to convince local authorities of their Indigeneity. Add to that pervasive stereotypes about Indigenous communities being anti-development or stuck in the past, and the challenge for many of the archipelago’s Indigenous leaders becomes retaining their traditional culture and customs while also evolving with the times. For the Kasepuhan Cisungsang, opening to visitors is part of that strategic thinking.</p>
<p>Through a translator, Kasepuhan Cisungsang elder Apih Jakar shares another saying from their ancestors: “Cope with the dynamics of time and adapt with it.”</p>
<h2>Battle over land</h2>
<p>For the Kasepuhan Cisungsang and the 56 other Kasepuhan groups living in the Halimun Salak area of Java, the battle for land rights dates back to the 19th century, when Dutch settlers failed to acknowledge the communities living in and around present-day Mount Halimun Salak National Park. The colonizers’ demarcations and land practices persisted after independence in 1945. Under Suharto, Indonesia’s second president, Indigenous land was converted into state forests and redistributed as private concessions to rubber, mining and palm oil companies.</p>
<p>Throughout the Suharto era “the Indonesian government argued that the country had to catch up and needed to achieve higher rates of growth,” says Timo Duile, an anthropologist at the University of Bonn who has spent years researching land rights in Indonesia. “That could be done by cooperation with the West and by opening the country to foreign capital. … Land was an important issue that created a lot of conflicts.” </p>
<p>It wasn’t until 2013 that a historic ruling known as MK35 provided Indigenous people the opportunity to reclaim ancestral land. However, this has proved to be a long and complicated process. </p>
<p>An independent mapping initiative has recorded over 50 million acres of Indigenous land in Indonesia, but only 15% has been recognized by the government. Critics blame the bottleneck on slow bureaucracy, poorly implemented and conflicting forest laws, and corporate land-grabbing.</p>
<p>But the first hurdle many communities face is proving their roots. </p>
<h2>Proving Indigeneity</h2>
<p>A community’s Indigeneity must be recognized by an administrative unit in a province, known as a kabupaten. </p>
<p>A group can qualify if they have markings as an Indigenous people, such as following customary laws and retaining unique social institutions, says Muhammad Arman, director of advocacy for policy, law and human rights at Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara, or the Indigenous Peoples Alliance of the Archipelago. But many kabupatens have ill-defined regulations, and proving Indigeneity can depend on the whims of local politicians. </p>
<p>“If you wear modern clothes, the government can say you have changed socially and culturally and therefore are no longer a member of an Indigenous community,” says Arman.
Legal recognition is also no guarantee that a community’s wishes will be respected. </p>
<p>Mama Rosita Tecuari is one of several leaders from the Namblong Indigenous community in Papua province fighting to defend their land from the expansion of a palm oil plantation. A company got the license and a permit to use the land without any consent from the 500 tribes settled there, says Tecuari. Even after local laws recognized the Namblong community’s right to the land in 2021, the company has not retreated. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A group of five Indonesian men sit on a rug in a sparse but elegant room with a hutch in back. This is a room where they receive visitors. The men are royalty in this Indonesian community" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555483/original/file-20231024-19-hfv2qq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555483/original/file-20231024-19-hfv2qq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555483/original/file-20231024-19-hfv2qq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555483/original/file-20231024-19-hfv2qq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555483/original/file-20231024-19-hfv2qq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555483/original/file-20231024-19-hfv2qq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555483/original/file-20231024-19-hfv2qq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Crown Prince Raden Angga Kusuma, far left, sits with other inner circle members on a rug in a room where visitors are received. He says, ‘Our ancestors have left us a message to protect and defend the environment.’</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2023/1010/Why-protecting-Indonesia-s-Indigenous-land-is-a-balancing-act">Kalpana Jain</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>“It’s not that we don’t want development,” she says, they just don’t want it to come at the expense of the environment. “We in Papua think of forests as our own hearts. If you clear our forests, it is the same as killing us.”</p>
<p>Still, for Indigenous groups to have a shot at local autonomy, they must show that they retain their Indigeneity. “To get land rights, they have to prove continuity between past and present with Indigenous institutions and Indigenous laws,” says Duile. “They can be in a process of change but have to convince officials that they are the same.”</p>
<h2>History of transformation</h2>
<p>That emphasis on continuity means that Indigeneity can get conflated with primitiveness, says scholar Rebakah Daro Minarchek of the University of Washington.</p>
<p>For her 2019 dissertation, Rebakah Daro Minarchek spent years studying how three Kasepuhan communities, including Kasepuhan Cisungsang, were embracing technology.</p>
<p>After the central government brought the internet to Ciptagelar village through a universal connectivity program and built a TV station and a radio station, villagers trained youth to interview elders on traditions and record their musicians. One village leader even turned to YouTube videos to teach himself how to use GPS technology to map land boundaries.</p>
<p>Daro Minarchek also observed Ciptagelar village send two young men to Japan to learn how to do commercial gardening and increase productivity. Many Indigenous communities are hesitant about certain kinds of education that distance youth from the community, she explains, but they don’t look down on education. </p>
<p>In the case of Kasepuhan Cisungsang, the crown prince and a few others have been allowed to go to a university under the condition they will return to their village and their way of life.</p>
<p>In recent years, the village has also invited international visitors to attend an annual harvest festival, known as Seren Taun, a thanksgiving ceremony for all the blessings received during the year. The tradition was captured in a 2016 short documentary called “Harvest Moon Ritual.”</p>
<p>This adaptation isn’t new, Daro Minarchek notes, pointing to the community’s religious practices. The Kasepuhan Cisungsang currently practices Islam but incorporates it with ancestral practices, including shamanic animism, along with Hindu and Buddhist practices.</p>
<p>“To say that this is a community from 700 years ago that hasn’t caught up to the future is dehumanizing,” says Daro Minarchek.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216257/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
The Conversation’s senior religion and ethics editor traveled the world to learn more about Indigenous populations. See one piece of what she discovered.Kalpana Jain, Senior Religion + Ethics Editor/ Director of the Global Religion Journalism InitiativeBeth Daley, Executive Editor and General ManagerLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2160072023-10-24T04:56:49Z2023-10-24T04:56:49ZA twist in Indonesia’s presidential election does not bode well for the country’s fragile democracy<p>On Valentine’s Day next year, Indonesia will go to the polls for its most important election in ten years.</p>
<p>The incumbent president, Joko Widodo (known as “Jokowi”), has built a broad supporting coalition of political parties and oligarchs, which has delivered stability but also power and wealth for a small elite. He has also presided over a period of increasing <a href="https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/talking-indonesia-democracy-under-threat/">democratic regression</a>, marked by an erosion of the independence of institutions like the <a href="https://www.centreforpublicimpact.org/case-study/indonesias-anti-corruption-commission-the-kpk">anti-corruption commission</a>, inaction on claims of human rights violations, and litigation to <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa21/6013/2022/en/">silence critics</a> of the government.</p>
<p>Despite this, Jokowi remains immensely popular, with some opinion polls indicating that 80% of citizens support him. He would likely win again if he ran. However, after two five-year terms, he is constitutionally barred from a third, and proposals to change the rules to keep him in the palace have failed. </p>
<p>This is of deep concern to his political allies, who are reluctant to lose their privileged positions. So, for many months, politicians and oligarchs have been manoeuvring to find a way to keep their grip on power.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/will-indonesias-presidential-election-be-delayed-and-could-jokowi-stay-in-power-longer-202609">Will Indonesia's presidential election be delayed? And could Jokowi stay in power longer?</a>
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<h2>A former rival turned ally</h2>
<p>Their solution now seems to be aligning behind the minister for defence, Prabowo Subianto. </p>
<p>At first glance, he is an unlikely choice: a cashiered general and former son-in-law of the authoritarian <a href="https://theconversation.com/soeharto-the-giant-of-modern-indonesia-who-left-a-legacy-of-violence-and-corruption-164411">Soeharto</a>, who ruled Indonesia for more than three decades. Prabowo has been accused of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/14/world/asia/indonesia-prabowo-subianto-us-visit.html">human rights abuses</a>, including in Timor and Papua, and alleged <a href="https://apnews.com/article/indonesia-constitutional-court-age-limit-election-subianto-e4d5da4882b32e4e4b8c28c1cc138d9c">involvement</a> in the abduction and murders of activists around the time of the collapse of Soeharto’s New Order regime in 1998. </p>
<p>Prabowo never faced trial, although several of his men were tried and convicted. The allegations against him meant he was, for years, denied a visa <a href="https://www.afr.com/world/asia/indonesia-defence-minister-prabowo-to-make-historic-visit-to-us-20201008-p56390">to enter the US</a>. He has <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-04-12/jokowi-rival-prabowo-to-stand-for-indonesian-president/9645650">denied</a> the allegations against him.</p>
<p>More recently, Prabowo ran against Jokowi in two bitterly fought election campaigns (2014 and 2019), which polarised Indonesia.</p>
<p>However, Prabowo is a member of an elite family, and, despite his previous election losses, can be expected to poll well. After he lost in 2019, Jokowi effectively co-opted him by offering him a seat in cabinet. He has been a compliant member of the administration ever since. Now he is Jokowi’s preferred candidate.</p>
<p>After months of uncertainty, Jokowi and his circle have come out strongly in support for Prabowo, with Jokowi’s son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, announced as his vice presidential running mate in recent days. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/soeharto-the-giant-of-modern-indonesia-who-left-a-legacy-of-violence-and-corruption-164411">Soeharto: the giant of modern Indonesia who left a legacy of violence and corruption</a>
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<h2>A controversial court decision</h2>
<p>This has sparked enormous controversy, for two reasons.</p>
<p>First, Jokowi is a member of former President Megawati Soekarnoputri’s PDI-P party, which backs another candidate, Ganjar Pranowo. Prabowo and Ganjar are running almost neck and neck, with Ganjar sometimes slightly ahead. If Jokowi’s supporters now give their votes to Prabowo, this might be enough to beat Ganjar. </p>
<p>Megawati is sure to see this as a massive betrayal by Jokowi, and she and her party will do whatever they can to stop Prabowo and Gibran.</p>
<p>Second, the 2017 Election Law says candidates for presidential or vice presidential office must be at least 40 years old. Gibran is only 36. Last week, this obstacle was conveniently overcome when the Constitutional Court ruled there was an exception to this age limit if the candidate had previously held elected office as a regional head. Gibran happens to be the mayor of Solo and so is now eligible.</p>
<p>Knocking out a statutory age limit for candidates might not seem a big issue, but this case has caused a <a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/indonesia-court-upholds-minimum-age-requirement-for-president-vp-candidates">huge scandal in Indonesia</a>.</p>
<p>The problem is the court’s chief justice, Anwar Usman, also happens to be Jokowi’s brother-in-law and Gibran’s uncle. The conflict of interest is obvious. But Anwar refused to recuse himself. </p>
<p>This was significant because the case was decided by five judges to four. Anwar had cast the deciding vote.</p>
<h2>Reversal of three similar cases</h2>
<p>Legally, the most controversial part of the decision is its reversal of three decisions the court read out earlier on the same day about precisely the same minimum age requirement. In those cases, the court had maintained the minimum age limit for presidential and vice presidential candidates. </p>
<p>As one of the dissenting judges in Gibran’s case pointed out, Anwar did not attend a meeting of judges last month to decide the three other cases. In that meeting, the judges voted by a majority of six to two to maintain the minimum age limit.</p>
<p>However, two days later, Anwar did attend a meeting to decide the Gibran case, during which the judges voted to remove the requirement. As dissenting judge Arief Hidayat wrote in his judgment, Anwar claimed he had not attended the first meeting to discuss the three other cases because of “health reasons”, not out of a conflict of interest. </p>
<p>The court’s decisions in all four cases were read out the same day, and, to the surprise of many, the final decision overruled the others. </p>
<p>The implication here is clear. When the chief justice did not attend the judges’ meeting on the initial three cases, the court was clearly in favour of maintaining the minimum age (and thus blocking Gibran). But when he did attend the final meeting, a number of judges switched sides and changed their decisions. </p>
<p>This reeks of political manipulation and interference. Professor Saldi Isra, perhaps the most-respected judge on the Constitutional Court for his expertise and integrity, expressed it this way in his dissenting judgment:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I am confused, I am really confused how to start my dissenting opinion. Because since setting foot in the Constitutional Court building as a Constitutional Court judge on 11 April 2017 […] this is the first time I have experienced an event so ‘extraordinarily strange’ and which can be said to defy reasonable expectation: The court changing its position and attitude in a flash.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The court has now paved the way for Gibran to run in the election. Critics joke the court’s name should be changed to “Mahkamah Keluarga” (the “Family Court”). </p>
<h2>Undermining the court’s independence</h2>
<p>The Constitutional Court is Indonesia’s first and only court with the power to review statutes. It was a key institution that emerged from the reforms after Soeharto’s fall. But many now see this decision as marking the end of the court’s independence. This is because it comes against a background of other obvious attempts to undermine its independence.</p>
<p>Earlier this year, the court’s serving deputy chief justice, Aswanto, was <a href="https://asianews.network/jokowi-gives-nod-to-controversial-removal-of-constitutional-justice/">removed</a> by the national legislature for <a href="https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/the-dpr-attacks-the-constitutional-court-and-judicial-independence/">perceived disloyalty</a>. In fact, all he did – along with other judges – was raise questions about the constitutionality of a law that was enacted without adequate public participation. This just happened to be Jokowi’s signature <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/whats-stake-with-indonesias-controversial-jobs-creation-law-2022-06-09/">Job Creation “Omnibus” Law</a>. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1595757307383595009"}"></div></p>
<p>Aswanto’s removal put the court’s other judges on notice that they could share his fate if they went against the government, particularly in big cases. Many suspect Aswanto’s removal was front of mind for the judges in Gibran’s minimum age case.</p>
<p>While there have yet to be any polls conducted since Gibran’s entry into the race, many expect the court’s decision means Prabowo will emerge as the favourite. And if he and Gibran win, Jokowi and the elite group around him may well expect to extend their influence and privilege for years to come.</p>
<p>However, the decision may also spell the end of Constitutional Court as an independent check and balance on Indonesia’s increasingly powerful rulers. That does not bode well for the country’s fragile democracy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216007/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tim Lindsey receives funding from The Australian Research Council.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Butt receives funding from the Australian Research Council. </span></em></p>A court ruling has paved the way for current president Joko Widodo’s son to run as a vice presidential candidate, even though he doesn’t meet the minimum age requirement.Tim Lindsey, Malcolm Smith Professor of Asian Law and Director of the Centre for Indonesian Law, Islam and Society, The University of MelbourneSimon Butt, Professor of Indonesian Law, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2124492023-10-24T04:11:28Z2023-10-24T04:11:28ZIndonesia needs to triple its funding to control tuberculosis – here’s where to start<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/552901/original/file-20231010-24-za7ydt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Image of a tuberculosis patient.
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tuberculosis#/media/File:Depiction_of_a_tuberculosis_patient.png">Myupchar/Wikipedia</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Indonesia is still <a href="https://tbindonesia.or.id/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Factsheet-Country-Profile-Indonesia-2022.pdf">struggling to fight tuberculosis (TB)</a>, with the second-highest number of cases worldwide.</p>
<p>In 2021, one study estimated Indonesia had a staggering incidence rate of TB <a href="https://rdi.or.id/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/Increasing-Financing-for-Tuberculosis-Programs-in-Indonesia.pdf">759 cases per 100,000 people</a> – more than double the World Health Organization’s 2021 estimate <a href="https://data.who.int/indicators/i/C288D13">354 cases per 100,000 Indonesians</a>. That compares with a global average of <a href="https://data.who.int/indicators/i/C288D13">134 per 100,000 people</a>.</p>
<p>Undeterred by the challenges posed by TB, Indonesia has set ambitious targets of reducing TB cases to <a href="https://tbindonesia.or.id/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/NSP-TB-2020-2024-Ind_Final_-BAHASA.pdf">190 per 100,000 individuals</a> by 2024 and to 65 per 100,000 by 2030. </p>
<p>With a staggering number of TB cases and those ambitious targets, the country urgently requires increased funding to combat this potentially deadly but preventable communicable disease. </p>
<p>Currently, insufficient funding is a significant obstacle in Indonesia to fight against TB. <a href="https://www.who.int/publications/digital/global-tuberculosis-report-2021/financing">Sustained adequate funding</a> would ensure the availability of essential resources, diagnostic tools, medications and healthcare services necessary to prevent, diagnose and treat TB effectively. </p>
<h2>Lack of funding risks more people getting sick</h2>
<p>Known as the <a href="https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240013131">TB financing gap</a>, lack of funding can lead to inadequate diagnostic tools and equipment provision, resulting in delayed or inaccurate diagnoses. These delays have grave consequences.</p>
<p>Studies <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7558533/">have shown</a> delayed treatment of TB increases disease transmission, posing a greater risk to individuals and communities.</p>
<p>Worldwide, 1.6 million people died from TB in 2021, making it the <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/tuberculosis#:%7E:text=A%20total%20of%201.6%20million,(above%20HIV%20and%20AIDS).">13th leading cause of death</a> – and the second leading infectious killer after COVID-19.</p>
<p>According to Indonesia’s national strategy, the country needs to spend <a href="https://tbindonesia.or.id/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/NSP-TB-2020-2024-Ind_Final_-BAHASA.pdf">Rp47.3 trillion (US$3 billion)</a> from 2020 to 2024 to control TB. However, the budget availability for that period is only around Rp15.7 trillion ($990 million). </p>
<p>Indonesia also lacks access to financing help pay for those extra control measures.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240013131">WHO Global Tuberculosis Report</a> said Indonesia needs US$429 million for TB prevention, diagnosis and treatment and US$87 million for tuberculosis care – a total of US$516 million. But it has only secured only US$111 million. </p>
<p>In fact, WHO data shows that since 2009, Indonesia has consistently <a href="https://rdi.or.id/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/Increasing-Financing-for-Tuberculosis-Programs-in-Indonesia.pdf">failed to meet the necessary TB financing requirements</a>, financing only 41% of the needed TB programs each year, on average.</p>
<p>This financing gap restricts the availability of essential medications for TB treatment. This issue is particularly concerning, as drug-resistant strains of TB are emerging, further complicating treatment efforts.</p>
<h2>The pandemic hit TB funding</h2>
<p>The COVID-19 pandemic has worsened the TB financing gap in Indonesia. </p>
<p>The government had to change its priorities during the pandemic, reallocating its health budget for COVID-19 treatment and mitigation efforts. </p>
<p>WHO said Indonesia’s TB funding decreased <a href="https://www.who.int/indonesia/news/campaign/tb-day-2022/fact-sheets">around 8.7% between 2019 and 2020</a>. </p>
<p>Upon closer examination,<a href="https://rdi.or.id/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/Increasing-Financing-for-Tuberculosis-Programs-in-Indonesia.pdf">Two significant reasons emerge</a> related to factors contributing to the funding gap. </p>
<p>First, the lack of adequate fund to cover the costs of TB services. This limits the reach and impact of programs. </p>
<p>There is also a tendency among patients to seek diagnosis and treatment at hospitals, rather than local primary healthcare centres and clinics. This leads to a heavier financial burden on the National Health Insurance system, because treatment costs in hospitals are more expensive.</p>
<p>Second, the lack of private sector involvement in diagnosis, reporting and treatment further compounds the problem, hindering progress. </p>
<h2>What should we do now?</h2>
<p>Increasing domestic financing for TB programs is crucial. </p>
<p>The Indonesian government should allocate a higher proportion of the national budget to prevent and control TB, as well as to conduct TB-related research. </p>
<p>Integrating externally-funded TB programs into the National Health Care system would ensure sustainability and align them with the national healthcare framework. </p>
<p>Strengthening the healthcare system is paramount, including bolstering the capacity and infrastructure of local health centres and clinics, training healthcare professionals, and improving diagnostic and treatment services. </p>
<p>Additionally, exploring innovative financing pathways – such as engaging the private sector through public-private partnerships and leveraging international funding mechanisms – could provide the necessary resources to drive progress.</p>
<p>Closing the TB financing gap is essential, not only to improve patients’ health, but to also safeguard the well-being and socioeconomic stability of communities as a whole. </p>
<p>Indonesia must pursue <a href="https://rdi.or.id/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/Increasing-Financing-for-Tuberculosis-Programs-in-Indonesia.pdf">strategic actions to overcome these challenges</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212449/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Para penulis tidak bekerja, menjadi konsultan, memiliki saham atau menerima dana dari perusahaan atau organisasi mana pun yang akan mengambil untung dari artikel ini, dan telah mengungkapkan bahwa ia tidak memiliki afiliasi di luar afiliasi akademis yang telah disebut di atas.</span></em></p>Indonesia has the world’s second-highest rates of TB – but lack of funding means not enough people are being diagnosed and treated fast enough.Rahmah Aulia Zahra, Children, Social Welfare, and Health Research Officer, Resilience Development Initiative (RDI)Wewin Wira Cornelis Wahid, Program Officer, Resilience Development Initiative (RDI)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2147552023-10-23T07:55:17Z2023-10-23T07:55:17ZVictims of the green energy boom? The Indonesians facing eviction over a China-backed plan to turn their island into a solar panel ‘ecocity’<p>I first visited Rempang island in Summer 2022. Greeting me were lush fields lined with coconut and banana trees, picture-book fishing villages with houses jutting into the water on stilts, and boats carrying people between the dozens of islands that dot the Riau archipelago in western Indonesia. I had made the pleasant, one-hour ferry trip from bustling, glass-and-chrome Singapore. This felt like another world.</p>
<p>My hosts (an environmental lawyer and an indigenous Melayu community organiser) and I had reached Rempang from the economic hub of Riau Islands province: the special manufacturing, trade and logistics zone of <a href="https://www.indonesia.travel/uk/en/destinations/sumatra/batam">Batam</a>. We had gone from Batam to Rempang by crossing one of the six metal bridges that connect the islands of Batam, Rempang and Galang. This network of bridges has turned the islands into an economic zone, now called the Barelang region. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/konflik-rempang-bagaimana-proyek-transisi-energi-yang-didukung-cina-justru-merampas-lahan-rakyat-bagian-1-216178">Konflik Rempang: bagaimana proyek transisi energi yang didukung Cina justru merampas lahan rakyat (bagian 1)</a>
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<p>My ongoing research is investigating how the international quest for green energy is reliant on “sacrificial zones” in developing countries. The transition to green energy, far from creating a green new deal for all, is actually reinforcing entrenched inequalities and hierarchies.</p>
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<img alt="Large suspension bridge" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/552772/original/file-20231009-19-qgpzcr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/552772/original/file-20231009-19-qgpzcr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/552772/original/file-20231009-19-qgpzcr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/552772/original/file-20231009-19-qgpzcr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/552772/original/file-20231009-19-qgpzcr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/552772/original/file-20231009-19-qgpzcr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/552772/original/file-20231009-19-qgpzcr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Batam Rempang Galang Bridge (Barelang). This bridge connects Batam Island with Rempang Island and Galang Island.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/batam-rempang-galang-bridge-barelang-this-2099136529">Shutterstock/NPCplastik</a></span>
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<p>I became interested in Rempang when I saw news reports heralding a renewable energy revolution. Companies from Singapore, Portugal and beyond were <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/sunseap-build-2-bln-floating-solar-farm-indonesia-worlds-largest-2021-07-22/">signing agreements</a> to build vast floating solar farms in local reservoirs in the Batam region. The plan was that the clean energy produced would be transported from the sunlit western Indonesian islands of Batam, Bulan, and Rempang to energy intensive Singapore via undersea cable.</p>
<p>But on reaching the islands, and visiting the sites named in the news reports, I saw no sign of green energy activity. The waters were placid. There was no solar farm in sight. I shrugged, met friends, ate the freshest possible seafood at a small <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kelong">Kelong</a> restaurant that was half on land and half in the sea, and went back to Singapore on the ferry. </p>
<h2>‘A state-backed land grab’</h2>
<p>My return a year later could not have been more different. The atmosphere was tense and the roads were lined with armed police. Large military trucks moved ominously on the tar, monitoring the situation. Villagers stood around in clusters, anxious and clutching at straws of information trickling through on WhatsApp and word of mouth about what seemed to be a <a href="https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/44609/chapter/393367359">state-backed land grab</a>.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><strong><em>This article is part of Conversation Insights</em></strong>
<br><em>The Insights team generates <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/insights-series-71218">long-form journalism</a> derived from interdisciplinary research. The team is working with academics from different backgrounds who have been engaged in projects aimed at tackling societal and scientific challenges.</em></p>
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<p>People were protesting because the 16 villages and 7,500 inhabitants of Rempang are facing eviction, as plans to transform their home into the latest hub for the global green transition gather apace. The Indonesian government and a Chinese-backed business consortium want to <a href="https://time.com/6313609/indonesia-rempang-eco-city-protests-china/">move the entire community</a> to another island and turn their home into a huge solar panel manufacturing centre, solar farm, and “ecocity”.</p>
<p>Videos filmed by residents from sites of protest show armed military and police clashing with the farmers and fishers of Rempang. The videos, some of which have been posted on social media, show people being thrown to the ground, bleeding, apparently roughed up by state forces. There have been many arrests. I regularly hear from friends and acquaintances who tell me that police and government authorities have taken to summoning suspected protestors, examining their phones for incriminating evidence, and looking into their home, work lives and tax affairs. Residents are clear this is “harassment” and “pressure” to give up their land and withdraw from the struggle. </p>
<p>Alongside large and publicised confrontations, the residents of Rempang are resisting the everyday encroachments of the proposed project. In local, spontaneous opposition in affected villages, women, including mothers and grandmothers in veils, have blocked roads, preventing government officials from entering villages to measure their land. Videos show them wailing as armed police approach. In others, young girls and old women can be seen in a semi-conscious state, being taken to hospital after apparent tear gassing.</p>
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<p>But how did things move so fast? From April 2023, news had begun to filter in that a well-connected businessman from Jakarta, who reportedly made his money and reputation <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/dili-tycoon-deal-triggers-alarm-20090502-aqtj.html">through businesses operated</a> on behalf of the Indonesian military, before turning to <a href="https://www.tatlerasia.com/people/tomy-winata">banking and real estate</a>, was to build a “township” on Rempang.</p>
<p>By August, the better informed in the community had gathered that the planned Rempang project was to be a collaboration between Tomy Winata’s Artha Graha Group, and a Chinese “glass manufacturer”. By September, Winata himself <a href="https://en.tempo.co/read/1775361/tomy-winata-its-just-miscommunication">was granting interviews</a> and talking about his plans for an ecocity. <a href="https://futuresoutheastasia.com/rempang-eco-city/">The project</a> – which has the enthusiastic blessings of the Batam economic zone authorities, the provincial government of Riau Islands, and importantly, the central government in Jakarta – is imminent. </p>
<p>It will displace 16 villages on Rempang island and will cover a mind boggling 17,000 hectares (one square hectare is roughly equivalent to one rugby field). As residents discussed these figures among themselves, they lobbed questions at me: “Why do they need so much land?” and “what will they even do with it?”</p>
<p>An elderly, mild mannered fisherman I spoke to in August, who was trying to organise resistance to what was then still a mysterious investment pushed by Jakarta and China said he was worried about the community being relocated:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>People here have history. Their whole story is in this area. They love this land. They live here. You can make your project here. Welcome. But build it in an empty area. Whatever you do, don’t disturb us. Keep us here, give jobs to our children … When people ask me, where is your village, I say it is Bapke [pseudonym]. Later, what will I say? Our identity will be lost.</p>
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<h2>From trickles of information to violence</h2>
<p>On first learning about the Rempang project, residents petitioned different layers of government, sought meetings, and even went to Jakarta to try and meet officials. Finding them unresponsive, people contemplated taking to the streets.</p>
<p>By mid-August, groups were meeting at local cafes and in the homes of community leaders. They were determined not to give up their land. One member of a group that was congregating in Batam told me “there is a meeting of Melayu youth to plan a protest at Barelang [bridge], and at the mayor’s office [in Batam]. We are here to discuss the situation. We will protest in the coming days”.</p>
<p>By the last week of August, there were demonstrations organised by the community at various locations in Rempang and Batam, and by civil society organisations in Jakarta. Soon, my contacts were talking about “clashes between the community and BP Batam” (<a href="https://bpbatam.go.id/en/profile/background/">the authority in charge</a> of the Batam free trade zone), and larger and larger demonstrations involving not just Rempang residents, but ethnic Melayus from the surrounding islands as well. At these early protests, police forces were present, there was tension, but no violence.</p>
<p>Despite growing opposition, authorities dismissed popular discontent as “<a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/indonesia/2023/09/14/jokowi-downplays-rempang-riot-as-miscommunication.html">miscommunication</a>”. As reported in the press, increasingly incensed residents began to resort to violence, <a href="https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/rempang-eco-city-batam-indonesia-riot-bp-xinyi-3764671?utm_source=flipboard&utm_content=channelnewsasia%2Fmagazine%2FCNA">using rocks and glass bottles</a>. These were desperate measures from increasingly desperate people facing the might of the state.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Protestors on the streets holding banners." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/552754/original/file-20231009-21-j7gcb9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/552754/original/file-20231009-21-j7gcb9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/552754/original/file-20231009-21-j7gcb9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/552754/original/file-20231009-21-j7gcb9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/552754/original/file-20231009-21-j7gcb9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/552754/original/file-20231009-21-j7gcb9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/552754/original/file-20231009-21-j7gcb9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Hundreds of people staged a protest against the Rempang ecocity project in central Jakarta on September 20, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/jakarta-indonesia-september-20-2023-hundreds-2365501927">Shutterstock/KevinHerbian</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/indonesia/2023/09/17/govt-insists-on-rempang-project-following-visit-by-ministers-police.html">Local</a> and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/15/protests-in-indonesia-as-thousands-face-eviction-for-rempang-eco">international media</a>, which had initially ignored the Rempang issue, was finally <a href="https://time.com/6313609/indonesia-rempang-eco-city-protests-china/">covering it</a> amid escalating “<a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/indonesia/2023/09/13/police-arrest-43-after-riot-over-china-backed-rempang-city-project.html">rioting</a>” at Rempang.</p>
<p>A Melayu youth messaged me on Whatsapp recently, saying: “I was called to the police station for questioning … I went through the investigation process [for many hours] regarding the case at [location X]. There was a clash between community and authorities which resulted in eight people being sent to prison.”</p>
<h2>Ecocity and mega solar panel production facility</h2>
<p>Meanwhile, preparations for the Rempang development have continued apace. It appears that as early as 2004, the Indonesian company PT Makmur Elok Graha (PT MEG), which is part of the Artha Graha Group, secured permission from the Batam Regional People’s Representative Council to <a href="https://ugm.ac.id/en/news/rempang-conflict-land-disputes-triggered-by-development-project/">develop Rempang</a>. The understanding at the time was for a tourism zone, covering <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/27/how-a-china-deal-put-the-homes-of-thousands-of-indonesians-at-risk">5,000 hectares</a>. Existing villages were to be preserved in this plan.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/552962/original/file-20231010-19-c6innt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A tweet from Amnesty International." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/552962/original/file-20231010-19-c6innt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/552962/original/file-20231010-19-c6innt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=952&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/552962/original/file-20231010-19-c6innt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=952&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/552962/original/file-20231010-19-c6innt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=952&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/552962/original/file-20231010-19-c6innt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1196&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/552962/original/file-20231010-19-c6innt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1196&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/552962/original/file-20231010-19-c6innt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1196&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Amnesty International is trying to draw attention to the islanders’ situation on social media.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://twitter.com/amnestyindo/status/1708679798720180432">X</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Nothing came of the agreement with PT MEG, until 2023. Earlier in 2023, representatives of PT MEG visited houses of notable locals in Rempang and indicated their intention to survey the land. According to one such local businessperson and community leader, the company did not inform him about what they intended to build. However, in a neighbouring village, some people say they were told about a survey for a glass factory, and in yet another, there was apparently talk of a hotel. </p>
<p>Now, in October 2023, the official business and government plans have revealed a much larger development than was suggested in 2004. The “Rempang ecocity” will be an industrial, service, and tourism area, as envisioned in the National Strategic Programme (PSN) of 2023. It is a joint venture between <a href="https://bpbatam.go.id/en/profile/background/">BP Batam</a> (which incorporates the free trade zone and Free Port Management Agency) and PT MEG. <a href="https://futuresoutheastasia.com/rempang-eco-city/">The project aims to attract investment</a> of about 381 trillion Indonesian Rupiah (Rp) by 2080, creating jobs for 30,000 workers. This equates to around US$24.8 billion or £20 billion. </p>
<p>Crucially, there is a major international investor: the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/27/how-a-china-deal-put-the-homes-of-thousands-of-indonesians-at-risk">world’s largest manufacturer of glass and solar panels</a>, China’s <a href="https://www.xinyiglass.com/en/">Xinyi Glass</a>. And the “glass factory” is no ordinary enterprise. It is a mega-investment from Xinyi which has reportedly pledged US$11.6 billion for the factory over several decades. In return, it seems, they have been promised Rempang’s land. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03066150.2020.1764542">my previous research</a> I called a similar zone of special economic interest in India, “hydra-like”. That’s because these sought after zones change shape, name and purpose according to what’s profitable at a particular point in time. And what’s profitable in Indonesia, and the world today, is the transition to green energy. Therefore, the showpiece of the Rempang ecocity proposal is the mega solar panel manufacturing facility that will probably supply the world with solar panels in the near future.</p>
<p>In the existing vision of the ecocity, there will be <a href="https://futuresoutheastasia.com/rempang-eco-city/">several zones</a> for industries, commercial and residential purposes, tourism, solar farms, and wildlife and nature. Rempang currently sustains farmers, fishers, seaweed processors and exporters, traders and shopkeepers, seafood kelongs, ten primary schools, three junior high schools, a senior school, hospitals, tourist guest houses and more. But it seems there is no place for this community in the futuristic vision of “green” Rempang. </p>
<h2>A project of strategic importance</h2>
<p>The proposed solar panel manufacturing facility, and the Rempang ecocity, may be a portent of a globalised production boom that the government of Indonesia, and its partner countries like China, envision for this region. This economic vision intends to draw on Indonesia’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/jobless-youth-raise-risk-of-indonesias-demographic-bonus-turning-into-disaster-50402">young and cheap labour</a>, its land and natural resources like silica, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/aae97af3-02ac-4723-a6fd-dbb0e5de55ff">nickel and cobalt</a>, and its willingness for regulatory flexibility. </p>
<p>It is this flexibility that made the government declare the proposed Rempang ecocity as a <a href="https://www.eco-business.com/opinion/why-has-batams-rempang-eco-city-national-project-become-a-controversy/#:%7E:text=Rempang%27s%20Eco%2DCity%20was%20upgraded,US%2425%20billion">Project of National Strategic Importance</a>, allowing it <a href="https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1755-1315/886/1/012071/pdf">to bypass social and environmental impact assessments, and acquire land quickly</a>.</p>
<p>The strategic importance of the Rempang project has not been lost on my contacts in Rempang. One of them speculated that the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/05/16/headway/indonesia-nusantara-jakarta.html">government’s plans</a> to build a <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-tale-of-two-cities-why-indonesia-is-planning-a-new-capital-on-borneo-and-abandoning-jakarta-podcast-181134#:%7E:text=Indonesia%20plans%20to%20move%20its,island%20of%20Borneo%20called%20Nusantara.">new capital city on Borneo</a> could be a motive for closer relations with China. They wondered whether the money for the new capital Nusantara would come from China, and whether that was why their land in Rempang had been “gifted” to the Chinese.</p>
<p>Another said: “Did they ask us? No. They only value investment. Not people.” Still others draw links with China’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/china-belt-road-initiative-44606">Belt and Road Initiative</a>, which has invested heavily in Indonesian infrastructure.</p>
<p>Not far from Rempang is one such investment: the series of bridges that will connect two of the largest islands in Riau province: the Batam-Bintan bridge project spread over <a href="https://batamterminal.com/7-km-batam-bintan-bridge-project/">7 kilometres</a>. Funded by the China-led <a href="https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/details/2022/special-fund/Indonesia-Support-for-Indonesia-Batam-Bintan-Bridge-Project.html">Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank</a>, the bridge will make it even easier to manufacture on Indonesia’s westernmost islands and carry this produce by road and sea to Singapore and the rest of the world.</p>
<p>The Rempang project may also be part of a looming trade war between China, the US and the EU. In 2022, China manufactured <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/05/17/1173250926/solar-power-eu-germany-china">three quarters of the world’s solar panels</a> and produced 97% of the silicon wafers that go into them. So far, the bulk of this production has been in Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang, which have a poor human rights record towards minorities like Uyghurs. Concerns around forced labour and Uyghur “re-education” camps, have <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jun/25/us-bans-target-chinese-solar-panel-industry-over-xinjiang-forced-labor-concerns">attracted sanctions from the west</a>.</p>
<p>This has come with protectionist policies towards <a href="https://www.unpri.org/download?ac=17824">emerging solar industries in the EU and America</a>. That is, to encourage national renewables manufacturing and create much needed green jobs, western governments are ready to generously subsidise manufacturers, while heavily taxing imports from competitors like China. <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/media-reaction-us-inflation-reduction-act-and-the-global-clean-energy-arms-race/">This international trade tussle</a> begs the question: does mass solar industrial manufacturing in a third country allow China to bypass sanctions and retain its domination of global solar panel manufacturing?</p>
<h2>Sand: a critical resource in the renewables push</h2>
<p>We know that the <a href="https://www.iea.org/topics/critical-minerals">green transition will require critical minerals</a> like cobalt, lithium and nickel to produce electric vehicles, solar cells and wind turbines. Indonesia has some of the world’s <a href="https://www.energymonitor.ai/extractive-industries/the-top-ten-critical-minerals-powerhouses-of-the-energy-transition/?cf-view">largest deposits of nickel and cobalt</a>, making it extremely attractive for countries and companies involved in the renewables push. </p>
<p>Rempang is not known for critical mineral or metal deposits. Yet, apart from its strategic location in the South China Sea, overlooking Singapore, Rempang is sitting on a crucial resource in the renewables transition: sand. Rempang, and its surrounding islands are abundant in silica and quartz sand, which is the <a href="https://interestingengineering.com/innovation/from-sand-to-solar-panels-unveiling-the-journey-of-solar-panel-manufacturing">base material for the manufacture of glass, and solar panels</a>.</p>
<p>Mass mining of sand is considered a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2017/feb/27/sand-mining-global-environmental-crisis-never-heard">global environmental crisis that often goes unreported</a>. The world over, a push for infrastructure and urbanisation is founded on massive supplies of cement and concrete, which are made from sand. By 2060, the world is expected to require <a href="https://theweek.com/news/science-health/960931/why-is-the-world-running-out-of-sand#">4.6 billion tonnes of sand</a>. The hunger for solar panels is part of this global sand rush.</p>
<p>Indonesia is at the heart of the sand trade. For years, it has supplied sand to Singapore. Official figures suggest that between 1997-2002 alone, Singapore imported 150 million tonnes of sand from Indonesia. Between 1999-2019, Singapore has shipped in <a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/indonesia-scraps-two-decade-ban-on-sea-sand-exports">517 million tonnes of sand </a> from neighbours like Malaysia, Indonesia and Cambodia. </p>
<p>Riau Islands are directly affected, with several islands shrinking significantly in area due to legal and illegal sand export to Singapore. <a href="https://www.asiasentinel.com/p/indonesia-resume-sand-exports-raising-fears">About a quarter of Singapore</a>, including iconic spaces like Marina Bay Sands and the luxury beach and resort area of Sentosa <a href="https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapore/sentosa-history-50-years-golden-jubilee-2547546">are built on reclaimed land</a> with imported sand. The losers in this process of <a href="https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/44609/chapter-abstract/393367359?redirectedFrom=fulltext">land-making</a> have been fishworkers, and others dependent on coastal land and waters, including my contacts in the Riau Islands. Fishworkers I have met speak of muddied waters, islands disappearing and drastic reduction in fish and seaweed at the peak of the sand trade.</p>
<p>In 2003, facing irreversible environmental harm, including rising seawater owing to reduced sand and mangrove plant buffers, Indonesia banned the sand trade. Yet, the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/5359d629-365c-4cd5-94dd-49eb168be1a2">illegal trade in sand went on</a>. In 2023, <a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/indonesia-scraps-two-decade-ban-on-sea-sand-exports">sand is back on the government’s agenda</a> as a legally <a href="https://www.greenpeace.org/southeastasia/press/58968/sea-sand-export-returns-after-a-20-year-ban/">tradeable commodity</a>. Rempang is very likely to face the repercussions of renewed sand mining.</p>
<h2>Compensation: a drop in the ocean</h2>
<p>The ecocity and solar panel project are a priority for the government of Indonesia. Ministers have now been deployed to the site to convince locals to support the project, and to hear them out. This includes the investment minister, <a href="https://en.tempo.co/read/1773595/minister-bahlil-visits-rempang-island-to-find-best-solution-without-violence">Bahlil Lahadalia</a>.</p>
<p>At the same time, residents were handed an eviction date of September 28, 2023. Representatives of <a href="https://bpbatam.go.id/en/">BP Batam</a> told them to sign consent forms by mid-September or risk losing the compensation on offer. Finally, villagers were made aware of the terms of compensation: a 45-square metre house, on 500 square metres of land. The house and land is estimated to cost around Rp120 million, or £6,257.</p>
<p>Residents rejected the compensation, with some instead demanding a 70-sq metre house, 1,000sq metres of land, and Rp200 million in cash. As a political commentator indicated <a href="https://kbanews.com/english-edition/land-and-cultural-conflict-in-rempang-balancing-progress-and-heritage/">in the local press</a>, if the government were to meet this higher demand, it would cost them Rp1.04 trillion for compensating all residents. When the proposed investment in the ecocity is Rp381 trillion, what is a compensation amount of a little under 0.3% of the total cost? </p>
<p>While the government is finally in talks with people at Rempang, and as compensation is being discussed, some people have already signed relocation papers. Some say they have been under intense pressure to do so. </p>
<p>This, however, is not the narrative being pushed by BP Batam which is now trying to win a PR war. In its latest press release <a href="https://bpbatam.go.id/en/progres-rempang-eco-city-25-kk-sudah-tempati-hunian-sementara/">it claimed</a> “most residents at some point have voluntarily accepted the shift”. It quoted the head of BP Batam, Muhammad Rudi, as saying, “there is no coercion or intervention,” and that the choice to be relocated was being made “purely from the hearts of the people” who support the ecocity project.</p>
<p>But others are holding out, convinced that “the Melayu cannot be bought”, or moved from their land. The idea that the local Melayu community is not for sale was repeated by many of my contacts. The powerful slogan was also printed on posters that have gone up in Rempang villages in the gathering movement against the glass factory and ecocity.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1703568089239998469"}"></div></p>
<p>Rumours and threats that the resistance at Rempang will lead to the cancellation of the project are beginning to be circulated. These have been <a href="https://inp.polri.go.id/2023/09/20/minister-luhut-confident-in-xinyi-groups-rempang-investment-amid-conflicts/">denied</a> at the highest levels but protests have forced the government to postpone the eviction date, even as they remain determined to start solar panel production at Rempang by <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-09-27/indonesia-to-build-25-billion-project-rocked-by-violent-clashes?leadSource=uverify%20wall">2024</a>. The government has also been compelled to <a href="https://voi.id/en/economy/314059">negotiate with protestors</a> regarding compensation, and has shifted the site of relocation from Galang Island to <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/front-row/2023/10/02/visit-to-tanjung-banon-indicates-eco-city-development-is-near.html">Tanjung Banon</a>, a district in the south-eastern corner of Rempang.</p>
<p>There is also talk of a phased relocation and a reduced project area. Some in the government have suggested that shifting within the same island, and fishing just a few kilometres past their old homes, can hardly even be called relocation. But for those who continue to resist the project, their only true home is where they currently live, and where their histories lie. Having had to reckon with relocation, residents are asking fundamental questions like: where will our children study? And, will the solar panel factory displace <a href="https://voi.id/en/news/311679">Melayu ancestral graves</a>?</p>
<p>After fighting alone for their rights for months, the people of Rempang finally have assistance from civil society groups and legal aid organisations. In August 2023, a civil society activist from Jakarta told me “there are too many resource and land conflicts in Indonesia. Something or other is always happening on our 17,500 islands. It is hard to keep up, and be involved in everything”.</p>
<p>But from September, <a href="https://en.tempo.co/read/1775087/civil-coalition-opens-legal-aid-post-in-rempang">prominent civil society groups</a> are assisting the residents of Rempang with a strategy for pushing back. Legal aid has been offered to them relating to their land rights as long-term residents – some of whom trace their connection to Rempang at least to the <a href="https://www.foei.org/rempang-island-indonesia-solidarity/">early 1800s</a>.</p>
<h2>The green transition’s collateral damage?</h2>
<p>My contacts at Rempang had been contemptuous of the suggested shift to Galang Island, and are not impressed by the alternate, smaller site at Tanjung Banon either. One said: “How can you take people from 16 villages, and put them in one small island? There will be conflict over land, and fishing. We are all fishers.” Adding to this incredulity is the idea that the government could even consider moving them to Galang — an island they know as the “Vietnamese refugee island”.</p>
<p>Galang housed boat people from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos under the auspices of the <a href="https://refugeecamps.net/GalangCamp.html">UNHCR between 1975-1996</a>. These were refugees in limbo, as they sought clearance of paperwork to emigrate to richer countries like the US and Australia. More recently, Galang housed the area’s main <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/indonesia/2022/12/22/galang-island-covid-emergency-hospital-closes.html">COVID emergency hospital</a>. People I am speaking to are understandably furious at being seen as “residue” by their own government – successors to a land that housed refugees and the sick and dying that needed to be isolated from the rest of society.</p>
<p>It is easy to understand the fury of those being left behind, or even trodden on, in the global march for greener energy. These local populations are, sometimes literally, at the coalface of the transition, yet their needs – and sometimes even their human rights – are deemed of little importance. </p>
<p>It is often Chinese investment, which makes the <a href="https://time.com/6313609/indonesia-rempang-eco-city-protests-china/">headlines</a>. But my ongoing research makes it clear that local people as residue is at the heart of this area’s longstanding development model. Indeed, as my <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/dech.12742">writing on the global south</a> more broadly shows, colonial and postcolonial development, and continuing north-south structural inequalities are built on the idea of the residual, racialised, inferior “other”. </p>
<p>The transition to green energy is reinforcing these long-held hierarchies. Events in Rempang are just the tip of the iceberg, as the poorer areas of the south become suppliers in the world’s energy needs.</p>
<p>Batam, and its neighbouring islands in Riau, were first conceptualised as an oil trading and logistics zone by US companies and fossil fuel contractors in the late 1960s. The US had aligned with the military <a href="https://theconversation.com/backgrounder-what-we-know-about-indonesias-1965-anti-communist-purge-66338">General Suharto</a>, against left-leaning nationalist President Sukarno in the fraught Cold War context. With US support, Suharto’s dictatorial New Order ruled Indonesia from 1968-98. </p>
<p>The US was the biggest oil producer in Indonesia at this time, with <a href="https://www.caltex.com/id/en/about-us/who-we-are/our-journey.html">Caltex</a>, a joint venture between Texaco and Chevron, producing <a href="https://oilandgascourses.org/the-amazing-chevron-pacific-indonesia/">a million barrels of oil per day</a> at its peak. Batam, as a regional logistics – and then a manufacturing and services – hub, is a creation of the Suharto-era. It was a major outlet for the crude oil trade from Batam to Singapore, and further afield. It was also an inlet for refined oil, with western oil companies and their enablers in Indonesia hiving off profits at the expense of a decimated environment, and a <a href="https://monthlyreview.org/2022/12/01/mining-capital-and-the-indonesian-state/">dispossessed local population</a>.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-tale-of-two-cities-why-indonesia-is-planning-a-new-capital-on-borneo-and-abandoning-jakarta-podcast-181134">A tale of two cities: why Indonesia is planning a new capital on Borneo – and abandoning Jakarta. Podcast</a>
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<p>Meanwhile, people on the small islands around Batam receive between four and six hours of electricity a day from the public utility provider. They experience a sense of déjà vu, as their government starts yet another ambitious project with foreign companies. Once more, their resources are to be ploughed into a money-spinning investment. They will be residue, to be signed off the land. Except this time, in the hotbed of Rempang, they have decided to fight back.</p>
<p>As the world looks to up its green energy consumption, with attendant demands on resources like sand, land and water, we will do well to consider the likely winners and losers in this process. There is a lot of talk on climate and energy justice in international circles right now. The idea of a green energy transition that can be “<a href="https://climatepromise.undp.org/news-and-stories/what-just-transition-and-why-it-important">just</a>” is absent from the volatile spaces of Rempang.</p>
<p>Faced with losing everything they call their own, the people of Rempang are not waiting for justice to be delivered to them. They are fighting for it on the ground. It might be the only way they will be heard, and counted, in the global green energy transition.</p>
<p><em>The Conversation approached the Indonesian government and the Artha Graha group for comments but none were received by time of publication.</em></p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=112&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=112&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=112&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><em>For you: more from our <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/insights-series-71218?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKengagement&utm_content=InsightsUK">Insights series</a>:</em></p>
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<p>_To hear about new Insights articles, join the hundreds of thousands of people who value The Conversation’s evidence-based news. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/the-daily-newsletter-2?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKengagement&utm_content=InsightsUK"><strong>Subscribe to our newsletter</strong></a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214755/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nikita Sud receives funding from the Oxford University Press supported John Fell Fund at Oxford University. Grant reference: 0012658.</span></em></p>The international quest for green energy is reliant on ‘sacrificial zones’ in developing countries.Nikita Sud, Professor of the Politics of Development, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2140692023-10-17T00:46:43Z2023-10-17T00:46:43ZSaltwater crocodiles are slowly returning to Bali and Java. Can we learn to live alongside them?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554133/original/file-20231016-29-woipe3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=20%2C20%2C6689%2C4446&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On January 4 this year, a three-metre saltwater crocodile heaved itself out of the water and up the beach. Nothing unusual about that – except this <a href="https://denpasar.suara.com/read/2023/01/04/173710/heboh-buaya-29-meter-ditangkap-di-pantai-legian-bali-dari-mana-asalnya">croc was on Legian Beach</a>, one of Bali’s most popular spots. The emaciated reptile <a href="https://www.9news.com.au/world/bali-crocodile-rescuer-reveals-fate-of-reptile-who-washed-ashore-popular-beach/3738e466-a700-442d-aa5f-47ecc3c3d8c8">later died</a>. </p>
<p>Only four months later, a <a href="https://regional.kompas.com/read/2023/04/30/152218878/pria-ini-tewas-dimakan-buaya-saat-cari-ikan-di-pantai-lombok-tengah">large crocodile killed a man</a> who was spearfishing with friends in Lombok’s Awang Bay, about 100 kilometres east of Bali. Authorities caught it and transferred it to captivity. </p>
<p>You might not associate crocodiles with Bali. But the saltwater crocodile once roamed most of Indonesia’s waters, and attacks are still common in some regions. I have been collecting records of crocodilian attacks since 2010, as the creator of the worldwide database CrocAttack. What’s new is that they’re beginning to return to areas where they were wiped out. </p>
<p>Does this mean tourists and residents should be wary? It’s unlikely these islands can host anywhere near the same population densities as the wide, fish-filled rivers of Australia’s tropical north. And in Bali, it’s unlikely we’ll see any crocodile recovery because of the importance of beaches to tourism and a high human population.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550525/original/file-20230927-29-eo085s.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A large saltwater crocodile tied to a boat with rope" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550525/original/file-20230927-29-eo085s.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550525/original/file-20230927-29-eo085s.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=284&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550525/original/file-20230927-29-eo085s.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=284&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550525/original/file-20230927-29-eo085s.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=284&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550525/original/file-20230927-29-eo085s.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=357&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550525/original/file-20230927-29-eo085s.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=357&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550525/original/file-20230927-29-eo085s.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=357&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">This 4.6-metre saltwater crocodile was captured in Lombok after the fatal attack in May.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Bali Reptile Rescue</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
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<h2>What happened to Indonesia’s crocodiles?</h2>
<p>Saltwater crocodiles (<em>Crocodylus porosus</em>) are also known as estuarine crocodiles, as they prefer to live in mangrove-lined rivers. They’re the largest living reptile, reaching up to seven metres in length – far larger than Indonesia’s famous Komodo dragon, which tops out at three metres. </p>
<p>Historically, crocodiles lived throughout the Indonesian archipelago. We have records of attacks on humans in <a href="https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:011071456:mpeg21:a0021">Bali from the early 20th century</a> and across <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/279806685_RECENT_REPORTS_OF_SALTWATER_CROCODILES_WITHIN_EAST_JAVA_AND_BALI_PROVINCES_IN_INDONESIA">much of Java until the 1950s</a>. Even Indonesia’s capital, Jakarta, <a href="https://voi.id/en/memori/20438">had crocodiles resident in many rivers</a> running through the city.</p>
<p>Crocodiles in Bali and Lombok were <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/279806685_RECENT_REPORTS_OF_SALTWATER_CROCODILES_WITHIN_EAST_JAVA_AND_BALI_PROVINCES_IN_INDONESIA">killed off by the mid-20th century</a>, and later across Java. But they survived in more remote parts of the island nation. </p>
<p>Salties are now being regularly sighted in Indonesia’s densely populated island of Java, including in <a href="https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4069902/misteri-buaya-25-meter-yang-muncul-di-tanjung-priok">seas off Jakarta</a>. At least 70 people are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/may/02/crocodile-catch-conservationists-warn-against-proposed-queensland-cull">killed by crocs every year</a> across the archipelago, with the highest numbers of attacks being reported from the Bangka-Belitung islands off Sumatra and the provinces of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/East_Kalimantan">East Kalimantan</a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/East_Nusa_Tenggara">East Nusa Tenggara</a>, and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Riau">Riau</a>. </p>
<h2>Are crocodiles returning in numbers?</h2>
<p>These incidents means numbers are increasing. But recovery may not be as significant as it seems. </p>
<p>On many Indonesian islands, there’s very limited <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0264837716302009">mangrove habitat suitable for crocodiles</a>, and many creeks and rivers may be naturally too small for more than a small number of them. Even a small population recovery could quickly fill up the croc capacity of estuaries and creeks. These crocodiles are the <a href="https://environment.des.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0028/88273/crocodile-monitoring-plan.pdf">most territorial of all crocodilians</a>. Dominant males push out smaller male crocodiles, who set out <a href="https://wildlife.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/jwmg.767">in search of new habitat</a>. </p>
<p>To date, Indonesia’s crocodile surveys reveal mostly <a href="https://jurnalbiologi.perbiol.or.id/home/article/9e75989e-d8e2-41f0-9b8a-c9a2992c9cbe">small</a> and <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/345977330_A_preliminary_study_on_the_population_and_habitat_of_saltwater_crocodile_Crocodylus_porosus_in_Timor_Island_East_Nusa_Tenggara">low-density populations</a>. But even the arrival of a single crocodile into human territory can spark conflict – and threaten the conservation of the species. </p>
<p>Worldwide, saltwater crocodiles are listed as a species of least concern on the IUCN Red List of Threatened Species, thanks to their <a href="https://www.iucncsg.org/365_docs/attachments/protarea/18%20--8088e67a.pdf">full population recovery in parts of northern Australia</a> after hunting was banned in the early 1970s. But in Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam the species is extinct. </p>
<p>Even in sparsely populated northern Australia, there’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/may/02/crocodile-catch-conservationists-warn-against-proposed-queensland-cull">still conflict between humans and crocs</a>, though this conflict is comparatively rare. In Indonesia, the problem is compounded by a massive human population which <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0264837716302009">puts pressure on crocodile habitat</a>.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/friday-essay-reckoning-with-an-animal-that-sees-us-as-prey-living-and-working-in-crocodile-country-160260">Friday essay: reckoning with an animal that sees us as prey — living and working in crocodile country</a>
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<h2>Where are Bali’s crocs coming from?</h2>
<p>You might look at a map and think crocodiles moving back into Bali are coming from Australia. But there is currently no evidence of <a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/australianz/killer-crocodiles-why-are-more-humans-being-attacked-in-east-timor#:%7E:text=East%20Timor%20sits%20between%20Indonesia,and%20collecting%20water%20to%20drink.">significant crocodile movement between Australia and Indonesia</a>. It would be a brave crocodile to swim more than 1,000 kilometres from Australia to Bali. </p>
<p>What we are likely witnessing is a crocodile exodus from nearby areas, though we would need to do genetic analysis to prove it. That’s because the surviving croc population centres are much closer than Australia. For Bali and Lombok, crocodiles are likely migrating from the islands to the east, such as <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/349111616_Saltwater_crocodile_Crocodylus_porosus_attacks_in_East_Nusa_Tenggara_Indonesia">Flores, Lembata, Sumba and Timor</a>. </p>
<p>The most likely source of Java’s crocodile arrivals is southern Sumatra, which is less than 30km from Java at its nearest. This area has long been prone to crocodile attacks. </p>
<h2>What does this mean for residents and tourists?</h2>
<p>Earlier this month, a relatively large crocodile was photographed <a href="https://www.detik.com/sumut/berita/d-6948883/buaya-nyantai-berjemur-di-keramba-nelayan-tak-berani-beraktivitas">basking on a large fish trap in West Lombok</a>, less than 50km from the tourist hotspot of the Gili Islands. </p>
<p>The spike in sightings and attacks suggests we’re going to have to find ways of living alongside these reptiles. The coastal waters and estuaries of Lombok and western Java are now likely home to a small resident population. </p>
<p>What can be done to prevent attacks? First, people have to know that crocs are back. Increasing crocodile awareness and caution is vital to save lives. </p>
<p>Some researchers believe attacks on us and our livestock get more likely if <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/352055695_MAPPING_THE_DISTRIBUTION_OF_SALTWATER_CROCODILE_Crocodylus_porosus_AND_RISKS_OF_HUMAN-CROCODILE_CONFLICTS_IN_SETTLEMENTS_AROUND_KUTAI_NATIONAL_PARK_EAST_KALIMANTAN">mangroves have been destroyed or fishing grounds fished out</a>. Protecting crocodile habitat and prey species can both secure the future of the species and cut the risk of attacks. </p>
<p>Does it mean you should cancel your next Bali trip? No. While restoration efforts have <a href="https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1755-1315/123/1/012022/pdf">brought back tracts of mangroves</a> along some coastlines in Bali, the sheer popularity of the island means it’s unlikely any crocodile population will ever be reestablished there.</p>
<p>But we could well see crocodiles slowly return to less populated parts of Java and Lombok. While that may fill us with anxiety, they’re a vital part of the ecosystem. Crocodiles are meant to be there. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-northern-territory-does-not-have-a-crocodile-problem-and-salties-do-not-need-culling-209863">The Northern Territory does not have a crocodile problem – and 'salties' do not need culling</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214069/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brandon Michael Sideleau is affiliated with IUCN Crocodile Specialist Group. </span></em></p>After decades of absence, crocodiles are now being seen off Bali, Lombok and Java. That’s good for the species – but what about us?Brandon Michael Sideleau, PhD student studying human-saltwater crocodile conflict, Charles Darwin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.