tag:theconversation.com,2011:/es/topics/yoweri-museveni-25474/articlesYoweri Museveni – The Conversation2024-01-25T15:53:16Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2218802024-01-25T15:53:16Z2024-01-25T15:53:16ZCecilia Atim Ogwal: a fearless Ugandan politician who spoke her mind and challenged conventions<p>Cecilia Barbara Atim Ogwal, one of Uganda’s longest-serving female legislators, passed away on 18 January 2024 at the age of 77.</p>
<p>Ogwal was regarded as a trailblazer, one of the strongest, most charismatic women leaders in the opposition, and a staunch defender of multipartyism, democracy and human rights. Known for her toughness, she was unafraid to stand up to male leaders in the ruling party and even within her own party. Hence she came to be known as the “iron lady” in Uganda. </p>
<p>Having studied gender and politics in Uganda for almost three decades, I followed her career as she became one of the strongest parliamentarians and a mentor to younger female politicians. She was a role model to them and stressed the importance of balancing work and family. </p>
<p>Uganda’s president Yoweri Museveni lauded her as a <a href="https://observer.ug/news/headlines/80348-museveni-honours-cecil-atim-ogwal">true patriot</a> at a vigil held in her honour after she died. But her experiences as an opposition politician are emblematic of the challenges faced by political opponents of the regime in Uganda.</p>
<p>She told Kampala’s The Observer newspaper in 2014 that she had survived 12 attempts on her life. In 2017, she alleged that security operatives beat her and her husband for campaigning against the lifting of the constitution’s presidential age limit. The age limit, which was lifted that year, allowed Museveni – then in his fifth term – to run for yet another term and potentially rule indefinitely.</p>
<h2>Early trailblazer</h2>
<p>Ogwal was the first girl to participate in a mathematics contest sponsored by the Verona Fathers congregation in the early 1960s. </p>
<p>She won a scholarship that allowed her to enrol in the oldest girls’ boarding school in Uganda, Gayaza High School. She was one of the first Catholics admitted to Gayaza. Even her father was initially against her attending the institution, which had been established by the (Anglican) Church of England. </p>
<p>She became one of four Ugandan women to be admitted on a trial basis by the University of East Africa, the precursor to the University of Nairobi, in Kenya. There she emerged as the best student in her field, graduating in 1970 with a Bachelor of Commerce degree.</p>
<p>Her extraordinary achievements didn’t end there. After marrying Lameck Ogwal in 1965, she went on to pursue a professional career while also raising seven of her own children and several adopted children.</p>
<p>Her first job in 1979 included the position of liaison officer at the Uganda Embassy in Nairobi, helping Ugandan refugees in Kenya return to Uganda after Idi Amin’s ouster. In 1980 she assumed the position of operations manager at the Uganda Advisory Board of Trade. </p>
<p>In 1982 she was instrumental in founding the Housing Finance Bank, which is still in existence, and she chaired the board of the Uganda Development Bank from 1981 to 1986. </p>
<p>But it wasn’t until she entered politics that her assertiveness and distinctive voice earned her the moniker “iron lady”.</p>
<h2>A warrior for democracy</h2>
<p>Ogwal first entered political leadership in the early 1980s.</p>
<p>She served as the acting secretary general of the Uganda People’s Congress from 1985 to 1992. She participated in the constituent assembly that promulgated the 1995 constitution. </p>
<p>Ogwal’s parliamentary journey began in 1996, when she represented Lira Municipality (1996-2005). She was also Uganda’s representative to the African Union’s Pan African Parliament. In 2011, she was elected as the women’s representative for Dokolo district for the Forum for Democratic Change.</p>
<p>Among her contributions, she helped rescind Article 252 from the 1995 constitution, which banned multiparty politics. Thus she helped ensure that the country transitioned from a de facto single party to multiparty politics in 2005.</p>
<p>In November 2003, after the government had launched a massive military offensive against the Lord’s Resistance Army rebels in northern Uganda, Ogwal, a Langi from the affected area, walked out on the president in parliament, demanding that he find a solution to the conflict, even if it meant seeking international assistance.</p>
<p>Her difficulties were not limited to the ruling party. She opposed former president Milton Obote, the leader of the Uganda People’s Congress, when he called for a boycott of the 1996 elections. Obote had been in exile, and she felt he was out of touch with Uganda. She argued that a boycott would destroy the opposition at a time when they were advocating for multiparty politics. </p>
<p>Her differences with the Uganda People’s Congress’ top leadership came to a head by the early 2000s, and she was expelled from the party. Ogwal then joined the leading opposition party at the time, the Forum for Democratic Change, and ran for the Dokolo Woman MP seat, which she held from 2011 until her death.</p>
<p>In her <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/cecilia-ogwal-parliament-s-uniting-factor-will-be-missed-dearly--4496034">tribute to Ogwal</a> at a special session of parliament, Speaker of the House Anita Among described this woman, who had once served as the opposition chief whip, as a unifying force between the opposition and the government in parliament.</p>
<p>She recalled the mediating role Ogwal had played at key political moments, such as when she brought the two contenders together following the 2021 speaker election. On more than one occasion, she stepped in and helped feuding legislators to bury their differences. For this, she gained enormous respect from legislators on all sides and even had her own reserved seat in the assembly. </p>
<p>“When she speaks, everybody keeps quiet,” the speaker added. “That is the Cecilia Ogwal we have lost.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221880/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aili Mari Tripp receives funding from National Science Foundation in the United States.</span></em></p>Ogwal’s experiences as an opposition politician are emblematic of the challenges faced by political opponents of the regime in Uganda.Aili Mari Tripp, Vilas Research Professor of Political Science, University of Wisconsin-MadisonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2181712024-01-16T14:13:09Z2024-01-16T14:13:09ZUganda’s battle for the youth vote – how Museveni keeps Bobi Wine’s reach in check<p>Uganda is one of the youngest countries in the world, with an <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/factsheet/2020/02/25/uganda-jobs-strategy-for-inclusive-growth#:%7E:text=Uganda%20is%20one%20of%20the,working%20age%20population%20is%20rapid.">average age of 15.9 years</a>. Young people aged below 30 make up about <a href="https://www.issuelab.org/resources/4998/4998.pdf#page=1">77%</a> of the country’s population of <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=UG">47 million</a> people.</p>
<p>Young people have legitimate and wide-ranging grievances, from unemployment to disenfranchisement. Opportunities remain limited, with <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/factsheet/2020/02/25/uganda-jobs-strategy-for-inclusive-growth">two-thirds of Ugandans</a> working for themselves or doing family-based agricultural work.</p>
<p>Yet, young people in Uganda haven’t coalesced as an electoral bloc. This is despite the emergence of a presidential candidate who champions youth issues. In the last presidential election in 2021, those aged between 18 and 30 made up <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/oped/commentary/what-young-voting-population-means-for-2021-elections-3206502">41%</a> of the total voter roll of 18 million. </p>
<p>Robert Kyagulanyi, the 41-year-old musician-turned-politician popularly known as Bobi Wine, leads the National Unity Platform. It is Uganda’s largest opposition party, known for its <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/21/young-africa-new-wave-of-politicians-challenges-old-guard">youth appeal</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/bobi-wine-has-already-changed-the-ugandan-opposition-can-he-change-the-government-150231">Bobi Wine’s run at the presidency in the 2021 election</a> highlights the reality that capturing the youth vote in Uganda is complex. And that this broad category and the role it plays in Ugandan politics is poorly understood.</p>
<p>As it is, the term “youth” lacks a clear definition. Uganda’s government defines the youth as those aged between 18 and 30. However, in practice the “youth” category is much more amorphous. It tends to <a href="https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/20.500.12413/13550">encompass</a> those who are no longer considered children, but haven’t yet realised the “social markers” that signify adulthood. These include financial independence, marriage and children.</p>
<p>The outcome of the 2021 elections defied expectations, given Uganda’s <a href="https://www.ubos.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/11_2022NLFS_2021_main_report.pdf#page=135">large and underemployed youth population</a> and the emergence of Bobi Wine. In a recent <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2023.2235661">paper</a>, we examined youth political mobilisation in this election. </p>
<p>Despite widespread “youth wave” optimism, we identified diverse, embedded strategies and tactics from the ruling party, the <a href="https://www.nrm.ug/manifesto-2021-2026">National Resistance Movement</a>, that obstructed Bobi Wine’s efforts to build a powerful national youth constituency. </p>
<p>The strategies were:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the structural capture of youth representation in Ugandan politics</p></li>
<li><p>diverse economic incentives for political loyalty in the form of loan schemes, grants and short-term employment </p></li>
<li><p>well-spun political narratives that draw on entrenched views of youth as beholden to their elders and the state. </p></li>
</ul>
<h2>New wine, old bottles</h2>
<p>When Bobi Wine ran in the presidential election, he was aged 38. Commentators worldwide suggested his candidacy represented a <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2019/1003/A-rapper-s-quest-to-be-president">real</a> and <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/bobi_wine_threat_museveni/">unprecedented threat</a> to Yoweri Museveni’s longstanding rule. Museveni, 79, has been Uganda’s president since 1986.</p>
<p>Bobi Wine got <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jan/16/uganda-president-wins-decisive-election-as-bobi-wine-alleges">35%</a> of the vote. This is about the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/120/481/629/6406415?redirectedFrom=fulltext">same proportion of votes</a> that has accrued to the main opposition candidates in Uganda since multi-party elections resumed in 2006. </p>
<p>For a new entrant on the political scene, this was an impressive achievement – particularly in the light of political repression and patronage that make the <a href="https://time.com/5913625/bobi-wine-uganda-presidential-candidate/">playing field far from fair</a> in Uganda. </p>
<p>Bobi Wine’s <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2020/12/uganda-stop-killings-and-human-rights-violations-ahead-of-election-day/">violent arrest</a> in November 2020 gained international attention, as did the government’s aggressive response to protests calling for his release. These resulted in the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/01/21/uganda-elections-marred-violence">death of at least 54 National Unity Platform supporters</a>. Security forces perpetrated <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/01/21/uganda-elections-marred-violence">widespread violence and human rights abuses</a> in the run-up to the election.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/black-november-remembering-ugandas-massacre-of-the-opposition-three-years-on-217847">Black November: remembering Uganda's massacre of the opposition three years on</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<p>On the eve of the election, the government ordered a <a href="https://apnews.com/article/kampala-elections-coronavirus-pandemic-uganda-united-states-65942284f4e73dbf120ace23775baae4">five-day internet shutdown</a>. There were also <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/special-reports/elections/nrm-dishes-out-money-to-locals-ahead-of-polls-3248892">reports</a> of the ruling party dishing out money to potential voters, with instructions to vote for Museveni. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2023.2235661">Our research</a> reviewed Ugandan history since its independence from the British in 1962. We found that the possibility of a national youth constituency had been a concern of Uganda’s post-colonial governments. Regimes have long sought to integrate the youth into their political project, while keeping them fragmented and regionally embedded to prevent broader political mobilisation. </p>
<p>Contemporary tactics used by the ruling party to co-opt the youth converge with these historically rooted methods of regime consolidation. </p>
<h2>Splitting the youth</h2>
<p>The National Resistance Movement has an elaborate set of measures in place –from state level to the villages – to prevent youth discontent from becoming a national political threat. </p>
<p>First, the youth are organised into a “special interest group” <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/41653703">reinforced through quota systems</a>. These are closely allied with the ruling party’s leadership. Political structures, such as youth MPs and representatives, absorb youth representation under regime authority and entrench regional divisions. </p>
<p>Second, the ruling party uses patronage networks and tactics to mobilise young voters. It offers economic rewards for allegiance and generous material compensation for “party-switching” – which is when supporters defect from the opposition to the National Resistance Movement, often quite publicly. Ahead of the 2021 election, Museveni <a href="https://observer.ug/news/headlines/62550-inside-museveni-s-war-on-the-ghetto">gave state appointments to popular musicians with wide youth appeal</a> who had been working closely with Bobi Wine’s party. </p>
<p>The ruling party also offers young people <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/opposition-cries-foul-as-museveni-gives-shs741m-in-cash-donations-1484578">economic incentives</a> during campaigns. These include short-term employment, loans and cash handouts. Youth are often recruited as election workers, special police constables and crime preventers. In these short-term positions, tens of thousands of youth survey their communities and share local intelligence with the authorities, acting as the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2016.1272283">state’s eyes and ears</a> at a village level. Among young, economically precarious men, this is seen as <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2023.2235661">an opportunity</a>, even though they become engaged in supporting the re-election of a regime they may oppose. </p>
<p>Third, during the last election, campaign observers were optimistic about the power of social media to amplify Bobi Wine’s message and increase support. But social media is also a tool the National Resistance Movement uses adeptly. Beyond internet shutdowns and disinformation campaigns, we found that Museveni and the National Resistance Movement used social media channels to promote powerful narratives that linked social order and prosperity to a culture of gerontocracy. This refers to a system of governance in which older people dominate.</p>
<h2>What hope for Bobi Wine?</h2>
<p>Well-developed structures, practices and narratives that fragment national youth mobilisation have been seen in recent Ugandan history. In northern Uganda, for example, young people have lived through a recent history of <a href="https://theconversation.com/managing-life-after-war-how-young-people-in-uganda-are-coping-108351">devastating conflict</a> and still struggle with its legacies. </p>
<p>This, combined with long-standing regional and ethnic tensions throughout the country, means that his opponents often describe Bobi Wine first as a <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/120/481/629/6406415?login=true">political agitator</a> who could tear the country apart, not as the youth’s best chance for <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2023.2235661">political liberation and progress</a>. </p>
<p>Against this backdrop, if Bobi Wine contests in 2026, he is likely to struggle again. He may attract global media attention, but Museveni and the National Resistance Movement are familiar with his brand of <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/120/481/629/6406415?login=trueopposition">“defiance-based” opposition politics</a>. </p>
<p>As commentators increasingly note, the big question remains whether Bobi Wine and the National Unity Platform, without experience in government and in the absence of strong links to powerful military and state players, can realistically achieve a political <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/120/481/629/6406415?login=trueopposition">transition</a> in Uganda. </p>
<p>The overall picture is one in which the elite have long seen the youth as an important resource and potential threat – and as such fear and value them. While Uganda’s young people have real and legitimate grievances, they lack modes of political and social organisation – by long-standing design.</p>
<p><em>Arthur Owor, the director for research and operations at the Centre for African Research, is a co-author of this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218171/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rebecca Tapscott receives funding from the ESRC-funded Centre for Public Authority and International Development (CPAID) and the Gerda Henkel Foundation's Special Programme for Security, Society and the State.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anna Macdonald receives funding from the ESRC-funded Centre for Public Authority and International Development (CPAID). </span></em></p>Bobi Wine’s run at the presidency in 2021 had appeared to present an unprecedented threat to Yoweri Museveni’s longstanding rule.Rebecca Tapscott, Lecturer, University of YorkAnna Macdonald, Associate Professor, Global Development, University of East AngliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2180972023-12-12T09:10:47Z2023-12-12T09:10:47ZWhat’s east Africa’s position on the Israel-Hamas war? An expert unpacks the reactions of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda<p>The reactions of some east African countries to the ongoing conflict in Gaza have been less dramatic than South Africa’s. South Africa’s parliament has passed a resolution calling for the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/safrican-lawmakers-vote-suspend-diplomatic-ties-with-israel-shut-embassy-2023-11-21/">closure</a> of its embassy in Tel Aviv. Algeria and South Africa have been the most supportive of the Palestinians. Thus far only South Africa and Chad have withdrawn their representatives from Tel Aviv.</p>
<p>In contrast, the reactions from east African capitals have been less dramatic. At the outset of the current conflict in Gaza, Kenya’s President William Ruto <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2023-10-08-kenya-stands-with-israel-ruto-says-amidst-war-with-palestine/">expressed solidarity</a> with Israel and condemned</p>
<blockquote>
<p>terrorism and attacks on innocent civilians in the country.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/museveni-reacts-as-hamas-attack-on-israel-spirals-4393308">Uganda</a> and <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/tanzania-calls-for-peace-as-israel-palestine-war-intensifies-4394110">Tanzania</a> condemned all forms of violence and called for</p>
<blockquote>
<p>restraint to stem further loss of human life.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=Michael+Bishku+research&hl=en&as_sdt=0&as_vis=1&oi=scholart">scholar</a> of Middle Eastern and African history, I have researched the relationship between Israel and African countries including those in <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/312006990_Israel's_Relations_with_the_East_African_States_of_Kenya_Uganda_and_Tanzania_-_From_Independence_to_the_Present">east Africa</a>. </p>
<p>It is my conclusion that the reactions of the east African states to the conflict in the Middle East are shaped by two things: the perceived national threat of terrorism by Islamist factions and, for those states with democratic institutions, domestic public opinion.</p>
<p>In my view these three countries are unlikely to change their stance unless the current conflict escalates. On the one hand they will continue to limit their actions to voting in the United Nations for resolutions in support of the Palestinians. On the other they will continue to solicit technical assistance – especially in agriculture and security – from Israel.</p>
<h2>The history</h2>
<p>Relations between African countries and Israel have been tested before. For example, in 1973, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20455585">25 independent African states</a> cut diplomatic relations with Israel after its occupation of Egyptian territory. These included east African states, such as Kenya, which had enjoyed particularly <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/a-history-of-africa-israel-relations/a-43395892">close relations</a> with Israel since its independence from Britain in 1963.</p>
<p>East African countries colonised by Britain <a href="https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2016/09/israeli-penetration-east-africa-objectives-risks-160929102604246.html">sought</a> technical assistance after independence. This was particularly true in agriculture. They viewed Israel as complementary or an alternative to having to seek assistance from the big powers.</p>
<p>When African states cut off the diplomatic ties with Israel in 1973, Kenya was reluctant but had to act in solidarity with other independent African nations. It kept its cooperation with Israel even before the formal ties were restored in 1988. It facilitated Israel’s <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Entebbe-raid">1974 rescue operation</a> at Uganda’s Entebbe airport. The operation was meant to rescue passengers of a French jet airliner that was hijacked on its way from Israel to France, and flown to Entebbe. </p>
<p>Tanzania, on the other hand, sought a more neutral course after independence. It found the socialist character of the Israeli Labour governments appealing but Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories following the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Six-Day-War">1967 Six-Day War</a> complicated relations. </p>
<p>Tanzania was one of the last African states to <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1481841?ln=en">renew</a> relations with Israel in 1994. That was a year after the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Oslo-Accords">Oslo Accords</a> between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation. Tanzania was also the <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200605-palestine-julius-nyerere-and-international-solidarity/">first African country</a> to recognise the Palestinian Liberation Organisation in 1973 and to host a representative office in its capital. </p>
<p>Uganda has had the most tempestuous relationship with Israel. Under the erratic <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Idi-Amin">Idi Amin</a> the country broke off relations with Israel and embraced Libya. Israel and Uganda have had good relations under President Yoweri Museveni. Israeli companies <a href="https://embassies.gov.il/nairobi/bilateral-relations/Pages/Israel-and-Uganda.aspx">currently operate</a> in Uganda’s construction, infrastructure, agriculture and water management, communications and technology sectors.</p>
<p>Uganda joined most other African countries in <a href="https://truman.huji.ac.il/publications/uganda-and-israel-history-complex-relationship">renewing</a> relations with Israel just after the end of the Cold War.</p>
<p>Uganda, along with Kenya, has militarily intervened in Somalia as part of an African Union mission. </p>
<p>The ebbs and flows of these relationships have to be seen against the backdrop of the hard work Israel has put in to building <a href="https://jewishstudies.washington.edu/israel-hebrew/benjamin-netanyahu-resetting-israel-africa-relations/">diplomatic relations</a> with a range of other African countries too. By 2023 it had ties with 46 of the <a href="https://au.int/">55 African Union member states</a>.</p>
<h2>National security threat</h2>
<p>Kenya has been affected by instability in neighbouring Somalia and has been the victim of terror attacks. </p>
<p>In 1998, al Qaeda attacks <a href="https://press.un.org/en/1998/19980813.sc6559.html">targeted</a> the US embassy in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. The Nairobi attack <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/kenya-victims-of-1998-us-embassy-bombing-demand-compensation-/7215264.html">resulted</a> in over 200 deaths and thousands of people were injured. Since then, Israel <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/23/nairobi-attack-israel-advising-kenyan-forces">has taken the lead</a> among foreign countries in aiding and advising Kenyan security.</p>
<p>Kenya has suffered attacks since then by al-Shabaab – across its <a href="https://theconversation.com/five-reasons-why-militants-are-targeting-kenyas-lamu-county-176519">border</a> as well as in <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/kenya/">Nairobi</a> in 2019. </p>
<p>Tanzania’s security situation has been different. Unlike Kenya, Tanzania has not militarily intervened in Somalia as part of an African Union mission (Amisom). The mission has been operating since 2007 to provide security in that country in the Horn of Africa.</p>
<p>Uganda has its own set of security problems. A terrorist bombing in Uganda’s capital Kampala in 2010 was <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2010/7/13/al-shabab-claims-uganda-bombings">attributed</a> to al-Shabaab. But a bigger threat to Uganda’s security has come from Islamist rebels known as the <a href="https://theconversation.com/tracking-the-drcs-allied-democratic-forces-and-its-links-to-isis-116439">Allied Democratic Forces</a> based in the Democratic Republic of Congo. </p>
<h2>Domestic institutions and public opinion</h2>
<p>There is one other factor that explains east Africa’s relations with Israel: the religious composition of populations in the region. </p>
<p>Israel is <a href="https://www.msnbc.com/opinion/msnbc-opinion/truth-many-evangelical-christians-support-israel-rcna121481">popular</a> with many devout Christians in east Africa, as is the case throughout the continent. If given the opportunity, these Christians would make a pilgrimage to the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/israelstudies.23.1.09">Holy Land</a>. This factor obviously affects <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/israel-in-africa-9781786995056/">public opinion</a>. </p>
<p>Conversely, Muslims in east Africa have a greater concern for the situation of the Palestinians. All three countries – Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania – have populations adhering to these two religions. </p>
<p>Given the democratic characters of Kenya and Tanzania, where there have been peaceful transfers of power, public opinion has more of an impact. This explains Ruto’s <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/president-ruto-changes-tune-on-israel-hamas-conflict-4431560">change of tone</a> after the initial statement strongly critical of Hamas.</p>
<p>Tanzania has remained consistent in condemning all forms of violence. That country calls for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as do the other east African states. </p>
<p>Public pressure is less important in Uganda, where Museveni is quite autocratic.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218097/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael B. Bishku does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>East Africa’s reaction to the war in Gaza appears shaped by history, affinity to the policies of the west and the threat of terrorism.Michael B. Bishku, Professor of Middle Eastern and African History, Augusta UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2178472023-11-17T13:19:07Z2023-11-17T13:19:07ZBlack November: remembering Uganda’s massacre of the opposition three years on<p>November marks a sombre anniversary in Uganda’s recent political history. In 2020, the east African country’s leading opposition politician, Robert Kyagulanyi, aka Bobi Wine, was <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2020/12/uganda-stop-killings-and-human-rights-violations-ahead-of-election-day/">arrested</a>. He was on the campaign trail ahead of the 2021 presidential elections. </p>
<p>Mass demonstrations demanding the release of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/bobi-wine-has-shaken-up-ugandan-politics-four-things-worth-knowing-about-him-153205">popular musician-turned-presidential-candidate</a> broke out in and around the capital, Kampala. Over two days, security agents of the regime of Yoweri Museveni – in power since 1986 – cracked down on the protests. </p>
<p>They fired <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-africa-57286419">live ammunition</a> into crowds of protesters, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/11/18/one-year-later-no-justice-victims-ugandas-lethal-clampdown">killing at least 54 people</a> and injuring many more. The regime <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/special-reports/elections/bobi-wine-s-lonely-walk-to-election-day-3251966">arrested</a> over <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/govt-lists-1-300-missing-people-3364558">a thousand</a> people. <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/3-years-on-still-no-closure-for-nov-protests-victims-families-4430210">Hundreds more</a> have since been reported <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2021/05/mass-abductions-in-uganda-what-we-know-and-dont-know/">disappeared</a>.</p>
<p>Three years on, the effects of the massacre loom large over Uganda’s contemporary politics. </p>
<p>The Ugandan Human Rights Commission recently announced it was <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/uhrc-fails-to-trace-18-missing-nup-supporters-4397058">closing the files</a> of 18 opposition supporters who remain missing. This has renewed demands for justice and government accountability in connection with the 2020 killings.</p>
<p>In my <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03056244.2023.2245729">research</a>, I have charted Kyagulanyi’s <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2021/05/our-liberation-is-a-matter-of-now-an-interview-with-bobi-wine/">unlikely political rise</a> from his landslide victory as an independent candidate in a <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/bobi-wine-wins-kyadondo-east-by-election-1708132">2017 parliamentary by-election</a> to his 2021 run for the presidency against Museveni. </p>
<p>Kyagulanyi and his supporters have been subject to <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/10/05/africa/bobi-wine-airport-arrest-intl/index.html">arrest</a>, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/12/08/no-justice-victims-forced-disappearances-uganda">abduction</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/22/uganda-hundreds-disappeared-tortured">unlawful detention</a>. They have been <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/9/3/bobi-wine-recounts-torture-by-ugandan-soldiers">tortured</a> and some have been <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/08/uganda-investigate-death-of-opposition-politicians-driver/">killed</a>.</p>
<p>Given this history, it’s not surprising that the Kyagulanyi-led opposition party, the National Unity Platform, has been at the centre of calls for justice. </p>
<p>Over the last month, the party has spearheaded a boycott of parliament in protest of the Museveni regime’s worsening human rights violations. The opposition has demanded that the state take <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/opposition-storm-out-of-parliament-for-third-time-4407578">full accountability</a> for the November 2020 killings and inform Ugandans of the whereabouts of those who remain missing.</p>
<p>With just a little over two years to the next presidential election in 2026, I trace the fallout from the November 2020 massacre to highlight its implications for both the Museveni regime and the Kyagulanyi-led opposition. </p>
<h2>Calls for accountability</h2>
<p>The initial impetus for a parliamentary boycott came on Uganda’s independence day on 9 October 2023. This followed security officers <a href="https://www.independent.co.ug/opposition-to-boycott-plenary-sittings-over-security-raid-of-nup-offices/">storming</a> the National Unity Platform’s headquarters. They broke up a prayer meeting of party leaders and families whose loved ones have either died or been disappeared. In the raid, <a href="https://www.newvision.co.ug/category/news/police-release-14-nup-members-arrested-on-ind-NV_172254">14 people</a> were arrested.</p>
<p>In addition to the boycott, the National Unity Platform has released a list of <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/3-years-on-still-no-closure-for-nov-protests-victims-families-4430210">20 Ugandans</a> who have been disappeared, 19 of them since the November 2020 protests. The party routinely posts briefs of the missing on its social media platforms in commemoration of what it calls “<a href="https://twitter.com/NUP_Ug/status/1724043617709298076?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Etweet">Black November</a>”. </p>
<p>The Museveni regime hasn’t budged. However, this pressure has led to some action. According to the leader of the opposition in parliament, Mathias Mpuuga, the human rights commission has <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/opposition-sticks-to-parliament-boycott-as-balaalo-issue-festers-4426386">started to re-contact</a> the families of the missing to get statements.</p>
<h2>International repercussions</h2>
<p>The 2020 killings and subsequent arrests and disappearances have had recent international repercussions. At the end of October 2023, for example, US president Joe Biden announced his intention to end Uganda’s participation in the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/us-end-participation-gabon-niger-uganda-central-african-republic-trade-program-2023-10-30/">African Growth and Opportunity Act (Agoa)</a> trade programme. Agoa gives exports from qualifying African countries duty-free access to the US market. </p>
<p>In justifying this decision, the White House pointed to the Museveni regime’s “<a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2023/10/30/letters-to-the-speaker-of-the-house-and-president-of-the-senate-on-intent-to-terminate-the-designation-of-the-central-african-republic-the-gabonese-republic-niger-and-the-republic-of-uganda-as-bene/">gross violations of internationally recognised human rights</a>”.</p>
<p>This official censure was additionally inspired by Uganda’s recently passed <a href="https://www.parliament.go.ug/sites/default/files/The%20Anti-Homosexuality%20Act%2C%202023.pdf">anti-homosexuality law</a>. The White House branded it in May 2023 “<a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/05/29/statement-from-president-joe-biden-on-the-enactment-of-ugandas-anti-homosexuality-act/">a tragic violation of universal human rights</a>”. </p>
<p>There had also been <a href="https://twitter.com/AsstSecStateAF/status/1342277259374321664?s=20">earlier warnings</a> from the US Bureau of African Affairs amid rising levels of state repression during the 2021 election campaign. The bureau said </p>
<blockquote>
<p>there will be consequences for those who are continuing to undermine democracy (in Uganda).</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Museveni is considered one of the United States’ <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2021/01/museveni-and-the-west-relationship-status-its-complicated/">closest and most reliable military allies</a> in Africa. He has been a “<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24522050">donor darling</a>” of the west for decades. In a New York Times op-ed in 2020, Kyagulanyi labelled Museveni “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/29/opinion/uganda-museveni-repression.html">America’s Favorite African Strongman</a>”. </p>
<p>Indeed, despite the Museveni regime’s worsening human rights record, the US has provided Uganda with <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-uganda/">hundreds of millions of dollars</a> in development and military aid. This has helped fund the Museveni state’s <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/how-america-has-funded-updf-4371002">robust militarisation</a>.</p>
<p>Time will tell if the Biden administration’s Agoa decision is anything more than a slap on the wrist. There are <a href="https://theintercept.com/2023/06/29/uganda-lgbtq-law-us-military-aid/#:%7E:text=The%20Defense%20Department%20has%20spent,be%20doled%20out%20this%20year.">certainly reasons to be sceptical</a> that it is. But given that Uganda currently trades approximately <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/us-to-remove-uganda-from-agoa-trade-deal-4419004">US$200 million</a> in exported goods to the US annually, the decision will have real economic impact.</p>
<h2>The Museveni succession</h2>
<p>So where does all this leave Kyagulanyi’s party, with just over two years until the country’s next presidential election? </p>
<p>Political rumours about a possible <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/08/30/uganda-president-museveni-kainerugaba-succession-crisis-political-dynasty/">Museveni succession</a> are rife. Some suggest that <a href="https://theconversation.com/musevenis-first-son-muhoozi-clear-signals-of-a-succession-plan-in-uganda-181863">his son</a> is being groomed to be his political heir. </p>
<p>Despite the Ugandan president <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/oped/commentary/museveni-must-be-older-than-75-years-1916126">“officially” turning 80 next year</a>, opposing him presents the opposition with familiar obstacles.</p>
<p>First, they must contend with unceasing state repression. In September 2023, for instance, Kyagulanyi was received warmly <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/bobi-wine-in-rallies-to-activate-support-4355788">by massive crowds</a> during his tour of Uganda to drum up grassroots support. This campaign, however, was cut short by the government, which accused him of using the rallies to “<a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/uganda-police-ban-bobi-wine-mobilisation-activities-4368488">incite violence (and) promote sectarianism</a>”.</p>
<p>Second, since securing a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/16/ugandas-museveni-declared-winner-of-presidential-election">sixth consecutive victory</a> in elections in 2021, Museveni’s government has <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/museveni-appoints-mao-justice-minister-3887380">co-opted, infiltrated and divided</a> the country’s fragmented opposition. </p>
<p>The country’s second-largest opposition party, the Forum for Democratic Change, for instance, has been mired in <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2023/10/autumn-of-an-african-patriarch/">a political scandal</a>. It’s been alleged that some of its top leadership accepted campaign funds from Museveni to foil a possible electoral alliance with the National Unity Platform in 2021. Kyagulanyi recently conceded that his party isn’t “<a href="https://www.newvision.co.ug/category/politics/nup-is-not-safe-from-museveni-says-kyagulanyi-NV_168302">really safe from Museveni’s infiltration</a>”.</p>
<p>Finally, Museveni’s grip over Uganda’s military <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-ugandan-state-outsources-the-use-of-violence-to-stay-in-power-180447">remains strong</a>. This means that any transfer of power through electoral means from Museveni to a Kyagulanyi-led opposition seems unlikely – regardless of how Ugandans actually vote in 2026. Indeed, Kyagulanyi has <a href="https://kenopalo.substack.com/p/the-museveni-succession?r=1xc3o9&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web">little connection</a> to Uganda’s powerful military establishment.</p>
<p>All this suggests that as Ugandans memorialise a tragic part of their recent past, their post-Museveni political future remains deeply uncertain.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217847/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Luke Melchiorre does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>State security agents violently quashed protests following the 2020 arrest of musician-turned-politician Bobi Wine.Luke Melchiorre, Associate Professor, Political Science and Global Studies, Universidad de los Andes Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2116352023-11-07T12:07:59Z2023-11-07T12:07:59ZWorld Bank suspension of Uganda funds over anti-homosexuality law: what this says about the struggle over funds and sovereignty<p>The World Bank issued a <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/statement/2023/08/08/world-bank-group-statement-on-uganda">statement</a> on 8 August 2023, announcing that it had effectively suspended all new public financing to Uganda over concerns with the country’s <a href="https://www.parliament.go.ug/news/6737/president-assents-anti-homosexuality-act">anti-homosexuality law</a>, which “fundamentally contradicts the World Bank Group’s values”. </p>
<p>According to Human Rights Watch, the anti-homosexuality act <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/05/30/ugandas-president-signs-repressive-anti-lgbt-law">violates multiple fundamental rights</a> guaranteed under Uganda’s constitution and a number of international human rights agreements which the government of Uganda has signed. The act was first proposed in March 2023, and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/02/uganda-parliament-passes-anti-lgbtq-bill">adopted</a> by the Ugandan parliament in early May. </p>
<p>The World Bank, and the diplomatic and donor community writ large, follow closely what happens in Ugandan politics.</p>
<p>It took three months for the bank to react and issue the statement. This was fairly fast. The World Bank is usually a slow mover because of its due diligence bureaucracy. It takes time to have <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/leadership">members</a> on board behind political statements. So, because it took only three months, one could argue there was an internal push from central people or member states. This says something about the bank’s ambiguous relationship to its client states’ domestic politics and how it deals with political concerns.</p>
<p>The World Bank has an apolitical mandate. Article IV (section 10) of the Bank’s <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/articles-of-agreement/ibrd-articles-of-agreement/article-IV">articles of agreement</a> says</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member or members concerned.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>On the other hand, its <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/who-we-are">mission statement</a> “to end extreme poverty and promote prosperity in a sustainable way” is not only political but requires political action.</p>
<p>As a social anthropologist, I have <a href="https://scholar.google.co.uk/citations?user=vQqMFWQAAAAJ&hl=en">researched</a> international aid in eastern Africa and particularly followed the relationship between the World Bank and Uganda since 2006.</p>
<p>The World Bank’s engagement with Uganda has always <a href="https://www.berghahnbooks.com/title/SandeLieDevelopmentality">filtered through</a> into the country’s domestic affairs. In my view, the recent suspension of funding over the anti-homosexuality law was in keeping with that tradition. The previous interventions in domestic issues involved presidential term limits, market reforms and governance reforms.</p>
<p>I believe the interventions should be viewed in the context of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2015.1024435">informal and indirect</a> means through which the World Bank seeks to control its clients. Despite its insistence on national ownership of its projects, the World Bank uses its lending portfolio to govern and control its clients. </p>
<h2>Presidential term limits</h2>
<p>In 2005/6, the World Bank <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/uganda/world-bank-intends-cut-aid-uganda-report">cut its loans</a> to Uganda by 10% due to technical issues referred to as “prior actions” which the government had failed to implement before signing the loan agreement, causing expenditure overruns in the public administration budget. The real reason for cutting aid, in my opinion, was politics. The World Bank was frustrated when President Yoweri Museveni <a href="https://observer.ug/component/content/article?id=18710:how-term-limits-were-kicked-out-in-2005">lifted</a> the presidential term limit to seek re-election again. </p>
<p>The recent reaction to the anti-homosexuality act thus demonstrates a continuity in how the World Bank responds to domestic political affairs. It also shows a change, as the reaction is not rooted in politics or concealed as a form of techno-bureaucracy, but explicitly linked to values. The tone is different. The World Bank always sought to appear neutral on values. It suggests to me that the institution’s most prominent owners and shareholders have weighed in.</p>
<h2>Market reforms</h2>
<p>During the structural adjustment era, lasting until around 2000, World Bank loans to Uganda and other recipients came with strict conditions and ready-made policies baked into them. The bank could make loans conditional on the recipient state privatising state-owned enterprises or liberalising the economy. Those are highly political and ideological measures in the client state’s sovereign domain. For instance, Museveni bought into a lot of the structural reform programmes which included <a href="https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/718281468317110673/uganda-policy-participation-people">market reforms</a> and <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/964971555504602614/pdf/Learning-from-Power-Sector-Reform-The-Case-of-Uganda.pdf">power sector development</a>. This is in contrast to Ethiopia, which until very recently has been considered more resistant to World Bank proposed reforms.</p>
<p>A later disbursement tactic was to make concessional lending contingent on the government making its own national poverty reduction strategy. Once that was endorsed by the bank, the bank would provide financial assistance to help the government implement its own strategy. This bypassed questions about external governance and policy imposition.</p>
<h2>Governance reforms</h2>
<p>As the World Bank withdrew from direct control, it aimed to retain power through other means – while respecting national ownership. Whatever is proposed by aid recipients still needs the bank’s endorsement to become effective.</p>
<p>The World Bank’s power and control don’t just lie in the ability to decide what to fund and when to stop funding. It is just as much a result of the bank’s ability to frame partnership and the conditions under which the recipient exercises the freedom it has been granted. </p>
<p>One of these freedoms concerns the formulation of national development policy. National policy needs the bank’s approval to become effective. So the client government should do as the bank wants it to do, but voluntarily.</p>
<p>The bank can govern at a distance. The policies funded by the bank are defined as the state’s own polices. </p>
<p>The World Bank, and indeed donors in general, always emphasise the principle of national ownership, even as their policies undermine it. This gives donors the advantage of placing the responsibility for failure on their clients if aid programmes do not succeed. And indirect governance structures imply that client governments appear both as objects to be shaped by donor policies and as subjects with whom agreements are made.</p>
<h2>What next</h2>
<p>How the World Bank governs and relates to its clients (not just in Uganda) has changed over time, from direct power and policy imposition to more indirect and tacit dynamics concealed as mutual partnership.</p>
<p>The fact that the Ugandan government went on to adopt the anti-homosexuality bill, despite the bank’s indirect governance and technocratic micromanagement, can thus be read as a failure of the partnership arrangement and the bank’s ability to govern at a distance.</p>
<p>Nor did lobbying and arm-twisting by international donors, the US and the EU among others, persuade the government to kill the bill.</p>
<p>More actors and emerging economies are becoming increasingly active as sources of financing, such as China, the Gulf states, Russia, and private actors. These are potentially replacing traditional western donors, marking a shift to more geopolitical rivalry on the African continent. But few lunches are free, and the new, emerging actors pose new conditions and expectations. The World Bank, given its commitment to transparency and democracy, may after all be preferable.</p>
<p>A return to more direct, conditionality-based governance, as practised during the structural adjustment era, could be a way to deal with values, but could jeopardise national ownership and mutual partnership.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211635/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jon Harald Sande Lie receives funding from the Research Council of Norway for the research project 'Public-Private Development Interfaces in Ethiopia' (grant no. 315356). </span></em></p>The World Bank’s funding freeze reflects a shift from policy imposition to indirect ways of controlling client nations.Jon Harald Sande Lie, Research Professor, Norwegian Institute of International AffairsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2127092023-09-17T05:37:21Z2023-09-17T05:37:21ZYoweri Museveni: ageing Uganda president rides on the memory of his past heroics<p>President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni – Africa’s fourth-longest-serving head of state in 2023 – has cemented his place in history. He brought an end to two tyrannies: in 1979 his militia helped to oust Idi Amin’s famously bloody regime; and in the 1980s his army won a guerrilla campaign against the brutal government of Milton Obote. When his men <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1986/01/30/world/rebel-sworn-in-as-uganda-president.html">marched into Kampala</a> in 1986, Museveni became the first leader of a popular insurrection to oust a sitting African government. </p>
<p>In recent years, media and public attention has focused on Museveni’s rough handling of political opponents and the deterioration of human rights under his watch. A <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/jul/12/uganda-president-son-yoweri-museveni-muhoozi-kainerugaba-accused-sponsoring-violence-icc">petition</a> before the International Criminal Court accuses him of sponsoring violence and abusing critics. Leading dissidents <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/jul/04/my-children-ask-what-happened-to-me-ugandan-author-kakwenza-rukirabashaija-on-torture-exile-and-why-he-keeps-fighting">bear the scars of abuse</a> inflicted by agents of the state.</p>
<p>For many Ugandans, however, Museveni remains essential. The president’s <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2023.2236848">claim to power</a> rests in large part on history, on the hold with which the country’s dark past grips the citizens of the present. The inhumanity of the 1970s and early 1980s – the casual and unpredictable <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/africa/article/government-work-in-idi-amins-uganda/E50AE1D0990CE0E8657A78DFE0C4CE43#article">brutality</a> of Amin’s government, the <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/afr590421985en.pdf">mass killings</a> of Obote’s regime – have passed out of the living memory of most Ugandans. Museveni’s government has had to create routines and institutions that remind Ugandans of their recent history. Keeping the politically instructive memory of the dark past vividly alive has been his enduring achievement.</p>
<h2>The politics of salvation</h2>
<p>Yoweri Museveni was born in 1944 in Ankole, an ancestral kingdom in south-western Uganda. His father was a member of the clan of noblemen; his mother was a born-again Christian, a <a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/Sowing_the_Mustard_Seed/et_SDwAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1">convert of the East African Revival</a>. Revivalists were renowned for <a href="https://derekrpetersondotcom.files.wordpress.com/2021/12/global-anglicanism-peterson-revival-ms.pdf">their loud professions of rectitude</a> and for their wilful disobedience towards traditional authorities. </p>
<p>By 1966 Museveni had broken with the Revival. At the University of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania he spent time in the company of Mozambican revolutionaries and toured the zones they had liberated from Portuguese control.</p>
<p>It was in politics, not religion, that the young Museveni sought to author other people’s salvation. He first came to diplomats’ notice in January 1973, when the American embassy in Nairobi received <a href="https://twitter.com/Unseen_Archive/status/1696709580518989980">a five-page manifesto</a> from the “Front for National Salvation”, called Fronasa. In it the young Museveni blamed Ugandan dictator Idi Amin – who had come to power in 1971 – for “stupid government, falling trade, rising prices” and the killing of at least 83,000 people. Fronasa’s objective was a “mass armed struggle”. </p>
<p>Within a few weeks Fronasa’s hideout in eastern Uganda had been raided by Amin’s soldiers. For years thereafter Museveni was to live in Tanzania, working as a teacher in a government school while financing Fronasa’s activities from his modest salary.</p>
<p>That is one of the themes of Museveni’s early political career: the distance between the lofty goals which he set out to achieve and the scarcity of the means with which he worked. </p>
<h2>The ‘black Che Guevara’</h2>
<p>In 1978 Museveni and a small band of militiamen joined the Tanzanian army as it invaded Uganda. By the time the Amin regime collapsed in April 1979, Museveni had 9,000 volunteers under his command. Many were from his home territory in the south-west.</p>
<p>His success as a recruiter earned Museveni a position of importance – minister of defence – in the fragile new government that took power in Kampala after Amin’s ouster. The British diplomat who worked closely with him <a href="https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C11527430">thought Museveni to be</a> a “tall, spare, intense man”, the “most effective member of the present Uganda government”. </p>
<p>In December 1980 Ugandans went to the polls to vote in a new government. It was the first election in Uganda since independence in 1962. Museveni stood for the presidency as the leader of a new party, called the Uganda Patriotic Movement. But it was Milton Obote – who had been ousted by General Amin in 1971 – who won the election and returned to the presidency. </p>
<p>Convinced that Obote’s new government would wreck Uganda, Museveni mobilised his followers and <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3876207?seq=1">launched a struggle</a> to oust his regime from power. There followed a long guerrilla war, fought between Museveni’s band of militants and the brutal, incompetent military of Obote’s government. Museveni’s militia called themselves the National Resistance Army. </p>
<p>At the outset they numbered 41 men, and had 27 guns between them. Nonetheless, they were convinced that they had the high ground. <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2016.1272297?scroll=top&needAccess=true&role=tab/">In a 1981 tract</a> Museveni argued that Obote was creating an </p>
<blockquote>
<p>enclave economy [with] night-clubs, neon lights, tourist hotels or shiny office blocks … surrounded by a sea of backwardness. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>It was revolutionaries’ role, in his view, to “revive the moral standards that had once characterised Uganda”. Museveni promised to create a “Directorate of Moral Guidance” that would “promote a general revival of values in society”. He insisted on a careful discipline among his cadres: his soldiers were to pay for food they received from peasant farmers; and soldiers’ rectitude about alcohol and other indulgences was widely admired.</p>
<p>Obote’s government waged a war of extermination against Museveni’s supporters, especially in Luweero, the region just to the north of Kampala which was the National Resistance Army’s base. A British journalist embedded with Museveni’s group reported that government soldiers had murdered thousands of innocent civilians. He compared Obote’s regime to Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge. Amnesty International <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/afr590421985en.pdf">published a report in 1985</a> describing state-sponsored murder, torture and other abuses of human rights. </p>
<p>Obote was overthrown in 1985 by his own generals. In January 1986 National Resistance Army militiamen marched into Kampala and formed a new government, with Museveni as president. Commentators sometimes referred to Museveni as the “<a href="https://www.newspapers.com/image/257801107/?terms=museveni%20che%20guevara&match=1">black Che Guevara</a>”.</p>
<h2>Commemorating the Bush War</h2>
<p>The awful violence of the Bush War, as it is called, made Museveni’s new government seem essential. After Museveni came to power his government set out to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2017.1288959">commemorate the events of their revolution</a>. The remains of people who had been killed by Obote’s army were put on display, and the skulls were lined up neatly for viewers to appraise. </p>
<p>Today the memory of the Bush War remains a key part of the liturgy of public life. Every 9 June government celebrates <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/all-set-for-heroes-day-celebrations-govt-4262360">Heroes Day</a>, marking the day when a group of Museveni’s comrades were executed by Obote’s malign government. Museveni periodically <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/04/yoweri-museveni-begins-six-day-trek-through-uganda-jungle">tours Luweero</a>, where the Bush War was largely fought. In September this year he <a href="https://twitter.com/KagutaMuseveni/status/1700259640989094277">celebrated his 79th birthday at Katonga</a>, scene of a key battle of the Bush War. His daughter, the film-maker Natasha Karugire, recently released <a href="https://www.youtube.com/@isaiah60films">an eight-part movie</a> documenting Museveni’s rise to power. There is a <a href="https://twitter.com/NRAArchives">new book</a>, too, produced by Museveni’s admirers. It is entitled The Titanic Story of The People’s Protracted War in Uganda. </p>
<p>In 1996 the country’s political system was opened up, and since then Museveni has won national elections six times: in 1996, when he defeated Paulo Ssemogerere; in 2001, 2006, 2011 and 2016, when he defeated the medical doctor Kiiza Besigye; and in 2021, when he defeated the young musician Bobi Wine (Robert Kyagulanyi Ssentamu), winning 59% of the vote. </p>
<p>All were marred by intimidation and by accusations of electoral malpractice. In 2021 government banned Bobi Wine’s rallies, using the COVID pandemic to justify the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2023.2235661">suppression of political opposition</a>. </p>
<p>Today, more than at any time in history, the memory of the old heroism grows dim. More than three quarters of Uganda’s population has been born since 1986, when Museveni came to power. Most of the 41 comrades who launched the Bush War have <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/museveni-s-childhood-friend-goes-to-rest-1537066">died or retired</a>. The president’s son, Muhoozi, is increasingly prominent in public life, and there is <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/08/30/uganda-president-museveni-kainerugaba-succession-crisis-political-dynasty/?tpcc=recirc_latest062921">talk</a> that in the next election he will succeed his father as candidate for the presidency.</p>
<p>And yet, as the electoral results suggest, the founding story of Museveni’s government remains persuasive for a great many people. During the COVID pandemic he <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/10/africa/uganda-president-work-out-video-intl-scli/index.html">made an exercise video</a>, sweating out 30 push-ups for the camera while instructing his viewers on the virtues of clean living. Here the “black Che Guevara” could be seen again: physically vigorous, full of direction for his people.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212709/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Derek R. Peterson receives funding from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, and the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation. </span></em></p>The founding story of Museveni’s government remains persuasive for a great many people 37 years later.Derek R. Peterson, Professor of History and African Studies, University of MichiganLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2072602023-06-18T11:21:19Z2023-06-18T11:21:19ZUgandan church waged rebellion against tradition – today’s homophobic views are at odds with history<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531688/original/file-20230613-27-c44ezs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A view of an evangelical and pentecostal church in Kampala, Uganda.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Franco Origlia/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On 26 May Uganda’s president, Yoweri Museveni, assented to the “anti-homosexuality bill” of 2023. The bill’s <a href="https://www.theelephant.info/documents/uganda-the-anti-homosexuality-bill-202/">aim</a> is to protect the “cherished culture of the people of Uganda, (and the) legal, religious, and traditional family values of Ugandans”. In the name of family values the law punishes “serial offenders” with the death penalty. </p>
<p>The Church of Uganda’s archbishop, Stephen Kaziimba, has supported the bill, and when it was signed he <a href="https://churchofuganda.org/blog/2023/05/29/church-of-uganda-grateful-for-anti-homosexuality-act-2023/">expressed</a> his church’s gratitude to the president. Anita Among, the speaker of parliament, <a href="https://twitter.com/AnitahAmong/status/1663126484435845120">celebrated</a> the new law’s defence of “the sanctity of the family”.</p>
<p>But since when have Ugandan Christians sought to uphold the “sanctity of the family”? These are buzzwords drawn from <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/19/africa-uganda-evangelicals-homophobia-antigay-bill/">America’s culture wars</a>. They are not part of the Church of Uganda’s history. Church history in eastern Africa is full of dissident, rebellious, un-traditional Christians.</p>
<p>I’m a historian, a loyal member of the Episcopal Church (USA), and the author of a <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/ethnic-patriotism-and-the-east-african-revival/51B9688E6A04114F77E5F6F72947FFF7">book</a> about the history of east Africa’s evangelical Christianity. The ancestors of today’s Christians in Uganda were not obedient to their fathers’ and mothers’ definitions of proper conduct. Neither were their families narrowly organised within the cloisters of heterosexual marriage. </p>
<p>To the contrary. Ugandan Christians today are heirs to an anti-establishment history of resistance to cultural orthodoxy.</p>
<h2>The east African revival</h2>
<p>The formative influence on Uganda’s Protestant church is the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/ethnic-patriotism-and-the-east-african-revival/51B9688E6A04114F77E5F6F72947FFF7">east African revival</a>, a conversion movement that began in northern Rwanda and southern Uganda in 1936 and spread through Kenya, Tanganyika, Sudan and other parts of eastern Africa. </p>
<p>The revival was led by African evangelists, many of them women. They burned their fathers’ shrines, destroyed the equipment of diviners, and flouted traditional standards of decorum. One of southern Uganda’s most emphatic revivalists was a young woman named Julaina Mufuko. She <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/11326/chapter/159952348">told me</a> how, in the revival’s early days, she and other converts would sometimes see flames licking the tops of the hills, or the sun in the heavens shaking. And then, she remembered, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>we used to shake, and there would be jumping and falling on the ground, and from that time we started cutting off the ornaments we used to wear, and we poured out the beer we were keeping at homes, and at night we went into churches, and we made a lot of noise, both men and women.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Paulo Ngologoza, the leading chief in the highlands of southern Uganda, put Mufuko and three other girls in prison, <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/11326/chapter/159952348">complaining</a> that “everyone has been caught into this salvation, and women are disobeying husbands, and husbands are complaining everywhere”. She tearfully told me how she and her friends were whipped on six occasions. “They would beat me during the night, and that morning, I would be on top of the mountain, preaching,” she remembered. “The Lord was forcing us to go and speak, speak, speak!” </p>
<p>Converts were not respecters of traditional authority. Not even Chief Karegyesa – ruler of the Rujumbura kingdom – could force converts to accept his power. During the late 1930s several of Karegyesa’s lovers converted, <a href="https://www.proquest.com/openview/552563350a907c6d4056089918bf46db/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=18750&diss=y">confessing</a> in public to their liaisons with the chief. Karegyesa <a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/Ethnic_Patriotism_and_the_East_African_R/21MhAwAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=karegyesa+rujumbura&pg=PA67&printsec=frontcover">warned</a> his nephew: “This new kind of religion is dangerous. It invades your privacy. You have nothing left.”</p>
<p>Revivalists spoke openly about subjects that important men sought to keep secret. Julaina Mufuko described how female converts would “confess in public, right in front of the men they had committed adultery with!” Snapping her fingers to the rhythm of her words, Julaina <a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_East_African_Revival/3OrOCwAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=julaina+mufuko&pg=PT128&printsec=frontcover">described</a> how the “Holy Spirit would show you spontaneously, say this, say this, say this!”</p>
<h2>Counter-cultural beliefs</h2>
<p>Revivalists would <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-african-history/article/abs/wordy-women-gender-trouble-and-the-oral-politics-of-the-east-african-revival-in-northern-gikuyuland/848A97459A6E6E3D91870CD3EA00D932#article">not abide</a> by traditional standards of decorum and respectability. Neither did they live within the enclosures of family and kinship. Revivalists distanced themselves from their families, rejecting their kin and refusing to honour their ancestors. </p>
<p>Converts in western Kenya refused to lend clothing to non-converts. Neither would they lend cups or plates. They refused to take part in funerals, brushing off their obligations with the saying “Let the dead bury their own dead”. Elderly converts organised marriages for their youthful colleagues. In southern Uganda, converts were <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/ethnic-patriotism-and-the-east-african-revival/religious-movements-in-southern-uganda/79A1FAA8A5C47928F030BCE26DFA774E">known as</a> Abatarukukwatanisa, “Those who do not cooperate”.</p>
<p>All over eastern Africa, government officials and cultural leaders mobilised to suppress this dissident Christianity. In southern Uganda, the District Commissioner banned drum-beating in churches and made singing on the roadways illegal. By 1943 police in Uganda were convinced that revivalists posed a <a href="https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C8978440">threat</a> to government. Officials worried that the converts were “openly attacking persons in authority in the established church, and the next step may easily be against the authority of the state”. </p>
<p>In the end it was the political disasters of the 1960s and 1970s that undermined revivalist Christianity. <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/646481/the-unseen-archive-of-idi-amin-by-derek-peterson-richard-vokes/">Idi Amin’s</a> disastrous regime brought about the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people. Revivalists were among the many who suffered and died, most famously the Janani Luwum, archbishop of the Church of Uganda. In the wake of Amin’s fall in 1979 a new generation had to plot a path forward. </p>
<h2>Why this matters today</h2>
<p>Yoweri Museveni is the son of a revivalist, and as a schoolboy he <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2016.1272297">converted</a>. Since he came to power in 1986 Museveni has brought his government into an alliance with the Protestant church. There is a <a href="https://www.dei.go.ug/about-us.html">Directorate of Ethics and Integrity</a> within the Uganda government, whose task it is to “(rebuild) ethics and integrity in the society”. Formerly revivalists had authored their own accounts of their sin. Today, Museveni uses the power of government to author other people’s <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2014.987509">salvation</a>.</p>
<p>There is a more radical history for Uganda’s Christians to remember and celebrate. Revivalists were never unthinkingly obedient to political leaders’ authority. They built community outside the bonds of kinship and heterosexual marriage, pushing away the claims of relatives and creating new solidarities.</p>
<p>This history of Christian nonconformism should lead church leaders to look with sympathy on gay Ugandans’ situation today. Like the revivalists, gay Ugandans know that the certainties of tradition are disguises for inequity and injustice. Like the revivalists, gay Ugandans are pushing out the borders of family life and making new relationships thinkable.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207260/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Derek R. Peterson receives funding from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and the Andrew Mellon Foundation. </span></em></p>The history of Christian nonconformism should lead church leaders to look with sympathy on gay Ugandans’ situation today.Derek R. Peterson, Professor of History and African Studies, University of MichiganLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2023762023-03-28T09:48:33Z2023-03-28T09:48:33ZUganda’s new anti-LGBTQ+ law could lead to death penalty for same-sex ‘offences’<p>People in same-sex relationships in Uganda now face the possibility of life in prison after the country’s parliament <a href="https://www.parliament.go.ug/news/6544/tough-penalties-engaging-acts-homosexuality">unanimously</a> passed its 2023 anti-homosexuality bill. The legislation, which Amnesty International <a href="https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/uganda-appalling-anti-lgbti-law-must-be-repealed-immediately">has called</a> “appalling”, “ambiguous” and “vaguely worded”, establishes a range of harsh penalties for same-sex “offences” – including the death penalty for “aggravated homosexuality”. </p>
<p>The text of the bill says the law is intended to “protect the traditional family” by not only criminalising same-sex acts themselves but also “the promotion or recognition of sexual relations between persons of the same sex”. If assented to by Uganda’s president, Yoweri Museveni, the law would also make it a duty of a gay person’s family and community to report individuals in same-sex relationships to the authorities.</p>
<p>It’s a significant blow to the LGBTQ+ community in Uganda, which fought to overturn the <a href="https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/530c4bc64.pdf">Anti-Homosexuality Act of 2014</a> that already contained draconian provisions, including life imprisonment for same-sex acts. Just five months after Museveni assented to the 2014 act, Uganda’s constitutional court <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-28605400">overturned it</a>, not due to public outcry, but on procedural grounds. </p>
<p>Human Rights Watch said the passage of the law opened the floodgates for <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/14/uganda-anti-homosexuality-acts-heavy-toll">persecution of sexual minorities</a>. HRW <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/03/09/uganda-new-anti-gay-bill-further-threatens-rights">has described</a> the current law as a “more egregious version” of the 2014 act and expressed concern that it “criminalises people simply for being who they are”.</p>
<p>The 2023 bill was introduced into a climate that already criminalised consensual same-sex acts, which it referred to as “unnatural offences” under Uganda’s <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/59ca2bf44.html">penal code</a>. </p>
<p>Aspects of the the 2023 bill seem to be an unnecessary duplication of the penal code. However parliament considers its passage necessary to address legislative gaps and “place emphasis on emerging matters” that are not contained in the criminal law. For example, criminalising the procurement, promotion and dissemination of literature relating to homosexuality.</p>
<p>Uganda’s constitution already prohibits <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2005/07/12/uganda-same-sex-marriage-ban-deepens-repression">same-sex marriage</a> and the <a href="https://africanlii.org/content/non-governmental-organisations-act-2016-act-5-2016-0#">Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) Act of 2016</a> in effect prevents the registration of organisations involved in promoting LGBTQ+ rights. This prevents civil society organisations from advocating for the rights and welfare of sexual minorities.</p>
<p>This was the case for Sexual Minorities Uganda, the country’s leading sexual minority rights organisation, which was <a href="https://www.ngobureau.go.ug/en/news-and-notices/statement-on-halting-the-operations-of-sexual-minorities-uganda">denied registration</a> as the proposed name was deemed “undesirable”. The group was subsequently <a href="https://rfkhumanrights.org/press/international-organizations-condemn-the-shutdown-of-ugandan-organization-sexual-minorities-uganda-smug-call-for-authorities-to-reverse-the-decision-immediately">forced to close</a>. </p>
<h2>Discrimination and intolerance</h2>
<p>The criminalisation of homosexuality has led to discrimination and marginalisation from employment, health and other services. Sexual minorities are ostracised from their communities and threatened with or experience homophobic attacks. </p>
<p>Non-partisan, pan-African research network <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/migrated/files/publications/Dispatches/ab_r7_dispatchno362_pap17_tolerance_in_africa_2.pdf">Afrobarometer</a> reported a 2020 survey which found that only 3% of Ugandans were tolerant of people with a different sexual orientation or identity.</p>
<p>Opponents of the anti-homosexuality bill argue it is in direct contravention of the <a href="https://www.parliament.go.ug/documents/1240/constitution">Bill of Rights</a> in the country’s constitution. This guarantees and protects a number of rights and freedoms applicable to all citizens. These include, but are not limited to, the right to privacy, freedom from inhuman and degrading treatment and protection against discrimination.</p>
<p>But article 43 of Uganda’s constitution also states that the enjoyment of rights and freedoms is <a href="https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/44038/90491/F206329993/UGA44038.pdf">subject to limitation</a> if that limitation is seen to be in the public interest and “acceptable and demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society”. The public interest here is the protection of moral values and the traditional heterosexual family.</p>
<p>In her submission to the legal and parliamentary affairs committee, prominent human rights activist and academic <a href="https://www.kuchutimes.com/2023/03/prof-sylvia-tamales-submission-to-the-legal-and-parliamentary-affairs-committee/">Dr Sylvia Tamale</a> wrote that same-sex relations have always existed in African societies without persecution and have tended to be treated as a private matter. To criminalise them is to transform them into a matter of public concern and introduce “sexual apartheid”, she added.</p>
<p>Like the 2014 act, the new bill has been met with international condemnation. Uganda is a signatory to international human rights instruments such as the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights">international covenant on civil and political rights (ICCPR)</a> which enshrines the right to non-discrimination, including in private sexual relations. </p>
<p>While the ICCPR does not specify sexual orientation as a protected ground, the <a href="https://humanrights.gov.au/our-work/education/human-rights-explained-case-studies-complaints-about-australia-human-rights">United Nations Human Rights Committee</a> has found that the treaty includes an obligation to prevent discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. These obligations are not legally binding on Uganda as the constitution is the country’s supreme legal instrument.</p>
<p>Everything hinges on whether Museveni signs the bill into law. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, said: “The passing of this discriminatory bill – probably among the worst of its kind in the world – is a deeply troubling development,” and he urged Museveni not to sign it. He said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>If signed into law by the President, it will render lesbian, gay and bisexual people in Uganda criminals simply for existing, for being who they are. It could provide carte blanche for the systematic violation of nearly all of their human rights and serve to incite people against each other.</p>
</blockquote>
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<p>But, after passing the 2014 law, Museveni described homosexuals as “disgusting” and it is thought likely that he will sign the bill into law. This will legitimise anti-LGBTQ+ hatred and open up the possibility that people could even face the death penalty for committing a private, consensual sexual act. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uganda-gaybill-idUSBREA1N05S20140224">threat of losing international aid</a> was not sufficient to dissuade Museveni from assenting to the 2014 act and it is doubtful whether it will dissuade him now.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/202376/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Zanele Nyoni- Wood does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It seems likely that Uganda’s president, who has described homosexuality as ‘disgusting’ will pass this bill into law.Zanele Nyoni- Wood, Lecturer, Law School, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2003612023-03-05T14:23:59Z2023-03-05T14:23:59ZWho is Joseph Kony? The altar boy who became Africa’s most wanted man<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/512165/original/file-20230224-649-j2ktnx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Joseph Kony speaks to journalists in southern Sudan in November 2006. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Stuart Price/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/who-is-joseph-kony-the-altar-boy-who-became-africas-most-wanted-man-200361&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p>Eleven years ago, a documentary catapulted the name Joseph Kony onto the global stage. The <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2012/03/08/148235430/while-controversial-kony-2012-has-put-focus-on-atrocities">controversial film Kony 2012</a> told the story of a Ugandan warlord whose forces are <a href="https://www.denverpost.com/2013/05/20/konys-lra-has-killed-more-than-100000-un/">believed by the United Nations</a> to be responsible for the deaths of more than 100,000 people, the abduction of at least 20,000 children and the displacement of more than two million people.</p>
<p>Though most of the world hadn’t heard of Kony before then, Ugandans knew and feared him. The founder of the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/topic/international-justice/joseph-kony-lra">Lord’s Resistance Army</a> unleashed a wave of violence across northern Uganda for two decades. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/uganda/kony">In 2005</a>, the International Criminal Court brought charges of crimes against humanity against Kony and four of his top commanders. <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-hunt-may-be-off-but-a-5-million-pledge-might-bring-kony-to-justice-13234">In 2013</a> and <a href="https://cf.usembassy.gov/united-states-announces-5-million-reward-for-joseph-kony/">2021</a>, the US announced a US$5 million bounty for information leading to Kony’s capture. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/icc-upholds-jail-term-for-ugandan-rebel-commander-ongwen-why-it-matters-for-africa-196349">ICC upholds jail term for Ugandan rebel commander Ongwen - why it matters for Africa</a>
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<p>He remains at large. </p>
<p>Now the International Criminal Court wants to <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-prosecutor-international-criminal-court-karim-aa-khan-kc-request-hold-hearing">confirm the charges</a> against Kony in his absence. The hope is that this will renew international efforts to find Africa’s most wanted fugitive. </p>
<p>So, who is Joseph Kony?</p>
<h2>His early life</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Joseph-Kony">Joseph Rao Kony</a> was born in 1961 in Odek sub-county in northern Uganda. He was one of six children in the Acholi middle-class family of <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Wizard-Nile-Hunt-Africas-Wanted/dp/1846270316#:%7E:text=See%20more-,%22Wizard%20of%20the%20Nile%22%20or%20the%20hunt%20for%20Joseph%20Kony,and%20political%20instability%20in%20general">Luizi Obol and Nora Oting</a>. </p>
<p>Kony’s parents were farmers. His father was a Catholic, his mother an Anglican. Kony was an <a href="https://archive.org/details/innocentslostwhe0000brig">altar boy until 1976</a>. He dropped out of school at age 15 to become a traditional healer. </p>
<p>In 1987, aged 26, Kony founded the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/the-lords-resistance-army-violence-in-the-name-of-god/a-18136620">Lord’s Resistance Army</a>, a <a href="https://www.britannica.com/dictionary/heterodox#:%7E:text=%2F%CB%88h%C9%9Bt%C9%99r%C9%99%CB%8Cd%C9%91%CB%90ks%2F-,adjective,established%20beliefs%20or%20standards%20%3A%20unorthodox">heterodox</a> Christian fundamentalist organisation that operated in northern Uganda until 2006. </p>
<h2>Altar boy turned rebel leader</h2>
<p>Kony rose to prominence after taking over the <a href="https://observer.ug/news-headlines/14665-the-roots-of-war-how-alice-lakwena-gave-way-to-joseph-kony">Holy Spirit Movement</a>, a rebel group led by Alice Lakwena, his aunt, to topple the Ugandan government. </p>
<p>The Holy Spirit Movement was formed after Ugandan president <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1996/06/10/world/gen-tito-okello-ex-ugandan-leader-82.html">Tito Okello</a>, an <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Acholi">Acholi</a>, was overthrown by the National Resistance Army – led by <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Yoweri--Museveni">Yoweri Museveni</a> – in January 1986. The Acholis largely occupy northern Uganda. </p>
<p>Museveni’s National Resistance Army was a rebel outfit that later metamorphosed into the <a href="https://www.updf.go.ug/">Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces</a>. Today it’s the national army. </p>
<p>When it came to power, the National Resistance Army appeared to <a href="https://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?page=topic&tocid=463af2212&toid=469f2f892&publisher=&type=&coi=BDI&docid=3ae6ad345c&skip=0">deliberately target</a> the Acholi population in the north. Villagers were violently attacked by army troops and subjected to food shortages. Houses were burnt down, leading to forced displacements. The scale of these attacks was never documented or substantiated.</p>
<p>Kony joined the Holy Spirit Movement to fight for the <a href="https://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?page=topic&tocid=463af2212&toid=469f2f892&publisher=&type=&coi=BDI&docid=3ae6ad345c&skip=0">rights of the Acholi</a>. By 1987, however, army troops had <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/19/world/africa/19lakwena.html">crushed the movement</a> – Lakwena escaped into Kenya where she died in a refugee camp in 2007.</p>
<p>Kony established the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Lords-Resistance-Army">Lord’s Resistance Army</a> and proclaimed himself his people’s prophet. He soon turned against his supporters, supposedly in an effort to “purify” the Acholi and turn <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/the-deadly-cult-of-joseph-kony-1001084.html">Uganda into a theocracy</a>. </p>
<p>The rebel group carried out <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/northern-uganda-understanding-and-solving-conflict">indiscriminate killings</a>. It <a href="https://invisiblechildren.com/challenge/kony/">forcibly recruited</a> boys as soldiers and girls as sex slaves.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/in-one-of-2016s-best-books-a-former-lords-resistance-army-child-soldier-reveals-the-reason-behind-the-mayhem-70027">In one of 2016's best books, a former Lord's Resistance Army child soldier reveals the reason behind the mayhem</a>
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<p>Ideologically, the group espoused a mix of mysticism, Acholi nationalism and Christian fundamentalism. It claimed to be establishing a <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/98/390/5/32908?redirectedFrom=fulltext&login=false">theocratic state</a> based on the biblical <a href="https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Exodus%2020&version=NIV">10 commandments</a> and Acholi tradition.</p>
<p>Kony proclaimed himself the spokesperson of God. He claimed to have been visited by a multinational host of 13 spirits, including a Chinese phantom.</p>
<h2>Kony’s military offensive</h2>
<p>Kony and his rebel outfit committed a string of atrocities against civilians. The group waged war for more than two decades within Uganda – and later in the politically unstable neighbouring countries of Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Central African Republic – in an effort to topple Museveni. The actual number of militia members varied over this period, hitting a high of 3,000 soldiers in the early 2000s. </p>
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<p>After the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/September-11-attacks">11 September 2001</a> terror attacks in the US, the American government designated the Lord’s Resistance Army <a href="https://irp.fas.org/world/para/dos120601.html">a terrorist group</a>. </p>
<p>In 2005, the International Criminal Court <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/warrant-arrest-unsealed-against-five-lra-commanders">issued arrest warrants</a> for top commanders of the Lord’s Resistance Army for crimes against humanity. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2008/08/29/E8-20164/in-the-matter-of-the-designation-of-joseph-kony-as-a-specially-designated-global-terrorist-pursuant">August 2008</a>, the US declared Kony a global terrorist, a designation that carries financial and other penalties. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ugandan-rebel-joseph-kony-the-latest-us-arrest-bid-raises-questions-177578">Ugandan rebel Joseph Kony: the latest US arrest bid raises questions</a>
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<p>The Lord’s Resistance Army was eventually forced out of Uganda following the failed <a href="https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB-Uganda-Lord.PDF">Juba peace talks</a> of 2006-2008 between the group’s leadership and the Ugandan government. The talks were mediated by the government of southern Sudan. </p>
<p>Kony and his militia <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jul/30/jeevanvasagar">went into hiding</a> in the DRC. <a href="https://www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=17456">In December 2008</a>, Uganda, DRC and Sudan launched an offensive dubbed <a href="https://www.independent.co.ug/revisiting-operation-lightning-thunder/">Operation Lightning Thunder</a> to track them down. </p>
<p>Kony’s rebel group attacked Congolese civilians suspected of supporting the operation. Villagers were raped, their limbs mutilated and <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2009-01-29-un-more-than-100-killed-in-massacre-by-ugandan-rebels/">hundreds killed</a>. The group <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/07/world/africa/07congo.html?pagewanted=all">eventually splintered</a> to evade capture, with most members escaping into the Central African Republic.</p>
<p>Uganda called off the operation in March 2009, saying the Lord’s Resistance Army was at its <a href="https://www.independent.co.ug/revisiting-operation-lightning-thunder/">weakest point ever</a>.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-25036874">November 2013</a>, Central African Republic officials reported that Kony was ready to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/kony-2013-us-quietly-intensifies-effort-to-help-african-troops-capture-infamous-warlord/2013/10/28/74db9720-3cb3-11e3-b6a9-da62c264f40e_story.html">negotiate his surrender</a>. He was reported to be in poor health in Nzoka, a town in the country’s eastern region. He never showed up.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/jan/07/surrender-aide-joseph-kony-blow-lords-resistance-army">By 2017</a>, the rebel group’s membership had shrunk to an estimated 100 soldiers. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/20/world/africa/uganda-joseph-kony-lra.html">In April</a> that year, the US and Ugandan governments ended efforts to find Kony. They stated he no longer posed a significant security risk to Uganda. But he is still wanted by the International Criminal Court. </p>
<h2>Kony today</h2>
<p>Some of the fighters from the Lord’s Resistance Army took advantage of <a href="https://www.ulrc.go.ug/system/files_force/ulrc_resources/amnesty-act.pdf?download=1">Uganda’s 2000 amnesty programme</a>, which offered blanket immunity to any rebel who had taken up arms against the government since 1986. </p>
<p>Kony’s exact location, however, remains unknown. He’s thought to be hiding in <a href="https://observer.ug/news/headlines/52475-why-updf-abandoned-hunt-for-kony-in-car.html">the vast jungles</a> of the Central African Republic or in <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/is-lra-rebel-leader-joseph-kony-hiding-in-darfur/a-61478125">Sudan</a>.</p>
<p>While attempts to bring Kony to justice continue, post-conflict northern Uganda is on the <a href="https://odi.org/en/publications/the-mental-landscape-of-post-conflict-life-in-northern-uganda/">slow path</a> to economic and social recovery.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200361/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Ugandan militant remains on the run despite a US$5 million bounty on his head for war crimes committed between 1987 and 2006.Dennis Jjuuko, Doctoral Candidate, UMass BostonTonny Raymond Kirabira, Teaching Fellow, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1915252022-10-08T05:00:57Z2022-10-08T05:00:57ZUganda’s fuel smugglers: are the Opec Boys (anti-)heroes of the marginalised?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/488040/original/file-20221004-17-1onk58.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Boureima Hama/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Smuggling in the Ugandan border region of West Nile has a long and chequered history. It straddles the <a href="https://books.google.be/books?hl=en&lr=&id=FTJhFP1FK1wC&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=abraham+and+van+schendel+2005&ots=hcL7cIKofK&sig=czwJFPyXuvAh0jtOHbYq5wNGyvY#v=onepage&q=abraham%20and%20van%20schendel%202005&f=false">fine line</a> between legitimacy and legality. Governance and conflict researcher Kristof Titeca has <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2012.664703?scroll=top&needAccess=true">studied</a> smuggling in the border region <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/oa-edit/10.4324/9781003043645-11/smuggling-legitimate-activity-kristof-titeca">since 2003</a>. He explains the dynamics.</em> </p>
<h2>What’s the history of smuggling in Uganda’s West Nile region?</h2>
<p>The term smuggling often brings strongly negative connotations, and is often associated with criminality and violence. However, smugglers aren’t always associated with these negative connotations by the communities in which they are embedded.</p>
<p>The West Nile region in Uganda illustrates this dynamic. This area is located in northwestern Uganda, and borders the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and South Sudan.</p>
<p>When colonialists introduced the borders demarcating Uganda, Zaire/Congo and Sudan, this divided ethnic groups but <a href="https://www.lse.ac.uk/international-development/Assets/Documents/PDFs/csrc-working-papers-phase-two/wp63.2-changing-cross-border-trade-dynamics.pdf">didn’t stop the interaction</a> between them. Continued untaxed trade – or smuggling – was <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/africa/article/abs/regulation-crossborder-trade-and-practical-norms-in-west-nile-northwestern-uganda/DF13D59E5184A27637447D169F4D7291">considered legitimate</a>. </p>
<p>In addition, smuggling – both then and now – is viewed as a survival mechanism. </p>
<p>For example, during successive wars and rebellions affecting the region, <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/346912534_A_Historical_Perspective_on_State_Engagement_in_Informal_Trade_on_the_Uganda-Congo_Border">many people fled across borders</a>. When former Ugandan president Idi Amin (a West Niler) was ousted from power in 1979, the residents of West Nile feared revenge and fled to eastern Congo and southern Sudan. Similarly, violence in southern Sudan in the early 1990s, and in more recent times, forced many (South) Sudanese to flee to northern Uganda. Smuggling constituted an <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03056249008703848">important livelihood</a> for many during these times, and laid the basis for contemporary trading networks and practices.</p>
<p>Smuggling is also linked to people feeling marginalised or oppressed. And the West Nile region <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/uganda/refugee-law-project-working-paper-no-12-negotiating-peace-resolution-conflicts-ugandas">feels marginalised</a> by the Yoweri Museveni regime. </p>
<p>Smuggling in this border region has to be understood in this context: as a way of making ends meet despite of – and in opposition to – a regime perceived to marginalise them. Smuggling is regarded as legitimate employment. And an important form of social mobility, a rags-to-riches story present in the wider social imaginary of the population. </p>
<h2>How pervasive is smuggling in Uganda?</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.undp.org/africa/publications/borderland-policy-briefing-series-informal-cross-border-trade-along-drc-uganda-border">Data</a> from the Bank of Uganda and Uganda Bureau of Statistics shows that in 2018, Ugandan informal exports – or smuggled products – were worth US$546.6 million. For their part, smuggled imports were worth US$60 million. </p>
<p>But these numbers are an underestimation as they are based on data from official border posts, which excludes goods smuggled through <a href="https://westniletodaynews.com/122-illegal-entry-points-fuel-silent-gold-trade-along-uganda-drc-border-in-west-nile/">many unofficial smuggling routes</a>. </p>
<p>Moreover, the <a href="https://www.undp.org/africa/publications/borderland-policy-briefing-series-informal-cross-border-trade-along-drc-uganda-border">data shows</a> that for the DRC – which in 2018 accounted for almost half of Uganda’s informal trade value – informal export and import figures are almost always higher than the formal ones.</p>
<h2>What does the story of the Opec Boys tell us?</h2>
<p>The Opec Boys – a term used to refer to fuel smugglers operating in the region – are a telling illustration of the dynamics of smuggling in the West Nile.</p>
<p>In my research, I have studied the Opec Boys at <a href="https://www.cairn-int.info/journal-politique-africaine-2006-3-page-143.htm">different moments</a> in their <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2012.664703">history</a> over the last 20 years. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/oa-edit/10.4324/9781003043645-11/smuggling-legitimate-activity-kristof-titeca">Their roots</a> can be traced to the late 1970s and early 1980s. This was when much of the population of north-western Uganda fled to neighbouring DRC and Sudan after the overthrow of the Amin regime. </p>
<p>During this time, a number of exiled young men made a living from smuggling fuel. They didn’t stop doing so upon their return to Uganda. They started an organisation that came to be known as the Opec Boys. Many other young men returning to their home areas, with no education or assets, were drawn into this fuel business. </p>
<p>They would sell smuggled fuel in jerrycans on street corners in the region’s major urban centres. There was a general shortage of petrol stations in the area, and their fuel was cheaper. The Opec Boys got their smuggled fuel in different ways: some smuggled it themselves from Congo, others used “transporters” who were mostly young(er) boys on bicycles, smuggling the fuel via back roads to avoid security officials. Others bought their fuel from truck drivers, who equally smuggled their fuel into Uganda. </p>
<p>The Opec Boys were the most important supplier of fuel in the area until the late 2000s. Around this time, the increased number of fuel stations, and the changing tax regime in DRC pushed many of them out of business. While they still exist, their activities are less prominent.</p>
<h2>What did they come to represent?</h2>
<p>The Opec Boys were considered an important social-economic and political force in two major ways. </p>
<p>First, they came to constitute an important manifestation of what sociologist Asef Bayat’s calls “<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436599715055">un-civil society</a>”. This is an unconventional, uninstitutionalised form of civil society. It operates through ad hoc, direct and sporadic action through which it represents the interests of the urban informal sector. This definition applies to the Opec Boys. </p>
<p>Particularly during the 1990s and 2000s, they would – led by <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/kaku-arua-opec-boys-supremo-rabble-rouser-3942538">a charismatic leader</a> – come to the defence of actors within the urban informal sector, such as market vendors or motorcycle taxi riders. They, for example, <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/oa-edit/10.4324/9781003043645-11/smuggling-legitimate-activity-kristof-titeca">intervened</a> when urban authorities wanted to forcefully remove streetside kiosks by blocking roads and organising protests. </p>
<p>Second, in doing so, they are an illustration of historian Eric Hobsbawm’s “<a href="https://www.abebooks.com/Bandits-Revised-Edition-E.J-Hobsbawm-Pantheon/5603239895/bd">social bandits</a>”. This is through their links to the population and their composition – young, unemployed men, and (certainly in their early phase) often ex-rebels considered “<a href="https://www.abebooks.com/Bandits-Revised-Edition-E.J-Hobsbawm-Pantheon/5603239895/bd">natural material for banditry</a>”. </p>
<p>Their smuggling activities provide employment to, and absorb, a potentially dangerous group: low-skilled, landless young men. In a region with a <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/uganda/refugee-law-project-working-paper-no-12-negotiating-peace-resolution-conflicts-ugandas">history of rebel groups</a>, this is seen as an important stabilising factor, allowing for the voicing of discontent through trading activities rather than illegality. </p>
<p>For these reasons, attempts to take formal action against smuggling in the West Nile region often lead to demonstrations and riots.</p>
<p>In February 2022, for instance, <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/one-shot-dead-ura-office-torched-in-clashes-with-boda-boda-cyclists-3727616">riots erupted</a> in Koboko town. These were directed against Uganda’s tax collecting agency – the Uganda Revenue Authority. </p>
<p>Protestors set the authority’s offices on fire after tax collectors allegedly hit and injured a suspected fuel smuggler (the authority <a href="https://twitter.com/URAuganda/status/1496886523933126656?s=20&t=PMBLUpWUtHgMH8uIcZ2wkQ">denied</a> this happened). The smuggler was reportedly carrying 320 litres of fuel in sixteen 20-litre jerrycans from the DRC. During the riots, one person was shot dead and several others wounded.</p>
<p>Months earlier, the shooting of a suspected smuggler also <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/one-shot-dead-as-ura-officers-impound-numberless-motorcycles-in-arua-3557294">led to violent demonstrations</a>. </p>
<p>However, this doesn’t mean all smuggling is romanticised. Smuggling in goods such as <a href="https://ugandaradionetwork.net/story/suspected-ugandan-drug-dealer-arrested-in-congo?districtId=553">drugs</a> or <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/201008240002.html">weapons</a> is looked at very differently, and doesn’t have the same legitimacy and popular support. </p>
<p>In sum, smuggling is looked at as more than a strictly economic activity; it’s a social and political one. In local social imaginaries, it’s seen as an act of resistance, a way to fend for oneself in difficult circumstances.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191525/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kristof Titeca does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Smuggling in Uganda’s West Nile region is seen as an act of defiance – a way to make ends meet in the face of perceived state neglect.Kristof Titeca, Professor in International Development, University of AntwerpLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1888412022-08-21T09:57:03Z2022-08-21T09:57:03ZIdi Amin’s ‘economic war’ victimised Uganda’s Africans and Asians alike<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479939/original/file-20220818-1579-gxpbap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ugandan President Idi Amin gestures during a speech in 1973. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Keystone/HultonArchive/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Fifty years ago – in early August 1972 – President Idi Amin summarily decreed the expulsion of Uganda’s “Asian” (that is, Indian and Pakistani) community. Over 50,000 people were given a scant three months to tie up their affairs and leave the country. There was a <a href="https://carleton.ca/uganda-collection/">scramble to secure new homes</a> for people rendered stateless by the Amin decree. For months, European and American media carried reports that dramatised the human misery of Uganda’s Asians.</p>
<p>All the attention paid to the plight of the Asian community has made it hard to see the much wider, much more violent history of Amin’s economic programme. It was Africans, not Asians, who were the targets of this larger campaign. Amin called it the “War of Economic Independence”; later it was named the “Economic War”.</p>
<p>Over the past decade, I’ve been working with Ugandan colleagues to <a href="https://derekrpetersondotcom.files.wordpress.com/2022/05/politics-of-archives-in-uganda-.pdf">organise, catalogue and digitise</a> endangered government archives. This work has brought the political and organisational logic of Amin’s regime into view. The Economic War was fought by government officials who overhauled, all at once, whole sections of public life. It was a regulatory war, pursued by authorities who sought to control prices and supervise the conduct of business. It was a war in which a great many Ugandans were unwittingly made into enemies of state. </p>
<p>The inhumanity of the Economic War was much more widely experienced than <a href="https://www.newburytoday.co.uk/news/uganda-to-newbury-the-human-impact-from-idi-amins-1972-asi-9262962/">anniversary events</a> marking the “Asian expulsion” can acknowledge.</p>
<h2>Economic war</h2>
<p>It was supposed to be a war of liberation. In the speech that announced it, Amin <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/africa/article/government-work-in-idi-amins-uganda/E50AE1D0990CE0E8657A78DFE0C4CE43#article">hymned</a> the Economic War as:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The day of salvation for the Ugandan Africans. This is the day of the redemption of the Ugandan Africans. All Ugandans must wake up, in full and total mobilisation, determined and committed to fight this economic war until it is won. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The Economic War made some Ugandans feel as though they were living in momentous times. </p>
<p>By the end of 1972, 5,655 farms, ranches and estates had been vacated by the departed Asian community. The abandoned properties fell under the custodianship of a new bureaucracy – the Departed Asians Property Custodial Board – which allocated houses and business premises to African tenants. </p>
<p>Here, in the conduct of business, was a theatre where black Ugandans could fight for their freedom. The “days of bargaining are done”, read a headline in the Voice of Uganda. The public expected the “new shopkeeper in their town or village to be dedicated and very hard working”, a “man of integrity and honesty” (Voice of Uganda, 9 December 1972). </p>
<p>New procedures were <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/africa/article/government-work-in-idi-amins-uganda/E50AE1D0990CE0E8657A78DFE0C4CE43#article">created to superintend</a> the conduct of black-run business. Amin himself took an active interest in the matter. In the months following the expulsion of Asians, he made surprise tours of Kampala’s businesses two or three times a week. On every tour of inspection, he would <a href="https://reuters.screenocean.com/record/421636">give directions</a>: he would tell a businessman to change his method of work, rearrange the stock or keep better records.</p>
<p>In the archives of the Uganda Broadcasting Corporation, there are hundreds of photographs of Abdallah Nasur, the governor of central province. Canadian diplomats reported that he spent his time: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>making surprise visits to the various business establishments, finding them in breach of various written or unwritten government regulations, closing their business, and allocating them to new owners. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>In the <a href="https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/thousands-newly-unearthed-photographs-document-ugandans-life-under-idi-amin-180972533/">photos</a>, Nasur is always at the centre of the frame, thrusting himself into the lives and businesses of Kampala’s people. </p>
<p>In this way, petty brutality was made to look like vigour. </p>
<h2>Economic crimes</h2>
<p>Early in 1975, Amin published the Economic Crimes Decree. It established a military court called the Economic Crimes Tribunal. Its judges were empowered to punish profiteers, hoarders and others who acted against the economic interests of the state. The <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/africa/article/government-work-in-idi-amins-uganda/E50AE1D0990CE0E8657A78DFE0C4CE43#article">penalty</a> was death by firing squad or 10 years in prison.</p>
<p>By April, traders charged with selling goods in excess of established government prices were being arrested and executed. In one case, the tribunal ordered the execution of two dozen men who were found attempting to smuggle 500 bags of coffee out of the country.</p>
<p>The targets of the Economic Crimes Tribunal were people without connections: petty traders, market women, people whose financial strategies ran afoul of government edicts. The most emotionally affecting pictures in the whole photographic archive are from a series made in March 1975. The photos depict people brought before the tribunal at a military barracks. The cameraman took dozens of pictures, most of them close-ups of individuals as they faced the judges.</p>
<p>In one photo there is a girl, her arms crossed, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/comparative-studies-in-society-and-history/article/unseen-archive-of-idi-amin-making-history-in-a-tight-corner/A3FFA73CD324320B6ED55DEA8C730A8A">staring defiantly at the camera</a>. In another photo there is a middle-aged woman, wearing a print dress, staring at the ground with tears in her eyes, her hand at her forehead. The photos were made to document the identities of the people who were being judged. What they captured, instead, is their fragility, their emotion, their nervousness, their innocence. They are evidence of the arbitrariness of justice and the cheapness of life.</p>
<p>Out of the hundreds of pictures taken at the Economic Crimes Tribunal, only one was ever printed or published in the government newspaper. Were the image-makers of Idi Amin’s regime squeamish about the tribunal’s draconian powers? Did they sympathise with the people whose lives were destroyed by the tribunal?</p>
<h2>Changing regimes</h2>
<p>In 1992, Uganda’s new ruler – Yoweri Museveni – <a href="https://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/2012/four-decades-after-the-expulsion-of-ugandan-asians/">announced</a> that the property seized from Asian owners in 1972 was to be restored to them. Asians who wished to reclaim properties could obtain the titles from the Departed Asians Property Custodial Board; claimants were obliged to secure the eviction of Ugandan tenants themselves.</p>
<p>Today the board retains custody of several hundred properties. Its leadership is under <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/mps-dig-into-departed-asian-properties-saga-3479800">parliamentary investigation</a>: billions of Ugandan shillings have been stolen from its accounts, and its managers are <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/mps-dig-into-departed-asian-properties-saga-3392968.">accused</a> of handing important buildings over to well-connected proprietors.</p>
<p>Among the many wrongs of the 1970s, among the many lives that were disrupted or ended by Amin’s regime, it is the expulsion of the Asian community that has been the focus of ongoing efforts at compensation and rectification. No one has made apology to the hundreds of innocent, terrified men and women who were pictured, in their last hour, on trial before the Economic Crimes Tribunal.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188841/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Derek R. Peterson receives funding from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and the Andrew Mellon Foundation.</span></em></p>The inhumanity of Idi Amin’s ‘economic war’ was about much more than the expulsion of Asians.Derek R. Peterson, Professor of History and African Studies, University of MichiganLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1818632022-05-22T12:35:12Z2022-05-22T12:35:12ZMuseveni’s first son Muhoozi: clear signals of a succession plan in Uganda<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/461233/original/file-20220504-13-flt98h.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Muhoozi Kainerugaba, commander of Uganda's land forces and President Yoweri Museveni's son.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Peter Busomoke/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On 8 March 2022, Ugandan politics was sent into a spin by 49 words tweeted by President Yoweri Museveni’s only son, Lt Gen Muhoozi Kainerugaba.</p>
<p>The tweet announced Muhoozi’s retirement from the Ugandan People’s Defence Forces (UPDF), which he had formally served in since 1999. Since his most recent promotion in June 2021, he has served as the commander of the land forces. The position made him the third-highest ranking officer in the defence forces.</p>
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<p>Muhoozi’s resignation would clear his legal path to formally enter electoral politics. Serving members of the armed forces are banned from political activity under Uganda’s constitution. </p>
<p>The tweet seemed to catch everyone by surprise, including senior security officials. They later <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/updf-clears-the-air-on-muhoozi-status-3745690">put out a statement</a> saying Muhoozi had not resigned. </p>
<p>While Muhoozi clarified hours later that his retirement would not come for eight years, the post fits a recent pattern that has fuelled growing public perception that he is declaring his political intentions. </p>
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<p>The most stark example of this occurred weeks after the tweet. This was in the form of a nationwide series of public events to mark <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/magazines/people-power/muhoozi-s-birthday-launch-of-the-project--3800066">Muhoozi’s 48th birthday</a>. </p>
<p>These included sports tournaments, public rallies, a party for supporters, and a state dinner. Public roads were shut for the events, and state-owned broadcasters aired some of them live. Rwandan President Paul Kagame attended the State Dinner. </p>
<p>At one of the birthday rallies held in the south-western town of Masaka on <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/the-curious-case-of-muhoozi-national-event-3791614">April 20,</a> supporters wore T-shirts with slogans such as ‘Muhoozi K is our next president’ and ‘MK Project. Team Chairman. Secure Your Tomorrow.’ </p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/we-will-take-power-says-muhoozi-3801732">subsequent tweets</a> in early May, Muhoozi dropped any remaining reticence. </p>
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<p>He later added:</p>
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<p>At the state dinner, Museveni, who has <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/i-am-not-grooming-my-son-for-presidency-says-museveni-3544172">always denied</a> grooming his son to succeed him, <a href="https://www.observer.ug/news/headlines/73599-why-colonels-generals-support-gen-muhoozi">made comments </a> implying that Muhoozi would soon be in charge. </p>
<p>Whether or not Muhoozi makes it to State House – and a great deal still stands in the way of this happening – it is undoubtedly clear that the possibility of replacing Museveni with his son has dramatically shifted from rumour to reality in recent months.</p>
<h2>Heir apparent, apparently</h2>
<p>Muhoozi was 11 years old when his father’s National Resistance Army took Uganda’s capital Kampala in 1986. In 1999, he formally joined the Ugandan defence forces while a student at the city’s Makerere University. </p>
<p>He has been subsequently trained at elite military academies in the UK and US, and <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/special-reports/muhoozi-kainerugaba-uganda-s-cagey-heir-apparent-3726692">continually promoted</a> ahead of more experienced peers.</p>
<p>After Muhoozi’s most recent promotion to commander of the land forces, he has featured in a number of Uganda’s military deployments. These include those in the <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/updf-sends-more-troops-armoured-vehicles-into-dr-congo-in-anti-adf-rebel-operation--3639838">Democratic Republic of Congo,</a> <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/the-rise-of-gen-muhoozi-kainerugaba-3742016">Somalia</a> where Uganda is part of the African Union peacekeeping force, and the <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/we-re-coming-with-hell-muhoozi-tells-rustlers-3757124">Karamoja region</a> in Uganda’s northeast. </p>
<p>Muhoozi’s fast-tracked rise into a position of power within the military has long produced <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/probe-assasination-claims-says-tinyefuza-1542336">accusations</a> that he is being groomed by Museveni for succession. Yet, despite this ‘heir apparent’ accusation, Muhoozi’s public profile had previously remained relatively small. He is still perceived as something of ‘an unknown quantity’ among broad swathes of the Ugandan public. </p>
<p>He has rarely given interviews to traditional media outlets. For most of his adult life, the average citizen would probably not have known very much about him. </p>
<p>The reasons for this relatively subdued profile were related to the inner workings of the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17531055.2016.1279853">National Resistance Movement</a> (NRM) regime that Museveni has led since 1986. </p>
<h2>Museveni’s play book</h2>
<p>At every point in his now 36 years at the helm, the president has maintained a posture of impending retirement. Museveni consistently suggests that the next election will be his last and that he dreams of <a href="https://chimpreports.com/museveni-i-am-ready-to-retire-as-soon-as-we-get-east-africa-federation/">the simple life</a> of cattle keeping. </p>
<p>Being constantly about to step down in this way has allowed Museveni to play off the factions of the NRM against each other. He has dangled the possibility of succession before them. </p>
<p>In Uganda, this ploy has been referred to as the succession <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/magazines/people-power/what-really-happened-to-the-succession-queue--1586740">‘queue’</a> within the ruling party.</p>
<p>In recent years, however, this act has worn thin. </p>
<p>This is mainly because Museveni has successfully marginalised several powerful National Resistance Movement figures who had developed partially autonomous political bases. They include former Vice President Gilbert Bukenya, former Parliamentary Speaker Rebecca Kadaga, former Inspector General of Police Kale Kayihura, and most spectacularly former Prime Minister and Party Secretary General Amama Mbabazi. </p>
<p>The decline of these figures – all rumoured to be in the metaphorical ‘queue’ for the top job – has made even the most naive party elites incredulous to the idea that Museveni will ever hand over power to one of them. </p>
<h2>Enter Muhoozi</h2>
<p>This change has coincided with the political emergence of Muhoozi in recent years. </p>
<p>His public profile has been growing both domestically and internationally. As a presidential advisor on special operations, a post he was appointed to in 2017 alongside his military roles, Muhoozi has <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/magazines/people-power/is-former-ldu-muhoozi-eyeing-seat-of-commander-in-chief--3800078">held summits</a> with the leaders of Egypt, Kenya and Somalia. </p>
<p>He has also held regional engagements with Rwanda’s Kagame, whom he refers to as his ‘uncle’. Following a meeting between the two men in Kigali in January, Rwanda finally agreed to <a href="https://theconversation.com/rwanda-has-reopened-the-border-with-uganda-but-distrust-could-close-it-again-176861">reopen its border</a> with Uganda. It had been closed for three years following Kigali’s accusations that Uganda had been harbouring members of the opposition Rwandan National Congress. </p>
<p>The perception that Muhoozi’s intervention has been key in mending the frosty relationship between the two countries was reinforced by a further meeting, again in Kigali, in <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202203150194.html">March</a>. After this, Muhoozi and Kagame announced a broader bi-lateral agreement to stop supporting dissidents in each other’s countries. </p>
<p>Shortly afterwards, Rwandan opposition blogger, and former journalist, <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/uganda-deports-top-rwandan-rebel-robert-mukombozi-3771012">Robert Mukombozi</a>, who had been living in Kampala, was pictured boarding a plane at Uganda’s Entebbe International Airport. </p>
<p>Muhoozi confirmed on Twitter that Mukombozi had been expelled, describing him as an “enemy of Rwanda and Uganda”. It was not clear where Mukombozi was going, although it was <a href="https://taarifa.rw/robert-mukombozi-rncs-boss-in-australia-deported-to-rwanda/">possibly to Australia</a>, with which he has ties. </p>
<p>No longer a quiet figure in the background, the First Son has recently become vocal on social media about many aspects of Ugandan politics and its foreign affairs. </p>
<p>In many cases, his stances appear to have <a href="https://observer.ug/news/headlines/72924-disregard-muhoozi-s-tweet-backing-russia-on-ukraine-minister-oryem">contradicted</a> some of the official positions of the Ugandan government. These include his tweets in support of Tigrayan rebels in Ethiopia’s civil war, and Russian President Vladimir Putin in his invasion of Ukraine.</p>
<p>Alarming to many is not just the positions Muhoozi has taken, but the <a href="https://observer.ug/viewpoint/72907-what-s-beneath-muhoozi-s-ridiculous-and-outrageous-tweets">bombastic and egotistic tone</a> of his discourse. </p>
<p>He frequently states that he will destroy Uganda’s enemies, and likens himself to military and revolutionary figures throughout history. These are discursive traits that have long been components of his father’s rhetoric.</p>
<p>Yet, across the country and online, multiple ‘Team MK’ or ‘MK 2026’ <a href="https://observer.ug/news/headlines/71516-muhoozi-army-campaigns-for-his-2026-presidential-bid">groups</a> are popping up to support his future presidential run.</p>
<h2>What’s coming?</h2>
<p>The most likely explanation for Muhoozi’s recent emergence is that his once low profile is being raised to position him to succeed his father. If this is indeed the regime’s wish, it would be unwise to bet against it. </p>
<p>However, the pathway for Muhoozi to reach State House is far from guaranteed. The Ugandan public would expect him to win an election to legitimise his leadership, and in so doing he would potentially face 2021 candidate <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/120/481/629/6406415">Bobi Wine</a> in fierce competition for the nation’s increasingly young electorate.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181863/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sam Wilkins has received funding from the British Institute in Eastern Africa</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Vokes has received funding from the Australian Research Council, the Royal Society of New Zealand, the European Union, the Economic and Social Research Council (UK), the British Institute in Eastern Africa, the British Library, and the Australia-Africa Universities Network.</span></em></p>The plan to replace Museveni with his son has dramatically shifted from rumour to reality in recent months.Sam Wilkins, Lecturer, RMIT UniversityRichard Vokes, Professor of Anthropology and International Development, The University of Western AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1804472022-04-10T07:54:05Z2022-04-10T07:54:05ZHow the Ugandan state outsources the use of violence to stay in power<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456092/original/file-20220404-22-c9tr4i.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Police officers cordon off a crime scene in Kampala, Uganda, in 2021.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Hajarah Nalwadda/Xinhua via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>How do authoritarian rulers survive in the context of democratic institutions? This is a <a href="https://www.graduateinstitute.ch/communications/news/new-perspectives-modern-authoritarianism">long-standing puzzle</a> that has become more pressing with the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2019.1582029">rise</a> of authoritarianism in the 21st century.</p>
<p>In theory, democratic institutions should allow citizens to vote out elected officials who don’t pursue the public interest, or hold them accountable via other measures, like an independent judiciary.</p>
<p>Yet, most of today’s authoritarian regimes hold regular elections, have a formal separation of powers and a relatively independent press. Scholars have <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/41428375?seq=1">called</a> these hybrid or electoral authoritarian regimes.</p>
<p>I set out to <a href="https://fdslive.oup.com/www.oup.com/academic/pdf/openaccess/9780198856474.pdf">research</a> this puzzle of authoritarian rule. I focused on Uganda because it provides a clear case of an <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14662043.2019.1576277?casa_token=KwJAV-kp4nUAAAAA%3A8FJpORb_XzZChQahLmL074YF3Bs6MC_ATIQOgYMjR-_kZZo0TLscX_Sco12cglNfsZK3DrRLHKeBQg">electoral authoritarian regime</a>. President Yoweri Museveni has held power since 1986 under the ruling party, the National Resistance Movement. The state is seen as <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/ugandas-fraudulent-election/">increasingly repressive</a>. However, it holds regular elections and meets some other basic criteria of a democracy. This includes a nominally independent judiciary, inclusive suffrage and a fairly free press.</p>
<p>In studying Uganda, I identified a type of governance that uses unpredictability to combine democratic institutions with authoritarian power. I call this ‘institutionalised arbitrariness’.</p>
<p>Uganda is unique in many ways. Nevertheless, my research offers some insights for contemporary practices of authoritarianism worldwide. It also offers insights into the workings of post-liberation African states like Ethiopia, Rwanda and Zimbabwe.</p>
<h2>The research</h2>
<p>I carried out fieldwork in Uganda, studying local violent actors. I held more than 300 interviews with local security actors. These included vigilantes and community police, community members and government representatives.</p>
<p>I attended public events like community meetings, and collected village-level bylaws and other documentation that helped triangulate what people told me. </p>
<p>I studied the interactions between state authorities and informal security actors to understand who can use violence and how, and the implications for state authority. For instance, I looked at how vigilante groups were formed in different communities and what they did. This included how they enforced local order and when they were seen to overstep their mandate. </p>
<p>I also studied <a href="https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780198856474.001.0001/oso-9780198856474-chapter-6">Uganda’s Crime Preventer programme</a>. My aim was to understand who joined it, what activities crime preventers were asked to do, and how the programme joined national-level politics to the grassroots.</p>
<h2>Key findings</h2>
<p>Uganda has limited capacity to <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/23040638?seq=1">fully monopolise violence in its territory</a> or <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/uganda/overview#1">provide basic services</a> to its citizens. It relies on repression, but its limited capacity means that it cannot silence dissent systematically and reliably. </p>
<p>My research analysed the interactions between state authorities and informal violent actors. What I found was surprising. First, state actors encouraged the formation of these groups and gave them the job of using violence to police their communities. This was an active outsourcing of violence to non-state actors. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-roots-of-pre-election-carnage-by-uganda-security-forces-152774">The roots of pre-election carnage by Uganda security forces</a>
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<p>I also found that local violent actors tried to consolidate their authority – as might be expected. They imposed bylaws and extracted resources in the form of fees and taxes. They also provided varying degrees of security and justice. </p>
<p>But the groups didn’t consolidate. Instead, they remained fluid and poorly defined. This was in part because their membership often got into trouble with state authorities for using excessive violence, or intervening in matters that were later determined beyond their remit. As a result, they were unable to succeed to a level that would meaningfully threaten state control. </p>
<p>The failure of violent local actors to consolidate was not for lack of trying. Across my cases, vigilantes and other local security actors tried to formalise control over a specific jurisdiction, usually their village.</p>
<p>They also emulated established authorities. For example, they printed ID cards and adopted titles like president, secretary, and even in one case, a ‘whip master’ who was tasked with caning wrongdoers. </p>
<p>But their efforts to consolidate power were largely unsuccessful because state actors continually changed their remit. At times they burdened local actors with tasks they were not equipped to handle. At other times, they reclaimed control without warning. </p>
<p>This enabled the state to outsource much of the day-to-day responsibilities associated with providing security and justice, while remaining authoritative.</p>
<p>So how does this link back to the paradox of electoral authoritarianism? </p>
<h2>The link to democracy</h2>
<p>My research shows that the presence of multiple kinds of authorities, each with poorly defined mandates, creates endemic unpredictability. This means that in everyday life, citizens do not know which actor can decisively solve a complaint. </p>
<p>For instance, if seeking accountability for a violent crime, citizens might go to the police. But they could also seek out local authorities, district officials, clan authorities and NGOs, among others. Each of these authorities may help to some extent, while partially deferring to – or overruling – other actors. The result is an environment in which no single actor can reliably claim authority over any area. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/arbitrary-detention-and-torture-in-uganda-the-government-ignores-the-law-157607">Arbitrary detention and torture in Uganda: the government ignores the law</a>
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<p>The state can allow certain autonomous or semi-autonomous spaces for opposition. This is because the unpredictable political environment makes these spaces so fragmented and fragile that citizens using them cannot gain traction to hold authorities accountable.</p>
<p>This creates an obstacle to the emergence of political accountability – sometimes called the compact between the state and society. The result is an approach to governance that is based more on fragmenting and weakening opposition than on extending unquestioned or unchallenged control. </p>
<h2>Implications</h2>
<p>The implications for Uganda are wide ranging. The first and most apparent one is that it’s difficult to mobilise political opposition in this context. It isn’t that there are no spaces for political action. Rather, these spaces are fragile and threatened by the possibility of unaccountable state violence. </p>
<p>This helps understand why Ugandans use political protests or the legal system to check the executive. Yet, it’s very difficult to translate these activities into sustained and effective political organisation and action. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/rising-vigilantism-south-africa-is-reaping-the-fruits-of-misrule-179891">Rising vigilantism: South Africa is reaping the fruits of misrule</a>
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<p>It also helps explain why citizens take up alternative approaches – such as <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13698249.2020.1680018">naked protests</a> – to raise their political voices. </p>
<p>My research additionally underscores why it’s not possible to understand Ugandan politics without understanding the role of the security sector and armed forces.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/180447/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>This research received funding from the Centre for Public Authority and International Development (ES/P008038/1).</span></em></p>Uganda uses unpredictability to combine democratic institutions with authoritarian power.Rebecca Tapscott, Research Fellow, Graduate Institute – Institut de hautes études internationales et du développement (IHEID)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1768612022-03-10T15:01:23Z2022-03-10T15:01:23ZRwanda has reopened the border with Uganda but distrust could close it again<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445494/original/file-20220209-1970-10db1fl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Rwanda has fully re-opened the Gatatuna-Katuna border with Uganda, ending a three-year impasse. Cyril Ndegeya/Anadolu Agency via </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-wait-cross-the-katuna-border-crossing-between-uganda-news-photo/1238095524?adppopup=true">Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Rwanda has now fully <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/gatuna-border-fully-reopens-ordinary-passengers-after-3-years">reopened</a> the Gatuna border with Uganda, ending a three-year impasse on the <a href="http://www.ttcanc.org/page.php?id=11">Northern Corridor</a>, one of East Africa’s key transport arteries that funnels goods from the Indian Ocean seaport of Mombasa to Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Democratic Republic of Congo. Rwanda <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47495476">abruptly closed</a> the border in February 2019 after it accused Uganda of abducting its citizens and supporting rebels seeking to topple President Paul Kagame. Legal scholar Filip Reyntjens takes us through the nature of Rwanda-Uganda relations.</em> </p>
<h2>What’s the brief history of Uganda-Rwanda relations?</h2>
<p>The presidents of Uganda and Rwanda, Yoweri Museveni and Paul Kagame, were close allies during the civil wars of <a href="https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/jcs/article/view/4386/5071">Uganda</a> (1981 to 1986) and <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/civil-war-erupts-in-rwanda">Rwanda</a> (1990 to 1994). They were also on <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1640692.stm">the same side</a> in the first (Democratic Republic of Congo) war that removed <a href="https://www.imdb.com/name/nm0782891/bio">Mobutu Sese Seko</a>, between 1996 and 1997. </p>
<p>But the two leaders <a href="https://eyalama.com/part-1how-six-day-kisangani-war-pushed-museveni-and-kagame-from-friends-to-nemesis/">fell out</a> during the second Congo war (between 1998 and 2003). Uganda and Rwanda clashed over the exploitation of Congolese resources and the management of the rebellion against <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03056240208704645">Laurent Kabila</a>, whose forces had deposed Mobutu Sese Seko. Rwandan and Ugandan armies fought each other in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1999 and 2000.</p>
<p>A semblance of peace was restored between the two leaders in the early 2000s but trust never returned. A new <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2017/12/frenemies-for-life-has-the-love-gone-between-uganda-and-rwanda/">round</a> of hostile verbal exchanges erupted in 2017, and they escalated considerably in early 2019. This time, Rwanda accused Uganda of harbouring armed dissidents and victimising Rwandans. </p>
<p>A 2018 UN <a href="https://www.undocs.org/S/2018/1133">report</a> found Uganda had provided support to Rwandan dissidents. Uganda too claimed that Rwanda was engaging in acts of espionage and attempts to destabilise Uganda. </p>
<p>Other issues included air traffic rights, the construction of a standard gauge railway, and energy projects. </p>
<p>In March 2019, Rwanda’s closure of the Gatuna/Katuna border crossing sealed the rupture. Influential opinion makers close to both countries’ regimes didn’t rule out the possibility of direct war. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/east-africa-should-intervene-to-defuse-rwanda-uganda-war-of-words-114202">East Africa should intervene to defuse Rwanda-Uganda war of words</a>
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<p>Later that year, the two leaders signed an agreement brokered by the Angolan and Congolese presidents. The <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/422686492/Memorandum-of-Understanding-of-Luanda">Luanda Memorandum of Understanding</a> called on both countries to desist from “acts such as the financing, training and infiltration of destabilising forces”. It also <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/uganda-rwanda-leaders-sign-pact-aimed-at-ending-tensions-1425494">called</a> for respect of rights, freeing of each other’s nationals and resumption of cross-border activities. </p>
<p>But there was very little progress. The two leaders continued to trade accusations. It seemed unlikely that, as long as Museveni and Kagame were at the helm, bilateral relations would ever improve. </p>
<h2>How important is the Gatuna border crossing?</h2>
<p>Gatuna is one of the most important borders in East Africa as it connects Kenya’s Mombasa port to various cities in the region. On <a href="https://www.ssatp.org/sites/ssatp/files/publications/SSATPWP96-border-crossing_1.pdf">average</a>, 2,518 trucks pass through the Gatuna border every month (84 trucks per day) into Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. The East African Community has since <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/works-gatuna-one-stop-border-post-near-completion">upgraded</a> it into a one-stop border post.</p>
<p>Its closure had <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/rwanda-re-opens-border-with-uganda-says-grievances-remain-2022-01-31/">choked off commerce</a> in East Africa. Its re-opening is set to spark <a href="https://www.eac.int/press-releases/2354-eac-applauds-the-re-opening-of-the-gatuna-katuna-border-post-by-the-republics-of-rwanda-and-uganda">social and economic activities</a> and also benefit the informal cross-border traders.</p>
<h2>What’s fuelling the border conflict now?</h2>
<p>The border stalemate is about two presidents who know each other well, and their mutual dislike and distrust is deeply ingrained. </p>
<p>On 22 January, Kagame met Lt. General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, Museveni’s senior presidential advisor on special operations and commander of the Uganda People Defence Forces. Kainerugaba has no official function in Uganda’s foreign affairs apparatus, but he is Museveni’s son. </p>
<p>Three days after the visit, in a gesture of goodwill, Museveni replaced intelligence chief Major General Abel Kandiho, who is considered in Kigali as “anti-Rwanda”. Three days later, Rwanda announced a <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/crossing-at-reopened-border-as-rwanda-uganda-3700576">partial reopening</a> of the Gatuna/Katuna border crossing.</p>
<p>But on 31 January, Rwandan deputy government spokesman Alain Mukuralinda told Rwanda TV that Uganda had not yet addressed all of Kigali’s grievances. </p>
<h2>Has the East African region seen the last of this conflict?</h2>
<p>The border issue is not a settled matter. The initial border reopening, which took place on 1 February, was made subject to COVID-19 protocols. Even with full reopening on 7 March, the situation at the border remains confused over the conflicting handling of the COVID-19 protocols by national agencies. </p>
<p>Ominously, on 8 February, Kagame told Parliament that Rwanda was ready to respond to any external <a href="https://chimpreports.com/why-museveni-cancelled-ex-cmi-boss-abel-kandihos-transfer-to-south-sudan/">threat</a>. He said: “We wish everybody in the region peace, but anyone who wishes us war, we give it to him”. </p>
<p>Kagame referred to rebel forces in the DRC, but the Ugandan army has been deployed there cooperating with the Congolese army against the Allied Democratic Forces, and a Rwandan intervention would carry the risk of a new confrontation with the Ugandan troops. </p>
<p>The next day, Museveni <a href="https://www.watchdoguganda.com/news/20220208/129901/gen-kandiho-bounces-back-as-polices-chief-of-joint-staff.html">appointed</a> Kandiho as Chief of the Joint Staff of the Uganda Police Force. </p>
<h2>How can this dispute be resolved?</h2>
<p>The mutual aversion between Museveni and Kagame is so deep that it has become hard to expect a long lasting solution to a conflict that has poisoned relations for over 20 years. </p>
<p>After the 2015 constitutional amendment Kagame can potentially stay in power until 2034. Although Museveni is not bound by term limits, he will be 82 years old at the time of the 2026 presidential election. Kainerugaba is often mooted as the <a href="https://www.independent.co.ug/muhoozis-2026-presidential-bid-is-impossible/">anointed successor</a> and he appears to want to make peace with Rwanda. </p>
<p>In the absence of initiatives by regional leaders, change will have to come from inside Rwanda and Uganda.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/176861/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Filip Reyntjens does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Tension persists between the neighbours as Kampala is yet to address all of Kigali’s grievances.Filip Reyntjens, Emeritus Professor of Law and Politics Institute of Development Policy (IOB), University of AntwerpLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1775782022-02-28T14:37:16Z2022-02-28T14:37:16ZUgandan rebel Joseph Kony: the latest US arrest bid raises questions<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/447535/original/file-20220221-22-4twk5o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Joseph Kony, head of the Lord's Resistance Army (Centre) arrives for a past peace talks at a jungle in Southern Sudan. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/joseph-kony-head-of-the-lords-resistance-army-arrives-at-a-news-photo/71584145?adppopup=true">Adam Pletts/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The US, through its embassy in the Central African Republic, <a href="https://cf.usembassy.gov/united-states-announces-5-million-reward-for-joseph-kony/">recently published</a> a warrant offering up to US$5 million for information leading to the capture of Ugandan warlord Joseph Kony. The US had <a href="https://www.state.gov/welcoming-the-verdict-in-the-case-against-dominic-ongwen-for-war-crimes-and-crimes-against-humanity/">previously announced</a> the bounty in early 2013. It has been on the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/04/22/joseph-kony-is-still-at-large-heres-why-the-u-s-and-uganda-were-willing-to-give-up-the-hunt/">trail</a> of the Lord’s Resistance Army leader since the early 2000s, spending at least <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/15/world/africa/joseph-kony-mission-ends.html#:%7E:text=The%20United%20States%20spent%20almost,fighting%20the%20Lord's%20Resistance%20Army.">US$800 million</a> on efforts to bring him to book. We asked international justice experts Tonny Kirabira and Leïla Choukroune to unpack the renewed interest in the Ugandan fugitive.</em></p>
<h2>What’s the history of the Lord’s Resistance Army?</h2>
<p>The Lord’s Resistance Army, a rebel group led by Joseph Kony, launched a <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781351271929-27/uganda-omona-andrew-david-samuel-baba-ayegba">war</a> in northern Uganda in 1987. For over two decades, the group engaged the Uganda People’s Defence Forces, while also targeting civilians. Besides massacres and destruction of property, the group systematically targeted and abducted children to become its soldiers and sex slaves. </p>
<p>It is <a href="https://theconversation.com/uganda-how-to-bring-justice-for-thousands-of-children-born-of-war-151121">infamous</a> for having pushed 66,000 children into war, and driven about 2 million people into camps. Over the years, various military campaigns by the Ugandan Army weakened the group and pushed its members into neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo and South Sudan. </p>
<p>The International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Kony and four of his top commanders – Vincent Otti, Raska Lukwiya, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen – in 2005. </p>
<p>The group took part in a two-year peace negotiation with the Ugandan government. The negotiation, brokered by South Sudan, collapsed in 2008. Kony <a href="https://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1195413/govt-rejects-lra-demand-icc">pulled out</a> after Uganda’s government failed to urge the International Criminal Court to lift the indictment against him and the other top commanders.</p>
<p>In 2008, the Ugandan forces and troops from neighbouring countries launched <a href="https://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1224614/lightning-thunder-milestone">Operation Lightning Thunder</a>, which drove the militants further into the Central African Republic. That’s where Joseph Kony is believed to be stationed.</p>
<h2>What has kept this group together?</h2>
<p>Besides its push for governance based on the <a href="https://hts.org.za/index.php/hts/article/view/4997/12458">Ten Commandments</a>, the Lord’s Resistance Army’s <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/magazines/people-power/revisiting-lra-war-10-years-later-1658118?view=htmlamp">primary objective</a> was to overthrow the government of <a href="https://www.statehouse.go.ug/people/h-e-yoweri-k-museveni">President Yoweri Museveni</a>. They perceived Museveni’s government as hostile towards Kony’s Acholi ethnic group in northern Uganda. </p>
<p>In the early stages of the war, it was <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/magazines/people-power/-sudan-government-has-evidence-that-uganda-still-supports-rebels-in-darfur-region--1515786?view=htmlamp">believed</a> that the Sudanese government provided logistical support to the group. At the time, Sudan had accused the Uganda government of supporting rebels in its Darfur region. </p>
<p>The Lord’s Resistance Army also <a href="http://enoughproject.org/reports/konys-ivory-how-elephant-poaching-congo-helps-support-lords-resitance-army">engaged</a> in elephant poaching and illegal ivory trade in the Democratic Republic of Congo, to fund its war.</p>
<h2>What’s known about the group’s activities today?</h2>
<p>The Lord’s Resistance Army is believed to have <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/uganda-lord-resistance-army-final-days/a-60535944">fewer than 1,000 fighters</a>, all scattered in splinter groups. There are reports of <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2020/08/11/Kony-LRA-Uganda-Congo-CAR">its atrocities</a> in South Sudan and Central African Republic. The group’s actions include violent attacks on civilian populations and abduction of children. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/photographs-reveal-the-personal-lives-of-the-lords-resistance-army-127843">Photographs reveal the personal lives of the Lord's Resistance Army</a>
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<p>Significant reduction in the number of fighters, and deaths of commanders like Otti, Okot and Lukwiya, dismantled the group’s top leadership. In addition, its commander, Ongwen, <a href="https://theconversation.com/dominic-ongwen-surrenders-but-justice-for-lords-resistance-army-victims-will-be-hard-to-find-35966">surrendered</a> to US forces in the Central African Republic in 2015. In 2021, Ongwen was <a href="https://theconversation.com/dominic-ongwen-icc-conviction-of-former-child-soldier-establishes-forced-pregnancy-as-a-war-crime-154671">convicted</a> for war crimes and crimes against humanity, and sentenced to 25 years of imprisonment. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/child-victim-soldier-war-criminal-unpacking-dominic-ongwens-journey-154850">Child victim, soldier, war criminal: unpacking Dominic Ongwen’s journey</a>
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<h2>Why is the US going for Joseph Kony now?</h2>
<p>The US has always maintained a strategic role and responsibility in the efforts to counter Kony’s group. But its recent action – issuing a warrant and providing a WhatsApp number for relaying the information – poses more questions than it offers solutions. </p>
<p>Previously, the US put <a href="http://enoughproject.org/files/lra_strategy_paper_051209.pdf">political pressure</a> on the Democratic Republic of Congo to counter the rebel group. The <a href="https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/government/cabinet.html">George W. Bush administration</a> provided logistical and intelligence <a href="http://enoughproject.org/files/lra_strategy_paper_051209.pdf">support for the Operation Lightning Thunder</a> in 2008 and 2009. </p>
<p>US civil society has also been active in the efforts to neuter Kony’s group. As a result, President Obama <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/statement-president-signing-lords-resistance-army-disarmament-and-northern-uganda-r">signed</a> the Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009 in 2010. </p>
<p>In 2011, Obama <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/10/14/letter-president-speaker-house-representatives-and-president-pro-tempore">deployed</a> 100 military advisors in Central African Republic to “enhance regional efforts against the Lord’s Resistance Army”. Succinctly, the deployment was premised on both national security and foreign policy interests of the US. While the foreign policy is magnified in the growth of US presence and influence in the region, supporting counterinsurgency operations could be critical to national security interests. </p>
<p>But with the reduction in the group’s capacity and threat, the renewed US interest is not clear. Does the move aim to support the International Criminal Court’s mandate, or is it simply a humanitarian intervention for civilians? </p>
<p>Following the conviction of Ongwen in 2021, the US Department of State issued a <a href="https://www.state.gov/welcoming-the-verdict-in-the-case-against-dominic-ongwen-for-war-crimes-and-crimes-against-humanity/">statement</a> in support of the International Criminal Court’s verdict. The statement noted: “While we continue to believe the court is in need of significant reform, we are pleased to see Ongwen brought to justice”. </p>
<p>It is in this same statement that the US emphasised its goal of hunting down Kony. The US$5 million prize for information leading to “the arrest, transfer, or conviction” of Kony was <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2013/4/4/us-offers-reward-for-uganda-warlord-kony">first announced by the Obama administration in 2013</a>.</p>
<p>Different interpretations can be made from this explicit US interest. The US$5m prize could demonstrate a tacit support of institutions like the International Criminal Court, as alternative avenues for peace and justice. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-hunt-may-be-off-but-a-5-million-pledge-might-bring-kony-to-justice-13234">The hunt may be off, but a $5 million pledge might bring Kony to justice</a>
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<p>Prior to the Donald Trump administration, the US <a href="https://www.e-ir.info/2012/04/14/the-darfur-crisis-the-role-of-the-usa-and-the-implications-for-the-icc/">supported</a> the International Criminal Court’s interventions in Darfur and Libya. It is important to note that the US is not a state party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. It has had a <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/74302/u-s-icc-relations-under-a-biden-administration-room-to-be-bold/">fractious relationship</a> with The Hague based court in previous years. </p>
<p>Ultimately, the Biden administration could be viewed as a new chapter in the US - International Criminal Court relationship, albeit under “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/3/5/biden-and-the-icc-partial-cooperation-selective-justice">partial and conditional</a> cooperation”. In essence, such cooperation is only limited to situations where US interests are at stake. In this case, the intervention in the fight against the Lord’s Resistance Army in Central Africa Republic. </p>
<p>Therefore, by placing a prize on Kony’s arrest, the Biden administration could be demonstrating a willingness to assist in the enforcement of an International Criminal Court-sanctioned warrant, in the process offering support to the Court.</p>
<p>But it could be argued that searching for Kony is a US entry point back into the Central African Republic. This is amid the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/russias-influence-central-african-republic">growing influence</a> of Russia in the country. France, the UK and the US accuse <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/28/russia-denies-its-personnel-involved-in-car-killings">Russian paramilitary forces of committing atrocities</a> in the Central African Republic. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-it-will-take-to-end-civil-war-in-the-central-african-republic-166041">What it will take to end civil war in the Central African Republic</a>
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<p>From a humanitarian perspective, the US intervention can be founded on a moral imperative to protect civilian victims of the Lord’s Resistance Army. And an external intervention would attain more legitimacy if received as a humanitarian intervention.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177578/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Fresh efforts to capture Kony comes amid growing influence of Russia in the Central African Republic.Tonny Raymond Kirabira, PhD Candidate in Law, University of PortsmouthLeïla Choukroune, Professor of International Law and Director of the University Research and Innovation Theme in Democratic Citizenship, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1677252022-01-12T14:42:43Z2022-01-12T14:42:43ZFrom mercenaries to citizens: how the Nubians gained acceptance in Uganda<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/440414/original/file-20220112-15-e7l747.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ugandan strongman General Idi Amin raised the national profile of Uganda Nubians -- but they were persecuted soon after his overthrow in 1979.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Keystone/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It’s been well over a century since the Nubian people arrived in Uganda from what was then Sudan, as the armed enforcers of the British colonial government. Over time, the new arrivals assimilated individuals from different ethnic backgrounds within Uganda while remaining a distinct group. Now officially recognised as Ugandans, the history of Ugandan Nubians – sometimes referred to simply as the “Nubi” – makes a case study of how social identity is formed and changed.</p>
<p>The Uganda Nubian origins were in what is now South Sudan. There, in the 1820s, some members of the Shilluk, Dinka, Bari, Lotuko, Madi, Lugbara and Alur ethnic groups coalesced into a community of people known as “Sudanese-Nubians”. They <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/722844">practised</a> Islamic culture and spoke a creolised form of Arabic. </p>
<p>The Sudanese Nubians developed as a distinct group as a result of Egypt’s military expansion south into Sudan in the first half of the nineteenth century. Among Sudanese Nubians were professional mercenaries who were used by both Africans and Europeans to capture slaves, ivory and minerals from Gondokoro (southern Sudan) during the 19th century. In the process, Africans adapted to the Arabic culture.</p>
<p>This is the group from which the British military administrator in Uganda <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Frederick-Lugard">Lord Frederick Lugard</a> recruited a band of mercenaries to keep law and order. </p>
<p>The Sudanese mercenaries under their leader Selim Bey were recruited at Kavali, an area in the southwestern corner of Lake Albert in Uganda. The band of about 8,200 Nubian men, women and children set off by canoe on Lake Albert via Bunyoro, a kingdom in western Uganda.</p>
<p>The Nubians later assimilated with those around them with whom they socially identified. This included the Kuku, Lugbara, Acholi, Kakwa, Bganda and Batoro. They became the Nubi-Muganda, Nubi-Kuku, Nubi-Toro, Nubi-Lugbara, Nubi-Acholi and Nubi-Kakwa, among others. </p>
<p>Most of Uganda’s ethnic groups are associated with specific ancestral territories. For instance the Baganda of central Uganda, Bagishu of eastern Uganda and Banyankole of western Uganda. However, Uganda Nubians have had no territorial claim because they settled in the different places they were deployed.</p>
<p>For decades Ugandan Nubians were treated as foreigners or “Abagwira” and discriminated against. But the country’s 1995 <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Uganda_2017.pdf?lang=en">constitution</a> recognised the Nubians as a Ugandan indigenous ethnic community and as citizens. This was a significant step because their identity was now officially recognised with similar rights as other Ugandans. </p>
<p>In my <a href="https://academicjournals.org/journal/AJHC/article-full-text-pdf/3410C7860468">PhD research</a> I studied the formation and shifts of the Nubian ethnic identity, and the strategies Uganda Nubians have used to define and sustain themselves as a distinct ethnic group in Uganda. Understanding identity shifts over time allows for an appreciation of the fluidity and the construction of identities. </p>
<p>I drew the conclusion that there is more to ethnic identity than ancestral location or settlement pattern. It goes beyond language or family history too. Understanding this can lead to lessening of ethnic conflicts worsened by the colonially constructed ethnic territorial boundaries.</p>
<h2>Shifting identity</h2>
<p>Like most historical studies, my research relied mainly on oral history and written archival records. Oral interviews were conducted in Bombo and Kampala (both in central Uganda), Kabarole district (western Uganda) and Arua Adjuman and Pakwach (west Nile districts of Uganda). </p>
<p>Based on the oral narratives and archival documents, my study found that over the years, the Uganda Nubians came to take on different identities. But they retained a distinct group identity bound together by Islam and other aspects of culture, including language, food, dress and crafts. </p>
<p>In the early colonial period (1890s-1930s), the Nubians were identified by the British as “Sudanese mercenaries”. This was because they had worked as Sudanese-Egyptian mercenaries during the Anglo-Egyptian imperial campaign in Sudan during the 19th century. </p>
<p>This is why they were hired by Lugard for the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Kenya/The-British-East-Africa-Company">Imperial British East African Company</a>. But their mercenary identity changed when the British recruited them formally into the British army (Uganda Rifles and later East African Rifles) with the intention to boost the colonial army in order to “pacify” East Africa. </p>
<p>Throughout the colonial period to independence (1894-1962), the Uganda Nubians had settled wherever they were deployed by the British. By the mid-20th century, many Nubian soldiers were retired from service and integrated with other ethnic communities because they could not go back to Sudan. The Sudanese government did not consider the Uganda Nubians as their own since many decades had passed since they had left Sudan. </p>
<p>After Uganda’s independence in 1962, the Uganda Nubians came to be seen as “Sudanese foreigners” or “Sudanese mercenaries”. Even after living in Uganda for many decades, they were still perceived as “Abasudani Abagwira”. This is the local phrase for “Sudanese immigrants”. Thus the Uganda Nubians were left out of national programmes like education, health and poverty eradication. </p>
<p>Perceptions of the Uganda Nubians were to <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/722844">change</a> again during Idi Amin’s regime (1971-1979). Some people labelled them as “Amin’s men”. Amin came from the Kakwa ethnic group, a Sudanic speaking Nilotic group in the West Nile part of Uganda. He identified himself as a Nubi-Kakwa and elevated the Uganda Nubians to crucial positions in the army, police, business, and other fields in his military government.</p>
<p>With the fall of Amin’s <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Idi-Amin">notoriously brutal</a> regime in 1979, many Uganda Nubians were targeted as having been his accomplices. Nubian settlements were destroyed, bank accounts were frozen and shops belonging to Nubians were looted. Some Nubians fled into exile in neighbouring Kenya, Sudan and Tanzania. </p>
<p>Those who remained in Uganda suffered from marginalisation and discrimination. Some of them changed their names and those of their children to disguise themselves as other ethnic groups to get access to government services. </p>
<h2>End of marginalisation</h2>
<p>The Uganda Nubians were able to return to Uganda and resettle after President Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Movement took over in 1986. The framers of the 1995 constitution recognised them as Ugandans since they had settled in Uganda before 1926 (the deciding date for the country’s boundaries and citizenship). They became known as the Nubi.</p>
<p>As citizens of Uganda, the Nubi were at last able to obtain national identification cards and passports. They now also enjoy voting rights. They became accepted by other ethnic communities, for example through intermarriage. This has eased ethnic tension and conflict in areas where the Nubi settled. </p>
<p>The 2014 <a href="https://www.ubos.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/03_20182014_National_Census_Main_Report.pdf">statistical report</a> puts the Uganda Nubian population at 28,772 out of about 34 million Ugandans. </p>
<p>The history of the Nubi is an example of how ethnicities change and are not limited to geographical boundaries. They are socially created by the power centres of the time.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/167725/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abudul Mahajubu receives funding from Gerda-Hankel Stiftung. </span></em></p>There is more to ethnic identity than ancestral location or settlement pattern, language or family history.Abudul Mahajubu, Researcher, Makerere UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1576072021-03-23T11:28:07Z2021-03-23T11:28:07ZArbitrary detention and torture in Uganda: the government ignores the law<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/390870/original/file-20210322-17-x71rnw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A patrol car of the Ugandan police is seen stationed outside the headquarters of the Uganda oppposition party National Unity Platform (NUP) on January 20, 2021. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by SUMY SADURNI/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>In Uganda, there have been <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/03/11/uganda-end-enforced-disappearances-opponents">widespread allegations</a> of arbitrary detention and torture of members of the opposition. Moina Spooner, from The Conversation Africa, asked Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi, a human rights expert who has been monitoring the situation in Uganda, to provide insights into domestic laws and what they say in relation to detention of civilians by security forces.</em></p>
<p><strong>What is arbitrary detention and what does Uganda’s law say in relation to it?</strong></p>
<p>Arbitrary detention <a href="https://cja.org/human-rights-issues/arbitrary-detention/">is when</a> a person is arrested and detained by a government without due process and without the legal protections of a fair trial. It can also refer to when a person is detained without any legal basis.</p>
<p>Arbitrary detention is prohibited in international human rights law – the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) provides <a href="http://www.claiminghumanrights.org/udhr_article_9.html">that</a> “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.” </p>
<p>In addition, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981) prohibit arbitrary detention. Both these treaties have been ratified by Uganda. </p>
<p>Uganda also has local legislation which protects the right to liberty and prohibits arbitrary detention, including <a href="https://statehouse.go.ug/sites/default/files/attachments/Constitution_1995.pdf">article 23</a> of the Ugandan constitution.</p>
<p>There are however grey areas that may embolden the state in carrying out arbitrary arrest. The Police Act (1994) provides for circumstances in which a police officer may arrest and detain a person who is suspected of committing an offence. In addition, section 161 of the Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces Act <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl-nat.nsf/0/34C18819BB7C4DFFC12573750032B4CE">provides</a> that a soldier can arrest any person who is reasonably suspected of being in possession of military store, such as clothing and equipment. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, in all circumstances, the constitution <a href="https://statehouse.go.ug/sites/default/files/attachments/Constitution_1995.pdf">states</a> that the arrestee has to be brought before court no later than 48 hours from the time of their arrest.</p>
<p>Despite this, there are innumerable cases of arbitrary detentions in Uganda. </p>
<p>For example, in its 21st Annual Report, published in 2018, the Uganda Human Rights Commission <a href="https://www.uhrc.ug/download/uhrc-21st-annual-report/?wpdmdl=417&refresh=60578df23c8d01616350706">noted with concern</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the continued long and arbitrary detention of suspects in police custody which negatively affected their right to fair and speedy trial. Some suspects were found to have been detained for weeks and even months in police custody without being produced before court. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Things haven’t improved. Since late last year, there have been <a href="https://chapterfouruganda.org/articles/2021/03/17/uganda-joint-civil-society-statement-enforced-disappearances">reports that</a> hundreds of supporters or members of the National Unity Platform, the leading opposition party headed by Robert Kyagulanyi (popularly known as Bobi Wine), have been arbitrarily detained. Internal Affairs Minister Jeje Odongo even presented a list to parliament of <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/hrw-calls-for-probe-into-missing-ugandans-3323290">177 people</a> who were in military detention. </p>
<p>The Ugandan president <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/security-quiet-on-abductees-despite-museveni-order--3292234">confirmed</a> that these detentions have been carried out by the Ugandan military.</p>
<p>Although these people have been ostensibly detained for allegedly committing offences, most of them <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/nubian-li-eddie-mutwe-and-47-others-charged-with-possession-of-ammunition-3251262">have not been</a> brought before court for prosecution. Just a few were arraigned before the court martial. This creates room for the argument that the detentions are meant to intimidate, persecute and ultimately weaken the opposition. </p>
<p><strong>What do laws say in relation to torture and have any government forces ever been convicted of torture?</strong> </p>
<p>Torture is <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2003/03/11/legal-prohibition-against-torture#:%7E:text=Under%20customary%20international%20law%20as,times%20and%20in%20all%20circumstances.">prohibited</a> under international law. </p>
<p>Ugandan law also protects the right to freedom from torture. Article 24 of the constitution <a href="https://statehouse.go.ug/sites/default/files/attachments/Constitution_1995.pdf">states that</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>No person shall be subjected to any form of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Torture is <a href="https://www.ulii.org/akn/ug/act/2012/3/eng@2012-09-18">also criminalised</a> by the Prevention and Prohibition of Torture Act (2012). A court which convicts a person of torture can impose a sentence of not more than 15 years imprisonment or a fine or both. </p>
<p>Despite these laws, torture appears to be rising in Uganda. The Uganda Human Rights Commission <a href="https://www.uhrc.ug/download/uhrc-21st-annual-report/?wpdmdl=417&refresh=60578df23c8d01616350706">reported</a> 346 complaints of torture in 2018. This was a 13% increase from the 306 complaints that were registered in 2017. The torture was allegedly mostly carried out by the police, the army and prison authorities. </p>
<p>It is against that background that the Uganda Human Rights Commission <a href="https://www.uhrc.ug/download/uhrc-21st-annual-report/?wpdmdl=417&refresh=60578df23c8d01616350706">recommended</a> that the Director of Public Prosecutions prosecute alleged perpetrators. However, there is no reported incident in which any of the perpetrators has been prosecuted. </p>
<p>Any person can institute a private prosecution against an alleged perpetrator of torture. However, attempts by victims of torture to institute private prosecutions against the perpetrators have also been unsuccessful. This is so because the Director of Public Prosecutions has <a href="https://www.euppublishing.com/doi/abs/10.3366/ajicl.2017.0214">taken over</a> these private prosecutions and <a href="https://www.independent.co.ug/state-takes-over-zaakes-case-against-individual-police-officers/">has not</a> continued with them. </p>
<p>It would appear that the Director of Public Prosecutions’ office is not interested in prosecuting law enforcement officers who are alleged to have committed torture.</p>
<p><strong>For those that are held without charge, how is the situation resolved?</strong></p>
<p>Some people who are held without charge are released after spending a few days, weeks or months in detention. However, others are not released and their lawyers have to approach the High Court to order their production in court. This is on the basis of the constitution, which provides for the right of <em>habeas corpus</em> – when a person is wrongfully detained and a request is made for a court order to produce the prisoner.</p>
<p>However, there are <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/nubian-li-eddie-mutwe-and-47-others-charged-with-possession-of-ammunition-3251262">cases</a> whereby some of those who have not been released, in particular those who were arrested by the army, have been prosecuted before courts, especially military courts, on trumped-up charges.</p>
<p><strong>What must be done to ensure that the rights of civilians are protected?</strong></p>
<p>There are many interventions which could be put in place to protect the rights of civilians. </p>
<p>Firstly, the army should stop being involved in law enforcement. This is so because army officers are not equipped with the necessary training and experience to do so. They should leave law enforcement to the police. </p>
<p>The Ugandan police are slowly being militarised. This is evidenced by, amongst other things, the deployment of senior military officers <a href="https://www.ahrlj.up.ac.za/nkuubi-j">in key</a> leadership positions in the police and the active participation of the military in policing operations. Many serious human rights violations, for example, the killing <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2020/11/23/africa/ugandan-protest-death-toll-intl/index.html">of over</a> 40 protesters last year, have happened during joint police and military operations. </p>
<p>Secondly, the culture of impunity should stop. Police and military officers who violate human rights should be held accountable. The army is also increasingly becoming partisan. The one-sided purported enforcement of COVID-19 regulations during the recently concluded presidential and parliamentary elections showed that the security agencies were bent on crushing the opposition. </p>
<p>I strongly believe that – in terms of Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court – the abduction, torture and enforced disappearance of National Unity Platform members are crimes against humanity. This treaty <a href="https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Uganda_International-Criminal-Court-Act_2010.pdf">was domesticated</a> in Uganda through the International Criminal Court Act (2010).</p>
<p>Since there is no indication that the Director of Public Prosecutions is willing – or able – to prosecute those who are involved in these heinous crimes, the International Criminal Court may have to intervene and, on the basis of command or superior responsibility, hold the senior military officers accountable.
Otherwise other countries should be prepared to invoke their <a href="https://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/news/20170519/icc-universal-jurisdiction-two-ways-one-fight">laws on universal jurisdiction</a> to hold these officers accountable. This is because the crimes of torture and enforced disappearances are crimes under international law.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/157607/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jamil Mujuzi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Arbitrary detention and torture are both prohibited under local and international laws.Jamil Mujuzi, Professor, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1565052021-03-08T15:19:49Z2021-03-08T15:19:49ZWhy working as a journalist in Uganda is particularly tough<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/387793/original/file-20210304-13-1ksubin.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A policeman beats up a journalist in Kampala outside the Daily Monitor and Red Pepper newspapers during a protest at the temporary closure of two newspapers by armed police in May 2013.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Isaac Kasamani/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ugandan journalists are subject to <a href="https://rsf.org/en/uganda">state intimidation and violence</a> almost on a daily basis. During the recent presidential elections, media crews covering opposition candidates – often in protective gear – were targets of physical assault for weeks. In one of the more egregious acts, journalists were <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-uganda-politics-idUSKBN2AI0RP">beaten</a> outside a United Nations compound in the capital Kampala while covering a post-election story – sparking international outrage. </p>
<p>Paradoxically, Uganda’s president Yoweri Museveni is <a href="https://cpj.org/2004/03/attacks-on-the-press-2003-uganda/">credited</a> with liberalising the media. The country is now home to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14112301">hundreds</a> of (mostly independent) media houses, making it one of the more vibrant media landscapes in the region. </p>
<p>In 2018 <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1461670X.2020.1852097?journalCode=rjos20">we interviewed</a> 27 journalists to find out more about <a href="https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/download/11456/2948">the challenges they faced</a>. </p>
<p>We drew a number of conclusions. Firstly, that media houses paid low wages and offered few development opportunities for journalists. This had a number of consequences: one was that it made journalists prone to self-censorship. A reporter at <a href="https://www.newvision.co.ug/">New Vision</a>, the largest state-funded newspaper in the country, explained the connection like this:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>You only get paid for your stories that are published, so you don’t want to write a sensitive story that might not get published because then you won’t get paid. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Low pay also made reporters more susceptible to bribes, which journalists said were commonplace.</p>
<p>Journalists also regularly spoke about the presence of spies in almost every newsroom in the country. This affected how they worked and what they wrote about.</p>
<p>Although our interviews were conducted nearly three years ago, the recent attacks on journalists suggest the problems have not been resolved, and may be worsening. As these challenges persist, individual journalists face increasing hardships, and the problematic aspects of journalism as a profession like bribes and self-censorship, for example — may be intensified. As journalists continue to feel forced to self-censor, Ugandan citizens receive limited information, thus hindering the country’s <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/comparative-politics/public-opinion-democracy-and-market-reform-africa?format=HB&isbn=9780521841917">progress toward democratisation</a>. </p>
<h2>A calculated form of control</h2>
<p>Journalists spoke of legal and illegal mechanisms that the government used to control them. These included threats, defamation charges, detainment and beatings. </p>
<p>But, many pointed out that what made the government retaliation particularly insidious was its uneven and unpredictable nature.</p>
<p>For example, a reporter for the private station NBS TV said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>There are times when we’ve had critical stories; we’ve run them and nothing has been said. You expect some backlash, nothing happens, a week, two weeks, a month, and it goes. But then, there are other stories where the state is increasingly involved and saying, ‘You can’t run this story’. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>These erratic repercussions left many journalists in a perpetual state of fear.</p>
<p>Spies in the newsroom added to this atmosphere. Journalists told us that “spies” worked as journalists within media houses. They accepted money from the government in exchange for publishing positive content about certain politicians or revealing forthcoming sensitive stories, enabling the government to force the publication to drop the story. </p>
<p>This issue isn’t unique to Uganda. While little evidence exists, such a practice <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/trc/media/1997/9709/s970916f.htm">has been seen</a> anecdotally in South Africa. But, based on our interviews, government-affiliated spies in Uganda’s media houses appeared prevalent and a mechanism the state favoured to keep control on the media.</p>
<p>Some journalists we interviewed said they knew, or suspected, who the spies in their newsroom were. Almost all journalists said they took precautions such as avoiding working collaboratively or working remotely to limit the number of people familiar with their stories. Some also said they would ask a trusted friend to hold sensitive documents or story drafts instead of keeping them in the newsroom.</p>
<p>Some said they would only work with a single editor they trusted.</p>
<p>Media houses also tried to protect journalists by withholding their bylines on sensitive stories to protect their reporters. </p>
<h2>What needs to be done?</h2>
<p>The journalists we spoke to agreed that both sides — the journalists and the government — needed to work together to alleviate problems such as bribes, spies, self-censorship and government intimidation. </p>
<p>For their part, journalists said they needed comprehensive training on the laws that protect them. They also needed to unite and become empowered in an effort to protect their profession. Some Ugandan journalists have made inroads by creating a WhatsApp group called Press Freedom Forum to discuss ways to exercise and protect their rights.</p>
<p>But a change in the mentality of government officials is also needed. </p>
<p>In our conversations, journalists said the government needed to better understand the role of journalism in society so that they weren’t defensive or offended when reporters ask tough questions. Journalists said the state viewed reporters — especially investigative or political reporters — as unpatriotic when they were trying to obtain information. </p>
<p>A senior reporter for the private newspaper Daily Monitor said sourcing information from police and security officials could be particularly problematic:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Once you tend to have asked questions, you want to get documents, they look at you as a threat.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>A former reporter said that government officials needed to see themselves as working for the public, rather than simply being in charge of them.</p>
<p>Ultimately, significant improvements in press freedom are unlikely to happen until the country sees a change in its leadership. In the meantime, journalists said the best path forward was to continue working hard and to persevere despite the challenges. </p>
<p>A former journalist said the media houses that have “stood the test of time despite the threats” are making a difference, both for journalism and for society:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Those journalists have done a tremendous job … the media plays a very central role, actually, as a key pillar of democracy.</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/156505/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Uganda media houses pay low wages and offer few development opportunities for journalists, which makes reporters more susceptible to bribes.Karen McIntyre, Assistant Professor, Journalism and Director of Graduate Studies, Richard T. Robertson School of Media and Culture, Virginia Commonwealth UniversityMeghan Sobel Cohen, Associate Professor, Department of Communication and the Master of Development Practice, Regis UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1546632021-02-08T14:15:02Z2021-02-08T14:15:02ZDefeating Museveni can’t be achieved through international pressure alone<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/382709/original/file-20210205-21-1td24pu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Joseph Kazibwe, with his wife Magere, listen to radio updates of the Uganda presidential election result in January 2021. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> Photo by Yasuyoshi Chiba/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the past few months, Western media and academia have placed unprecedented, and somewhat bewildering, focus on Uganda’s 2021 general elections. It is puzzling because throughout the 2000s and 2010s, most Western commentators either painted a positive image or took a largely lukewarm interest in the deepening tenor of Yoweri Museveni’s 35-year-long authoritarian rule. </p>
<p>The fact is Museveni’s military dictatorship has been draped in civilian garb for a long time. As a routine ritual, Museveni purports to seek legitimation every five years through elections. These elections are scarcely <a href="http://africaworldpressbooks.com/controlling-consent-ugandas-2016-election-edited-by-j-oloka-onyango-and-josephine-ahikire/">free, fair or credible</a>. This has been <a href="https://nai.uu.se/news-and-events/news/2021-01-08-musevenis-rule-by-violence-sends-clear-message-to-opponents.html">particularly true</a> since at least 2001 when Museveni first faced a serious challenge to his stay at the helm. </p>
<p>At a personal, idiosyncratic level Museveni loathes political competition. He has expressed indignation for electoral rules that should apply to all actors. Because he holds an exaggerated sense of <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/magazines/people-power/museveni-s-changing-stance-on-retirement--3259884">messianic mission for Uganda and Africa</a>, he feels irritated having to subject himself to the motions of electioneering. </p>
<p>As Museveni’s rule has become more repressive, public opinion and media coverage in the West have shifted dramatically against him. In the 2021 elections, many in the community of pro-democracy advocates and activists in Africa found reason to overtly and proactively support Museveni’s main challenger for the presidency, the pop star and member of parliament Robert Kyagulanyi, more popularly known as Bobi Wine. </p>
<p>However, the obsession with Bobi Wine is problematic. This is because it fails to grasp the complex conditions around Museveni’s stay in power and the daunting dilemma of freeing the country from his firm grip. Museveni is a ruler whose primary source of power is the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/%20us-uganda-politics/ugandanspecial-forces-accused-ofejecting-mps-from-parliamentidUSKCN1C41RX">bullet</a> – not the ballot.</p>
<p>Resisting and defeating such an entrenched authoritarian ruler cannot be achieved through pressure from Western powers alone. The forces and fuel that can prudently take down Museveni – in a way that advances the cause of genuine democracy and freedom – must necessarily evolve and emerge from Uganda and among Ugandans. </p>
<p>It is my argument that the outsized role of external agitators might in fact hurt rather than help the struggle for liberation from what is now a decayed, moribund and personalised system of rule. </p>
<h2>It’s not enough to chase out Museveni</h2>
<p>The Western media made the recent election about Bobi Wine as a person rather than what is critically at stake for Uganda and Ugandans. This meant that they handed Museveni a free pass to smear and discredit his opponent. He has sought to portray Bobi Wine as nothing more than an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/jan/11/yoweri-museveni-bobi-wine-uganda-election">agent of foreign interests</a> – a front for the same old imperial interests Museveni repeatedly claims are seeking to weaken Africa.</p>
<p>External agitation and pressure may sound like a benign and welcome ingredient to take down a brazen dictator. In practice, however, it can inadvertently promote nationalist mobilisation and jingoism in the service of entrenching the dictatorship. This happened in <a href="https://www.eurospanbookstore.com/media/pdf/extracts/9781626370760.pdf">Zimbabwe</a> when Robert Mugabe dug in deeper to hold on for so long.</p>
<p>For those keen to advance democracy and freedom in Uganda, the starting point is to take in the lessons of history. Externally instigated regime change tends not to happen the way it is expected to – and often leads to <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/Kuperman%20policy%20brief%20published%20version%202.pdf">disastrous outcomes</a>. </p>
<p>Bringing about meaningful change is not as simple as chasing out an autocrat and installing a new figure with populist appeal. It is also wrong to construe opposition figures as angels embodying democracy and deserving uncritical embrace. To see Museveni as a devilish dictator and his opponents as angelic democrats is a misleading dichotomy. Today’s ‘pro-democracy’ opposition figures can easily turn into tomorrow’s authoritarian rulers.</p>
<p>Uganda is a deeply socially complex society. The scale of the country’s socioeconomic problems and crisis of its politics cannot be overemphasised. It will be a herculean task to forge a new Uganda of peace and prosperity. The issue is not merely one of saving Ugandans from a ruthless dictator. It is also about understanding how a post-Museveni Uganda can be pursued and prudently implemented. </p>
<p>Here, the Western journalist, the academic, the democracy advocate and activist, the diplomat and politician need to pause and appreciate that principled partnership with Ugandans might help. But old-type paternalism won’t. The agency of Ugandans is what can make a true and durable difference.</p>
<h2>More humility, less hubris</h2>
<p>I propose more humility and less hubris for foreign actors genuinely concerned and fired up for freedom and liberation of suffering Ugandans. The possibility of social disintegration in the country is real. Its social fabric is fragile. The youth bulge presents a <a href="http://fontes.no/foundation/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Michael-Pletscher_Youth-unemployment-in-Uganda.pdf">daunting task</a>. Land conflicts easily portend the most important source of social disharmony and violence. The country’s democratic experiment requires a total rethink. </p>
<p>To start tackling these and other endemic problems, Uganda urgently needs a candid and concerted national conversation to turn the corner away from Museveni’s misrule, to reimagine a new Uganda. </p>
<p>The country wants to free itself from Museveni’s mess, but Museveni too needs to be liberated from his own trap of power. There is a delicate and difficult negotiation to be navigated here. It needs thoughtfulness and perceptiveness, not just fancy slogans and foreign pressure. </p>
<p>The prospects for forging a post-Museveni Uganda any time soon may very well be undercut by actions of overzealous and overbearing foreign actors. There is no magic wand of a popular figure that will easily sweep away Museveni without the efforts of coherent, coordinated and combined change seeking forces inside the country.</p>
<p><em>A longer version of this article was published in <a href="https://codesria.org/IMG/pdf/3-_khisa_codbul_online_21.pdf">CODESRIA Bulletin No.3</a>, January 2021</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/154663/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Moses Khisa is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at North Carolina State University, a columnist for Daily Monitor newspaper, a research associate with the Centre for Basic Research in Kampala and a member of the Pan-African Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa in Dakar. </span></em></p>For those keen to advance democracy and freedom in Uganda, the starting point is to take in the lessons of history.Moses Khisa, Assistant Professor of Political Science, North Carolina State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1540812021-01-28T14:11:19Z2021-01-28T14:11:19ZMuseveni has failed to win over young, urban Ugandans: why he’s running out of options<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/380827/original/file-20210127-21-1ha6vo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Campaign posters of President Yoweri Museveni hang on a cable a day after the election commission said he won a sixth term in office.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">YASUYOSHI CHIBA/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Yoweri Museveni <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-55689665">has claimed</a> victory in Uganda’s recent elections, potentially extending his presidential rule to 41 years. The elections were marred by <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/oped/columnists/daniel-kalinaki/in-five-years-will-our-destination-be-talks-on-the-left-or-junta-on-the-right--3264364">widespread claims of rigging, malpractice and intimidation</a>. At the receiving end of this was his thoroughly <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/bobi-wine-robert-kyagulanyi-uganda-opposition-yoweri-musaveni-torture-police-medical-treatment-a8519916.html">brutalised</a> opponent, the pop star-turned politician Robert Kyagulanyi, also known as Bobi Wine. </p>
<p>The question is, what’s next? </p>
<p>Museveni’s political party – the National Resistance Movement – has been the ruling party in Uganda since 1986. But its popularity has now hit rock bottom in the country’s urban areas, particularly among young people. </p>
<p>Kampala, like most of Uganda’s urban areas, has <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/dpr.12068">long been an opposition stronghold</a> and the urban challenge to Museveni was clear even before Bobi Wine arrived on the political scene in 2017.</p>
<p>It’s difficult for anyone to know exactly how much support Wine and his National Unity Platform command across the country. But what’s clear is that Museveni has been rejected in the capital. Wine’s party won <a href="https://dailyexpress.co.ug/2021/01/18/list-59-nup-elected-mps-for-the-11th-parliament/">nine of the 10 parliamentary seats</a> in Kampala, with the 10th being retained by its incumbent, an independent MP. Museveni’s party also won just <a href="https://www.independent.co.ug/landslide-victory-for-lord-mayor-erias-lukwago/">8% of the mayoral votes</a> cast in Kampala. </p>
<p>Of the many challenges facing the president, the mobilisation of young people living in urban areas is one that clearly will not dissipate. Uganda has <a href="https://population.un.org/wup/Download/">one of the</a> youngest populations in the world, with a median age of 17. Moreover, between 2015 and 2020 its urban growth rate was <a href="https://population.un.org/wup/Download/">higher than any other country globally</a>. Given that <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/09/20/why-are-ugandan-youth-so-angry-these-4-takeaways-illuminate-the-recent-protests/">disaffected urban youth</a> are so central to National Unity Platform’s support base, urban opposition is likely to fester and grow after this disputed election.</p>
<p>On the one hand, Uganda finds itself in uncharted territory. The beaten opposition candidate is from the growing demographic of dissatisfied urbanites, and his party has swept the board in Kampala and surrounding districts like no other opposition party before.</p>
<p>On the other hand, there is a sense of déjà vu. Museveni’s party didn’t win any seats in Kampala <a href="https://www.ec.or.ug/sites/default/files/docs/Gazette%20List%20Elected%20MPs%202016.pdf">in 2016 </a> either. </p>
<p>So what did Museveni do to try to regain political dominance in urban areas after previous elections? And what does this mean for the future?</p>
<p><a href="https://www.effective-states.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/esid_wp_146_muwanga_mukwaya_goodfellow.pdf">Our research</a> explores this. It focuses on the National Resistance Movement’s attempt to dominate Kampala over the last two decades, and especially since 2010. </p>
<p>It shows the breadth of strategies and tactics used against urban opposition. Wads of cash, institutional restructuring, waiving taxes and regulations, militarisation and open terror on the streets were among them. But they’ve all failed to stop Kampala’s residents from voting against him. </p>
<p>Uganda is at a crossroads. It is clear that Museveni is <a href="https://www.independent.co.ug/landslide-victory-for-lord-mayor-erias-lukwago/">running out of tactics</a>, and business as usual is no longer going to be enough. Either the country’s young, urbanising population needs to be taken much more seriously by the regime, or Museveni takes the country down the road of all-out military dictatorship.</p>
<h2>Two decades of shifting strategies</h2>
<p>Most media attention has understandably been focused on the brutal repression of opposition. Nevertheless, we can see that Museveni’s long campaign to claw back support in Kampala was multifaceted. It included efforts to manipulate institutions and co-opt urban youth, as well as to coerce.</p>
<p>Since the early 2000s, Museveni has made efforts to win over Kampala’s huge numbers of <a href="https://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/understanding-the-informal-economy-in-african-cities-recent-evidence-from-greater-kampala">informal workers</a>. He built support among the city’s market vendors, carpenters, salon operators, restaurant owners and transport workers by <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S026427511200039X?casa_token=ziNpxYRcymcAAAAA:oLv7ZveR2LuL6_stBMAk5c5tvko2z3JkI7LU3Uqc-opRiB-LSDyFwA2pF34sCYDue0SPTHhuMQ">constantly intervening</a> to prevent the city council from implementing taxes and regulations. He also showered workers’ associations with micro finance schemes and other sporadic favours. This may have even yielded some results with an uptick in support in <a href="https://www.ec.or.ug/sites/Elec_results/2011_Direct_MPs.pdf">2011’s election.</a>.</p>
<p>But it became apparent between 2011 and 2016 that his push to transform the city through the new <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1468-2427.12012?casa_token=QmOTslgiYaMAAAAA%3ACyca9NmN68ZpMYm7s5lvVuaHdGnhd-AyS4WtwLu_qjGwBgb9lZIPsw_69J7E76KWr6c0mWclSX5Uebc">Kampala Capital City Authority</a> also made him unpopular with informal workers. Many found themselves at the sharp end of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2017.1378448?casa_token=8Tc1Ci1VrHAAAAAA%3AuBKKRIswQpBGOetZXRlQnqrw04g9Af6yRjrgG7tynTdMPeDkblvJFXqOwTHVpx0nrgFHODQgMZLt">“clean up” operations</a> on the city’s streets. </p>
<p>In the run-up to the 2016 election – by which time Bobi Wine’s politically-charged music was already rattling the president – Museveni even <a href="https://matsutas.wordpress.com/2015/11/16/we-are-with-you-musicians-and-the-2016-general-elections-in-uganda-by-nanna-schneidermann/">co-opted a dozen of Uganda’s other leading pop stars</a> into his own <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-4JhrmVpL68">campaign</a> song.</p>
<p>This failed to prevent his very <a href="https://www.ec.or.ug/ecresults/02-Final%20Presidential%20Results%20by%20District.pdf">low vote share</a> in Kampala in 2016. He then went into overdrive to buy influence among urban youth and opposition figures. He established an informal <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/museveni-s-fight-for-soul-of-the-ghetto-1857056">“ghetto fund” and “brown envelopes”</a>, allegedly diverting money from official government projects, and <a href="https://www.effective-states.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/esid_wp_146_muwanga_mukwaya_goodfellow.pdf">sent “socialites” and “philanthropists”</a> into city slums to distribute cash and consumer goods.</p>
<p>Wine’s home neighbourhood of Kamwokya was a particular target for Museveni. His State House acolytes wrote <a href="https://observer.ug/images/Museveni-handing-over-a-Shs-100m-dummy-cheque-to-Mulago-car-washers.jpg">gigantic</a> cheques to youth organisations - handouts that took place largely outside official channels.</p>
<p>In this respect, Museveni’s attempt to gain support in urban areas in the 2021 elections was not only about repression. But it still failed.</p>
<h2>Looking ahead</h2>
<p>What, then, will Museveni do next? </p>
<p>Fierce urban opposition didn’t prevent him from claiming a “large margin” of victory. After all, over <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.RUR.TOTL.ZS?locations=UG">three quarters</a> of Uganda’s population still live in rural areas, and Museveni has always dominated rural Uganda.</p>
<p>Given this, it is possible that he could just abandon efforts to win urban support, instead adopting a strategy of containment towards Bobi Wine and his urban followers.</p>
<p>There are, however, at least two good reasons to think this unlikely.</p>
<p>The first is Uganda’s extreme <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS?locations=UG">urbanisation trajectory</a>. The problem of urban opposition, if ignored, will only grow. The balance of voters is shifting away from Museveni, and he knows it.</p>
<p>The second is that abandoning cities to the opposition will mean maintaining very high levels of urban militarisation and repression, especially since Bobi Wine (now <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/61347/uganda-high-court-orders-military-to-release-bobi-wine-from-house-arrest/">released</a>) will surely try to continue mobilising his base. </p>
<p>This level of ongoing brutality is unlikely to be what the regime wants. Museveni likes to <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/01/12/953580506/ugandas-ruler-museveni-defends-violent-crackdown-in-bid-for-6th-term?t=1611765023363">show people who is boss in public</a>, viciously and periodically; but not continuously. His relationship with Western donors is still valued, and full-blown military rule is not a good option.</p>
<p>He might try to offer something new to offer city dwellers – such as major transport and housing projects or industrial jobs. </p>
<p>But for reasons relating to land tenure, corruption and the city’s politics, Kampala is a <a href="https://www.independent.co.ug/the-fall-of-jennifer-musisi/">notoriously difficult context</a> in which to deliver these kinds of projects. That’s why the regime has always fallen back on informal favours and populist gestures. Evidently these are no longer sufficient to stop urban opposition mounting.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/154081/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tom Goodfellow receives funding from the Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre, Economic and Social Research Council and Global Challenges Research Fund.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Isolo Mukwaya receives funding from Effective States & Inclusive Development Centre, Economic and Social Research Council and Global Challenges Research Fund. </span></em></p>Museveni’s attempt to gain support in urban areas in the 2021 elections was not only about repression. But it still failed.Tom Goodfellow, Lecturer in Urban Studies and Planning, University of SheffieldPaul Isolo Mukwaya, Senior Lecturer, Makerere UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1533382021-01-15T17:27:51Z2021-01-15T17:27:51ZUganda election: Museveni social media ban caps violent campaign<p>Forty-eight hours before Ugandan voters went to the polls the country’s Communications Commission (UCC) <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uganda-election-social-media/uganda-orders-all-social-media-to-be-blocked-letter-idUSL1N2JN0SH">imposed a social media blackout</a>. It had been a bitter and violent election campaign pitting the 76-year-old veteran president, Yoweri Museveni against Robert Kyagulanyi – better known as Bobi Wine – a 38-year-old pop-star-turned-politician. </p>
<p>Museveni has been in power for 34 years and a victory in this election would be his seventh in a row in a tenure marked, say his critics, by a <a href="https://www.africaresearchinstitute.org/newsite/blog/subtleties-authoritarianism-musevenis-uganda/">slide towards authoritarianism</a>. </p>
<p>According to BBC reports, the shutdown affected not only popular social media sites such as Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, Signal and Viber, but more than 100 virtual private networks (VPN) which people were using to circumvent restrictions. The BBC also reported that the Uganda Communications Commission had ordered telecoms companies to suspend internet access altogether the evening before the January 14 election, although this information has yet to be officially verified.</p>
<p>It’s not the first time this has happened – a similar social media ban was ordered during the <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/02/uganda-election-social-media-shutdown/463407/">2016 general election</a>. Restrictions on social media were implemented in 2019 around elections or referenda in <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-47734843">several African countries</a>, including Togo, Burundi and Guinea. </p>
<p>Museveni, the self-styled liberator, led the National Resistance Movement to power in Uganda in 1986. He has ten opponents in this year’s election, but the consensus is that Wine is <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uganda-election-bobi-wine/ugandan-presidential-challenger-bobi-wine-campaigns-in-a-flak-jacket-idUSKBN29B10E">the most serious challenger</a>. His National Unity Platform has led a vigorous campaign against the incumbent and Wine himself <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/dec/30/uganda-opposition-candidate-bobi-wine-campaign-team-arrest">has been arrested several times</a> in the run-up to the poll. His home was raided two days before election day. </p>
<p>On January 13, the government ordered internet service providers to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/13/world/africa/uganda-facebook-ban-elections.html">block all social media platforms</a> and messaging apps and online activity plummeted to 33% of normal levels, according to the <a href="https://netblocks.org/reports/social-media-and-messaging-platforms-restricted-in-uganda-ahead-of-general-election-XB7aaO87">NetBlocks Internet Observatory</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/378996/original/file-20210115-15-1wew5kd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Graph showing internet usage in Uganda falling sharply after social media ban." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/378996/original/file-20210115-15-1wew5kd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/378996/original/file-20210115-15-1wew5kd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=349&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/378996/original/file-20210115-15-1wew5kd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=349&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/378996/original/file-20210115-15-1wew5kd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=349&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/378996/original/file-20210115-15-1wew5kd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/378996/original/file-20210115-15-1wew5kd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/378996/original/file-20210115-15-1wew5kd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ugandan government’s social media ban prompted sharp fall in internet use.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Netblocks</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Museveni’s press secretary, Don Wanyama, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-55618994">told reporters</a> the move was made in retaliation after Facebook took down a number of pro-government accounts which it said were engaged in a coordinated campaign of misinformation. </p>
<p>Facebook <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-uganda-election-facebook-idUSKBN29G1H9">released a statement alleging</a> that government agencies had “used fake and duplicate accounts to manage posts, comment on other people’s content, impersonate users, re-share posts in groups to make them appear more popular than they were”.</p>
<p>DFRLab, a Washington-based internet watchdog, <a href="https://medium.com/dfrlab/social-media-disinformation-campaign-targets-ugandan-presidential-election-b259dbbb1aa8">announced</a> it had “uncovered a collection of Twitter accounts and Facebook pages engaging in suspicious online behaviour”. </p>
<p>Wanyama, whose own social media accounts had been suspended after the investigation, accused Facebook of bias: “It is simply a platform,” he <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-55618994">told the BBC</a>. “It should not morph into a political party. There must be regulation of these platforms and independent oversight bodies.”</p>
<h2>Heavy hand of internet regulation</h2>
<p>The latest shutdown suggests that, in trying to regulate social media, the Ugandan authorities want to manage online platforms in a similar way to broadcasters. In December 2020, the <a href="https://techjaja.com/ucc-writes-to-google-wants-the-following-ugandan-youtube-channels-blocked/">UCC wrote to Google</a>, citing the <a href="http://www.ug-cert.ug/files/downloads/UCC%20Act%202013#:%7E:text=An%20Act%20to%20consolidate%20and,to%20provide%20for%20related%20matters.">Communications Act of 2013</a> as the basis for which 17 pro-opposition YouTube accounts should be suspended. Section 27 of the Act requires all broadcasters to be licensed and Section 2(c) says regulatory subjects include “any electronic representation of information”. This deliberately vague wording allows a very wide interpretation of what can be effectively controlled by the state.</p>
<p>It’s not the first time the UCC has used this 2013 legislation to restrict online publishers. In March 2018, the UCC <a href="https://www.independent.co.ug/ucc-registration-online-publishers-uganda/">cited Section 6(e)</a> of the Act to require internet publishers and broadcasting platforms to be annually registered. In September 2020, <a href="https://twitter.com/UCC_Official/status/1302886140350005248">this order was extended</a> to “all persons currently offering or planning to commence the provision of online data communication”. Meanwhile, in July 2018, the government introduced a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uganda-internet/uganda-imposes-tax-on-social-media-use-idUSKCN1IW2IK">social media tax</a> of 200 Shilling (US$0.05) per day on all users as a way of combatting “online gossip”. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1349335341090680832"}"></div></p>
<p>In spite of the broad application of the act, big tech platforms such as Facebook and Twitter have not been directly targeted. Instead these recurring internet bans have targeted ISPs and telecoms providers. This is probably because these platforms are perceived as being beyond the reach of Uganda’s government control – for instance, Google <a href="https://www.independent.co.ug/google-tells-uganda-to-go-to-court/">pushed back</a> against the UCC’s take-down demands, arguing that a court order would be needed before it would comply. </p>
<p>The Museveni government’s approach is different from efforts being made in developed countries to introduce some measure of online regulation. In the UK, the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/online-harms-white-paper">Online Harms White Paper</a> which was published in December 2020, “sets out plans for new laws to make the UK a safer place to be online, while ensuring strong safeguards for freedom of expression”. This puts the onus on online publishers – including social media platforms – to moderate the content on their own platforms. The white paper itself was developed after a three-month consultation process in which responses from more than 2,400 stakeholders were considered.</p>
<p>It seems likely that, unless its approach changes with a new government, the UCC will be content to exert its influence on ordinary people and organisations within Uganda as it continues to view social media regulation through the same lens as it regards traditional media. How that will work remains to be seen.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/153338/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Vincent Obia receives funding from the Commonwealth Scholarship Commission in the UK. </span></em></p>In a bitterly contested election, the government is seeking to control the message by shutting down the internet.Vincent Obia, PhD Researcher, Birmingham City UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1532052021-01-13T14:02:54Z2021-01-13T14:02:54ZBobi Wine has shaken up Ugandan politics: four things worth knowing about him<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/378503/original/file-20210113-13-dmiay0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Robert Kyagulanyi Ssentamu, also known as Bobi Wine, addresses supporters in Uganda's capital Kampala. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Luke Dray/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Regardless of how Ugandans decide to vote in the January 14 presidential elections, the incumbent Yoweri Museveni will most likely be declared the winner. Museveni has ruled the country for five consecutive terms. He has historically been able to <a href="https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2016/05/16/uganda-cost-of-fake-democracy/">manipulate</a> elections in his favour, because he controls Uganda’s military, judiciary, and Electoral Commission with an iron fist.</p>
<p>Throughout this electoral campaign, however, the long-standing Ugandan president has been upstaged by a formidable young challenger: popular musician-turned-parliamentarian Robert Kyagulanyi, aka Bobi Wine. Since being elected as a Member of Parliament in 2017, the 38-year-old leader of the National Unity Platform has become the new face of Uganda’s opposition.</p>
<p>There are four things worth knowing about Bobi Wine and Uganda’s politics.</p>
<h2>Building a movement, defying expectations</h2>
<p>Bobi Wine has repeatedly been underestimated by government supporters and critics since he first ran for parliament. He was forced to run as an independent after the two major opposition parties, the Forum for Democratic Change and the Democratic Party, turned him away.</p>
<p>He nevertheless easily won the by-election in the Kyandondo East constituency within Kampala with <a href="https://observer.ug/news/headlines/53602-kyadondo-east-bobi-wine-headed-for-landslide-victory">78%</a> of the vote. Since then, he has proved himself to be a skilled politician who has successfully built a strong political movement – from scratch.</p>
<p>Within his first two years in office, he forged a reputation as a principled and fearless opponent of Museveni’s policies. He was a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LLDMrbk5VIU">leading voice</a> against the president’s ultimately successful effort to remove <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/us-turns-blind-eye-ugandas-assault-democracy/">presidential age limits</a> from the constitution. He also led protests against the government’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44798627">proposed tax on social media</a> in July 2018.</p>
<p>Over the course of that same year, he endorsed opposition candidates who went on to <a href="https://www.independent.co.ug/bobi-wine-beats-besigye-in-bugiri/">win</a> four consecutive parliamentary by-elections. </p>
<p>By 2018, he had created a political pressure group called <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/can-bobi-wine-unite-uganda-and-bring-down-a-dictator/">People Power, Our Power</a>. When the government blocked its registration as a formal political party, Bobi Wine outmanoeuvred the Electoral Commission by aligning himself with a smaller, pre-existing one, which he <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/how-bobi-wine-nup-deal-was-negotiated-1908714">re-christened</a> as the National Unity Platform. Almost immediately more than 20 MPs left more established opposition parties to <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/21-mps-join-bobi-wine-1921682">join</a> his party.</p>
<h2>A target of unprecedented state repression</h2>
<p>Bobi Wine has been a regular target of state <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/besigye-lauds-opposition-presidential-candidates-for-bracing-security-brutality-3254412">repression</a>. </p>
<p>The Museveni regime responded to his early successes by repeatedly <a href="https://observer.ug/news/headlines/62237-police-cancels-another-bobi-wine-concert">blocking</a> him from holding concerts and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/9/30/uganda-bans-red-beret-bobi-wines-signature-headgear">banning</a> the public from wearing People Power’s trademark red berets.</p>
<p>Since being elected, Bobi Wine has been <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/uganda-presidential-candidate-bobi-wine-arrested-reports-3243652">arrested</a> countless times. He has never been convicted on any of the charges. Some of his movement’s members and supporters have been <a href="https://observer.ug/news/headlines/63683-one-shot-dead-as-police-battles-bobi-wine-supporters-in-nansana">killed</a>, sometimes in <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/ziggy-wyne-death-bobi-wine-speaks-out-1841472">suspicious</a> <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/police-accused-of-killing-people-power-movement-supporter-1876952">circumstances</a>. </p>
<p>Many have been arrested. Perhaps most notoriously, in August 2018, as he campaigned for a fellow independent candidate in a by-election in Arua in northwestern Uganda, Bobi Wine and at least 35 of his political associates were <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/08/uganda-bobi-wine-arrested/568549/">arrested</a> following dubious <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/can-bobi-wine-unite-uganda-and-bring-down-a-dictator/">reports</a> that Museveni’s motorcade had been stoned. That same night the opposition leader’s driver, <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/08/uganda-investigate-death-of-opposition-politicians-driver/">Yasin Kawuma</a>, was murdered with a bullet that Bobi Wine <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/29/opinion/uganda-museveni-repression.html">believes</a> was intended for him.</p>
<p>In the aftermath of these arrests, the Kyadondo East MP was <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/uganda-museveni-critic-bobi-wine-charged-in-military-trial/a-45082938">charged with treason</a> and possession of illegal firearms. Over his next ten days in custody, he was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/04/bobi-wine-ugandan-pop-star-politician-describes-torture-by-soldiers">beaten so brutally</a> by government security forces that he could not stand, sit or walk. He eventually sought <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/9/1/bobi-wine-arrives-in-us-for-medical-treatment">treatment for his injuries</a> in the US.</p>
<p>International <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/22/chris-martin-and-damon-albarn-join-campaign-to-free-uganda-star-bobi-wine">outrage</a> at this incident has not stopped the Museveni regime from escalating its tactics of repression during this election cycle.</p>
<p>The arrests have continued unabated throughout the current campaign. In addition, campaign rallies have been restricted and the government has met opposition supporters with deadly force on multiple occasions. Most tragically, following Bobi Wine’s arrest in mid-November, nationwide protests erupted during which state security forces killed <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/12/uganda-stop-killings-and-human-rights-violations-ahead-of-election-day/">at least 54 people</a>.</p>
<p>In response to these abuses, in early January, Bobi Wine and two other co-claimants filed a 47-page complaint to the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/08/world/africa/uganda-election-bobi-wine-icc.html">International Criminal Court</a> against Museveni and nine of his regime’s security officials, accusing them of gross human rights violations dating back to 2018.</p>
<h2>Generational dimension</h2>
<p>Uganda’s changing demographics have a great deal to do with Bobi Wine’s electoral appeal. The East African country of 46.5 million people has one of the world’s youngest populations, with a median age of <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/uganda-population/">16.7</a>. Just over one in five Ugandans are between the ages of 15 and 24 and 77% of the country’s population is <a href="https://www.issuelab.org/resources/4998/4998.pdf">under the age of 30</a>.</p>
<p>Although these young people have benefited from reforms to public education introduced by the Museveni regime, they see little hope for the future. By some estimates, youth unemployment in Uganda is as <a href="https://theconversation.com/insights-into-why-ugandas-strategy-to-create-jobs-for-young-people-hasnt-fully-worked-149576">high</a> as 70%. Frustrated young people can, therefore, easily identify with Bobi Wine, who grew up in the Kampala ghetto of Kamwokya. Like him, they have only known life under Museveni. He was not even four when Museveni first came to power in 1986.</p>
<p>Bobi Wine has skilfully appealed to this demographic. He frames his political movement in generational terms: the “Facebook generation”, which he represents against the <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2020/11/uganda-if-we-do-not-take-risks-we-risk-everything/">“entrenched interests of the ‘Facelift generation’”</a> of the Museveni regime. He has been able to speak to – and articulate – the deep sense of anger and grievance that young Ugandans feel towards the Museveni regime. In so doing, Uganda’s “Ghetto President” has come to be the face and voice of young people’s collective desire for generational political change.</p>
<h2>Populism</h2>
<p>In the final weeks of the campaign, Museveni derided Bobi Wine as a <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/some-countries-have-voted-for-change-out-of-excitement-museveni--3250376">populist</a> politician. While this adjective was intended to dismiss his young adversary, there is some truth to this label. In my <a href="https://www.academia.edu/44894954/_Politics_Unusual_Generational_Populism_and_the_Making_of_People_Power_in_Uganda">research</a>, I argue that Bobi Wine’s inclusionary brand of populism has also been a key to his political success.</p>
<p>His use of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13569317.2020.1844372">populist rhetoric</a> has effectively forged a new collective sense of identity among his mostly youthful supporters around the nodal point of “the people” and in antagonistic opposition to the country’s political elite .</p>
<p>But Bobi Wine’s brand of populism is novel because his conception of “the people” is defined not in ethno-nationalist terms (as with right-wing politicians in the US or Western Europe). Rather it’s defined largely in generational ones. This has helped him to build a burgeoning political coalition across ethno-regional lines.</p>
<p>If Bobi Wine’s brand of generational populism proves successful, its repercussions could be felt across Africa. It could serve as a model for opposition politicians who are operating in countries with similar demographic characteristics and facing many of the same political obstacles.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/153205/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Luke Melchiorre does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Opposition presidential candidate Robert Kyangulanyi has repeatedly been underestimated by government supporters and critics since he first ran for parliament.Luke Melchiorre, Assistant Professor, Political Science, Universidad de los Andes Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1531072021-01-12T16:05:54Z2021-01-12T16:05:54ZSocial media seized the narrative in Uganda’s election. Why this was good for democracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/378234/original/file-20210112-23-ioio6h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=265%2C68%2C757%2C533&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ugandan musician-turned-politician Robert Kyagulanyi addresses the media after his car was shot at by police in eastern Uganda during his campaign.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Sumy Sadurni/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>For months, Ugandans have witnessed a <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/uganda-wraps-up-violent-and-chaotic-election-campaign-3251436">vicious presidential election campaign</a> without precedent. While the incumbent, Yoweri Museveni, has enjoyed free rein on the campaign trail, his youthful main opponent Robert Kyagulanyi and his supporters have faced numerous obstacles – and <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/58126/uganda-elections-bobi-wine-puts-yoweri-museveni-on-icc-notice/">physical assault</a>. The result is a pervasive <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/01/1081662">sense of political crisis</a> in the run-up to the January 14 vote. </p>
<p>But in this crisis is the potential for release. Ordinary Ugandans are pouring their social and political grievances onto social media platforms, spawning <a href="https://www.voanews.com/africa/uganda-protest-over-new-social-media-tax-turns-violent">debates</a> around accountability and governance. They have taken to recording events they find newsworthy and posting them directly to ordinary people’s WhatsApp, Facebook and Twitter accounts. In the process, they are sidestepping traditional channels – mainly radio, television and newspapers – along with their bureaucratic and hierachical procedures of news gathering. </p>
<p>The traditional media landscape has been dominated by Vision Group, in which the state owns the majority stake. The group owns the biggest circulating newspaper,<em>The New Vision</em>, a number of local regional newspapers and TV stations. Uganda Broadcasting Corporation, a statutory agency, has the widest TV and radio reach over the country, broadcasting in English and the major local languages as well as Kiswahili. The other main players are private media houses with TV and radio outlets and newspapers. But all are kept on a short leash through legislation and commercial imperatives in a market where the government is the <a href="https://acme-ug.org/tag/media-landscape-in-uganda/">chief source of advertising</a>.</p>
<p>The migration to social media has been driven by two key factors. The first is the wave of excitement in favour of Kyagulanyi, better known by his stage name Bobi Wine, and his bid for the presidency. The recent riots and their spread across the country only provide a glimpse into the popular interest in him. Traffic on social media is an indication of his appeal. </p>
<p>The second driver has been the fact that Uganda has a very youthful voting age population. The country has the <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/05/the-world-s-10-youngest-countries-are-all-in-africa">second youngest population on the continent</a>. According to the <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/uganda-population">World Population Review</a>, just 2% of Ugandans are 65 or older. </p>
<p>These young Ugandans have turned to their favourite tool and pastime: social media. The easy access to information on smartphones has emboldened them to speak out without fear. </p>
<p>In addition, journalists and prominent people in politics have set up Facebook pages and YouTube channels. They have taken to posting realtime events and activities of the politicians and their families. These clips range from hard news to human interest stories as well as outright propaganda and lies which are quickly debunked by the adversary.</p>
<p>The government tried to curb the use of social media, such as enacting a law on the misuse and abuse of technology. But it does not have the capacity to track all offenders, let alone to prove its case in court. Also, its attempts to limit access by levying social media tax have largely been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/feb/27/millions-of-ugandans-quit-internet-after-introduction-of-social-media-tax-free-speech">sidestepped</a> by the widespread use of <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/computer-science/virtual-private-network">virtual private networks</a>. </p>
<p>Never has a contest in Uganda’s political history been so furiously played out in the media space as the 2021 national elections. This trend is now irreversible. This may be the one gain for Ugandan democracy from the bruising poll. And it’s a gain unlikely to be dented by Uganda’s unprecedented <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uganda-election-social-media/uganda-orders-all-social-media-to-be-blocked-letter-idUSKBN29H1E7">ban</a> on all social media platforms and messaging apps 48 hours before the presidential vote. </p>
<h2>History</h2>
<p>During Amin’s <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Idi-Amin">era</a> in the 1970s balanced reporting was unheard of. The government newspaper, Voice of Uganda, carried leading headlines daily featuring Amin throughout its lifetime and the government radio and TV stations were Amin’s mouthpieces. It was suicidal to carry dissenting voices.</p>
<p>When the National Resistance Movement came to power in 1986 through an armed insurrection, it set up its own media presence. This media extolled the new leadership and the movement through which it captured power. “When we captured power” became the ubiquitous preamble of many government officials’ speeches. It was embraced positively in TV and radio documentary scripts and newspaper articles. </p>
<p>The image of a new regime riding on the wrongs of past leaders to capture power by armed insurrection in the interests of the people is <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5UoqwEREY5A">now a distant memory</a>. Fast forward to 2021 and six election cycles later, Ugandans in general and journalists in particular are feeling the full force of that power. </p>
<p>Journalists covering the current campaign have endured <a href="https://allafrica.com/view/group/main/main/id/00076398.html">police assault</a>, access restrictions and regulatory sanctions such as having to register to be accredited. There is <a href="https://www.hrnjuganda.org/hrnj-uganda-alert-two-arrested-over-brutal-assault-of-three-journalists-four-others-remain-at-large-2/">ample evidence of brutality</a>. </p>
<p>COVID-19 restrictions have also been <a href="https://www.independent.co.ug/un-high-commissioner-for-human-rights-condemns-abuses-in-uganda/">used as a smokescreen</a> to control the media and the movement of journalists. </p>
<p>Restrictions have been placed on media access for opposition candidates. Such candidates have reported incidents of being denied access to upcountry broadcast outlets by government authorities and owners fearing repercussions. Opposition candidates also <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BiYISQYySbQ">lament restrictions to the mainstream radio and television such as UBC’s network</a>.</p>
<p>Amid all these hurdles, Museveni has continued to appear daily on media outlets. His daily schedule includes live TV appearances commissioning government development projects such as roads, hospitals, markets, bridges and dams. </p>
<h2>Social media</h2>
<p>There are also downsides to the spike in social media use. One is that conspiracy theories abound on the various platforms. But, despite the challenges posed by the unprofessionalism of some citizen journalism on social media, the public has woken up to the power of breaking news and whistleblowing that speaks directly to power. </p>
<p>There have been some notable instances where social media has come into its own in holding those in authority accountable. One example was the effective use of live streaming of the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N2UloXXNzZA">deadly political riots</a> in which at least 45 were killed in November 2020. This proved to be the only source of direct information after security services cut the flow of information by seizing journalists on the scene and prevailing on media houses <a href="https://ipi.media/journalist-critically-injured-in-uganda-riots/">not to broadcast</a> the violent scenes. </p>
<p>How the role of social media will affect the outcome of the poll remains an open question. Demographics will play a large role. Museveni still has a hold on rural and elderly voters while Kyagulanyi seems to pull the urban youth. </p>
<p>Above all, much depends on whether it’s a free and fair poll. Here, Kyagulanyi can only hope that the electoral commission ensures a level playing field.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/153107/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Geoffrey Ssenoga does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Never has a political contest in Uganda’s history been so furiously played out in the media space as the 2021 national elections.Geoffrey Ssenoga, Lecturer of Mass Communications, Uganda Christian UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1527742021-01-10T08:13:22Z2021-01-10T08:13:22ZThe roots of pre-election carnage by Uganda security forces<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/377782/original/file-20210108-13-1iuzd6x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ugandan soldiers shoot at demonstrators during riots in Kampala sparked by the arrest of opposition leader Kizza Besigye in 2011. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> Marc Hofer/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>For two days in November 2020, Uganda witnessed some of the <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/special-reports/death-toll-from-riots-rises-to-50--3208320">most violent riots</a> in a decade. The riots were triggered by the arrest of opposition presidential candidate Robert Kyagulanyi, who is challenging the incumbent Yoweri Museveni in the February 14 2021 election. Authorities alleged that Kyagulanyi, better known as Bobi Wine, had consistently disregarded COVID-19 related election campaign <a href="https://www.newvision.co.ug/news/1520972/ec-bans-campaign-rallies-2021-polls">guidelines</a> limiting gatherings to no more than 200 people. </p>
<p>In the violence that ensued, contingents of heavily armed police and the army responded with tear gas and live ammunition, resulting in the <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/special-reports/death-toll-from-riots-rises-to-50--3208320">death</a> of at least 45 people. Eleven members of the security forces were also reportedly <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/security-forces-start-investigating-their-own-over-last-week-s-killings-3210952">injured</a> during the riots. </p>
<p>The lethal use of force to break up a riot provoked national and international <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/africa/article/2001394469/us-condemns-deadly-violence-in-uganda-after-bobi-wine-arrest">condemnation</a>. It also raised questions around the standard applied by Uganda’s security forces in quelling this and similarly <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/09/10/uganda-investigate-2009-kampala-riot-killings">deadly riots</a> in the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/04/22/uganda-5-years-no-justice-walk-work-killings">past</a>. </p>
<p>The blanket and indiscriminate use of firearms and live ammunition led directly to the carnage witnessed in only two days. This violent response of police and army units reinforces my <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-uganda-needs-new-laws-to-hold-police-in-check-and-accountable-120900">view</a> that Uganda must overhaul its national legal framework on the use of force and firearms during law enforcement. The current framework contains highly permissive and ambiguous standards which enable law enforcement actors to use excessive force with no clear lines of accountability. </p>
<p>The framework doesn’t address Uganda’s long-standing reliance on the army for strictly law enforcement tasks. Army officers deployed in this way are obliged to obey the orders of their superior working in collaboration with the officer in charge of the civil power. This is highly unlikely given the record of past brutally executed joint law enforcement tasks. </p>
<p>It’s now time that the country enacted laws in keeping with international standards, such as the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms. It needs to redefine the relationship between police and military during law enforcement.</p>
<h2>Use of force and firearms</h2>
<p>The right to life is <a href="https://www.parliament.go.ug/documents/1240/constitution">protected</a> under Uganda’s constitution. This protection was recently buttressed by Uganda’s <a href="https://ulii.org/ug/judgment/constitutional-court-uganda/2019/5">Constitutional Court</a>, which declared as unconstitutional the wide latitude given to law enforcers under Uganda’s Police Act. </p>
<p>The act previously empowered police to do “all things necessary” when dispersing unlawful assemblies. It granted immunity for any death or injury caused in the process, while condoning police brutality. The Police Act has not yet been amended to reflect the Constitutional Court’s ruling.</p>
<p>According to UN principles on the use of force and firearms, lethal use of firearms must be restricted to instances of an imminent threat of death or serious injury. Moreover, intentional use of lethal force even in such cases should only be when strictly unavoidable and in order to protect life. These principles require that law enforcement operations must be carefully planned to avoid use of force or use it as a last resort and employ the least harmful means necessary, to minimise damage and risk to bystanders and preserve human life. </p>
<p>But Uganda’s security minister, General Elly Tumwine – a top army general – has <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wOkgzQs-4Vk">asserted</a> that security forces have a right to shoot and kill in a situation where an offender displays a “certain level of violence”. He did not set out where the boundaries lie.</p>
<p>There have been dissenting voices, even among top administrators in Uganda. For example, the Police Director of Operations <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2020/12/04/uganda-police-apologise-for-bobi-wine-arrest-mass-shooting/">went on record</a> with an apology and admission of error. He acknowledged that the use of live bullets to disperse crowds was unlawful and that police should have used tear gas instead.</p>
<h2>Historical army clout</h2>
<p>The right to life is the <a href="https://www.policinglaw.info/assets/downloads/ICRC_the-use-of-weapons-and-equipment-in-law-enforcement-operations.pdf">most relevant right</a> during law enforcement operations and must not be arbitrarily deprived. JR Thackrah, a scholar of joint police and military operations in counter terrorism, has <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0032258X8305600107">noted</a> that,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“An army may kill in the execution of its normal functions but the function of the police is fulfilled by apprehending and bringing to account.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Unfortunately, in Uganda’s context, this distinction is not always apparent. This poses challenges for the application of human rights standards during joint police and military law enforcement operations.</p>
<p>Under Uganda’s constitution and the <a href="https://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwih3dvTttrtAhVByYUKHTGZBU0QFjADegQIChAC&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ulrc.go.ug%2Fsystem%2Ffiles_force%2Fulrc_resources%2Fu.p.d.f-act-2005.pdf%3Fdownload%3D1&usg=AOvVaw2YxYtdHTQeNLGqeyUuzQfJ">Uganda People’s Defence Forces Act,</a> the army can be called upon to “assist the civilian authority” in an emergency. Emergencies include a riot or a disturbance of the peace which the authorities can’t bring under control. <a href="http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/publications/police/uganda_country_report_2006.pdf">Past inquiries</a> into joint undertakings suggest domination and intimidation of the Uganda Police by the army. The army also reportedly disregards civilian laws and procedures. </p>
<p>This ultimately undermines the police leadership in its law enforcement role. Cumulatively, it undermines the distinction between use of force standards and protocols that must be applied during peacetime versus during war time.</p>
<h2>The way forward</h2>
<p>Under Uganda’s constitution the national army is subordinate to civilian authority. In practice, however, this isn’t the case. When the military is deployed during peacetime law enforcement operations, for instance, there is no statutory requirement that the army receives appropriate equipment and applies standards of training and doctrine which are in line with human rights standards fit for peacetime contexts. </p>
<p>By comparison, in some jurisdictions like <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/a42-020.pdf">South Africa,</a> military personnel deployed for law enforcement tasks in co-operation with the police must by law undergo appropriate training. They are also given equipment suitable for this role. This serves to <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPPHC/2020/147.html#:%7E:text=Even%20after%20the%20death%20of,not%20%27provoke%27%20the%20soldiers.&text=In%20effect%20what%20the%20Minister,which%20they%20did%20not%20have.">re-orient them</a> from enemy combat roles to peacetime roles. </p>
<p>In such contexts they are also explicitly <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/a42-020.pdf">bound by the same limits</a> on the use of force as the South African police. </p>
<p>Uganda’s Defence Forces Act could be amended to ensure such a requirement. This oversight could also ensure that mechanisms are in place to protect and maintain the police’s lead role during joint law enforcement operations.</p>
<p>Along with this, the police should receive more training and equipment including protective equipment in order to facilitate de-escalated and graduated use of force. Whereas the police have recently developed a <a href="https://www.upf.go.ug/handbook-on-the-use-of-force-and-firearms-by-law-enforcement-officers-during-operations/">handbook</a> on the use of force and firearms, this is not enough. The guidelines must be debated and incorporated in a comprehensive enforceable legal statute.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/152774/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sylvie Namwase receives funding from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark as a Post Doctorate Researcher on peace and sustainable growth in Uganda. </span></em></p>Uganda must overhaul its national legal framework on the use of force and firearms during law enforcement.Sylvie Namwase, Post Doctorate Researcher under the DANIDA funded project on security, sustainable growth and peace in Uganda., University of CopenhagenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1464902020-09-22T14:50:08Z2020-09-22T14:50:08ZA contested legacy: Julius Nyerere and the 2020 Tanzanian election<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/358840/original/file-20200918-22-zar446.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Julius Nyerere's ideas and legacy remain objects of debate in contemporary politics, especially in an election year.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Tanzanians will head to the polls on 28 October in which the incumbent, John Magufuli, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/c0repynkl22t/john-magufuli">faces</a> a determined opposition. Elected to a first term in 2015, Magufuli’s time in office has lived up to his nickname <em>tinga tinga</em>, Kiswahili for “the bulldozer”. He has been applauded by some for advancing a series of <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/news/President-Magufuli-out-to-leave-mega-projects-legacy/1840340-4838814-dbnbu0z/index.html">major developmental projects</a>. Others have denounced him for his arguably <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/oct/29/tanzania-president-magufuli-condemned-for-authoritarian-stance">more autocratic, repressive rule</a> </p>
<p>Magufuli leads <a href="https://www.ccmtz.org/history-chama-cha-mapinduzi-party-tanzania/">Chama Cha Mapinduzi</a>, one of the longest serving ruling parties in Africa. It is also the party of Tanzania’s socialist founding father, <a href="https://www.juliusnyerere.org/about">Julius Nyerere</a>, who looms large over the country’s politics more than 20 years after his death.</p>
<p>As the French anthropologist Marie-Aude Fouéré has <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/african-studies-review/article/julius-nyerere-ujamaa-and-political-morality-in-contemporary-tanzania/E3E68E60A9DE29197F82B230E8EA3CEB">noted</a>, Nyerere remains </p>
<blockquote>
<p>a political metaphor for debating and acting upon the present. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Magufuli has repeatedly <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2020.1779223">played up</a> the similarities between himself and Nyerere. His supporters cite his attacks on corruption among the ruling political class and his enthusiasm for completing infrastructural projects as evidence that he is the <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/news/1840340-5303282-9raarh/index.html">“Nyerere of our time”</a>.</p>
<p>Others are less reverent. They include Tundu Lissu, the presidential candidate for the main opposition party, Chadema. His family was forcibly relocated under Nyerere’s <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-7679.1975.tb00439.x">villagisation scheme</a> of the 1970s. He brands Nyerere an autocrat who built an <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/the-standard-insider/article/2001386054/magufuli-vs-lissu-what-it-takes-to-stop-a-political-bulldozer">“imperial presidency”</a>. </p>
<p>There is ample evidence of the ruling party’s tightening grip on power under Magufuli. In the lead up to the 2020 election, opposition rallies have been <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/magufuli-criticised-as-tanzania-bans-rallies--1351138">blocked</a>. The press has been <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/opinion-tanzanias-media-law-muzzles-free-speech/a-54532521">muzzled</a>, and prominent opposition politicians have been violently <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/tanzania-opposition-cries-foul-over-attacks-on-leaders-as-election-looms/a-53764518">attacked</a>. </p>
<p>In August, the Magufuli-controlled National Electoral Commission’s registration of candidates was marked by <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2020/08/26/tanzania-elections-opposition-report-widespread-nomination-interference/">irregularities</a>. Many opposition politicians were disqualified from contesting in October. </p>
<p>Lissu himself only <a href="https://theconversation.com/at-the-edge-of-democracy-what-the-upcoming-general-election-holds-in-store-for-tanzania-144601">returned from exile in July</a> after surviving an assassination attempt in 2017. For him, Magufuli’s brand of authoritarianism has its <a href="https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/former-tanzania-mp-magufuli-and-nyerere-era/5118744.html">roots</a> in the Nyerere era.</p>
<p>As these contrasting depictions of Nyerere attest, his ideas and legacy remain objects of debate in contemporary politics, especially in an election year.</p>
<p>In my <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03057070.2020.1799158?forwardService=showFullText&tokenAccess=T6GPRITEAJQZSX8FQJIP&tokenDomain=eprints&target=10.1080%2F03057070.2020.1799158&doi=10.1080%2F03057070.2020.1799158&doi=10.1080%2F03057070.2020.1799158&doi=10.1080%2F03057070.2020.1799158&journalCode=cjss20">research</a>, I explore the political history of the Nyerere era. I examine his socialist project through the prism of Tanzania’s first and most prestigious national university, the <a href="https://www.udsm.ac.tz/">University of Dar es Salaam</a>.</p>
<p>Charting the rise and fall of leftist student activism at the university throughout the 1970s and 1980s allows us to better understand the aspirations of Nyerere’s socialist project and its ultimate limits and legacy.</p>
<h2>The Arusha Declaration</h2>
<p>African universities were <a href="https://theconversation.com/africas-student-movements-history-sheds-light-on-modern-activism-111003">key</a> to processes of decolonising and developing post-colonial states at independence. The young nations relied on them to produce new professional classes and state bureaucrats. Given their national importance, African presidents were commonly appointed as chancellors. </p>
<p>As both president and chancellor of the university, Nyerere’s idea was that it should produce “servants” committed to building the Tanzanian nation. As he put it, its <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4187669?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">role</a> was not to </p>
<blockquote>
<p>build sky-scrapers here at the university so that a few very fortunate individuals can develop their own minds and live in comfort. We tax the people to build these places only so that young men and women may become efficient servants to them.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It was partly for this reason that he was deeply <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4187669?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">disappointed</a> by the student protests of late 1966. In October of that year, students marched on the streets of Dar es Salaam against mandatory induction into the government-run National Service scheme. They were expected to spend their first two years after graduation working in nation-building programmes on 40% of their normal stipend. </p>
<p>Worried that the university was producing a generation of self-centred elitists, Nyerere decided to take dramatic measures. All the protesters were expelled from the university. To demonstrate the value of personal sacrifice for the Tanzanian nation, he cut his own salary by 20%.</p>
<p>In the aftermath of these protests, in February 1967, Nyerere released the <a href="http://library.fes.de/fulltext/bibliothek/2-tanzania-s0019634.pdf">Arusha Declaration</a>. This explicitly committed his government to socialist policies, including nationalisation and rural collectivisation. </p>
<p>Soon after, he vowed to transform the university into a socialist institution. The ruling party created a youth wing branch on campus. A general course on the political economy of development was made mandatory for all students.</p>
<p>These reforms and the Arusha Declaration inspired the emergence of a small, but vocal group of leftist students on campus. These notably included the Yoweri Museveni-led University Students’ African Revolutionary Front. It started a student journal, organised public lectures and teach-ins, and raised money for African liberation movements.</p>
<p>But, over time, the government became increasingly concerned by the prominence and independence of these leftist student groups. In the 1970s and 1980s, student politics came to be marked by an unmistakable irony: in the years following the supposed socialist transformation, leftist student activism at the university actually declined.</p>
<p>This is largely because the government exercised increasing control over university activities. Ruling party loyalists were appointed to high-ranking positions in the university administration. Following public displays of student dissent in 1970 and 1978, independent student bodies were dissolved. </p>
<p>Slowly, but surely, the university was brought more squarely under the control of the ruling party.</p>
<h2>Political order over independence</h2>
<p>This approach to public dissent was the rule rather the exception in Nyerere’s Tanzania. Trade unions, rural development collectives and party youth organisations were banned or brought under party control if they displayed too much independence. Faced with increasing <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2011/12/21/tanzania-at-50-does-nyerere-deserve-the-blame-and-praise-for-the-countrys-economic-failure-and-political-success/">economic challenges</a>, Nyerere regularly felt the need to prioritise political order and obedience over desires for mass-driven socialist transformation.</p>
<p>But to label Nyerere as merely an authoritarian, as Lissu suggests, is to gloss over the complexity of his years in power. As chancellor, he distinguished himself from the vast majority of his African counterparts. All too often, he sought to win students over through argument, rather than coercion.</p>
<p>His legitimacy among the student community did not rest on patronage or intimidation. Rather, many were committed to his socialist ideology, which he called <em>ujamaa</em>. It emphasised equality, self-reliance, national unity, and African liberation.</p>
<p>They respected the fact that Nyerere consistently communicated these ideas to them directly. His frequent visits and candid exchanges with students on campus helped maintain his popularity among them.</p>
<p>This legitimacy is reflected in the fact that on the rare occasions when students took to the streets to protest post-1966, it was never against Nyerere’s socialist project. Rather, it was to rail over its perceived betrayal by the political elite.</p>
<p>Examining Nyerere’s legacy through this prism, therefore, complicates characterisations of his domestic legacy as singularly autocratic. It is true that his regime did stifle leftist student activism. But many students believed in and were inspired by his socialist ideals and his sense of political morality.</p>
<p>Nyerere’s legacy still looms large over the country’s politics, and not just within Chama Cha Mapinduzi. The upstart opposition party, Alliance for Change and Transparency has <a href="https://thenextsystem.org/learn/stories/economic-justice-and-african-socialism-interview-zitto-kabwe">declared</a> its desire to revive and update the Arusha Declaration if elected to power in October. They explicitly <a href="https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/04/zitto-kabwe-chadema-act-julius-nyerere">commit</a> themselves to </p>
<blockquote>
<p>building a socialist society with equality as its basic principle. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The resonance of this message with young Tanzanians suggests Nyerere’s legacy is far more complex than either Magufuli or Lissu recognise.</p>
<p>For all his shortcomings, Nyerere’s ideas continue to inspire Tanzanians fighting for a more equal and democratic future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/146490/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Luke Melchiorre received funding from International Development Research Council (IDRC) for this project.</span></em></p>For all of the shortcomings of Nyerere’s regime, his ideas continue to inspire Tanzanians fighting for a more equal and democratic future, over 20 years after his death.Luke Melchiorre, Assistant Professor, Political Science, Universidad de los Andes Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.