tag:theconversation.com,2011:/fr/topics/david-mabuza-47441/articlesDavid Mabuza – The Conversation2023-05-24T13:42:03Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2061012023-05-24T13:42:03Z2023-05-24T13:42:03ZCorruption in South Africa: former CEO’s explosive book exposes how state power utility was destroyed<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527785/original/file-20230523-19-yugb19.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Former Eskom CEO Andre de Ruyter.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">PenguinRandomHouse</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>One repeated theme of the <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.co.za/book/truth-power-my-three-years-inside-eskom/9781776390625#:%7E:text=De%20Ruyter%20candidly%20reflects%20on,to%20speak%20truth%20to%20power">memoir</a> Truth to Power: My Three Years Inside Eskom, by Andre de Ruyter, former CEO of South Africa’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-electricity-supply-whats-tripping-the-switch-151331">troubled power utility</a>, Eskom, is that “negligence and carelessness had become cemented into the organisation”. </p>
<p>Dirt piled up at even the newest power stations until it damaged equipment, which stopped working – and some equipment disappeared beneath a layer of ash.</p>
<p>Integrity had been displaced by greed and crime: </p>
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<p>Corruption had metastasised to permeate much of the organisation. </p>
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<p>As a political scientist who has, among other topics, followed corruption and kleptocracy, this book ranks among the more informative.</p>
<p>De Ruyter (or his ghost writer) delivers a pacey, racy adventure <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.co.za/book/truth-power-my-three-years-inside-eskom/9781776390625">thriller</a>. Chapter after chapter reads like a horror story about Eskom, whose failure to generate enough electricity consistently for <a href="https://theconversation.com/power-cuts-and-food-safety-how-to-avoid-illness-during-loadshedding-200586">the past 15</a> years has <a href="https://www.investec.com/en_za/focus/economy/sa-s-load-shedding-how-the-sectors-are-being-affected.html">hobbled the economy</a>. </p>
<p>The book is also a sobering indication that parts of South Africa now fester with organised crime.</p>
<p>This book merits its place alongside <a href="https://www.loot.co.za/product/crispian-olver-how-to-steal-a-city/jywy-5080-g730?PPC=Y&gclid=EAIaIQobChMIgZaS7pbE3QIVS7DtCh0EGQXfEAAYASAAEgLszPD_BwE&gclsrc=aw.ds">How to Steal a City</a> and <a href="https://jacana.co.za/product/how-to-steal-a-country-state-capture-and-hopes-for-the-future-in-south-africa/">How to Steal a Country</a>. These two books chronicle how corruption undermined respectively a city and a country to the level where they became dysfunctional.</p>
<h2>Brazen looting</h2>
<p>Another take-away is the devastating indictment of De Ruyter’s immediate predecessors as CEO, <a href="https://www.eskom.co.za/heritage/matshela-koko/">Matshela Koko</a> and <a href="https://www.eskom.co.za/heritage/brian-molefe/">Brian Molefe</a>. They appear as incompetent managers who ran into the ground what the Financial Times of London had praised as the world’s best state-owned enterprise as recently as 2001. Both <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/live-former-eskom-boss-matshela-koko-arrested-on-corruption-charges-20221027">Koko</a> and <a href="https://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/molefe-singh-back-in-palm-ridge-specialised-commercial-crimes-court/">Molefe</a> have been charged with corruption – at Eskom and the transport parastatal Transet, respectively.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/explosive-revelations-about-south-africas-power-utility-why-new-electricity-minister-should-heed-the-words-of-former-eskom-ceo-201508">Explosive revelations about South Africa's power utility: why new electricity minister should heed the words of former Eskom CEO</a>
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<p>The standard joke about corruption is “Mr Ten Percent” – meaning a middleman who adds 10% onto the price of everything passing through his hands. Under Koko and Molefe, this had allegedly ballooned into “Mr Ten Thousand Percent”. </p>
<p>For example, De Ruyter writes that Eskom was just stopped in the nick of time from paying a middleman R238,000 for a cleaning mop. </p>
<p>Corruption focused on the procurement chain. One middleman bought knee-pads for R150 (US$7,80) and sold them to Eskom for R80,000 (US$4,200). Another bought a knee-pad for R4,025 (US$209) and sold it to Eskom for R934,950 (US$48,544). The same applied to toilet rolls and rubbish bags. One inevitable consequence of corruption on such a scale was that Eskom’s debt, which was R40 billion (US$2.076 billion) in 2007 (the year that former president Jacob Zuma came to power), ballooned to R483 billion (US$25 billion) by 2020 – which incurred R31 billion (US$160 million) in annual finance charges.</p>
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<p>De Ruyter reveals that the “presidential” cartel (meaning one of the local mafias) pillaged Matla power station, the “Mesh-Kings” cartel Duvha power station, the “Legendaries” cartel Tutuka power station, and the “Chief” cartel Majuba power station. He writes that the going rate for bribes at Kusile power station is R200,000 (US$10,377) to falsify the delivery of one truckload of good quality coal. <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/special-investigating-unit-secure-another-preservation-order-matter-related-corruption">Kusile</a> is one of the two giant new coal-fired power stations which Eskom is relying on to end power cuts.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-bailout-of-eskom-wont-end-power-cuts-splitting-up-the-utility-can-as-other-countries-have-shown-200490">South Africa's bailout of Eskom won't end power cuts: splitting up the utility can, as other countries have shown</a>
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<p>The book says a senior officer at the <a href="https://www.saps.gov.za/dpci/index.php">Hawks</a>, the police’s priority crimes investigation units, tipped off De Ruyter how he was blocked in all his attempts to combat corruption at Eskom. Senior police officers, at least one prosecutor, and a senior magistrate, have also been bribed by the gangs. </p>
<h2>Noncomformist</h2>
<p>Eskom had 13 CEOs and acting CEOs in 13 years. Twenty-eight candidates, most of them black, rejected head-hunters’ offers to become CEO of Eskom. De Ruyter who was previously CEO of Nampak, took a pay cut (to R7 million) to accept the job, in the hope of accelerating Eskom’s transition from coal to renewables.</p>
<p>At the time of his appointment some commentators alleged that he was an African National Congress (ANC) cadre deployed to Eskom. The ANC’s <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321223498_The_African_National_Congress_ANC_and_the_Cadre_Deployment_Policy_in_the_Postapartheid_South_Africa_A_Product_of_Democratic_Centralisation_or_a_Recipe_for_a_Constitutional_Crisis">cadre deployment</a> policy is aimed at ensuring that all the levers of power are in loyal party hands – often regardless of ability and probity. But De Ruyter came <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/politics/anc-claims-de-ruyter-is-trying-to-tarnish-its-image-ahead-of-elections-in-2024-20230426">into conflict</a> with the ruling party.</p>
<p>What caught De Ruyter out was the viciousness of the political attacks on him: smears of racism and financial impropriety. He had to devote many hours of office time to refuting them: </p>
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<p>occupying that seat at Megawatt Park comes with political baggage. </p>
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<p><a href="https://za.geoview.info/eskom_megawatt_park,32555009w">Megawatt Park</a> is Eskom’s head office in Johannesburg. </p>
<p>The book’s early chapters summarise how he was one of those Afrikaners with Dutch parents, who did not conform entirely to apartheid norms. The Afrikaner <em>volk</em> imposed the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/apartheid">apartheid</a> regime onto South Africa for 42 years. In his high school years he became a card-carrying member of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Progressive-Federal-Party">Progressive Federal Party</a>, a liberal anti-apartheid opposition party, antecedent of the Democratic Alliance, which is now the official opposition to the governing party. </p>
<h2>Poisoning</h2>
<p>De Ruyter’s book mentions organising a routine Eskom stakeholders’ meeting at a guesthouse in Mpumalanga province. </p>
<p>To save time, he ordered that food be served on plates to table places, instead of buffet arrangements. The guesthouse management refused, due to fear of facilitating poisoning one or more guests – only buffet arrangements could thwart that. </p>
<p>He says that in Tshwane (Pretoria), the seat of government, the National Prosecution Authority no longer orders takeaway lunches for delivery to their premises. Instead, standard procedure is that a staff member buys lunches for all at random take-away shops. </p>
<p>This sinister development culminated in De Ruyter himself being poisoned with cyanide in his coffee in his office, demonstrating how mafia-type gangs had recruited at least one Eskom headquarters staff member.</p>
<h2>Unintended consequences</h2>
<p>In several places De Ruyter also touches on other issues. The unintended consequence of some government policies, such as localisation and <a href="https://www.treasury.gov.za/comm_media/press/2022/2022110801%20Media%20Statement%20-%20PPP%20Regulations%202022.pdf">preferential procurement</a>, is that it costs Eskom two and a half times more to pay for each kilometre of transmission cable than it costs <a href="https://www.nampower.com.na/">Nampower</a> Namibia’s power utility, just across the border. </p>
<p>What stands out from this memoir is that the success of a company demands that a CEO, managers, artisans, guards, and cleaners all take the attitude that the buck stops with them – seven days a week – and act accordingly.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206101/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Gottschalk is a member of the African National Congress, but writes this review in his professional capacity as a political scientist.</span></em></p>The book shows how parts of South Africa now fester with organised crime.Keith Gottschalk, Political Scientist, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2023662023-03-28T15:28:33Z2023-03-28T15:28:33ZPaul Mashatile, South Africa’s new deputy president, has a critical task: to bring back a sense of stability<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/517666/original/file-20230327-20-x9uext.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Paul Mashatile, the deputy president of South Africa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Foto24/Gallo Images/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In a recent <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/speeches/statement-president-cyril-ramaphosa-changes-national-executive">cabinet reshuffle</a> President Cyril Ramaphosa appointed Paul Mashatile, the deputy president of South Africa’s governing party, the African National Congress (ANC), as the country’s deputy president. The tradition in the ANC since democracy in 1994 has been for its elected deputy president to ascend first to the deputy presidency of the country, and eventually to become head of state. So Mashatile, an <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-has-a-new-deputy-president-in-paul-mashatile-what-he-brings-to-the-table-200089">experienced politician</a>, may also be destined for top office.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa’s cabinet reshuffle took place in a climate of growing <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-has-been-warned-that-it-faces-an-arab-spring-so-what-are-the-chances-187634">restlessness</a> across the nation about the many failures of the state, high levels of corruption and <a href="https://theconversation.com/link-between-crime-and-politics-in-south-africa-raises-concerns-about-criminal-gangs-taking-over-198160">organised crime</a>. </p>
<p>As a political scientist and researcher on security governance matters, I have been considering the role Mashatile could play in responding to the security crisis. </p>
<p>He will serve on two cabinet structures that are crucial to safety and security in the country. Through this he could contribute to rebuilding <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africans-have-low-trust-in-their-police-heres-why-178821">trust</a> that the public has lost in the law enforcement and criminal justice system. </p>
<h2>Justice, crime prevention and security</h2>
<p>One of Mashatile’s <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2023-03-14-ramaphosa-appoints-mashatile-to-chair-cabinet-security-cluster/">tasks</a> is to chair the <a href="https://www.saps.gov.za/resource_centre/publications/naidoo_makananisa_integrated_presentation.pdf">Justice, Crime Prevention and Security</a> cabinet committee. This committee coordinates the work of the ministers who are collectively charged with ensuring safety and stability in the country. During the devastating <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-deadly-july-2021-riots-may-recur-if-theres-no-change-186397">July 2021 unrest</a>, the ministers contradicted each other. They also failed to show a united front against the violence that engulfed several provinces, particularly KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng.</p>
<p>With deft leadership, Mashatile can assist Ramaphosa to address the legacy of poorly coordinated security services. The former minister in the presidency, <a href="https://www.news24.com/citypress/politics/security-cluster-needs-unity-gungubele-20220730">Mondli Gungubele</a>, acknowledged this problem on the anniversary of the deadly July 2021 riots. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-has-a-new-deputy-president-in-paul-mashatile-what-he-brings-to-the-table-200089">South Africa has a new deputy president in Paul Mashatile: what he brings to the table</a>
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<p>The Justice, Crime Prevention and Security cluster was among several cabinet “clusters” established during former president Thabo Mbeki’s tenure. This has cemented a tradition of intergovernmental cooperation ever since. It oversees the work of the following core ministries and departments:</p>
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<li><p>police</p></li>
<li><p>state security</p></li>
<li><p>justice and correctional services </p></li>
<li><p>home affairs</p></li>
<li><p>defence and military veterans</p></li>
<li><p>finance.</p></li>
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<p>Mashatile will have to contend with a labyrinth of structures responsible for safety. The operational work of the cluster is coordinated by the directors-general of these departments through the National Joint Operational and Intelligence Structure (<a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/national-joint-operational-and-intelligence-structure-natjoints-0700-update-20-mar-2023">NATJOINTS</a>). </p>
<p>While the NATJOINTS operates at national level, its activities are decentralised to provincial structures (<a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/all-hands-on-deck-w-cape-saps-sandf-metro-police-on-high-alert-amid-planned-national-shutdown-20230319">PROVJOINTs</a>). They coordinate security operations at a provincial level. They work with municipal law enforcement and emergency services, and advise the provincial governments on measures they are taking to keep the public safe. </p>
<h2>The National Security Council</h2>
<p>Mashatile will also serve on the <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/notices/2020/20200310-gg42482proc13-COnstitution-NSC.pdf">National Security Council</a>, which is chaired by the president.</p>
<p>The entity is mandated to coordinate a <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-03-01-sas-proposed-national-security-strategy-more-hot-air-or-a-potential-democratic-opening/">national security strategy</a>. It also oversees the annual formulation of a budget and priorities by the country’s <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-01-27-the-ssa-can-improve-but-misconceptions-about-the-role-of-intelligence-services-need-to-be-cleared-up/">intelligence services</a>. It is responsible for coordinating the work of the security services, law enforcement agencies and relevant organs of state to ensure national security. In addition, it receives coordinated, integrated intelligence assessments from the national security structures, and mandates these structures to attend to matters of national security as required.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-needs-strategic-leadership-to-weather-its-storms-its-presidents-have-not-been-up-to-the-task-194296">South Africa needs strategic leadership to weather its storms. Its presidents have not been up to the task</a>
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<p>There is a significant <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/notices/2020/20200310-gg42482proc13-COnstitution-NSC.pdf">overlap of the membership</a> of the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security cluster of ministers, and the National Security Council. Besides the president and deputy president, the council includes all the ministers who are part of the Police, State Security and Justice cabinet committee, as well as the ministers of home affairs, defence and military veterans, international relations, and cooperative governance and traditional affairs. </p>
<h2>How Mashatile could bring stability</h2>
<p>Ramaphosa has entrusted important functions to his deputy. This suggests a level of confidence and cooperation between the two men, rather than a <a href="https://sundayworld.co.za/news/politics/block-mashatile-ramaphosa-warned/">rivalry</a>. Neither can afford to let the ANC fail in government, as this would augur badly for its <a href="https://www.biznews.com/thought-leaders/2023/02/09/anc-crisis-polls-steep-loss-support-elections">prospects</a> in the 2024 general elections. </p>
<p>Mashatile should prioritise getting a few key systems in place. The visibility and effectiveness of the police in day-to-day policing must improve. He must oversee strategies to combat organised crime, which is strangling so many areas of public life. He must also work to secure the resources to implement the recommendations of the <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/">Zondo Commission on state capture</a>. </p>
<p>With confidence in the state <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/migrated/files/publications/Dispatches/ad474-south_africans_trust_in_institutions_reaches_new_low-afrobarometer-20aug21.pdf">as low as it is</a>, and the public deeply traumatised by high levels of <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2023-02-09-sona-2023-sas-soaring-murder-rate-underscores-need-for-ramaphosa-to-ensure-better-leadership-in-policing/">violent crime</a>, Mashatile must put in extra effort to boost public confidence in the justice, crime prevention and security sector. </p>
<p>He can do this by listening to what key stakeholders have to say about the security of the country. Young people bear the brunt of the epidemic of violence – physical and structural. Attending to their security and <a href="https://theconversation.com/idle-and-frustrated-young-south-africans-speak-about-the-need-for-recreational-facilities-176921">wellbeing</a> is crucial for the country’s future.</p>
<p>He also needs to be more strategically visible than his predecessor, David Mabuza, who <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/politics/government/david-mabuza-the-man-from-mpumalanga-who-quit-as-deputy-president-before-some-argue-ever-starting-20230304">resigned</a> from the position. Mabuza’s job description was almost identical to that of Mashatile’s. Yet he <a href="https://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/ramaphosa-urged-to-appoint-a-competent-deputy-president/">left office with many questioning</a> if he had made any impact. </p>
<h2>New broom</h2>
<p>Mashatile could be the new broom that sweeps clean. Ramaphosa’s apparent confidence in him suggests that he has some latitude to do so. </p>
<p>It is said the job of a deputy president, in practically any country, is <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/elections/articles/2021-01-20/what-does-the-vice-president-do">waiting</a> to replace the president. While Mashatile waits in the wings, he has the opportunity to make a difference and make South Africa a more secure place for the public.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/202366/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sandy Africa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Mashatile could be the new broom that sweeps clean. Ramaphosa’s apparent confidence in him suggests that he has some latitude to do so.Sandy Africa, Associate Professor, Political Sciences, and Deputy Dean Teaching and Learning (Humanities), University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2000892023-02-19T06:41:20Z2023-02-19T06:41:20ZSouth Africa has a new deputy president in Paul Mashatile: what he brings to the table<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510840/original/file-20230217-364-wwl3re.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Paul Mashatile was voted ANC deputy president in December 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Deaan Vivier/Foto24/Gallo Images/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa has a new deputy president in Paul Shipokosa Mashatile, the deputy president of the governing African National Congress (ANC). He’ll replace the incumbent, David Mabuza, who announced he would <a href="https://www.capetownetc.com/news/david-mabuza-confirms-his-resignation-as-deputy-president/">step down</a>. </p>
<p>Who is Mashatile and what does he bring to the position?</p>
<p><a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/paul-shipokosa-mashatile">Mashatile</a> (61) is a veteran politician from the ANC, the party that has governed South Africa since democracy in 1994. He has occupied a dizzying array of posts and portfolios during his climb to the top.</p>
<p>Mashatile has been continuously in party or state posts for 29 years. Though he battled with the ANC’s parlous financial plight before 2023 as treasurer, overall his track record is a creditable performance.</p>
<p>He brings gravitas to whichever post he occupies. Mashatile holds <a href="https://www.vukuzenzele.gov.za/book/export/html/734">a postgraduate diploma</a> in Economic Principles from the University of London. He demonstrates competence and diligence in whatever post he holds. If anyone can, he will bring visibility to the office of deputy president.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-needs-strategic-leadership-to-weather-its-storms-its-presidents-have-not-been-up-to-the-task-194296">South Africa needs strategic leadership to weather its storms. Its presidents have not been up to the task</a>
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<p>A strong incumbent can shape the role, although it is partially dependent on the president’s actions. The deputy president’s role as the leader of government business in parliament also has much potential for wielding power and attracting publicity.</p>
<h2>Political activism</h2>
<p>Mashatile’s commitment to political activism started as a schoolboy in the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/congress-south-african-students-cosas">Congress of South African Students</a>, an ANC-allied organisation for high school pupils. He later became the first president of the Alexandra Youth Congress, also allied to the ANC. He represented the organisation at the launch in 1983 of the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/united-democratic-front-udf">United Democratic Front</a>, which provided a political home for “Charterists” while the ANC was still banned. The term refers to exponents of the <a href="https://www.anc1912.org.za/the-freedom-charter-2/">Freedom Charter</a>, the blueprint for free, democratic South Africa adopted by the ANC and allies in 1955. </p>
<p>Mashatile was detained without trial throughout the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/states-emergency-south-africa-1960s-and-1980s">1985-1989 states of emergency</a>. These were the core years of President PW Botha’s repression during the closing years of a crumbling apartheid era. After the <a href="https://theconversation.com/fw-de-klerk-made-a-speech-31-years-ago-that-ended-apartheid-why-he-did-it-130803">1990 unbanning</a> of the ANC, the South African Communist Party (<a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Communist-Party-of-South-Africa">SACP</a>), the <a href="https://pac.org.za/">Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania</a> and other liberation movements, Mashatile helped reestablish both the ANC and the SACP <a href="https://www.anc1912.org.za/paul-mashatile/">in the Johannesburg region</a>. (Almost uniquely in the world, these two political parties permit dual membership in each other.)</p>
<p>During the 1990s Mashatile rose to become <a href="https://www.anc1912.org.za/paul-mashatile/">provincial secretary</a> of the ANC in Gauteng province, and provincial chair during the 2000s. </p>
<h2>Role in government</h2>
<p>In 1994 he was elected as a member of the provincial legislature and leader of the house in Gauteng. He became in turn a member of the executive committee for transport and public works, next for safety and security, then human settlements, then finance and economic affairs. For 2008-2009 he became the fourth premier of Gauteng.</p>
<p>From 2010 to 2016 he was a member of parliament, when he served as <a href="https://www.vukuzenzele.gov.za/meet-paul-mashatile-minister-arts-and-culture">minister of arts and culture</a>. </p>
<p>He became an opponent of then South African president Jacob Zuma’s alleged corruption. In 2017 he was elected as <a href="https://www.anc1912.org.za/anc-deputy-president-paul-shipokosa-mashatile/">treasurer-general of the ANC</a>, and added to that in 2022 the role of <a href="https://www.enca.com/news/mashatile-steps-anc-secretary-general-role">acting secretary-general</a>. At the ANC’s 2022 national elective congress, he was elected by a sizeable majority as deputy president of the ANC.</p>
<p>So Paul Mashatile is in pole position to be appointed as the next deputy president of South Africa. Being a decade younger than President Cyril Ramaphosa, he is also well positioned to compete to succeed him in five years’ time.</p>
<p>There are no substantiated charges against him of corruption – a <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/opinions/voices/cyril-ramaphosa-the-anc-is-accused-number-one-for-corruption-20200823">serious problem in the ANC</a>. Critics are fond of loose talk that he was a member of the <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2007-08-31-mashatile-and-the-alex-mafia/">“Alex mafia”</a>, an informal network of political activists and business people from <a href="https://web.mit.edu/urbanupgrading/upgrading/case-examples/overview-africa/alexandra-township.html">Alexandra</a>, north of Johannesburg. But the <a href="https://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/integrity-has-its-own-champion/">Gauteng integrity commissioner</a>, Jules Browde, cleared him of any improprieties. The Gauteng integrity commissioner is the only provincial post with a corruption-busting mandate.</p>
<p>Similarly, he was cleared of any wrong-doing concerning his alleged misuse of a government credit card. Allegations that he was involved in stealing one billion rand (now worth about US$55 million) for the <a href="http://thehda.co.za/pdf/uploads/multimedia/gau_alexandra_rev_gov.pdf">Alexandra renewal project</a> were exposed as smears – <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/mashatile-recalls-no-knowledge-of-corruption-during-impementation-of-alex-project-20191119">no budget was ever allocated to that proposal</a>.</p>
<h2>Deputy presidency</h2>
<p>The deputy presidency has become invisible during <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/profiles/deputy-president-david-mabuza%3A-profile">David Mabuza’s five years in office</a>. Neither good news nor bad news has emanated from it. This raises the debate about what function the deputy presidency fulfils.</p>
<p>Historically, the role of a deputy president was to be on standby in case a president died or was otherwise removed from his post. But the time has long gone when governments would pay the expenses of such an office solely for it to be a spare tyre. </p>
<p>In 1961, the US president John Kennedy gave his vice-president Lyndon Johnson the portfolio to <a href="https://www.whitehousehistory.org/lyndon-b-johnson-forgotten-champion-of-the-space-race">oversee</a> the high-profile National Aeronautics & Space Administration, a tradition continued ever since by both Democrat and Republican presidents.</p>
<p>In South Africa, presidents have flexibly varied the job description of the deputy president around the strengths of the incumbent, or the current needs of the presidency. As deputy president, former president <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/frederik-willem-de-klerk">FW de Klerk</a> symbolised that his political constituency would not be entirely marginalised from state power after 1994. Thabo Mbeki functioned as de facto prime minister during Nelson Mandela’s presidency, <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-needs-strategic-leadership-to-weather-its-storms-its-presidents-have-not-been-up-to-the-task-194296">seeing to the day-to-day running of government</a>. </p>
<p>Mabuza’s last-minute delivery of the winning margin of votes to Ramaphosa at the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-ramaphosa-wont-be-able-to-deliver-the-three-urgent-fixes-south-africa-needs-89402">ANC’s 2017 elective conference</a> clearly demanded a prestigious reward, so the deputy presidency became his.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-needs-moral-leaders-not-those-in-pursuit-of-selfish-gain-76244">South Africa needs moral leaders, not those in pursuit of selfish gain</a>
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<p>Ramaphosa’s concentration of power in a bloated presidency means that his deputy president could conceivably be tasked with any portfolio. Mashatile’s disposition will serve him well in any role. He does not have the <a href="https://theconversation.com/rule-of-law-in-south-africa-protects-even-those-who-scorn-it-175533">outbursts</a> of ANC tourism minister Lindiwe Sisulu, nor the <a href="https://www.news24.com/citypress/trending/mbalulas-tweet-is-it-funny-or-foul-20230214">over-the-top</a> <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/pretoria-news/news/fikile-mbalula-rules-twitter-streets-for-second-year-in-a-row-ac65a2fd-39d4-4670-9e24-6cc49e081d26">internet flamboyance</a> of party secretary-general Fikile Mbalula. He will be well aware that his performance in his next post will be crucial to his chances for the culmination of his political career – as president of the country.</p>
<p><em>Updated to reflect Mashatile’s appointment as deputy president.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200089/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Gottschalk is an ANC member, but writes this article in his professional capacity as a political scientist.</span></em></p>The veteran liberation struggle activist brings gravitas to every position he occupies.Keith Gottschalk, Political Scientist, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1318602020-02-14T15:23:30Z2020-02-14T15:23:30ZRamaphosa dodges critical decisions, raising the question: is he a lame duck?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/315509/original/file-20200214-10991-kbt9ix.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Africa's President Cyril Ramaphosa delivers his state of the nation address. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS/Sumaya Hisham/Pool</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Is it possible that South Africa’s Cyril Ramaphosa has become a “lame duck” president? This often happens towards the end of a leader’s term, especially when a successor has already been identified. But Ramaphosa is not even halfway through his first term. </p>
<p>That I even ask the question suggests that I have doubts that Ramaphosa is making the necessary decisions. By that I mean catalytic decisions that will define the legacy of his presidency and the fate of the country.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa has the misfortune of being president at the most challenging time in the life of post-apartheid South Africa. Economic activity is at its lowest, with growth this year estimated at <a href="https://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/south-africa/world-bank-cuts-south-africa-gdp-forecast-on-eskom-fears/">below 1%</a>. </p>
<p>The country’s tax agency will collect <a href="http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/mtbps/2019/mtbps/Chapter%203.pdf#page=7">R250bn below</a> what was forecast in the 2019 budget over the next three years. And unemployment – <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1856&PPN=P0211&SCH=7622">at 29,1% </a> – remains a grave concern, although perhaps not as immediate a danger as dwindling revenues. South Africa has a massive welfare safety net – from free education and health to monetary grants – which has cushioned the country’s poor against the ravages of unemployment. </p>
<p>But because the tax agency is collecting less – the result of companies closing and jobs being lost – the little that goes into public coffers should be spent prudently. Is it being spent prudently? </p>
<p>The answer is a resounding no. Nor does the president’s <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/speeches/state-nation-address-president-cyril-ramaphosa%2C-parliament%2C-cape-town-0">state of the nation address</a> offer much comfort. It showed that he has a preference for less contentious matters that attract praise. And there were such easy wins in the speech. They included relaxing regulations for independent producers to generate energy, and allowing municipalities to procure renewable energy. Students were promised more accommodation and aspiring business people should expect a state bank that will provide affordable loans to start a business. </p>
<p>These are all commendable measures, unlikely to attract any derision – at least not immediately. But the country’s problems will not be solved through safe decisions. This is a “decisive moment”, as the president himself acknowledged, that requires equally bold moves and vocal support for cabinet ministers carrying out his instructions. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/speeches/state-nation-address-president-cyril-ramaphosa%2C-parliament%2C-cape-town-0">state of the nation address</a> showed, once again, Ramaphosa’s proclivity to avoid tackling contentious issues. Examples abound, but one of the most telling is his handling of the crisis at the national airline, <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-in-unfamiliar-terrain-as-national-carrier-goes-into-business-rescue-128868">South African Airways</a>.</p>
<h2>Bungling big decisions</h2>
<p>South African Airways has been surviving on government bail-outs. After the previous CEO, Vuyo Jarana, <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Economy/saa-ceo-vuyani-jarana-resigns-20190602">quit in exasperation</a> in June 2019, government eventually conceded that the airline was unsustainable in its current form. Tito Mboweni, the finance minister, thought the airline should <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2019-11-21-tito-mboweni-on-saa-close-it-down-and-start-another-airline/">simply be shut down</a>, or sold to a private owner. But government figured that it could still be salvaged. Its preferred course of action was to put it through <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-in-unfamiliar-terrain-as-national-carrier-goes-into-business-rescue-128868">business rescue</a>. </p>
<p>The understanding was that the rescue practitioners would do whatever was necessary to turn the national airline around.</p>
<p>But when it came to actually doing what was necessary to rescue the airline, the rescue practitioners soon began to realise that they didn’t have carte blanche. This became clear after they’d announced the cancellation of unprofitable routes, a step taken to reduce operational costs.</p>
<p>Khensani Kubayi-Ngubane, the minister of tourism, disagreed with the decision. Some of the cancelled flights, <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bt/business-and-economy/2020-02-09-saa-route-cuts-irk-minister/">she protested</a>, would harm the tourism industry. The minister’s protestation was understandable – she was protecting her own territory. What was bewildering was Ramaphosa <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Companies/Industrial/ramaphosa-not-happy-with-saa-route-cancellations-report-20200207">agreeing with her</a>. </p>
<p>As the president he ought to have a broader appreciation that cutting costs would ease pressure on the airline’s finances. Moreover, the president should know that decisions like this hardly please everybody. A president, who has to balance various interests against each other, goes with the decision that guarantees the maximum results. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/public-approval-is-ramaphosas-only-defence-against-his-enemies-in-the-anc-130485">Public approval is Ramaphosa's only defence against his enemies in the ANC</a>
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<p>The president didn’t even provide a viable alternative plan. In his state of the nation address he said only that the “business rescue practitioners are expected to unveil their plans for restructuring the airline in the next few weeks”. It’s not clear from this whether the plan will be formulated entirely by the practitioners. </p>
<p>Government’s discomfort over the reduction of routes suggests that it wants to determine what the plan should be. This shows its reluctance to allow the practitioners to do what is necessary, however unpleasant, to make the airline commercially viable. </p>
<p>But finding funds to bail it out once more looks increasingly unsustainable. The latest injection – <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2020-01-28-saa-gets-r35bn-lifeline-from-development-bank/">a R3.6bn loan</a> from the Development Bank of Southern Africa – can’t be repeated. And any decision to take additional money out of government coffers will negatively affect other things. </p>
<p>As it is, the minister of finance has the unenviable task of finding money for all the things the president has promised. But Mboweni won’t be able to source money for students and aspirant entrepreneurs without denying others. And he’s likely to have to deal with an even more crippled national power utility as Eskom loses income when consumers – especially companies and municipalities – opt for independent producers of energy. </p>
<p>And assuming Mboweni does find money somewhere, will the president come to his defence when he’s attacked?</p>
<h2>Formidable foes</h2>
<p>It is difficult to sustain a fight against formidable foes all alone without support. Mboweni appears to be showing signs of resilience against severe criticism from the left wing of the party. But <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-01-14-as-battle-for-eskom-goes-nuclear-pravin-gordhan-is-once-again-the-target/">Pravin Gordhan</a>, minister of public enterprises, doesn’t seem to be doing as well. Since taking over this portfolio, Gordhan has exposed widespread maladministration and corruption in state-owned enterprises, and led the call for prosecutions. </p>
<p>Yet, after repeatedly supporting the restructuring of the airline, he also backtracked when business rescuers cut down on routes. This suggests he is taking a lot of strain, and may be capitulating. It’s not surprising as his detractors even include the country’s deputy president, David Mabuza. </p>
<p>Mabuza is unhappy that Gordhan has bypassed the governing party’s deployment committee when making appointments to boards of parastatals. The committee was partly responsible for appointing unscrupulous individuals that looted parastatals and its current head, Mabuza, is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/22/world/africa/south-africa-david-mabuza.html">not known for propriety</a>. But Ramaphosa has not been vocal in his public support for Gordhan. </p>
<p>Ramaphosa appears not to have realised that routine decisions are akin to inaction, no different from being a lame duck. Lack of support will alienate allies, which will leave him vulnerable to detractors. Without ardent supporters Ramaphosa may not even conclude his first term. He has formidable enemies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/131860/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mcebisi Ndletyana received funding from the National Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences. He is affiliated with CASAC.</span></em></p>President Ramaphosa’s state of the nation speech showed his preference for less contentious matters that attract praise, rather than catalytic decisions.Mcebisi Ndletyana, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1180832019-05-30T15:05:20Z2019-05-30T15:05:20ZCabinet picks show Ramaphosa and allies believe they’re firmly in control<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/277224/original/file-20190530-69051-yzr9b7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Deputy President David Mabuza, right, could pose a potential threat from within the ANC to President Cyril Ramaphosa, left.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GovernmentZA/Flickr</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South African President Cyril Ramaphosa has <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/press-statements/statement-appointment-members-national-executive">selected a Cabinet</a> which shows that he and his allies believe they are now firmly in control of the governing party and can shape the government’s agenda. What is not yet clear is whether they are right.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa’s choice of cabinet was particularly important because government in South Africa is at a crossroads. </p>
<p>The governing African National Congress (ANC) has been the site of a factional battle between the president’s allies and supporters of former president Jacob Zuma. Ramaphosa’s group has vowed to stop the misuse of public money and trust of which the Zuma faction is accused. But their credibility is dented by, among other factors, the claim that they are too weak to counter the Zuma faction’s influence over the ANC. Their detractors point to the continued presence in the national government of ministers in the Zuma faction who are accused of abuses.</p>
<p>A key indicator of whether the government can win back public trust is, therefore, who Ramaphosa appoints to his Cabinet.</p>
<p>Before the announcement, he and his allies seemed to face an impossible task. They had to make good on his promise to <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Economy/ramaphosa-has-full-anc-backing-to-shrink-cabinet-20190510">trim down the Cabinet</a>. But they must know that, in any governing party, fewer jobs means more resentment: one reason why Zuma became ANC president at the expense of his predecessor Thabo Mbeki is that Mbeki rarely replaced ministers and so ANC politicians believed that their job prospects were slim until he went. </p>
<p>Second, they had to meet public demands to remove Zuma faction ministers. But governing party leaders who deny posts to their opponents within the party are likely to be accused of purging them and might be resisted by anyone outside their faction.</p>
<h2>A clear message</h2>
<p>Given these obstacles, the Cabinet appointments send a clear message that Ramaphosa and his allies believe that, having improved the <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/NPEDashboard/app/dashboard.html">ANC’s vote</a> compared to the 2016 local government elections – the first time in 15 years that it did better in any election compared to the previous one – they are firmly in control. </p>
<p>Only five of the 28 ministers are linked to the Zuma faction: one of them, <a href="https://www.pa.org.za/person/nkosazana-dlamini-zuma/">Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma</a>, is probably no longer aligned to it. She was the faction’s <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-12-08-00-no-deal-the-anc-battle-is-on">choice for president</a> but was not overly enthusiastic about its style of politics then and seems even less so now. </p>
<p>So only one in seven ministers are aligned to Zuma’s group and none are in posts regarded within government as senior positions. The Cabinet has been reduced although, as Ramaphosa acknowledged when he announced the appointments, <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2019/05/30/ramaphosa-should-be-commended-for-reducing-cabinet-analyst">not as much as he would like</a>. So unconcerned was Ramaphosa about resistance within the ANC that he appointed an opposition politician, former Cape Town mayor <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/i-have-no-plans-to-give-up-fighting-minister-patricia-de-lille-20190530">Patricia de Lille</a>, as his public works minister.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa and his faction did not ignore resistance within the ANC. The Cabinet was announced five days after he was inaugurated, an unusually long delay: the announcement was twice postponed on the day. This signalled that there had been intense bargaining within the ANC. </p>
<p>The Ramaphosa group lost one important battle. They had hoped to drastically cut the number of deputy ministers but reports suggest that they bowed to resistance from various lobby groups, among them the Zuma faction: there are 34 deputies, <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-south-africa-would-do-well-to-fire-all-its-deputy-ministers-58809">three fewer</a> than under Zuma. At least 12 of them are in the Zuma faction.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-ramaphosa-had-to-delay-appointing-south-africas-next-cabinet-117923">Why Ramaphosa had to delay appointing South Africa's next cabinet</a>
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<p>But their strategy seems to have been to give ground only if they believed this would not prevent them from appointing the Cabinet they needed to pursue their agenda. So, as they did when Ramaphosa chose his first Cabinet, they appointed Zuma faction members in posts which are not central to their plans or as deputy ministers, who are not members of the Cabinet and have no say over what it decides.</p>
<h2>Potential threat</h2>
<p>The Cabinet signals to the Zuma faction that the Ramaphosa group believes their star is waning and that they are not strong enough to turn the tide. They are probably right.</p>
<p>First, the election was a huge defeat for the Zuma faction. Three parties formed by or including politicians linked to the faction made no headway in the May election. While parties formed by supporters of factions which lost ANC battles won over 8% in 2009 and 6% in 2014, the three parties – <a href="https://www.atmovement.org/">African Transformation Movement</a>, <a href="https://acmovement.org.za/">African Content Movement </a> and <a href="https://blf.org.za/">Black First, Land First</a> – polled 0,6% between them. </p>
<p>In the North West province, the removal of a <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2018-06-15-revealed-why-supra-mahumapelo-was-removed-as-north-west-premier/">Zuma faction premier</a> and his replacement by a <a href="https://city-press.news24.com/News/mokgoro-shuts-door-on-supra-allies-as-he-makes-sweeping-changes-in-north-west-20190528">Ramaphosa faction appointment</a> boosted an ANC vote which had fallen below 50% in by-elections <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/NPEDashboard/app/dashboard.html">to over 60%</a>. If they were to lead the ANC again, it would probably lose its majority and most active ANC members must know this.</p>
<p>Second, Ramaphosa’s government has <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2019-02-07-special-npa-unit-to-deal-with-zondo-commission-evidence-to-be-set-up">boosted the capacity</a> of the <a href="https://www.npa.gov.za/">National Prosecuting Authority</a> to prosecute crimes committed by politicians accused of misusing public office. There are signs that key Zuma faction politicians are in the firing line. This will hamper their political role and further damage their credibility.</p>
<p>But there is a potential threat to Ramaphosa from within the ANC. <a href="http://www.presidency.gov.za/profiles/deputy-president-david-mabuza%3A-profile">Deputy president David Mabuza</a> was a key member of the Zuma faction. He abandoned it to encourage unity between the factions and was largely <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/news/2017-12-22-how-david-mabuza-outplayed-the-ndz-camp/">responsible for Ramaphosa’s victory</a> because he allowed his provincial delegates to vote as they pleased rather than delivering Dlamini-Zuma the block vote he had promised.</p>
<p>Mabuza is now politically isolated: the Zuma faction feel he betrayed him while the Ramaphosa faction never trusted him. But he seems bent on reinventing himself. In the weeks before the Cabinet appointment, it was rumoured that he would not be reappointed. He reacted by <a href="https://www.news24.com/Analysis/explained-with-mabuza-standing-back-ramaphosa-will-have-to-move-fast-this-is-how-20190522">delaying his swearing</a> in as a member of Parliament and appearing before the ANC integrity commission to answer allegations of corruption <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/04/world/africa/south-africa-anc-david-mabuza.html">published in the New York Times</a>. His aim was presumably to discredit the claims and so present himself as a champion of clean government and a plausible next president.</p>
<h2>Shifting battle</h2>
<p>His plan worked in the short-term – he is back as deputy president. Ironically that may make it harder for him to build support. ANC history shows that candidates who are removed from government office have plenty of time to campaign for support; some have used this to win election to national or provincial office. Mabuza will now have less time on his hands to campaign behind the scenes as he tackles his governmental duties.</p>
<p>The odds seem stacked against Mabuza if he is eyeing the presidency, for himself or his ally <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/anc54-meet-paul-mashatile-the-man-who-will-control-the-anc-purse-12468701">Paul Mashatile</a>, the ANC’s treasurer. But he still seems a likelier contender for power than the Zuma faction. If he does aspire to lead the ANC, the threat to the Ramaphosa group may shift from the Zuma faction to Mabuza.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/118083/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Friedman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Cabinet signals to the Zuma faction that the Ramaphosa group believes their star is waning and that they are not strong enough to turn the tide.Steven Friedman, Professor of Political Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1179232019-05-28T15:21:19Z2019-05-28T15:21:19ZWhy Ramaphosa had to delay appointing South Africa’s next cabinet<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/276796/original/file-20190528-42560-1g0m3nm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Cyril Ramaphosa takes the oath of office at his inauguation by Chief Justice Mogoeng Mogoeng. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> EPA-EFE/Stringer</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The delay in the appointment of South Africa’s new Cabinet after the inauguration of President Cyril Ramaphosa on <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/president-ramaphosas-inauguration-in-30-fantastic-pictures-24026343">25 May 2019</a> reflects the impact of two institutions: first, the governing African National Congress’s (ANC) integrity commission, and secondly, the <a href="http://www.pprotect.org/">Public Protector</a>. </p>
<p>The ANC’s integrity commission’s job is to root out unethical conduct in the party. The Public Protector’s responsibility provides oversight over the government. It’s empowered to “investigate, report on and remedy improper conduct” by <a href="http://www.pprotect.org/">all state organs</a>.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa needs both if he is to succeed in cleaning South Africa’s body politic of corruption. He therefore can’t afford to run roughshod over either. </p>
<p>All the incoming presidents since democracy in 1994 have announced their deputy presidents, cabinets and deputy ministers on the day after their inaugurations. Ramaphosa is the first who has not done so. </p>
<p>Since the inauguration, and until the members of a new cabinet are sworn in, South Africa is without a cabinet. For this period, Ramaphosa is the only member of the Executive. Not even the Deputy President is available.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/SAConstitution-web-eng.pdf">Constitution</a> is clear about the fact that the President must assume office within five days after his election by Parliament. And that the first sitting of the National Assembly after an election must take place not later than 14 days after the election results are announced. </p>
<p>But it’s silent on the Cabinet. Theoretically, at least, this means that the President can continue without a cabinet for an unspecified period. </p>
<p>The main reason Ramaphosa hasn’t been able to act with haste is because the <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/politics/2019-04-14-anc-top-six-will-discuss-integrity-commission-report-amid-list-furore/">integrity commission</a> has made unfavourable pronouncements against some prospective Cabinet members. One of them is his deputy David Mabuza. And, the <a href="http://www.pprotect.org/">Public Protector</a> has recommended he take disciplinary action against Pravin Gordhan, his trusted former Public Enterprises Minister. </p>
<p>Ramaphosa couldn’t appoint people with a cloud over their heads, especially given his stated commitment to a <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/ramaphosa-promises-corruption-crackdown-at-maiden-sona-20180216">clean and effective government</a>.</p>
<h2>ANC integrity commission</h2>
<p>The ANC’s integrity commission was established under the party’s <a href="https://www.anc1912.org.za/constitution-anc">constitution</a>. Any member accused of unethical or immoral conduct that can <a href="https://www.anc1912.org.za/constitution-anc">bring the ANC into disrepute</a> can be referred to the commission by the party’s top six officials as well as its <a href="https://www.anc1912.org.za/national-executive-committee">national executive committee (NEC)</a>. This is its highest decision making body in between its national conferences. </p>
<p>The integrity committee is made up of nine ANC veterans chaired by former Robben Island prisoner George Mashamba. </p>
<p>The ANC’s NEC flagged <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2019-05-28-anc-integrity-commission-finalising-report-this-morning/">22 people</a> on the party’s 2019 parliamentary candidates’ list as potentially being improper. This included Mabuza and the Minerals and Energy Minister Gwede Mantashe. Both are also part of the <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/meet-the-ancs-new-top-6-20171218">ANC’s top six leaders</a>. They are respectively the party’s deputy president and national chairman. </p>
<p>The integrity commission could potentially develop into a powerful organisational instrument in Ramaphosa’s drive against corruption, and to <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2019-05-05-read-it-in-full-cyril-ramaphosas-address-at-siyanqoba-rally">renew the ANC</a>. </p>
<h2>Public Protector</h2>
<p>The Public Protector is one of the institutions established by the Constitution to support and <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02167/04lv02184/05lv02193/06lv02204.htm">protect South Africa’s constitutional democracy</a>. </p>
<p>The Public Protector, Busisiwe Mkhwebane, has recommended that Ramaphosa take <a href="http://www.capetalk.co.za/articles/349753/judge-kriegler-public-protector-has-made-a-number-of-strategicmistakes">disciplinary action</a> against Gordhan, a trusted ANC colleague who has served as public enterprises minister, the country’s finance minister on two occasions, as well as head of the South African Revenue Service. </p>
<p>Mkhwebane has accused Gordhan of behaving illegally by approving an early retirement agreement with the deputy head of the South African Revenue Service, Ivan Pillay. Gordhan disputes the accusation and is <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2019/05/28/gordhan-s-lawyers-ask-court-to-set-aside-busisiwe-mkhwebane-s-report">challenging the public protector’s report</a> in court. </p>
<p>It would be indefensible for Ramaphosa to ignore Mkhwebane’s report and to appoint Gordhan. Only a court judgment <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/full-text-constitutional-court-rules-on-nkandla-public-protector-%2020160331">could set aside</a> the public protector’s report. </p>
<p>The office of the Public Protector has the potential to be another indispensable instrument in Ramaphosa’s anti-corruption arsenal. He cannot, therefore, undermine it by ignoring a decision it has taken.</p>
<p>On the other hand, he will be loath to sacrifice Gordhan. </p>
<h2>Uncertainty</h2>
<p>The seriousness of these considerations – and their dire impact on the executive – shows how respectful Ramaphosa is of these anti-corruption institutions. </p>
<p>The fact that he stood aside and allowed Mabuza, who was key to his election as president of the ANC in <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/news/2017-12-22-how-david-mabuza-outplayed-the-ndz-camp/">December 2017</a>, to be put through the integrity commission’s processes even though this meant not pulling off a speedy appointment of the cabinet, is testimony to his determination to respect due process. Ramaphosa has also <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2019-05-28-pravin-gordhan-files-application-to-set-aside-public-protectors-report/">left Gordhan</a> to deal with the Public Protector’s report.</p>
<p>After being cleared the integrity commission, Mabuza was due, belatedly, to be <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/mabuza-to-be-sworn-in-as-mp-24244580">sworn in as an MP</a>.</p>
<p>This has removed uncertainty about his future as Deputy President. But it’s given him ammunition for the future because he can point to the fact that he’s been exonerated of any wrongdoing by his own party. </p>
<p>Ramaphosa is inching closer to being able to make his vital cabinet appointments. He will want to do so as soon as possible. Constitutionally, the country’s executive power is vested in the President – but he exercises most of his power in concert with Cabinet members. </p>
<p>That’s not to say that this lacuna has left government departments entirely in limbo. They are still managed by directors-general, and the laws they have to implement are not affected by <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/government-system/structure-and-functions-south-african-government">this situation</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/117923/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dirk Kotze does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ramaphosa couldn’t appoint people with a cloud over their heads, especially given his stated commitment to a clean and effective government.Dirk Kotze, Professor in Political Science, University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/966662018-05-15T14:19:31Z2018-05-15T14:19:31ZHow a deal with provincial strongmen is haunting South Africa’s ruling party<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/219027/original/file-20180515-195315-e0638.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">North West Premier Supra Mahumapelo (centre) before the announcement that his province is being taken over by national government.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> EPA-EFE/STR</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Last year South Africa’s governing African National Congress (ANC) <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-ramaphosas-moment-of-hope-is-built-on-a-fragile-foundation-92043">elected a new leadership</a> which was the result of a hard boiled deal between the party’s factions. South Africans can now see how the deal which produced a new governing party leadership last year is meant to work. It may keep the ANC together and is unlikely to worry people in the major cities much. But it could make an already <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-needs-a-fresh-approach-to-its-stubbornly-high-levels-of-inequality-87215">serious inequality problem</a> worse.</p>
<p>The nature of the deal is revealed by events in North West province where Supra Mahumapelo, an unpopular provincial premier, seems set on remaining in power despite voter <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/live-mahumapelo-addresses-vocal-supporters-trying-to-gatecrash-pec-meeting-20180509">rejection</a> and demonstrations calling for his head. He has so far been able to do this because he controls the provincial ANC structures. </p>
<p>The national leadership has placed the province <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2018/05/13/report-ramaphosa-takes-over-troubled-nw">under the administration</a> of central government. But that is more an admission of defeat than a solution. It’s an acknowledgement that central government could not solve the problem politically and so it’s been forced to use administrative measures.</p>
<p>To understand these events, we need to go back to the ANC’s December conference at which its current leadership, with Cyril Ramaphosa as President, was elected. The choice of leaders was the product of a <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2018/05/13/report-ramaphosa-takes-over-troubled-nw">deal</a> which saw the leadership group divided equally between supporters and opponents of former president Jacob Zuma. </p>
<p>It was also a compromise between two types of politics – one which uses the state’s resources for enrichment and patronage and one rooted in the market which opposes government behaviour that might weaken its ability to create wealth.</p>
<h2>The deal</h2>
<p>Since the election, the ANC’s national leadership has been behaving largely as if no deal was done and they alone are in charge. It has removed Zuma and has appointed an <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2018-01-25-in-full--state-capture-inquiry-to-probe-guptas-zuma-and-ministers/">inquiry</a> into the “state capture” of which his faction is accused. It has also <a href="https://theconversation.com/ramaphosas-to-do-list-seven-economic-policy-areas-that-will-shift-the-dial-94352">replaced the boards</a> and senior managers of state owned enterprises which were seen to aid the capture of public resources by connected people. </p>
<p>Ramaphosa’s first <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/ramaphosa-reshuffles-cabinet-20180227">cabinet</a> included members of the Zuma faction, but the key positions are held by his group. </p>
<p>This begged an obvious question: what was the pro-Zuma faction getting out of the deal? Why were they falling in line with the anti-state capture agenda which pulled the rug from under them?</p>
<p>North West provides the answer. At the core of the Zuma faction’s campaign, which relied on electing his ex-wife Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma president, were the so-called <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2017/12/19/the-rise-of-the-premier-league-and-their-failed-bid-to-install-ndz_a_23310554/">Premier League</a>, provincial premiers in three mainly rural provinces. </p>
<p>Mahumapelo was one but he did not ascend to national office. The other two, David Mabuza and Ace Magashule, are now deputy president (of both the ANC and the country) and ANC secretary general respectively. While there are differences between them – Mabuza struck the deal which got Ramaphosa elected – all three are regional strongmen whose power relies on controlling their provinces. </p>
<p>They seem to have decided not to challenge Ramaphosa’s faction on national issues. But all three are set on retaining their power base in their provinces; Mabuza and Magashule have been replaced by premiers who are likely to defer to them and Mahumapelo is <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/live-mahumapelo-addresses-vocal-supporters-trying-to-gatecrash-pec-meeting-20180509">determined</a> to hold onto the North West ANC. They seem to remain strong enough in their provincial ANCs to allow them to do this.</p>
<h2>Back to Bantustans</h2>
<p>If they succeed, people in the cities will be largely unaffected. The battle against national state capture will continue. But those in rural areas, most of which were <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/homelands">Bantustans</a> under apartheid – rural dumping grounds where local power holders controlled residents on behalf of the apartheid state – will remain firmly in the grip of the patronage politics and state capture from which the cities will be at least partly free.</p>
<p>This will not only entrench inequality. It will keep alive the apartheid patterns which democracy was meant to end because millions of people in the former Bantustans will remain under the control of leaders who are not interested in serving them. They will be at best partly free and will continue to live in poverty.</p>
<p>Whether this is allowed to happen will depend less on ANC politicians, including Ramaphosa, than on citizens. The ANC national leadership is trying to intervene in North West but it has shown no interest in changing the way Free State and Mpumalanga are governed. It seems to understand the deal to mean that they cannot be touched. If Zuma’s ally Sihle Zikalala wins control of KwaZulu-Natal, he too might gain a free pass to govern that province as he pleases.</p>
<p>The only reason the ANC leadership is intervening in the North West is that citizens have made it clear that they want Mahumapelo and his style of governing gone. Besides the damaging street demonstrations, the ANC <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/195876/new-poll-shows-anc-is-losing-support-below-50/">may lose North West</a> to the opposition in next year’s general election. </p>
<p>While it has lost ground at the polls in the other Premier League provinces, the damage is not enough to persuade national leaders that they need to do anything about these areas. That would no doubt change if the ANC vote in those provinces also started dipping under 50%.</p>
<p>The ANC deal seems set to condemn people living where apartheid’s Bantustans once reigned to much the same sort of governance as they endured then. But they have a weapon now which they lacked then: a vote, which might yet bring them the same freedoms people in the cities enjoy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/96666/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Friedman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The chaos visiting South Africa’s North-West province shows that ordinary people in rural areas have got a raw deal from ruling party.Steven Friedman, Professor of Political Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/937972018-03-27T13:09:01Z2018-03-27T13:09:01ZRamaphosa has started the clean up job. But can he turn the state around?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211567/original/file-20180322-54875-kjykfn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African President, Cyril Ramaphosa, is on a mission to rebuild a battered party and state. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Nic Bothma</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s new President, Cyril Ramaphosa, is presently receiving numerous <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/opinion-and-analysis/2018-03-03-ramaphosas-cabinet-clean-up-shows-promising-signs-of-what-lies-ahead/">plaudits</a> on how he’s handling the transition from the troubled Jacob Zuma presidency.</p>
<p>Zuma’s generals have been scattered, his underlings fleeing the battlefield. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, against whom Ramaphosa fought for the leadership and under whose wing Zuma thought he would be able to shelter had she won, has been brought into the <a href="https://www.ujuh.co.za/cyril-ramaphosas-new-cabinet-a-balancing-game-with-key-victories/">cabinet</a> and safely neutralised.</p>
<p>The ousting of Zuma has also had a dramatic impact on the major opposition parties. Both the Democratic Alliance (DA) and Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) have been deprived of their strongest electoral attraction. </p>
<p>The DA is now in a state of major disarray, attempting to resolve its various internal squabbles. For the moment at least – it seems to be heading towards a bloody nose at the 2019 election. </p>
<p>The EFF has played the brief post-Zuma moment more skillfully, most notably by getting the ANC to back its motion in parliament, albeit with amendments, in favour of expropriation of land without compensation. But Ramaphosa has responded in kind by subtly extending an invitation to the EFF to rejoin the ANC, a ploy which will continually compel it to justify its continuing existence, especially if the ruling party continues to steal its policy clothes.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Ramaphosa continues to bask in the admiration of whites and seems likely to bring disaffected elements of the black middle class back into the ANC. He has brought back hopes of better days for a previously despondent South Africa. </p>
<p>He is master of all the surveys, Mr Action and Mr Clean. </p>
<p>Yet the new president is no fool. He knows that his major challenge, after the depradations of the Zuma years, is to work towards making what he termed in his inauguration speech, a “<a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2018-02-16-in-full--read-cyril-ramaphosas-first-state-of-the-nation-address/">capable state</a>”. This revolves around addressing challenges of governance, the party as well as the economy.</p>
<h2>Low hanging fruit</h2>
<p>Ramaphosa has had little option but to first turn to addressing immediate problems within the state. The early steps have been relatively easy. The most straight forward task has been to shuffle the cabinet. By doing so he was able to expel or marginalise ministers known for their loyalty to Zuma or their incompetence, while bringing in replacements of known ability and integrity. </p>
<p>He has also moved swiftly to address crises at major parastatals, notably at the power utility Eskom and South African Airways to prevent them defaulting on their loans to banks and other creditors. With new boards now in place, emergency measures have been taken to prevent financial meltdown. </p>
<p>Likewise, Ramaphosa has given notice that he is determined to restore the South African Revenue Service to its former glory. Getting rid of the top brass, notwithstanding the resistance of Zuma’s point man, the commissioner Tom Moyane, should not be too difficult. But, as within the parastatals, it is the problem of what to do with Zuma cronies at lower levels of management that is likely to be more difficult and more time consuming. </p>
<p>Zuma cronies who have been embedded in state organisations for a long time will have set up procurement linkages that will need to be examined closely. This will provoke resistance, some of it overt, much of it covert, for whatever the cronyistic patterns of procurement, they will have been celebrated as black empowerment. Their disruption will be stigmatised as reactionary. Pravin Gordhan, the new minister of state owned enterprises, will probably have to get tough, and the fights could get nasty. </p>
<h2>ANC politics</h2>
<p>The other set of challenges which Ramaphosa faces have to do with his party, the ANC. His narrow victory at the party’s national conference was only secured because he did a deal with David Mabuza, then Premier of Mpumalanga, now promoted to <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/who-is-our-new-deputy-president-elect-david-mabuza-20180226">deputy president</a>. </p>
<p>Ramaphosa will, in time, find that this kind of backing was instrumental. Loyalty will come at a price, and Ramaphosa will have to play his cards carefully. </p>
<p>He may have to make alliances with a lot of party power holders he doesn’t like. This may include ceding control of certain provinces to party barons so that their patronage patterns are left intact. </p>
<p>This is a problem because, as Ramaphosa knows, some provincial governments, such as the Eastern Cape, are grossly inefficient. They are staffed by people who simply lack the capacity to do their jobs – but who have strong connections with local party bosses. Disrupting such networks will take determination and courage, and will meet politically costly pushback. Expect little to be done this side of an election.</p>
<h2>The economy</h2>
<p>Perhaps Ramaphosa’s most formidable challenge is how to kick start economic growth. He has been lauded as the man who, with experience in both the trade union movement and in business, can bring labour and capital together around a new consensus. </p>
<p>It’s a nice idea, and one boosted by Ramaphosa’s smooth talk of convening a summit around the economy. But if it is going to be more than just another talk shop, he is going to have to do an awful lot of arm twisting. Both sides are going to have make concessions. </p>
<p>South Africa’s major corporations have been sitting pretty for years. Despite the horrors of the Zuma years, the stock market has <a href="https://www.cnbcafrica.com/news/2017/07/31/south-africas-stock-market-defies-recession-scales-record-highs/">boomed</a>. The country became a low investment, high profit economy, characterised by the power of huge <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-economy-is-badly-skewed-to-the-big-guys-how-it-can-be-changed-92365">cartels</a>. </p>
<p>Ramaphosa has to convince them that they have to get out of the comfort zone, warning that if they don’t, levels of inequality and unemployment are such that South Africa may explode. Capitalism is going to hit big trouble if they don’t look beyond the short-term bottom line and commit to serious levels of investment, combining this with major commitments to labour-intensive employment and training. </p>
<p>The president is also going to have the difficult job of convincing the unions that they have a greater responsibility to address unemployment. To date their emphasis has been on securing higher wages for their members (that’s what unions do) and they have succeeded in getting the government to implement a minimum wage. </p>
<p>But these wins have come at a cost. For example, central bargaining has resulted in wage agreements with big firms that have imposed massive costs on small and medium sized businesses. </p>
<p>While no one wants a low wage economy, Ramaphosa would need to convince the unions that something has to give if problems like this are going to be addressed.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa’s easiest task will be to win the next election. But history will judge him on his ability to do something much bigger: rendering the South Africa state one that is not only capable, but genuinely developmental.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/93797/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>South Africa’s new president, Cyril Ramaphosa, has done well so far but more challenges relating to reigniting the economy lie ahead.Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/925592018-02-28T08:12:33Z2018-02-28T08:12:33ZRamaphosa’s new cabinet is a motley crew: what he’ll need to make it work<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/208228/original/file-20180228-36696-n357ut.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nhlanhla Nene and Pravin Gordhan were both fired by former South African President Jacob Zuma.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>South African President Cyril Ramaphosa has announced sweeping changes to the Cabinet he inherited from Jacob Zuma. Notably, respected former finance ministers Nhlanhla Nene and Pravin Gordhan, who were both controversially fired by Zuma, are back. Ramaphosa said the changes made his government better equipped to carry out its mandate. Politics and Society editor Thabo Leshilo asked Mashupye Maserumule for his thoughts.</em> </p>
<p><strong>Is the new Cabinet fit for purpose - is it better equipped to do what needs to be done?</strong></p>
<p>It could possibly be, largely because the ministries generally regarded as strategic in the economy have been wrestled out of the control of those allegedly implicated in the capture of the state: National Treasury, Public Enterprises, and Mineral Resources. Nhlanhla Nene as finance minister and Pravin Gordhan as minister public enterprises are excellent choices. Bringing in former mine worker organiser <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/gwede-mantashe">Gwede Mantashe</a> to head up minerals and energy is also an inspired decision.</p>
<p>The contributions of the three men are desperately needed to get South Africa out of the economic doldrums. The government economic cluster is consolidated. This is what Ramaphosa’s administration needs, at least for now. </p>
<p>By retaining some of Zuma’s loyalists who’d performed woefully, such as <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/contact-directory/bathabile-olive-dlamini-ms">Bathabile Dlamini</a>, I think Ramaphosa was trying to manage a political dynamic – to keep the party’s powerful Women’s League on side. The league is a voting block within the governing party and Dlamini is president of the league. </p>
<p>Those like Dlamini that he’s kept from the old administration have been assigned to less strategic ministries. Because of this, I don’t think they’ll be able to have much influence in disturbing the strategic objectives of Ramaphosa’s administration. </p>
<p>The way he constituted his cabinet also reflects the distribution of power that emerged at the ANC’s national conference in December. The conference spawned a <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/zuma-to-go-but-no-decision-on-when-20180120">motley crew</a> (it includes some Zuma loyalists) in the ANC’s national executive committee, the party’s highest decision-making body in between conferences.</p>
<p>Because of this, Ramaphosa will need leadership capabilities of epic proportions to ensure that everybody pulls their weight in achieving what he promised in his <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/speeches/state-nation-address-president-republic-south-africa%2C-mr-cyril-ramaphosa">state of the nation address</a>. To keep track of government’s progress the monitoring and evaluation role that will be played by the new minister in the presidency, Nkosasana Dlamini-Zuma, will be crucially important. Her appointment to this portfolio makes her a prime minister of some sorts. </p>
<p>As the Deputy President of the country, David Mabuza is part of the presidency assigned the responsibility of the leader of government business in parliament. This is a very important role. It requires political authority, sophistication and gravitas. Managing the parliament-cabinet nexus is important to optimise the functioning of the state. The jury’s still out on whether DD – as Mabusa is known – has what it takes. </p>
<p>Ultimately, whether the cabinet is fit for purpose is a function of the quality of leadership at the helm -– the presidency. Important personalities that comprise that leadership are Ramaphosa, Dlamini-Zuma and Mabuza. </p>
<p><strong>What does all this augur for the future, and Ramaphosa’s success?</strong></p>
<p>I think the choices Ramaphosa made show that he is trying to consolidate his power base for the <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/newsmaker-2019-elections-results-will-be-credible-20171015-2">2019 general elections</a>. He wants to focus on the ANC gaining credibility rather than being pre-occupied by internal party squabbles. The choices he made show this. He tried to accommodate all the factions in the ANC. This is a brilliant tactical move. But his success lies in how he will build on this. </p>
<p>His state of the nation address captivated the nation. This, coupled with his <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/15/cyril-ramaphosa-to-be-elected-president-of-south-africa-jacob-zuma">strong anti-corruption stance</a>, presaged the possibility of a good future. But that future is the function of collective leadership at the political executive level. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, the majority of cabinet members appear to be amenable to his leadership. This is important for his success – at least for now as he finishes Zuma’s term. His true test is likely to emerge after the general elections in 2019 – if the ANC wins. For the moment he’s managing what he has consistently referred to as <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/224597/zuma-exit-near-as-ramaphosa-promises-power-transition/">“the transition”</a>. It stands to reason that the cabinet, as constituted, is part of “managing transition”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/92559/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mashupye Herbert Maserumule previously received funding from the National Research Funding for his post-graduate studies. He is the Chief Editor of the Journal of Public Administration
</span></em></p>The way South Africa’s new president Cyril Ramaphosa has constituted his cabinet reflects the distribution of power within the governing ANC.Mashupye Herbert Maserumule, Professor of Public Affairs, Tshwane University of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/925382018-02-27T15:19:14Z2018-02-27T15:19:14ZRamaphosa has chosen a team that will help him assert his authority<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/208119/original/file-20180227-36680-1x0i4mv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Cyril Ramaphosa during the late night announcement of his new cabinet. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Elmond Jiyane, GCIS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>South Africa’s new president, Cyril Ramaphosa, <a href="https://www.news24.com/Analysis/graphic-all-the-changes-ramaphosa-made-to-cabinet-20180227">has announced</a> his cabinet. As widely expected, he either fired or demoted almost all cabinet ministers implicated in corruption or considered incompetent who served under Jacob Zuma. In their stead Ramaphosa appointed his dream team to key ministries, bringing back former finance ministers Nhlanhla Nene and Pravin Gordhan both of whom had been fired by Zuma. But, contrary to expectations, he kept some ministers widely believed to have made a hash of their jobs. Politics and Society editor Thabo Leshilo asked Keith Gottschalk for his perspective.</em></p>
<p><strong>Is the new Cabinet fit for purpose - is it better equipped to do what needs to be done?</strong></p>
<p>This was a major shuffle, affecting two-thirds of ministers, more than most analysts had expected. </p>
<p>The new cabinet is undoubtedly better than the one that served under Zuma. The ministers incriminated in subverting procurement procedures for the benefit of the <a href="https://mg.co.za/tag/gupta-brothers">Guptas</a>, or at best, above their level of competence, have vanished. The Guptas’s were allied to Zuma and were at the heart of corruption and <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/FULL-TEXT-Statement-by-Public-Protector-on-Nkandla-Report-20140319">state capture </a> in the country.</p>
<p>The independence and competence of Gordhan, who has come back to serve as minister of Public Enterprises, and Nene who returns to the finance minister post, are welcome and will be well received by the markets. The appointment of <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/contact-directory/grace-naledi-mandisa-pandor-ms">Naledi Pandor</a> to Higher Education and Training is a good fit. Her views and temperament match with the vice-chancellors of higher education institutions.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa appointed two former ministers to their previous jobs: <a href="https://www.pa.org.za/person/derek-andre-hanekom/">Derek Hanekom</a>, who was fired by Zuma, is back running tourism and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f45af228-1a10-11e7-a266-12672483791a">Malusi Gagaba</a>, who relinquished the finance ministry, has been put back in charge of Home Affairs. An obvious posting for Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, who ran against Ramaphosa for the position of president of the African National Congress, would have been her former portfolio in international relations. Instead she has become a minister within the presidency.</p>
<p>The country is onto its eleventh minister responsible for energy since 1994. This time the post has gone to <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/contact-directory/jeffrey-thamsanqa-radebe-mr">Jeff Radebe</a>. Each of the previous incumbents lasted an average of 2.4 years. </p>
<p>In future the revolving door of ministers, directors-general and deputy directors general will need to end.</p>
<p>Before then, there will be at least one more shuffle and pruning when, as Ramaphosa has <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2018-02-16-ramaphosa-promises-to-cut-bloated-cabinet/">indicated</a>, the cabinet and the number of state departments are cut back. </p>
<p>It is a rule of thumb in political science that the poorer a country, the bigger its cabinet. The USA’s includes the Vice President and the heads of <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-trump-administration/the-cabinet/">15 executive departments</a>. South Africa’s is <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/leaders/profile/1083">35</a>, up from 30 <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/1994-cabinet">under Nelson Mandela</a>.</p>
<p><strong>What does all this augur for the future, and Ramaphosa’s success?</strong></p>
<p>Politics, except under a dictatorship, involves negotiating trade-offs with those with whom you have to negotiate, not only with those you would like to have as your allies. A winner only wins because he or she has formed a coalition of factions which outnumbers the rival coalition of factions.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa had to do some fancy footwork. This is because there’s broad consensus that his narrow victory over Nkosazana for the presidency was solely due to the intervention of the premier of Mpumalanga David Mabuza who ordered his followers to switch their votes at the last minute. Ramaphosa squeaked through. And, notwithstanding Ramaphosa’s preference for Pandor as his deputy, Mabuza won the necessary backing. Ramaphosa announced Mabuza’s appointment as deputy president of the country as part of his cabinet announcement. (Convention has it that the president and deputy president of the ANC serve as president and deputy president of the country.)</p>
<p>Making Dlamini-Zuma a minister within the presidency is clearly also a gesture of inclusivity to the anti-Ramaphosa faction.</p>
<p>Overall, Ramaphosa has a cabinet that forms a team he can work with, and that will help him assert his authority. As he <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/press-statements/president-ramaphosa-announces-changes-national-executive">said</a> in announcing it:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>These changes are intended to ensure that national government is better equipped to implement the mandate of this administration and specifically the tasks identified in the State of the Nation Address.</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/92538/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Gottschalk is an ANC member, but writes this in his professional capacity as a political scientist.</span></em></p>Overall South Africa’s new president has a cabinet that forms a team with whom he can work.Keith Gottschalk, Political Scientist, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/894022017-12-19T14:56:54Z2017-12-19T14:56:54ZWhy Ramaphosa won’t be able to deliver the three urgent fixes South Africa needs<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199948/original/file-20171219-4995-1l53lra.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">New ANC President Cyril Ramaphosa, centre, with fellow top leaders elected at the party's 54th national conference.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Cornell Tukiri</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The competition for the <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/anc-conference-2017/2017-12-18-cyril-ramaphosa-wins-anc-presidential-race/">top six leadership positions</a> in South Africa’s governing party, the African National Congress (ANC), was no carefully choreographed script such as the one-candidate-per-election of Chinese Communist Party congresses. It was a rip-roaring, full-throated democratic contestation – as raucous as US primary elections. Even more so, with delegates’ repeated singing and dancing. </p>
<p>This point bears emphasising. As recently as 2016, one hardline ANC critic published a book-length argument that ANC political practice and culture is shaped by an exile culture of avoiding or <a href="http://scholar.ufs.ac.za:8080/xmlui/handle/11660/3717">rigging elections</a>. The ANC’s 2017 national elective conference proves him wrong.</p>
<p>At a cost of <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/news/2017-12-16-the-anc-conference-hotel-bill-mints-on-6000-plus-pillows-as-delegates-check-in/">tens of millions of rand</a> to host <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/breaking-anc-meeting-over-68-missing-votes-20171219">4 776 delegates</a> – and 1 200 <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-12-17-00-media-turnout-at-conference-is-biggest-the-party-has-ever-seen">accredited journalists</a> – for a five day conference, the ANC achieved the closest possible thing to internal democracy. By contrast, the UK Prime Minister has, on occasion, been chosen by less than four hundred MPs in a <a href="http://uk.businessinsider.com/heres-how-the-process-to-pick-a-new-uk-prime-minister-works-post-referendum-brexit-2016-6">party parliamentary caucus</a>.</p>
<p>This refutes those who predicted <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Economy/Labour/News/nasrec-the-beginning-of-the-end-for-anc-says-vavi-20171218">“the end of the ANC”</a>.</p>
<p>In the end <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/cyril-matamela-ramaphosa">Cyril Ramaphosa</a> won the tightly contested race. He was the favourite candidate of that rarest of all alliances - business, labour and the South African Communist Party. His election was preceded by high expectations that, if elected, he would displace Zuma as state president before his term ends in 2019; stop corruption in loss making state owned enterprises; and make credible appointments to replace discredited ones in state institutions.</p>
<p>On the one hand, Ramaphosa’s narrow victory over Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma means that there will be no breakaway from the ANC, unlike the Economic Freedom Front and COPE after previous pivotal moments in the party.</p>
<p>On the other, Ramaphosa wins a poisoned chalice, raising big question marks over whether he will be able to deliver on the three big expectations.</p>
<h2>Poisoned chalice</h2>
<p>Ramaphosa faces a number of constraints. The biggest one is <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/meet-the-ancs-new-top-6-20171218">the composition of the other four men and a woman</a> who constitute the ANC’s “top six”. The team effectively runs the organisation.</p>
<p>The election results for the top six were a neck-and-neck mix of the two rival slates behind Ramaphosa and Dlamini-Zuma. Winning candidates were separated from their rivals by only a few hundred votes.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199959/original/file-20171219-4980-cprpz3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199959/original/file-20171219-4980-cprpz3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=778&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199959/original/file-20171219-4980-cprpz3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=778&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199959/original/file-20171219-4980-cprpz3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=778&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199959/original/file-20171219-4980-cprpz3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=977&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199959/original/file-20171219-4980-cprpz3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=977&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199959/original/file-20171219-4980-cprpz3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=977&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Cyril Ramaphosa with Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. He narrowly defeated her to become ANC president.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Kim Ludrook</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The rest of the team that will work with Ramaphosa are: David Mabuza as deputy president, Gwede Mantashe as national chairman, Ace Magashule as secretary-general, Paul Mashatile as treasurer-general and Jessie Duarte remains deputy secretary-general.</p>
<p>It makes for strange bedfellows given that Mabuza, Magashule and Duarte are widely viewed as Jacob Zuma supporters. This means that Ramaphosa won’t be as free to act as he might want to.</p>
<p>For example, it’s unlikely that a majority of the six would back a motion to ask Zuma to retire as state president before the end of his term of office in 2019. </p>
<p>It also remains to be seen to what extent this mixed slate leadership will support action against the <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1334530/who-are-the-guptas-details-according-to-madonsela/">Guptas</a>, Zuma’s friends at the heart of <a href="https://cdn.24.co.za/files/Cms/General/d/4666/3f63a8b78d2b495d88f10ed060997f76.pdf">state capture</a> allegations, and <a href="https://www.gov.za/tenderpreneurship-stuff-crooked-cadres-fighters">tenderpreneurs </a> - business people who get rich through government tenders, usually using dubious means - and the whole system of <a href="http://pari.org.za/betrayal-promise-report/">patronage and clientelism</a> that has gotten out of hand. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/politics/2017-12-19-cyril-ramaphosa-wins-a-poisoned-chalice/">make-up of the team</a> that Ramaphosa will lead might also baulk at pressing the ANC led Parliament to take decisive action against the decline in the country’s large state owned enterprises such as South African Airways and power utility Eskom.</p>
<h2>Implications for the opposition</h2>
<p>The best results from a partisan viewpoint for the Democratic Alliance (DA) and Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) would be had Dlamini-Zuma won. This would have alienated more ANC voters in the 2019 elections. </p>
<p>Ramaphosa’s victory means the DA has no option but to knuckle down to the hard slog of building branches in townships, ensuring a rising proportion of black people are represented as members, and promoting a rising proportion of black representatives in its parliamentary and provincial legislature caucuses.</p>
<p>Anticipating a Ramaphosa win, DA leader Mmusi Maimane set the tone for his party’s 2019 campaign in a recent round of full page newspaper ads with the message: whoever wins at the ANC conference is irrelevant – only a DA government can turn the country around. For DA election canvassers, every month that Zuma continues in office as state president is the gift that keeps on giving.</p>
<p>But whether Ramaphosa can tempt disillusioned, abstaining ANC voters back to the polls remains a moot point. Will the DA now win the Gauteng Province in the 2019 elections? Will the ANC retain its shrinking Northern Cape Provincial majority? Can the DA get an absolute majority, or at least hold onto its three metro prize catches of Johannesburg, Tshwane, and Nelson Mandela Bay during the 2021 municipal elections?</p>
<p>All these questions are now part of the roller coaster ride that is normal in functioning democracies.</p>
<p>The EFF will probably continue its taunting of Ramaphosa as “buffalo man”, – a reference to the fact that <a href="https://www.news24.com/Archives/City-Press/Ramaphosa-sorry-about-R18m-buffalo-20150429">he bought</a> a buffalo cow and her calf for nearly R20 million rand – but the party seems to have hit its ceiling of attracting alienated ANC voters. It will struggle to build its share of the vote any higher.</p>
<p>This ANC elective conference marks the start of a watershed for the party, which will continue until the end of Zuma’s term as president of the country in 2019.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89402/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Gottschalk is an ANC member, but writes this in his professional capacity as a political scientist.</span></em></p>Cyril Ramaphosa has secured the leadership of South Africa’s governing ANC. But he may not be able to clean up the mess left by Jacob Zuma given the other members of the party’s leadership team.Keith Gottschalk, Political Scientist, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/888922017-12-10T11:26:21Z2017-12-10T11:26:21ZWhy talk of unity in South Africa’s ANC is disingenuous, and dangerous<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/198317/original/file-20171208-27705-12qlydt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Are calls for unity in the ANC an attempt to prevent Cyril Ramaphosa from cleaning out the stables if he wins the presidency.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Mike Hutchings</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa is gripped by anxiety laced with anticipation as the much anticipated African National Congress (ANC) 54th <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-anc-leadership-race-will-go-down-to-the-wire-heres-why-88667">elective conference</a> draws closer. All the country’s nine provinces have consolidated their leadership preferences for the ANC’s presidential race from the branches. But the question about who will emerge victorious remains difficult to answer as a neck and neck scenario emerges. </p>
<p>The conference has very important implications for the country’s future: the president of the ANC becomes the president of South Africa. Whoever leads the ANC determines the kind of leader the country will get, and what policy trajectory will be taken.</p>
<p>President Jacob Zuma has been the president of the ANC and the country for almost a decade now. His tenure has been marked by successive controversies, some of which led to <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-jacob-zuma-is-fast-running-out-of-political-lives-80009">attempts to oust him</a>. All were foiled. He’s presided over the ANC’s declining <a href="http://www.heraldlive.co.za/opinion/2017/12/04/justice-malala-zuma-unity-bad-joke/">electoral prospects</a>, South Africa’s downgrading by <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-11-25-global-credit-ratings-agency-has-downgraded-south-africa-to-junk-status">international rating agencies</a>, and allegations that he manoeuvred his allies into positions that allowed them to manipulate state tenders and even <a href="https://www.news24.com/Columnists/GuestColumn/how-jacob-zuma-conquered-the-anc-20171027">government appointments</a>. </p>
<p>In a few days, he will not be the president of the ANC any more. So, who is likely to succeed him? The frontrunners are <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-11-03-00-ramaphosa-takes-an-early-lead-as-anc-branches-cast-their-vote">Cyril Ramaphosa</a> and <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/business/2017-11-29-dlamini-zuma-endorsed-by-free-state-in-anc-leadership-race/">Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma</a>. </p>
<p>The Premier of Mpumalanga, David Mabuza has thrown a spanner in the works. He has called for a vote for <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/mabuza-sheds-light-on-unity-mystery-20171201">“unity”</a>, suggesting that no particular candidate should be backed unless they agree on a unity ticket. </p>
<p>Mabuza’s call makes predictions about the conference impossible because the province he leads commands the party’s <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-10-06-mpumalanga-now-second-biggest-voting-bloc-in-anc/">second biggest membership</a> after <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-09-26-anc-leadership-race-kwazulu-natal-a-province-waiting-to-exhale/#.WiqoyFWWbIU">KwaZulu-Natal</a>.</p>
<p>I believe that the “unity” narrative feigns a solution to what is not a problem, but a manifestation of it. “Consensus leadership” – which the “unity” narrative wants to be the outcome of the elective conference – fudges internal organisational democracy. The absurdity is that if it was allowed, it could mutate into a political system where people’s choice doesn’t matter, while leadership is simply imposed. This is where and how dictatorship starts.</p>
<h2>More about power elites sharing the spoils</h2>
<p>Branches in Mpumalanga <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/politics/2017-12-01-anc-delegates-vote-with-their-abstentions-for-unity-in-mpumalanga/">have already voted</a>. The tally shows that 223 supported the “unity” approach which under the ANC’s electoral process these will be considered abstentions. </p>
<p>But Mabuza’s stunt to cajole for a non-contest doesn’t make him a kingmaker, or show that he’s mastered the art of brinksmanship. If anything, the ploy has weakened his position in the presidential race because the province he leads isn’t unanimously behind this particular manoeuvre. </p>
<p>In any case, what exactly is the “unity” that Mabuza says he’s vehemently pursuing? Is it really about uniting the ANC? Why doesn’t it rhyme with <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-10-15-is-zweli-mkhize-ancs-plan-b-if-dlamini-zumas-campaign-collapses/">Zweli Mkhize’s campaign</a> – he’s one of the other presidential hopefuls – framed around the same concept? How does it relate to the ANC’s <a href="https://www.marxists.org/subject/africa/anc/2001/eye-needle.htm">Through the Eye of the Needle</a> report, where the attributes of the leadership of the party are defined? </p>
<p>Why does it appeal largely to those who perfected the politics of the slate which determines their positions in the party and state, those with a cloud hanging over their heads? How is it to, anyway, play itself out in the presidential race? Is it to take the form of horse-trading? If so, how does it differ from Zuma’s <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/deshnee-subramany/president-jacob-zumas-opening-address-at-ancs-5th-national-pol_a_23009668/">remarks</a> at the end of the ANC’s 5th policy conference, that whoever loses the race for the presidency of the party should automatically become the deputy president? </p>
<p>Aren’t these all inventions of the same logic, essentially seeking power-sharing deals, which are about the political elites trying to accommodate each other in the leadership positions? The unity narrative is a facade. If anything, it institutionalises the very phenomenon it seeks to expunge from the ANC: slate politics.</p>
<p>Contest for the leadership positions is part of the democratic process. It only becomes a problem when sullied by slates, which are the function of factionalism. </p>
<h2>Unity issue misses the point</h2>
<p>Talk about “unity” and “consensus leadership” misses the point. It’s deflecting attention from the fact that the ANC is atrophying. The contest for the leadership of the ANC is in fact about proximity to state resources, not restoring its foundational value. As Senator William Marcy <a href="http://www.bartleby.com/73/1314.html">put it</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>To the victor belong the spoils. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Ramaphosa <a href="https://www.enca.com/south-africa/ramaphosa-criticises-abuse-of-resources">talks tough</a> against this. He doesn’t mince words. During his campaign he has consistently critiqued the status quo and unambiguously taken a stand against corruption. This is a good start for the ANC’s redemption. He insists that a commission of inquiry into state capture should be established, as recommended in the public protector’s report. This implicates Zuma and the coterie that makes up his oligarchy. It’s a move that’s ruffled feathers and unsettled those who have been shielded from being pursued for allegedly bagging ill-gotten gains from the state. </p>
<p>What’s disturbing is that the “unity” narrative could easily be a ploy to preempt Ramaphosa’s presidency, contriving to ensure that if he succeeds he will be entrapped in the consensus leadership arrangements. This would emasculate his vigour in pursuing those alleged to have looted the state.</p>
<p>Another possibility is that it’s being used to co-opt those with a sense of ethics into the company of those who are ethically compromised so that they could all look the same. </p>
<p>However, the questions around the call for “unity” are answered, it’s important to remember that when the ethical edifice collapses, society becomes the victim of the leadership of scoundrels.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88892/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mashupye Herbert Maserumule receives funding from National Research Foundation for my postgraduate studies. I am a member of the South African Association of Public Administration and Management (SAAPAM), including being a chief editor of its journal.</span></em></p>The ANC’s elective conference has very important implications for South Africa’s future. Whoever leads determines the kind of leader the country will get, and what policy trajectory will be taken.Mashupye Herbert Maserumule, Professor of Public Affairs, Tshwane University of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.