tag:theconversation.com,2011:/fr/topics/governance-in-africa-33753/articlesGovernance in Africa – The Conversation2021-07-21T15:02:23Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1647952021-07-21T15:02:23Z2021-07-21T15:02:23ZSouth Africa since 1994: a mixed bag of presidents and patchy institution-building<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/412195/original/file-20210720-17-tylty5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African president Cyril Ramaphosa delivers a speech next to a statue of the late former president Nelson Mandela in Cape Town in 2020. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Ruvan Boshoff</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The coronavirus pandemic has placed the leadership of presidents and prime ministers across the world under the most unforgiving <a href="https://theconversation.com/all-world-leaders-face-mega-covid-19-crises-how-ramaphosa-is-stacking-up-134682">spotlight</a>. It has exposed underlying weaknesses and revealed hidden strengths.</p>
<p>An extreme crisis like this provides the most searching examination of a political leader – a very acute form of accountability. Such a crisis can make or break a leader.</p>
<p>South Africa is a country that faces a crisis of leadership. Against a backdrop of a former president <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/south-african-court-dismisses-zumas-application-block-arrest-2021-07-09/">being jailed</a> for contempt of court for failing to appear before a commission of inquiry probing state capture and corruption, public trust has unsurprisingly declined. This has come through in research, including <a href="http://www.hsrc.ac.za/en/departments/sasas">studies</a> by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC).</p>
<p>This implies that there is a need for a form of leadership that responds to ethical crises. In South Africa and around the world, there is a severe challenge to the “normative core” – the underlying values and ethical principles that hold a society together – as the <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/world/south-africa-riots-jacob-zuma-b1887121.html">recent devastating unrest</a> has underlined.</p>
<p>This is the starting point of our chapter, Presidential Leadership and Accountability from Mandela to Ramaphosa, in a new <em>State of the Nation</em> <a href="https://www.hsrcpress.ac.za/books/ethics-politics-inequality-new-directions">publication</a> from the HSRC.</p>
<p>Our conceptual approach to comparing the presidents of South Africa’s democratic era was guided by the notion of “ethical presidential leadership”. We posed questions such as: what were the principal characteristics of three of the presidents who preceded Ramaphosa (Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma)? And what are the appropriate and useful inferences for his term as head of government?</p>
<p>We developed a framework for assessing presidential leadership based on five criteria: constitutional fidelity, institution building, socio-economic transformation, decision-making and political judgment, and strategic vision and statecraft.</p>
<p>Our chapter applies the first two – constitutional fidelity and institution-building.</p>
<p>We found that, in the 25 years since South Africa became a democracy, there has been both impressive constitutional fidelity and egregious constitutional infidelity. There has been impressive institution-building and destabilising institutional destruction. </p>
<p>Thus, South Africa’s experience of presidential leadership and accountability since 1994 is a confusing and often contradictory mixture of strength and weakness, success and failure, resilience and vulnerability.</p>
<h2>Constitutionalism and governance</h2>
<p>South Africa is a constitutional democracy. Fundamental to its transition away from the arbitrary, authoritarian and discriminatory rule of the apartheid era was the establishment of a rules-based society. In this, executive power would have to be exercised against the stern test of what the South African activist, academic and jurist <a href="https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/soaf113&div=80&id=&page=">Etienne Mureinik</a> called a “culture of justification”. Every exercise of public power would be publicly explained in an open and transparent way.</p>
<p>Moreover, the <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/saconstitution-web-eng.pdf">founding document</a> of South Africa’s new democracy was conceived as more than simply a map of the fresh distribution of power and authority. It was also seen as a constitution with “transformative” purpose. In other words to change the “<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02587203.1998.11834974">country’s political and social institutions and power relationships in a democratic, participatory and egalitarian direction</a>.” </p>
<p>South Africa’s constitution does this. It lays out the primary code for democratic governance as well as social change – even though we recognise that this is a contested paradigm. </p>
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<img alt="A man wearing spectacles, a suit and tei listens attentively to another." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/412201/original/file-20210720-19-1ws2vtg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/412201/original/file-20210720-19-1ws2vtg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/412201/original/file-20210720-19-1ws2vtg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/412201/original/file-20210720-19-1ws2vtg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/412201/original/file-20210720-19-1ws2vtg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/412201/original/file-20210720-19-1ws2vtg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/412201/original/file-20210720-19-1ws2vtg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Former presidents Jacob Zuma, left, and Thabo Mbeki, chat after the former’s state of the nation address in Parliament, in June 2009.</span>
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<p>Hence, the extent to which presidents adhere to the constitutional written code will have profound implications in relation to their use of executive power and their leadership.</p>
<p>Mandela, with his unequivocal support for the principle of constitutionalism and the supremacy of the rule of law, set a high bar. </p>
<p>For his part Mbeki did his utmost to strengthen the capacity and coherence of democratic governance, most notably with reforms to the Presidency itself. It’s nevertheless hard to avoid the conclusion that his approach to statecraft, and to the political management of his own complicated and often fractious party, led him to have undermined the constitution and the rule of law. This might have been done unwittingly, but nonetheless unerringly. </p>
<p>We conclude that he will therefore not be remembered as a great constitutionalist or ethical leader, even though in comparison with his successor, Zuma, history is proving to be kinder to him. </p>
<p>In the case of Zuma, the highest court in the land declared that <a href="https://theconversation.com/historic-moment-as-constitutional-court-finds-zuma-guilty-and-sentences-him-to-jail-163612">he had transgressed the constitution</a>. In addition, <a href="https://pmg.org.za/call-for-comment/694/">a large volume of evidence</a> has been adduced before the Zondo Commission of Inquiry that suggests that Zuma abused the power entrusted in him as president. And that he enabled the systemic form of corruption that is now commonly referred to as “state capture”.</p>
<h2>Institution building</h2>
<p>Institution building is a close relative of constitutional fidelity. This is because South Africa’s constitution is notable for the extensive constellation of “institutional infrastructure” that it establishes. It is the other side of the same coin. Institution building ensures that the vehicles for transformation have the necessary organisational drivers, fit for purpose in every sense.</p>
<p>As the Ghanaian lawyer and educationalist <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/our-network/leadership/henry-kwasi-prempeh">H. Kwasi Prempeh</a> argues, there is a need to shift focus from </p>
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<p>strong leadership to building credible and effective institutions at the national and local levels. </p>
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<p>We agree institution building is critical. But institutions without conscious, visionary and accountable leaders are vulnerable to abuse of power and loss of integrity.</p>
<p>In other words, ethical leadership requires strong, capable institutions. As Ramaphosa discovered last week, leaders will be rendered vulnerable by weak institutions. There was a massive failure of both crime intelligence and policing, as the president was compelled to publicly accept. </p>
<h2>What next</h2>
<p>The mixed outcomes of the last 25 years have numerous implications for Ramaphosa and future leaders. </p>
<p>Individual ethical standards of the highest order are essential. But these must be buttressed by strong, capable public institutions. Mbeki recognised this and set about building them. Zuma hollowed them out and rendered them vulnerable to “capture”. Ramaphosa is now in a process of rebuilding, but faces a perfect storm of interlocking social, fiscal, economic and health crises.</p>
<p>The influence of strong ethical leadership by heads of state is critical. But a culture of “ethics of care” must be translated at every level of governance. </p>
<p>Facing a severe, protracted and multifaceted crisis, the presidential leadership stakes could not be higher – for the authority of the Presidency and democratic state, the integrity of the constitution, and the socio-economic stability and advancement of South Africa.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/164795/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Calland is a founding partner of political risk consultancy, The Paternoster Group, and a member of the advisory council of the Council for the Advancement of the South African Constitution.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mabel Dzinouya Sithole is affiliated with the Civic Futures Africa, African Governance Futures Initiative, a range of civil society groups working on issues of democratic governance, youth participation, youth leadership, international organisations.</span></em></p>The extent to which presidents adhere to the constitutional written code will have profound implications in relation to their use of executive power.Richard Calland, Associate Professor in Public Law, University of Cape TownMabel Dzinouya Sithole, Programme Officer - Building Bridges, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1629422021-06-22T16:08:34Z2021-06-22T16:08:34ZWe studied why South Africans vote the way they do. This is what we found<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/407006/original/file-20210617-27-x72wne.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Residents in a Cape Town suburb queue to vote during previous municipal elections in South Africa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Foto24/Gallo Images/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africans are set to <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/trending/485123/ramaphosa-sets-the-date-for-the-2021-local-government-elections/">go to the polls</a> on 27 October 2021 for the country’s sixth municipal elections since the advent of democracy in 1994. The right of all adult South Africans to vote was <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-elections-south-africa">hard won</a> after a long struggle against colonialism and apartheid.</p>
<p>Voting is a cornerstone of democracy: a chance for people to elect their preferred representatives. But, what informs people’s voting decisions? Why do they choose to vote for one party and not another? In short, can we predict who they are likely to vote for in an upcoming national and a local election? </p>
<p>Over the past four years we tracked the factors that influence South African voters’ party choices and more importantly, why they made these choices. We interviewed a nationally representative sample of about 3 400 respondents from October to December, between 2017 and 2020. In total, four waves of data were collected in face-to-face interviews.</p>
<p>We are, therefore, able to compare the findings over the four waves to identify the factors that influenced their choices and also how these changed over this period. </p>
<p>Our <a href="https://www.uj.ac.za/faculties/humanities/sarchi-welsocdev/Documents/Factors%20Determining%20Voter%20Choice%20_%20Report%20_%20May%202021%20_%20Web_Final.pdf">latest report</a> contains the findings from the fourth wave of data collected on voter preferences - amid the pandemic and in the run-up to the 2021 municipal elections. </p>
<p>Four theories are tested statistically in our research. These are rational choice, clientelistic, sociological and party identification. All are widely used to understand voting behaviour across countries. The research questions and analysis model that we devised include all four theories. These provide the possible explanations for people’s voting choices. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-needs-new-thinking-for-its-democracy-to-work-for-all-162472">South Africa needs new thinking for its democracy to work for all</a>
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<p>In this article, we share findings from our longitudinal study to gain a better understanding of why people vote the way they do. The findings serve as a gauge of citizens’ approval or disapproval of policies and programmes, and can serve to hold elected officials accountable for their decisions and actions. </p>
<h2>What informs voter choices?</h2>
<p>We asked six questions about their party choice relating to governance and trust in political leadership, corruption, socio-economic well-being, democratic rights, social grants and socio-demographic factors such as age, gender, education and income and employment. </p>
<p>We used a logistic regression model to assess how the four factors influenced their choices. In December 2020, 52% of respondents selected the ANC, 10% selected the opposition Democratic Alliance and Economic Freedom Fighters, respectively. A quarter were either undecided, would not vote or refused to disclose their party choice. Only 6% said they would vote differently in a local government election compared to a national election. </p>
<p>We found the following: </p>
<p><strong>Rational choice model</strong>: This <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF00869640">suggests</a> that voters make their choices based on rational considerations motivated by self-interest. Closely related factors that are pertinent that we assessed included perceptions of governance – such as trust in institutions, government performance and progress in addressing corruption.</p>
<p>We found that concern about socioeconomic well-being was the main reason respondents gave for their choice of a political party across all four waves. It was also a statistically significant predictor of voter choice in 2017.</p>
<p>But, this factor became less important after the leadership changes in the governing African National Congress (ANC), that saw Cyril Ramaphosa replace Jacob Zuma as ANC president <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-anc-has-a-new-leader-but-south-africa-remains-on-a-political-precipice-89248">in December 2017</a>.</p>
<p>It is likely that socio-economic well-being became less important and that trust in Ramaphosa’s presidency resulted in <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.20940/JAE/2020/v19i1a1">increased support for the ANC</a>. </p>
<p><strong>Clientelism model:</strong> This <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3876122?seq=1">contends</a> that politicians use their power to provide economic privileges or material support in exchange for political support. </p>
<p>Some opponents of South Africa’s <a href="https://www.gov.za/faq/services/how-do-i-apply-social-grant">extensive social grant system</a> have suggested that social grants guarantee support for the ANC.</p>
<p>Respondents expressed fear of losing a social grant if they supported an opposition party across all four waves. Although receiving a grant is not a predictor of party preference, fear of loss of a grant certainly is. This suggests that potential voters do make rational decisions and choices that affect their material well-being, and expressed approval of the grants system.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/242653736_Theoretical_models_of_voting_behaviour"><strong>The Sociological model</strong></a> also informed our analysis. This essentially argues that social determinants like “race”, class, gender and education are what drive voting decisions. </p>
<p>We found that <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-origin-of-the-khoisan-tells-us-that-race-has-no-place-in-human-ancestry-53594">“race”</a> continued to be consistently a predictor of voter preference over all the waves. Regarding gender, women shifted their support away from the ANC towards the opposition in 2017 during the Zuma presidency (<a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/profiles/president-jacob-zuma-0">May 2009 - February 2018)</a>.</p>
<p>In wave 4, a greater proportion of women grant beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries supported the ANC compared to male grant beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Age also remained a consistent predictor of voter choice: younger people were less likely than older people to support the ANC than opposition parties. But, support for the ANC was spread across all age groups.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/ad/article/view/135773"><strong>Party identification model:</strong></a> This has been used to explain voting preferences in South Africa. It examines the extent to which party choice is guided by support for the party that led the struggle for freedom and democracy – that is, the ANC and, specifically, its leadership. We did not find evidence for this in <a href="https://www.uj.ac.za/newandevents/Documents/Voter%20Preference%20Report%20A4%2002.10.%202018%20PDF.PDF">wave 1</a> during Zuma’s presidency. But, trust in the presidency of Ramaphosa and party loyalty <a href="https://theconversation.com/ramaphosas-presidency-is-drawing-voters-back-to-the-anc-new-study-115261">emerged as significant predictors</a> across the subsequent three waves.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/study-shows-young-south-africans-have-no-faith-in-democracy-and-politicians-118404">Study shows young South Africans have no faith in democracy and politicians</a>
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<p>While trust in institutions declined over this same period, trust in the president did not. In fact, it increased from 54% in wave 3 to 60% in Wave 4. This may be attributed to the view that President Ramaphosa and the government did a good job in managing the coronavirus pandemic. </p>
<p>This does confirm the importance of political leadership as a predictor of voting behaviour in the current South African scenario. Contextual factors such as leadership changes in the governing party and the management of the pandemic also appear to hold sway.</p>
<h2>Intersecting factors</h2>
<p>We found that a range of intersecting factors explain voting preferences over the past four years. While existing theories of voting behaviour are helpful in understanding voter choices, specific factors that influence party choice emerged from our study.</p>
<p>These include the importance of democratic rights and perceptions of good governance - in particular the prevalence of corruption and the performance of the president on Covid-19 - and the fear of loss of social grants if the party in power changes.</p>
<p>Furthermore, it is evident that party loyalty is not fixed. It can rise and wane as voters have become disillusioned with the governing party. Although there is a slight shift in voters agreeing (41%) that corruption is being dealt with decisively in wave 4, the majority thought that <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/SouthAfrica/News/siu-investigating-ppe-corruption-worth-r142bn-20210511">corruption during the pandemic</a> made them more negative towards the ANC. We conclude that voter preferences are driven by rational considerations in their choice of a party in elections.</p>
<p><em>Megan Bryer and Jaclyn de Klerk co-authored the research on which this article is based.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/162942/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Leila Patel receives funding from the DST/NRF for her Chair in Welfare and Social Development and from the University of Johannesburg </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yolanda Sadie does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Concerns about socioeconomic well-being were the main reason why people voted for a certain political party.Leila Patel, Professor of Social Development Studies, University of JohannesburgYolanda Sadie, Emeritus professor in Politics, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1562212021-03-09T14:41:15Z2021-03-09T14:41:15ZCameroon’s Biya is Africa’s oldest president: assessing his 38 years in power<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/387789/original/file-20210304-13-668eu4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Paul Biya during a visit to China in 2018.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Lintao Zhang Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Cameroon’s President Paul Biya celebrated his 88th birthday recently, making him the <a href="https://africa.businessinsider.com/local/leaders/7-of-africas-oldest-presidents/wd9wgt9">oldest</a> president in Africa. He has been in power for 38 years. <a href="https://www.voanews.com/africa/cameroon-president-oldest-african-leader-celebrates-88th-birthday">Birthday celebrations</a> held across the country were met with protest by the opposition, demanding that he step down. So, how has he acquitted himself in office, and what has been his legacy for Cameroon?</p>
<p>Cameroonians welcomed Biya when he became president in <a href="https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781498564649/Post-Colonial-Cameroon-Politics-Economy-and-Society">November 1982</a>. The peaceful transfer of power by his predecessor <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ahmadou-Ahidjo">Ahmadou Ahidjo</a> won Cameroon praise as an example to emulate in Africa, where leaders either held on to power for too long, through duplicity and violence, or were forced out. </p>
<p>Ahidjo was ruthless, authoritative, and vicious. He ruled by intimidation. Under him rivals were hunted down, tortured, killed, or forced into exile. He was the <a href="https://www.amazon.ca/Gaullist-Africa-Cameroon-Under-Ah/dp/9781560045">“source of all power in the state”</a>. </p>
<p>Biya was seen as a breath of fresh air, and he stepped in saying the right things to different groups. He visited the nation’s Anglophone regions, spoke in English, and even referred to Bamenda, a major city in the Northwest region, as his “second home”. It was a marked difference from his predecessor, whose policies severely undermined English as a major part of the nation’s bilingualism. </p>
<p>Biya’s early actions were received with cheers. He pledged a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/45193445?refreqid=excelsior%3Acc0af1fd07fb6080efa451dbb12e2de4&seq=1">“new deal”</a> to restore integrity and eliminate corruption. He also announced that although he was of the Beti/Bulu ethnic group, he was born a Cameroonian and would govern as such. </p>
<p>His policies extended elementary and secondary education to <a href="https://spearsmedia.com/shop/southern-cameroons/">rural areas</a>. He allowed press freedom. In his book <em><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Communal-liberalism-Paul-Biya/dp/0333453379">Communal Liberalism</a></em> he emphasised the importance of creating a </p>
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<p>“more open, more tolerant and more democratic political society”.</p>
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<p>But those promises and pronouncements were short-lived.</p>
<h2>Hopes dashed</h2>
<p>By the end of Biya’s first year in office, he had reverted to his predecessor’s tactics, a practice which intensified after the attempted coup <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1984/05/10/world/cameroon-reported-to-execute-plotters-after-trials-in-secret.html">in 1984</a>. </p>
<p>He remade the nation’s only political party, Cameroon National Union, in his image, renaming it the <a href="https://www.prc.cm/en/the-president/political-vision">Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement</a>. He packed his administration with people from his ethnic group and drove a solvent economy <a href="https://www.langaa-rpcig.net/?s=Cameroon%27s+predicaments">into insolvency</a>.</p>
<p>His policies targeted and undermined groups like <a href="https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781498564632/Post-Colonial-Cameroon-Politics-Economy-and-Society">Bamilekes</a>, <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon/250-cameroons-anglophone-crisis-crossroads">Anglophones</a> and <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/contemporary-west-african-states/B90AB6DD0DD8F468F383737F1593FF89">Northerners</a>. </p>
<p>He changed the name of the country from the United Republic of Cameroon to the <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/665344/pdf">Republic of Cameroon</a>, a clear indication that <a href="https://scholarlypublications.universiteitleiden.nl/handle/1887/12878">Anglophone concerns did not matter</a>. </p>
<p>He went to the World Bank and International Monitory Fund for help to revive an ailing economy. But, after <a href="https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781498564632/Post-Colonial-Cameroon-Politics-Economy-and-Society">three decades of intervention</a> by these institutions, the economy remains on the brink of collapse. </p>
<p>The nation’s currency was devalued on his watch in 1994, bringing <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/i228968?refreqid=excelsior%3Aad8921a0aef1cdc531714369088d7ad9">misery to many</a>. </p>
<p>Corruption became endemic. Cameroon is often ranked as being among <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/cameroon">the most corrupt</a> countries in the world. </p>
<p>Biya circumvents the country’s multiparty political system at will. He has repeatedly amended the constitution to tighten <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/236713349_Understanding_the_Protest_of_February_2008_in_Cameroon">his grip on power</a>. One amendment, in 2008, was to eliminate presidential term limits.</p>
<p>As a response to protests against excessive centralisation of decision making in Yaounde, Biya signed a decentralisation decree in 1996 to empower regional and local authorities. But 25 years later, that initiative has <a href="https://www.intechopen.com/books/public-economics-and-finance/decentralized-territorial-communities-and-implementation-of-public-policies-the-case-of-cameroon">not been realised</a>. Another failed initiative was the National Commission for the Promotion of Bilingualism and Multiculturalism created <a href="https://www.prc.cm/files/b1/00/4d/1f4edab0eb8fab5df54955177eff43d3.pdf">in 2017</a> in response to the Anglophone protest. After billions of francs CFA were squandered, the commission has achieved <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/62657/cameroon-can-musongues-committee-unite-the-country/">nothing substantive</a>. </p>
<p>Biya’s Achilles heel is the ongoing <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/cameroon#">Anglophone crisis</a>. He has overstayed his term in office, using underhand manoeuvres to cling to power.</p>
<p>His nearly four decades’ rule has robbed Cameroon of its credibility as a stable and peaceful country. Nations such as the US have repeatedly imposed <a href="https://cm.usembassy.gov/security-alert-u-s-embassy-yaounde-cameroon-april-5-2018/">advisory travel bans on Cameroon</a>. </p>
<h2>The true test of leadership</h2>
<p>Four years ago, a peaceful protest against the marginalisation of English-speaking people turned violent as Biya’s military responded with arrests and torture. </p>
<p>Some responded with a call for secession of the Anglophone regions and created a virtual <a href="https://ambagov.org/">Ambazonia Republic</a>. They formed a military wing, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/13/cameroons-separatist-movement-is-going-international-ambazonia-military-forces-amf-anglophone-crisis/">Ambazonia Defence Force</a>, and used it to attack Biya’s military and disrupt economic and social services in the region.</p>
<p>My work in Cameroon brings me to the <a href="https://ecommons.udayton.edu/hst_fac_pub/149/">conclusion</a> that the Anglophone crisis degenerated into violence because of miscalculations by Biya’s regime. The resulting crisis has devastated entire communities. The region’s economy has also been crippled, resulting in a wave of <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/08/14/horrific-video-shows-cameroon-killing">crime</a>, and burning of businesses and <a href="https://cm.usembassy.gov/burning-of-kumba-district-hospital/">public facilities</a>.</p>
<p>Cameroon is now a <a href="https://www.osac.gov/Country/Cameroon/Content/Detail/Report/5b1d78b0-241a-4d0e-baca-188e24fffb5f">no-go country</a> in many respects.</p>
<h2>Foreign policy success</h2>
<p>My research shows that Biya’s most enduring achievement has been in his <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/abs/cameroons-relations-toward-nigeria-a-foreign-policy-of-pragmatism/5138B90C617DBA925EF4D22199FBCAFA">conduct of foreign policy</a>. He remains influential in the African Union, and maintains good relations with <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/african-studies-review/article/abs/sinocameroon-relations-a-foreign-policy-of-pragmatism/1371F463322610B315EF0A447C20FFD7">France, the US and China</a>. </p>
<p>Cameroon was part of the multinational joint task force which conducted military operations to contain <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Understanding-Boko-Haram-Terrorism-and-Insurgency-in-Africa/Hentz-Solomon/p/book/9780367076306">Boko Haram</a>. Biya was key in convincing major powers that Boko Haram <a href="https://www.editions-harmattan.fr/index.asp?navig=catalogue&obj=livre&no=44190">posed a global threat</a>. </p>
<p>He settled Cameroon’s conflict with Nigeria over the Bakassi Peninsula and placed relations between the nations on a <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/abs/cameroons-relations-toward-nigeria-a-foreign-policy-of-pragmatism/5138B90C617DBA925EF4D22199FBCAFA">good footing</a>. </p>
<p>Biya also diversified foreign policy from a focus on France to expanding relations with China (though by 2007 he had begun to regret China’s <a href="https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10YAOUNDE83_a.html">economic domination</a> in Cameroon). He has encouraged American businesses in Cameroon too.</p>
<p>Even after Cameroon was excluded from the <a href="https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/trade-development/preference-programs/african-growth-and-opportunity-act-agoa">African Growth and Opportunity Act</a>, a programme that allows African nations to export their goods to the US duty free, for <a href="https://agoa.info/news/article/15691-cameroon-car-gambia-niger-see-us-agoa-status-changes.html">human rights violations</a>, US-Cameroon military collaboration <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2020/01/21/us-cameroonian-military-cooperation-broadens-and-matures/">continued</a>.</p>
<h2>Turning the tide</h2>
<p>Given Biya’s unwillingness to step down from power, the global community needs to exert pressure on him to solve the Anglophone crisis. </p>
<p>The crisis exposes the hypocrisy and weaknesses of the current global system. The major powers make noises about human rights, yet fail to stop abuses by Biya’s government.</p>
<p>What happens with the Anglophone crisis may turn out to be the most significant determinant of Biya’s legacy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/156221/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Julius A. Amin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Biya’s long rule has robbed Cameroon of its credibility as a stable and peaceful country.Julius A. Amin, Professor, Department of History, University of DaytonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1503052020-11-18T14:57:47Z2020-11-18T14:57:47ZWhy South Africa’s president stands on solid ground in the fight against corruption<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/369847/original/file-20201117-19-vcbs7w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">ANC secretary-general Ace Magashule in court in Bloemfontein, on corruption charges.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Conrad Bornman</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Sometimes, the best thing politicians can do to take a society forward is – nothing. This reality is key to understanding the prosecution on <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/everything-you-need-to-know-about-ace-magashules-arrest-and-court-appearance--78fba3e3-387a-5ddf-a47a-0c9afcd327cd">corruption charges</a> of the secretary-general of South Africa’s governing African National Congress (ANC), Ace Magashule.</p>
<p>Magashule, a leader in the ANC faction which supported former president Jacob Zuma, is the highest-ranking politician besides <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/jacob-zuma-corruption-case-postponed-again-to-resolve-pre-trial-issues-npa-20200908">Zuma himself</a> to face charges of misusing public trust. The prosecution stems from lengthy investigations into <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/">“state capture”</a>, the use of government power to serve private ends. </p>
<p>Much of the media, business and the public debate have been urging his prosecution and that of other Zuma allies; they now have what they wanted, a signal that highly placed politicians are not above the law.</p>
<p>Inevitably, the prosecution has not pleased Magashule and his faction: their reaction has prompted claims that they are about to fight back by <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/mangaung-dispatches-magashule-fires-warning-shots-at-ramaphosa-and-his-supporters-20201113">unseating President Cyril Ramaphosa</a>. When Magashule appeared in court in his home province, Free State, his supporters gathered despite an appeal by the ANC leadership (including, in theory, Magashule himself) <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/anc-top-six-pledges-support-for-magashule-but-wont-be-by-his-side-when-he-appears-in-court-20201111">not to demonstrate on his behalf</a>. Some burned T-shirts <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HFRxcTC-kTo">bearing Ramaphosa’s face</a>. Magashule addressed them, insisting he would not step down from his position despite an <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2020/08/31/anc-nec-briefing-following-3-day-meeting">ANC executive committee decision</a> that office holders charged with corruption should do this.</p>
<p>Media also reported that Magashule’s supporters were planning a special ANC conference at which Ramaphosa would be removed. Reporting and commentary assume that the prosecution has triggered a battle to control the ANC between Ramaphosa and his faction, and the group which supports Magashule, and that this is likely to decide the future of the governing party.</p>
<h2>Factional battles</h2>
<p>In reality, the chances that Magashule’s prosecution will tear the ANC apart and seriously damage Ramaphosa are slim. But it may well take South Africa into a new era.</p>
<p>As ever, media reports on events since Magashule was charged are long on televised drama and leaks from politicians, very short on making sense of either. The <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2020-11-13-magashule-supporters-clash-with-police-as-anc-leader-hands-himself-in/">demonstrations outside court</a> may have seemed dramatic but were inevitable. </p>
<p>Magashule is a key figure in the Zuma faction whose members are now threatened by the prospect of a raft of prosecutions of politicians accused of “state capture”. He also controls a network of supporters in Free State. This made a rally in his support, much like those which are organised when Zuma <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43668144">appears in court</a>, inevitable. Given the enmity between the factions, some of those who gathered were bound to denounce Ramaphosa.</p>
<p>But the fact that a few hundred loyalists arrive to cheer a politician does not mean they have much support in the ANC. </p>
<p>Politicians also regularly leak their plans to the media because they know they will be reported without any attempt to evaluate the information. The fact that some in the Zuma faction, in order to create a sense of momentum, told the media that they were organising a special conference does not mean they will be able to do this.</p>
<p>Magashule’s refusal to step aside is no great act of defiance since the resolution requiring this is not in force.</p>
<h2>Ramaphosa’s position in the ANC</h2>
<p>The important question is whether Magashule’s faction has the support it needs. This seems very unlikely. Since he won the ANC presidency (in December 2017), Ramaphosa’s position has strengthened. A key reason is that he halted the slide in the ANC’s electoral fortunes under Zuma: its 2019 national election showing was its first to improve on a previous election (the 2016 local ballot) <a href="https://theconversation.com/cabinet-picks-show-ramaphosa-and-allies-believe-theyre-firmly-in-control-118083">in over a decade</a>.</p>
<p>This means more seats for ANC politicians for whom winning one may be the difference between being middle class and poor. It is easy to see why most ANC members who vote at conferences, special or otherwise, would continue to back him.</p>
<p>Obviously, the prospect of widespread prosecutions alarms ANC members who fear they are in the firing line. But for every office holder who may lose a seat because they are prosecuted, another job opens up. For every politician alienated by the prosecutions, at least one other sees them as a lifeline.</p>
<p>This makes it unlikely that Magashule’s allies could attract enough support to convene a special conference (which needs support from most of the provinces) and even less likely that, if they did, they could win. As long as the ANC vote holds firm or improves – which it did in <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-by-elections-in-south-africa-say-about-the-ruling-party-and-the-state-of-opposition-150314">local government by-elections recently</a> – Ramaphosa should command majority support in the ANC.</p>
<p>Another aspect of this saga strengthens Ramaphosa’s position further. One of his core goals since becoming president has been to strengthen government institutions to ensure that they are not prey to attack as they were during Zuma’s tenure. </p>
<p>A particular concern is to insulate the criminal justice system from interference by politicians. One of the earliest decisions Ramaphosa had to make was the appointment of a national director of public prosecutions. </p>
<p>All his predecessors had appointed the person they wanted. Ramaphosa asked citizens’ organisations, in particular lawyers’ organisations, for their recommendation and <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-appointment-national-director-public-prosecutions-4-dec-2018-0000">accepted it</a>. So, the director, <a href="https://www.npa.gov.za/content/adv-shamila-batohi">Shamila Batohi</a>, is the choice of the legal profession, not the president. Which may be why she is the first person in the job who is a professional prosecutor with no apparent political history.</p>
<p>Since then, Ramaphosa has – despite intense pressure from business and other interests – refused to intervene to hasten prosecutions of politicians accused of <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-09-14-00-definition-of-state-capture/">“state capture”</a>. He has insisted throughout that decisions must be taken by prosecutors and has kept as far as he can from the workings of the prosecuting authority.</p>
<p>Unlike his predecessors, he can, therefore, credibly insist that he has no role in the prosecutions. While members of the opposing faction might claim, spuriously, that he is behind it, it seems unlikely that this will gain much traction given his attitude since he took office. Ramaphosa is also under no pressure to do anything at all about the prosecution since he had nothing to do with it. Given this, the fallout is likely to be contained by the ANC and the promised fight to the death is unlikely.</p>
<h2>Looking forward</h2>
<p>But, if the prosecution will not trigger High Noon in the governing party, it could open a new era. Regardless of the outcome of Magashule’s case, a high-ranking politician has been charged because a prosecutor thinks he is guilty, not because a politician wants him gone. </p>
<p>That signals not only that politicians are subject to the law but that prosecutors can treat senior politicians like any other citizen and not face political consequences. That would be a victory for the rule of law and the administration of justice which would dwarf the ANC’s factional politics, despite the noise that it generates.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/150305/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Friedman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>For every office holder who may lose a seat because they are prosecuted, another job opens up.Steven Friedman, Professor of Political Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1490062020-11-16T14:59:52Z2020-11-16T14:59:52ZGrowing turbulence in DRC’s ruling coalition points to an early divorce<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/369276/original/file-20201113-23-1f96hpo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Former DRC President Joseph Kabila, left, congratulates his succesor, Felix Tshisekedi, on his inauguration in January 2019. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Kinsela Cunningham</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The rickety coalition that has governed the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) for 20 months, forged by President Félix Tshisekedi and his predecessor Joseph Kabila, appears to be falling apart. </p>
<p>In 2019, for lack of a parliamentary majority, Tshisekedi chose to share power with his former rival, Kabila, in a coalition of their respective political platforms – the Cape for Change and the Common Front for the Congo. The Cape for Change is led by Tshisekedi and opposition figure <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/Africa/News/drc-opposition-figures-tshisekedi-and-kamerhe-form-joint-ticket-20181123">Vital Kamerhe</a>.</p>
<p>Rather than put the country on the path of economic and social recovery as intended, this alliance turned out to be a centre of conflict from early on. The alliance partners have fought over the sharing of ministerial posts. They have also clashed over the control of other state agencies, including the judiciary and the national electoral commission.</p>
<p>The tensions have become more pronounced in the last six months, as shown by, for example, the ousting of <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/30182/drc-tshisekedi-loses-an-asset-in-parlia">Jean-Marc Kabund a Kabund</a>, the interim president of Tshisekedi’s party, Union for Democracy and Social Progress, from his post as vice president of the National Assembly. This was at the instigation of Kabila’s platform. The members of the platform in the government have also been refusing to execute orders from Tshisekedi. </p>
<p>In addition, the parliament, which is dominated by Kabila’s platform, has accused Tshisekedi of violating the constitution. He appointed three new judges to the constitutional court <a href="https://www.radiookapi.net/2020/07/18/actualite/justice/justice-felix-tshisekedi-nomme-trois-nouveaux-membres-la-cour">in July</a> and the Kabila camp considers the appointment to be <a href="https://in.reuters.com/article/us-congo-politics/congo-leader-boosts-influence-with-new-constitutional-court-judges-idUSKBN27629F">flawed</a>. They also accuse the president of wanting to <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/46712/drc-constitutional-court-fight-reveals-kabila-tshisekedi-struggle/">control the country’s judicial institutions</a>.</p>
<p>Members of parliament aligned to Kabila have been boycotting initiatives by Tshisekedi, in both the government and parliament. They refused to take part in the swearing-in of the three recently appointed judges.</p>
<h2>Unworkable marriage</h2>
<p>Tshisekedi became president 20 months ago. Before then, his political party had been the main opposition party for more than 35 years, to the successive regimes of <a href="https://www.lesinrocks.com/2017/04/16/livres/actualite/lascension-et-la-chute-de-mobutu-lhomme-leopard-qui-ravage-le-congo/">Mobutu Sese Seko</a>, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Laurent-Kabila">Laurent Désiré Kabila</a> and his son <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/12/25/drc-what-is-joseph-kabilas-legacy-after-18-years-in-power">Joseph Kabila</a>. </p>
<p>As his party didn’t get enough MPs to form a government, he got into a coalition with Kabila’s Common Front for Congo, which had more than the required number of MPs. This enabled him to lead the war-weary, unstable country, promising to rebuild it.</p>
<p>But being a president without a loyal parliament made his position precarious.
From early on, the governance of the country was like a vehicle driven by two people at the same time, without any prospect of positive economic outlook.</p>
<p>It didn’t take long for a breakdown to happen.</p>
<p>Major disagreements arose between the coalition partners. They differed over how to share ministerial posts, management of the state-owned companies, diplomacy, the <a href="https://actualite.cd/2020/08/03/rdc-elections-les-trois-principales-reformes-proposees-par-les-12-personnalites">electoral process</a>, appointments of the head of the electoral commission as well as judges of the constitutional court, to mention but a few.</p>
<p>From the onset, many observers dismissed the coalition between Tshisekedi and Kabila as an <a href="https://afrique.lalibre.be/44907/opinion-la-coalition-tshisekedi-kabila-duo-ou-duel-au-sommet-de-letat-en-rd-congo/">unholy alliance</a> doomed to fail. The experience of the last 20 months supports the sceptics’ view that the coalition was never sincere about working together for the benefit of the Congolese people. </p>
<p>For Kabila, the motivation seems to be the desire to retain power behind the scenes. His platform used its parliamentary majority to get cabinet positions and other positions in stated-owned companies (such as the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15859686">national railway of the Democratic Republic of Congo</a> and <a href="https://www.gecamines.cd/">Gécamines, the Congolese commodity trading and mining company</a>).</p>
<p>For Tshisekedi, the main goal appears to have been to take advantage of the opportunity offered by the coalition to destroy the system of cronyism and corruption that had become entrenched under Kabila. He relied on popular support and political gamesmanship to tighten his grip on power. </p>
<h2>Looming divorce</h2>
<p>After endless, futile negotiations with the Kabila camp, Tshisekedi appears to have finally recognised the limits of the coalition government, and has lost patience. In a brief address to the nation <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=0ZptIKGTDe0">on 23 October</a>, he denounced the Kabila camp’s obstructive actions. It was thinly veiled rebuke of his coalition partner. He said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>These disagreements between parties involved in this Agreement are hindering the economic take-off of the country.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>He announced a consultation with social, religious and political leaders with a view to bringing about reforms. His aim is to gain a majority in parliament and establish a new government loyal to him. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I would not let any political commitment of any kind take precedence over my constitutional prerogatives and over the best interests of Congolese people. I will never compromise the best interests of the nation.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The statement underlines the primacy of constitutional order over all kinds of political arrangements, including the governing coalition. The president promised to report back to the nation on the outcome of his consultations. Undoubtedly, this statement spells the end of the ruling coalition. </p>
<p>The Kabila camp was caught by surprise. It came soon after they failed to make good on their threats to impeach the president. This is even more unlikely since he appointed new judges to the constitutional court. </p>
<p>The constitutional court is the institution empowered to proclaim the results of both the presidential and legislative ballots, and to judge the head of state and the prime minister if necessary. Its verdicts are final.
It is, therefore, a strategic institution in the control of power. In this context, the frustration of the Kabila camp is understandable. They suspect the newly appointed judges <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/46712/drc-constitutional-court-fight-reveals-kabila-tshisekedi-struggle/">belong to Tshisekedi’s movement</a>. </p>
<h2>Looking forward</h2>
<p>If successful, the president’s consultation process would end the Kabila faction’s stranglehold on his government. He will be free to set up a new government – through a new parliamentary majority – in line with his own political agenda.</p>
<p>Now, the question is how to get this new parliamentary majority. In the labyrinth of Congolese politics, two possibilities seem to open to Tshisekedi: either to dissolve the parliament and call early parliamentary elections, or to create a new coalition with the participation of new partners from the current parliament. </p>
<p>Calling early elections seems unlikely for want of time and funding. The second option sounds more plausible as Tshisekedi is more likely to be supported by dissidents from the Kabila platform and other opposition leaders, including for example, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j9tvaP9Upkc">Bahati Lukwebo</a>, <a href="https://www.financialafrik.com/2020/11/08/moise-katumbi-peu-bavard-apres-avoir-rencontre-felix-tshisekedi/">Moise Katumbi</a> and <a href="https://www.financialafrik.com/2020/11/04/jean-pierre-bemba-a-felix-tshisekedi-je-soutiens-ce-dialogue-entre-congolais/">Jean-Pierre Bemba</a>. The consequence would be that Kabila and his remaining supporters would be a minority in the parliament, and subsequently join the opposition. </p>
<p>If Tshisekedi wins this battle for a new parliamentary majority, he will have achieved a masterstroke. Meanwhile, the Congolese people are holding their collective breath.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/149006/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Albert Kasanda does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After endless, futile negotiations with the Kabila camp, Tshisekedi appears to have finally recognised the limits of the coalition government and has lost patience.Albert Kasanda, Researcher in Political Philosophy and social sciences, Center of Global studies, Institutes of Philosophy, Czech Academy of SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1492842020-11-16T14:58:46Z2020-11-16T14:58:46ZNigeria’s federal system still isn’t working: what should change<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/369036/original/file-20201112-15-kixhhw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/image-nigeria-flag-painted-on-brick-94201426">Shutterstock </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Nigeria is a troubled federation. Its federal character has been a subject of debate since the return to democratic rule in 1999. Various groups have claimed to be marginalised and not sufficiently represented in the central offices of the national government. Some <a href="https://guardian.ng/opinion/nigerias-unitary-federalism/">say</a> it’s not even a federation so much as a unitary state, created by the military. </p>
<p>The oil-producing communities of the Niger Delta are among the groups that have militated for change. They feel neglected in development and dissatisfied with environmental degradation. Their call is for <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40175053?seq=1">control</a> of the wealth from resources in their region. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2017/10/24/southern-governors-unite-insist-on-true-federalism-devolution-of-powers/">Some state governors</a> who felt shortchanged by the federal structure have also called for ‘true federalism’. These states, largely from the southern part of the country, argue that the federation favours parts of the country that produced key actors in the military regimes. Even President Muhammadu Buhari has made <a href="https://businessday.ng/politics/article/president-buhari-calls-for-return-to-true-federalism/">this call</a>. </p>
<p>Other groups, like the <a href="http://saharareporters.com/2020/10/01/acf-demands-referendum-one-nigeria-dismisses-call-restructuring">Arewa Consultative Forum</a> (Hausa-Fulani), <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BmhhQVkQ1Sw">Afenifere</a> (Yoruba) and <a href="https://guardian.ng/news/ohanaeze-ndigbo-insists-on-restructuring-of-nigeria/">Ohaneze </a>(Igbo), also insist on federal restructuring. Some have called for a return to the <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202001070262.html">regions</a> of the 1950s, others for <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/08/world/africa/nigeria-cameroon-secession-separatists.html">secession</a> and the establishment of <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2017/11/calls-biafran-independence-return-south-east-nigeria">Biafra</a> or Oduduwa republics. </p>
<p>Calls for federal restructuring have become a way of expressing dissatisfaction with <a href="https://theconversation.com/economic-inequality-lies-behind-growing-calls-for-secession-in-nigeria-84620">poor economic performance</a> and misgovernance in Nigeria. On the other hand, even elite groups, who mobilise as ethnic factions and compete for power and resources, point to the country’s poor performance as evidence that the federal structure is not working. </p>
<p>Misgovernance and poor economic development are visible in <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/3d304f0a-e446-11e9-b112-9624ec9edc59">deplorable infrastructure</a>, <a href="https://nairametrics.com/2020/08/14/13-9-million-nigerian-youth-are-unemployed-as-at-q2-2020-nbs/">high youth unemployment</a>, widespread poverty and conflicts. In 2018, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/06/26/africa/nigeria-overtakes-india-extreme-poverty-intl/index.html#:%7E:text=Lagos%2C%20Nigeria%20(CNN)%20Nigeria,less%20than%20%241.90%20a%20day">Nigeria overtook India</a> as the country with the highest number of poor people. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53009704">Banditry</a>, <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/boko-haram-insurgency-in-nigeria/">insurgency</a> and religious extremism have multiplied. </p>
<p>Nigerians may agree that the federal system hinders the country’s progress. But they haven’t agreed on how to change it. No structural changes have been made since the return to democratic rule in 1999. </p>
<h2>The problems with Nigeria’s federal structure</h2>
<p>Complaints about the federation structure date back to the pre-independence period, when <a href="https://books.openedition.org/ifra/759?lang=en">minority groups felt dominated</a> by majority groups. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://nigerianscholars.com/tutorials/nigerian-federalism/sir-henry-willink-commission/">Willink Commission</a>, which looked into the matter, recommended the inclusion of a bill of rights in the Independence Constitution, rather than creating states for minority groups. But by 1963 the carving up of the country had begun, and eventually by <a href="https://www.pulse.ng/news/local/nigerian-states-this-is-how-the-36-states-were-created/mdtnq3e">1 October 1996</a> there were 36 states. </p>
<p>The creation of states grants access to public offices and infrastructure for local elites. It also creates new majority and minority groups in the new states. Unviable states have proliferated, dependent on the common pool revenues and unable to fund their bureaucracies. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/249743486_The_Political_Economy_of_Fiscal_Federalism_and_the_Dilemma_of_Constructing_a_Developmental_State_in_Nigeria">Scholars</a> have emphasised that the fiscal arrangement, <a href="https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/34277/ssoar-fedgov-2010-1-ojo-The_politics_of_revenue_allocation.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y&lnkname=ssoar-fedgov-2010-1-ojo-The_politics_of_revenue_allocation.pdf">especially the formula</a> for sharing the common pool account, is not <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02589001.2010.512741?src=recsys">an incentive</a> for states to produce revenue. States angle to get more revenue share from the central pool rather than generate revenue within their territories. </p>
<p>State governors complain that the share of revenue that goes to the national government is too large, making competition for offices at the centre too intense. They call for revision to grant more revenue to the states. Some of the governors also <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/200912080305.htm">call</a> for more responsibilities, to get access to ways of generating revenue. Some governors believe that decentralisation, when <a href="https://leadership.ng/fayemi-reiterates-call-for-creation-of-state-police/">extended to policing</a>, would also improve security. </p>
<h2>Attempts at solving the problem</h2>
<p>In 1995, six geopolitical zones were created and the <a href="https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780191828836.001.0001/acref-9780191828836-e-367">zoning and rotation principle</a> was introduced. The idea was that key political offices would be rotated among the six zones in the country, among the districts in the case of the states and so on.</p>
<p>A number of talk shops on the restructuring of the country have been held over the years, but the outputs were never implemented. These included the <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/national-political-reform-conference-abuja-2005/oclc/743060040">National Political Reform Conference (2005)</a>, <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/national-conference/time-to-get-tough-with-north-korea-and-iran-as-imminent-nuclear-bomb-test-looms/">the National Conference (2014)</a> and the All Progress Congress Party <a href="https://pgfnigeria.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Volume-1-Main-report-summary-of-findings-and-arecommendations.pdf">Committee Report on True Federalism</a> (2018). </p>
<p>I argued in <a href="https://www.eisa.org/pdf/JAE11.1Aiyede2.pdf">a paper</a> that Nigeria’s preoccupation with federal restructuring has been driven by desperate competition for power and the perks and preferment that come with it. It is not based on the objectives of the constitution:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>good government and welfare of all persons in our country, on the principles of freedom, equality and justice, and for the purpose of consolidating the unity of our people.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Instructively, the recent <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/22/timeline-on-nigeria-unrest">#EndSARS protest</a> by Nigerian youths has been focused on ending police brutality and bad governance. Apart from these demands, they have emphasised the high cost of governance, the excessively high remuneration for political office holders, widespread corruption and lack of compassion of the political leadership. Federal restructuring has not been high on the agenda of the youths because of these more concrete issues they confront in their daily lives. </p>
<p>The present federal structure is not fit for the 21st century because it is the product of political competition among elite groups that rely on state power for affluence and influence. It is also a competition devoid of commitment to empower ordinary citizens, reduce inequality, advance economic competitiveness or improve state performance in service delivery. As long as elites aren’t expected to carry out these commitments, the political structure will not easily yield to constitutional innovations. </p>
<h2>What should be done</h2>
<p>Nigeria’s federal system needs to be rejigged to promote economic prosperity and accommodate its diverse peoples. Economic performance and the reduction of poverty must be the prime basis for reviewing the structure of the federation. </p>
<p>This means that additional decentralisation measures must be carried out to promote innovation and healthy competition among the states for productive activities. The leadership needs to practise and uphold fairness and responsibility in governance. Government bureaucracies must be nimble and oriented to getting results.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/149284/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Emmanuel Remi Aiyede does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Many things have to change for Nigeria’s federal system to work and accommodate its diverse citizens’ interestsEmmanuel Remi Aiyede, Professor of Political Institutions, Governance and Public Policy, University of IbadanLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1491332020-10-30T10:11:13Z2020-10-30T10:11:13ZTanzanian poll is likely to usher in a new era of authoritarianism. Here’s why<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/366639/original/file-20201030-17-9xagv3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President John Magufuli has closed down all the reliable means to evaluate allegations of foul play. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Tanzanians voted in their general election on October 28 in a poll that pitted popular opposition chief Tundu Lissu against incumbent John Magufuli. As the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54748332">results were</a> announced, Dan Paget explains why incumbent John Magufuli was declared the winner, and what his second term will mean for democracy in the East African nation.</em></p>
<p><strong>How do you rate the independence or fairness of the Tanzania election commission now and in the past?</strong></p>
<p>I <a href="https://tanzaniaelectionswatch.org/2020/10/24/a-letter-to-the-national-electoral-commission-of-tanzania-calling-for-free-fair-and-credible-elections-in-the-republic-of-tanzania-in-line-with-international-law-and-norms/">no longer have faith</a> in Tanzania’s National Electoral Commission or the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/29/opposition-leaders-allege-in-tanzanian-elections">validity of the election results</a>. The validity of elections should be something that is determined by independent bodies and rigorous procedures. However, I am afraid that guesswork and judgement are the only means at our disposal to assess the validity of these elections, because other avenues to verify it have been blocked in advance.</p>
<p>It is never easy to know when to give credence to allegations of election manipulation. Such accusations can always be made in bad faith. If the election commission were independent, and governed by a cross-party board, one might trust them to arbitrate these allegations. Instead <a href="https://urbanlex.unhabitat.org/sites/default/files/urbanlex//constitution_of_the_united_republic_of_tanzania_1977.pdf">the constitution</a> gives the president the authority to appoint the heads of the commission. The opposition has been <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Chadema-shifts-gear/2558-2294240-view-printVersion-e1qpr0/index.html">calling for the commission to be reformed</a> for years.</p>
<p>In the absence of an independent electoral commission, and independent courts, normally one would turn to independent observer missions. They routinely deploy large teams which observe the conduct of the election and assess irregularities, but these <a href="https://apnews.com/article/virus-outbreak-john-magufuli-tanzania-elections-nairobi-33bce46190d61be88f839f2f98e42945">missions have been kept away</a>. So have many of the most respected domestic election observers, such as the <a href="https://www.humanrights.or.tz/">Legal and Human Rights Centre</a>. The conclusions of <a href="https://eisa.org/pdf/tan2020eom.pdf">the few observation missions</a> present will be important. So will be the judgements of <a href="https://tanzaniaelectionswatch.org/">Tanzania Election Watch</a>, which is assaying the conduct of the election remotely. I recommend their <a href="https://tanzaniaelectionswatch.org/download/tanzania-elections-watch-preliminary-election-report-on-the-general-election-held-in-the-republic-of-tanzania-on-the-28th-october-2020/">preliminary report</a>.</p>
<p>Altogether, the reliable means to evaluate allegations of foul play have been all but closed down. Given all that, it is hard to know what to do except to give <em>prima facie</em> credence to the widespread <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/tanzania-election-tundu-lissu-rejects-fraud-election-results-2725484">allegations of election fraud</a> made by the opposition and <a href="http://www.vanguardafrica.com/africawatch/2020/10/26/former-tanzanian-intelligence-officer-in-a-free-and-fair-vote-the-opposition-wins">many analysts</a>. </p>
<p>Their claims acquire weight from the stream of videos and photographs shared via social media. These largely unverified reports appear to show <a href="https://twitter.com/aikande/status/1320005967342424069">the manipulation of the electoral register</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/aikande/status/1321148857737191426">ghost polling stations</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/MariaSTsehai/status/1321384282993102849">pre-filled ballots</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/MariaSTsehai/status/1320335563799580672">pre-printed ballots</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/ThinkBigmind/status/1321423028367040512">ballot-stuffing</a>, polling agents <a href="https://twitter.com/ChademaAgent/status/1319504151278161922">disqualified or barred access</a> to polling stations, and a variety of other irregularities.</p>
<p>What puts it over the top is the scale and character of the victory for the ruling party – Chama cha Mapinduzi. In its final results, the election commission <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54748332">said</a> the president took 84% of the vote, while Lissu received 13%. In addition, the ruling party’s victories have been declared in places you would least expect them to win, and at a scale which is hard to believe. </p>
<p>The popularity of the opposition and the ruling party alike is difficult to discern, especially given <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/beware-dodgy-opinion-polls-aidan-eyakuze/">the absence of opinion polls</a>. This makes the size of rallies one of the few indicators of party popularity left available to us. The rally is a <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/oped/1840568-5629534-37vgjq/index.html">treacherous indicator of party popularity</a>. Nonetheless, <a href="https://www.diis.dk/en/event/tanzanias-2020-elections-whats-stake">as I have argued elsewhere</a>, we can draw a tentative, negative conclusion: opposition support has not collapsed. It is not negligible. If it had, we would not have seen large opposition rallies so consistently. This inference is consistent with the opposition’s <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/118/473/692/5250960">wide organisational base</a>.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, so far, officials have <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/29/tanzania-opposition-loses-key-seats-in-vote-marred-by-fraud-claim">declared the defeat</a> of the opposition’s most admired leaders in their greatest strongholds. Household names like Zitto Kabwe, Freeman Mbowe, Joseph Mbilinyi, Halima Mdee, John Heche and Esther Bulaya have all lost their seats. These defeats, moreover, are by astounding margins. Altogether, it is hard to see why the National Electoral Commission and the wider infrastructure which oversees elections in Tanzania should be given the benefit of the doubt.</p>
<p><strong>The police made regular arrests of opposition candidates and broke up heir rallies. To what extent were the police – and by extension the government – a factor in the eventual outcomes?</strong></p>
<p>The police have certainly been a forceful presence in this campaign. The video evidence of them firing teargas, breaking up meetings, arresting opposition candidates and committing acts of brutality are available on social media for all to see. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1314273102277365769"}"></div></p>
<p>On the instructions of state officials, first the leading opposition candidate for the presidency of Tanzania, <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/44469/tanzania-candidate-tundu-lissu-is-suspended-just-ahead-of-polls/">Tundu Lissu</a>, and then the leading opposition candidate for the presidency of Zanzibar, <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/news/ZEC-suspends-ACT-Wazalendo-s--Maalim-Seif--/1840340-5632184-156aug9/index.html">Seif Hamad</a>, were temporarily barred from campaigning.</p>
<p>It must all have had an effect on the election outcome.</p>
<p>Alongside the police has been the army. They have been deployed to oversee the election in parts of the country, and there are multiple albeit mostly unverified reports of brutality and murder at their hands.</p>
<p>But their actions need to be interpreted in the wider authoritarian context. Tanzania has always been an authoritarian state. The old authoritarian architecture was never removed after the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4006174?seq=1">reintroduction of multiparty elections in 1992</a>. But there has been a sea-change since 2015 when <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/tanzania-shrinking-space-and-opposition-protest/">Magufuli came to power</a>. Things that were permitted in 2014 are not permitted today. The media are censored. Political parties are oppressed. Politicians and civic activists are harassed, in court and out of it. Rallies were banned for four years. There has been a spate of violence by anonymous actors, which context suggested but did not confirm were connected to the state. That context is key. The trajectory of party politics in Tanzania has been shaped by it. It is crucial to everything.</p>
<p><strong>Based on what you know so far, was the 2020 election a step forward or backward in Tanzania’s path to fully free and fair elections?</strong></p>
<p>So far, it seems that this election will usher in a new era of authoritarianism. Any resemblance that Tanzania has borne to a liberal democracy seems to be slipping away. Not only is the apparent scale of election manipulation unprecedented. The authoritarian landslide will be presented by the regime as a vindication of its <a href="https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/tanzanias-election-president-magufuli-and-struggle-ideas-27952">extreme authoritarian project</a> over the last five years.</p>
<p>My speculative opinion is that President Magufuli and his ruling Chama cha Mapinduzi will use their super-majority to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2020.1779223">enact their authoritarian developmental vision</a>. They will institute a deeper and further-reaching authoritarian agenda. This might include lifting presidential term limits, but it is also likely to include the institution of further measures that consolidate the party’s authoritarian transformation of Tanzania.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/149133/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dan Paget is a member of the British Labour Party.</span></em></p>As key opposition members lose seats in their strongholds, it is clear that Tanzania’s ruling party is set to establish a super-majority that will institute a deeper authoritarian agenda.Dan Paget, Lecturer in Politics, University of AberdeenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1427322020-07-16T16:04:01Z2020-07-16T16:04:01ZSouth Africa is failing on COVID-19 because its leaders want to emulate the First World<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/347865/original/file-20200716-23-wyrng6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The township of Khayelitsha in Cape Town. South Africa has adopted First World COVID-19 responses for Third World reality.</span> </figcaption></figure><p>COVID-19 infections are <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2020/07/15/sa-closing-on-300-000-confirmed-coronavirus-cases">rising sharply</a> in South Africa – and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-52711458">Latin America</a>. This is fitting: South Africa resembles the countries of South America more than those of its home continent.</p>
<p>It has become common to point out that COVID-19 has <a href="https://theconversation.com/pandemic-underscores-gross-inequalities-in-south-africa-and-the-need-to-fix-them-135070">highlighted South Africa’s inequalities</a>. It is less common, but just as important, to recognise that inequality shapes how the country is governed, ensuring that, while South Africa is located in Africa, those who govern it may be closer to their counterparts in Latin America.</p>
<p>The first reason South Africa has been unable to stem the tide of infections is that its strategy <a href="https://www.medicalbrief.co.za/archives/mkhize-warns-of-exponential-rise-of-covid-19-infections/">always assumed a severe epidemic was inevitable</a>. It is hard to fight anything if you assume you are bound to lose. This followed advice from South Africa’s medical scientists, almost all of whom embrace this view despite the fact that scientists in other parts of the world have helped to prevent great damage. </p>
<p>Why is this? Possibly because their points of comparison on the pandemic were <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-needs-a-post-lockdown-strategy-that-emulates-south-korea-136678">not Asia</a> and <a href="https://oecd-development-matters.org/2020/05/26/ethiopias-response-to-covid-19/">parts of Africa</a> where infections were curbed, but the rich countries of the global North, many of which <a href="https://theconversation.com/covid-19-has-blown-away-the-myth-about-first-and-third-world-competence-138464">were overwhelmed</a>. They also probably assumed that while some countries might be able to prevent a severe outbreak, South Africa could not.</p>
<p>If so, this would reveal a common way of thinking in South Africa: the belief that the country must compare itself to the rich countries of the North – but that it will never match up.</p>
<h2>Capacity problems</h2>
<p>This pessimism is born of the view that South Africa’s government has very limited capacity. The failure to curb COVID-19 does show glaring capacity gaps. But the problem is not, as critics usually assume, a lack of technical know-how. It is, rather, a particular view of the world and the difficult relationship between those who govern and the governed.</p>
<p>Despite appearing to give up before the fight began, South Africa could have contained COVID-19 had it done what its government said it would do: create an effective testing and tracing programme which would identify people with the virus, trace their contacts and isolate them if they were infected.</p>
<p>The government likes to boast about the large number of tests its many <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/speeches/statement-president-cyril-ramaphosa-progress-national-effort-contain-covid-19-pandemic%2C-union-buildings%2C-tshwane">community health workers have conducted</a>. It talks much less about why testing has not stemmed the virus: <a href="https://mg.co.za/coronavirus-essentials/2020-06-03-the-backlogs-denials-and-future-of-testing-covid-19/">a bottleneck</a> at the <a href="https://www.nhls.ac.za/">National Health Laboratory Service</a>, which supports provincial and national government health departments. </p>
<p>In May, doctors complained that it took on average a week to receive COVID-19 test results for outpatients and three to four days for patients in hospitals. Other doctors reported cases in which it took weeks to receive results. At the end of May, Gauteng, the country’s economic hub, was waiting for test results for over 20,000 people.</p>
<p>Testing can contain COVID-19 only if results are received speedily so that the contacts of infected people can be traced. The laboratory backlog meant that testing and tracing could not work no matter how many tests were conducted and how many health workers were hired.</p>
<p>This seems to be an obvious technical failure. Some test results were, according to doctors, lost, which seems to show that the lab was simply not up to the task. But the real problem may be that the government put far too much faith in a high-tech laboratory which was, because too much was expected of it, simply overwhelmed (hence the lost results). </p>
<p>By contrast, Senegal, a far poorer country, knowing that it had no laboratory service that could have coped, developed a test which <a href="https://www.one.org/international/blog/innovations-senegal-covid-19/">cost only $1</a> and produced results very quickly.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/347869/original/file-20200716-19-gf59sm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/347869/original/file-20200716-19-gf59sm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/347869/original/file-20200716-19-gf59sm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/347869/original/file-20200716-19-gf59sm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/347869/original/file-20200716-19-gf59sm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=513&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/347869/original/file-20200716-19-gf59sm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=513&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/347869/original/file-20200716-19-gf59sm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=513&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">South African President Cyril Ramaphosa.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>So, South Africa believed it had capacity which it lacked. It also assumed that a laboratory which operated like those in rich countries was the most effective way to test for COVID-19. And so, unlike Senegal, it failed to come up with a solution fitted to its needs. Again, the desire to be like the North made it impossible to contain the virus.</p>
<h2>Elitist approach</h2>
<p>The second problem is that the behaviours which are needed to stem COVID-19 are very difficult for most South Africans – those who live in the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/township-South-Africa">formerly blacks-only urban townships</a> and in <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7141253/">shack settlements</a>. Overcrowding makes physical distancing very hard, clean water may not be available for hand washing and people are forced to <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-minibus-taxi-industry-has-been-marginalised-for-too-long-this-must-change-142060">travel in full minibus taxis</a>.</p>
<p>The government could have overcome these problems if it had chosen to work with people in these areas to find ways to protect themselves. But it did not try – it relied on instructing people to do things they clearly could not do.</p>
<p>To South Africa’s elite, of which the government is now a part, people in low-income townships lack sophistication and maturity: poverty is confused with inability. And so there is no point in working with them.</p>
<p>The problem here is the government’s lack of political capacity, its inability to form a relationship with voters which would enable them to work together against a common threat.</p>
<p>Why is South Africa governed this way? Unlike other sub-Saharan African countries and like several Latin American countries, South Africa is both <a href="https://theconversation.com/whats-needed-to-take-africa-from-third-to-first-world-in-25-years-61418">“First World” and “Third World”</a>. A significant section of its people lives like, and measure themselves by the standards of, the affluent in North America and Western Europe. </p>
<p>This is why it has facilities other African countries lack and why it insists on relying on them.</p>
<p>People who live in “First World” conditions also find it much easier to lobby politicians. That is why the government’s claim that it would be guided only by the science of COVID-19 collapsed as lobby groups persuaded it to open activities which <a href="https://www.enca.com/news/level-3-regulations-ramaphosa-lifts-ban-on-religious-gatherings">allowed the virus to spread</a>. </p>
<p>But most people live in the same conditions as the poor of the “Third World”. Facilities designed for the “First World” one-third of the population cannot meet the needs of the other two-thirds. The elite’s deep admiration for the “First World” ensures that the government always wants to rely on what works only for the one-third because only this is “respectable”.</p>
<p>The issue is not that many South Africans are wealthy and live well – so do elites in other African countries. It is that the country is divided into two worlds. An entire economy and social system serves one-third of the people and excludes the rest from its benefits. This shapes attitudes as well as who gets what. The government may be elected by people outside the charmed circle but it is a product of it, hence its response to COVID-19. </p>
<h2>Exceptionalism</h2>
<p>Another consequence, common to South Africa and much of Latin America, is that those who live in “First World” conditions tend to see those who don’t as people who have not attained their exalted standards: they must be told what to do and controlled if they do not listen. Working with the majority to fight the virus isn’t possible when they are seen as “backward” embarrassments.</p>
<p>Many South Africans like to think the country is unique in sub-Saharan Africa. Its contrasts of wealth and poverty certainly are one of a kind. Its response to COVID-19 shows how much this prevents the government from doing what it needs to do.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/142732/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Friedman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Glaring capacity gaps aside, the failure to curb COVID-19 is not so much due to a lack of technical know-how but to a particular view of the world.Steven Friedman, Professor of Political Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1285792019-12-30T05:13:06Z2019-12-30T05:13:06ZWhy very few women go into politics in Mauritius<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/306816/original/file-20191213-85376-1xvyx7y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The first female president of Mauritius, Ameenah Gurib-Fakim, at the Budapest Water Summit in 2016. She left office in 2018.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Szilard Koszticsak/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Mauritius is an island that is famed for its beautiful beaches and for its reputation as an “<a href="https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/4450110/Frankel_MauritiusAfrican.pdf?sequence=1">African success story</a>”. Since its independence from the UK in 1968, it has had tremendous <a href="https://www.ft.com/reports/mauritius-at-50">economic progress, consolidated its democracy and maintained political stability</a>. </p>
<p>Mauritius has held <a href="http://electoral.govmu.org/English/electionresult/nasselec/Pages/default.aspx">11 general elections</a> since independence. But the recent general elections highlighted one serious political failure that the country continues to grapple with: poor female representation. </p>
<p>While Mauritius has excelled in most democratic indicators, it has been slow to improve gender equality in politics. <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/wep/mauwomen.htm">Women’s representation</a> in the Mauritian parliament was 5.7% in 1983 and 1987, 17% in 2005 and 11.6% in 2014. In the latest elections, the <a href="https://data.ipu.org/content/mauritius?chamber_id=13462">figure rose</a> to 20%. </p>
<p>The Mauritian political system is a parliamentary democracy based on the Westminster model. It has a legislature consisting of 62 elected members, a prime minister, who is the head of government, and a ceremonial president. There is no quota for gendered representation in parliament. Mauritius had a <a href="https://qz.com/africa/1226739/mauritius-president-ameenah-gurib-fakim-may-be-forced-to-step-down-over-credit-card-scandal/">woman president</a> between 2015 and 2018, and a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/03/20123309833263960.html">woman vice-president</a> between 2010 and 2016. </p>
<p>All prime ministers of the country have so far been men. </p>
<p>Mauritius’ constitution guarantees the equality of all citizens and ensures that women have the same legal rights as men. But as I argue in <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/328346250_Mauritius_Still_a_Long_Journey_Ahead">my paper</a>, which examines the participation and presence of women in politics, cultural and societal barriers still prevent women from fully exercising their rights. The country’s political parties and electoral system are not gender sensitive. Little space is made for women in the political field.</p>
<p>Symbolically, it is important to have equal representation of women in parliament since women represent <a href="http://statsmauritius.govmu.org/English/Publications/Documents/2019/EI1471/Pop_Vital_Jan-Jun19.pdf">slightly over 50%</a> of the population of the country. Moreover, women form a distinct political group with specific interests that concern them. Women parliamentarians can also serve as role models to encourage more women to get involved in politics.</p>
<h2>Low representation</h2>
<p>Over the past 50 years women’s lives have improved on a number of fronts. In education, both girls and boys have access to free education from primary level to university and <a href="http://statsmauritius.govmu.org/English/Publications/Documents/2019/EI1474/Edu_Yr19.pdf">pass rates are higher for girls</a>. Women have better access to employment opportunities, especially in the manufacturing and services sectors. And they are <a href="http://gender.govmu.org/English/Documents/2018/AGDI%20report%20-%20Final%20(1)_30032018.pdf">more financially independent</a>. </p>
<p>But political representation has consistently remained low despite Mauritius having <a href="http://gender.govmu.org/English/Documents/2018/AGDI%20report%20-%20Final%20(1)_30032018.pdf">ratified several international treaties</a>. These cover women’s rights and gender equality. They include the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, Optional Protocol on Violence against Women, and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa. </p>
<p>But unlike many other African countries, Mauritius has not adopted any policy of affirmative action to increase women’s presence in Parliament. In the last elections <a href="https://defimedia.info/alliance-nationale-12-femmes-sur-la-liste-des-candidats">12 women candidates</a> out of a total of 60 were fielded by each of the three of the main political groups that were competing to win. </p>
<p>Of the <a href="https://www.lemauricien.com/article/reduit-les-24-ministres-de-lalliance-morisien-ont-prete-serment/">24 ministers appointed</a>, only three were women. There were three women ministers in the previous government as well. </p>
<h2>Patriarchal society</h2>
<p>For my research, I interviewed women politicians and leaders of women’s organisations to examine the factors that affected women’s political participation.</p>
<p>A major impediment to women’s political participation is that Mauritius is a <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/978-1-137-59074-9_37">conservative, patriarchal society</a>. These values govern notions of respectable femininity where women are discouraged from adopting what is considered to be masculine behaviour and roles. This becomes problematic in the political sphere where aspiring politicians are required to be in the field a lot and to lead public meetings where the crowds are mainly men. As such, politics is viewed as inappropriate for women, and therefore, bad for the reputation of a family.</p>
<p>Mauritian society is also <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/978-1-137-59074-9_37">highly family orientated</a> and women are expected to shoulder the bulk of domestic responsibilities. This leaves them with less time than men for political activities. Those that do end up in politics usually have strong family support and financial security. </p>
<p>The prevailing patriarchal culture also leads to discrimination against women politicians both overtly and covertly. A recent example was when Joanna Bérenger, a new politician, was <a href="https://www.facebook.com/parti.MMM/photos/a.10152701002855831/10157341094450831/?type=3&theater">described in a headline</a> of one of the country’s most read newspapers as coming to parliament with “ek zak dan tant”. This Creole expression literally means “jackfruit in the basket”. Bérenger is pregnant.</p>
<p>Many Mauritians, especially women, found the headline offensive and it led to a <a href="https://moti.news/news/zak-dan-tant-de-lexpress-a-propos-de-joanna-berenger-souleve-une-vague-dindignation-128945">wave of protest</a> on social media and elsewhere on the internet. The main issue highlighted was the fact that Mauritian society still makes reference to women’s reproductive roles despite their success as political leaders. </p>
<h2>Going forward</h2>
<p>Many of the women candidates in the most recent election were young, indicating an emerging interest of young women in political careers. This is encouraging.</p>
<p>One way to challenge male dominance is through coordinated action among women’s movements. Unfortunately women’s organisations have not been able to forge a national consensus on the significance of women’s representation in the Mauritian parliament. As such, the <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/978-1-137-59074-9_37">women’s lobby has remained weak</a>.</p>
<p>On top of this, Mauritius has failed to set up and implement mechanisms to increase the participation of women in politics. It needs a new electoral system to ensure a more equitable representation across the board. The country also needs a gender quota.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/128579/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ramola Ramtohul does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In Mauritius there’s been little change in cultural norms and values to genuinely support gender egalitarianism.Ramola Ramtohul, Senior Lecturer in Sociology and Gender Studies, University of MauritiusLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1218222019-08-21T12:16:29Z2019-08-21T12:16:29ZThe AU’s role in brokering Sudan deal offers lessons for the future<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/288691/original/file-20190820-170918-hlkxpy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Chairman of Sudan's transitional council, Lt. Gen. Abdel Fattah Abdelrahman Burhan, speaks during the power sharing agreement ceremony.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Morwan Ali/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The African Union (AU) came into existence after a restructuring of its predecessor – the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). It was created to build an integrated, prosperous and peaceful continent. </p>
<p>While the AU has a clear mandate to deepen the process of economic and political integration on the continent, its predecessor was run on the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/78/311/197/16165?redirectedFrom=PDF">principle of non-interference</a> in the internal affairs of member states. This lessened its ability to resolve member states’ internal disputes. </p>
<p>However, the OAU did originate some of the standards that are at the foundation of the AU’s conflict resolution approach. One such standard is contained in the Lome Declaration which criminalises <a href="https://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/compilation_democracy/lomedec.htm">unconstitutional changes of government</a>. </p>
<p>The AU now has a wider legal mandate for internal conflict resolution than its predecessor. This mandate is set out in its <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf">Constitutive Act</a> and in its Peace and Security Council <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7781-treaty-0024_-_protocol_relating_to_the_establishment_of_the_peace_and_security_council_of_the_african_union_e.pdf">Protocol</a>. But, the implementation of this mandate is still a work in progress. </p>
<p>But the AU has in recent days been <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/african-union-au-sudan-power-sharing-agreement-mediation-by-paul-mulindwa-2019-07">rightly praised</a> for using its regional laws to <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/new-sudan-thousands-celebrate-as-protesters-army-sign-deal-20190818">broker an agreement</a> between the Sudanese military and the country’s civilian movement. The agreement comes after months of conflict that followed <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47892742">the ouster</a> of Sudan’s despotic ruler Omar al-Bashir.</p>
<p>After al-Bashir was deposed, the military attempted to assume leadership of the country. It attacked protesters who were demanding that authority be transferred to a civilian administration. The attacks led to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/07/sudan-school-children-shot-dead-el-obeid-massacre-190729184528614.html">deaths and injuries</a>.</p>
<p>The agreement, which was brokered with the help of Abiy Ahmed, the Ethiopian Prime minister, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/08/sudan-constitutional-declaration-190804182241137.html">set out key conditions</a>, including the following:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The establishment of a joint military and civilian sovereign council, which will govern the country for three years before elections are held. </p>
<p>Shared leadership of the council. A military leader will lead for 21 months followed by a civilian leader for 18 months.</p>
<p>A bill of rights and freedoms for all Sudanese citizens.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The AU’s involvement has proven the usefulness of its regional laws in <a href="https://theconversation.com/could-african-union-law-shape-a-new-legal-order-for-the-continent-99245">resolving internal disputes</a> in member States. So how did it reach this point, and what lessons have been learned from its work in Sudan?</p>
<h2>AU intervention</h2>
<p>The military takeover that followed al-Bashir’s removal from power amounted to an “unconstitutional change of government” which is prohibited by Article 4 of the AU’s Constitutive Act. </p>
<p>This breach of regional law empowered Moussa Faki Mahamat, the chairperson of the AU Commission, to <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20190411/statement-chairperson-commission-situation-sudan">denounce the military’s actions</a>. </p>
<p>Following the official denouncement, the AU’s Peace and Security Council adopted a decision stating that the actions of the Sudanese military amounted to an <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/communique-of-the-840th-meeting-of-the-psc-on-the-situation-in-sudan">unconstitutional change of government</a>. The Council is central to the AU’s legal framework. It was set up to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts. Its April 2019 decision also reiterated the need for a civilian-led and consensual transition and demanded that the military hand over power within 15 days. </p>
<p>Failure to hand over power should have led to the automatic suspension of Sudan from the activities of the AU as provided by the <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-protocol-en.pdf">Council’s protocol</a>. However, an <a href="https://af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/idAFL5N2253AZ">extension of three months</a> was subsequently agreed to allow for further negotiations. </p>
<p>In my view, the decision to grant the extension was problematic because it undermined the “automatic” nature of the suspension and allowed the military to continue attacks on civilians without repercussions. Due to lack of progress and escalating violence, the Council <a href="https://twitter.com/AU_PSD/status/1136596052088373248">eventually suspended</a> Sudan in June.</p>
<p>During the three-month notice period, the AU continued to engage with the key parties in the conflict. This happened even as the military continued attacks on protesters. Finally in July, the AU/Ethiopia mediation team convinced both parties to <a href="https://www.apnews.com/d691c59bdf3f407885803bd97cece7a3">resume talks</a>. This led to the signing of a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-49213901">constitutional declaration</a>. </p>
<p>In the end, the AU’s mediation was successful. But during the drawn out negotiations over a hundred people <a href="https://www.apnews.com/6b47b66b2b68455b9c7047a78a73c048">were killed and hundreds more injured.</a> This begs the question: what could the AU have done differently?</p>
<h2>Lessons learned</h2>
<p>While it is laudable that the AU’s intervention in the Sudanese political crisis resulted in an agreement, there are lessons that should be learnt.</p>
<p>The most important lesson is regarding the implementation of the provision for suspension. The 15-day ultimatum that was originally given for the restoration of civilian rule is <a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2019/04/29/the-quest-for-a-civilian-led-transition-in-sudan-is-african-unions-role-still-relevant/">consistent with previous practice</a> by the AU’s Peace and Security Council. </p>
<p>The threat of imminent suspension could have incentivised the military to act more speedily towards a resolution within a shorter time frame. It could have prevented or reduced the violence that ensued in the following months. </p>
<p>In addition, the AU and its Council need to develop a concrete strategy for dealing with continuing violence in the course of negotiations. The Constitutive Act gives these bodies the power to directly intervene in member states where there is serious threat to legitimate order and a need to restore peace and stability. The means and method of implementation of this power is left to the AU under the law, but could include the deployment of peacekeeping forces. </p>
<p>I would argue that the Sudan crisis warranted direct intervention. </p>
<p>This is not to downplay the crucial role that the AU and the Council played in helping to resolve the Sudan political crisis. Indeed, the role played by the regional body underscores the importance of its legal order and institutions in conflict resolution in Africa. </p>
<p>Its success in this respect will instil confidence among member states. It will also bolster the AU’s image as an effective and efficient organisation on the international stage.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/121822/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Femi Amao receives funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC), UK . </span></em></p>The African Union’s role in Sudan’s political crisis proves that it’s legal framework is strong enough to resolve regional disputesFemi Amao, Senior Lecturer, University of SussexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1185722019-06-11T14:11:19Z2019-06-11T14:11:19ZJune 12 is now Democracy Day in Nigeria. Why it matters<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/278871/original/file-20190611-32317-w5r6dx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Muhammadu Buhari has endorsed June 12 as Nigeria's official
Democracy Day</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> Esther Addy/Flickr</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Democracy Day in Nigeria is being celebrated on the 12th of June this year. This is the first time the day has been marked on this date. And the change carries heavy symbolism for a country that’s known more years of being ruled by military men than by democratically elected leaders.</p>
<p>Until last year the date on which Nigeria commemorated <a href="https://searchworks.stanford.edu/view/3310433">the restoration of democracy</a> was May 29. But last year President Muhammadu Buhari declared June 12 to be the new <a href="https://thenationonlineng.net/buhari-signs-june-12-democracy-day-bill-into-law/">Democracy Day</a>. </p>
<p>June 12 carries huge significance for older Nigerians. It was on this date in 1993 that presidential elections were held for the first time since the 1983 military coup. It was an event many observers have described as the <a href="https://www.thecable.ng/meaning-june-12">most significant</a> in Nigeria’s post-independence political history. It is still viewed as the freest, fairest and most peaceful election ever held in Nigeria. </p>
<p>On the day, an estimated 14 million Nigerians – irrespective of ethnic, religious, class, and regional affiliations, (in a period when religious acrimony and tension had reached its zenith) – <a href="https://www.academia.edu/2123541/_The_dawn_of_constitutionalism_in_Nigeria_in_Mbondenyi_M._K._and_Ojienda_T._eds._Constitutionalism_Constitution_Making_and_Constitutional_Reform_in_Africa_Contemporary_Perspectives_from_Sub-Saharan_Africa">defied</a> bad weather to elect their president with the hope of ending eight years of military dictatorships.</p>
<p>The euphoria was short-lived. The results of the election were never released. But unofficial results gathered through the various polling stations by civil society groups across the country indicated <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/abacha-regime-and-the-june-12-crisis-by-ebenezer-babatope-lagos-ebino-topsy-1995-available-from-beacons-books-london-pp-215-1295-paperback/AB05F1D76A8A5D3A6E45DBB40F5329E4">broad national support</a> for the presidential candidate of the Social Democratic Party, Chief Moshood Kashimawo Olawale Abiola.</p>
<p>Abiola was a businessman, publisher, politician and aristocrat of the Yoruba Egba clan. He made his fortune through various enterprises, including communication, oil and gas. He made his first, unsuccessful run at the presidency in 1983. By then, Nigeria had endured a great deal of political upheaval since its 1960 independence. It was a <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/ethnic-religious-crises-nigeria">deeply divided</a> nation, riven along ethnic, religious and regional lines. Political and military power was held by the north.</p>
<p>Then came Abiola, a man from the South. He brought a different perspective to the table and was able to <a href="https://www.nigerianinfopedia.com/biography-mko-abiola-nigerias-president-never-was/">connect with people across divides</a>. Come 12 June 1993, he tried for the presidency again.</p>
<p>Despite his popularity, and the turnout, the elections stalled. The then military head of state, General Ibrahim Babangida, decided to <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4186945?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">annul the results of the election</a>. He <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/24/world/nigerian-military-rulers-annul-election.html">justified the annulment</a> on the grounds that it was necessary to save the nation. He alleged that political activities preceding the election were inimical to peace and stability in Nigeria.</p>
<p>Some people however believe that the military <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/06/the-military-underrated-abiolas-popularity-sen-zwingina-campaign-manager/">underrated Abiola’s popularity</a>. It also did not envisage the level of crisis after the annulment of the election result. </p>
<p>The June 12 election and subsequent annulment marked the beginning of a decades long struggle to see the election result restored and democracy rehabilitated.</p>
<h2>The fallout</h2>
<p>The annulment of the election result was not taken lightly in the south-Western part of the country. Civil violence in the South Western states provoked by electoral fraud and political exclusion previously contributed to <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0975087814532585">the breakdown of the first and second republics</a>. These ran from 1993 to 1999 when Nigeria had its return to democratic rule.</p>
<p><a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0975087814532585">According to</a> political scientist Professor Emmanuel Ojo, Southern resentment over Abiola’s rebuff also threatened to create fissures within the military. This in turn raised the spectre of wider civil conflicts and state collapse. In his official reaction to the annulment, Abiola was <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0975087814532585">quoted as saying</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I might embark on the programme of civil disobedience in the country. If those who make the law disobey the law, why (should) I obey it? There is a limit to the authenticity one could expect from a military ruler who is obviously anxious to hang on to power.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Abiola’s statement threw the country into unprecedented crisis. The Campaign for Democracy spearheaded mass protests by calling for a five-day non-violent protest. </p>
<p>Protests later <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1993/07/06/world/nigerian-protests-erupt-in-violence.html">turned violent</a>. At least 100 protesters were killed, shot by police. The violence prompted a mounting exodus from the major cities, as southern ethnic groups (most especially the Ibos), fearing a recurrence of the communal purges which had preceded the 1967 Civil War, <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0975087814532585?journalCode=ioaa">fled to their home regions</a>. Author B.O Nwabueze lucidly and graphically described the crisis <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0975087814532585">like this</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The annulment of the June 12 presidential election plunged the country into what indisputably is the greatest political crisis in its 33-year life as an independent nation. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Never before, except during the <a href="https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Nigerian_Civil_War">murderous confrontation of 1966 to 1970</a>, had the survival of Nigeria as one political entity been in more serious danger. The impasse created was certainly unequalled in the country’s history.</p>
<h2>Push for change</h2>
<p>Civil society groups pushed for the re-democratisation of Nigeria. Their first call was that the mandate be returned to Abiola. During this period there was a great deal of fear and insecurity in the country. But, as Ebenezer Babatope, in his book “<a href="https://www.amazon.com/Abacha-regime-June-crisis-democracy/dp/B0006F671A">The Abacha Regime and the June 12 crisis</a>” notes, people mobilised to face the challenges of a military leadership that had reneged on its promise to hand over power to democratically elected leaders. </p>
<p>Under tremendous pressure, the Abubakar administration arranged for elections to be held. </p>
<p>These took place – for state governorships, the senate and local councils – over a few months from late 1998 to February 1999. </p>
<p>Finally, Abubakar’s transition reached the climax with the declaration of General Olusegun Obasanjo, who had retired from the military, as the president elect in late February 1999. He was duly sworn in on 29 May 1999.</p>
<p>This explains why May 29 became the official public holiday on which Nigerians celebrated the country’s return to civilian rule. </p>
<p>During most of this time, Abiola was in jail. In 1994 he declared himself Nigeria’s lawful president after returning from a trip to win the support of the international community for his mandate. After declaring himself president he was accused of treason and arrested on the orders of then military President General Sani Abacha, who sent 200 police vehicles to bring him into custody. </p>
<p>Abiola died in suspicious circumstances on the day that he was due to be released, 7 July 1998.</p>
<h2>Democracy today</h2>
<p>Buhari’s decision to mark 12 June as Democracy Day should be viewed as an attempt to placate the South Western Nigerian State, which has always set aside the day to remember Abiola’s stolen mandate and an annulled election that many still view as the country’s freest and fairest in the history of Nigeria and democracy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/118572/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Damilola Agbalajobi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>June 12 is widely regarded as the most important day in Nigeria’s post-independence poltiical historyDamilola Agbalajobi, Lecturer, Political Science, Obafemi Awolowo UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1180832019-05-30T15:05:20Z2019-05-30T15:05:20ZCabinet picks show Ramaphosa and allies believe they’re firmly in control<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/277224/original/file-20190530-69051-yzr9b7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Deputy President David Mabuza, right, could pose a potential threat from within the ANC to President Cyril Ramaphosa, left.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GovernmentZA/Flickr</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South African President Cyril Ramaphosa has <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/press-statements/statement-appointment-members-national-executive">selected a Cabinet</a> which shows that he and his allies believe they are now firmly in control of the governing party and can shape the government’s agenda. What is not yet clear is whether they are right.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa’s choice of cabinet was particularly important because government in South Africa is at a crossroads. </p>
<p>The governing African National Congress (ANC) has been the site of a factional battle between the president’s allies and supporters of former president Jacob Zuma. Ramaphosa’s group has vowed to stop the misuse of public money and trust of which the Zuma faction is accused. But their credibility is dented by, among other factors, the claim that they are too weak to counter the Zuma faction’s influence over the ANC. Their detractors point to the continued presence in the national government of ministers in the Zuma faction who are accused of abuses.</p>
<p>A key indicator of whether the government can win back public trust is, therefore, who Ramaphosa appoints to his Cabinet.</p>
<p>Before the announcement, he and his allies seemed to face an impossible task. They had to make good on his promise to <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Economy/ramaphosa-has-full-anc-backing-to-shrink-cabinet-20190510">trim down the Cabinet</a>. But they must know that, in any governing party, fewer jobs means more resentment: one reason why Zuma became ANC president at the expense of his predecessor Thabo Mbeki is that Mbeki rarely replaced ministers and so ANC politicians believed that their job prospects were slim until he went. </p>
<p>Second, they had to meet public demands to remove Zuma faction ministers. But governing party leaders who deny posts to their opponents within the party are likely to be accused of purging them and might be resisted by anyone outside their faction.</p>
<h2>A clear message</h2>
<p>Given these obstacles, the Cabinet appointments send a clear message that Ramaphosa and his allies believe that, having improved the <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/NPEDashboard/app/dashboard.html">ANC’s vote</a> compared to the 2016 local government elections – the first time in 15 years that it did better in any election compared to the previous one – they are firmly in control. </p>
<p>Only five of the 28 ministers are linked to the Zuma faction: one of them, <a href="https://www.pa.org.za/person/nkosazana-dlamini-zuma/">Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma</a>, is probably no longer aligned to it. She was the faction’s <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-12-08-00-no-deal-the-anc-battle-is-on">choice for president</a> but was not overly enthusiastic about its style of politics then and seems even less so now. </p>
<p>So only one in seven ministers are aligned to Zuma’s group and none are in posts regarded within government as senior positions. The Cabinet has been reduced although, as Ramaphosa acknowledged when he announced the appointments, <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2019/05/30/ramaphosa-should-be-commended-for-reducing-cabinet-analyst">not as much as he would like</a>. So unconcerned was Ramaphosa about resistance within the ANC that he appointed an opposition politician, former Cape Town mayor <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/i-have-no-plans-to-give-up-fighting-minister-patricia-de-lille-20190530">Patricia de Lille</a>, as his public works minister.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa and his faction did not ignore resistance within the ANC. The Cabinet was announced five days after he was inaugurated, an unusually long delay: the announcement was twice postponed on the day. This signalled that there had been intense bargaining within the ANC. </p>
<p>The Ramaphosa group lost one important battle. They had hoped to drastically cut the number of deputy ministers but reports suggest that they bowed to resistance from various lobby groups, among them the Zuma faction: there are 34 deputies, <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-south-africa-would-do-well-to-fire-all-its-deputy-ministers-58809">three fewer</a> than under Zuma. At least 12 of them are in the Zuma faction.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-ramaphosa-had-to-delay-appointing-south-africas-next-cabinet-117923">Why Ramaphosa had to delay appointing South Africa's next cabinet</a>
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<p>But their strategy seems to have been to give ground only if they believed this would not prevent them from appointing the Cabinet they needed to pursue their agenda. So, as they did when Ramaphosa chose his first Cabinet, they appointed Zuma faction members in posts which are not central to their plans or as deputy ministers, who are not members of the Cabinet and have no say over what it decides.</p>
<h2>Potential threat</h2>
<p>The Cabinet signals to the Zuma faction that the Ramaphosa group believes their star is waning and that they are not strong enough to turn the tide. They are probably right.</p>
<p>First, the election was a huge defeat for the Zuma faction. Three parties formed by or including politicians linked to the faction made no headway in the May election. While parties formed by supporters of factions which lost ANC battles won over 8% in 2009 and 6% in 2014, the three parties – <a href="https://www.atmovement.org/">African Transformation Movement</a>, <a href="https://acmovement.org.za/">African Content Movement </a> and <a href="https://blf.org.za/">Black First, Land First</a> – polled 0,6% between them. </p>
<p>In the North West province, the removal of a <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2018-06-15-revealed-why-supra-mahumapelo-was-removed-as-north-west-premier/">Zuma faction premier</a> and his replacement by a <a href="https://city-press.news24.com/News/mokgoro-shuts-door-on-supra-allies-as-he-makes-sweeping-changes-in-north-west-20190528">Ramaphosa faction appointment</a> boosted an ANC vote which had fallen below 50% in by-elections <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/NPEDashboard/app/dashboard.html">to over 60%</a>. If they were to lead the ANC again, it would probably lose its majority and most active ANC members must know this.</p>
<p>Second, Ramaphosa’s government has <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2019-02-07-special-npa-unit-to-deal-with-zondo-commission-evidence-to-be-set-up">boosted the capacity</a> of the <a href="https://www.npa.gov.za/">National Prosecuting Authority</a> to prosecute crimes committed by politicians accused of misusing public office. There are signs that key Zuma faction politicians are in the firing line. This will hamper their political role and further damage their credibility.</p>
<p>But there is a potential threat to Ramaphosa from within the ANC. <a href="http://www.presidency.gov.za/profiles/deputy-president-david-mabuza%3A-profile">Deputy president David Mabuza</a> was a key member of the Zuma faction. He abandoned it to encourage unity between the factions and was largely <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/news/2017-12-22-how-david-mabuza-outplayed-the-ndz-camp/">responsible for Ramaphosa’s victory</a> because he allowed his provincial delegates to vote as they pleased rather than delivering Dlamini-Zuma the block vote he had promised.</p>
<p>Mabuza is now politically isolated: the Zuma faction feel he betrayed him while the Ramaphosa faction never trusted him. But he seems bent on reinventing himself. In the weeks before the Cabinet appointment, it was rumoured that he would not be reappointed. He reacted by <a href="https://www.news24.com/Analysis/explained-with-mabuza-standing-back-ramaphosa-will-have-to-move-fast-this-is-how-20190522">delaying his swearing</a> in as a member of Parliament and appearing before the ANC integrity commission to answer allegations of corruption <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/04/world/africa/south-africa-anc-david-mabuza.html">published in the New York Times</a>. His aim was presumably to discredit the claims and so present himself as a champion of clean government and a plausible next president.</p>
<h2>Shifting battle</h2>
<p>His plan worked in the short-term – he is back as deputy president. Ironically that may make it harder for him to build support. ANC history shows that candidates who are removed from government office have plenty of time to campaign for support; some have used this to win election to national or provincial office. Mabuza will now have less time on his hands to campaign behind the scenes as he tackles his governmental duties.</p>
<p>The odds seem stacked against Mabuza if he is eyeing the presidency, for himself or his ally <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/anc54-meet-paul-mashatile-the-man-who-will-control-the-anc-purse-12468701">Paul Mashatile</a>, the ANC’s treasurer. But he still seems a likelier contender for power than the Zuma faction. If he does aspire to lead the ANC, the threat to the Ramaphosa group may shift from the Zuma faction to Mabuza.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/118083/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Friedman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Cabinet signals to the Zuma faction that the Ramaphosa group believes their star is waning and that they are not strong enough to turn the tide.Steven Friedman, Professor of Political Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1170392019-05-17T09:31:48Z2019-05-17T09:31:48ZWhy the African Union shouldn’t ease up on Sudan’s coup leaders<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/275111/original/file-20190517-69199-17ourk2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters outside the army headquarters in Khartoum, Sudan.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> EPA-EFE/Stringer</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Two weeks after a transitional military council came to power in Sudan through a <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/after-coup-sudan-faces-fragile-transition-to-democracy/ar-BBVYiZ3">coup</a> in April, African heads of state <a href="https://af.reuters.com/article/africaTech/idAFKCN1RZ191-OZATP">decided</a> to ease the pressure on the new rulers. </p>
<p>This decision was a big mistake.</p>
<p>President Omar al-Bashir governed Sudan through military force, repression and divide-and-rule tactics for <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/04/profile-omar-al-bashir-sudan-longtime-ruler-190411083628141.html">three decades</a>. Years of rebellions and popular protests culminated in the mid-April coup. On taking power, the military council suspended the constitution, dissolved parliament and said it planned to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/sudans-military-expected-to-announce-overthrow-of-president-following-months-of-popular-protests/2019/04/11/bedcc28e-5c2b-11e9-842d-7d3ed7eb3957_story.html?utm_term=.99b4d08fbdae">rule Sudan for two years</a>.</p>
<p>The Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU) immediately <a href="http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article67375">condemned</a> the unconstitutional seizure of power. It demanded that the military council step down and transfer power to a civilian transitional government. The Peace and Security Council warned that the AU would suspend Sudan if the generals did not comply with this demand <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/african-union-and-un-back-civilian-led-sudan-transition-20190507">within 15 days</a>.</p>
<p>But as this deadline approached, the African heads of state countermanded the Peace and Security Council’s position. They extended the deadline and gave the generals three months to <a href="https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2019/04/24/African-Union-extends-deadline-for-Sudanese-military-to-relinquish-state-power/6371556094467/">hand the reins</a> to a civilian interim government. Driving this decision was Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, the current chairperson of the AU. Sisi is a former general who participated in a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/16/egypt-coup-catastrophe-mohamed-morsi">coup in his own country</a> in 2013.</p>
<p>The military has engaged in tense negotiations with the protest leaders over the composition of the interim government. If the current deadlock is overcome, a new supreme council will be formed with a mix of civilians and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48276764">military officers</a>. The interim regime will thus not be purely civilian government. </p>
<p>The AU has a “zero tolerance” <a href="https://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/compilation_democracy/lomedec.htm">policy</a> on coups. If it does not apply this policy strictly in the case of Sudan, there is the distinct danger that the army will continue to meet the protests with violence. Already, over 70 protesters have been <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/05/sudanese-security-forces-open-fire-khartoum-sit-190515160917339.html">killed</a> by government forces .</p>
<p>Sudan could become increasingly unstable, with negative spillovers for neighbouring states. In addition, the AU’s failure to adhere strictly to its policy will weaken the credibility of that policy and reduce its potential to deter future coups.</p>
<h2>The policy</h2>
<p>According to the <a href="https://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/compilation_democracy/lomedec.htm">Lomé Declaration</a>, coup perpetrators shall be given six months to restore constitutional order. During this period, the country shall be suspended from the AU. The <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-protocol-en.pdf">Peace and Security Council Protocol</a> adds that the Peace and Security Council shall institute sanctions following an unconstitutional change of government.</p>
<p>The policy emphasis on “shall” and “zero tolerance” offers no wriggle room for a discretionary response to coups. Coups are a scourge that destroy the constitutional order and preclude the emergence and consolidation of democracy.</p>
<p>There’s no doubt about the tyrannical way in which al-Bashir ruled Sudan. His war crimes were set out in the <a href="http://saharareporters.com/2019/04/12/turn-over-al-bashir-international-criminal-court-amnesty-international-tells-sudan">indictment</a> against him by the International Criminal Court. There’s therefore every reason to share the Sudanese people’s joy at his downfall. But if the AU does not adopt a tough posture, there may be no progress in Sudan towards real democracy.</p>
<h2>Precedents</h2>
<p>Since the introduction of the anti-coup policy in 2000, there have been 16 coups in Africa - <a href="https://s3.amazonaws.com/ssrc-cdn1/crmuploads/new_publication_3/%7B10AD77AA-F0B5-E711-80C7-005056AB0BD9%7D.pdf">14 between 2000 and 2014</a>, then in Zimbabwe and Sudan. In most cases, the Peace and Security Council has indeed been tough. <a href="https://s3.amazonaws.com/ssrc-cdn1/crmuploads/new_publication_3/%7B10AD77AA-F0B5-E711-80C7-005056AB0BD9%7D.pdf">Research</a> shows that suspension and sanctions have been effective: within an average period of 20 months, the targeted country reestablished constitutional order through elections.</p>
<p>In all these cases, the African pressure was intensified through sanctions imposed by the US, the European Union and other providers of financial aid. It was also accompanied by mediation undertaken by African organisations, which facilitated the return to constitutional rule.</p>
<p>The message from the AU and its international partners was thus clear: unlike the widespread tolerance of African coups in the 1970s and 1980s, a coup is no longer a viable means to retaining power. It is a cul de sac. The only exit for the coup regime is to step down and permit free and fair elections.</p>
<p>In short, pressure shuts the door to sustained military rule, and mediation opens the door to restoring constitutional order in a legitimate manner.</p>
<p>The positive outcomes of African and international pressure can be contrasted with cases where the AU failed to apply its policy. For example, the AU turned a blind eye to the de facto <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/african-union-wrong-zimbabwe-171204125847859.html">coup</a> in Zimbabwe in 2017. This allowed the army and ruling party to get away with forcibly deposing President Robert Mugabe and installing another brutal hardliner, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41995876">Emmerson Mnangagwa</a>.</p>
<p>In the case of Zimbabwe, as well as Egypt, a coup leader contested presidential elections and won. This was a violation of the AU policy, which <a href="http://www.achpr.org/instruments/charter-democracy/">bans</a> the perpetrators of unconstitutional action from running for office. The ban is meant to prevent coup leaders from whitewashing their offence and staying in power via the ballot box.</p>
<h2>No ‘ifs’ and ‘buts’</h2>
<p>There should be no debate about the main thrust of the continental and international response to the coup in Sudan. Suspension and sanctions should be imposed immediately, and should be lifted only when constitutional rule is restored through free and fair elections have been held.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/117039/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Laurie Nathan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The African Union’s policy offers no wriggle room for a discretionary response to coups, a scourge that imperils the consolidation of democracy.Laurie Nathan, Professor of the Practice of Mediation, University of Notre DameLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1130482019-03-12T13:51:10Z2019-03-12T13:51:10ZAfrican peer review: progress is being made, but there are problems<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/263355/original/file-20190312-86682-jj7wuy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Flickr/Embassy of Equatorial Guinea </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>There was great excitement and hype when the <a href="https://au.int/en/organs/aprm">African Peer Review Mechanism</a> was launched <a href="https://au.int/en/organs/aprm">16 years ago</a>. This was because it presented an innovative approach to improving governance on the continent.</p>
<p>The review mechanism was established in 2003, soon after the Organisation of African Unity became the African Union (AU). It was inspired by the desire to find <a href="https://www.up.ac.za/media/shared/Legacy/sitefiles/file/46/1322/17295/welttrends92themanathansdafrikaafrikanischeunionsicherheitspolitikdiplomatie.pdf">“African solutions to African problems”</a>. It was supposed to signify a new approach to politics in Africa: a voluntary, non-adversarial peer-review which would lead to improvements in governance.</p>
<p>States that are party to the peer review mechanism develop self-assessment reports, which are then combined with reviews produced by experts from other African countries. The reviews are then tabled and discussed by heads of state of member countries. Finally, the reviewed country embarks on implementing its <a href="http://saiia.org.za/research/lessons-from-implementing-the-aprm-national-programme-of-action-in-nigeria/">national programme of action</a> to address any governance shortcomings that were identified. </p>
<p>These are not just government reviews: they focus on the country as a whole. Civil society and the private sector are involved in putting together the national self-assessment. Reviews are supposed to take place every three to five years, but in practice only a handful of countries have been reviewed twice. </p>
<p>The mechanism got off to a good start. But enthusiasm soon waned. Between 2008 and 2016 the peer review mechanism’s secretariat did not have a permanent CEO, hardly conducted any reviews and was marred by <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/201404101502.html">allegations of financial mismanagement</a>. </p>
<p>Three years ago the political stewardship of Kenyan <a href="https://www.enca.com/africa/kenyatta-revive-african-peer-review-mechanism">President Uhuru Kenyatta</a>, and the appointment of South African Professor Eddy Maloka as CEO of the secretariat brought new energy to the review mechanism. More countries joined.</p>
<p>Maloka implemented the <a href="https://www.uneca.org/cfm2016/pages/africa-peer-review-mechanism-restoration-reinvigoration-and-renewal">“Three Rs Strategy”</a>: restoration, reinvigoration and renewal. This helped, for the most part, to restore faith in the review mechanism and put it in a much stronger position. But political and technical challenges remain. </p>
<p>Country reviews have once again stalled and review reports aren’t being released on time.</p>
<h2>The decline</h2>
<p>The peer review mechanism works as a voluntary partnership between government, civil society, and the private sector. The aim is to collectively and collaboratively address socio-economic problems, improve governance practices and strengthen laws and policies. The key philosophy behind the initiatives is that, by working together, different stakeholders can achieve improved transparency, greater accountability and good governance. </p>
<p>The first decade saw 17 mostly solid, comprehensive and honest review <a href="https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/saia_spb_170_gruzd-turianskyi_20180307.pdf">reports being published</a>. However, even then most enthusiastic member countries failed to implement their recommendations.</p>
<p>At the same time, attendance of the peer review mechanism’s annual <a href="https://www.aprm-au.org/apr-forum/">forums</a>, which were held on the sidelines of African Union summits, dwindled. Most heads of state delegated authority to ministers, who don’t have the same political clout.</p>
<p>What was supposed to be a frank discussion between African leaders about governance problems devolved into a mostly technical exercise, sprinkled with words of praise – but never criticism – from the few attending presidents. </p>
<p>Things went from bad to worse when not a single state was reviewed between <a href="https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/saia_spb_170_gruzd-turianskyi_20180307.pdf">2013 and 2016</a>. </p>
<h2>Some progress but still problems</h2>
<p>The situation has improved significantly since then. Reviews are resuming, and some countries are undergoing second reviews. These are intended to be pithier, specifically focusing on cross-cutting issues emanating from the countries’ first reviews.</p>
<p>And new members are joining, among them <a href="https://neweralive.na/posts/namibia-joins-au-governance-body">Namibia in 2017</a> and <a href="https://www.politicalanalysis.co.za/botswana-joins-african-peer-review-mechanism-forum/">Botswana in February 2019</a>. </p>
<p>As part of <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2019-02-23-00-kagames-au-reforms-will-struggle-to-survive-without-him">reforms</a> introduced by Rwandan President and former African Union chair Paul Kagame in 2018, the review mechanism was incorporated into the continental body as a specialised agency, and given an expanded mandate. </p>
<p>Apart from conducting country reviews, it will now also track progress achieved under the <a href="https://au.int/en/agenda2063">African Union’s Agenda 2063</a> and the United Nations’ <a href="https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld">Sustainable Development Goals</a>. It will do this for the 38 members as well as countries on the continent that aren’t African Union members.</p>
<p>But there are still questions about whether African leaders have the will to make the peer review mechanism a strong initiative that can change the continental governance landscape. Its recently launched <a href="https://city-press.news24.com/Voices/a-check-on-state-of-governance-in-africa-20190301">African Governance Report</a> is a case in point. Although it provides trends and data on governance on the continent, it doesn’t mention any countries by name. This shows an unwillingness to “name and shame” those that lag behind in implementing progressive policies and ratifying treaties. </p>
<p>It’s also a missed opportunity to commend countries which are leading in promoting good governance, transparency and accountability. </p>
<p>The attendance of peer review mechanism forum meetings by top officials surged briefly under Kenyatta and Maloka, but quickly dissipated. Only four heads of state attended the recent meeting in February. Even more worrying is the failure to release available country reports. These are supposed to be published six months after they are tabled at the forum. </p>
<p>The Senegal review is now two years late, while Sudan and Uganda’s second reviews are over a year late. Chad and Djibouti’s 2017 reports have been released, but are only available in French. Insiders suggest that politicians are reluctant to make the information – which provides a balanced overview of governance in the country, including both strengths and weaknesses - available to their citizens.</p>
<p>The African Peer Review Mechanism must follow its own rules, and not be complicit with governments in burying these reports.</p>
<h2>Going forward</h2>
<p>The review mechanism should build on its current momentum to strengthen its status within the African Union. It should be able to release the review reports without waiting for politicians’ approval. It should also name member states that are not progressing or are not paying their annual financial contributions. </p>
<p>It also needs to modernise its website and make all documents, reports and press releases easily accessible. It is currently easier to conduct a Google search and find this information from other sources. </p>
<p>Finally, the review mechanism would benefit from establishing a civil society desk at its secretariat. Civil society is an important stakeholder and stronger links should be built for relationships that promote synergy in improving African governance.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/113048/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yarik Turianskyi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The African Peer Review Mechanism got off to a good start, but enthusiasm soon waned.Yarik Turianskyi, Yarik Turianskyi is Manager of the Governance and African Peer Review Mechanism Programme at the South African Institute of International Affairs and guest lecturer in African Governance and Eastern European Politics, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1089472019-01-21T13:40:47Z2019-01-21T13:40:47ZThe CAR provides hard lessons on what it means to deliver real justice<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/253637/original/file-20190114-43525-1gdlngs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Many have been displaced by violence in the Central African Republic. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Stringer</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The conundrum facing justice in the Central African Republic (CAR) was well summed up by Jean Pierre Waboe, Vice-president of the country’s Constitutional Court, whom I interviewed:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>In a situation whereby the state does not exist, injustice becomes the norm. Anybody can set about doing anything. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The breakdown of state control since the resurgence of conflict in 2013 has had drastic consequences for the possibility of any forms of governance – political, economic or legal in CAR. </p>
<p>Under these circumstances, the need for “justice” has become more crucial. For Waboe, however, the problem of justice in the country is that it’s seen as too formal, too distant, too complex, and too slow to respond to what’s needed. For justice to work, a country needs a judiciary system that’s functioning, legitimate and credible. And that can deliver justice that’s immediate, operative and helps populations to reconnect torn relationships. A justice that, for him, can “dry tears”. </p>
<p>The question that keeps getting asked is: what justice is possible in a climate of impunity? And indeed in times of war.</p>
<p>The CAR’s Special Criminal Court is the site of protracted struggle over the meaning, and the feasibility of justice. In the absence of a functioning judicial system, the establishment of a <a href="http://www.cps-rca.cf/sites/default/files/inline-files/Loi%20_%20Cour%20p%C3%A9nale%20sp%C3%A9ciale%20_.pdf">tribunal in 2015</a>
was an unprecedented initiative. Yet, the precarious conditions of its existence make it a promise that teeters on the ledge of collapse. </p>
<p>The special court is something of an experiment. Unlike previous ad hoc tribunals such as Yugoslavia and Rwanda, it isn’t meant to constitute an alternative or competitor to the International Criminal Court (<a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/pids/publications/uicceng.pdf">ICC</a>). Rather, it’s role is to complement the ICC’s ongoing investigations into alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity. If successful, <a href="https://justiceinconflict.org/2015/05/14/why-central-african-republics-hybrid-tribunal-could-be-a-game-changer/">the hope</a> is that it could become a model of shared prosecuting authority across domestic and international judicial regimes for grave crimes. </p>
<h2>Fraught with difficulties</h2>
<p>The mandate of the court is to prosecute crimes committed since 2003 including rape and sexual violence, widespread crimes and material destruction. Human Rights Watch found that some of the most egregious and brutal crimes have been committed since <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/05/17/looking-justice/special-criminal-court-new-opportunity-victims-central-african">the breakout of the civil war in 2013</a>. And yet, no form of justice has been offered and no one prosecuted. </p>
<p>The temporary nature of the special court’s mandate sits at odds with the fact that violence is ongoing. In the provinces outside of Bangui and the South West, a plethora of armed groups offer “protection” one day, the next they repress. They raze villages, extract rare minerals, levy tax, loot humanitarian supplies, kidnap people for ransom, set up racket schemes and impose tolls to trucks and people. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13600820701562843?src=recsys&journalCode=cgsj20">Many scholars view</a> special courts as part of the liberal peace building treatment package and in that sense a part of a broader agenda of social transformation of post-conflict societies.</p>
<p>But the CAR’s current volatile conditions render the very administration of justice a dangerous endeavour. Judges and witnesses have to be protected; the domestic judiciary personnel lacks experience in investigating crimes against humanity and the judiciary system itself is vulnerable to “instrumentalisation”, that is its misuse for political or other ends. Deterring fighters from committing grave crimes or recidivists from committing further crimes is one thing. Restoring confidence, trust and respect for the justice system is another. How are ordinary people to respond when it’s clear that the assessment of crimes happens against a backdrop of entrenched hierarchies based on ethnicity, political and religious affiliation, and economic capacity? </p>
<p>There are a host of additional problems too. For instance, the recruitment of young people into armed groups has gone unabated. According to the United Nations’ Children and Armed Conflict report, <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/world/children-and-armed-conflict-report-secretary-general-a72865-s2018465-enar">the number of young recruits quadrupled</a> in 2017 relatively to 2016.</p>
<p>The reality is that, for victims, the promise of justice is a spectrum that carries both risks and possibilities. </p>
<p>The court, for instance, regulates the forms, spaces, styles and even the emotional structure of victim testimony. And the convention of legal proceedings – the use of codified language and formal rules of presentation and evidence for example – leave victims, most of whom are illiterate, further marginalised. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/251933/original/file-20181222-103657-1vcq1gs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/251933/original/file-20181222-103657-1vcq1gs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/251933/original/file-20181222-103657-1vcq1gs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/251933/original/file-20181222-103657-1vcq1gs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/251933/original/file-20181222-103657-1vcq1gs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/251933/original/file-20181222-103657-1vcq1gs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/251933/original/file-20181222-103657-1vcq1gs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">CAR’s Special Criminal Court.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Supplied by author.</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A further complication is that war criminals seem to have little to fear from United Nations forces given the latter’s limited mandate. Besides, atrocities have been committed by all parties involved. The <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/car/bemba?ln=fr">acquittal</a> of Jean Pierre Bemba by the ICC remains a great puzzle for those that have witnessed the atrocities committed by his troops in CAR. </p>
<p>This poses the question of the criteria and line of priority that are to guide future prosecutions. </p>
<h2>The alternatives</h2>
<p>Is there an alternative to lengthy and costly procedures and imprisonment? For Walidou, a legal scholar who has taught at the University of Bangui for many years, there is:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Give to each [former fighter] a modest income, a decent uniform and integrate them in an auxiliary unit to calm them down and they will leave armed groups.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>For Walidou, by taking back youngsters, the state can gather information on logistics, the circulation of weapons, the exploitation of resources, the means of supply to armed groups, and other information that it currently doesn’t have.</p>
<p>The imperative for a justice that restores what has been broken, and the need to make examples of perpetrators who have been captured, can pull in different directions. In fact, they run the risk of cancelling out each other. </p>
<p>What this points to is the need to better understand the sociology of the conflict, to assess the role of justice in relation to the peace process and to reconstruction more generally. This could, for example, mean considering the role of amnesty and moratoria as well as non-legal mechanisms in national reconciliation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/108947/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amy Niang received a grant to cover a research trip to the Central African Republic as part of the Uncovering Security Story Lab programme supported by the Thomson Reuters Foundation, the Stanley Foundation and the Gerda Henkel Stiftung.</span></em></p>The volatile conditions in the Central African Republic make the administration of justice difficult.Amy Niang, Visiting Professor at the University of Sao Paulo and Senior Lecturer in International Relations, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1075342018-11-23T14:34:57Z2018-11-23T14:34:57ZShades of Brazil as anti-corruption drive in South Africa turns nasty<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/247049/original/file-20181123-149326-133vsu2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Julius Malema and his Economic Freedom Fighter are using President Cyril Ramaphosa's anti-corruption campaign against him. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Kevin Sutherland</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>What better way to derail an anti-corruption campaign than to beat it at its own game? You might damage or derail democracy in the process, but that is the country’s problem, not yours.</p>
<p>Anti-corruption campaigns are normally good for democracy. But they can threaten it: this happens when the people claiming to root out corruption are themselves corrupt. One recent example is Brazil, where an elected president, Dilma Rousseff, was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2016/aug/31/dilma-rousseff-impeachment-brazil-what-you-need-to-know">forced from office </a> by politicians who are far more corrupt and were covering their own tracks. Something similar seems to be afoot in South Africa.</p>
<p>One recent sign that not all fights against corruption are principled is an unexpected shift in strategy by the <a href="https://www.effonline.org/">Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)</a>, the country’s third biggest party.</p>
<p>The EFF, whose founding leaders were either <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2012-02-29-julius-malema-expelled">suspended or expelled</a> from the governing African National Congress (ANC) at the behest of former President Jacob Zuma, won the hearts of sections of the middle class when it joined the campaign against Zuma and his faction. Its brash style, designed to win maximum media attention, struck a chord among a middle class angered by Zuma’s patronage politics.</p>
<p>Now it has changed sides and is using the same style of politics to <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/fighters-be-ready-malema-gets-ready-to-go-to-war-with-pravin-gordhan-20181120">go after Public Enterprises Minister Pravin Gordhan</a>, who plays a key role in President Cyril Ramaphosa’s fight against corruption.</p>
<p>This is part of a wider shift in approach in which it now says in public what the Zuma faction would like to say but which ANC discipline will not allow. It has <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/gordhan-media-and-moyane-malema-lashes-out-20180705">supported </a> former head of the South African Revenue Service Tom Moyane <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2018-10-16-fire-tom-moyane-now-nugent-tells-president-cyril-ramaphosa/">whose dismissal was recommended by a judicial commission</a> of inquiry after hearing evidence that he had caused the Revenue Service huge damage in the service of Zuma’s faction. It has <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/companies/16-million-reasons-why-the-eff-defended-vbs-17428022">backed VBS Bank</a>, which was <a href="https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/business/2018-11-13-court-orders-vbs-bank-liquidation/">wound up</a> after an inquiry found it had been brought down by looting.</p>
<h2>Diverting Attention</h2>
<p>The EFF’s reasons for switching sides are not mysterious. Its leaders are <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-11-21-vbs-bank-heist-effs-family-ties-and-moneyed-connections/">accused of benefiting from VBS</a> and the party has received money from a company accused of <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1977581/ndlozi-reaffirms-unapologetic-effs-links-to-cigarette-smugglers-are-no-secret/">benefiting from the illicit tobacco trade</a>: one of Moyane’s goals was to close down the Revenue Service’s investigations of this trade. So, like the Zuma faction itself, it is diverting attention away from its own dealings.</p>
<p>This confirms what the middle-class enthusiasm for the EFF ignored. Its campaign against Zuma was not a fight against corruption but pay-back for driving them out of the ANC. Before then, the EFF’s leader, Julius Malema, had been a <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/we-will-kill-for-zuma-404646">loud supporter of Zuma</a> and was accused of much the same behaviour. Now that Zuma has gone, he and the EFF can return to defending the behaviour which once made them Zuma allies.</p>
<p>More interesting – and ominous – is how they are going about it. During the last period of Zuma’s presidency, his faction’s routine response to criticism of their links to key figures in the state capture project, the Gupta brothers, and campaigns against corruption, was that the critics were lackeys of <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/rdm/politics/2017-07-05-zuma-faction-loses-white-monopoly-capital-battle-at-anc-conference/">“white monopoly capital”</a>. The EFF has not abandoned <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/fighters-be-ready-malema-gets-ready-to-go-to-war-with-pravin-gordhan-20181120">this theme</a> but has added one: instead of denouncing the anti-corruption campaign as a white plot, it has tried to turn it on those in the ANC who pose a threat to them by <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/shivambu-wants-enabler-of-state-capture-gordhan-to-resign-18180033">accusing Gordhan of corruption</a>.</p>
<p>Their first salvo was an attempt to link him to the Guptas by suggesting that, like <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2018-10-09-nhlanhla-nene-resigns-as-finance-minister/">recently resigned Finance Minister Nhlanhla Nene</a>, he met them and did not disclose this. Later, they claimed he and his <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/here-is-the-effs-evidence-on-gordhans-daughter-and-why-their-claims-are-bogus-20181122">daughter Anisha benefited financially</a> from their links to government.</p>
<h2>What’s behind the switch</h2>
<p>This campaign may not be all the EFF’s own work. Its many admirers in the media like to portray it as immensely powerful despite the fact that its share of the vote has <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2018/03/21/is-the-eff-2019s-dark-horse-lets-look-at-the-numbers_a_23391412/">never reached 10%</a> – they suggest that it has an army of sources feeding it information. </p>
<p>More likely is that ANC factions use the EFF to fight their battles by leaking it information about their opponents. The Zuma faction may also have leaked to the main opposition, the Democratic Alliance, the claim that Ramaphosa or his son <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/r500k-bosasa-donation-to-ramaphosa-is-nothing-short-of-a-bribe-says-maimane-18235689">received money from Bosasa</a>, a security company which does business with the government. If, as is probable, the faction is leaking the information to the largest two opposition parties, then it has decided that instead of denouncing the anti-corruption campaign, it will use it against Ramaphosa, Gordhan and their allies.</p>
<p>The obvious reason for this switch is that it is far more plausible. Anger at corruption is deep and widespread and so blaming white business for the campaign against it persuades no-one outside the faction. But precisely because many people are appalled by corruption, painting politicians who say they are fighting it as corrupt wins some sympathy from media and citizens who are more than willing to believe that all politicians are on the take. This is particularly so because the baleful effect of money on politics is not restricted to Zuma and his faction and many citizens know this.</p>
<p>If this strategy gains momentum, it could threaten democracy. Anti-corruption campaigns are essential to democracy – when they seek to replace corrupt people and practices in government with alternatives. When they signal that all office holders are corrupt, they breed cynicism which weakens or ends democracy. Why bother who wins and loses if all politicians are corrupt? Why fight for clean government when no-one will make it happen? But that does not deter those who smear their opponents – democracy is probably an obstacle for them anyway.</p>
<p>Fortunately for democrats, the new campaign is likely to fail. The evidence so far suggests that Gordhan has no case to answer and most voters will probably see this. Ramaphosa does have some explaining to do but voters are likely to see a President who did not know about an untoward payment and then rectified it as a better bet than one who tries to wreck government to hide those payments. </p>
<p>The EFF is a long way from challenging for control of a single province, let alone the country and so the only plausible winner is the ANC’s Zuma faction which is discredited among voters: if it took over the governing party, it would probably lose the <a href="https://www.thesouthafrican.com/south-african-elections-2019-voting-dates/">next election in 2019</a>.</p>
<p>But, unless public debate distinguishes clearly between politicians who serve themselves and those who serve citizens, and continues to insist that corruption can be controlled, those who peddle cynicism to protect themselves will continue to threaten democracy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/107534/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Friedman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Economic Freedom Fighters’ strategy of painting President Ramaphosa and his allies as corrupt is unlikely to succeed.Steven Friedman, Professor of Political Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1054602018-10-31T13:56:02Z2018-10-31T13:56:02ZSouth African voters are moving beyond party loyalty: they want delivery<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/242019/original/file-20181024-48724-c9n1mi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Voters line up in South Africa's last election. Their concerns are shifting.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The attention of South Africans has recently been firmly fixed on issues of good governance – or more specifically on its failures. This is due partly to several exposés of scandals involving former President Jacob Zuma and the <a href="https://www.enca.com/news/rise-and-fall-gupta-empire">Gupta family</a>. The allegations are that members of the family and a network of individuals close to Zuma were involved in <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-09-14-00-definition-of-state-capture">corruption and efforts to weaken key state institutions</a>.</p>
<p>But does the public outcry reflect actual changes in the hearts, minds, and loyalty of the nation’s voters? And what does this mean for the incumbent government, led by the African National Congress (ANC), when the people return to the <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/iec-on-track-for-2019-elections-not-planning-for-rumoured-early-vote-20180529">polls in 2019</a>?</p>
<p>New <a href="https://www.uj.ac.za/faculties/humanities/csda/Documents/Voter%20Preference%20Report%20A4%2002.10.%202018%20PDF.pdf">research</a> suggests that major shifts are beginning to happen in the country. For example, in past elections, loyalty to the ANC – the party that led the struggle for freedom and democracy – mattered more than government performance and trust in government institutions. This is no longer the case. The research shows that the performance of institutions such as parliament, the Courts, the South African Police Services, the South African Social Security Agency, the Department of Social Development and the media are now as important a predictor of voters’ preferences. </p>
<p>In fact, issues of good governance – reflected in trust in institutions, the implementation of the socio-economic rights enshrined in the Constitution and perceptions of corruption – matter significantly.</p>
<p>This is clear from the two major findings of the study. The first is that the number of people supporting the ANC is down significantly. The survey found that 53% of those interviewed said that they would vote for the ANC in 2019. The percentage may be slightly higher as 11% of respondents said they wouldn’t vote and the remainder refused to answer the question. This is significantly lower than the 70% the ANC got in 2004 and marginally lower than the 54% in the 2016 local government elections. </p>
<p>Secondly, perceptions of good governance are becoming more important for the average voter, and that party loyalty – while still significant – is on the decline.</p>
<p>These first findings are part of a three-part national study into the drivers of voting preference and influence. </p>
<h2>What matters</h2>
<p>Perceptions of who and how decisions are made, how resources are managed and implemented, and the extent to which public institutions meet the needs of the population (rather than a select group of people) appears to be holding sway among potential voters. This is pertinent given the prevalence of <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-is-paying-a-heavy-price-for-dysfunctional-local-government-102295">service delivery protests</a>, increasing concerns <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-wont-become-less-violent-until-its-more-equal-103116">about safety </a> and the daily exposure by various <a href="https://theconversation.com/anc-will-go-to-the-polls-with-only-one-major-asset-its-president-ramaphosa-105433">commissions of enquiry</a> of the magnitude of corruption.</p>
<p>The study clearly shows that perceptions of good governance, corruption as well as social and economic well-being are the key factors likely to influence how people vote in the 2019 national general elections. </p>
<p>We also found that:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>75% of the respondents believed that corruption had increased in the country.</p></li>
<li><p>Voting for the party of “liberation” was still the most important reason for 35% of all respondents. But this was not a key driver of voting behaviour in our statistical model. This is a clear shift from the past two decades.</p></li>
<li><p>Many respondents expressed fairly high levels of trust in institutions (such as the courts, media, South African Social Security Agency, and the Department of Social Development). But, former President Jacob Zuma fared poorly: only 26% of potential voters expressed trust in him. </p></li>
<li><p>Voters who expressed strong trust in institutions were nearly four times likelier to vote ANC than those who had strong distrust in institutions.</p></li>
<li><p>Voters who believed that corruption had increased since 2014 were half as likely to vote for the ANC than those who thought that corruption had decreased.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Contradictions</h2>
<p>The research revealed that while potential voters in the poor and middle-income brackets are not oblivious to how public institutions conduct their affairs, just over half of the respondents were likely or extremely likely to trust the South African Social Security Agency and the Department of Social Development. These two departments are directly engaged in poverty reduction through the payment of social grants to almost 17 million beneficiaries and the delivery of welfare services to vulnerable individuals and families. </p>
<p><strong>Figure 1: How likely are you to trust in the following institutions?</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/241797/original/file-20181023-169801-16vq6fy.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/241797/original/file-20181023-169801-16vq6fy.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=333&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241797/original/file-20181023-169801-16vq6fy.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=333&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241797/original/file-20181023-169801-16vq6fy.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=333&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241797/original/file-20181023-169801-16vq6fy.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241797/original/file-20181023-169801-16vq6fy.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241797/original/file-20181023-169801-16vq6fy.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>However, the survey found lower levels of trust in the South African Police Service (44%). This comes as no surprise in view of <a href="https://www.thesouthafrican.com/crime-stats-south-africa-murder-rate-2018/">high rates of crime and violence in the country</a>. </p>
<p>Trust in Parliament was 45%, indicating less favourable public opinion about the failure of parliament to hold political office bearers to account. Similarly, corruption is highly likely to be the reason for the low levels of trust expressed in former President Zuma (26%). </p>
<h2>Looking ahead</h2>
<p>These findings, when read along with concerns about corruption and service delivery failures, suggest that good governance matters significantly to voters. These perceptions and the extent to which public institutions meet the needs of the population appear to be holding sway among potential voters. </p>
<p>This is pertinent given the persistence of service delivery protests in communities all over the country and the exposure to corruption on a daily basis.</p>
<p>Whether the recent changes in ANC leadership, which saw Cyril Ramaphosa become party president and leader of the country, will once again shift voter perceptions is a question that we hope to answer when the results of the 2018 study are released. </p>
<p><em>This first set of data was collected through a nationally representative survey, at the height of the <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/ramaphosa-dlamini-zuma-in-a-tightrace-20171104">contestation for leadership</a> in the governing party in 2017. It’s the first set of findings released in a three-year study. The next findings – to be released in the first quarter of 2019 – will help to show patterns over time, particularly where voters hold contradictory views.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/105460/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Leila Patel receives funding from the National Research Foundation for her Research Chair in Welfare and Social Development, from the University of Johannesburg's Research Committee and the Faculty of Humanities Research Committee at UJ </span></em></p>South African voters are worried about how their country is being run. Most still support the ANC but in far fewer numbers.Leila Patel, Professor of Social Development Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1045832018-10-08T15:19:36Z2018-10-08T15:19:36ZCameroon presidential poll underscores the need for term limits<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/239730/original/file-20181008-72113-1boj9nv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Cameroonian President Paul Biya votes in the presidential elections in the capital Yaounde. He has been in power for 36 years.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE/EPA/Nic Bothma</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The official results of Cameroon’s October 7, 2018 presidential election are due <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/cameroon-votes-as-separatists-pose-a-threat-biya-win-likely/2018/10/07/e11be120-ca01-11e8-9c0f-2ffaf6d422aa_story.html?amp;utm_term=.4cc85477087a&noredirect=on&utm_term=.28d02b799133">in two weeks</a>. But they’re not expected to yield any surprises. Paul Biya (85), who became president in 1982, is almost certain to retain power for a <a href="https://fr.euronews.com/2018/10/05/cameroun-paul-biya-brigue-un-septieme-mandat">seventh term</a>. If he wins and stays in power until 2025 – the end of his next term – he would have run the country for a whopping 43 years. His overextended rule has been marked by <a href="https://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/cameroon/">corruption</a>, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/cameroons-presidential-election-will-the-votes-count/">patronage politics</a>, and a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43469758">largely absent president</a>.</p>
<p>The election has taken place amid a great deal of uncertainty and insecurity. Municipal and legislative elections were postponed by a year because of <a href="https://www.journalducameroun.com/en/cameroon-postpones-legislative-municipal-elections/">too volatile a space</a>, though government cited more technical reasons. Only senatorial elections were held in <a href="https://democracychronicles.org/presidential-elections-in-cameroon/">March 2018</a>.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cameroon-separatists/anglophone-cameroons-separatist-conflict-gets-bloodier-idUSKCN1IX4RS">biggest tensions</a> have been between the English-speaking – which represent <a href="http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/cameroon-population/">20% of the population</a> – and French-speaking parts of the country. After the presidential polls opened on Sunday, <a href="https://www.whig.com/article/20181007/AP/310079953">violent confrontations</a> broke out in English speaking regions of the North West and the South West. Almost no polling took place in these regions following calls by separatists for a lockdown (stay at home), which would mean in effect that no people would leave their houses to vote.</p>
<p>Biya is almost certain to return to power given the government’s well-oiled election machine and its use of the security sector to manage dissent. Elections over the past 10 years have been <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2011/10/10/world/africa/cameroon-elections/index.html">marred by accusations of fraud</a>. These elections will be no different.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, Biya’s credibility and legitimacy are increasingly being tarnished. And there is growing support for alternative candidates.</p>
<p>The election is a reminder of the importance of defined term limits for presidents. Although Cameroon’s <a href="http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/Cameroon.pdf">1996 Constitution</a> limited presidential mandates to two seven-year terms, Biya’s party repealed the term limits in 2008 so that he could extend his stay.</p>
<h2>The main contenders</h2>
<p>This year’s election has pitted Biya against <a href="http://www.crtv.cm/2018/08/liste-des-candidats-a-lelection-presidentielle-2018/">eight opposition candidates</a>. The major contenders are Joshua Osih of the <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2018/02/24/cameroon-s-main-opposition-sdf-elects-49-year-old-candidate-to-face-biya/">Social Democratic Front</a>; Maurice Kamto of the <a href="https://www.mrcparty.org/">Cameroon Renaissance Movement</a>; Cabral Libii Li Ngue candidate for <a href="https://www.lebledparle.com/actu/politique/1104138-cameroun-le-parti-univers-de-nkou-mvondo-investi-cabral-libii-comme-son-candidat-a-l-election-presidentielle">Univers party</a>, and <a href="https://akeremuna2018.com/profile/">Akere Tabeng Muna</a> of the <a href="https://www.journalducameroun.com/en/2018-presidential-election-akere-muna-kicks-off-campaign-with-convention-in-yaounde/">Popular Front for Development</a>.</p>
<p>The Social Democratic Front has become a household name in Cameroon since its inception in 1990 and its candidate, Osih, is popular.</p>
<p>For his part, Kamto who heads up the Cameroon Renaissance Movement was a former minister in Biya’s regime. He <a href="http://www.crtv.cm/2018/09/maurice-kamto-presidential-candidate-for-mrc-party/">resigned from government</a> in 2011 to form his own political party. He draws his support from the western region and the urban middle class.</p>
<p>Cabral is a young university lecturer who has been outspoken in his criticism of the regime and has captured the imagination of young Cameroonians. Muna is the son of the former vice president and an international jurist. He aligned with Kamto two days before the election.</p>
<p>Kamto and Cabral attracted large crowds at their rallies. But they are unlikely to gain a majority of votes given that the state’s machinery is stacked against them.</p>
<h2>The issues</h2>
<p>Three major issues dominated the run up to the elections: political transition, the economy, and security.</p>
<p>After 36 years as president, the opposition and other observers view Biya’s exit as long overdue. But he is unlikely to step down as has been the case of other African leaders who have overstayed their terms. And the opposition forces are not yet strong enough to force a change in leadership.</p>
<p>Cameroon is central Africa’s largest economy, producing oil, gas, timber, and cocoa. Nevertheless, it faces a range of major economic challenges. These include <a href="https://theodora.com/wfbcurrent/cameroon/cameroon_economy.html">stagnant per capita income, inequitable distribution of income</a>, <a href="https://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/cameroon/">corruption</a>, nepotism and a <a href="https://www.businessincameroon.com/companies/1307-7263-in-cameroon-the-informal-sector-weighs-as-much-in-gdp-as-in-south-africa-and-mauritius-but-less-than-in-nigeria">large informal economy</a>. It also has substantial debt, constituting<a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/cameroon/government-debt-to-gdp"> 35% of its GDP</a>.</p>
<p>Of all the issues affecting the election, security is the biggest. For nearly two years there have been protests in the North West and South West against what Anglophones describe as general marginalisation as well as the “Frenchification” of their courts and schools. The protests have been met with a <a href="https://theconversation.com/biya-must-stop-the-killings-in-cameroon-and-lead-the-search-for-peace-100026">brutal crackdown</a> which in turn triggered an armed pro-independence insurgency.</p>
<p>On top of this <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/anglophone-crisis-looms-cameroon-presidential-election-181004081327023.html">Cameroon has been challenged</a> by the violence of Boko-Haram in the North, the instability of the Central Africa Republic in the East and the separatist movement in the South. Clashes with the separatists have already left <a href="http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/africa/Amnesty-says-scores-killed-in-Cameroon-violence/4552902-4767086-f6kq23z/index.html">400 people dead</a> and 20 000 displaced as refugees in neighbouring Nigeria.</p>
<h2>Implications for African politics</h2>
<p>Some commentators have pointed to the problem of <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/choiceless-democracy/">“choiceless democracies”</a> in Africa. Leading economist <a href="https://prabook.com/web/thandika.mkandawire/497006">Thandika Mkandawire</a> <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/200804171247.html">has noted that</a> “African leaders exhibit a wide array of unethical ways when it comes to capturing, retention, and exercising of political power, the long-term result being the tendency by a people denied the right to a free choice of their leaders to write electoral lists in blood.”</p>
<p>This is once again playing out in Cameroon. The country has a president who has captured the state to the detriment of many of his people. And people increasingly see violence as the only means through which they can have their voices heard and their needs taken into account.</p>
<p>Across Africa pessimism is replacing the mood of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/democracy-in-africa-the-ebbs-and-flows-over-six-decades-42011">1990s</a> when multi-party democracy was on the rise. Old tendencies of authoritarian leaders remaining in power beyond their term, corruption and the pillaging of public resources persist. These in turn is leading to a rise in conflict.</p>
<p>The African Union (AU) and regional intergovernmental institutions seem unable to hold leaders like Biya to account. This despite the AU’s proclamations of <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/silencing-the-guns-by-2020-ambitious-but-essential">“silencing the guns”</a> in Africa by 2020, and creating an Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law <a href="https://au.int/en/agenda2063">by 2063</a>. All Africans need to take a principled stand on presidential term limits as it is impacting on the development, peace and security of the continent.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/104583/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gabriel Ngah Kiven is a University of Johannesburg GES Scholar</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cheryl Hendricks does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>President Paul Biya’s credibility and legitimacy are increasingly being tarnished, amid growing support for opposition candidates.Cheryl Hendricks, Executive director, Africa Institute of South Africa, Human Sciences Research CouncilGabriel Ngah Kiven, PhD candidate in Political Studies at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1033582018-09-17T14:53:08Z2018-09-17T14:53:08ZWhy Ramaphosa’s future may hang on inquiry into corruption in South Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/236643/original/file-20180917-158222-vs2515.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Deputy chief justice Raymond Zondo is heading up the inquiry into corruption in South Africa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A <a href="https://www.sastatecapture.org.za/">commission</a> of inquiry into <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/download-the-full-state-of-capture-pdf-20161102">corruption</a> in South Africa is underway. How it goes about its work, and delivers on its mandate, will have profound constitutional and political consequences. This is more so because it is clear that deposed former President Jacob Zuma, who is at the core of the allegations, has launched a <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/news/2018-09-08-exposed-jacob-zuma-plot-to-oust-cyril-ramaphosa/">fightback campaign</a> that can undermine President Cyril Ramaphosa’s efforts to clean up government.</p>
<p>The remit of the commission, which is headed by Constitutional Court Deputy Chief Justice <a href="https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/south-africa/2018-08-20-state-capture-inquiry-profile-of-deputy-chief-justice-raymond-zondo/">Raymond Zondo</a>, is to establish the extent of what’s become known as “state capture” by rogue elements in government. Its findings will reveal how the country’s democracy was so imperilled within two decades of its founding election in 1994. It’ll also help ensure that the necessary remedial action is taken to prevent a repeat.</p>
<p>South Africa needs to find out how Zuma and his cronies, the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22513410">Gupta family</a>, were able to exploit weaknesses in the country’s governance system. </p>
<p>To perform its role effectively, a judicial commission must act as an inquisitorial inquiry whose job is to find out what happened and why. This requires it to refrain from acting like a normal (adversarial) court of law. The commission isn’t a substitute for criminal prosecution or, for that matter, civil litigation. </p>
<p>A great deal flows from this foundational point. </p>
<p>Zondo’s job isn’t to <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/opinion-and-analysis/2018-09-15-zondo-commission-now-has-a-chance-to-follow-the-money/">“follow the money”</a> as some have suggested. Important features of the corporate labyrinth built by the Guptas and their allies and accomplices has already been uncovered, for example <a href="https://www.outa.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Gupta-bonds-13July2017.pdf">the property holdings of the Gupta family</a>, or examined in <a href="https://www.outa.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Founding-Papers-Part-1.pdf">court proceedings</a>.</p>
<p>The commission’s job isn’t to track the flow of funds or any money-laundering machines. That will be the job of the criminal courts, as and when they get the chance.</p>
<p>Instead, Zondo should grapple with the politics of state capture. He needs to get under the skin of the politics of state capture; to get on record why and what happened; and to make clear findings of political accountability. Speed is of the essence. He needs to move fast enough that the commission maintains momentum and does not allow Zuma and other implicated parties to get out ahead of it, or to seek to <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2018-09-12-there-is-no-state-that-was-captured-zuma/">tilt public opinion in their favour</a>.</p>
<p>The urgency is underscored by reports that Zuma is plotting with others against <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/news/2018-09-08-exposed-jacob-zuma-plot-to-oust-cyril-ramaphosa/">Ramaphosa</a>.</p>
<h2>Process and powers</h2>
<p>To evaluate the commission’s progress, it is important to keep in mind its <a href="http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/notices/2018/20180713-gg41772_gen396-SCAPcomms-Rules.pdf">terms of reference</a> and its powers. What can Zondo investigate and what can the commission do about whatever it uncovers?</p>
<p>Firstly, its terms of reference are deep, but narrow. Seven of the nine elements of the terms of reference refer directly to the Guptas’ or Zuma’s interference with government decision-making and procurement. Tthe remaining two invite a broader inquiry into state procurement.</p>
<p>So the terms of reference are essentially confined to the Gupta family and its relationship with the democratic state – from the presidency and the cabinet, down through state agencies and state-owned enterprises, and down deep into the <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/369963043/Government-Gazette-State-Capture-Inquiry-Term-of-Reference#from_embed">executive arm of government</a>.</p>
<p>In digging for the truth, those responsible for what happened will – or should – be identified by the commission so that they can be held to account. </p>
<p>But what powers does the commission have to take remedial action to address any wrongdoings it uncovers?</p>
<p>Very little. Certainly, far less than people seem to think. The commission’s task is to investigate and report back to Ramaphosa, which may include recommendations.</p>
<p>These recommendations are not, <em>per se</em>, binding. The commission is essentially a fact-finding mission and does not have the power to make orders.</p>
<p>So the report could say, for example, that criminal activity has been committed, and the commission may refer the matter for prosecution or further investigation.</p>
<p>But, the prosecutorial authorities don’t have to wait for the conclusion of the commission process. Indeed, they should be following the proceedings closely and initiating action wherever it suggests that criminality may have occurred.</p>
<p>Uncertainty about this point has led to some procedural confusion during the opening fortnight, particularly around whether those implicated would have an opportunity to cross-examine.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, Zondo let the matter fester unnecessarily before <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/statecaptureinquiry-zondo-denies-guptas-requests-for-cross-examination-in-scathing-ruling-20180913">finally ruling on September 11</a>. He had little difficulty dismissing the application of the Gupta brothers on the basis that they are, in essence, fugitives from justice who are unwilling to come back to South Africa to give evidence to the commission. In the case of Zuma’s son, Duduzane Zuma, he granted the application to cross-examine.</p>
<p>This may be justified. But it may also be a red herring. The best commissions of inquiry are those with strong “counsel for the inquiry” who don’t just lead evidence of one side of a story, but who test the evidence as they go along, adding to its weight and credibility, in pursuit of a robust version of the truth. </p>
<h2>High stakes</h2>
<p>There are anxieties about Zondo’s pace. It is worth remembering that this commission derives from the <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/download-the-full-state-of-capture-pdf-20161102">report on state capture</a> by former public protector <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-south-africas-public-protector-has-set-a-high-bar-for-her-successor-63891">Thuli Madonsela</a>. Because she had had neither sufficient time nor resources to complete her work, appointing a judicial commission of inquiry was the remedial action that had to be taken.</p>
<p>Madonsela wanted the commission to complete its work in six months. It was a rather optimistic target. But it wasn’t entirely unreasonable provided that the commission focused on the narrow scope set by the terms of reference, and organised its procedure in a lean and equally focused manner.</p>
<p>Zondo has asked for an additional two years. It very far from clear why he needs so long and has led the lobby group, the Council for the South African Constitution, to join the court proceedings to <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2018/07/25/casac-seeks-reasons-behind-state-capture-inquiry-extension">object to any extension</a>.</p>
<p>Regardless, the commission needs to act as swiftly as it can. South Africans are being reminded daily that Zuma may have left office, but that he still is capable of <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2018-09-12-there-is-no-state-that-was-captured-zuma/">muddying the waters</a>. If it focuses efficiently on its core task, and evidence of the political conspiracy that underpinned the state capture project is adduced and tested, the proceedings of the commission may serve to keep a lid on Zuma’s fightback campaign. </p>
<p>The stakes are very high for all concerned – for Ramaphosa’s political future, and for the country he leads.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/103358/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Calland is a partner at The Paternoster Group: African Political Insight, a Board Member of the Open Democracy Advice Centre and a member of the Advisory Council of the Council for the Advancement of the South African Constitution. </span></em></p>Justice Zondo needs to get under the skin of the politics of state capture in South Africa, to get on record what happened, and why.Richard Calland, Associate Professor in Public Law, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1021362018-08-29T14:18:15Z2018-08-29T14:18:15ZHow structural flaws contribute to the crisis in South Africa’s municipalities<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233881/original/file-20180828-86129-1iao6ms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Vaal River in Gauteng, South Africa's richest province, is polluted.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Jon Hrusa</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The dire state of municipal governance in South Africa has been <a href="https://www.news24.com/Opinions/IN-FOCUS/in-focus-zweli-mkhizes-4-point-plan-to-fix-municipalities-20180601">in the news</a> for much of this year. Recent events in <a href="http://www.emfuleni.gov.za/">Emfuleni Local Municipality</a>, an urban municipality with <a href="http://citypopulation.info/php/southafrica-admin.php?adm2id=GT421">more than 700 000 residents</a> in Gauteng, the country’s economic hub, show the extent of the problem.</p>
<p>The municipality, located to the south of Johannesburg, has been unable to settle water and electricity debts owing to the utilities <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/rand-water-threatens-to-cut-water-to-emfuleni-municipality-over-r419m-debt-20180411">Rand Water</a> and <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2018/07/24/eskom-emfuleni-municipality-at-loggerheads-over-debt">Eskom</a>. This has led to services to residents being reduced or cut. Lack of infrastructure maintenance has further bedevilled the delivery of water and electricity, as well as rubbish removal. </p>
<p>Sewage spills <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/the-star/raw-sewerage-run-on-streets-and-taps-remains-dry-as-emfuleni-water-issues-continue-16249851">have plagued suburbs</a> and <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/science-and-environment/2018-07-31-emfuleni-faces-catastrophe-as-sewage-threatens-crops-and-tourism/">severely polluted the Vaal River</a> - the main source of drinking water in the province that is also crucial to its tourism and agriculture. The municipality’s entire basic vehicle fleet was recently <a href="https://www.thesouthafrican.com/emfuleni-municipality-vehicles-repossessed/">repossessed by creditors</a>.</p>
<p>In June, the Gauteng Provincial government placed the municipality under <a href="https://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/emfuleni-work-progress">financial administration</a>. </p>
<p>Emfuleni is not alone. The national minister responsible for municipalities recently said 31% of the country’s municipalities are <a href="http://www.cogta.gov.za/?p=3447">“dysfunctional”</a>, and another 31% “almost dysfunctional”. He went on to say that many South African municipalities are battling with financial management as well as good governance and <a href="http://www.cogta.gov.za/?p=3447">administration</a>.</p>
<p>Given its extensive infrastructure and a large tax base, Emfuleni is the kind of municipality that has little excuse not to function well. If it is failing, how could less developed municipalities thrive?</p>
<h2>Who is to blame?</h2>
<p>It’s tempting to blame the government for the municipality’s troubles.</p>
<p>According to the National Treasury’s <a href="https://municipalmoney.gov.za/profiles/municipality-GT421-emfuleni/">municipal finance data website</a>, Emfuleni had a healthy cash balance in 2015. But it then fell by over a third in 2016, before collapsing in 2017. While the municipality did have problems with wasteful expenditure and budget <a href="https://municipalmoney.gov.za/profiles/municipality-GT421-emfuleni/">overspending before,</a> things got much worse after the local government elections in August 2016.</p>
<p>The municipality has also been experiencing political turmoil. The previous mayor resigned in 2017 amid a sex scandal and rumours of <a href="https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/south-africa/2017-11-21-anc-gauteng-welcomes-resignation-of-emfuleni-mayor-mofokeng/">financial mismanagement</a>. <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2018-06-05-da-accuses-anc-of-running-emfuleni-municipality-into-the-ground/">Opposition parties</a> and <a href="https://www.thesouthafrican.com/emfuleni-local-minicipality-makhosi-khoza-outa/">civil society organisations</a> blame the council and mayor, who are from the governing African National Congress, for the municipality’s problems. </p>
<p>But it’s also necessary to look beyond people and politics, and consider whether structural factors have contributed to the crisis. Emfuleni’s problems perhaps point to flaws in the way in which local government in South Africa is structured and financed.</p>
<h2>Raising revenue</h2>
<p>Emfuleni’s cash shortage has partly been blamed on poor collection of <a href="https://www.enca.com/south-africa/emfuleni-intervention-to-focus-on-revenue-recovery-makhura">revenue from service charges</a>. This highlights the extent to which South African towns depend on income from service delivery. <a href="https://municipalmoney.gov.za/profiles/municipality-GT421-emfuleni/">Municipal finance data</a> show that Emfuleni generated about 85% of its own income in the 2016/2017 financial year. (The rest came from its equitable share of national tax revenue and grants from national government). Most of its self-raised revenue came from service charges.</p>
<p>A budget that depends on recovering service debt means that the ability to run the municipality depends on how much residents can consume and pay for. This is neither stable nor sustainable.</p>
<p>A number of factors affect these revenue streams. The first is that a <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Economy/culture-of-non-payment-threatens-stability-of-municipal-finances-treasury-20180308">culture of non-payment</a> is pervasive among residents. Secondly, service revenue is also often affected by supply side constraints, such as <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/the-inherent-problem-of-municipal-financing-20180421">water scarcity</a> or power cuts. And lastly, a revenue stream based on consumption also assumes that most residents can afford services. This isn’t always the case.</p>
<p>Emfuleni has gone through tough economic times in recent years. Unemployment has risen sharply and some better off residents have moved away. This does not bode well for service demand, or the ability to pay for what has been consumed.</p>
<p>The problem won’t go away unless municipalities find less volatile ways of balancing the books. A greater allocation from national government would be one route. So would raising money through loans and imposing taxes or development levies on businesses.</p>
<p>But the problem goes beyond money. </p>
<h2>Unclear lines of accountability</h2>
<p>At least some of the crisis in Emfuleni has been down to mismanagement. This calls into question how municipalities are run. </p>
<p>According to the <a href="http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/SAConstitution-web-eng.pdf">Constitution</a>, local governments have both legislative and executive functions. This means that there isn’t a clear separation of powers between municipal executive leaders (mayors) and the councils to which they report. </p>
<p>On top of this, municipal powers are closely tied to administrative functions, meaning that there is an overlap between political and bureaucratic structures in municipalities. </p>
<p>The close connection between different functions makes sense. But it makes lines of accountability unclear. This isn’t helped by the fact that municipalities can chose from different governance models. This means that accountability works differently in almost every municipality. </p>
<p>This may well have added to Emfuleni’s woes. The municipality has an elected municipal council and an executive mayor system. It is further part of the <a href="http://www.sedibeng.gov.za/">Sedibeng District Municipality</a>, with which it shares responsibility for many of its functions.</p>
<p>There are concerns that executive mayor systems give too much power to mayors and <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-06-25-municipalities-must-change-the-way-they-are-governed/">not enough to councils</a>. There is also insufficient accountability, and flows of information, between local and <a href="https://www.salga.org.za/Documents/NMMF%202016/Reporting%20between%20Districts%20and%20Locals.pdf">regional municipalities</a>.</p>
<p>South African municipal governance is also bedevilled by the influence of political parties over councils, mayors and the administration. In Emfuleni, for instance, the mayor initially resigned when the council was put under administration, but then withdrew his resignation after <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/anc-says-emfuleni-mayor-back-on-the-job-20180608">the ANC intervened</a>.</p>
<h2>What needs to happen</h2>
<p>South Africa may have to consider reducing the governance options available to municipalities, to ensure more uniformity and easier oversight. It also needs to devise uniform, simple and clear, internal accountability structures for local government. And it should seriously consider legally regulating the line between political parties and the civil service.</p>
<p>Finally, provincial intervention in local government affairs is not ideal, and should only happen in extreme cases – as has been the case in Emfuleni. But it would be better if this was triggered by an event - such as a municipality falling into arrears with the water or electricity supplier – rather than waiting for political discretion to be exercised.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/102136/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marius Pieterse receives funding from Wits University and the NRF. </span></em></p>South Africa’s local governments lack a clear separation of legislative and executive powers.Marius Pieterse, Professor of Law, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1007432018-08-20T14:13:30Z2018-08-20T14:13:30ZGovernor’s race in Ekiti points to problems in national Nigerian poll<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/232720/original/file-20180820-30596-1gxjh4e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">There are widespread concerns in Nigeria about vote buying and intimidation.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">IIP Photo Archive</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>With less than 200 days to Nigeria’s next general election - scheduled for February 16, 2019 - there are apprehensions about how vote buying, violence and the deployment of security agents could affect the 2019 polls. Concerns about the fairness of the national poll have been heightened by events surrounding the <a href="http://dailypost.ng/2018/07/16/ekiti-election-pdp-apc-bought-votes-tmg-releases-full-report/">election of the governor in Ekiti State</a> in southwestern Nigeria. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://punchng.com/by-elections-kogi-katsina-pdp-reject-results-as-apc-wins-in-three-states/">by-elections</a> in Bauchi, Katsina and Kogi states have raised similar concerns with the opposition People’s Democratic Party alleging that the elections were neither free nor fair, and insisting that they were marred by violence, snatching of ballot boxes, and vote-buying. </p>
<p>These elections raised <a href="https://cleen.org/2018/08/06/ekitidecides2018-improved-security-49997-deployed-security-personnel-unjustifiable/">two central problems</a> within Nigerian electoral politics - vote buying, and the deployment of the police and military to intimidate opponents and their supporters. </p>
<p>These two factors featured prominently in the Ekiti state poll. The election was won by the ruling party candidate Kayode Fayemi who ran against the incumbent deputy governor Olusola Kolapo Olubunmi.</p>
<p>That election was significant because it was said to prove that the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC) is still popular among Nigerians in the southwest of the country. Of the six states in the southwest, only Ekiti was controlled by the People’s Democratic Party. As things stand, the entire southwest is now an All Progressives Congress zone. </p>
<p>The Ekiti state election victory was therefore a big win for the ruling party. This is particularly true because of President Muhammadu Buhari’s <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/270010-buharimeter-nigerians-rate-buhari-low-on-corruption-security-economy-poll.html">dwindling popularity</a>. The president’s approval rating is at 40%, which marks a 17 percentage point decline from the 57% rating recorded in the 2017. This is part of the reason why the party <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=733z2P591Q0">went all out</a> to ensure a win in Ekiti. </p>
<p>The final outcome of the gubernatorial election, however, still hangs in the balance - the opposition party <a href="https://guardian.ng/news/ekiti-governorship-poll-pdp-candidate-eleka-files-700-page-petition/">has rejected the result</a> and challenged it at the <a href="https://punchng.com/ekiti-poll-olusola-asks-tribunal-to-declare-him-winner/">election tribunal</a>. </p>
<p>Even election observers say that the election <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/07/ekiti-poll-short-of-global-best-practices-electoral-standards-observers/">fell short of global best practices</a>. Nonetheless, the ruling party’s win in Ekiti has been seen as a <a href="http://dailypost.ng/2018/07/15/ekiti-election-breeze-fayemis-victory-will-sweep-south-east-2019-bso/">harbinger of what’s to come</a> in Nigeria’s 2019 general election. </p>
<h2>Intimidation by security agents</h2>
<p>The Ekiti election showed the government pulling out all the stops when it comes to the deployment of the country’s police force.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://punchng.com/ekiti-election-police-deploy-30000-personnel-two-choppers-others/">police headquarters deployed</a> 30,000 policemen – out of total of 370 000 in the whole country – two helicopters, 250 patrol vehicles, and 10 armoured personnel carriers, to man the election in Ekiti, which has a population of just 2.3 million. </p>
<p>The police were used to harass opposition with Ayodele Fayose – who is the outgoing incumbent governor – allegedly being <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x2G8KXFJI8c">slapped and teargassed</a>. <a href="http://www.aitonline.tv/post-election_observers_condemn_ekiti_violence">Election observers</a> condemned the absence of campaign security, which the government should have provided, and the violence which injured opposition party supporters. </p>
<p>The events in Ekiti showed that Nigeria’s security organs are more loyal to the government in power than they are to the country and its citizens. </p>
<p>The levels of police presence – and the use of violence – are not unprecedented even by Nigerian standards. What it points to is the possibility that a similar pattern will be repeated in the national poll. Although it may be difficult for the government to muster the same levels of police presence across the whole of Nigeria. </p>
<p>But there’s a strong possibility that security agents will be deployed in states where president Buhari’s chances are slim. This would affect voter turnout as people may fear violence.</p>
<h2>Cash for votes</h2>
<p>Another trend that was in evidence in the Ekiti election was vote buying.</p>
<p>This isn’t unique to Nigeria and has <a href="https://www.enca.com/south-africa/mbalula-mthembu-accusing-each-other-of-buying-votes">been reported</a> in country’s across Africa including Kenya and South Africa. The practice has diluted Africa’s fledgling democracies for years. </p>
<p>The prepaid vote buying strategy was adopted by both the ruling party and the opposition. For this strategy, state <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/07/money-rain-in-ekiti-as-pdp-apc-entice-voters-with-cash/">residents were paid</a> to vote for either the ruling party or the opposition. The outgoing governor was reported to have <a href="https://punchng.com/i-received-n3000-alert-from-govt-to-vote-pdp-candidate-ap-candidate/">wired N3,000 naira</a> (USD$8) into civil servants and pensioners’ accounts days before the election to buy their allegiance. </p>
<p>This appears to be a very small amount of money. But <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/06/26/africa/nigeria-overtakes-india-extreme-poverty-intl/index.html">more than half</a> of the Nigerian population lives below the poverty line. On top of this, government workers in the state <a href="https://www.dailytrust.com.ng/workers-demand-payment-of-outstanding-salaries-as-fayose-promotes-40-100-workers.html">haven’t been paid for 10 months</a>. Pensioners are also <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/regional/ssouth-west/234788-pay-n19-7billion-benefits-ekiti-pensioners-tell-fayose.html">owed money</a>. </p>
<p>The result is that many are struggling to survive on meagre resources, so much so that come election time, voters cards become a commodity which are <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/gram-matenga/cash-for-votes-political-legitimacy-in-nigeria">sold for as little as 500 naira (USD$1)</a>. </p>
<p>In some cases, political operatives employed a postpaid strategy. For this strategy voters would take photographs of their ballot papers using their mobile phones, and then show them to their party agents who would then give them cash for their “yes” vote. </p>
<h2>Poverty curse</h2>
<p>Despite the vote-buying and the massive security presence in Ekiti the federal government described the victory as an endorsement of Buhari’s performance. </p>
<p>But the evidence suggests otherwise. Unless poor Nigerians understand the power of the ballot this mockery of voters by political merchants will be front and centre during the 2019 election.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/100743/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Oludayo Tade does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Nigerians go to the polls in 2019 in an election that the incumbent Muhammadu Buhari wants to win by any means necessary.Oludayo Tade, Lecturer of Criminology, Victimology, Deviance and Social Problems, University of IbadanLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/988672018-06-26T13:36:26Z2018-06-26T13:36:26ZScene is set for interesting contest in Zimbabwe’s upcoming poll<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/224856/original/file-20180626-112611-15e9m20.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa (centre) at a ZANU-PF rally in Bulawayo.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Aaron Ufumeli/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Zimbabweans are heading to the polls on July 30. They will be making their decisions not only on what appears to be a dramatically changed political landscape, but with looming fears of a destabilised country following the <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/breaking-news-attempt-on-eds-life/">recent bomb blast</a> at a Zanu-PF election rally in Bulawayo. Reports say that the attack targeted President Emmerson Mnangagwa. Opposition parties now <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/24/zimbabwe-opposition-fears-crackdown-election-rally-bombing-emmerson-mnangagwa">fear a crackdown</a>.</p>
<p>But Mnangagwa and his <a href="http://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/nothing-will-stop-zimbabwes-election-vice-president/">deputy</a> immediately pledged that the bomb attack wouldn’t <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/nothing-will-stop-zimbabwes-july-election-vp-chiwenga-20180624">stop</a> the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44593338">elections going ahead</a>. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, the incident is likely to create a climate of fear, insecurity, intense polarity and high securitisation of the state. Even before it happened civil society actors and think-tanks in Zimbabwe had raised questions about the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vdno_qu25b0">possibility of a rigged election</a>. </p>
<p>But be that as it may, the circumstances are very different from when Zimbabweans went to the polls in 2013. Then Zanu-PF won a <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/Mugabe-gets-two-thirds-majority-20130802">two thirds majority</a>.</p>
<p>The upcoming elections will be closely fought between the 75-year-old Mnangagwa and new leader of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-Alliance), Nelson Chamisa (40). In addition, the polls will be contested without two men who have dominated Zimbabwe’s politics for decades - Robert Mugabe, who was <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42071488">deposed</a> in 2017 and Morgan Tsvangirai who <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/14/morgan-tsvangirai-zimbabwe-opposition-leader-dies-aged-65">died</a> in February this year.</p>
<p>These two factors – new leaders and the absence of old ones – set up an interesting contest.</p>
<p>As things stand, the MDC-Alliance is seeking to regain its relevance in the absence of Tsvangirai. Across the aisle, Mnangagwa is seeking to legitimately secure his authority, and the dominance of his party following the November 2017 transition after 37 years of Mugabe’s rule. </p>
<p>The elections are significant for average Zimbabweans too. Citizens are eager for new leaders to kick start the economy after <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2017/11/21/this-is-how-mugabe-broke-zimbabwes-economy_a_23284108/">years of decline</a> under Mugabe’s rule.</p>
<h2>Restoring legitimacy</h2>
<p>A lot is at stake for Zanu-PF. The party has aggressively pursued an agenda to restore its legitimacy regionally and internationally. For example, the Mnangagwa administration has repeatedly promised that the election will be credible. It has even taken its reform agenda to the <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/event/zimbabwe-s-international-re-engagement-and-socio-economic-recovery">international stage</a>. </p>
<p>To bolster its credible election claim, the administration has also <a href="https://www.ndi.org/publications/joint-iri-ndi-delegation-zimbabwe-issues-pre-election-statement-2018">invited international observers</a> from the European Union, the International Republican Institute, and the National Democratic Institute, to witness the upcoming poll. Observers weren’t welcome in Mugabe’s time owing to his strained relations with the West for over <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/eu-to-observe-zimbabwe-polls-for-first-time-in-16-years-20180528">16 years ago</a>. </p>
<p>Although the administration has made delivering a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/18/zimbabwe-president-pledges-free-and-fair-vote-in-four-to-five-months">credible election</a> a top priority, its promises haven’t inspired confidence among ordinary Zimbabweans and opposition parties. </p>
<p>What remains worrisome is that several issues related to the <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/chamisa-election-agent-zecs-justice-chugumba-in-violation-of-oath-of-office-must-apologise/">biometric voter register</a> remain a bone of contention among the contesting <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2018/06/21/mdc-zec-row-threatens-polls">parties</a>. If un-addressed, they will raise concerns about the credibility of the poll.</p>
<p>And with just a few weeks remaining until the election and after the official <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/371590-2/">confirmation of candidates</a>, the voters’ roll has <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/confusion-reigns-over-voters-roll-release-as-parties-deny-zec-claims/">not been made available</a> to opposition parties. </p>
<p>On top of this a <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/nothing-can-stop-the-election-says-zimbabwe-elections-body-15539555">comment</a> by Zimbabwe’s Electoral Commission (ZEC) chairperson Justice Priscilla Chigumba has raised concerns because it suggests that the elections will take place, no matter what. Her words were:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The first thing to take note of is once the President has proclaimed the election date, there is nothing short of an earthquake which can stop the election so whether candidates scrutinise the voters’ roll, whether they see any anomalies in it, whatever the anomalies are, whatever legal recourse they have will not stop the election. I want that to be very clear, that is the law.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Split opposition vote</h2>
<p>Another concern is the fact that the political space is very crowded given that there are <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/371590-2/">23 aspirant presidential candidates</a>. One possible outcome is that the opposition vote will be split. The likelihood of this happening is more so, given that the main opposition parties have been unable to come together and field a single candidate. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/zimbabwe-rainbow-coalition-joice-mujuru/4079821.html">People’s Rainbow Coalition</a> led by Joice Mujuru, Elton Mangoma’s <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2017/10/code-nominates-mangoma-presidential-candidate/">Coalition for Democrats</a>, Thokozani Khupe’s <a href="http://www.zbc.co.zw/khupe-mdc-t-to-field-112-parly-candidates/">MDC-T</a>, and Chamisa’s <a href="https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/zimbabwe-electoral-commission-zec-mdc-alliance/4425687.html">MDC-Alliance</a> are all fielding candidates in most constituencies nationwide. </p>
<p>The over-crowded opposition field have diminished chances that Mnangagwa and Zanu-PF could be dislodged. </p>
<p>There are also concerns that a <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2018/06/15/mdc-alliance-threatens-to-boycott-forthcoming-polls/">bloated ballot paper</a> will confuse the average voter. </p>
<h2>More questions than answers</h2>
<p>Questions abound as Zimbabwe prepares for the polls. Would Mnangagwa have risked dethroning Mugabe only to allow the opposition to assume the reins of power without a fight? In a telling sign of <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/05/mukupe-offside-on-military-intervention-if-chamisa-wins/">what might be in store for Zimbabwe</a>, Deputy Finance Minister Terence Mukupe and Minister of State for Masvingo province, Josiah Hungwe revealed that the <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2018/05/25/mnangagwa-will-shoot-to-keep-power">army would not accept a Chamisa win</a> in the event that Zanu-PF lost. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa’s favourite <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/africa/2018-05-08-the-voice-of-the-people-is-the-voice-of-god-says-emmerson-mnangagwa/">dictum</a> is:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the voice of the people is the voice of God.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Will it still be the case once the people have spoken in the upcoming historic poll?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/98867/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gift Mwonzora is a Research Fellow at Rhodes University</span></em></p>The world waits to see if Zimbabwe will pass the democracy test as it holds its first election after Robert Mugabe next month.Gift Mwonzora, Post-Doctoral Research fellow (specializing in Political Sociology) in the Unit of Zimbabwean studies - Sociology Department at Rhodes University, South Africa., Rhodes UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/982482018-06-24T07:21:37Z2018-06-24T07:21:37ZCameroon’s Anglophone crisis threatens national unity. The time for change is now<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/224195/original/file-20180621-137717-1xr78ht.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Cameroon's President Paul Biya has been in charge for nearly 40 years. His people want change.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">REUTERS/LINTAO ZHANG</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Cameroon’s governance and security problems have historically attracted little outside attention. But this seems likely to change, for two reasons. The first is the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon/cameroon-electoral-uncertainty-amid-multiple-security-threats">growing political crisis</a> in the Central African nation’s English-speaking region. The second is a <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/cameroon-opposition-party-picks-presidential-candidate-20180224">presidential election</a> scheduled for October 2018.</p>
<p>Roughly <a href="https://qz.com/1097892/cameroons-anglophone-crisis-is-danger-of-becoming-a-full-blown-conflict/">20% of the country’s population</a> of 24.6 million people are Anglophone. The majority are Francophone. The unfair domination of French-speaking politicians in government has long been the source of conflict.</p>
<p>Activists in the country’s Anglophone western regions are protesting their forced assimilation into the dominant Francophone society. They argue that this process violates their minority rights, which are <a href="https://theconversation.com/history-explains-why-cameroon-is-at-war-with-itself-over-language-and-culture-85401">protected under agreements that date back to the 1960s</a>. Anglophone political representation and involvement at many levels of society has dwindled since the Federal Republic of Cameroon became the United Republic of Cameroon in 1972. There are <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2018/06/12/world/africa/ap-af-cameroon-deadly-violence.html">growing calls</a> for the Anglophone region to secede from Cameroon. </p>
<p>This festering conflict represents <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon/cameroon-electoral-uncertainty-amid-multiple-security-threats">a major test</a> as Cameroonians prepare for the October elections.</p>
<p>Three things are urgently needed now in Cameroon. The first is to understand the origins of the crisis. The second is to support an inclusive national dialogue. And the third is to ensure that the 2018 elections are free and fair for all.</p>
<h2>Growing crisis</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tAgBBzrjMUI">Before 1961</a>, the Southern Cameroons were a British administered territory from Nigeria. They elected to join the Republic of Cameroon by UN plebiscite in 1961 around the time of decolonisation. </p>
<p>A power-sharing agreement was reached: the executive branch of government was meant to be shared by Francophones and Anglophones. But that agreement has not been upheld and, over the years, Anglophone political representation has been <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tAgBBzrjMUI">steadily eroded</a>.</p>
<p>The crisis came to a head in late 2016 when lawyers, joined by teachers and others with similar grievances, led protests in major western cities demanding that the integrity of their professional institutions be protected and their minority rights respected. </p>
<p>President Paul Biya responded by deploying troops to the region and blocking internet access. When peaceful demonstrations were met with violent repression it exacerbated tensions and escalated the conflict to a national political crisis. </p>
<p>On 12 June 12 2018, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2018/06/12/world/africa/ap-af-cameroon-deadly-violence.html">Amnesty International issued a report</a> documenting human rights violations in Cameroon. <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon/cameroon-electoral-uncertainty-amid-multiple-security-threats">The International Crisis Group says</a> that at least 120 civilians and 43 members of security forces <a href="https://www.yahoo.com/news/un-says-160-000-anglophone-cameroonians-fled-violence-145916871.html">have been killed</a> in the most recent waves of violence. </p>
<p>More than 20,000 people have fled to neighbouring Nigeria, and an estimated 160,000 are displaced within Cameroon. </p>
<p>Some human rights activists <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/05/30/africas-next-civil-war-could-be-in-cameroon/?utm_term=.0880fcf57106">worry</a> that Cameroon could be the site of Africa’s next civil war.</p>
<p>Agbor Nkongho, an Anglophone human rights lawyer and director of the Center for Human Rights and Democracy in Africa, told the <em>Washington Post</em>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>We are gradually, gradually getting there (civil war). I’m not seeing the willingness of the government to try to find and address the issue in a way that we will not get there.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Another issue is that there are diverse views even within the Anglophone and Francophone communities about what would be best for Cameroon going forward.</p>
<h2>Obstacles to national unity</h2>
<p>In October 2017 the separatist leader Julius Ayuk Tabe declared the independence of the <a href="https://www.ambazonia.org/">Republic of Ambazonia</a>. His interim government laid claim to a territory whose borders are the same as the UN Trust Territory of Southern Cameroons under British rule (1922-1961). </p>
<p>The interim government’s spokesman, Nso Foncha Nkem, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KL7HM47aqA8">invited</a> Francophones to leave the region and called on Anglophones in Biya’s “rubber-stamp” government to return to Ambazonia and support the movement. He also pleaded for unity, asking that Anglophones speak in one voice. </p>
<p>However, that call has not overcome the challenges posed by <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tAgBBzrjMUI">diverse viewpoints</a> within the Anglophone population itself. Some favour secession. Others want to return to the 1961 federation and the power-sharing agreement. There are those who prefer decentralisation that would devolve power to regional leaders, and some who simply want an administrative solution that would leave the Republic of Cameroon as it stands. </p>
<p>And among the Francophone population, there is some support for the radical separatists, while some see the Anglophone situation as a general crisis of governance and others deny any problem exists. </p>
<p>Mongo Beti, a Francophone novelist and activist who spent 30 years in exile, observed after <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3820363?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">returning home</a> in the 1990s that a general absence of identification with a viable, unified nation due to various divisions had frayed Cameroon’s social fabric and was a significant impediment to progress. </p>
<p>It is unclear whether Biya, who is 85 and in power since 1982, will run for re-election. His 38 years in office as a corrupt, absent leader have left <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon/cameroon-electoral-uncertainty-amid-multiple-security-threats">the nation in tatters</a>. The vast majority of Cameroonians, whether Anglophone or Francophone, are hungry for change. </p>
<h2>The way forward?</h2>
<p>There is an <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tAgBBzrjMUI">urgent need for an inclusive national dialogue</a> to harness this desire for change. </p>
<p>The government must recognise that it faces a substantive national crisis and take extraordinary steps. A general conversation about governance in all its regions is also necessary. Given the depth and severity of people’s grievances, a holistic approach is needed that would address issues of governance, security, and civic engagement to mend the bonds that have been broken. </p>
<p>This is necessary if the current crisis it to become an opportunity to develop a new road map for the future that could empower citizens.</p>
<p><em>Phyllis Taoua is the author of African Freedom: How Africa Responded to Independence (Cambridge University Press, 2018) and was a Tucson Public Voices Fellow with the Op-Ed Project.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/98248/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Phyllis Taoua does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Some human rights activists worry that Cameroon could be the site of Africa’s next civil war.Phyllis Taoua, Professor of Francophone Studies (Africa, Caribbean), Faculty Affiliate with Africana Studies, World Literature Program and Human Rights Pracice, University of ArizonaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/973312018-05-29T13:01:57Z2018-05-29T13:01:57ZLocal government in South Africa is in crisis. How it can be fixed<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/220602/original/file-20180528-80653-hvdjy9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Africa's Auditor General Kimi Makwetu says most municipalities in the country are dysfunctional.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Flickr/CGR</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Most of South Africa’s 257 municipalities are in a disastrous financial position. According to the country’s Auditor General, only 33 (13%) are in full compliance with the relevant legal requirements, and produced quality financial statements and performance reports. </p>
<p>The most recent <a href="http://www.agsa.co.za/Reporting/MFMAReports/MFMA2016-2017.aspx">audit report</a> from Auditor General, <a href="https://www.agsa.co.za/MediaRoom/LatestAG%E2%80%99scolumn/tabid/238/Author/8/Default.aspx">Kimi Makwetu</a>, shows that nearly a third (31%) of the municipalities indicated that they are not financially viable. In business terms that means they are not going concerns anymore.</p>
<p>According to Makwetu this dire situation can be ascribed to a range of factors. These include a lack of appropriate financial and management skills, political interference and infighting in councils. The failure to fill key personnel positions is also a problem, as is the fact that there’s clearly a lack of political will to ensure accountability. </p>
<p>There are serious consequences to this unacceptable state of affairs. The most important is that municipalities are unable to deliver services such as clean water, sanitation and electricity. It also means there’s a lack of maintenance of infrastructure in towns and cities all over the country. The <a href="http://www.municipaliq.co.za/">rise in protests</a> by disgruntled citizens is a clear sign of people’s frustration and the failure of local government to provide basic services.</p>
<p>Local governments are also responsible for providing services such as refuse and sewage removal and disposal, storm water drainage systems as well as municipal roads and street lighting in a <a href="https://www.worklaw.co.za/">sustainable way</a>. The Constitution and the laws of the country make it clear that municipal officials and councillors are accountable to ensure good financial governance, and that there could be disciplinary or criminal proceedings if they fail to do so. For their part, citizens are entitled to receive good services from their respective municipalities. </p>
<p>How can the disastrous situation be turned around? There appears to be a complex set of problems which means that there are no quick fixes. What’s required is a comprehensive approach that deals with various elements of the local government system. </p>
<h2>What needs to be done</h2>
<p>Firstly, it’s important to understand the role that the other spheres of government have to play to help cure the problems. </p>
<p>Although municipalities have a specific constitutional role to play, they are not expected to do so on their own. Provincial and national governments must support municipalities to perform their functions. They can do this in various ways, such as providing training, technical support and capacity building workshops. Financial governance capacity in key issues such as debt collection, risk management, internal audit and revenue management needs to be strengthened. </p>
<p>The provincial and national governments must also monitor the performance, including the financial performance of municipalities. If they all do this properly, more financial management problems could be identified and dealt with during the course of a financial year. </p>
<p>The Auditor General is also an important part of the support structure. His office is an important constitutional institution that does more than just audit the accounts of all three spheres of government. It also has an important role to play in the <a href="http://www.agsa.co.za/Reporting/MFMAReports/MFMA2016-2017.aspx">accountability chain</a> by identifying key problems and causes. It goes on to make recommendations to help municipalities solve their problems. </p>
<p>At the moment the Auditor General’s office doesn’t have the power to enforce its recommendations. But that’s about to change. Amendments to the <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/CommitteeNotices/2018/january/draft_Public_Audit_Amendment_Bill/PA_Amendment_Bill_2017_6_Dec_2017-English.pdf">Public Audit Act, 2004</a>, being debated in Parliament will give the office more teeth to strengthen accountability. This is a welcome and necessary legislative improvement.</p>
<p>But a great deal of what needs to be done rests with municipalities themselves. Local government finance specialist Deon Van der Westhuizen, <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books/about/Local_Government_Finance.html?id=R-MiDAAAQBAJ&redir_esc=y">states that</a> </p>
<blockquote>
<p>one of the cornerstones of successful, continued service delivery is systemic discipline.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This implies effective revenue management, which includes timely debt collection, regular payment of suppliers and a well-structured and managed repairs and maintenance plan for the infrastructure of a municipality. </p>
<p>But to do this effectively and efficiently, appropriate financial management capacity is required. Where municipalities lack this, creative use of shared services between municipalities could be used. And private sector expertise to help improve financial management and audit outcomes should also be part of the solution. </p>
<p>In a worse case scenario, a municipality can be put <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/dr-nkosazana-dlamini-zuma-municipality-under-administration-kzn-cogta-20180328">under administration</a>. This means that for a limited period of time the particular provincial government takes over the running of the municipality in order to solve the critical problems that prevent it from functioning properly. It’s a very drastic measure and should only be used sparingly since it interferes in the constitutional mandate of an elected municipal council. But in cases of serious systemic failure it might be the most appropriate course of action. It should, however, be only for a limited time and should be aimed at getting the municipal administration in a position where it could function on its own again.</p>
<p>Lastly, South Africans across the board need to work harder at ensuring that officials are held accountable. Accountability is one of the fundamental principles of the country’s constitutional democracy. Any person or government institution that does not give effect to accountability contravenes the Constitution. Good quality financial statements and annual reports are necessary to ensure that accountability and transparency are achieved.</p>
<p>The current situation is a national crisis and requires a joint effort across political, geographical and jurisdictional boundaries to get municipalities working properly.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/97331/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dirk Brand previously received funding from the Hanns Seidel Foundation for research on local government finance that led to the publication of a book, Local Government Finance - a comparative study.</span></em></p>Nearly a third of South Africa’s municipalities are not financially viable.Dirk Brand, Extraordinary Senior Lecturer at the School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/970952018-05-24T12:53:50Z2018-05-24T12:53:50ZWhy the Pan-African Parliament must clean up its act if it wants to survive<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/220137/original/file-20180523-51091-fwxyiy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Pan African Parliament in session in Midrand, South Africa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Jon Hrusa</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Pan-African Parliament (PAP) has recently been in the news for the wrong reasons. There have been allegations of abuse of power by its Cameroonian president, Nkodo Dang. He’s been <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/2018-05-19-only-the-best-will-do-for-pan-african-parliament-head-at-a-hefty-cost-to-sa/">accused</a> of refusing to table a report about the organisation and its finances. His lavish lifestyle at the <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/opinion-and-analysis/2018-05-19-pan-african-parliament-has-abused-our-hospitality/">expense</a> of the South African government has further tarnished the institution’s image.</p>
<p>The PAP was established in 2004 by the African Union. The protocol that established it gave it an <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7780-treaty-0022_-_protocol_to_the_treaty_establishing_the_african_economic_community_relating_to_the_pan-african_parliament_e.pdf">advisory role only</a>. It envisaged that a conference would be organised to “review the operation and effectiveness” five years after it was set up. That conference should have happened in 2009, but never has. </p>
<p>The PAP is made up of 250 members representing 50 African Union (AU) member states. Each member state has <a href="https://au.int/en/organs/pap">five members</a>. It is headed by a president, who is supported by four vice presidents. The president and vice presidents represent Africa’s five sub-regional zones. The parliament is funded by the AU and other external donors including the European Union (EU), the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13572331003740107">United Nations Development Programme</a>. </p>
<p>The PAP is different to the EU parliament in two crucial respects: members aren’t directly elected and it has no binding legislative powers.</p>
<p>The PAP’s lack of meaningful legislative powers and lack of accountability are already major <a href="https://theconversation.com/toothless-pan-african-parliament-could-have-meaningful-powers-heres-how-87449">concerns</a>. Negative messages about profligacy could further diminish its legitimacy and if not addressed, could threaten the parliament’s very existence: funders could walk away. </p>
<h2>Legitimacy</h2>
<p>The parliament’s legitimacy rests on two points. One is its ability to exercise full legislative powers. African leaders have not shown any intention to empower the institution. The 2014 PAP Protocol gave the parliament only powers to submit <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7780-treaty-0022_-_protocol_to_the_treaty_establishing_the_african_economic_community_relating_to_the_pan-african_parliament_e.pdf">“draft model laws to the Assembly … for its consideration and approval”</a>. This position makes it nothing more than an <a href="https://theconversation.com/toothless-pan-african-parliament-could-have-meaningful-powers-heres-how-87449">expensive talk-shop</a>, where no binding rules or regulations can be enacted.</p>
<p>The point relates to accountability. Two factors affect this – firstly, the issue of the direct election of PAP members. Its representatives are national legislators chosen by their respective countries. This means that members don’t necessarily owe any allegiance to citizens. They’re answerable only to national parliaments or governments.</p>
<p>The other factor affecting accountability is that, since representatives can’t make binding laws and aren’t directly elected by citizens, they are not obligated to render an explanation of their stewardship to civil society. </p>
<p>It is this point that appears to have emboldened Dang to behave as though he’s above scrutiny. If he was directly elected, he might have a keener sense of obligation to his constituency, with the understanding that any misdemeanour would lead to him being punished at the polls. </p>
<p>This is not to say that directly elected representatives can’t be corrupt, but to suggest that the involvement of civil society in electing PAP representatives would improve awareness and oversight activities.</p>
<h2>Danger</h2>
<p>Allegations of corruption and wasteful expenditure at the PAP have a number of damaging consequences. One is the possibility of donors reassessing their contributions. </p>
<p>Apart from <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13572331003740107">foreign donors</a>, the PAP also gets support from the African Development Bank. South Africa provides funding for its operations. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/220138/original/file-20180523-51095-1kcwxoe.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/220138/original/file-20180523-51095-1kcwxoe.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=578&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/220138/original/file-20180523-51095-1kcwxoe.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=578&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/220138/original/file-20180523-51095-1kcwxoe.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=578&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/220138/original/file-20180523-51095-1kcwxoe.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=726&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/220138/original/file-20180523-51095-1kcwxoe.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=726&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/220138/original/file-20180523-51095-1kcwxoe.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=726&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Nkodo Dang, president of the Pan African Parliament.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Flickr/Stortinget</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>While the South African government is yet to comment on the allegations, <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/2018-05-19-only-the-best-will-do-for-pan-african-parliament-head-at-a-hefty-cost-to-sa/">major newspapers</a> in the country have been <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/opinion-and-analysis/2018-05-19-pan-african-parliament-has-abused-our-hospitality/">extremely critical</a>. It’s not inconceivable that Pretoria might be forced to re-assess its financial contribution in the face of civil society pressure.</p>
<p>The other danger is that bad publicity could dent the PAP’s efforts to secure more meaningful legislative powers. This is seen as important in the broader context of the drive to great integration on the continent. In addition, being able to make laws will improve the parliament’s relevance and give citizens a stake in the regional integration process. </p>
<p>The image of the parliament as corrupt is also bound to raise even more questions about its <a href="https://theconversation.com/toothless-pan-african-parliament-could-have-meaningful-powers-heres-how-87449">continued existence</a>. The PAP is costly to run. Some may question if it’s worth keeping or whether it might be more productive to channel the funds that keep it afloat to other strategic regional integration projects. These include infrastructure development and the promotion of good governance.</p>
<h2>A clean PAP is imperative</h2>
<p>The controversy about the PAP’s leadership doesn’t augur well for Africa’s integration drive. It has caused division within the institution, a factor that could slow down the quest for autonomy to make binding laws. </p>
<p>The AU has to step in. The AU Assembly should urgently insist that the PAP releases its financial report and investigates the accusations against Dang.</p>
<p>The South African representatives to the parliament have already expressed concerns over Dang’s leadership, <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1923906/the-pan-african-parliament-is-led-by-a-corrupt-president-julius-malema/">accusing him of corruption</a>. If he’s found guilty, the organisation shouldn’t hesitate to act appropriately against him. By doing this, the AU will be sending a clear signal that it disapproves of any irregularities. It will also highlight the importance of having a clean organisation at the core of the regional integration process. </p>
<p>The principle of accountability cannot be separated from the exercise of full legislative powers. The AU cannot afford to allow the parliament’s leadership to stand in the way of deepening Africa’s regional integration process.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/97095/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Babatunde Fagbayibo receives funding from the National Research Foundation of South Africa. </span></em></p>Reports of profligacy by the leaders of the Pan African Parliament could further diminish its legitimacy, which is already being questioned .Babatunde Fagbayibo, Associate Professor of International Law, University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.