tag:theconversation.com,2011:/fr/topics/ayatollah-khamenei-47035/articles
Ayatollah Khamenei – The Conversation
2024-03-04T13:37:27Z
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/224833
2024-03-04T13:37:27Z
2024-03-04T13:37:27Z
Commander of Iran’s elite Quds Force is expanding predecessor’s vision of chaos in the Middle East
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579281/original/file-20240301-50192-65mwly.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C0%2C2966%2C1853&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Esmail Ghaani, head of Iran's expeditionary Quds Force, speaks at a ceremony in Tehran on April 14, 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/IranIsrael/7769f2ccb99244898fcb9149111c664d/photo?Query=quds%20force&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=200&currentItemNo=47">AP Photo/Vahid Salemi</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Most Americans have likely never heard of <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/who-is-esmail-ghaani-the-successor-to-slain-iranian-general-soleimani/">Esmail Ghaani</a>, despite his fingerprints being over a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/27/world/middleeast/us-iran-militias.html">slew of recent attacks</a> on U.S. targets.</p>
<p>As the powerful chief of the Quds Force, the unconventional warfare wing of Iran’s <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards">Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps</a>, Ghaani is charged with overseeing Tehran’s network of allied and proxy groups across the Middle East.</p>
<p>But despite <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/esmail-qaani-commander-of-the-axis/article67808742.ece">recent media attention</a> following a significant increase in attacks by Quds-backed militants since the Oct. 7, 2023, attack in Israel, Ghaani remains a figure who largely shuns the public spotlight.</p>
<p>This is both like and unlike his predecessor Qassem Soleimani, who died in a <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/mideast/airport-informants-overhead-drones-how-u-s-killed-soleimani-n1113726">controversial 2020 U.S. strike in Iraq</a>.</p>
<p>For the first decade of his stint as Quds Force commander, which began <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20190925041643/http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/suleimani.pdf">in the late 1990s</a>, Soleimani also kept a low profile. But in the years leading up to his death in 2020, he promoted his accomplishments <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/esmail-ghaani-iran-announces-new-military-leader-after-commander-killed-in-us-airstrike-11901047">openly on social media</a>.</p>
<p>Soleimani’s loss was seen as a massive blow to the Quds Force and Iran’s national security agenda overall given his popularity in Iran and his achievements, making the task of replacing him daunting. Ghaani had been <a href="http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2011/12/profile-the-canny-general-quds-force-commander-ghasem-soleimani.html">Soleimani’s deputy</a>, and the two had known each other since the early 1980s during their <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/who-esmail-qaani-new-chief-commander-irans-qods-force">military service in the Iran-Iraq War.</a> </p>
<p>In the initial aftermath of Soleimani’s death, experts questioned <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2020/1/20/esmaii-qaani-new-shadow-commander-of-irans-quds-force">whether Ghaani would be a capable replacement</a>.</p>
<p>But despite differing from Soleimani in both personality and attitude toward publicity, Ghaani has managed to expand upon the foundation that Soleimani carefully cultivated over a 20-year period.</p>
<p>Under Ghaani, the Quds Force has doubled down on the strategy of supporting, arming and funding terrorist and insurgent groups in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, Afghanistan and the Palestinian territories. </p>
<p>Building from Soleimani’s legacy, Ghaani is responsible for developing the network into what Iranian officials call the “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-axis-resistance-against-israel-faces-trial-by-fire-2023-11-15/">Axis of Resistance</a>.”</p>
<p>It is a coalition that cuts across ethnic and religious divides in the region, despite Iran itself remaining a hard-line theocracy with an ethnic Persian and Shia Muslim identity. In cultivating the network, first Soleimani and now Ghaani have displayed a degree of pragmatism and flexibility at odds with the extreme ideological position of Iran’s ruling ayatollahs. And Ghaani, like Soleimani before him, appears to have done this with the full trust and support of Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.</p>
<h2>Pressuring Iran’s enemies</h2>
<p>As <a href="https://fordschool.umich.edu/faculty/javed-ali">an expert in national security issues</a> with a focus on counterterrorism, I have observed how the Quds Force’s <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/02/07/iran-unleashed-forces-that-it-can-no-longer-control/">unconventional warfare strategy</a> has changed the security landscape in the region. It is premised on creating pressure against Iran’s enemies — Israel, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia — through partnering with groups within the axis.</p>
<p>As Quds Force commander, Ghaani has to manage his organization’s relationships with each of these groups. This is made all the more tricky as each maintains its own agendas, decision-making calculations and, at times, independence despite Iran’s influence and largesse.</p>
<p>Take the Quds Force’s relationship with Hamas. Despite the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/04/hamas-drew-detailed-attack-plans-for-years-with-help-of-spies-idf-says">long planning involved</a> with the horrific Hamas attacks in Israel in October 2023, the Quds Force <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2023/12/28/Iran-s-IRGC-retracts-statement-on-Oct-7-attacks-after-rare-public-spat-with-Hamas">does not appear to have had a direct role</a>.</p>
<p>Not that the assault wasn’t welcomed by Ghaani, in public at least. In late December 2023, he <a href="https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-780069">was reported as saying</a> on Iran’s official news agency that, “Due to the extensive crimes committed by the Zionist regime against the Muslim people of Palestine, [Hamas] themselves took action. … Everything they did was beautifully planned and executed.”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Man speaking in front of image of two men." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Esmail Ghaani speaks at event commemorating the death of former Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani on Jan. 3, 2024.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com.mx/detail/fotograf%C3%ADa-de-noticias/commander-esmail-qaani-of-the-islamic-fotograf%C3%ADa-de-noticias/1898123764?adppopup=true">Photo by Morteza Nikoubazl/NurPhoto via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>With other militant groups in the region, Ghaani appears to have a more hands-on approach. The deadly <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/01/28/politics/us-troops-drone-attack-jordan/index.html">Jan. 28, 2024, drone attack</a> against a U.S. military outpost in Jordan, launched by the Iraq-based and Iran-supported <a href="https://theconversation.com/drone-attack-on-american-troops-risks-widening-middle-east-conflict-and-drawing-in-iran-us-tensions-222216">Islamic Resistance in Iraq</a> network, significantly escalated tensions in the region.</p>
<p>It provoked a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/27/world/middleeast/us-iran-militias.html">significant U.S. and British response</a> in Iraq and Syria. After the incident, it was reported that <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraqi-armed-groups-dial-down-us-attacks-request-iran-commander-2024-02-18/">Ghaani spent considerable effort</a> getting the Iraqi groups responsible to temporarily pause anti-U.S. attacks. </p>
<p>Whether that pause lasts for an extended period or if attacks resume will be a test of Ghaani’s ability to wield his influence in Iraq.</p>
<p>Ghaani’s calculus in regard to Yemen, where the Houthis have emerged as a dangerous insurgent group, looks less clear.</p>
<p>Having been armed throughout a decadelong civil war by Iran, the Houthis responded to Israel’s campaign in the Gaza Strip <a href="https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Documents/News/Military_Power_Publications/Iran_Houthi_Final2.pdf">by launching hundreds of rocket, missile and drone attacks</a> against commercial and military shipping in the Red Sea. </p>
<p>Retaliatory strikes by the U.S. and other coalition members <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/24/politics/us-uk-strikes-houthi-targets-yemen/index.html">on Houthi targets</a> have destroyed a significant amount of the capability that Iran had provided. Yet the Houthis seem undeterred and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/02/stricken-ship-attacked-by-houthi-rebels-sinks-in-red-sea">have continued anti-shipping operations</a>. </p>
<p>It is unclear if Ghaani has attempted to dial those operations back or if he has encouraged the Houthis to maintain their pace, given the shared goals between Iran and the Houthis to keep pressure on the United States and Israel.</p>
<h2>Relationship with Hezbollah</h2>
<p>Beyond Israel, Iraq and Yemen, Ghaani is also likely attempting to manage the Quds Force’s relationship with Lebanon’s Hezbollah, <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/hizballah-and-the-qods-force-in-irans-shadow-war-with-the-west">arguably Iran’s strongest partner</a> in the Axis of Resistance. The partnership stretches back to the early 1980s and has transformed Hezbollah into a powerful force in Lebanon and a serious security concern in the region.</p>
<p>Since Oct. 7, the group has engaged in near daily conflict with Israel, with both sides conducting cross-border strikes. Hezbollah’s general secretary, Hassan Nasrallah, seems wary of engaging in a broader war with Israel, but at the same time he has not reined in the attacks and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/16/hezbollah-warns-that-israel-will-pay-in-blood-for-killing-civilians">has vowed to retaliate against Israel</a> for the death of civilians in Lebanon. </p>
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<img alt="Three Iranian leaders, two in military fatigues stand and talk." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Iranian leader Ali Khamenei, left, meets with Esmail Ghaani, right, and Revolutionary Guards General Commander Hossein Salami, center, on Dec. 28, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com.mx/detail/fotograf%C3%ADa-de-noticias/iranian-leader-ali-khamenei-iranian-fotograf%C3%ADa-de-noticias/1883329738?adppopup=true">Anadolu via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>Although Iran may well welcome Hezbollah becoming a persistent irritant to Israel, Tehran is also wary of a full-blown conflict. In such a scenario, Nasrallah, Ghaani and Supreme Leader Khamenei would have to worry about whether the United States would get directly involved – as, reportedly, the White House <a href="https://www.axios.com/2023/10/17/israel-news-us-military-hezbollah-attacks">had been considering</a> in the days after the Oct. 7 attack on Israel.</p>
<p>Any future statements by Ghaani regarding Hezbollah will be a strong indicator of Iran’s intent in regard to how it sees this volatile aspect of tensions in the Middle East developing.</p>
<h2>Walking a tightrope</h2>
<p>To date, Ghaani seems to have successfully navigated the transition between replacing the charismatic figure of Qassem Soleimani and advancing Iran’s interests through Quds Force operations with the full backing of Khameini.</p>
<p>He may never be as revered in Iran as Soleimani, but by managing the Quds Force’s relationship with Axis of Resistance groups, Ghaani has proved to be a formidable and capable adversary who should not be underestimated. </p>
<p>The recent escalation of multifaceted tensions across the Middle East has provided both opportunities and potential pitfalls for Ghaani’s strategy – how to encourage the activities of its Axis of Rrsistance while insulating Iran from any direct blowback from the United States.</p>
<p>But one thing is becoming clear: Reversing the Quds Force’s influence while bolstering U.S. interests is likely to be a top policy priority for Washington as it attempts to manage the developing conflict in the Middle East.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224833/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Javed Ali does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Esmail Ghaani took control of the unconventional warfare wing of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps following the killing of predecessor Qassem Soleimani.
Javed Ali, Associate Professor of Practice of Public Policy, University of Michigan
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/224804
2024-02-29T17:47:45Z
2024-02-29T17:47:45Z
Iranian parliamentary election: what people are voting for and why it’s different this time
<p>Iranian voters head to the polls on March 1 to elect the country’s next parliament and the powerful Assembly of Experts. The result is likely to be a foregone conclusion, given the tight control that the Islamic Republic holds over who can run for office. But the way the election plays out – and its significance – may be different to normal.</p>
<p>Every four years the public get to vote for the 290 members of the <a href="https://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/parliament">Iranian parliament</a> (also known as the Islamic Consultative Assembly). The parliament is the legislature of the country, and its members are responsible for drafting legislation, approving the annual budget and any international treaties or agreements. It is not responsible for foreign or nuclear policy.</p>
<p>At the same time, elections are being held for the <a href="https://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/assembly-experts">Assembly of Experts</a>, which serves an eight-year term and is imbued under the <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Iran_1989">Iranian constitution</a> to monitor, dismiss and elect the supreme leader. </p>
<p>Despite Iranians being able to vote, there are a number of limitations to the democratic process in Iran. Most notably, all candidates are vetted by the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/03/iran_power/html/guardian_council.stm">Guardian Council</a> – an unelected body – hence removing a significant element of choice. </p>
<p>Of the 49,000 people who registered to run for parliament this year, <a href="https://www.shora-gc.ir/en/news/243/over-14000-candidates-approved-for-irans-parliamentary-elections">14,200 applicants</a> were approved. This has involved the disqualification of many reformist and centrist conservatives and has left mainly right-wing conservatives vying for posts. </p>
<p>In fact, only 30 reformists have been approved to run for office, leaving them <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202402204964">to claim</a> that the elections are “meaningless, non-competitive, unfair, and ineffective in the administration of the country”.</p>
<p>In the Assembly of Experts, 144 candidates have been approved to run for the 88 seats. But the centrist and reformist former president, <a href="https://twitter.com/hassanrouhani?lang=en">Hassan Rouhani</a>, has been <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/mena/iran/2024/01/24/irans-rouhani-says-he-is-banned-from-running-in-march-election-for-elite-assembly/">banned from seeking re-election</a>. This has further cemented the Assembly of Experts as a stronghold of conservatives and ultra-conservatives.</p>
<p>The names of the final candidates were also released very late – just two weeks before the election. This has allowed little time for campaigning or, more importantly, for the public to get to know who they are supposed to be voting for.</p>
<h2>It’s different this time around</h2>
<p>There are three important points to note about this election. First, this is the first election since the death of <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/09/what-happened-to-mahsa-zhina-amini/">Mahsa Amini</a>. Amini died in police custody in September 2022, at the age of 26, after being arrested by Iran’s morality police for violating the country’s strict Islamic dress code. </p>
<p>Her death led to <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/maggiemcgrath/2022/12/06/mahsa-amini-the-spark-that-ignited-a-women-led-revolution/">widespread protests</a> <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/16/iran-one-year-after-the-death-of-mahsa-amini">across Iran</a> which were met with a brutal crackdown. And while these “woman, life, freedom” protests, may have largely died down after 18 months, they <a href="https://theconversation.com/womens-activism-in-iran-continues-despite-street-protests-dying-down-in-face-of-state-repression-213514">continue via online activism and civil disobedience</a>. </p>
<p>Therefore, this election is likely to see some response from these events, with women and young people wanting to continue the protest through the ballot box.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/womens-activism-in-iran-continues-despite-street-protests-dying-down-in-face-of-state-repression-213514">Women's activism in Iran continues, despite street protests dying down in face of state repression</a>
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<p>Second, there is expected to be a <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/28/middleeast/iran-election-parliament-turnout-low-jihad-vote-mime-intl/index.html">low turnout</a>. Voting turnout has been on the decline in Iranian elections for some time, but increasing dissatisfaction with the voting choice, combined with apathy and frustration over the lack of change in the country means that many voters are planning to stay away from the ballot box.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.etemadonline.com/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%DB%8C-9/652287-%D9%87%D8%B4%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%86%D8%AC%DB%8C-%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%AF%D9%87%D9%85">recent poll</a> suggested that national turnout is likely to be at 35% and only 18% in the capital, Tehran. By comparison, the <a href="https://irandataportal.syr.edu/2020-parliamentary-election">turnout in 2020 was 42.5%</a> – but this was the lowest it had been since 1979 and was during a global pandemic.</p>
<h2>Succession question</h2>
<p>A low turnout could be problematic for the political leadership, who rely on elections to provide a veil of legitimacy over their regime. As a result, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has started a dual pronged campaign of encouraging citizens to vote and blaming the west if they don’t.</p>
<p>Last month he <a href="https://twitter.com/khamenei_ir/status/1759192438504120516">tweeted</a>: “Elections are the main pillar of the Islamic Republic, and they are the way to improve the country. For those who are seeking to solve the problems, the way to do this is the elections.” </p>
<p>He also attended a meeting with people from the East Azerbaijan province and used the opportunity to emphasise that it was the intention of what he called the <a href="https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/495092/Enemies-oppose-Iran-elections">“arrogant powers”</a> and the US to encourage people to boycott the elections.</p>
<p>The third point is that the elections are likely to have a greater significance for the future of Islamic Republic than normal. Khamenei is currently 84 years old, so the election of the next supreme leader is likely to happen within the next eight-year term of the Assembly of Experts. </p>
<p>This is why it is thought that the Guardian Council has been so restrictive when it has come to this year’s <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202401293591">candidate selection</a> for the Assembly – because this election could secure Iranian succession.</p>
<p>The first results could emerge within 24 hours, although the full tally – and what it means for Iran’s future – may not be clear for some days.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224804/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Louise Kettle is an Associate Fellow of the Royal United Services Institute</span></em></p>
Candidates have been pre-approved to favour the religious right.
Louise Kettle, Assistant Professor of International Relations, University of Nottingham
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/191958
2022-10-07T15:13:58Z
2022-10-07T15:13:58Z
Iran: ‘hijab’ protests challenge legitimacy of Islamic Republic
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/488529/original/file-20221006-14-fm3up6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C1%2C898%2C670&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Giving the regime the finger: students protest in Isfahan, Iran.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reddit</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Three weeks after the violent death of 22-year-old Iranian Kurdish woman Mahsa Amini at the hands of Iran’s morality police for the crime of wearing her hijab improperly, <a href="https://theconversation.com/iranian-women-burning-their-hijabs-are-striking-at-the-islamic-republics-brand-191809">protests continue</a> to rage across the country. These demonstrations defy both repression by security forces in the streets of major cities and restrictions on the internet. They challenge the legitimacy of a hardline regime whose authority appears to be eroding by the day.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/iranian-women-burning-their-hijabs-are-striking-at-the-islamic-republics-brand-191809">Iranian women burning their hijabs are striking at the Islamic Republic's brand</a>
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<p>Activists inside Iran and analysts outside it assess that these protests could be the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-63006664">most serious challenge</a> to the regime since millions took to the streets after the disputed 2009 presidential election.</p>
<p>There have been recurrent nationwide demonstrations since then. In December 2017, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/29/iranian-police-disperse-anti-government-protests">ten days of rallies</a> were spurred by economic conditions as well as the compulsory hijab law. In November 2019, up to 1,500 people were killed during <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/16/protests-erupt-in-iran-after-government-raises-price-of-gas-by-50">four days of protests</a> sparked by a sudden rise in petrol prices. At the local level, there are demonstrations over pay and working conditions, the environmental situation, and detentions.</p>
<p>In these cases, though, the mass rallies have ebbed after a few days. Following their shows of anger and demands for rights, Iranians apparently returned to resignation over their economic hardship and lack of political agency and social freedoms.</p>
<p>In contrast, the current protests have not receded so far, despite the regime’s <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/10/05/iran-security-forces-fire-kill-protesters#:%7E:text=In%20one%20of%20the%20most,killed%20during%20the%202019%20protests.">use of force</a> and attempts to shut down communications.</p>
<p>This is not this just a display of resistance from one group, or a movement led by men. Women, some of them taking off or not wearing the hijab, <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-protest-at-enforced-hijab-sparks-online-debate-and-feminist-calls-for-action-across-arab-world-191178">have been prominent</a> and there have been large gatherings at universities and schools.</p>
<p>The regime has not been able to close down the movement with a staged counter-protest, as it did with mass rallies in December 2009. A <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iranian-army-says-it-will-confront-enemies-protests-rage-2022-09-23/">government-organised demonstration</a> after Friday prayers on September 23 brought out only tens of thousands, far from the “millions” proclaimed by the state media.</p>
<p>As always with mass protests, Iranian authorities have tried to portray the rallies as plots orchestrated by the US, Israel, Saudi Arabia, “mercenaries” and “terrorists”. But so far, no attempt to tear down the protests has gained the upper hand. The vast majority of demonstrations have been non-violent and the expression of Iranians, rather than the work of devious foreign elements.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1577711665260498960"}"></div></p>
<p>On Monday, Iran’s supreme leader tipped off his concern. In Ali Khamenei’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-khamenei-says-protests-riots-were-planned-state-media-2022-10-03/">first public comments</a> on Amini’s death, which he called “a tragic incident that saddened us”, he claimed:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The recent riots and unrest in Iran were schemes designed by the US; the usurping, fake Zionist regime; their mercenaries; and some treasonous Iranians abroad who helped them … How can some people not see the US and Israel’s hands in this event?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The demonstrations have widened beyond Amini’s death. The compulsory hijab is a <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-protests-majority-of-people-reject-compulsory-hijab-and-an-islamic-regime-surveys-find-191448">marker of concerns</a> about the regime’s social restrictions on women and on all Iranians. The chants of “women, life, freedom” point to the campaign for political agency.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-protests-majority-of-people-reject-compulsory-hijab-and-an-islamic-regime-surveys-find-191448">Iran protests: majority of people reject compulsory hijab and an Islamic regime, surveys find</a>
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</em>
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<hr>
<p>Demonstrators emphasise that this is a movement with “no leader”, which raises a challenge beyond the short-term. How long can the spontaneous pursuit of rights continue without organisation? Should a specific platform, beyond abolition of compulsory hijab and of the “morality police”, be produced? Still, the demonstrations have pulled the curtain back on a regime which rules by coercion and patronage rather than acceptance.</p>
<h2>Hardliners versus discontent</h2>
<p>The mass marches in 2009 highlighted the discontent of many Iranians, as well as their aspirations for a system not manipulated by the supreme leader through his functionaries and the Revolutionary Guards.</p>
<p>The regime was able to shut down those aspirations but it has not conquered discontent. The economic situation in Iran has deteriorated throughout the past 13 years. Inflation is officially at <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202208257560">more than 52%</a>, with higher rises for food and other essentials. There has been only a small increase in GDP after declines of 6% to 7% in 2018 and 2019. Only one-third of jobs lost during the COVID pandemic have been recovered. This week, the Iranian currency set a new all-time low against the US dollar of 42,229.5:1.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-iran-nuclear-deal">2015 nuclear deal</a> offered a window of opportunity for recovery. But that soon narrowed and was shut in 2018 by the Trump administration’s withdrawal and its expansion of US sanctions. The renewal of that agreement has been stalled for months over Iranian demands such as strict limits on inspections of its nuclear facilities.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the regime takes an even harder line at home. After his miscalculation led to the unexpected victory of the centrist Hassan Rouhani in the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/15/iran-presidential-election-hassan-rouhani-wins">2013 presidential election</a>, the supreme leader used the new president as a firewall. Khamenei allowed Rouhani to take the blame for economic difficulties and for the failure – because of the hardliners’ stonewalling – to deliver social reforms.</p>
<p>In 2021, Khamenei and the hardliners consolidated their domestic position. They used a “managed election” put the head of judiciary, Ebrahim Raisi, into the presidency. But now they have no firewall against the mounting problems of Iranians.</p>
<h2>Welcome to isolation</h2>
<p>Khamenei’s regime is increasingly isolated. The stalemated nuclear talks means there is no prospect of renewed links not only with the US and Europe but also much of Asia.</p>
<p>China is happy to take discounted Iranian oil but cautious about political ties. India is looking to Khamenei’s “enemies” – joining the US, Australia and Japan <a href="https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-and-the-quad/">in the Quad</a> alliance – rather than allying with Tehran. In the Middle East, the regime is contending with an unstable situation in Iraq, and talks for reconciliation with Saudi Arabia are making slow progress.</p>
<p>Perhaps most importantly, a <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/the-ukraine-war-has-made-iran-and-russia-allies-in-economic-isolation-heres-how/">vaunted alliance with Russia</a> is tethered to Vladimir Putin’s failing invasion of Ukraine. Far from seeing an economic boost, Iran finds itself handcuffed to another heavily sanctioned system which could soon be in upheaval.</p>
<p>Khamenei <a href="https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2022/10/05/2784035/ayatollah-khamenei-role-of-arrogant-powers-policies-in-recent-bitter-events-in-iran-is-obvious">has insisted</a> that: “Whenever the enemies plan on creating unrest anywhere, it will be the courageous and faithful people of Iran who will stand up to them the most.”</p>
<p>Unfortunately for him, the courageous and faithful on the streets of Iran beg to differ.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191958/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Scott Lucas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
The autocratic regime of Ayatollah Khamenei is coming under pressure like never before.
Scott Lucas, Professor of International Politics, University College Dublin
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/191297
2022-09-26T17:47:58Z
2022-09-26T17:47:58Z
Iran on fire: Once again, women are on the vanguard of transformative change
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486510/original/file-20220926-21-vlyodu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4031%2C3024&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In this Monday, Sept. 19, 2022, photo obtained by The Associated Press, a police motorcycle burns during a protest over the death of a young woman who had been detained for violating the country's conservative dress code in downtown Tehran, Iran.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo)</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/iran-on-fire--once-again--women-are-on-the-vanguard-of-transformative-change" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>On Sept. 16, 2022, Mahsa Amini, a 22-year-old Iranian woman, died in Tehran, Iran, while in police custody. Amini was arrested by the Guidance Patrol, the morality squad of the Law Enforcement Command of the Islamic Republic of Iran that oversees public implementation of hijab regulations, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/23/opinions/mahsa-amini-iran-protests-hair-women-nemat/index.html">for not wearing a hijab properly</a>.</p>
<p>Soon after the news of her death was broadcast and a photograph emerged on social media of her lying in a Tehran hospital in a coma, people throughout the country became enraged. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1571264656810905606"}"></div></p>
<p>Amini’s death starkly illustrated the systematic violence of police and highlighted particularly the brutality of the regime towards women and minorities. She was Kurdish, <a href="https://dckurd.org/2020/09/15/overlooked-by-the-inter/">a member of one of the most oppressed minority ethnic groups in Iran.</a> </p>
<p>All Iranian women who are routinely humiliated because of their gender can empathize with her. But Kurds and Kurdish women in particular understood the political message of her death at the hands of police and the state’s subsequent violent response to the protests.</p>
<p>The huge wave of protests in Iran following Amini’s death represents a historic moment in Iran. People have taken to the streets shouting slogans against the compulsory hijab and denouncing Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/sep/23/how-iran-erupted-after-mahsa-amini-death-protests">Protests have raged</a> in 31 provinces, including Kurdistan and Tehran as well as cities such as Rasht, Isfahan and Qom, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/sep/23/mahsa-amini-death-could-be-spark-broader-political-action-iran">among Iran’s most conservative communities</a>. Dozens of people <a href="https://bbc.in/3LFqH9N">have been killed by security forces and hundreds more have been arrested.</a> </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A large crowd and cars are seen on a tree-lined city street, smoke billowing in places." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486507/original/file-20220926-27-3rh4qw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C3000%2C1998&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486507/original/file-20220926-27-3rh4qw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486507/original/file-20220926-27-3rh4qw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486507/original/file-20220926-27-3rh4qw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486507/original/file-20220926-27-3rh4qw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486507/original/file-20220926-27-3rh4qw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486507/original/file-20220926-27-3rh4qw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In this photo taken by an individual not employed by the Associated Press and obtained by the AP outside Iran, protesters chant slogans during a protest over the death of Mahsa Amini, who was detained by the morality police, in downtown Tehran, Iran, on Sept. 21, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The Girls of Revolution Street</h2>
<p>Although the current uprising may seem unprecedented, it is in fact part of a deep-rooted and longstanding resistance movement by women in Iran. </p>
<p>In what is widely seen as a punishment to the hundreds of women who participated in the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/01/24/the-iranian-revolution-a-timeline-of-events/">anti-regime protests leading to the Iranian Revolution of 1979</a>, the hijab became compulsory two years later in 1981.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/iranian-women-risk-arrest-daughters-of-the-revolution-92880">Iranian women risk arrest: Daughters of the revolution</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Consequently, publicly removing hijabs <a href="https://www.radiofarda.com/a/29998175.html">became a challenge to the regime in Iran</a>.</p>
<p>Decades later, in 2017, Vida Movahed climbed onto a platform on Enghelab (Revolution) Street in the centre of Tehran, <a href="https://iranhumanrights.org/2019/05/icon-of-irans-hijab-protest-movement-vida-movahedi-released-from-prison/">took off her headscarf and waved it in the air</a> as a sign of opposition to compulsory hijab. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1572001541472817153"}"></div></p>
<p>She was followed by other women and the movement quickly became known <a href="https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/03/the-girls-of-revolution-street-waving-their-veils/">as The Girls of Revolution Street</a> or <em>Dokhtaran-e Khiaban-e Enghelab</em>. </p>
<p>The Girls of Revolution Street represented a fundamental challenge by younger women to Iran’s compulsory veiling laws. Their actions resulted in an <a href="https://en.radiofarda.com/a/iran-protest-against-hijab-veil/29011931.html">increase in the number of women who braved the streets without hijab</a> in defiance of the state.</p>
<p>Unsurprisingly, when religious hardliner <a href="https://msmagazine.com/2021/06/18/iran-presidential-election-feminist-womens-rights/">Ebrahim Raisi became president in the contested 2020 election</a>, the message was clear: Women would be further oppressed.</p>
<h2>Zan, Zendegi, Azadi: Woman, life, freedom</h2>
<p>This recent uprising is a link in a chain of protests that together have the potential to bring about fundamental change in Iran. </p>
<p>It began with the pro-democracy <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2013/6/12/what-happened-to-the-green-movement-in-iran">Green Movement in 2009</a> followed by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/24/world/middleeast/iran-protests-raisi-khamenei-hijab.html">popular uprisings in 2018 and 2019</a>. The Green Movement was largely peaceful, but the uprisings grew increasingly more confrontational with each wave of repression.</p>
<p>Women have been in the lead in all these protests, posing a real challenge to the regime. They’re the leaders of transformative change, the vanguard of a potential revolution, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/sep/23/mahsa-amini-death-could-be-spark-broader-political-action-iran">challenging the legitimacy of the current government.</a>. </p>
<p>The current protests are focused on two main demands: dignity and freedom. Both have been absent from political life in Iran, and both have a prominent presence in almost all slogans during this uprising, particularly “Woman, Life, Freedom.” </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A woman holds a sign that reads Women, Life, Freedom at a protest march." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486525/original/file-20220926-25-diz3bl.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486525/original/file-20220926-25-diz3bl.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486525/original/file-20220926-25-diz3bl.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486525/original/file-20220926-25-diz3bl.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486525/original/file-20220926-25-diz3bl.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486525/original/file-20220926-25-diz3bl.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486525/original/file-20220926-25-diz3bl.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Members of the Iranian community and their supporters rally in solidarity with protesters in Iran in Ottawa on Sept. 25, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Justin Tang</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The recent uprising makes it clear that the demand for radical change in Iran today is strong and significant. </p>
<p>With every wave of protest, the desire for freedom gets stronger, the voices get louder and success is within reach. Once again, Iranian women are at the forefront of demanding transformative change. </p>
<p>With the strong support this time of men, political and ethnic minorities and other disenfranchised groups, they may be leading their country closer to a freer and more just society.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191297/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Vrinda Narain is a Board Member of the research organization, Women Living Under Muslim Laws.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Fatemeh Sadeghi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Women have long demanded change in Iran. In the aftermath of the death of a woman for a hijab violation, women protesters may be leading their country to a freer and more just society.
Vrinda Narain, Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Centre for Human Rights and Legal Pluralism; Max Bell School of Public Policy, McGill University
Fatemeh Sadeghi, Research associate, Politics, UCL
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/154912
2021-03-01T15:38:04Z
2021-03-01T15:38:04Z
Iran’s leaders signal interest in new nuclear deal, but U.S. must act soon
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/386578/original/file-20210225-15-ihp67t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4200%2C2791&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Iran's President Hassan Rouhani arrives for a news conference in Tehran, Iran, in February 2020, with a portrait of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei hanging on the wall behind him. Both men have signalled an interest in a new nuclear deal. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Ebrahim Noroozi)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On the campaign trail, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/17/world/middleeast/iran-biden-trump-nuclear-sanctions.html">Joe Biden</a> pledged that if elected he would quickly return the United States to the Joint Collective Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran nuclear deal.</p>
<p>But negotiations have been slow to materialize, and with Iran’s presidential elections scheduled to take place in June, the window of opportunity may be closing. If Biden does not make a deal soon, he risks getting mired in the convoluted machinations of Iran’s domestic political system and sucked back into the brinksmanship that began under Donald Trump’s administration. </p>
<p>Just this week, Iran <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/iran-limits-nuclear-inspections-inching-closer-talks-us/story?id=76067958">restricted International Atomic Energy Agency</a> access to nuclear sites, and the United States <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-syria-strike-idUSKBN2AQ1L8">attacked</a> Iranian targets in Syria. No doubt neither side wants war, but games of chicken are never easy to control.</p>
<p>At the moment, political conditions in Tehran are favourable for a settlement. Iran’s current president, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-usa-idUSKBN29P0NK">Hassan Rouhani</a>, has said his country is ready to quickly rejoin the JCPOA, on the basis of <em>compliance for compliance</em> — meaning both sides return to their obligations as originally spelled out in the 2015 agreement.</p>
<p>Rouhani even has the go-ahead from the regime’s Supreme Leader, <a href="https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2169574-irans-rohani-gets-green-light-to-engage-with-biden">Ayatollah Ali Khamenei</a>, who is the ultimate arbiter of power in the regime. </p>
<h2>Making the first move</h2>
<p>All this means reaching an agreement on a new nuclear deal isn’t going to be a cakewalk. There’s still the question of who needs to make the first move, Washington or Tehran. But the remaining issues could all be finessed, particularly with the help of a country <a href="https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/458025/Qatar-FM-says-working-to-revive-JCPOA">like Qatar</a>, which has volunteered to mediate. </p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/386495/original/file-20210225-15-181vnft.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C209%2C3334%2C2006&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Iran's President Hassan Rouhani smiles" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/386495/original/file-20210225-15-181vnft.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C209%2C3334%2C2006&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/386495/original/file-20210225-15-181vnft.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/386495/original/file-20210225-15-181vnft.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/386495/original/file-20210225-15-181vnft.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/386495/original/file-20210225-15-181vnft.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/386495/original/file-20210225-15-181vnft.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/386495/original/file-20210225-15-181vnft.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani smiles during a news conference in Tehran, Iran, in February 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Ebrahim Noroozi)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Unfortunately, these conditions are unlikely to last for more than a few months. Presidential elections are scheduled for June 18, at which point Rouhani will leave office after finishing his second term. Like the U.S., Iran puts a two-term limit on its presidents.</p>
<p>Campaigning will start even before that, probably in April or May, once the candidates have been vetted by the Council of Guardians, a clerical body tasked with ensuring candidates are loyal to the regime. At that point, Iran’s political elite will be consumed with domestic politics, and whatever talks are in progress will likely have to stop. </p>
<p>Iran’s presidential elections are notoriously hard to predict. Very few people picked Rouhani to win in 2013, just as very few people picked <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mohammad-Khatami">Mohammad Khatami</a> in 1997 or <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mahmoud-Ahmadinejad">Mahmoud Ahmadinejad</a> in 2005. The situation now is particularly fluid. </p>
<p>There are plenty of potential candidates, but <a href="https://en.radiofarda.com/a/iranian-media-name-potential-candidates-for-2021-presidential-election/30757385.html">no real favourites</a>, and until the Council of Guardians rules, no one really knows who will be allowed to run. </p>
<p>Prior to Biden’s election win, many pundits were predicting a win <a href="https://iranintl.com/en/iran/irans-parliament-paves-way-candidacy-generals-presidential-race">by the hardliners</a>. They had swept the 2020 parliamentary elections and the stagnation of the JCPOA seemed to leave the moderate camp directionless. However, after Biden’s win, momentum seemed to swing back towards <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/irans-hardliners-think-biden-might-hurt-their-june-presidential-election-strategy/">the moderates</a>. </p>
<p>That analysis though, was predicated on a swift return to the JCPOA. If the negotiations stall, or Biden plays hardball with Iran, the moderates may once again be in trouble.</p>
<h2>Does it matter?</h2>
<p>Some Iran watchers might argue that it really doesn’t matter. As already noted, the candidates are drawn from a narrow pool of regime loyalists and the real power remains in the hands of the Supreme Leader. Therefore, it will be Khamenei who decides if Iran negotiates, not the new president. </p>
<p>This argument is not so much wrong as over-simplified. There are significant divisions between hardliners and moderates concerning the JCPOA. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/04/hassan-rouhani-iran-nuclear-talks">hardliners</a> in Tehran have been just as critical of the deal as the hawks in Washington, Riyadh and Tel Aviv. They did not expect the U.S. would live up to <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/11/iran-rouhani-zarif-criticism-talks-us-biden-nuclear-deal.html">its JCPOA obligations</a> and argue that Biden is no less <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/irans-hardliners-think-biden-might-hurt-their-june-presidential-election-strategy/">anti-Iranian</a> than Trump. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Protesters hold a burning photograph of Trump and Biden" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/386512/original/file-20210225-17-1ws7w57.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/386512/original/file-20210225-17-1ws7w57.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/386512/original/file-20210225-17-1ws7w57.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/386512/original/file-20210225-17-1ws7w57.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/386512/original/file-20210225-17-1ws7w57.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/386512/original/file-20210225-17-1ws7w57.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/386512/original/file-20210225-17-1ws7w57.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A group of protesters burn pictures of former U.S. president Donald Trump and President-elect Joe Biden a day after the killing of an Iranian scientist linked to the country’s nuclear program by unknown assailants near Tehran.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Vahid Salemi)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It is true that a hard-line president could not refuse to negotiate if Khamenei so ordered, but the dynamics of the process would be significantly different if the Iranian president was, at best, ambivalent about the outcome. Perhaps even more importantly, the optics of negotiating with a hardliner would be difficult for Biden to manage at home. </p>
<p>If a new Iranian president took the same ideological tone as former president Ahmadinejad, for example, Biden would probably be forced to withdraw from negotiations. At the very least, it would make it very difficult for his team to offer any compromises. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="Secretary of State Antony Blinken speaks at a podium." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/386521/original/file-20210225-15-ns7g5y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/386521/original/file-20210225-15-ns7g5y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/386521/original/file-20210225-15-ns7g5y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/386521/original/file-20210225-15-ns7g5y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/386521/original/file-20210225-15-ns7g5y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/386521/original/file-20210225-15-ns7g5y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/386521/original/file-20210225-15-ns7g5y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Secretary of State Antony Blinken speaks at the State Department in Washington on Feb. 4, 2021, about the Biden administration’s early efforts to resurrect the 2015 Iran nuclear deal.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Evan Vucci)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>So far, the new U.S. administration is sending mixed messages about its intentions. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-iran-nuclear-france-idUSKBN2AI2UX">Biden recently said</a> he was willing to sit down with Iran immediately, along with the United Nations Security Council and France and Germany. However, in January, <a href="https://www.voanews.com/middle-east/voa-news-iran/us-sanctions-iran-remain-blinken-says">Secretary of State Anthony Blinken</a> suggested that the administration wanted to expand the scope of the negotiations and foresaw a drawn-out negotiating process. </p>
<p>It’s possible that Blinken’s comments represent nothing more than pre-negotiation posturing. If so, Biden must not to wait too long before getting down to the real business of substantive talks. If, however, Blinken’s remarks are an accurate reflection of the administration’s thinking, Biden is trading a relatively quick foreign policy win for a much more perilous path.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/154912/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Devine does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Joe Biden has said he wants to return the United States to the Joint Collective Plan of Action, also known as the Iran nuclear deal.
But the window of opportunity may be closing.
James Devine, Associate Professor Politics and International Relations, Mount Allison University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/130432
2020-01-23T19:24:38Z
2020-01-23T19:24:38Z
Despite shows of unity, Iran is more divided than ever after Soleimani killing
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/311670/original/file-20200123-162246-3xmom.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=73%2C34%2C1037%2C582&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters hold flowers during protests at Amir Kabir University in Tehran, in tribute to the victims of the crash of Flight PS752. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The two major events that have shaken Iran in recent weeks have also had major internal repercussions. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://apnews.com/5597ff0f046a67805cc233d5933a53ed">assassination of Qassem Soleimani by an American</a> drone lit the fuse, sending shock waves around the world and increasing the risk of an escalation of armed conflict between Iran and the United States. Following this assassination, Iran was the scene of massive demonstrations to commemorate the Iranian general and denounce the Americans. </p>
<p>A few days later, as Iran launched a retaliatory raid on U.S. bases in Iraq, <a href="https://theconversation.com/flight-ps752-a-deadly-combination-of-irans-recklessness-and-incompetence-129749">a Ukrainian civilian plane crashed near Tehran airport, killing 176 people, including 57 Canadians</a>. This tragedy provoked anti-regime demonstrations this time. Thousands of Iranians took to the streets, angry at their government <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-51073621">when it admitted responsibility for the crash</a> after three days of denial. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310971/original/file-20200120-69539-1kdz6uw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310971/original/file-20200120-69539-1kdz6uw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310971/original/file-20200120-69539-1kdz6uw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310971/original/file-20200120-69539-1kdz6uw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310971/original/file-20200120-69539-1kdz6uw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310971/original/file-20200120-69539-1kdz6uw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310971/original/file-20200120-69539-1kdz6uw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Debris from the plane crash near Tehran airport.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">The Canadian Press/AP-Ebrahim Noroozi</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Thus, in the space of 10 days, Iran was the scene of pro- and anti-regime demonstrations. </p>
<p>During the pro-government demonstrations, some commentators claimed that <a href="https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/reza-marashi-interview-iran-soleimani-assassination-934852/">Iranians were rallying around the regime after the assassination of Soleimani</a>. Was this really the case? Did the assassination of the general really change Iranians’ perceptions of the regime? </p>
<p>To better understand the current context in Iran, it should be noted that Soleimani was assassinated a month and a half after <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/11/iran-anti-government-protests-us-support/">the largest anti-regime demonstrations</a>, which took place last November. These protests were so threatening to the regime that Supreme Leader Khamenei led the deadliest crackdown since 1979, saying: “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-protests-specialreport/special-report-irans-leader-ordered-crackdown-on-unrest-do-whatever-it-takes-to-end-it-idUSKBN1YR0QR">The Islamic Republic is in danger. Everything necessary must be done. This is an order</a>.” </p>
<p>As many as <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/01/06/dont-believe-iranian-propaganda-about-mourning-soleimani/">1,500 protesters were reportedly killed</a> in November. The repression was so severe that the security forces even prevented mourning ceremonies for <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/12/26/an-iranian-couple-wanted-mourn-son-killed-protests-now-they-are-jail/">some victims</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
À lire aussi :
<a href="https://theconversation.com/violent-crackdown-against-iraq-protests-exposes-fallacy-of-the-countrys-democracy-124830">Violent crackdown against Iraq protests exposes fallacy of the country's democracy</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Why did so many mourn Soleimani?</h2>
<p>How did the regime manage to bring so many people to the streets for Soleimani in a climate of <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/01/iran-shot-down-hopes-its-people/605158/">public discontent against both the reformist and conservative factions of the regime</a>? There are several factors that explain how Tehran managed to give <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/09/politics/donald-trump-iran-congress/index.html">this illusion of unity by using Soleimani’s funeral</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310975/original/file-20200120-69531-1jn0rta.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310975/original/file-20200120-69531-1jn0rta.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310975/original/file-20200120-69531-1jn0rta.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310975/original/file-20200120-69531-1jn0rta.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310975/original/file-20200120-69531-1jn0rta.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310975/original/file-20200120-69531-1jn0rta.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310975/original/file-20200120-69531-1jn0rta.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A demonstration near Tehran’s Great Mosque in honor of General Ghassem Soleimani. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khameini said in his sermon that U.S. President Donald Trump was a ‘clown.’</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader via AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>First of all, Soleimani was very popular among both the reformist and conservative factions of the regime. His funeral received <a href="https://twitter.com/AlinejadMasih/status/1215310781853642752">enormous media coverage</a> in Iran. This contrasted with the non-existent coverage surrounding the November anti-regime protests <a href="https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/28376/after-protests-iran-may-be-locked-into-a-future-of-more-social-unrest">targeting both reformers and conservatives</a>. The authorities blocked internet access for more than seven days while they massacred protesters in the streets, according to a <a href="https://observers.france24.com/en/20191224-iran-hidden-slaughter-video-investigation-protest">reporting by France 24</a>. </p>
<p>Second, the state deployed enormous resources to increase the number of participants in the pro-Soleimani demonstrations. <a href="https://twitter.com/AlinejadMasih/status/1213682218033266688">Students, civil servants and shopkeepers were forced to go attend.</a>. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-51021854">Persian BBC journalist</a> so aptly said about the regime’s ability to orchestrate their own demonstrations: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“The organizers are now experts in their work. From declaring national holidays to gathering university students to requiring military and civil servants to go out with their families, every means has been used to gather the crowds. Buses, trains and trucks are provided to transport people from villages and towns across Iran to the rallies that are constantly announced on state television.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>That said, there are also citizens who are truly fascinated by Soleimani.</p>
<p>For several years now, there has been a certain craze for the general, who is very present on state television, in the sermons of the mosques and even with some celebrities. Soleimani is viewed in Iran as a hero who saved the Middle East from the influence of the Islamic State (ISIS). Because of his role in the fight against the terrorist organization, Soleimani embodies for some Iranians the image of a benevolent commander who is above the internal politics of the country. The presence of these admirers was also marked in these pro-Soleimani demonstrations.</p>
<h2>Demonstrations after the crash</h2>
<p>But the apparent unanimity that followed Soleimani’s assassination, <a href="https://www.commondreams.org/news/2020/01/06/sea-endless-people-mourns-soleimani-across-iran-vowing-trump-will-be-held">commented on by many as a rally around the flag</a> and against the Americans, quickly collapsed in the face of popular demands and general discontent.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310972/original/file-20200120-69551-p888jj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310972/original/file-20200120-69551-p888jj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310972/original/file-20200120-69551-p888jj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310972/original/file-20200120-69551-p888jj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310972/original/file-20200120-69551-p888jj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310972/original/file-20200120-69551-p888jj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310972/original/file-20200120-69551-p888jj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A demonstrator prepares to throw a tear gas cannister at police outside Amir Kabir University in Tehran during a demonstration in memory of the victims of Flight PS752. The apparent unanimity that followed the assassination of Soleimani quickly collapsed.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As soon as the Iranian leaders announced, in the face of international pressure, that the Ukraine Airlines passenger jet had been shot down by an Iranian missile – <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/21/iran-admits-it-fired-two-missiles-at-ukrainian-passenger-jet">it is now known that it was two missiles</a> – anti-regime demonstrations broke out in major cities such as Tehran, Mashhad, Esfahan and Racht, as well as in several other regions.</p>
<p>Protesters chanted many of the same anti-regime slogans as they did in November: “<a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/12/iran-braces-for-protests-after-admitting-plane-shootdown.html">We were told that the enemy is the United States. Yet our enemy is here</a>.” The demonstrators were dispersed by force, which is the usual <em>modus operandi</em> of the Iranian republic.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310978/original/file-20200120-69531-ub6gcm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310978/original/file-20200120-69531-ub6gcm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310978/original/file-20200120-69531-ub6gcm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310978/original/file-20200120-69531-ub6gcm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310978/original/file-20200120-69531-ub6gcm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310978/original/file-20200120-69531-ub6gcm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310978/original/file-20200120-69531-ub6gcm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Police take a stand as demonstrators gather in front of Amir Kabir University in Tehran to mourn the victims of Flight PS752. Police fired both live ammunition and tear gas to disperse the protesters.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In short, Soleimani’s death didn’t weld the country together. It is still grappling with structural problems that cannot be solved overnight without a real willingness to change. The gap between the regime and the people will only grow if current trends persist. Among these trends is an expected increase in anti-regime demonstrations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/130432/count.gif" alt="La Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Vahid Yücesoy ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>
Despite apparent unity after the killing of an Iranian general by the U.S., deep divisions still mark the Middle Eastern country.
Vahid Yücesoy, PhD Candidate in political science, Université de Montréal
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/110693
2019-02-11T05:06:51Z
2019-02-11T05:06:51Z
Forty years on from the Iranian Revolution, could the country be at risk of another one?
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/258151/original/file-20190211-174880-1r6pcj5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The last four decades in Iran have been marked by internal tension due to its political system, which combines theocratic and republican elements.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">from shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Iran’s ruling clergy are celebrating the 40th anniversary of the 1979 revolution, during which Shi'ite Islamists, led by religious leader Ayatollah Khomeini, toppled Mohammad Reza Shah’s secular monarchy. </p>
<p>The linchpin of the Islamic Republic’s political system is Ayatollah Khomeini’s doctrine of <a href="http://www.logosjournal.com/amanat.pdf">Wilayat-i Faqih</a>, or guardianship of the jurist, which makes a Shia religious jurist the head of state. The jurist’s legitimacy to hold the most powerful position in the state is claimed to be based on divine sovereignty.</p>
<p>As its name suggests, the Islamic Republic of Iran’s current system combines theocratic and republican elements. The president and parliament are democratically elected, while the members of powerful institutions such as the Guardian Council and the judiciary are appointed by the Supreme Leader (Walī-yi Faqīh).</p>
<p>The Guardian Council oversees elections and the final approval of legislation. According to the <a href="https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/ir/ir001en.pdf">Constitution of the Islamic Republic</a>, all legislation, policies and programs must be consistent with the observance of Islamic principles.
The Guardian Council has a duty to monitor all legislative decisions and determine whether their implementation would cause a violation.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/world-politics-explainer-the-iranian-revolution-100453">World politics explainer: the Iranian Revolution</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>This unprecedented political system brought in four decades of internal conflict. The established Islamic Republic of Iran also ceased being a US ally and instead became an enemy. International sanctions, along with the clergy’s mismanagement and endemic corruption, have resulted in a dire economic situation. There is a strong fear the high unemployment and inflation rate will continue to rise.</p>
<p>Under these circumstances, there are now <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/feature/will-2018-bring-revolution-iran-24104">doubts the Islamic Republic</a> can survive. And some wonder whether we may soon see another revolution. So, what is the situation in Iran 40 years after the Shah was overthrown and who is agitating for change?</p>
<h2>Decades of unrest</h2>
<p>After Ayatollah Khomeini died in 1989, a more conservative Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, came to power and strengthened the theocracy.</p>
<p>The reformist movement emerged in the mid-1990s to counter the newly established conservative regime. They had little chance of gaining power through theocratic institutions, so they focused on the electoral side. They campaigned for women’s rights, democratic rule and a civil-military divide.</p>
<p>Reformists gained power twice: from 1997 to 2005 and from 2013 – with the election of the relatively moderate president, Hassan Rouhani – until now. In these years, reformists controlled electoral institutions such as the presidency and the parliament. </p>
<p>For decades, reformers have struggled to limit the power of theocratic institutions – while still broadly complying by the laws of the clergy, and the principles set in place by Khomeini – and expand the power of republican institutions. However, they were no match for the Khamenei-led resistance, and theocratic institutions are more powerful today than they were in the mid-1990s.</p>
<p>Iran has also continually had tense relations with the international community. In addition to eight years of war with Iraq, Iran has been under sanctions for almost all of the past four decades. These have been imposed by the US, the EU, and the United Nations over claims Iran breached its nuclear obligations.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-iran-nuclear-agreement-is-a-deal-worth-honouring-69132">Why the Iran nuclear agreement is a deal worth honouring</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<p>Today, the Donald Trump-led US government is pursuing an extremely hostile approach to Iran. Crucially, the US has withdrawn from a nuclear deal negotiated with the Obama administration – under which Iran agreed to limit its nuclear program. The US has reapplied previous sanctions (which were lifted under the deal) and imposed new ones. Iranians are also the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/01/world/americas/travel-ban-trump-how-it-works.html">most affected</a> of the Muslim majority countries included in Trump’s travel ban.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1092144837120405506"}"></div></p>
<p>Reformists have made some progress towards easing economic hardship, loosening social control, and initiating a temporary easing of tensions with the outside community. But the parlous nature of the political structure empowers the theocrats to manipulate the system and stymie any reform effort that promises a path to democratisation.</p>
<h2>Reformists or pro-regime opposition</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-01-03/who-the-iran-protesters-are-and-why-they-are-angry/9301316">protests that swept Iran</a> between December 2017 and January 2018 showed that many Iranians don’t consider the reformists capable of bringing about meaningful change. Protestors <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/30/iran-protests-trump-tweets">expressed their anger</a> over increasing economic hardship, as well as Iran’s support and funding for foreign conflicts, namely the civil wars in Yemen and Syria. They also chanted slogans calling for an end to the rule of clerics.</p>
<p>Rampant corruption, the failure of Rouhani to fulfil his promises – such as boosting the economy, extending individual and political freedoms, ensuring equality for women and men, and easing access to the internet – and the return of sanctions have combined to shatter hope of reform. This has been expressed in global protests by the Iranian diaspora calling for a change to the government.</p>
<p>It seems unlikely the reformists will be able to maintain their positions in the country’s electoral institutions. The sad reality is that even if they have another chance, the result will only compound their failures.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-irans-protests-matter-this-time-89745">Why Iran's protests matter this time</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>These circumstances have led to another <a href="http://www.arabnews.com/node/1146531">stream of opposition</a> – one agitating for a toppling of the Islamic Republic and regime change – gaining currency. Most members of this group are in exile, including Iran’s ex-prince and son of the Shah overthrown by the revolution, <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-06-19/iran-s-ex-prince-pahlavi-wants-a-democratic-revolution">Reza Pahlavi</a>. </p>
<p>But there is profound disagreement between the opposition groups in exile. Although they share a similar goal, they have consistently proven unable to agree on an overarching framework. The profound divisions among the groups has drained both their resources and intellectual capacity, which has rendered them incapable of contesting the country’s ruling clergy.</p>
<p>Those advocating for regime change have also been incapable of articulating a viable alternative to the Islamic Republic. All opposition groups overuse the abstract notion of “secular democracy” without clearly explaining what exactly they have in mind.</p>
<p>Pahlavi’s desire is reportedly not to put himself back on the throne, but to let the people decide what the political system would look like. He has said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>It’s not the form that matters, it’s the content; I believe Iran must be a secular, parliamentary democracy. The final form has to be decided by the people.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>While this is a legitimate statement, figures like Pahlavi ought to offer viable alternatives that would help bring opposition groups together. Potential alternatives should also be structured to appeal to the masses, a considerable segment of whom have expressed disillusionment with the ideal of an Islamic state.</p>
<p>Opposition groups are absorbed in delegitimising the Islamic Republic, questioning the way the clergy run the country. In doing so, they forget the the people who have already expressed widespread dissatisfaction with the clergy.</p>
<p>The opposition needs to skilfully craft an alternative to the Islamic Republic and a comprehensive plan for the transition to democracy. Until an alternative political system is formulated and popularised, the opposition will remain impotent and unable to initiate a transformation in the country.</p>
<p>Of course, change is not impossible. A military confrontation with Israel or the US, the departure of 79-year-old Ayatollah Khamenei, or a spontaneous mass uprising could prove a game changer.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/110693/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Naser Ghobadzadeh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Reformers have tried to modernise Iran for decades but have failed mainly due to the country’s powerful theocracy. And then there are those who want to overthrow the regime altogether.
Naser Ghobadzadeh, Senior lecturer, National School of Arts, Australian Catholic University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/90352
2018-01-23T19:29:38Z
2018-01-23T19:29:38Z
Unrest in Iran will continue until religious rule ends
<p>The two-week protest movement that <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/12/30/world/iran-protests-issues/index.html">rocked cities across Iran</a> earlier this year has largely subsided, but the fallout from the government’s harsh response <a href="https://mobile.nytimes.com/2018/01/14/world/middleeast/iran-protests-deaths.html?smid=fb-share&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fm.facebook.com%2F">has just begun</a>.<br>
On Jan. 14, two activists, Saro Ghahremani and Ali Poladi, <a href="http://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iran/140120181">died in prison</a>, reportedly from torture. By early February, the detainee death toll had <a href="http://www.iranobserver.org/thousands-illegally-detained-in-iran-amidst-protests-number-of-torture-deaths-rises-to-11/">risen to 11</a>.</p>
<p>Family members have been <a href="http://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iran/140120181">gathering by the thousands outside Iranian jails</a> since January. <a href="http://www.indiana.edu/%7Eceus/about/people/faculty/khezri.shtml">As an Iranian-born scholar</a>, I see this daily vigil as a warning to the government: Violence against dissidents will not go unnoticed. It’s also a sign that unrest in Iran is far from over.</p>
<h2>Criminalizing protest</h2>
<p>Though Iran’s Constitution enshrines the <a href="http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ir00000_.html">right to peaceful protest</a>, dissent has historically been met with harsh reprisal. </p>
<p>More than 3,700 people were arrested and 23 were killed in the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/01/03/tens-of-thousands-of-people-protested-in-iran-this-week-heres-why/">sometimes violent nationwide marches</a> that started on Dec. 28, 2017, in response to an austerity budget proposed by President Hasan Rouhani. </p>
<p>At first, the protests were a display of anger by working-class Iranians in the city of Mashhad, who complained of poverty and inequality. But the unrest <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/iran-protests-spread-with-lightning-speed/">soon spread to more than 80 cities</a>. And as thousands of disenchanted citizens widened the agenda to include <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/20/world/middleeast/iran-protests-corruption-banks.html">corruption</a>, human rights, foreign policy and women’s empowerment, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-rallies-strategy/iran-treads-cautiously-as-protests-spread-idUSKBN1EQ136">police began to crack down</a>. Eventually, using <a href="https://www.npr.org/2018/01/01/574942821/anti-government-protesters-in-iran-risk-violence-from-police">tear gas, batons and bullets</a>, police quelled the protests in early January 2018. </p>
<p>In 2009, hundreds of people were arrested during <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/06/19/iran-halt-crackdown">the Green Movement</a>, a mass uprising of the Iranian middle class. Many were allegedly <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/8102358/Rape-in-Irans-prisons-the-cruellest-torture.html">later tortured and raped in jail</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202881/original/file-20180122-182938-l7k5vr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202881/original/file-20180122-182938-l7k5vr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202881/original/file-20180122-182938-l7k5vr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202881/original/file-20180122-182938-l7k5vr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202881/original/file-20180122-182938-l7k5vr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202881/original/file-20180122-182938-l7k5vr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202881/original/file-20180122-182938-l7k5vr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">During and after the 2009 Green Movement uprising, hundreds of Iranian protesters were arrested and allegedly tortured in jail.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4f/Iran_election_%282%29.jpg">mangostar/Wikimedia</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The recent deaths of nearly a dozen detainees have again raised fears that more activists will suffer a similar fate – concerns heightened by the hard-line rhetoric of Iran’s supreme leader, the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.</p>
<p>On Jan. 2, Khamenei called the protesters – who across the country had <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/12/31/574842829/2-protesters-killed-as-anti-government-protests-enter-fourth-day-in-iran">taken the bold step of calling for his removal</a> – “<a href="http://time.com/5083800/ayatollah-khamenei-iran-protests-9-dead/">enemies of Iran</a>.” </p>
<p>Two weeks later, after the protests had ended, the spokesman for the judicial system – which falls under Khamenei’s jurisdiction – <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/14/world/middleeast/iran-protests-deaths.html">denied</a> any government responsibility for protester deaths. He said that the <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-wave-protests-prices-government-rallies-trump/28947178.html">bullets used to kill marchers</a> aren’t the type used by Iranian police. </p>
<p>Such statements have earned popular sympathy for the thousands of people now keeping daily watch at Iran’s jails. Many Iranians were outraged when the same government spokesman, Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/14/world/middleeast/iran-protests-deaths.html">claimed</a> that the first two activists who died in jail “were drug addicts” who had “committed suicide.”</p>
<p>The victims’ families, relatives, and even <a href="https://twitter.com/baharerahnama/status/952502396814536704">celebrities familiar with the case</a> firmly denied this assertion. </p>
<p>Though President Rouhani has on several occasions <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-42531165">defended Iranians’ right to protest</a>, he seems unwilling to challenge the supreme leader on the brutality that has lead to 34 protester deaths. </p>
<p>His silence has infuriated Iranians. A few days into the protests, demonstrators began accusing the self-declared reformist president of being no different than supreme leader, chanting, “<a href="https://twitter.com/ArminNavabi/status/948013866897653760">Reformists, hardliners, your time is up</a>.” </p>
<h2>Who is Iran’s supreme leader?</h2>
<p>To understand Iranian voters’ frustration, it is key to understand just how powerful the Ayatollah Khamenei is in Iran.</p>
<p>Ever since the <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/01/iran-1979-revolution-shook-world-2014121134227652609.html">1979 Iranian Revolution</a> created the Islamic Republic of Iran, replacing Iran’s 2,500-year-old monarchy with a clerical regime, the <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2013-08-12/who-ali-khamenei">supreme leader</a> has been both the head of state and the highest ranking religious authority in Iran. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202630/original/file-20180119-110084-1ltsupw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202630/original/file-20180119-110084-1ltsupw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202630/original/file-20180119-110084-1ltsupw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202630/original/file-20180119-110084-1ltsupw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202630/original/file-20180119-110084-1ltsupw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202630/original/file-20180119-110084-1ltsupw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202630/original/file-20180119-110084-1ltsupw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The 1979 Iranian Revolution established the supreme leader as the country’s ultimate ruler. Now many citizens say the time for clerical rule is over.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/8a/Iranian_Revolution_in_Shahyad_Square.jpg">Wikimedia</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Constitution grants the supreme leader’s office almost unlimited power. Today, Khamenei – like his <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/khomeini_ayatollah.shtml">well-known predecessor Ayatollah Khomeini</a>, whose reign ended when he died in 1989 – wields enormous control over Iran’s military, judiciary, treasury, media, foreign policy, presidential cabinet and legislative process. </p>
<p>The executive branch, in contrast, is rather weak. The president is limited to enforcing or changing the Constitution, meaning he can appoint ministers and ambassadors, for example – but he cannot, say, repeal laws that <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-iranian-women-want-rights-jobs-and-a-seat-at-the-table-77633">discriminate against women</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/kurdistan-earthquake-politics-creates-roadblocks-to-relief-87928">ethnic minorities</a>.</p>
<p>As a result, Rouhani, like other reform-minded presidents before him, have <a href="https://theconversation.com/irans-rouhani-may-now-control-parliament-but-do-his-economic-reforms-stand-a-chance-59120">struggled to keep such campaign promises as modernizing Iran’s economy</a> and improving human rights.</p>
<p>Khamenei’s power is also financial. A major portion of Iran’s national budget goes to the office of the supreme leader and its affiliated institutions. This funding is <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-setad-legal-specialreport/special-report-to-expand-khameneis-grip-on-the-economy-iran-stretched-its-laws-idUSBRE9AC0JS20131113">not subject to government oversight</a>, and no one but Khamenei himself knows how much money he receives.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202882/original/file-20180122-182976-1c99mvn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202882/original/file-20180122-182976-1c99mvn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=856&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202882/original/file-20180122-182976-1c99mvn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=856&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202882/original/file-20180122-182976-1c99mvn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=856&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202882/original/file-20180122-182976-1c99mvn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1076&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202882/original/file-20180122-182976-1c99mvn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1076&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202882/original/file-20180122-182976-1c99mvn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1076&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/7a/Ali_Khamenei_crop.jpg">Wikipedia</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Nor does anyone control how he spends it. Since the 1979 revolution, the office of the supreme leader has laid out billions of dollars to expand the influence of his faith, Shia Islam, across the Middle East. </p>
<p>War is a key part of that foreign policy. From 1980 to 1988, under the auspices of the Ayatolla Khomeini, Iran fought <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-34353349">the Sunni-led government of Saddam Hussein</a>, in Iraq. Since 2011, the current supreme leader has sent Iranian troops into Syria’s civil war <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/14/iran-troop-deployment-syria-anti-rebel-offensive-revolutionary-guards-assad">to help keep its contested president, Bashar al-Assad, in power</a>.</p>
<p>The supreme leader is also behind Iran’s controversial nuclear program. The country’s <a href="http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/iran.aspx">insistence on processing nuclear-grade uranium</a> – ostensibly as a source of energy – has brought international sanctions, invasive inspections and <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/heshmatalavi/2017/09/29/iran-economy-nuclear-deal/#7f8b326c3e42">global political criticism to Iran</a>.</p>
<p>Finally, because it controls police and the judiciary, the supreme leader’s office sets the tone for government handling of protest. And, since 1979, it has <a href="https://fanack.com/iran/faces/sadeq-larijani/">appointed conservative leaders</a> who criminalize dissent.</p>
<p>As a result, for nearly four decades, both citizen dissident and reform-minded leaders who oppose Iran’s Islamic regime have been harshly suppressed. The recent protests mark seven years since three Green Movement leaders <a href="https://www.iranhumanrights.org/2016/12/karroubi-mousavi-rahnavard/">were placed under house arrest</a>. They are still awaiting trial. </p>
<h2>‘We regret Rouhani’</h2>
<p>President Rouhani has twice <a href="https://theconversation.com/rouhanis-commanding-election-victory-might-just-help-him-change-iran-78051">won election handily</a> by promising to resolve Iranian’s nuclear conflict, free the Green Movement leaders and ensure civil rights for all citizens. </p>
<p>All of these initiatives require him to go head to head with the supreme leader. In 2015, he succeeded in achieving a <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33521655">hard-fought nuclear agreement between Iran and six world powers</a>, a deal Khamenei ostensibly opposed. </p>
<p>But, in exchange, Rouhani has had to sacrifice other campaign promises like <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/28/world/middleeast/un-rights-investigator-highly-critical-of-iran.html?_r=0">improving human rights</a>, fighting corruption and addressing inequality. The mass discontent on display recently reflects voter frustration with the president’s lack of progress on these important issues.</p>
<p>One recent scandal has implicated two high-level officials – judiciary head Sadeq Larijani and his brother Ali Larijani, who is speaker of the parliament – for <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-politics/ahmadinejad-accuses-iran-speakers-family-of-corruption-idUSBRE9120DG20130203">using their political connections for their family’s economic gain</a>.</p>
<p>And last year, a January 2016 leak dubbed “<a href="http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-iran-salaries-20160622-snap-story.html">Payslip-gate</a>” revealed that the top brass at state-owned companies were earning extravagant salaries of up to <a href="http://beta.latimes.com/world/la-fg-iran-salaries-20160622-snap-story.html">100 times the monthly wage of the lowest-paid government employees</a>.</p>
<h2>The end of the supreme leader?</h2>
<p>Between Rouhani’s ineffectiveness and Khamenei’s state-sanctioned violence, both leaders seem to have alienated Iranian voters. </p>
<p>The damage may be beyond repair. Protest slogans like “Overthrow the clerics’ regime” and “Death to Rouhani” suggest that for the first time since 1979, Iranians are demanding not incremental reform but a whole new era – one without an omnipotent, unaccountable supreme leader. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202632/original/file-20180119-110117-4n9mqk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202632/original/file-20180119-110117-4n9mqk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202632/original/file-20180119-110117-4n9mqk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202632/original/file-20180119-110117-4n9mqk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202632/original/file-20180119-110117-4n9mqk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202632/original/file-20180119-110117-4n9mqk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202632/original/file-20180119-110117-4n9mqk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Many Iranians have pushed their government to address persistent gender inequality, to little avail.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Ebrahim Noroozi</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>That puts President Rouhani in an uncomfortable position. I believe Iran’s president is loyal to the principle of an Islamic republic rooted in religious authority. After all, he is a cleric, too. </p>
<p>But Rouhani – who <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-23554836">has a doctorate in constitutional law from a Scottish university</a> – is also smart enough to observe that this medieval dual-government system is struggling to survive in modern, restive Iran. </p>
<p>Time may heal all. Khamenei is 78 years old and in poor health. In my assessment, it is conceivable that his death could actually mark the beginning of the end of supreme leadership in Iran.</p>
<p>And if it doesn’t, then Iran’s uprisings will go on.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/90352/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Haidar Khezri does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
11 activists have died in prison since Iran’s mass protests were crushed in January. Now, some detainees’ families are keeping a daily vigil outside jails. It’s a sign that unrest in Iran is not over.
Haidar Khezri, Adjunct Assistant Professor at the Department of Central Eurasian Studies (CEUS), Indiana University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/89588
2018-01-02T16:14:06Z
2018-01-02T16:14:06Z
Protests in Iran could spell trouble for the Middle East at large
<p>Roiling more than a dozen major cities, young Iranians are protesting against the country’s government. They appear to be particularly angered by the country’s funding of wars in Arab countries, such as Yemen and Syria, as Iranian citizens slide towards poverty. In the city of Kerman, demonstrators <a href="http://eaworldview.com/2017/12/iran-videos-saturdays-protests-across-country/">chanted</a> that the “People are living like beggars, the Leader is behaving like a God”, and in Khuzestan, protesters reportedly <a href="https://twitter.com/HadiNili/status/947134139395952640">called out</a> “death to Khamenei”, Iran’s supreme leader. Something profound is happening – and it could have major implications for the Middle East as a whole.</p>
<p>On the face of it, this is reminiscent of the huge protests that followed the 2009 election, known as the <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/05/201351661225981675.html">Green Movement</a> or Green Revolution. But these latest protests are all round very unlike the Green Movement in their implications, their size, and their demographics. In 2009, protesters mainly came from a young and educated middle class; this time, the protests started in the north-western city of <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-iran-economy-protests/hundreds-protest-against-high-prices-in-iran-idUKKBN1EM19T">Mashad</a>, traditionally a religiously conservative place, and those taking to the streets come from a far wider variety of backgrounds.</p>
<p>Alas, much as happened in 2009, the latest protests in Iran face a severe government crackdown. The first deaths at the hands of security forces were reported in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-rallies-shooting/at-least-two-protesters-shot-in-western-iran-social-media-idUSKBN1EO0JN">Dorud</a>, and <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2018/01/01/world/iran-protests-deaths-rouhani-intl/index.html">more than 20 casualties</a> have now been counted. And yet the protesters continue to stand up against the government’s iron-fisted approach. So what’s driving them?</p>
<p>Besides the protesters’ explicit antipathy toward Iranian foreign policy in the Arab world, the protests also have a distinctively Arab dimension. In Ahwazi, a majority Arab region in Iran’s south-west, protests have been going on for weeks, with people taking to the streets to rail against the Iranian government’s repression and its <a href="http://unpo.org/article/7696">confiscation of Ahwazi land and water</a>. Thousands of Arab Iranians took to the streets when an Iranian parliamentarian, Qassem al-Saeedi, slammed the Iranian government’s discriminatory policies, even <a href="http://www.basnews.com/index.php/en/opinion/400443">comparing</a> the Iranian regime’s anti-Arab policies to those of Israel.</p>
<h2>Lending support</h2>
<p>Then there’s the matter of Syria. Since the beginning of the Syrian uprisings in 2011, Ahwazi Arab Iranians have stood in solidarity with their counterparts on the Syrian streets, while Syrian pro-democracy protesters have waved the Ahwaz flag in their protests against Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Small wonder then that today’s Syrian anti-regime revolutionaries and activists are standing in solidarity with the Iranian protests.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/06/opinion/bombs-will-not-defeat-isis-but-maybe-the-internet-will.html">Abdelaziz al-Hamza</a>, a Syrian pro-democracy activist from Raqqa and active member of the group <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/as-told-to/the-tragic-legacy-of-raqqa-is-being-slaughtered-silently">Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently</a>, advised the Iranian protesters not to reveal their identity, not to carry any ID documentation, and to use removable memory cards in the devices they use to document the protests. He also strongly advised them to use nicknames for their Facebook, Twitter and YouTube accounts, and to communicate via encrypted apps.</p>
<p>Many Syrian opposition activists hope that the Iranian protests will start a domino effect that eventually affects Iranian foreign policy towards Syria. In recent years, the Iranian government has spent billions of dollars annually supporting the repressive Syrian regime. Iran’s powerful military chief, General <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-27883162">Qasem Soleimani</a>, has been leading the Iranian military operation inside Syria. If the current protests lead to some sort of revolutionary change, Iran’s strong financial and military support to active actors in the Syrian war – among them <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-hezbollah-matters-so-much-in-a-turbulent-middle-east-88111">Hezbollah</a> and the Assad regime’s army – could suddenly shrivel up. This will also have major implications for Arab countries where Iran is playing a military role, not least <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/14/iran-ballistic-missiles-yemen-houthi-rebels-un">Yemen</a>.</p>
<p>If anything is to be learned from the Syrian uprisings, it’s that protests such as these can take on a life of their own in ways no one anticipated. There is a significant chance that the Iranian regime will be every bit as brutal in its crackdown as the Assad regime. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has blamed the protests on a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/the-latest-iran-news-agency-says-officer-slain-at-protest/2018/01/01/bf0e71e0-ef57-11e7-95e3-eff284e71c8d_story.html">foreign conspiracy</a>; hundreds of protesters have been arrested, and the head of Iran’s Revolutionary Court <a href="https://www.thedailybeast.com/irans-chief-justice-protesters-may-face-the-death-penalty">warned</a> that some will receive death sentences. </p>
<p>The prospect of major bloodshed at the hands of the state looms large – and if that happens, the ensuing domino effect could create yet another volatile and explosive situation in an already stormy and dangerous region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89588/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Josepha Ivanka Wessels does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
The nationwide anti-government protests in Iran could have significant implications in Syria and beyond.
Josepha Ivanka Wessels, Senior Researcher Middle Eastern Studies, Lund University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/84042
2017-12-01T00:41:25Z
2017-12-01T00:41:25Z
Who are the Baha'is and why are they so persecuted?
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/197179/original/file-20171130-30931-mb6d9m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Entrance to the Shrine of Bahá’u’lláh, burial place of the founder of the Bahá’í faith, near Acre, Israel.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://news.bahai.org/legal">Bahá’í World News Service © Bahá'í International Community</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Baha'is are among the most persecuted religious minorities in the world.</p>
<p>In Iran, where the religion was founded, universities <a href="https://www.iranhumanrights.org/2017/09/iranian-bahai-students-offered-university-enrollment-in-exchange-for-renouncing-their-faith">refuse to admit Baha'i students</a>, <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/14/bahai-cemetery-iran-destroyed_n_5323286.html">Baha'i cemeteries have been destroyed</a> and the country’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei <a href="http://www.reuters.com/investigates/iran/#article/part1">has confiscated properties from Baha'i families</a>. Baha'is have also been discriminated against in <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/04/yemen-bahai-community-faces-persecution-at-hands-of-huthi-saleh-authorities/">Yemen</a> and in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-bahai/bahais-in-egypt-fight-for-recognition-as-people-idUSL2757830620070221">Egypt</a>.</p>
<p>At the same time, the Baha'i faith has spread around the globe. There are more than 100,000 local <a href="http://www.bahai.org/national-communities">Baha'i communities</a> in places as diverse as <a href="http://www.cnn.com/style/article/bahai-temple-chile/index.html">Chile</a>, <a href="http://www.news.bahai.org/story/1190">Cambodia</a> and the <a href="https://www.bahai.us/">United States</a>.</p>
<p>On the 200th anniversary of the birth of Baha'u'llah, the founder of the Baha'i faith, the question remains: What is the reason for their persecution?</p>
<h2>Baha'u'llah and the Babi movement</h2>
<p><a href="https://oneworld-publications.com/baha-u-llah-pb.html">Baha'u'llah</a>, whose name means “Glory of God” in Arabic, was born in Tehran in 1817. Baha'u'llah’s father was a minister in Iran’s government, which supported Shi'i Islam as the state religion. As a member of Iran’s nobility, Baha'u'llah was offered a government position. Instead, he <a href="http://www.kalimat.com/resurrection.html">joined a new religious movement</a>, started by a young Iranian, known as the Bab.</p>
<p>The Babi movement called for revolutionary social changes and <a href="http://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=25087">championed women’s rights</a>. Quite controversially, the Bab claimed that his teachings were a revelation from God and <a href="http://www.bahaibookstore.com/Selections-from-the-Writings-of-the-Bab-P7293.aspx">predicted</a> that a new prophetic figure, or manifestation of God, would soon appear.</p>
<p>In 1850, the Bab was charged by Shi'i religious officials with heresy and was put to death by firing squad. Subsequent public protests and mob violence <a href="https://www.routledge.com/The-Bahais-of-Iran-Socio-Historical-Studies/Brookshaw-Fazel/p/book/9780415356732">claimed the lives of thousands of his followers.</a> </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/197176/original/file-20171130-30937-1alqghf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/197176/original/file-20171130-30937-1alqghf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197176/original/file-20171130-30937-1alqghf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197176/original/file-20171130-30937-1alqghf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197176/original/file-20171130-30937-1alqghf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=586&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197176/original/file-20171130-30937-1alqghf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=586&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197176/original/file-20171130-30937-1alqghf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=586&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In Acre in northern Israel, a former prison city of the Ottoman Empire, the barracks where Bahá’u’lláh was imprisoned starting in 1868.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://news.bahai.org/legal">Bahá’í World News Service © Bahá'í International Community</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As part of its crackdown on the followers of the Bab, the Iranian government incarcerated Baha'u'llah. He was kept in an underground prison in Tehran, which Baha'u'llah describes in his writings as filthy, dark and “<a href="http://www.bahaibookstore.com/Epistle-to-the-Son-of-the-Wolf-P8480.aspx">foul beyond comparison</a>.” </p>
<p>The government released Baha'u'llah in 1853, and <a href="http://theisispress.org/book-b220.htm">exiled him to Baghdad</a>, then part of the Ottoman Empire. It was during this exile that he publicly announced the establishment of the Baha'i faith. Indeed Baha'u'llah claimed to be the manifestation of God that the Bab had foretold and gained a large following. </p>
<p>Ottoman officials later moved Baha'u'llah to the prison city of Akka in Palestine. He remained there until his passing in 1892. Today, Baha'u'llah’s shrine, now in Israel, is an important pilgrimage site.</p>
<h2>Baha'u'llah’s teachings</h2>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/197189/original/file-20171130-30931-1l7yxo5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/197189/original/file-20171130-30931-1l7yxo5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197189/original/file-20171130-30931-1l7yxo5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197189/original/file-20171130-30931-1l7yxo5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197189/original/file-20171130-30931-1l7yxo5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197189/original/file-20171130-30931-1l7yxo5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197189/original/file-20171130-30931-1l7yxo5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Metal pen nib belonging to Bahá’u’lláh.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://news.bahai.org/legal">Bahá’í World News Service © Bahá'í International Community</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Baha'u'llah’s <a href="http://www.bahai.org/library/authoritative-texts/bahaullah">writings</a> form the foundation of the Baha'i faith. Throughout his life, Bah'u'llah penned over 100 volumes in Arabic and Persian. About a dozen of these have been translated into English and other languages. </p>
<p>His most well-known book is <a href="https://oneworld-publications.com/the-hidden-words-of-baha-u-llah-pb.html">“The Hidden Words,”</a> which is composed of short poetic statements that get to the heart of his spiritual and ethical teachings. </p>
<p>A primary theme of Baha'u'llah’s teachings is achieving world peace through the establishment of unity, justice and equality. Therefore, <a href="https://oneworld-publications.com/the-baha-i-faith-pb-1056.html">Baha'u'llah’s teachings</a> specifically advocate for racial unity, gender equality, universal education, and harmony of science and religion. </p>
<p>Baha'is, for example, embrace interracial marriage and education for girls. In fact, the first school for girls in Iran was established by the Baha'is. </p>
<p>Baha'is were nonetheless subjected to persecution, as some Muslim clerics perceived their faith to be a heresy. For most Muslims, the prophet Muhammad was the last and final prophet.</p>
<h2>Establishment of the Baha'i faith</h2>
<p>Despite the persecution, the Baha'i faith has attracted millions of adherents around the globe for its ability to transcend nationalism, racism and the like.</p>
<p>Baha'u'llah’s followers disseminated his teachings in the Middle East and beyond. His son and successor, Abdu'l-Baha, traveled to Europe and the United States to <a href="http://www.palgrave.com/us/book/9781137032003">spread the faith</a>. </p>
<p>Baha'u'llah <a href="http://www.grbooks.com/george-ronald-publisher-books/academic-books/bahai-ethics-vol-1-1308657144">encouraged Baha'is</a> to cooperate with their governments and engage with the followers of all religions in a spirit of fellowship. Yet Baha'is in Iran, who are the largest non-Muslim religious community, continue to face persecution. The majority of Baha'is, however, <a href="http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/religion/religion-general-interest/introduction-bahai-faith?format=PB#ZrOxiHuKuyDYLyjE.97">live in the global south</a>.</p>
<p>For many, the Baha'i faith is one of the most <a href="http://connect.customer.mheducation.com/products/connect-for-molloy-experiencing-the-worlds-religions-6e/">universal religions</a>. Summed up in Baha'u'llah’s words:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“<a href="http://www.bahaibookstore.com/Tablets-of-Bahaullah-Revealed-After-the-Kitab-i-Aqdas-P6196.aspx">The Earth is but one country, and mankind its citizens</a>.”</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/84042/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Zackery M. Heern does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
The Baha'i faith originated in Iran and today has 100,000 communities across the globe, including the United States. Here is their history.
Zackery M. Heern, Assistant Professor of History and Middle East Studies, Idaho State University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.