tag:theconversation.com,2011:/fr/topics/eritrea-16623/articlesEritrea – The Conversation2024-02-20T10:25:22Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2234902024-02-20T10:25:22Z2024-02-20T10:25:22ZEthiopia’s peace pacts with the Oromo Liberation Front have failed: here’s what was missing<p>Two attempts have been made over the past six years to broker peace between the Ethiopian government and the armed rebel group Oromo Liberation Front. The armed group was formed half a century ago with the goal of carving out an independent state for Oromia, the country’s largest regional state.</p>
<p>Both attempts at brokering peace – in <a href="https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/6133/">2018</a> and again in <a href="https://addisstandard.com/newsalert-govt-ola-second-talks-in-tanzania-end-without-agreement-again/#:%7E:text=The%20OLA%20in%20its%20part,insurmountable%20security%20and%20political%20challenges.%E2%80%9D">2023</a> – ended in failure and a <a href="https://borkena.com/2018/09/16/oromo-ethno-nationalists-massacred-at-least-60-ethiopians/">return to violence</a>.</p>
<p>Oromia is Ethiopia’s <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Oromo">largest and most populous</a> region. The Oromo Liberation Front has sought autonomy for the region since the group <a href="https://webarchive.archive.unhcr.org/20230602085350/https://www.refworld.org/docid/5696030f4.html">emerged</a> in 1973. It was briefly part of a transitional government led by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front coalition in 1991. Since then, the Oromo Liberation Front has continued to wage a low-level armed struggle against the government. </p>
<p>Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed rose to power in 2018 following the abrupt <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/15/ethiopia-prime-minister-hailemariam-desalegn-resigns-after-mass-protests">resignation</a> of his predecessor, Hailemariam Desalegn. At the time the country was reeling from widespread unrest, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/2/20/ethiopia-mass-protests-rooted-in-countrys-history">particularly in the Oromia and Amhara</a> regions. Among Abiy’s surprise reforms was <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/7/5/ethiopia-removes-olf-onlf-and-ginbot-7-from-terror-list">amnesty</a> for numerous outlawed rebel groups harboured by Eritrea that were waging war on government. </p>
<p>The most prominent of these was the Oromo Liberation Front, which had been based in neighbouring Eritrea. Subsequently, the Oromo Liberation Front announced a ceasefire, made a peace agreement with the Ethiopian government in the Eritrean capital, Asmara, and later entered Ethiopia. </p>
<p>However, the details of the peace agreement were not made public and there was no clarity on its legal grounds. The peace agreement soon failed to deliver the expected outcome of peace, amid <a href="https://borkena.com/2018/09/16/oromo-ethno-nationalists-massacred-at-least-60-ethiopians/">renewed violence</a>. </p>
<p>I am a political scholar of Ethiopia with an interest in the country’s federal governance and <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/361708000_The_extra_constitutionality_of_election_postponement_in_Ethiopia_amidst_COVID-19_pandemic">constitution</a>. My 2022 <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/370692256_The_causes_and_consequences_of_the_2018_failed_peace_agreement_between_the_Oromo_Liberation_Front_and_the_Ethiopian_government">research paper</a> examined the main reasons for the failure of the 2018 peace agreement. </p>
<p>I found that the most notable reasons were:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>there was no signed pact, which meant that there was no clear plan</p></li>
<li><p>the presence of competing factions within the Oromo Liberation Front </p></li>
<li><p>a lack of political will from both sides</p></li>
<li><p>the absence of a democratic ethos among both parties. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Many peace agreements between the Oromo Liberation Front and Ethiopia had been concluded since the early <a href="https://www.refworld.org/reference/countryrep/irbc/1993/en/93314">1990s</a> but did not bring the required stability. They were not durable because they did not address the factors at the core of their dispute. It is my view that these reasons also played a big part in the failure of the subsequent rounds of peace talks in 2018 and 2023. </p>
<p>A lasting peace can only be achieved when conflicting parties are willing to address the fundamental problems that trigger Ethiopia’s political challenges. </p>
<h2>A failed peace pact</h2>
<p>The first signs of failure came in September 2018, when more than 60 non-Oromo civilians were <a href="https://borkena.com/2018/09/16/oromo-ethno-nationalists-massacred-at-least-60-ethiopians/">killed</a> in Oromia region on the outskirts of western Addis Ababa. This alarmed many Ethiopians because it occurred shortly after the agreement was made.</p>
<p>Later, <a href="https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2020/10/07/charges-state-that-hachalus-assassins-were-part-of-olf-shane-anti-government-plot/">Hachalu Hundessa, a popular Oromo singer, was assassinated</a> in Addis Ababa. The government claimed that the assassination was part of the Oromo Liberation Front’s anti-government plot. This heightened the tension between the front and the Ethiopian government. On 23 June 2018, there was also an <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-45678760">assassination attempt targeting Abiy</a>.</p>
<p>From here on mutual suspicions overshadowed the peace agreement. It eventually collapsed for the following reasons.</p>
<p><strong>No signed document:</strong> A clear roadmap is central to post-conflict recovery and a pillar of any peace agreement. The 2018 Asmara peace agreement was reached without a written signed accord. </p>
<p>In August 2018, the Oromo Liberation Front leadership declared a unilateral ceasefire in response to Abiy’s request for dialogue with armed groups. This led to the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/8/7/ethiopia-signs-deal-with-oromo-rebels-to-end-hostilities">7 August 2018</a> peace agreement to halt hostilities and restore peace and stability.</p>
<p>The deal was short-lived. Conflicting reports about what was agreed were traded between government and the Oromo Liberation Front. The absence of a signed peace agreement made the environment more volatile. </p>
<p><strong>Competing factions within the Oromo Liberation Front:</strong> The emergence of new factions has historically been the party’s weak point. Less than eight months after returning to Ethiopia, one Oromo Liberation Front faction and the army wing released a statement stating that the Oromo Liberation Army had separated from the front. </p>
<p>Over time, the Oromo Liberation Front has splintered into at least eight different groups. These include the Oromo Liberation Army, the Oromo Liberation Front, a secret grouping known as Abba Torbe and Oromo Democratic Front, which denounces the use of violence. </p>
<p>The extent to which the Oromo Liberation Front controls its armed wing is <a href="https://docslib.org/doc/984072/report-of-a-home-office-fact-finding-mission-ethiopia-the-political-situation">unclear</a>. <a href="https://docslib.org/doc/984072/report-of-a-home-office-fact-finding-mission-ethiopia-the-political-situation">According</a> to the Life and Peace Institute, an international peacebuilding lobby, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>it is difficult for the government to identify OLF combatants…there is no clear definition between members, fighters and supporters.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The divisions within the Oromo political elite and the history of competition among the Oromo opposition forces point to the failed peace effort.</p>
<p><strong>Lack of political goodwill:</strong> It appears that although the moment might have appeared ripe for a peace agreement in 2018, neither party was ready for such an agreement. The government tried to exercise strong control from the centre and was reluctant to manage conflict peacefully with the Oromo Liberation Front.</p>
<p>The peace agreement was short-lived largely due to the absence of open and genuine commitments by both sides. The absence of a democratic ethos on both sides also weakened the agreement.</p>
<p><strong>Unclear demands:</strong> The Oromo Liberation Front’s political options have not been clear and consistent. It’s <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/3360-exploring-new-political-alternatives-for-the-oromo">not clear at any given time</a> whether their demand is substantial autonomy for the Oromo people within an Ethiopian federation or an independent sovereign Oromo state. The strategy swings wildly between a political solution and an armed struggle.</p>
<h2>Difficult environment to pursue peace</h2>
<p>Following the 2018 Asmara peace agreement, the internal political intricacies of Ethiopia drastically deteriorated. The democratic reform and euphoria brought by Abiy Ahmed, which included him winning the 2019 <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/15/world/africa/ethiopia-abiy-ahmed-nobel-war.html">Nobel peace prize</a>, soon faded.</p>
<p>One of the factors that made Ethiopia less stable after the peace agreement was the postponement of elections, partly due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The government’s decision to delay the election was considered a power grab and an unconstitutional term extension. It was rejected by most opposition parties and it led to the war with the Tigray regional government. </p>
<p>Ethiopia has since descended into civil war with ethnically motivated killings, religious conflict and displacement throughout the country. These constraints weaken the Ethiopian government’s ability to implement any peace agreement. It’s the setting in which a new round of peace talks in Tanzania was also doomed to fail.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223490/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marew Abebe Salemot does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The peace agreement was short-lived largely due to the absence of open and genuine commitments by both sides.Marew Abebe Salemot, Lecturer of Federalism, Debark UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2222422024-02-11T13:50:31Z2024-02-11T13:50:31ZThe diversity within Black Canada should be recognized and amplified<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573888/original/file-20240206-22-3e51m3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C50%2C6720%2C4416&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Eden Hagos (right) the founder of Black Foodie, sits with fellow African content creator Yvonne Ben.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.blackfoodie.co/three-tips-for-enjoying-nigerian-food-at-home/">(Black Foodie)</a>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It seems trite, in 2024, to suggest that the <a href="https://www.statcan.gc.ca/en/dai/smr08/2024/smr08_278">Black population in Canada is diverse</a>. On the surface, this is a relatively uncontroversial point to make and one that most people would agree with.</p>
<p>However, are we curious enough about what this diversity actually looks like? Further, what are the implications of reckoning with these nuances as we support and shape Black-focused policies, programs, studies, and spaces? These questions lead us into less certain terrain.</p>
<p>Global music star Abel Tesfaye, <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-musicians-fled-the-country-after-the-1974-revolution-how-their-culture-lives-on-206214">formerly known as The Weeknd</a>, is arguably one of the most recognizable contemporary Black Canadian figures. Piecing together some of the public details about his background and activities paints a picture that helps us appreciate the textured landscape of Black Canada today. </p>
<p><a href="https://pitchfork.com/thepitch/793-the-weeknds-east-african-roots/">Abel was born in Toronto to Ethiopian immigrant parents</a> and raised in Scarborough — a neighbourhood with diverse Black communities. His music draws on a wide repertoire of Black musical traditions, including R&B and <a href="https://www.okayafrica.com/the-weeknd-ethiopian-heritage/">Ethiopian influences and melodies</a>. </p>
<p>His recent philanthropy is also notable, including donations to causes such as <a href="https://www.billboard.com/music/rb-hip-hop/the-weeknd-donated-500k-racial-justice-initiatives-9395412/">Black Lives Matter</a>, <a href="https://www.utoronto.ca/news/support-weeknd-u-t-s-ethiopic-program-soars-past-500000-endowment-goal">Ethiopic Studies at the University of Toronto</a> and humanitarian <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56638328">efforts in Tigray (northern Ethiopia)</a>. </p>
<p>When we zoom in to individual stories like Abel’s, we can appreciate the multifaceted nature of Black Canada and the connections between contemporary and historical processes and events.</p>
<h2>Black Canadian histories</h2>
<p>Black Studies scholars Peter James Hudson and Aaron Kamugisha remind us that “<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26752055">despite Black Canada’s apparent marginality</a>,” it exists and matters as it relates to our histories, cultures, ideas and politics as a country. The new edited volume <a href="https://utorontopress.com/9781487529178/unsettling-the-great-white-north/"><em>Unsettling the Great White North: Black Canadian History</em></a> by history professors Michele A. Johnson and Funké Aladejebi underscores this point and demonstrates that we can trace Black people to every corner in Canada, across both space and time.</p>
<p>There are many historic Black communities in Canada established by people brought by, fleeing and descended from the transatlantic slave trade, <a href="https://humanrights.ca/story/story-africville">including Africville</a>, a Black settlement in Nova Scotia. </p>
<p>There was a new and large wave of <a href="https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/89-657-x/89-657-x2020001-eng.htm">Black people who arrived from the Caribbean beginning in the 1960s</a>, following the introduction of a point-based immigration system in Canada. Generations of Caribbean communities have made an indelible mark on Canada, from <a href="https://www.canadian-nurse.com/blogs/cn-content/2022/02/18/black-cross-nurses-were-the-heartbeat-of-providing">underpinning the health-care system</a> in the 20th century, to solidifying the <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/documentaries/short-docs/the-story-of-toronto-s-bizarre-1985-patty-wars-when-the-government-tried-to-rename-the-beef-patty-1.6352203">Jamaican beef patty as an essential staple</a> in the Toronto diet.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/covid-19s-impact-on-migrant-workers-adds-urgency-to-calls-for-permanent-status-148237">COVID-19's impact on migrant workers adds urgency to calls for permanent status</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>This only begins to scratch the surface of the multiplicity of experiences, communities and stories encompassed within Black Canada. Yet even these few details are ones you rarely bump into, but rather have to go searching for on your own. The mainstream discourse around Blackness in Canada often <a href="https://theconversation.com/black-canadian-women-artists-detangle-the-roots-of-black-beauty-109560">leans too heavily upon American Black history and politics</a>, and/or monolithic depictions of “the Black community.”</p>
<p>There is utility and beauty found behind the broad and unifying banner of Blackness. We saw this most starkly during the height of the Black Lives Matter movement, as a diversity of Black people, communities and organizations stood in solidarity and collective pain and grief. While it is important to amplify and stay attuned to these collective identities and movements, it should not be at the expense of attention to the details of this bigger picture.</p>
<h2>New waves of immigration</h2>
<p>Statistics Canada census data from both <a href="https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2019/statcan/89-657-x/89-657-x2019002-eng.pdf">2016</a> and <a href="https://www.statcan.gc.ca/en/dai/smr08/2023/smr08_270">2021</a> captures changes that were already apparent to many of us living alongside, working with or paying attention to Black people in Canada. Demographics have shifted considerably, owing in large part to new waves and patterns in immigration trends. </p>
<p>To begin with, the Black population in Canada is growing rapidly — from <a href="https://www.statcan.gc.ca/en/dai/smr08/2022/smr08_259">573,000 in 1996</a> to <a href="https://www.statcan.gc.ca/en/dai/smr08/2023/smr08_270">1.5 million in 2021</a>. Around 60 per cent of Black people in Canada were born abroad. While earlier generations of Black immigrants were mostly from the Caribbean, more recent immigrants are coming from African countries, including Nigeria and Ethiopia. This is also shifting broader national demographics, as Africa is now the second largest source continent representing recent immigrants in Canada.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573603/original/file-20240205-19-hckuzj.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A Statistics Canada chart showing the origin of Black immigrants from before 1981 to 2016. The proportion of immigrants from Africa increased from 4.8 per cent before 1981 to 65 per cent in 2016." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573603/original/file-20240205-19-hckuzj.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573603/original/file-20240205-19-hckuzj.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=294&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573603/original/file-20240205-19-hckuzj.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=294&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573603/original/file-20240205-19-hckuzj.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=294&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573603/original/file-20240205-19-hckuzj.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573603/original/file-20240205-19-hckuzj.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573603/original/file-20240205-19-hckuzj.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Statistics Canada data shows how the background of Black immigrants has changed over recent decades.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/89-657-x/89-657-x2019002-eng.htm">(Statistics Canada)</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>These migration patterns are more than footnotes in Black Canadian history. This diversity intersects with vastly different migration pathways and immigration statuses, class differences, unique cultural and linguistic influences, a multitude of religious traditions, as well as a variety of local and transnational social and political practices. </p>
<h2>Diversity of Black experiences</h2>
<p>We need the language, and quite frankly the attention span, to make sense of these unique Black trajectories and stories in Canada. For example, experiences and insights coming from the Somali diaspora community in Etobicoke are likely different than long-established Black communities in Halifax. Also, despite living with the unifying experience of encountering anti-Black racism, new Black Canadians who arrive as economic migrants may benefit from resources and privileges unavailable to Black folks who grew up in structurally-induced intergenerational poverty.</p>
<p>There is also so much to make note of as far as how Blackness itself is being made and remade in Canada through these shifting tides. Eden Hagos is a young Black-Canadian entrepreneur and founder of the online food and culture platform <a href="https://www.blackfoodie.co/">Black Foodie</a>. Hagos was inspired to become an advocate for Black food and culture after <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/life/food-and-wine/food-trends/eden-hagoss-black-foodie-blog-examines-the-racial-rhetoric-of-food/article30755637/">experiencing a racist incident at a European restaurant in Toronto</a>. </p>
<p>When you peruse Black Foodie content (including her merchandise donning phrases such as “Injera + Chill” and “Jollof + Chill”), you see that Hagos’s expression of Blackness is filtered through her East African roots, and her culinary routes through various African, Caribbean and Black American traditions.</p>
<p>If we care to make Black communities more visible and amplify their voices and demands for change and belonging, it is critical we also tune into these diversity of experiences and perspectives. We should take care to ensure the hard-earned policies and initiatives intended to combat the legacy of <a href="https://theconversation.com/call-out-anti-black-racism-every-day-not-as-a-campaign-tactic-183792">anti-Black racism in Canada</a> are extended throughout Black communities, and not just to those who have the easiest access to them. </p>
<p>In public discourse and national remembering, we need to continue the project of raising consciousness around the stories of historic Black communities while also drawing attention to contemporary diasporic communities, like the <a href="https://www.torontomu.ca/arts/about/new-hires/sam-tecle/">forthcoming book</a> by sociologist Sam Tecle does.</p>
<p>From an academic perspective, Black Studies in Canada also needs to make note of and engage with this diversity of experience. It should foster a new set of research questions and curricula that reflect this dynamism and diversity.</p>
<p>While concepts like “Black Canada” are useful blanket terms and an important organizing identity, a closer look reveals a detailed and fascinating tapestry that also deserves to be put on display.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222242/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alpha Abebe has received funding from the the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for previous research that has informed this article.</span></em></p>While “Black Canada” is a useful blanket term and important organizing identity, a closer look reveals a detailed tapestry of communities that also deserves visibility.Alpha Abebe, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Humanities, McMaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2211312024-02-07T13:27:32Z2024-02-07T13:27:32ZSomaliland-Ethiopia port deal: international opposition flags complex Red Sea politics<p>The <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-67858566">memorandum of understanding</a> between Ethiopia and Somaliland announced on 1 January 2024 set off diplomatic rows in the Horn of Africa – and beyond. </p>
<p>Details of the agreement are not publicly known, but both state leaders have touched on its content. Among the main elements:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Ethiopia gets <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f1a7ffa3-03d8-46e4-a009-3710b4abc27d">a 50-year lease</a> on a strip of land on Somaliland’s Red Sea coast for naval and commercial maritime use and access to the Berbera port. </p></li>
<li><p>Somaliland gets a share of Ethiopian Airlines. It also gets <a href="https://twitter.com/SomaliGuardian/status/1741854201162985590">an undertaking that</a> Ethiopia will investigate recognising Somaliland as a sovereign state. If it decides to do so, Ethiopia will be the first country to recognise Somaliland. The breakaway state has operated autonomously since it declared its independence from Somalia in May 1991, but lacks international recognition. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The list of countries opposed to the memorandum of understanding includes those in the region, such as Egypt, and western powers such as the US and the EU. China and Turkey add to the powerful mix.</p>
<p>Reasons for their objections vary. Some attest to the geopolitical significance of ports and other infrastructure like roads, dams or railways. These projects are often contested, a subject I <a href="https://more.bham.ac.uk/port-infrastructure/">have studied at close quarters</a>. </p>
<p>Infrastructure is deeply intertwined in political identities. Ethiopia’s political leadership, for example, has declared maritime access as a “<a href="https://addisstandard.com/news-ethiopias-quest-to-access-sea-not-a-matter-of-luxury-but-of-survival-premiers-security-advisor-briefs-military-attaches-reps-of-international-partners/">matter of survival</a>”. It argues that the country’s historical status and its rapid economic growth entitle it to sovereign access to the sea. </p>
<p>Infrastructures aren’t the only drivers of dissent over the deal. But they emphasise geopolitical struggles and point to political and economic competitions that are raising worries of increasing instability in the region. </p>
<p>The diplomatic squabbles show re-configurations of political alliances in the Red Sea region and beyond. The memorandum of understanding has placed the question of Somaliland’s recognition into the centre of these political dynamics.</p>
<h2>Opposition</h2>
<p>Somalia is the biggest opponent of the port deal. The president of the federal government of Somalia, Sheikh Hassan Mohamud, declared the memorandum a violation of Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. He announced Somalia would defend its territory against Ethiopian “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67861390">aggression</a>”. </p>
<p>However, the federal government in Mogadishu has no actual authority in Somaliland. It does not even exert full territorial control across Somalia – Al-Shabaab controls territory in south and central Somalia. The militant Islamist group also declared the agreement a violation of Somalia’s sovereignty.</p>
<p>So far the United Arab Emirates, a close partner of Somaliland and Ethiopia, has been silent. The UAE is increasing its influence in the Red Sea region and Africa more generally. It has <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2022/12/berbera-the-making-of-a-global-port-and-the-unmaking-of-a-people/">containerised</a> and manages Somaliland’s Berbera port. UAE companies <a href="https://maritime-executive.com/article/uae-s-overarching-role-in-african-ports-development">are building</a> port infrastructures across Africa. The UAE is among the largest foreign investors on the continent, following China, the US and the EU. </p>
<p>The lineup of globally and regionally powerful countries opposed to the deal suggests that the deck is stacked against the agreement.</p>
<p>The US, the EU and Turkey have invested heavily in attempts to rebuild Somalia’s state and security apparatus and to counter Islamist terrorism. </p>
<p>For example, Turkey took over the management of the airport and seaport in Mogadishu. It has built social and physical infrastructure in the capital, and opened its first external military base in the country.</p>
<p>The US and Turkey have each trained special forces in Somalia, and both countries have military on the ground. A confrontation between Somalia and Ethiopia would put their investments at risk, provide further challenges for the stability of the region and, likely, play into the hands of Al-Shabaab. </p>
<p>The role of the EU and of European countries is more ambiguous. The EU is a crucial financial backer of the Somalia federal government, which is part of its Horn of Africa <a href="https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/news-and-events/news/global-gateway-eu-and-horn-africa-countries-sign-alliance-boost-economic-development-and-combat-2023-12-15_en">Global Gateway Initiative</a>. </p>
<p>The initiative promises to connect regional infrastructure to foster economic integration. That’s something Ethiopia also promises with the memorandum of understanding. The EU doesn’t recognise Somaliland, but provided support to build its state institutions. </p>
<p>The UK is even funding the Hargeisa bypass road, part of the Berbera corridor that links Somaliland’s port to the Ethiopian border. </p>
<p>Not surprising is the opposition of Djibouti and China. Djibouti’s seaport processes over 80% of Ethiopia’s overseas trade. Ethiopia’s use of Berbera port is likely to reduce the trade volume handled in Djibouti. </p>
<p>Djibouti is also a crucial location in <a href="https://more.bham.ac.uk/port-infrastructure/2023/03/21/djibouti-fiddles-amid-the-scramble-for-the-red-sea/">China’s</a> Belt and Road Initiative. China supports Djibouti’s port development, operates an international free trade zone, and funds the renovation of the railway to Ethiopia. </p>
<p>Eritrea and Egypt also support Somalia. This is mainly because their relations with Ethiopia have been marred with conflicts. Eritrea and Ethiopia fell out again after Ethiopia struck peace with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front in November 2022. </p>
<p>Egypt is opposed to the building of Ethiopia’s hydroelectric <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66776733">Grand Renaissance Dam</a>, which increases Ethiopia’s control of the Nile waters on which both countries depend. Egypt and Eritrea are also not eager to see Ethiopia having a naval presence, and Egypt works against the UAE’s expansion of power in the Red Sea region. </p>
<h2>The way forward</h2>
<p>The regional Intergovernmental Authority for Development, chaired by Djibouti, recently convened an extraordinary meeting to discuss <a href="https://igad.int/communique-of-the-42nd-extraordinary-assembly-of-igad-heads-of-state-and-government/">tensions</a> between Somalia and Ethiopia. It affirmed the territorial integrity of Somalia, but also called for de-escalation and dialogue. </p>
<p>Ethiopia did not attend the meeting. But Ethiopia’s president, who uses access to the sea to mobilise public support, has a lot to lose by offending these states. The country’s international reputation has already suffered from allegations of war crimes and <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/09/1140872">mass atrocities in Tigray</a>. The government’s militarised response to opposition in several regions has had a negative impact on Ethiopia’s economy and contributed to <a href="https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/ethiopia/">food insecurity</a>. </p>
<p>The good news is that a violent confrontation between Ethiopia and Somalia seems unlikely. Ethiopia would risk political isolation, as major world powers and regional organisations, such as the African Union and Arab League, have confirmed Somalia’s territorial integrity. </p>
<p>The winner of rising political tensions in the region would be al-Shabaab, which is already calling Somalis to defend their land from foreign interference. </p>
<p>The most likely loser of the diplomatic row is Somaliland, which now seems even more unlikely to receive the international recognition it so craves.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221131/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>This author is part of a research project on Port Infrastructure, International Politics, Everyday Life in the Horn of Africa (<a href="http://portinfrastructure.org">http://portinfrastructure.org</a>) which received funding from Carnegie Corporation of New York. The statements made and views expressed in this article are solely the responsibility of the author. </span></em></p>If the international reactions are anything to go by, Ethiopia’s Red Sea port deal is easier said than done.Jutta Bakonyi, Professor in Development and Conflict, Durham UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2209512024-01-13T10:20:36Z2024-01-13T10:20:36ZRed Sea crisis: expert unpacks Houthi attacks and other security threats<p><em><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67938290">Recent attacks</a> on commercial vessels by Houthi militia in the Red Sea have put the vital shipping region in the spotlight. The Yemen-based rebels <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67932725">claim to be</a> targeting Israeli-linked vessels, in protest at Israel’s war against Hamas in Gaza. The UN Security Council recently <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/01/11/middleeast/un-security-council-houthi-attacks-resolution-intl-hnk/index.html#:%7E:text=The%20UN%20resolution%20condemned%20some,the%20commercial%20vessel%2C%20Galaxy%20Leader.">passed a resolution</a> demanding an immediate end to the Houthi attacks, while the US and UK <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/12/us-and-uk-launch-strikes-against-houthi-rebels-in-yemen#:%7E:text=The%20United%20States%20and%20Britain,of%20conflict%20in%20the%20region.">have launched a series of strikes on Yemen against the rebels</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>Burak Şakir Şeker, who <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/371719209_Security_Environment_of_The_Red_Sea">has studied security issues in the Red Sea</a>, shares his insights on the global importance of the region, the security issues that exist and how these must be addressed.</em></p>
<h2>Why is the Red Sea such an important international area?</h2>
<p>The Bab al-Mandab Strait between Yemen, in the Middle East, and Djibouti, in the Horn of Africa, is one of the world’s busiest oil transit points and is of great importance for the Red Sea. It’s a historically important trade transit route. Its proximity to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf reduces shipping distances and facilitates trade. About <a href="https://dg.dryadglobal.com/red-sea">33,000</a> merchant ships pass through the strait every year. </p>
<p>Because of its strategic importance, one of the greatest consequences of insecurity in the Red Sea is a significant increase in the cost of global trade and global energy transportation. </p>
<p>For example, an oil tanker leaving the Gulf would reach the port of London, 12,000km away, <a href="http://ports.com/sea-route/port-of-al-kuwayt,kuwait/port-of-londonderry,united-kingdom/">in 14 days</a> (at a speed of 22 knots) via the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea. But if that route is not available the tanker would have to go around the southern tip of Africa – a 24-day journey covering 20,900km.</p>
<p>The Red Sea’s strategic importance also makes it an important geopolitical area. Countries have <a href="https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2020-03/sipripp54_0.pdf">military bases</a> here and intervene to protect oil and merchant shipping. These include military bases of Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, China, the US, Italy, France, and Japan. </p>
<p>The Red Sea is therefore an area where complex global relations can play out. For instance, Israel’s attempt to control the <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/israels-sinai-dilemma">Sinai Peninsula</a>, one of the key supply routes for the Palestinian resistance, threatens the safety of merchant shipping in the Red Sea.</p>
<p>The Red Sea is also a security hotspot, drawing in countries that sit on either side of it, such as Yemen and Eritrea, as well as countries much further afield, such as the US and China.</p>
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<h2>Who are the Houthi militia? Why are they carrying out attacks?</h2>
<p>Because of the fragility, or lack, of central government in Somalia and Yemen, non-state armed groups are becoming more active. Examples include the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep55423.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3Abcad3b49f36a2209db265e84b98ac4c1&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_search_gsv2%2Fcontrol&origin=&initiator=&acceptTC=1">Houthi</a> and <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26297008.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3A3e7f38c4d0743bfab84eaf4812fbb476&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_phrase_search%2Fcontrol&origin=&initiator=search-results&acceptTC=1">al-Hirak</a> in Yemen and Somalia’s <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26351270.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3A01204b47bdbe5fe2c9d545df0a79f99c&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_phrase_search%2Fcontrol&origin=&initiator=search-results&acceptTC=1">al-Shabaab</a> and <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26297736.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3Abbab4fe5bcd7187fc0621ba043188061&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_phrase_search%2Fcontrol&origin=&initiator=search-results&acceptTC=1">Ansar al-Sharia</a>. </p>
<p>The Houthi militia, also known as Ansar Allah, is a rebel group based in Yemen. Originating from the Zaidi Shia Muslim minority, they rose to prominence in the early 2000s, opposing Yemen’s central government. The group’s name comes from its founder, Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi. </p>
<p>The Houthis aim to establish a Zaidi Shia-led government in Yemen. They’ve been involved in armed conflicts with the Yemeni government supported by Saudi-UAE coalition, including the Yemeni Civil War. They’re also backed by Iran. This is not to say the Houthi are a monolithic entity with a single common agenda; they are a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep40553.7.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3A11e66397f6320c7d5b8b91336cd2da4e&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_phrase_search%2Fcontrol&origin=&initiator=search-results&acceptTC=1">complex and volatile</a> coalition. </p>
<p>The Houthis are, currently, the Red Sea basine’s most pressing security danger. </p>
<p>Houthi soldiers have hounded, assaulted and taken control of many boats <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26470495.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3A6f6473f21a1081338473ca7920a79e32&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_phrase_search%2Fcontrol&origin=&initiator=search-results&acceptTC=1">since 2016</a>. Their earliest techniques, such as rocket-propelled grenades, were not very sophisticated, but their strategies <a href="https://pt.icct.nl/sites/default/files/import/pdf/haugstvedt-and-jacobsen.pdf">have evolved</a> to be more hazardous and successful. They have employed mines, drones and anti-ship missiles. The biggest casualty of their attacks are <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep38651.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3A3e9f92532ab00045060bdcd43edb1719&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_search_gsv2%2Fcontrol&origin=&initiator=search-results&acceptTC=1">Saudi</a> ships and ports. </p>
<p>The Houthi have weakened Yemen and exposed the country to foreign intervention. For instance, in 2015, the United States supported <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/yemen-peace-possible">Saudi Arabia’s intervention</a> to prevent the Houthis from invading all of Yemen. </p>
<h2>What are the other major security challenges facing the region?</h2>
<p>The biggest are the ongoing wars and tensions between and within each country. These include disputes over the affiliation of the <a href="https://www.inss.org.il/publication/red-sea-old-new-arena-interest/">Red Sea islands</a>, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep12602.6.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3Aeb6117d282db2402cdac046b5860ef76&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_search_gsv2%2Fcontrol&origin=&initiator=search-results&acceptTC=1">border disputes</a>, <a href="https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/gray-zones-in-the-middle-east">territorial claims</a>, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep21365.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3A7eada516b25619aa413ec7fb9a0242df&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_phrase_search%2Fcontrol&origin=&initiator=search-results&acceptTC=1">conflicting economic interests</a>, ideological differences and ethnic divisions. Examples of these include the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep26165.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3A86d529deede5c526ae8633abe7a04d2a&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_search_gsv2%2Fcontrol&origin=&initiator=search-results&acceptTC=1">Yemen-Saudi Arabia War</a> and tensions between Sudan, Ethiopia and Egypt over the <a href="https://ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/SIPRI_Insight-2005.pdf">Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam</a>.</p>
<p>Regional crises – such as the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.7864/j.ctt1657tv8.6.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3Ae52070930a6b2a2dc6bc03266e0cbb15&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_phrase_search%2Fcontrol&origin=&initiator=search-results&acceptTC=1">Arab Spring</a>, the <a href="https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/2031280/is-there-a-path-out-of-the-yemen-conflict-why-it-matters/">Yemen crisis</a>, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/blockade-of-port-sudan-whats-behind-it-and-what-can-end-it-169264">Sudan</a> and <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep17358.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3A943c3408b7774a356da3014f58599b3b&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_phrase_search%2Fcontrol&origin=&initiator=search-results&acceptTC=1">Qatar</a> blockades – also have a direct impact on the balance of power in the Red Sea.</p>
<p>Another major, escalating security problem is that the Red Sea is being <a href="https://www.coursehero.com/file/140125832/IPI-Rpt-Humanitarian-Crisis-in-Yemenpdf/">used by </a>smugglers smuggling – goods as well as people. They have used the proceeds to finance civil wars and terrorist activities in the region. </p>
<p>Due to its transit point and proximity to conflict zones, the Red Sea is one of the areas with the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep25263.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3Afc8929cfe214b2980f81a00ec1842cb7&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_phrase_search%2Fcontrol&origin=&initiator=search-results&acceptTC=1">highest concentrations</a> of arms and <a href="https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1251">human traffickers</a>. </p>
<p>The growing power of the illegal sector has <a href="https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaip2015.pdf">adversely</a> affected regional stability. It has paved the way for the formation of many <a href="https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-05/hoa_pb_april_2019_1.pdf">organised crime groups</a>. It has also claimed hundreds of thousands of lives.</p>
<h2>What must be done to better secure the Red Sea area?</h2>
<p>For a number of years, the main security issue in the wider region was Somali piracy. A major coordinated naval operation, involving key international actors, helped to address the threat and shows what can be achieved. </p>
<p>This suggests that the first approach to this regional crisis should be regional cooperation.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/somali-piracy-once-an-unsolvable-security-threat-has-almost-completely-stopped-heres-why-213872">Somali piracy, once an unsolvable security threat, has almost completely stopped. Here's why</a>
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</p>
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<p>In 2020 the <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/1612471">Red Sea Council (AKA Council of Arab and African Coastal States of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden)</a> was established by Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia, Eritrea, Egypt, Yemen and Jordan with the aim of maintaining security and stability in the Red Sea. It was to consult and coordinate efforts to combat dangers, while not being a military group. </p>
<p>The Red Sea Council is meant to be a new regional instrument. However, the council <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202401020375.html">hasn’t been able</a> to prevent the militarisation of the Red Sea corridor – one of its mandates. This is due of a lack of support from the international community and<br>
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-abiy-takes-a-page-from-russia-china-in-asserting-the-right-to-restore-historical-claim-to-strategic-waters-216237">historical tensions</a> over territorial issues. </p>
<p>It’s also <a href="https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2020-10/senior_study_group_on_peace_and_security_in_the_red_sea_arena-report.pdf#page=34">mainly dominated</a> by Saudi Arabia, based on its economic power and political authority. And so it could in fact work to limit the ability of Ethiopia, Qatar and Turkey, along with Iran, to move freely in the Red Sea. </p>
<p>Ultimately, increased coordination and collaboration between adversaries and allies with shared interests are necessary to ensure the safety and security of the Red Sea.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220951/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Burak Şakir Şeker does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>One of the biggest consequences of insecurity in the Red Sea is a significant increase in the cost of global trade.Burak Şakir Şeker, Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2162372023-11-13T13:29:00Z2023-11-13T13:29:00ZEthiopia’s Abiy takes a page from Russia, China in asserting the right to restore historical claim to strategic waters<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/557242/original/file-20231102-17-tfg6ng.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C0%2C2798%2C1868&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed arrives in Beijing on Oct. 16, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/ethiopian-prime-minister-abiy-ahmed-arrives-at-beijing-news-photo/1726773830?adppopup=true">Ken Ishii/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed <a href="https://www.ena.et/web/eng/w/eng_3458629">claimed on Oct. 13, 2023</a>, that his landlocked country has a right to demand maritime access to a Red Sea port from its neighbors in the Horn of Africa – first through diplomatic means, he said, or by force if necessary. </p>
<p>In confrontational language, Abiy all but threatened conflict should Ethiopia be denied what he called the country’s intrinsic right to waterway expansion. He has since <a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/world/ethiopia-pm-abiy-seeks-to-quell-neighbours-concerns-over-invasion">sought to soften his comments</a>, but the remarks have nonetheless <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2023/11/02/ethiopias-prime-minister-wants-a-red-sea-harbour">rattled the region</a>.</p>
<p>Such a move would help Ethiopia to reassert itself as <a href="https://theconversation.com/landlocked-ethiopia-wants-better-sea-access-a-port-deal-with-neighbours-could-benefit-the-region-211759">the dominant player</a> in the Horn of Africa, located in East Africa along a strategic maritime trade route. Ethiopia has been landlocked since coastal <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/6/29/ethiopia-eritrea-and-the-hope-for-lasting-peace">Eritrea broke away and became independent</a> in 1993 after a decadeslong war.</p>
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<p>Abiy, a <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2019/summary/">Nobel Peace Prize winner</a> once acclaimed for promoting peace and international cooperation but later accused of being <a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/11/29/939902460/nobel-peace-prize-winner-to-belligerent-warmaker-ethiopia-under-abiy-ahmed">a belligerent warmaker</a>, has alarmed countries in the region with his recent remarks. Abiy invoked a 19th-century Abyssinian warrior, <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/ras-alula-and-the-scramble-for-africa-a-political-biography-ethiopia-eritrea-1875-1897/oclc/34320977">Ras Alula Aba Nega</a>, who had proclaimed the Red Sea as Ethiopia’s “natural boundary.” The concern is in attempting to assert itself, Ethiopia might risk <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67332811">reigniting a conflict</a>.</p>
<p>Abiy’s comments come at a time when Ethiopia is in a period of soul-searching, caught between the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/04/08/ethiopias-transition-democracy-has-hit-rough-patch-it-needs-support-abroad">paths of democracy and authoritarianism</a>. They also signal a potential willingness by Abiy to break with international norms amid a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/blinken-meet-ethiopian-government-leaders-repair-ties-2023-03-15/">growing shift away</a> from once welcoming powers in the West. </p>
<p>His rhetoric echoes ambitious geopolitical powers like China and Russia, both of which have shown a willingness to use military force to dominate strategic waters – as evidenced by Russia’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/07/ukraine-russia-crimea-naval-base-tatars-explainer">invasion of Crimea in 2014</a> and China’s <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-boxed-america-out-of-south-china-sea-military-d2833768">military posturing in the South China Sea</a>. </p>
<p>They also come at a time when <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/12/7/abiys-efforts-to-unify-ethiopia-could-lead-to-its-disintegration">Abiy struggles to unite Ethiopia</a> behind a single ideological nationalism and is unable to contain insurgencies by two ethnic groups – the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67361386">Amhara paramilitary organization Fano</a> and the <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/11/09/second-round-of-talks-between-ethiopian-government-and-oromo-rebels/">Oromo Liberation Army</a> – both of whom hold historical grievances against the Ethiopian government and strive for greater political self-determination.</p>
<h2>Africa’s ties with the major powers</h2>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Leaders of China, Russia, Ethiopia, Indonesia and Kazakhstan walking." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/557240/original/file-20231102-31-3wrr4t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/557240/original/file-20231102-31-3wrr4t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557240/original/file-20231102-31-3wrr4t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557240/original/file-20231102-31-3wrr4t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557240/original/file-20231102-31-3wrr4t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557240/original/file-20231102-31-3wrr4t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557240/original/file-20231102-31-3wrr4t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, Indonesian President Joko Widodo and Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev head to a group photo session at the third Belt and Road forum on Oct. 18, 2023, in Beijing.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/chinese-president-xi-jinping-russian-president-vladimir-news-photo/1730510539?adppopup=true">Photo by Suo Takekuma-Pool/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.libarts.colostate.edu/people/mmahad/">researcher in international relations and conflict resolution</a>, I have watched as African countries have been courted by international powers, partly because of <a href="https://theconversation.com/africa-is-being-courted-by-china-russia-and-the-us-why-the-continent-shouldnt-pick-sides-210516">sea trade routes</a>. Africa’s sea trade routes are of strategic and economic importance for major powers like China and the U.S. They provide international shipping and trade, and access to critical resources. They also are key for maintaining geopolitical influence, as evidenced by military outposts such as the <a href="https://cnreurafcent.cnic.navy.mil/Installations/Camp-Lemonnier-Djibouti/#:%7E:text=Welcome%20to%20Camp%20Lemonnier%2C%20Djibouti,in%20the%20Horn%20of%20Africa.">U.S. base in Djibouti</a> and <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/15/russia-sudan-putin-east-africa-port-red-sea-naval-base-scuttled/">Russian attempts to establish a naval presence</a> in the Red Sea.</p>
<p>Abiy’s new diplomatic alliances were on display on Oct. 18, 2023, during his visit to China for a forum on the <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-turns-10-xi-announces-8-new-priorities-continues-push-for-global-influence-216014">Belt and Road Initiative</a> – an infrastructure project that has seen China grow its influence across the Global South. During the meeting, Abiy was seen walking in step with Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin. Photos from the conference seemingly conveyed Abiy’s alignment with those leaders and renewed Washington’s long-standing concerns over <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/15/refile-blinken-to-meet-ethiopian-government-leaders-to-repair-ties">its weakening ties</a> to Ethiopia.</p>
<p>Such concerns have been in the air since the outbreak of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2023/11/2/photos-one-year-on-peace-holds-in-tigray-but-ethiopia-still-fractured">Ethiopia’s Tigray war</a> in late 2020. The conflict led to President Joe Biden’s <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2023/09/07/notice-on-the-continuation-of-the-national-emergency-with-respect-to-ethiopia-2/">Executive Order 14046</a>, imposing sanctions on certain persons in the Ethiopian government over documented human-rights abuses, and subsequent economic and arms embargoes, effectively isolating Ethiopia from its traditional Western allies. </p>
<p>In response, Ethiopia turned toward China and Iran, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/20/world/africa/drones-ethiopia-war-turkey-emirates.html">procuring drones</a> that eventually tipped the balance in the Tigray conflict. The Ethiopian government’s rhetoric has since become increasingly Eastern-focused, distancing itself from the West.</p>
<p>This shift culminated in Ethiopia’s accession alongside five other states, including Iran, to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/21/world/asia/brics-summit-members.html?searchResultPosition=1">the BRICS group</a>, composed of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – a move that offers Ethiopia additional avenues to circumvent future U.S. sanctions.</p>
<h2>Domestic turmoil</h2>
<p>In addition to emulating Russia and China, the timing and riskiness of Abiy’s maritime motivations warrant scrutiny, especially given Ethiopia’s ongoing internal strife. </p>
<p>I believe that a motivating factor for the maritime claim is Abiy seeking to galvanize the people of Africa’s second most populous country through the creation of a potent nationalist narrative. This comes in the wake of his unsuccessful “<a href="https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2020/02/16/medemer-in-a-land-of-extremes/">Medemer” campaign</a>, which tried but failed to create a single unifying ideology for Ethiopians to rally behind. Medemer, which means “togetherness,” was coined by Abiy when he took power in 2018 in hopes to unite and galvanize an Ethiopia divided along ethnic lines for the past 30 years. </p>
<p>In addition to the insurrection threat, Ethiopia is beset by <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/11/02/ethiopia-atrocities-mar-ceasefire-anniversary">political violence</a>, <a href="https://www.wfp.org/countries/ethiopia">hunger and poverty</a>, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopia-religious-tension-is-getting-worse-5-factors-driving-groups-apart-214278">worsening religious tensions</a>, problems that Abiy may want to divert attention from. </p>
<h2>What Abiy risks</h2>
<p>Abiy’s bold rhetoric may backfire in several ways, both domestically and internationally.</p>
<p>Given the <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/11/07/ethiopia-eritrea-war-tplf/">heightened state of regional alert</a> following Abiy’s comments, his approach could easily lead to escalated tensions or even armed conflict with neighboring countries. There are already reports of <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/11/07/ethiopia-eritrea-war-tplf/">Eritrea being on high alert</a> amid Ethiopia’s amassing troops between its border and Eritrea.</p>
<p>Abiy’s attempt to distract from internal discord may inadvertently generate new crises for Ethiopia’s already stretched military and recovering economy, and thereby jeopardize Ethiopia’s already strained economic and security capabilities.</p>
<p>In addition, Abiy’s attempts to emulate global powers like China and Russia and impose its will through force carries its own risks. China and Russia have the military might to enforce their geopolitical ambitions, a luxury that Ethiopia does not have. </p>
<p>And it is unlikely that China will extend the same level of support to Ethiopia as it <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/china-firms-russia-body-armor-bullet-proof-drones-thermal-optics-army-equipment-shanghai-h-win/">did to Russia</a> during its invasion of Ukraine. Unlike with Russia, Beijing doesn’t rely on Ethiopia for access to raw materials it needs. Similarly, Russia is not expected to supply arms to Ethiopia while it is <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-desperate-need-for-weapons-ukraine-win-for-north-korea-2023-9">seeking to replenish its own arsenal from North Korea</a> to continue its fight in Ukraine. </p>
<p>As such, trying to adopt a similar assertive maritime stance in a region already fraught with tensions could prove disastrous for Ethiopia – plunging the country and its neighbors into extended turmoil.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216237/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mahad Darar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed claims his landlocked country has a right to demand maritime access to a Red Sea port from its neighbors in the Horn of Africa − Somalia, Eritrea and Djibouti.Mahad Darar, Ph.D. Student of Political Science, Colorado State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2052172023-05-11T09:19:32Z2023-05-11T09:19:32ZSudan refugee crisis: aid agencies face huge challenges as hundreds of thousands flee violence<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/525604/original/file-20230511-25-7g00wd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Refugees who crossed from Sudan to Ethiopia wait in line to register at the International Organization for Migration at Metema on May 4, 2023. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by AMANUEL SILESHI/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Sudan stands on the brink of yet another civil war <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-created-a-paramilitary-force-to-destroy-government-threats-but-it-became-a-major-threat-itself-203974">sparked by</a> a confrontation between two generals: the head of Sudan’s Armed Forces, General Abdelfatah El-Burhan, and the head of the Rapid Support Forces, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo.</em></p>
<p><em>The conflict, currently unfolding in the capital, Khartoum, has created a widespread humanitarian crisis. Thousands of people, trying to escape the violence, are crossing into neighbouring countries. International law and refugee <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Asylum-Seeker-and-Refugee-Protection-in-Sub-Saharan-Africa-The-Peregrination/dOrsi/p/book/9781138025424">expert</a> Cristiano d'Orsi tells us what his biggest concerns about the situation are, and what needs to be done to address them.</em></p>
<h2>What are your biggest concerns with the refugee situation?</h2>
<p>In Sudan, the situation is particularly worrying because of the huge number of refugees that will be moving. People are leaving from many parts of the country. Though the conflict’s epicentre is in Khartoum, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/18/what-is-happening-in-sudan-a-simple-guide">it has spread</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/01/1082722">At least</a> 100,000 people have already arrived in neighbouring countries, <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15265.doc.htm">including</a> Chad, Egypt and South Sudan. Contingency plans are being put in place <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/news/unhcr-sudan-refugee-response-will-need-445-million-rising-numbers-fleeing-sudan">for about</a> 860,000 refugees. As an <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Asylum-Seeker-and-Refugee-Protection-in-Sub-Saharan-Africa-The-Peregrination/dOrsi/p/book/9781138025424">expert on</a> the legal protection of asylum-seekers, refugees and migrants, I’m interested in seeing how these vulnerable groups will fare.</p>
<p>The numbers are high partly because Sudan hosted <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/countries/sudan">1.1 million</a> refugees, one of the largest refugee populations in Africa. South Sudanese represented more than 70% (800,000) of the refugees in Sudan, followed by 126,000 Eritrean refugees (11%). Most of these refugees, about 60%, <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-country-refugee-response-plan-crp-january-december-2023">lived outside</a> camps – in towns, villages and areas just outside Khartoum.</p>
<p>The refugees hosted by Sudan are now fleeing violence in Sudan. Neighbouring countries will have to treat them as asylum-seekers or refugees because <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/6450e5814.html#page=3">they cannot</a> be returned to a situation of conflict. Some will also face the difficult decision of returning to their home countries. For instance, there are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/07/eritrea-accused-of-forcibly-repatriating-civilians-caught-up-in-sudan-fighting">reports</a> that Eritrean men who escaped military service and fled to Sudan are already being detained upon their return.</p>
<p>Another big concern I have is the challenges facing aid efforts. </p>
<p>With Khartoum under attack, aid efforts – to support both refugees and the wider public – will require a new operational hub. Port Sudan – a city and port on the Red Sea in eastern Sudan – has become a hub for evacuations, and looks set to become an operating base for the UN and aid groups. </p>
<p>Given the current insecurity, getting relief to people in need will be a massive hurdle. Depending on how the conflict unfolds, aid may need to move across front lines or across national borders. </p>
<p>In addition, last year the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that Sudan’s aid groups, including those looking after refugees, only received <a href="https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/1068/summary">around half</a> of the nearly US$2 billion they requested from donors – a shortfall that other relief missions are also facing. </p>
<p>The crisis places huge, new demands on the international community to increase funding. UNHCR alone will need <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/news/unhcr-sudan-refugee-response-will-need-445-million-rising-numbers-fleeing-sudan?mc_cid=14b70653fa&mc_eid=4aad996b35">at least US$445 million</a> to support the displaced until October 2023.</p>
<p>How long it will take for donor funding to materialise remains to be seen. In the meantime, frontline communities and mutual aid networks <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-65344673">are acting</a> as first responders, from hosting displaced families to coordinating relief in Khartoum and beyond. </p>
<h2>What’s the international response been like?</h2>
<p>There has been some international action. From what I’ve seen, for now, it’s mostly been the United Nations, European Union and a handful of individual countries. </p>
<p>The African Union has <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20230502/african-union-condemns-violence-sudan-calls-humanitarian-ceasefire-and-urges">condemned the violence and called</a> for an immediate humanitarian ceasefire. It has also pledged to coordinate international action on Sudan. </p>
<p>A regional refugee emergency response, led by UNHCR, is underway. And the International Medical Corps <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-conflict-situation-report-2-april-27-2023">has launched</a> a regional response to meet the needs of internally displaced persons and refugees. </p>
<p>The UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/05/1136292">has provided</a> critical water, sanitation and hygiene support to hospitals in Khartoum and Darfur. UN Women <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/05/1136292">is providing</a> financial and technical support to young Sudanese women who are using app technology to keep themselves safe. They’re able to find food, medicine and safe routes away from the fighting. The UN is <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/05/1136292">also</a> tracking cases and allegations of gender-based violence and taking measures to support victims. </p>
<p>The European Union has <a href="https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/where/africa/sudan_en">allocated</a> €200,000 (about US$220,000) for immediate relief and first aid assistance to those injured or exposed to high risk. This will support the Sudanese Red Crescent Society with first aid, evacuation services, and psychosocial support.</p>
<p>The Arab League <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/05/07/arab-league-begins-negotiations-between-sudans-warring-sides">has been holding</a> emergency meetings to find a real solution to the clashes and stop the bloodshed.</p>
<h2>What more needs to be done?</h2>
<p>The root causes of refugee flows need to be addressed. The most obvious solution to end Sudan’s refugee crisis is to make efforts to reach a peace agreement.</p>
<p>While attempts to mediate the conflict are underway, for instance by the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudanese-pin-their-hopes-talks-saudi-arabia-2023-05-08/">Arab League</a>, there are several factors that must be respected. </p>
<p>First, the rights of refugees, asylum seekers and returnees must be respected and protected. All of Sudan’s neighbours have a duty under law to do this. Five of Sudan’s neighbours are party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, so they’re obliged to protect refugees on their territory. </p>
<p>Even though Libya and Eritrea aren’t party to the convention, the principle of non-refoulement – whereby people aren’t allowed to be returned to situations of harm – has today become <a href="https://harvardilj.org/2022/12/the-obligation-of-non-refoulement-and-its-erga-omnes-partes-character/">a principle of customary</a> international law. This means they can’t force people to return to Sudan, while it’s still volatile. The UN, the AU and UNHCR typically supervise this. </p>
<p>UNHCR <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/6450e5814.html#page=3">has called on</a> states to suspend the forcible return of nationals and stateless people residing in Sudan. </p>
<p>In addition, countries that people are fleeing to must suspend issuance of negative decisions on applications for international protection, until the situation in Sudan has stabilised.</p>
<p>Finally, all countries <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/news/unhcr-urges-states-keep-borders-open-sudanese-suspend-negative-asylum-decisions?mc_cid=14b70653fa&mc_eid=4aad996b35">must allow</a> civilians of all nationalities fleeing Sudan non-discriminatory access to their territories. These include those who do not have documentation or passports. </p>
<p>Next, Sudan will need stronger aid infrastructure. This <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2023/04/26/aid-agencies-sudan-war">includes</a> improved security analysis and better coordination mechanisms between civilian and military actors. </p>
<p>Finally, <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2023/04/26/aid-agencies-sudan-war">funding</a> for relief efforts will also need to increase substantially. Key to this is <a href="https://www.wider.unu.edu/publication/four-key-areas-improve-aid-effectiveness">accountability</a>. Donors are more likely to base their own policies on recipient priorities if donors act together.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205217/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cristiano d'Orsi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The number of refugees leaving Sudan is particularly high because Sudan was itself host to a million refugees.Cristiano d'Orsi, Lecturer and Senior Research Fellow at the South African Research Chair in International Law (SARCIL), University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1922522022-10-16T07:51:53Z2022-10-16T07:51:53ZTigray has resisted Ethiopia’s far greater military might for two years – here’s why neither side is giving in<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/489408/original/file-20221012-20-g31ivm.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters in the UK demonstrate against Ethiopia's Tigray war in October 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mike Kemp/In Pictures via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/tigray-has-resisted-ethiopias-far-greater-military-might-for-two-years-heres-why-neither-side-is-giving-in-192252&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p>The Ethio-Tigray war started on <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54964378">4 November 2020</a>. For almost two years, the governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea – along with Amhara regional forces and militia – have waged war against Tigray’s regional government and society. </p>
<p>Tigray is a tiny ethnonational group that makes up about <a href="https://www.atlasofhumanity.com/tigray">6%</a> of Ethiopia’s population of <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/ethiopia-population/">121 million</a>. Yet, it has been able to hold off well-armed military forces.</p>
<p>As a sociologist who has <a href="https://works.bepress.com/asafa_jalata/">written extensively</a> on the cultures of nationalism in the region, I have studied the deep and complex roots of this conflict. I believe that understanding its history is key to comprehending how Tigray has developed the resolve to hold off a far greater military might than its own.</p>
<p>Neither the leaders of Ethiopia and Eritrea nor those of Tigray accept the principles of compromise, peaceful coexistence or equal partnership. According to their political cultures, winners take all. It’s zero-sum politics.</p>
<h2>The war today</h2>
<p>The Ethiopian National Defence Force <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/battle-mekelle-and-its-implications-ethiopia">captured Mekelle</a>, Tigray’s capital city, on 28 November 2020. The Ethiopian army was helped by Eritrean and Amhara military forces. </p>
<p>Abiy Ahmed, Ethiopia’s prime minister, congratulated his army and allied forces for what looked like a quick victory. </p>
<p>However, the Tigrayan Defence Force made a <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/battle-mekelle-and-its-implications-ethiopia">tactical retreat</a>. Its troops moved to rural areas and used guerrilla operations supported by war veterans. This strategy demonstrated Tigray’s effective fighting force, which was first developed in the 1970s.</p>
<p>As a result, eight months after the start of the war, Tigrayan troops returned to their capital. The Ethiopian army <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/28/world/asia/tigray-mekelle-ethiopia-retreat.html">retreated</a> from Mekelle and other cities.</p>
<p>Tigrayan troops then invaded the neighbouring Afar and Amhara regions, and almost made it into Finfinnee (<a href="https://www.dw.com/en/tigrayan-forces-advance-toward-ethiopian-capital/av-59712725">Addis Ababa</a>) in November 2021. However, they soon retreated to their region.</p>
<p>Since then, Tigrayan forces have controlled and administered most of Tigray. </p>
<iframe title="The regions of Ethiopia" aria-label="Locator maps" id="datawrapper-chart-yEyyR" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/yEyyR/2/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" height="650" width="100%"></iframe>
<p>The Ethio-Tigray war has been <a href="https://mereja.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=305544#p1331271">devastating</a> for Tigrayans. They have faced mass killings, military bombardment, rape, looting and the destruction of property. The conflict has denied them access to food, electricity, telecommunications, medicine, banking services and other necessities. </p>
<p>Yet they support the Tigray Defence Force. To understand why requires a deeper reading of Ethiopia’s history.</p>
<h2>A complex history</h2>
<p>Two Amhara emperors and one Tigrayan emperor laid the foundation of the modern imperial state of Ethiopia. The first emperor of Abyssinia/Ethiopia was Tewodros (1855-1868). He was followed by Yohannes IV (1872-1889) of Tigray and then Menelik II (1889-1913). </p>
<p>Under Menelik II, the Amhara state elite replaced Tigray’s leaders. They made Tigrayan society a junior partner in building the Ethiopian empire. </p>
<p>But Tigrayan nationalists believe their society was the foundation of the Ethiopian state. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-war-in-tigray-risks-wiping-out-centuries-of-the-worlds-history-179829">Ethiopia's war in Tigray risks wiping out centuries of the world's history</a>
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<p>In the last decades of the 1800s, the Ethiopian empire <a href="https://www.degruyter.com/document/isbn/9781685855772/html?lang=en">expanded</a> from its northern core of Tigray and Amhara by colonising the Oromo and other ethnonational groups. </p>
<p>It established slavery, the nafxanya-gabbar system (semi-slavery) and the colonial land-holding system by taking the land of conquered people. </p>
<p>The nafxanya (gun-carrying settlers) elite – led by the Amhara – dislodged the Tigrayan elite from Ethiopian state power. Tigray was pushed to the periphery of an Amhara-dominated society. This created <a href="https://www.degruyter.com/document/isbn/9781685855772/html?lang=en">political rivalry</a> between the two groups. </p>
<p>The status and living conditions of the Tigrayan elite and people deteriorated. This, along with several wars in the region, aggravated political, economic and social problems. </p>
<p>Accumulated grievances and many forms of resistance produced the Tigray People’s Liberation Front in 1975. It aimed to <a href="https://research.vu.nl/en/publications/a-political-history-of-the-tigray-peoples-liberation-front-1975-1">liberate Tigrayans</a> from Amhara-led governments. This helped develop Tigrayan nationalism. </p>
<h2>Tigray’s two nationalisms</h2>
<p>Tigrayans maintain two forms of nationalism. </p>
<p>The first promotes Tigrayan autonomy, self-reliance and development. </p>
<p>The second is Tigrayan Ethiopianism. This theoretically maintains Ethiopia’s current geopolitical boundary, with its decentralised political structures where different population groups have some autonomy. </p>
<p>After building military power in the 1980s, Tigrayan elite <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Cultural-Capital-and-Prospects-for-Democracy-in-Botswana-and-Ethiopia/Jalata/p/book/9780367786373">dominated</a> other ethnonational groups, particularly the Oromo, the empire’s largest ethnonational group. </p>
<p>Between 1991 and 2018, the Tigrayan elite <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-lies-behind-the-war-in-tigray-150147">controlled</a> state power and the political economy. The Tigrayan elite created a pseudo-democracy. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front was the mover and shaker of the Ethiopian state. </p>
<p>The Oromo expressed their collective grievances with this political arrangement through the struggles of the Oromo Liberation Front. The Qeerroo/Qarree (Oromo youth) movement got involved between 2014 and 2018. This eventually <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-oromo-protests-mark-a-change-in-ethiopias-political-landscape-63779">dislodged Tigrayan leadership</a> from Ethiopian central power in 2018. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-young-ethiopians-in-oromia-and-sidama-fought-for-change-161440">Why young Ethiopians in Oromia and Sidama fought for change</a>
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<p>Abiy was a member of the Oromo People’s Democratic Organisation, a subsidiary political party of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. The Tigrayan Front, alongside its allied organisations, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/3/28/abiy-ahmed-elected-as-chairman-of-ethiopias-ruling-coalition">elected Abiy</a> as Ethiopia’s prime minister in April 2018. He later turned on his support base. </p>
<p>Once he came to power, Abiy and his allies believed they wouldn’t stay in control if they did not destroy Tigrayan and Oromo nationalists. These were symbolised by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, the Oromo Liberation Front and the Oromo youth movement. </p>
<h2>Zero-sum politics</h2>
<p>Tigrayan and Amhara elites express and practice Ethiopianism differently.</p>
<p>The Amhara elite dominated Ethiopia from 1889 to 1991. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front overthrew them in 1991. </p>
<p>The wealth and experience Tigrayan elite accumulated over nearly three decades increased their national organisational capacity. This has helped them in the current war. </p>
<p>The Oromo have rejected the dominance and tyranny of both these groups. They have carried out their <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-oromo-protests-mark-a-change-in-ethiopias-political-landscape-63779">liberation struggle</a>.</p>
<p>Abiy and his Amhara collaborators are fighting Tigrayans, Oromos and others to control Ethiopian state power. Their winning the war in Tigray and <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-other-conflict-whats-driving-the-violence-in-oromia-187035">Oromia</a> would allow the Abiy regime to continue a modified version of Ethiopia’s pre-1991 policy. </p>
<p>For Tigrayans, losing this battle would be equivalent to losing political power and returning to victimisation, poverty and the threat of annihilation. </p>
<h2>Uncertain future</h2>
<p>Given their complicated political history, reconciling the central government and the Tigrayan regional government is challenging. Even if these two groups negotiate a peace deal, conflict will continue if the Oromo are left out of the process. </p>
<p>If Tigray and Oromia’s political problems aren’t correctly understood and resolved, conflicts will continue until the collapse of the Ethiopian state.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192252/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Asafa Jalata does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Leaders at the centre of the Ethio-Tigray war don’t believe in equal partnership. In their political cultures, winners take all.Asafa Jalata, Professor of Sociology and Global and Africana Studies, University of TennesseeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1868422022-08-11T15:24:48Z2022-08-11T15:24:48ZNowhere to run: the plight of Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474282/original/file-20220715-22-da64l1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Eritrean refugee children in Ethiopia.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Eduardo Soteras/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ethiopia has hosted large numbers of Eritrean refugees for years.
Before the recent conflict, about <a href="https://www.unrefugees.org/news/ethiopia-s-tigray-refugee-crisis-explained/">100,000</a> Eritrean refugees lived in camps in Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region. </p>
<p>They have fled some of the <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/313615_ERITREA-2021-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf">worst human rights</a> conditions in the world, including widespread persecution and forced military conscription. Eritrea is a highly authoritarian country. Those who speak out, or are even suspected of opposition to government policy, have been jailed for years, tortured, executed, and disappeared. </p>
<p>However, since late 2020, these Eritrean refugees found themselves caught up in the conflict between Tigrayan forces, the central government, and other regional armed groups. The conflict quickly spiralled into a full-fledged civil war, with dangerous <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-61009077">ethnic dimensions</a>. It has made many parts of Ethiopia unsafe for the refugees. </p>
<p>There has been progress toward peace, but the humanitarian need for Ethiopians and refugees that it hosts is still great. In fact, the World Food Programme just <a href="https://www.wfp.org/news/wfp-unhcr-rrs-appeal-funding-continue-feeding-over-750000-refugees-ethiopia">announced</a> that it could run out of food for refugees as soon as October if action is not taken.</p>
<p><iframe id="0EoP7" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/0EoP7/2/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>I’m <a href="https://www.refugeesinternational.org/sarah-miller">an expert</a> on refugee issues and published a <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/506c8ea1e4b01d9450dd53f5/t/621fe06b67fab200e77dd641/1646256236952/Eritrea+Brief+-+March+2022+%281%29.pdf">recent report</a> to highlight the specific needs of Eritrean refugees. It pulls together data from interviews with refugees, UN, NGO, government and civil society individuals.</p>
<p>I’ve found that Eritrean refugees in Tigray and other parts of Ethiopia have been attacked by nearly all fighting groups.</p>
<p>Before the conflict, Ethiopia was considered a safe place for refugees. It hosts one of the <a href="https://data.unhcr.org/en/country/eth">largest refugee populations</a> in Africa, and is among Africa’s economic <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2019/03/26/ethiopia-africas-next-powerhouse/">powerhouses</a>. But, it is now clear that Eritrean refugees, as well as other populations of refugees and some internally displaced groups, are struggling to find safety in Ethiopia. </p>
<h2>Nowhere to run</h2>
<p>Eritrean refugees have been attacked by the Ethiopian Defense Forces, Eritrean troops (that have invaded and remain in northern Ethiopia), Tigrayan groups, Amharan militia, among others. </p>
<p>In some cases they were inadvertently caught in harm’s way. In other cases, they were explicitly targeted because of their ethnicity. Eritreans can easily be confused with Tigrayans, both of whom speak Tigrinya, and thus be targeted by those attacking Tigrayans. They have also been attacked by Eritrean troops, in some cases even <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/12/11/disturbing-un-says-safety-of-eritrean-refugees-greatly-at-risk">kidnapped</a> and taken back to Eritrea.</p>
<p>The UN and wider aid community – even with the conflict subsiding – have no means to <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/briefing/2022/1/61ea6fe74/deteriorating-conditions-eritrean-refugees-grave-risk-tigray.html">guarantee their</a> <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/briefing/2022/1/61ea6fe74/deteriorating-conditions-eritrean-refugees-grave-risk-tigray.html">safety</a>, let alone reach them with consistent and <a href="https://apnews.com/article/international-news-eritrea-abiy-ahmed-ethiopia-united-nations-344e7156295eb1801f9441a9359c2dab">adequate aid</a>. </p>
<p>Early in the conflict, <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/506c8ea1e4b01d9450dd53f5/t/621fe06b67fab200e77dd641/1646256236952/Eritrea+Brief+-+March+2022+%281%29.pdf">Eritrean troops entered</a> Ethiopia and destroyed Ethiopia’s northern Eritrean refugee camps of Hitsats and Shimelba. Tens of thousands of Eritrean refugees were forced to flee further into the Tigrayan warzone. Others were killed or kidnapped back to Eritrea, and some <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/09/16/ethiopia-eritrean-refugees-targeted-tigray">became the targets</a> of other groups, as well. </p>
<p>While some have managed to reach other camps in Ethiopia, or neighbouring countries like Sudan, most remain without anywhere to go and adequate <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/briefing/2022/1/61ea6fe74/deteriorating-conditions-eritrean-refugees-grave-risk-tigray.html">assistance</a>. For example, Eritrean refugees in the newly constructed Alemwach camp <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/jul/28/eritrean-refugees-claim-arbitrarily-arrested-beaten-detained-in-ethiopian-camps-unhcr?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other">report</a> dangerous conditions and a lack of food and medicine.</p>
<h2>Devastating war</h2>
<p>To be clear, the wider population of Ethiopia’s Tigray region, as well as parts of Amhara and Afar, have also been in dire straits over the course of the conflict. </p>
<p>Famine has been used as a <a href="https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/29548/in-the-tigray-war-weaponized-starvation-takes-a-devastating-toll">weapon of war</a> in Tigray, with devastating <a href="https://apnews.com/article/africa-united-nations-only-on-ap-famine-kenya-0598a26af21928d11d5734b7b826e988">consequences</a>. According to the World Food Programme, <a href="https://nation.africa/africa/news/to-fight-hunger-us-envoy-s-visit-to-ethiopia-must-emphasise-peace-and-accountability-3894686">two million people</a> are severely hungry.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/06/crimes-against-humanity-and-ethnic-cleansing-ethiopias-western-tigray-zone">Human rights violations</a>, including <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/08/ethiopia-troops-and-militia-rape-abduct-women-and-girls-in-tigray-conflict-new-report/">sexual violence</a>, massacres and widespread detention, have also been widely reported over the course of the conflict. Making matters worse, Ethiopia is now facing a crippling drought that could be the <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/04/1116872">worst in 40 years</a>. </p>
<p>This unfolding scenario is already affecting the entire region, and refugees – already in a vulnerable state – will face further suffering, as well.</p>
<h2>A safe place</h2>
<p>Even if the Ethiopian government were to renew its commitment to protecting and assisting refugees on their territory – as it is bound to do under <a href="https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2021/6/9/from-displacement-to-development-how-ethiopia-can-create-shared-growth-by-facilitating-economic-inclusion-for-refugees">domestic</a> and <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b73b0d63.pdf">international law</a> – would it be able to ensure protection and assistance for displaced groups amid such a fractured political, security, and ethnic landscape? </p>
<p>The reality is that even if peace were achieved today (and there are still some major <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/long-last-ethiopia-prepares-peace-talks">obstacles</a> to overcome before a peace deal is reached) and humanitarian assistance was exponentially increased, Ethiopia will struggle to provide adequate protection and assistance to Eritrean refugees in the coming years.</p>
<p>While Ethiopia is first and foremost responsible for protecting and assisting refugees on its territory, the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ethics-and-international-affairs/article/abs/normative-terrain-of-the-global-refugee-regime/3F91A61887D7748A525CD7103FFEEFCA">global refugee regime</a> dictates that the rest of the world – states, NGOs, the UN, civil society and others – also have a duty to help Eritrean refugees caught in the crossfire. They need help finding safety elsewhere in the form of a durable solution whereby they can live in dignity and support themselves.</p>
<p>The traditional refugee solutions of returning to their home country or locally integrating into the host country offer little for Eritreans at this stage. Thus resettlement to other countries, including the United States, must be increased.</p>
<p>Some 932 Eritrean refugees were <a href="https://eritreanrefugees.org/refugee-stats/">admitted</a> to the US in 2019, and <a href="https://eritreanrefugees.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Refugee-Arrivals-by-State-and-Nationality-as-of-30-June-2022.pdf">around 200</a> Eritrean refugees arrived in the US between October 2021 and June 2022. There are about <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwi3uPO9ptr4AhWHhIkEHRiJDbQQFnoECBcQAw&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.usatoday.com%2Fstory%2Fnews%2Fworld%2F2021%2F03%2F24%2Feritreans-us-worry-loved-ones-ethiopia-refugee-camps%2F6981923002%2F&usg=AOvVaw0XpNrCTe7qTYvRm_vs-g5A">35,000</a> Eritreans in the US to date. But this is a drop in the bucket compared to the level of need still in the region. </p>
<p>However, even if the US and other resettlement countries found resettlement places for much larger numbers of Eritreans and other refugees in need – scaling up staff is necessary to undertake the long screening process, which can sometimes take years for US-bound refugees – it will not be enough for those who need help now.</p>
<p>While increasing resettlement capacity in the US and other states is an important long-term response, there are other immediate steps that must be taken. <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/">UNHCR</a>, NGOs and others in the humanitarian community need to continue to insist on unfettered access to all parts of Ethiopia, including the beleaguered camps where Eritreans have fled or been forced to reside.</p>
<p>Humanitarians must also help Eritreans who seek to leave Tigray and they must work with parties to the conflict to find ways to secure the refugee camps in other parts of Ethiopia where Eritreans are staying.</p>
<p>Finally, the UN and US must continue to work toward lasting peace in Ethiopia, which includes accountability for denying humanitarian access and starving civilians. Without this broader context, Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia will never find safety or a solution to their displacement.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/186842/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sarah Miller does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia are caught in a conflict in a country that was supposed to provide them refuge.Sarah Miller, Assistant Research Professor and Senior Fellow, Georgetown UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1826082022-05-11T13:45:52Z2022-05-11T13:45:52ZThe war in Ukraine: Africa risks paying a heavy price for neutrality<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/462001/original/file-20220509-21-ulqqok.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A vendor selling cereals in Nairobi.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Simon Maina/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Far from being swift, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine now looks likely to become a long-running war of attrition. It will therefore have an accumulating, and increasingly drastic, impact on Africa unless it can be brought to a swift end. </p>
<p>But can African countries influence that? And do they want to?</p>
<p>This article argues that both African and western countries need to change their approach if Africa is to suffer less damage from the crisis. If it continues to sit on the fence, it risks exacerbating conflict in Africa itself.</p>
<p>The Ukraine war has compounded the economic problems caused by the pandemic. Both the <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2022/03/08/pr2267-statement-kristalina-georgieva-meeting-uneca-african-min-finance-cent-bank-gov-impact-ukraine">International Monetary Fund</a> and <a href="https://news.un.org/pages/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/UN-GCRG-Brief-1.pdf">UNECA</a> have emphasised the economic damage being done to African countries. On top of <a href="https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/rising-food-prices-global-risks-and-vulnerabilities-34747">food price inflation</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-ukraine-crisis-highlights-africas-need-to-diversify-its-wheat-sources-181173">Africa’s dependence on food supplies</a> from both Ukraine and Russia, the <a href="https://www.wfp.org/hunger-catastrophe">World Food Programme</a> has highlighted the shortage of emergency supplies to feed the starving in drought-struck eastern Africa.</p>
<p>The 20%-40% increase in oil and gas prices has hit consumers and manufacturers as well as farmers through the price of fertiliser. And as revenue falls and demand for government spending rises, there is a growing risk of debt distress. This is true even of hitherto stable countries like Ghana.</p>
<p>This economic pressure, and particularly rising food prices, may not only provoke protest but precipitate political instability and conflict across the continent. It was, after all, food price rises that stimulated the Arab Spring in 2011. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/may/06/sri-lankan-president-calls-second-state-of-emergency-in-five-weeks">Sri Lanka’s</a> current foreign exchange crisis shows how politically dangerous it can be.</p>
<p>The war in Ukraine has also diverted global political attention from Africa’s problems, and made it harder for the UN to lead international peace-making efforts. From Putin’s point of view, the more chaos in the world the better to divert his enemies. But, unless the African Union is willing and able to step in, the lack of global attention risks more African conflicts getting out of hand.</p>
<p>The Ukraine crisis, therefore, significantly increases political stress and potential conflict throughout Africa. Economic, political and social stress levels are already high due to <a href="https://royalafricansociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Conference-Co-chairs-Conclusions-final-15-9-21.pdf">climate change and demographic growth</a>. Countries like Nigeria and Mozambique as well as those in the Horn of Africa and Sahel have latent or actual conflicts that will be exacerbated.</p>
<p>African governments are already appealing for more economic support to mitigate these stresses. But many donor countries are now diverting more money to defence, and it would be quicker and more effective to tackle the root of the problem: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.</p>
<p>Yet African governments seem increasingly reluctant to put pressure on Russia. </p>
<h2>The neutrality question</h2>
<p>The shocking breach of national sovereignty and territorial integrity initially led many to support the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jwDWxyLVBxk">Kenyan arguments</a> at the UN Security Council against the invasion, and on 2 March <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/3/unga-resolution-against-ukraine-invasion-full-text">28 voted for</a> the UN resolution condemning the invasion and only one, Eritrea, against. Even so, 17 abstained and 8 absented themselves. </p>
<p>A month later, however, in the vote to remove Russia from the UN Human Rights Council on 7 April, only <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/7/un-to-vote-on-suspending-russia-from-rights-council">10 voted for</a>, 9 against and the remaining 34 sat on the fence.</p>
<p>A few authoritarians, like President Isaias Afwerki in Eritrea, and a number of states that depend on Russia for security, like Mali and the Central African Republic, were always likely to support it. But other countries with sound democratic credentials, like Senegal, Ghana and Botswana, have also avoided picking sides.</p>
<p>Many Africans firmly believe they should <a href="https://theconversation.com/russias-war-with-ukraine-five-reasons-why-many-african-countries-choose-to-be-neutral-180135">remain neutral</a>. <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/3/23/why-africa-does-not-appear-to-be-standing-with-ukraine">They argue</a> that this is not Africa’s quarrel and that western countries are hypocritical, defending their own invasions, like Iraq, while opposing Russia’s in Ukraine. They also wonder why the suffering of Ukrainians should be more important than the suffering of Ethiopians, to which the west has paid so little attention. </p>
<p>Not all agree. </p>
<p>South Africa has been <a href="https://theconversation.com/russias-war-in-ukraine-how-south-africa-blew-its-chance-as-a-credible-mediator-181101">accused</a> of prioritising its political ties to Russia over its principles of sovereignty and self-determination: Ramaphosa urged a peaceful solution, but criticised NATO for its expansion rather than Russia for its invasion.</p>
<p>For European and North American countries, the immediate point of historical reference is the Second World War: dictators who invade their neighbours cannot be trusted and must be firmly opposed for the safety of the whole world. Hence their remarkable unity and swift response. </p>
<p>For Africa, however, the historical reference is the Cold War, when the Soviet Union supported the liberation struggle against (western) imperial powers. This looks to Africans more like a replay of the Cold War, of Russia vs ‘the west’, than of World War II (democrats vs dictators) and non-alignment therefore seems natural.</p>
<p>Russia <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/21/russia-west-africa-disinformation-burkina-faso/">actively promotes</a> this interpretation on social media in Africa, pedalling a narrative that NATO is the aggressor and Russia the victim, writing the Ukrainians out of the script.</p>
<p>But this creates four problems for Africa. It prolongs the war. It implies accepting Russia’s right to a ‘sphere of influence’ over neighbouring countries, whatever the views of their citizens. It means ignoring the principles of self-determination and non-interference. And it risks Africa becoming again a playground for great power rivalry.</p>
<p>Soviet imperialism was just as real as western imperialism, simply more local. Ukrainians and other east Europeans, achieved their independence from Russia long after most African countries, and are equally determined to keep it. Many therefore rushed to join NATO and the EU, with the full support of their citizens; and Ukrainian refugees have received a warm welcome in neighbouring countries because their hosts are all too aware that unless Russian aggression is stopped, they too could be refugees tomorrow.</p>
<p>What would an alliance with Russia bring African countries in a multipolar world where the international rule of law is ignored and might alone makes right? </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-and-syria-bound-together-in-a-mission-that-is-far-from-accomplished-165345">The Syrians</a> know already: ruthless and effective military support for a client dictator enabling him to crush and expel all dissent. </p>
<p>The Libyans also know, though Russia’s military support for General Haftar was neutralised by Turkey’s intervention. </p>
<p>Even in South Africa the Russian alliance nearly brought the country <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/12/16/nuclear-enrichment-russia-s-ill-fated-influence-campaign-in-south-africa-pub-80597">a ruinous contract</a> to build nuclear power plants that would have generated more corruption than energy.</p>
<h2>The West’s mistakes</h2>
<p>But western countries also need to recognise they are not innocent. From an African perspective, trade still feels unbalanced, the costs of ‘structural adjustment’ are still resented, and while western donors see themselves defending human rights, financial probity, good governance and civil society, others see them as hypocritical, supporting dictatorial regimes past, like <a href="https://observingafrica.wordpress.com/2016/02/18/why-did-the-us-support-joseph-mobutu/">Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire</a> (now DRC), and present, like Rwanda and Uganda. </p>
<p>Most recently, the benign western self-image has been badly damaged by the <a href="https://africacdc.org/video/vaccine-inequality-and-vaccination-rate-in-africa/">vaccine inequality</a> exposed by the Covid-19 pandemic. </p>
<p>Western governments have been <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/197109/how-not-to-persuade-africa-to-support-ukraine-and-denounce-russia/">using the wrong arguments</a>, appealing to the need to preserve the international rule of law and multilateral institutions when many Africans see these as skewed in favour of ‘the west’ and Africa as perpetually disadvantaged.</p>
<p>African perceptions of western hypocrisy have been reinforced by the contrast between support for Ukraine and the precipitous departure from Afghanistan, relative <a href="https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/86862?utm_source=rssemail&utm_medium=email&mkt_tok=ODEzLVhZVS00MjIAAAGD5oubIiZYhaCG4lXOElaSmW-LpCkzYIB7RRO-gK0W75tXFnlF7inngyYU9VyipIlwgiUqE406nLKkdsSCv4R30LCQHhawJJJY07Eg">indifference to Syria’s suffering</a>, and hostility to African refugees. The scenes of European border guards discriminating against black refugees played directly into the narrative that ‘the west’ supports white folks more than black.</p>
<p>Even if ending the war is clearly very much in Africa’s self-interest, Western countries need to address this perception if they are to persuade African countries to put more pressure on Russia.</p>
<p>Two steps are needed:</p>
<p>1) The West would be wise to admit its own past sins and omissions, and admit African countries to a fuller part in the global order, to give them more confidence that it will work in their interests and is a preferable alternative to acting as clients to one superpower or another.</p>
<p>2) Africans themselves need to look at where their real interests lie. Distrust of ‘the west’ is understandable, but does that make Russia a trustworthy alternative? The Ukrainians don’t think so, nor many Libyans, and certainly not the millions of Syrians who have been forced into exile by Russian bombs. </p>
<h2>The dangers of sitting the fence</h2>
<p>Will Africa benefit from standing aside, urging talks, while the conflict continues and the world economy is irreparably damaged? </p>
<p>The longer the war continues, the worse the economic damage to Africa, and the greater the risk that conflict breaks out in African countries themselves. Russia will not stop the war until forced to do so, by arms or by bankruptcy. </p>
<p>If African countries mean what they say about respecting sovereignty and building a fairer international system, they need to step in, not step away. But they also need to be clearer to western countries what their price is.</p>
<p>To stay neutral risks signalling African weakness and marginalisation in international affairs. A confident, assertive, self-interested and united Africa would say: ‘Stop this: it is wrecking all of us.’ Sitting on the fence helps no-one, especially when the fence will inevitably one day collapse.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/182608/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicholas Westcott is director of the Royal African Society, a not-for-profit charity.</span></em></p>The Ukraine crisis is significantly increasing political stress and potential conflict throughout Africa.Nicholas Westcott, Research Associate, Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1818662022-05-09T13:35:17Z2022-05-09T13:35:17ZFamine in Ethiopia: the roots lie in Eritrea’s long-running feud with Tigrayans<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/461524/original/file-20220505-14-mcsp8r.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A woman receives food aid at a distribution centre in Ethiopia. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jemal Countess/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The war in northern Ethiopia that began in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54964378">November 2020</a> has left millions in Tigray on the brink of famine. </p>
<p><a href="https://uk.news.yahoo.com/aid-convoys-ethiopias-tigray-truce-180227148.html?guccounter=1">Reports</a> suggest that nearly 40% of the region’s six million inhabitants face “an extreme lack of food”. Shortages have forced aid workers to deliver medicines and other crucial supplies “sometimes by foot”. </p>
<p>A few convoys have been allowed to enter Tigray, but the United Nations <a href="https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/ethiopia">says</a> convoys of at least 115 trucks are required daily, yet the entire region is classified “hard to reach”. This indicates that it is effectively inaccessible. </p>
<p>This is not the result of a natural disaster: it is a famine induced by the closure of the borders of Tigray by Ethiopian, Eritrean and Somali forces, reinforced by militia from Ethiopia’s Amhara and Afar ethnic groups. </p>
<p>Since the Tigrayans’ army <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/20/tplf-rebels-announce-retreat-to-ethiopias-tigray-region">retreated</a> into their region in December 2021, they have been surrounded by armies that have blockaded Tigray. </p>
<p>A handful of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/aid-convoy-enters-ethiopian-territory-controlled-by-tigray-forces-first-time-3-2022-04-01/">aid convoys</a> have been allowed through. They have been far fewer than the humanitarian assistance required daily to feed the population. </p>
<p>The blockade and resulting famine are well recognised. What is poorly understood are the origins of this crisis. </p>
<p>They lie in a bitter feud between Eritrea’s President Isaias Afwerki and Tigrayans that dates back to the 1970s, and the president’s determination not to allow them to rebuild their forces by cutting their supply lines to Sudan. </p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071847.2021.1981630?src=&journalCode=rusi20">paper</a> I wrote last year, <a href="https://eritreahub.org/the-tigray-famine-lessons-from-1984-85">I revisited this history</a>, in particular the seminal moment in relations between the Eritrean and Tigrayan liberation movements. </p>
<h2>Lessons from the 1983-1985 famine</h2>
<p>The Ethiopian famine of 1983 to 1985 was the result of a combination of a devastating drought and a ferocious war as Eritreans fought for their independence and Tigrayans for their rights. </p>
<p>Both liberation movements used a lifeline through Sudan to provide aid to millions. They also brought in supplies essential for their war efforts. </p>
<p>It is the memory of the utility of these supply lines that explains why the Eritrean, Ethiopian and Somali <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/is-another-regional-alliance-what-the-horn-needs">alliance</a> fought so hard to sever ties between Tigray and Sudan when the current conflict began in November 2020. </p>
<p>Their aim was clear: to cut possible routes to Sudan, as well as meet the grievances of the <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/28/ethiopia-tigray-war-amhara-abiy-ahmed-expansionism/">Amhara community,</a> who claimed that Western Tigray was part of its ancestral lands. </p>
<p>Human Rights Watch <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/02/11/ethiopia-unlawful-shelling-tigray-urban-areas">reported</a> that the attack on Humera (at the tri-point of Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea) began on 9 November 2020. Within two days, the town was in the hands of the invading forces. </p>
<p>Tigrayan forces were forced northwards and eastwards. Tens of thousands of Tigrayan civilians were <a href="https://www.iom.int/news/over-1-million-people-displaced-due-conflict-northern-ethiopia-iom-dtm">forcibly expelled</a>. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-people-from-war-torn-tigray-told-us-about-the-state-of-their-lives-amid-the-war-180594">What people from war-torn Tigray told us about the state of their lives amid the war</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Afwerki’s determination to crush the Tigrayans – who are, after all, the government of a region in a neighbouring state – needs unravelling. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03056244.2003.9659773">enmity</a> between the Afwerki-led Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) – now renamed the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice – and the governing Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) is longstanding, complex and visceral. </p>
<h2>A toxic fued between rebel groups</h2>
<p>Afwerki’s loathing came about because of deep-seated differences over political strategy, which originated in student politics in Addis Ababa in the <a href="https://africaworldpressbooks.com/without-troops-and-tanks-humanitarian-intervention-in-ethiopia-and-eritrea-by-mark-duffield-john-prendergast-hardcover/">1970s</a>. But – perhaps above all else – there was the question of which liberation movement was the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/peasant-revolution-in-ethiopia/E3B7988793DC3063511E3765B026EE16">region’s ‘top dog’</a>. </p>
<p>This feud festered over time, but came to the fore at the worst possible moment: the famine that struck Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa in 1983 to 1985. Their quarrel peaked just as huge quantities of aid were being trucked from Sudan into the remote areas of Eritrea and Tigray held by the respective liberation movements. </p>
<p>Both rebel groups had established relief subsidiaries – the Eritrean Relief Association and the Relief Society of Tigray – to work with international humanitarian organisations to provide the resources needed to feed their people. They were remarkably successful. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-legal-implications-of-humanitarian-aid-blockades-154847">The legal implications of humanitarian aid blockades</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<p>Some three-quarters of a million tonnes of supplies, worth around $350 million at the time, were transported into rebel-held areas from Sudan before, during and after the famine, from 1981 to 1991. </p>
<p>The relief operation was not immune to divisions between the Eritrean and Tigrayan political organisations that had established them. </p>
<p>In the mid-1980s, these divisions spilled over into an open dispute. There was a complete <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/10149208-historical-dictionary-of-eritrea">suspension of communication</a> between the Eritrean and Tigrayan liberation fronts from 1985 to 1988. </p>
<p>Afwerki, determined to show the Tigrayans that the Eritrean movement was the most powerful actor in the region, ordered his forces in 1985 to cut the road through territory they held and on which vital supplies from Sudan got into Tigray.</p>
<p>Closing the border became etched on Tigrayan consciousness. Recalling the suffering the Eritreans inflicted, a Tigrayan leader <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/africa/article/abs/alemseged-abay-identity-jilted-or-reimagining-identity-the-divergent-paths-of-the-eritrean-and-tigrayan-nationalist-struggles-trenton-nj-red-sea-press-1998-232-pp-1499-isbn-1-56902-072-8-paperback/5EFF1C492081169A49828C0EAB235BB7">declared</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I do not hesitate to categorise it a ‘savage act’. It must be recorded in history like that! </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Tekleweini Assefa, the head of the Relief Society of Tigray, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/africa/article/abs/alemseged-abay-identity-jilted-or-reimagining-identity-the-divergent-paths-of-the-eritrean-and-tigrayan-nationalist-struggles-trenton-nj-red-sea-press-1998-232-pp-1499-isbn-1-56902-072-8-paperback/5EFF1C492081169A49828C0EAB235BB7">made clear</a> the bitterness he felt about the Eritrean front’s decision.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>They closed the road for about two years and we had no access to the Sudan for one month until we built a new road ourselves. And that was at the height of the famine!</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The Tigrayan movement was forced to march more than 100,000 Tigrayans across the difficult terrain of western Tigray into Sudan where they could receive international assistance. Many of those who made the journey were old, children, frail or ill. As many as 13,000 people are <a href="http://www.harep.org/Africa/7219.pdf">reported</a> to have died along the way. </p>
<p>Relations were eventually repaired and the two movements went on to coordinate their offensives against the Ethiopian government. This culminated in the capture of their respective capitals in coordinated operations in 1991. The Eritrean liberation front was in power in Eritrea, while the Tigrayan front led a coalition government in Ethiopia. </p>
<p>But the rift never really healed. Rather, the wounds festered, leading to the disastrous <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44004212">Ethiopia-Eritrea border war</a> of 1998 to 2000. It also underlies Afwerki’s unwavering determination to destroy the Tigrayans as a political force. </p>
<h2>Unresolved tensions</h2>
<p>In 2018, Afwerki welcomed the end of the Tigray-led government and the entry of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. Peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea was <a href="https://www.ethioembassy.org.uk/ethiopia-and-eritrea-sign-peace-agreement-in-saudi-arabia/">sealed</a> in Saudi Arabia on 16 September 2018. </p>
<p>However, Afwerki continued to plot against the Tigrayans. In his <a href="http://www.afrikakomitee.ch/eritrea/2018_08_Eritrea-Ethiopia.pdf">2018 speech</a> to the Eritrean nation, he declared that <a href="https://www.routledge.com/The-Politics-of-Contemporary-Ethiopia-Ethnic-Federalism-and-Authoritarian/Gedamu/p/book/9781032029047">their loss of power</a> had critical implications for the region and that the “TPLF’s toxic and malignant legacy” needed to be removed. It was an attitude that contributed to the November 2020 war. </p>
<p>But Afwerki knew from experience that winning that war required cutting the links between Tigray and Sudan. </p>
<p>Western Tigray, linking the region and Sudan, remains the most deeply contested question and will be extraordinarily difficult to resolve. It is claimed by both the Tigrayan and Amhara people. </p>
<p>Whoever holds Western Tigray holds the future of Tigray. This is the key lesson from the famine of 1983-85 and one reason it is such a complex question. As the Crisis Group <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/building-ethiopias-fragile-truce">put it</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The future of Amhara-occupied Western Tigray is the thorniest issue to resolve.</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181866/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Martin Plaut is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Commonwealth Studies of the University of London</span></em></p>The origins of Ethiopia’s food crisis can be traced to a bitter feud between Eritrean and Tigrayan liberation fighters.Martin Plaut, Senior Research Fellow, Horn of Africa and Southern Africa, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, School of Advanced Study, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1786632022-03-08T14:52:14Z2022-03-08T14:52:14ZRussia-Ukraine war: decoding how African countries voted at the UN<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/450616/original/file-20220308-19-1lsnolj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Sergiy Kyslytsya, Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations, speaks during a special session of the General Assembly on March 02, 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Michael M. Santiago/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In recent weeks the world has witnessed <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/03/07/asia/china-india-ukraine-reaction-intl-hnk-dst/index.html">the most tense moments</a> in international relations since the end of the Cold War. This was evident in the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/un-general-assembly-set-censure-russia-over-ukraine-invasion-2022-03-02/">deliberations</a> and voting by members of the United Nations on resolutions calling on Russia to halt its invasion and withdraw its forces from Ukraine.</p>
<p>The events have also been a stress test for military and political alliances. </p>
<p>Africa yielded significant influence on the voting outcome with <a href="https://www.nationalworld.com/news/world/un-general-assembly-vote-on-russia-ukraine-results-who-abstained-which-countries-opposed-3587664">54 countries</a>, (27,97 % of all votes).</p>
<p>First, was the meeting of the 12-member Security Council on 25 February 2021. The three African representatives, Gabon, Ghana and Kenya, along with eight other countries <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2022/sc14808.doc.htm">voted for the resolution</a>. However, Russia used its veto power to block it. This veto prompted the US and 94 countries to call an emergency meeting of the UN General Assembly on 27 February 2022 where a similar, but non-binding motion was tabled. The assembly’s first emergency meeting in 40 years.</p>
<p>The resolution included a condemnation of Russia’s decision to “increase the readiness of its nuclear forces”. It was <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/3/unga-resolution-against-ukraine-invasion-full-text">adopted</a> with the required two-third votes of all member-states.</p>
<p>There was less unanimity in African votes at the General Assembly than in the Security Council where the allocation of non-permanent seats, while obeying a certain geographical distribution, does not require representative countries to be their regions’ mouthpieces.</p>
<p>The majority of African countries clearly sided with Ukraine – 28 out of 54 (51,85%). Only Eritrea voted against the resolution. But nearly a third refrained from taking sides (17 out of 54) – that’s if one understands abstention to be halfway between a yes and a no. Eight countries were absent.</p>
<p>My research has investigated the similarities and differences in countries’ reactions to crises. For example, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/21599165.2015.1129946?journalCode=fjcs21">I examined</a> the 2015 refugee crisis in Europe and the opposite reactions of Western and Eastern European countries. I explained these through their different identities – or the “who we are?”. </p>
<p>I also examined the Joint-Valletta Action Plan, an immigration pact signed by the European Union and African Union in reaction to the refugee crisis. I showed that the plan, which has helped <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-migration-and-mobility-pact-has-helped-to-reset-au-eu-relations-176603">reset AU-EU relations</a>, was based on interdependence, a kind of interest whereby parties held to their interests (territorial integrity for the Europeans and economic development for the Africans) but recognised (especially the more powerful Europeans) that they needed each other to advance these interests.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780203405345-14/data-analyses-voting-united-nations-general-assembly-erik-voeten">Research</a> carried out by authors such as the Dutch political scientist Erik Voeten also shows that voting at the General Assembly is – generally speaking – motivated by interests. But, as the American political scientist Alexander Wendt has shown, what constitutes interest depends on <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Alexander-Wendt#ref1203935">each government’s perception</a>. So much so that, two rival countries can sometimes vote for the same resolution.</p>
<p>Historically, as Voeten showed, voting patterns have been shaped by the big issues of the day. In the 1950s, colonialism pitted European countries against Asian and African countries. From the 1960s to the 1980s, it was the Cold War and the division between Eastern or Western Blocs. More recently, voting patterns have been structured by developing countries’ desire to obtain or secure aid from developed countries and increasingly the liberal-illiberal <a href="https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2022/02/09/a-new-low-for-global-democracy">divide</a> between democratic and authoritarian regimes </p>
<p>This divide trumps other potential explanations for voting patterns at the emergency general assembly meeting on the Ukraine invasion. The degree of closeness of the country’s ties with either the West or Russia is an additional explanation. </p>
<h2>The dividing line</h2>
<p>The group of 27 African countries that voted for the resolution was mostly made of <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20220305-comment-la-rdc-se-positionne-dans-le-conflit-ukrainien?ref=tw_i">western aligned-democracies</a>. They were Benin, Botswana, Cabo Verde, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo , Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Tunisia and Zambia. </p>
<p>But the list included a few non-democratic or hybrid regimes too. They were Côte d’ivoire, Gabon, Libya, Chad, Egypt, Mauretania, Rwanda, and Somalia. </p>
<p>They did, however, all have one thing in common: they are all Western allies, with close military ties such as military bases and joint military operations against jihadists.</p>
<p>Conversely, most of the 17 African countries that abstained or, like Eritrea, voted against the resolution, are authoritarian or hybrid regimes. These included Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>Some of these have close military and ideological ties with Russia sometimes going back to the Cold War. This list includes Algeria, Angola, Congo, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Mali, Central African Republic. </p>
<p>There were also some exceptions to the rule. </p>
<p>A number of functioning democracies – Namibia, South Africa, and Senegal – also abstained. All have strong affinities with the West. But in the case of Namibia and South Africa, their respective ruling parties, – the South West African People’s Organisation and the African National Congress – received support from the Soviet Union during their struggles for independence. </p>
<p>Senegal’s case is more puzzling. The country is a darling of the West because of its long democratic tradition. The Senegalese government <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20220305-senegal-blasts-kyiv-over-illegal-call-for-fighters">stated</a> that its abstention conformed to the “principles of non-alignment and the peaceful settlement of disputes”. However, its president’s <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20220224/african-union-statement-situation-ukraine">official statement</a> as the current president of the African Union together with the AU Chairperson could be construed as supporting the territorial integrity of Ukraine.</p>
<p>This liberal or illiberal cleavage conveys three sorts of insights.</p>
<p>Firstly, that the world is convulsed by the kind of clash of civilisations <a href="https://www.routledge.com/An-Analysis-of-Samuel-P-Huntingtons-The-Clash-of-Civilizations-and-the/Quinn/p/book/9781912127924">predicted</a> by the American political scientist Samuel P. Huntington who claimed that cultural identity will be the faultline in world conflicts. </p>
<p>This faultline will give way to world-civilizations: Western, Chinese, Islamic, Latin, Slavic and perhaps African. While his idea of a clash – and identity as its engine – appears to materialise, this identity is based on ideology – not culture. Illiberalism having replaced communism.</p>
<p>We simply had not yet arrived at the <a href="https://www.amazon.com/End-History-Last-Man/dp/0743284550">triumph of democracy</a> proclaimed by the American political scientist Francis Fukuyama in his book the End of History published in 1992 after the fall of the Berlin wall. </p>
<p>Secondly, that authoritarian regimes find comfort and support in the proximity of similar regimes for their survival. This works like an insurance policy. Russia having shown its determination to rescue authoritarian regimes such as Syria, these countries don’t want to close off the option of resorting to its help if they faced an existential threat.</p>
<p>Thirdly, that if the war in Ukraine escalates globally and a Cold War 2.0 including China settles in, African countries would split into blocs instead of presenting a common front. </p>
<p>Seen in the context of the EU-AU renewed partnership, this cleavage will take more importance now than at their Brussels summit, a week before the conflict eruption, where they proclaimed a Joint Vision for 2030 and sought a strategic alliance. </p>
<p>The EU’s demands regarding democracy and as such alignment would likely increase and it naturally will seek to deepen its relations with like-minded African countries.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178663/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mahama Tawat does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The resolution is not legally binding, but is an expression of the views of the UN membership.Mahama Tawat, Research fellow, Université de MontpellierLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1755912022-01-30T07:32:59Z2022-01-30T07:32:59ZEritrea is involved in Tigray to boost its stature. Why the strategy could backfire<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/442673/original/file-20220126-19-1el1euu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki (L) and Ethiopia's Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed at an event in Ethiopia in 2018.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Eduardo Soteras/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Eritrean military has been involved in the war in Ethiopia’s Tigray region since the conflict broke out <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54964378">in November 2020</a>. Eritrea shares a <a href="https://sovereignlimits.com/boundaries/eritrea-ethiopia-land">1,000 km border with Ethiopia</a>, including with Tigray. It sent thousands of soldiers in support of the Ethiopian federal forces in their operations against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front.</p>
<p>These actions have both prolonged and worsened the hugely <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/b171-ethiopias-tigray-war-deadly-dangerous-stalemate#:%7E:text=Ethiopia%E2%80%99s%20Tigray%20War%3A%20A%20Deadly%2C%20Dangerous%20Stalemate%20Both,the%20war%20zone%2C%20while%20maintaining%20pressure%20for%20talks.">destructive conflict</a>. </p>
<p>Eritrea’s involvement also has wider implications. It represents an attempt by Asmara to reassert itself on the regional stage, following two decades of relative diplomatic isolation.</p>
<p>The large-scale commitment of soldiers – as well as logistical and political support for Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed – is the result of a remarkable turnaround in relations between Asmara and Addis Ababa. After almost two decades of hostility, Abiy struck a peace deal with Eritrea’s Isaias Afwerki in <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-legal-materials/article/joint-declaration-of-peace-and-friendship-between-eritrea-and-ethiopia/76C651A25602F6DF3E2D62B01BC5984E">July 2018 </a>. This appeared to usher in a new era of stability and cooperation. </p>
<p>But that’s not what transpired. In the following months, Abiy intensified his programme of political reform in Ethiopia. He <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/269-managing-ethiopias-unsettled-transition">consolidated his power</a> at the expense of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. The movement had <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/understanding-contemporary-ethiopia/">dominated politics in Ethiopia since 1991</a>.</p>
<p>The front was also Eritrea’s bitterest enemy. There had been a troubled history of relations between it and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front dating back to the 1970s. This antagonism culminated in a war between Ethiopia and Eritrea <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/0384AC30F3C8F59E15F88AE823623DA7/S000197200009166Xa.pdf/old_problems_in_new_conflicts_some_observations_on_eritrea_and_its_relations_with_tigray_from_liberation_struggle_to_interstate_war.pdf">between 1998 and 2000</a>.</p>
<p>The outbreak of the war in Tigray served a number of purposes for Isaias. Firstly, it gave him the opportunity to end Eritrea’s long-standing international isolation. It did this by enabling him to exercise influence in a conflict which threatened to completely destabilise the region. This was a deeply worrying prospect to a range of international actors.</p>
<p>Secondly, it reasserted his influence in Ethiopia’s internal affairs. </p>
<p>And lastly it provided an opportunity to seek revenge on the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. The front’s leadership outwitted and outgunned Eritrea militarily in the 1998-2000 war. It also outmanoeuvred Eritrea diplomatically in the years following the conflict.</p>
<h2>Eritrea’s opportunistic policy</h2>
<p>The government in Asmara has pursued an opportunistic foreign policy. Its aim has essentially been to gain regional superiority at <a href="https://libcat.simmons.edu/Record/b2158131/TOC">Ethiopia’s</a> expense. </p>
<p>Eritrea has sought to exercise leverage by getting involved in others’ conflicts. For much of the 2000s and 2010s, for instance, Asmara defied the international consensus on Somalia. This consensus was primarily orchestrated by the government in Ethiopia, at the time led by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. Reaching the consensus involved the creation of a Transitional Federal Government with broad international support. </p>
<p>Ethiopian troops and African Union peacekeepers, supported in the air by the US, launched offensives against al-Shabaab, the Somali Islamist group which Eritrea was accused of supporting.</p>
<p>This led to the 2009 imposition of <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2009/sc9833.doc.htm">sanctions on Eritrea</a>. There were also interventions in Darfur and eastern Sudan by the Eritrean government.</p>
<p>Eritrea’s regional policy has largely been influenced by Ethiopia, its much more powerful southerly neighbour. But Ethiopia has represented both an obstacle and an opportunity in the pursuit of regional dominance. </p>
<p>In many respects, the single biggest obstacle facing the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front regime in Asmara is a strong, united Ethiopia. A country capable of dominating the region in economic, military and diplomatic terms – and especially one covertly or overtly hostile to Eritrea itself. This was the case under the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Africa/bpethiopiaeritrea.pdf">regime</a> led by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. </p>
<p>A weakened and disunited Ethiopia – with at least some political actors who are easy to influence – therefore represents an opportunity for Eritrea’s interests. This is because the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front’s vision for the country is as regional gatekeeper and pivot – secure in itself, cohesive and militarily potent. </p>
<p>In search of that status, the best scenario is to have Ethiopia unstable enough to allow opportunities for intervention and influence. Asmara would also want to be able to justify prolonged militarisation, which has become the hallmark of independent Eritrean nationhood. But, it wants to avoid Ethiopia’s total collapse. </p>
<p>Asmara’s best-case scenario is a prolonged, unresolved conflict in Ethiopia in which the presence of Eritrean forces and political support are still required by Addis Ababa. </p>
<p>Abiy’s assent to power and the marginalisation of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front – combined with widespread and growing political protest in the preceding years – presented just such an opportunity. </p>
<h2>Risky strategy</h2>
<p>But this is a risky strategy. </p>
<p>Isaias has essentially harnessed his cause to that of Abiy. When things were going well against the Tigrayan forces – as in late 2020 and early 2021 – it looked like a justifiable policy, however catastrophic for the civilian population. But it could backfire. </p>
<p>There have been signs that negotiations between the Ethiopian government and Tigrayan leadership may be <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/rare-chance-peace-ethiopia#:%7E:text=A%20Rare%20Chance%20for%20Peace%20in%20Ethiopia%20Tigray%E2%80%99s,should%20step%20up%20to%20provide%20support%20for%20talks.">possible</a>. </p>
<p>If there is to be serious dialogue between Addis Ababa and Mekele, the Tigrayan leadership will demand the withdrawal of Eritrean forces and Isaias’ removal from discussions over Ethiopia’s future. Abiy will need to concede this. In such a scenario, Isaias will quickly find himself isolated. This would take him back to the pariah status he has occupied for most of the last two <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/eritrea/eritrea-siege-state">decades</a>. </p>
<p>Further, in the longer term, an Ethiopia where various parties are reconciled to one another’s legitimacy could once again become a hostile entity on Eritrea’s southern flank. </p>
<p>Involvement in other people’s wars is inherently risky business. The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front regime has frequently played with fire. It has done so domestically and regionally. Yet, to date, it has seemingly defied geopolitical gravity.</p>
<p>But the Eritrean army’s disproportionately violent and inhumane intervention in Ethiopia in pursuit of payback against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front and the regional stature Isaias has long craved could result in the most destructive blowback imaginable: a coalescence of Ethiopian antagonists and domestic opposition that presents an existential threat to the Eritrean government itself.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/175591/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Reid does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The war in Tigray appears to have boosted Eritrea’s efforts at regional pre-eminence. But it could backfire.Richard Reid, Professor of African History, St Cross College, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1721582021-11-21T09:04:03Z2021-11-21T09:04:03ZEthiopia’s civil war: Five reasons why history won’t repeat itself<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/432810/original/file-20211119-25-1gq54g5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A cheering crowd surrounds the toppled statue of Russian revolutionary leader Vladimir Ilyich Lenin in Addis Ababa following the overthrow of the Ethiopian military regime in 1991. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jerome Delay/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>One year after the outbreak of civil war in Ethiopia the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/could-ethiopias-capital-fall-tigrayan-allied-forces-2021-11-05/">spectre of regime change looms</a> over Africa’s second most populous nation. The tides of the military conflict pitting Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and his allies against the rebel Tigray Defence Forces and Oromo Liberation Army changed after a government offensive failed to push back their enemies in October. Instead the insurgents made <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/11/07/1051940127/rebels-are-closing-in-on-ethiopias-capital-its-collapse-could-bring-regional-cha">important territorial gains</a> over the past weeks, vowing to take the capital Addis Ababa.</p>
<p>In response, the government <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-58163641">called on civilians to join the war effort against the ‘terrorists’</a>. It also <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/2/ethiopia-declares-nationwide-state-of-emergency">declared</a> a nation-wide state of emergency. </p>
<p>The military outcome of the conflict remains uncertain. Nevertheless, the threat to Abiy’s elected government is reminiscent of the <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/ethiopian-capital-falls-to-rebels">downfall</a> of the Derg dictatorship in May 1991. Led by Mengistu Haile Mariam, the <a href="https://yale.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.12987/yale/9780300141634.001.0001/upso-9780300141634">socialist military regime</a> ruled Ethiopia for 17 years after the 1974 revolution that deposed emperor Haile Selassie. It gained a reputation as one of Africa’s most repressive Cold War governments.</p>
<p>Supporters of Abiy, including many residents in Addis Ababa, fear a victory by Tigrayan and Oromo fighters. This could lead to a resurrection of the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front, which ruled the country for <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54932333">27 years</a>. This coalition of ethno-national parties, led by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, ruled with an iron fist until Abiy’s unexpected rise to power in April 2018. </p>
<p>Those in favour of the rebels argue that Abiy’s nationalist politics seek to undo the autonomy and political rights of the country’s various ethno-linguistic groups. </p>
<p>At a superficial level the conflict is between, on the one hand, a pan-Ethiopianist political centre advocating for a more unitarian state and, on the other, ethno-nationalist forces fighting for a federal order. This follows a familiar fault line in modern Ethiopian politics.</p>
<p>But, based on my long-term research on local and national politics in Ethiopia, this is where historical parallels between the current and past conflicts in Ethiopia end. A 1991 type of regime change at national level is unlikely, even if the Tigray Defence Forces and Oromo Liberation Army – which recently established the nine-member <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/nine-ethiopian-groups-form-anti-government-alliance-2021-11-05/">United Front of Ethiopian Federalist and Confederalist Forces</a> – were to prevail militarily.</p>
<p>Prevailing political attitudes, security actors, alliances and geopolitics differ starkly from the final days of the hated Derg military regime. Five reasons in particular explain why 2021 is not 1991.</p>
<h2>1. Abiy’s leadership is not deeply unpopular</h2>
<p>When Tigray People’s Liberation Front forces entered Addis Ababa in May 1991 after 16 years of guerrilla warfare against one of Africa’s strongest armies, the Derg government was deeply unpopular. The same cannot be said about Abiy’s <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ethiopias-ruling-prosperity-party-declared-landslide-winner-of-june-vote/a-58227894">Prosperity Party</a>. The party enjoys considerable support in Addis Ababa and parts of Amhara and Oromia regions. It is popular in major cities across the country and among parts of the Ethiopian diaspora.</p>
<p>The Tigrayan-led forces were welcomed as liberators three decades ago. But that’s unlikely to happen today. Many Ethiopians remember the pre-Abiy regime for its uncompromising authoritarian rule and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2011.642516">broken promises</a> to democratise Ethiopia.</p>
<p>Few believe that a reincarnated Tigray-led transitional government will solve the country’s deep seated political problems, in particular inter-ethnic animosities. </p>
<h2>2. Proliferation of inter-communal conflicts</h2>
<p>Today’s security environment is very different. The federal army has been considerably weakened after a year of war. The removal of senior Tigrayan commanders from the Ethiopian National Defence Forces after Abiy came to power is another factor. These commanders are now on the Tigray Defence Forces’ side. </p>
<p>The Ethiopian army’s ability to lead and coordinate operations has diminished while security forces operating under the command of regional states have strengthened. These ‘<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/three-more-regions-reinforce-ethiopia-army-amhara-against-tigray-forces-2021-07-16/">special forces</a>’ of Amhara, Oromia, Afar and other regions – not the army – have shouldered much of the recent fighting against the Tigrayan and Oromo rebels.</p>
<p>In Amhara region in particular, thousands of <a href="https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2021/06/07/amhara-nationalism-at-the-polls-in-ethiopia/">local nationalists</a> have joined the war against Tigrayan forces to reverse their gains. A proliferation of <a href="https://issafrica.org/research/east-africa-report/what-is-driving-ethiopias-ethnic-conflicts">inter-communal conflicts</a> across the country and a militarisation of Ethiopian society mean that, militarily speaking, neither the rebels nor the government are the only game in town.</p>
<h2>3. Fragile alliances</h2>
<p>The political alliances underpinning both Abiy’s government and the rebel coalition are fragile at best. The Amhara and Oromo wings of the ruling Prosperity Party are held together by their joint animosity towards Tigray. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/eighteen-killed-clashes-between-ethiopias-oromo-amhara-groups-2021-04-19/">Inter-ethnic conflicts between Amhara and Oromo communities</a> in both regional states has been a source of tension within the ruling party. Amhara nationalists feel increasingly let down by Abiy’s government and are likely to continue fighting against Tigrayans even in the unlikely event of a peace deal.</p>
<p>On the rebel side cooperation between Tigray and Oromo forces is based on an opportunistic calculus as well. Oromo nationalists were <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a8101c.html">sidelined</a> from political power during the early years of the previous regime, when the Tigray People’s Liberation Front was in power.</p>
<h2>4. The Eritrean factor</h2>
<p>When Tigray People’s Liberation Front forces entered the capital three decades ago, they were backed by the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front. This paved the way for the <a href="https://www.csis.org/independence-movements/eritrea">secession</a> of Eritrea. Between 1998-2000 however, Ethiopia and Eritrea went to war driving a wedge between the Tigrayan and Eritrean leadership. </p>
<p>Abiy’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-eritrea-saudi-idUSKCN1LW0KV">peace agreement</a> with Eritrean president Isaias Afwerki, signed in 2018, turned out to be a military pact against their common enemy – the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. Eritrean defence forces invaded Tigray in the early days of the war, playing a crucial role in the government’s early battle wins.</p>
<p>What’s more, future relations between Tigray and Eritrea have the potential for long-term destabilisation in the northern parts of Ethiopia.</p>
<h2>5. The Tigray question</h2>
<p>Finally, Tigrayan elites are themselves divided over strategy. The options are between further decentralisation of the country or secession of Tigray in line with <a href="https://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/et00000_.html">article 39</a> of the Ethiopian constitution. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front has long argued that self-determination within Ethiopia was in the best interest of Tigrayans. But the war and humanitarian crisis in Tigray have pushed many Tigrayans to <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/4f377353-b69a-41af-8e65-ddca918f599d">rally behind calls for secession</a>. </p>
<p>For the time being the main objective is to defeat Abiy’s government. The other is to liberate what they consider as Amhara-occupied territories in western Tigray, and to establish a national <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/05/world/africa/ethiopia-tigray-eight-groups.html">transitional government</a>. But Tigray’s political future remains very much <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-ethiopia-and-tigray-face-tough-options-the-west-needs-to-be-even-handed-164714">in the balance</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/172158/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tobias Hagmann received funding from various national research councils in the past.</span></em></p>Prevailing political attitudes, security actors, alliances and geopolitics differ starkly from the final days of the hated Ethiopian military regime.Tobias Hagmann, Associate professor, International Development, Roskilde UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1698422021-10-20T07:16:23Z2021-10-20T07:16:23ZWe unpack what some African countries are doing about tobacco control<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/426410/original/file-20211014-16-smwk9i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The growth in tobacco use in Africa is a potential public health catastrophe.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Rapid <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/africas-population-boom-burden-or-opportunity">population growth</a>, increased <a href="https://tobaccotactics.org/wiki/bat-africa-history-double-standards/">advertising</a> by the tobacco industry, and growing <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/samj/article/view/175692">tobacco consumption</a> among young people in Africa all contribute to a projected massive tobacco-related burden of disease. The World Health Organisation (WHO) <a href="https://www.afro.who.int/health-topics/tobacco-control">estimates</a> that one in five African adolescents use tobacco. The WHO also forecast <a href="https://www.afro.who.int/health-topics/tobacco-control">a doubling</a> of deaths related to tobacco use in low- and middle-income countries between 2002 and 2030.</p>
<p>There are many efforts being made to prevent these unnecessary deaths. One of these is the establishment of the <a href="https://actd.africa/">Africa Conference on Tobacco Control and Development</a> (26-28 October 2021). The aim of the conference is to connect researchers, policymakers, advocates, students and members of the public who are interested in tobacco control on the continent. It’s a platform to share information on some of the tobacco control work conducted in Africa, reflect on lessons learned and identify what needs attention.</p>
<p>Our own contribution to the conference is <a href="http://www.reep.uct.ac.za/etcp/projects/economics-tobacco-control-project">work on the economic impacts of tobacco use</a> on the continent and beyond. </p>
<h2>Progressive developments</h2>
<p>Many African countries have indicated that they want to adopt tobacco control policies. Of the 54 countries in Africa, 51 have ratified the <a href="https://fctc.who.int/who-fctc/overview/parties">WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control</a> – Malawi, South Sudan and Eritrea have not. By ratifying the convention, countries commit to adopting effective and evidence-based measures to curb tobacco consumption.</p>
<p>One of the key interventions is to ban smoking in public spaces. The WHO suggests that, globally, between <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/tobacco">1 million and 1.2 million deaths annually</a> are related to exposure to second-hand smoke. Thirteen African countries have <a href="https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240032095">smoke-free bans</a>, joining more than 50 other countries around the world.</p>
<p>Sixteen African countries <a href="https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/assets/global/pdfs/en/WL_country_size.pdf">require</a> cigarette manufacturers to print graphic health warnings on cigarette packs. Studies have <a href="https://systematicreviewsjournal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s13643-018-0933-0">shown</a> that pictures of risks, like diseased lungs, reduce the attractiveness of the pack and the appeal of smoking.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-ghana-is-using-graphic-pictures-to-cut-tobacco-use-116845">How Ghana is using graphic pictures to cut tobacco use</a>
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<p>In 2018 the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products came into force. Countries that ratify the protocol commit themselves to adopting a variety of measures, such as using track and trace systems to prevent and counter illicit trade. Currently, 27 African countries have <a href="https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IX-4-a&chapter=9&clang=_en">ratified the protocol</a>, the highest proportion of any continent. A number of countries have already implemented some of the measures suggested in the protocol.</p>
<p>Raising excise taxes is the most effective measure to <a href="https://apps.who.int/iris/rest/bitstreams/1341465/retrieve">reduce smoking</a>. Studies around the world show that excise taxes that effectively raise the price of tobacco products almost always result in a <a href="https://cancercontrol.cancer.gov/sites/default/files/2020-08/m21_complete.pdf">decline in smoking</a>. The structure of the excise tax is important. In general, a specific tax (an amount of tax per cigarette, irrespective of value) is better than an ad valorem tax (a percentage of the product’s value). Simpler tax systems are better than complex ones.</p>
<h2>Safeguarding the gains</h2>
<p>Despite the progress made in many countries, many challenges remain. One is the slow adoption of recommended tobacco tax policies.</p>
<p>Most African countries have excise tax systems that are <a href="https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240032095">generally regarded</a> as sub-optimal. This is because the tax systems are usually ad valorem, tiered, or both. These factors dampen the influence of excise taxes on the price of cigarettes. It is thus unsurprising that cigarettes are relatively cheap in most African countries. In fact, the excise tax, expressed as a percentage of the average retail price, is lower in Africa than on any other continent in the world. On average, this figure stands at 28.6% in Africa, 35.4% in South America and 37.3% in Asia. </p>
<p>The excise tax systems in some countries have actually regressed. A classic example is Kenya. In the 1990s and early 2000s, Kenya had one of the most complex tax systems in Africa. This complexity allowed the tobacco industry to profit at the expense of the fiscus and of public health. Targeted campaigns by tobacco-control advocates culminated in the implementation of the WHO-recommended uniform specific excise tax in 2015. This achievement, however, was short-lived. In 2019, under pressure from the tobacco industry, the Kenyan government reintroduced a <a href="https://www.kra.go.ke/en/media-center/blog/823-sin-tax">two-tier system</a>. The two-tier system allows tobacco companies to differentiate their products just enough to maximise profits on high-end brands, while keeping low-end brands cheap enough that large numbers of people continue smoking.</p>
<p>South Africa’s tax system has also regressed. Between 1994 and 2009, South Africa’s tobacco control efforts, anchored by sharp increases in the excise tax, were praised globally. Strong administrative controls by the South African Revenue Service prevented illicit trade from increasing. Since 2010, there has been a rapid increase in illicit trade, even though excise tax increases in the past decade have been negligible. Since 2015, illicit trade in South Africa has increased substantially, and now accounts for at least <a href="https://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/tobaccocontrol/29/Suppl_4/s234.full.pdf">35% of the total market</a>. The primary reason for this increase is the decline in the South African Revenue Service’s capacity to ensure tax compliance among tobacco manufacturers. The tobacco industry has been at the forefront of <a href="http://www.inqcomm.co.za/Docs/media/SARS%20Commission%20Final%20Report.pdf">undermining the revenue authority</a>. Efforts to implement a track and trace system have been unsuccessful.</p>
<p>The ethical practices of the tobacco industry have been called into question for decades. Recently, the BBC’s programme <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/m000zpd5/panorama-dirty-secrets-of-the-cigarette-business">Panorama</a> presented a documentary on the tobacco industry. The documentary was the culmination of <a href="https://tobaccotactics.org/wiki/the-bat-files/">years of research</a> conducted by investigative journalists and researchers at the University of Bath. It <a href="https://bat-uncovered.exposetobacco.org/">details</a> the ways in which British American Tobacco (BAT) acted unethically in various <a href="https://tobaccotactics.org/wiki/bat-africa-dirty-deeds/">African countries</a> to maintain its high profits, to block or weaken tobacco control legislation, and to maintain its market dominance. </p>
<p>This is not the first time British American Tobacco has been accused of these practices and, sadly, it is unlikely to be the last.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/169842/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Corné van Walbeek is the Director of the Research Unit on the Economics of Excisable Products (REEP) at the University of Cape Town. The unit is soft-funded and receives funding from a number of donor organisations, the most important of which are the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the African Capacity Building Foundation, the International Development Research Centre and Cancer Research UK. His salary is paid by UCT, but he receives a modest supplement from these funding agencies. He is not affiliated to the tobacco industry. He is a non-remunerated board member of the Tobacco, Alcohol and Gambling Advisory, Advocacy and Action Group. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Zunda Chisha is a research officer with the Research Unit on the Economics of Excisable Products (REEP). He is also a PhD candidate in economics at the University of Cape Town. His thesis is focused on how tobacco use and alcohol abuse affect development in South Africa. Zunda's PhD studies are funded through a scholarship provided for by the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) with a grant from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. He is not affiliated to the tobacco industry. </span></em></p>Globally, about 1 million deaths annually are related to exposure to second-hand smoke. Thirteen African countries have implemented comprehensive smoke-free bans.Corne van Walbeek, Professor at the School of Economics and Principal Investigator of the Economics of Tobacco Control Project, University of Cape TownZunda Chisha, Research officer, Research Unit on the Economics of Excisable Products, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1663742021-09-02T15:27:02Z2021-09-02T15:27:02ZFollowing the Tigray conflict, the rocky road to peace in Ethiopia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/418620/original/file-20210831-27-bhr75n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Tigrayan refugee places a cross made from twigs on the banks of a river marking the border between Ethiopia and Sudan where bodies frequently wash up. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Ashraf Shazly/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>All wars end. So will the Tigray conflict. But when and how will peace come, and will it be sustained? What can we learn from other <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691140605/how-wars-end">experiences of war and peace</a>?</p>
<p>History suggests that while there are many routes to war, the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2019.1615460?journalCode=fjss20">path back to peace</a> is the same: through <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/05/08/how-wars-end-peacemaking-negotiations-diplomacy-reconciliation-united-nations-security-council-sierra-leone-syria-tajikistan-tony-blair/">negotiation</a>. But this is effective only when one side has more-or-less won or when both are stalemated. Then the conflict becomes ripe for solving. </p>
<p>Until then, external diplomacy has little leverage. Foreign involvement, such as military intervention or <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/25654550">economic sanctions</a> – have mixed results. They may tip the balance in the short-term, but usually prolong the overall conflict. This is because the targeted side takes umbrage and digs in deeper.</p>
<p>A future vision for peace in Ethiopia is, as yet, elusive. Domestic and geopolitical factors mean that this conflict has enough fuel to burn for some time, and there are no easy extinguishers at hand.</p>
<p>The essential conditions for peace, that is the military victory of one side, or leadership change on one or both sides is unlikely any time soon. In fact it is probable that the conflict will get more vicious before it simmers down as both sides regroup their fighters, mobilise additional forces, and replenish their war-making stock.</p>
<h2>Ending wars is hard</h2>
<p>The length of a war matters. As <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_e_KpYIfZAY">Syria</a> exemplifies, the longer its course, the more difficult the peace-making. This is because the chance of appalling brutalities increases, by design or accident. As the way a war is waged determines the quality of succeeding peace, vicious conflicts make it harder to return to decency. The <a href="https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-winner-effect/201403/the-personality-profile-leaders-who-make-war">psychology of warring leaders</a> and groups is vital in peace-making.</p>
<p>Several African conflicts provide sobering reflections on how wars end. The vicious <a href="https://origins.osu.edu/milestones/nigerian-civil-war-biafra-anniversary">Nigerian civil war</a> killed more than a million people and finished only when Biafra surrendered, leaving behind a <a href="http://ftp.iza.org/dp10938.pdf">divisive legacy</a> that is still unfolding. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/the-mozambican-civil-war-1977-1992/">Mozambican</a> civil war dragged on for 15 years, ending only when the Soviet Union and South African apartheid collapsed. <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/angolan-civil-war-1975-2002-brief-history">Angola’s </a> multi-layered, post-colonial civil war lasted 27 years; its end was triggered only when a principal protagonist, Jonas Savimbi, was assassinated.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.prio.org/Publications/Publication/?x=12489">Sudan</a> holds the African record for the longest running civil conflict. Since its independence in 1955, it has had some 60 years of civil war interrupted only by South Sudan’s secession. The new nation has itself been embroiled in subsequent ongoing strife.</p>
<h2>Sustaining peace is harder</h2>
<p>As peace is ultimately made in hearts and minds, those who suffer a lot need consolation through finding meaning from their pain and loss. If they are not de-traumatised, they become nuclei of future conflict. Therefore, the blood and tears of a long-drawn conflict must be propitiated through <a href="https://www.ictj.org/our-work/transitional-justice-issues/reparations">justice and reparations</a>.</p>
<p>There is no standard way to do this as each context and culture must find its own accommodation. So, we have varied approaches, appropriate in their own settings. Examples include Sierra Leone’s <a href="http://www.rscsl.org/">Special Court</a>, South Africa’s <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/trc/">Truth and Reconciliation Commission</a> and Rwanda’s <a href="https://www.e-ir.info/2012/07/30/gacaca-a-successful-experiment-in-restorative-justice-2/">gacaca courts</a>. </p>
<p>None were perfect but their greatest virtue was bringing justice closer to the communities of both survivors and perpetrators.</p>
<p>Ethiopia will not lack models from which to choose the best features for their circumstances. Even if that takes decades. Germany only recently acknowledged its early 20th century slaughter of the Herero and Nama peoples in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/28/world/europe/germany-namibia-genocide.html">Namibia</a> as a genocide, and offered compensation.</p>
<p>Whenever peace does come, keeping it is a permanent endeavour. That is why <a href="https://onepulsefoundation.org/2018/05/29/why-do-we-build-memorials/">memorials</a> are built to symbolise the painful journeys of sundered peoples, and carefully-balanced <a href="https://www.edutopia.org/blog/teaching-war-todd-finley">histories</a> taught in schools. Thereby, a shared understanding emerges, forgiveness and healing become possible, and acceptance of the good and bad that is everyone’s lot. The opposite is exemplified by Korean and Chinese tensions with <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/cjs/968">Japan’s teaching</a> on its atrocious World War II conduct.</p>
<h2>Implications for Ethiopia</h2>
<p>How does all this apply to the Ethiopian conflict in Tigray? Although a young <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54964378">conflict</a> that is less than a year old, it has already generated a formidable human toll with nearly 6 million in <a href="https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/ethiopia">dire need</a>.</p>
<p>Grim as that is, the underlying nature of the conflict is more alarming. <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/global-health/terror-and-security/six-months-of-ethiopias-shadow-war/">War crimes, mass atrocities, and egregious violations</a> of humanitarian laws have taken place. These are reminiscent of the <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur">Darfur genocide</a> but facilitated by upgraded technologies such as drones and tanks.</p>
<p>Thousands have been <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AFR2545692021ENGLISH.PDF">raped</a>. Countless <a href="https://observers.france24.com/en/africa/20210312-ethiopia-tigray-video-massacre-war-mai-harmaz-investigation">summary executions</a> have occurred. The means of livelihood have been <a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/wpf/files/2021/04/Starving-Tigray-report-final.pdf">deliberately destroyed</a>, and food and other humanitarian aid <a href="https://www.vox.com/22545382/tigray-famine-ethiopia-abiy-war">‘weaponised’</a> through their denial.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.voanews.com/africa/more-refugees-ethiopia-stream-sudan#:%7E:text=KHARTOUM%20%2D%20Authorities%20in%20Sudan%20say,in%20this%20report%20from%20Khartoum.">Refugees</a> have poured into neighbouring Sudan, even as the fighting has also extended within Ethiopia. Terror stalks the land with thousands of <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/get-involved/take-action/end-the-arbitrary-arrests-of-tigrayans/">detentions and disappearances</a> of Tigray-identity people.</p>
<p>This is a thoroughly modern conflict, and all the more vicious for it. Waged across multiple theatres, it combines the worst tactics of our angry age. In cyberspace, hearts and minds are targeted through <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/hate-speech-in-ethiopia-abiy-ahmed-resurrects-old-demons/a-55800705">hateful exhortations</a>, reminiscent of earlier genocides in <a href="https://cla.umn.edu/chgs/holocaust-genocide-education/resource-guides/rwanda">Rwanda</a> and <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/07/1096092">former Yugoslavia</a>.</p>
<p>Skirmishing is also fierce in the diplomatic arena, paralysing the <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/113662/ethiopia-why-hasnt-the-african-union-intervened-in-tigray/">African Union</a> and the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/07/02/un-security-council-end-inaction-ethiopia">United Nations</a>, even as Addis <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/08/11/ethiopia-abiy-ahmed-samantha-power-usaid-biden-tigray-conflict-humanitarian-crisis/">repulses</a> high level envoys and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudan-recalls-ambassador-ethiopia-after-mediation-offer-rejected-2021-08-08/">rejects</a> peace-making efforts.</p>
<h2>Genocidal acts complicate solutions</h2>
<p>A greater complication comes from the realisation that the mass atrocities committed in Tigray qualify, prima facie, as crimes against humanity and acts of genocides as per definitions in the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf">Genocide Convention</a> and the <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/resource-library/documents/rs-eng.pdf">Statute of the International Criminal Court</a>.</p>
<p>If that is accepted by an international court of law or UN Security Council (however unlikely at present), the precedents from previous genocides such as in Rwanda, Darfur, Srebrenica, <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/pol-pot-overthrown">Cambodia</a>, make for uncomfortable reflection. All historical genocides have ended only by countervailing armed force. But this is unlikely, not least in the aftermath of failed interventions in <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2019.1684232?journalCode=fjss20">Afghanistan</a> and <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/france/20210713-macron-announces-france-s-sahel-military-force-will-end-in-early-2022">Sahel</a>.</p>
<p>However, that does not stop internationalisation of this crisis. <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/17/eritrea-confirms-its-troops-are-fighting-ethiopias-tigray">Eritrean forces</a> are already involved along with rising regional tensions, especially with <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/africa/sudan-recalls-ambassador-to-ethiopia-as-tensions-rise-3503916">Sudan</a> and <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/85672/is-a-war-between-egypt-and-ethiopia-brewing-on-the-nile/">Egypt</a>.</p>
<h2>Peace is not imminent</h2>
<p>The sad conclusion is that Ethiopia’s Tigray war will not end until it becomes ripe for solving. Meanwhile, tragically, more pain must be endured. That is why it is so important to redouble humanitarian efforts. Not just to save lives and relieve suffering. But also to keep the light of humanity shining, pointing towards the path of peace, whenever the belligerents have the courage to walk it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/166374/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mukesh Kapila is affiliated with the University of Manchester</span></em></p>Domestic and geopolitical factors mean that the Ethiopian conflict has enough fuel to burn for some time.Mukesh Kapila, Professor Emeritus in Global Health & Humanitarian Affairs, University of ManchesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1525192021-05-13T12:35:20Z2021-05-13T12:35:20ZRefugee camps can wreak enormous environmental damages – should source countries be liable for them?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385362/original/file-20210219-17-eo1lbe.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=54%2C15%2C5067%2C3399&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Tents in a Rohingya refugee camp cluster on a muddy hillside in Bangladesh.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Saleh Ahmed</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>While it may seem that much of the world has been locked down during the past pandemic year, more than <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/">80 million people</a> are currently on the move – unwillingly. </p>
<p>Facing <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/syria-emergency.html?query=Syria">conflict in Syria</a>, <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/rohingya-emergency.html?query=Myanmar">human rights violations in Myanmar</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-55147858">violence in Eritrea</a>, among other hot spots, refugees are trying to relocate to North America and Western Europe, or at least to neighboring countries. </p>
<p>Large camps of displaced persons can wreak <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/environment/3b03b2a04/unhcr-environmental-guidelines.html">major environmental damage</a>. Refugees use and pollute water, deplete wood supplies for fuel, and poach animals for food, often harming <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/excom/unhcrannual/3c90b1242/report-united-nations-high-commissioner-refugees.html?query=UNHCR%201996%20report">parks, nature reserves and World Heritage Sites</a>. These impacts make host countries less willing to receive more refugees. </p>
<p>International law offers refugees only limited protection. Mainly, it bars forcing them to return to the places where they were persecuted. It is quite difficult for refugees to attain adequate redress or relief. </p>
<p>We study <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=P84MARYAAAAJ&hl=en">international law</a> and the <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=FepnVEsAAAAJ&hl=en">human dimensions of global environmental change</a>. Our research on the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13549839.2020.1849078">environmental calamity</a> caused by over 1 million Rohingya refugees fleeing from Myanmar into Bangladesh has convinced us that a new angle is worth considering. </p>
<p>We believe that countries offering safe harbor to refugees should have a legal option to sue the sending country for environmental damages. Such payments would help pay for some of the impacts of housing thousands of displaced persons, and could even provide some direct support to the refugees for their living costs. </p>
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<h2>Refugees strain resources</h2>
<p>Imagine a million homeless people suddenly moving to your region without jobs, money, food or belongings. They would have myriad needs, starting with clean water, toilets, health care and food. </p>
<p>This is the situation in Bangladesh, where over 1 million displaced Rohingya have fled since August 2017 to escape violence in their home country, Myanmar. The <a href="https://www.undp.org/content/dam/bangladesh/docs/Publications/Pub-2018/Updated/REIRI.pdf">resulting environmental damage </a>in Bangladesh is unprecedented and massive. </p>
<p>Temporary makeshift housing for Rohingya has destroyed at least 3,713 acres of critical reserve forests as refugees cut trees for housing and fuel. As a result, soil erosion has increased dramatically. More than 100 tons of human waste and garbage has polluted canals and waterways, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10668-020-00792-0">severely degrading local air quality</a>. Camps have been constructed in areas that are habitat for Asian elephants, leading to <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.22120/jwb.2019.104762.1057">clashes between humans and these endangered animals</a>. </p>
<h2>The limits of international law</h2>
<p>Under current international law, a sending state that causes people to run away does not typically bear any financial responsibility. We believe it is time to hold governments that cause massive exoduses accountable for human and financial losses. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385366/original/file-20210219-23-1hqdvbn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385366/original/file-20210219-23-1hqdvbn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385366/original/file-20210219-23-1hqdvbn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385366/original/file-20210219-23-1hqdvbn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385366/original/file-20210219-23-1hqdvbn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385366/original/file-20210219-23-1hqdvbn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385366/original/file-20210219-23-1hqdvbn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385366/original/file-20210219-23-1hqdvbn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Rohingya refugees search for their belongings following a fire at the Nayapara refugee camp in Teknaf, Bangladesh, Jan. 14, 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/rohingya-refugees-search-for-their-belongings-after-a-fire-news-photo/1230579093?adppopup=true">AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There are strong historical grounds for holding the sending state responsible for environment damage. In the <a href="https://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_III/1905-1982.pdf">Trails Smelter Arbitration of 1938 and 1941</a>, the U.S. successfully sued Canada for pollution damages caused by a smelting factory near the border. The Canadian company had to cease operations because its factory emitted harmful fumes, and it was required to pay for the damages it caused. </p>
<p>This case established a principle called the “no-harm rule,” which dictates that a state has a strict obligation <a href="https://intlpollution.commons.gc.cuny.edu/an-international-environmental-law-case-study-the-trail-smelter-arbitration/#:%7E:text=The%20two%20principles%20arising%20from,along%20with%20the%20decisions%20themselves.">not to cause environmental harm in another state</a>. Today the no-harm rule reflects customary international law – a set of international rules that all states accept as binding and are obligated to uphold. </p>
<p>Like fumes from a factory, refugees can <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/desperatejourneys/">cross international borders as they flee from persecution</a>. The sending state caused them to flee, and could have prevented their exodus from happening. The receiving state presumably has not consented to a huge influx of displaced people that causes severe environmental damage. </p>
<p>A state can rely on customary international law to bring a cause of action against another state, and make use of international bodies like the United Nations to engage the process and involve international actors and organizations. States can also invoke principles of customary international law in international courts, such as the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court. </p>
<p>The International Court of Justice, for example, relied on the no-harm rule both in its 1996 <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/95">Advisory Opinion Regarding the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons</a> and a 1997 dispute between Hungary and Slovakia over a <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/92/judgments">hydroelectric dam on the Danube River</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385367/original/file-20210219-15-1e22dhp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385367/original/file-20210219-15-1e22dhp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385367/original/file-20210219-15-1e22dhp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385367/original/file-20210219-15-1e22dhp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385367/original/file-20210219-15-1e22dhp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385367/original/file-20210219-15-1e22dhp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385367/original/file-20210219-15-1e22dhp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Refugee camps in Idlib, Syria, flooded in heavy rains, Jan. 31, 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/heavy-rainstorm-flood-syrian-refugee-camps-in-idlib-syria-news-photo/1230888430?adppopup=true">Muhammad al-Rifai/NurPhoto via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The human right to a clean environment</h2>
<p>International law does recognize that governments have a duty to protect and preserve the environment, and to provide stable and suitable places for all people. States have begun to codify this responsibility in treaties like the <a href="http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instree/loas2005.html">Arab Charter on Human Rights</a>, the <a href="http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B-32_American_Convention_on_Human_Rights.pdf">American Convention of Human Rights</a> and the <a href="https://www.achpr.org/legalinstruments/detail?id=49">African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights</a>. </p>
<p>The Council of Europe also has recognized the right to a clean and healthy environment. Court decisions under the <a href="https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf">European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms</a> have relied on the right to life, the right to health and the right to privacy and family life to uphold a right to a clean environment. </p>
<p>More than 100 states have already codified <a href="https://www.unenvironment.org/explore-topics/environmental-rights-and-governance/what-we-do/advancing-environmental-rights/what-0">the right to a clean environment</a> in their constitutions. Recent lawsuits against states include one <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Environment/SREnvironment/Indonesian_air_pollution_case.pdf">against Indonesia for unhealthy air quality in Jakarta</a> and another against <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Environment/SREnvironment/Brazilian_climate_change_case.pdf">the Brazilian government</a> filed by a number of opposition parties for not adequately protecting the environment, including healthy biodiversity and a safe climate in the Amazon rainforest.</p>
<p>The United Nations’ <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/Issues/environment/SRenvironment/Pages/SRenvironmentIndex.aspx">Special Rapporteur on human rights and the environment</a> created the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/environment/srenvironment/pages/frameworkprinciplesreport.aspx">Framework Principles on Human Rights and the Environment</a> in 2018. This document affirms that states should work together to prevent global environmental harm and to protect vulnerable groups. </p>
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<h2>Bangladesh could challenge Myanmar in court</h2>
<p>Based on these principles and precedents, we believe that Bangladesh has a strong legal foundation to challenge Myanmar for environmental damages. The impacts on Bangladesh of accepting huge numbers of Rohingya <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13549839.2020.1849078">can be calculated and presented in court</a>.
The right to a clean environment also can prevent states from creating forced massive human displacement in the future. </p>
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<p>Bangladesh can demonstrate that Myanmar bears responsibility for environmental damages because <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/rohingya-crisis">Myanmar’s persecution of the Rohingya caused them to flee</a>, and it can claim costs involved in caring for them. Long recognized as one of the <a href="https://blogs.worldbank.org/endpovertyinsouthasia/bangladesh-most-climate-vulnerable-country">world’s most environmentally vulnerable countries</a>, Bangladesh needs to avoid further environmental damage as it provides basic needs for the Rohingya population.</p>
<p>In our view, the very land that displaced people occupy can help them and their hosts find relief under the law.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/152519/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>International law bars nations from causing environmental harms in other states. Should that include sending thousands of refugees over the border in search of food, water and shelter?Leonard Hammer, Director of Outreach and Development, Human Rights Practice Graduate Programs, University of ArizonaSaleh Ahmed, Assistant Professor, School of Public Service, Boise State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1510422020-11-30T09:24:17Z2020-11-30T09:24:17ZConflict between Tigray and Eritrea – the long standing faultline in Ethiopian politics<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/371758/original/file-20201127-24-m81m1k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An Ethiopan soldier mans a position near Zala Anbesa in the northern Tigray region of the country, about 1,6 kilometres from the Eritrean border.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> Marco Longari/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20201115-rockets-fired-from-ethiopia-s-tigray-region-hit-eritrea-capital-govt-source">missile attack</a> by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front on Eritrea in mid-November transformed an internal Ethiopian crisis into a transnational one. In the midst of escalating internal conflict between Ethiopia’s northernmost province, Tigray, and the federal government, it was a stark reminder of a historical rivalry that continues to shape and reshape Ethiopia.</p>
<p>The rivalry between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front and the movement which has governed Eritrea in all but name for the past 30 years – the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front – goes back several decades. </p>
<p>The histories of Eritrea and Ethiopia have long been closely intertwined. This is especially true of Tigray and central Eritrea. These territories occupy the central massif of the Horn of Africa. Tigrinya-speakers are the predominant ethnic group in both Tigray and in the adjacent Eritrean highlands. </p>
<p>The enmity between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front dates to the mid-1970s, when the Tigrayan front was founded in the midst of <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/peasant-revolution-in-ethiopia/E3B7988793DC3063511E3765B026EE16">political turmoil in Ethiopia</a>. The authoritarian Marxist regime – known as <a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/ethiopia/history-dergue.htm">the Derg</a> (Amharic for ‘committee’) – inflicted violence upon millions of its own citizens. It was soon confronted with a range of armed insurgencies and socio-political movements. These included Tigray and Eritrea, where the resistance was most ferocious.</p>
<p>The Tigrayan front was at first close to the Eritrean front, which had been founded in 1970 to fight for independence from Ethiopia. Indeed, the Eritreans helped train some of the first Tigrayan recruits in 1975-6, in their shared struggle against Ethiopian government forces for social revolution and the right to self-determination. </p>
<p>But in the midst of the war against the Derg regime, the relationship quickly soured over ethnic and national identity. There were also differences over the demarcation of borders, military tactics and ideology. The Tigrayan front eventually recognised the Eritreans’ right to self-determination, if grudgingly, and resolved to fight for the liberation of all Ethiopian peoples from the tyranny of the Derg regime.</p>
<p>Each achieved seminal victories in the late 1980s. Together the Tigrayan-led Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front and the Eritrean front overthrew the Derg in May 1991. The Tigrayan-led front formed government in Addis Ababa while the Eritrean front liberated Eritrea which became an independent state.</p>
<p>But this was just the start of a new phase of a deep-rooted rivalry. This continued between the governments until the recent entry of prime minister Abiy Ahmed. </p>
<p>If there’s any lesson to be learnt from years of military and political manoeuvrings, it is that conflict in Tigray is unavoidably a matter of intense interest to the Eritrean leadership. And Abiy would do well to remember that conflict between Eritrea and Tigray has long represented a destabilising fault line for Ethiopia as well as for the wider region. </p>
<h2>Reconciliation and new beginnings</h2>
<p>In the early 1990s, there was much talk of reconciliation and new beginnings between Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia and Isaias Afeworki of Eritrea. The two governments <a href="http://africaworldpressbooks.com/eritrea-even-the-stones-are-burning-by-roy-pateman/#:%7E:text=In%20Eritrea%3A%20Even%20the%20Stones%20Are%20Burning%2C%20Professor,and%20other%20developments%20in%20the%20last%20two%20decades.">signed</a> a range of agreements on economic cooperation, defence and citizenship. It seemed as though the enmity of the liberation war was behind them. </p>
<p>Meles <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/The_Eritrean_Struggle_for_Independence.html?id=ee6nFgq4-TkC&redir_esc=y">declared as much</a> at the 1993 Eritrean independence celebrations, at which he was a notable guest. </p>
<p>But deep-rooted tensions soon resurfaced. In the course of 1997, unresolved border disputes were exacerbated by Eritrea’s introduction of a new currency. This had been anticipated in a 1993 economic agreement. But in the event Tigrayan traders often refused to recognise it, and it caused a collapse in commerce.</p>
<p>Full-scale war <a href="https://www.ohioswallow.com/book/Brothers+at+War">erupted</a> over the contested border hamlet of Badme in May 1998. The fighting swiftly spread to other stretches of the shared, 1,000 km long frontier. Air strikes were launched on both sides. </p>
<p>It was quickly clear, too, that this was only superficially about borders. It was more substantively about regional power and long standing antagonisms that ran along ethnic lines. </p>
<p>The Eritrean government’s indignant anti-Tigray front rhetoric had its echo in the popular contempt for so-called Agame, the term Eritreans used for Tigrayan <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/shallow-graves/">migrant labourers</a>.</p>
<p>For the Tigray front, the Eritrean front was the clearest expression of perceived Eritrean arrogance. </p>
<p>As for Isaias himself, regarded as a crazed warlord who had led Eritrea down a path which defied economic and political logic, it was hubris personified. </p>
<p>Ethiopia deported tens of thousands of Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean descent. </p>
<p>Ethiopia’s decisive final offensive in May 2000 forced the Eritrean army to fall back deep into their own territory. Although the Ethiopians were halted, and a ceasefire put in place after bitter fighting on a number of fronts, Eritrea had been devastated by the conflict.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/3df4be2e14.html">Algiers Agreement of December 2000</a> was followed by years of standoff, occasional skirmishes, and the periodic exchange of insults. </p>
<p>During this period Ethiopia consolidated its position as a dominant power in the region. And Meles as one of the continent’s representatives on the global stage. </p>
<p>For its part Eritrea retreated into a militaristic, authoritarian solipsism. Its domestic policy centred on open-ended national service for the young. Its foreign policy was largely concerned with undermining the Ethiopian government across the region. This was most obvious in Somalia, where its alleged support for al-Shabaab led to the imposition of sanctions on Asmara.</p>
<p>The ‘no war-no peace’ scenario continued even after Meles’s sudden death in 2012. The situation only began to shift with the resignation of Hailemariam Desalegn against a backdrop of mounting protest across Ethiopia, especially among the Oromo and the Amhara, and the rise to power of Abiy. </p>
<p>What followed was the effective overthrow of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front which had been the dominant force in the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front coalition since 1991. </p>
<p>This provided Isaias with a clear incentive to respond to Abiy’s overtures.</p>
<h2>Tigray’s loss, Eritrea’s gain</h2>
<p>A <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/cen5x5l99w1t/ethiopia-and-eritrea-peace-agreement">peace agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea,</a> was signed in July 2018 by Abiy and Eritrean President Isaias Afeworki. It formally ended their 1998-2000 war. It also sealed the marginalisation of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. Many in the Tigray People’s Liberation Front were unenthusiastic about allowing Isaias in from the cold.</p>
<p>Since the 1998-2000 war, in large part thanks to the astute manoeuvres of the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, Eritrea had been exactly where the Tigray People’s Liberation Front wanted it: an isolated pariah state with little diplomatic clout. Indeed, it is unlikely that Isaias would have been as receptive to the deal had it not involved the further sidelining of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, something which Abiy presumably understood. </p>
<p>Isaias had eschewed the possibility of talks with Abiy’s predecessor, Hailemariam Desalegn. But Abiy was a different matter. A political reformer, and a member of the largest but long-subjugated ethnic group in Ethiopia, the Oromo, he was determined to end the Tigray People’s Liberation Front’s domination of Ethiopian politics. </p>
<p>This was effectively achieved in December 2019 when <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-new-party-is-welcome-news-but-faces-big-hurdles-128551">he abolished</a> the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front and replaced it with the Prosperity Party.</p>
<p>The Tigray People’s Liberation Front declined to join with the visible results of the current conflict.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/residual-anger-driven-by-the-politics-of-power-has-boiled-over-into-conflict-in-ethiopia-150327">Residual anger driven by the politics of power has boiled over into conflict in Ethiopia</a>
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<p>Every effort to engage with the Tigrayan leadership – including the Tigray People’s Liberation Front – in pursuit of a peaceful resolution must also mean keeping Eritrea out of the conflict. </p>
<p>Unless Isaias is willing to play a constructive role – he does not have a good track record anywhere in the region in this regard – he must be kept at arm’s length, not least to protect the 2018 peace agreement itself.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/151042/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Reid does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Conflict between Eritrea and Tigray has long represented a destabilising fault line for Ethiopia as well as for the wider region.Richard Reid, Professor of African History, St Cross College, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1504032020-11-19T16:58:18Z2020-11-19T16:58:18ZEthnic violence in Tigray has echoes of Ethiopia’s tragic past<p>Violence has engulfed northern Ethiopia and, as usual, it is the civilians caught in the middle of this bitter ethnic conflict who are paying the highest price. <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/11/ethiopia-investigation-reveals-evidence-that-scores-of-civilians-were-killed-in-massacre-in-tigray-state/#:%7E:text=Amnesty%20International%20can%20today%20confirm,the%20night%20of%209%20November.">Amnesty International</a> reported on November 12 that a brutal massacre had taken place in the town of Mai Kadra in the northwestern province of Tigray. Scores – maybe hundreds – of people, described by Amnesty as seasonal labourers, were killed with knives and machetes.</p>
<p>Fighting has also been reported near the border town of Humera where the Ethiopian army is understood to have <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/10/ethiopias-pm-not-rebuffing-calls-for-calm-as-clashes-continue">wrested control of the airport</a> from the Tigray People’s Liberation Army (TPLF). So far an estimated <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/thousands-of-ethiopian-refugees-flee-into-sudan/2044407">25,000 people</a> have fled to Sudan, including <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-ethiopia-conflict-sudan-bombings/ethiopians-fleeing-to-sudan-describe-air-strikes-machete-killings-in-tigray-idUKKBN27T1OL">from the Humera area</a>, an area that can be seen as a microcosm of the tensions that are pulling at the complex ethnic fabric across Ethiopia.</p>
<h2>Ethiopia’s ‘Casablanca’</h2>
<p>Back in 1993, while I was casting around looking for potential PhD research sites, a friend and colleague recommended I go to Humera, a town in the far northwest corner of Ethiopia. “It’s like an Ethiopian Casablanca,” he told me. I duly went to check it out. What I found held not so much the mystique of an old Islamic city but a bustling community of Tigrayan former refugees who had recently been repatriated after a decade in camps in eastern Sudan where they had sought refuge during the civil war that raged in Ethiopia from 1974 to 1991.</p>
<p>Originally highlanders, they were resettled into the fertile lowlands around Humera with the expectation that they would become smallholder farmers, supplementing their incomes working on the commercial sesame and sorghum farms in the area. Humera itself was a war-ravaged, dusty town that was just coming back to life after years of neglect. Remnants of the civil war could still be seen: in the walls of buildings that had been pockmarked by bullets and shrapnel, the carcasses of old abandoned tanks, and a local administration that was largely run by the former cadres of the TPLF, as a civilian administration had not yet been installed.</p>
<p>Although they were repatriating to Ethiopia from Sudan, the Tigrayans were not returning to their highland communities of origin. They were settled by the new regional administration into an area of northwest Ethiopia that had once been part of the Gondar province, but had been newly incorporated into the Tigray region in a process of redistricting that took place as soon as the Tigrayan-led government took power in 1991. </p>
<p>Repatriating 25,000 Tigrayans to these western lowlands became a way of laying claim to the land. Most were settled onto plots that had made up the unsuccessful state farms under the Marxist “Derg” government that had controlled the area from 1974-91 in the areas known as Mai Kadra, Rawayan and Adabai.</p>
<p>Life in the first years for newly repatriated refugees was difficult. They had to rebuild their lives from virtually nothing and learn to farm new crops using different methods than they had been accustomed to in their original homes. The Tigray region was faced with enormous post-war reconstruction needs, and many of the returnees in these three sites felt that they had been forgotten by the regional authorities once they returned. They received only meagre food and cash assistance for the first few months after returning and then were expected to become self sufficient. Gradually, however, people came to think of <a href="https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780801489396/this-place-will-become-home/#bookTabs=1">this place as home</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/370382/original/file-20201119-14-2tlpyd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map showing Ethiopia's Tigray region." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/370382/original/file-20201119-14-2tlpyd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/370382/original/file-20201119-14-2tlpyd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=427&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/370382/original/file-20201119-14-2tlpyd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=427&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/370382/original/file-20201119-14-2tlpyd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=427&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/370382/original/file-20201119-14-2tlpyd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=536&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/370382/original/file-20201119-14-2tlpyd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=536&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/370382/original/file-20201119-14-2tlpyd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=536&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Tigray is at odds with Ethiopia’s central government.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Laura Hammond</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>At first, people in the local area got along with each other reasonably well. Amhara, Tigrayan, Welkait and other ethnic groups coexisted peacefully. The strongest resentment to the redrawing of regional boundaries to incorporate the area into Tigray region seemed to come from further away – from the city of Gondar a day’s drive to the south and the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa in the centre of the country. In these places the symbolism of shifting regional boundaries and seizure of land fed into a growing narrative of resentment against the Tigrayan-dominated central government. </p>
<h2>Explosion of violence</h2>
<p>These tensions have escalated over the years. The Humera area was largely isolated by the Ethiopia-Eritrea border war which lasted for two decades from 1998 to 2018. The main route for transporting sesame, its largest cash crop, out of the area – through Eritrea – was closed, and the town’s location along the banks of the Tekezze River which separates the two countries in the west was within the militarised zone.</p>
<p>Since coming to power in 2018, Abiy Ahmed, the first Oromo prime minister, has made overtures to the Eritrean president, Isaias Afewerki, seeking to end the border conflict with that country and implement the peace treaty originally agreed in 2000. His efforts helped him secure the <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2019/summary/">2019 Nobel Peace Prize</a>.</p>
<p>But internally he has been focusing his efforts on weakening the Tigrayan-led government. He has replaced the former ruling party with a new Prosperity Party, which the former Tigrayan leadership has refused to join. When national elections were postponed, citing the risks posed by COVID-19, the Tigrayan regional government went ahead and held their own election on September 9. The central government refused to recognise the results and declared its intention to install an administration of its own choosing, thereby <a href="https://theconversation.com/residual-anger-driven-by-the-politics-of-power-has-boiled-over-into-conflict-in-ethiopia-150327">ramping up the tensions</a> between the centre and the region.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/residual-anger-driven-by-the-politics-of-power-has-boiled-over-into-conflict-in-ethiopia-150327">Residual anger driven by the politics of power has boiled over into conflict in Ethiopia</a>
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<p>The real losers in this political crisis are, of course, the civilians caught in the middle of the fighting. For the people of Humera and its surroundings, who fled civil war during the 1980s, then lived through the border war with Eritrea and are now again on the front lines, the fighting brings back the trauma of past wars and displacements.</p>
<p>The grievances of each side are real and legitimate. But the violence that is now spreading across Tigray and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-54942546">into Eritrea</a> and neighbouring regions is not resolving them. It is only adding to them, heaping pain and outrage onto a dangerous bonfire that is already burning out of control.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/150403/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Laura Hammond receives funding from the European Union. She is Team Leader of the Research and Evidence Facility for the Horn of Africa. She is also Global Challenge Leader for Security, Protracted Conflict, Refugees and Forced Displacement for UK Research and Innovation's Global Challenges Research Fund. </span></em></p>As ever, civilians are caught in the middle of warring ethnic groups in this strife-torn region of Ethiopia.Laura Hammond, Reader in Development Studies, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1486052020-10-26T16:36:48Z2020-10-26T16:36:48ZSlavery charges against Canadian mining company settled on the sly<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/365357/original/file-20201025-22-1h9iyy3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C361%2C4928%2C2891&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Bisha mine in Eritrea is seen in November 2017.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Martin Schibbye/Creative Commons)</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://mining.ca/resources/mining-facts/">Mining is major business</a> in Canada, particularly operations conducted beyond its borders. The Canadian mining industry, however, has often <a href="https://news.mongabay.com/2020/07/canada-not-walking-the-walk-on-its-miners-abuses-abroad-campaigners-say/">been criticized</a> for its human rights record abroad. </p>
<p>In 2018, Canadian companies had mining assets in <a href="https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/maps-tools-publications/publications/minerals-mining-publications/canadian-mining-assets/canadian-mining-assets-cma-country-and-region-2017-and-2018/15406">100 countries</a> abroad, <a href="https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/maps-tools-publications/publications/minerals-mining-publications/canadian-mining-assets/19323?_ga=2.94124765.1315252348.1600953025-332247511.1597684500">valued at $174.4 billion</a>. This made up two-thirds of total Canadian mining assets. </p>
<p>Among the 100 countries was <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Eritrea">Eritrea</a>, where the operations of the gold, copper and zinc Bisha mine gave rise to <a href="https://ca.topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/employment-labor/vancouver-based-mining-company-nevsun-facing-mass-slavery-lawsuit/">one of the most closely observed pieces of litigation</a> in Canada in recent years, largely because it involved allegations of slave labour and torture. Its <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20201013-canada-le-proc%C3%A8s-d-une-compagnie-mini%C3%A8re-esclavage-en-%C3%A9rythr%C3%A9e-n-aura-pas-lieu?fbclid=IwAR2UMF3rY6MygiS6lkr6KQGscit2EbmrOLDB_5M7hMw5Gx7OYHscDr1_A6Q&ref=fb">recent settlement</a> in near total silence therefore raises some important questions.</p>
<h2>Alleged human rights abuses</h2>
<p>First, though, it’s important to understand what happened in the case. In 2014, three Eritrean plaintiffs <a href="https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/nevsun-lawsuit-re-bisha-mine-eritrea/">launched a class-action lawsuit</a> in the British Columbia Supreme Court against a Vancouver-based mining company, Nevsun Resources. </p>
<p>They alleged that they had suffered human rights abuses at the Bisha mine, including slavery and torture, as well as a variety of domestic violations, including assault, battery and unlawful confinement. The mine was held by a consortium comprising Nevsun and the Eritrean government.</p>
<p><a href="https://decisions.scc-csc.ca/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/18169/index.do">The claimants</a> said they were part of Eritrea’s involuntary and indefinite military conscripts and deployed to work at the mine for subsistence wages. When they tried to flee, they were allegedly beaten with sticks, tied up and left to lie in the hot sand in temperatures of up to 50 C.</p>
<p>Under provincial court rules, a defendant may request early on that a matter be removed from the court’s roll, arguing essentially that the <a href="https://www.financierworldwide.com/dispositions-without-a-trial-a-quick-canadian-primer#.X5GN2y-946U">claim has no reasonable chance of succeeding</a>. Nevsun made this request.</p>
<p>At the end of February 2020, the <a href="https://decisions.scc-csc.ca/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/18169/index.do">Supreme Court of Canada upheld</a> the decisions of the British Columbia Supreme Court and the B.C. Court of Appeal, refusing the defendant’s request. Justice Rosalie Abella concluded:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Customary international law is part of Canadian law. Nevsun is a company bound by Canadian law. It is not ‘plain and obvious’ to me that the Eritrean workers’ claims against Nevsun based on breaches of customary international law cannot succeed.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.canadianlawyermag.com/practice-areas/litigation/nevsun-can-be-sued-in-canada-for-alleged-human-rights-abuses-supreme-court-rules/326872">This opened the way for the matter to proceed to trial</a>. It had the potential to set a major precedent in terms of the liability of Canadian mining companies for wrongs committed abroad.</p>
<h2>Québec case</h2>
<p>Attempts to hold Canadian mining companies accountable for the human rights abuses or environmental disasters of their subsidiaries abroad date back to a 1998 Québec case, <em><a href="https://leap.edw.ro/countries/ca/national-case-law/recherches-internationales-quebec-petitioner-v-cambior-inc-l">Recherches Internationales Québec (RIQ) vs. Cambior Inc</a></em>. In this case, toxic waste water had spilled into Guyana’s main river, the Essequibo, after the failure of Omai gold mine’s waste treatment dam. </p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/365358/original/file-20201025-13-1kdafze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Two men in suits smile as they chat with a Cambior sign behind them." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/365358/original/file-20201025-13-1kdafze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/365358/original/file-20201025-13-1kdafze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/365358/original/file-20201025-13-1kdafze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/365358/original/file-20201025-13-1kdafze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/365358/original/file-20201025-13-1kdafze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=519&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/365358/original/file-20201025-13-1kdafze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=519&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/365358/original/file-20201025-13-1kdafze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=519&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Cambior CEO Louis Gignac, left, and Iamgold Corp. CEO Joseph Conway chat prior to a Cambior special shareholders meeting to approve the merger of the two gold producers in November 2006 in Montréal.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Paul Chiasson</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>As primary shareholder of Omai, Cambior had both financed and supervised the mining project. The Québec Superior Court ruled that a Guyanese court should hear the matter. But the 23,000 Guyanese victims did not succeed in the High Court of Guyana, <a href="https://nacla.org/blog/2012/7/13/everything-glitters-isn%25E2%2580%2599t-green-guyana">though they tried twice</a>. </p>
<p>The recent settlement of <em>Nevsun vs. Araya</em> <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/settlement-amnesty-scoc-africa-mine-nevsun-1.5774910">didn’t make very much news</a> in the Canadian media. The Franco-African press reported that <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20201013-canada-le-proc%C3%A8s-d-une-compagnie-mini%C3%A8re-esclavage-en-%C3%A9rythr%C3%A9e-n-aura-pas-lieu?fbclid=IwAR2UMF3rY6MygiS6lkr6KQGscit2EbmrOLDB_5M7hMw5Gx7OYHscDr1_A6Q&ref=fb">a terse news release had invoked confidentiality</a>, indicating that the parties had reached a “mutually satisfactory arrangement.” This means that the litigation came to an abrupt end. </p>
<p>One can’t blame the Eritrean plaintiffs for wanting to end the matter. It’s also understandable that the company wished to avoid the <a href="https://www.mining-journal.com/politics/news/1381974/nevsun-suffers-eritrea-legal-setback">increased media attention</a> that court cases bring. The mining industry undoubtedly will breathe a sigh of relief.</p>
<h2>Kept quiet</h2>
<p>The disturbing aspect of this settlement is that it has been kept so quiet. It ends a <a href="https://www.barchart.com/story/stocks/quotes/NSU/4466250/supreme-court-of-canada-hands-down-landmark-human-rights-ruling-against-canadian-mining-company">high-profile case</a> with an elevated potential for setting negative precedents for Canadian mining companies operating abroad. Contrast this with the settlement terms of another matter involving allegations of human rights abuses, <em><a href="https://www.bccourts.ca/jdb-txt/ca/17/00/2017BCCA0039.htm">Garcia vs. Tahoe Resources, Inc</a></em>. </p>
<p>In that case, the B.C. Court of Appeal had cleared the way for a trial against Tahoe Resources, which, through its wholly owned subsidiaries, fully controlled the operations of the Escobal mine in Guatemala. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man holds a sign in Spanish outside a courthouse that reads 'We do not want the looting of Guatemalan resources.'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/365360/original/file-20201025-13-cxmvyq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/365360/original/file-20201025-13-cxmvyq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/365360/original/file-20201025-13-cxmvyq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/365360/original/file-20201025-13-cxmvyq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/365360/original/file-20201025-13-cxmvyq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/365360/original/file-20201025-13-cxmvyq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/365360/original/file-20201025-13-cxmvyq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Protesters demonstrate against Tahoe Resources’ Escobar silver mine outside the Constitutional Court of Guatemala in May 2018. The sign reads: ‘We do not want the looting of Guatemalan resources.’</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Jackie McVickar/Flickr)</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The mine’s security guards had fired on protesters, leading to criminal charges against the mine’s head of security in Guatemala. The protesters launched a battery claim against Tahoe in Canada. The <a href="https://www.bccourts.ca/jdb-txt/ca/17/00/2017BCCA0039.htm">B.C. Court of Appeal</a> allowed the matter to proceed in Canada, based on the risk of unfairness for the claimants in Guatemalan courts due to systemic corruption. </p>
<p>Tahoe was then acquired by Pan American Silver, which went on to settle the matter publicly. <a href="https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/pan-american-silver-announces-resolution-of-garcia-v-tahoe-case/">Terms of settlement</a> included acknowledging wrongdoing and condemning the use of violence, apologizing to the victims and the community and reiterating the rights of the victims to protest against the mine in future. It was a win for the mining industry because harms had been redressed in a way that brought greater transparency.</p>
<p>Nevsun, too, was <a href="https://www.newswire.ca/news-releases/zijin-acquires-276-820-575-shares-of-nevsun-and-files-notice-of-extension-862771821.html">acquired by another company</a>, Zijin Mining, prior to the settlement. But the similarities end there.</p>
<p>Make no mistake. I am not opposed to the Nevsun settlement. Settling matters avoids extensive litigation and high legal costs. </p>
<p>But what’s troublesome is the veil of secrecy in which this settlement is cloaked. Greater transparency, while not legally required, would have demonstrated that Nevsun is a responsible mining company that takes the interests of its stakeholders seriously. Instead, Nevsun remains silent.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/148605/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Elizabeth Steyn does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Why a mining company’s quiet settlement of a slave labour case is big news.Elizabeth Steyn, Cassels Brock Fellow and Assistant Professor of Mining and Finance Law; Public and Private International Law Research Group Member, Western UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1442922020-08-11T14:25:23Z2020-08-11T14:25:23ZState of democracy in Africa: changing leaders doesn’t change politics<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352212/original/file-20200811-14-16wenam.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">shutterstock</span> </figcaption></figure><p>For the last few years the African political landscape has been dominated by high profile changes of leaders and governments. In Angola (2017), Ethiopia (2018), South Africa (2018), Sudan (2019) and Zimbabwe (2018), leadership change promised to bring about not only a new man at the top, but also a new political and economic direction. </p>
<p>But do changes of leaders and governments generate more democratic and responsive governments? The Bertelsmann Transformation Index Africa Report 2020 (BTI), <a href="https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/en/publications/publication/did/changing-guards-change-systems">A Changing of the Guards or A Change of Systems?</a>, suggests that we should be cautious about the prospects for rapid political improvements.</p>
<p>Reviewing developments in 44 countries from 2017 to the start of 2019, the report finds that leadership change results in an initial wave of optimism. But ongoing political challenges and constraints mean that it is often a case of <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/289660924_Kenya_since_2002_The_more_things_change_the_more_they_stay_the_same">“the more things change the more they stay the same”</a>. </p>
<p>Political change occurs gradually in the vast majority of African countries. </p>
<h2>More continuity than change</h2>
<p>From 2015 to 2019, the general pattern has been for the continent’s more authoritarian states – such as Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea and Rwanda – to make little progress towards democracy. In some cases countries became incrementally more repressive. </p>
<p>At the same time, many of the continent’s more democratic states – including Botswana, Ghana, Mauritius, Senegal and South Africa – have remained “consolidating” or “defective” democracies. Very few of these dropped out of these categories to become “authoritarian” regimes.</p>
<p>A number of countries have seen more significant changes. But in most cases this did not fundamentally change the character of the political system. For example, Cameroon, Chad, Kenya and Tanzania moved further away from lasting political and economic transformation. Meanwhile Angola, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe initially made progress towards it, but these gains were limited – and only lasted for a short period in Ethiopia and Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>As this brief summary suggests, at a continental level the trajectories of different states have by and large cancelled each other out. Positive trends in some cases were wiped out by negative trends in others.</p>
<p>Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole has thus seen no significant changes to the overall level of democracy, economic management and governance. For example, the index shows that between 2018 and 2020, the overall level of democracy declined by just 0.09, a small shift on a 1-10 scale. This suggests continuity not change. </p>
<h2>Leadership changes often disappoint</h2>
<p>In almost all cases, positive trends were recorded in countries where leadership change generated hope for political renewal and economic reform. This includes Angola, after President <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/08/world/africa/angola-dos-santos.html">José Eduardo dos Santos</a> stepped down in 2017, and Ethiopia, following the rise to power of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/ethiopias-abiy-ahmed-wont-be-answering-any-questions-when-he-receives-his-nobel-prize/2019/12/09/5277fe12-1871-11ea-80d6-d0ca7007273f_story.html">Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed</a>. It also includes Zimbabwe, where the transfer of power from <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/118/472/580/5462513">Robert Mugabe to Emmerson Mnangagwa</a> was accompanied by promises that the Zanu-PF government would show greater respect for democratic norms and values in future.</p>
<p>Sierra Leone also recorded a significant improvement in performance following the victory of opposition candidate Julius Maada Bio in the presidential election of 2018. Nigeria has continued to make modest but significant gains in economic management since Muhammadu Buhari replaced Goodluck Jonathan as president in 2015. </p>
<p>The significance of leadership change in all of these processes is an important reminder of the extent to which power has been personalised. But it is important to note that events since the end of the period under review in 2019 have cast doubt on the significance of these transitions.</p>
<p>Most notably, continued and in some cases increasing human rights abuses in countries such as Ethiopia, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zimbabwe suggest that we have seen “a changing of the guards” but not a change of political systems. </p>
<p>Nowhere is this more true than Zimbabwe, where the last few weeks have witnessed a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/08/zimbabwe-activists-decry-unprecedented-clampdown-arrests-200805144813725.html">brutal government crackdown</a>. Not only have journalists been arrested on flimsy charges, but the rule of law has been manipulated to keep them in jail. Following this sustained attack on democracy, it is now clear that the Mnangagwa government is no more committed to human rights and civil liberties than its predecessor was. </p>
<h2>There is no one ‘Africa’</h2>
<p>So what does the future hold? I often get asked what direction Africa is heading in. My answer is always the same: where democracy is concerned, there is no one “Africa”. The Bertelsmann Transformation Index report shows how true this is. </p>
<p>In addition to the well-known differences between leading lights like Botswana and entrenched laggards like Rwanda, there is also a profound regional variation that is less well recognised and understood. </p>
<p>From relatively similar starting points in the early 1990s, there has been a sharp divergence between West and Southern Africa – which have remained comparatively more open and democratic – and Central and Eastern Africa, which remained more closed and authoritarian. There is also some evidence that the average quality of democracy continued to decline in Eastern and Central Africa in the past few years. Because it continues to increase in West Africa, we have seen greater divergence between the two sets of regions.</p>
<p>Figure 1. Average Democracy scores for African regions, BTI 2006-2020*</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352175/original/file-20200811-23-1tvj99j.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352175/original/file-20200811-23-1tvj99j.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352175/original/file-20200811-23-1tvj99j.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352175/original/file-20200811-23-1tvj99j.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352175/original/file-20200811-23-1tvj99j.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352175/original/file-20200811-23-1tvj99j.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352175/original/file-20200811-23-1tvj99j.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
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<p>These variations reflect the historical process through which governments came to power, the kinds of states over which they govern, and the disposition and influence of regional organisations. In particular, East Africa features a number of countries ruled by former rebel armies (Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda). Here political control is underpinned by coercion and a longstanding suspicion of opposition. </p>
<p>This is also a challenge in some Central African states. Here the added complication of long-running conflicts and political instability (Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo) has undermined government performance in many ways. </p>
<p>A number of former military leaders have also governed West African states, including Ghana, Nigeria and Togo. But the proportion has been lower and some countries, such as Senegal, have a long tradition of plural politics and civilian leadership. In a similar vein, southern Africa features a number of liberation movements. But in a number of cases these developed out of broad-based movements that valued political participation and civil liberties. Partly as a result, former military or rebel leaders have had a less damaging impact on the prospects for democracy in Southern and West Africa.</p>
<p>It is important not to exaggerate these regional differences. There is great variation within them as well as between them. But, this caveat notwithstanding, we should not expect to see any convergence around a common African democratic experience in the next few years. If anything, the gap between the continent’s most democratic and authoritarian regions is likely to become even wider.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/144292/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nic Cheeseman was paid for his work writing this report for the BTI.</span></em></p>The gap between the continent’s most democratic and authoritarian regions is likely to continue to grow.Nic Cheeseman, Professor of Democracy, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1324492020-03-02T14:18:34Z2020-03-02T14:18:34ZAfrican Union needs a more robust response to conflict in Cameroon<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/317115/original/file-20200225-24694-p154fx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of Cameroonian President Paul Biya outside the French embassy in Yaounde.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images/AFP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The violent conflict that erupted in the North West and South West regions of Cameroon <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-it-would-take-to-break-the-impasse-in-cameroons-deadly-crisis-122134">in 2016</a> continues unabated. It was triggered by the government’s repression of protests over the increasing influence of French in the English-speaking legal and educational institutions, and by the perceived marginalisation of the country’s Anglophone regions.</p>
<p>Some Anglophones are demanding increased decentralisation, while others are violently struggling for an independent state called <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon/130-cameroon-worsening-anglophone-crisis-calls-strong-measures">“Ambazonia”</a>. </p>
<p>The conflict has had devastating consequences for the Anglophone regions. <a href="https://bit.ly/2uLy6Re">According to Crisis Group</a> around 3,000 people have died and half a million have been displaced. One in three people in the Anglophone regions are estimated to be in need of humanitarian aid.</p>
<p>Attempts have been made, including the involvement of other countries, to resolve the crisis. For example, Switzerland led a <a href="https://bit.ly/2Rzsd2K">mediation initiative in 2019</a>. But, for its part, the African Union, has been <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/au-silent-over-cameroon-separatist-crisis/a-40820693">largely silent on the conflict</a>.</p>
<p>It supported the Swiss-led initiative. It was also party to a joint statement <a href="https://bit.ly/3aUCMow">on a tripartite commitment to supporting</a> Cameroon’s ongoing peace and reconciliation process. And the African Union head, Moussa Faki Mahamat, visited Cameroonian President Paul Biya in <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20180716/readout-visit-chairperson-african-union-commission-cameroon">July 2018</a> and discussed the need for a national dialogue to resolve the conflict. He visited again in <a href="https://au.int/ar/node/37799">November 2019</a>. </p>
<p>But the conflict is conspicuously absent from the African Union’s Peace and Security Council, its decision-making body on the “prevention, management and resolution of conflicts”. This, despite the council being mandated to “facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa”. </p>
<p>The reason for this, we believe, is that a major part of the struggle in Cameroon is separatist in character. Cameroon’s territorial integrity is therefore at stake. In 1963, the Organisation of African Unity, predecessor to the African Union, adopted the principle of the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20007111?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">inviolability of borders</a> inherited from colonisation. </p>
<p>Since then there has been little support for secessionist movements in Africa. Eritrea and South Sudan were able to become independent states and many African countries support Western Sahara’s quest for self-determination. But a host of others – including Biafra, Katanga, Bioko, Zanzibar, Darfur, Casamance, Somaliland – have not seen much support. </p>
<p>Many of Cameroon’s neighbours, and a few on the Peace and Security Council, face similar challenges and are, therefore, not sympathetic to this cause. Indeed the African Union chairperson, during his visit to President Biya in 2018 <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20180716/readout-visit-chairperson-african-union-commission-cameroon">had reconfirmed</a> the African Union’s “unwavering commitment to the unity and territorial integrity of Cameroon”.</p>
<p>But the African Union is vital to finding a sustainable solution to the conflict in Cameroon. It needs to overcome this difficulty, and step up its lacklustre conflict management response. </p>
<h2>Who should be doing what</h2>
<p>The United Nations (UN) is tasked with the responsibility of preventing and managing conflict globally. In 2017, it and African Union signed a joint <a href="https://unoau.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/signed_joint_framework.pdf">“framework for enhanced partnership in peace and security”</a>. It emphasised collaboration and predictability in dealing with conflict in Africa. </p>
<p>Regional organisations are tasked, where appropriate, to respond to conflicts in their respective regions. There are many positives about this division of labour. But, there can also be challenges when there is a lack of capacity or unwillingness to respond to conflicts. </p>
<p>The UN Security Council attempted to discuss Cameroon in May 2019, but had to be content with an informal discussion after African members <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/will-the-au-peace-and-security-council-do-better-in-2020">blocked a formal tabling of the matter</a>.</p>
<p>For its part, the African Union has established a robust peace and security architecture. Besides the Peace and Security Council, it also has the</p>
<ul>
<li><p><a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/is-the-african-standby-force-any-closer-to-being-deployed">African Standby Force</a>, for peace enforcement and peacekeeping;</p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/african-union-panel-wise-conflict-prevention/">Panel of the Wise</a>, for preventative diplomacy;</p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13533312.2013.838393">Continental Early Warning System</a>, which monitors, analyses and provides warnings of impending conflict situations in Africa; and </p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://au.int/en/aureforms/peacefund">Africa Peace Fund</a>, established in 1993 to be the main funder of peace and security activities.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The African Union also has a mediation unit and, more recently, established a post conflict reconstruction centre. </p>
<p>The African Union has used these various avenues to resolve conflicts in a number of countries. These have included the Central Africa Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, Somalia, Gambia and Sudan. </p>
<p>Its track record in conflicts mixed. <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-aus-role-in-brokering-sudan-deal-offers-lessons-for-the-future-121822">It did well in managing the conflict in Sudan</a>, but not so well in Libya or South Sudan. The reasons often cited for the failures include <a href="https://journals.co.za/content/journal/10520/EJC-1371834a43?crawler=redirect&mimetype=application/pdf">the near absence of</a> regional leadership, reliance on external funding, problems of harmonisation with the regional economic communities and a <a href="https://kroc.nd.edu/assets/237284/rigos_and_peacebuilding_the_role_of_civil_society.pdf">lack of capacity</a>.</p>
<p>There is also a lack of political will on the part of the African Union’s peace and security council to get involved in a conflict deemed largely as an internal matter. </p>
<p>The fact that an African Union head has visited the country could point to some “quiet diplomacy” taking place in the background. But, that is not enough.</p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>If the African Union does not become more proactive in resolving the conflict in Cameroon, it risks seeing it escalate, and possibly fuelling instability in the region. </p>
<p>For many years Cameroon was considered a haven of peace in Central Africa, one of the more unstable regions on the continent with conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Burundi and Chad. The region does <a href="https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/the-global-state-of-democracy-2019.pdf">not have a single democratic state</a>.</p>
<p>There are a number of different issues that need to be simultaneously addressed in the management of the conflict in Cameroon. </p>
<p>Firstly, the African Union and UN need to coordinate their efforts in addressing the humanitarian needs of the refugees and displaced persons. And the African Union <a href="https://www.achpr.org/">Commission on Human and Peoples Rights</a> must investigate the many complaints of human rights abuses in Cameroon, and to take appropriate action. </p>
<p>Secondly, the continental body needs to deploy its “Panel of the Wise” to determine how best to manage the conflict. Thirdly, it must also send a special envoy to the Anglophone region to implement a conflict management strategy that will lead to a sustainable peace agreement.</p>
<p>Fourthly, it must settle the disputes over the right to self determination through the appropriate UN structures. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-cameroon-must-move-beyond-dialogue-to-solve-its-anglophone-crisis-125241">Why Cameroon must move beyond dialogue to solve its Anglophone crisis</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/132449/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cheryl Hendricks is the Executive Director of the Africa Institute of South Africa at the Human Science Research Council which receives funding from multiple sources.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gabriel Ngah Kiven does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The African Union’s intervention track record in conflict situations is mixed.Cheryl Hendricks, Executive director, Africa Institute of South Africa, Human Sciences Research CouncilGabriel Ngah Kiven, PhD candidate in Political Studies at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1311302020-02-06T13:45:06Z2020-02-06T13:45:06ZThe 6 countries in Trump’s new travel ban pose little threat to US national security<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313845/original/file-20200205-149802-yx1arb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The new ban applies to citizens of Eritrea, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar, Nigeria, Sudan and Tanzania.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/american-flags-flag-usa-located-airport-455640031">Ingus Kruklitis/Shutterstock.com</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Over the past two decades, how many people have been killed in the U.S. by extremists from the six countries on the Trump administration’s <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/proclamation-improving-enhanced-vetting-capabilities-processes-detecting-attempted-entry/">new travel ban</a> list? </p>
<p>The answer is zero, according to <a href="http://kurzman.unc.edu/muslim-american-terrorism/annual-report/">data I have collected</a> from Department of Justice records and other sources. Immigrants from these countries constitute less than 1% of <a href="https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/bulletins/terrorism/monthlysep19/gui/">terrorism cases</a> in the United States, and none of the cases in the last two years.</p>
<p>The same is true for the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-travel-ban-in-numbers-why-families-and-refugees-lose-big-99064">original travel bans</a> imposed in 2017. There were, and still are, zero fatalities in the United States caused by extremists from the countries on those lists, too.</p>
<h2>One attempted attack in decades</h2>
<p>Under the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/31/us/politics/trump-travel-ban.html">new ban</a>, which begins on Feb. 22, citizens of Eritrea, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar, Nigeria, Sudan and Tanzania will no longer be able to apply for immigrant visas. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/proclamation-improving-enhanced-vetting-capabilities-processes-detecting-attempted-entry/">The White House says</a> these countries “must satisfy basic security conditions outlined by America’s law-enforcement and intelligence professionals” in order for the ban to be lifted. </p>
<p>However, there is no evidence that immigrants from these six countries pose a national security threat to the United States.</p>
<p>In fact, only one citizen from any of these countries has attempted a terrorist attack in the United States: 11 years ago, a man from Nigeria tried but <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/topic/person/umar-farouk-abdulmutallab">failed to ignite explosives in his underwear</a> as his flight approached Detroit. Nobody was injured, apart from the would-be bomber. </p>
<p>In recent years, Nigeria has “actively cooperated with the United States and other international partners” to prevent further attacks, according to <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2018/">a State Department report</a> last October. </p>
<p>The new ban wouldn’t have stopped the underwear bomber, in any case, because he was traveling on a tourist visa, and the new ban applies only to immigrant visas.</p>
<p><iframe id="8MMZE" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/8MMZE/6/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>Immigrant extremism versus domestic extremism</h2>
<p>Donald Trump’s presidential campaign and many of his administration’s policies have played on the trope of threats posed by <a href="https://vimeo.com/262486734">refugees</a>, <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3502556">asylum seekers</a> and other <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/1478929919865131">migrants</a>. </p>
<p>However, the administration’s own security agencies view homegrown and domestic terrorism as a greater threat than extremist violence by foreigners. </p>
<p>“We now assess the most predominant terrorist threat to the Homeland to emanate from U.S.-based lone actors,” the acting director of the National Counterterrorism Center <a href="https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Testimony-Travers-2019-11-05.pdf">testified</a> to Congress in November.</p>
<p>For more than a decade, under three administrations, <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony">the FBI’s annual briefing</a> on worldwide terrorist threats has rated American extremism as a greater concern than foreign operatives. The director of the FBI repeated this point in <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/fbi-oversight-020520">congressional testimony</a> several days after the new travel ban was announced.</p>
<p>The travel ban would not have prevented the country’s deadliest <a href="https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?page=1&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=2017&end_yearonly=2018&dtp2=all&country=217&charttype=line&chart=overtime&expanded=no&ob=TotalNumberOfFatalities&od=desc#results-tabl">terrorist attacks</a> in recent years, which were committed by right-wing Americans, not immigrants: the anti-immigrant extremist who killed 22 shoppers <a href="https://www.npr.org/2019/10/10/769013051/el-paso-walmart-shooting-suspect-pleads-not-guilty">at a store in El Paso</a>; the white supremacist who killed 17 students and teachers at <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/feature/parkland-florida-school-shooting/">a school in Parkland, Florida</a>; or the anti-Semite who killed 11 worshipers <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/26/us/pittsburgh-synagogue-shooting-death-penalty.html">at a synagogue in Pittsburgh</a>.</p>
<p>The travel ban also would not have prevented the most recent attack by a foreign national – the Saudi officer who killed three sailors <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/naval-air-station-pensacola-shooting-called-act-of-terrorism-011320">at a naval air base in Pensacola</a>. The officer did not arrive on an immigrant visa, and the ban specifically exempts Saudi Arabia.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313838/original/file-20200205-149796-jrt9vt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313838/original/file-20200205-149796-jrt9vt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313838/original/file-20200205-149796-jrt9vt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313838/original/file-20200205-149796-jrt9vt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313838/original/file-20200205-149796-jrt9vt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313838/original/file-20200205-149796-jrt9vt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313838/original/file-20200205-149796-jrt9vt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313838/original/file-20200205-149796-jrt9vt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Demonstrators at the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport protest the Trump administration’s first travel ban in January 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Trump-Travel-Ban-Atlanta/bac2d38253a94dbab6af1bf31f6b0366/61/0">AP Photo/Branden Camp</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Fanning fears</h2>
<p>National security has a special status in government policy – policymakers are given extra leeway on security issues in order to safeguard against existential threats. </p>
<p>A generation ago, during the Cold War, those threats involved nuclear missiles and million-man armies. After 9/11, the primary threat was mass casualty attacks by nongovernmental organizations. Today, fortunately, those threats have diminished to the point that the latest <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905-2.pdf">National Security Strategy</a> of the United States focuses on lone individuals with small arms, homemade explosives, vehicles and knives. </p>
<p>This violence is a concern, but not a leading threat to public safety. Terrorists were responsible for only one-fifth of 1% of the 290,000 murders in the United States since 9/11, according to data from the <a href="https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/">Global Terrorism Database</a> and the FBI’s <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/ucr/publications">Uniform Crime Reports</a>. The government’s counterterrorism dragnet, involving thousands of agents over many years, has discovered <a href="https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/bulletins/terrorism/monthlysep19/gui/">fewer and fewer plots</a> in recent years.</p>
<p>Still, many Americans do not feel safe. Half of the respondents in <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/267383/americans-equally-worried-mass-shooting-terrorism.aspx">recent</a> <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2378023119856825">surveys</a> <a href="https://blogs.chapman.edu/wilkinson/2018/10/16/americas-top-fears-2018/">say</a> they worry about being the victim of a terrorist attack.</p>
<p>Trump’s new travel ban asks Americans to believe that they will be more secure without immigration from Nigeria and five other countries. In my view, that is an insult both to those countries and to the country that calls itself the home of the brave.</p>
<p>[ <em><a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=expertise">Expertise in your inbox. Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter and get a digest of academic takes on today’s news, every day.</a></em> ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/131130/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Charles Kurzman received funding from the National Institute of Justice for early phases of his research on violent extremism.</span></em></p>Immigrants from Eritrea, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar, Nigeria, Sudan and Tanzania constitute less than 1% of terrorism cases in the United States, and none of the cases in the last two years.Charles Kurzman, Professor of Sociology, University of North Carolina at Chapel HillLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1297962020-01-16T13:40:18Z2020-01-16T13:40:18ZHow the UN’s more nimble approach can contribute to peace and security<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309913/original/file-20200114-151880-1r9y4vr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Rwandan soldiers line up to receive their UN peacekeeping medals for their work in Juba, South Sudan in 2019. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Flickr</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The United Nations’ peace operations are changing. This is true of a range of operations, from special political missions and peacebuilding offices to multidimensional peace efforts.</p>
<p>This reflects the fact that the <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/">UN Security Council</a> has always adapted to new forms of conflict and to new security environments, expanding the notion of security in its resolutions. As a result, peacekeeping has adapted to suit the purpose and methods of its time. </p>
<p>Until the end of the 1980s, peacekeeping was mainly a tool to help end interstate conflicts. These included the <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unefi.htm">Suez crisis</a>, the conflict between <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unipom.htm">India and Pakistan</a> and that between Israel and Syria over the <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/undof">Golan heights</a>. The exceptions were civil wars in the <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/onuc.htm">Congo</a> and <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/unifil">Lebanon</a>.</p>
<p>Since then, UN peacekeeping has become mainly an imperfect tool to help solve intrastate conflicts like those in <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/Unavem2/Unavem2.htm">Angola</a>, <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unosomi.htm">Somalia</a>, <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/untac.htm">Cambodia</a> and elsewhere. Exceptions have been the conflicts between <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unmee/index.html">Ethiopia and Eritrea</a> in 2000 and the civil unrest in <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minustah">Haiti</a> in 2004.</p>
<p>Peace operations are now becoming entangled in conflicts with regional and transnational dimensions. These very often involve a proliferation of armed groups (both rebel and criminal). Many are in conflict with the host countries. As a result, the relationship between peacekeepers and host states has been more complicated. Many don’t see an interest in complying with the mandate of the UN, such as in the Democratic Republic of Congo under former <a href="http://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20180926-Congo-Joseph-Kabila-UN-withdraw-troops-elections">president Joseph Kabila</a>, or in <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/mali/un-peace-operation-mali-troubled-yet-needed-mission">Mali</a>.</p>
<p>Moreover, peace operations have become, more than ever before, playgrounds for the political interests of China, France, Russia and the US, whether allied with regional actors or not. Some of the operations have become bases for creating new spheres of influence or strengthening existing ones, like in Central Africa and Mali. </p>
<p>This power struggle is not helping peace operations deliver on their various complex mandates. </p>
<h2>New direction</h2>
<p>For a few years now, UN peace operations have stood at a crossroads. Do they continue with expensive missions with little peace to keep, but which provide much-needed confidence and security in the world’s most difficult contexts? Or do they opt for less ambitious and more achievable objectives, which would place more responsibility on other actors (national, regional, parallel forces) to shore up basic security in trying to find a path to peace?</p>
<p>In 2019, peace operations seem to have taken the second path, shifting away from large, multidimensional, “conflict management” operations. The reasons for this shift include political and budgetary pressures – the kind of investments member states and the Security Council are willing to make – as well as structural reforms. </p>
<p>The number of personnel deployed in UN peacekeeping has slowly been decreasing. In April 2015 the UN was responsible for 107,800 soldiers and police officers worldwide. It now has only 83,669 uniformed personnel deployed. Four missions have been closed – <a href="https://www.ipinst.org/2018/06/un-operation-in-cote-divoire">Côte d’Ivoire</a>, <a href="https://www.ipinst.org/2018/12/liberias-peacekeeping-transition">Liberia</a> and two in <a href="https://www.ipinst.org/2018/12/planning-for-end-of-un-peacekeeping-in-haiti">Haiti</a>).</p>
<p>Despite this, the UN is today the second largest single deployer of troops in the world after the United States.</p>
<p>Divisions within the Security Council have also affected the delivery of mandates, and have weakened the relationships between various missions and their host states. As pointed out by <a href="https://www.ipinst.org/by/arthur-boutellis">Arthur Boutellis</a>, a senior advisor at the International Peace Institute, in a recent <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s40647-019-00274-2">paper</a>, a number of peacekeeping missions did not enjoy unanimously supported mandates. And cracks have started to occur among the United States, the United Kingdom and France, all permanent members of the Security Council, on some missions.</p>
<h2>Adaptability</h2>
<p>UN bodies should recalibrate peacekeeping operations to accord with the level of investment member states are willing to provide. This would, according to UN Secretary-General António Guterres, help </p>
<blockquote>
<p><a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/secretary-generals-remarks-to-security-council-high-level-debate-collective-action-to-improve-un">to refocus peacekeeping with realistic expectations</a>. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>This means that multidimensional peacekeeping seems to be behind us as it has become too expensive for the UN. It contradicts the push for dramatic financial cuts to make peacekeeping more nimble. </p>
<p>The political missions that are likely to take over from the multidimensional missions in <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/unamid">Darfur</a> in Sudan, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-ready-for-peacekeepers-to-leave-by-2022-127729">Democratic Republic of Congo</a>, <a href="https://news.un.org/en/audio/2017/12/640461">Haiti</a> and <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/sc13887.doc.htm">in Hodeida, Yemen</a> all show the wide array of tools the UN has at its disposal, and the spectrum its conflict resolution and conflict management is covering.</p>
<p>As pointed out by a recent United Nations University <a href="https://cpr.unu.edu/conflict-prevention-in-the-sahel-emerging-practice-across-the-un.html">report</a>, another example is the task force established in Burkina Faso by the UN resident coordinator, the UN country team and the UN Office in Western Africa and the Sahel to reinforce conflict prevention and peacebuilding capacities in key areas. It is supported by the UN’s <a href="https://news.un.org/en/tags/peace-building-fund">Peace-building Fund</a>. This example shows another innovative way the UN can work.</p>
<p>Such an approach is yet more proof of the adaptability of the UN system. As was the effort in Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia to deal with the <a href="https://ebolaresponse.un.org/un-mission-ebola-emergency-response-unmeer">Ebola pandemic</a> in 2014–2015 – the UN’s first emergency health mission. Another is the strengthened coordination established in the <a href="https://www.who.int/emergencies/crises/cod/en/">Beni region of the DRC</a> with the World Health Organisation in May 2019. </p>
<p>This breadth of tools and this spectrum of crisis resolution and management is an asset that makes the UN unique. It enables a truly global approach in dealing with crises and conflicts. The more the UN is able to use these tools and the systems attached to them, the more flexible it will be in adapting to evolving challenges. </p>
<p>The transitions in Haiti and Darfur, and the evolving situation in Burkina Faso, will serve as a reality check for the new secretariat’s nimble approach to maintaining international peace and security.</p>
<p><em>This article is a shortened version of the one published in December 2019 for the NYU Center on International Cooperation’s Peace Operations <a href="https://cic.nyu.edu/publications/peace-operations-review-2019">Review 2019</a></em>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129796/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexandra Novosseloff is a non resident senior fellow at the International Peace Institute and at the NYU Center for Cooperation. She is also an independent consultant on UN issues.</span></em></p>The number of personnel deployed in UN peacekeeping has slowly been decreasing.Alexandra Novosseloff, Chercheure-associée au Centre Thucydide, Université Paris-Panthéon-AssasLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1251602019-10-11T11:31:54Z2019-10-11T11:31:54ZAbiy Ahmed has won the Nobel Peace Prize: but big challenges still await Ethiopia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/296650/original/file-20191011-96235-grwz6r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=49%2C0%2C5472%2C3514&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alexandros Michailidis/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Abiy Ahmed, the Ethiopian Prime Minister, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/nobel-peace-prize-2019-winner-dle-scli-intl/index.html">has won</a> the Nobel Peace Prize. He becomes the 100th Nobel Peace Prize winner, and the first Ethiopian to receive the accolade. </p>
<p>Abiy is the 12th winner from Africa to be awarded the prize. Last year it was won by medical doctor Denis Mukwege from the Democratic Republic of Congo. Other African winners have included Albert Luthuli, Anwar al-Sadat, Desmond Tutu, Nelson Mandela and F.W. de Klerk, Kofi Annan, Wangari Maathai, Mohamed ElBaradei, Leymah Gbowee and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf. Tunisia’s National Dialogue Quartet won it in 2015.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/296674/original/file-20191011-96235-1a2hug9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/296674/original/file-20191011-96235-1a2hug9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296674/original/file-20191011-96235-1a2hug9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296674/original/file-20191011-96235-1a2hug9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296674/original/file-20191011-96235-1a2hug9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296674/original/file-20191011-96235-1a2hug9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296674/original/file-20191011-96235-1a2hug9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Office of the Prime Minister reacts on twitter to the announcement.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Nobel Peace Prize is one of the five Nobel Prizes established in 1895 under the instructions of Swedish industrialist Alfred Nobel in his will. The Peace Prize is awarded to the person who, in the preceding year, <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/facts/facts-on-the-nobel-peace-prize/">has</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>done the most or the best work for fraternity between nations, for the abolition or reduction of standing armies and for the holding and promotion of peace congresses. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2019/press-release/">formal announcement</a> by the Nobel Prize said that Abiy was awarded the prize for:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>his important work to promote reconciliation, solidarity and social justice. The prize is also meant to recognise all the stakeholders working for peace and reconciliation in Ethiopia and in the East and Northeast African regions…efforts to achieve peace and international cooperation, and in particular his decisive initiative to resolve the border conflict with neighbouring Eritrea. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>But who is Abiy Ahmed? Does he deserve an international accolade? And what of the challenges still facing the country he leads? </p>
<p>Berit Reiss-Andersen, the Chair of the Norwegian Nobel Committee, commented in her announcement speech that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… many challenges remain unresolved. Ethnic strife continues to escalate, and we have seen troubling examples of this in recent weeks and months.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Unexpected rise to power</h2>
<p>Barely two years ago Abiy Ahmed was largely an unknown figure. In early 2017 a couple of YouTube clips started to circulate on <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d6NkiTpyRSs">social media</a> that showed him gathered with veteran leaders at a party meeting. He came onto the scene with a simple, but powerful, message of togetherness.</p>
<p>At the time he was a political leader at regional and cabinet levels. But he didn’t sound like one. He comes across as remarkably authentic and his approach was distinct. At a time of elevated fear that the nation might head into disintegration, his message soared above the popular anxiety of possible conflict.</p>
<p>Unlike Ethiopian politicians of the past four decades his rhetoric mimicked neither Albanian Marxism nor Maoism. He has anchored his story on local cultural and religious sensibilities. </p>
<h2>Delicate course</h2>
<p>Abiy’s extraordinary rise to power, as well as his ability to steer a more peaceful political course in Ethiopia, is remarkable given the tensions and complexities of the country’s politics.</p>
<p>He has distanced himself, at least in his political outlook, from his party’s maligned old guard. He has had to steer a delicate course to keep various factions of the political coalition that has ruled Ethiopia for almost three decades – the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) – on board. The ruling elites from this party have never tolerated dissent. There have been <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr25/4178/2016/en/">numerous accusations</a> levelled against them of human rights abuses and the imprisonment of journalists who criticised the regime. </p>
<p>Instead of dismantling the existing system, Abiy opted for internal transformation.</p>
<p>It has taken tremendous courage to break away from a powerful political machine while remaining within the system. But he has stuck to his beliefs, even promoting the notion of “Medemer” – synergy and togetherness – while remaining within the party. </p>
<h2>Hopeful times</h2>
<p>Abiy inherited a nation that was in political disarray. Hundreds of people <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43073285">had died</a> in three years of anti-government protests.</p>
<p>But shortly after taking office from Hailemariam Desalegn in April 2018, Abiy began to move ahead rapidly with political reforms. He released political prisoners, unfairly incarcerated journalists and activists. He opened the door for political dissidents. </p>
<p>His message was that the country needed to win through bold ideas, not through the barrel of a gun. </p>
<p>He also showed his intention to build institutions. One example was the appointment of the well-known political dissident <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46301112">Birtukan Mideksa</a> as the head the electoral board. </p>
<p>He has also <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-ethiopias-progressive-premier-is-levelling-the-gender-playing-field-106365">championed</a> the role of women, including in politics. He appointed women in the positions of president, chief justice and press secretary. He also brought their share in his cabinet to 50%. </p>
<h2>International diplomacy</h2>
<p>But arguably his biggest achievements have been in international diplomacy. Ethiopia and neighbouring Eritrea share a common culture, language and ways of life. But a decades-long conflict between the two nations has brought immense misery to people who live on the border, and to families split by the fighting. </p>
<p>Abiy brought the conflict with <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2018-march-2019/after-making-peace-ethiopia-and-eritrea-now-focus-development">Eritrea to an end</a>. A treaty ended the state of war between Eritrea and Ethiopia and declared a new era of peace, friendship and comprehensive cooperation. A lot remains to be done, though. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-glow-of-the-historic-accord-between-ethiopia-and-eritrea-has-faded-119931">How glow of the historic accord between Ethiopia and Eritrea has faded</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>He also played a crucial role in regional politics. He was key to bringing leaders of <a href="https://www.voanews.com/africa/ethiopias-abiy-sudan-broker-talks">Sudan and South Sudan</a> to the negotiating table and helped mediate between Kenya and Somalia in a maritime territory dispute. </p>
<p>His popularity in the region and further abroad is evident when he’s travelling. He’s often greeted more like a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IHSRxVNcj5o">rock star</a> than a head of state. But maintaining the same image at home has been more complicated. </p>
<h2>Challenges ahead</h2>
<p>The Nobel Prize is an acknowledgement of Abiy’s achievements over the past two years. But it doesn’t guarantee his future success. </p>
<p>A case in point is Myanmar’s <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/09/what-happened-to-aung-san-suu-kyi/594781/">Aung San Suu kyi</a>. After surviving house arrest, and attacks on her life by the ruling junta, she won the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1991. But her fortunes turned after her party won a national election. It now stands accused of carrying out what the United Nations high commissioner for human rights has called “a textbook example of ethnic cleansing” against the Rohingya Muslims. </p>
<p>There are a great many troubling issues still unresolved in Ethiopia and tense times ahead with an election due next year. Abiy also has many enemies. These include agitators who try to use ethnic fault-lines for their own political ends, powerful ethno-nationalist activists who thrive on division and political entrepreneurs who only see politics as a means of personal enrichment. All are relentlessly working to exploit a fragile situation. Securing the safety of the citizens is the bare minimum he needs to do.</p>
<p>In my view he needs to accept the Nobel Peace Prize as acknowledgement of what he’s achieved, as well as a mandate to champion equality, justice and lasting unity in Ethiopia.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/125160/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mohammed Girma is affiliated with International Bible Advocacy Centre (IBAC).</span></em></p>Abiy Ahmed was awarded the prize for efforts to achieve peace and international cooperation, and in particular his decisive initiative to resolve the border conflict with neighbouring Eritrea.Mohammed Girma, Research associate, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1206012019-07-23T07:03:37Z2019-07-23T07:03:37ZDemocracy in Africa: success stories that have defied the odds<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/284781/original/file-20190718-116590-cw2viv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Senegalese women cast their ballots in the presidential elections in February. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Nic Bothma</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When I first said that I was going to write a book about the <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Democracy-Africa-Successes-Political-Approaches/dp/0521138426/ref=sr_1_5?keywords=democracy+africa&qid=1563291882&s=gateway&sr=8-5">history of democracy in Africa</a>, quite a few people responded with a joke. That will be one of the world’s shortest books, up there with the compendium of great English cooking, they would say. </p>
<p>But, it turned out that there was a lot to talk about: Africa’s past reveals more fragments of democracy than you would think. And, its present has a number of important things to teach the world about the conditions under which democracy can be built.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/publications/pp35-election-quality-public-trust-are-central-issues-africas-upcoming-contests">poor quality of elections</a> in many sub-Saharan African countries, combined with a tendency for the media to focus on controversy, means that Africa is often depicted as a bastion of authoritarianism. But, it actually has some of the most remarkable and important stories of democratic struggle.</p>
<p>Countries such as Benin, Botswana, Ghana, Namibia, Mauritius, Senegal and South Africa have not only become beacons of political rights and civil liberties, they have done so <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/democracy-in-africa/introduction-democratization-against-the-odds/69FC0205A06760562CFF822FD1F16CB4">against the greatest of obstacles</a>. These experiences teach us important lessons about where democracy can work, and why.</p>
<h2>Pre-conditions for strong democracy</h2>
<p>Political scientists like to talk about the conditions necessary for countries to build a strong and stable democracy. These lists are fiercely fought over, but there are a number of factors that most researchers would agree are probably important.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=ZeaWzPZb54AC&oi=fnd&pg=PA261&dq=robert+dahl+national+identity&ots=f5p5GzOMZV&sig=3xmTowrnoS7kbmYAwWYoGIkr9IU">cohesive national identity</a> is likely to make it easier to maintain national unity, while <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/16730/summary">wealth</a> and economic success have been found to promote political stability. A strong national infrastructure, underpinned by respect for the <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/218813/summary">rule of law</a>, means that the government is likely to be effective without being abusive. And, a vibrant <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/jid.3057">middle class</a> and powerful civil society are usually seen as important to promote accountability and responsive government.</p>
<p>What is remarkable about the democratisation of African states is that most did not enjoy a single one of these “pre-conditions”.</p>
<p>With the exception of South Africa, all of Africa’s democracies entered multiparty politics with low GDP per capita and high levels of unemployment. This was compounded by <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2698386">weak and underdeveloped states</a> that had been designed – both in the colonial era and during the authoritarian rule of the 1980s – to exploit resources rather than empower citizens. In states like Ghana, this was compounded by a history of military rule, which heightened the risk of further coups.</p>
<p>Almost all of these states also featured civil societies that were fragile and fragmented, despite the strength of religious organisations. At the same time, in the early 1990s, the middle class was small. More often than not, it was also economically dependent on the government. It was thus poorly placed to fight against corruption or democratic backsliding.</p>
<h2>Challenges</h2>
<p>These were not the only challenges that African states faced. With the exception of Botswana, they are all diverse multi-ethnic societies in which the question of national identity has been problematic. In <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2149995?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">Ghana</a> and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/cd36800a-cb1b-11e8-8d0b-a6539b949662">Mauritius</a> for instance, ethnic identities have historically played a role in structuring political networks. This increased the tension around elections. </p>
<p>Worse still, under colonial rule and <a href="https://theconversation.com/world-politics-explainer-the-end-of-apartheid-101602">during apartheid</a>, white regimes sought to entrench <a href="https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=3MqNER4J6zEC&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&dq=apartheid+south+africa+race&ots=ov1DHZtITC&sig=Q8AoHCIHjIXcnB7zEbTWf_j8rg0">racial divisions and hostilities</a> in Namibia and South Africa, creating a particularly difficult environment.</p>
<p>Against this backdrop, all of these states might have been expected to collapse into some form of authoritarian regime by now. Given this context, their success should be celebrated and studied for what it tells us about how democracy can be built even in the most challenging of contexts.</p>
<h2>Bucking the trend</h2>
<p>It is striking that, with the exception of <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2019/04/28/benin-vote-in-an-election-with-no-opposition/">Benin</a> and possibly <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/senegalese-govt-accused-of-misusing-courts-to-skew-vote-20180710">Senegal</a>, these democracies have grown stronger during a period in which the world is supposed to be <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/facing-up-to-the-democratic-recession/">backsliding on democracy</a>. </p>
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<p>While Europe is convulsed by <a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-wisdom-of-crowds-proves-effective-predictor-of-britains-chaotic-eu-departure-119906">Brexit</a> and the <a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/2018/05/right-wing-populism-rising-progressive-politics-fails-it-too-late-save-democracy">rise of right-wing populists</a>, and Donald Trump is doing his best to undermine America’s reputation for political checks and balances, Africa’s most democratic states have proved to be remarkably resilient.</p>
<p>Ghana has experienced numerous transfers of power and, in 2016, the first ever defeat of a sitting president. Namibia has consolidated its position as a “free” political system with robust respect for civil liberties, according to <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/namibia">Freedom House</a>. </p>
<p>South Africa suffered politically and economically during the <a href="https://www.news24.com/Analysis/analysis-stepping-out-of-the-nuclear-shadow-of-the-zuma-years-20190627">presidency of Jacob Zuma</a>, but now has the chance to bounce back after the governing African National Congress (ANC) voted to pursue reform under <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/whats-next-ramaphosa-south-africa-heads-polls/">President Cyril Ramaphosa</a>.</p>
<p>For their part, Botswana and Mauritius – the continent’s oldest democracies – continue to combine respect for political rights with prudent economic policies.</p>
<p>Praising Africa’s democratic success stories does not, of course, mean that we should overlook its failures. A number of countries have taken steps backwards in recent years, including <a href="https://theconversation.com/tanzanias-latest-clampdown-takes-decades-of-repression-to-new-lows-96959">Tanzania</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-museveni-has-twisted-ugandas-constitution-to-cling-to-power-118933">Uganda</a>. Authoritarian leaders also remain entrenched in <a href="https://theconversation.com/biya-needs-to-devise-a-monumental-shift-if-cameroon-is-to-turn-the-corner-106254">Cameroon</a>, <a href="https://time.com/5559491/chad-social-media-internet-ban-censorship/">Chad</a>, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/eritrea">Eritrea </a>, and many more. But it is important to recognise that there is much more to Africa than authoritarianism.</p>
<h2>Explaining success</h2>
<p>In the absence of the conventional building blocks of democracy, we need to look elsewhere to explain these success stories. Some might be tempted to think that the role of the global community has been critical in keeping governments on the straight and narrow. But in reality, democracy is built from within, as the fact that aid-dependent countries such as Uganda and Rwanda have remained firmly authoritarian shows only too well.</p>
<p>We should, therefore, give greater credit to the politicians and people of Africa’s democratic states. African presidents are often lambasted for being corrupt and self-serving. But, in a number of countries, they have shown considerable restraint, establishing institutions capable of checking their power.</p>
<p>In Ghana, cohesive relationships among the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/114/457/529/2195167">political elite</a> have underpinned a growing consensus on the value of democracy. In South Africa, inclusive leadership played a critical role in overcoming racial divisions and building trust in the new post-apartheid political system since 1994. In Namibia, successive presidents have refused to use the electoral dominance of the governing party to remove the opposition.</p>
<p>The role played by African citizens also deserves greater recognition. It was their willingness to take to the streets that forced democratic openings in the late 1980s. The same has been true in recent years, with mass action challenging authoritarian regimes in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/31/burkina-faso-president-blaise-compaore-ousted-says-army">Burkina Faso</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-sudans-protesters-upped-the-ante-and-forced-al-bashir-from-power-115306">Sudan</a>. </p>
<p>Despite economic challenges and democratic difficulties, high levels of <a href="http://www.afrobarometer.org/press/africans-want-high-quality-elections-especially-if-they-bring-change-afrobarometer-surveys">public support for democracy</a> in Africa mean that leaders understand the costs of backsliding.</p>
<p>At a time when people are questioning the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/mar/04/shock-system-liberal-democracy-populism">value of democracy</a> in many Western states, many African populations who have lived under one-party, one-man, or military rule are prepared to fight to prevent their return. This should serve both as an important lesson and a source of inspiration.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/120601/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nic Cheeseman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Africa’s democracies have grown stronger during a period in which the world is backsliding on democracy.Nic Cheeseman, Professor of Democracy, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.