tag:theconversation.com,2011:/fr/topics/baath-party-40700/articlesBaath Party – The Conversation2023-03-16T14:07:04Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2000752023-03-16T14:07:04Z2023-03-16T14:07:04ZIraq war, 20 years on: how the world failed Iraq and created a less peaceful, democratic and prosperous state<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/515420/original/file-20230315-26-c915gj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=439%2C12%2C3708%2C2956&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Khalid Mohammed/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Two decades ago, Australia joined the US-led “coalition of the willing” that staged a major military intervention in Iraq.</p>
<p>To justify the war, leaders like US President George W. Bush and Australian Prime Minister John Howard argued that Iraq had developed weapons of mass destruction and was harbouring terrorist groups like al-Qaeda. Neither could be tolerated in a post-9/11 world.</p>
<p>However, when evidence for Iraq’s weapons program or links to terrorism failed to emerge, the coalition partners were forced to re-frame the war. The goals were threefold: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>to topple Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and bring peace to the Iraqi people</p></li>
<li><p>to replace the autocratic Baathist regime with a democratic government</p></li>
<li><p>to transform Iraq into a prosperous state governed by a free-market economy.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Twenty years on, the legacy of the war still looms large in Iraq. Despite the enormous human and financial costs, the coalition abjectly failed to achieve its central goals. Today, Iraq is not more peaceful, democratic or prosperous than it was in 2003.</p>
<h2>The costs of war</h2>
<p>Any reflection of the war must first address the staggering costs. </p>
<p>Although estimates vary, approximately <a href="https://www.iraqbodycount.org/">186,000 Iraqi civilians died</a> and an untold number were injured. And more than <a href="https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/costs/human/refugees/iraqi">nine million Iraqis</a> were internally displaced or forced to flee the country. </p>
<p>Beyond such figures are a series of very real, but far less tangible, costs such as the damage done to much of Iraq’s rich cultural heritage or the deep emotional scars that come with two decades of war.</p>
<p>On the coalition side, <a href="https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2021/Davidson_AlliesCostsofWar_Final.pdf">4,487 US military and 238 other coalition troops</a> died during the operation. </p>
<p>The war effort also came at an enormous cost to US taxpayers: <a href="https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2021/Davidson_AlliesCostsofWar_Final.pdf">US$756 billion (A$1.15 trillion)</a> in military spending from 2003-18. (The <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-iraq-war-has-cost-the-us-nearly-2-trillion-129617">true cost</a>, however, is likely far higher.) Over the same period, the <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/aspis-decades-the-iraq-war/">cost of Australia’s military operations in Iraq</a> has surpassed A$4 billion. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-iraq-war-has-cost-the-us-nearly-2-trillion-129617">The Iraq War has cost the US nearly $2 trillion</a>
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</em>
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<h2>Goal 1: Peace at the barrel of a gun</h2>
<p>On the purported aims of the invasion, Iraq has clearly gone backwards on many metrics.</p>
<p>On the first goal of bringing peace to Iraq, it is true the coalition forces toppled Hussein and his entire Baathist regime in just six short weeks. He was later captured, put on trial and finally <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2016/12/29/middleeast/iraqi-voices-saddam-execution/index.html">hanged</a> in December 2006. </p>
<p>However, the coalition forces failed to adequately secure the nation after his regime was toppled. This created a security vacuum that was rapidly filled by a host of different militant groups. From 2006 onward, Iraq descended into a dark and unprecedented period of horrific sectarian violence.</p>
<p>This worsened considerably after the US troop withdrawal at the end of 2011. By 2013, the Islamic State had begun to conquer vast swathes of territory across both Syria and Iraq, eventually capturing the city of Mosul in mid-2014.</p>
<p>The group went on to impose strict Sharia law in the territory it controlled and enacted mass genocidal pogroms that included the slaughter, enslavement and forced exodus of <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/07/19/iraq-isis-abducting-killing-expelling-minorities">thousands of innocent civilians</a>. </p>
<p>Today, Iraq remains one of the most violent places on earth. Since the expulsion of the Islamic State from Mosul in July 2017, over <a href="https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/">10,000 civilians have been killed in across Iraq</a>. </p>
<p>The irony here barely needs to be stated: there was no credible terrorist presence in Iraq before the coalition forces staged their invasion, but by mid-2014 roughly a third of the country was controlled by terrorists who remain a threat today. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/its-been-20-years-since-the-us-invaded-iraq-long-enough-for-my-undergraduate-students-to-see-it-as-a-relic-of-the-past-199460">It's been 20 years since the US invaded Iraq – long enough for my undergraduate students to see it as a relic of the past</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<h2>Goal 2: Democracy as a pathway to authoritarianism</h2>
<p>The second key goal of the war was to bring liberal democracy to Iraq.</p>
<p>It, too, has a complicated legacy. On the one hand, the Iraqi people are to be admired for having embraced democracy. Millions of Iraqis vote in the nation’s regular provincial and federal elections. </p>
<p>Iraq is also now home to a strong culture of dissent, as is evidenced by the frequent protests that were not permitted under the former regime.</p>
<p>However, one of the unfortunate consequences of the war has been that many ethno-religious political factions viewed it as an opportunity to peddle their own relatively narrow and divisive political rhetoric. </p>
<p>This led the political elite to tighten their stranglehold on power and frequently crack down hard on Iraqi media and civil society.</p>
<p>According to the annual <a href="https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2022/">Democracy Index</a> released by the Economist Intelligence Unit, Iraq has been consistently ranked as among the worst political regimes in the world. And the situation is actually getting worse. By 2022, Iraq had been downgraded to an “authoritarian regime” and was ranked 124th out of 167 countries in the democracy rankings. </p>
<p>So, while Iraq holds regular elections and allows mass protests, it fails to meet the minimum criteria by which we would normally measure a democracy. This speaks volumes about the merits of imposing a top-down model of democracy by force.</p>
<h2>Goal 3: Prosperity at any cost</h2>
<p>Third, the goal of turning Iraq into a beacon of prosperity driven by a free-market economy has only benefited a handful of corrupt elites.</p>
<p>On the one hand, Iraq’s real GDP (based on purchasing power parity) has skyrocketed in recent years on the back of its oil wealth, reaching an estimated <a href="https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/field/real-gdp-purchasing-power-parity/country-comparison">US$390 billion (A$583 billion) in 2021</a>. This is the 50th largest economy in the world. </p>
<p>Yet, this cash flow is not filtering down to the Iraqi people. In 2022, Iraq <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2022">ranked 157th (out of 180 countries)</a> on Transparency International’s annual Corruption Index. </p>
<p>Also in 2022, the Sustainable Development Report ranked Iraq as <a href="https://dashboards.sdgindex.org/">115th (out of 163 countries)</a> on progress towards achieving the UN’s sustainable development goals. It was the worst-performing middle-income country in the world. </p>
<p>In other words, while corrupt Iraqi political elites and major Western oil companies extract billions of dollars in revenues from Iraq’s rich natural resources, millions of Iraqis continue to live in destitution in a country with crumbling and insufficient infrastructure.</p>
<p>Iraq may well be a free-market economy, but what use is that if ordinary Iraqis have sporadic electricity, limited potable water, few working sewage systems and inadequate health care and education?</p>
<h2>Australia’s obligations 20 years on</h2>
<p>All of this raises deep questions about the political responsibilities and moral obligations of the United States and its key coalition partners such as Australia.</p>
<p>While various Australian organisations run a handful of important programs across Iraq – especially in agriculture, human rights and mine-clearing – these fall well short of meeting the needs of the Iraqi people.</p>
<p>Australia could do much more. Politicians and policy-makers, for instance, could use the 20-year anniversary of the Iraq war to launch a renewed effort on three pragmatic and achievable fronts: education, security and democracy building. </p>
<p>Iraq’s education sector has been crippled by the legacy of war, autocratic leadership and international sanctions. This has left the schools and universities decades behind international standards. </p>
<p>The Australian government could do much more to train Iraqi teachers, fund schools and streamline the process of knowledge-sharing and exchanges between the Iraqi and Australian education sectors.</p>
<p>In terms of security, the Australian government and military must continue to work closely with Iraq’s security forces on training programs. This is needed to prevent
Iraq from returning to the grim days of sectarian violence or, worse still, the emergence of a new terrorist threat. </p>
<p>Finally, Australia should stick to its stated goal of supporting universal human rights and fostering democratic participation in the region. </p>
<p>By setting up capacity-building initiatives for Iraq’s media, unions and civil society movements, Australia could greatly enhance Iraq’s fledgling democracy and ensure it does not slip further into authoritarianism.</p>
<p>In fact, Australia is in a unique position to achieve these three goals. Its role as part of the “coalition of the willing” was generally perceived as being less heavy-handed than the US or UK. </p>
<p>This is a moment of consequence. Making good on our commitment to the initial goals of the war will influence how Australia is perceived in Iraq, the Middle East and across the world. And we owe the Iraqi people that much at least.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200075/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Benjamin Isakhan has received research funding from the Australian Department of Defence and the Australian Research Council. The views expressed in this article do not reflect those of Defence or Government policy. </span></em></p>While some progress has been made, the coalition forces abjectly failed to achieve their central goals. But Australia has an opportunity now to make good on its promises.Benjamin Isakhan, Professor of International Politics, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/849372018-02-18T18:12:39Z2018-02-18T18:12:39ZHow Saddam Hussein’s old ideology may have contributed to the modern Islamic State<p>In an <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OHfvvl193og">interrogation video</a> broadcast by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on January 10, 2018, French jihadist Thomas Barnouin accused the Islamic State (IS) or Daesh, which he had previously joined, of being the criminal creation of former Baath party members, aided by Western intelligence services.</p>
<p>While his allegations sounded like a familiar conspiracy account and were noticeably the result of manipulation by his Kurdish jailers, they once again revived the old controversy of the ties between Iraq’s former Baathist regime and IS, under scrutiny since at least 2015.</p>
<p>On April 18 that year, German journalist Christoph Reuter published in <em>Der Spiegel</em> an investigation dissecting the life of the so-called Haji Bakr, <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/islamic-state-files-show-structure-of-islamist-terror-group-a-1029274.html">Samir Abd Muhammad al-Khlifawi</a>.</p>
<p>A former colonel in the Iraqi forces who maintained an association with the intelligence, al-Khlifawi was presented by Reuter as the agent of a cynical attempt, through his IS allegiance, to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/20/former-saddam-spy-masterminded-the-rise-of-islamic-state-says-report">recast the past dictatorship</a>. Meanwhile, a number of IS fighters were killed by the Iraqi government. The coalition often presented them as secret agents of the defunct Iraqi regime.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/205721/original/file-20180209-51703-wykd3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/205721/original/file-20180209-51703-wykd3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205721/original/file-20180209-51703-wykd3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205721/original/file-20180209-51703-wykd3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205721/original/file-20180209-51703-wykd3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205721/original/file-20180209-51703-wykd3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205721/original/file-20180209-51703-wykd3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Aflaq (front row, first from right) with the leaders of the July 14, 1958, revolution in Iraq, including Khaled al-Naqshabendi (front row, left), Abd as-Salam Arif (back row, second from left), Abd al-Karim Qasim (back row, third from left) and Muhammad Najib ar-Ruba'i (back row, fifth from left).</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michel_Aflaq#/media/File:Leaders_of_July_14_1958_Revolution.jpg">Wikimedia</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Baathism was originally a revolutionary secular ideology theorised by Syrian nationalists <a href="https://www.lesclesdumoyenorient.com/Zaki-al-Arsouzi-nationaliste-arabe.html">Zaki al-Arsuzi</a> and <a href="https://www.lesclesdumoyenorient.com/Michel-Aflaq-et-Salah-al-Bitar.html">Michel Aflaq</a> in the early 1940s. It promoted the establishment of a unified Arab state, just like IS and other jihadist movements have advocated <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/arabunity/2008/02/200852518534468346.html">its “Islamic” version</a>.</p>
<h2>Old ties, new rumours</h2>
<p>The thesis of a Baath–Islamic State connection has gathered a large audience since Reuter’s publication, many considering IS as the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/the-hidden-hand-behind-the-islamic-state-militants-saddam-husseins/2015/04/04/aa97676c-cc32-11e4-8730-4f473416e759_story.html">manifestation of the former tyrant’s party</a>. However, the confusion generated by this debate has contributed to projecting a deeply flawed historical and sociological image of IS.</p>
<p>A heated discussion continues, as some scholars <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iraq/2016-01-12/saddams-isis">refute any such influence of Saddam Hussein’s late order</a>, claiming that IS is primarily the consequence of a decade-long foreign occupation and its dramatic effects. Others, often on ideological grounds, bring forward the opposite view: They claim that <a href="http://www.weeklystandard.com/saddams-al-qaeda-connection/article/4277">even before the US entered the war</a> there was a possible connection between Saddam Hussein’s regime and the newly forming organisation later known as IS. Indeed, many in the late 1990s felt that the <a href="https://newrepublic.com/article/107238/baathism-obituary">Baathist system was coming to an end</a> and were hungry for a new political project.</p>
<p>In 2003, Iraqi officers and soldiers were sacked by the US-led “debaathification” measure. It dissolved the Iraqi regime’s political structures and was so poorly designed and executed that it contributed to the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/11/23/how-the-united-states-helped-create-the-islamic-state/">collapse of the state and the rise of radical armed violence</a>.</p>
<p>Concomitantly, the Iraqi army’s dismantlement – at least <a href="http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2007/09/who_disbanded_the_iraqi_army.html">250,000 soldiers were dismissed</a> – pushed many to join insurgent cells in the country. However, insofar as these circumstances help shed light on one specific sequence of the Iraqi conflict, they do not prove that Baathist loyalists had colluded with jihadist factions before the war.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/185062/original/file-20170907-8405-10e22p9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/185062/original/file-20170907-8405-10e22p9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=878&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185062/original/file-20170907-8405-10e22p9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=878&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185062/original/file-20170907-8405-10e22p9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=878&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185062/original/file-20170907-8405-10e22p9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1103&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185062/original/file-20170907-8405-10e22p9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1103&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185062/original/file-20170907-8405-10e22p9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1103&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Saddam Hussein during his trial in 2004.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.google.fr/search?q=saddam+hussein&tbm=isch&source=lnt&tbs=sur:fmc&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi6-o7T45LWAhVJQBoKHUSFA3sQpwUIHQ&biw=1379&bih=689&dpr=1#imgrc=oQ__HMWgOtmgaM:">DR/Wikimedia</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Even though Saddam Hussein constantly referred to jihad himself – <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2944318.stm">against “external aggression” and “traitors”</a> – no real evidence ever emerged that had planned an uprising before 2003 or initiated contact with transnational jihadist movements. Besides, his relationship with Sunni Islamism had essentially been hostile throughout his reign.</p>
<p>This did not deter hundreds of Iraqi Sunni Arabs – former personnel of the regime and also more ordinary citizens – from joining the insurgency after Hussein’s fall, at a time when the occupation was becoming an everyday fact for the population. These men all headed toward nationalist groups, Salafist factions as well as IS, which was the only one truly promising a political revolution through the establishment of a “caliphate”. By then, only a handful of loyalists were left to save <a href="http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/analysis/2015/08/21/Where-is-Iraq-s-Baath-party-today-.html">Saddam’s failed order</a>.</p>
<p>In sum, was the early conception of IS an offspring of the old Baath party? Or was it completely separate, with no connection at all? Reality is probably a bit of a mix of both. IS has been influenced by ex-Baath party members but embraced a new ideology, <a href="http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/619/html">Salafism-Jihadism</a>.</p>
<h2>A legacy of violence</h2>
<p>All this considered, has IS’s “religiosity” been somewhat overstated by some commentators, leading to downplay its quest for political power aided by former Baathists? Even though the spread of Salafism among Sunni communities in Iraq <a href="http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CMEC_59_Mansour_Sunni_Final.pdf">favoured its hegemonic enterprise</a>, the so-called “religious” propaganda of IS must be considered with caution. One can argue, indeed, that the group’s ostentatious religiosity is not what attracted Baath party members and nationalists. One can also assume that the group’s leaders used an “Islamist cover” to serve their political goals, separately (or not) from their old Baathist belonging.</p>
<p>The propagation of Salafism in Iraq was prior to the embargo of the 1990s and took root in Sunni circles – including the regime’s own military and security personnel – during the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4260420.stm">war against Iran</a> (1980-1988). At the time, piety gave hope to those who no longer believed in Arab and Iraqi nationalism as a vehicle for restoring the country’s dignity.</p>
<p>Moreover, a deliquescent Baathist ideology – <a href="http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/analysis/2015/08/21/Where-is-Iraq-s-Baath-party-today-.html">originally secular</a> – paved the way for the expansion of the rigorist Sunni doctrine. If proof were needed, in 1993 Saddam Hussein launched his notorious <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/FromMilitantSecularismtoIslamism.pdf">“national faith campaign”</a> (<em>al-hamla al-wataniyya al-imaniyya</em>) to make Islam a political resource and regain standing and legitimacy in the eyes of his people. This campaign favoured the development of puritan Islam among the Sunni community, its Salafist version in particular.</p>
<p>To date, the former regime has also survived through a legacy of violence and tyranny that IS embodied in its most accomplished form between 2014 and 2017. Thousands of young Iraqi Sunnis – some of whom later turned jihadists – <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/30/world/middleeast/30saddam.html">grew up in a world extreme brutality</a> and inherited a totalitarian conception of society.</p>
<p>Like the Baathist ideology in its time, IS’s <em>takfirist</em> discourse, excommunicating Muslims on the basis of their supposed apostasy and promoted by <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/07/the-short-violent-life-of-abu-musab-al-zarqawi/304983/">Jordanian jihadist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi</a> and his Iraqi followers, is inseparable from the cycles of civil conflict that have plagued Iraq. It may re-erupt as IS has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/dec/31/isis-dreams-of-caliphate-gone-now-deadly-new-strategy">not been entirely defeated on the ground</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/84937/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Myriam Benraad ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>Was the early conception of IS a branching-out of the old Baath party? Or was it, as some argue, completely separate with no connection at all? Reality is probably a bit of a mix of both.Myriam Benraad, Professeure assistante en science politique, Leiden UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/874062017-12-13T13:15:11Z2017-12-13T13:15:11ZSyrian nationalism is all about masculinity<p>To truly “belong” to Syria, you have to be masculine – especially in a time of war. And throughout the country’s catastrophic six-year conflict, the same macho message has been driven home repeatedly.</p>
<p>The current Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad, laid it out boldly in a landmark <a href="http://bit.ly/2zRLRz1">speech</a> on July 26 2015, in which he emphasised the relationship between sacrificial heroism, militarism, national membership and belonging. As he put it: “The fatherland is not for those who live in it or hold its nationality, but for those who defend and protect it,” pointing out that “the army, in order to be able to perform its duties and counter terrorism, must be supported by the human element.” </p>
<p>The major themes that coursed through the speech still hold sway. Syria is a “fatherland” for which Syrian men should be ready to die; their self-sacrifice requires martial ability and physical strength, both of which are tests of national loyalty. And at the centre of it all is the army, whose accomplishments Syrians are required to appreciate. In other words, the ideal Syrian is a martial man. </p>
<p>And just as these ideas are at the forefront of the Syrian conflict, they will be very familiar to any ordinary Syrian. Assad’s invigorated nationalism is a highly amplified and intensified version of the same nationalist ideology that we have all experienced over the last four decades.</p>
<h2>Boys’ club</h2>
<p>As a Syrian, I encountered nationalism all the way through my primary and secondary school education. The male pupils were conscripted to two organisations affiliated with the Assads’ <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18582755">Ba'ath Party</a>: in primary school, the Syrian National Organisation for Childhood <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BdV7f1fX0hY">(tala'e'e)</a>, and in high school, the Revolutionary Youth Union <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AHZUOhKDShA">(al-shabibah)</a>. These two organisations would mobilise boys through enforced training and then membership of paramilitary groups.</p>
<p>In the classroom, we sat through a lesson every week about how to become an <a href="https://www.alaraby.co.uk/miscellaneous/2014/9/21/%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%AB%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AB-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%87%D9%82%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84-%D8%B5%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%82">active Ba'athist</a> by using a Kalashnikov rifle, and how to show our love for both the nation and the leader, particularly through celebrating a physically strong body. </p>
<p>A compulsory 15-day summer camp gave male students extra time to learn about the soldierly life, in an attempt to prepare them for compulsory army conscription when they finished high school. Meanwhile, we female students attended sessions that taught us about the glorious past of our nation – a story told entirely through the heroic deeds of men.</p>
<p>During enforced mass marches to celebrate the “great leader”, at the time, Bashar al-Assad’s father, Hafez, we learned by heart the slogan: “With blood and soul, we sacrifice ourselves for you, Hafez.” We were taught <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VpKP1KNyYas">nationalist songs</a> celebrating the heroic deeds of men and their strength and bravery, reinforcing the idea that the nation was built only by men’s accomplishments.</p>
<h2>The nation of men</h2>
<p>This cult of masculinity necessarily obscures the achievements of Syrian women, and relegates them to a supporting role. Their part in the national story is to respect and revere their protective patriarchs, with Hafez and then Bashar al-Assad positioned as all Syrians’ ultimate fathers, protectors and leaders. </p>
<p>And even to the extent that Syrian nationalism is demonstrated through familial love, this love can only be accomplished in masculine terms – and only by the patriotic men who serve as great soldiers of the nation.</p>
<p>This endless perpetuation of masculine nationalism happens not just in the classroom and the military training camp, but in everyday spaces too. Walking along the streets in any Syrian city, the aura of male strength and heroism is everywhere; khaki is the dominant colour, and portraits of Hafez al-Assad are on prominent display.</p>
<p>With Syria still embroiled in all-consuming conflict, the Syrian people face many scenarios that carry a particular set of nationalistic sentiments. Many hope that even if the current regime survives, it will lose its power to shape and control a national narrative of any sort. </p>
<p>But that only raises the difficult question of what the Syrian nation even is, and how Syrians can organise a sense of national love and belonging in what promises to be a close-to-unrecognisable future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87406/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rahaf Aldoughli does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Lessons in military manliness and how to respect it have been a part of Syrian education for decades.Rahaf Aldoughli, Lecturer in Modern Middle Eastern History, University of ManchesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/809292017-07-13T14:25:45Z2017-07-13T14:25:45ZIraq faces a crucible after Mosul: South Africa offers some useful lessons<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178050/original/file-20170713-7112-10819un.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The remains of the University of Mosul destroyed during a battle with Islamic State militants, in April 2017. South Africa offers lessons in rebuilding.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Marko Djurica</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The defeat of the Islamic State in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-mosul-idUSKBN19V105">Mosul</a> and the apparent death of its
leader <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-dead-isis-leader-killed-latest-news-updates-a7835271.html">Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi</a> are great cause for celebration in Iraq.</p>
<p>But beyond the horrors of the Islamic State, Iraq faces a crucible. The challenges ahead are monumental: the reconstruction of flattened cities, the plight of thousands who fled their homes, the threat of <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/iraqi-kurds-set-date-independence-referendum-170608044202182.html">Kurdish secession</a>, marauding Shia militias, and the fact that the Islamic State retains the capacity to conduct or inspire terrorist attacks in Iraq and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/live/2017/jun/03/london-bridge-closed-after-serious-police-incident-live">across the world</a>.</p>
<p>However, arguably Iraq’s biggest challenge is the creation of an inclusive and robust political arrangement that can overcome deep-seated differences and heal still bleeding wounds.</p>
<p>In trying to forge such fresh political arrangements, Iraq could learn much from South Africa’s peaceful and patient transition from apartheid to a relatively robust and stable democracy.</p>
<h2>Similarities and differences</h2>
<p>At first glance, the differences between Iraq and South Africa may appear too large to justify useful comparison. But the two share much more in common than is usually acknowledged.</p>
<p>They both have a history that includes colonialism and brutal oppression, which still evince sharp memories. Both were crippled by international sanctions that isolated the country and hampered development. Both are rich in natural resources and hold the promise of being economic powerhouses, yet a great number of their respective populations have always been poor.</p>
<p>With the end of apartheid in the <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/collapse-apartheid-grade-12">early 1990s</a> and the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/ref/timestopics/topics_iraq.html">toppling of the Baath in 2003</a>, both countries wrote towering constitutions amid great political upheaval and saw their citizens vote for the first time to great international fanfare.</p>
<p>Since then, both have seen the emergence of newly empowered political elites who had a great deal of experience in opposing the former regime, but little experience in governing. Sadly, both have seen their new democracies cynically undermined by those who rely on populism, nepotism and corruption as vehicles to achieve and retain power.</p>
<p>Despite such similarities, South Africa has chartered a very different course to Iraq. It’s mostly <a href="http://overcomingapartheid.msu.edu/unit.php?id=65-24E-6">peaceful transformation</a> stands in stark contrast to Iraq which rapidly degenerated into a patchwork of competing factions, virtually all of whom have been prepared to use <a href="https://edinburghuniversitypress.com/book-the-legacy-of-iraq-13771.html">horrific violence</a> to achieve their goals.</p>
<h2>Four key lessons</h2>
<p>There are four key lessons Iraq can learn from South Africa’s example.</p>
<p>The first is that South Africa’s transition was organic and internal. Yes, its transition was both resisted and encouraged by various actors in the international community. But its <a href="https://zelalemkibret.files.wordpress.com/2012/01/the-autobiography-of-nelson-mandela.pdf">“long walk to freedom”</a> was largely its own. The apartheid regime was undone by its own brutality and a persistent movement to undermine it.</p>
<p>The Baath regime was toppled by a foreign military intervention that imposed democracy. The Iraqi people were not the agents of change. Today, however, they have the opportunity to be the drivers of an inclusive future.</p>
<p>The second key lesson for Iraq can be found in South Africa’s pioneering <a href="http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/report/finalreport/Volume5.pdf">Truth and Reconciliation Commission</a>.</p>
<p>By openly engaging with the traumas of the past, South Africa enabled understanding and forgiveness of the pain inflicted by the state. To a large extent, this served as a bulwark against further violence.</p>
<p>In Iraq, the US-led coalition preferred a wholesale dismantling of the former regime – <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/03/201331055338463426.html">“De-Baathification”</a> – to any lengthy and emotive reconciliation process. The people of Iraq were never given the opportunity to deal with their trauma and to address the divergent narratives of suffering and remembrance.</p>
<p>The defeat of the Islamic State represents a unique opportunity to correct this wrong. South Africa could play an invaluable role in Iraq by sharing its experiences of reconciliation. </p>
<p>The third key lesson from South Africa is its extensive <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0147176705001392">nation building programme</a>. </p>
<p>Both South Africa and Iraq are home to a complex mosaic of people with divergent ethnic, tribal, religious and political affiliations that cannot easily be divided into discrete categories.</p>
<p>Following the end of apartheid, and particularly under the leadership of <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/nelson-rolihlahla-mandela">Nelson Mandela</a>, South Africa underwent a concerted nation building programme. The <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/national-flag">new flag</a> was one among many symbols of a collective national consciousness.</p>
<p>The US and the Iraqi political elite have undertaken no such initiative. The creation of national narratives towards a cohesive and united identity factored little in the minds of neo-conservatives in Washington or power-mongers in Baghdad.</p>
<p>Here, too, the defeat of the Islamic State represents an opportunity to change course. And Iraq would do well to look to South Africa.</p>
<p>The final, and arguably most important, lesson that Iraq can learn from South Africa is that democracy, reconciliation and nation building are always, in the words of French philosopher Jacques Derrida, <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/derrida/">“to come”</a>. That’s to say that a truly robust and democratic society is an ideal that must be constantly fought for and renegotiated.</p>
<p>This is widely understood in South Africa today – from student protests demanding the <a href="https://theconversation.com/africa/topics/decolonisation-17372">decolonisation of their curriculum</a>, to sharp editorials denouncing <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2016-03-23-editorial-evidence-of-state-capture-mounts">“state capture”</a>.</p>
<p>It is South Africa’s spirit of vibrant but peaceful debate, of respectful agonism, that is a vital lesson for Iraq if it’s to emerge from the horrors of the past into a viable and peaceful future.</p>
<p>South Africa’s experience has been far from perfect. But its unique story offers invaluable lessons for the Iraqi people as they strive for a new future beyond the Islamic State.</p>
<p><em>Benjamin Isakhan is visiting South Africa as Adjunct Senior Research Associate, Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Johannesburg.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80929/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Benjamin Isakhan receives funding from the Australian Research Council (DE120100315) and the Australian Department of Defence. The views expressed in this article do not reflect those of Defence or Government policy.</span></em></p>South Africa’s peaceful transition from apartheid to democracy holds crucial lessons for a post-Islamic State Iraq.Benjamin Isakhan, Associate Professor of Politics and Policy, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.