tag:theconversation.com,2011:/fr/topics/adama-barrow-34801/articlesAdama Barrow – The Conversation2022-01-27T15:09:47Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1756612022-01-27T15:09:47Z2022-01-27T15:09:47ZWhy The Gambia should fast-track gender quotas for women<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/442685/original/file-20220126-19-gyuv41.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of incumbent president Adama Barrow’s National Peoples Party (NPP) during a campaign rally in Banjul in November 2021.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Guy Peterson/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Women have <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/gambia/gambia-s-women-demand-seat-political-table">historically</a> been poorly represented in positions of power and decision-making in The Gambia. Out of 58 National Assembly members, only six are women lawmakers and only three of these are elected. Women make up more than half of the Gambian population, yet they account for <a href="http://archive.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm">only 10% of parliamentarians</a>, including the speaker.</p>
<p>This poor representation is just as evident in <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202108090284.html">the political parties</a>. None of the 18 <a href="https://iec.gm/political-parties/registered-parties/">registered political parties</a> is led by a woman. A few have women serving as deputy party leaders. But for the most part, women are assigned token positions that lack the necessary power and authority. They are deployed as mobilisers, campaigners and cheerleaders. </p>
<p>Little wonder then that during the December 4, 2021 elections, only one woman, Marie Sock, filed her nomination for the presidency. Even then her application was <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202111100022.html">rejected</a> by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) as she failed to declare her assets. She also did not have the <a href="https://www.lawhubgambia.com/electoral-laws">legally required number</a> of registered voters to support her nomination.</p>
<p>This left the field open to a contest between six male candidates in which Adama Barrow <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/6/the-gambias-barrow-wins-second-term-opposition-reject-results">secured his second term</a>. </p>
<p>Adama Barrow was voted into office in December 2016, <a href="https://constitutionnet.org/news/new-gambia-and-remaking-constitution">ending 22 years of autocratic rule</a> under Yahya Jammeh. In the democratic transition that followed, Barrow pledged a <a href="https://crc220.org/">reformed constitution</a> and transitional justice for victims of Jammeh’s brutal dictatorship. </p>
<p>But the <a href="https://www.lawhubgambia.com/latest-news/publication-constitutional-developments-in-2020-gambia">constitution-making process is stalled</a>. The proposed Constitution Promulgation Bill of 2020 was <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202009230283.html">rejected</a> by the National Assembly owing to <a href="https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/2020-posts/2020/9/29/attempts-at-constitutional-reform-in-the-gambia-whither-the-draft-constitution">political party disagreements</a>. </p>
<p>The draft constitution outlined several provisions to accelerate substantive equality between men and women. Among its transformative provisions was a section that explicitly forbids discriminatory treatment based on gender. </p>
<p>Section 55 further provided equal treatment between men and women. This included equal political, economic and social opportunities. Section 74 set out general principles for the electoral system. This included fair representation of all genders in elective public bodies. The draft constitution also provided a quota system that reserves 14 seats in parliament for women.</p>
<p>The failure to pass the bill represents a loss in the momentum for gender reforms. </p>
<p>But, in my view, there is still an opportunity to address the issue of women’s representation in politics. This is in the form of a <a href="https://thepoint.gm/africa/gambia/headlines/women-seek-16-parliament-reservation-seats">private member bill</a> which seeks to increase women’s representation in the National Assembly.</p>
<p>The bill presents a timely opportunity to rectify imbalances in political representation by guaranteeing a number of seats for women. Arguments against it might be that it’s only a temporary measure. But, I would argue, temporary measures such as legislative gender quotas can increase women’s access to political participation. </p>
<p>It’s true that over the past few decades the principle of equality between women and men has become increasingly <a href="https://constitutions.unwomen.org/en">constitutionalised</a>. These include gender-specific constitutional provisions on women’s rights, the right to reproductive healthcare, access to education, protection from violence.</p>
<p>But a number of <a href="https://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/General%20recommendation%2025%20(English).pdf">temporary special measures</a> have also been put in place. One is the quota system. </p>
<h2>Support for quotas</h2>
<p>Gambians are ready for change.</p>
<p>A nationwide <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331260768_'Women's_Political_Participation_and_Representation_in_The_Gambia_One_step_forward_or_two_back">study</a> on women’s political participation and representation showed that 89% of all respondents supported the introduction of the quota system.</p>
<p>In 2018, a <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/D%C3%A9p%C3%AAches/ab_r7_dispatchno338_gambias_draft_constitution_reflects_citizen_preferences.pdf">survey</a> by Afrobarometer – the pan-African research network – showed overwhelming support (85%) in the country for constitutional change that would mandate a quota system for women’s representation in the National Assembly.</p>
<p>But this support has not yet been translated into the statute books.</p>
<p>Gender rights in The Gambia are governed by the <a href="https://www.lawhubgambia.com/1997-constitution">1997 constitution</a> and other relevant laws. These laws include the <a href="https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/MONOGRAPH/90619/115464/F-1335047347/GMB90619.pdf">Women’s Act 2010</a> which has general provisions to support women’s political participation and representation. </p>
<p>The Gambia is also one of few countries in Africa that has <a href="https://www.hhrjournal.org/2019/12/the-gambias-political-transition-to-democracy-is-abortion-reform-possible/">enacted</a> specific legislation to <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331260847_The_impact_of_the_African_Charter_and_the_Maputo_Protocol_in_The_Gambia">domesticate</a> African and international norms and standards that recognise the human rights of women and girls. </p>
<p>But the legal framework in its present form is not comprehensive in securing a substantive right for women in the political realm. Take section 15 of the Women’s Act. It provides a general obligation to adopt temporary special measures. But it does not make a definitive prescription such as electoral gender quotas.</p>
<p>In addition, existing laws are grossly inadequate given the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331260768_'Women's_Political_Participation_and_Representation_in_The_Gambia_One_step_forward_or_two_back'?_sg=WRVtUl1YUavXBZSSNsLQEjiyRFEUtNBOxlLPqKAqiTQKdOhGY-h2p_s0n-zQKA265YaXx99x8J8B9PivTjbP17OHETYsPlsPy-CU54Cm.6wvKJV6BgmNiDlJocFXUEfaJvYbcl6MujA4VelILKp3f9NzI5ObDTfnj7n_KB6zvxsRZ7IKzA2cOTHsC4IBCYw">socio-cultural barriers</a> that are well entrenched in society against women. </p>
<h2>An alternative route</h2>
<p>The private member bill before parliament presents an opportunity to embrace reform. The bill proposes increasing the total number of seats in The Gambia’s National Assembly from 58 to 71, reserving 16 seats for women assembly members. Fourteen would be elected from each region; people with disabilities will elect one woman from among them, and the president would appoint one. </p>
<p>In my view the private member bill effort would be beneficial for advancing women’s rights. </p>
<p>However, a key question has arisen as to what will be the modalities for electing the women parliamentarians. It would be helpful to draw from other countries with a quota system to address this. For example, the <a href="https://ulii.org/akn/ug/act/statute/1995/constitution/eng%402018-01-05">revised 1995 Constitution of Uganda</a> institutionalised the quota system by providing for a number of reserved seats in the national parliament equal to the number of districts in the country. Each district elects a female parliamentary representative. </p>
<p>In this case, reserved seats are organised as <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/recruitment-mechanisms-for-reserved-seats-for-women-in-parliament-and-switches-to-nonquota-seats-a-comparative-study-of-tanzania-and-uganda/4ADE9AFC34E95A7F163588EF62629F88">single-member “women’s districts” constituencies</a>, designed as first-past-the-post districts. In essence, a one-woman representative is elected by universal suffrage in each district – which may consist of multiple counties (constituencies) – indirectly contested “female candidate only” elections.</p>
<p>Equally, in the case of The Gambia, it is proposed that parliamentarians for the female-reserved seats be elected and not appointed to enhance the legitimacy of these parliamentary seats. Some have <a href="https://academic.oup.com/sp/article-abstract/15/3/345/1616342">argued</a> that this may promote a static view of “women” as a group and push for a parallel process that affects equal voting rights. But in this case this is necessary as a time-limited positive measure that is intended to provide opportunities for a historically and systematically disadvantaged group.</p>
<p><em>A longer version of this article was <a href="https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/spotlight-on-africa/2022/1/25/womens-political-participation-in-the-gambia-gender-quotas-as-fast-track-to-equality">published</a> by International Association of Constitutional Law.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/175661/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Satang Nabaneh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Temporary measures such as legislative gender quotas can increase women’s access to political participation.Satang Nabaneh, Director of Programs, University of DaytonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1734372021-12-09T15:05:32Z2021-12-09T15:05:32ZWhat Barrow’s re-election means for The Gambia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/436638/original/file-20211209-21-8m3mr6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Gambia's president Adama Barrow waves to supporters shortly after he arrived the country in 2017.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Carl De Souza/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Gambia’s President Adama Barrow, of the National People’s Party, comfortably <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-59542813">won re-election</a> on 4 December with about 53% of the vote. </p>
<p>The runner-up, Ousainou Darboe of the United Democratic Party, won about <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2021-12-05/gambia-president-barrow-wins-re-election-in-post-jammeh-vote">28%</a> of the vote. In third place was Mama Kandeh of the Gambia Democratic Congress with about 12%. </p>
<p>Three other candidates — Halifa Sallah of the People’s Democratic Organisation for Independence and Socialism, Abdoulie Jammeh of the National Unity Party, and Essa Faal (independent) – each got under 5% of the national vote. </p>
<p>The outcome was not a surprise. Public <a href="https://ceprass.gm/research/second-pre-election-opinion-poll-survey-findings/">opinion polling</a> conducted before the election had shown the National People’s Party with a commanding lead. </p>
<p>Darboe and Kandeh have <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/499258-gambiadecides-darboe-two-others-reject-election-result.html">rejected</a> the result of the election, citing unspecified irregularities. (Faal initially did too, but has since conceded.)</p>
<p>United Democratic Party supporters <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/gambia-one-three-rebel-presidential-candidates-accepts-barrows-victory-2021-12-06/">clashed</a> with police a day after the election results were announced but it is unlikely that the result will change. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-gambias-55-year-old-marbles-voting-system-is-simple-but-difficult-to-cheat-173263">The Gambia's 55-year-old marbles voting system is simple but difficult to cheat</a>
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<p>A coalition of <a href="https://twitter.com/WANEP_Gambia/status/1467565714269777921?s=20">civil society organisations</a> and the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R2mNjhFCi2s">Commonwealth</a> have both described the election as credible and transparent.</p>
<p>Barrow’s decisive win will reverberate through the Gambian political landscape. It signals the diminishing importance of his predecessor, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-59531167">Yahya Jammeh</a>, who tried to influence the election from his exile in Equatorial Guinea. </p>
<p>And it calls into question the fate of The Gambia’s transitional programme, adopted by Barrow and his coalition partners after they won the 2016 election. </p>
<p>The programme included a new constitution, security sector reform, a Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission, and the lifting of repressive laws, many of colonial origin, used by Jammeh. </p>
<p>The effort to create a new constitution is currently dormant. It’s not clear if it will be revived. </p>
<p>Equally unclear is whether the recommendations in the final report of the <a href="https://www.trrc.gm/">Truth, Reconciliation, and Reparations Commission</a>, submitted to the Barrow administration just days before the election, will be heeded. </p>
<p>The report is yet to be made public. But it is believed to include recommendations for prosecuting certain political figures in the Jammeh administration who may now be in a political alliance with Barrow. </p>
<p>Barrow’s win leaves the opposition with an uncertain path forward, faced with weak results and in several cases ageing leadership.</p>
<p>Finally, it is clear that Barrow pulled off what Jammeh failed to do before the 2016 election: consolidate an anti-United Democratic Party alliance out of several smaller parties. </p>
<p>As my <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/abs/anticipatory-tribalism-accusatory-politics-in-the-new-gambia/F6F89D60BD65F47C26A9D504BB363E65">research</a> has shown, there is a long history of a kind of shadow politics of ethnicity in The Gambia. But Barrow won across the country and even a majority of the constituencies that make up Foni, the heartland of Jammeh’s Jola ethnic group.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/whats-in-store-for-gambians-as-they-gear-up-for-hotly-contested-poll-172807">What's in store for Gambians as they gear up for hotly contested poll</a>
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<h2>Implications of Barrow’s victory</h2>
<p>Jammeh sought to influence the election from afar and his messages were recorded and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-59531167">broadcast</a> at rallies for his supporters. But his former party, the Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction, had split into two factions. </p>
<p>One of Barrow’s more controversial moves prior to the election was to form an alliance with the Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction and several other smaller parties. The inclusion of the party in the alliance was decried as a <a href="https://gainako.com/victims-center-npp-aprc-alliance-is-a-treacherous-betrayal/">betrayal</a> of the victims of Jammeh and the making of an <a href="https://thepoint.gm/africa/gambia/opinion/the-hypocrisy-in-defending-the-evil-alliance-of-betrayal-between-npp-and-aprc">“evil alliance”</a>.</p>
<p>Initial reporting on the alliance suggested that it would pave the way for <a href="https://thepoint.gm/africa/gambia/headlines/aprc-npp-agree-on-jammehs-return-as-duo-form-alliance-ahead-of-dec-polls">Jammeh’s return</a> to the country. But Jammeh himself <a href="https://www.gambia.com/ex-president-yahya-jammeh-denounces-aprcs-alliance-with-npp/">denounced</a> the alliance and called for his old party’s members to support Kandeh’s Gambia Democratic Congress.</p>
<p>If Jammeh had ambitions to serve as a kingmaker, these ambitions have been dashed. Kandeh generally did worse in 2021 than he did in the 2016 election. </p>
<p>At the same time, there is clearly no love lost between Barrow and Jammeh. It does not seem likely that Barrow would welcome Jammeh’s return to the country.</p>
<p>Second, it is very uncertain what will happen with the draft constitution. Although Barrow was officially supportive of the work of the Constitutional Review Commission, it was legislators loyal to Barrow that, in September 2020, torpedoed the effort because of the issue of term limits. </p>
<p>The Gambian political scientist <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2020/09/the-gambia-why-mps-just-shot-down-the-popular-new-draft-constitution/">Sait Matty Jaw wrote</a> at the time that their key concern was “allowing Barrow to stay in office”.</p>
<p>However, in his first press conference after his victory, <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-12-07/gambia-s-reelected-leader-vows-to-push-for-term-limits-justice">Barrow pledged</a> a new constitution that would include term limits.</p>
<p>It is also unclear what Barrow’s victory means for the recommendations of the Truth, Reconciliation, and Reparations Commission. The commission has given Gambians a window into the extensive and systematic <a href="https://www.hrw.org/tag/yahya-jammeh">human rights abuses</a> of the Jammeh era. </p>
<p>Jammeh loyalists, including some now in the alliance with Barrow, have criticised the commission’s hearings as a “witch hunt”. They called for its recommendations to be “trashed”, raising the worry that the report and its recommendations will be ignored with Barrow’s victory. </p>
<p>Unlike other candidates, Barrow did not make the implementation of the recommendations a major theme in his campaign. Even after winning re-election, if Barrow concludes that he is reliant on Jammeh loyalists to push his agenda, the recommendations might only be enacted in part. </p>
<p>The final report of the Truth, Reconciliation, and Reparations Commission was originally scheduled to be presented to the government in July 2021. It was finally <a href="https://jfjustice.net/trrc-in-last-ditch-efforts-to-make-its-final-report-public/">submitted</a> to the government on 25 November. Critics raised <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p0b6f45z">questions</a> about the timing. There was not sufficient time for it to be released to Gambians before the election. </p>
<p>The entry of the lead prosecutor of the commission, Essa Faal, into the political fray as an independent candidate added fuel to the criticism. Some Gambians <a href="https://www.thegambiatimes.com/essa-faal-for-president-a-classic-betrayal-and-disservice-to-the-nation/#:%7E:text=On%20Friday%2C%20August%2027th%2C%202021%2C%20Essa%20Mbye%20Faal%2C,independent%20candidate%20in%20the%20December%202021%20Presidential%20election">criticised</a> Faal as an ambitious opportunist. </p>
<p>His candidacy was arguably not helped by the commission not being as popular as one might expect. According to <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/countries/gambia-1">Afrobarometer polling</a>, less than half of all Gambians trust the Truth, Reconciliation, and Reparations Commission at least somewhat.</p>
<p>Faal’s abysmal showing (around 2% of the national vote) may well show Barrow that he has the political headroom to ignore or soften the commission’s recommendations. </p>
<p>In the post-election press conference, Barrow <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-12-07/gambia-s-reelected-leader-vows-to-push-for-term-limits-justice">said</a> “there will be justice” and “there will be reconciliation and there will be reparations.” But what justice will look like, given his successful electoral alliance, remains unclear.</p>
<h2>What’s next?</h2>
<p>Darboe, the leader of the United Democratic Party, is 73 years old and it seems unlikely he will contest the 2026 presidential election. He doesn’t have a clear successor.</p>
<p>Kandeh is 56 and will likely have another go at the presidency in five years, but his showing in this election does not suggest a successful run.</p>
<p>Sallah is 68 and has already <a href="https://www.voicegambia.com/2021/12/08/halifa-sallah-announces-retirement-from-political-representation/">announced</a> that he is done running for office. </p>
<p>Abdoulie Jammeh and Faal are both in their 50s, but their results call their future candidacies into question unless there is a political re-alignment of some sort in The Gambia. </p>
<p>It is thus difficult to see a serious electoral challenge against Barrow and the National People’s Party in the near future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/173437/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Niklas Hultin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Adama Barrow’s re-election in The Gambia was not unexpected. It, however, leaves the opposition with an uncertain path forward and signals the shrinking status of his predecessor, Yahya Jammeh.Niklas Hultin, Assistant Professor, Global Affairs Program , George Mason UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1732632021-12-07T15:22:07Z2021-12-07T15:22:07ZThe Gambia’s 55-year-old marbles voting system is simple but difficult to cheat<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/441165/original/file-20220117-15-13semxp.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C5%2C3598%2C2391&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption"></span> </figcaption></figure><p>The Gambia’s President Adama Barrow has been <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-59542813">declared</a> winner of the election held on 4 December. Barrow received around 53% of the vote cast while his closest rival at the polls, Oussainou Darboe, got 28%.</p>
<p>The election – the first since Barrow <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-38183906">defeated</a> Yahya Jammeh in 2016 – is largely seen as a test for democracy in The Gambia. Jammeh was forced into exile following refusal to accept his loss at the poll. His 22-year rule had been <a href="https://www.hrw.org/tag/yahya-jammeh">marred</a> by human rights violations and repression of opposition voices. </p>
<p>The ousting of Jammeh opened the political space in the country, allowing mass participation. Citizens had the freedom to affiliate with any political party of their choice without fear of being arrested, detained, and tortured.</p>
<p>As results of the 2021 election came in, representatives from all opposition parties signed off on nearly all the tally sheets read to the independent electoral commission.</p>
<p>However, Darboe and two other candidates, Mama Kandeh and Essa Mbye Faal, said they would <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/499258-gambiadecides-darboe-two-others-reject-election-result.html">not accept</a> the results because counting took longer than expected and because of unspecified problems at some polling stations. </p>
<p>Members of the electoral commission later confirmed that delay in the announcement of the results was made out of precautionary measures to ensure that the votes are fully vetted before being announced.</p>
<p>Barrow’s victory was resounding mainly due to his messages of reconciliation and promoting unity across ethnic and tribal affiliations in the country. </p>
<p>For Darboe, Kandeh and Faal, challenging the results may be a political tactic to energise their supporters. There are no expectations that any error could emerge substantial enough to produce a different outcome. </p>
<p>The Gambia’s democracy has so far endured. </p>
<p>The country has a unique system of voting that does not involve the use of paper ballots in casting votes. Instead, it uses <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-africa-38164870">marbles</a>. </p>
<p>The opposition candidates who rejected the results have not indicated any problem with the voting process, especially as it relates to the use of marbles.</p>
<p>This form of voting has proven to be simple and difficult to cheat.</p>
<h2>Votes cast in marbles</h2>
<p>Voting with marbles was introduced in The Gambia by the <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=gvz-Qy0vrS0C&pg=RA16-PA11&lpg=RA16-PA11&dq=Voting+with+marbles+was+introduced+in+The+Gambia+by+the+British+in+1965&source=bl&ots=KUeurNc-UY&sig=ACfU3U2vHPSpCyP2b_7KCGfRoJgxmwX23Q&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjk7ICmhtH0AhUUV8AKHYT4AH0Q6AF6BAgJEAM#v=onepage&q=Voting%20with%20marbles%20was%20introduced%20in%20The%20Gambia%20by%20the%20British%20in%201965&f=false">British in 1965</a> when the country first obtained its independence because of the low literacy levels in the population at the time. The system has continued to be in use.</p>
<p>In the place of ballot boxes, there is a metal cylinder with a hole in the top. The containers are arranged on a table inside a voting booth and painted with the party colours of candidates as well as their photos for ease of identification. Each voter drops a marble into the container representing the chosen candidate.</p>
<p>The final tool used in this unique form of voting is the counting box. Marbles are emptied into a square tray that is dotted with holes. At the end of the voting, counting is done on the spot. </p>
<p>The holes in the trays get evenly filled with marbles. The total is then tallied and recorded on the spot for representatives of candidates and voters.</p>
<p>Counting on the spot ensures fairness and builds public confidence in the electoral process. </p>
<p>The candidates who have questioned the results have pointed to procedural issues in the delayed counting by the independent electoral commission. No evidence of fraud has been presented to prove that the results were rigged in favour of the incumbent.</p>
<h2>Gambia voting zones</h2>
<p>As a standard rule of election and for ease of identification, the country is divided into zones referred to as constituencies and in each constituency, there are several polling stations where voting takes place. Every polling station is headed by a presiding officer representing the Independent Electoral Commission. </p>
<p>Voters are only allowed to cast their ballots at locations where they have registered to vote. On the election day, the presiding officers have a list to crosscheck the identities of the voters at that location. Voters’ fingers are marked with liquid ink before they get a marble. These measures are taken to prevent individuals from voting twice. </p>
<h2>A two horse race</h2>
<p>The 4 December presidential election was more of a competition between Barrow, the incumbent and candidate of the National People’s Party, and his former vice-president Darboe of the United Democratic Party.</p>
<p>The electoral system in The Gambia is based on first past the post. There is no runoff and any party that manages to record the highest number of total votes cast, however small the margin, is declared winner.</p>
<p>Barrow and Darboe’s political “bromance” came to a grinding halt when Darboe began to express a presidential ambition. Darboe, who is one of the founding members of the United Democratic Party, has repeatedly run for office in the past and lost to Jammeh. </p>
<p>Beyond these two individuals, a number of issues were of significance to voters on 4 December.</p>
<p>They <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/sep/23/gambia-joy-gives-way-to-sinking-distrust-adama-barrow-clings-to-power">include</a> the economy, security, corruption and falling standards of healthcare delivery.</p>
<p>While some of these issues were an assessment of the incumbents’ four years of leadership, there is also a concerning increase in ethnic and tribal politics never seen before in the country.</p>
<h2>Election as a statement</h2>
<p>Although the use of marbles in elections may be considered an obsolete form of voting, it is a process that has so far been transparent and discouraged rigging. </p>
<p>Despite its simplicity, this form of voting has successfully ended a dictatorship in The Gambia. That is clear evidence that the voting system is working. Jammeh may have ruled with fear and intimidation but also respected the voting process which ultimately led to his ouster. </p>
<p>There is talk of introducing paper ballots in conformity with modern standards of voting. But why change to something much more complex when what is already in place is producing the desired outcome of a free and fair election?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/173263/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alieu Sanneh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Gambia has a unique system of voting that does not involve the use of paper ballots in casting votes – instead it uses marbles.Alieu Sanneh, Political scientist, University of Missouri-St. LouisLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1728072021-11-30T14:36:01Z2021-11-30T14:36:01ZWhat’s in store for Gambians as they gear up for hotly contested poll<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434456/original/file-20211129-58471-f3p3yx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of Gambia's president, Adama Barrow, sing and dance during a campaign rally in Banjul on November 27, 2021. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Guy Peterson/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Gambians will <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/10/the-gambia-elections-meet-the-men-running-for-president">shortly go to the polls</a> to elect a new president in the country’s ninth direct presidential election, of which only one has seen an opposition candidate defeat the incumbent. That was in December 2016 when Adama Barrow <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-38183906">defeated</a> Yahya Jammeh to end the latter’s 22 years of brutal rule. </p>
<p>Before that, <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1478-0542.2008.00513.x">Dawda Jawara</a> had won three successive elections between 1982 and 1992 and <a href="https://qz.com/africa/905081/the-legacy-of-gambias-yahya-jammeh-captured-in-photos-and-words/">Jammeh</a> five between 1996 and 2011. </p>
<p>Even after being defeated at the polls Jammeh tried to cling to power by initially <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gambia-election-idUSKBN13Y2QO">rejecting</a> the outcome. But Barrow was eventually <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/1/19/adama-barrow-sworn-in-as-gambias-president-in-senegal">sworn in </a> as president in January 2017. </p>
<p>The 2021 election is expected to be peaceful and, unlike 2016, losing candidates are likely to accept the outcome.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://ceprass.gm/research/second-pre-election-opinion-poll-survey-findings/">recent poll</a> showed that 89% of Gambians expect there is more than a 50% chance that the 2021 election will be peaceful. </p>
<p>Barrow contested the 2016 election as an independent representing a seven-party coalition. This time he is the candidate of the <a href="https://www.npp.gm/">National People’s Party</a> which he established in December 2019. </p>
<p>The National People’s Party is one of 18 political parties that the <a href="https://iec.gm/">Independent Electoral Commission</a> has registered. Many are very small and have no representation in the National Assembly. In the most recent National Assembly election in <a href="https://iec.gm/download/national-assembly-final-results-6th-april-2017/">April 2017</a>, the <a href="https://udpthegambia.com/">United Democratic Party</a> won 31 out of 53 seats. Three parties, the <a href="https://www.gdc.gm/">Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction</a>, the <a href="https://www.gdc.gm/">Gambia Democratic Congress</a> and the <a href="https://iec.gm/political-party/national-reconciliation-party-nrp/">National Reconciliation Party</a>, each won five. The <a href="https://pdois.org/">People’s Democratic Organisation for Independence and Socialism</a> won four seats and the <a href="https://iec.gm/political-party/peoples-progressive-party-ppp/">People’s Progressive Party</a>, two. One independent candidate was elected.</p>
<p>Barrow’s surprising victory in 2016 was widely welcomed both in The Gambia and externally for restoring democracy and human rights. Jammeh’s repeated <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/09/17/gambia-two-decades-fear-and-repression">human rights violations </a> included extra-judicial executions, ‘disappearances’, detentions without trial and extensive media harassment. </p>
<p>Human rights has improved enormously under Barrow, but he has nevertheless faced strong criticism for:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>going back on his 2016 promise to serve for only three years rather than for a full five year term; </p></li>
<li><p>retaining the Economic Community of West African States Military contingent, which has been responsible for Gambian security since 2017. A recent <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/press/gambians-feel-less-safe-want-ecomig-leave-afrobarometer-survey-shows">poll</a> showed that Gambians overwhelmingly want the regional troops out;</p></li>
<li><p>effectively <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-gambias-quest-for-a-new-constitution-came-unstuck-and-what-next-147118">preventing</a> the 2020 draft Constitution being passed by the National Assembly;</p></li>
<li><p>signing an <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/barrow-puts-political-power-ahead-of-justice-in-the-gambia">electoral pact</a> recently between the National People’s Party and the Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction, the party formed by Yahya Jammeh in 1996 and which he led throughout his presidency. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Many Gambians feared the pact might make an eventual Jammeh return more likely. It might also undermine the work of the <a href="https://www.trrc.gm/">Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission</a> that was established in 2018 to investigate human rights violations, consider reparations for the victims of abuses and promote reconciliation.</p>
<p>In spite of these issues, Barrow remains the favourite to win the poll. He may, however, not achieve an absolute majority of the votes cast. </p>
<h2>The main contenders</h2>
<p>Although 21 presidential candidates were nominated, only <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/six-stand-president-gambias-first-election-after-jammeh-2021-11-06/">six</a> were given the all clear by the Independent Electoral Commission. </p>
<p>Three contenders, all of whom have previously contested presidential elections, stand out.</p>
<p>They are <a href="https://www.gambia.com/anm-ousainou-darboe-receives-thousands-of-supporters-at-his-residence-in-pipeline/">Ousainou Darboe</a>, <a href="https://thepoint.gm/africa/gambia/headlines/mama-kandeh-says-mou-does-not-include-jammeh-amnesty">Mamma Kandeh</a> and <a href="https://www.ourcampaigns.com/CandidateDetail.html?CandidateID=128049">Halifa Sallah</a>. </p>
<p>Darboe, the United Democratic Party leader since 1996, finished second behind Jammeh in each election between 1996 and 2011. He could not stand in 2016 having recently been <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2016/07/gambia-prison-sentences-for-opposition-leaders-continues-downward-spiral-for-human-rights/">imprisoned</a> for participating in an illegal demonstration. </p>
<p>He was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in February 2017 and served as Barrow’s vice-president between June 2018 and March 2019, before being sacked.</p>
<p>The United Democratic Party remains the largest party in the National Assembly, even though eight of its 31 MPs <a href="https://nationaltelegraph.net/gambias-udp-expels-8-lawmakers-from-parliament-suspected-of-supporting-president-barrow/">were expelled</a> in November 2019 and now sit as independents. </p>
<p>Darboe’s courageous opposition to Jammeh over two decades counts in his favour. However, at 73, he is the oldest candidate. The <a href="https://iec.gm/download/group-by-region-2021/">youthful profile</a> of the Gambian electorate (58% are aged between 18 and 35) may cost him votes. </p>
<p>Darboe’s best electoral performance was in 1996. He may well achieve a higher share than his 17% in 2011, but he is unlikely to defeat Barrow. </p>
<p>The leader of the Gambia Democratic Congress, Kandeh is a former Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction National Assembly member, who finished third behind Barrow and Jammeh in 2016. He had previously refused to join the opposition coalition. </p>
<p>This time he will stand in alliance with a breakaway faction of the Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction. Jammeh supports the alliance with Kandeh, seeing this as a way to engineer his return to The Gambia, and has recently spoken by telephone at his campaign rallies. </p>
<p>Kandeh’s links with Jammeh will bring him votes in the Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction heartland of the Fonis. But it may well cost him support in other areas where voters fear his victory would lead to Jammeh’s return. His chances of victory remain slim.</p>
<p>Sallah was a founding member of the People’s Democratic Organisation for Independence and Socialism in 1986. He is currently National Assembly member for Serrekunda and was the party’s presidential candidate in 2006. </p>
<p>The party is seen as radical and often criticised by both Jawara and Jammeh. </p>
<p>Sallah commands respect because of his long political career. However, the party he leads has never enjoyed much support outside the urban areas and he is unlikely to achieve more than the 6% of the vote he gained in 2006.</p>
<p>The two remaining candidates – apart from Barrow – are contesting their first presidential election. <a href="https://www.internationalairportreview.com/speaker_profile/70405/abdouliejammeh/">Abdoulie E. Jammeh</a>, a former director general of the Gambia Civil Aviation Authority, heads the <a href="https://www.nupgambia.com/">National Unity Party</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.gammatters.com/essa-faal">Essa M. Faal</a>, the only independent candidate, is an international lawyer who until recently was the chief prosecutor of the Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission. </p>
<p>Neither is expected to win many votes.</p>
<p>Thanks to the electoral commission’s vigorous promotion of voter registration the size of the electorate has <a href="https://thepoint.gm/africa/gambia/article/about-900000-electors-expected-to-vote-in-dec-polls-1">increased </a> from 886,578 in 2016 to 962,157 in 2021. Women account for <a href="https://iec.gm/download/group-by-region-2021/">57%</a> of registered voters.</p>
<p>Only Gambians registered in the country are eligible to vote. </p>
<h2>What to expect</h2>
<p>A recent <a href="https://ceprass.gm/research/second-pre-election-opinion-poll-survey-findings/">opinion poll</a> showed that 41% of those surveyed in November intended to vote for Barrow, compared with 22% for Darboe, 6% for Kandeh and 5% for Sallah. </p>
<p>Importantly, however, 23% remained undecided or declined to state their voting intention. Doubtless some in this group will not vote. But if a substantial proportion support Darboe, he could yet upset the odds and at last become president. </p>
<p>If, as anticipated, Barrow wins again, he will probably continue to lead the country in a similar manner and direction. He will doubtless change his cabinet, but may retain the leaders of some other parties, including Hamat Bah of the National Reconciliation Party. </p>
<p>One immediate challenge for a new Barrow government would be how to respond to the <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/11/gambia-truth-and-reconciliation-report-must-lead-to-justice-and-reparations-for-victims/">final report</a> of the Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission, which was submitted to him on 25 November. </p>
<p>Barrow will certainly face pressure to prosecute some of the major violators of human rights under Jammeh.</p>
<p>Fears that a Barrow victory would lead to the former president returning to The Gambia have receded following Jammeh’s denunciation of the pact between his party and the ruling party.</p>
<p>If Darboe loses once again, his hopes of ever becoming president will surely be over. If he should win against the odds, there may be relatively few changes in government policy, although all talks of Jammeh ever returning to The Gambia will surely be over.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/172807/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Perfect does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The 2021 presidential election in The Gambia is expected to be peaceful and losing candidates are likely to accept the outcome.David Perfect, Visiting professor, University of ChesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1471182020-10-06T14:43:43Z2020-10-06T14:43:43ZWhy The Gambia’s quest for a new constitution came unstuck – and what next<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/361121/original/file-20201001-22-19pux1w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Gambians celebrate the departure of former strongman Yahya Jammeh in front of an armoured vehicle manned by West African troops in early 2017.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Carl de Souza/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The constitution-drafting process aimed at ushering in The Gambia’s third republic has reached an unfortunate dead-end. More than two years after the process began, and after a highly acrimonious and polarised parliamentary debate, the proposed Constitution Promulgation Bill, 2020 was recently <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202009230283.html">rejected</a> in the national assembly. </p>
<p>This bill would have brought in a new constitution to replace the 1997 one. But with 23 lawmakers voting against, the backing of 31 fell short of the three-quarters required to put it to a referendum.</p>
<p>The failure to adopt the new constitution is a hurdle in efforts to put the country firmly on the road to democracy. This began when former president <a href="https://www.hrw.org/tag/yahya-jammeh">President Yahya Jammeh</a> was voted out of office in December 2016, ending his 22 years of dictatorship. His efforts to cling to power failed after the Economic Community of West African States intervened militarily, forcing him to make way for the winner, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/1/26/profile-adama-barrow-the-gambias-new-president">Adama Barrow</a>.</p>
<p>A new vision for The Gambia included a new constitution and accountability for past human rights violations. A <a href="http://www.trrc.gm/">Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission</a> was established to probe human rights violations committed between July 1994 to January 2017.</p>
<p>While this has been a costly exercise, it was worth it. Gambians have grappled with some important constitutional ideas, and reached insights that will be helpful in the long run. Given its great quest for change and the broad consensus that there cannot be any meaningful break with the political past without true and complete reform, I am confident that The Gambia will eventually give itself a new constitution.</p>
<h2>Draft constitution</h2>
<p>Constitutional change and a rebuilding of the foundations for good governance and democracy were a campaign promise of the ruling coalition. The <a href="https://crc220.org/">formal process</a> of reviewing the 1997 constitution and drafting a new one started in June 2018 with the appointment of an 11-member commission.</p>
<p>The commission had a two-fold mandate. The first was to review the 1997 constitution and draft a new one. The second was to prepare a report on the draft constitution. The commission solicited the views and opinions of Gambians about issues they wished to see addressed in their new constitution.</p>
<p>The commission began the review by preparing a list of 369 questions and issues on which public opinion was sought. It toured the country, had further consultations and conducted additional household and online surveys.</p>
<p>It held dialogues with various actors, including political parties, central and local government institutions and civil society organisations. In addition, it consulted with Gambians in the diaspora.</p>
<p>Following these consultations as well as some in-depth research, the commission produced a draft constitution, published on 15 November 2019. It then toured the country again to make people aware of the draft and to solicit feedback. </p>
<p>On 30 March 2020, the commission <a href="https://www.voicegambia.com/2020/03/31/president-barrow-receives-final-draft-of-new-constitution/">submitted</a> the “Final Draft Constitution and Report” to the President Barrow. In line with requirements in the 1997 constitution, the bill was twice published in the Government Gazette, then introduced in the national assembly on 14 September 2020.</p>
<p>The draft constitution introduced several measures aimed at enhancing and strengthening democracy. They included a presidential term limit, limits on executive power and greater political inclusion of marginalised groups (including women, youth and people with disabilities). The Bill of Rights chapter complied with international and regional human rights standards. </p>
<p>The public had high hopes for significant constitutional change. The personalised politics of the recent past, the undemocratic provisions in the frequently amended 1997 constitution and a complete disregard of the rule of law by the former president left Gambians with a desire for change. </p>
<p>Sadly, these hopes were dashed when the bill did not receive the requisite majority vote in parliament.</p>
<h2>The options</h2>
<p>One way of trying to determine why it did not pass is to look at who voted against it. From this it is possible to speculate what their main concerns were. </p>
<p>A review of the parliamentary debates suggests that the major concerns were those of the governing party. It took issue with the limitations to the scope of executive power. It also <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/gambias-draft-law-restricts-presidential-terms/a-53825425">did not like</a> the fact that the presidential term limit would operate retroactively. This provision would ensure the current term of President Barrow would be counted towards his term limit.</p>
<p>The rejection of the bill on its merits means that Gambians will not get to see this version of the 2020 draft constitution in a future referendum. So, what now? The executive has not yet shared any plans, so we are left to speculate. </p>
<p>I foresee two possibilities here. One option is to amend the 1997 constitution to include some of the more progressive provisions in the 2020 draft. The problem with amendment is that it would have to follow the same process as for the promulgation of a new constitution. </p>
<p>In other words, it would require approval of three-quarters of all the members of the national assembly on the second and third readings and would also have to be passed in a national referendum. This further requires a minimum 50% voter turnout with 75% approving.</p>
<p>A second option is to go back to the drawing board. Under this scenario, the Constitutional Review Commission Act would be amended. The commission could either restart the drafting process afresh, or amend the draft to resolve obstacles to a consensus. But this too would be challenging.</p>
<p>The majority of parliamentarians who did support the bill would view a new process with suspicion. On the other hand, given the assertive citizenry and engaged and revitalised civil society seen in recent times, the public is also not likely to buy into any process that produces a watered-down version.</p>
<p>Even if going back to the drawing board was feasible, success is clearly not guaranteed.</p>
<p><em>An earlier version of this article was <a href="https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/2020-posts/2020/9/29/attempts-at-constitutional-reform-in-the-gambia-whither-the-draft-constitution">published</a> by International Association of Constitutional Law.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/147118/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Satang Nabaneh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The rejection of the bill on its merits means that Gambians will not get to see this version of the 2020 draft constitution in a future referendum.Satang Nabaneh, Post-Doctoral Researcher, Centre for Human Rights, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1293652020-01-14T14:10:00Z2020-01-14T14:10:00ZWhy the Gambia’s plea for the Rohingya matters for international justice<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309072/original/file-20200108-107231-1az78ni.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A protester supports the Rohingya outside the Peace Palace in The Hague, Netherlands, on 10 December 2019. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Sem van der Wal</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In early December, the International Court of Justice <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/178">heard arguments</a> filed by <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/178/178-20191111-APP-01-00-EN.pdf">the Gambia against Myanmar</a> for violations of the Genocide Convention. This included a request for “provisional measures”, asking that the UN court immediately order Myanmar to cease <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/hrc/myanmarffm/pages/index.aspx">genocidal activities</a> and to report to it within four months. </p>
<p>Under the 1948 Genocide Convention any member state can bring a claim against any other and be heard by the International Court of Justice. This is in keeping with the principle that the act of genocide harms all of humanity, not just those directly involved in it. Yet the case against Myanmar is only the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-aung-san-suu-kyi-is-in-the-hague-defending-myanmar-against-allegations-of-genocide-125102">third invocation of the Genocide Convention</a> before the UN court. It is the first case ever to consider acts and actors of non-contiguous, non-warring countries.</p>
<p>But even a successful judgement on provisional measures may still not bring relief to the minority Rohingya community in Myanmar or Bangladesh. Provisional measures against genocidal acts have an unfortunate history. The International Court of Justice issued them in 1993 against Serbia, for example, and this did not prevent the 1995 Srebrenica massacre. </p>
<p>Moreover, even though legally binding, enforcement of provisional measures will prove difficult. In the meantime the Rohingya are still being persecuted and killed in Myanmar. They are also <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/bangladesh-may-force-100000-rohingya-to-resettle-on-uninhabited-island/a-50256755">increasingly unwelcome in Bangladesh</a>.</p>
<p>Yet the Gambia’s invocation of the Genocide Convention remains politically and legally significant, not least for the potential it signals about the application of international law by actors in the global south.</p>
<h2>Why the Gambia?</h2>
<p>The Gambia emerged from 22 years of dictatorship in 2016. President Adama Barrow came to power on a human rights and anti-corruption platform. He has embraced the case, which has been vigorously pursued by his justice minister, Abubacarr Tambadou. </p>
<p>In 2018 Barrow told <a href="https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/73/gm_en.pdf">the UN General Assembly</a> that his government would “champion an accountability mechanism” for crimes against the Rohingya.</p>
<p>Tambadou worked for 13 years in the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. In 2017, he travelled to Bangladesh for the annual meeting of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. This is an international organisation open to countries with a Muslim majority and which the Gambia currently chairs. </p>
<p>Meeting refugees in the settlement of Cox’s Bazaar in Bangladesh convinced Tambadou of the need for his country to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-world-court-gambia/with-memories-of-rwanda-the-gambian-minister-taking-on-suu-kyi-idUSKBN1Y91HA">“use our voice”</a> to assist the Rohingya. </p>
<h2>The arguments</h2>
<p>Two central points emerged from the December hearing on provisional measures. First, the hearing reiterated how Myanmar, in the person of the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11685977">once-celebrated</a> human rights advocate Aung San Suu Kyi, categorically denies the atrocities for which there is overwhelming evidence. </p>
<p>The Gambia, led by Tambadou, relied almost exclusively on evidence collected by UN fact-finding missions, which are officially constituted and rigorously vetted. Yet Aung San Suu Kyi rejected these findings in favour of Myanmar’s internal investigations, and <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/178/178-20191211-ORA-01-00-BI.pdf">concluded</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>It would not be helpful for the international legal order if the impression takes hold that only resource-rich countries can conduct adequate domestic investigations and prosecutions, and that the domestic justice of countries still striving to cope with the burden of unhappy legacies and present challenges cannot be made good enough. The Gambia will also understand this challenge with which they too are confronted.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In this way, Aung San Suu Kyi borrowed from both neocolonialism and “fake news” populism in constructing her argument. </p>
<p>Second, the hearing emphasised how narrowly the International Court of Justice has previously drawn the definition of genocide. In the two previous cases invoking the Genocide Convention, the court declined to find state-sponsored genocide, due to its interpretation of the Convention’s “intent” element. As the court stated in its 2007 judgment <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/91/091-20070226-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf">Bosnia-Herzegovina v Serbia</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>It is not enough that the members of the group are targeted because they belong to that group, that is because the perpetrator has a discriminatory intent. Something more is required. The acts listed must be done with intent to destroy the group as such in whole or in part.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Aung San Suu Kyi specifically invoked this judicial history throughout her address to the court.</p>
<p>The prominent international law scholar appearing on behalf of Myanmar, William Schabas, <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/178/178-20191211-ORA-01-00-BI.pdf">pushed this definition even further</a>. He argued that the International Court of Justice’s jurisprudence suggested that the correct understanding for genocidal intent was necessarily the absence of any other explanation for a state’s conduct.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Myanmar submits that the information in the application and in the materials invoked in its support … provide ample evidence to indicate alternative inferences…. Should the Court agree that there is ample support for an alternative explanation, then it cannot but conclude that the application has no reasonable chance of success on the merits. Not a 50 per cent chance. Not a 25 per cent chance. No chance.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Schabas went on to cite the <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/178/178-20191211-ORA-01-00-BI.pdf">International Criminal Court’s investigation</a> into deportation of the Rohingya as a demonstration of the kinds of “alternate inferences” that would disallow the court to find the requisite genocidal intent.</p>
<p>Schabas developed this definition through an analogy of how domestic criminal law categorises crime. This interpretation would destroy the possibility of finding states responsible for genocide, however. This is because it is impossible to intentionally destroy a group in whole or in part, which is the core of the legal definition of genocide, without committing other international crimes along the way. </p>
<p>This distortion of the Genocide Convention perverts both its purpose as well as the International Court of Justice’s past jurisprudence, and seems unlikely to be adopted by the court.</p>
<h2>Promising new direction?</h2>
<p>The Gambia and Myanmar are a world away from one another. Nevertheless, in bringing a case against Myanmar, the Gambia represents “humanity” rather than Africa or world Islam. </p>
<p>The curiosity and surprise that have met the Gambia’s bold step remind us that this universal mantle is rarely worn by African countries. The Gambia’s initiative signals a promising new direction.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129365/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Rohingya case before the International Court of Justice is politically and legally significant.Kerstin Bree Carlson, Associate Professor International Law, University of Southern DenmarkLine Engbo Gissel, Associate Professor, Global Political Sociology, Roskilde UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1142032019-03-27T13:30:28Z2019-03-27T13:30:28ZHow The Gambia is going about its search for truth and reconciliation<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/265812/original/file-20190326-36276-zonmi7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Gambian refugees return home from Senegal on January 21, 2017, the day Yahya Jammeh conceded defeat and left the country.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Legnan Koula</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Seeking uncomfortable truths about atrocities perpetrated against citizens has become an integral part of rebuilding societies after the fall of authoritarian regimes or at the end of armed conflicts. </p>
<p>In West Africa, <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/1999/06/truth-commission-nigeria">Nigeria (1999)</a>, <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2002/11/truth-commission-sierra-leone">Sierra Leone (2000)</a>, <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4020-3237-0_5">Ghana (2002)</a>, <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2006/02/truth-commission-liberia">Liberia (2005)</a> and <a href="https://acjr.org.za/resource-centre/us-department-of-state-human-rights-report-cote-divoire-2012">Cȏte d’Ivoire (2012)</a> are among countries that have walked this path.</p>
<p>The setting up of the Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission in The Gambia is no different. It follows over 20 years of authoritarian rule under Yahya Jammeh marked by egregious violations of human rights. The crimes included torture, disappearances and extrajudicial killings of people perceived to be opponents by the dreaded National Intelligence Agency and Jammeh’s loyal death squad, the Jungulars. </p>
<p>It took the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-west-africa-built-the-muscle-to-rout-dictators-and-keep-the-peace-71688">intervention of the West African regional powers</a> to install Adama Barrow after his surprise electoral victory over Jammeh in elections held in 2016. When Barrow took over one of the first promises was to establish a truth commission to chronicle past atrocities. He <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/adama-barrow-yahya-jammeh-leaving-guinea-170121175618203.html">considered</a> this a necessary first step towards national reconciliation and peace-building. He said at the time: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Before you can act, you have to get the truth, to get the facts together. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>After extensive consultations with ordinary citizens, civil society organisations and international human rights institutions, a new law was passed in 2017 to facilitate the setting up of a truth and reconciliation commission. </p>
<p>The act required that an historical record be put down of the nature, causes and extent of human rights abuses committed under Jammeh between July 1994 and January, 2017. The commission’s mandate includes investigating violations and abuses of human rights and identifying who was involved; establishing the identity of victims, their fate and the extent of the harm suffered; and finally determining what evidence has been destroyed to conceal violations and abuses.</p>
<p>The process is to be welcomed because families will finally know how their relatives disappeared or were killed. In the course of the hearings, public apologies by perpetrators will be offered. But searching for truth is often difficult. Through testimonies and the collection of information from various places, the commission will come across many truths of what happened. The complex task will be how to establish what’s truthful, and what is not. </p>
<h2>The commission’s remit</h2>
<p>The Commission requires witnesses to be truthful in their evidence. For this reason, it has adopted a key International Criminal Court (ICC) <a href="http://legal.un.org/icc/statute/99_corr/cstatute.htm">procedure</a> for getting its witnesses to testify on the truthfulness of their evidence. Article 69 (1) of this procedure states that witnesses shall</p>
<blockquote>
<p>give an undertaking as to the truthfulness of the evidence to be given by that witness</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This is an affirmation to witnesses that the nation is interested in nothing, but the truthfulness of the evidence.</p>
<p>The difficulty in The Gambia’s approach in search of truth is that people who committed crimes against humanity face prosecution. Under <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5a7c2ca18a02c7a46149331c/t/5a8451b4e4966bfad91329e9/1518621128178/truth%2C+reconcilation+and+reparations+commission+act%2C+2017.pdf">Article 19 (3) of the Gambia commission act</a>, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Amnesty shall not apply to acts which form part of a crime against humanity.<br>
Under the circumstance, some important disclosures by perpetrators could be concealed for fear of future prosecution.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The process followed by Ghana was quite different. It offered a blanket immunity to perpetrators of past atrocities. This could allow for important disclosures and also a good means to chronicle how most serious crimes were perpetrated which could be difficult through The Gambia’s approach. </p>
<p>The good thing about The Gambia’s approach is that allowing criminal trials for most serious crimes means holding perpetrators accountable for their crimes. </p>
<h2>Extrajudicial killings</h2>
<p>The commission begun sitting on 7 January, 2019. Since then it has conducted 87 sittings at which a number of former soldiers and past and present commissioned officers of the Gambia National Army have testified. Their testimony has mainly been on the events of the July 1994 coup which ousted the country’s first president Dawda Jawara. </p>
<p>Other officers have testified on the botched coup of 11 November 1994.</p>
<p>So far, a number of revelations on extrajudicial killings in the 11 November massacre have been laid bare. Some have made confessions about these killings, even within military barracks. An army colonel who was himself a victim of abuse supervised by his senior has also come forward. Another officer, a lieutenant-colonel, witnessed dead bodies of people shot in their barracks under the auspices of the military junta of Yahya Jammeh, and also the two mass graves in the Yundum barracks.</p>
<h2>Justice in all forms</h2>
<p>Speaking at the launch of the 11-member commission headed by a former senior official of the United Nations, Lamin Sise, President Barrow <a href="https://www.chinadailyhk.com/articles/251/137/188/1539673244479.html">declared</a> the “dark days” experienced under Yahya Jammeh were over. Typical of truth commissions, he rehashed the “never again” catchphrase stressing to his fellow Gambian compatriots not to revisit the country’s authoritarian past.</p>
<p>Barrow urged the commission to put victims at the centre of the process, arguing that the inclusion of reparations in the commission’s work was to ensure that the victims of the past regime received justice in all forms. </p>
<p>The Gambian-born International Criminal Court prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/20181015-otp-stat-ENG.pdf">acknowledges</a> the complexities and uniqueness of past truth commissions in Africa and elsewhere. However, she points out that setting aside accountability of perpetrators of the most serious crimes could have a negative effect on the long term sustainable peace and social cohesion. </p>
<p>From the sittings so far, there is no doubt the commission will unravel the circumstances of some extrajudicial killings and disappearances necessary for families to know how their relatives were killed and buried. What is unclear is how Yahya Jammeh, who has been the key person in the execution of these atrocity crimes, would have the opportunity to respond to allegations being made against him.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/114203/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abdul-Jalilu Ateku received funding from the Commonwealth Scholarship Commission in the United Kingdom</span></em></p>Criminal trials await those found responsible for the most serious crimes in The Gambia.Abdul-Jalilu Ateku, Researcher in conflict, peace and security, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/916002018-02-21T07:05:47Z2018-02-21T07:05:47ZAfrica waves some leaders goodbye: but is the democratic deficit any narrower?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/205965/original/file-20180212-58312-1numn6s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Jose Eduardo dos Santos has stepped down as president of Angola but the country's political system hasn't been overhauled.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Manuel de Almeida</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>At a time when Africa has seen a few long-standing leaders exit, the issue of change in power is occupying minds of citizens as well as those in leadership positions. </p>
<p>In spite of their varied repertoire of tactics to remain in power, no one is immune to the wave of change in leadership that has led many African presidents to lose their coveted top job. </p>
<p>Whether through elections, succession battles, coups or end of terms in office it has become a question of when and how they will exit. That’s if one is not too concerned with what comes afterwards. Though it is too early to tell whether meaningful changes can be expected, cases such as Zimbabwe suggest that its citizens can envisage more of the same.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, a review of developments in 2017 shows that it was a fruitful year for those advocating change. Examples include the Gambia where Adama Barrow came in as a promising new leader. Angola’s Joao Manuel Lourenço rose to power and immediately replaced some top public servants, raising hopes that he might champion good governance, although there hasn’t been an overhaul of the system. </p>
<p>In any case, the arrival of a ‘new’ leader in power always brings optimism for change and constitutes an opportunity for new beginnings.</p>
<h2>The big changes of 2017</h2>
<p>In the Gambia Yahya Abdul-Aziz Jammeh decided to hang onto power <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38289219">following his electoral defeat to Adama Barrow</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/205991/original/file-20180212-58335-5lsuk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/205991/original/file-20180212-58335-5lsuk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205991/original/file-20180212-58335-5lsuk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205991/original/file-20180212-58335-5lsuk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205991/original/file-20180212-58335-5lsuk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205991/original/file-20180212-58335-5lsuk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205991/original/file-20180212-58335-5lsuk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Gambian President Adama Barrow.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Benoit Tessier</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A nuisance to his Senegalese neighbour and an embarrassment to his peers in the subregional body, he was eventually pushed out by the Economic Community of West African States, <a href="http://dailypost.ng/2018/01/19/gambia-ecowas-used-force-yahya-jammeh-buhari/">ending his 22-year rule</a>. He has since been in exile in Equatorial Guinea. </p>
<p>After nearly four decades in power Angola’s Jose Eduardo Dos Santos did not seek reelection. But his ruling Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) retained power after winning the August presidential election. <a href="https://theconversation.com/mugabe-and-dos-santos-africas-old-men-seem-finally-to-be-fading-away-87689">Dos Santos was succeeded by Joao Manuel Goncalves Lourenço, his former Minister of Defense</a>.</p>
<p>Zimbabwe provided the finale to an eventful year when, in a battle for succession, Robert Mugabe was forced out by a faction of his ZANU-PF with the help the Zimbabwean Defense Forces. Emmerson Mnangagwa, his long-time ally, and vice-president, <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-crisis-in-zimbabwe-shows-the-inconsistency-of-african-intergovernmental-organisations-87891">took over the country</a>. Mnangagwa has <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/01/24/zimbabwe-hold-free-fair-elections-july-mnangagwa-announces-davos/">announced that elections this year will be ‘free and fair’</a>. He is expected to retain power and his ZANU-PF to keep control of the national assembly.</p>
<h2>Different fortunes</h2>
<p>Rwanda, Kenya and Liberia all presented tales of different presidential fortunes. </p>
<p>After the December 2015 constitutional amendment allowing Paul Kagame to run for a third term and potentially <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/01/rwanda-paul-kagame-third-term-office-constitutional-changes">remain in power until 2034</a>, he was, without a surprise, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/05/paul-kagame-secures-third-term-in-rwanda-presidential-election">reelected in august 2017 with almost 99 % of the votes</a>. Kagame, touted by many as the providential leader who has stabilised and redressed a country emerging from genocide, is also criticised for muzzling <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/rwanda">all forms of opposition and restricting civil liberties</a>. </p>
<p>In Kenya, Chris Msando, head of information, communication and technology for the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission, <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/kenya-election-official-torture-murdered-chris-msando-nairobi-general-election-vote-a7871146.html">was tortured and murdered a week before the presidential election</a>. Following the august 8th polls, the opposition coalition known as NASA and led by Raila Ondinga, <a href="https://qz.com/1051226/elections-in-kenya-2017-raila-odinga-and-nasa-say-he-should-be-president-not-uhuru-kenyatta/">contested the reelection of incumbent Uhuru Kenyatta</a>. Despite international observers (including the African Union) finding no major issues with the polls, the Kenyan Supreme Court annulled the results and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/20/kenyan-election-rerun-not-transparent-supreme-court">called for a new election in October</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/205994/original/file-20180212-58344-othrrf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/205994/original/file-20180212-58344-othrrf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=849&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205994/original/file-20180212-58344-othrrf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=849&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205994/original/file-20180212-58344-othrrf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=849&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205994/original/file-20180212-58344-othrrf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1067&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205994/original/file-20180212-58344-othrrf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1067&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205994/original/file-20180212-58344-othrrf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1067&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Kenya’s President Uhuru Kenyatta.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Tiksa Negeri</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Uhuru Kenyatta was eventually <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41807317">reelected president in October</a>, after NASA’s refusal to take part in the election without addressing the <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2017/10/14/odinga-refuses-to-sign-kenya-election-withdrawal-form-insists-he-wont-re-run/">key issues raised about the electoral commission</a>. </p>
<p>Kenya has since sunk into a political and institutional crisis, aggravated by the <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/01/kenya-tv-networks-gagged-odinga-inauguration-180130081747894.html">recent inauguration of Odinga as the ‘peoples president’</a>.</p>
<p>Africa’s presidential electoral year ended in Liberia, on 28 December, with the passing of the baton between <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/28/world/africa/george-weah-liberia-election.html">the ruling-party’s candidate Joseph Nyumah Bokai and Georges Oppong Weah</a>. The former soccer star turned politician and senator, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42507405">won in the second round with more than 60% of the votes</a> taking over from Ellen Johnson Sirleaf’s 12 year rule. He will have to redress the resource-rich but yet poor nation, in the wake of a debilitating Ebola outbreak. </p>
<h2>Lessons to take into 2018</h2>
<p>In the three emblematic cases of ‘handover’ – Angola, Zimbabwe and The Gambia – it’s difficult to say whether the democratic deficit is less serious today. But if ZANU-PF and the MPLA don’t renew themselves, systems that don’t have a stellar record in the rule of law and good governance departments could easily be perpetuated. </p>
<p>Gambians, for their part, can hope that the coming to power of a novice in politics will bring them a better life.</p>
<p>Ensuring democratic and good governance, free and fair elections, and peaceful transitions to power are no longer optional. </p>
<p>Stability in several countries will indubitably be jeopardised in 2018 if some governments do not deliver free and fair elections. Similarly, undertaking constitutional changes that contradict the rule of law, the separation of powers and don’t uphold political agreements, will further entrench instability. From this point of view, Africa’s regional organisations will have to manage the post-electoral crises from previous years – including Kenya – and try and prevent those on the horizon this year.</p>
<p>The African Union must, more than ever, have all its member states sing to the tune of democracy. This can be facilitated by a reform of the organisation. But this, in turn, hinges on the political will of those who will have to endorse the necessary changes. Unfortunately, they remain, for the moment, the guardians of the old order.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/91600/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mohamed M Diatta does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>No one is immune to change in leadership that has led many African presidents to lose their coveted top job.Mohamed M Diatta, Ph.D. Candidate & Lecturer in Political Science-International Relations, Sciences Po Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/718222017-02-19T08:09:48Z2017-02-19T08:09:48ZWhat the rest of Africa can learn from The Gambia’s transition to democracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/156540/original/image-20170213-23342-wnc5ya.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">People cheer as Senegalese troops arrive to take charge of security at the presidential palace in Banjul, The Gambia.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Legnan Koula</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The tensions that followed the historic electoral defeat of Gambia strongman President Yahya Jammeh has been a litmus test for democracy in Africa
beyond the tiny west African nation.</p>
<p>It’s five years since the <a href="https://au.int/web/sites/default/files/treaties/7790-file-african_charter_on_democracy_elections_and_governance.pdf">African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance</a> came into <a href="http://myafricanunion.org/fr/projects/good-governance">force</a>. </p>
<p>When it was adopted there were high hopes for a new democratic Africa. African leaders sought to <a href="https://au.int/web/sites/default/files/decisions/9556-assembly_en_29_30_january_2007_auc_the_african_union_eighth_ordinary_session.pdf">consolidate a collective commitment</a> to promote democratisation. The adoption of the charter was seen as an important step towards the AU’s <a href="https://au.int/web/sites/default/files/decisions/9556-assembly_en_29_30_january_2007_auc_the_african_union_eighth_ordinary_session.pdf">democratic agenda</a>. </p>
<p>The charter set out five ways in which heads of state could hold onto power that would constitute unconstitutional changes of government and, by implication, threaten democratic processes. The five are: coups, mercenary interventions, replacement of democratically elected governments by armed dissidents or rebels, refusal by an incumbent to relinquish power, and constitutional revisions that infringe democratic processes.</p>
<p>But political developments in <a href="https://theconversation.com/africa-faces-a-new-threat-to-democracy-the-constitutional-coup-72011">parts of Africa</a> have left much to be desired with respect to the realisation of the charter.</p>
<p>For a while it seemed that The Gambia was doomed to follow suit. Instead, it has become an important democratisation <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-gambia-keeps-dream-of-deepening-democracy-in-africa-alive-69899">success story</a>. Jammeh eventually stepped down, thanks to pressure from Ecowas. He went without a single shot being fired. Barrow, his democratically elected successor, has committed himself to transforming the country into a thriving democracy after two decades of dictatorship.</p>
<p>So what lessons can be learnt from the Gambia which other parts of Africa can emulate? This article highlights three mutually reinforcing lessons: inward evolution, strong coalitions and sub-regional pressure.</p>
<h2>Inward evolution</h2>
<p>The first key factor that propelled the Gambian electoral outcome was the need for change led by Gambians themselves. </p>
<p>The Gambia had once been the <a href="https://books.google.ca/books?id=UOB3w8TZ0dUC&pg=PA194&lpg=PA194&dq=Gambia+draft+home+african+charter+human+rights&source=bl&ots=iyePoeCMpd&sig=ytY2utQKxaQRP0BtuOR4AyXh2MI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjDqM-2xoPSAhXq6IMKHc7BBeM4ChDoAQgbMAA#v=onepage&q=Gambia%20draft%20home%20african%20charter%20human%20rights&f=false">drafting home</a> of the <a href="https://au.int/web/sites/default/files/treaties/7770-file-banjul_charter.pdf">African Human Rights Charter</a>. But under Jammeh it gained international notoriety for human rights violations. </p>
<p>The economy plummeted and unemployment soared. Thousands of <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/alexandra-embiricos/back-way-to-europe-gambia-s-forgotten-refugees">Gambians</a> fled. Many chose to take the perilous journey across the Mediterranean Sea in the hope of reaching Europe. </p>
<p>Gambians began to recognise the need to reassess the direction the country was going in. Political rhetoric for change began to ring loudly. This was amplified on social media platforms through hashtags such as <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/GambiaDecides?src=hash&ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">#GambiaDecides</a> and <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/freegambia">#FreeGambia</a>. </p>
<p>This mobilisation for change based on the belief in democratic values eventually resulted in a re-calibration of the political system through the <a href="https://theconversation.com/enough-is-enough-gambians-put-faith-in-democracy-as-yahya-jammeh-ousted-at-ballot-box-69825">ballot box</a>.</p>
<p>This drive for change is what propelled the <a href="https://www.ineteconomics.org/uploads/papers/MOMANI_Bessma_-Arab-Spring-a-Genuine-Revolutionary-Movement.pdf">Arab Spring</a> in countries such as Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. What was different in The Gambia was that organised political structures were set up. It was through these that the <a href="http://www.sbngambia.com/gambia-2016-coalition-candidate-adama-barrows-address-nation/">Barrow-led</a> coalition won the election.</p>
<h2>Strong coalition</h2>
<p>History has shown that strong coalitions are useful speedboats for democratic change. This is particularly true in countries where governance structures have been woven around a dominant order. </p>
<p>In Africa, coalitions have been shown to be effective and useful in a number of countries. These include <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-21370540">Nigeria</a> and <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-senegal-election-idUKBRE8600JX20120701">Senegal</a>. A coalition of four major political parties in Nigeria propelled the wheels of change in the 2015 General Elections leading to the defeat of former incumbent President Jonathan’s Peoples Democratic Party in the presidential election. In Senegal, Sall’s Benno Bokk Yakaar coalition <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-18719787">won</a> a landslide victory in parliament against Wade’s Senegalese Democratic Party in the 2012 elections.</p>
<p>In the Gambian case, the seven party coalition against the Jammeh-led Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and <a href="https://global.britannica.com/topic/Alliance-for-Patriotic-Reorientation-and-Construction">Reconstruction</a> proved to be a powerful force.</p>
<p>Aside from the coalition, a third driver of the Gambian victory was the sub-region’s commitment to the democratic process.</p>
<h2>Sub-regional pressure</h2>
<p>Regionalism is a powerful and efficient force because it locates political diplomacy within countries that have strong socio-political and economic ties. </p>
<p>While the pressures exerted by the <a href="http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=55776#.WJOrA4WcFPY">United Nations</a> and <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/gambia-politics-afru-idUSKBN14X1RC">African Union</a> were crucial to the Gambian process, the <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/01/19/gambia-crisis-british-tourists-flee-west-african-forces-poised/">efforts by</a> Ecowas were the most effective.</p>
<p>In Africa, sub-regional institutions such as Ecowas and the <a href="http://www.eac.int/">East African Community</a> have been very effective in promoting economic integration and human rights. As active inter-governmental institutions, their role in the democratic narrative cannot be underestimated.</p>
<p>Only time will tell if the continent as a whole will learn from the Gambian experience. What’s important to emphasise is that African democratisation lies in the will of its people and institutions.</p>
<p>If the Gambia is to become an exemplar of African democratisation, the new administration under Barrow must do three things. First, it must live up to its democratic commitment. Second, it must undo the damage that’s been done by the erstwhile regime. Third, it must set the country on a path to peace and prosperity.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/71822/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Romola Adeola does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The adoption of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance five years ago raised hopes for a new democratic Africa. But its ideals remain elusive for many parts of the continent.Romola Adeola, Steinberg Postdoctoral Fellow in International Migration Law, Centre for Human Rights and Legal Pluralism, Faculty of Law, McGill UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/716882017-02-01T15:58:43Z2017-02-01T15:58:43ZHow West Africa built the muscle to rout dictators and keep the peace<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/154021/original/image-20170124-8088-rrj4lu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Members of the Ecowas force at the Denton Bridge check point in Banjul, The Gambia, following Yahya Jammeh's departure.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Thierry Gouegnon</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Following the resolution of the political impasse in The Gambia, a great deal of attention has focused on the role played by the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas). The regional body brought a <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/01/22/gambias-defeated-leader-yahya-jammeh-goes-exile/">swift end</a> to the potentially explosive crisis sparked by the refusal of former President Yahya Jammeh to hand over to the newly elected Adama Barrow.</p>
<p>Jammeh’s flight to exile was preceded by weeks of diplomacy to persuade him to hand over power peacefully. When this failed regional troops and military assets were <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/19/new-gambian-leader-adama-barrow-sworn-in-at-ceremony-in-senegal">mobilised</a> to install Barrow forcibly. The rest is history. Barrow is now officially in the <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/gambia-president-adama-barrow-pledges-reforms-170128194124520.html">presidential seat</a>. </p>
<p>This resounding success, unrivalled by any African regional organisation, has taken decades to craft. It is remarkable to think that <a href="http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/index.php/economic-community-of-west-african-states-">at its inception in 1975</a>, joint military action was not even on the cards.</p>
<h2>The fractious 1960s</h2>
<p>By the close of the early 1960s most countries in the West African sub-region had gained political freedom from colonial powers. They adopted a variety of political systems including multiparty democracy, one-party civilian administrations and military autocracies. The region developed quite a reputation for <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/04/why-are-there-so-many-coups-west-africa/329209/">military coups</a>. There were more in the region than anywhere else on the continent. </p>
<p>Initial attempts to form Ecowas floundered in the early 1960s. This was due largely to the differences between Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, and Nigeria’s first prime minister, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, on the kind of integration necessary for the states in the region. </p>
<p>The fall of these two personalities from power in 1966 did not end the political rivalries in the region. Attempts at integration were further delayed by the civil war in Nigeria between 1967 and 1970. Its aftermath further affected any chances at integration due to the struggle over the supremacy of the West African region between Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire along Anglo-Francophone lines. </p>
<p>Eventually two influential military leaders – Generals Yakubu Gowon of Nigeria and Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo – formed the nucleus of Ecowas in the 1970s. They succeeded in bringing on board the other military leaders of Dahomey (now Benin), Ghana and Niger among others. This explains the dominant role of the military in the life of the organisation. </p>
<p>Ecowas was eventually formed on May 28 1975, in Nigeria as a regional economic grouping of 15 states. Membership went up to 16 when Cape Verde joined in 1976. But it declined again to 15 when Mauritania withdrew in December 2000. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/attachments/351_ecowas%20treaty%20of%201975.pdf">Ecowas Treaty of 1975</a> envisaged the group as an economic community with the aim of promoting</p>
<blockquote>
<p>cooperation and development in all fields of economic activity.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The grouping saw its role as raising the living standards of people in the region, increasing and maintaining economic stability, fostering closer relations among its members and contributing to the progress and development of the continent. </p>
<p>It is significant that no reference was made to defence or security in any of the treaty’s 65 articles. </p>
<p>How did the economic bloc blossom into a dominant sub-regional peace and security organisation in Africa? </p>
<h2>The need for a security organisation</h2>
<p>When Ecowas was formed in 1975 only Nigeria had experienced a <a href="https://oldnaija.wordpress.com/2015/07/26/the-nigerian-civil-war/">civil war</a>. But there was an increase in the number of violent conflicts after the late 1980s. </p>
<p>Several factors contributed to the intractability and complexity of violent conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Côte d'Ivoire. These included the effects of the Cold War, economic malaise, human rights abuses and political rivalries and interests of states in the region. The conflicts had deleterious implications for peace and security of the region. </p>
<p>The effect of the civil wars was that some states became places for recruiting disenchanted unemployed youth into various armed banditry groups. They pillaged the region for natural resources and committed heinous war related crimes. </p>
<p>Ecowas was formed at a time when power vacillated between civilian and military rulers in the region. The period was characterised by governments accusing one another of supporting dissidents. There were also accusations of domestic problems being instigated externally. </p>
<p>Against this backdrop, the treaty was revised in 1993. The “Revised Treaty” allowed the promulgation of protocols to regulate the peace and security architecture of member states. </p>
<h2>The peace and security architecture of Ecowas</h2>
<p>The first protocol promulgated was a nonaggression pact signed on April 28 1978 in Lagos, Nigeria. The region’s leaders present noted that the community</p>
<blockquote>
<p>cannot attain its objective save in an atmosphere of peace and harmonious understanding among Community members.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This marked the beginning of future steps by member states to address security matters in the region. But the protocol proved inadequate against either external attacks or intrastate conflicts which were becoming more frequent. This led to the mutual assistance in defence protocol being passed.</p>
<p>This was signed in May 1981 despite fervent opposition from Mali, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. It did not create a standing army but provisions were made for joint action in the event of any security threat to a member state through a voluntary contribution of troops. These were referred to as the Allied Armed Forces of the Community.</p>
<p>But the reliance on troop contributions from member states was a major challenge. This was because by the time troops were assembled the violence would have escalated. </p>
<p>These and many other bottlenecks, in particular, the harrowing experiences of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (Ecomog) in Liberia and Sierra Leone, led to the next big step. Which is why in 1999 a <a href="http://www.wanep.org/wanep/attachments/article/101/tp_ecowas_subregional_peacekeeping.pdf">mechanism</a> for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping and security was agreed.</p>
<h2>Current peace and security framework</h2>
<p>The 1999 protocol put in place comprehensive structures and processes that have to be followed in the event of conflict breaking out. </p>
<p>The mechanism makes provision for diplomatic and military interventions. It empowers regional leaders to decide on the deployment of political and military missions.</p>
<p>Ecowas has a standby force in member countries which can be deployed rapidly to prevent conflicts from escalating. The rapid deployment of troops from Nigeria and The Gambia’s neighbour Senegal in the recent deadlock is a case in point. </p>
<p>Other protocols relating to the prevention, management and resolution of conflict make up a significant part of the regional peace and security architecture. These include a supplementary protocol on democracy and good governance adopted in 2001. </p>
<p>There are a number of other security related structures. These include an early warning system and a mediation and security council which advises the authority of heads of state and government. In addition, there are offices of the special representatives, a council of elders and special mediators.</p>
<p>But the challenge of preventing conflicts from escalating remained. To meet this challenge, a conflict prevention framework was agreed in 2008. This enabled the regional powers to harness <a href="http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/womenandjustice/upload/ECOWAS-Conflict-Prevention-Framework.pdf">human and financial resources</a> from other important players such as private and civil society organisations. </p>
<p>A major challenge that now remains is the financial burden associated with political and military missions. But with its long history of meeting its challenges full square, there is every chance Ecowas will make a success of that, too.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/71688/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abdul-Jalilu Ateku receives funding from the Commonwealth Scholarship Commission in the United Kingdom. </span></em></p>Regional power Ecowas, which has just seen off yet another dictator in Yahya Jammeh, started off with a tame agenda 42 years ago. But it was soon shaped by civil wars, military coups and despotsAbdul-Jalilu Ateku, PhD Candidate in International Relations, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/718422017-01-30T15:18:11Z2017-01-30T15:18:11ZCurb your enthusiasm: there are limits to the ‘Gambia-effect’ for the rest of Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/154713/original/image-20170130-7680-14cvbmi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Gambia's new President Adama Barrow arriving home.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As the new Gambian President <a href="http://www.nation.co.ke/news/africa/Barrow-arrives-take-power-in-Gambia/1066-3789034-f9akifz/">Adama Barrow settles in</a>, regional organisations are being lauded for playing a key role in ensuring a democratic and peaceful transition.</p>
<p>The Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) and the African Union (AU), in coalition with external actors such as the European Union (EU) have indeed been essential in making sure that his predecessor Yahya Jammeh stepped down after losing the elections. But caution is warranted in assuming this heralds regional organisations fostering a continental trend of ending dictatorships. </p>
<p>Ecowas and the AU were keen to <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201612110444.html">condemn</a> Jammeh’s refusal to relinquish power after losing the presidential elections in December 2016. They even openly threatened military action in the country to <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-gambia-is-testing-west-africas-resolve-to-protect-democracy-71173">remove him</a>. </p>
<p>The reasons for such assertiveness, which is unusual given the many undemocratic moves in Africa, are manifold. Regional organisations on the continent are still predominantly governed by summits of heads of state. Jammeh was not able to count on key allies that would shield him from the military actions of his country’s neighbours.</p>
<p>In addition, the small and impoverished country’s <a href="http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=30787:the-gambia&catid=119:african-militaries&Itemid=255">army of less than 1 000 soldiers</a> would not have been able to resist a concerted regional intervention. Finally, regional organisations have a strong preference for stability. Governments in power are often perceived as guaranteeing such stability whereas contenders risk producing upheaval.</p>
<p>But in this particular case Jammeh was considered a source of fragility for the entire region. In other words, The Gambia provided favourable conditions for Ecowas and the AU to flex their muscles. Cautious optimism should be the order of the day before assuming this resolve will be repeated elsewhere when needed.</p>
<h2>What sets the African Union apart</h2>
<p>Unlike some other regional organisations, such as <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/conditions-membership_en">the EU</a> or <a href="http://www.complianceandrisks.com/regulations/mercosur-democratic-commitment-in-mercosur-bolivia-and-chile-ushuaia-protocol-1998-7494/">the Common Market of the Southern Cone of South America (Mercosur)</a>, democracy is not a precondition for membership in the AU. The AU’s membership comprises the whole gamut of regime types. These include democracies, absolute monarchies, authoritarian regimes and dictatorships. </p>
<p>Numerous heads of states on the continent have been in power <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2017/01/19/africa/africa-gambia-longest-serving-leaders/">for 20 or more years</a>. It’s not surprising that no country needs to fear being suspended from the continental organisation because of its domestic political system.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, the AU has tried to foster democratic standards and frowns on unconstitutional changes of government. These are broadly understood as the forceful replacement of a democratically elected government. But this constellation requires free and fair elections in the first place. This fixation on constitutional change exempts countries where political power is governed by non-democratic constitutions or political practices. </p>
<p>The AU seems to be increasingly willing to interpret its mandate in broader terms when the conditions are favourable. But in many countries with massive democratic deficits the AU can be expected to continue a policy of waving through elections that are not free or fair. Governments that oppress democratic movements include the AU’s host country <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36940906">Ethiopia</a> or Jammeh’s new home <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/equatorial-guinea">Equatorial Guinea</a>.</p>
<h2>The role of Europe</h2>
<p>The EU and its member states have also played a supportive role in increasing the pressure on Jammeh and slimming down his chances of staying in power. Whether we can see this pattern reproducing elsewhere remains questionable. This is because Europe’s current dominant interest in Africa doesn’t always favour regime change.</p>
<p>With more European governments succumbing to populist demands, cooperation with Africa is increasingly framed around <a href="http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2015/11/11-12/">reducing the number of refugees crossing the Mediterranean</a>. The Gambia is home to less than two million people. Yet, it accounts for around <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/alexandra-embiricos/back-way-to-europe-gambia-s-forgotten-refugees">5% of African refugees getting on a boat to Europe</a>. Many of these people were fleeing Jammeh’s despotic rule. The post-election turmoil further fuelled this exodus. </p>
<p>Barrow’s return and a successful transition to democracy is a favourable outcome for Europe.</p>
<p>But the situation may be different in African countries where dictators are not perceived as a reason for emigration to Europe but rather <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/06/eu-sudan-eritrea-migration">seem effective in oppressing the movement of people</a>. Here, the EU and its member states might be less likely to play an assertive role in supporting democratic overthrows.</p>
<h2>The main driver of political change: the people</h2>
<p>Intergovernmental organisations, be they African or external, cannot be expected to always be the saviours of democracy. The good news is that it might be enough if they play second fiddle. There has been a lot of attention on the role of Ecowas and the AU in supporting the transition in The Gambia. We easily forget who remains the main driver for political change. It’s the Gambians who overcame their fears and reclaimed their dignity by ousting a dictator. If Barrow doesn’t live up to expectations of democracy, he too is likely to face popular resistance. </p>
<p>In many other countries the established networks of patronage and the oppression of opposition voices are still firmly in place. Six years after the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jan/02/the-guardian-view-on-the-arab-spring-it-could-happen-again">Arab Spring</a> a political coming-of-age of the sub-Saharan African youth is not yet within grasp but events such as those in The Gambia can bring the continent closer to democracy, one transition at a time. In some cases, regional organisations might be allies from the start and in other cases they will have to be won over.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/71842/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Frank Mattheis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Although Ecowas and the AU made sure that Yahya Jammeh stepped down after losing the elections in The Gambia, caution is warranted in assuming this heralds a trend against African dictatorships.Frank Mattheis, Senior Researcher in Global Studies, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/712292017-01-12T09:59:13Z2017-01-12T09:59:13ZA turning point for The Gambia, the smiling face of Africa?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/152520/original/image-20170112-25884-km2duc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Gambian president-elect Adama Barrow during an interview in December 2016. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Afolabi Sotunde</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Gambia’s presidential election <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-gambia-politics-idUSKBN14T18X">crisis</a> has been of particular personal interest for me. Between 2013 and 2014 I lived in the country as a law lecturer at the University of The Gambia. The experience was a fantastic one and helped me to understand why the country and its inhabitants are affectionately referred to as the “smiling face of Africa”. </p>
<p>It was a year that moulded and shaped me, but also in some respects shocked me. During one of my lectures I looked up to see an unfamiliar face. Students later informed me that the individual was a member of the national intelligence agency detailed to monitor anti-government sentiment. </p>
<p>This, however, is barely the tip of the iceberg of the ways in which Yahya Jammeh, defeated finally in the December 2016 presidential elections, behaved towards The Gambia and its citizens. Since Jammeh came into power in 1994, human rights violations have become a <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/africa/gambia/report-gambia/">commonplace tool</a> the regime uses to stay in power.</p>
<p>Violations highlighted by international observers include <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/gambia">numerous incidents</a> of alleged torture, enforced disappearances, arbitrary detention, and deprivation of freedom of speech. After an attempted coup in 2014, a number of alleged plotters were held incommunicado. Three later died in <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/gambia">suspicious circumstances</a> after being captured. </p>
<p>In May 2015, Jammeh fired all the presiding judges of the Supreme Court, bar one, leaving the court <a href="http://www.nation.co.ke/news/africa/gambia-top-court-adjourns-election-case-until-january/1066-3495364-42yj4p/">dormant</a>. He was apparently angry at their decision to commute a number of death sentences to life sentences. Last year, a prominent of member of the opposition party <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/08/05/gambia-opposition-politicians-death-must-prompt-human-rights-reform">died</a> after being arrested while peacefully protesting for electoral reform. </p>
<p>Similarly, elections held between <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/1996/09/28/world/military-ruler-in-gambia-defeats-rivals-in-election.html">1994</a> and 2016 have been repeatedly criticised for being <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/5377448.stm">undemocratic</a> and unfairly conducted. This allowed Jammeh to win five concurrent elections and remain in power for 22 years. </p>
<p>After winning the 2011 election Jammeh was so confident he would remain in power he claimed that he was prepared to rule for <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16148458">“1 billion years”</a> if Allah willed it. </p>
<p>This made the results of the election held at the end of 2016 so surprising. Adama Barrow of the United Democratic Party <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-38335541">won</a> the race with 43.3% of the vote. Barrow’s support was in a large part made up of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/nov/30/young-gambians-ready-to-vote-out-dictatorial-yahya-jammeh-regime">youth vote</a> and those disenfranchised by the economic crisis in the country – including the high unemployment rate – widespread repression of freedom of speech, and the mass exodus of Gambian youth on the “back way” to Europe. </p>
<h2>Why Jammeh is hanging by a thread</h2>
<p>Even more surprising than Barrow’s win was Jammeh’s initial acceptance of the result. This apparent acceptance even included a phone call to Barrow where Jammeh conceded defeat and <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-38183906">congratulated</a> his opponent on his win. But the dreams of democracy were short-lived, and provide a stark warning about the fragile nature of the journey to democracy. </p>
<p>Less than a week after the election results were announced the United Democratic Party stated its <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/07/the-gambias-new-rulers-vow-to-prosecute-outgoing-president">intention to prosecute</a> the outgoing leader for numerous crimes committed during his presidency. A few days later, Jammeh responded by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/10/gambian-president-rejects-election-results-yahya-jammeh-adama-barrow">rejecting</a> the election results. He claimed that, after an investigation, a number of “serious and unacceptable abnormalities” had been identified in the election process. </p>
<p>The international condemnation of Jammeh’s decision to contest the election results was swift. The United Nations has urged him to respect the election results and to <a href="http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=55776#.WHSni7aLRE4">transfer power</a>, without delay, to Barrow. The African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the UN secretary-general released a <a href="http://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-african-union-and-un-statement-on-the-political-developments-in-the-gambia/">joint statement</a> calling on the government to abide by its constitutional responsibilities and to respect the will of the people clearly expressed through the ballot box. </p>
<p>ECOWAS and Senegal, which is a member and The Gambia’s closest neighbour, have gone so far as to <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-38414790">mobilise troops</a> to intervene militarily if Jammeh refuses to step down on January 19, the day of Barrow’s inauguration. </p>
<p>There have also been dissenting voices within the country. Numerous national organisations have protested Jammeh’s decision, including several Imams, the Gambian Christian Council, the Gambian Medical Council and the <a href="http://www.freedomnewspaper.com/gambia-breaking-news-gambia-bar-association-boycotts-courts-saying-outgoing-dictator-lacks-legitimacy/">Gambian Bar Association</a>. Staff at the University of The Gambia have been <a href="https://twitter.com/article19wafric/status/807623726422495233">boycotting teaching</a> until Jammeh steps down. </p>
<p>Finally, a civil society initiative for individual citizens, <a href="http://www.gambia.com/">#GambiaHasDecided</a>, is up and running. The campaign calls for Jammeh to step down, to peacefully transfer power to Barrow, and to restore democracy. </p>
<p>One of the campaign’s founding leaders, Raffie Diab, was a friend of mine while I was in The Gambia. He talked to me recently about the campaign. Diab said the initiative had become a <a href="http://www.gambia.com/img/5EC443E0-7A2E-452F-895F-BBD80C367C21-236-0000001204C581C4_tmp.png">target</a> of intimidation and hostility from state security services. Uniformed members of the security services have also destroyed #GambiaHasDecided posters.</p>
<p>Diab and Salieu Taal, the initiative’s chairman, <a href="http://www.freedomnewspaper.com/gambia-breaking-news-two-members-of-gambia-has-decided-campaigners-flee-banjul/">fled</a> the country after credible reports warned of their impending arrest. Others associated with the campaign have been arrested and held incommunicado, allegedly for simply wearing one of the campaign t-shirts. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, Diab and #GambiaHasDecided are confident and hopeful about the future for The Gambia. They believe that Jammeh will permit a peaceful transition of power over the next few days. Their belief is based on several factors. </p>
<p>First, the recent <a href="http://www.freedomnewspaper.com/gambia-breaking-news-gambias-information-minister-defects/">resignation</a> of Jammeh’s information minister is seen as a sign of his regime weakening. </p>
<p>The other important factor is Jammeh’s <a href="http://www.nation.co.ke/news/africa/gambia-top-court-adjourns-election-case-until-january/1066-3495364-42yj4p/">legal challenge</a> contesting the validity of the election results. The supreme court declined to hear the case on January 10, saying that it did not have the capacity and could only hear cases in May and November. This is a situation precipitated by Jammeh when he fired the presiding judges of the supreme court in 2015. </p>
<p>Following the court decision, Jammeh vowed to <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38582180">stay put</a> until a ruling was made on his petition, now unlikely until May. He said he and his cabinet would remain in place beyond his constitutional term which ends on January 18. His nationwide TV broadcast came just hours before West African mediators, led by Nigerian president Muhammadu Buhari, arrive in the country on January 12 for a last-gasp diplomatic push to persuade Jammeh to step down.</p>
<p>Diab believes this meeting with Jammeh will apply sufficient diplomatic pressure to encourage him to peacefully step down. </p>
<h2>Gambia has decided</h2>
<p>But most importantly for the #GambiaHasDecided movement is the change on the ground. </p>
<p>Diab noted that, for the first time since Jammeh came to power, there has been open dissent, and there is a feeling of ownership of the country’s future. </p>
<p>Three years ago when I was living and working in The Gambia this would have been unimaginable. Open dissent and protestation could get you arrested, disappeared, tortured or killed. Government agents were commonplace. In large part, Diab believes this transformation is because Gambians are speaking with one voice. </p>
<p>The #GambiaHasDecided campaign is indicative of real change, and of real hope. </p>
<p>Significant steps have been taken by organisations such as the UN and the African Union. But to help ensure that the will of the Gambian people is respected, the international community and the international media needs to pay attention to this West African nation.</p>
<p>Given that opportunities for a peaceful transition from dictatorship are rare, this is a chance that should not be missed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/71229/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sophie Gallop does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There is a real sense of optimism in The Gambia: for the first time since Yahya Jammeh came to power, there has been open dissent of the regime and a feeling of ownership of the country’s future.Sophie Gallop, Doctoral Candidate and Teaching Associate, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.