tag:theconversation.com,2011:/fr/topics/farc-7340/articlesFARC – The Conversation2023-09-07T15:43:25Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2112822023-09-07T15:43:25Z2023-09-07T15:43:25ZColombia: former Farc fighters who signed 2016 peace deal now live amid threats and assassinations<p>Former members of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/25/farc-che-guevara-era-closes-latin-america-guerrillas">Farc guerrilla army</a> in Colombia who laid down their arms as part of a peace deal in 2016 are being forced off the land they were allowed to settle after they demobilised. </p>
<p>More than 200 families of the Mariana Páez community, about eight hours south of the capital Bogotá in Colombia’s Meta department, have had to flee the hamlet they have lived in following demobilisation due to threats from dissident former Farc fighters who have refused to accept the treaty. </p>
<p>Another group of about 360 people have reportedly also been <a href="https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-07-04/hundreds-of-former-farc-guerrillas-forced-to-flee-their-homes-due-to-death-threats.html">forced off their land</a> at Vista Hermosa, in the same region of Colombia, after the assassinations of two former Farc guerrillas, both signatories to the peace deal, and subsequent death threats.</p>
<p>But the community of Mariana Páez is particularly symbolic. It was the site of the <a href="https://www.elespectador.com/colombia-20/paz-y-memoria/en-fotos-asi-dejaron-las-armas-las-farc-hace-tres-anos-en-mesetas-meta-article/">official ceremony</a> in which the Farc members formally laid down their weapons in 2017. Mariana Páez and Georgina Ortiz (the name of the community in Vista Hermosa) are two of more than <a href="https://www.reincorporacion.gov.co/es/reincorporacion/Documents/ETCR-simple-Pagina-WEB-06022019.pdf">20 reintegration and training spaces</a> built with international support as part of the peace deal signed by the guerrilla group with the Colombian government the previous year. </p>
<p>Nowadays, many of these camps look like other Colombian villages. Only at a second glance one sees the various wall paintings of Che Guevara, former Farc leaders and revolutionary slogans.</p>
<p>“Mariana Páez is our home,” community spokesperson Jasbleidy Cabana told me. “We have built this place and many of us have started families here.” Yet, in March, the community was told to leave by members of a splinter group of former Farc fighters, the <a href="https://insightcrime.org/venezuela-organized-crime-news/ex-farc-mafia-central-general-staff/">Estado Mayor Central (EMC)</a>, that refused to sign the peace agreement.</p>
<h2>The Farc’s demobilisation</h2>
<p>After the 2016 peace deal, some <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/americas/20211124-un-hails-colombian-peace-process-despite-setbacks-as-us-moves-to-remove-farc-from-terrorist-list">13,000 Farc members demobilised</a>. They handed over their weapons to the United Nations and joined a programme to assist in reintegrating them into civil society. Since then, almost <a href="https://www.radionacional.co/actualidad/judicial/firmantes-de-paz-asesinados-en-colombia-2023-cnr">400 have been assassinated</a>, and even more have been internally displaced.</p>
<p>The EMC has an estimated <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/colombia-suspends-ceasefire-with-estado-mayor-central-rebels-some-areas-2023-05-22/">3,500 members</a> across 23 of Colombia’s 32 departments. While it seems paradoxical that a group of former Farc fighters would threaten their former comrades who have demobilised, Cabana explains: “The dissidents see us as traitors to Farc’s struggle. Moreover, many current members of the dissidents joined after 2016 and never got to know us.”</p>
<p>The Farc, from which the EMC emerged, started as a Marxist movement – but over the years, the EMC has become heavily involved in criminal activities, particularly narcotics trafficking. The <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/20/world/americas/colombia-comandos-armed-groups.html">EMC‘s ranks include</a> former rebels, soldiers, paramilitaries and members of organised criminal groups. </p>
<h2>Political responses</h2>
<p>Colombian politics have done little to change the situation. In 2018, Iván Duque from the right-wing Democratic Center party – which <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/09/world/americas/colombian-opposition-to-peace-deal-feeds-off-gay-rights-backlash.html">fiercely opposed</a> the 2016 peace deal – <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/18/ivan-duque-wins-election-to-become-colombias-president">won the presidency</a>. During his four-year term, his administration <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2019/03/14/colombias-president-ivan-duque-undermines-a-peace-deal">undermined several aspects of the agreement</a>. Limited funding and political support meant that some of the peace deal’s key elements, such as land redistribution and an overhaul of rural Colombia, <a href="https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/barometer/visualizations">remained unfulfilled</a>.</p>
<p>Then, in August 2022, Colombians elected the first left-wing government in the country’s <a href="https://www.lasillavacia.com/la-silla-vacia/podcasts/episodios/%C2%BFes-petro-el-primer-presidente-de-izquierda-en-la-historia-spoiler-no-">recent history</a>. The new president, Gustavo Petro, promised to implement the 2016 peace deal more thoroughly and seek additional peace settlements with any armed groups still active. “We have to comply with the peace agreement because that is how we can tell the other armed groups out there that the state is complying,” Petro <a href="https://www.infobae.com/colombia/2023/02/22/gustavo-petro-y-su-llamado-a-la-paz-total-se-acabo-esa-historia-en-donde-el-estado-traiciona-y-mata-al-que-acuerda-la-paz/">announced in February</a> .</p>
<p>One success of Petro’s so-called “<a href="https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/petro-colombia-eln-insurgency-conflict-farc-violence/?share=email&messages%5B0%5D=one-time-read-success">total peace</a>” initiative has been ongoing peace talks and a ceasefire since early August with the National Liberation Army (ELN), another leftist guerrilla group. Negotiations with this group in the past had been particularly complicated, given the group’s decentralised organisational structure, considerable autonomy of different regional units, and ideological inflexibility. </p>
<p>But this ceasefire is limited to exchanges between the ELN and the Colombian military. On August 20, violent clashes between the ELN and the EMC led to the <a href="https://www.lasillavacia.com/la-silla-vacia/envivo/en-samaniego-narino-mas-de-400-familias-desplazadas-por-enfrentamientos-entre-armados">displacement of 400 families</a> in Samaniego, a municipality in the south-western Nariño department. In early September, the Red Cross <a href="https://www.lasillavacia.com/la-silla-vacia/envivo/arrecia-la-guerra-entre-eln-y-disidencias-de-las-farc-en-arauca">reported</a> clashes between these two groups, leading to the killings of ten people in the eastern Arauca department.</p>
<p>Similarly, the Colombian government’s negotiations with other groups are complex. In March, the government suspended a ceasefire with the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2023/colombia-drug-trafficking-agc-negotiation/">Gulf Clan</a> (formally the Gaitanist Self-Defence Forces of Colombia), a powerful criminal organisation which controls much of the drug trafficking across large parts of Colombia.</p>
<h2>Symbolism for Colombia</h2>
<p>So the evictions from the Mariana Paéz community are symbolic of the challenging task of achieving peace in Colombia, where lucrative illicit economies, such as the drugs trade and <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/closer-look-colombias-illegal-artisanal-and-small-scale-mining">illegal gold mining</a> continue to provide incentives for armed groups to operate. </p>
<p>In late May, the Colombian government <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/colombia-suspends-ceasefire-with-estado-mayor-central-rebels-some-areas-2023-05-22/">suspended its ceasefire</a> with the EMC in four Colombian departments, including Meta, after the group forcibly recruited four indigenous teenagers and shot them when they attempted to escape. </p>
<p>This led the people of Mariana Páez to leave the community, even though the EMC officially <a href="https://www.elespectador.com/colombia-20/conflicto/disidencias-de-ivan-mordisco-dicen-que-no-atentaran-contra-excombatientes-de-farc-mesetas-meta/">retracted</a> its threats. “There are no guarantees for our lives, and also, the housing available is not dignified,” Cabana told me. </p>
<p>The families moved on August 10 to a nearby municipality, where the Colombian government has provided land that the community hopes will allow them to grow crops.</p>
<p>The community’s decision is thus emblematic of the security situation in rural Colombia. Announcements in early September by the government and the EMC that <a href="https://www.infobae.com/colombia/2023/09/02/firman-acuerdo-especial-para-conversaciones-de-paz-con-el-estado-mayor-central-de-las-farc/">a new ceasefire and peace negotiations</a> will soon begin provide hope. But the past has shown too often that violence and instability will persist. Providing security and enabling the reintegration of former Farc members into society will likely remain a major challenge.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211282/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christoph Sponsel does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>They used to fight the state and now want to be part of society – but after demobilisation, thousands of former Farc guerrillas face violence and displacementChristoph Sponsel, PhD Candidate in Political Science, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1862212022-07-04T15:12:58Z2022-07-04T15:12:58ZColombia: Gustavo Petro and Francia Márquez have achieved a historic victory for the left – so who are they?<p>It was, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/colombia-elects-first-black-woman-vp-francia-marquez-who-vows-stand-nobodies-2022-06-20/">said Francia Márquez Mina</a>, a victory for “the nobodies”. Speaking in Bogota on June 19 after the results of the Colombian presidential election were announced, the newly elected vice-president struck a jubilant note after becoming the first black woman to be elected to the office – on a ticket with former guerrilla fighter Gustavo Petro, the country’s first left-wing president.</p>
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<p>After 214 years we have achieved a government of the people, a popular government, a government of people with calloused hands.</p>
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<p>Petro and Márquez beat millionaire businessman Rodolfo Hernández, taking <a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-colombian-presidential-elections/">50.5% of the votes</a>. Their platform largely focused on economic and environmental matters, along with a pledge to tax the rich, combat income inequality, reform healthcare and pension systems, promote peace and tackle corruption. </p>
<p>But first they need to bring an end to what Márquez calls the “politics of death”, which has a long history in Colombia. In 2016, a peace deal was signed with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Farc), bringing to an end 60 years of armed conflict with this guerrilla faction. But violence has not ceased, and since 2016, over 1,200 human rights activists have been killed – <a href="https://indepaz.org.co/lideres-sociales-defensores-de-dd-hh-y-firmantes-de-acuerdo-asesinados-en-2022/">89 in 2022</a> – and 21 former Farc fighters murdered this year so far. </p>
<p>Colombians have voted against decades of dispossession and violence. A number of firsts have been achieved with this election result. It is the first time in Colombian history that leftist candidates have made it alive to the final round of an election – notwithstanding constant death threats during the campaign. It is also the first time that an ex-guerrilla has been elected to the top job, and that a black woman, victim of the armed conflict, will occupy the vice-presidency.</p>
<p>Petro, 62, was a fighter with the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-61863885">M-19 guerrilla group</a>, a leftist armed guerrilla faction, mostly urban, that operated from 1974 until disarmament in 1990. After the 1990 peace process, M-19 <a href="https://www.elespectador.com/politica/la-constitucion-del-91-el-mejor-legado-del-m-19-article-199833/">played a key role </a> in the constitutional reform of 1991. Since then, Petro has been constantly involved in mainstream Colombian politics: he has served as mayor of Bogotá and was a senator until the election.</p>
<p>Márquez, 40, comes from the war-torn department of Cauca in Colombia. She became <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/06/world/americas/francia-marquez-colombia-vp.html">an activist at the age of 13</a>, and a mother at the age of 16. In 2018, she won the <a href="https://www.goldmanprize.org/recipient/francia-marquez/">Goldman environmental prize</a> for mobilising women to halt illegal mining in her territory. As she <a href="https://elpais.com/america-colombia/elecciones-presidenciales/2022-06-19/francia-marquez-y-el-asalto-al-poder-de-los-nadies.html">told a rally</a> during the election campaign: “I have not asked to be in politics. But politics messed with me and now, we are messing with her.”</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/inside-a-reintegration-camp-for-colombias-ex-guerrilla-fighters-words-of-reconciliation-are-our-only-weapons-now-184074">Inside a reintegration camp for Colombia's ex-guerrilla fighters: ‘Words of reconciliation are our only weapons now’</a>
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<h2>Multi-faceted victory</h2>
<p>The alliance of Petro and Márquez was timely, refreshing and highly strategic. Bogotá-based journalist <a href="https://elpais.com/america-colombia/elecciones-presidenciales/2022-06-22/el-largo-camino-de-la-izquierda-colombiana-al-poder.html">Camila Osorio</a> has identified four key long-term factors that influenced this shift in Colombian politics. Importantly, the revised constitution in 1991 included a requirement for diversity in Colombian politics. This has led to a wider array of voices and opinions in the public sphere. Meanwhile, the 2016 peace agreement changed the narrative about the left and its association with the guerrillas. This then made way for the <a href="https://theconversation.com/face-aux-injustices-la-colombie-senflamme-et-letat-reprime-brutalement-160667">widespread protests of 2019 and 2021</a> which generated mass support for a wider and more inclusive political conversation.</p>
<p>The success of Petro and Márquez is a legacy of the nation-wide <a href="https://elpais.com/america-colombia/elecciones-presidenciales/2022-06-22/el-largo-camino-de-la-izquierda-colombiana-al-poder.html">mobilisations of the left over decades </a>, which has included constant activism from grassroots NGOs, feminist and antiracist collectives, underground student associations, guerrilla groups and the Communist Party, which was forced to go clandestine because of political persecution.</p>
<h2><em>Vivir sabroso</em> or living with dignity</h2>
<p>However, it was, above all, women, Afro-Colombians, Indigenous people and the dispossessed that guaranteed the election of Petro and Márquez. Petro’s campaign for the second round has been able to mobilise strategic cities such as Cali and Bogotá that were key to the 2019 and 2021 social protests. The two leaders were also very successful at getting the vote out, combating apathy and abstention.</p>
<p>It was Márquez’s longstanding activism that was key to rallying voters. Her ability to mobilise the <a href="https://nacla.org/colombian-elections-diaspora-voters-support-francia-marquez">Colombians living abroad</a>, was an important factor. But years of experience as a black activist, a feminist and a representative of victims of the armed conflict meant Márquez was able to represent herself as the embodiment of the grassroots struggle for change in Colombia.</p>
<p>Reclaiming publicly Afro-Colombian outfits and openly advocating for intersectional feminism, Márquez’s main campaign slogan was <em>vivir sabroso</em>, which translates as “to live with flavour”. It is an Afro-Colombian conception of “living without fear; it refers to living in dignity; it refers to living a life with rights guaranteed”, <a href="https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2022/06/22/vivir-sabroso-francia-marquez-colombia-que-es-orix/">according to Márquez</a>. Petro, meanwhile, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JRaF6x647Ko">called for</a> a “politics of love” in his victory speech – which he defined as “a politics of understanding, a politics of dialogue, of understanding one another”.</p>
<p>This positive, inclusive language from Petro and Márquez stands in stark contrast to Colombia’s traditional political discourse, which has tended to focus on the needs of political and social elites and has largely ignored the more marginalised sectors of society. Their campaign rhetoric was geared towards prioritising the needs of all of Colombia after decades of armed violence and inequality.</p>
<p>They will face a raft of challenges – principal among which are the inequalities still rampant in Colombia as well as continuing political violence. The cultivation of <a href="https://www.unodc.org/unodc/es/frontpage/2018/September/informe-de-unodc-reporta-alza-histrica-en-los-cultivos-de-coca-en-colombia.html">coca</a> has been on the rise again since 2018, corruption remains entrenched, as does longstanding structural oppression, such as gender-based violence, class divisions and racism. </p>
<p>Trying to achieve this level of social and economic reform will be extremely difficult. As their election victory suggests, the country remains deeply divided and there are significant interests lined up in opposition. The pair have received – and continue to receive – <a href="https://towardfreedom.org/story/archives/americas/celebrations-in-colombias-streets-gustavo-petro-to-be-first-left-wing-president-and-francia-marquez-the-first-afro-descendant-woman-vp/">regular death threats</a>. But their ability to mobilise a broad array of social movements and mass-based collectives will certainly give them a powerful life force to confront the next four years.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/186221/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Priscyll Anctil Avoine receives funding from Vinnova / Marie Curie Seal of Excellence. She is also the Director of Fundación Lüvo, a feminist and antiracist collective. </span></em></p>Colombia has elected its first left-wing government, led by a former guerrilla fighter and a female black activist.Priscyll Anctil Avoine, Vinnova/Marie Curie Fellow - Researcher in Feminist Security Studies, Lund UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1840742022-06-06T09:29:39Z2022-06-06T09:29:39ZInside a reintegration camp for Colombia’s ex-guerrilla fighters: ‘Words of reconciliation are our only weapons now’<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466299/original/file-20220531-12-1tn9em.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Olmedo Vega spent 35 years as a FARC guerrilla commander before moving to the Agua Bonita demobilisation camp. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photograph: Juan Pablo Valderrama</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><blockquote>
<p>The election of Iván Duque four years ago was a threat for us. But we will continue to follow the peace agreement regardless of who is the next president of Colombia. We are more determined than ever to comply with the peace accords, and this is the reason they want to kill us.</p>
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<p><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tJTwgO0dnq0">Olmedo Vega</a> spent 35 years as a guerrilla commander during Colombia’s armed conflict – one of the longest the world has ever seen. “The FARC is my family – I grew up with the guerrillas. But now I really want to commit to this new life here in Agua Bonita, along with my old comrades.”</p>
<p>Over the past four years, we have carried out 42 in-depth interviews with former guerrilla soldiers in Agua Bonita and some of the other 25 Territorial Spaces for Training, Reintegration and Reincorporation (ETCR in Spanish), developed by the Colombian government and the UN to resettle thousands of former FARC fighters after <a href="https://theconversation.com/santos-got-the-nobel-prize-for-not-giving-up-on-peace-heres-why-all-colombians-won-66689">the historic</a> 2016 peace agreement.</p>
<p>We sought to understand <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21647259.2022.2065792">the barriers faced by ex-combatants</a> as they try to reintegrate into civil society. With President Duque’s reign almost over and his successsor due to be <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-61628589">elected on June 19</a>, the result has major implications for the future of Colombia, the survival of the peace agreement, and the prospects of all those former combatants who have committed to a life without conflict.</p>
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<p><strong><em>This story is part of Conversation Insights</em></strong>
<br><em>The Insights team generates <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/insights-series-71218">long-form journalism</a> and is working with academics from different backgrounds who have been engaged in projects to tackle societal and scientific challenges.</em></p>
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<p>After six decades of fighting, it is estimated that almost 20% of the population is a <a href="http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/micrositios/balances-jep/descargas/balance-sujetos-victimizados.pdf">direct victim of Colombia’s civil war</a> – <a href="http://centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/descargas/informes2016/basta-ya-ingles/BASTA-YA-ingles.pdf">including</a> almost 9 million internally displaced people, 200,000 enforced disappearances, up to 40,000 kidnappings, more than 17,000 child soldiers, nearly 9,321 landmine incidents, and 16,324 acts of sexual violence. </p>
<p>For the almost 13,000 former FARC guerrillas, the end of the conflict initiated a process of “disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration” into Colombian society. But while positive steps were taken on both sides, <a href="https://indepaz.org.co/observatorio-de-derechos-humanos-y-conflictividades/">more than 300 massacres</a> have been recorded since the peace deal was signed on September 26 2016. Some <a href="https://colombia.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/04.04.22_eng_infographic_reportmar2022.pdf">316 FARC ex-combatants</a> and <a href="https://indepaz.org.co/">1,287 human rights defenders</a> have been murdered during this period of “peace”, putting the agreement under <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/07/1068371">increasing threat</a>.</p>
<h2>‘A place to have a dignified life’</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.reincorporacion.gov.co/es/reincorporacion/Paginas/ETCRs/AETCR_agua_bonita.aspx">Agua Bonita</a> (“Beautiful water”) guerrilla demobilisation camp is located on a small plateau on the edge of the Amazon basin, about an hour’s bumpy drive from Florencia, capital city of the Caquetá department in Colombia’s Amazonía region.</p>
<p>Since 1970, Caquetá had been the headquarters for both FARC and the guerrillas of <a href="https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/popular-liberation-army">the Popular Liberation Army</a> (EPL). It is a geographically strategic corridor for illicit drug trafficking (particularly related to the production of cocaine), the transport of illegal weapons and the smuggling of kidnapped people. It is also one of the first places where guerrilla groups <a href="https://unmas.org/en/programmes/colombia">used landmines</a> to wrest territorial control from the Colombian army.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466085/original/file-20220530-20-af9in0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466085/original/file-20220530-20-af9in0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466085/original/file-20220530-20-af9in0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466085/original/file-20220530-20-af9in0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466085/original/file-20220530-20-af9in0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466085/original/file-20220530-20-af9in0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466085/original/file-20220530-20-af9in0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466085/original/file-20220530-20-af9in0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Agua Bonita’s high year-round temperatures and humidity mean it is a ‘heaven’ for fruit growing. Photo: Juan Pablo Valderrama.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In 2017, when ex-FARC combatants first arrived in the empty area where Agua Bonita now stands, they worked with local builders for seven months to construct 63 houses using glass-reinforced plastic and average-quality plywood. Local workers from Florencia and the nearby towns of Morelia, Belen de los Andaquíes and El Paujil helped them build the camp.</p>
<p>“At the beginning, it was difficult to work side-by-side with the local builders because of our stigma as <em>guerrilleros</em>,” recalled <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=enPwRjHr4cg">Federico Montes</a>, one of the community leaders. “But after six months of working with us every day, a couple of them moved with their families to live here!”</p>
<p>Agua Bonita is situated amid one of the most biologically diverse terrestrial ecosystems in the world; home to around 40,000 plant species, nearly 1,300 bird species and 2.5 million different insects. Red-bellied piranhas and pink river dolphins swim in the waters here – yet in both 2019 and 2020, Colombia was named the world’s <a href="https://english.elpais.com/usa/2021-09-15/colombia-the-worlds-deadliest-country-for-environmentalists-in-2020.html">deadliest country for environmentalists</a> by human rights and environmental observers Global Witness.</p>
<p>According to Montes, Agua Bonita’s high year-round temperatures and humidity mean “the weather is perfect to grow yucca, plantain, cilantro and pineapple. And if you are feeling more adventurous, you can have trees of <a href="https://thefoodhog.com/araza-fruit-eugenia-stipitata/">araza</a>, <a href="https://www.fondazioneslowfood.com/en/ark-of-taste-slow-food/copoazu/">copoazu</a>, <a href="https://tipbuzz.com/yellow-dragon-fruit/">yellow pitaya</a> and other Amazonic crops. We are in the middle of a fruit heaven here.”</p>
<p>The community started with a population of more than 300 ex-FARC combatants. These days, it boasts a library with 19 computers and four printers, a bakery, convenience store and restaurant, a football pitch, health centre and community centre with a daycare facility for toddlers. Former combatants farm eight hectares of pineapple cash crop and have their own basic processing plant for fruit pulp. They also have six 13-metre-long fish tanks, a big hen house and dozens of large communal gardens.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466077/original/file-20220530-18-9pr3mr.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Brightly painted hut in Colombia" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466077/original/file-20220530-18-9pr3mr.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466077/original/file-20220530-18-9pr3mr.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466077/original/file-20220530-18-9pr3mr.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466077/original/file-20220530-18-9pr3mr.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466077/original/file-20220530-18-9pr3mr.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466077/original/file-20220530-18-9pr3mr.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466077/original/file-20220530-18-9pr3mr.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">One of the many thought-inspiring murals painted on the houses of Agua Bonita. Photo: Juan Pablo Valderrama.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>One of the main attractions for visitors is the <a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/misiononucol/albums/72157702429996671/">vibrant murals</a> painted on the 65 modest houses, <a href="https://www.facebook.com/AguaBonitaFestival/">portraying</a> everything from local flora and fauna to guerrilla leaders and FARC paraphernalia. The most recurring features are the words “peace”, “reconciliation” and “hope”.</p>
<p>“Our main aim,” said Montes, “is to create a place to have a dignified life, where all together can be free, safe and secure, living in proper houses with access to health, employment, and education.”</p>
<p>Yet since the establishment of Agua Bonita in 2017, <a href="https://indepaz.org.co/observatorio-de-derechos-humanos-y-conflictividades/">29 ex-combatants</a> have been killed in the area. According to <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tJTwgO0dnq0">Olmedo</a>: “During the government of Duque, there has been a shortage of food, goodwill and economic support in Agua Bonita – a total lack of governmental support. But the presidential elections are giving us hope for a better future.”</p>
<h2>‘A lot of stigmas and negative attitudes against us’</h2>
<p>In the run up to his election in June 2018, Duque, as leader of the right-wing Centro Democrático party, fiercely opposed the peace agreement with the FARC, vowing to renegotiate what he described as a <a href="https://theconversation.com/colombia-elects-a-conservative-who-promises-to-correct-its-peace-accord-98273">“lenient” deal</a> while pledging not to “tear the agreement to shreds”.</p>
<p>After four years in charge, Duque – Colombia’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/26/duque-most-unpopular-colombian-president-poll">least popular president</a> in polling history – has <a href="https://www.wola.org/analysis/colombia-peace-accord-is-not-weak-its-duque-who-insists-on-weakening-it/">undermined</a> the implementation of the peace agreement, and further <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/02/17/from-old-battles-to-new-challenges-in-colombia-pub-83785">polarised</a> the country and its politics. Levels of respect for human rights, security, quality of life and poverty <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/colombia">have all worsened</a> under his militaristic tenure.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466309/original/file-20220531-12-gidpl3.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466309/original/file-20220531-12-gidpl3.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466309/original/file-20220531-12-gidpl3.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466309/original/file-20220531-12-gidpl3.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466309/original/file-20220531-12-gidpl3.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466309/original/file-20220531-12-gidpl3.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466309/original/file-20220531-12-gidpl3.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466309/original/file-20220531-12-gidpl3.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Olmedo Vega: ‘I believe in the peace process because now we have the opportunity to study.’ Photo: Juan Pablo Valderrama.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Olmedo Vega, 49, has lived in Agua Bonita from its earliest foundations. When we met him, Vega was taking part in a <a href="https://kidnappingworkshop.net/caqueta/">video letter exchange project</a> with young people from Medellin, Colombia’s second-largest city. “Some of the questions from these students were really difficult to answer,” he told us. “There are a lot of stigmas and negative attitudes against us as ex-FARC members. ‘Terrorist’, ‘murderer’, ‘killer’, ‘scumbag’ … these are the words some people used to introduce me.”</p>
<p>But these days, Vega is proud to call himself a student too. One evening, during dinner, he asked us: “What did the arrival of an American astronaut on the Moon mean politically?”</p>
<p>As we fumbled for an answer, he interrupted to say: “I am studying four hours every day to get my qualifications: two hours in the morning, two in the afternoon. We are 30 comrades working so hard to sit the ICFES (Colombian A-level exams) next September. This is why I believe in the peace process, because now we have the opportunity to study. I want to be a doctor in the future, this is my dream. I want to help people, and to build a more equal society in Colombia.”</p>
<p>That evening, Vega offered us <a href="https://youtu.be/0XCMwqJ-lO0"><em>cancharina</em></a> for pudding and the sugar cane drink <a href="https://www.mycolombianrecipes.com/aguapanela-sugar-cane-drink/"><em>agua de panela</em></a>, a FARC <a href="https://www.atlasobscura.com/articles/what-farc-ate-colombia">culinary tradition</a>. And he talked about one topic repeatedly: the murder of his best friend, Jorge Eliecer Garzón, <a href="https://www.telesurtv.net/news/asesinan-firmante-paz-colombia-20211017-0007.html">by paramilitary groups</a> in 2021.</p>
<p>“Jorge was my pal. He taught me how to be a good <em>guerrillero</em>, a good comrade. He strongly believed in the power of peace and reconciliation. I cannot understand why he was assassinated in front of his family in that bakery.”</p>
<p>Expressed as a cold statistic, Garzón was <a href="https://twitter.com/Indepaz/status/1449719441911164938/photo/1">ex-combatant no.290</a> to have been murdered since the signing of the peace agreement. The <a href="https://www.urosario.edu.co/Documentos/Facultad-de-Ciencia-Politica-Gobierno-y-Relacione/Observatorios/Crimen-organizado/DOCUMENTOS_OCCO_2_A_Criminal_Peace-18-nov-min.pdf">reasons for these killings</a> vary, from preventing the political participation of ex-FARC members to asserting control of areas for the production and international distribution of cocaine. In general, security and justice for demobilised FARC fighters has never been a priority for the Duque administration, and paramilitary groups have taken advantage of this.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/colombias-fragile-peace-deal-threatened-by-the-return-of-mass-killings-154315">Colombia's fragile peace deal threatened by the return of mass killings</a>
</strong>
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<p>At one point in the evening, Vega recalled: “Jorge used to say to me: ‘You must believe in how peace can change the world. But to heal and be in peace, I do not need to forgive what these paramilitary groups have done to us. Jorge didn’t deserve to be murdered. After his killing, I was broken.”</p>
<p>Mostly, however, Vega remained conciliatory, and positive. “We are more determined than ever to comply with the peace accords – this is the reason they want to kill us. We need to defend the peace agreement. Words of reconciliation and hard work are our only weapons now. I am feeling positive. This is the best way to honour the memory of Jorge.”</p>
<h2>The spectre of political assassination</h2>
<p>Colombia’s current presidential campaign has been haunted by the spectre of <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220514-colombia-elections-the-spectre-of-political-assassination">political assassination</a>. <a href="https://colombiafocus.com/candidate-profile-gustavo-petro">Gustavo Petro</a>, the leftist former guerrilla and ex-mayor of Colombia’s capital Bogotá, had to call off public appearances after his campaign received first-hand information regarding assassination plots by paramilitary groups. His running partner, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/may/25/francia-marquez-colombia-vice-president-black-candidate?CMP=Share_AndroidApp_Other">Francia Márquez</a>, a black environmentalist, also received death threats.</p>
<p>Petro led the presidential election first round on May 29 with 40% of the votes. His rival in the run-off on June 19 will be <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/colombias-king-tiktok-hernandez-ready-run-off-after-shock-result-2022-05-30/">Rodolfo Hernández</a>, a businessman-politician who is viewed as a right-wing conservative and populist outsider.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466087/original/file-20220530-22-nh4943.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Two political candidates on stage" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466087/original/file-20220530-22-nh4943.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466087/original/file-20220530-22-nh4943.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=376&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466087/original/file-20220530-22-nh4943.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=376&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466087/original/file-20220530-22-nh4943.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=376&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466087/original/file-20220530-22-nh4943.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=472&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466087/original/file-20220530-22-nh4943.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=472&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466087/original/file-20220530-22-nh4943.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=472&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Gustavo Petro and his running partner, Francia Márquez, have both received death threats during this election campaign.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/bogota-colombia-november-22-2021-gustavo-2161317985">Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Colombia is the only major country in Latin America that has <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-05-12/colombia-election-front-runner-beefs-up-security-over-violence-threat">never had a leftist leader</a>. The country’s right-wing parties and liberal establishment appear determined to maintain this record, amid campaigns that have been regularly accused of <a href="https://www.ips-journal.eu/topics/democracy-and-society/the-race-for-colombias-next-president-5865/">racism, sexism and classism</a> against Márquez in particular.</p>
<p>Yet according to a recent <a href="https://noticias.caracoltv.com/politica/elecciones-colombia/encuesta-invamer-resultados-y-analisis-5-de-diciembre-2021">survey</a>, 79% of Colombians believe the country is on the wrong track. Political parties have a collective disapproval rate of 76%, with the Colombian Congress only marginally less unpopular.</p>
<p>The successful reintegration of thousands of ex-FARC guerrillas into civil society remains one of many daunting challenges for the next Colombian government. Reintegration problems encountered by ex-combatants worldwide have <a href="https://www.igi-global.com/book/handbook-research-transitional-justice-peace/137136">included</a> a lack of educational opportunities, the absence of suitable career options and insufficient psychological support.</p>
<p>In Colombia, we have identified <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21647259.2022.2065792">three crucial aspects</a> that are challenging successful reintegration for FARC ex-combatants: a lack of participation in the civilian economy, a lack of access to educational opportunities, and a failure by the authorities to exercise “equal citizenship” that guarantees social and civic reintegration.</p>
<p>At stake is the entire future of the peace agreement, and with it, prospects for reducing poverty, inequality and other dynamics of economic exclusion. Three generations of Colombians do not know what it means to live in a peaceful society. The reintegration of ex-combatants is crucial to building a general understanding that reconciliation is key to creating a new Colombia, where violence is not the answer to overcoming your problems.</p>
<h2>‘The stigma makes it impossible to get a job’</h2>
<p>The access road to Agua Bonita is not easy. There is no public transport, and the roads are extremely precarious. The poor transport infrastructure of Caquetá in general severely hampers the <a href="http://diposit.ub.edu/dspace/bitstream/2445/125507/1/TFM-ECO_Gonz%C3%A1lez_2018.pdf">productivity of this region</a>.</p>
<p>While the camp – which operates entirely as a cooperative – has not suffered from trade boycotts, unlike some other reintegration camps, raw materials can take months to arrive here. And the twin spectres of discrimination and unemployment loom large over residents here.</p>
<p>“I have plenty of stories of people saying to me: ‘You cannot get a job because you don’t deserve it, just get out of here,’” Vega told us. “I have to fight against this stigma every day, and it is worst when I have to apply for a job because sometimes people have the wrong idea about us. I am a proud ex-combatant that just wants the peace of Colombia and a decent job!”</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466078/original/file-20220530-20-7ku22s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466078/original/file-20220530-20-7ku22s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466078/original/file-20220530-20-7ku22s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466078/original/file-20220530-20-7ku22s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466078/original/file-20220530-20-7ku22s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466078/original/file-20220530-20-7ku22s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466078/original/file-20220530-20-7ku22s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466078/original/file-20220530-20-7ku22s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Residents of Agua Bonita struggle with poor transport links and a lack of jobs. Photo: Juan Pablo Valderrama.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3XxbY31Yd1g">Daniel Aldana</a> is one of the youngest ex-combatants living in Agua Bonita. He has been trying to get a job since 2019 but, due to the extent of criminalisation and stigmatisation of ex-FARC guerrillas in the region, he said it is almost impossible for him even to secure an interview.</p>
<p>“When the employers saw my identity card had been issued in La Montañita [the nearest town to Agua Bonita], they said I needed to have a ‘special selection process’. That means they will double or triple-check with the authorities if I have a police record or if my name is on a terrorist database list. If you say you are from Agua Bonita, the people say you are a terrorist. This stigma is making it impossible to get a job here.”</p>
<p>Aldana is not alone. <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=havQkGEhXeM">Jorge Suarez</a>, a builder who spent more than 13 years as a FARC commander, recalled going for a job interview in Florencia. “It was so humiliating. ‘Assassin’, ‘murderer’ and ‘scumbag’ were just a few of the words the people at the recruitment agency used to refer to me. Never again.”</p>
<p>Suarez added: “The problem is that people don’t trust us. We have done everything to show that our intentions for a peaceful future are real, yet so far we are getting only two things back: no proper jobs, and tons of bullets.”</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/colombias-cash-for-kills-victims-could-number-10-000-civilians-96316">Colombia's 'cash-for-kills' victims could number 10,000 civilians</a>
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<p>Such experiences are not unique to ex-combatants living in Agua Bonita. Esteban Torres, a former guerrilla doing his reintegration in the <a href="https://www.reincorporacion.gov.co/es/reincorporacion/Paginas/ETCRs/AETCR_pondores.aspx">Pondores</a> camp (<a href="https://www.facebook.com/FARCGuajira/">ETCR Amaury Rodríguez</a>) in La Guajira, told us he had experienced the same negative reaction.</p>
<p>“In Riohacha City, when I was looking for a job, the people said to me: ‘Well, you look like a nice bloke, but you have blood on your hands. You will never have a job here because you have the blood of innocent people on your hands, and you are a terrorist – a disgrace.’”</p>
<p>Torres continued: “That is when you realise that this is a long-term process. We need a process to remove the stigma against us from Colombian people’s hearts.”</p>
<h2>Lessons from Northern Ireland</h2>
<p>As well as our interviews with former guerrilla soldiers in Colombia, we also conducted 12 in-depth conversations with ex-combatants in the conflict known as <a href="http://qpol.qub.ac.uk/can-there-be-an-official-history-of-the-troubles/">The Troubles</a>. Despite Northern Ireland’s <a href="https://education.niassembly.gov.uk/post_16/snapshots_of_devolution/gfa#:%7E:text=The%20Belfast%20Agreement%20is%20also,Northern%20Ireland%20should%20be%20governed.">peace agreement</a> having been in place for nearly a quarter of a century – and the country’s very different societal context – we found many of the raw grievances raised by ex-FARC combatants mirrored by these former political prisoners in Northern Ireland, all of whom asked to remain anonymous.</p>
<p>While we heard common themes expressed by loyalist and republican interviewees alike, we highlight some republican voices here as these ex-combatants were dedicated to a form of counter-state insurgency that resembled the aims of the FARC’s armed struggle against the Colombian state. </p>
<p>One former member of the Provisional Irish Republican Army, (P)IRA, spoke about his difficulties finding meaningful employment, despite the fact that he had gained educational qualifications during his time in prison. “I could only get low-level jobs. In prison I had studied so I had qualifications, but I was still only working as a kitchen porter or doorman. </p>
<p>"No one would employ an IRA guy,” he continued. “In one job, I was asked to leave because people found out about my past. They weren’t comfortable working with me any more.”</p>
<p>Another ex-(P)IRA combatant explained the complexity of simply filling out a job application form. “A job application asks: ‘Do you have a criminal record?’ If we say ‘no’ because we claim we don’t have a criminal record – we are not criminals – then we have lied and can be dis-employed, which has happened to many people. But if we say ‘yes’, then we will not get through the vetting procedure.”</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-good-friday-agreement-belongs-to-the-people-not-the-politicians-94535">The Good Friday Agreement belongs to the people, not the politicians</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21647259.2022.2065792">Our interviews</a> also highlighted a common resentment about the forms of legally structured discrimination that former combatants in Northern Ireland have experienced.</p>
<p>“We can be stopped from travelling to certain places, and certain jobs are completely off limits to us,” explained another ex-(P)IRA member. “Even our ability to spend money is restricted; we can’t purchase home insurance and car insurance. It’s an inhibitor. We can’t get business loans … It all adds up to making things more difficult for us than for everyone else.”</p>
<p>Many of our interviewees had either worked or volunteered for community-based organisations that sought to diffuse inter-community tensions in Northern Ireland, and to steer young people away from participation in violence. In general, an incredibly small number of ex-political prisoners on both sides have returned to political violence, and very few have been convicted for other forms of violent criminality. Yet despite this, the loyalist and republican ex-combatants we spoke to complained of being largely denied equality of citizenship, and still face blockages to participation in the civilian economy.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466089/original/file-20220530-22-8arffe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466089/original/file-20220530-22-8arffe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466089/original/file-20220530-22-8arffe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=362&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466089/original/file-20220530-22-8arffe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=362&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466089/original/file-20220530-22-8arffe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=362&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466089/original/file-20220530-22-8arffe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466089/original/file-20220530-22-8arffe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466089/original/file-20220530-22-8arffe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Esperanza: ‘Those of us who go to war break stereotypes set for women, so society resents us.’ Photo: Juan Pablo Valderrama.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>‘Society resents us’</h2>
<p>More than a decade ago, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zt4wNiypacE">Esperanza</a>* served as a commander and learned about equal rights as she fought side-by-side with the FARC men. But as soon as she stepped into civilian life, she told us she lost her autonomy again.</p>
<p>“Historically, this is a patriarchal culture. Those of us who go to war break traditional roles and stereotypes set for women, so society resents us. I used to give orders and command 100 armed men, and now they are expecting me to do a cooking course! What the hell?”</p>
<p>Problems highlighted by Esperanza and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xcq7IKbxOsI">Tania Gomez</a>, another female ex-combatant living in Agua Bonita, include an absence of suitable career options for women, and a lack of psychological support and understanding of their needs and interests following the war. Such concerns are leading female ex-combatants to drop out of the reintegration programmes.</p>
<p>When the Colombian Reintegration Agency offered Gomez the chance to do a sewing and childcare course, she recalled saying to the official: “Are you kidding me! After 10 years of fighting against the Colombian Army every day, you want me to open a kindergarten? I didn’t join FARC to become a substitute mother, I am a revolutionary!”</p>
<p>For female ex-combatants, after long years as a fighter, the idea of “mainstream” family life can be very unappealing. “What would my life be like in the future if I follow this path?” Esperanza asked us. “Just at home with a husband, kids and playing ‘happy house’ forever? No way! I wouldn’t last a day doing that!”</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466082/original/file-20220530-12-yzyr6z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466082/original/file-20220530-12-yzyr6z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466082/original/file-20220530-12-yzyr6z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466082/original/file-20220530-12-yzyr6z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466082/original/file-20220530-12-yzyr6z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466082/original/file-20220530-12-yzyr6z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466082/original/file-20220530-12-yzyr6z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466082/original/file-20220530-12-yzyr6z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Tania Gomez: ‘I didn’t join FARC to become a substitute mother.’ Photo: Juan Pablo Valderrama.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The reintegration process has clearly failed to achieve genuine gender inclusiveness. When we asked <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KeUS-uMXflc">Nelcy Balquiro</a> why she joined the FARC 11 years ago, she said without hesitation: “I wanted to change the world and become somebody. I wanted to be part of something important. My dream now as a civilian is to empower everyday women about their rights and fight this patriarchal system. As a female ex-FARC commander, this is now my more important <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2017/mar/27/feminists-farc-colombia-female-inequality">political mission</a>.”</p>
<p>Discussing the wave of violence that is killing ex-combatants, Balquiro countered immediately: “Nobody says anything about the murdered females – once again the spotlight is on men! Nobody is saying a word about Maria, Patricia, Luz and the other <a href="https://news.un.org/es/story/2022/01/1502572">10 women</a> who have been murdered [since the peace agreement] – it is shameful.”</p>
<p>Balquiro wants to fight for equal pay and the right to work outside the home. She argued that “feminism is a main part of being a female ex-combatant. We are fighting now for Colombian women to have freedom from abuse and male exploitation.”</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466090/original/file-20220530-24-t8etu5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466090/original/file-20220530-24-t8etu5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466090/original/file-20220530-24-t8etu5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466090/original/file-20220530-24-t8etu5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466090/original/file-20220530-24-t8etu5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466090/original/file-20220530-24-t8etu5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466090/original/file-20220530-24-t8etu5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466090/original/file-20220530-24-t8etu5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Nelcy Balquiro: ‘My dream now as a civilian is to empower everyday women about their rights.’ Photo: Juan Pablo Valderrama.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>‘We are dreaming of peace’</h2>
<p>Colombia’s outgoing leader Iván Duque will be widely remembered as a <a href="https://www.elespectador.com/mundo/america/wola-acuerdo-de-paz-no-es-debil-es-duque-quien-insiste-en-debilitarlo/">president that did nothing</a> to implement the peace agreement. Colombia’s election now offers a critical opportunity to address the problems amplified by four years of governmental neglect and lack of political will.</p>
<p>Simón* is a FARC ex-combatant living in the <a href="https://www.reincorporacion.gov.co/es/reincorporacion/Paginas/ETCRs/AETCR_la_fila.aspx">Icononzo</a> camp (ETCR <a href="https://en-gb.facebook.com/ETCR-Antonio-Nari%C3%B1o-Icononzo-Tolima-105455094848401/?ref=page_internal">Antonio Nariño</a>) in the Andean region of Tolima. “I don’t want to live in fear for another four years,” he said. </p>
<p>“The feeling that paramilitary soldiers can kill you at any moment, working in <a href="https://www.elespectador.com/colombia-20/conflicto/militares-disfrazados-de-guerrilleros-y-otras-denuncias-en-el-operativo-militar-en-putumayo/">alliance</a> with the actual government, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/apr/13/colombia-army-raid-putumayo-investigation">like what happened in Putumayo recently</a> … it’s becoming unbearable. This presidential election is the opportunity to build new roads, new ways, and leave the torturous one that we are having now.”</p>
<p>According to Esteban Torres from the <a href="https://www.reincorporacion.gov.co/es/reincorporacion/Paginas/ETCRs/AETCR_pondores.aspx">Pondores</a> camp: “The implementation of the peace process is similar to [Colombia’s traditional festival], <a href="https://www.colombia.co/en/colombia-travel/tourism-by-regions/guide-barranquilla-carnival/#:%7E:text=Barranquilla's%20carnival%20is%20the%20biggest,colorful%20celebration%20of%20Colombian%20culture.">Barranquilla’s carnival</a>. Those who live it, enjoy it – and we want to continue the party. [Our goal] is not just to stop killing each other any more in Colombia; it is about creating a new culture of peace, a new rhythm.</p>
<p>"Duque almost killed the party. He didn’t know how to dance along with people that don’t like guns and his extreme-right perspectives. He just likes the rhythms of war. But now we have the opportunity to start tuning good vibes once again and change our future as new citizens of Colombia. My hope is to restart the party!”</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466084/original/file-20220530-24-xtvg6v.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466084/original/file-20220530-24-xtvg6v.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466084/original/file-20220530-24-xtvg6v.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466084/original/file-20220530-24-xtvg6v.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466084/original/file-20220530-24-xtvg6v.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466084/original/file-20220530-24-xtvg6v.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466084/original/file-20220530-24-xtvg6v.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466084/original/file-20220530-24-xtvg6v.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Despite their struggles, the residents of Agua Bonita are still dreaming of peace. Photo: Juan Pablo Valderrama.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Over the six-decade conflict, the Colombian state helped to create and sustain an image of FARC combatants as bloodthirsty barbarians. The new government will need to take brave and imaginative steps to break down these deep-rooted conceptions. There have already been some important initiatives, such as the <a href="https://kidnappingworkshop.net/caqueta/">letter exchanges</a> between former FARC combatants and Colombian civilians. However, much more must be done if the Colombian state is to avoid the long-standing forms of discrimination still being expressed by ex-political prisoners in Northern Ireland.</p>
<p>It’s also important, in time, to remove legal barriers to equality of citizenship. Understandable measures taken in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, such as the need to carry forms of personal identification that highlight an ex-combatant’s background, need to be subject to sunset clauses – to be lifted, for example, if an individual has met certain requirements that demonstrate their dedication to peace. Similarly, criminal records directly related to participation in the conflict might also be erased once ex-combatants have demonstrated their commitment to the agreement.</p>
<p>In addition, former combatants need to feel some control over their own reintegration. Many participated in combat from a very young age, and possess few skills beyond those learned in situations of violence. Peace can be very difficult for them to navigate. This needs to be recognised and incorporated into the thinking of the Colombian peace process as it develops under the new government.</p>
<p>On the last day of our visit to Agua Bonita, we asked Olmedo Vega what his biggest wish for the future is. “From the bottom of our hearts,” he said, “it is not to leave us alone. We have suffered war, and [since then] we have grown in hope and love. We carry on our backs the historical responsibility of generating reconciliation. We are dreaming of peace.”</p>
<p><em>*Some interviewees asked only to be identified by their first names</em></p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=112&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=112&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=112&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Camilo Tamayo Gomez is a senior adviser in transitional justice for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gavin Hart does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The outcome of Colombia’s presidential election has major implications for the survival of its historic peace deal, and the prospects of former combatants who have committed to a life without conflictCamilo Tamayo Gomez, Senior Lecturer in Criminology, University of HuddersfieldGavin Hart, Lecturer in Criminology, Liverpool Hope UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1746672022-01-26T13:27:31Z2022-01-26T13:27:31ZUS has taken FARC off its terrorist list, giving insight into Biden’s foreign policy<p>The Biden administration has signaled how it will use its power to designate different groups as terrorists as part of its foreign policy efforts.</p>
<p>Secretary of State Antony Blinken <a href="https://www.state.gov/revocation-of-the-terrorist-designations-of-the-revolutionary-armed-forces-of-colombia-farc-and-additional-terrorist-designations/">took the Colombian rebel group</a> the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, known as the FARC, off the U.S. Foreign Terrorist Organizations <a href="https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/">list</a> at the end of 2021.</p>
<p>I know the importance of this decision <a href="https://www.middlebury.edu/institute/people/jason-blazakis">because I worked on adding and deleting groups</a> and individuals on <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/66206/whats-the-new-terror-financing-executive-order-all-about/">multiple lists</a>, including the Foreign Terrorist Organizations. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/442346/original/file-20220124-25-fbbazo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos shakes hands with former FARC leader Timoleon Jimenez. Both are dressed in white, and stand in front of a crowd of people also dressed in white" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/442346/original/file-20220124-25-fbbazo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/442346/original/file-20220124-25-fbbazo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442346/original/file-20220124-25-fbbazo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442346/original/file-20220124-25-fbbazo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442346/original/file-20220124-25-fbbazo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442346/original/file-20220124-25-fbbazo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442346/original/file-20220124-25-fbbazo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Former Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, left, shakes hands with former FARC leader Timoleon Jimenez after they signed the historic peace agreement in 2016.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/colombian-president-juan-manuel-santos-and-the-leader-of-the-farc-picture-id610592048?s=2048x2048">Luis Acosta/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What’s the use of terrorist lists?</h2>
<p>In 1997, the U.S. government began labeling groups as foreign terrorist organizations to highlight the threat they pose. Shortly after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, President George W. Bush signed <a href="https://www.state.gov/executive-order-13224/">Executive Order 13224</a>, expanding the State and Treasury Departments’ ability to also sanction individuals who were engaged in terrorist activity.</p>
<p>The terrorist designation process is highly complex and involves the State Department reviewing intelligence information and conducting an intensive legal review.</p>
<p>Groups and individuals are added to the State Department’s Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Executive Order 13224 lists regularly, but decisions to remove groups from these lists are less common. </p>
<p>Simply put, most terrorist groups don’t want to put down their weapons, which is the only way they’ll ever get off the U.S. lists.</p>
<p>In late 2021, the State Department added two more Colombian-based splinter terrorist groups to the lists: the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia People’s Army, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/colombia-united-states-south-america-armed-forces-revolutionary-armed-forces-of-colombia-492c423824351ff8dc1ed4bba761d200">known as FARC-EP, and Segunda Marquetalia</a>.</p>
<p>The State Department also sanctioned six senior FARC-EP and Segunda Marquetalia leaders.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/442344/original/file-20220124-19-1xf32cb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Two groups of young women stand together, looking over men securing the wooden coffins that they will lower into the ground." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/442344/original/file-20220124-19-1xf32cb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/442344/original/file-20220124-19-1xf32cb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442344/original/file-20220124-19-1xf32cb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442344/original/file-20220124-19-1xf32cb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442344/original/file-20220124-19-1xf32cb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442344/original/file-20220124-19-1xf32cb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442344/original/file-20220124-19-1xf32cb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Relatives of two men massacred by an armed group in Colombia attend the funeral in August 2020. Violence in Colombia’s countryside remains common.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/relatives-of-heine-collazos-and-esneider-collazos-two-of-the-six-men-picture-id1228201141?s=2048x2048">Luis Robayo/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Why removing the FARC makes sense</h2>
<p>The FARC was an enduring and central part of the Colombian conflict, which lasted for more than 50 years. The FARC officially ended its reign over <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/08/24/the-staggering-toll-of-colombias-war-with-farc-rebels-explained-in-numbers/">approximately 25%</a> of Colombian territory <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-36605769">in 2016</a>, when it reached a peace settlement with the Colombian government. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/26/world/americas/colombia-peace-deal-farc.html">peace agreement’s implementation</a> over the last five years has been rocky. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/27/world/americas/colombia-children-war-FARC.html?searchResultPosition=4">Thousands of FARC members</a> were unwilling to embrace the peace agreement and fought over territory and drug markets with rival groups.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/13/world/americas/colombia-massacres-protests.html">Mass killings</a> continued after the agreement. And close to <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/colombia/colombia-conflict-persists-five-years-after-peace-deal">5 million people</a> remain internally displaced because of the conflict. </p>
<p>Former FARC leaders, like Ivan Marquez, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/as-colombia-peace-accord-unravels-ex-farc-leaders-take-up-arms-to-resume-struggle/2019/08/29/e2a50bd6-ca5d-11e9-9615-8f1a32962e04_story.html">have announced</a> they will no longer follow the peace deal. </p>
<p>The Colombian government <a href="https://www.wola.org/analysis/a-long-way-to-go-implementing-colombias-peace-accord-after-five-years/">continues to implement</a> the peace agreement, which calls for investing more in rural communities — where the FARC once dominated — and people’s basic services, like clean water.</p>
<p>Yet, the decision to remove the FARC from the State Department’s FTO list made sense to me and <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/andes/colombia/092-fight-other-means-keeping-peace-colombias-farc">other experts</a> because the FARC has lived up to key elements of the peace deal. The FARC has largely <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-colombia-peace/colombias-farc-rebels-turned-in-more-than-8000-weapons-u-n-idUSKCN1AV2HN">turned in its arms</a> and made a <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/12/colombia-us-aids-peace-lifting-terrorist-label-farc">good-faith effort</a> to become part of the Colombian political system. </p>
<p>The FARC’s political party, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-colombia-farc/colombias-farc-party-changes-name-to-comunes-idUSKBN29T0SF">Comunes</a>, has had <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/andes/colombia/092-fight-other-means-keeping-peace-colombias-farc">“dismal”</a> election results in recent years, according to the think-tank organization International Crisis Group. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/442341/original/file-20220124-17-9rlslv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A soldier clad in military wear stands in front of a painted mural that says " src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/442341/original/file-20220124-17-9rlslv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/442341/original/file-20220124-17-9rlslv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442341/original/file-20220124-17-9rlslv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442341/original/file-20220124-17-9rlslv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442341/original/file-20220124-17-9rlslv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442341/original/file-20220124-17-9rlslv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442341/original/file-20220124-17-9rlslv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">While the FARC has largely adhered to the Colombian peace agreement, other splinter terrorist groups, like the FARC-EP, remain active in the country.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/soldier-stands-guard-at-a-territorial-training-and-reincorporation-picture-id1236750117?s=2048x2048">Joaquin Sarmiento/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Getting off the FTO list is complicated</h2>
<p>Today, the FTO list has <a href="https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/">more than 70 groups</a> on it. <a href="https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/">Only 15 groups</a> have been removed from the list since 1997, including the Khmer Rouge, the communist regime that ruled <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-10684399">Cambodia in the 1970s</a>.</p>
<p>Removing terrorist groups from these U.S. government blacklists is difficult.</p>
<p>Governments in countries where terrorist groups historically operate are often reluctant to support the U.S. decision to alter the list, since this can distress the civilians and government officials these groups harmed. </p>
<p>It is also difficult because the named terrorist groups often have a very bloody history. That holds true for the FARC, which <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/colombia-guerrilla-farc-death-toll-1.4771858">may be responsible</a> for more than 100,000 deaths. </p>
<p>There are a few pathways to removing a group from the FTO list. In one scenario, a terrorist group has been defeated.</p>
<p>There can be little doubt, based on my experience, that factions of Colombia’s government were upset by the U.S. decision to strike the FARC from the FTO list.</p>
<p>One of the most important policy maneuvers that can make such a political move less controversial is adding new groups and individuals from the same conflict to the blacklists.</p>
<p>Including two new Colombian groups and six individuals to the terrorist lists showed Colombia that the U.S. remains concerned about the terrorist threat landscape there. </p>
<p>When Blinken removed the FARC from the FTO and Executive Order 13224 lists on Nov. 30, 2021, <a href="https://www.state.gov/executive-order-13224/#state">he also added other Colombian-based groups and individuals</a> to the terrorist lists.</p>
<h2>Consequences to getting named on the FTO list</h2>
<p>In the U.S. system of sanctions, there are <a href="https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/">three key consequences</a> if a group is listed as a terrorist organization. </p>
<p>First, named terrorist groups are blackballed from the U.S. formal financial system, meaning their bank accounts are frozen.</p>
<p>Second, anybody who tries to do business with these groups may end up behind bars for up to two decades. </p>
<p>Third, anybody who is linked to a listed terrorist group can never set foot in the U.S. because of visa restrictions. </p>
<p>Blinken’s decision to remove the FARC from the FTO list, while simultaneously adding other groups and individuals, may signal that the Biden administration will use terrorist sanction tools in complex ways. </p>
<p>Instead of simply adding groups or individuals to the lists, the Biden team may be more willing to remove groups that have ceased violent activity in conflicts. In doing this, the Biden administration may improve the FTO list’s credibility by making it more dynamic and open to changing political climates and conflicts. It would also show there are benefits if listed terrorist groups and people engage in a political process. </p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jason M. Blazakis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The U.S. State Department rarely removes terrorist groups from its Foreign Terrorist Organizations list. Most terrorist groups, unlike the Colombian FARC, don’t want to put down their weapons.Jason M. Blazakis, Professor of Practice and Director of Center on Terrorism, Extremism, and Counterterrorism, MiddleburyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1714682021-11-18T16:33:28Z2021-11-18T16:33:28ZAnniversary of peace deals in Nepal and Colombia: Views on female ex-soldiers need to be challenged<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/432282/original/file-20211116-25-15qtbmh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5595%2C3840&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A FARC rebel holds her four-month-old daughter Manuela outside her tent at a rebel camp in a demobilization zone in La Carmelita, Colombia, in 2017.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Fernando Vergara) </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>November sees the anniversary of two peace deals — on Nov. 21, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2019.1658969">Nepal’s agreement reaches its 15th anniversary</a> and on Nov. 24, Colombia commemorates its <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2021/sc14579.doc.htm">fifth anniversary of the La Havana Peace Deal</a>. In both armed conflicts, women actively participated in combatant roles, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2019/aug/03/brave-confrontations-its-time-writers-broke-the-taboo-of-the-female-warrior">challenging gender norms</a>. But what are female ex-combatants experiences when they return to civilian society? </p>
<p>The number of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100500180253">women joining armed groups</a> has grown significantly recently. Research shows that <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/14616742.2015.1007729">some of the armed groups’ ideologies</a> (egalitarian, liberation, equality and justice) resonate with <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/14616742.2018.1521296">women’s personal aspirations</a>, motivating them to participate. </p>
<p>In leftist insurgencies, women are often offered critical roles, such as holding guns, conducting military attacks or commanding troops, typically considered men’s roles. When female militants take up arms, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/2347797017710743">it challenges gender roles</a> for both ex-combatants and non-combatant women. </p>
<p>Despite this, they experience <a href="https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137516565">social and political setbacks during the transition to peace</a>. Our research in Nepal and Colombia looks at female ex-combatants’ reintegration in post-war contexts. </p>
<h2>Female ex-combatants’ reintegration in Nepal and Colombia</h2>
<p>Reintegration starts after <a href="https://unitar.org/sustainable-development-goals/peace/our-portfolio/disarmament-demobilization-and-reintegration">disarmament and demobilization</a>: it is a final and crucial stage where combatants transit to non-combatants and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0307883318000548">“re-embody” civilian values and norms</a>. </p>
<p>Nepal and Colombia have experienced armed conflicts rooted in inequalities and poverty. Nepal <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/14616742.2018.1521296">faced a decade of civil war (1996-2006)</a> as Maoist rebels sought to end 240 years of monarchy and establish a democratic republic.</p>
<p>Born as a self-defence peasant group, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470674871.wbespm281">the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)</a> was fighting against the state for almost 60 years. After five years of negotiations, the FARC signed <a href="https://www.jep.gov.co/Marco%20Normativo/Normativa_v2/01%20ACUERDOS/Texto-Nuevo-Acuerdo-Final.pdf?csf=1&e=0fpYA0">a peace agreement in La Havana</a> on Nov. 24, 2016. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Men wearing white applaud and shake hands." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/432059/original/file-20211115-21-zlxpx0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/432059/original/file-20211115-21-zlxpx0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/432059/original/file-20211115-21-zlxpx0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/432059/original/file-20211115-21-zlxpx0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/432059/original/file-20211115-21-zlxpx0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/432059/original/file-20211115-21-zlxpx0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/432059/original/file-20211115-21-zlxpx0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Humberto de La Calle, right, head of Colombia’s government peace negotiation team shakes hands with Ivan Marquez, chief negotiator of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia after signing a peace agreement in Havana, Cuba, on Aug. 24, 2016.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Ramon Espinosa)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Both groups aimed at ending oppressive structures. The Maoists’ war had a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0921374004047750">strong emancipation agenda</a>. The FARC mobilized its ideology in defence of the poor and advocated for the inclusion of women as combatants. Estimates suggest that women made up <a href="https://portal.research.lu.se/en/publications/disembodying-combat-female-combatants-political-reintegration-in-">30–40 per cent in both insurgencies</a>.</p>
<p>Nepal’s reintegration process started in 2006, and concluded in 2012. In Colombia, the FARC <a href="https://news.un.org/es/story/2017/06/1381501">surrendered all weapons to the UN Mission of Verification in June 2017</a>, reintegration is ongoing.</p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2019.1658969">Reintegration is a gendered phenomenon</a> — women, men and LGBTQ+ people experience it differently. In fact, research on gender and disarmament and demobilization offers several findings, two of which we want to highlight for their importance.</p>
<p>First, disarmament and demobilization programs are <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228475893_Girls_in_fighting_forces_in_Northern_Uganda_Sierra_Leone_and_Mozambique_Policy_and_program_recommendations">gender blind “one size fits all” policy</a> that fails to consider the diverse needs of ex-combatants. Second, female ex-combatants are <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/14616742.2018.1521296">accepted in wartime and neglected post-war</a>. </p>
<h2>Unkept promises?</h2>
<p>In Nepal’s and Colombia’s armed conflicts, <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/352488155_Disembodying_Combat_Female_Combatants'_Political_Reintegration_in_Nepal_and_Colombia">female ex-combatants fulfilled roles equal to men</a>. They were combatants, doctors, nurses, strategists, planners and political activists. Despite this, inclusive reintegration and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/26/world/americas/colombia-peace-deal-farc.html">promises of transforming gender inequalities remain elusive</a>. </p>
<p>Nepal’s reintegration program was gender blind and entailed false promises. For example, one of the reintegration programs was to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2019.1658969">integrate Maoist ex-combatants into the Nepali Army</a>. Many mothers wanted to opt for this program, but couldn’t participate in the interview process because of care work and difficulties travelling with children. Reintegration policy neglects systematic barriers that work against women and penalizes them. </p>
<p>In order to avoid “<a href="http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/72865/">trading weapons for cooking pots</a>,” Colombian female ex-FARC have been exchanging knowledge with ex-combatants in other countries. They have been able promote gender equality in many central aspects of reintegration: land access, women’s political participation and “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/14616742.2020.1768879">gender-specific psychosocial support</a>.” They have also proposed their own feminist agenda, with “<a href="https://www.huffpost.com/archive/qc/entry/vers-un-feminisme-insurge-la-mobilisation-politique-des-farianas_a_23420320">insurgent feminism</a>.” </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A group of women walk down the street carrying flowers." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/432061/original/file-20211115-17-pchi6a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/432061/original/file-20211115-17-pchi6a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/432061/original/file-20211115-17-pchi6a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/432061/original/file-20211115-17-pchi6a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/432061/original/file-20211115-17-pchi6a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/432061/original/file-20211115-17-pchi6a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/432061/original/file-20211115-17-pchi6a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Relatives and friends of slain Astrid Conde, a former rebel of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, arrive to the cemetery for her funeral in Bogota, Colombia, in March 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Ivan Valencia)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Now, five years after La Havana, much of this work has been diminished. While some women have been able to participate in politics, gain new skills and educational training, <a href="https://uwaterloo.ca/defence-security-foresight-group/sites/ca.defence-security-foresight-group/files/uploads/files/dsfg_wiis-c_anctil_avoine_wp_june_10_2021_1.pdf">many others have experienced depoliticization and increasing individualization</a>. Some admit to not feeling reintegrated.</p>
<h2>Women in post-war settings</h2>
<p>Female ex-combatants’ reintegration illustrates that women are visible during war and invisible during peace. In many cases, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2019.1658969">they face “triple” rejections: by their families and communities, political party and government</a>.</p>
<p>The Nepal and Colombia peace agreements do not address female ex-combatants’ particular needs and fail to transform structural gendered inequalities. Gender, class, race, caste and ethnic-based discrimination are still widespread. </p>
<p>In both countries, many <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/14616742.2018.1521296">women joined violent armed conflict because they desired to live just and equal lives</a> — they believed war could bring that change. </p>
<p>Despite progress on gender equality in both countries after signing the peace agreements, female ex-combatants are often left out.</p>
<p>In Colombia, our research shows an increase in gender-based violence among ex-combatants, even though female ex-FARC have proposed an <a href="https://partidofarc.com.co/farc/download/estrategia-intergral-para-la-reincorporacion-de-las-mujeres-de-farc/">extensive plan for their reintegration</a>.</p>
<p>Many are caught between their willingness to participate politically and their fear of <a href="https://uwaterloo.ca/defence-security-foresight-group/sites/ca.defence-security-foresight-group/files/uploads/files/dsfg_wiis-c_anctil_avoine_wp_june_10_2021_1.pdf">re-embodying gender norms</a> they believe comes with reintegration. </p>
<h2>What should be done?</h2>
<p>We propose five recommendations for gender-inclusive reintegration:</p>
<ol>
<li><p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/14616742.2020.1734043">Women’s political agency post-war</a> needs to be considered. The <a href="https://doi.org/10.46692/9781529207774.005">multiple facets of their political engagement</a> should be assessed as well as how their skills learned during conflict can contribute to gender equity in peacebuilding. This means not erasing their insurgent identities but how those identities can be transformed. </p></li>
<li><p>Reintegration programs should implement long-term action plans that provide women with sustained financial, health, education and psychological support. More work is necessary to establish solidarity and political connectedness between female ex-combatants and non-combatants to ensure post-war benefits for all.</p></li>
<li><p>The reintegration program should assess the diversity of experiences of female ex-combatants and pinpoint a variety of responses concerning their political and economic participation after war. </p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://uwaterloo.ca/defence-security-foresight-group/sites/ca.defence-security-foresight-group/files/uploads/files/dsfg_wiis-c_anctil_avoine_wp_june_10_2021_1.pdf">Views on female ex-combatants</a> should be challenged: highlighting the difference between <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/ijtj/ijab006">civil and military or victims and perpetrator have proven to reaffirm stigma</a> of female ex-combatants and don’t favour their return to civil society. </p></li>
<li><p>We recommend <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/352488155_Disembodying_Combat_Female_Combatants'_Political_Reintegration_in_Nepal_and_Colombia?">diversifying reintegration programs</a>. Reintegration should account for the intersections of gender, race and class. It should also consider the intersections of geopolitics, embodiment and emotions in female ex-combatants’ transition to civilian society.</p></li>
</ol><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/171468/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>This work in Nepal was supported by Nuffice, The Dutch Organization for International Studies/NFP-PhD-CF8771/2013.
Luna KC works at the Research Network-Women Peace Security (McGill University), funded by the Government of Canada Mobilizing Insights in Defence and Security (MINDS) program.
</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Priscyll Anctil Avoine receives funding from the Vinnova/Marie Curie Seal of Excellence Fellowship. She is affiliated with Fundación Lüvo, a feminist NGO.</span></em></p>Reintegration is a gendered phenomenon — women, men and LGBTQ+ people experience it differently.Luna K.C., Postdoctoral Researcher, Women, Peace and Security at the Centre for International Peace and Security, Max Bell School of Public Policy, McGill UniversityPriscyll Anctil Avoine, Vinnova/Marie Curie Fellow - Researcher in Feminist Security Studies, Lund UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1543152021-02-15T16:06:34Z2021-02-15T16:06:34ZColombia’s fragile peace deal threatened by the return of mass killings<p><a href="https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-55806414">The murder of five students</a> at a farm in Buga, in south-western Colombia, on January 24 highlights the fragility of the 2016 peace deal which brought to an end more than five decades of civil conflict between successive governments and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). </p>
<p>January 2021 was the most violent month since the peace deal was signed, with 12 mass killings and total of 45 people murdered, <a href="http://www.indepaz.org.co/informe-de-masacres-en-colombia-durante-el-2020/">according to the Colombian NGO INDEPAZ</a>. The <a href="https://colombia.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/english_version_20_enero_2021_informesg_dic2020.pdf">United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/02/10/left-undefended/killings-rights-defenders-colombias-remote-communities">Human Rights Watch</a> have recorded the deaths of 261 FARC ex-combatants and more than 400 human rights defenders and social leaders since 2016. </p>
<p>Colombia’s savage civil war between the central government and members of the left-wing FARC militia finally came to an end in November 2016 after years of negotiation. An initial referendum on the deal on October 2 was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/02/colombia-referendum-rejects-peace-deal-with-farc">rejected by 50.2%</a> of voters, but after further negotiation, an amended peace deal was finally signed at the Colón Theatre in Bogotá <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/24/colombia-signs-historic-peace-deal-with-farc-rebels">on November 24</a>, and ratified by Colombia’s Congress on November 30. This date officially marks the end of the armed conflict in Colombia.</p>
<p>Álvaro Daza was one of many local community leaders who watched on television as the peace deal was signed. As a president of the Community Action Board Organisation (JAC) of the small town of El Vado in the Department of Cauca, south-western Colombia – and as a resident of one of the regions <a href="http://centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/descargas/informes2016/basta-ya-ingles/BASTA-YA-ingles.pdf">most heavily affected</a> by the armed conflict – he was feeling extremely optimistic about the future. As he told members of JAC that day: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The peace agreement is an opportunity to help us as a community to ‘move on’ from past human rights abuses and turn the page of violence. Our victims will have peace on the day that we can reach justice. This is the best way to honour our dead. But to achieve reconciliation we need to promote sustainable development and peaceful coexistence across Colombia. This is our responsibility as social leaders. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>On April 29 2020, two armed men – <a href="https://www.elespectador.com/colombia2020/territorio/masacre-en-mercaderes-lideres-sociales-en-medio-de-guerrilla-y-paramilitares-articulo-917381/">allegedly former FARC fighters</a> – murdered Daza at his home in El Vado, along with his wife, son and granddaughter. A few months later, on October 30, <a href="https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/dos-masacres-en-la-misma-casa-asi-exterminaron-a-la-familia-de-lider-social-en-cauca/202018/">unidentified armed men</a> invaded the same house and killed his sister, brother-in-law and nephew. </p>
<p>The Colombian police <a href="https://www.france24.com/es/am%C3%A9rica-latina/20201101-colombia-masacre-lider-social-familia">said at the time</a> that these murders were the work of illegal armed groups who saw the entire Daza family as an obstacle to achieving control of the region. But a report from Human Rights Watch said that the massacres occurred with <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/02/10/left-undefended/killings-rights-defenders-colombias-remote-communities">the complicity and inaction</a> of state forces that operate in south-western Colombia.</p>
<p>The Daza family’s case is far from unique. Across the region, former paramilitary groups, drug trafficking organisations and former FARC militia members are using massacres as a way to resolve disputes. These mainly take place in territory previously controlled by FARC where there is competition to dominate drug trafficking and illegal mining and there is little in the way of <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UBgwjJKfxRA&t=3s">government support</a> to implement the peace agreement. </p>
<p>Massacres have been used strategically for decades in Colombia as a means to spread fear and terror. According to the <a href="http://centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/descargas/informes2016/basta-ya-ingles/BASTA-YA-ingles.pdf">National Centre for Historical Memory of Colombia</a>, there were more than 1,982 massacres of civilians between 1980 and 2012. In 2020 alone, <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/12/1080082">the UN</a> and Colombian NGO <a href="https://www.elespectador.com/colombia2020/pais/un-ano-marcado-por-las-masacres/">INDEPAZ</a> recorded that 375 people died in 89 massacres (the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/crimes-against-humanity.shtml">UN defines a massacre</a> as the killing of three or more people at one time). </p>
<h2>Massacres as a method of violence</h2>
<p>My <a href="https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7576-7562">research suggests</a> there are two main reasons for the resurgence of massacres in Colombia. First, the 2016 deal set in place various mechanisms to achieve peace, including reconciliation and truth and justice investigations. These are a serious threat to illegal organisations in post-conflict Colombia, and criminal groups are using mass killings to <a href="https://centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/el-salado-esa-guerra-no-era-nuestra/">let civilians know</a> about the high cost of supporting the peace agreement. </p>
<p>Second, massacres – especially during long-term armed conflicts – tend to contribute to a culture of the <a href="https://www.redalyc.org/pdf/557/55703508.pdf">“theatricalisation” of violence</a>. Dismemberment and mutilation of victims – in these cases mainly human rights defenders and community leaders – send powerful messages of humiliation and work to dehumanise the opponents of the perpetrators. In post-conflict Colombia, the massacred bodies of human rights defenders and social leaders <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/es/2020/09/13/espanol/america-latina/colombia-protestas-masacres.html">are often used as trophies</a> by the groups that have rejected the peace deal. </p>
<p>The resurgence of massacres is the most critical challenge currently facing Colombia. The country’s president, Iván Duque, who was elected in June 2018, came to power with the promise that he would renegotiate what he described as a <a href="https://theconversation.com/colombia-elects-a-conservative-who-promises-to-correct-its-peace-accord-98273">“lenient” peace deal</a>, but also pledged not to “tear the agreement to shreds”.</p>
<p>But his government is in denial, referring euphemistically to “<a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/democraciaabierta/colombia-massacres-august/">multiple homicides</a>” rather than “massacres” and blaming the peace agreement and the <a href="https://www.eltiempo.com/politica/proceso-de-paz/analista-dice-que-duque-no-debe-culpar-a-santos-de-masacres-sino-evitar-que-sigan-ocurriendo-533982">previous administration</a> for what Duque sees as the deal’s shortcomings.</p>
<p>Despite <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/12/1080082">calls from the UN</a> for the Colombian government to take action to protect civilians, critics say that the government is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/oct/08/colombia-activists-murder-amnesty-international">not doing anything concrete</a> to provide a solution to the violence. </p>
<p>The impact of massacres on the implementation of the peace agreement is colossal. Peacebuilding is a lengthy process requiring long-term engagement and commitment from a diverse range of people and institutions. Community leaders and human rights defenders play a key role in representing the interests of ordinary people during the implementation of the peace deal and are vital in the fabric of social life after the war. </p>
<p>But these are the people being murdered in large numbers. If the Colombian government continues in denial like it has been, the 2016 peace agreement is under severe threat.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/154315/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Senior Adviser in Transitional Justice for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) appointed to Colombia's Truth and Reconciliation Commission </span></em></p>Despite a landmark deal in 2016 which brought an end to five decades of conflict, an upsurge in mass killings is threatening peace in Colombia.Camilo Tamayo Gomez, Senior Lecturer in Criminology and Security Studies, Birmingham City UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1440182020-08-12T12:21:28Z2020-08-12T12:21:28ZWhat the coronavirus pandemic looks like for Colombia’s former FARC fighters<p>Communities all over the world are trying to manage the coronavirus crisis, with varying amounts of support from governments. We contacted people who used to fight in the guerrilla movement The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC-EP), to see how they were coping. </p>
<p>These men and women often live communally in remote rural areas of Colombia and their complex relationships with other communities and the government have made pandemic life difficult.</p>
<p>The Colombian government signed a peace deal with the FARC-EP in 2016. Now, more than <a href="http://www.reincorporacion.gov.co/en/agency/ARN%20Process%20Figures/ARN%20process%20figures%20february%202020.pdf">13,000</a> former combatants live as civilians. Some have taken a collective path, entering civilian life as communities. Others have gone it alone, starting their own businesses, entering the job market or returning to their families.</p>
<p>In March 2020, when the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-colombia/colombia-confirms-its-first-case-of-coronavirus-idUSKBN20T2QQ">first case</a> of COVID-19 was registered in Colombia, more than <a href="https://colombia.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/en_n2007152.pdf">one-quarter</a> of ex-combatants were still living in the special territorial areas that were set up in 2017 to help reincorporate them into the civilian population. </p>
<p>Others had moved mainly to rural areas, where many ex-combatants also <a href="https://colombia.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/n2015182.pdf">live in groups</a>, outside formal territorial areas. Ex-combatants in these rural areas are facing particular challenges <a href="https://minsalud.maps.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/e18894fa4dd546d094e8267179562413">during the pandemic</a>. When we asked leading figures what was happening, many said that, like most of us, they did not understand what was going on at first. One man from a group in Guaviare Department in the southern central region of Colombia explained:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>For ex-combatants it is a very new subject, we had no experience in handling it, there was misinformation and fear in the collective, which we gradually clarified.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But, given their history of living in collectives, and their current circumstances, many felt they had a responsibility to address the situation as a group. Everyone we spoke to was monitoring the news and government guidance. They discussed the situation with other ex-combatants, both in different areas and in their own collectives. They have also been holding virtual meetings with government representatives and organisations involved in the peace process and received guidance from the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/08/30/the-farc-just-became-a-colombian-political-party-heres-why-elections-are-critical-to-a-lasting-peace/">FARC political party</a>. </p>
<p>Community meetings are held periodically in areas where ex-combatants live together to address the challenges they face in their <a href="https://www.ssrc.org/publications/view/the-farc-s-collective-reincorporation-project-its-impact-on-colombia-s-ddr/#:%7E:text=It%20argues%20that%20the%20FARC%27s,in%20the%20national%20and%20local">communal</a> way of life. These have been used to agree collective measures to manage the spread of COVID-19. </p>
<p>To comply with <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-colombia-quarantin/colombia-to-hold-19-day-quarantine-to-fight-coronavirus-idUSKBN218068">national</a> and <a href="https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/decretan-toque-de-queda-en-meta-como-medida-contra-el-coronavirus-473586">local</a> government measures, communities adopted hand washing and social distancing. They also banned mass meetings, put limitations on entry and exit from their areas and restricted residents’ movements. They even formed community guards to impose overnight road closures so that COVID-19 wouldn’t be brought in or carried out. As one leader of an ex-combatant community explained:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We formed the guard to prevent unknown people from entering and bringing the virus and to prepare food for those who need care in the community.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>However, rural underdevelopment and ongoing armed conflict make it extra difficult for former fighters to react to the pandemic. Everyone we spoke to highlighted problems with the health system and the limited support they received from government institutions that are particularly weak in their remote rural areas. </p>
<p>Those living in groups in these settings are struggling with <a href="https://colombia.unmissions.org/en/how-quarantine-experienced-former-territorial-areas-training-and-reintegration?fbclid=IwAR1J_tsLYAUAlhhKSlfVd0SpXAkKqrPmWqjb4OXwKLGfLPCW7z9HV1-amec">poor sanitary conditions</a> and few health services. The Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization (ARN) has distributed <a href="http://www.reincorporacion.gov.co/en/News/Lists/News/view%20news.aspx?ID=13">food aid and cleaning and disinfection kits</a>, among other forms of support. But many communities still lack basic infrastructure, such as handwashing facilities, that could help prevent the spread of COVID-19.</p>
<p>As an ex-combatant in Tolima Department in the centre-west of the country told us:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>No institution has come to provide us with health support, the economy. Practically, the reincorporated [ex-combatants] and peasants have defended ourselves with what we produce on the farm, [this is how] we survive.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Meanwhile, armed groups have continued to clash over control for territories in Colombia. Some of these armed groups have imposed <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/07/15/colombia-armed-groups-brutal-covid-19-measures">brutal COVID-19 measures</a> in their territories, including curfews. They threaten and even reportedly kill those who don’t comply. The problem is especially pronounced in the rural areas and regions that are central to illicit economies, such as coca production. </p>
<p>Violence against ex-combatants and social leaders promoting the peace process has continued <a href="https://justiceforcolombia.org/news/farc-member-murdered-in-antioquia-is-22nd-victim-so-far-this-year/">unabated</a>.</p>
<p>Ex-combatants told us that they have avoided going out alone at night or to unknown places. Doing so is now even more dangerous than it was before pandemic because there are fewer people around. Some <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/05/07/in-colombia-pandemic-heightens-risks-for-women-social-leaders-pub-81736">women have reported</a> being targeted by armed groups while complying with quarantine measures at <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/06/lideres-sociales-nos-siguen-matando-durante-cuarentena/">home</a>.</p>
<p>Many ex-combatant communities have increased collective security measures in response to these threats as well as the pandemic. But those living in cities have not had the same access to collective support. Many don’t live in groups and have relied on their families and government assistance. The ARN, which follows ex-combatants as they reintegrate into civilian life, is trying to communicate with these people. </p>
<p>As one former fighter in the capital, Bogotá, told us: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Problems are usually resolved alone or with family in cities…support among former guerrillas has been more difficult…We have faced [the pandemic] as a family … [and] have been in contact with ARN officials, who have individually called all ex-combatants.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>For all ex-combatants we spoke to, there was a sense of uncertainty about how they could remain safe during the pandemic and how they can earn a living. As one summarised the situation:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The most serious problem is economic, the ex-combatants’ ability to go out to work … illegal groups and crime remain in the territory, so security problems remain.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>While the work of implementing Colombia’s peace agreement has <a href="https://colombia.unmissions.org/en/statement-special-representative-secretary-general-mr-carlos-ruiz-massieu-united-nations-security-2">continued</a> virtually during the pandemic, these particular challenges faced by former FARC-EP members could put a strain on the peace process by undermining the trust in the government’s ability to support and protect.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/144018/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anastasia Shesterinina does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Interviews with former fighters show the pandemic is putting a fragile peace process under strain.Anastasia Shesterinina, Lecturer in Politics/International Politics, University of SheffieldLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1323092020-04-10T12:15:02Z2020-04-10T12:15:02ZColombia hopes for ‘humanitarian’ ceasefire during coronavirus as violence resurges<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/326938/original/file-20200409-184019-qhp3n7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=4%2C13%2C2995%2C2082&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Colombian soldiers patrol the streets of Bogota on March 30, 2020, during a mandatory national quarantine. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/soldiers-wearing-face-masks-patrol-the-streets-of-bogota-on-news-photo/1208678250?adppopup=true">GUILLERMO MUNOZ/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Colombia’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-37477202">2016 peace accord</a> was meant to end a half century of conflict with the Marxist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC. </p>
<p>Yet some areas previously dominated by the FARC guerrillas are seeing <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/colombia/2019-10-30/slow-death-colombias-peace-deal">unintended consequences</a> of that agreement, including a turf war between other armed groups. Colombian <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/andes/colombia/63-colombias-armed-groups-battle-spoils-peace">paramilitaries, drug traffickers and rebel groups</a> are now fighting for control over what was once FARC territory. </p>
<p>One result of renewed violence in Colombia is that humanitarian aid groups are less able to reach conflict-affected communities that have long depended on their services, according to <a href="https://www.shaunangillooly.com/research">my research</a> on the Colombian peace process. </p>
<p>Such international assistance is more critical than ever as coronavirus spreads <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-colombia-trfn/colombia-reports-first-coronavirus-cases-among-indigenous-people-idUSKBN21J3QJ">across the South American country</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/326957/original/file-20200409-165427-17f1rfm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/326957/original/file-20200409-165427-17f1rfm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/326957/original/file-20200409-165427-17f1rfm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/326957/original/file-20200409-165427-17f1rfm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/326957/original/file-20200409-165427-17f1rfm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/326957/original/file-20200409-165427-17f1rfm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/326957/original/file-20200409-165427-17f1rfm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/326957/original/file-20200409-165427-17f1rfm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">People in the city of Cali on their balconies during Colombia’s national coronavirus lockdown, April 6, 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-are-seen-on-the-balconies-for-their-apartments-in-news-photo/1209322616?adppopup=true">LUIS ROBAYO/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Unintended consequences of ‘peace’</h2>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/violence-climbs-in-colombia-as-president-chips-away-at-landmark-peace-deal-with-farc-guerrillas-115112">Colombia’s 2016 peace deal</a> with the FARC was far-reaching. To meet the guerrillas’ demands, the government promised land reform, economic development and political inclusion of the rural areas controlled by the FARC. </p>
<p>Three years later, implementation of these ambitious agreements remains <a href="https://theconversation.com/colombias-peace-process-under-stress-6-essential-reads-122696">slow, underfunded and incomplete</a>. Repeating a situation <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/rebelocracy/67B0396DABAA4AE1C988A2DA3FBAC425">documented in other post-conflict zones</a>, the government’s lack of presence and control in previously FARC-dominated regions has left a power vacuum for other armed groups to contest the territory.</p>
<p>Violence is particularly high in Colombia’s Pacific coast area, which is <a href="https://propacifico.org/en/about-us/region-pacifico/">predominantly black and indigenous</a>, and is among <a href="https://colombiareports.com/colombia-poverty-inequality-statistics/">Colombia’s most socially and economically marginalized</a> regions. But it is <a href="https://revistas.uniandes.edu.co/doi/full/10.7440/colombiaint93.2018.01">rich in resources like gold and coca</a>, the traditional Andean crop used to make cocaine – both lucrative income sources which help fund the illegal activities of armed groups.</p>
<p>Poverty rates reach 59% in some areas of the Colombian Pacific, <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/andes/colombia/076-calming-restless-pacific-violence-and-crime-colombias-coast">compared to a 27% national average</a>. The most recent census shows that up to 70% of people in parts the Pacific have <a href="https://www.dane.gov.co/files/censos/resultados/NBI_total_municipios_30_Jun_2011.pdf">insufficient access to potable water, food and housing</a>. </p>
<p>As a result, many households, businesses, farms and community projects in Colombia’s Pacific region rely on humanitarian assistance and development aid. </p>
<p>This year Colombia <a href="https://colombiareports.com/us-aid-to-colombia-will-grow-to-448-million-in-2020-largest-amount-in-9-years/">is slated to receive US$448 million in total aid from United States</a>. The <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/echo/where/latin-america-caribbean/colombia_en">European Union</a> and <a href="http://www.pasocial.org/quienes-somos/planeacion-estrategica/vision-y-mision">Catholic Church</a> also provide substantial humanitarian aid to the country. </p>
<p>But the recent <a href="https://colombiareports.com/colombia-illegal-armed-groups-maps/">proliferation of criminal groups</a> is making it very difficult for humanitarian groups to do their work. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/327043/original/file-20200409-88785-1m9ueh4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/327043/original/file-20200409-88785-1m9ueh4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/327043/original/file-20200409-88785-1m9ueh4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/327043/original/file-20200409-88785-1m9ueh4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/327043/original/file-20200409-88785-1m9ueh4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/327043/original/file-20200409-88785-1m9ueh4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/327043/original/file-20200409-88785-1m9ueh4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/327043/original/file-20200409-88785-1m9ueh4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Colombians from the Wounaan indigenous group before a medical checkup on the European Union-supported hospital ship ‘San Raffaele,’ Choco department, Colombia, April 24, 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/colombian-native-of-the-wounaan-ethnic-group-yenny-cardena-news-photo/1142482048?adppopup=true">RAUL ARBOLEDA/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>‘We don’t know who’s in charge’</h2>
<p>Before the 2016 peace deal, “we knew who to negotiate with,” a representative of an aid group based in the city of Cali, told me. </p>
<p>The aid worker, who like all participants in my research must remain anonymous for safety and ethics reasons, said his staff used to negotiate with the local FARC or paramilitary bloc commander to ensure safe passage for their aid supplies.</p>
<p>“Now we can’t do that,” he said, “because we don’t know who’s in charge.” </p>
<p>There was a <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/farc-drops-its-weapons-but-colombias-deadly-conflict-goes-on">brief honeymoon period of reduced violence</a> following the 2016 peace accord, an aid worker from a different humanitarian group told me. Now, he said, while aid is still getting to some high-need urban communities in Colombia’s Pacific region, remote areas are increasingly hard to access.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/326952/original/file-20200409-130026-1xgyubx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/326952/original/file-20200409-130026-1xgyubx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/326952/original/file-20200409-130026-1xgyubx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/326952/original/file-20200409-130026-1xgyubx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/326952/original/file-20200409-130026-1xgyubx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/326952/original/file-20200409-130026-1xgyubx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/326952/original/file-20200409-130026-1xgyubx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/326952/original/file-20200409-130026-1xgyubx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Members of the National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrillas, during a training in El Choco, Colombia, May 26, 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/members-of-the-ernesto-che-guevara-front-belonging-to-the-news-photo/1150406235?adppopup=true">RAUL ARBOLEDA/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>“Armed groups often check the cars or boats that pass through their territory,” he said. “So, if you have aid materials with you, it can be complicated, depending on who’s in charge that day.” </p>
<p>Sometimes, he told me, their deliveries of supplies like textbooks, medical supplies, seeds and fertilizer are let through without problem. Other times, local paramilitaries or rebel groups seize the supplies and threaten the humanitarian workers. </p>
<h2>COVID-19 and human rights</h2>
<p>Violence is also complicating Colombia’s response to the global coronavirus pandemic.</p>
<p>Colombia, which <a href="https://colombia.as.com/colombia/2020/04/03/tikitakas/1585913081_594581.html">passed the 1,000 COVID-19 case mark</a> in early April, has been proactive in its efforts to contain the virus. The country is under a nationally mandated quarantine until at least April 13.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/326964/original/file-20200409-59613-1bhospp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/326964/original/file-20200409-59613-1bhospp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/326964/original/file-20200409-59613-1bhospp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/326964/original/file-20200409-59613-1bhospp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/326964/original/file-20200409-59613-1bhospp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/326964/original/file-20200409-59613-1bhospp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/326964/original/file-20200409-59613-1bhospp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/326964/original/file-20200409-59613-1bhospp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Colombian soldiers deliver food to low-income residents under lockdown in the city of Cali, March 26, 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/colombian-soldier-wearing-a-face-mask-delivers-food-to-low-news-photo/1208288900?adppopup=true">LUIS ROBAYO/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>That hasn’t kept Colombia’s armed groups at home. As the country prepared for quarantine the week of March 23, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/23/colombian-groups-exploiting-coronavirus-lockdown-to-kill-activists">three community leaders</a> were killed. The murders are part of a wave of violence against Colombian community organizers who have <a href="https://thebogotapost.com/colombian-strikes-hold-up-country/21882/">led protests and strikes by indigenous and peasant communities to demand</a> the social and economic justice initiatives promised in the peace deal. </p>
<p>An estimated <a href="https://colombiapeace.org/numbers/">600 to 900 activists</a> have been murdered in Colombia since 2016. </p>
<h2>An uncertain future for peace</h2>
<p>Following the United Nations’ appeal on March 24 for a global ceasefire while the coronavirus crisis lasts, the ELN – Colombia’s largest active guerrilla group – declared a monthlong <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-52090169">ceasefire</a> as a “humanitarian gesture.” So far, other armed groups have not <a href="https://colombiapeace.org/">heeded the call</a>.</p>
<p>Humanitarian workers worry that aid to the country <a href="http://northafricapost.com/39417-eu-to-redirect-e450-mln-to-support-moroccos-response-to-covid-19.html">may start to dry up</a> with supplies from the U.S. and Europe being redirected to their domestic coronavirus response. </p>
<p>“As different countries around the world close their borders and brace themselves for COVID-19, we expect to see a huge decrease in the level of international aid we’ll receive,” a Colombian government member who works in international cooperation and humanitarian projects told me. </p>
<p>In the meantime, the violence indirectly caused by the 2016 peace accords continues in Colombia, complicated by the arrival of COVID-19. </p>
<p>[<em>You need to understand the coronavirus pandemic, and we can help.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=upper-coronavirus-help">Read The Conversation’s newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/132309/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shauna N Gillooly receives funding from the Fulbright Hays Program, which is funded by the US Department of Education.</span></em></p>A nationally mandated quarantine isn’t keeping Colombia’s armed groups at home. Despite calls for a ceasefire, they are still killing activists, threatening humanitarian workers and seizing aid.Shauna N Gillooly, PhD Candidate, Political Science, University of California, IrvineLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1317552020-02-26T14:02:02Z2020-02-26T14:02:02ZA guerrilla-to-entrepreneur plan in Colombia leaves some new businesswomen isolated and at risk<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/316500/original/file-20200220-92558-1b3ifsx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4003%2C2669&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">More than 2,000 women were processed through demobilization camps in Colombia as the government transitions disarmed FARC guerrillas back into civilian life, Jan. 18, 2017. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/guerrilla-fighters-seen-during-a-line-up-inside-a-news-photo/641252372?adppopup=true">Kaveh Kazemi/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Women made up nearly a quarter of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/getting-to-yes-in-colombia-what-it-would-take-to-reintegrate-the-farc-66710">13,000 guerrilla fighters</a> disarmed by Colombia’s 2016 peace accord with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, <a href="https://theconversation.com/colombian-guerrillas-disarm-starting-their-risky-return-to-civilian-life-73947">or FARC</a>. Though implementation has been <a href="http://theconversation.com/violence-climbs-in-colombia-as-president-chips-away-at-landmark-peace-deal-with-farc-guerrillas-115112">halting</a>, the landmark peace deal officially ended Colombia’s 52-year armed conflict with this Marxist rebel group. </p>
<p>But even before the peace deal more than 19,000 fighters – including thousands of women – had <a href="http://www.reincorporacion.gov.co/es/agencia/Documentos%20de%20ARN%20en%20Cifras/ARN%20en%20cifras%20corte%20septiembre%202019.pdf">abandoned different Colombian guerrilla and paramilitary groups</a>, voluntarily or after being captured by the army. </p>
<p>In exchange for disarming, Colombia offered this first group of ex-combatants training in accounting, stock management, market analysis, development of business plans and US$2,300 – roughly eight months of <a href="https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=RMW">minimum wage earnings</a> – to <a href="https://www.reincorporacion.gov.co/es/la-reintegracion/centro-de-documentacion/Documentos/Documento%20Conpes%203554%20l%20Pol%C3%ADtica%20nacional%20de%20reintegraci%C3%B3n%20social%20y%20econ%C3%B3mica%20para%20personas%20y%20grupos%20armados%20ilegales.pdf">start a small business</a>. With the government’s assistance, thousands of former female insurgents have started small home businesses, tailoring clothing, making handicrafts or selling food. </p>
<p>Now, <a href="http://www.reincorporacion.gov.co/en/reintegration/Pages/dimensions/productive.aspx">the government is expanding its entrepreneurship program</a> to cover all 2,990 female FARC fighters <a href="http://pensamiento.unal.edu.co/fileadmin/recursos/focos/piensa-paz/docs/presentacion_censo_farc.pdf">disbanded under the 2016 peace deal</a>. </p>
<p>So I wanted to check in on past beneficiaries to see how they were faring. For seven months in 2018 and 2019, as part of my <a href="https://independent.academia.edu/PaulinaArango4">dissertation research on Colombia</a>, I conducted in-depth interviews with 12 retired female guerrilla fighters to document their transition back into civilian life.</p>
<p>They’re not doing so well. </p>
<h2>Transforming identities</h2>
<p>In Colombia, as in other conflict zones, rejoining society after war is generally <a href="https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2018-08/gender-inclusive-framework-and-theory-guide.pdf">more challenging for women</a>. </p>
<p>Whether they served as soldiers, cooks, spies or <a href="https://doi.org/10.1596/0-8213-5968-1">sexual partners</a> to male fighters, women <a href="https://theconversation.com/colombian-militants-have-a-new-plan-for-the-country-and-its-called-insurgent-feminism-77148">militants</a> are frequently seen as abnormal, or unfeminine. Fighting violates traditional expectation of women as the peaceful and <a href="https://theconversation.com/getting-to-yes-in-colombia-what-it-would-take-to-reintegrate-the-farc-66710">nurturing</a> gender. </p>
<p>In Colombia, many of the women I interviewed said they were shunned when they returned to <a href="https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/4acdd8512.pdf">civilian life</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/316498/original/file-20200220-92526-nmubqc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/316498/original/file-20200220-92526-nmubqc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/316498/original/file-20200220-92526-nmubqc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/316498/original/file-20200220-92526-nmubqc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/316498/original/file-20200220-92526-nmubqc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/316498/original/file-20200220-92526-nmubqc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/316498/original/file-20200220-92526-nmubqc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/316498/original/file-20200220-92526-nmubqc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Female FARC insurgents days before their relocation to government-run transition camps, Vegaez municipality, Antioquia department, Colombia, Dec, 30, 2016.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/guerillas-members-pose-for-a-picture-at-the-34-alberto-news-photo/630698248?adppopup=true">RAUL ARBOLEDA/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>“Even my family thought the worst of me – that I had become bloodthirsty or bad,” said a 33-year-old woman who was forced by her father to join the FARC when she was 17.</p>
<p>Other women reported feeling similar social exclusion. The perception of stigma prevented them from fully engaging with their local communities. All hid their pasts. Some avoided interacting with neighbors, afraid they would discover their secret.</p>
<p>This is the opposite of the government’s intention with the small business program, which aims to promote social interactions. Funded by the Colombian government, USAID and the <a href="http://escolapau.uab.cat/img/programas/desarme/ddr005i.pdf">United Nations</a> and designed following <a href="https://www.unddr.org/uploads/documents/IDDRS_4.30%20Reintegration%20WEB.pdf">U.N. guidelines</a>, entrepreneurship is supposed to help former insurgents <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2012.667661">gain community acceptance</a>, take control over their circumstances, rejoin the <a href="https://www.reincorporacion.gov.co/es/la-reintegracion/centro-de-documentacion/Documentos/Documento%20Conpes%203554%20l%20Pol%C3%ADtica%20nacional%20de%20reintegraci%C3%B3n%20social%20y%20econ%C3%B3mica%20para%20personas%20y%20grupos%20armados%20ilegales.pdf">labor market</a> and reduce poverty.</p>
<p>Promoting entrepreneurship is a popular development strategy for women, not just in conflict zones but also in poor countries with entrenched gender inequality. Since 2001 the World Bank has launched micro-lending and small grant programs in South Sudan, Liberia, Afghanistan, Haiti and Kosovo, <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/20618/WPS7098.pdf?sequence=1">among others</a>. </p>
<p>However, their effectiveness is <a href="https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2622220">unproven</a>, and some <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-microfinance-disappointed-the-developing-world-23206">studies</a> find entrepreneurship does not meaningfully improve women’s lives.</p>
<p>Running a home business seemed to isolate the former insurgents in my study. More than half told me they were unable to form the kind of social support system that research <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2012.667661">shows is necessary for reintegration</a>.</p>
<p>“I don’t like to go anywhere, I don’t like to visit anyone,” a 31-year-old woman told me. </p>
<p>She was particularly worried that if neighbors learned about her history as an rebel fighter, they would tell the gang members who control her neighborhood, endangering her life.</p>
<p>This social isolation effectively trapped some women in <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2009.09.027">violent relationships</a>. One felt that working from home kept her from meeting new people who might have become a protective network. </p>
<p>“He punched me. I still have the bruise,” she said. </p>
<p>I could see the mark on her cheek. The attack was recent. The woman told me she hadn’t left the house in 15 days.</p>
<h2>Constraints to social inclusion</h2>
<p>Succeeding in business is difficult for anyone, in any country, under any circumstance. Research shows the chances for success are <a href="https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2622220">even lower</a> for poor female entrepreneurs.</p>
<p>My interviews in Colombia suggest that the Colombian government’s reliance on entrepreneurship may make female ex-insurgents financial situation even more precarious than it would otherwise be because they lack the safety net of formal employment. </p>
<p>“I was not used to having a business, so I gave credit to many people,” said one ex-combatant whose government seed-funded grocery store in Medellin, Colombia went broke.</p>
<p>When former insurgents who receive government benefits fail, they do not get another loan. They must find a job <a href="https://www.redjurista.com/Documents/resolucion_754_de_2013_agencia_colombiana_para_la_reintegracion_de_personas_y_grupos_alzados_en_armas.aspx#/">on their own</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/316496/original/file-20200220-92502-wno0rx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/316496/original/file-20200220-92502-wno0rx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/316496/original/file-20200220-92502-wno0rx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/316496/original/file-20200220-92502-wno0rx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/316496/original/file-20200220-92502-wno0rx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/316496/original/file-20200220-92502-wno0rx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/316496/original/file-20200220-92502-wno0rx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/316496/original/file-20200220-92502-wno0rx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Many women left the FARC guerrilla group along with their partners, Colinas, Guaviare, Colombia, June 15, 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/members-of-the-revolutionary-armed-forces-of-colombia-walk-news-photo/696684966?adppopup=true">RAUL ARBOLEDA/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>Another problem I identified with Colombia’s governmental entrepreneurship program was that it restricts grant recipients to low-skill jobs that may not align with an individual’s experience, skills and interests.</p>
<p>“My dream was to study dentistry, but I did not have a high school diploma,” a woman who was a dentist in the FARC told me. “I had to do tailoring.” </p>
<p>Sewing and selling underwear and jackets helped the former fighter support herself and her son through a divorce. But the work was not meaningful to her, and it did not further her long-term educational and career goals.</p>
<p>Running a small business at home also reinforced <a href="https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/3F71081FF391653DC1256C69003170E9-unicef-WomenWarPeace.pdf">unequal distribution of family responsibilities</a> for many of the women I interviewed. Because they were in the house, they were expected to do all domestic chores and childcare – all while cooking, sewing or selling food.</p>
<h2>Gender troubles</h2>
<p>The former guerrilla fighters I interviewed are years into the reintegration process. Their struggles signal great challenges ahead for Colombia as it returns thousands of <a href="https://theconversation.com/peace-makes-strides-in-colombia-but-the-battle-is-far-from-won-83601">FARC women</a> back to civilian life <a href="http://www.reincorporacion.gov.co/en/reintegration/Pages/what.aspx">by 2023</a>, the timeline for completing the reintegration process.</p>
<p>In some ways, however, Colombia is actually ahead of the game. Gender-specific policies are in short supply in war zones globally.</p>
<p>“Peace agreements are still adopted without provisions considering the needs and priorities of women and girls,” <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/sgsm19834.doc.htm">said U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres in October 2019</a>. </p>
<p>He said a “pitifully small” amount of aid to fragile and post-conflict nations – just 0.2% – goes to “women’s organizations.”</p>
<p>Colombia’s accord tried to do better. At the <a href="https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/acuerdo-de-paz-con-las-farc-enfoque-de-genero/504340">FARC’s insistence</a>, women were on the negotiating team. The accord specifically commits the state to promoting <a href="https://kroc.nd.edu/assets/349904/200128_second_gender_report_in_english.pdf">equal rights for women and men</a>. </p>
<p>But my research suggests that making peace work for female insurgents will take more than a well crafted accord.</p>
<p><em>Stephanie Simmons Zuilkowski, a professor of international and multicultural education at Florida State University, contributed research to this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/131755/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Maria Paulina Arango receives funding from the United States Institute of Peace. </span></em></p>Small business grants are supposed to help Colombia’s disarmed FARC fighters start new lives as entrepreneurs. But interviews with 12 female ex-insurgents suggests the government plan may fail women.Maria Paulina Arango, PhD candidate in International and Comparative Education at Florida State University and 2019-2020 USIP Peace Scholar, Florida State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1151122019-06-04T12:42:26Z2019-06-04T12:42:26ZViolence climbs in Colombia as president chips away at landmark peace deal with FARC guerrillas<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/276877/original/file-20190528-42565-11sb2o3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Police protect a judicial complex where former FARC rebel leader Seuxis Hernandez was standing trial on May 20, 2019. The former peace negotiator has been arrested on drug charges and is now fighting extradition to the United States.
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Colombia-Rebel-Leader/65e6fa7a81094638ad4967fedc8effca/2/0">AP Photo/Ivan Valencia</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Thousands of Colombian militants and soldiers will have their day in court. </p>
<p>A panel of judges <a href="https://amp.elespectador.com/noticias/judicial/las-objeciones-la-jep-si-se-hundieron-en-el-congreso-corte-constitucional-articulo-863299">ruled on May 29</a> that a <a href="https://www.jep.gov.co/Paginas/Inicio.aspx">special peace tribunal</a> established in Colombia’s landmark <a href="https://theconversation.com/colombias-peace-plebiscite-the-case-for-yes-and-the-case-for-no-66325">2016 peace deal with the FARC guerrillas</a> must proceed under the agreed-upon terms. It cannot be altered to narrow its scope or make sentencing harsher, as Colombia’s new president, Ivan Duque, had <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2019/03/14/colombias-president-ivan-duque-undermines-a-peace-deal">requested</a>.</p>
<p>Colombia’s <a href="https://colombia2020.elespectador.com/colombia-en-transicion/las-consecuencias-territoriales-del-recorte-al-sistema-de-justicia">transitional justice system</a>, which resembles processes used in nations <a href="https://www.ictj.org/our-work/regions-and-countries">like South Africa and Guatemala</a>, will judge FARC militants and members of the armed forces for crimes perpetrated during Colombia’s 52-year conflict. But the emphasis is on making amends for harm caused to civilians – not on punishing combat-related offenses, such as a guerrilla killing a soldier in combat. </p>
<p>Nearly all of the 6,804 FARC guerrillas who <a href="https://lta.reuters.com/articulo/colombia-paz-idLTAKCN1AV2AI-OUSLT">disarmed in 2016</a> and settled in government-run “reintegration camps” must now surrender themselves to the peace tribunal, swear to testify honestly and be interviewed by Colombia’s new <a href="https://comisiondelaverdad.co/">truth commission</a>. </p>
<p>Fighters who are determined not to have committed human rights violations during the conflict, and to have obeyed the law since the peace deal, may leave the reintegration camps to rejoin society. All others will be sentenced to jail or to community service in the areas they once terrorized.</p>
<p>This will happen despite the attitude of Duque, who thinks the <a href="https://www.jep.gov.co/Paginas/JEP/Sistema-Integral-de-Verdad-Justicia-Reparacion-y-NoRepeticion.aspx">transitional justice system</a> is too lenient. It is one of many provisions of the landmark Colombian peace deal he has moved to weaken, or even abandon, since taking office in August 2018.</p>
<h2>Colombia’s best chance at peace</h2>
<p>Colombia’s painstakingly negotiated peace agreement with the FARC – which won former Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos the <a href="https://theconversation.com/santos-got-the-nobel-prize-for-not-giving-up-on-peace-heres-why-all-colombians-won-66689">2016 Nobel Peace Prize</a> – ended the longest-running armed conflict in the Western Hemisphere. Fighting <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/colombia-farc-peace-treaty-longest-war-western-hemisphere-ends-a7331746.html">killed 200,000 people</a> and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/colombias-war-has-displaced-7-million-with-peace-will-they-go-home/2016/09/05/538df3c6-6eb8-11e6-993f-73c693a89820_story.html">displaced 7 million</a> between 1964 and 2016.</p>
<p>But the deal was <a href="https://theconversation.com/santos-got-the-nobel-prize-for-not-giving-up-on-peace-heres-why-all-colombians-won-66689">rejected at referendum</a> before being passed by Congress in November 2016, and it remains controversial.</p>
<p>Its goals include exposing and documenting the atrocities of the Colombian conflict, offering reparations to <a href="https://www.unidadvictimas.gov.co/es/registro-unico-de-victimas-ruv/37394">war victims</a> and revitalizing the long-neglected rural areas terrorized by different armed groups. It also aims to turn a Marxist insurgency into a <a href="https://theconversation.com/colombias-farc-rebels-have-rebranded-as-a-political-party-now-they-need-a-leader-82728">political party</a> and to reconcile Colombians by <a href="https://theconversation.com/colombian-guerrillas-disarm-starting-their-risky-return-to-civilian-life-73947">reintegrating rebel fighters back into society</a>. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/276876/original/file-20190528-42551-14tix3c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/276876/original/file-20190528-42551-14tix3c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/276876/original/file-20190528-42551-14tix3c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276876/original/file-20190528-42551-14tix3c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276876/original/file-20190528-42551-14tix3c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276876/original/file-20190528-42551-14tix3c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276876/original/file-20190528-42551-14tix3c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276876/original/file-20190528-42551-14tix3c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Former FARC guerrillas elected to Congress in Colombia celebrate their win, July 20, 2018.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Colombia-Rebel-Lawmakers/8bdde539af7f44ec9a569d99711f0ffe/27/0">AP Photo/Fernando Vergara</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>Conflict researchers <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=jjkUy0wAAAAJ">like myself</a> have found that this comprehensive truth and justice process stands a good chance of <a href="https://www.ictj.org/about/transitional-justice">bringing lasting peace and reconciliation</a>. </p>
<p>At first, it seemed to be working. </p>
<p>Violence dropped markedly in 2017, Colombia’s <a href="https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/judicial/homicidios-en-colombia-la-tasa-mas-baja-en-los-ultimos-42-anos-se-dio-en-2017-articulo-734526">safest year since 1975</a>. Social movements – <a href="https://theconversation.com/mass-protests-in-colombia-mar-presidents-first-100-days-but-reveal-a-nation-marching-toward-peace-107339">long repressed</a> by a state that labeled all dissent as the seeds of insurgent rebellion – <a href="https://www.msn.com/es-co/noticias/colombia/%C2%BFpor-qu%C3%A9-ha-aumentado-la-movilizaci%C3%B3n-social-en-este-gobierno/ar-BBQ30FO">blossomed</a>. And a robust public debate began around <a href="https://theconversation.com/colombians-are-fed-up-with-corruption-and-everyone-seems-to-be-under-investigation-75173">corruption</a> and public services, both concerns long buried by militant violence. </p>
<h2>A directionless peace process</h2>
<p>Then Duque took office <a href="https://theconversation.com/colombia-elects-a-conservative-who-promises-to-correct-its-peace-accord-98273">promising to “correct” Colombia’s peace agreement</a>. As a senator, he helped lead the “Vote No” initiative that <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-colombia-voted-no-to-peace-with-farc-66416">narrowly derailed the accord</a> at referendum. </p>
<p>Under Duque’s leadership, the government’s progress on fulfilling its commitments to peace has <a href="https://kroc.nd.edu/news-events/news/tercer-informe-sobre-la-implementacion-del-acuerdo-de-paz-la-implementacion-sigue-progresando/">slowed to nearly a standstill</a>. </p>
<p>Duque has appointed “No” campaign loyalists to lead the agencies that must implement the agreement and left their <a href="https://colombia2020.elespectador.com/verdad/comision-de-la-verdad-con-menos-recursos-para-funcionar">budgets underfunded</a>. He has voiced opposition to a Santos administration commitment to <a href="https://www.dandc.eu/en/article/why-destroying-colombian-coca-fields-pesticides-may-backfire-terribly">help farmers who grow illegal coca leaf</a> transition to legal crops like coffee and ignored <a href="https://www.elcolombiano.com/colombia/la-reforma-rural-integral-se-quedara-en-promesas-XY9414819">promises to boost economic investment in rural areas</a>. </p>
<p>And Duque’s conservative Democratic Center party played a central role in vetoing a peace accord agreement that would have given more <a href="https://www.elcolombiano.com/colombia/politica/circunscripciones-no-obtuvieron-la-mayoria--efrain-cepeda-IG7822596">seats in Congress</a> to remote rural areas of Colombia – places so long neglected by the government that militant groups like the FARC controlled the territory.</p>
<p>The president’s foot-dragging comes after <a href="https://theconversation.com/latest-threat-to-colombias-peace-process-murders-a-kidnapping-delays-and-of-course-politics-73895">legislative delays</a> and last year’s election had already substantially slowed the peace process. One-third of the peace deal’s 578 provisions have not even begun to be implemented, according to Notre Dame University’s <a href="https://kroc.nd.edu/research/peace-processes-accords/pam-colombia/#Spanish">Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies</a>. </p>
<p>Few provisions in Colombia’s peace deal have official deadlines or progress markers. That’s common in peace agreements, <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Truth-Justice-and-Reconciliation-in-Colombia-Transitioning-from-Violence/Diaz-Pabon/p/book/9781857438659">which after tense negotiations between warring sides tend to capture promises – not establish work plans</a>.</p>
<p><iframe id="5ghJt" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/5ghJt/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Duque also appears to be considering a <a href="https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/detalles-del-desayuno-entre-whitaker-y-congresistas-articulo-850317">demand from the United States</a> to <a href="http://www.wradio.com.co/noticias/actualidad/oficina-judicial-de-embajada-de-eeuu-cancela-cena-prevista-con-magistrados-colombianos/20190403/nota/3886216.aspx">extradite FARC guerrillas</a> accused of involvement in international drug trafficking.</p>
<p>Currently, Colombian law only allows for the extradition of former guerrillas who committed drug crimes after the peace agreement was signed. Those who did so during the conflict, as a means to finance the FARC’s insurgency, will be dealt with through the transitional justice system.</p>
<h2>The risks of a derailed peace</h2>
<p>Members of the peace <a href="https://www.rcnradio.com/politica/fuertes-criticas-de-sergio-jaramillo-duque-por-objeciones-la-jep">delegation that reached the FARC agreement</a> say the government’s actions <a href="https://elpais.com/internacional/2018/01/17/colombia/1516162343_892303.html">compromise peace itself</a>. </p>
<p>According to a <a href="https://imgcdn.larepublica.co/cms/2019/05/17085310/031800190000-GALLUP-POLL-130.pdf">recent Gallup poll</a>, 55% of Colombians believe the government will not fulfill its commitments to the peace process. Sixty-two percent believe the FARC will not hold up its end of the deal.</p>
<p>As trust between the two sides deteriorate, violence in Colombia is climbing.</p>
<p>Murders <a href="https://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/delitos/indice-de-homicidios-crece-en-colombia-en-el-2018-313930">rose 3% in 2018</a>, from 12,066 to 12,458. That figure includes a wave of attacks against activists, <a href="https://theconversation.com/colombias-murder-rate-is-at-an-all-time-low-but-its-activists-keep-getting-killed-91602">peasant organizers and Afro-Colombian community leaders</a> who have vocally defended the peace deal, 226 of whom were killed last year.</p>
<p>An estimated <a href="https://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/investigacion/los-ejercitos-ilegales-que-enfrentara-la-nueva-cupula-militar-305714">1,700 former guerrillas have returned to armed struggle</a>, joining one of Colombia’s many other militant groups, according to the think tank <a href="http://www.ideaspaz.org/publications/posts/1662">Fundacion Ideas Para la Paz</a>. Several high-profile leaders – including Ivan Marquez, <a href="https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/ivan-marquez-sale-espantado-de-bogota-y-se-instala-en-caqueta/564211">who lead the FARC’s peace negotiations</a> – have gone into hiding.</p>
<p>In February, a <a href="https://theconversation.com/violence-and-killings-havent-stopped-in-colombia-despite-landmark-peace-deal-111232">bombing by the ELN guerrillas</a> in Bogotá killed 21 police personnel, confirming that domestic terrorism remains a threat in Colombia. </p>
<p>In response to climbing violence, Colombia’s armed forces have gotten more violent, too. </p>
<p>In early 2019, Major Gen. Nicacio Martínez Espinel ordered soldiers to “double the number of criminals they kill, capture or force to surrender,” <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/18/world/americas/colombian-army-killings.html">The New York Times</a> has reported.</p>
<p>The reporting raised fear that Colombia would revert to the era of “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-48344919">false positives</a>,” when members of Colombia’s armed forces in the early 2000s killed unarmed civilians, dressing their dead bodies in militant fatigues to meet their kill quota.</p>
<p>According to some estimates, soldiers <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/08/colombia-false-positives-scandal-casualties-higher-thought-study">murdered 10,000 innocent Colombians</a> to earn bonuses, holidays and promotions.</p>
<h2>A long path to peace</h2>
<p>Countries commonly suffer violence as they transition out of armed conflict, making <a href="https://theconversation.com/advice-for-colombia-from-countries-that-have-sought-peace-and-sometimes-found-it-67419">strong political leadership</a> crucial for a peace process to succeed. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14094918">post-apartheid South Africa</a>, Nelson Mandela brought legitimacy to the country’s return to democracy. As its first black president, Mandela curbed political forces that opposed racial integration in South Africa and <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-first-democratic-elections-25-years-on-never-lose-sight-of-what-the-country-has-achieved-115861">supported the truth and reconciliation process</a>. </p>
<p>In doing so, Mandela made the prospect of peace seem real. He virtually willed it into being.</p>
<p>Colombia’s acrimonious post-accord government is leading the country in a different direction, empowering longtime opponents of the FARC accords and eroding the political capital of FARC leaders committed to peace. That increases the risk of <a href="https://www.semana.com/opinion/articulo/se-esta-promoviendo-la-formacion-de-una-nueva-amenaza-criminal-en-colombia-columna-de--jeremy-mcdermott/617500?fbclid=iwar0s2uigd2klpsnm-tb5_m487agkovzq54wzc5k1zpwrti2q8kd2_qmi9rc">relapsing violence that takes dangerous new forms</a>.</p>
<p>War may not be imminent in Colombia. But neither, it now seems, is peace.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/115112/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Fabio Andrés Díaz Pabón does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Colombia’s new president opposes the 2016 peace deal with the FARC guerrillas. As trust between the government and militants erodes, at least 1,700 former insurgents have returned to armed struggle.Fabio Andrés Díaz Pabón, Researcher on Conflict, Peace and Development, International Institute of Social StudiesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1130112019-03-08T11:43:22Z2019-03-08T11:43:22ZHow women wage war – a short history of IS brides, Nazi guards and FARC insurgents<p>The names of American-born Hoda Muthana and Brit Shamima Begum have appeared in countless headlines in the United States and Europe since these two female members of the Islamic State group were discovered in a large displaced persons camp weeks ago. </p>
<p>The women were among the holdouts in Islamic State’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/03/isis-nowhere-baghouz-last-stronghold-syrian-defence-forces">last stronghold</a> in Baghouz, Syria. When they were <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/shamima-begum-bring-me-home-says-bethnal-green-girl-who-fled-to-join-isis-hgvqw765d">found</a> by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/17/us-woman-hoda-muthana-deeply-regrets-joining-isis-and-wants-return-home">journalists</a>, one was pregnant and the other was caring for her young child.</p>
<p>In the four years that these women lived as part of IS, they went from a self-described idyll in IS’s capital, Raqqa, to fleeing airstrikes with little more than the clothes on their backs. Now, as young mothers, they have been held up as iconic <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/24/isis-brides-secret-world-jihad-western-women-syria">IS brides</a>, evidence of the group’s ability to distort the minds of vulnerable teenagers.</p>
<p>In numerous <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5bzeMFx8R2k">interviews</a>, these two women have wholeheartedly adopted this narrative.</p>
<p>“When I went to Syria, I was just a housewife for the entire four years – stayed at home, took care of my husband, took care of my kids,” Begum <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/is-bride-shamima-begum-full-transcript-i-did-have-a-good-time-there-11640278">told Sky News</a>. Although Muthana incited the murder of Americans on <a href="https://www.buzzfeednews.com/amphtml/ellievhall/gone-girl-an-interview-with-an-american-in-isis?__twitter_impression=true">Twitter</a>, according to these women’s accounts they did not take part in Islamic State’s <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/eprint/mFTJeBS22yPWqr37QecV/full">violence</a>. They did not even see it. </p>
<h2>A history of impunity</h2>
<p>We’ve heard this story before. </p>
<p>As Wendy Lower meticulously details in <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Hitlers-Furies-German-Killing-Fields/dp/0544334493/">“Hitler’s Furies: German Women in the Nazi Killing Fields,”</a> roughly half a million German women followed their husbands or volunteered to settle the territory conquered by Nazi Germany in Eastern Europe. Women on the Eastern Front were integral to the expansion of the Nazi state, serving in key administrative, logistical and medical roles.</p>
<p>Some of these Nazi women also perpetrated horrific crimes. As many as <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/18/world/europe/18holocaust.html">5,000</a> served as concentration camp guards. Roughly 10,000 women were SS auxiliaries, or <a href="https://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/1183">Helferinnen</a>, serving in a bureaucracy that murdered millions in the gas chambers of Auschwitz and elsewhere. A total of 7,900 women were employed in the <a href="https://homepage.univie.ac.at/ljiljana.radonic/texte/Schwarz.pdf">SS Frauenkorps</a>, where those working as secretaries would often decide which political prisoners ended up on the day’s kill lists. Thousands more Nazi nurses assisted in heinous medical experiments and euthanasia. </p>
<p>Yet, like most of the women in IS, <a href="http://hydrastg.library.cornell.edu/fedora/objects/nur:01147/datastreams/pdf/content">Nazi women</a> did not engage in armed combat. They clung to the <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Women-in-Nazi-Germany-1st-Edition/Stephenson/p/book/9780582418363">gender roles and identities</a> that National Socialism had created for them as wives and mothers.</p>
<p>As the Third Reich collapsed around them, most Nazi women in the East fled and returned to their former lives in Germany. Of the few who were apprehended, only a small portion ever faced justice. Following a military trial, the United Kingdom executed one such woman – <a href="https://www.upi.com/Archives/1945/12/14/Belsen-Beast-Irma-Grese-hanged-with-nine-other-horror-camp-aides/9191481832607/">Irma Grese</a>, a 22-year-old Bergen-Belsen guard. But the vast majority of Nazi women were never held to account for their crimes, <a href="https://www.welt.de/regionales/hamburg/article156213757/Geschichte-einer-Frau-die-unbedingt-zur-SS-wollte.html">in Germany</a> or abroad.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/262574/original/file-20190307-100802-fdwioe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/262574/original/file-20190307-100802-fdwioe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/262574/original/file-20190307-100802-fdwioe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/262574/original/file-20190307-100802-fdwioe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/262574/original/file-20190307-100802-fdwioe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/262574/original/file-20190307-100802-fdwioe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=592&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/262574/original/file-20190307-100802-fdwioe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=592&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/262574/original/file-20190307-100802-fdwioe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=592&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Irma Grese, shown here in 1945, was an SS supervisor at the Nazi concentration camp Bergen-Belsen. Grese was later hanged for war crimes.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Associated-Press-International-News-Germany-WWI-/48f2711962e5da11af9f0014c2589dfb/4/0">AP photo</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Insurgent women</h2>
<p>The roles carved out for women in Islamic State and Nazi Germany as wives and mothers, first, and perpetrators of violence, second, differ from the experiences of most women in armed groups. </p>
<p>In <a href="http://press.georgetown.edu/book/georgetown/insurgent-women">“Insurgent Women: Female Combatants in Civil Wars,”</a> <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Why-Women-Rebel-Understanding-Womens-Participation-in-Armed-Rebel-Groups/Henshaw/p/book/9781138209855">Alexis Henshaw</a>, <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/us/book/9783319401409">Ora Szekely</a> and I detail women’s participation in conflicts in Colombia, Ukraine and the Kurdish regions of the Middle East. Women in rebel groups in these contexts often participate in combat, in addition to communications, logistics and other support roles. </p>
<p>In Colombia’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-36605769">FARC</a>, women were first mobilized with their families as the wives of fighters. Only later were women permitted to take up arms, eventually constituting between 30 and 40 percent of the FARC’s fighting force. Unlike IS, which encouraged women to give birth to grow the population of the caliphate, the FARC heavily regulated <a href="https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-07-20/end-farcs-50-year-pregnancy-ban-leads-baby-boom">women’s fertility and sexual relations</a>. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-35082412">Forced abortions</a> and abandoned children were accepted as a cost of victory.</p>
<p>In contrast, many women who took up arms against the Ukrainian military in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine did so precisely because they were mothers. Women in these <a href="https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/female-warlord-defects-to-ukraine-details-russias-involvement-in-donbas.html">pro-Russian</a> separatist groups often say they are fighting to protect their families and their homeland, having been abandoned by men who are avoiding conscription by both sides of the conflict. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/06/ukraine-women-battalion-mans-barricades-201463132521484197.html">Yelena Dustova</a>, a 39-year-old mother of three, said, “What, should I allow them to shoot at me in my town? No. I will stand here so that they won’t be allowed to pass. I have my mom and kids in there.”</p>
<p>As our book <a href="http://press.georgetown.edu/book/georgetown/insurgent-women">“Insurgent Women”</a> details, rebel women in the Donbas see no tension between their duties driving tanks, staffing checkpoints or serving as snipers and their roles as daughters, mothers and wives. </p>
<h2>Holding women accountable</h2>
<p>Women’s roles in armed groups vary. But, in large part due to their ability to blur the line between civilian and combatant, women’s often unseen contributions to conflict can be key to an armed group’s success. </p>
<p>The mobilization of <a href="https://icsr.info/2018/07/23/from-daesh-to-diaspora-tracing-the-women-and-minors-of-islamic-state/">more than 4,700 women</a> like Shamima Begum and Hoda Muthana by IS was unprecedented because they were foreign. But women’s participation in violent projects to remake their societies is more common than we realize.</p>
<p>Tens of thousands of Nazi women escaped justice. This historical precedent should be considered as governments decide how they will hold the women of IS to account for their crimes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/113011/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jessica Trisko Darden is a Jeane Kirkpatrick Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.</span></em></p>Hundreds of thousands of women helped the Nazi cause. Few ever faced justice.Jessica Trisko Darden, Assistant Professor of International Affairs, American University School of International ServiceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1122402019-02-21T14:39:19Z2019-02-21T14:39:19ZVenezuela: a humanitarian and security crisis on the border with Colombia<p>As the crisis in Venezuela continues, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-47166680">aid trucks are being blocked</a> at the border with Colombia. But this development isn’t only about the <a href="https://theconversation.com/venezuela-crisis-explained-a-tale-of-two-presidents-111198">two men claiming</a> to be the country’s rightful president: it’s also about the borderlands themselves. </p>
<p>The Colombia-Venezuela border is home to some of the worst violence and organised crime in the region. Aid blockages can be seen as yet another manifestation of these problems, with armed groups playing power games at the expense of vulnerable local people.</p>
<p>Concerns that Venezuela’s instability could <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/08/10/venezuelas-instability-has-far-broader-implications-heres-whats-at-stake/?utm_term=.461ee45244b0">extend beyond its borders</a> have already materialised – <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2018/11/5be4192b4/number-refugees-migrants-venezuela-reaches-3-million.html">3m citizens</a> have left the country. Most of them are “absorbed” by borderland communities, pressurising already strained governance systems. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://conpeace.ccw.ox.ac.uk">our research</a> shows, the pressure on basic services in these communities that have been deficient anyway – health, access to food and jobs – fuels crime, prostitution, and begging, and deepens social tensions. Together with the xenophobic discourse of right-wing politicians, this becomes an explosive mix. </p>
<p>Venezuela’s crisis is also fuelling the expansion of criminal networks that have ruled the region for decades, as they take advantage of the economic crisis along the border. </p>
<p>Take cocaine production, for example. Colombian <a href="https://lasillavacia.com/silla-santandereana/en-el-catatumbo-la-coca-aumento-pero-no-se-desbordo-68037">coca cultivation has increased</a>, especially near the border with Venezuela. As one civil society leader from Colombia told our research team, a “labour force from Venezuela is arriving at the coca cultivations”. </p>
<p>The money Venezuelans can make in coca farming exceeds normal salaries back home, and may be the only income option available. This constant availability of labour then allows armed groups to keep the cocaine business going. </p>
<p>Yet this is not just about drugs. As I show in my new book <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Borderland-Battles-Violence-Governance-Colombias/dp/0190849150/ref=tmm_pap_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=1548948602&sr=8-1">Borderland Battles</a>, the Colombia-Venezuela border features many illicit flows, including of weapons, gasoline and people. These are boosted by the crisis, with <a href="https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/transnational-sex-trafficking-rings-cash-venezuela-crisis/">more Venezuelan women and children</a> being trafficked. </p>
<p>Furthermore, according to interviewees from the Venezuelan state of Táchira, it is increasingly common to hear Mexican accents in Venezuelan border towns. This reflects the steady expansion of Mexican drug cartels into the region, intensifying violent competition over the business. </p>
<h2>Risking peace in Colombia</h2>
<p>Upheaval in Venezuela has also intensified the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14702436.2017.1421859">cross-border violence</a> related to Colombia’s armed conflict. While Colombian guerrillas have used Venezuela as a safe haven for decades, their presence in the country has now become more complex.</p>
<p>Despite Colombia’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-momentous-peace-deal-with-the-farc-so-what-next-for-colombia-64452">peace deal</a> with the leftist guerrilla group, FARC, there is ongoing conflict with the <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/colombia-s-eln-rebels-call-car-bomb-legitimate-act-of-war-1.3765324">ELN rebels</a>, who are believed to operate in <a href="https://es.insightcrime.org/noticias/analisis/maduro-inicia-segundo-mandato-en-venezuela-apoyado-por-estructuras-criminales/">12 Venezuelan states</a>. At the same time, FARC dissidents have expanded their control over gold mining in southern Venezuela, and Colombian right-wing groups occupy Venezuela’s border regions. They gain strength in Venezuela to strike Colombia, while adding to Venezuela’s internal violence as they clash with state forces. </p>
<p>Further afield, incidents such as the US national security advisor writing “<a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-29/hint-to-maduro-5-000-troops-to-colombia-reads-bolton-notepad">5,000 troops to Colombia</a>” on his notepad serve only to escalate tensions. </p>
<p>Back in 2012, a human rights defender in Venezuela explained to me that the country needs to prepare itself for a US invasion, which would start via Colombia. For that reason, there are some who would welcome a FARC presence in Venezuela – as a “buffer”. Such a scenario was engraved in many of my interviewees’ minds, exposing the irresponsibility of reviving such fears. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, bodies of Venezuelan nationals killed in combat between Colombian state forces and guerrillas reveal that young Venezuelans in search of a better future have become easy recruits for the ELN, FARC dissidents, and other Colombian armed groups. Moreover, Venezuelan “colectivos”, radical left-wing groups, have expanded into Colombia’s border region.</p>
<p>Further violent escalation in Venezuela may give rise to a messy cross-border conflict, rather than <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2019/01/31/eu-risks-pushing-venezuela-towards-civil-war-after-parliament-recognises-guaido">civil war</a>. Instead of the emergence of clear front lines, the Venezuelan state forces might fragment into factions loyal to Maduro, others supporting Guaidó, and yet others picking their own local leaders whose illicit business interests do not stop at the border, as the aid blockages may indicate. </p>
<p>With Colombia’s peace on shaky grounds and the ELN’s armed struggle continuing, both organised and “disorganised” violence could develop across the two countries. </p>
<h2>Border control</h2>
<p>The need for action is clear, but there are no easy fixes. Shutting Venezuela’s borders to avoid insecurity from “spilling over” would be irresponsible. </p>
<p>At long borders with rough terrain, such as the Colombian-Venezuelan one that extends 1,378 miles (comparable to the 1,954-mile US-Mexican border), porous areas are inevitable. Violent entrepreneurs use them to their advantage, while suffering people are stuck. <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-humanitarian-and-diplomatic-crisis-is-unfolding-on-the-colombia-venezuela-border-46994">This happened in 2015</a> after Maduro closed the border: illicit flows kept thriving, but people’s needs remained unmet. </p>
<p>Even a complete border closure serves to incentivise more illicit cross-border activities, because with increased risk comes increased prices and profits. Instead, curbing people’s insecurity amid Venezuela’s turmoil requires a dual approach. </p>
<p>In Venezuela, calls for unity and democracy need to extend to the military to contain violence effectively. In the borderlands, humanitarian assistance to Venezuelan refugees must be combined with long term support for communities to “absorb” them by stepping up the provision of services and sustainable job opportunities.</p>
<p>Sadly, violence knows no borders. But nor do humanitarian principles and solidarity. Venezuela’s political future may still be uncertain, but one thing is sure: turning a blind eye to the border region is no longer an option. Borderland communities’ security must come first.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/112240/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Annette Idler receives funding from UK Research Councils, the Global Challenges Research Fund, and Canada Global Affairs. </span></em></p>Cross border security is at serious risk. So are the lives of the people who live there.Annette Idler, Director of Studies, Changing Character of War Centre and Senior Research Fellow, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1112322019-02-06T11:42:47Z2019-02-06T11:42:47ZViolence and killings haven’t stopped in Colombia despite landmark peace deal<p>A deadly <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2019/jan/17/bogota-car-bomb-kills-at-least-eight-people-video">car bomb at a Bogotá police academy</a> claimed by Colombia’s National Liberation Army, or ELN, is the latest sign that Colombia’s civil war is not over. President Ivan Duque called the January attack, which <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/colombia-asks-cuba-to-arrest-eln-negotiators-for-car-bombing/2019/01/18/b2eb5a2e-1b87-11e9-b8e6-567190c2fd08_story.html">killed 21 military personnel</a> and wounded 68, a “crazy terrorist act.”</p>
<p>The leftist ELN became Colombia’s largest guerrilla group after the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, disbanded following a <a href="https://theconversation.com/peace-makes-strides-in-colombia-but-the-battle-is-far-from-won-83601">peace agreement</a> with the government in September 2016.</p>
<p>As I write in my <a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/G/bo29202793.html">new book on the counter-insurgency efforts</a> leading up to the peace deal, there were already clear signs that neutralizing the FARC would not end Colombia’s 52-year armed conflict. </p>
<h2>A complex conflict</h2>
<p>What Colombians call “el conflicto” – the conflict – was never a simple two-way fight of everyone versus the FARC. It was, and remains, a set of <a href="https://arts.uchicago.edu/event/violentology-manual-colombian-conflict-stephen-ferry">overlapping and interrelated conflicts</a> involving the government, Marxist rebels, right-wing militias and drug cartels, staggered across the decades from 1964 to today.</p>
<p>The 2016 FARC deal was a <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-only-now-after-51-years-war-is-ending-in-colombia-48563">historic</a> achievement. After its signing, armed conflict-related fatalities in Colombia dropped from about <a href="http://www.elcolombiano.com/colombia/acuerdos-de-gobierno-y-farc/el-primer-ano-de-la-paz-en-cifras-GE7745778">3,000 a year to just 78</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257276/original/file-20190205-86195-1v1k4yt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257276/original/file-20190205-86195-1v1k4yt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257276/original/file-20190205-86195-1v1k4yt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=369&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257276/original/file-20190205-86195-1v1k4yt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=369&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257276/original/file-20190205-86195-1v1k4yt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=369&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257276/original/file-20190205-86195-1v1k4yt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257276/original/file-20190205-86195-1v1k4yt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257276/original/file-20190205-86195-1v1k4yt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Juan Manuel Santos shakes hands with FARC commander Rodrigo Lodoño after signing Colombia’s historic peace treaty on Sept. 26, 2016.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://ustv-mrs-prod.ap.org/c252dad242cd4409b95ba59533955502/components/secured/main.jpg?response-cache-control=No-cache&response-content-disposition=attachment%3Bfilename%3DAP_16273806278437.jpg&Expires=1544041737&Signature=CRwY1BLXm99DQCoQbAgLsWlliS52a0f1A5K4FpAUWiewT20lQOEJ0z70Unmd9vQ">AP Photo/Desmond Boylan</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But an ever-changing array of criminal gangs still operate in Colombia, profiting off <a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/colombia-peace/">drug production, illegal mining and extortion</a>. The landscape of their territorial control has simply changed, with the ELN, Autodefensa Gaitanista de Colombia and other armed groups spreading into areas once run by the FARC.</p>
<p>Other political violence has <a href="https://theconversation.com/colombias-murder-rate-is-at-an-all-time-low-but-its-activists-keep-getting-killed-91602">ticked up</a> since the 2016 accord, too, including the targeted killing of <a href="http://www.indepaz.org.co/566-lideres-sociales-y-defensores-de-derechos-humanos-han-sido-asesinados-desde-el-1-de-enero-de-2016-al-10-de-enero-de-2019/">indigenous and Afro-Colombian activists</a>.</p>
<p>The FARC is not entirely defunct, either. </p>
<p>Colombian research groups <a href="http://www.ideaspaz.org/publications/posts/1709">Fundación Ideas para la Paz</a> and <a href="https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/farc-dissidents-growing-faster-colombia-can-count/">Insight Crime</a> report that ever more former fighters are dissatisfied with the FARC’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/colombias-farc-rebels-have-rebranded-as-a-political-party-now-they-need-a-leader-82728">reincarnation as a political party</a>. Up to 3,000 guerrillas – one-quarter of the roughly 12,000 demobilized after the peace accord – have re-armed alongside their former comrades. </p>
<p>Others have <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/18/world/americas/colombia-farc-peace.html">joined the ELN</a>, which has <a href="https://www.eltiempo.com/politica/gobierno/duque-promete-fortalecer-fuerza-publica-en-el-catatumbo-para-combatir-al-eln-317420">doubled in size since the FARC’s disarmament</a>. </p>
<p>January’s car bombing was a show of force. </p>
<h2>Colombia’s tense border</h2>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257288/original/file-20190205-86233-as72hk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257288/original/file-20190205-86233-as72hk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257288/original/file-20190205-86233-as72hk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=710&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257288/original/file-20190205-86233-as72hk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=710&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257288/original/file-20190205-86233-as72hk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=710&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257288/original/file-20190205-86233-as72hk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=892&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257288/original/file-20190205-86233-as72hk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=892&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257288/original/file-20190205-86233-as72hk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=892&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><span class="source">The Conversation CC-BY-ND</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
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<p>The attack likely snuffs out any chance of <a href="https://theconversation.com/will-colombias-most-stubborn-rebel-group-agree-to-peace-71835">a peace deal with the ELN</a>, which Colombia’s government has pursued for years.</p>
<p>The ELN is primarily active along the Colombia-Venezuela border. If Colombia’s government cracks down on the group, violence could escalate quickly. </p>
<p>Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro is in a <a href="https://theconversation.com/venezuela-power-struggle-plunges-nation-into-turmoil-3-essential-reads-110419">power struggle</a> to save his embattled presidency, and the U.S. has threatened military intervention. That would probably involve <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/01/29/troops-photo-john-boltons-notes-raise-questions-about-military-role-venezuela-crisis/">using Colombian territory as an operations base</a>.</p>
<p>Colombia’s border region is a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/08/venezuela-migrants-colombia-brazil-borders">tinderbox of geopolitical tension</a>. A flare-up with the ELN may be the spark that sets it off.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/111232/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexander L Fattal has received funding from the National Science Foundation, Social Science Research Council, and Wenner-Gren Foundation.</span></em></p>A 2016 accord with the FARC guerrillas was supposed to end Colombia’s 52-year civil war. But a deadly car bomb in Bogotá shows that armed insurgents still threaten the South American country.Alexander L Fattal, Assistant Professor, Pennsylvania State University, Departments of Film-Video and Media Studies and Anthropology, Penn StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1073392018-12-07T11:40:13Z2018-12-07T11:40:13ZMass protests in Colombia mar president’s first 100 days but reveal a nation marching toward peace<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/248853/original/file-20181204-34142-1xq4ays.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">University students ask for a higher budget for public higher education.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Colombia-Student-Protest/bf231de170214c5693b68b5d76fd849d/8/0">AP Photo/Fernando Vergara</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ivan Duque has only been Colombia’s president since August, but already <a href="https://elpais.com/internacional/2018/11/16/colombia/1542387103_783744.html">his government is in crisis</a>. </p>
<p>The country that has been gripped by near-constant <a href="https://www.rcnradio.com/economia/dignidades-campesinas-se-suman-movilizaciones-del-28-de-noviembre">protest</a> since the 42-year-old conservative took power. But the mass demonstrations that criticize Duque’s young government may actually be a good sign for Colombian democracy.</p>
<p>Duque, who has <a href="https://theconversation.com/colombia-elects-a-conservative-who-promises-to-correct-its-peace-accord-98273">never before held elected office</a>, pledged that his government would “<a href="https://theconversation.com/colombia-elects-a-conservative-who-promises-to-correct-its-peace-accord-98273">correct</a>” the perceived mistakes of the centrist former president Juan Manuel Santos, who left office after eight years with <a href="https://colombiareports.com/santos-to-leave-office-with-one-of-the-worst-approval-ratings-ever/">19 percent public support</a>. </p>
<p>Voters blamed Santos for failing to reign in corruption, allowing Colombia’s economy to stagnate and signing an <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-did-a-new-colombian-peace-agreement-come-so-quickly-after-the-referendum-no-vote-69749">unpopular peace treaty</a> with the country’s main guerrilla group. Now, as Duque recently <a href="https://twitter.com/IvanDuque/status/1063830442409906176">acknowledged on Twitter</a>, they are angry that his floundering government has struggled to deliver on any campaign promises in its first 100 days.</p>
<h2>Protests grip Colombia</h2>
<p>Duque’s economic reform package, which proposed <a href="https://www.dinero.com/pais/articulo/ivan-duque-anuncia-sus-primeras-reformas-economicas/260749">tax exemptions for industrial developers and a tax hike on food</a>, was seen as pro-business and anti-poor. The government is also feeling the fallout of the massive <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2018/11/17/colombias-biggest-corruption-scandal-gets-more-complicated?frsc=dg%7Ce&fbclid=IwAR3-iWNpuZWCvNO7Cm6XZNtyadTnT8qcW0ZkyGR-LhNViivdJaOOPcNz0GQ">Odebrecht corruption scandal</a> that has implicated high-ranking public officials across Latin America, including in Colombia.</p>
<p>The president’s approval rating <a href="https://www.financecolombia.com/approval-rating-of-colombian-president-duque-plummets-just-months-after-taking-office/">plummeted</a>, from 47 percent in October to 27 percent in November. Meanwhile, <a href="http://www.ideaspaz.org/publications/posts/1710">the number of street protests has more than tripled</a> since Duque took office, according to an analysis by the think tank <a href="http://www.ideaspaz.org/">Fundación Ideas para la Paz</a>.</p>
<p>Students and school <a href="http://www.fecode.edu.co/index.php/notas-principales-1.html">teachers</a> have <a href="https://www.semana.com/educacion/articulo/movimientos-estudiantiles-historicos-en-colombia/529694">demonstrated</a> to demand higher public education investment, better teacher pay and improved educational access nationwide. Their marches have been joined by <a href="http://www.onic.org.co/comunicados-onic/2599-indigenas-de-colombia-onic-apoya-y-lucha-por-el-derecho-a-la-educacion-superior-gratuita-y-pluricultural">indigenous groups</a>, who express solidarity with the students and demand an autonomous indigenous education system. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/protesta-de-cocaleros-bloquean-vias-en-norte-de-santander-279888">Coca-leaf growers</a> have marched in different provinces, protesting the government’s renewed focus on eradicating their illicit crop rather than on helping farmers plant substitutes like cacao and coffee. </p>
<p>And Colombian truckers <a href="https://www.larepublica.co/economia/el-proximo-viernes-distintos-lideres-de-los-camioneros-empezarian-un-paro-nacional-2795125">went on strike over what they say are excessively high fuel, VAT and toll prices in late November</a>, demonstrations that now risk paralyzing commerce. </p>
<h2>Ending Colombia’s armed conflict</h2>
<p>In Colombia, a protest movement with so much power and stamina is not necessarily a bad sign. As a scholar of <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=jjkUy0wAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">peace and conflict</a>, I see these public displays of dissent as proof that peace is effectively taking hold in Colombia after decades of bloody violence.</p>
<p>The Colombian conflict, which began in the late 1940s and continues today, is one of the world’s longest-running armed struggles. It involves the Colombian armed forces, leftist guerrillas seeking to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-36605769">overthrow the state</a>, drug lords who control huge swaths of territory and right-wing paramilitary groups.</p>
<p>Clashes between these factions – which have included bombings, firefights, kidnappings and <a href="https://theconversation.com/colombias-murder-rate-is-at-an-all-time-low-but-its-activists-keep-getting-killed-91602">targeted assassinations</a> – have killed more than <a href="https://www.unidadvictimas.gov.co/es/registro-unico-de-victimas-ruv/37394">1 million civilians since 1985</a> and given Colombia <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2017/">the world’s second-largest displaced population</a>. </p>
<p>In late 2016, after a lengthy negotiation, President Santos <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-did-a-new-colombian-peace-agreement-come-so-quickly-after-the-referendum-no-vote-69749">signed</a> a <a href="https://theconversation.com/getting-to-yes-in-colombia-what-it-would-take-to-reintegrate-the-farc-66710">controversial treaty</a> with the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia, or FARC guerrillas. </p>
<p>The FARC was the biggest and most tenacious player in Colombia’s conflict, with around 7,000 troops stationed across the country. Disarming these Marxist revolutionaries was an important step toward deescalating violence and convincing <a href="https://theconversation.com/will-colombias-most-stubborn-rebel-group-agree-to-peace-71835">other armed groups</a> to enter talks with the government.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/248856/original/file-20181204-34134-rykhkg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/248856/original/file-20181204-34134-rykhkg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=369&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/248856/original/file-20181204-34134-rykhkg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=369&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/248856/original/file-20181204-34134-rykhkg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=369&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/248856/original/file-20181204-34134-rykhkg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/248856/original/file-20181204-34134-rykhkg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/248856/original/file-20181204-34134-rykhkg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Colombian president Juan Manuel Santos, center left, shakes hands with FARC commander Timochenko after signing a peace accord.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/The-Week-That-Was-in-Latin-America-Photo-Gallery/c252dad242cd4409b95ba59533955502/2/0">AP Photo/Fernando Vergara</a></span>
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<p>The Colombian government has faced <a href="https://theconversation.com/latest-threat-to-colombias-peace-process-murders-a-kidnapping-delays-and-of-course-politics-73895">numerous</a> hurdles to fully <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-latest-threat-to-peace-in-colombia-congress-87810">implementing</a> the agreements it made with the FARC, and many Colombians reject <a href="https://theconversation.com/negotiating-with-terrorists-diplomacy-triumphs-in-colombias-peace-process-65775">negotiating with terrorists</a> entirely. Skirmishes continue, and a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-colombia-rights-killings/human-rights-activists-say-hitmen-are-targeting-them-in-colombia-un-idUSKBN1O22OW">spate of activist killings</a> has international observers worried. </p>
<p>Peace is still fragile.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, the year after the accord came into effect, on Nov. 30, 2016, FARC fatalities <a href="http://www.elcolombiano.com/colombia/acuerdos-de-gobierno-y-farc/el-primer-ano-de-la-paz-en-cifras-GE7745778">declined from 3,000 to 78</a>, Colombia’s murder rate dropped to <a href="https://theconversation.com/colombias-murder-rate-is-at-an-all-time-low-but-its-activists-keep-getting-killed-91602">a historic low</a>, and <a href="https://razonpublica.com/index.php/politica-y-gobierno-temas-27/10958-colombia-seguir%C3%A1-el-asesinato-de-los-l%C3%ADderes-pol%C3%ADticos.html">attacks by armed groups declined 52 percent</a>.</p>
<h2>Peace stretches its wings</h2>
<p>The current protest movement is another consequence of Colombia’s new peace. </p>
<p>During the FARC’s 52-year insurgency, social movements in Colombia were frequently accused of being an <a href="https://read.dukeupress.edu/labor/article-abstract/8/1/57/15433">extension of the guerrilla group</a> or of <a href="https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/ministro-de-defensa-dice-que-grupos-armados-financian-la-protesta-social/582944">being infiltrated by its members</a>. That allowed public officials to discredit protesters as terrorists and ignore their demands.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/colombias-deal-with-the-farc-could-bring-peace-or-create-a-power-vacuum-48130">FARC accord</a> changed that. </p>
<p>For the first time in its modern history, there’s room for dissent in Colombia. </p>
<p>Politicians from the left and right now openly <a href="https://twitter.com/angelamrobledo/status/1067841633453072386">support the marches</a> organized by students, teachers, coca-growers, indigenous people, Afro-Colombians and trade unions. Political backing gives protesters more legitimacy and shields them from possible police repression – previously a <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/es/countries/americas/colombia/report-colombia/">common response to non-violent and violent protests alike</a>. </p>
<h2>Police protection, not repression</h2>
<p>National policing reforms <a href="https://www.policia.gov.co/sites/default/files/ley-1801-codigo-nacional-policia-convivencia.pdf">passed in 2016</a>, which sought to safeguard the <a href="http://www.constitucioncolombia.com/titulo-2/capitulo-1/articulo-37">constitutional right to protest in Colombia</a>, have also led to a more restrained response by law enforcement.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Officers greeting student protesters from the National University of Colombian in October.</span></figcaption>
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<p>When marches shut down city streets and snare traffic, Colombian riot police typically escort and protect protesters, rather than confront them. On the last day of a student strike in October, officers in the town of Popayán even <a href="http://www.wradio.com.co/noticias/regionales/policias-recibieron-con-flores-a-estudiantes-que-marcharon-en-popayan/20181018/nota/3813348.aspx">gave protesters flowers</a>. </p>
<p>Confrontations between <a href="https://www.facebook.com/senadorcarlosfelipemejia/videos/214353412794707/">Colombian police and protesters still occur</a>, sometimes <a href="https://twitter.com/YaoMedinaMar/status/1063192485852266497/photo/1">violently</a>. </p>
<p>On Nov. 11, as officers in riot gear arrested students during a massive education march in Bogota, video <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xlhSSp7suQA">footage</a> appears to confirm protesters’ allegations that <a href="https://twitter.com/angelamrobledo/status/1063211204460593152">plainclothes police</a> threw stones at the officers to incite violence.</p>
<p>Colombian police seem to use force more often in confronting rural marches by <a href="http://www.vanguardia.com/actualidad/colombia/230136-indigenas-denunciaron-abusos-del-esmad-durante-las-protestas">indigenous</a>, <a href="http://www.defensoria.gov.co/es/nube/enlosmedios/6402/Defensor-del-Pueblo-llama-la-atenci%C3%B3n-por-abusos-del-Esmad-en-paro-de-Buenaventura-Buenaventura-ESMAD-Fuerza-P%C3%BAblica-crisis-humanitaria-orden-p%C3%BAblico-Derechos-colectivos.htm">Afro-Colombian</a> and <a href="http://www.hchr.org.co/index.php/compilacion-de-noticias/52-fuerza-publica/8270-denuncian-abuso-del-esmad-tras-disturbios-por-exploracion-petrolera-en-caqueta">peasant</a> protesters, my analysis shows. In part, that’s because the 2016 police reforms – like most government initiatives in Colombia – have been more fully adopted in the capital and other major cities. </p>
<p>Urban protesters also have better access to the legal and PR help they need to hold law enforcement accountable for abuse, and their causes tend to enjoy more political support.</p>
<p>Police are not the only ones changing their protest tactics in the new Colombia. </p>
<iframe src="https://www.facebook.com/plugins/video.php?href=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.facebook.com%2Fkatherin.ayala%2Fvideos%2F10156958456776410%2F&show_text=0&width=560" width="100%" height="315" style="border:none;overflow:hidden" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" allowtransparency="true" allowfullscreen="true"></iframe>
<p><em>Colombians dance at a protest in the main square of Bogota on Nov. 11 (Katherin Ayala/Facebook)</em></p>
<p>Advocacy groups have demonstrated creative, <a href="https://youtu.be/BEBlCzQPoBs">peaceful forms of protest</a>, using art, dance and music to convey their message. Most <a href="http://extra.com.co/noticias/nacional/alejandro-palacios-lider-estudiantil-rechaza-actos-de-vandal-478506">explicitly reject</a> violence as a strategy.</p>
<p>In a country where for so long dissent was met with repression, stigma and accusations of terrorism, these vibrant protests are signs of positive change indeed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/107339/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Fabio Andrés Díaz Pabón does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Strikes and rallies have gripped Colombia for months. That’s bad news for its new government but a sign of progress in a country that had little tolerance for dissent during its 52-year civil war.Fabio Andrés Díaz Pabón, Researcher on Conflict, Peace and Development, International Institute of Social StudiesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/982732018-06-18T20:46:52Z2018-06-18T20:46:52ZColombia elects a conservative who promises to ‘correct’ its peace accord<p>In <a href="http://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/conflicto-y-narcotrafico/colombia-vivio-las-elecciones-mas-seguras-223160">the most peaceful election in its modern history</a>, Colombia has elected as its next president a conservative who <a href="https://theconversation.com/colombias-presidential-runoff-will-be-a-yet-another-referendum-on-peace-91603">has promised to “correct” the country’s tenuous 2016 peace deal</a>. </p>
<p>Iván Duque, of the Democratic Center party, won election on June 17 with <a href="https://presidente2018.registraduria.gov.co/resultados/2html/resultados.html">54 percent</a> of the votes amid <a href="https://registraduria.gov.co/?page=Elecciones_2018">record high turnout</a>. Duque opposes same-sex marriage, supports harsh penalties for drug use and wants to <a href="http://www.elcolombiano.com/elecciones-2018-colombia/mas-empresas-y-menos-impuestos-quiere-duque-EC8774336">reduce taxes on the wealthy</a>. </p>
<p>His left-wing rival, Gustavo Petro – a one-time Marxist guerrilla fighter and former Bogota mayor – received <a href="https://presidente2018.registraduria.gov.co/resultados/2html/resultados.html">42 percent of the vote</a>. </p>
<p>Approximately <a href="https://twitter.com/CatesbyHolmes/status/1008496479311417348">5 percent of Colombians cast blank ballots</a>, showing their dissatisfaction with the two candidates who advanced from the first round of Colombia’s presidential election in May.</p>
<p>The 41-year-old Duque, who has never before held elected office, begins his four-year term in August. His running mate, Martha Lucía Ramírez, will become Colombia’s <a href="http://www.dane.gov.co/reloj/">first female vice president</a>.</p>
<h2>What of peace?</h2>
<p>Duque’s <a href="http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-colombia-election-20180616-htmlstory.html">win was widely predicted</a> in this conservative South American country. </p>
<p>But his opponent did far better than expected, almost doubling his share of the votes between the first and second rounds of the election. He received 8 million votes, <a href="https://www.rcnradio.com/politica/petro-el-politico-de-izquierda-mas-votado-en-la-historia-de-colombia">more than any leftist presidential candidate</a> in Colombia’s history.</p>
<p>Beyond appealing to progressive Colombians, Petro also attracted moderates who feared Duque’s <a href="https://lasillavacia.com/podria-duque-modificar-el-acuerdo-de-paz-66216">opposition to a 2016 peace accord</a> between the Colombian government and the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia, or FARC guerrillas. </p>
<p>As part of the deal, which ended 52 years of violence in Colombia, FARC combatants would <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/09/27/colombia-peace-deals-promise-and-flaws">avoid jail time for their wartime crimes</a> if they agreed to lay down their weapons and undergo training for their re-entry into civilian life. </p>
<p>FARC members were also allowed to participate in Colombia’s political process. The FARC relaunched as a <a href="https://theconversation.com/colombias-farc-rebels-have-rebranded-as-a-political-party-now-they-need-a-leader-82728">political party in August 2017</a>, and its former commander <a href="https://theconversation.com/colombian-guerrilla-leader-ends-controversial-presidential-bid-giving-peace-a-chance-93200">briefly ran for president</a> this year before withdrawing for health reasons.</p>
<p>Echoing the hawkish rhetoric of his mentor, the powerful Senator and former President Alvaro Uribe, Duque says the 2016 FARC accord was too lenient and should be “renegotiated.” The president-elect wants former combatants to be <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-colombia-election/colombian-peace-deal-critic-to-face-fiery-leftist-in-runoff-idUSKCN1IS03E">punished for their crimes</a>.</p>
<p>Duque was the only candidate in Colombia’s 2018 presidential election who did not support the <a href="https://kroc.nd.edu/assets/257593/informe_kroc.pdf">ambitious agreements ending war with the FARC</a>. Reneging on the deal risks restarting the <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/ending-colombias-hundred-year-war/">longest-running conflict in the Western Hemisphere</a>.</p>
<p>Colombia is currently in talks with a different armed group, the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-35929399">National Liberation Army</a>. The group, which is now Colombia’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/will-colombias-most-stubborn-rebel-group-agree-to-peace-71835">largest guerrilla organization</a>, has kept a ceasefire in place and <a href="https://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/2018/05/30/nota/6783908/beltran-negociacion-seguira-duque">signaled its intention to stay at the negotiation table</a>. But the status of that peace process is now unclear. </p>
<h2>Tackling the drug trade</h2>
<p>Also on Duque’s chopping block is the peace accord’s plan for dealing with drug trafficking and the cultivation of coca leaf, the main ingredient in cocaine.</p>
<p>The drug trade remains a <a href="http://www.americasquarterly.org/content/how-santos-new-peace-deal-aggravated-colombias-drug-war">central challenge to Colombia’s peace process</a>. Revenue from illegal coca and cocaine fueled Colombia’s armed conflict <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books/about/Colonizaci%C3%B3n_coca_y_guerrilla.html?id=ELe8AAAAIAAJ&redir_esc=y">for the last three decades</a>. In April 2018, the U.S. accused FARC leader Jesús Santrich <a href="https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/judicial/la-acusacion-de-estados-unidos-contra-jesus-santrich-articulo-749309">of international drug trafficking</a>.</p>
<p>Suggesting that the FARC’s connections to the drug trade <a href="https://elpais.com/internacional/2018/01/17/colombia/1516162343_892303.html">inappropriately influenced the peace deal</a>, the president-elect has said he will reconsider its drug-related provisions. They include programs that help farmers <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-coca-leaf-not-coffee-may-always-be-colombias-favourite-cash-crop-74723">replace their illicit crop with legal products</a> like coffee or cacao. </p>
<p>Duque wants to resume aerial fumigation, a <a href="http://progressive.org/dispatches/back-to-spraying-poison-u-s-pressures-colombia-to-resume-aer/">U.S.-supported</a> counter-narcotics strategy to eradicate coca crops. It was ended in 2015, decades after evidence emerged that <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/05/15/406988063/colombia-will-end-coca-crop-dusting-citing-health-concerns">the glysophate spray was poisoning Colombian farmers</a> and killing legitimate agricultural products.</p>
<p>Advocates of Colombia’s peace deal and drug policy reformers say such punitive approaches merely <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2001/01/07/aerial-attack-killing-more-than-coca/df386c06-e9c7-4e85-85b2-80a514f1ae37/">hurt poor farmers</a> while <a href="https://www.razonpublica.com/index.php/econom-y-sociedad-temas-29/10554-el-narcotr%C3%A1fico-como-delito-pol%C3%ADtico-desatino-o-condici%C3%B3n-para-el-posconflicto.html">fueling the kind of rural anti-government sentiment</a> that bolsters support for armed factions. </p>
<h2>Birds of a feather?</h2>
<p>The president-elect may not follow through on all these campaign promises. </p>
<p>Colombia’s peace deal with the FARC was divisive. Just <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-colombia-voted-no-to-peace-with-farc-66416">over 50 percent of the population voted against it in an October 2016 referendum</a>, compelling President Juan Manuel Santos to pass his hard-won accord through congressional action instead. So running against the peace process was a good campaign strategy for an opposition candidate. </p>
<p>But Duque moved toward the center in the lead-up to the presidential run-off to win over moderate voters, and he has <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/06/conservative-ivan-duque-wins-colombia-presidential-election-180617215223568.html">promised</a> not to “tear the agreement to shreds.” </p>
<p>As president, he may prove better able than the current president to sell conservative constituents on some concessions that are necessary to keep Colombia’s peace.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/220821/original/file-20180529-80650-1xnj90v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/220821/original/file-20180529-80650-1xnj90v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/220821/original/file-20180529-80650-1xnj90v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/220821/original/file-20180529-80650-1xnj90v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/220821/original/file-20180529-80650-1xnj90v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/220821/original/file-20180529-80650-1xnj90v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/220821/original/file-20180529-80650-1xnj90v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Colombia ended its 52-year conflict with the FARC guerrillas in late 2016. The next president must decide whether to uphold the deal.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Ivan Valencia</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>His decision on the peace process and many other pressing issues in Colombia will likely depend on <a href="http://lasillavacia.com/duque-no-seria-el-titere-de-uribe-porque-ya-encarna-su-vision-66389">the role that the hard-line former President Uribe</a> plays in his administration. Uribe – now a senator and the leader of a deeply right-wing legislative bloc backed <a href="https://www.elespectador.com/elecciones-2018/noticias/politica/movimientos-evangelicos-en-primera-vuelta-quien-se-quedo-con-el-botin-articulo-789981">by evangelical Christian groups</a> – was an outsized presence in Duque’s campaign. </p>
<p><a href="https://elpais.com/internacional/2018/05/28/colombia/1527513115_112851.html">Polls show that many Petro voters</a> voted against Duque because they feared that <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/25/world/americas/colombia-uribe-drugs.html">the controversial Uribe</a> would run his presidency behind the scenes. </p>
<h2>The specter of corruption</h2>
<p>Duque’s campaign was also endorsed by <a href="http://lasillavacia.com/los-apoyos-cuestionados-y-aceptados-de-duque-65921">several politicians with alleged connections to violent Colombian paramilitary organizations</a>. That has fueled concern that the powerful illicit groups will <a href="https://www.elespectador.com/opinion/dos-discrepancias-y-un-voto-columna-794331">once again exert influence over Colombian politics</a> at the highest level.</p>
<p>Duque, however, says fighting corruption will be a centerpiece of his presidency. </p>
<p>“We will be the government that … confront[s] this cancer,” he said in <a href="https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/no-voy-gobernar-con-odios-ivan-duque-video-794987">his acceptance speech</a>, adding that Colombia should be a “country of social justice and political equality.”</p>
<p>For the millions of Colombians who voted against him, the future of this war-torn nation feels uncertain. Duque must now decide whether to govern Colombia in peace.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/98273/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Fabio Andrés Díaz Pabón does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In the most peaceful election in their modern history, Colombians have elected as their next president a conservative who will renegotiate the country’s fragile 2016 accord with the FARC guerrillas.Fabio Andrés Díaz Pabón, Researcher on Conflict, Peace and Development, International Institute of Social StudiesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/968302018-06-14T15:07:02Z2018-06-14T15:07:02ZColombia struggles to build trust in the state as peace process rumbles on<p>In the Colombian peace plebiscite of 2016, <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-colombia-voted-no-to-peace-with-farc-66416">50.2% of voters rejected the Havana Accords</a> signed between the government and the FARC guerrilla movement. This they did after a sensationalist No campaign exploited a lack of informed public opinion, using questionable “facts” to stir up fear and hatred, among them such as “Santos is giving the country over to the FARC” or the idea that the peace agreement created a “gender ideology” that would teach homosexuality in schools. </p>
<p>Colombia’s State Council ultimately <a href="http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/consejo-de-estado-reconoce-que-hubo-engano-generalizado-en-campana-del-no-al-plebiscito/510010">found</a> that many of the No campaign’s claims constituted “generalised deceit”, despite the fact that the government had been formally required to make the terms of the referendum as clear as possible.</p>
<p>In the run-up to the vote, Colombian society, especially organised civil society such as human rights organisations, universities and local communities called urgently for the state to disseminate and explain the accords so people could vote in an informed manner. This demand was even enshrined into law by the Constitutional Court, which <a href="http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2016/c-379-16.htm">ruled</a> the state had “the duty to inform citizens in an objective, impartial and sufficient way on the issue they are going to decide about” in order to uphold “the right to information”. </p>
<p>Educating an electorate about a complex peace process was never going to be easy. Nevertheless, starting in 2014, the government began to disseminate and explain the Havana Accords. The work was picked up by social organisations, academics, journalists, international organisations and state entities – in particular the <a href="http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Paginas/OACP/Oficina-Alto-Comisionado-para-la-Paz.aspx">Presidential Office for the High Commissioner for Peace</a> (OACP). The OACP created a so-called “pedagogy team” that travelled the country explaining the agreement. They met with military members, civil servants, the business sector, rural communities and social organisations. </p>
<p>But the team’s work proved to be in vain. In the end, turnout was low, and Colombia <a href="https://www.lrb.co.uk/v38/n20/gwen-burnyeat/no">voted No</a>. After the unexpected result, the OACP tried to analyse where it had gone wrong – and, on reflection, many of its workers believed they had gone about it in entirely the wrong way.</p>
<h2>Another way</h2>
<p>In the words of one of the OACP members I have been doing ethnographic fieldwork with over the last year: “Society needs to feel security, tranquility and trust”, but “we were communicating technical things”. As another pointed out, the agreement as written is “like a brick” – a 310-page tome whose technical complexity makes it practically unreadable for most ordinary people. </p>
<p>To keep the work going, they therefore created after the vote various projects which seek to communicate the peace process in a way that engages people’s emotions. The premise is that the implementation of the accords (which were renegotiated after the plebiscite and ratified by Congress) is only a starting point, and that the peace process cannot succeed unless Colombian society gets behind it.</p>
<p>One project, called “<a href="https://web.facebook.com/YoEnVosConfio/?ref=br_rs">In Thou I Trust</a>” is trying to to create new narratives that promote pro-peace mindsets to counter the No campaign’s “post-truth” slogans, many of which are still circulating. These narratives are generated in workshops between OACP and regional civil society groups representing people whose voices have long been silenced. As one team member explained to me: “The FARC gave up their weapons and no one celebrated the end of 50 years of war. We have to change that, and we have to do it with the voices of citizens in the regions.”</p>
<p>This all sounds hopeful indeed, but there are big challenges to overcome. The most obvious is the upcoming <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/28/colombia-presidential-elections-ivan-duque-gustavo-petro-runoff">2018 presidential election</a>, where the future of the peace process has become one of the most polarising issues. But on a deeper level, the Santos government that negotiated the peace deal has never really given serious thought to the complex ways in which Colombians perceive the state. Instead, the government has underestimated the scale of the task. </p>
<h2>Trust deficit</h2>
<p>The Havana Agreement includes <a href="http://www.ideaspaz.org/publications/posts/1542">70 different mechanisms</a> designed to involve citizens in implementing the peace process, which would necessarily mean working with and through the state. But that will be close to impossible unless the state can change the way many Colombians currently perceive it.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://revistas.uniandes.edu.co/doi/full/10.7440/antipoda29.2017.01">several anthropologists</a> have detailed, various groups in Colombia feel deeply mixed emotions about the state. They want it to “be present” and implement promises of rights and citizenship – but at the same time they are angry at a history of direct state violence and “abandonment”. They want the state to make amends for its past misdeeds, but also believe it never will.</p>
<p>In many ways, the peace process is less about the FARC than about a deeper process of state-building. Colombia is fragmented by geographical and racial divisions, unequal patterns of colonisation and uneven investment in infrastructure. </p>
<p>The upshot is that participants in OACP projects are often sceptical about making any alliances with the state at all. In one meeting I attended, a woman said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The conflict has a political, social and economic background. The power structures have generated this abandonment, a cultural legacy in which violence, poverty and exclusion have been normalised. These meetings, convened by those who are supposed to ensure the fulfilment of the agreement, will they really lead to deep changes? Many things are going unfulfilled. I do not see any political will.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The OACP is trying to give people a new opportunity to express these emotions to compassionate state representatives. Many of the officials I’ve met are deeply committed to “doing things differently”. Among them are people who previously worked in NGOs and international agencies, and who now hope to transform the state and its relationship with society from the inside. They have to quickly thicken their skins; it’s not easy to be frequently confronted with accusations about “the state” that overwhelm their own ability to take responsibility.</p>
<p>But the ultimate test will be the next government’s behaviour in terms of the continuity of the Santos’ administration’s peace policy. It’s simply not enough to send out a small team of well-intentioned state officials to be sympathetic interlocutors. If the government fails to honour the commitments acquired in the Havana Accords, and implemented them convincingly, it will only reinforce many Colombians’ deeply cynical attitudes towards the state. That will make it much harder for society to recognise its own duty to participate in peace-building – and in turn, put the hard-won peace process on the back foot.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/96830/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gwen Burnyeat is a Wolfson Foundation PhD Scholar in Anthropology at University College London. She is currently doing ethnographic field research as an unpaid volunteer within the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace. </span></em></p>The Colombian government has learned the hard way that simply explaining a complex deal to people won’t win them over.Gwen Burnyeat, Wolfson PhD Scholar in Anthropology, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/916032018-05-30T10:37:21Z2018-05-30T10:37:21ZColombia’s presidential runoff will be a yet another referendum on peace<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/220821/original/file-20180529-80650-1xnj90v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Colombia ended its 52-year conflict with the FARC guerrillas in late 2016. The next president must decide whether to uphold the deal.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Ivan Valencia</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>There were five candidates competing in Colombia’s May 27 presidential election, but peace was the main question on the ballot.</p>
<p>In late 2016, the Colombian government signed a <a href="https://theconversation.com/peace-makes-strides-in-colombia-but-the-battle-is-far-from-won-83601">controversial accord</a> with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, a guerrilla group. Election season <a href="http://www.chicagotribune.com/sns-bc-ams-gen-2017-colombia-paz-y-elecciones-20171229-story.html">closely followed the peace deal</a> – an incredibly divisive issue that was <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-colombia-voted-no-to-peace-with-farc-66416">defeated at referendum</a> just over a month before Congress approved it – turning it into a polarizing campaign issue.</p>
<p>Implementation of the <a href="https://kroc.nd.edu/assets/257593/informe_kroc.pdf">ambitious agreements with the FARC remains a work in progress</a>. Colombia is also currently negotiating another <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-35929399">peace process, with the National Liberation Army guerrilla group</a>. </p>
<p>The next president must decide whether to keep to this path or take a different route. </p>
<p>None of the five candidates <a href="https://presidente2018.registraduria.gov.co/resultados/html/resultados.html">received over 50 percent of the vote</a> on May 27, so the top two candidates – conservative Iván Duque and the leftist former Bogota Mayor Gustavo Petro – <a href="https://www.npr.org/2018/05/28/615010212/colombias-presidential-election-heads-to-runoff">will face off in a June 17 runoff</a>. </p>
<p>Their visions for the country’s future could hardly be more different.</p>
<h2>Peace on the agenda</h2>
<p>This is not the first time peace has been on the ballot in Colombia. </p>
<p>The FARC’s violent 52-year campaign against the government constituted <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/colombia-farc-peace-treaty-longest-war-western-hemisphere-ends-a7331746.html">the longest-running conflict in the Western Hemisphere</a>. According to <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Catalina_Jimenez3">our research on Colombia’s violence</a>, different plans for quelling it have featured prominently in <a href="http://a.co/hu1ElZc">every Colombian election since 1998</a>. </p>
<p>But this year is different. After decades of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/10/01/heres-the-century-long-history-behind-colombias-peace-agreement-with-the-farc/">stalled negotiations</a>, a peace process is finally in motion. This is the first presidential election in Colombia in which the FARC participated not as an armed group but as a <a href="https://theconversation.com/colombias-farc-rebels-have-rebranded-as-a-political-party-now-they-need-a-leader-82728">political party</a>.</p>
<p>Now, the two presidential candidates disagree on what should happen next.</p>
<p>Duque, a right-wing senator from the <a href="http://www.centrodemocratico.com/">Democratic Center Party</a>, who received 39 percent of the votes, believes the deal is too lenient on Colombia’s former guerrillas. If elected, he promises to <a href="https://lasillavacia.com/podria-duque-modificar-el-acuerdo-de-paz-66216">renegotiate</a> the accords to include <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-colombia-election/colombian-peace-deal-critic-to-face-fiery-leftist-in-runoff-idUSKCN1IS03E">punishment for demobilized combatants’ wartime crimes</a>.</p>
<p>Petro, who is committed to upholding the current accord with the FARC, won 25 percent of the vote competing against two other pro-peace candidates. Petro once belonged to an armed guerrilla group himself: the <a href="http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/91">the M-19</a>, which signed a <a href="https://www.semana.com/especiales/articulo/la-paz-con-el-m-19/32794-3">peace deal</a> with the Colombian government in the early 1990s. </p>
<p>This difference in approaches towards peace is evident on both candidates’ webpages. <a href="https://www.ivanduque.com/">Duque’s</a> does not even mention the word “peace.” But peace is a <a href="https://petro.com.co/">central element of Petro’s presidential agenda</a>.</p>
<h2>Left vs. right</h2>
<p>The FARC accord is not the only point of disagreement between Duque and Petro. The two also represent opposite ideological positions. </p>
<p>Duque, an ally of Colombia’s <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2018/05/26/colombians-hope-for-change-in-the-first-post-war-presidential-election">powerful former President Alvaro Uribe</a>, opposes same-sex marriage, supports harsh penalties for drug use and has the backing <a href="https://www.elespectador.com/elecciones-2018/noticias/politica/movimientos-evangelicos-en-primera-vuelta-quien-se-quedo-con-el-botin-articulo-789981">of evangelical Christian organizations</a>.</p>
<p>His economic proposals would <a href="http://www.elcolombiano.com/elecciones-2018-colombia/mas-empresas-y-menos-impuestos-quiere-duque-EC8774336">reduce taxes on the wealthy</a> and <a href="http://www.ivanduque.com/propuestas/8/147/medio-ambiente/el-desarrollo-minero-del-pais-se-adelantara-con-los-mas-altos-estandares-de-responsabilidad">ramp up mining</a> and oil extraction in Colombia.</p>
<p>Petro, on the other hand, is a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/blogs/americas/2013/12/98146.html">leftist firebrand</a>. As mayor of Bogota from 2012 to 2014, he promoted human rights and pushed through numerous social welfare programs. </p>
<p>But he is mostly remembered for a scandal brought on by his administration’s attempt to take over the capital city’s <a href="https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/basuras-la-pelea-de-honor-que-libro-gustavo-petro/552598">garbage collection</a>, which was then privately run. <a href="http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/article1958454.html">Trash piled up</a> for days. </p>
<p>In December 2013, Petro was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/10/bogota-mayor-gustavo-petro-removed">removed from office</a> by Colombia’s top prosecutor. A court order reinstated him in April 2014.</p>
<p>Now, his campaign promises include fighting tax evasion, increasing renewable energy sources and reforming the tax code to penalize large-scale landowners <a href="http://www.eltiempo.com/elecciones-colombia-2018/presidenciales/gustavo-petro-presenta-propuestas-para-acabar-con-el-latifundio-improductivo-183892">who let their lands lay fallow</a>.</p>
<h2>Exaggerations and smear campaigns</h2>
<p>The two candidates’ visions for Colombia’s future differ so dramatically that <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/es/2018/05/28/opinion-abad-faciolince-colombia-oligarquia-demagogia-duque-petro/">each stands accused of representing a danger to the nation</a>. Well-crafted social media campaigns, whose <a href="http://www.elpais.com.co/proceso-de-paz/las-polemicas-revelaciones-de-promotor-del-no-sobre-estrategia-en-el-plebiscito.html">origins remain largely unknown</a>, have <a href="https://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Five-Scandals-that-Marked-the-Colombian-Presidential-Campaigns-20180527-0013.html">spread false news stories, doctored photos and disinformation</a> about both throughout the presidential campaign.</p>
<p>Duque is portrayed as a juggernaut who will destroy the peace process and <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2018/05/26/colombians-hope-for-change-in-the-first-post-war-presidential-election">undermine Colombian democracy</a>. He is also derided as a pawn who will allow former President Uribe – a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/25/world/americas/colombia-uribe-drugs.html">deeply divisive figure accused of having ties to the drug trade</a> – to once again control the country, despite being constitutionally prohibited from seeking another term. </p>
<p>Petro is <a href="https://www.elespectador.com/opinion/petro-el-expropiador-columna-738428">said to be a Marxist and a follower of the late Venezuelan populist leader Hugo Chávez</a> who will lead Colombia into <a href="https://www.semana.com/opinion/articulo/castro-chavismo-el-dano-que-hace-la-palabra-opinion-de-juan-diego-restrepo/381145-3">economic and social dystopia</a>. His management of Bogota <a href="https://www.elespectador.com/opinion/el-fracaso-de-petro-columna-557229">is portrayed as chaotic</a>. </p>
<p>These <a href="https://www.elespectador.com/elecciones-2018/noticias/politica/asi-se-fabrican-las-noticias-falsas-creeria-usted-esto-que-dicen-fajardo-duque-petro-y-vargas-articulo-738881">social media campaigns</a> promote grossly exaggerated versions of reality.</p>
<p>But they’re working. Surveys <a href="https://elpais.com/internacional/2018/05/28/colombia/1527513115_112851.html">show</a> that many Colombian voters made their choices on May 27 driven largely by fear: They voted <a href="https://elpais.com/internacional/2018/05/28/colombia/1527513115_112851.html">against Petro or Duque, not for them</a>.</p>
<p>In this sense, Colombia’s online disinformation campaigns recall the online voter polarization efforts that predated major ballots in the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/07/us/politics/russia-facebook-twitter-election.html">United States</a> and United Kingdom in 2016. </p>
<h2>What comes next?</h2>
<p><a href="https://elpais.com/internacional/2018/05/06/colombia/1525643351_897656.html">Both campaigns</a> have likewise <a href="https://www.semana.com/economia/articulo/propuestas-economicas-mas-populistas-de-los-candidatos/558750">fueled this extreme rhetoric</a> throughout the campaign season.</p>
<p>As the June 17 presidential runoff approaches, Petro and Duque will likely seek to sharpen their differences to court supporters of the three candidates who did not advance into the second round of voting. </p>
<p>To win, Duque needs supporters of the hard-line right-wing candidate <a href="https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/world/2018/05/27/conservative-tops-colombia-presidential-vote-but-runoff-needed/9n0yW1zihi01g3CfZ9BodJ/story.html">Germán Vargas Lleras</a>, who received almost 8 percent of the vote. He must also charm centrists inclined toward his politics but fearful that democracy would suffer <a href="https://elpais.com/internacional/2018/05/28/colombia/1527513115_112851.html">under former President Uribe’s renewed influence</a>.</p>
<p>Petro will try to earn the trust of supporters of Sergio Fajardo, the even-keeled former mayor of Medellín who came in a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/the-latest-polls-close-in-colombian-presidential-election/2018/05/27/f2edd8fe-61f1-11e8-81ca-bb14593acaa6_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.7f83963c16cd">very close third with just under 24 percent of votes</a>. He also hopes to gain leftists who voted for Humberto de la Calle, the lead negotiator in Colombia’s 2016 peace deal. </p>
<p>These moderate voters believe in the peace process. But they are <a href="https://elpais.com/internacional/2018/05/28/colombia/1527513115_112851.html">uncertain about Petro’s leadership style and radical economic proposals</a>. </p>
<p>Whoever wins on June 17 will face an enormous challenge. Nothing less than the future of a perilously fragile nation will rest in their hands.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/91603/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Two candidates from Colombia’s May 27 presidential vote will face off on June 17. One is a former guerrilla. The other is a hard-liner. Their views for the nation’s future couldn’t be more different.Fabio Andrés Díaz Pabón, Researcher on Conflict, Peace and Development, International Institute of Social StudiesMagda Jiménez, Associate professor, Universidad Externado de ColombiaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/963162018-05-18T12:55:46Z2018-05-18T12:55:46ZColombia’s ‘cash-for-kills’ victims could number 10,000 civilians<p>Of all the horrors to emerge from Colombia’s five-decades long conflict with the guerilla forces of the FARC-EP, the so-called <a href="https://theconversation.com/colombia-struggles-to-deliver-justice-in-army-cash-for-kills-scandal-82350">false positives scandal</a> is one of the most notorious. </p>
<p>Between 2002 and 2010, members of the Colombian military <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/13/opinion/colombias-compromise-with-murder.html">used promises of employment</a> to lure, kidnap and murder thousands of vulnerable young men before presenting their deaths as “combat kills”, for which they were remunerated by the government. According to evidence presented in the perpetrators’ <a href="https://thebogotapost.com/2018/02/15/recruiter-false-positives-scandal/">trials</a>, they transported their victims hundreds of miles into the jungle and dressed them in FARC-EP uniforms, then photographed their corpses and presented the pictures as evidence for financial remuneration.</p>
<p>Now, in a recent <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/08/colombia-false-positives-scandal-casualties-higher-thought-study">book</a>, a former Colombian police colonel, Rojas Bolaños, has alleged that the practice was far more widespread and systematic than first imagined, and that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/08/colombia-false-positives-scandal-casualties-higher-thought-study">approximately 10,000 civilians</a> were murdered by Colombian military forces. </p>
<p>That staggering number raises difficult questions about the future of Colombia’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/colombias-approach-to-criminals-must-be-tough-for-the-sake-of-peace-73085">already struggling</a> post-conflict justice process. In a way, 10,000 represents the crossing of a sort of psychological threshold – it is hard to ignore. But Colombia has also been far too slow in delivering justice for crimes committed in its decades-long conflict – and that raises the possibility of an intervention by the International Criminal Court (ICC).</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/colombia-struggles-to-deliver-justice-in-army-cash-for-kills-scandal-82350">Colombia struggles to deliver justice in army 'cash-for-kills' scandal</a>
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<p>Colombia has been under “<a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/colombia">preliminary examination</a>” by the ICC since June 2004. So far, the court has gathered evidence, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/may/01/2017-deadliest-year-on-record-colombian-human-rights-defenders">received reports by advocacy groups</a>, <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/3D3055BD-16E2-4C83-BA85-35BCFD2A7922/285102/OTPCOLOMBIAPublicInterimReportNovember2012.pdf">produced interim reports</a>, and conducted visits to Colombia in 2013, 2015 and 2017. But since Colombia has not yet been formally recognised as a “<a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/Situations.aspx">situation</a>” by the ICC, no official investigations have begun, no arrest warrants prepared, and no hearings scheduled.</p>
<p>Many people both inside and outside Colombia think it’s time for the ICC to take the next step and declare the state “<a href="https://www.lawfareblog.com/who-board-unwilling-or-unable">unwilling or unable</a>” to carry out genuine prosecutions of those most responsible for these crimes. The ICC has jurisdiction over crimes against humanity committed by Colombian nationals or on the territory of Colombia since November 1, 2002 – a timeframe that would include the majority of “false positive” murders. But the mere fact the ICC can intervene in Colombia doesn’t mean it will, or indeed that it should.</p>
<h2>Into the fray?</h2>
<p>After a visit to Colombia in September 2017, the ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int//Pages/item.aspx?name=170913-otp-stat-colombia">insisted</a> that she was “impressed by the commitment, invaluable experience and high standards of Colombian courts”. She also said the courts were determined “to ensure genuine accountability for the most serious crimes and respect for the rights of victims”.</p>
<p>This hardly sounds like a prosecutor preparing to intervene. Perhaps that’s to be expected; the ICC is designed to be a court of last resort. It’s quite likely that Colombia will be given more time to bring those responsible to justice, especially since the country’s new transitional justice system has only recently opened its doors.</p>
<p>That system, known as the <a href="https://www.jep.gov.co/Paginas/Inicio.aspx">Special Jurisdiction for Peace</a>, was <a href="https://armedgroups-internationallaw.org/2017/06/18/final-english-translation-of-the-colombian-peace-agreement/">agreed</a> by the negotiating parties to the 2016 peace deal. A complex system of accountability, it is founded on exchanging the full confessions of those most responsible for international crimes for “limited sanctions”, meaning up to eight years of restricted liberty and enforced community service. Those who do not confess in full can be put on trial and potentially sentenced to up to 20 years in prison.</p>
<p>This setup has proved very controversial among Colombians. It was in fact <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-colombia-voted-no-to-peace-with-farc-66416">rejected</a> by a slim majority in a 2016 referendum, and ultimately implemented without being put to another popular vote. The FARC-EP is now a political party, but in recent legislative elections, it received only <a href="http://www.eltiempo.com/elecciones-colombia-2018/congreso/resultados-de-farc-en-las-elecciones-a-congreso-2018-minuto-a-minuto-192596">0.34%</a> of the total vote.</p>
<p>Much could depend on the winner of this year’s presidential elections, the outcome of which is set to be declared on June 17. One of the strongest runners is <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-colombia-election-polls/right-winger-duque-keeps-lead-in-poll-for-colombia-election-idUSKCN1IJ05G">Iván Duque</a>, a staunch right-wing critic of the peace deal; he is supported by an ex-president, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Alvaro-Uribe-Velez">Álvaro Uribe</a>, who worked hard to mobilise “No” voters in the 2016 plebiscite. </p>
<p>At minimum, assuming there’s a second round run-off, Duque will almost certainly be one of the two candidates fighting it. If he commits to unravelling the peace deal, then the resulting impunity may mean that an ICC intervention becomes inevitable. Without a credible and genuine attempt to bring those most responsible for international crimes to justice, Colombia will be in breach of its international obligations under the Rome Statute and calls for an ICC intervention will only get louder.</p>
<p>Whoever the next president of Colombia is, they would do well to remember Colombia’s international obligations. As the ICC’s Bensouda herself <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=160901-otp-stat-colombia">affirmed</a> after the peace deal was struck: </p>
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<p>As a state party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Colombia has recognised that grave crimes threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world and stated its determination to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators and thus contribute to the prevention of such crimes.</p>
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<p>That’s not a small task, but the peace process was deliberately set up to take it on. Whether Colombia will be willing and/or able to follow through is another matter.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/96316/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Seb Eskauriatza does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As reports of crimes against humanity mount, Colombia’s post-conflict justice system is still moving desperately slowly.Seb Eskauriatza, Teaching Fellow in Law, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/932002018-03-14T10:53:28Z2018-03-14T10:53:28ZColombian guerrilla leader ends controversial presidential bid, giving peace a chance<p>In a decision with far-reaching consequences for Colombia’s fragile peace process, the FARC – a political party formed by former Marxist guerrillas from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – has <a href="http://www.elpais.com.co/elecciones/elecciones-presidenciales/rodrigo-londono-timochenko-se-retira-y-la-farc-no-tendra-candidato-presidencial.html">withdrawn from the country’s presidential race</a>
after candidate Rodrigo Londoño underwent <a href="https://noticias.caracoltv.com/colombia/timochenko-se-recupera-satisfactoriamente-tras-operacion-de-corazon-abierto">open-heart surgery in Bogota</a>. </p>
<p>The 59-year-old Londoño, who as leader of the violent rebel group used the name Timochenko, had a <a href="https://www.lafm.com.co/nacional/timochenko-sufrio-paro-cardiaco-dos-anos/">heart attack</a> in 2015. Last year, not long after <a href="https://theconversation.com/colombia-has-a-new-peace-agreement-but-will-it-stick-69535">signing a historic peace deal</a> with the Colombian government, he <a href="http://www.teleamazonas.com/2017/07/timochenko-jefe-las-farc-fue-hospitalizado-colombia-derrame-cerebral/">suffered a stroke</a>. </p>
<p>Despite <a href="https://theconversation.com/colombias-farc-rebels-have-rebranded-as-a-political-party-now-they-need-a-leader-82728">concerns</a> that his health problems were a political liability, Londoño’s symbolic power and name recognition <a href="https://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/FARC-Leader-Londono-to-Run-as-2018-Presidential-Candidate-20171030-0017.html">won him the nomination</a> to lead the FARC’s ticket. This is the group’s first election since laying down weapons on June 27, 2017.</p>
<p>Londoño, who was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-colombia-election-poll/colombian-former-rebel-petro-leads-polls-ahead-of-presidential-vote-idUSKCN1G71WC">polling at zero percent in February</a>, didn’t stand a chance of winning in the May 27 election. But his candidacy was symbolic of the rebel group’s transition from armed struggle to political participation. </p>
<p>Rather than disrupt that process, Londoño’s departure may actually ease the country’s delicate transition away from violence. As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=jjkUy0wAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">scholar of civil conflict</a>, I believe this ex-guerrilla’s withdrawal from public life could be good news for Colombia.</p>
<h2>Colombia’s violent campaign season</h2>
<p>The FARC’s entry into politics, a requirement of the 2016 peace deal, has divided this violence-scarred nation. Colombians first <a href="https://theconversation.com/colombia-did-not-vote-no-in-its-peace-referendum-what-the-statistics-reveal-66471">rejected the peace deal, narrowly, in an October 2016 referendum</a>, and the final agreement barely made it through to congressional approval.</p>
<p>Today, many people have accepted the FARC’s political participation as a necessary, if odious, condition of peace. But, in my assessment, Timochenko’s candidacy was too much, too soon. </p>
<p>It got underway before people had been able to fully reckon the FARC’s outsize role in their country’s 55-year armed conflict, which has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/25/colombia-conflict-death-toll-commission">killed 225,000 and displaced millions</a>. Colombia has yet to launch the <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Truth-Justice-Reconciliation-Colombia-Transitioning/dp/1857438655/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1520886551&sr=8-1&keywords=Truth%2C+Justice+and+Reconciliation+in+Colombia%3A+Transitioning+from+Violence+%28Europa+Perspectives+in+Transitional+Justice%29&dpID=51TE8dDS0TL&preST=_SY291_BO1,204,203,200_QL40_&dpSrc=srch">transitional justice process that will try war criminals and compensate victims</a>. Many Colombians bristled at seeing the FARC’s commander run for president without ever having acknowledged inside a court room <a href="http://pacifista.co/timochenko-primero-tienes-que-ir-a-la-jep-victimas/">the suffering his organization caused</a>. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/210137/original/file-20180313-30958-12p9ulo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/210137/original/file-20180313-30958-12p9ulo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=711&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210137/original/file-20180313-30958-12p9ulo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=711&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210137/original/file-20180313-30958-12p9ulo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=711&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210137/original/file-20180313-30958-12p9ulo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=894&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210137/original/file-20180313-30958-12p9ulo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=894&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210137/original/file-20180313-30958-12p9ulo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=894&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Timochenko in his guerrilla days.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/79/Rodrigo_Londo%C3%B1o_Echeverri.jpg">Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
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<p>The country also remains generally uncomfortable with the <a href="https://elpais.com/internacional/2018/02/25/colombia/1519592213_064747.html">FARC’s radical left-wing rhetoric</a>. Politicians on the right have inflamed deep-set fears of the Marxist-Leninist guerrilla group, saying that the FARC will turn Colombia into a <a href="http://www.eluniversal.com.co/blogs/el-ojo-de-morgana/es-gustavo-petro-castrochavista">Communist dystopia</a>. FARC campaign rallies <a href="http://www.wradio.com.co/noticias/actualidad/protestas-contra-timochenko-saboteo-o-reclamo-legitimo-de-los-ciudadanos/20180206/nota/3707361.aspx">in Cali, Armenia and other cities</a> have experienced boycotts, taunts and violence. </p>
<p>Despite accusations by the FARC that its conservative factions <a href="https://www.elespectador.com/elecciones-2018/noticias/politica/para-la-farc-los-ataques-su-campana-son-promovidos-por-el-centro-democratico-articulo-737296%22%22">orchestrated the attacks at campaign events</a>, candidates across the political spectrum have seen virulent protest in a Colombian <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/19/colombia-farc-activist-killings">election year marked by violence</a>. </p>
<p>Gustavo Petro, a progressive former Bogota mayor, was <a href="http://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/investigacion/no-hubo-ataque-con-armas-contra-petro-en-cucuta-fiscalia-190190">attacked in his car after a March campaign rally in the city of Cúcuta</a>. He is currently running in second place in the presidential race. The hard-line former president and current senator, Alvaro Uribe – who backs right-wing frontrunner Ivan Duque – has also been <a href="https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/opositores-del-senador-alvaro-uribe-causan-disturbios-en-popayan-articulo-742329">booed at his public appearances</a>.</p>
<h2>The FARC’s big fail</h2>
<p>The FARC faces deeper challenges this election season, too. </p>
<p>The peace deal guaranteed the group – which, despite its rebranding as a political party, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/29/colombia-farc-rebel-group-civil-war-us-terrorist-organization-list-peace-deal">remains on the U.S. terrorist watch list</a> – <a href="http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/proceso-de-paz-estas-serian-las-curules-de-las-farc-en-el-congreso/491068">10 seats in Congress for a period of two four-year terms</a>. </p>
<p>But FARC candidates performed poorly in Colombia’s March 11 congressional elections. Only <a href="https://resultados2018.registraduria.gov.co/resultados/99SE/BXXXX/DSE99999.htm">52,532 people voted for the FARC’s congressional candidates</a> – less than 0.4 percent of the nearly 14.5 million votes cast. </p>
<p>The FARC was clearly going to struggle to win Colombians’ support. After half a century of civil conflict, <a href="http://www.eltiempo.com/contenido/politica/gobierno/ARCHIVO/ARCHIVO-16832164-0.pdf">77 percent of Colombians hold a negative opinion of the group</a>. That’s why the group’s leaders insisted on obtaining a quota of congressional seats in exchange for disarming.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"972245144023044097"}"></div></p>
<p>But its bad results in the congressional ballot were worse than expected. The <a href="http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-38836443">FARC retired 7,000 guerrillas when it demobilized in 2017</a> and got just 52,000 votes in exchange. It once used those same troops to <a href="https://nacla.org/article/farc-war-and-crisis-state">exert control over some 600 municipalities in Colombia</a>, influencing the lives of many millions of Colombians.</p>
<p>Such power loss is <a href="http://www.urosario.edu.co/UR-reconciliacion/Inicio/">actually typical for armed groups who have laid down their weapons</a>, though. Once guerrillas no longer threaten violence or command resources, many people <a href="https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/timochenko-pide-de-nuevo-santos-cumplir-lo-prometido-y-lo-firmado-articulo-715074">who once “supported” them drift off</a>. The FARC is now failing to compete with more established left-wing forces, including the <a href="https://www.polodemocratico.net/">Democratic Pole</a> and <a href="http://movimientoprogresistacolombiano.blogspot.com.co/">Progressivists Movement</a>. </p>
<p>As a result, Lodoño’s withdrawal from the presidential race probably won’t much change the election outcome. He had <a href="https://www.colombiamegusta.com/timochenko-0-intencion-voto-bogota/">such low popular support</a> that his voters’ transferred allegiances won’t alter the political math in May.</p>
<h2>Sustaining a tenuous peace</h2>
<p>His exit could, however, endanger the country’s already faltering peace process. </p>
<p>Many former FARC fighters are <a href="http://static.iris.net.co/semana/upload/documents/informe-kroc.pdf">frustrated by how slow the government has been to implement the agreements</a> it made with the rebel group in 2016. More than 1,000 ex-combatants <a href="http://caracol.com.co/emisora/2018/03/01/medellin/1519917754_200499.html">have already rejoined other armed groups in Colombia</a>. </p>
<p>Londoño was the only presidential candidate who <a href="https://www.farc-ep.co/comunicado/carta-abierta-al-senor-presidente-de-la-republica-juan-manuel-santos.html">openly defended the controversial peace deal</a>. Without him in the race, its more contested provisions are political orphans.</p>
<p>The perception that the deal is imperiled could spur more former FARC fighters to return to armed struggle, seeing it as the best way to achieve their <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-colombia-peace-land/colombia-peace-deal-to-usher-in-rural-reform-but-land-conflicts-feared-experts-say-idUSKCN11T1WK">agenda of agrarian reform and radical social change</a>. </p>
<p>Ultimately, though, I think Lodoño’s health problems may prove a lucky break for Colombia and the FARC. His withdrawal spares the volatile young party the embarrassment of being crushed in next month’s presidential primary and gives the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-latest-threat-to-peace-in-colombia-congress-87810">transitional justice system time to do its job</a> before the FARC faces voters again for 2019’s mayoral races. </p>
<p>Lodoño’s campaign was an important step in the FARC’s transition from armed rebellion to political party. But it was a powder keg. His retirement averts the risk of a big explosion.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/93200/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Fabio Andres Diaz is also a research associate in the the Department of Political and International studies at Rhodes University in South Africa</span></em></p>A former FARC rebel commander-turned- presidential candidate has withdrawn from Colombia’s 2018 election. Despite increased violence, the peace accord he signed will probably survive this setback.Fabio Andrés Díaz Pabón, Researcher on Conflict, Peace and Development, International Institute of Social StudiesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/903512018-01-26T11:14:45Z2018-01-26T11:14:45ZColombia’s long-hidden wonders open up after years of violence<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/203515/original/file-20180126-100899-11mzeq1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">El Cocuy National Park.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Felipe Roa-Clavijo</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since the peace agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC in November 2016, thousands of guerrilla troops have demobilised from many corners of the country, mainly from isolated areas full of rich ecosystems. This has opened up areas that just a few years ago were too dangerous to visit. With the aim of rediscovering my own country, I embarked on a winter trip to <a href="http://www.parquesnacionales.gov.co/portal/en/ecotourism/andean-region/el-cocuy-national-natural-park/">El Cocuy National Natural Park</a> in north-eastern Colombia. </p>
<p>A few years ago, it would have been unthinkable to do what I did just a few days ago: to drive 10 hours north-east from Bogota, passing through towns, remote villages and places that were attacked and even destroyed during the violent conflict, and spend three days in a national park walking more than 65km of trails.</p>
<p>A protected area of 3,060 square kilometres, El Cocuy National Park hosts Colombia’s largest collection of glacier peaks, with 150 lakes and ecosystems that stretch from the dry forest at 500 meters up to the paramos ecosystems and glaciers above 5,000 meters. On my journey, I discovered not only incredible natural wonders that I never imagined existed in my country, but also the cultural richness of the U’was indigenous communities who have lived there for centuries.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/203520/original/file-20180126-100915-11yjuod.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/203520/original/file-20180126-100915-11yjuod.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203520/original/file-20180126-100915-11yjuod.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203520/original/file-20180126-100915-11yjuod.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203520/original/file-20180126-100915-11yjuod.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203520/original/file-20180126-100915-11yjuod.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203520/original/file-20180126-100915-11yjuod.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Open to all.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Felipe Roa-Clavijo</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
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<p>During the FARC conflict, El Cocuy was a violent area that played host to various guerrilla and paramilitary groups. Local people told me how it provided a strategic corridor for illegal groups, as it connects the eastern Andes with the lower plains. </p>
<p>In 2002, FARC <a href="http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1355521">bombed and destroyed a bridge</a> over the Chicamocha river that connects Soata and Boavita, two small towns through which you have to pass to get to El Cocuy. It took the state two years to rebuild the bridge. In 2015, in the rural area of Guican – today the starting point of the hiking trail to Laguna Grande de la Sierra (the Great Lake of the Mountain) – there was a terrifying <a href="https://noticias.caracoltv.com/colombia/emboscada-del-eln-en-guican-boyaca-deja-al-menos-11-uniformados-muertos">guerrilla attack</a> on military troops that killed 12 professional soldiers. </p>
<p>The park was closed and re-opened to the public over the years, but with violent groups perennially present, it was too risky to visit.</p>
<h2>The contradictions of peace</h2>
<p>With all this violence now finally part of history, I imagined most of the region’s people would have supported the 2016 peace agreement. I was wrong: most who voted in the towns of <a href="http://plebiscito.registraduria.gov.co/99PL/DPL07082ZZZZZZZZZZZZ_L1.htm">El Cocuy</a>, <a href="http://plebiscito.registraduria.gov.co/99PL/DPL07112ZZZZZZZZZZZZ_L1.htm">Guican</a> and <a href="http://plebiscito.registraduria.gov.co/99PL/DPL07073ZZZZZZZZZZZZ_L1.htm">Chita</a> voted against the deal. Many local people told me they were too angry at FARC for all its violent actions to get behind a peace plan.</p>
<p>But at the same time, the deal has been a boost for the region. Tourism is already roaring – there are almost 200 registered guides, and an excellent network of hotels, services and transportation. El Cocuy is joining other areas of Colombia that have “opened up” such as the Chiribiquete National Natural Park, another area where violent confrontation took place, which was recently featured by <a href="https://www.instagram.com/p/BcLG3UyjM-x/?taken-by=natgeo">National Geographic</a>. </p>
<p>Not that there isn’t plenty to argue about. Indigenous communities, farmers, local tourism organisations and the National Natural Parks agency all have their grievances: indigenous people demand respect for their sacred territories, the local tourism organisations demand the right to provide services in the park, and the parks agency asserts its mandate to conserve natural ecosystems.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/203521/original/file-20180126-100915-obq4nw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/203521/original/file-20180126-100915-obq4nw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203521/original/file-20180126-100915-obq4nw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203521/original/file-20180126-100915-obq4nw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203521/original/file-20180126-100915-obq4nw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203521/original/file-20180126-100915-obq4nw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203521/original/file-20180126-100915-obq4nw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Colombians are exploring once off-limits areas.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Felipe Roa-Clavijo</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
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<p>But the point is that these so far non-violent conflicts are a far cry from the terror and misery of the FARC years. This time, competing interests are being reconciled through dialogue and negotiation rather than violence. It was only after negotiations between the U’was communities and the national government that the park re-opened its doors to the public in April 2017. </p>
<p>During my journey in El Cocuy, I crossed paths not only with other Colombian nationals but also with large numbers of foreign tourists including people from Germany, France, Belgium and the US. In what used to be a war-torn territory, today lives a new phase of openness for tourism, research and natural protection that has allowed me, other Colombians and foreign visitors the discovery and exploration of a unique natural and cultural area – and with it, a country that’s now returning to some measure of peace after five dark decades.</p>
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<p><em>To see more pictures of this trip, follow <a href="https://www.instagram.com/explore/tags/cocuyexploration2018/">#cocuyexploration2018</a> on Instagram.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/90351/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Felipe Roa-Clavijo is a Doctoral Candidate in International Development at the University of Oxford and works for the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI).</span></em></p>One of Colombia’s most beautiful areas, El Cocuy National Natural Park was for years too dangerous to visit. No more.Felipe Roa-Clavijo, Doctoral Candidate in International Development, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/877062017-12-14T12:18:11Z2017-12-14T12:18:11ZColombia’s peace process is moving too slowly – and squandering people’s trust<p>Colombia’s president, Juan Miguel Santos, <a href="https://theconversation.com/santos-got-the-nobel-prize-for-not-giving-up-on-peace-heres-why-all-colombians-won-66689">won a Nobel Peace Prize</a> for striking a peace deal with the FARC guerrillas after decades of conflict. But now his government is charged with putting the deal into action – and with parliamentary and presidential elections coming up in 2018, the clock is ticking.</p>
<p>Some advances have been made; the members of Colombia’s Truth Commission have at last been elected, and the Constitutional Court has finally given the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP), a body meant to try those responsible for human rights violations, the go-ahead. But for all that these look like steps forward, the reality is more worrisome. The <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-40155871">demobilisation of the FARC</a> proceeded slowly, as did the approval of the JEP. These difficulties have not only bogged the peace process down, but eroded the population’s trust in both the government and the settlement. </p>
<p>There are other problems too. The Constitutional Court only approved the JEP with some far-reaching last-minute changes. Although previous justice processes have demonstrated how big a role <a href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0124-05792012000100007">business and industry</a> played in the conflict, the Constitutional Court chose to downgrade these third parties’ participation in the JEP from mandatory to voluntary. This will not only narrow the scope of justice, but also limit the resources for reparations to victims, which are meant to be partly provided by perpetrators.</p>
<p>On another front, the Senate recently decided that human rights lawyers who have previously defended conflict victims are no longer eligible to serve as JEP magistrates. This affects <a href="http://www.verdadabierta.com/procesos-de-paz/farc/6818-corte-constitucional-dejo-a-medias-la-justicia-transicional">several magistrates already appointed</a>, and raises doubts about just how committed the state is to the victims.</p>
<h2>Hard truths</h2>
<p>Then there’s the proposed Truth Commission. Many consider it a crucial device for establishing a unified narrative of the conflict, but what is it really going to do that hasn’t been done before? Colombia’s <a href="http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/en/about-the-national-center-about-the-national-center">National Centre for Historical Memory</a> has already produced a wealth of reports about many aspects of the conflict, with survivors’ experiences prominently featured. As for the wider “historical truth” that the commission is meant to clarify, attempts have already been made by the Centre’s 2014 “<a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2014/01/13/basta-ya-on-the-colombian-center-for-historical-memory-report/">Basta Ya!</a>” report and by the academics of the <a href="http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/para-que-servira-la-comision-de-la-verdad/546581">Historical Commission on the Conflict</a>.</p>
<p>More worryingly for the commission’s advocates, the truth commissions held in places as diverse as <a href="https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-04-06/south-africas-imperfect-progress-20-years-after-truth-reconciliation-commission">South Africa</a> and Peru show that survivors expect more than the “collective catharsis” that truth commissions promise to deliver. Simply testifying can be far from healing for survivors, especially when they continue to suffer the poverty and insecurity the conflict caused them.</p>
<p>So what will these peace and justice measures actually achieve? Survivors’ experiences suggest that their key concerns are security and access to basic public services. The infrastructural and development services for reintegration camps and surrounding communities are being set up <a href="http://www.defensoria.gov.co/es/nube/destacados/6646/Consulte-aqu%C3%AD-el-Informe-Espacios-Territoriales-de-Capacitaci%C3%B3n-y-Reincorporaci%C3%B3n.htm">disappointingly slowly</a>. This is slowly but surely eroding people’s already brittle trust in the state.</p>
<p>The same goes for the efforts to tackle Colombia’s drug problem. The forced coca eradication campaign <a href="http://www.defensoria.gov.co/es/nube/destacados/6646/Consulte-aqu%C3%AD-el-Informe-Espacios-Territoriales-de-Capacitaci%C3%B3n-y-Reincorporaci%C3%B3n.htm">is not matched</a> by a similar commitment to implement <a href="https://www.wola.org/analysis/coca-colombian-peace-accords-commentary-pilot-substitution-project-briceno/">coca substitution projects</a> or improve the infrastructure needed to commercialise new crops. The persistent insecurity caused by the FARC has in fact increased, with other illegal armed groups filling the vaccuum; <a href="https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/investigacion/la-lista-roja-de-defensores-de-derechos-humanos-articulo-713488">more than 200 civil society leaders</a> have been killed since 2016. </p>
<h2>Making peace a reality</h2>
<p>For peace and reconciliation to take hold, people need the basic conditions that support a dignified life. In a country like Colombia, where the state has been historically all but absent from conflict-hit rural areas, this requires proper structural transformations. </p>
<p>The state’s planned “transformation of the rural sector” will be implemented by the recently created Agency for the Renovation of the Territory. The plans will target 170 municipalities in 16 subregions, but they are far from comprehensive; they fail to include historically abandoned regions such as Magdalena, where I conducted my own research. And as the prestigious Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies <a href="http://kroc.nd.edu/assets/258961/171127_english_version_of_kroc_institute_report_executive_summary.pdf">recently noted</a>, there is little sign of these and other measures actually being implemented.</p>
<p>Colombia has a tendency to tackle problems by creating <a href="https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/paz/una-implementacion-que-avanza-media-marcha-articulo-723543">new institutions, laws and programmes</a>, but that is not enough to restore trust. Rather than investing in an ever more complicated legal and institutional framework to provide peace and justice, the government must strengthen the existing state institutions needed to provide basic public services and security. </p>
<p>The gap between survivors’ needs and what’s currently provided must be closed. If these laws and policies don’t change living conditions on the ground, this hard-won peace could turn out to be mere performance – and for all the good it’ll do Colombia’s international image, that will be a sad disappointment for many of the conflict’s millions of survivors. As one community leader I worked with put it: “There is peace, but we continue to suffer, so we don’t know what peace really means.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87706/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sanne Weber does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Some of the crucial mechanisms meant to deliver peace in Colombia have yet to be set up.Sanne Weber, Research fellow at the International Development Department, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/853432017-11-14T12:10:33Z2017-11-14T12:10:33ZColombia: how universities can help to build lasting peace<p>After more than 50 years of conflict, the recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-momentous-peace-deal-with-the-farc-so-what-next-for-colombia-64452">peace agreement in Colombia</a> marks a historic ceasefire between the government and rebel groups. It also poses great challenges, as the various parts of Colombian society learn to adjust.</p>
<p>The country’s universities have their own special role to play in the transition. This includes admitting former guerillas into higher education and proving real support to victims of violence. Universities can provide opportunities for reconciliation between former enemies. </p>
<p>According to a non-official source from the <a href="http://www.reintegracion.gov.co/es">Agencia para la Reincorporación y la Normalización</a> (Colombian agency for reincorporation and standardisation), around 500 former combatants from armed groups have enrolled in Colombian universities. </p>
<p>There is a great deal of diversity within their ranks – particularly from former members of FARC, the largest guerrilla group. Now students, they are, for the most part, men and women from poor rural communities. Many of them were recruited at a very young age, sometimes before turning 15. And after 50 years of warfare, some have spent most of their adult life in guerrilla organisations. </p>
<p>Given this diversity, some will need literacy and basic education in order to move on to technical and professional education. Others will need to enrol in educational programs to acquire technical skills, which will allow them to apply for jobs and join the formal economy. A smaller group of ex-combatants, who may have had a stronger academic background when they joined the armed groups, will enrol directly into universities. </p>
<p>Whichever part of the education system the FARC ex-combatants join, the main challenge will be supporting them as they develop cognitive, practical and subject specific skills – as well as social skills linked to democratic citizenship.</p>
<p>Universities need to adapt the traditional model of university education to incorporate the experiences of these people. <a href="https://theconversation.com/khanya-college-a-south-african-story-of-decolonisation-85005">Previous worldwide experiences</a> of working with the marginalised young has shown the importance of acknowledging the social, political and cultural identities of such students – and also taking seriously the knowledge and skills they bring to enrich the university community.</p>
<p>But the universities cannot do this alone. A successful process will require the collaboration of national and local governments, non-governmental organisations and the private sector to ensure education leads to real opportunities and rebuilding lives. </p>
<p>Nor can universities blindly accept ex-combatants without thinking carefully about the wider impact on the university community. The blurred line between victims and perpetrators requires careful thought about communal spaces and possible scenarios of segregation, which could generate new tensions. </p>
<p>The overall aim is to move away from simplistic understandings of “good” and “bad” people and to recognise the complexity of the post-conflict era. In recognising the humanity of the “other”, we can make the university community grow among all the differences. </p>
<h2>New skills</h2>
<p>Universities have the power not only to educate, but also to help transform an unequal social system. This will require training teachers to adopt a more inclusive approach to education, promoting moral reflection and allowing for participation, criticism, creativity – and even protest – as ways to promote innovation and change. </p>
<p>There is no doubt that academic institutions can be a point of convergence between former rebels and society, and assist in the successful reintegration of former guerrillas into civil and political life. The details of a renewed relationship between universities and former rebels are yet to be fully determined – and many questions need to be asked.</p>
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<p>Should former combatants be given open admission to universities and be allowed to merge within the student bodies? Should there be preferential treatment treatment or tailored programs to satisfy ex-combatants’ specific demands from academic institutions? Rather than simply incorporating ex-combatants, should universities enter into dialogue with ex-combatants as a specific interest group in society?</p>
<p>These debates are <a href="http://www.bath.ac.uk/management/news_events/news/2017/23-10-jose-restrepo-explains-how-he-is-spreading-peace-in-colombia.html">just getting started</a>.</p>
<p>While Colombia appears to be a special case, many other countries face the problem of growing numbers of disaffected young men and women who need to be given hope and real opportunities to play a positive role in society. England for example has rising numbers of young people who are neither in employment nor in education or training while poverty, lack of jobs, poor education and family breakdown lead in countries like South Africa to violent youth gangs. </p>
<p>The innovations happening in Colombian universities offer important insights into how universities can transform themselves – and take greater responsibility for educating and reintegrating those who are currently excluded and overlooked.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/85343/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Now the war is over, academia has a special role to play in securing the peace.Jose Manuel Restrepo Abondano, President and Rector, Universidad del RosarioRajani Naidoo, Professor and Director, International Centre for Higher Education Management, School of Management, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/836012017-10-16T00:36:09Z2017-10-16T00:36:09ZPeace makes strides in Colombia, but the battle is far from won<p>One year after Colombians initially <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/colombians-vote-on-historic-peace-agreement-with-farc-rebels/2016/10/02/8ef1a2a2-84b4-11e6-b57d-dd49277af02f_story.html">rejected a peace agreement with the FARC guerrilla group</a>, today the outlook for peace seems almost promising. On Oct. 10, the country’s constitutional court <a href="https://colombia2020.elespectador.com/politica/acuerdo-de-paz-una-politica-de-estado-por-12-anos">shielded that accord from any changes for a period of 12 years</a>, removing fears that future governments could water down or undo the controversial deal.</p>
<p>With this much-anticipated decision, nine judges made it possible for the country to institutionalize peace after 50 years of internal conflict. </p>
<p>But for all the speculation among scholars about the FARC’s transition from armed rebellion to political party – <a href="https://theconversation.com/colombias-farc-rebels-have-rebranded-as-a-political-party-now-they-need-a-leader-82728">my own included</a> – the end of the conflict remains uncertain. Colombia’s violence was never just about the FARC, and peace won’t be, either. </p>
<h2>Not just the FARC</h2>
<p>On the one hand, there are positive signs of calm in the country. On Oct. 1, <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/colombia-eln-leader-readies-troops-ceasefire-170930163656526.html">a ceasefire went into effect</a> with the National Liberation Army (ELN), <a href="http://www.warscapes.com/blog/eln-and-peace-colombia">the FARC’s lesser-known rebel sibling</a>. </p>
<p>Established in Colombia in 1964, the same year as the FARC, the ELN aimed to promote a <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-11400950">Cuban model of armed revolution in Colombia</a>. This set them apart from the FARC, with <a href="https://www.farc-ep.co/decima-conferencia/decima-conferencia-nacional-guerrillera.html">its Marxist-Leninist approach to social change</a>. So did the ELN’s less militaristic approach to violence. The group didn’t shy away from <a href="http://cdn.ideaspaz.org/media/website/document/529debc8a48fa.pdf">ambushing Colombia’s armed forces</a>, but its preferred methods were sabotage – bombing oil pipelines, <a href="http://www.verdadabierta.com/victimarios/eln/6293-radiografia-de-los-artefactos-explosivos-del-eln">laying landmine fields</a> – and extortion.</p>
<p>The ELN still has 1,500 to 2,000 troops stationed across the country, in <a href="http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/despite-peace-talks-colombia-eln-guerrillas-continue-expansion">territory that intersects with areas once occupied by the FARC</a>. Thus, any narrative of the Colombian conflict that touts the FARC’s centrality risks missing the key role that the ELN must play in building a lasting peace. </p>
<p>As such, the ELN ceasefire is an important step in its peace process, which <a href="http://www.verdadabierta.com/procesos-de-paz/eln/6545-negociacion-con-el-eln-en-su-fase-publica">started in February 2017</a>. On Oct. 5, the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/un-approves-monitoring-of-eln-rebel-cease-fire-in-colombia/2017/10/05/02416d52-aa14-11e7-9a98-07140d2eed02_story.html">U.N. announced a mission</a> to verify its implementation.</p>
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<p>This opens the door to broader deescalation of violence in Colombia, which remains high since the peace agreement. At least 200 human rights activists <a href="https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/investigacion/la-lista-roja-de-defensores-de-derechos-humanos-articulo-713488">have been killed over the past two years</a>, and <a href="https://elpais.com/internacional/2017/07/22/colombia/1500740630_359655.html">drug cartels, organized crime groups and paramilitary organizations</a> continue to operate in the country. This dangerous dynamic does not miraculously disappear along with the FARC, or the ELN for that matter. </p>
<p>Recidivism is another threat: In past peace efforts in Colombia, demobilized fighters from one rebel group simply <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Peace.Conflict.Spanish.pdf">rejoined other armed organizations</a>. This fueled the war, giving it a continuity that went beyond particular organizations to become a kind of generalized social phenomenon.</p>
<h2>Spoiler alert</h2>
<p>Despite recent advances, implementing the FARC agreement is still a significant challenge: The accords are ambitious, and they must be carried out in a country whose populace <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-37537252">voted against the peace agreement by a thin margin</a> just one year ago. </p>
<p>There were <a href="http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/acuerdo-de-paz-con-las-farc-enfoque-de-genero/504340">numerous conspiracy theories</a> floated during the peace talks, including allegations that the negotiations’ inclusion of gender and LGBTQ issues would promote a “homosexual agenda” in Colombia.</p>
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<p>But the deal’s opponents raised <a href="https://theconversation.com/colombias-peace-plebiscite-the-case-for-yes-and-the-case-for-no-66325">valid claims</a>, too. Some <a href="http://www.warscapes.com/opinion/uncertainty-peace-agreements-and-public-participation-colombia">wondered</a> whether conflict victims would actually see justice served, while others expressed concerns about former rebels joining the political process. </p>
<p>In the end, many Colombians were profoundly uncertain about how the principles of the FARC agreement would be interpreted and implemented. Just over <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/02/colombia-referendum-rejects-peace-deal-with-farc">50 percent of them rejected the peace agreement</a>, which ultimately had to be approved via a fast-tracked passage through Congress. </p>
<p>As the 2018 presidential election season heats up, some candidates and parties have found that <a href="http://www.eltiempo.com/politica/debate-en-redes-por-video-de-cambio-radical-contra-las-farc-137494">attacking the accords</a> is now a good way to mobilize votes. </p>
<p>This, in my assessment, is a dangerous electoral strategy. FARC fighters could interpret such political bluster as the state reneging on its commitments, which could in turn produce a spike in recidivism: Why should guerrillas hold up their end of the deal if the government won’t?</p>
<p>Indeed, there are already reports that demobilized fighters are being recruited by <a href="http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/choco-eln-y-autodefensas-oprimen-a-comunidades-advierte-hrw/527800">other armed groups</a>. This has real potential to foil the peace process.</p>
<p>The court’s decision has now shielded the agreement from populist proposals of renegotiating a “better deal.” But there are other reasons why the Colombian government could fail to keep its commitments to the FARC – namely the ongoing <a href="http://lasillavacia.com/el-duro-aterrizaje-de-las-farc-la-realidad-62692">challenges of implemention</a>. </p>
<p>From <a href="https://theconversation.com/latest-threat-to-colombias-peace-process-murders-a-kidnapping-delays-and-of-course-politics-73895">delays in disarming rebels</a> and underfunded mental health care for ex-combatants to setbacks in passing the laws necessary to activate components of the peace deal, the process has been fraught. </p>
<p>Colombia, a middle-income South American nation, may simply lack the institutional capacity necessary to fulfill its own landmark agreement. After all, a weak state unable to deliver on promises made to its citizens is one reason that warlords and armed actors <a href="http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/mesadeconversaciones/PDF/Informe%20Comisi_n%20Hist_rica%20del%20Conflicto%20y%20sus%20V_ctimas.%20La%20Habana%2C%20Febrero%20de%202015.pdf">got so powerful there in the first place</a>. </p>
<h2>Political tensions</h2>
<p>There have been remarkable achievements, of course. In June, the FARC <a href="http://caracol.com.co/radio/2017/06/26/nacional/1498513260_592266.html">surrendered its weapons to the U.N.</a>, and its guerrillas are now concentrated in reintegration camps. The government has even managed to keep demobilized fighters safe throughout this process.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/190220/original/file-20171013-3520-1nplqxa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/190220/original/file-20171013-3520-1nplqxa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=378&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/190220/original/file-20171013-3520-1nplqxa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=378&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/190220/original/file-20171013-3520-1nplqxa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=378&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/190220/original/file-20171013-3520-1nplqxa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/190220/original/file-20171013-3520-1nplqxa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/190220/original/file-20171013-3520-1nplqxa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The FARC: Not the only players in the game of peace.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Fernando Vergara</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But the next big hurdle is just around the corner: the phases of <a href="http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Documents/informes-especiales/abc-del-proceso-de-paz/abc-jurisdiccion-especial-paz.html">transitional justice and historical reckoning</a>. Colombia’s Congress is now debating legislation <a href="https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/en-congreso-se-debate-la-ley-que-pone-en-marcha-la-jep-articulo-715151">detailing how FARC fighters will be punished</a>, or not, for their transgressions. </p>
<p>Lawmakers must also set up the <a href="http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Documents/informes-especiales/comision-verdad-proceso-paz/index.html">Colombian Truth Commission</a>, which will allow Colombians to understand, for the first time, the full extent of the atrocities committed in their country.</p>
<p>At present, this legislation is being filibustered by some right-wing politicians, who want Colombia’s transitional justice to be more punitive. Meanwhile, members of the Cambio Radical Party stand accused of seeking <a href="http://lasillavacia.com/el-presidente-santos-ha-quedado-rehen-de-su-coalicion-62873">bribes from President Juan Manuel Santos’ administration</a> in exchange for their votes. As the May 2018 election nears, such political tensions are likely to rise. </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/advice-for-colombia-from-countries-that-have-sought-peace-and-sometimes-found-it-67419">Peace-building often looks like this</a>. It’s messy and long and nonlinear, a national process that takes political leadership, sacrifice and no small dose of patience.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/83601/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Fabio Andrés Díaz Pabón does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A court decision securing last year’s peace deal and a new ceasefire have invigorated Colombia’s peace process, but there are plenty of ways it could still go wrong.Fabio Andrés Díaz Pabón, Researcher on Conflict, Peace and Development, International Institute of Social StudiesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/823502017-09-18T13:02:44Z2017-09-18T13:02:44ZColombia struggles to deliver justice in army ‘cash-for-kills’ scandal<p>As Colombia’s 50-year armed conflict enters a post-conflict phase, the country is having to face up to the toll it took on millions of lives. There are more than <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2017/02/current-situation-colombia">8m registered victims</a>, and today, Colombia is host to <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/briefing/2017/3/58c26e114/forced-displacement-growing-colombia-despite-peace-agreement.html">7.4m</a> internally displaced people – more than <a href="http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/colombia">anywhere else</a> in the world. Atrocities were committed by all sides, including the government, and civilians were the principal casualties. </p>
<p>As the post-conflict justice system takes shape, there are many individual rights violations and atrocities to be addressed. But the conflict’s most emblematic atrocity is the extrajudicial murder of thousands of innocent civilians during the so-called “<a href="https://colombiareports.com/false-positives/">false positives</a>” scandal.</p>
<p>After the right-wing paramilitary <a href="http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/85">AUC</a> <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/may/14/colombia.sibyllabrodzinsky">demobilised in 2004</a>, the then-defence minister, Camilo Ospina, introduced a policy known as “cash-for-kills”, which awarded US$1,500 to Colombian Army personnel in exchange for evidence of “positive combat kills”. This resulted in a state-sponsored onslaught of Colombia’s most vulnerable citizens. Poor or mentally ill civilians were lured with offers of employment and driven for hundreds of miles into FARC-controlled areas, where they were executed and dressed in FARC combat uniforms. Photographs were taken of their corpses, and their murders presented as combat kills.</p>
<p>The scheme only came to light in 2008, when 22 men from <a href="http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/falso-positivo-de-soacha-condenas-de-hasta-52-anos/520904">Soacha</a> disappeared and were found dead hundreds of miles away in North Santander. A Soacha government official, Luis Fernando Escobar Franco, filed a lawsuit and gradually many other similar cases came to light. According to <a href="http://archives.forusa.org/sites/default/files/uploads/false-positives-2014-colombia-report.pdf">one study</a> on the links between US Aid and the false positives scandal, there were more than 5,763 extra-judicial executions between 2000 and 2010. </p>
<p>These murders were not linked to the Colombian armed conflict. Instead, it seems members of the army simply exploited an incentives programme for personal economic gain. Colombia has a legal duty to prosecute those responsible for these crimes, and to some extent, it has followed through. But even with the peace deal done, the dispensation of justice has been slow – and now, a new obstacle is emerging. </p>
<h2>Slow going</h2>
<p>The peace agreement’s plan for post-conflict justice hinges on a new Special Jurisdiction for Peace. Known as the “JEP” in Spanish, it will create a special system of transitional justice to deal with atrocities committed by all sides during the five-decades-long armed conflict.</p>
<p>In a nutshell, the system is designed to provide “alternative sentences” for people guilty of serious crimes, who can voluntarily enter the JEP and receive a sentence of up to eight years in prison – a significantly shorter sentence than they might otherwise expect. Perpetrators who want to access these more lenient sentences must come forward, plead guilty, provide a full account of what happened, and undertake to make reparations to their victims. </p>
<p>This form of “limited justice” is meant to kill two birds with one stone: to help persuade rebels to lay down their weapons while fulfilling the victims’ right to truth and accountability. But the JEP’s slow setup is already creating problems. Defence lawyers across the country are arguing that with the new system coming down the line, the “ordinary” justice system is avoiding the false positives cases.</p>
<p>In Caldas, a judge suspended a <a href="http://caracol.com.co/emisora/2017/05/22/manizales/1495476444_818197.html">kidnap and murder case</a> that implicates three high-ranking military officers. In <a href="http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/falsos-positivos-de-madres-de-soacha-juzgados-por-la-jep/524586">Soacha</a>, a case was suspended against five military officers accused of murdering a 16-year-old. In Manizales, another judge suspended a case against <a href="http://colombia2020.elespectador.com/justicia/un-gran-debate-sobre-la-jep">nine armed forces personnel</a> suspected of committing extrajudicial executions as part of the false positives scandal. That particular judge was convinced that the cases should be heard at the new post-conflict tribunal, and said there was little point wasting time and resources on a case that would probably be heard in the new system.</p>
<p>This rationale is both dangerous and incorrect. It will be for the JEP to decide which cases it will hear, and judges in the ordinary criminal justice system simply cannot predict its decisions. But many judges seem happy to bet that the JEP will take up their cast-offs. As the judge in Manizales put it: “what is it to wait six more months?”. </p>
<p>There are good reasons for the JEP to reject the false positives cases. For one, those implicated in the scandal acted for personal gain, and their crimes were not linked to the armed conflict. Besides, the peace agreement made clear that ongoing cases should continue until the JEP is up and running. Instead, cases are being suspended, and some military officers who have already convicted are even being <a href="http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/libertad-condicional-para-el-general-r-henry-torres-escalante/535508">released</a> so they can access the JEP. </p>
<h2>Unwilling or unable?</h2>
<p>This is all deeply concerning, and if doesn’t change course, it could become an issue for the International Criminal Court (ICC). If Colombia continues to deny victims access to justice in cases that come within the ICC’s jurisdiction, then there may be good reason to step in. The court can <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/InternationalCriminalCourt.aspx">initiate proceedings</a> when a state is “unwilling or unable” to prosecute a case itself.</p>
<p>That would certainly flatter the ICC’s image at a time when it urgently needs to prove it’s willing to investigate <a href="https://theconversation.com/international-criminal-court-must-not-ignore-threats-of-an-african-mass-withdrawal-67257">cases from outside Africa</a>. But it could also destabilise an already fragile peace process. </p>
<p>Colombia’s next presidential election is due in <a href="http://www.as-coa.org/articles/explainer-colombias-2018-elections">2018</a>, and post-conflict criminal trials are highly politicised. It must be remembered that in the 2016 plebiscite, the majority of Colombian citizens voted against the peace deal. And if the ICC were to prosecute individuals from the army but leave the FARC high command alone, the resulting resentment could easily be exploited by those willing to return to war.</p>
<p>The post-conflict system ought to be given a chance, and as long as the JEP is still “under construction”, the ordinary justice system should carry out its legal duty and prosecute those suspected of extrajudicial killings. But if things don’t change course very soon, the ICC may feel that it has no choice but to intervene – whatever the consequences.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/82350/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Seb Eskauriatza does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It seems the culprits in a “cash-for-kills” scheme that claimed thousands of lives might find a way to wriggle out of the peace process.Seb Eskauriatza, Teaching Fellow in Law, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/827282017-09-12T02:18:29Z2017-09-12T02:18:29ZColombia’s FARC rebels have rebranded as a political party – now they need a leader<p>Ever since <a href="https://theconversation.com/colombia-has-a-new-peace-agreement-but-will-it-stick-69535">Colombia signed</a> its fragile, contested peace agreement with the <a href="http://www.elmundo.es/internacional/2017/09/01/59a88cb346163f1c678b45d6.html">Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)</a> in November 2016, the big question has been: What will this no-longer-armed insurgency do next?</p>
<p>On Aug. 28, the FARC made its official reply. <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-41070022">In its first congress since disarmament</a>, the Marxist guerrilla group unveiled Colombia’s newest political party: the Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común, or Commoners’ Alternative Revolutionary Force. </p>
<p>“The new party will be built with many voices and diverse ideas,” announced Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri, the FARC’s top commander, via Twitter.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"903268681416921088"}"></div></p>
<p>In keeping their well-known acronym but setting aside the violence, the FARC seems to be embracing the opportunities and obligations of the 2016 accords. These enabled former combatants to <a href="https://www.farc-ep.co/pdf/Acuerdos/Acuerdofinal/3-ACUERDO-FINAL-participacion-politica.pdf">participate in Colombia’s political system</a> after <a href="http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/paz/onu-fue-prudente-mostrar-como-avanza-la-dejacion-de-armas-de-las-farc-articulo-698348">disarmament</a> – including, controversially, allocating the group 10 congressional seats for a period of two four-year terms. </p>
<p>As the campaign season for the <a href="http://www.as-coa.org/articles/explainer-colombias-2018-elections">2018 presidential and congressional elections heats up</a>, everyone is now wondering whether this insurgency turned political party can find its place on Colombia’s political stage.</p>
<h2>New horizons</h2>
<p>For five decades, the FARC used violence to push its Marxist agenda of land reform and anti-capitalist revolution, <a href="https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/e62e/6fba71918abcf7564ec983b0e2d592389d21.pdf">forestalling political solutions to social problems</a> and silencing the voice of millions of Colombians. </p>
<p>In doing so, it also launched a roiling armed conflict that <a href="https://rni.unidadvictimas.gov.co/RUV">turned eight million people into victims</a> of homicide, terrorism, grievous injury and displacement.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/05/01/colombias-guerrillas-come-out-of-the-jungle">FARC maintains</a> that it resorted to armed struggle because the Colombian political elite ran the country like a caste system, ignoring the struggles of the rural and peasant classes, which for much of the 20th century accounted for <a href="https://datos.bancomundial.org/indicador/SP.RUR.TOTL.ZS?locations=CO">70 percent of Colombia’s population</a>.</p>
<p>The FARC is now hoping to position itself as the party for these marginalized voters. To succeed, it must develop new organizational capacities, including the ability to process internal dissent and debate while maintaining party unity – a tricky feat considering that several FARC units <a href="http://lasillavacia.com/silla-llena/red-de-la-paz/historia/disidencias-de-las-farc-por-que-lo-hacen-son-peligrosas-58817">have already reneged on the peace agreements</a>. </p>
<p>It must also build a political platform that can reach a wider segment of the Colombian electorate. Today, <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS?locations=CO">three-quarters of all Colombians live in cities</a>. Voters in Bogota or Cali do not necessarily share the needs of the rural sectors that shaped the FARC’s political agenda.</p>
<p>The FARC’s leadership is clearly aware that <a href="http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/propuestas-de-los-partidos-no-coinciden-con-las-prioridades-de-los-votantes/537715">low popularity</a> is a weakness. Recently, FARC leadership <a href="http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/paz/rene-higuita-en-las-listas-de-las-farc-para-el-congreso-articulo-710822">invited the former soccer star Rene Higuita</a> to run as a FARC congressional candidate, and they have made other clear bids to attract the general population.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"887103721846562818"}"></div></p>
<p>There is certainly room for new voices in Colombia’s political debate. In the past, peace and security have topped Colombians’ <a href="http://dominio1.cide.edu/documents/320058/320502/tickner.pdf">list of concerns</a>. But since the peace process, voters have turned their attention to other issues, including <a href="http://info-estructura.com/colombia-corrupcion-gallup/">corruption</a> and its role in the state’s inability to deliver services.</p>
<p>The FARC’s rhetoric during its armed struggle often centered on health care, public education and economic development, so it is now closely associated with demands for better state services. As such, the group has the potential to promote a political agenda of inclusion and to advocate for more effective solutions to the problems that concern Colombians across the country.</p>
<h2>Room for debate</h2>
<p>Signs of change are already afoot. Earlier this year, when the citizens of Buenaventura took to the streets <a href="https://theconversation.com/protests-in-colombia-and-south-africa-reveal-link-between-inequality-and-popular-uprisings-78214">to protest low wages and lack of basic services</a>, newspapers reported dispassionately on the marches, giving voice to protestors’ grievances.</p>
<p>In the past, media commentators were generally quick to dub such marches as “FARC-inspired.” This effectively <a href="https://www.insightonconflict.org/blog/2013/09/peasant-protests-colombia/">delegitimized</a> peasants’ complaints of <a href="http://www.elpais.com.co/valle/las-cifras-de-la-crisis-en-buenaventura-el-principal-puerto-sobre-el-pacifico.html">state neglect</a>. </p>
<p>This subtle shift illustrates the political opening created by the peace process: The FARC’s absence as a violent actor makes a proper democracy possible in Colombia.</p>
<p>But the success of the new FARC will not depend entirely on its ability to attract public support. In this fractured nation, the group must also be seen as a force for reconciliation. </p>
<p>And, paradoxically enough, this is made possible by the fact that many powerful, hawkish Colombian politicians <a href="https://theconversation.com/latest-threat-to-colombias-peace-process-murders-a-kidnapping-delays-and-of-course-politics-73895">tried to derail last year’s accords</a>, which allowed the new FARC to position themselves as agents of peace.</p>
<p>The Colombian establishment is unintentionally empowering the new FARC in other ways, too. For decades armed conflict and fear were <a href="https://theconversation.com/colombians-are-fed-up-with-corruption-and-everyone-seems-to-be-under-investigation-75173">used as a shield</a> to cover up malfeasance by government officials and state institutions. Peace has made <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-40426033">corruption far more visible</a>, and it now sits squarely on the FARC’s agenda. </p>
<p>The Green Party, Liberal Party and some conservative parties, too, are starting to <a href="http://caracol.com.co/radio/2017/01/17/politica/1484677940_136047.html">join the anti-corruption crusade</a>.</p>
<h2>Show me a leader</h2>
<p>There’s one major hurdle, however, in the FARC’s thus far fortuitous rebirth: its graying hierarchy.</p>
<p>The average age of the FARC’s top leadership is 65, and Comandante Lodoño Echevarri, who also goes by Timochenko, has spent recent months in Havana under the care of Cuban doctors after a <a href="http://www.lafm.com.co/nacional/timochenko-sufrio-paro-cardiaco-dos-anos/">heart attack</a> and <a href="http://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/2017/07/02/nota/6261424/timochenko-maximo-lider-farc-sufre-derrame-es-hospitalizado">seizure</a> in July. </p>
<p>Timochenko is a respected rebel leader who successfully ended the group’s war on Colombia’s government, something numerous predecessors had failed to do. Some even <a href="http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/paz/santos-y-timochenko-serian-nominados-al-nobel-de-paz-articulo-657541">anticipated</a> that he would be nominated for a joint Nobel Peace Prize alongside President Juan Manuel Santos. He wasn’t. </p>
<p>Health issues aside, guerrilla commander and party boss are very different jobs. To build its constituency, the party will need a powerful and charismatic leader who embraces a discourse of peace and reconciliation, not war and confrontation. </p>
<p>One obvious contender <a href="http://colombia2020.elespectador.com/politica/el-proceso-de-democratizacion-de-las-farc">among the many candidates currently receiving speculation</a> is Luciano Marin, also known as Ivan Márquez, a former politician and FARC member who led the guerrilla group’s peace negotiations in Havana. </p>
<p>But there are also many civilians who came to the FARC from the labor movement, activism and the left-leaning Marcha Patriótica party. Choosing a leader unburdened by the group’s militaristic past would project a new image for the party. A young leader could speak more directly to the youth of Colombia.</p>
<p>Whoever takes the helm of the new FARC must represent all its members, merging the interests of its newest ranks with those of its core constituency. It will require diplomacy and tact to form a united front from these disparate streams – peasants, former combatants, urbanites – and sell the country on a party born of both violence and peace.</p>
<p>Sustaining that political institution will prove another challenge. In the past, demobilized armed groups like the populist <a href="http://www.refworld.org/docid/414eee264.html">ADM-19</a> have found that their political movements were initially popular but ultimately short-lived.</p>
<p>If this political movement fails, too, it would give fodder to radical sectors that still promote armed struggle as a means to political change. </p>
<p>In an irony familiar to <a href="https://theconversation.com/advice-for-colombia-from-countries-that-have-sought-peace-and-sometimes-found-it-67419">other post-conflict nations</a>, peace now rests heavily in the hands of those who waged war. The FARC’s success is in Colombia’s best interest, but it’s far from guaranteed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/82728/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Fabio Andrés Díaz Pabón does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Meet the Commoners’ Alternative Revolutionary Force, Colombia’s newest political party. To move beyond its violent past, the new FARC will need a charismatic leader who can win over voters.Fabio Andrés Díaz Pabón, Researcher on Conflict, Peace and Development, International Institute of Social StudiesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.