tag:theconversation.com,2011:/fr/topics/baltics-12170/articlesBaltics – The Conversation2024-03-19T18:17:39Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2261652024-03-19T18:17:39Z2024-03-19T18:17:39ZThe EU should stop ‘westsplaining’ and listen to its smaller eastern members – they saw the Ukraine war coming<p>It’s rare for the words of Lithuanian government officials to make the top of the news outside the country. Lithuania’s views aren’t even a top priority among its allies. But perhaps it’s time that changed. </p>
<p>Following February’s Munich security conference, Lithuanian foreign minister Gabrielius Landsbergis warned:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We don’t lack capacity, we lack the political will and urgency necessary to support Ukraine and maintain our collective security. Russia, on the other hand, has the will to destroy Ukraine and reestablish the Russian Empire. When will we start using our capacity to deter this?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Lithuania is a small country of just 3 million people, so perhaps we wouldn’t expect it to lead Europe’s response to Russian aggression. However, the Soviet occupation of Lithuania, imbued with persecution, repression and a totalitarian regime, are deeply understood even by young generations. It would seem like common sense to give greater weight to the views of Lithuania and its neighbours than other nations. So why doesn’t this happen? </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1759271051177943311"}"></div></p>
<p>Vytautas Landsbergis, who was formerly the first president of the country’s parliament after independence from the USSR, predicted this war as long ago as 2008. Interviewed by a European news <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JDQ3a0aNSqE">website</a> about the “situation in Georgia”, he bluntly responded: “It is not the situation in Georgia only; it is a very bad situation in Europe, and for Europe’s future, and very promising badly … Who is next after Georgia? … The next is Ukraine.”</p>
<p>This view stood in stark contrast to what the EU foreign ministers agreed upon at the time when they expressed “grave concern” over the war. They criticised Russia’s disproportionate response but pressed Georgia to sign the six-point ceasefire agreement, which basically allowed Russian “security forces” to implement “additional security measures”. The ceasefire agreement led to the Russian occupation of 20% of Georgia’s territory, which continues to this day. </p>
<p>In 2014, when Russia occupied Crimea, other European Union states agreed on certain sanctions but continued all the while to build their energy partnerships with the aggressor. Lithuania instead built its own liquefied natural gas terminal, named “independence”, which allowed it to break from its dependence on Russian gas.</p>
<p>In 2015, when EU countries were cautious to name the Russian Federation as an aggressor in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions of Ukraine, the Lithuanian ambassador to the UN clearly <a href="https://urm.lt/default/en/news/lithuania-in-the-un-security-council-minsk-accords-must-be-respected-by-all-parties-including-russia">stated</a>: “Russia is a direct party to this conflict and bears the primary responsibility for the conflict that is tearing into Ukraine’s flesh.”</p>
<h2>How to respond to Russia?</h2>
<p>By 2022, Russia had launched a full-scale attack against Ukraine. Words of support came from every direction but concrete support was less forthcoming. During the first days of the war, <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-war-russia-germany-still-blocking-arms-supplies/">Germany</a> refused to send weapons to Ukraine and even prevented Estonia from sending its old howitzer artillery weapons by withholding approval.</p>
<p>Lithuania, meanwhile, along with Latvia, Estonia and Poland, were sounding the alarm about the threat the situation posed to the <a href="https://twitter.com/GLandsbergis/status/1496706310221574149?s=20">rest of the region</a> and called for Europe to support Ukraine “with every means available”. For many in the region, Europe should commit unambiguously to helping Ukraine win the war. </p>
<p>Until recently, even French president Emmanuel Macron was suggesting that Ukraine should compromise on some of its sovereignty to accommodate Putin’s demands. Such comments were coldly received in Baltic and eastern European states. </p>
<p>When Macron changed his strategy to say that he did not rule out sending troops to Ukraine, he faced <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/27/sweden-rules-out-sending-troops-to-ukraine-after-nato-membership-agreed">backlash</a> from several European capitals. However, he found an ally in Lithuania.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A map of Europe with Lithuania highlighted." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582840/original/file-20240319-22-yui65c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582840/original/file-20240319-22-yui65c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=358&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582840/original/file-20240319-22-yui65c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=358&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582840/original/file-20240319-22-yui65c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=358&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582840/original/file-20240319-22-yui65c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582840/original/file-20240319-22-yui65c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582840/original/file-20240319-22-yui65c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Can you point to Lithuania on a map? Vladimir Putin certainly can.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lithuania#/media/File:EU-Lithuania.svg">Wikipedia/NuclearVacuum</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Entrenched westsplaining</h2>
<p>This historical perspective highlights the stark difference of opinion between countries like Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland and the Czech Republic as compared to western European countries such as France or Germany. This suggests that “westsplaining” still prevails in the European Union.</p>
<p>Eastern European candidates have never been chosen for crucial roles like the Nato secretary general, for example. In fact, they are even <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-eastern-european-union-rutte-secretary-general-commission-russia-ukraine-war-defense/">briefed against</a>, including by former European Commission vice president <a href="https://wnl.tv/2023/11/15/estse-premier-kaja-kallas-concurrent-voor-mark-rutte-bij-opvolging-navo-topman-stoltenberg/">Frans Timmermans</a> and at least one <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-eastern-european-union-rutte-secretary-general-commission-russia-ukraine-war-defense/">Commission official</a> off the record. </p>
<p>Western Europe still does not view eastern Europe and the Baltics as equal partners. As a result, the EU – dominated by the west – still doesn’t truly perceive Russia as a direct threat to European security.</p>
<p>In a positive sign of recognition, EU Commission president Ursula Von der Leyen <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/ov/speech_22_5493">mentioned</a> in her annual state of the union address in 2022: “We should have listened to the voices inside our union – in Poland, in the Baltics, and all across central and eastern Europe.”</p>
<p>This fleeting moment of acknowledgement should form the basis of a much more meaningful debate about who makes the decision in the EU and on what basis.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226165/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Viktoriia Lapa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Lithuania doesn’t often set the agenda, yet it has been warning that Russia would invade Ukraine since 2008.Viktoriia Lapa, Lecturer, Institute for European Policymaking, Bocconi UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1000922018-07-18T05:50:11Z2018-07-18T05:50:11ZWhy Trump has made Europe more fearful of a possible Russian attack<p>US President Donald Trump’s <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/07/17/opinions/trump-europe-visit-an-unmitigated-disaster-opinion-intl/index.html">eyebrow-raising visit to Europe</a> has confirmed Europeans’ worst fears: if another <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/mar/22/annexing-crimea-putin-make-russia-great-again">“Crimea-like” take-over</a> by Russia occurs somewhere on the continent, they will likely be on their own. </p>
<p>Trump had made it abundantly clear that European leaders can no longer rely on the US for its protection. He was not only <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/07/16/politics/congress-reaction-trump-putin-comments/index.html">harshly criticised</a> by his own party for being too conciliatory with Russian President Vladimir Putin during their Helsinki summit, he also lashed out at US allies once more, going so far as to <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/europe/trump-calls-eu-a-foe-before-arriving-in-finland-for-putin-summit-20180716-p4zroi.html">call the European Union a “foe”</a>.</p>
<p>The US may have more than <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-44717074">60,000 troops</a> stationed in Europe, but a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-assessing-cost-of-keeping-troops-in-germany-as-trump-battles-with-europe/2018/06/29/94689094-ca9f-490c-b3be-b135970de3fc_story.html?utm_term=.c1f23d65628c">recent report </a>stating the Pentagon is assessing the impact of a possible reduction of troop numbers, coupled with Trump’s unpredictability, has made America’s traditional allies nervous. </p>
<p>Indeed, by initiating trade wars and continuously attacking his closest allies, Trump has weakened the entire West.</p>
<h2>Another war in Europe remains possible</h2>
<p>Despite his reassurances last week that the US still values NATO, Trump’s divisive visit to Europe may embolden Putin in his assessment that occupying more European land may not be met with much military resistance. </p>
<p>Poland is so concerned, it has recently offered to pay the US up to US$2bn to permanently <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/flashpoints/2018/05/29/poland-offers-up-to-2-billion-for-a-permanent-us-military-presence/">deploy</a> an armoured division on its soil. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/us-approach-to-security-is-deeply-troubling-and-its-not-just-about-trump-91239">US approach to security is deeply troubling – and it's not just about Trump</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/07/trump-putin-helsinki-ukraine/565235/">on-going conflict in Ukraine</a>, coupled with Putin’s increased emphasis in recent years on <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-ethnic-russification-baltics-kazakhstan-soviet/25328281.html">Russia’s “right” and “obligation”</a> to “protect” ethnic Russians and Russian speakers beyond its borders, contribute further to the unease between Moscow in the West. This is particularly being felt in the Baltic states, two of which (Estonia and Latvia) have sizeable Russian minorities. </p>
<p>It certainly doesn’t help when Russia <a href="http://time.com/4941045/russia-zapad-drills-nato/">conducts military drills</a> or <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/nato-forces-intercept-russian-jets-estonia-latvia-spots-seven-645046">dispatches warplanes</a> on the borders with the Baltics, giving a real sense that military escalation in this part of Europe is <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-fuels-anxiety-in-europe-over-security-1531481130">entirely plausible</a>.</p>
<h2>Tensions are building in Eastern Europe</h2>
<p>The focus of any possible Russian military incursion could be a thin stretch of land between Poland and Lithuania known as the <a href="https://www.news.com.au/world/europe/the-suwalki-gap-the-potential-european-flashpoint-vladimir-putin-is-keeping-a-close-eye-on/news-story/eb51cce0c50f06949a16f9370779338e">Suwalki Gap</a> (named after the nearby Polish town of Suwałki), which would allow Russia to reinforce its only access to the Baltic Sea through its Kaliningrad exclave and cut the Baltics off from the rest of Europe.</p>
<p>The Suwalki Gap also links Kaliningrad with Belarus, a staunch Russian ally. Moscow regularly organises joint strategic military exercises with Minsk, the most recent being the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/russias-zapad-2017-war-games-explained/g-40503661">Zapad (meaning “West” in Russian) war games</a> last September. </p>
<p>Kaliningrad is strategically important, as well, as the site of recently <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/ef93af1e-0a8d-11e8-8eb7-42f857ea9f09">deployed</a> nuclear-capable short-range missiles and an <a href="https://fas.org/blogs/security/2018/06/kaliningrad/">upgraded</a> nuclear weapons storage site. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/russias-world-cup-widely-hailed-as-success-but-will-the-good-vibes-last-for-putin-99208">Russia's World Cup widely hailed as success, but will the good vibes last for Putin?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Reflecting their concerns about a possible invasion, NATO members held military exercises last June that focused <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-russia-suwalki-gap-idUSKBN1990L2">for the first time</a> on defending this 104km strip of land from a possible Russian attack. Then, last month, NATO held the Trojan Footprint 18 joint military exercise in Poland and the Baltics, which was one of its <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/us/politics/american-allies-russia-baltics-poland-hybrid-warfare.html">biggest-ever</a> war games in the region. </p>
<p>These military build-ups on NATO’s eastern flank are reminiscent of the Cold War and feed both Russia’s “deep-seated sense of <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_276_Rumer_Russia_Final.pdf">vulnerability</a> vis-à-vis the West” and Europe’s own feelings of insecurity.</p>
<h2>Going it alone</h2>
<p>But should Russia decide to invade the Suwalki Gap, would Europe go to war over it? </p>
<p>It may not be able to. European military options remain limited as <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/how-russian-and-nato-forces-in-europe-compare-2017-8?IR=T">NATO does not have the military means</a> to go to war against Russia without the US. Acutely aware of this, European leaders launched a new regional defence <a href="http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17-1476_en.htm">fund</a> last year to develop the continent’s military capabilities outside of NATO.</p>
<p>While a direct Russian invasion of a NATO member would be the worst-case scenario, it’s more likely that Putin would seek to further destabilise the bloc’s eastern flank through a hybrid war involving cyber-attacks, divisive propaganda campaigns and the use of armed proxies like the “<a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2016/03/how-why-and-when-russia-will-deploy-little-green-men-and-why-the-us-cannot/">little green men</a>” that appeared during the Ukraine conflict. </p>
<p>Even here, though, it’s clear that Europe cannot provide a unified front to counter potential Russian actions. Some countries like Hungary and Italy seek a closer relationship with Russia, while others like the UK are already embroiled in diplomatic conflicts with it. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-vladimir-putin-outfoxed-donald-trump-at-helsinki-before-their-meeting-even-began-99320">How Vladimir Putin outfoxed Donald Trump at Helsinki before their meeting even began</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>France and Germany have <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/07/08/france-germany-increase-defence-spending-amid-fears-donald-trump/">already announced plans</a> to increase defence spending not because of commitments made to Trump during the latest NATO summit, but out of real concerns that another confrontation with Russia is becoming a real threat.</p>
<p>Trump has weakened the Western alliance at a time when Europe is not ready to step up and ensure its own security. He may have united Europeans around shared fears and their collective response, but he’s also made them more vulnerable.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/100092/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jean S. Renouf does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>US President Donald Trump’s attacks on allies and conciliatory actions toward Russia have made European leaders feel more vulnerable than ever.Jean S. Renouf, Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Southern Cross UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/775312017-06-27T01:03:58Z2017-06-27T01:03:58ZIs Putin’s Russia the critical threat Americans believe it to be?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/175714/original/file-20170626-29085-bzo4b8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Russian President Vladimir Putin attends a wreath-laying ceremony at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Moscow.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Pavel Golovkin</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>At least four U.S. intelligence agencies <a href="http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2017/jul/06/17-intelligence-organizations-or-four-either-way-r/">agree that evidence shows</a> the Russian government hacked the Democratic National Committee and waged a campaign to influence voters in 2016.</p>
<p>Although no evidence of collusion between U.S. citizens and Russia has been proven yet, <a href="http://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/16/president-donald-trump-says-getting-along-with-russia-is-a-good-thing.html">President Donald Trump</a> and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s attempt to improve relations with Russia has been hobbled.</p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/did-sessions-and-trump-conspire-to-obstruct-justice-79388">The cloud</a> <a href="https://theconversation.com/was-trumps-hope-comeys-command-we-asked-a-language-expert-79540">hanging over</a> <a href="http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/explainer-jared-kushners-attempted-back-channel-russia-treasonous-typical/">the White House</a> seems to be growing, with Congress <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/15/politics/russia-sanctions-senate-trump/index.html">considering sanctions</a> against Russia. A majority of Americans view Russia unfavorably and believe it represents a threat, <a href="http://www.gallup.com/poll/1642/russia.aspx">according to Gallup</a>. Russia is depicted daily as a major menace to the United States. The slightest concession by an American to a Russian overture has become suspicious and <a href="https://www.vox.com/2017/6/13/15794976/sessions-wyden-senate-testimony">smells of capitulation</a>.</p>
<p>As a historian who has watched and <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/russias-empires-9780199924394?cc=us&lang=en&">written about</a> the rocky ride <a href="https://global.oup.com/ushe/product/the-soviet-experiment-9780195340556?cc=us&lang=en&">Russians have experienced</a> since the collapse of the USSR, I offer a look at the broader context of U.S.-Russia relations.</p>
<p>While Russia has certainly caused mischief for <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/russia-jet-after-us-plane-europe-aircraft-shot-down-syria-627665">Washington and Europe</a>, I don’t believe we should consider negotiation and compromise with Putin as appeasement – as we did during the Cold War. Careful consideration of how Russia views its own vital interests may help us see past the noise. </p>
<h2>How big a threat is Russia?</h2>
<p>In reality, the most powerful country in history and on the globe at the moment, the United States, faces a considerably weaker adversary in Russia. </p>
<p>The Kremlin spends about 10 percent of what the <a href="http://www.pgpf.org/chart-archive/0053_defense-comparison">United States spends</a> on defense (US$600 billion). The United States spends more on defense than the next eight countries combined. </p>
<p>Putin <a href="http://www.salon.com/2017/03/19/so-much-for-the-russian-threat-putin-slashes-defense-spending-while-trump-plans-massive-buildup/">slashed military spending</a> a few months ago by 25.5 percent, just as Trump plans to <a href="http://www.npr.org/2017/03/16/520305293/trump-to-unveil-hard-power-budget-that-boosts-military-spending">increase American defense spending</a> by more than $54 billion.</p>
<p>Russia’s economy pales in comparison to America, Europe, Japan and China. It has an economy roughly the <a href="http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/stats/Economy/GDP">size of Italy’s</a>, but must provide for a larger population, territory and defense budget.</p>
<p>It’s true that a somewhat weaker power can annoy, pressure or even harm a stronger power. And while Russia has a huge nuclear arsenal and impressive cyber capabilities, it is seriously outmatched by the United States in terms of influence and power. Obama <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-dismisses-russia-as-regional-power-acting-out-of-weakness/2014/03/25/1e5a678e-b439-11e3-b899-20667de76985_story.html?utm_term=.3cdab72637fc">referred to Russia</a> as “a regional power,” and Putin <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-dismisses-russia-as-regional-power-acting-out-of-weakness/2014/03/25/1e5a678e-b439-11e3-b899-20667de76985_story.html?utm_term=.3cdab72637fc">thinks of America</a> as a “global hegemon.” There are important truths in both of their statements.</p>
<p>Both Putin and his predecessor, the late Russian President Boris Yeltsin, repeatedly complained about the expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe, and even into countries formerly part of the Soviet Union – the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Baltic-states">Baltic republics</a> of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The Kremlin made its opposition clear in 2008 when it launched a devastating incursion into Georgia, a country that <a href="http://www.nato.int/cps/es/natohq/topics_38988.htm">hoped to join NATO</a>. In 2014, Russia, Europe and the United States maneuvered for dominance in Ukraine – this time Russia lost. Moscow exacted its revenge by annexing Crimea in March 2014, which only <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/ukraine-russia-and-the-u-s-policy-response/">drove Ukraine</a> deeper into the arms of the West.</p>
<p>Putin occasionally overreaches, as he did in Crimea. Yet the Russian president usually plays his comparatively weak hand rather shrewdly. In Syria, for example, Putin supports the Bashar al-Assad government, a <a href="https://www.pri.org/stories/2014-09-24/8-reminders-how-horrible-syrian-president-bashar-al-assad-has-been-his-people">truly vicious regime</a> that is prepared to kill hundreds of thousands of its citizens to hold on to power. Here the United States tried regime change, but Putin and <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/04/russia-iran-vow-continued-military-support-assad-170408184313230.html">Iran’s backing of Damascus</a> made that impossible. As both the <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/29/obama-never-understood-how-history-works/">Obama</a> and Trump administrations struggled to formulate a policy in Syria, Putin effectively marginalized the United States by forging a common front with Turkey and Iran. </p>
<p>And while the United States and Russia might disagree about the Syrian regime, they do have some common ground. Both powers have decided that the first priority is to combat the Islamic State. Both countries have found reliable allies against IS in <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/syria-s-kurds-struggle-within-struggle">the Syrian Kurds</a>, which my research suggests is <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/russias-empires-9780199924394?cc=us&lang=en&">a distinct nation</a> prepared to fight for their autonomy or independence. Despite Russia’s first priority to defend Assad’s government, both the United States and Russia appear at the moment to be working together with the Syrian Kurds to contain IS, the most immediate danger to the Middle East and by extension <a href="http://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/20/russian-threat-to-target-us-aircraft-in-syria-seen-as-more-bluster.html">much of the world</a>.</p>
<p>The crises over Syria, Ukraine and Georgia, as well as Russia’s blustering threats against the Baltic republics, all are responses of a relatively vulnerable, less-than-superpower. Russians feel threatened, humiliated by the West’s military expansion eastward. American troops regularly exercise in what was <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2016-03-30/us-to-beef-up-military-presence-in-europe">once the Soviet Bloc</a>. American rockets have been placed in the Czech Republic and Poland. Russian and American <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/21/world/europe/russia-nato-jets-baltic-sea.html?_r=0">planes buzz each other</a> near the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad. </p>
<p>Although it is unable to reestablish the kind of dominance in Eastern Europe that it enjoyed during the Cold War, the Kremlin is determined to retain an influential position in the part of the world closest to its borders. What we are watching, in my view, is an uneven struggle between a real superpower and global hegemon, the United States, and a regional hegemon, Russia, that feels it has been backed into a corner.</p>
<h2>Common interests</h2>
<p>More than anything else, in my opinion, Russians wish to be taken seriously. </p>
<p>Putin still refers to the United States not as an adversary but as a partner, as <a href="https://qz.com/1008284/oliver-stones-the-putin-interviews-reveal-a-cynical-brooding-and-oddly-optimistic-leader/">he did repeatedly</a> in interviews with film director Oliver Stone. At the same time, unwilling to accept American global dominance without challenge, he fails to face the effects his policies have on Western leaders and the broader public. He repeatedly declares he is perplexed by the hysteria in America that demonizes Russia. </p>
<p>While investigations into Russian hacking and Trump’s campaign ties must continue, the <a href="http://www.aegee.org/general-overview-of-the-south-caucasian-conflicts/">major hot spots</a> mentioned above will continue to smolder and may suddenly flare up. The stakes are high and Russian and American interests coincide in many areas. There are few that can not be ameliorated, if not fully resolved, through negotiation.</p>
<p>Yet, the distance between the two countries grows wider by the day. Wrangling inside the Beltway – one of the signs of a healthy democracy – continues. But above the din, few voices can be heard calling for a more sober and farsighted evaluation of our strategic interests. In my years as a historian, I have found that it is precisely in such moments of heightened confrontation and deafness to the interests of others that unpredictable and destructive conflicts break out. As impossible as it seems at the moment to deescalate inflammatory rhetoric, I believe only discussion and negotiation offer a way forward.</p>
<p><em>This article has been updated to correct the number of intelligence agencies investigating Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77531/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ronald Suny does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A historian takes us beyond the noise in Washington and examines how US and Russian power and interests compare.Ronald Suny, Professor of History and Political Science, University of MichiganLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/714242017-01-18T15:15:12Z2017-01-18T15:15:12ZTrump NATO strategy awaited with increasingly frayed nerves in eastern Europe<p>While America celebrates the inauguration of its 45th president, there is widespread concern about his <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2017/01/17/politics/donald-trump-nato-europe/index.html">potential approach towards NATO</a>, his relations with Russia – and whether Russian president Vladimir Putin will try to take advantage of any signs of weakness or disunity within the western treaty alliance. There are, potentially, troubling times ahead which have foreign policy analysts worried.</p>
<p>Before the outcome of the US presidential election were known, many commentators were talking about a “<a href="https://theconversation.com/west-could-sleepwalk-into-a-doomsday-war-with-russia-its-time-to-wake-up-59936">new Cold War</a>”, against a backdrop of Russian involvement (alleged or otherwise) in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Having repeatedly campaigned on a platform of “America first” – an approach which might mean less commitment to overseas military undertakings in general (and NATO in particular) – <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/17/opinion/russia-gains-when-donald-trump-trashes-nato.html?_r=0">recent pronouncements from the president-elect</a> have done little to calm nerves in eastern Europe. </p>
<p>So what does NATO itself think? Secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg has expressed guarded concern about the future of US involvement – although diplomatic niceties required that <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/19/world/europe/nato-trump-us-stoltenberg.html?_r=0">he chose his words carefully</a> – saying he was “absolutely confident that President Trump will maintain American leadership” of NATO. The recent <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1048463/eucom-commander-us-armored-brigades-deployment-to-poland-significant">deployment of an American armoured brigade</a> is reassuring for eastern Europe – and other NATO members (notably the UK with <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/27/uk-to-deploy-hundreds-of-troops-and-aircraft-to-eastern-europe">the ongoing deployment of Typhoon jets</a>) have made clear their commitment to the Baltic states. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"820762623167832064"}"></div></p>
<p>But the US deployment could be reversed by the new commander-in-chief in Washington – and while there has been vocal, if somewhat muted, support for NATO <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jan/16/europes-fate-is-in-our-hands-angela-merkels-defiant-reply-to-trump">from European capitals</a> there has been no definitive commitment to <a href="http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm">Article V</a> which states that an attack on one NATO member is an attack on all – the bedrock of the NATO Treaty. There have also been no new commitments by NATO members other than the US, Greece and the UK to bring their defence spending towards the NATO target of <a href="http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160704_160704-pr2016-116.pdf">2% of a country’s GDP</a>.</p>
<p>There are sound reasons for this: both the state of the broad European economy and not wishing further to antagonise the Kremlin are in themselves good reasons to tread warily. There is, furthermore, a degree of “wait and see” on the part of European leaders. Will Trump carry through with his rhetoric, or will realpolitik and the centralising tendencies of office, with its bureaucracy (all those committees, existing agreements, the political trade-off between the White House and the Hill), result in a change of direction?</p>
<h2>Putin powerplay</h2>
<p>Trump’s recent pronouncements on NATO seem, if anything, to be becoming more strident and are running in parallel with growing concerns about the direction his relationship with Putin will take. Analysing recent events from a Russian viewpoint, there is certainly little obvious in the way of Western words, let alone actions, to deter further acts, or threats, of Russian aggression. Putin appears to enjoy <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/15/observer-profile-vladimir-putin">unprecedented levels of support and approval</a> at home and his twin-track agenda of playing the strong man and rebuilding Russia’s world standing are playing to traditional Russian fears. </p>
<p>The Russian leader is, of course, limited to an extent by the pressures of trade, globalisation and (perhaps to a lesser degree) world opinion. Russia is also subject to the economic sanctions imposed by Europe and the US, which Trump has indicated he will, at least initially, continue. Low oil prices will also affect his capacity for aggressive foreign policy gambits.</p>
<p>But the Kremlin has undertaken some clever diplomacy to <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-russia-turkey-and-iran-are-natural-allies-70819">restore links with Turkey</a>, a key NATO member, and build its influence there. There is perhaps an example here of how Russia will continue to act – Putin seems determined to move Turkey from a Western sphere to a Russian one. And against the backdrop of <a href="https://theconversation.com/erdogan-could-be-losing-his-grip-on-a-dangerous-divided-turkey-70856">civil unrest</a>, a struggling economy, stalled EU accession, a potentially declining NATO and a style of increasingly autocratic governance from President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan that is more attuned to the Kremlin than Brussels, the Russian leader might be said to be succeeding.</p>
<p>The idea of possible Turkish secession from NATO is not a reassuring picture for the <a href="https://theconversation.com/from-turkey-to-the-baltics-nato-faces-up-to-russia-48847">Baltic states</a>. After the heady days of Soviet withdrawal in the region in the 1990s and the subsequent accession to NATO and EU membership, the countries of this region could be forgiven for a degree of unease. But whether Russia really would risk all via an invasion of one or another of the Baltics is less clear – where’s the gain? Putin is, if nothing else, a realist and any potential domestic kudos garnered from a military attack on a Baltic state would have to be balanced against the international reaction it would generate – and it seems unlikely that Putin would risk the backlash. </p>
<h2>Over to you Mr President</h2>
<p>What of the future of NATO itself? That is far harder to judge. For years, NATO has been seeking a purpose beyond a seemingly hollow collective security requirement. It must be said, however, that with growing Russian military spending, capability and willingness to resort to hard power this may be starting to appear to be less hollow. And after the high-water mark of the return of the Balkan states, NATO has struggled to define its role.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"821593210296246272"}"></div></p>
<p>A resurgent Russia might just re-energise the capitals of western Europe in terms of defence priorities. And Trump? In many ways, he is going to set the agenda: will he indeed risk US standing, influence and defence sales with a significant retrenchment policy? He is, after all, a businessman and – from the viewpoint of the American bottom line – a retreat into political isolationism would more likely harm the American economy than grow it.</p>
<p>All eyes are on Washington. If nothing else, we should by now have started to be accustomed to off-the-cuff, but potentially significant, pronouncements from Trump. Keep your Twitter feed open.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/71424/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ian Shields does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As Putin’s Russia flexes its muscles, there are concerns over the future of the alliance without US leadership.Ian Shields, Associate Lecturer in International Relations, Anglia Ruskin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/693922016-12-07T13:08:40Z2016-12-07T13:08:40ZBy flirting with isolationism, Trump could be teeing up a third world war<p>Throughout his presidential campaign, Donald Trump repeatedly <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/22/us/politics/donald-trump-foreign-policy-interview.html">opined</a> that the US should no longer serve as the world’s policeman. He publicly questioned what the US gets out of its military presence in <a href="http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2016/05/31/north_korean_state_media_endorses_trump_s_south_korea_plan.html">South Korea</a> and <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/08/05/donald-trump-savages-japan-saying-all-they-will-do-is-watch-sony/">Japan</a>, where it plays a strategic role in facing down China and North Korea. He also expressed admiration for Vladimir Putin, and indicated that Russia’s actions in Ukraine are legitimate (to the extent that he’s even <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2016/07/31/politics/donald-trump-russia-ukraine-crimea-putin/">acknowledged them</a>). </p>
<p>Many optimists would argue that Trump’s bluster on the campaign trail won’t actually predict how he behaves in office. As they see it, depending on who he appoints to advise him and execute his policy, his overall foreign affairs priorities might not ultimately deviate much from American orthodoxy. Still, one could hardly blame Putin or North Korea’s Kim Jong-Un for gambling on it if they chose to attack traditional US allies in the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38014997">Baltic States</a> or East Asia. </p>
<p>Trump’s carefree campaign-trail isolationism has put the US in a dangerous bind. Should his advisers manage to convince him that the US’s commitment to NATO and its partnerships with key allies in East Asia really do matter, he will be in the unusual position of having to prove the US’s commitment, which has gone without saying in the past. In a worst case scenario, the result could be tens of thousands or even hundreds of thousands of fatalities.</p>
<h2>Facing off</h2>
<p>Wars are less common than many people appreciate. From a humanitarian perspective, of course, they aren’t rare enough – but the forces pushing towards peace are more effective than we often give them credit for. </p>
<p>Similarly, at any given time, there’s at least one war taking place somewhere in the world – yet most countries, most of the time, are at peace. That much is clear from a look at <a href="http://cow.dss.ucdavis.edu/data-sets/MIDs">Militarized Interstate Dispute data</a>, a database of all incidents where one country threatened to use force against another, engaged in a hostile display of force, or actually did use force. Roughly 94% of all MIDs end short of war. As an analogy, remember that for your every birthday, you also experience 364 or 365 <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iL2Wm-PcfPo">unbirthdays</a>.</p>
<p>Even when countries disagree with each other strongly enough that they threaten to attack one another, or go as far as to call up the reservists, or violate one another’s air space, peace almost always prevails. So if we want to understand why wars occur, it’s not enough to ask where the different sides disagree; the question is why their disagreement couldn’t be resolved peacefully, as the vast majority are.</p>
<p>One of the best explanations that scholars have come up with is that states sometimes push too far when they <a href="http://web.stanford.edu/group/fearon-research/cgi-bin/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Rationalist-Explanations-for-War.pdf">don’t know what they can get away with</a>. That is, even those who do not desire war for its own sake might accept some risk of accidentally provoking one in hopes of revising the status quo. </p>
<p>According to this argument, most wars occur not because of greed or intolerance – factors that were surely present to one degree or another in the 94% of disputes that didn’t become wars – but because those who desire peace also care about the terms on which they get it. The problem is particularly acute when states signal that they’re unwilling to defend something, but ultimately decide it is worth defending after all. </p>
<p>This is roughly the story of two of the US’s most important military ventures: the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/coldwar/korea_usa_01.shtml">Korean War</a> of 1950-53 and the <a href="https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/short-history/firstgulf">First Gulf War</a> in 1990-1. </p>
<h2>Over the line</h2>
<p>In his detailed account of the Korean War, <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/23/books/review/Frankel-t.html">The Coldest Winter</a>, David Halberstam explains how from 1945 on, Korean communist leader Kim Il-Sung sought Soviet premier Joseph Stalin’s permission to unite the Korean peninsula by force. Every time he brought the matter up, Stalin ordered him to sit tight because he feared a war with the US. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/149048/original/image-20161207-25746-ercssk.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/149048/original/image-20161207-25746-ercssk.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=634&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/149048/original/image-20161207-25746-ercssk.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=634&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/149048/original/image-20161207-25746-ercssk.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=634&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/149048/original/image-20161207-25746-ercssk.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=796&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/149048/original/image-20161207-25746-ercssk.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=796&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/149048/original/image-20161207-25746-ercssk.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=796&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">US troops along the Naktong River, 1950.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:HA-SC-98-06983-Crew_of_M24_along_Naktong_River_front-Korean_war-17_Aug_1950.JPEG">Sgt. Riley, US Army/Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But in 1949, US Secretary of State Dean Acheson gave a <a href="http://www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/books/ct-books-general-vs-the-president-hw-brand-20161005-story.html">commencement speech</a> at the US Military Academy at West Point in which he outlined a “defence perimeter” or areas of the globe that were vital to US interests. The Korean peninsula went conspicuously unacknowledged. When Kim next asked Stalin to green-light an offensive, Stalin relented – though as Halberstam tells it, he told Kim that if he got into trouble, he’d have to ask Mao Tse-Tung for help. </p>
<p>Unfortunately for Kim, it turned out that the US was in fact willing to go to war to defend South Korea. Had the secretary of state communicated this clearly in 1949, there might never have been a war from 1950 to 1953. </p>
<p>Similarly, just three days before the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Ambassador April Glaspie <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/01/09/wikileaks-april-glaspie-and-saddam-hussein/">reassured</a> Iraqi President Saddam Hussein that the US had friendly intentions towards Iraq and had “no special defense or security commitments to Kuwait”. Small wonder, then, that Hussein did not back down when the US threatened to go to war if he didn’t withdraw his forces – but unfortunately for him, President George H. W. Bush decided that he was willing to go to war after all.</p>
<p>Taken alongside all this history, Trump’s noncommittal pronouncements are especially troubling. It’s all too easy to see why Putin or Kim might think he would let them get away with things they’ve so far deemed too risky. </p>
<p>It’s also frighteningly easy to imagine that any new conflict on the Korean peninsula might once again elicit Chinese military intervention. The Chinese leadership has surely not forgotten that the last time the US intervened to defend South Korea from Communism, its goal shifted to Korean unification once the war was underway. If Western forces push past the <a href="http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/11/economist-explains-1">38th parallel</a> once more, raising the possibility that new US military bases could be set up less than a mile from Chinese territory, even a cautious Chinese Communist Party might feel compelled to act.</p>
<p>Either way, it’s all deeply worrying. If Trump’s laissez-faire, isolationist posturing is borne out in his presidency, the US’s biggest rivals may embark on some dangerous new ventures; if he tries to prove he is in fact prepared to defend his allies, he could spur them into defending their interests with force. The result could be a return to warfare on a scale not seen in decades. </p>
<p>I for one hardly hope to see the US abandon its key allies. But that’s exactly why the countdown to Trump’s inauguration is so troubling. If Putin and Kim respond to Trump’s comments the way leaders have often responded to American isolationism, there is no best case scenario.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/69392/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Phil Arena does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Will the world be safer if Trump meant the things he said on the campaign trail, or if he didn’t?Phil Arena, Lecturer, Department of Government, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/488472015-10-08T15:51:58Z2015-10-08T15:51:58ZFrom Turkey to the Baltics, NATO faces up to Russia<p>Jens Stoltenberg, secretary general of NATO, has <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/10/08/us-mideast-crisis-syria-nato-idUSKCN0S20HJ20151008">said</a> the organisation is “ready and able to defend all allies, including Turkey against any threats”. This followed incursions into Turkish airspace by Russian planes. On the same day, UK defence secretary, Michael Fallon announced that around 100 British troops would be deployed to the <a href="https://uk.news.yahoo.com/uk-commits-long-term-troop-091528786.html">Baltic region</a>.</p>
<p>Arguably these actions and others are a response to what Admiral Mark Ferguson, the commander of US Naval Forces Europe, described as Russia’s “<a href="http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/naval/2015/10/06/russia-military-naval-power-shipbuilding-submarine-warships-baltic-mediterranean-black-sea-arctic-syria-estonia-latvia-lithuania-crimea-ukraine/73480280/">arc of steel</a>” – a chain of air, land and sea defence assets stretching from the Arctic to the Middle East.</p>
<p>These gestures herald what many in NATO see as an ominous new turn in Russia’s behaviour. This sea change in NATO-Russia relations has its roots way back in the Kosovo conflict, but finally seems to be coming full circle – first in Ukraine and now in Syria.</p>
<h2>Deteriorating relations</h2>
<p>Russia has reportedly had both regular and irregular troops operating in eastern Ukraine, not to mention Crimea, and has now entered into the civil war in the air over Syria to help prop up the regime of Bashar al-Assad, along with the Iranians and Lebanon’s Hezbollah. Now both Ukraine and Syria are being used to illustrate how Russia is a growing threat to European security. NATO’s role is to give reassurance to not only the Baltic States and Poland but also now to Turkey. </p>
<p>From the NATO’s perspective, there are considerable concerns about its own frontiers. Russia has <a href="http://www.albawaba.com/news/russias-long-history-airspace-violation-752400">persistently violated airspaces</a> since the end of the Cold War but has done so with increasing frequency in eastern and northern Europe in recent years. The air war in Ukraine, especially near its borders with NATO countries (Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania) is almost nonexistent, especially after the downing of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-a-failure-in-command-and-control-the-cause-of-mh17-disaster-29425">Malaysia Airlines flight MH17</a> in 2014. The prospect for conflict in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/just-how-dangerous-are-the-skies-over-syria-48456">skies over Syria</a>, however, poses a much more serious problem.</p>
<p>Turkey had previously seemed a soft spot for Russia’s relations with the region but the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/06/nato-chief-jens-stoltenberg-russia-turkish-airspace-violations-syria">mood</a> between Ankara and Moscow <a href="https://theconversation.com/syria-airstrikes-expose-the-faultlines-in-turkeys-relationship-with-russia-48770">has changed dramatically</a> since Russia’s decision to intervene in Syria on behalf of the Assad regime, which Turkey has sought to remove <strong>link</strong>. As soon as Russian aircraftt violated Turkish airspace on October 5, the risk of a military stand-off between Russia and a NATO member increased. </p>
<h2>NATO’s response</h2>
<p>On one hand, the Turkish response to Russia’s intervention and its airspace violation is itself a serious issue. Military retaliation could spark a much wider conflict. Russia has indicated that it is serious about its intervention in Syria and has already carried out airstrikes on rebel groups supported by the US and Turkey. The possibility of accidents and open confrontation is real.</p>
<p>On the other, action in Syria enables NATO to remind its members and neighbours that Russia is a security threat to Europe.</p>
<p>The Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have repeatedly stressed how vulnerable they are, given their geographical proximity to Russia and the number of Russian people living within their borders – which could be seen as catalysts for Russian intervention. This was, after all, one of the reasons Russia gave for annexing Crimea.</p>
<p>NATO has been <a href="http://sputniknews.com/military/20151003/1027946640/Trident-Juncture-2015-NATO-Military-Exercises.html">very active</a> in the Baltic region but local leaders have appealed for it to have a greater presence, including a permanent base for troops.</p>
<p>National security has been high on the agenda in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania from the beginning of their independence from the Soviet Union. Recently these concerns have concentrated on the prospect of Russia playing passport politics, a tactic used by Moscow in 2008 when Russia invaded Georgia on the pretext of protecting its nationals living there. The cyber attacks that followed the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6602171.stm">Bronze Soldier riots</a> in Estonia in 2007, when ethnic Russians and police clashed over the removal of a Soviet-era war monument, spooked not only the small state of 1.7m people, but NATO as a whole. As a result, NATO placed its Cyber Defence Centre in Tallinn. </p>
<p>Perhaps, given all this, it is small wonder that the Baltic States, their neighbour Poland, and more recently the non-NATO countries Sweden and Finland, see Russian actions in Ukraine and elsewhere as boding ill for them and for NATO as a whole.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/48847/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David J Galbreath receives funding from the ESRC and AHRC.</span></em></p>Airspace incursions are spilling over into wider tensions.David J Galbreath, Professor of International Security, Director of Centre for War and Technology, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/333432014-10-23T05:03:27Z2014-10-23T05:03:27ZHow to find a submarine (no, it’s not just a case of flicking the sonar on)<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/62545/original/pxbkktxt-1413997899.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Sub hunting: not easy.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:US_Navy_101210-N-6720T-142_The_Los_Angeles-class_attack_submarine_USS_Houston_(SSN_713)_leads_a_formation_of_ships_from_USS_George_Washington_(CVN.jpg">Adam K Thomas/USN</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Das Boot, The Hunt for Red October, The Bedford Incident, We Dive At Dawn: films based on submariners’ experience reflect the tense and unusual nature of undersea warfare – where it is often not how well armed or armoured a boat is that counts, but how quiet.</p>
<p>Submarines generate sound from their machinery and crew, and sound waves from other submarines or surface ships are used to find them. But of course submarines don’t want to be found. With the Swedish Navy <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/21/sweden-cold-war-submarine-hunt-russia-vessel-military">currently hunting</a> what is believed to be a Russian mini-submarine in Swedish Baltic waters, how can unseen boats below the water be detected?</p>
<h2>Echolocation</h2>
<p>Sonar devices reveal objects below the surface by directing sound waves into the ocean and recording the sound waves reflected back. This is called active sonar – a form of echolocation much like that used by bats. Radar is also similar, but uses radio waves instead of sound. </p>
<p>Active sonar sources and receivers – essentially underwater loudspeakers and microphones – are usually distributed along a rope in an array and towed behind a ship. The length of the array is the equivalent to the aperture of a lens in optics: the longer the array the more sound it will receive, resulting in a higher definition and better quality sonar image. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/62544/original/pnqmk2g5-1413997676.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/62544/original/pnqmk2g5-1413997676.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=322&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/62544/original/pnqmk2g5-1413997676.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=322&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/62544/original/pnqmk2g5-1413997676.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=322&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/62544/original/pnqmk2g5-1413997676.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/62544/original/pnqmk2g5-1413997676.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/62544/original/pnqmk2g5-1413997676.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">What sound goes out, comes back.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Sonar_Principle_EN.svg">Dr. Schorsch</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Sonar works well if the submarine has a highly reflective steel surface and is surrounded by water at a constant temperature. But in the deep ocean the water temperature varies, which causes the water density to vary. This changing density creates an effect called the <a href="http://ww2010.atmos.uiuc.edu/(Gh)/wwhlpr/thermocline.rxml">thermocline</a>, which acts as a barrier, causing sound energy to bend away. A canny submarine captain can use the thermocline to good effect, effectively shielding the submarine from view.</p>
<p>Another ruse (one often seen in the films) is for a submarine to hide itself by coming to rest on the ocean floor, or near ocean cliffs and trenches. Here it’s difficult for the sonar to distinguish between echoes from rocks and from the submarine. If this wasn’t enough, modern submarines are shaped in such a way to minimise reflections, and are covered in coated tiles to absorb sound and minimise the boat’s profile even further. </p>
<h2>Listening in</h2>
<p>While sonar is well known, it’s rarely actually used to hunt submarines as it’s too easy to hide from the incoming sound waves. Instead modern <a href="http://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/asw.htm">anti-submarine warfare</a> systems are actually extremely sensitive listening devices which rely on the submarine giving away its position by the sounds it makes. This is known as passive sonar.</p>
<p>Surviving below the ocean without making any sound is pretty much impossible. Keeping the submariners quiet is the easy part. Much harder is keeping the submarine’s complex systems quiet – such as the machinery used to circulate air for the crew, or the boat’s engines. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/62543/original/gmsdts46-1413997571.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/62543/original/gmsdts46-1413997571.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/62543/original/gmsdts46-1413997571.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/62543/original/gmsdts46-1413997571.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/62543/original/gmsdts46-1413997571.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/62543/original/gmsdts46-1413997571.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/62543/original/gmsdts46-1413997571.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/62543/original/gmsdts46-1413997571.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Submarines have been getting quieter.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Sub_Noise_Comparison_ENG.svg">Voytek S</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>So the first thing a submarine wishing to hide does is to shut down all unnecessary systems and, most importantly, come to a stop. This is important – a moving submarine disturbs the water, and the sound of the moving water leaves an imprint of sound waves that can be detected by the pursuer’s highly sensitive microphones. </p>
<h2>Countermeasures</h2>
<p>Given how hard it is to remain silent, submarine designers have spent a lot of time thinking of ways to minimise the sounds their systems make. For example <a href="http://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/eng/reactor.html">naval nuclear power plants</a> not only allow long missions at sea between refuelling but can also be cooled without using pumps, a source of noise. The final protection is the outer layer of tiles, which both reduce echoes from incoming sound waves and also reduce transmission of sound from within the submarine out into the ocean.</p>
<p>To find a submarine in the Baltic Sea is a challenge, as this area of relatively shallow waters is strewn with lots of small islands. To get the highest resolution images with active and passive sensors would require large arrays, often kilometres in length, to be towed behind quite large ships. But the complex ocean terrain makes doing so really tricky. In all probability Sweden will use relatively small arrays, and while these are still effective for detection, they are less able to discriminate between objects and pretty poor at accurate location.</p>
<p>All of which <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/sweden/11178965/Sweden-promises-to-use-force-over-Russian-sub-as-Baltic-hide-and-seek-goes-on.html">explains the current situation</a>: the navy knows there is a submarine out there, but they just don’t know where. Ultimately there are just too many good places for a submarine to hide in this region. The hunt continues.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/33343/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bruce Drinkwater has received funding for research from the UK EPSRC and MoD as well as BAE Systems, Rolls-Royce Plc and ATLAS Electronik, all of whom are involved in aspects of submarine manufacture. </span></em></p>Das Boot, The Hunt for Red October, The Bedford Incident, We Dive At Dawn: films based on submariners’ experience reflect the tense and unusual nature of undersea warfare – where it is often not how well…Bruce Drinkwater, Professor of Ultrasonics, University of BristolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/311482014-09-08T05:27:14Z2014-09-08T05:27:14ZTo stand up to Russia, NATO must split the defence burden more equally<p>NATO’s secretary general Anders Fogh Rasmussen is fond of saying that the alliance must now transform from a “<a href="http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_94321.htm">deployed NATO to a prepared NATO</a>”. But given the current crisis to its eastern flank, many are asking just how prepared NATO actually is to deal with an increasingly threatening and belligerent Russia. </p>
<p>The candid <a href="http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmdfence/358/35802.htm">assessment</a> delivered by General Sir Alexander Richard David Shirreff, the recently retired deputy supreme allied commander for Europe, might seem surprising:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I think NATO would find it very difficult to respond sufficiently quickly if, for example, Russia decided to attack and mount an airborne descent operation, for example, on Riga, Tallinn or Vilnius … the honest answer, as we speak now, is that NATO would be very pushed to respond sufficiently quickly in the event of a sudden surprise attack.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>While a Russian conventional attack on a NATO member remains unlikely, if one were to occur, a Baltic state would most likely be the target. That’s not just because of Russia’s geographical proximity to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; Putin’s recent <a href="http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/22586">declarations</a> that Russia will “actively defend the rights of Russians, our compatriots abroad, using the entire range of available means” is also alarming, since the Baltics harbour populations who precisely fit Putin’s rubric. </p>
<p>What worries NATO defence planners is not so much a conventional Russian attack on a member state, but the use of so-called “hybrid war” techniques. This term refers to a combination of military (both symmetrical and asymmetrical) and non-military tactics. Or, as one <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/ea5e82fa-2e0c-11e4-b760-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3CMnfbbbP">Russian military official</a> described the approach, “The broad use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian and other non-military measures.” </p>
<h2>New threats</h2>
<p>Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty was designed to deter a conventional attack on the soil of one or more member states, but, there is an increasing realisation that NATO is just not currently structured or equipped to counter a challenge that would most likely be more asymmetric in nature.</p>
<p>The real fear is that asymmetric or hybrid schemes would skirt the usual trigger points for an Article 5 response.</p>
<p>The most obvious example of this is in the cyber domain, and accordingly, NATO leaders updated their collective defence article <a href="https://theconversation.com/nato-to-unveil-cyber-defence-strategy-fit-for-changing-times-31143">to include cyber threars</a> at the Wales Summit this week.</p>
<p>But for NATO to project a credible deterrent, it needs to go much further than a line in a Communiqué referring to cyber threats. Fundamentally, it must recalibrate towards both collective defence and out-of-area security challenges. For this to happen, a few important decisions and steps must be taken.</p>
<h2>Stepping up</h2>
<p>NATO needs to permanently base troops on the territory of one of its eastern member states, and fair and credible criteria for burden-sharing must be applied. That means that while embedded US forces will of course be needed to achieve collective defence credibility, European allies will have to contribute troops and resources too for the burden to be equitably shared. </p>
<p>The announced plan to agree a <a href="http://www.stripes.com/news/europe/obama-allies-to-ok-4-000-troop-nato-response-force-in-eastern-europe-1.301149">NATO response force</a> in eastern Europe is a good first step. Increasing defence budgets in a way that also reflects equal burden-sharing across the alliance would be another. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm?selectedLocale=en">Wales Summit Declaration</a> has approved a “NATO Readiness Action Plan” with a “continuous air, land and maritime presence … in the Eastern part of the alliance.” It also set out an agreement to reverse declining defence budgets, aiming for all members to meet the alliance’s guideline spend of 2% of GDP per year “within a decade.” </p>
<p>Although the target of all member states spending 2% of their GDP on defence remains somewhat unrealistic, that the Wales Summit has seen the NATO Command Structure updated, and developing an exercise programme that includes “hybrid warfare” threats is an encouraging sign. </p>
<p>All laudable declarations, then – but it should also be noted that this is not a legally binding document. The 2% target, too, was already agreed once before, in 2006. NATO has to face up to critical challenges when it comes to spending and burden-sharing, but it also must face up to the short-term task of simultaneously winding down operations in Afghanistan while transforming to becoming a “NATO prepared”. </p>
<p>The alliance’s members must surely realise that if they don’t address the imbalances in its collective defence posture, NATO’s relevance will be fundamentally damaged – maybe even with devastating short-term consequences. </p>
<p>As they make their way home with their Welsh goody bags, the alliance’s 28 leaders should remember this much: for NATO, failing to plan is planning to fail.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/31148/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon J Smith receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC).</span></em></p>NATO’s secretary general Anders Fogh Rasmussen is fond of saying that the alliance must now transform from a “deployed NATO to a prepared NATO”. But given the current crisis to its eastern flank, many…Simon J Smith, Research Associate, Department of Politics, Languages & International Studies, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/296022014-09-03T05:21:35Z2014-09-03T05:21:35ZRussia’s borders: minorities and military manoeuvres rattle nerves in the Baltics<p><em>Anxiety over the crisis in eastern Ukraine has ratcheted in recent days amid claims of an <a href="http://online.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-accuses-russia-of-invasion-west-to-consider-sanctions-1409222768">effective Russian invasion</a>, and warnings of <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/02/world/europe/nato-to-create-a-rapid-response-force-for-eastern-europe-officials-say.html?_r=0">NATO making a 4000-troop reaction force available</a> to the region. As events continue to unfold, we ask what this means for the future of Russia and relations with its neighbours. Is Vladimir Putin merely defending his country’s interests or are we witnessing the gathering momentum of a new Russian imperialism?</em> </p>
<p><em>This is the first of a series that aims to explain the risks and flashpoints across Russian’s European frontier. Here we spotlight the Baltic states of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania.</em></p>
<p><strong><em>Agnia Grigas, Occidental College, Los Angeles</em></strong></p>
<p>Baltic‒Russian relations could have never been described as friendly. Since the Baltic states gained independence from the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, they have been among the most contentious in Europe. Yet before Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the conflict in eastern Ukraine, a territorial threat on the Baltic states seemed implausible. Today it has certainly become a concern, if not an immediate risk.</p>
<p>Despite Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia joining NATO and the EU in 2004, Moscow unexpectedly continued to perceive the Baltics as a <a href="http://home.comcast.net/%7Elionelingram/Russias_Sphere_of_Interest_09oct_Trenin.pdf">“zone of privileged interest”</a>. In turn Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius still perceive Russia as a potential threat to their economies, energy sectors and societies – a fact that many observers found surprising until Russia annexed Crimea and stoked conflict in eastern Ukraine.</p>
<p>The Baltic states have faced repeated Russian defence exercises in their neighbourhood, despite NATO membership. In March, immediately after the annexation of Crimea, the Russian fleet <a href="http://en.itar-tass.com/russia/721751">conducted</a> unexpected tactical exercises along the Baltic coast. </p>
<p>After Poland <a href="http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_107711.htm">invoked Article 4</a> of the North Atlantic Treaty, which is a request for security consultations, NATO demonstrated its commitment to security by increasing its air and ground presence in the region and collaborating in military exercises. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/57881/original/mdb46tgr-1409577655.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/57881/original/mdb46tgr-1409577655.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/57881/original/mdb46tgr-1409577655.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=470&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/57881/original/mdb46tgr-1409577655.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=470&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/57881/original/mdb46tgr-1409577655.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=470&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/57881/original/mdb46tgr-1409577655.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=590&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/57881/original/mdb46tgr-1409577655.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=590&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/57881/original/mdb46tgr-1409577655.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=590&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mapbox</span>, <a class="license" href="http://artlibre.org/licence/lal/en">FAL</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Russia <a href="http://en.itar-tass.com/russia/735782">responded in June</a> by deploying its own 24 warships and bombers to Kaliningrad, the Russian territory sandwiched between Poland and Lithuania on the Baltic sea. As recently as <a href="http://en.delfi.lt/lithuania/defence/nato-fighter-jets-escort-russian-aircraft-from-lithuania.d?id=65454778">August</a>, Russian fighter jets flew close to the Estonian coast above neutral waters and violated Baltic air space. </p>
<p>Energy dependence is another source of tensions. The three states face almost total dependency on Russian oil and gas, and are linked to Russian electricity networks. Russia has repeatedly hiked its gas prices to Lithuania during times of political tensions, not least over <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/03/us-eu-gazprom-idUSBRE9920DV20131003">a row with</a> Russia’s Gazprom. </p>
<p>But Lithuania’s <a href="http://www.enmin.lt/en/activity/veiklos_kryptys/strateginiai_projektai/lng_terminal.php?clear_cache=Y">Klaipeda liquid natural gas terminal</a> will start operations in December, enabling Lithuania to buy gas from world markets rather than solely from Gazprom via Russian-owned pipelines. This will strengthen Lithuania’s bargaining position, and weaken Russia’s ability to demand political concessions. </p>
<p>But possibly most worrying, given Russia’s efforts to “protect” Russian speakers in eastern Ukraine, is the Baltic’s own sizeable population of Russian ethnic minorities. In Estonia and Latvia, ethnic Russians number 24% and 27% of the population respectively, concentrated in the east of the country, while in Lithuania it is below 6%. Percentages of Russian speakers, rather than ethnic Russians, are even higher.</p>
<p>Over the past couple of decades, Russia has made great efforts to maintain political, economic and social ties with these people. It hands out citizenship to them, particularly in eastern Estonia. Moscow also handed out citizenships to residents in Crimea; Georgia’s <a href="http://example.com/">Abkhazia and South Ossetia</a>; and <a href="http://www.euractiv.com/sections/europes-east/russia-defies-moldovas-eu-pact-boosting-transnistria-trade-303263">Moldova’s Transnistria</a> before it sought to gain control of these territories.</p>
<p><strong><em>Matthew Crandall, Tallinn University</em></strong></p>
<p>NATO has noticeably increased its presence in the Baltics of late. On his <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/erik-brattberg/why-president-obamas-visi_b_5743940.html">recent visit</a> to Estonia, US President Obama reiterated NATO’s commitment to <a href="http://www.nato.int/terrorism/five.htm">article 5</a> (attack against one member is an attack against all). Estonia is also looking at ways to increase its own military capabilities, including purchasing tanks, other military hardware and increasing spending on defence. </p>
<p>Social cohesion is even more important in many ways than the military capabilities being discussed. Putin tends to invade places where the majority welcome him with open arms, like Georgia, Crimea and to a certain extent eastern Ukraine. So for Estonia, the best defence is to ensure that the Russian-speaking population would not welcome a Russian invasion. Considering Estonia’s demographic make-up, it is surprising this has not garnered more media attention. </p>
<p>The Russian speakers in the Georgian and Ukrainian conflicts certainly didn’t exist as independent societies. In many ways Putin has been responsible for their behaviour via his propaganda machine, using the local population as a tool to achieve larger geopolitical aims. This only increases the importance of Estonia’s handling of its Russian speakers. The more integrated the Russian speakers, the less effective Putin’s asymmetrical warfare. </p>
<p>For the government, this could include funding more Russian media outlets in Estonia that would provide a neutral view of current affairs. This would be expensive, but would not cost more than the €100m (£81m) that <a href="http://news.err.ee/v/society/75881a43-ecfe-41fd-85bd-ba829fb89758">may be</a> spent on used tanks. Moving some state entities to the city of Narva or elsewhere in eastern Estonia could be another option. Introducing mandatory civilian service for both men and women in addition to mandatory military service could increase a sense of community among Russian speaking youth. Increasing the welfare of those in the region should also be a priority, since most welfare indicators show it is disproportionately badly off. </p>
<p>The public has a role too. Estonian speakers need to see Russian speakers not as illegal immigrants from the Soviet Union era who are unwilling to learn Estonian, but simply as neighbors who speak a different language. And Russian speakers should avoid any victim mentality and take ownership of their own situation, making the most of their lives in Estonia. While Estonian and Russian speakers may disagree on the legacy of the past, they should agree on the country’s future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/29602/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Anxiety over the crisis in eastern Ukraine has ratcheted in recent days amid claims of an effective Russian invasion, and warnings of NATO making a 4000-troop reaction force available to the region. As…Agnia Grigas, Fellow of the McKinnon Institute for Global Affairs, Occidental CollegeMatthew Crandall, Lecturer of International Relations, Tallinn UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.