tag:theconversation.com,2011:/fr/topics/benefits-tourism-8662/articlesBenefits tourism – The Conversation2017-01-09T12:52:45Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/709552017-01-09T12:52:45Z2017-01-09T12:52:45ZHow Finland could see benefits from its basic income experiment <figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/151997/original/image-20170106-18665-ktv17q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A new plan</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/pic-547912216/stock-photo-cityscape-of-helsinki-the-capital-city-of-finland.html?src=1VVEL4ibzFDFtgNmNIgnMA-2-60">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>One of the greatest political challenges in the 21st century is coming up with a welfare system which is both effective and fair. Recipients and non-recipients of benefits payments are both quick to point out apparent deficiencies in the status quo – as well as problems with any potential alternatives. But some countries are clearly ready for change.</p>
<p>As of January 1 2017, Finland became the <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/finland-universal-basic-income-ubi-citizens-560-euros-monthly-job-poverty-unemployment-a7492911.html">first European country to implement a plan</a> whereby unemployed citizens receive a basic monthly income. Created by the government agency responsible for Finnish social security benefits (<a href="http://www.kela.fi/web/en">KELA</a>), it will be run as a pilot scheme in which 2,000 randomly selected unemployed people receive €560 every month in place of their existing social security payments. </p>
<p>Recipients will continue to be paid even if they find work or, more significantly for some, even if they choose not to look for work. The trial will last for two years and is intended to reduce <a href="http://www.tradingeconomics.com/finland/unemployment-rate">high levels of unemployment</a>. </p>
<p>Like many Western societies, Finland has long had a complex social security system which could lead to an unemployed person refusing a low-paid or short-term job for fear of having their financial benefits reduced dramatically. This kind of system can be said to cause a negative cycle in which those in receipt of payments feel they are better off on benefits. The fear of losing “certain” benefits for “uncertain” wages becomes a significant barrier to moving into employment. </p>
<p>This kind of situation is replicated in much of continental Europe and it’s certainly a bold move for the Finnish government to look at the possibility of such wide scale change. Perhaps they are encouraged by the success of similar schemes in <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/a-new-approach-to-aid-how-a-basic-income-program-saved-a-namibian-village-a-642310.html">parts of Africa</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/economics-blog/2014/dec/18/incomes-scheme-transforms-lives-poor">India</a>, which were designed to reduce poverty. In the UK, <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/scotland-pilot-universal-basic-income-ubi-snp-fife-and-glasgow-scheme-a7505411.html">Scotland considered</a> scrapping the current welfare system and replacing it with a non-means tested guaranteed income for all citizens in the hope of tackling the growing problem of mass unemployment.</p>
<p>It doesn’t appeal to everyone however. In June 2016, after a frank, open and occasionally heated debate, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-36454060">Swiss voters overwhelmingly rejected</a> a minimum monthly income for all, with only 23% of voters supporting the plan. But looking at the logic behind Finland’s experiment, it can be argued that a basic income scheme has more advantages than disadvantages. </p>
<p>First, basic income will make the social security system much simpler by reducing bureaucracy, resulting in a fairer and more cost effective system that should end extreme poverty. The scheme will reward unpaid contributions to society, such as close family carers. And it could make people feel more secure in making changes to their lives – a safety net which might strengthen the nation’s sense of endeavour and enterprise. </p>
<p>Another important advantage is that a basic income scheme should almost completely eradicate the plague of benefit fraud, which <a href="http://www.theweek.co.uk/62461/benefit-fraud-v-tax-evasion-which-costs-more">costs the UK billions</a> of pounds every year. </p>
<h2>Race to the Finnish</h2>
<p>Critics of the scheme feel it will reward and encourage laziness. Harsher sceptics have even likened the concept to reverting back to negative stereotypes of communist societies. But beyond fears of what might happen if a population is given “free money’”, perhaps the biggest concerns currently being voiced tie into immigration. Would a scheme like this give a country an unwanted “pull factor”?</p>
<p>It’s no secret that Europe is currently undergoing the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-32395181">worst migrant crisis</a> since the World War II. Having a basic income scheme in Europe could make the continent an even more attractive place to live. Last year, the UK saw its highest level of net migration ever, with figures for the year ending June 2016 <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-38167225">standing at 335,000</a>. It has been suggested that Finland could see migrants turning away from the UK as they are pulled towards the country and the promise of an “easier” life because it offered a basic income. This argument was a dominant part of the Swiss debate. </p>
<p>Critics of the scheme also point to the issue of benefit tourism among European citizens who move from low GDP countries to higher GDP countries with absolutely no intention of finding work. You can see why there are more than a handful of doubters. </p>
<p>Yet among all the discussion, one key point seems to have escaped many people’s attention. The average private sector income in Finland is <a href="http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-finland-basic-income-20170103-story.html">around €3,500 a month</a>, making the basic income for unemployed just 16% of the average salary. Perhaps the question people should be asking is whether this is enough to pay for day-to-day living expenses in Finland, let alone be a pull factor towards the country?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/70955/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The country’s new scheme could make it an extremely popular destination.Surraya Rowe, Finance Lecturer, Cardiff Metropolitan UniversityChris Parry, Senior Lecturer in Accounting and Finance, Cardiff Metropolitan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/439312015-06-26T10:49:04Z2015-06-26T10:49:04ZEU leaders know the plan, but need convincing of Cameron’s motivations<p>David Cameron has opened discussions at the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-real-reason-cameron-is-outlining-his-eu-plans-over-dinner-in-brussels-43865">European Council</a> about the changes he wants to see in the European Union ahead of a UK referendum on membership.</p>
<p>This is an unprecedented step. It is the first time an EU leader has set out political conditions for a country to stay in the EU.</p>
<p>Cameron held individual meeting and calls with each of the leaders ahead of the Brussels summit on June 25, so his negotiation points will not have come as news to them. But he is still keeping the detail light, and crucially, is cagey on his motivations.</p>
<p>This matters because co-operation from his fellow leaders may well hinge on what those motivations are. </p>
<p>The key issues on the table include handing greater powers to national parliaments, cutting red tape, allowing the UK to <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/jan/23/david-cameron-uk-exemption-eu">opt out</a> of the principle of “ever closer union”, and restricting welfare entitlements for EU migrants.</p>
<p>What he means by giving more power to national parliaments is very vague at the moment. Does he want to repatriate powers from the EU? And if so, which ones? Or does it mean more oversight over EU legislation? If so, Cameron’s request may be more of a rhetorical tool than a substantive demand. The British government has not exactly shown enormous interest in <a href="mailto:https://theconversation.com/theres-more-to-europe-than-in-or-out-and-britain-desperately-needs-to-talk-about-it-39392">scrutinising EU legislation</a> over the past few years.</p>
<p>The issue of red tape is not particularly controversial, and it seems that Junker’s Commission has made this one of its <a href="mailto:http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/politics-tax.z74">top priorities</a>. And freeing the UK’s commitment to the “ever closer union” may not necessarily require a full EU Treaty change. The EU’s legal machinery may find a way to include this in an additional UK-specific annex.</p>
<h2>The big ask</h2>
<p>At this point probably the most sticky issue relates to EU migration. Cameron has previously stated that he wants to limit immigration through <a href="mailto:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/immigration/11172379/David-Camerons-plans-to-limit-immigration-through-quotas-for-EU-workers-is-illegal-European-President-says.html">quotas for EU workers</a>. This is problematic as it infringes upon a fundamental EU freedom. The European Council’s President Donald Tusk has reportedly stated that the fundamental values of the EU <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-33278440">“are not for sale and so are non-negotiable</a>”.</p>
<p>Cameron appears to have already toned down his rhetoric on this issue, and is now focusing his argument on benefits for EU migrants. He wants, for a start, to repatriate EU migrants after six months if they are unemployed. This is controversial as it goes against the fundamental EU principle of free movement. It is also potentially hard to implement, as it will require very rigid immigration controls. It is unclear how the government will track these EU migrants in the first place.</p>
<p>He also wants longer transition periods for EU migrants before they can claim tax credits and have access to social housing. The question here is whether this could be legally implemented through UK legislation without EU Treaty change. </p>
<p>Cameron’s argument will be that since the UK system is non contributory – unlike other EU member states – this change does not necessarily contravene EU legislation. Perhaps less controversially, he wants to stop migrants claiming benefits for children living outside the UK. These proposals have already been criticised by the <a href="mailto:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-33253209">adviser</a> to the Polish PM who argued that this might be tantamount to discrimination.</p>
<p>And here lies the problem. Cameron’s success may depend on what his goal actually is. Is the objective to stop EU migrants from abusing the UK welfare state or to stop them moving to the UK altogether? If it’s the former, some EU leaders may concede to some of his demands. But if it’s the latter, Cameron is unlikely to be a winner in the EU.</p>
<p>Cameron will now present his full reform plan at the next European Council in December. The PM has already conceded that <a href="mailto:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-33278440">Treaty change may not be possible</a>, so it looks like he will have to be very pragmatic regarding what he asks of EU partners. And he’ll not only need to be convincing about the changes he wants – but why he wants them.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/43931/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
David Cameron has opened discussions at the European Council about the changes he wants to see in the European Union ahead of a UK referendum on membership. This is an unprecedented step. It is the first…Sofia Vasilopoulou, Lecturer, Department of Politics, University of YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/338152014-11-05T06:15:11Z2014-11-05T06:15:11ZYes, EU immigrants do have a positive impact on public finances<p>The impact of immigration on Britain’s tax and welfare system is perhaps the most important economic issue in the debate over the country’s relationship with the EU and its principle of free movement. There are claims that immigrants from Europe take advantage of the UK’s benefit and health system. This has led to political pressure to <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/immigration/10996721/David-Cameron-announces-immigration-benefits-crackdown.html">limit immigrants’ access to benefits and public services</a> and even <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-29878283">restrict immigration</a> from the European Economic Area countries.</p>
<p>But, despite the controversy surrounding this issue, evidence for how much immigrants take out of and contribute to the public purse in Britain is surprisingly sparse. Our <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ecoj.12181/abstract">new research</a> published by the Royal Economic Society in the Economic Journal aims to fill this void. </p>
<p>Based on the <a href="http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/about-ons/get-involved/taking-part-in-a-survey/information-for-households/a-to-z-of-household-and-individual-surveys/labour-force-survey/index.html">UK Labour Force Survey</a> and a multitude of government sources, we calculate the overall fiscal contribution of native Britons and immigrants. Our findings show that European immigrants to the UK have paid more in taxes than they received in benefits, helping to relieve the fiscal burden on UK-born workers and contributing to the financing of public services.</p>
<p>To do this, we assign individuals their share of cost for each item of government expenditure. We then identify their contribution to each source of government revenue. We distinguish between immigrants from the European Economic Area (EEA), and those from outside Europe. Additionally, we break down the EEA group into immigrants from the Eastern and Central European countries that joined the EU since 2004 (known as A10 countries), and immigrants from the rest of EEA.</p>
<h2>Positive net contribution</h2>
<p>Our findings show that immigrants to the UK who arrived since 2000, and for whom we observe their entire migration history, have made consistently positive fiscal contributions regardless of their area of origin. Between 2001 and 2011 recent immigrants from the A10 countries contributed to the fiscal system about 12% more than they took out, with a net fiscal contribution of about £5 billion.</p>
<p>At the same time the overall fiscal contributions of recent European immigrants from the rest of the EU totalled £15 billion, with fiscal payments about 64% higher than the value of public services they used. Immigrants from outside the EU countries made a net fiscal contribution of about £5.2 billion, thus paying into the system about 3% more than they took out. </p>
<p>In contrast, over the same period, native British people made an overall negative fiscal contribution of £616.5 billion. The fiscal balance of overall immigration to the UK between 2001 and 2011 amounts therefore to a positive net contribution of about £25 billion, over a period in which the UK has run an overall budget deficit.</p>
<p>Our analysis thus suggests that immigrants arriving since the early 2000s from Europe have made a net contribution to Britain’s public finances. This is a reality that contrasts starkly with the view often maintained in public debate that immigrants are a drain on the economy.</p>
<h2>State benefits</h2>
<p>This conclusion is further supported by our evidence on the degree to which immigrants receive tax credits and benefits compared with natives. Recent immigrants are 43% (17 percentage points) less likely to receive state benefits or tax credits. These differences are partly attributable to the fact that immigrants are generally working-age men and coming to the UK to work. However, even when compared with natives of the same age, gender composition and education, recent immigrants are still 39% less likely than natives to receive benefits.</p>
<p>Additionally, our research points at the strong educational background of immigrants. For instance, while the percentage of natives with a degree was 24% in 2011, that of EEA and non-EEA immigrants was 35% and 41%, respectively. Similarly, about one in two British born individuals fall into the “low education” category (defined as those who left full-time education before 17), while only 21% of EEA immigrants and 23% of non-EEA immigrants do so.</p>
<p>Most immigrants arrive in the UK after completing their education abroad, and thus at a point in their lifetime where the discounted net value of their future net fiscal payments is positive. If the UK had to provide each immigrant with the level of education they have acquired in their home country (and use productively in the UK, as natives do), the costs would be substantial. </p>
<p>Our estimates indicate that recent immigrants endowed Britain with productive human capital between 2000 and 2011 that would have cost £6.8 billion in spending on education. This aspect is often neglected in the debate about the costs and benefits of immigration.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/33815/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christian Dustmann receives funding from European Research Council (ERC)</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tommaso Frattini does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The impact of immigration on Britain’s tax and welfare system is perhaps the most important economic issue in the debate over the country’s relationship with the EU and its principle of free movement…Christian Dustmann, Director, Centre for Research and Analysis on Migration (CReAM), UCLTommaso Frattini, Assistant Professor of Economics, University of MilanLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/223242014-01-24T13:29:59Z2014-01-24T13:29:59ZBig gap between rhetoric and facts in immigration debate<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/39677/original/5dxpbtbk-1390397733.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Bordering on fiction: the immigration debate has drifted away from reality.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">PA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c1d92086-7a13-11e3-8211-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2qUA6pVDd">a recent interview</a> with the Financial Times, veteran Conservative minister Ken Clarke argued that immigration has contributed positively and significantly to the economy, and that EU free movement is unlikely to lead to “vast” or “unacceptable” levels of future immigration, particularly from Romania and Bulgaria.</p>
<p>Clarke’s intervention exacerbated infighting among Tory members of the coalition government, despite merely restating arguments made by many academics and other independent experts. However, Clarke was directly contradicting recent statements from the prime minister and other senior ministers (notably Ian Duncan Smith and Theresa May), who have argued that “vast migrations” (the term used by <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/add36222-56be-11e3-ab12-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2qUA6pVDd">David Cameron himself</a>) have been accompanied by widespread “benefit tourism”, something that <a href="https://theconversation.com/hard-evidence-does-benefits-tourism-exist-22279">has yet to be identified</a> in the available evidence.</p>
<p>Clarke’s intervention has significance far beyond Conservative Party HQ, because he alluded to several important aspects of migration that have been either conspicuously lacking or purposely misrepresented in the wider public debate.</p>
<h2>‘Deluge’ that never was</h2>
<p>First, the UK has not experienced increasing “waves” of migration since the 2004 EU enlargement which brought in eight central and eastern European countries – Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia – known as the A8. This is <a href="http://www.ntu.ac.uk/apps/news/151807-15/Expert_opinion_Migration_in_context_-_UK_arrivals_and_departures.aspx">easily demonstrated</a> with freely available official data. </p>
<p>For the two years immediately following the 2004 EU enlargement, the UK did experience a significant inflow of (mainly) A8 nationals, with an annual high-point of 302,300 additional residents due to migration between mid-2004 and mid-2005. But net migration has fallen steeply since then, and currently accounts for a minority of annual population growth (natural change, such as a recent baby boom currently contributes more than net migration). </p>
<p>Migrants continue to account for a small minority of the population in almost all local authority areas in England and Wales, with A8 migrants accounting for just 2% of the total population. Putting this in perspective, the <a href="http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/World-Migration-in-Figures.pdf">Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</a> estimates that 6.5% of adults born in the UK have emigrated to live, work or retire in other OECD countries.</p>
<p>A second problema with the debate is the idea that the UK has experienced significant “benefits tourism”. This is not only claimed without supporting evidence, but in the face of <a href="https://theconversation.com/hard-evidence-does-benefits-tourism-exist-22279">considerable evidence to the contrary</a>. Recent estimates <a href="http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778_332467.pdf">published by the UK Office for National Statistics</a> demonstrate that adults in the UK who were born in A8 countries have an employment rate of 79%, compared to an average of 72% for all UK residents, with the employment rate for those Bulgarian and Romanian nationals already in the UK at 77%.</p>
<p>A third troublesome dimension of the public debate is the under-emphasis on the positive impact of migration on the UK budget and wider economy. In his <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/immigration/10570839/Immigration-has-a-positive-impact-says-Office-for-Budget-Responsibility-head.html">recent appearance</a> before the Treasury Select Committee, Robert Chote, head of the Office for Budgetary Responsibility argued that immigration tends to “produce a more beneficial picture” for UK finances. Chote’s argument is supported by a <a href="http://www.ucl.ac.uk/news/news-articles/1113/051113-migration-report">recent study</a> from University College London. </p>
<p>As migrants are more likely to be working age and in employment compared to the UK-born population, they contribute to a significant proportion of total income tax receipts while they are less likely to draw unemployment and other benefits, claim tax credits, or use publicly-funded education and health services - resulting in a <a href="https://theconversation.com/revealed-immigrants-put-34-more-into-public-finances-than-they-take-out-19845">substantial net contribution</a> to the Exchequer.</p>
<p>The OBR has consistently argued that the UK requires a higher level of migration to fund future healthcare and pensions, and estimates that the closer the Government gets to its target to cut net immigration, the harder it will become to meet its deficit reduction targets.</p>
<p>Much has been made of a <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/dec/26/britain-europe-top-economy-by-2030">recent report</a> suggesting that the UK economy could grow to be larger than that of Germany by 2030. What was not reported so widely was that this outcome <a href="http://www.social-europe.eu/2014/01/european-migration-debate/">requires ongoing migration into the UK</a>. Or, to put it another way, limiting migration will limit economic growth in the UK – to the detriment of everyone.</p>
<h2>‘Evidence-free’ rhetoric</h2>
<p>A new, fourth, dimension to the migration debate is the call by some in the Conservative Party that the UK should have the right to veto EU laws of which they do not approve. The most obvious problem with this, as a tactic for cutting immigration, would be the self-inflicted economic damage it would cause: migration benefits the UK and so cutting migration reduces those benefits. It is quite correct to argue that this move would be illegal under EU law, but this argument merely distracts from the more fundamental point that it would harm UK economic interests.</p>
<p>Such a stance will also undermine David Cameron’s attempts to build alliances with other EU leaders in his efforts to promote reform within the EU. Tensions have already been growing <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-25656429">with some other EU leaders</a>, who may well be supportive of his wider reform efforts. <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/91350d0e-7f91-11e3-b6a7-00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=uk#axzz2qw2AUhZi">In a recent report in the Financial Times</a>, Germany’s Foreign Minister highlights the benefits of migration to Germany and the damage to German, as well as EU, interests that these and other UK proposals on migration would have. In short, this German politician, unlike his British counterparts, is putting evidence and economic interests above damaging political rhetoric.</p>
<p>We have now reached the point where senior UK politicians appear not to accept the vast prevailing body of evidence on the positive impacts migration has for the UK (including that coming from within offices of state), because it reveals the vacuity of their anti-migration rhetoric. An <a href="http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2013/11/why-immigration-debate-getting-us-nowhere">article in the New Statesmen</a> by Matthew Goodwin examines the long-term danger of this strategy for our democracy. Analysing long-term trends in opinion polling, Goodwin argues that political rhetoric – in attempting to capitalise on popular hostility to immigration for electoral advantage – merely creates expectations that the mainstream parties are unable to fulfil. This increases support for “protest” parties, such as the BNP in 2006 and UKIP more recently, and leads to a wider disillusionment in the political system.</p>
<p>For many mainstream politicians, “evidence-free” rhetoric on immigration is becoming the norm. Although it may appear to them, and their supporters in the media, that fear of migrants and migration will serve their short-term political ends, historical trends in voter behaviour suggest they are unlikely to be rewarded in the long-term. In the end they are stoking expectations they will not, and should not, be able to meet.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/22324/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Ackrill has received funding for research from Leverhulme Trust; Economic and Social Research Council.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Lawton works within the Economic Strategy Research Bureau in Nottingham Business School, providing consultancy services on economic development issues to public, private and third-sector clients. No past or current consultancy projects or client relationships relate to this topic, but it is possible that future consultancy projects could include analysis or commentary on migration and related demographic and labour market topics.</span></em></p>In a recent interview with the Financial Times, veteran Conservative minister Ken Clarke argued that immigration has contributed positively and significantly to the economy, and that EU free movement is…Robert Ackrill, Professor of European Economics and Policy, Nottingham Trent UniversityChris Lawton, Senior Research Fellow, Division of Economics, Nottingham Trent UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/222792014-01-22T06:47:54Z2014-01-22T06:47:54ZHard Evidence: does ‘benefits tourism’ exist?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/39584/original/sysw5qgm-1390323045.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Not bad, but have you seen the Whitechapel job centre?</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Chiugoran</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>For all of the changes to the UK over the last century, the ideal of “fair play” still seems to be a pretty fundamental part of Britain’s national self-image. The concept that anyone – especially anyone foreign – might try to take advantage of efforts to play fair is a surefire way to generate lots of angry headlines.</p>
<p>So the very idea that the institutions Britain established to ensure the nation’s poorest and most vulnerable were protected financially and medically – the NHS and the welfare state – might be being systematically abused by “benefit tourists” or “health tourists” is often <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-25114890">media dynamite</a>.</p>
<p>But who actually counts as a “benefit tourist”, or a “health tourist” and how much do they cost the UK?</p>
<p>No agreed definition exists for a “benefits tourist”, and while a recent government commissioned report does provide a definition of who counts as a “health tourist”, this is by no means universally accepted. In practice, the use of both terms by the media and policy makers is often vague and confusing, dealing with different groups at different times to make different points.</p>
<h2>Benefits tourism</h2>
<p>The lack of an agreed definition of who counts as a “benefits tourist” makes it very hard to discuss the subject with any real clarity. One definition would be someone who travels with the primary objective of acquiring benefits, but there is no useful data on motivations of this sort.</p>
<p>Non-EU migrants do not have recourse to public funds until they have been resident in the UK for five years, so benefits alone are not realistic as the primary motivation for non-EU migrants to travel to the UK.</p>
<p>So the easiest way of identifying the scale of “benefits tourism” as an issue is to look at the use of benefits by EU migrants.</p>
<p>The UK’s membership of the European Union means citizens of EU countries who come to the UK have access to its welfare system on essentially equal terms with British citizens, which could arguably provide a motivation for some to travel to the UK.</p>
<p>The chart below outlines how many EU migrants are in the UK, their employment rate, their use of working age benefits and claims for jobseeker’s allowance, and the number who are economically inactive – which would also include groups such as stay-at-home mothers, children, students and retired people. A8 refers to the Eastern European countries that <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/4479759.stm">joined the EU in 2004</a> (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia).</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/39586/original/v79jtxqf-1390325355.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/39586/original/v79jtxqf-1390325355.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/39586/original/v79jtxqf-1390325355.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=650&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/39586/original/v79jtxqf-1390325355.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=650&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/39586/original/v79jtxqf-1390325355.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=650&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/39586/original/v79jtxqf-1390325355.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=817&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/39586/original/v79jtxqf-1390325355.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=817&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/39586/original/v79jtxqf-1390325355.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=817&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">In order: Annual Population Survey, 2012, ONS; Labour Force Survey, 2013 Q2, ONS; DWP, February 2013; DWP, February 2013; European Labour force Survey, 2013 Q2, Eurostat. The information in this table, while informative, is not fully comparable across categories as it comes from several different sources (ONS, DWP, Eurostat), compares slightly different time periods (e.g. Feb 2013 vs 2012), geographies (UK vs GB), and groups (old EU, Accession countries, EU14, A2 and A8).</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This suggests that less than 5% of EU migrants are claiming jobseeker’s allowance, while less than 10% are claiming other working age benefits. (Precise percentages are not available from these tables, as some figures refer to the UK while others are for Great Britain only.)</p>
<p>It also shows that the employment rate of EU migrants is 77.5% – which rises to nearly 80% for A8 migrants. While none of this disproves the assertion that some EU migrants might travel to the UK with the intention of claiming benefits, it does suggest that the vast majority of EU migrants do not use out-of-work or working age benefits. Other in-work benefits, such as tax credits, are also available. However as in-work benefits are for the employed, it is hard to reconcile recipients of them with the view that claiming benefits is the primary motivation of a “benefits tourist”.</p>
<p>This conclusion is supported by a <a href="http://csdle.lex.unict.it/docs/labourweb/A-fact-finding-analysis-on-the-impact-on-the-Member-States-social-security-systems-of-the-entitlemen/4470.aspx">recent review</a> of social security policies around the EU and their impacts on migration which concluded:</p>
<p>“No evidence shows that access to the specific special non-contributory benefit income-based jobseeker’s allowance could be considered a significant driver for EU migrants in the UK.” </p>
<p>However the situation is complicated further by the question of what role in-work benefits, such as tax credits (not included in the table above), may play in attracting migrants from the EU to the UK. In-work benefits are, of course, for the employed, so it is hard to reconcile recipients of them with the view that claiming benefits is the primary motivation of a “benefits tourist”.</p>
<p>Incorporating in-work benefits into an analysis of the attractiveness of the UK’s welfare state for migrants from Romania and Bulgaria, for example, adds further uncertainty to assessments about the economic motivations for migration.</p>
<p>As the table below shows, transitional controls created an incentive for migrants from these countries to the UK to be registered as self-employed, rather than to work for an employer in the <a href="http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/aboutus/workingwithus/mac/-restrictions-worker1/transitional-restrictions.pdf?view=Binary">limited fields available to them</a> as a result of the controls.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/42180/original/csvs578g-1392974859.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/42180/original/csvs578g-1392974859.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/42180/original/csvs578g-1392974859.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=122&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/42180/original/csvs578g-1392974859.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=122&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/42180/original/csvs578g-1392974859.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=122&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/42180/original/csvs578g-1392974859.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=154&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/42180/original/csvs578g-1392974859.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=154&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/42180/original/csvs578g-1392974859.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=154&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Labour Force Survey Q1-3, 2013 (average); Migration Observatory calculations</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Perversely, this meant that the UK’s transitional controls on access to benefits did not apply to the majority of Romanian and Bulgarian nationals working in the UK because self-employment provided them with, essentially, <a href="http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/research/briefing-papers/SN05972/eea-nationals-the-right-to-reside-requirement-for-benefits">full access to the UK’s welfare state</a>. In 2013 an estimated 69,000 Romanian and Bulgarian workers in the UK – which accounts for 59% of the 117,000 in employment – were registered as self employed, compared to just under 14% for British workers, 15% for workers from the A8 accession countries and 15.8% for workers from the old EU 14 countries.</p>
<p>Again, this does not prove that these migrants specifically chose to come to the UK to claim benefits. Registration as self-employed was less of a choice than a necessity for coming to work in the UK, as a result of transitional restrictions on what work they could do in the UK. However, regardless of motivation, this status did provide access to the benefits system.</p>
<h2>Health tourism</h2>
<p>Unlike “benefits tourism” there is a definition of “health tourism” that has been used in a recent <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/251909/Quantitative_Assessment_of_Visitor_and_Migrant_Use_of_the_NHS_in_England_-_Exploring_the_Data_-_FULL_REPORT.pdf">government commissioned report</a>, which provides a useful, if not agreed, framework for understanding the concept.</p>
<p>The definition, prepared for the Department of Health in October 2013, acknowledges that definitions vary widely, but identifies health tourists as:</p>
<blockquote>
<ul>
<li>Deliberate intent: people who have travelled with a deliberate intention to obtain free healthcare to which they are not entitled.</li>
<li>Taking advantage: frequent visitors registered with GPs and able to obtain routine treatment including prescriptions and some elective (non-emergency) hospital referral</li>
</ul>
</blockquote>
<p>The “taking advantage” group includes both British citizens and foreign citizens who do not live in the UK, but use the NHS on regular visits.</p>
<p>The specific definition in this Department of Health report suggests an overall cost to the NHS of between £70 million and £300 million per year.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/39583/original/598wztmp-1390321348.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/39583/original/598wztmp-1390321348.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/39583/original/598wztmp-1390321348.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=208&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/39583/original/598wztmp-1390321348.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=208&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/39583/original/598wztmp-1390321348.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=208&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/39583/original/598wztmp-1390321348.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=262&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/39583/original/598wztmp-1390321348.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=262&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/39583/original/598wztmp-1390321348.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=262&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">prederi</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The problem with definitions</h2>
<p>Despite the clear definition of health tourism in the report for the Department of Health, a Daily Mail front page from October covered it with this headline, <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2470994/TRUE-cost-health-tourism-Foreigners-cost-NHS-2BN-year.html">Health tourism: the TRUE cost</a>. This was followed by the claim:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Foreign visitors and short-term migrants cost the NHS £2billion a year, an official report warns … The first comprehensive assessment of “health tourism” says the true cost to taxpayers is up to 100 times bigger than some estimates.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The Daily Mail report broadened the definition of “health tourists” to include all foreign visitors and short-term migrants. Clearly this increases the costs to the NHS, but these migrants are not included as health tourists in the report, and have the legal right to use the service.</p>
<p>Undertaking a similar broadening of the definition of a “benefits tourist” will also, naturally, increase both the number of “benefits tourists” and the associated cost to the economy. But circumstances where, for example, a couple born in another country but resident in the UK for 30 years, and both earning £50,000 are classed as “benefits tourists” on the basis that they receive child benefit is contrary to most understandings of the term.</p>
<p>By failing to make adequate distinctions between deliberate abuse and lawful use – widening and narrowing definitions of these unwanted “tourists” to create more dramatic narratives – some politicians and journalists are muddying the water in an already complicated debate. If the parameters of these terms can be agreed by reporters and politicians so that the public can know who is being discussed and targeted by policies, all the better, but until then these terms are usually confusing at best, and should be taken with a pinch of salt.</p>
<p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/topics/hard-evidence">Hard Evidence</a> is a series of articles in which academics use research evidence to tackle the trickiest public policy questions.</em></p>
<hr>
<p><em>This article was updated on 21 February 2014 to include <a href="https://theconversation.com/most-romanians-and-bulgarians-already-had-full-access-to-benefits-before-2014-23498">new research</a> on the employment status of Romanian and Bulgarian migrants.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/22279/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The Migration Obsrvatory receives funding from the ESRC, Esmée Fairbairn Foundation, Unbound Philanthropy and The Barrow Cadbury Trust.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rob McNeil does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>For all of the changes to the UK over the last century, the ideal of “fair play” still seems to be a pretty fundamental part of Britain’s national self-image. The concept that anyone – especially anyone…Carlos Vargas-Silva, Senior Researcher, Migration Observatory, University of OxfordRob McNeil, Head of Media and Communications, Migration Observatory, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.