tag:theconversation.com,2011:/fr/topics/anzus-18614/articlesANZUS – The Conversation2023-08-28T20:04:03Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2123602023-08-28T20:04:03Z2023-08-28T20:04:03ZTalk of a new Cold War is overheated – but NZ faces complex challenges in the era of ‘strategic competition’<p>As the general election nears, the campaign focus so far has been almost exclusively on domestic issues. And yet, over the past two months, no fewer than <a href="https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/roadmap-for-future-of-defence-and-national-security-released">five government documents</a> have been released outlining the significant defence and security challenges the country now faces.</p>
<p>If there is one theme that unites these reports, it is captured in the <a href="https://www.defence.govt.nz/publications/publication/defence-policy-review-defence-policy-and-strategy-statement-2023">Defence Policy and Strategy Statement</a>’s observation that “New Zealand is facing a more challenging strategic environment than it has in decades”.</p>
<p>That assessment matches other national security reports, defence reviews and Indo-Pacific strategies released in the past 12 months by Australia, Germany, Japan, Britain and South Korea. </p>
<p>All support the essential pillars of the post-1945 international system – including the US alliances in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, the United Nations system, and the basic international capitalist economic framework – that have underpinned stability and prosperity.</p>
<p>That stability is now under sustained challenge from a combination of forces: US-China rivalry, Russian expansionism, nationalism, ethnic conflict, populist domestic politics, as well as climate change and possible future pandemics.</p>
<p>The situation is complicated by the deep economic relationships shared by those powers challenging aspects of the existing international order and those seeking to defend it: Russia is Germany’s key energy supplier and its fourth-largest non-European Union trade partner; China is the top trade partner of Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea (and Germany’s second-largest).</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1687193384950390784"}"></div></p>
<h2>No new Cold War</h2>
<p>As this complex picture has evolved, there has been careless talk of a “new Cold War” – but it’s a flawed comparison. </p>
<p>Unlike the Soviet Union, which dominated Eastern Europe after the second world war, Russia cannot even secure victory against a state on its periphery. Moscow’s Ukraine war is a strategic defeat that confirms its decline as a major power – not least by reinvigorating NATO. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nzs-first-national-security-strategy-signals-a-turning-point-and-the-end-of-old-certainties-210885">NZ’s first national security strategy signals a 'turning point' and the end of old certainties</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>At the same time, the US relationship with China is fundamentally different from its Cold War relationship with the Soviet Union. Six years after the then US president, Donald Trump, declared a “trade war” with China, interdependence has actually increased.</p>
<p>The US and China are now each other’s top trading partner. In contrast, the Soviet Union and the US had significantly lower levels of trade. </p>
<p>During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the US had formidable global alliance systems. In 2023, the US has expanded its alliances into Eastern Europe and the Indo-Pacific, while China has only one formal ally, North Korea. </p>
<h2>The rise of ‘strategic competition’</h2>
<p>That said, the stakes of current US-China “strategic competition” are difficult to overstate. It will shape the character and rules of the international system for the 21st century and beyond.</p>
<p>China is a formidable competitor seeking to balance US power, not least in the Indo-Pacific, the powerhouse of the world economy. As the 2022 US <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf">National Security Strategy</a> states:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[…] the post-Cold War era is definitely over and a competition is underway between the major powers to shape what comes next [… The US] will partner with any nation that shares our basic belief that the rules-based order must remain the foundation for global peace and prosperity. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Essentially, the US view is that alliances and partnerships will determine the course of world politics, even more than during the Cold War. </p>
<p>Membership of this sphere will yield privileges, while non-membership risks economic and military costs (something New Zealand will need to consider in its decision on joining pillar two of the AUKUS security pact). </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-defence-dilemma-facing-nzs-next-government-stay-independent-or-join-pillar-2-of-aukus-212090">The defence dilemma facing NZ's next government: stay independent or join 'pillar 2' of AUKUS?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Washington needs allies</h2>
<p>There are two important implications for New Zealand and its key partners (including Australia, most of the ASEAN nations, the EU, UK, Japan and South Korea).</p>
<p>The first involves the objective decline in US power since the 2008 global financial crisis and the rise of its allies and partners. </p>
<p>The stability and fortunes of the international order that Washington has constructed will increasingly hinge on the willingness of those allies and partners to defend key principles that underpin the system. </p>
<p>These include the defence of state sovereignty through cooperative relationships with international institutions, and the free flow of trade and investment. </p>
<p>It is notable, too, that New Zealand’s recent defence and security statements – like those from Australia, Britain, South Korea and Japan – use the US concept of “strategic competition” to characterise the central dynamic of this new era. </p>
<p>China’s national security planners will not have failed to notice this.</p>
<h2>Speaking truth to power</h2>
<p>The second implication involves the role America’s allies and partners expect it to play in the world. These countries are critical in sustaining the existing economic and political order, and expect US restraint in its defence of it.</p>
<p>An enlightened understanding of America’s own national interest is consistent with those expectations. For example, most reasonable observers in the US would now agree with the Helen Clark government’s position of “speaking truth to power” in <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/308164/nz-made-'right-judgement'-over-iraq">not backing</a> the invasion of Iraq in 2003. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-number-8-wire-days-for-nzs-defence-force-are-over-new-priorities-will-demand-bigger-budgets-211182">The 'number 8 wire' days for NZ's defence force are over – new priorities will demand bigger budgets</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>And there is strength in numbers. The sooner the US internalises the view that constructive feedback from allies and partners is an asset in the age of strategic competition, the more likely it is that the current international order can last.</p>
<p>The next New Zealand government faces the most challenging set of circumstances and decisions since the <a href="https://theconversation.com/anzus-at-70-together-for-decades-us-australia-new-zealand-now-face-different-challenges-from-china-163546">breakdown of the ANZUS alliance</a> in the mid-1980s. It will have to define more clearly how the country’s independent foreign policy is reinforced by closer cooperation with allies and partners.</p>
<p>And it will no longer be able to use that idea of independence as a reason to avoid long overdue but necessary decisions on the funding of foreign policy and defence. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/anzus-at-70-together-for-decades-us-australia-new-zealand-now-face-different-challenges-from-china-163546">ANZUS at 70: Together for decades, US, Australia, New Zealand now face different challenges from China</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212360/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicholas Khoo has received funding from the Asia New Zealand Foundation, the Australian National University, Columbia University, the New Zealand Contemporary China Research Centre, and the University of Otago. </span></em></p>With the rise of China and shifting international power dynamics, New Zealand needs to find its place in a complex system of alliances and partnerships.Nicholas Khoo, Associate Professor of International Politics, University of OtagoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2068492023-06-02T00:30:54Z2023-06-02T00:30:54ZThe war in Ukraine is escalating and New Zealand will not escape the consequences<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/529680/original/file-20230601-18228-vuy6n2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=6%2C6%2C4594%2C3055&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Russia’s war with Ukraine is now at a critical turning point. The relentless missile and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2023/may/30/kyiv-third-wave-drone-strikes-24-hours-video">drone strikes</a> on the capital Kyiv may look like a sign of strength, but appearances can be deceiving. </p>
<p>The Russian assault is a sign of weakness. It is an attempt to weaken Kyiv’s air defences in advance of a much-anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive against Russian forces in Ukraine.</p>
<p>Earlier this week, a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65753825">suspected Ukrainian drone attack</a> damaged two residential buildings in Moscow. If confirmed, this would be the first strike by Kyiv on a civilian area in Moscow.</p>
<p>BBC Russia editor Steve Rosenberg, whose own Moscow home windows shook during the explosions, reported feeling “as if the hostilities are coming much closer to home now”.</p>
<p>But this was not the first drone attack on Moscow. In early May, the Russian government reported that two unmanned aerial vehicles had unsuccessfully attempted to attack the Kremlin.</p>
<p>The clear concern now is that the war is escalating. And the repercussions will affect the United States-China relationship, as well as Australia, New Zealand and the South Pacific. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/529679/original/file-20230601-18-c7ivr0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/529679/original/file-20230601-18-c7ivr0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/529679/original/file-20230601-18-c7ivr0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/529679/original/file-20230601-18-c7ivr0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/529679/original/file-20230601-18-c7ivr0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/529679/original/file-20230601-18-c7ivr0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/529679/original/file-20230601-18-c7ivr0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Russia’s home front: a damaged Moscow apartment building after the drone attack on May 30.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Diplomatic absence</h2>
<p>As University of Chicago scholar <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/playing-fire-ukraine">John Mearsheimer wrote</a> in the journal Foreign Affairs in August 2022:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The maximalist thinking that now prevails in Washington and Moscow gives each side more reason to win on the battlefield so that it can dictate the terms of the eventual peace. In effect, the absence of a possible diplomatic solution provides an added incentive for both sides to climb up the escalation ladder.</p>
</blockquote>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/moscow-drone-attacks-are-a-morale-booster-for-ukraine-and-a-warning-for-russia-heres-why-206797">Moscow drone attacks are a morale booster for Ukraine and a warning for Russia – here's why</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>If this sounds alarmist, it shouldn’t. Does anyone doubt Vladimir Putin’s political (and possibly personal) survival rests on winning the first land war in Europe since the 1990s, one that directly involves NATO and Russia?</p>
<p>And does anyone doubt that NATO will not rest until its efforts in Ukraine secure Russia’s strategic defeat? That is the obvious interpretation of US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s April 2022 <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/25/russia-weakedend-lloyd-austin-ukraine">statement</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>We want to see Ukraine remain a sovereign country, a democratic country able to protect its sovereign territory. We want to see Russia weakened to the point where it can’t do things like invade Ukraine.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>While we may be sympathetic to that statement, its escalatory implications are clear.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1496773025647443971"}"></div></p>
<h2>An escalation triangle</h2>
<p>The current regime in Russia is arguably its own worst enemy. As Stanford historian Stephen Kotkin has written, Putin is repeating a pattern of failed modernisation and unsuccessful aggression that can be traced back to Tsar Peter the Great (1672-1725).</p>
<p>The savagery of the Russian campaign in Ukraine demands the scrutiny of an international criminal court. Whether this happens or not, history should teach us not to expect a consolidated liberal democracy to emerge from the ashes of the Putin regime. Indeed, the only thing worse than its continuation could be what replaces it.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-russia-might-rethink-its-alliance-with-china-after-putin-204595">How Russia might rethink its alliance with China after Putin</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Russia’s war in Ukraine has also escalated existing tensions in the US relationship with China.</p>
<p>If that relationship was adversarial before the Ukraine war, it is far more so now. The war has turbocharged Beijing’s view of US expansionism, and the US sense that it should press its advantage against its Chinese and Russian rivals.</p>
<p>Evidence suggests Beijing will do all it can to ensure the Putin regime’s survival, and eventually support the transition to a more restrained Russian leader who remains aligned with China. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/approach-with-caution-why-nz-should-be-wary-of-buying-into-the-aukus-security-pact-203915">Approach with caution: why NZ should be wary of buying into the AUKUS security pact</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>NZ and the ANZAC alliance</h2>
<p>These escalations are now being felt within Australia and New Zealand’s strategic environment.</p>
<p>In recent years, China’s leader, Xi Jinping, <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-01/02/c_137714898.htm">has made clear</a> that China’s “national rejuvenation” cannot be achieved without “reunification” with Taiwan. The present situation, <a href="https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1621525585057630330&wfr=spider&for=pc">he has said</a>, “cannot go on [from] generation to generation”.</p>
<p>Since 2020, New Zealand’s sole alliance partner Australia has borne the brunt of a coercive economic and diplomatic sanctions policy initiated by China. Canberra responded with the ambitious 2021 <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/03/13/joint-leaders-statement-on-aukus-2/">AUKUS</a> initiative, a strategic technology-sharing partnership with the US and UK.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-australia-signs-up-for-nuclear-subs-nz-faces-hard-decisions-over-the-aukus-alliance-201946">As Australia signs up for nuclear subs, NZ faces hard decisions over the AUKUS alliance</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>China then escalated tensions by signing a security agreement with the Solomon Islands in May 2022. The operational details weren’t transparent but the strategic target was clear – Australia. </p>
<p>These developments profoundly affect New Zealand’s own security. This explains Minister of Defence Andrew Little’s announcement in April 2023 that Wellington is interested in hearing more detail about possible “<a href="https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/131625701/new-zealand-interested-in-joining-second-tranche-of-aukus-deal-defence-minister-says">pillar two</a>” participation in AUKUS.</p>
<p>One necessary casualty of the current era of conflict escalation is a worldview based on plentiful security and few hard choices. How far we have come from the benign era when New Zealand signed a free trade agreement with China in 2008.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206849/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicholas Khoo has received funding from the Asia New Zealand Foundation, the Australian National University, Columbia University, the New Zealand Contemporary China Research Centre, and the University of Otago.
</span></em></p>It may be half-a-world away, but the war in Ukraine is escalating geopolitical tensions everywhere – including between China and the US, with major implications for New Zealand foreign policy.Nicholas Khoo, Associate Professor of International Politics, University of OtagoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2019462023-03-16T18:31:09Z2023-03-16T18:31:09ZAs Australia signs up for nuclear subs, NZ faces hard decisions over the AUKUS alliance<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/515686/original/file-20230316-213-gmme4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=20%2C10%2C6969%2C4618&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Australian PM Anthony Albanese and US President Joe Biden seal the AUKUS deal in San Diego, March 13.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Former Australian prime minister Paul Keating’s recent <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/mar/15/paul-keating-labels-aukus-submarine-pact-worst-deal-in-all-history-in-attack-on-albanese-government">strident criticism</a> of the A$368 billion nuclear-powered <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/14/what-is-the-aukus-submarine-deal-and-what-does-it-mean-the-key-facts">submarine deal</a> announced under the AUKUS security pact
will have little effect on Australian policy. Canberra’s deepening level of security cooperation is underpinned by a deep political consensus.</p>
<p>But the clarity of Australian policy stands in stark contrast with New Zealand’s position on <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/03/13/joint-leaders-statement-on-aukus-2/">AUKUS</a>, the trilateral technology-sharing agreement between Australia, the UK and US. In fact, New Zealand’s AUKUS policy can be summed up in one word – ambiguity.</p>
<p>The establishment of AUKUS in September 2021 was met with an <a href="https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/politics/2021/09/aukus-jacinda-ardern-welcomes-united-kingdom-united-states-engagement-in-pacific-says-nz-nuclear-stance-unchanged.html">equivocal endorsement</a> by New Zealand. On the one hand, the prime minister at the time, Jacinda Ardern, was “pleased to see” the initiative, declaring she “welcome[d] the increased engagement of the UK and the US in our region”.</p>
<p>On the other hand, Ardern noted the country’s longstanding nuclear-free policy meant any nuclear-propelled submarines developed by our Australian ally would be prohibited from New Zealand waters. </p>
<p>After Tuesday’s joint AUKUS <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/eyeing-china-biden-allies-unveil-nuclear-powered-submarine-plan-australia-2023-03-13/">leaders’ statement</a> in San Diego by Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, US President Joe Biden and British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, it’s time to start counting the opportunity cost to New Zealand of maintaining this ambiguous policy posture. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1635853674059812866"}"></div></p>
<h2>Bets both ways</h2>
<p>It may be surprising to hear, but Wellington’s AUKUS policy is ambiguous by design, reflecting a broader policy of “hedging”. This deliberately seeks to maximise the economic gains from trade with China, while supporting a US-constructed international order that aligns with New Zealand’s interests and values. </p>
<p>Unfortunately for New Zealand, the geopolitical environment that underpinned this policy has been torpedoed by the deterioration in US-China relations. It began during the Obama administration and has escalated during the Trump and Biden administrations. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/paul-keating-lashes-albanese-government-over-aukus-calling-it-labors-biggest-failure-since-ww1-201866">Paul Keating lashes Albanese government over AUKUS, calling it Labor's biggest failure since WW1</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The creation of AUKUS is a reflection of this broader strategic environment. And it has a direct effect on New Zealand’s security in two respects. </p>
<p>First, New Zealand’s leading trade partner, China, views AUKUS as contributing negatively to regional security dynamics. And Beijing cannot be expected to placidly accept this <em>démarche</em>. </p>
<p>China responded to the formation of AUKUS with the China-Solomon Islands <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/world/465534/china-and-solomon-islands-sign-security-pact">security agreement</a> in April 2022. What will its response be this time? It’s likely to involve some attempt to reduce Australian security, such as a Solomon Islands-style partnership with any number of states in the Pacific Islands Forum. This will have knock-on effects for New Zealand’s own security. </p>
<h2>Regional instability</h2>
<p>The possible scenarios are limited only by China’s capabilities and level of resolve to respond to AUKUS. As it stands, China’s foreign ministry spokesperson, Wang Wenbin, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/14/china-aukus-submarines-deal-embarks-path-error-danger">reacted critically</a> to the AUKUS leaders’ statement. According to Wang: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The latest joint statement from the US, UK and Australia demonstrates that the three countries, for the sake of their own geopolitical interests, completely disregard the concerns of the international communities and are walking further and further down the path of error and danger.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>To put it mildly, such criticism is misplaced. Truth be told, while there is clearly an interactive dynamic at work, AUKUS is much more an effect of a deteriorating security environment than a cause of it.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/aukus-submarine-plan-will-be-the-biggest-defence-scheme-in-australian-history-so-how-will-it-work-199492">AUKUS submarine plan will be the biggest defence scheme in Australian history. So how will it work?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Like all countries, China has legitimate security concerns and interests. And it is clearly misleading, as many hawks in the US are doing, to paint China as an unvarnished threat to regional stability in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. </p>
<p>But it’s equally misleading to overlook China’s role in the increased regional instability over the past decade or more, which has led to the creation of AUKUS and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (<a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/24/joint-statement-from-quad-leaders/">QUAD</a>) involving Australia, India, Japan and the US. </p>
<h2>Historic turning point</h2>
<p>Second, the latest AUKUS developments have clear implications for New Zealand’s alliance with Australia, which is at a historic turning point. The principle at play here is clear – investment signals commitment, while lack of investment signals lack of commitment. </p>
<p>What is New Zealand’s level of commitment to the alliance? We will soon find out. The New Zealand Ministry of Defence is conducting a major review that will release its report after the 2023 general election.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nukes-allies-weapons-and-cost-4-big-questions-nzs-defence-review-must-address-188732">Nukes, allies, weapons and cost: 4 big questions NZ's defence review must address</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>It’s a fair bet Canberra is open to a serious discussion with Wellington on investing in a retooled ANZAC alliance. This would secure both countries’ national interests, not least their maritime, cyber and regional security.</p>
<p>Australia has chosen to invest in AUKUS. As Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles stated at a press conference in Canberra timed to occur immediately after Albanese’s joint ceremony with Biden and Sunak: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>This is an investment in our nation’s security. It is an investment in our economy. And it is an investment that we cannot afford not to make. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>AUKUS is both a catalyst and a mirror reflecting a swiftly changing strategic environment. New Zealand now needs to make some considered decisions on how to respond.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201946/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicholas Khoo has received funding from the Asia New Zealand Foundation, the Australian National University, Columbia University, the New Zealand Contemporary China Research Centre, and the University of Otago. </span></em></p>It’s likely Canberra is open to discussions with Wellington about investing in the AUKUS alliance. Can New Zealand keep hedging its bets on China and the US?Nicholas Khoo, Associate Professor of International Politics, University of OtagoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1887322022-08-16T18:56:47Z2022-08-16T18:56:47ZNukes, allies, weapons and cost: 4 big questions NZ’s defence review must address<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479225/original/file-20220815-11-lorh32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=24%2C8%2C5431%2C3604&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>New Zealand’s <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/472901/ukraine-training-programme-new-zealand-to-send-another-120-defence-staff">commitment this week</a> to send a further 120 defence staff to assist with training the Ukrainian military underlines how quickly the geopolitical landscape is changing.</p>
<p>Earlier this month, US Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi’s provocative (some would say reckless) Taiwan trip set off another round of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/05/china-halts-us-cooperation-nancy-pelosi-taiwan">sabre-rattling by China</a> and a breakdown in bilateral discussions with the US.</p>
<p>More recently, US Deputy Secretary of State <a href="https://www.1news.co.nz/2022/08/10/nz-could-eventually-join-aukus-alliance-top-us-diplomat/">Wendy Sherman suggested</a> New Zealand could be invited to join <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus/">AUKUS</a>, the defence alliance focused on the Indo-Pacific region and aimed at countering China’s rising influence. </p>
<p>Taken together, these events show why the government’s newly commissioned <a href="https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/defence-policy-review-ensure-future-investment-fit-post-covid-world">Defence Policy Review</a> is both timely and urgent.</p>
<p>The review follows the <a href="https://www.defence.govt.nz/publications/publication/defence-assessment-2021">2021 Defence Assessment</a>, which highlighted the challenges presented by climate change, China and Russia. But even in the nine months since the assessment was released, the scale of the <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-022-02114-y">climate crisis</a> has only become more evident, while relations with Russia and China have become more complicated.</p>
<p>In particular, China’s influence in the Pacific came into sharp relief in April when it signed a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/20/the-deal-that-shocked-the-world-inside-the-china-solomons-security-pact">security agreement</a> with Solomon Islands. With regional and global pressures increasing, the defence review has four vital questions to address.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1559021292157673472"}"></div></p>
<h2>1. What is the nuclear risk?</h2>
<p>Because of New Zealand’s <a href="https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1987/0086/latest/DLM115116.html">nuclear-free status</a> and the suspended ANZUS agreement, some might assume the country is safe. In fact, <a href="https://thebulletin.org/doomsday-clock/current-time/">nuclear tensions are high</a> and the review needs to make this clear.</p>
<p>Just what impact a nuclear conflict would <a href="https://blogs.otago.ac.nz/pubhealthexpert/sustained-resilience-the-impact-of-nuclear-war-on-new-zealand-and-how-to-mitigate-catastrophe/">have on New Zealand</a> would depend on its scale and location, including whether the country was a direct target. Either way, it would be enormous. Aside from the need to factor this into the <a href="https://dpmc.govt.nz/our-programmes/national-security-and-intelligence/national-security/new-zealands-national-security">national security system</a>, the review has to be clear about associated risks.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-aukus-pact-born-in-secrecy-will-have-huge-implications-for-australia-and-the-region-168065">The AUKUS pact, born in secrecy, will have huge implications for Australia and the region</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Since New Zealand is part of the <a href="https://www.gcsb.govt.nz/about-us/ukusa-allies/">Five Eyes</a> security partnership, it’s possible the Waihopai spy base could be a direct target. The larger and more sophisticated <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-01-23/cia-document-says-nt-spy-base-could-be-a-target/8205432">Pine Gap</a> facility in Australia likely already is – which in turn raises the issue of what happens if New Zealand’s closest and most important ally is attacked.</p>
<p>After the AUKUS defence pact was signed last year, <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/china-threatens-australia-missile-attack-199667">China warned</a> Australia could become a “nuclear war target”. Regardless of the estranged ANZUS relationship, New Zealand would likely be pulled into any such conflict.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479227/original/file-20220815-5636-crjinr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479227/original/file-20220815-5636-crjinr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479227/original/file-20220815-5636-crjinr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479227/original/file-20220815-5636-crjinr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479227/original/file-20220815-5636-crjinr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479227/original/file-20220815-5636-crjinr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479227/original/file-20220815-5636-crjinr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">NZ Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern with her Belgian counterpart Alexander De Croo at the NATO summit in Madrid, June 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>2. What would NZ fight for?</h2>
<p>For all those reasons, the defence review will need to look at New Zealand’s diplomatic settings in a world of changing military alliances. </p>
<p>Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern has stressed the values underpinning the country’s foreign policy to both the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/31/united-states-aotearoa-new-zealand-joint-statement/">US</a> and <a href="https://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/pms-comments-nato-session">NATO</a>, but these should be made explicit in the review. How are these values defended, and how can New Zealand’s independent foreign policy be reconciled with collective security goals?</p>
<p>With Australia, what are the commitments, responsibilities, benefits and implications of the Anzac relationship in the 21st century? And what is New Zealand’s position on Australia’s connection to the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (<a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/24/quad-joint-leaders-statement/">QUAD</a>) with the US, Japan and India, and the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-us-and-australia-launch-new-security-partnership">AUKUS </a>agreement with the US and Britain? </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/china-us-tensions-how-global-trade-began-splitting-into-two-blocs-188380">China-US tensions: how global trade began splitting into two blocs</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Critically, the review should also assess the costs and benefits of New Zealand joining such arrangements.</p>
<p>And while New Zealand can’t join NATO, a clear assessment of this evolving relationship is clearly warranted, given current cooperation to supply <a href="https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/nz-provide-additional-deployment-support-ukraine">weapons, intelligence and military training</a> to Ukraine.</p>
<p>Finally, while the relationship with the US has improved since the signing of a <a href="https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/us-nz-defence-arrangement-signed">defence arrangement</a> in 2012, what are the future prospects? Can the <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Completed_Inquiries/jfadt/usrelations/appendixb">ANZUS commitment</a> to “mutual aid […] and collective capacity to resist armed attack” be revisited without compromising New Zealand’s non-nuclear stance?</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1557166740752064512"}"></div></p>
<h2>3. Which weapons systems?</h2>
<p>As the war in the Ukraine is demonstrating, the <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/across-drones-ai-and-space-commercial-tech-flexing-military-muscle-ukraine">technology of warfare</a> is evolving fast. Preparing for that change will be essential if New Zealand is to have a credible defence system.</p>
<p>New Zealand may have no capacity for nuclear-powered submarines or aircraft carriers, but its armed forces will need access to some of the equipment already being deployed against Russia’s invasion.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-crisis-how-do-small-states-like-new-zealand-respond-in-an-increasingly-lawless-world-177919">Ukraine crisis: how do small states like New Zealand respond in an increasingly lawless world?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The defence review should also examine the next generation of platforms, including <a href="https://theconversation.com/better-ai-unhackable-communication-spotting-submarines-the-quantum-tech-arms-race-is-heating-up-179482">quantum technologies</a>, hypersonic weaponary, advanced cyber capabilities, electronic warfare, artificial intelligence and potentially some autonomous systems.</p>
<p>Inter-operability with allies will be crucial. And the review should explore the possibility of New Zealand contributing proportionately to joint allied military budgets for things beyond its own capacity to supply, such as fighter aircraft or advanced weapons systems.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/better-ai-unhackable-communication-spotting-submarines-the-quantum-tech-arms-race-is-heating-up-179482">Better AI, unhackable communication, spotting submarines: the quantum tech arms race is heating up</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>4. How much should NZ spend?</h2>
<p>New Zealand’s defence spend was boosted in the last budget to <a href="https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/funding-boost-secures-defence-capabilities">NZ$5.2 billion</a> and is <a href="https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/new-zealand-increases-202223-defence-budget-by-4">projected</a> to keep increasing to 2030. The country spends about <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/programmes/the-detail/story/2018838061/hitting-the-right-balance-on-defence-spending">1.5% of its GDP</a> on defence, compared to
an <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?locations=OE-NZ">OECD average</a> now at 2.5% (3.7% for the US, 2.2% for Britain, 2.1% for Australia and 1.4% for Canada).</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-says-peace-in-ukraine-will-be-on-our-terms-but-what-can-the-west-accept-and-at-what-cost-187349">Russia says peace in Ukraine will be ‘on our terms’ – but what can the West accept and at what cost?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Whether New Zealand’s defence budget is sufficient is always a difficult question to answer. Every tax dollar has an opportunity cost – each one spent on the military represents one not spent on health, education, social housing or other pressing needs. </p>
<p>At the same time, New Zealand has to spend enough to defend itself and also carry its fair share for friends and allies. The pendulum will swing when the external threats are perceived to be greater than domestic ones – which is why the defence review must ask the right questions.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188732/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexander Gillespie does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With heightened superpower tensions, war in Europe and new military alliances forming, New Zealand’s defence review must set the right course in a dangerous world.Alexander Gillespie, Professor of Law, University of WaikatoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1793772022-04-27T00:10:38Z2022-04-27T00:10:38ZA brief history of the US-Australia alliance - and how it might change after the May election<p><em>This is part of a foreign policy election series looking at how Australia’s relations with the world have changed since the Morrison government came into power in 2019. You can read the other pieces <a href="https://theconversation.com/from-handshakes-to-threats-can-the-election-bring-a-fresh-start-in-our-fractured-relationship-with-china-178415">here</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-should-the-next-australian-government-handle-the-pacific-178534">here</a>.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>It feels like a lifetime ago now former Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull had a <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-08-04/donald-trump-malcolm-turnbull-refugee-phone-call-transcript/8773422">very tense conversation</a> with the recently inaugurated Donald Trump. </p>
<p>Aside from some <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2021/feb/24/joe-bidens-climate-envoy-admits-us-and-australia-not-on-same-page">carefully worded diplomatic statements</a>, however, the alliance under Joe Biden and Scott Morrison remains the central pillar of Australian foreign policy. </p>
<p>Its strength was demonstrated by the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-aukus-pact-born-in-secrecy-will-have-huge-implications-for-australia-and-the-region-168065">trilateral AUKUS pact</a> between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States last year. </p>
<p>But the future of this historic security partnership remains uncertain. </p>
<p>What impact will elections, climate policy, and tumultuous relations with China have on Australia’s alliance with the United States?</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/view-from-the-hill-for-morrison-aukus-is-all-about-the-deal-never-mind-the-niceties-168248">View from The Hill: For Morrison AUKUS is all about the deal, never mind the niceties</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Broad bipartisanship</h2>
<p>From mid-2018, the Morrison government has pursued a closer relationship with the US. </p>
<p>In the Trump years, Morrison was one of just two world leaders invited to a <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-09-19/scott-morrison-donald-trump-state-dinner/11525286">White House state dinner</a> – and arguably the only one who did not <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/03/world/europe/world-leaders-trump-frenemies.html">later regret it</a>. </p>
<p>Most recently, the Morrison government affirmed Australia’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-anzus-treaty-does-not-make-australia-safer-rather-it-fuels-a-fear-of-perpetual-military-threat-165670">long-standing security ties</a> to the US through the AUKUS agreement, which represents the most significant development in the alliance since the foundational <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/anzus">ANZUS Treaty</a> in 1951.</p>
<p>Yet the Morrison government was also criticised for pursuing a close relationship with Trump. Opposition leader Anthony Albanese <a href="https://anthonyalbanese.com.au/anthony-albanese-speech-us-australia-relations-under-a-biden-administration-perth-wednesday-20-january-2021">echoed arguments</a> the government’s focus on Trump left Australia exposed after his 2020 election loss to Biden.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, former US ambassador to Japan and incoming US Ambassador to Australia Caroline Kennedy praised Australia for its <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/08/caroline-kennedy-praises-australias-bipartisan-foreign-policy-despite-pms-claims-on-labor-and-china">bipartisan commitment</a> to the alliance in a US Senate confirmation hearing earlier this month.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/avoiding-the-china-trap-how-australia-and-the-us-can-remain-close-despite-the-threat-118991">Avoiding the China trap: how Australia and the US can remain close despite the threat</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Kennedy’s comments reflect a desire to keep the alliance <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/address-opposition-leader-anthony-albanese">above the fray</a> of domestic politics. This is understood as especially crucial in what <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/address-prime-minister-scott-morrison">Morrison called</a> the world’s “most difficult and dangerous security environment in 80 years”.</p>
<p>The Biden administration has proved willing to <a href="https://podcasts.apple.com/au/podcast/cop26-special-our-exceptional-friend/id1478594339?i=1000540058609">indulge the Morrison government on climate</a> partly because of Australia’s ongoing loyalty. </p>
<p>Biden can expect this to continue no matter which party wins the May election.</p>
<p>This broad bipartisanship does not mean, however, that there wouldn’t be important differences between an Albanese and a Morrison government. </p>
<h2>The alliance under a second Morrison government</h2>
<p>Should Morrison win the election, we can expect Australia’s alliance with the United States to remain largely the same.</p>
<p>The current government is clearly aware of the Indo-Pacific’s strategic importance to the alliance. But its actions and rhetoric suggest an almost singular focus on China; it appears to consider the Pacific a diplomatic afterthought.</p>
<p>A second Morrison government would likely uphold the alliance as the bulwark against the so-called “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2022/mar/07/morrison-decries-arc-of-autocracy-reshaping-world-as-he-pledges-to-build-nuclear-submarine-base">arc of autocracy</a>” represented by Russia and China. </p>
<p>This would see Australia continue to pursue a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/04/australia-anxious-to-show-it-didnt-drop-the-ball-on-pacific-after-china-and-solomon-islands-deal">reactive foreign policy </a> at the expense of strengthening its own <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/why-isn-t-australia-putting-diplomacy-first">diplomatic capabilities</a>.</p>
<p>And looking closely, the primacy of the security relationship obscures deep ideological differences. While the security relationship will hold sway, Morrison has been <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/economic-diplomacy-building-back-better-frenemies-after-ukraine">seemingly dismissive</a> of Biden’s politics.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-pushing-for-an-economic-alliance-with-the-us-to-counter-chinese-coercion-would-be-a-mistake-167629">Why pushing for an economic 'alliance' with the US to counter Chinese coercion would be a mistake</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>The alliance under an Albanese government</h2>
<p>Should the Labor Party win the May election, opposition leader Anthony Albanese has <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/address-opposition-leader-anthony-albanese">affirmed its commitment</a> to a robust US-Australia alliance.</p>
<p>Labor’s endorsement of the AUKUS agreement reflects the party’s <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/address-opposition-leader-anthony-albanese">prioritisation of Australia’s national security</a> and its commitment to deepening the alliance.</p>
<p>More broadly, Labor’s foreign affairs spokeswoman Penny Wong has outlined a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/audio/2022/mar/12/penny-wong-on-labors-plans-for-rebuilding-diplomatic-relations">foreign policy agenda</a> directing resources to reinforce Australia’s independent diplomatic presence. Wong has argued this is crucial for countering <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-risks-of-chinas-ambitions-in-the-south-pacific/">China’s influence</a> in the Pacific and “maximising” Australia’s influence.</p>
<p>And Albanese has <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/address-opposition-leader-anthony-albanese">explicitly linked</a> Australia’s national security to its “environmental security”. </p>
<p>Unlike the Morrison government, it seems Labor intends to foreground climate action in <a href="https://anthonyalbanese.com.au/media-centre/labor-to-make-climate-central-to-the-us-alliance">its alliance with the United States</a>. </p>
<h2>An unpredictable future</h2>
<p>Whichever party wins the May election will only have six months until the American mid-term elections in November. </p>
<p>Nothing is inevitable, but a historically consistent result would see the Democrats lose their congressional majority. </p>
<p>The impact on the security alliance would be negligible. However, this would likely see Australia engage with a US administration less able to pursue its own political agenda – particularly on climate action. </p>
<p>This development would likely be welcomed by a second Morrison government, while it would strike a blow to Labor’s more ambitious foreign policy goals.</p>
<p>Perhaps of even greater consequence, about two-thirds of the way through the next government’s term, the world will be faced with another US presidential election and the potential return – through legitimate process or otherwise – of Trump. </p>
<p>It’s not clear if either party, or the rest of the world, <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/north-america/what-s-the-plan-australia-needs-to-prepare-for-the-collapse-of-american-democracy-20220103-p59llh.html">has a plan for that</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179377/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Emma Shortis' research draws on projects funded by Jean Monnet Awards from the European Union’s Erasmus Plus program.</span></em></p>Whichever party wins the May election will only have six months until the American mid-term elections in November.Emma Shortis, Lecturer, RMIT UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1680712021-09-16T20:00:24Z2021-09-16T20:00:24ZANZUS without NZ? Why the new security pact between Australia, the UK and US might not be all it seems<p>We live, to borrow a phrase, in interesting times. The pandemic aside, relations between the superpowers are tense. The sudden arrival of the new AUKUS security agreement between Australia, the US and UK simply adds to the general sense of unease internationally.</p>
<p>The relationship between America and China had already deteriorated under the presidency of Donald Trump and has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/10/us/politics/biden-xi-china.html">not improved</a> under Joe Biden. New <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/13621676-a2bd-42b3-bd62-809542c2f8c8">satellite evidence</a> suggests China might be building between 100 and 200 silos for a <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/06/hypersonic-missiles-a-new-arms-race/">new generation</a> of nuclear intercontinental missiles.</p>
<p>At the same time, the US relationship with North Korea <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58540915">continues</a> to smoulder, with both North and South Korea <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/nkorea-fired-unidentified-projectile-yonhap-citing-skorea-military-2021-09-15/">conducting missile tests</a> designed to intimidate.</p>
<p>And, of course, Biden has just presided over the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2021/08/16/politics/afghanistan-joe-biden-donald-trump-kabul-politics/index.html">foreign policy disaster</a> of withdrawal from Afghanistan. His administration needs something new with a positive spin.</p>
<p>Enter AUKUS, more or less out of the blue. So far, it is just a <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/15/joint-leaders-statement-on-aukus/">statement</a> launched by the member countries’ leaders. It has not yet been released as a formal treaty.</p>
<h2>The Indo-Pacific pivot</h2>
<p>The new agreement speaks of “maritime democracies” and “ideals and shared commitment to the international rules-based order” with the objective to “deepen diplomatic, security and defence co-operation in the Indo-Pacific region”.</p>
<p>“Indo-Pacific region” is code for defence against China, with the partnership promising greater sharing and integration of defence technologies, cyber capabilities and “additional undersea capabilities”. Under the agreement, Australia also <a href="https://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/australia-us-and-uk-form-auukus-under-a-new-nuclear-defence-pact/PMMR46UAWAKXCQB2DXM6MZXATY/">stands to gain</a> nuclear-powered submarines.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-to-build-nuclear-submarines-in-a-new-partnership-with-the-us-and-uk-168068">Australia to build nuclear submarines in a new partnership with the US and UK</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>To demonstrate the depth of the relationship, the agreement highlights how “for more than 70 years, Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States have worked together, along with other important allies and partners”.</p>
<p>At which point New Zealand could have expected a drum roll, too, having only just marked the <a href="https://theconversation.com/anzus-at-70-together-for-decades-us-australia-new-zealand-now-face-different-challenges-from-china-163546">70th anniversary</a> of the ANZUS agreement. That didn’t happen, and New Zealand was conspicuously absent from the choreographed announcement hosted by the White House.</p>
<p>Having remained committed to the <a href="https://www.gcsb.govt.nz/about-us/ukusa-allies/">Five Eyes</a> security agreement and having put boots on the ground in Afghanistan for the duration, “NZ” appears to have been taken out of ANZUS and replaced with “UK”.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1438288911558533124"}"></div></p>
<h2>Don’t mention the nukes</h2>
<p>The obvious first question is whether New Zealand was asked to join the new arrangement. While Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern has <a href="https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/politics/2021/09/aukus-jacinda-ardern-welcomes-united-kingdom-united-states-engagement-in-pacific-says-nz-nuclear-stance-unchanged.html">welcomed</a> the new partnership, she has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/16/aukus-submarines-banned-as-pact-exposes-divide-between-new-zealand-and-western-allies">confirmed</a>: “We weren’t approached, nor would I expect us to be.”</p>
<p>That is perhaps surprising. Despite <a href="https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/124696892/yes-he-did-say-that-diplomats-scramble-to-contain-fallout-of-damien-oconnors-australiachina-comments">problematic comments</a> by New Zealand’s trade minister about Australia’s dealings with China, and the foreign minister’s statement that she “felt uncomfortable” with the expanding remit of the Five Eyes, <a href="https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/politics/2021/04/prime-minister-jacinda-ardern-reaffirms-commitment-to-five-eyes-after-uk-media-claims-it-s-become-four.html">reassurances by Ardern</a> about New Zealand’s commitment should have calmed concerns.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-nuclear-submarines-are-a-smart-military-move-for-australia-and-could-deter-china-further-168064">Why nuclear submarines are a smart military move for Australia — and could deter China further</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>One has to assume, therefore, that even if New Zealand had been asked to join, it might have chosen to opt out anyway. There are three possible explanations for this.</p>
<p>The first involves the probable provision to Australia of nuclear-powered military submarines. Any mention of nuclear matters makes New Zealand nervous. But Australia has been at pains to reiterate its commitment to “leadership on global non-proliferation”.</p>
<p>Similar commitments or work-arounds could probably have been made for New Zealand within the AUKUS agreement, too, but that is now moot. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1438323102287548416"}"></div></p>
<h2>The dragon in the room</h2>
<p>The second reason New Zealand may have declined is because the new agreement is perceived as little more than an expensive purchasing agreement for the Australian navy, wrapped up as something else.</p>
<p>This may be partly true. But the rewards of the relationship as stated in the initial announcement go beyond submarines and look enticing. In particular, anything that offers cutting-edge technologies and enhances the interoperability of New Zealand’s defence force with its allies would not be lightly declined.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/anzus-at-70-together-for-decades-us-australia-new-zealand-now-face-different-challenges-from-china-163546">ANZUS at 70: Together for decades, US, Australia, New Zealand now face different challenges from China</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The third explanation could lie in an assumption that this is not a new security arrangement. Evidence for this can be seen in the fact that New Zealand is not the only ally missing from the new arrangement.</p>
<p>Canada, the other Five Eyes member, is also not at the party. Nor are France, Germany, India and Japan. If this really was a quantum shift in strategic alliances, the group would have been wider — and more formal than a new partnership announced at a press conference.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, the fact that New Zealand’s supposedly extra-special relationship with Britain, Australia and America hasn’t made it part of the in-crowd will raise eyebrows. Especially while no one likes to mention the elephant – or should that be dragon? – in the room: New Zealand’s relationship with China.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/168071/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexander Gillespie does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>PR exercise, elaborate purchasing agreement or genuine security pact? The new AUKUS agreement raises plenty of questions about why New Zealand missed out.Alexander Gillespie, Professor of Law, University of WaikatoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1672612021-09-03T03:04:31Z2021-09-03T03:04:31ZVIDEO: Michelle Grattan on national accounts and national cabinet<p>University of Canberra Professorial Fellow Michelle Grattan and University of Canberra Vice-Chancellor and President Professor Paddy Nixon discuss the week in politics.</p>
<p>This week Michelle and Paddy discuss the state of the federation generally - with various states experiencing varying levels of lockdown and case exposure. Despite the disparity, the federal government is pushing to treat the virus as endemic.</p>
<p>They also discuss the economic growth experienced in the June quarter, and the prime minister’s further attempts to keep the minutes of national cabinet confidential.</p>
<p>CORRECTION: I misspoke when I said Queensland and NSW were making it clear they would not be dictated to - this should be Queensland and Western Australia. MG</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/rIzXXWewAyw?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/167261/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Michelle Grattan discusses the political week that was with Professor Paddy Nixon.Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1656702021-08-31T20:01:59Z2021-08-31T20:01:59ZThe ANZUS treaty does not make Australia safer. Rather, it fuels a fear of perpetual military threat<p>In June 2020, the Australian federal government announced a new, <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-06-30/australia-unveils-10-year-defence-strategy/12408232">A$270 billion defence strategy</a>. Part of this entailed spending $800 million on new AGM-158C long-range anti-ship missiles from the United States. </p>
<p>The new spend formed part of a long tradition of Australian defence procurement from the US. In 2017, <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-12-28/us-weapons-spend-tops-billion-dollar/9287170">the Australian National Audit Office estimated</a> the Australian Defence Force (ADF) had spent an eye-watering $10 billion on American weapons and equipment in the previous four years alone. </p>
<p>This trend looks set to continue. This May, for example, the ADF announced the establishment of a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2021/may/19/australian-military-to-set-up-space-division-with-7bn-budget">$7 billion space division</a>, which will inevitably deepen Australia’s security and economic ties with the US.</p>
<p>And as the Biden administration focuses more attention on “the Quad” — the quadrilateral security arrangement between the US, Australia, Japan and India — to counter Chinese influence in the Asia-Pacific region, Australia will most <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2021/04/30/india-australia-cleared-to-buy-43-billion-in-us-military-gear/">likely purchase even more</a> American weapons and military equipment. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="The Quad leaders meet virtually." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/418546/original/file-20210831-23-1rclyie.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/418546/original/file-20210831-23-1rclyie.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=356&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418546/original/file-20210831-23-1rclyie.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=356&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418546/original/file-20210831-23-1rclyie.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=356&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418546/original/file-20210831-23-1rclyie.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=447&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418546/original/file-20210831-23-1rclyie.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=447&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418546/original/file-20210831-23-1rclyie.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=447&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Quad leaders meet virtually in March to discuss Indo-Pacific security.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ryohei Moriya/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>ANZUS is no security guarantee</h2>
<p>These close security linkages reflect the broader consensus underpinning the <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Completed_Inquiries/jfadt/usrelations/appendixb">Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS)</a>, which marks its 70th birthday today. </p>
<p>This consensus – shared not just by US and Australian governments, but also by the broader foreign policy and media establishments in both countries – is that ANZUS makes Australia, and the world, safer. </p>
<p>The belief is the treaty — and the deep friendship between our two countries — gives Australia special access to advanced American military technology that we need (although not at a discount). </p>
<p>And, more importantly, that it keeps us under an American security umbrella. Australians can rely, in the <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-04-26/mike-pezzullo-home-affairs-war-defence-force/100096418">recent words of one senior bureaucrat</a>, on the “protection afforded” by ANZUS. </p>
<p>This assumption rests specifically on Article IV of the treaty, in which each party “declares that it would act to meet the common danger”. This language is widely assumed to constitute a security guarantee from the US. However, the reality is, <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-07-08/does-anzus-commit-us-to-come-to-australias-aid-fact-check/5559288?nw=0">it does not</a>. </p>
<p>President Harry Truman, who oversaw the birth of the treaty, was never willing to provide that, nor has any administration since. A commitment to “act” in the face of “common danger” could, after all, mean absolutely anything. </p>
<p>ANZUS does not provide Australia with a security guarantee, and it never will. And, perhaps more importantly, even if it did, it does not make us safer. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/defence-update-in-an-increasingly-dangerous-neighbourhood-australia-needs-a-stronger-security-system-141771">Defence update: in an increasingly dangerous neighbourhood, Australia needs a stronger security system</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Reinforcing a perception of perpetual military threat</h2>
<p>Why is this? One reason is the treaty (and Australia’s relationship with the US more broadly) reinforces and perpetuates a belief that Australia faces a perpetual military threat. </p>
<p>It also reinforces the idea that military might is needed to meet that threat. The purchase of more American weapons, <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-06-30/australia-unveils-10-year-defence-strategy/12408232">in the words of Prime Minister Scott Morrison</a>, has the effect of “deterring an attack on Australia and helping to prevent war”. </p>
<p>Even putting <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/14/nuclear-deterrence-myth-lethal-david-barash">the questionable basis of this assumption</a> aside, this focus on military threat at the expense of all else has had significant consequences for both Australia and our region. Other genuine threats, such as climate change, are always treated as peripheral to the core of Australia’s relationship with the US. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1278099151578755072"}"></div></p>
<p>It was perhaps telling that as Australian officials were negotiating the purchase of more American weaponry last year, they weren’t using our uniquely close relationship to secure priority access to something that would actually make Australians safer: American vaccines. </p>
<p>When Morrison announced the country’s new defence strategy, he justified both the spending and aggressive posturing on the basis a post-COVID world will be “<a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-06-30/australia-unveils-10-year-defence-strategy/12408232">poorer, more dangerous and more disorderly</a>”. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1278111541078798337"}"></div></p>
<p>As I argue in my new book, <a href="https://www.hardiegrant.com/au/publishing/bookfinder/book/our-exceptional-friend-by-emma-shortis/9781743797839">Our Exceptional Friend: Australia’s Fatal Alliance with the United States</a>, ANZUS reinforces this way of seeing the world. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/418547/original/file-20210831-27-1l4ldf5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/418547/original/file-20210831-27-1l4ldf5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=918&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418547/original/file-20210831-27-1l4ldf5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=918&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418547/original/file-20210831-27-1l4ldf5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=918&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418547/original/file-20210831-27-1l4ldf5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1153&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418547/original/file-20210831-27-1l4ldf5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1153&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418547/original/file-20210831-27-1l4ldf5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1153&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Hardie Grant Publishing</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Instead of viewing our region with empathy and generosity — or partnering with the US to prevent the world from becoming poorer, more dangerous or more disorderly — the Australian government seeks to arm itself. </p>
<p>In the process, it serves only to perpetuate a world in which conflict becomes ever more likely, and economic, racial and environmental inequality <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2021/aug/17/australia-pfizer-purchase-from-vaccine-sharing-covax-stockpile-under-fire">more entrenched</a>. </p>
<h2>A shift in mentality is needed</h2>
<p>ANZUS was born out of a shared experience of war in the 1950s, and particularly Australian perceptions of ongoing, existential threats from non-white neighbours. These perceptions, based on deep racism and fear, were <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/library/pubs/bp/1992/92bp06.pdf">wrong then</a>, and they are wrong now. </p>
<p>Yet, the current US-Australia strategic relationship still requires an enemy – a “common danger”. As a result, the US and Australia will always find one, together. </p>
<p>The only way to change this is through a deep, honest reckoning with the origins of Australia’s security alliance with the US — and its consequences. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/anzus-at-70-together-for-decades-us-australia-new-zealand-now-face-different-challenges-from-china-163546">ANZUS at 70: Together for decades, US, Australia, New Zealand now face different challenges from China</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>This doesn’t mean scrapping ANZUS. Even if that were possible, the structures that exist around it and the ideas that inform Australian foreign policy would endure.</p>
<p>It does mean, however, trying to find different ways for Australia to manoeuvre within those structures, stepping back from a fear-mongering, military threat mentality, and forging genuine relationships with our neighbours. </p>
<p>It means trying to forge a relationship with the United States that is not, <a href="https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1173955/shared-risk-blood-cement-us-australian-ties-trump-says/">in the words of a former US president</a>, “sealed with … blood”.</p>
<p>Yet, even as the recent events in Afghanistan make the consequences of our unquestioning security alliance so glaringly obvious, there is no indication Australia will do anything other than double down on it. </p>
<p>The mindset that has led successive Australian governments to follow the US will not change, no matter what Washington does or who is in charge. The position of the current government is to strengthen the treaty, rather than try to dismantle it. </p>
<p>That’s dangerous for us and the world. Happy birthday, ANZUS. </p>
<hr>
<p><em>Emma Shortis’s new book, <a href="https://www.hardiegrant.com/au/publishing/bookfinder/book/our-exceptional-friend-by-emma-shortis/9781743797839">Our Exceptional Friend: Australia’s Fatal Alliance with the United States</a>, was published last month by Hardie Grant Books.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165670/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Emma Shortis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The current US-Australia strategic relationship requires an enemy – a “common danger”. As a result, Australia doesn’t seek cooperation with the Asia-Pacific region, it arms itself instead.Emma Shortis, Research Fellow, RMIT UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1670542021-08-31T08:34:26Z2021-08-31T08:34:26ZView from The Hill: Morrison yet to forge personal relationship with Biden as ANZUS turns 70<p>On the eve of ANZUS turning 70 on Wednesday, Scott Morrison was asked whether he had spoken to US President Joe Biden since the fall of Kabul.</p>
<p>“No, I haven’t as yet. I anticipate doing that not too far away,” he said on Queensland radio.</p>
<p>When it was put to him that the lack of contact, plus the US not providing Australia with spare doses of the Pfizer vaccine, suggested Australia was “on the nose” with the president, Morrison quickly protested.</p>
<p>“No, not at all. I mean, I mean, I just don’t agree with that. I’ve been dealing with the United States on many issues and we continue to do that. And, you know, I’m not precious about these things. I just focus on getting the job done.”</p>
<p>Presumably he expects a phone conversation to mark the ANZUS anniversary. It would be strange if there wasn’t one.</p>
<p>Regardless of when the call comes, it is notable that many months into the Biden presidency, it remains unclear precisely how the relationship between the two leaders lies. The coming months will throw some light on it.</p>
<p>In relation to the Kabul evacuation, the government would point to the discussions between Foreign Minister Marise Payne and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken.</p>
<p>But Australia is an ally joined at the hip with America, and its soldiers served in Afghanistan for the best part of two decades, which would make some leader-level contact to have been expected during the evacuation. Moreover, Morrison and UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson spoke then.</p>
<p>The Australia-US relationship doesn’t depend on the personal rapport between the leaders of the two countries at any particular time. The alliance is driven by shared national interests. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, personalities can be important. This was never more evident than with the Bush-Howard bond at the start of the Afghanistan war – especially tight because John Howard was in Washington when the terrorist attacks occurred on September 11, 2001.</p>
<p>The opportunity to “eyeball” can be central in developing a relationship and Morrison and Biden have had minimal eyeball time.</p>
<p>So far, there has only been that three-way meeting (US, Australia, UK) when Morrison attended the G7 summit in June. It seems there wasn’t time for an additional bilateral session. Given a choice, one would have thought Morrison would have been better off meeting just with Biden, whom he didn’t know personally.</p>
<p>Why is Morrison not further forward in the foreign queue for presidential attention?</p>
<p>Possibly it’s a matter of all the other demands on the president. Biden is overwhelmed with domestic and foreign problems; he looks less than robust and no doubt his team limits what he has to do. The attitude might be that Australia would understand if it’s sometimes taken for granted.</p>
<p>In the past, Australia wasn’t a country high in Biden’s consciousness. For example, it’s a tradition for the US vice president to receive visiting Australian foreign and defence ministers, but when Biden was vice president under Barack Obama it was initially quite difficult for Australian officials to make this happen.</p>
<p>Possibly the Biden administration remembers how cosy (albeit for pragmatic reasons) Morrison was with Donald Trump, including the unfortunate occasion when a joint appearance had all the hallmarks of a Trump rally.</p>
<p>Possibly the president and those around him are frustrated with the Coalition’s tardiness in signing up to a more ambitious climate change agenda.</p>
<p>Perhaps it is an amalgam of all these things.</p>
<p>Work is currently underway for a meeting in the US of leaders of the Quad security grouping – the US, Australia, India and Japan – in late September or early October.</p>
<p>If the meeting is in person, Morrison intends to go, despite the difficulties of the domestic COVID situation. This would provide the opportunity for bilateral discussions with Biden.</p>
<p>A major topic of the bilateral talks would be Australia’s position on climate change, ahead of the November climate conference in Glasgow.</p>
<p>Whether Morrison will be able to embrace the net-zero 2050 target is still unknown, dependent on the divided and shambolic Nationals. Biden would want that and more.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, on Wednesday Morrison will take part in a small ceremony at the Australian-American Memorial in Canberra, and address parliament on ANZUS. He’d hope to say he’d spoken to the president by then. </p>
<h2>UPDATE</h2>
<p>President Biden marked the ANZUS birthday on Wednesday with a video in which he paid tribute to Australia’s part in the evacuation from Afghanistan. </p>
<p>“As we bring an end to 20 years of military conflict in Afghanistan, Australia is still standing with the United States, contributing to efforts to evacuate our people and those Afghans who served by our side,” he said. </p>
<p>Biden said: “Through the years, Australians and Americans have built an unsurpassed partnership and an easy mateship grounded in shared values and shared vision”.</p>
<p>But Scott Morrison is yet to speak personally with Biden in the wake of events in Afghanistan, with a presidential call expected soon.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/167054/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The eve of ANZUS turning 70 is an opportunity to re-examine Australia’s relation with the Biden administration, writes Michelle Grattan.Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1635462021-08-24T13:06:18Z2021-08-24T13:06:18ZANZUS at 70: Together for decades, US, Australia, New Zealand now face different challenges from China<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/415692/original/file-20210811-27-ma61ni.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=6%2C0%2C4594%2C3456&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The U.S., Australia and New Zealand have been friends, partners and allies for decades.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/nyng/14136139632">New York National Guard via Flickr</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Seventy years after the U.S., Australia and New Zealand <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Completed_Inquiries/jfadt/usrelations/appendixb">signed a treaty</a> committing them to defend one another and work together to ensure a peaceful Pacific, the alliance has assumed new and crucial relevance as all three countries face economic, political and diplomatic challenges from China.</p>
<p>The ANZUS Treaty, named with the initials of the three countries, emerged in 1951 from the nations’ shared history and became an important element of post-World War II international relations. Now, as the Pacific region is ominously <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/05/05/china/australia-china-war-military-mic-intl-hnk/index.html">poised on the brink of war</a>, the alliance is again a key part of international relations and power struggles.</p>
<h2>Deep shared pasts</h2>
<p>Beyond the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1525/9780520968899">ancient connections</a> between Indigenous Hawaiians and New Zealand’s Māori people, the three nations’ stories have been intertwined for centuries.</p>
<p>Britain began colonizing Australia in 1788 because of the loss of the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24442306">American colonies</a>. Some advocates wanted to <a href="https://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/matra-james-mario-maria-13084">relocate American loyalists</a>, as well as indentured servants once destined for North America, to the South Pacific instead. <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/86852/libertys-exiles-by-maya-jasanoff/">Exiled British loyalists</a> scattered around the empire, with only some reaching the <a href="http://www.beacon.org/Epic-Journeys-of-Freedom-P619.aspx">South Pacific</a>. But for <a href="https://www.nla.gov.au/research-guides/convicts">160,000 convicts</a>, Australia’s colonies became their place of banishment over the next 80 years.</p>
<p>At the end of the 18th century, New England whalers and sealers began arriving in <a href="https://teara.govt.nz/en/whaling/page-1">New Zealand</a> and <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/41053571">Australia</a>. Complex ongoing connections spanned the Pacific over the subsequent years from trade, idea flows and movements of people, fueled especially by Pacific <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315188232">gold rushes</a>. All three societies developed similiar nation-founding myths out of their parallel experiences of conquering Indigenous peoples to form their respective “<a href="https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/111281843?searchTerm=great%20white%20fleet">white nations</a>.”</p>
<p>Complex interconnections reached new heights during World War II. In 1940, spurred by impending war, the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1q1crhz">U.S. recognized Australia as an independent nation</a>, distinct from the United Kingdom. Two years later, the U.S. <a href="https://history.state.gov/countries/new-zealand">did the same for New Zealand</a>, while the three nations’ <a href="https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/230965710?searchTerm=Australia%20looks%20to%20America">military forces</a> were joined in fighting a war against imperial Japan.</p>
<p><iframe id="eoWgM" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/eoWgM/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>The Cold War birth of ANZUS</h2>
<p>All three nations played critical roles in bringing about Japan’s 1945 surrender, and all were transformed by that experience. More than a million U.S. troops were stationed in Australia and New Zealand to defend those countries against feared Japanese invasions. The sheer numbers of them, among the countries’ combined <a href="https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/159047860?searchTerm=great%20and%20powerful%20friend">8.6</a> <a href="https://nzhistory.govt.nz/war/new-zealand-and-the-second-world-war-overview">million</a> residents, reshaped the provincial societies, Americanizing their music and romantic rituals. Australia and New Zealand were also transformed by 17,000 women leaving their homelands to become American <a href="https://nzhistory.govt.nz/media/photo/war-brides-departing">wives</a> and <a href="https://www.aussiewarbrides.com/">mothers</a>. </p>
<p>Then from 1949, when Communists took over China, the Pacific region was plunged into the Cold War. The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 further escalated anxieties about communism’s spread. Yet Australia and New Zealand <a href="https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/247766933?searchTerm=stretch%20a%20protecting%20hand%20across%20the%20Pacific">still felt threatened</a> by a rearmed, “<a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/historical-documents/Pages/volume-21/18-cablegram-from-australian-mission-at-the-united-nations-to-department-of-external-affairs">aggressive</a>” Japan. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-dangerous-new-cold-war-brewing-with-china-will-test-new-zealand-even-more-than-the-old-one-142893">The dangerous new cold war brewing with China will test New Zealand even more than the old one</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>There was a complication, though: The U.S. wanted to rapidly rebuild Japan to help defend democracy and peace in the North Pacific. This objective was to be enshrined in a proposed mutual security alliance with the former bitter enemy. </p>
<p>The U.S. had been ambivalent about formalizing security arrangements <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/historical-documents/Pages/volume-21/3-cablegram-from-embassy-in-washington-to-department-of-external-affairs">with only Australia and New Zealand</a>. As the U.S. advanced its Japan treaty in 1951, however, Australia and New Zealand met this development with what the U.S. State Department called “<a href="https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cwr/102768.htm">great suspicion and disapproval</a>.” So the three nations devised a compromise to placate Australia and New Zealand’s concerns. </p>
<p>That compromise was a trilateral agreement, the ANZUS Treaty. It guaranteed each nation’s security and set up ongoing regional cooperation to protect peace in the Pacific. The <a href="https://natlib.govt.nz/records/22825730">ANZUS Treaty</a> was signed in <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10357710301741">San Francisco</a> on Sept. 1, 1951, seven days before the signing of the <a href="https://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/texts/docs/19510908.T2E.html">Japan-U.S.</a> treaty.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/415691/original/file-20210811-27-b1fxw9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A circular military patch showing an eagle, a kiwi and a kangaroo" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/415691/original/file-20210811-27-b1fxw9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/415691/original/file-20210811-27-b1fxw9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415691/original/file-20210811-27-b1fxw9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415691/original/file-20210811-27-b1fxw9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415691/original/file-20210811-27-b1fxw9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415691/original/file-20210811-27-b1fxw9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415691/original/file-20210811-27-b1fxw9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An airman at Whenuapai Air Base in New Zealand wears a patch commemorating a joint U.S.-Australia-New Zealand military exercise in 1984.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6400495">U.S. National Archives</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>ANZUS strained and repaired</h2>
<p>In the U.S., ANZUS is little known. But in Australia and New Zealand, the treaty has been a <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-australia/">defining part of national security</a> for 70 years. Its popularity has shifted based on <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/us-australia-alliance-friendship-not-love-affair">public opinion about the U.S. president at the time</a>, or his wars.</p>
<p>In the 1980s, <a href="http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1743-8594.2010.00115.x">stark differences</a> over nuclear power led the pro-nuclear U.S. to <a href="https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cwr/102768.htm">suspend</a> its alliance commitment to the anti-nuclear New Zealand. Tensions eased during the wars <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/286365/new-zealand%27s-15-year-role-in-iraq">in Iraq</a> <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2021/aug/22/a-disgrace-australian-government-rejects-visas-for-more-than-100-former-embassy-staff-in-afghanistan">and Afghanistan</a>, and the military relationship was strengthened with <a href="http://usnzcouncil.org/us-nz-issues/wellington-declaration/">formal agreements in 2010</a> <a href="https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/us-nz-defence-arrangement-signed">and 2012</a>. Relations have <a href="https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R44552.pdf">largely been normalized</a> in the subsequent years.</p>
<p>In more recent years, emphasis has shifted to the many unifying facets of the nations rather than points of difference. In 2021, as when ANZUS was born in 1951, the activities of China are reshaping the alliance. This has been evident in a renewed stress on long-standing friendships, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/10/world/australia/hollywood-stars-film.html">cultural common ground</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiab081">regional partnerships</a> on defense matters. </p>
<h2>New tensions with China</h2>
<p>Both Australia and New Zealand had been economic beneficiaries of the rise of China, both nations’ largest <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/china/china-country-brief">trading</a> <a href="https://www.mfat.govt.nz/mi/countries-and-regions/asia/china/">partner</a>, while pragmatically maintaining close ties with the U.S. as well.</p>
<p>The balance shifted in 2020, when <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-12-03/whats-behind-chinas-bullying-of-australia-soft-target/12943486">Australia led calls for investigations</a> into Chinese accountability for the COVID-19 pandemic. <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2021/07/china-australia-america/619544/">China’s response</a> was <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/north-america/joe-biden-s-asia-tsar-china-s-harshness-to-australia-looks-unyielding-20210707-p587g7.html">quick</a>: <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china-suspend-economic-dialogue-mechanism-with-australia-2021-05-06">It suspended economic dialogues</a>, targeted <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/australias-top-exporting-state-calls-reset-china-ties-2021-06-15/">trade reprisals</a> on some Australian <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2021/jul/10/china-is-far-from-alone-in-taking-advantage-of-australian-universities-self-inflicted-wounds">exports</a> and, <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/china/china-country-brief">most alarming</a>, threatened <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/china-threatens-australia-with-missile-attack/">missile strikes</a>.</p>
<p>Amid these escalating tensions, Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison made an <a href="https://www.pm.gov.au/media/address-launch-2020-defence-strategic-update">ominous speech</a> evoking a region “eerily haunted by similar times many years ago in the 1930s” that led to the Pacific war. </p>
<p>Even so, the value of Australia’s exports to China actually <a href="https://themarketherald.com.au/china-australia-trade-strengthens-in-2021-despite-boiling-tensions-2021-06-09/">increased 33%</a> over the past year, in part thanks to rising prices of Australian iron ore.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/415690/original/file-20210811-19-122hxbg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man in a suit looks at a poster on a wall." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/415690/original/file-20210811-19-122hxbg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/415690/original/file-20210811-19-122hxbg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415690/original/file-20210811-19-122hxbg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415690/original/file-20210811-19-122hxbg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415690/original/file-20210811-19-122hxbg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415690/original/file-20210811-19-122hxbg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415690/original/file-20210811-19-122hxbg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In 2019, Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison visited the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and stopped by the ANZUS corridor there, honoring the three nations’ treaty.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/secdef/48767012036">Lisa Ferdinando/U.S. Defense Department via Flickr</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Though Australia is <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/43133734">again closely aligned</a> with the U.S., there is one major caveat. Australia’s ongoing <a href="https://www.samoaobserver.ws/category/editorial/86187">fossil-fuel-friendly</a> policies differ from the Biden’s administration’s sweeping climate agenda. Biden has pledged not to “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/sep/07/joe-biden-if-president-will-push-allies-like-australia-to-do-more-on-climate-adviser-says">pull any punches</a>,” even with Australia, to <a href="https://www.climatechangenews.com/2020/11/09/biden-promised-expose-climate-outlaws-heres-make-list/">solve a global problem</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/new-zealand-criticized-five-eyes-alliance-stance-china">New Zealand</a> is still trying to balance Chinese and U.S. interests. Rapidly rising regional tensions over Taiwan, the South China Sea and China’s hand in eroding human rights and democracy, not to mention its treatment of Australia, are testing the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/new-zealand-wants-mature-relationship-with-china-foreign-minister-says-2021-05-07/">nation’s leaders</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-anzus-ascendancy-continued-44554">The ANZUS ascendancy (continued)</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Shifting focus to the Pacific region</h2>
<p>Because of China, the U.S. is <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/kamala-harris-asia-china-afghanistan/2021/08/23/00fea34e-ff27-11eb-87e0-7e07bd9ce270_story.html">increasing its attention to the Pacific</a> at levels not seen since World War II. Two recent bipartisan <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/1260/text">congressional</a> <a href="https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/press-releases?ID=411185A8-740D-4FD3-947D-E5A304D6CB27">bills</a> address Chinese influence in multiple arenas, including scientific research security and China’s economic, political and military efforts.</p>
<p>In related efforts, the U.S. military has announced plans to <a href="https://www.pacificislandtimes.com/post/us-fsm-agree-on-a-plan-to-build-military-base-in-micronesia">build new bases</a> in <a href="https://ipdefenseforum.com/2021/02/palau-u-s-welcome-to-build-military-bases-amid-prcs-influence-push/">three strategically located Pacific island countries</a>. The countries – the <a href="https://www.doi.gov/ocl/freely-associated-states">Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Republic of Palau</a> – were <a href="https://www.un.org/dppa/decolonization/en/history/international-trusteeship-system-and-trust-territories">U.N. trusts administered by the U.S.</a> but are now independent nations freely associated with the U.S.</p>
<p>ANZUS is fundamental in this U.S. strategy. Both <a href="https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3131398/amid-china-warnings-australia-spend-us581-million-military-bases">Australia</a> and <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/on-the-inside/446030/opinion-best-defence-or-giving-offence-questions-about-military-spending">New Zealand</a> are substantially increasing defense spending in ways that further bind the three nations’ militaries together. Also key is the intelligence-sharing agreement dating back to World War II, “<a href="https://www.dni.gov/index.php/ncsc-how-we-work/217-about/organization/icig-pages/2660-icig-fiorc">Five Eyes</a>,” which also includes Canada and the U.K. </p>
<p>In addition, the U.S. and <a href="https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10491.pdf">Australia</a> are part of “<a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/12/quad-leaders-joint-statement-the-spirit-of-the-quad/">The Quad</a>,” a four-nation group, with Japan and India, building on Cold War security agreements to meet China’s rise in the <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Free-and-Open-Indo-Pacific-4Nov2019.pdf">Indo-Pacific</a> region. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/415698/original/file-20210811-19-153f7xp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A missile flies into the sky" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/415698/original/file-20210811-19-153f7xp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/415698/original/file-20210811-19-153f7xp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415698/original/file-20210811-19-153f7xp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415698/original/file-20210811-19-153f7xp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415698/original/file-20210811-19-153f7xp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415698/original/file-20210811-19-153f7xp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/415698/original/file-20210811-19-153f7xp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">U.S. forces fire a Patriot missile from a military base in Australia on July 16, 2021, as part of a multination training exercise intended to boost security in the Pacific region.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.army.mil/article/248526/us_army_launches_patriot_missiles_during_exercise_talisman_saber_21">Lance Cpl. Alyssa Chuluda/U.S. Marine Corps</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>While military tensions in the mid-2021 Pacific are high around Taiwan, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/07/16/1017012902/biden-administration-warns-against-doing-business-in-hong-kong">Hong Kong</a> and the South China Sea, the U.S. has just concluded <a href="https://www.stripes.com/theaters/asia_pacific/2021-07-19/pacific-iron-talisman-sabre-us-military-exercises-2190831.html">Operation Pacific Iron</a> in Guam and the Northern Marianas, a huge demonstration of air, land and sea power. Also, biennial joint exercises called <a href="https://news.usni.org/2021/07/29/admiral-talisman-sabre-proves-u-s-allies-can-create-pacific-naval-force-in-days">Talisman Sabre</a> recently concluded in Australia, involving include 17,000 troops from U.S. and allied nations. These exercises were also aimed at demonstrating power and battle readiness. China <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-07-18/second-chinese-spy-ship-australia-monitor-military-exercises/100302198">watched these activities closely</a>.</p>
<p>As ANZUS turns 70, the deep, entwined pasts of New Zealand, Australia and the U.S. will continue to fundamentally shape the Pacific’s uncertain future.</p>
<p><em>This story was updated Aug. 25, 2021, to more accurately reflect the nature of U.S.-New Zealand relations since 2010.</em></p>
<p>[<em>The Conversation’s Politics + Society editors pick need-to-know stories.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/politics-weekly-74/?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=politics-need-to-know">Sign up for Politics Weekly</a>._]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/163546/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Patricia A. O'Brien received funding from the Australian Research Council as a Future Fellow, the Jay I. Kislak Fellowship at the John W. Kluge Center, Library of Congress, Washington D.C. and New Zealand's JD Stout Trust.</span></em></p>A 70-year-old Cold War-era treaty among the three nations is finding renewed importance in response to the global rise of Chinese power and influence.Patricia A. O'Brien, Visiting Fellow, Department of Pacific Affairs, Australian National University, and Adjunct Professor, Asian Studies Program, Georgetown UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1510172020-11-30T01:43:10Z2020-11-30T01:43:10ZWhat Australia can learn from New Zealand: a new perspective on that tricky trans-Tasman relationship<p>The recurring metaphor of New Zealand as “experiment” or “<a href="https://teara.govt.nz/en/visitors-opinions-about-new-zealand/page-3">social laboratory</a>” might go back to the 1890s, but it continues to resonate in the 21st century. </p>
<p>Australian political journalist <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/laura-tingle/9711054?nw=0">Laura Tingle</a> has revived the venerable idea in the latest edition of the <a href="https://www.quarterlyessay.com.au/">Quarterly Essay</a>, The High Road: What Australia can learn from New Zealand.</p>
<p>Her comparative historical narrative reveals uncanny parallels between the two countries — and significant divergences — with special attention to the recent history of neoliberal reforms, beginning in the 1980s, and then through to the post-global financial crisis and COVID-19 eras. </p>
<p>Time and perspective make all the difference, of course.</p>
<p>In the 1990s, for instance, when New Zealand was the global poster child for neoliberalism, Australia’s business lobbyists might have asked: why don’t we adopt the New Zealand model? Nowadays, the Australian left might <a href="https://theconversation.com/left-leaning-australians-may-look-to-new-zealand-with-envy-but-ardern-still-has-much-work-to-do-128227">look wistfully across the Tasman</a> and ask a similar question — for radically different reasons.</p>
<p>What Australians think they can learn from New Zealand, then, depends on the interests and values they stand for — and on the spin they put into retelling the histories of both countries.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/371850/original/file-20201129-19-d3qzbl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/371850/original/file-20201129-19-d3qzbl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=841&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371850/original/file-20201129-19-d3qzbl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=841&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371850/original/file-20201129-19-d3qzbl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=841&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371850/original/file-20201129-19-d3qzbl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1057&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371850/original/file-20201129-19-d3qzbl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1057&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371850/original/file-20201129-19-d3qzbl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1057&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Good and bad lessons</h2>
<p>Although long, Tingle’s essay could hardly do justice to the sweep of history it covers. It’s a commendable effort all the same, with only a few inaccuracies. For example, she writes “there wasn’t any official British administrative presence in New Zealand […] until 1839”, overlooking the arrival of James Busby in 1833 as <a href="https://nzhistory.govt.nz/james-busby-inaugurated-british-resident">first British Resident</a>.</p>
<p>But overall, Tingle’s trans-Tasman comparative political economy hits the right spots.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/with-a-mandate-to-govern-new-zealand-alone-labour-must-now-decide-what-it-really-stands-for-144490">With a mandate to govern New Zealand alone, Labour must now decide what it really stands for</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>She argues: “[T]he extent and speed of change in New Zealand [in the late 1980s and early 1990s], and the havoc it wreaked, would be impossible to defend from an Australian perspective.” </p>
<p>And, indeed, New Zealand’s “radical industrial relations change [from 1991] has not provided any panacea” for its persistently low levels of productivity — nor for a widening income gap with Australia.</p>
<p>In contrast, New Zealand’s <a href="https://nzhistory.govt.nz/politics/treaty/the-treaty-in-brief">Treaty of Waitangi</a> (1840) recognises Indigenous rights and provides constitutional backing for reconciliation and reparations. Its relevance has only grown, putting New Zealand well ahead of Australia in this respect, albeit with much work still to do.</p>
<h2>Growing apart</h2>
<p>At the turn of the 20th century, New Zealanders politely declined to join Australians in federation. The invitation is still open, in principle, but unlikely ever to be taken up. Neither side has any interest in completing that job. </p>
<p>As both countries matured after the world wars, they tended to ignore one another, looking more to the UK, Europe and US as leaders and exemplars. This is despite the Closer Economic Relations <a href="https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements-in-force/nz-australia-closer-economic-relations-cer/">CER</a> agreement (1983) and the many parallels in their political histories that Tingle points out.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/courageous-investment-means-innovation-stays-in-nz-not-sold-off-overseas-150381">'Courageous' investment means innovation stays in NZ, not sold off overseas</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Regrettably, the two countries have continued to grow apart. The post-1984 <a href="https://nzhistory.govt.nz/politics/nuclear-free-nz">nuclear-free policy</a> led to New Zealand being kicked out of the <a href="https://nzhistory.govt.nz/anzus-comes-into-force">ANZUS</a> Treaty. Then, as immigration and security became serious issues, the then Australian prime minister, John Howard, unilaterally withdrew the (once reciprocal) social rights of <a href="https://theconversation.com/wheres-the-choice-bro-kiwis-in-australia-get-a-raw-deal-18545">Kiwis in Australia</a> (an event Tingle omits to mention).</p>
<p>There was an accusation that New Zealanders were bludging off Australians in terms of both incomes and regional defence. Nowadays Australia deports its unwanted Kiwis with alacrity, which Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern pointedly described as “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/28/not-much-love-actually-jacinda-ardern-was-right-to-call-out-australias-corrosive-policies">corrosive to our relationship</a>”. </p>
<h2>Trust in government</h2>
<p>Given that diplomatic corrosion, Australia probably won’t learn much from New Zealand. Nevertheless, the shared trauma of a global pandemic could bring the two countries closer again, especially once travel restrictions ease.</p>
<p>Many Australians see the conduct of politics in New Zealand as more civil and mature. Ardern certainly burnishes that reputation, even though there is scepticism at home about her government’s actual performance.</p>
<p>Tingle rightly points out that New Zealand’s proportional representation <a href="https://www.parliament.nz/en/get-involved/features/what-is-the-mmp-voting-system/">electoral system</a> encourages competition for that notional median voter. Hence there is convergence between major political parties, rather than polarisation. Kiwi politicians never know when they might need their opponents’ support. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/who-are-donald-trumps-supporters-in-new-zealand-and-what-do-we-know-about-them-149424">Who are Donald Trump’s supporters in New Zealand and what do we know about them?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Perhaps related to this, international comparative data indicate that people’s “<a href="https://www.bennettinstitute.cam.ac.uk/publications/global-satisfaction-democracy-report-2020/">dissatisfaction with democracy</a>” has grown alarmingly in Australia, the UK and the US — but not in New Zealand.</p>
<h2>Keeping dialogue open</h2>
<p>Being a small unitary state with a unicameral legislature, change is institutionally easier and swifter in Wellington than in Canberra. Because of this, New Zealand occasionally does something that makes Australians stop and think. </p>
<p>For instance, Australia was once on the verge of adopting New Zealand’s <a href="http://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/n5314/pdf/ch14.pdf">universal no-fault model</a> of accident compensation. That fell through with the dismissal of the Whitlam government. But Australia’s federal constitution would have made implementation more complicated. </p>
<p>Whether New Zealand is ever an example worth following is up to your political judgment. But Tingle’s essay is an important contribution to a maturing cross-Tasman dialogue that looks far beyond ANZAC jingoism and sporting rivalries. </p>
<p>Still, both countries are divided over how to understand their own histories, let alone learn one another’s. And there will always be argument about whether and why Australia could learn anything at all from New Zealand, or vice versa. </p>
<p>Tingle suggests paying closer attention to New Zealand — in the sense of it still being an experiment or a laboratory — and that seems to be all.</p>
<p>If the Australian government were to reconsider its “corrosive” approach to the relationship, however, we might begin to see a more constructive sharing of ideas in both directions.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/151017/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Grant Duncan is a citizen of both Australia and New Zealand.</span></em></p>In a major essay, senior Australian political correspondent Laura Tingle suggests her country could still learn from the New Zealand ‘experiment’.Grant Duncan, Associate Professor, School of People, Environment and Planning, Massey UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/823822017-08-11T07:16:25Z2017-08-11T07:16:25ZOn North Korea, Turnbull locks Australia into the unpredictability of unpredictable players<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/181758/original/file-20170811-1225-1kk348g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Donald Trump's presidency is unlike any of its modern predecessors. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Michael Reynolds/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A week ago, the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/politics/australia-mexico-transcripts/">leaked transcript</a> of the January telephone call between Malcolm Turnbull and Donald Trump revealed Turnbull had told the president, “You can count on me. I will be there again and again.”</p>
<p>Now, as the US-North Korea verbal war intensifies, with fears it could run into a military conflict, Turnbull has made specific that general pledge.</p>
<p>In extended comments on Melbourne’s <a href="http://www.3aw.com.au/podcast/neil-mitchell-speaks-with-prime-minister-malcolm-turnbull/">3AW on Friday</a>, Turnbull declared: “Be under no misapprehension – in terms of defence we [Australia and US] are joined at the hip”.</p>
<p>“Let’s be very clear … If there is an attack on the United States by North Korea, then the ANZUS treaty will be invoked and Australia will come to the aid of the United States, just as if there was an attack on Australia, the United States would come to our aid.”</p>
<p>Asked what would happen in the event of an attack on the US territory of Guam, Turnbull said: “We would come to the aid of the United States. Now, how that manifests itself will obviously depend on the circumstances and the consultations with our allies.”</p>
<p>North Korea is threatening to launch missiles not at Guam itself but in the ocean nearby.</p>
<p>Ahead of a Friday briefing from military chiefs and intelligence and foreign policy experts, Turnbull underlined his point: “We stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the United States”. The worsening crisis was among topics discussed in a Thursday night telephone conversation between Turnbull and US vice-president Mike Pence.</p>
<p>The 1951 ANZUS treaty says: “The Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific”. (Article III)</p>
<p>“Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.” (Article IV)</p>
<p>Despite the tight alliance, only once has ANZUS been invoked – by John Howard after the September 11 2001 attacksv</p>
<p>Mostly, when Australia has stood with the US militarily, the treaty has been not relevant or not needed.</p>
<p>Nor has ANZUS or the wider American alliance meant the US automatically supports Australia. Australian efforts to get America involved in regional clashes, notably Indonesia’s claims to West New Guinea, and the Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation of the 1960s, were met with resistance.</p>
<p>Geoffrey Barker wrote in 2015, “In fact the US commitment to ANZUS has never been as strong as the Australian commitment”.</p>
<p>While Turnbull has trumpeted the message that Australia would support the US in a conflict with North Korea Hugh White, professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University, believes he has given a narrow, literal interpretation of the treaty and gone further than he had to.</p>
<p>“He’s missed the point that we have the right to judge our interests”, White says.
“Under article IV there is an obligation to act – there’s no obligation to act by contributing military forces. It’s always acknowledged that each side has the right to make a judgement about the kind of response it makes.”</p>
<p>The judgement, White argues, would depend on the particular circumstances. He outlines four scenarios of military conflict.</p>
<p>… an attack by the United States on North Korea, which some believed Trump building up to in his words earlier this week, when he said continued threats to the US “will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen”;</p>
<p>… an attack by North Korea on the US;</p>
<p>… North Korea firing its missiles to near Guam, but not on Guam;</p>
<p>… A pre-emptive strike by the US to prevent North Korea completing the development of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability.</p>
<p>White says that Turnbull has walked past the complexities of what might happen, and asks: “Is it in Australia’s interests to encourage the US by saying we’d support it unconditionally ?</p>
<p>Foreign minister Julie Bishop had been more circumspect. When it was put to her this week that we would be in the fight, if it came to that, given both ANZUS and Australia’s being a party to the Korean War ceasefire, she said: "In fact we were not a party in the legal sense to the armistice so there is no automatic trigger for Australia to be involved. As far as the ANZUS alliance is concerned, that is an obligation to consult. But of course we have been in constant discussion with our friends in the United States”.</p>
<p>Bishop carefully kept options open.</p>
<p>It is worth noting, however, that Kim Beazley a former defence minister, has a different view of the ceasefire agreement. He wrote in The Strategist: “At the signing of the armistice in Korea in 1953 we agreed, with South Korea’s allies, that we would defend the South in the event of an attack by the North.”</p>
<p>If Australia became involved in a military conflict, it would a limited contribution. It would be presence, rather than capability, that (as usual) would be important to the Americans.</p>
<p>As has become evident, Trump’s presidency presents Australia with serious management challenges in the alliance relationship, which is built into the foundations of Australian security policy.</p>
<p>This presidency is unlike any of its modern predecessors, and judging how to handle it is extremely difficult for the government. It’s interesting to note the new administration hasn’t yet even posted an ambassador to Australia.</p>
<p>Turnbull, with his personalised style of operating, has chosen to try to get up close and personal, talking as one businessman to another. Hence the “you can count on me” sort of line.</p>
<p>Turnbull may later nuance his Friday comments, but as they stand, they lock Australia into the unpredictability of unpredictable players. They also reflect, unvarnished, the reality that Australia always answers America’s call.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/82382/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
A week ago, the leaked transcript of the January telephone call between Malcolm Turnbull and Donald Trump revealed Turnbull had told the president, “You can count on me. I will be there again and again…Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/653542016-09-20T19:54:33Z2016-09-20T19:54:33ZCostly choices: how well will Trump or Clinton manage the Australia-US alliance?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/137694/original/image-20160914-4980-169t9js.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Should Hillary Clinton win the White House the long evolution of Australia-US alliance should continue as normal.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Trade and security in the Asia-Pacific, including Australia, is at a crossroads. Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/what-might-a-hillary-clinton-presidency-mean-for-asia/">represents continuity</a> with more than 25 years of American regional engagement. But Republican nominee Donald Trump places the very foundation of the US security guarantee <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/donald-trumps-asia-policy-would-be-a-disaster/">under threat</a>.</p>
<p>So, if elected president, how well will either of these candidates manage the <a href="http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BriefingBook44p/AustUSDefence">Australia-US alliance</a>?</p>
<p>US presidents over the past 25 years have had varying views of the alliance. While none have questioned its value, commitment has not been even across the board.</p>
<h2>George H.W. Bush</h2>
<p>George H.W. Bush, arguably, is most responsible for the character of today’s alliance. </p>
<p>A <a href="http://ww2db.com/person_bio.php?person_id=354">second world war veteran</a>, Bush shared many personal experiences with Australians serving in the Pacific. He also had <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=EuqFg5dUmgQC&pg=PA161&lpg=PA161#v=onepage&q&f=false">close relationships</a> with Australian leaders, especially Bob Hawke. </p>
<p>When Bush’s Australia visit was first planned, Hawke was still prime minister. In the intervening months Paul Keating replaced Hawke. What was to be a reunion between two close friends did not quite work as intended.</p>
<p>Bush set the benchmark for Australian-US alliance. In 1992 <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=CUjVAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA17&lpg=PA17#v=onepage&q&f=false">he said</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We will not abandon the special responsibility we have to help further stability in this region.</p>
</blockquote>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/vtOTxHKkmzM?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Bob Hawke visits the White House in 1989.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Bill Clinton</h2>
<p>Before becoming president, former Arkansas governor Bill Clinton was a foreign policy amateur. </p>
<p>In 1993, the Australian-inspired Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) forum <a href="http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46137">became a way</a> of bridging Clinton’s <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/It%27s_the_economy,_stupid">economic focus</a> with international trade. Later, his 1996 visit to Australia met with tremendous success, aligning Australian and American visions for the Asia-Pacific. </p>
<p>Clinton’s relationship with the Keating government was mostly positive, but his relationship with the Howard government was less so. </p>
<p>In 1999 the Howard government <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20100923201217/http://www.abc.net.au/news/howardyears/content/s2422684.htm">fumbled its handling</a> of calling on the US to send troops into East Timor alongside Australia’s. The US made significant contributions to the Australian-led efforts, providing essential logistical and communication support. </p>
<p>By the end of his administration Clinton had built on the efforts of his predecessor and continued to strengthen the alliance.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/ES8p4ozUcbM?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Bill Clinton addresses federal parliament in 1996.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>George W. Bush</h2>
<p>It is hard to say what George W. Bush’s handling of the Australia-US alliance would have been like if the September 11 terror attacks had not happened. Would his father’s Australian experience have coloured his view? </p>
<p>There can be no doubt that, after September 11, Australia’s support of US-led conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq signalled the continuing deepening of the alliance. </p>
<p>Despite Bush’s unpopularity in Australia, his administration continued to see Australia as an important ally. Adding to the depth of the alliance was agreement on the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Australia%E2%80%93United_States_Free_Trade_Agreement">Australia-US Free Trade Agreement</a> and creation of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/E-3_visa">E3 visa</a> category for Australians. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/137691/original/image-20160914-4936-11jxhn8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/137691/original/image-20160914-4936-11jxhn8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/137691/original/image-20160914-4936-11jxhn8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/137691/original/image-20160914-4936-11jxhn8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/137691/original/image-20160914-4936-11jxhn8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=524&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/137691/original/image-20160914-4936-11jxhn8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=524&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/137691/original/image-20160914-4936-11jxhn8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=524&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Bush administration saw Australia as an important ally.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Kevin Dietsch</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Barack Obama</h2>
<p>America’s first truly Asia-Pacific president is Barack Obama. </p>
<p>Obama was born in Hawaii and <a href="http://millercenter.org/president/biography/obama-life-before-the-presidency">lived in Indonesia</a> in his youth. The Obama-led “pivot” to Asia acknowledged the importance of the Asia-Pacific, both in economic and security terms, as he described in a <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament">speech to the Australian parliament</a> in 2011. </p>
<p>Australia has a central place in the pivot. The George W. Bush-negotiated <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/ustradetreaty/aboutthetreaty.asp">Defence Trade Co-operation Treaty</a> between the US and Australia was finally passed in the US Senate and signed into law by Obama in 2013. </p>
<p>Obama has built on the foundations in the alliance laid by his predecessors.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/8_hSqLEtX_Y?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Barack Obama addresses federal parliament in 2011.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What might 2016 mean?</h2>
<p>Should Hillary Clinton win the White House the long evolution of alliance should continue as it has done since Bush senior’s presidency. </p>
<p>One of her most-trusted advisers, Kurt Campbell – <a href="http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2016/07/04/Book-review-The-Pivot-The-Future-of-American-Statecraft-in-Asia-by-Kurt-Campbell.aspx">the pivot’s architect</a> – might well become <a href="http://www.afr.com/opinion/columnists/hillary-clintons-tough-on-china-strategy-will-demand-more-of-australia-20160904-gr8mqe">secretary of state</a>. Under Clinton Australians would be in no doubt about the US position on the alliance in particular and America’s broader commitment to the Asia-Pacific.</p>
<p>A Trump victory signals ambiguity and insecurity. He has already <a href="https://www.donaldjtrump.com/positions/us-china-trade-reform">telegraphed his intention</a> to use trade tariffs against China in his campaign to protect American manufacturing. </p>
<p>His commitment to American security alliances is predicated upon each ally’s financial commitment to the particular alliance. Australia’s defence spending might protect it against a Trump presidency’s ire. But, then again, it might not. </p>
<p>Finally, Trump has <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-04-02/donald-trump-nuclear-fallout-analysis/7294358">expressed an indifferent view</a> on the continued growth of nuclear weapons in northeast Asia.</p>
<p>Unlike previous Republican candidates, Trump does not have a stable of ready political appointees to take up positions of responsibility. Even if he did, his congressional relations will be anything but cordial if the Democrats win the Senate. </p>
<p>Given the long experience of Republican congressional obstinacy to pass legislation, the Democrats might feel it is their time for payback. Should the Democrats win the Senate, which is distinctly possible, one can expect Trump nominees to have a very long and slow confirmation process. </p>
<p>A Trump presidency will likely seem to Australians like a very long four years. Under Clinton, time will pass at its normal pace.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/65354/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alan Tidwell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>US presidents over the past 25 years have had varying views of the alliance with Australia. While none have questioned its value, commitment has not been even across the board.Alan Tidwell, Director, Center for Australian, New Zealand and Pacific Studies, Georgetown UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/534832016-01-20T22:37:31Z2016-01-20T22:37:31ZPresident Trump and the ANZUS alliance<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/108801/original/image-20160120-26125-1jh2v0b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption"></span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Nick Oxford</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>One thing Malcolm Turnbull didn’t talk about on his recent visit to the US was the possibility of Donald Trump becoming president. Perhaps he thinks of it as too unlikely to worry about. The conventional wisdom is that despite being the most popular candidate, Trump won’t be the Republican nominee. Even if he is, Hillary Clinton will trounce him in the only poll that matters.</p>
<p>I’m far from being the only person hoping the pundits are right. A number of world leaders, like UK Prime Minister David Cameron, have taken the unusual step of interfering in the electoral contest to criticise Trump. Many others must be praying that America’s grumpy old white men and xenophobes don’t carry the day. But what if they do?</p>
<p>No-one quite knows what goes on in other people’s heads in the privacy of the voting booth, so we can’t be certain of the outcome. Extremism is making a comeback around the world. In some places it never entirely disappeared, and that’s part of the problem. </p>
<p>The question in Australia is whether our policymakers, particularly in defence and national security, have actually thought about the unthinkable – the ascendancy of president Trump.</p>
<p>Given that our national security is ostensibly guaranteed by the US, the possible advent of a Trump presidency is especially consequential for Australians. If anyone doubts just how much of a difference an individual president can actually make, we need only recall the disastrous administration of George W. Bush.</p>
<p>Not only did the Bush era fundamentally undermine the US’s own security position – in both its conventional military and, equally importantly, economic forms – but it also led to a number of its allies embarking on monumentally misguided and, in Australia’s case, unnecessary military adventures.</p>
<p>The point to emphasise is that any country that relies too heavily on another for its security is potentially hostage to its protector’s policies – no matter how ill-conceived, dangerous or inappropriate they may be. That possibility was realised in entirely predictable and disastrous fashion when Bush was president. A Trump administration threatens to be even more catastrophic on a number of levels.</p>
<p>We may hope that much of Trump’s rhetoric is bluster and simply playing to the prejudices of his core supporters. But threatening to use America’s still formidable and decisive military might to “solve” problems in the Middle East has the potential to make the conflicts in Iraq look like a relatively minor precursor to the main event.</p>
<p>Given Australian policymakers’ track record of always supporting the US in whatever conflict it may find itself involved, no matter how remote geographically or distant from vital Australian interests it may have been, one wonders if a similar blank cheque will be offered to a potential Trump regime. </p>
<p>If a Trump administration threatened to use the ANZUS alliance and its supposedly vital security benefits as a bargaining chip, would any Australian government feel compelled to support the US no matter what the policy was or its possible consequences?</p>
<p>Given that Trump thinks that standing up to China economically and militarily is vital for America’s national interests, any administration he led might hasten the proverbial nightmare scenario in which Australia is forced to make a painful choice between its principal strategic and economic partners.</p>
<p>Such a dilemma might have been avoided altogether if Australia had a more independent, non-aligned foreign policy in the first place. Supporters of the alliance, who bang on endlessly about the supposed cost-saving and intelligence advantages it provides, conveniently overlook the amount of treasure and – more significantly – blood that’s actually been expended in its maintenance.</p>
<p>Equally significant is the idea that Australia enjoys the proverbial “special relationship” with the US, in which its wise counsel is actively sought and taken into account in the formulation of American foreign policies, would be put to a searching examination in any Trump administration. It’s difficult to imagine Trump listening to advice from within the US, let alone some peripheral vassal state.</p>
<p>Hopefully, it won’t come to this. Surely our American cousins aren’t that misguided and irresponsible, are they? Probably not. </p>
<p>But, at a time when the stability and effectiveness of America’s democracy is increasing called into question and even held up to ridicule, the possibility of a Trump presidency can’t be entirely discounted. If it does happen, the policy implications for friend and foe alike will be profound. We must hope such a possibility is at least being considered in Canberra, even if history suggests that the outcome of such conjectures is all too predictable.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>An earlier version of this article appeared in <a href="http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/president-trump-and-the-anzus-alliance/">The Strategist</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/53483/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
One thing Malcolm Turnbull didn’t talk about on his recent visit to the US was the possibility of Donald Trump becoming president. Perhaps he thinks of it as too unlikely to worry about. The conventional…Mark Beeson, Professor of International Politics, The University of Western AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/445542015-07-13T00:20:17Z2015-07-13T00:20:17ZThe ANZUS ascendancy (continued)<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/88125/original/image-20150711-17439-8sv2vm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption"></span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Ian Waldie</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>What J.K. Galbraith famously called the conventional wisdom is a powerful thing to behold. There are few better local examples than the belief that the military alliance with the US is vital for the security of Australia and the stability of the wider Asia-Pacific region. </p>
<p>Given that this idea is also overwhelming supported by both the general public and – more predictably – the defence establishment in Australia, one would have thought it needed little reinforcing. And yet there is a veritable army of commentators and analysts who continually fret about the health of the ANZUS alliance and the possibility that it might be neglected or in disrepair. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/COG%20%2323%20Web.pdf">latest example</a> of the ANZUS-boosting genre has been jointly produced by the ANU’s Strategic and Defence Studies Centre and the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies. </p>
<p>The series editor – Andrew Carr – promises the reader that the report will reflect “the different viewpoints of the authors”. If it does, then I’m afraid I missed it. The most striking feature of this review – like so many others before it – is the remarkable uniformity of opinion.</p>
<p>The ostensible rationale for this “candid audit” is the rise of China. At least the authors are not mealy mouthed about actually saying so. And no doubt there <em>is</em> something to fret about in this context. China’s recent behaviour has been alarming, especially for its smaller Southeast Asian neighbours. The question, as ever, is what is to be done?</p>
<p>Predictably enough, the authors are in no doubt. Australia is still what Des Ball called a suitable piece of real estate, and not just as a spy base. Now Australia’s great strategic significance is as a:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… sanctuary from China’s anti-access/area denial capabilities.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Equally predictably, playing the part of a creditable alliance partner will involve spending vast amounts of money on new hardware to facilitate “interoperability”. This is apparently vital in the event that we need to do our bit again in far-off places – or “combined expeditionary operations”, as we apparently call them these days. </p>
<p>The authors are clearly scandalised that Australia has recently:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… behaved fairly openly as a free-rider in the relationship. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>What is more surprising and remarkable, perhaps, is that the authors are also clearly aghast at the idea that people such as the late Malcolm Fraser should have the temerity to question the value of the alliance:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… in no other US-allied capital do former leaders engage in such blatant questioning of the alliance with the United States. What are Americans to make of such statements, and how can Washington and Canberra align their China strategies?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The possibility that Australians might actually want to have a debate about, or even have a different, independent position on some of these issues is not one that is entertained in the report.</p>
<p>On the contrary, “it is only natural” that the thinking of the US and Australia on key issues will converge, and so it should, the authors clearly believe. The key here is developing “coherent and sustainable China strategies” and ignoring the “accommodational mutterings” (sic) of public figures who are not on message. </p>
<p>One assumes the authors have Hugh White in mind as he has provided some of the most sophisticated – and plausible – alternatives to the sort of quasi-containment strategies outlined here. Given that the authors claim to favour an open debate, it might have been useful to directly engage with some of White’s ideas, if only to demonstrate why they think we shouldn’t take them seriously.</p>
<p>As it is, this report contains few surprises for anyone who has been taking even the vaguest interest in defence issues of late. All of the usual justifications for the alliance are trotted out including the inherently implausible idea that Australia exerts a major influence over strategic thinking in the US. We are assured that the Americans are now apparently worried about “abandonment by Canberra”.</p>
<p>One of the most potentially novel, important but underdeveloped aspects of the report was the idea that the US and Australia as “staunch defenders of the neoliberal order” ought to try and “shape China’s expectations”. Perhaps so. At the very least, it is implicit recognition that the economic and ideational aspects of relations with China are potentially as, if not more, important than the more traditional strategic considerations that predominate here. </p>
<p>In the absence of war geoeconomics will arguably be the main game. In the presence of war between the US and China not only will Australia’s military contribution be entirely redundant, but so too will all the carefully calibrated calculations and strategising that underpin this document.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/44554/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
What J.K. Galbraith famously called the conventional wisdom is a powerful thing to behold. There are few better local examples than the belief that the military alliance with the US is vital for the security…Mark Beeson, Professor of International Politics, The University of Western AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.