tag:theconversation.com,2011:/fr/topics/hinkley-c-20705/articlesHinkley C – The Conversation2019-01-23T12:50:11Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1102532019-01-23T12:50:11Z2019-01-23T12:50:11ZNow that UK nuclear power plans are in tatters, it’s vital to double down on wind and solar<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255031/original/file-20190122-100285-1rj3x9q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">More spin less gas?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/offshore-windmill-park-alternative-energy-windmills-1101570944?src=xVrHSYGsZ-3MFWTZv2pK6Q-1-12">Marc Stuber</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Now that Japanese giants <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/nov/08/toshiba-uk-nuclear-power-plant-project-nu-gen-cumbria">Toshiba</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-46900918">Hitachi</a> have walked away from UK nuclear power projects that had <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-20134735">previously</a> been <a href="https://utilityweek.co.uk/toshiba-to-buy-majority-stake-in-nugen/">abandoned</a> by others, it has forced the government to reassess the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/science/political-science/2018/mar/29/why-is-uk-government-so-infatuated-nuclear-power">pro-nuclear bias</a> of its energy policy. Greg Clark, the UK business secretary, has <a href="https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2019-01-17/debates/9C841326-B63A-4790-867F-905DEDDDD8AC/NuclearUpdate?highlight=hitachi#contribution-9A5530BD-23F0-4B92-B9AA-5C56D0D54873">recognised that</a> nuclear power is no longer cost competitive with renewable energy, but don’t expect any extra push into the cheaper technology. </p>
<p>There is easily enough solar and wind energy available to make up for the cancellation of the nuclear projects and to produce the low-carbon electricity required to make the UK’s 2030 carbon emissions <a href="https://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/CCC-2018-Progress-Report-to-Parliament.pdf">targets</a> achievable. Instead, however, the country’s incentives and regulations favour developing more power plants driven by natural gas. Having hacked back emissions from power by over two-thirds since 1990, progress with decarbonising the grid risks coming to an end. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/CCC-2018-Progress-Report-to-Parliament.pdf">According to</a> the UK parliament’s Committee on Climate Change, the UK needs to cut power emissions from about 265g of carbon dioxide per kilowatt hour in 2017 to under 100g by 2030. The government had been substantially relying on nuclear power to do this, having <a href="http://namrc.co.uk/intelligence/uk-new-build-plans/">originally identified</a> eight sites as viable for new plants. Six projects were taken forward, including Hitachi and Toshiba plants in Wales and Cumbria respectively. </p>
<p>Yet despite <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/jan/16/uk-green-energy-investment-plunges-after-policy-changes">much larger</a> government incentives than those available for renewables, most private nuclear builders are now steering clear, having seen the problems with new plants in the likes of <a href="https://www.relocatemagazine.com/news/enterprise-uk-finance-usa-woes-force-toshiba-to-abandon-uk-nuclear-plant-1118-dsapsted">the US</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/apr/10/edf-warns-of-faults-at-nuclear-power-station-it-is-building-in-france">France</a>. The only two projects still on the slate are a joint venture by EDF of France and CGN of China – both foreign state-owned companies. They are building the UK’s first new plant in over two decades, Hinkley C in south-west England; while also planning a second, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-46950292">Bradwell B</a>, in the south east. </p>
<h2>Nuclear and renewables</h2>
<p>Even before the latest announcement that Hitachi’s Wylfa plant in Wales was being suspended, the Committee on Climate Change was <a href="https://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/CCC-2018-Progress-Report-to-Parliament.pdf">already saying</a> the UK needed to build more renewable capacity to reach its carbon reduction targets. Now the problem is even worse. </p>
<p>In 2018, 19% of the UK’s electricity was generated by nuclear plants. With most existing plants due to retire over the next few years, I calculate this may now fall to 10% by 2030 when you factor in the new-build cancellations. Solar and wind generation could easily more than make up for this. For years, renewables’ share of generation has been steadily rising. It reached 30% in 2018 and is due to reach 35% in 2020. But with no new incentives for onshore wind and solar and only limited incentives for offshore wind, it looks likely to fall far short of its potential. </p>
<p>The government incentivises renewable energy projects through so-called <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/electricity-market-reform-contracts-for-difference">contracts for difference</a> (CFD) auctions in which the most competitive bidders are granted contracts to supply electricity at fixed prices. This year, it is set to auction some new offshore wind farm contracts. Only a trickle of projects that don’t receive such incentives go ahead, so the number of contracts on offer effectively dictates how much offshore wind capacity will be built. </p>
<p>With offshore wind currently <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/.../ET_6.1.xls">providing</a> about 7% of generation, I have heard from informal soundings that the new contracts will add less than 10% more. In other words, it would at best offset the decline in nuclear. With no further contracts in the pipeline at present, it suggests low-carbon power in the UK is at a standstill. </p>
<h2>Power politics</h2>
<p>The reason why more renewables are not on the cards is because the Treasury is keen to limit energy incentives. It worries that the electricity price <a href="https://www.thegreenage.co.uk/why-are-uk-energy-prices-rising/">has been</a> increasing – and hence the Treasury wants to strictly limit new incentives, the costs of which are added to electricity bills. This, however, ignores the fact that CFD prices will benefit from the falling cost of building offshore wind farms – the price has <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-46906245">more than</a> halved in three years. Nevertheless, the amount of money available to pay for the contracts is <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-confirms-up-to-557-million-for-new-renewable-energy-projects">being limited</a> to around half that being made available to owners of gas-fired power plants to supply capacity when the wind isn’t blowing.</p>
<p>If <a href="https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.renewableuk.com/resource/resmgr/luke/RUK18_Offshore_Timeline.pdf">all 27GW</a> of offshore wind power schemes in various stages of planning got contracts, I calculate it would supply around one-third of the total electricity requirement. Coupled with the remaining nuclear power and the renewables that are already onstream, that would reach the 75% of power that the Committee on Climate Change reckons needs to be coming from these low-carbon sources by 2030 to achieve the emissions targets. This is not counting potential offshore wind resources which are not even being mobilised, plus large possibilities for onshore wind and solar. Instead, gas-fired power looks set to supply around half of UK electricity by 2030, compared to 40% at present.</p>
<p>One government justification for being less generous to renewables is that unlike gas or nuclear, they do not represent “firm” power – in other words, they only generate when the wind is blowing or the sun is shining.
Proponents of renewable energy counter that you can reduce the generating capacity required <a href="https://www.wsp.com/en-GB/insights/energy-storage">by increasing</a> the <a href="http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/169664/scaling-up-energy-storage-in-great-britain-progress-on-change">use of</a> batteries to store power on the grid and by incentivising consumers to, say, use more power overnight when demand is lower. </p>
<p>Yet one other option that attracts less attention is that you also get spare “firm” capacity from <a href="https://www.powerengineeringint.com/articles/print/volume-23/issue-5/features/the-rise-and-rise-of-gas-engines.html">small gas engines</a> or <a href="http://www.ipieca.org/resources/energy-efficiency-solutions/power-and-heat-generation/open-cycle-gas-turbines/">open-cycle turbines</a>. These can be built quickly and would only be sparingly needed in a system mostly supplied by renewables. </p>
<p>Based on my calculations using Hinkley C and Wylfa, they cost around one-twentieth of the projected cost of new nuclear power. They <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/566803/Leigh_Fisher_Non-renewable_Generation_Cost.pdf">are also</a> nearly half the price of large gas-fired “CCGT” plants. Instead, however, the government spends the lion’s share of its incentives pot on large conventional power plants, many of which would operate whether they were subsidised or not. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255020/original/file-20190122-100270-1l0r19j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255020/original/file-20190122-100270-1l0r19j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255020/original/file-20190122-100270-1l0r19j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255020/original/file-20190122-100270-1l0r19j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255020/original/file-20190122-100270-1l0r19j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255020/original/file-20190122-100270-1l0r19j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255020/original/file-20190122-100270-1l0r19j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255020/original/file-20190122-100270-1l0r19j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Emission accomplished.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/gas-turbine-electrical-power-plant-twilight-658756918?src=LiomS7012YjBcx7FdDiHKw-1-5">CAT SCAPE</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The underlying obstacle seems to be political opposition within the Conservative Party. My understanding from renewable energy lobbying sources is that the government’s Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy would like to promote renewable energy more, but is held back by the Treasury, which wants to leave it to “the market”. </p>
<p>The upshot is that government policy is offering large incentives to new nuclear, gas-fired power and also shale gas extraction – but, paradoxically, not many are actually being developed. Meanwhile the cheapest options – onshore wind, solar and offshore wind – are being discriminated against. The collapse of the UK’s nuclear power plans should be an opportunity to think again. How frustrating that decarbonising power is instead falling off the agenda.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/110253/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Toke has in the past been funded by the ESRC, EU, Leverhulme Trust and British Academy for academic research projects. He has done energy related consultancies in the past for Friends of the Earth, World Future Council, NUPE, Combined Heat and Power Association. He is a member of RenewableUK and is currently lobbying in a voluntary capacity in support of funding being given for testing and demonstration of the Resen Wave power technology. He is a member of the Scottish Green Party and the Green Party of England and Wales.</span></em></p>The choice is now between a green grid or a whole lot more gas-fired power.David Toke, Reader in Energy Policy, University of AberdeenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/935192018-03-19T15:04:37Z2018-03-19T15:04:37ZThe unholy alliance that explains why renewable energy is trouncing nuclear<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/210996/original/file-20180319-31596-bujmzn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">'I was the future once.'</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/rusty-door-on-chernobyl-atomic-station-6508090?src=V82f5ywKRL8FJjRdH7xGKg-1-70">Betacam-SP</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>If recent <a href="https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/en/corporate/pdf/energy-economics/statistical-review-2017/bp-statistical-review-of-world-energy-2017-full-report.pdf">trends</a> continue for another two years, the global share of electricity from renewables excluding hydropower will overtake nuclear for the first time. Even 20 years ago, this nuclear decline would have greatly surprised many people – particularly now that reducing carbon emissions is at the top of the political agenda. </p>
<p>On one level this is a story about changes in relative costs. The costs of solar and wind have plunged while nuclear has become almost astoundingly expensive. But this raises the question of why this came about. As I argue in my new book, <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Low-Carbon-Politics-A-Cultural-Approach-Focusing-on-Low-Carbon-Electricity/Toke/p/book/9781138696778">Low Carbon Politics</a>, it helps to dip into cultural theory. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/210974/original/file-20180319-31624-13ja6ut.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/210974/original/file-20180319-31624-13ja6ut.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/210974/original/file-20180319-31624-13ja6ut.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=351&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210974/original/file-20180319-31624-13ja6ut.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=351&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210974/original/file-20180319-31624-13ja6ut.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=351&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210974/original/file-20180319-31624-13ja6ut.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=442&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210974/original/file-20180319-31624-13ja6ut.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=442&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210974/original/file-20180319-31624-13ja6ut.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=442&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2017.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Culture wars</h2>
<p>The seminal text in this field, <a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book.php?isbn=9780520050631">Risk and Culture (1982)</a>, by the British anthropologist Mary Douglas and American political scientist Aaron Wildavsky, argues the behaviour of individuals and institutions can be explained by four different biases:
</p><ol>
<li><strong>Individualists</strong>: people biased towards outcomes that result from competitive arrangements;</li>
<li><strong>Hierarchists</strong>: those who prefer ordered decisions being made by leaders and followed by others;</li>
<li><strong>Egalitarians</strong>: people who favour equality and grassroots decision-making and pursue a common cause;</li>
<li><strong>Fatalists</strong>: those who see decision-making as capricious and feel unable to influence outcomes.</li>
</ol><p></p>
<p>The first three categories help explain different actors in the electricity industry. For governments and centralised monopolies often owned by the state, read hierarchists. For green campaigning organisations, read egalitarians, while free-market-minded private companies fit the individualist bias. </p>
<p>The priorities of these groups have not greatly changed in recent years. Hierarchists tend to favour nuclear power, since big power stations make for more straightforward grid planning, and nuclear power complements nuclear weapons capabilities considered important for national security. </p>
<p>Egalitarians like Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth usually oppose new nuclear power plant and favour renewables. Traditionally they have worried about radioactive environmental damage and nuclear proliferation. Individualists, meanwhile, favour whichever technologies reduce costs. </p>
<p>These cultural realities lie behind the problems experienced by nuclear power. To compound green opposition, many of nuclear power’s strongest supporters are conservative hierarchists who are either sceptical about the need to reduce carbon emissions or treat it as a low priority. Hence they are often unable or unwilling to mobilise climate change arguments to support nuclear, which has made it harder to persuade egalitarians to get on board. </p>
<p>This has had several consequences. Green groups won subsidies for renewable technologies by persuading more liberal hierarchists that they had to address climate change – witness the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2008/apr/29/renewableenergy.energyefficiency">big push</a> by Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth for the feed-in tariffs that drove solar uptake in the late 2000s, for example. In turn, both wind and solar have been optimised and their costs have come down. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/210998/original/file-20180319-31599-1k04sha.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/210998/original/file-20180319-31599-1k04sha.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/210998/original/file-20180319-31599-1k04sha.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210998/original/file-20180319-31599-1k04sha.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210998/original/file-20180319-31599-1k04sha.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210998/original/file-20180319-31599-1k04sha.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210998/original/file-20180319-31599-1k04sha.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210998/original/file-20180319-31599-1k04sha.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Hot property.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/solar-farm-green-energy-field-thailand-204711964?src=WFLFHWuAd1EGRrA4FzvwaA-1-6">kessudap</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Nuclear largely missed out on these carbon-reducing subsidies. Worse, greens groups persuaded governments as far back as the 1970s that safety standards around nuclear power stations needed to improve. This more than anything <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Low-Carbon-Politics-A-Cultural-Approach-Focusing-on-Low-Carbon-Electricity/Toke/p/book/9781138696778">drove up</a> costs.</p>
<p>As for the individualists, they used to be generally unconvinced by renewable energy and sceptical of environmental opposition to nuclear. But as relative costs have changed, they have increasingly switched positions. </p>
<p>The hierarchists are still able to use monopoly electricity organisations to support nuclear power, but individualists are increasingly pressuring them to make these markets more competitive so that they can invest in renewables more easily. In effect, we are now seeing an egalitarian-individualist alliance against the conservative hierarchists.</p>
<h2>Both sides of the pond</h2>
<p>Donald Trump’s administration in the US, for example, <a href="http://energypost.eu/trumps-coal-nuclear-subsidy-cost-u-s-economy-10-billion-year/">has sought</a> subsidies to keep existing coal and nuclear power stations running. This is both out of concern for national security and to support traditional centralised industrial corporations – classic hierarchist thinking. </p>
<p>Yet this has played out badly with individualist corporations pushing renewables. Trump’s plans have even been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/jan/08/donald-trump-coal-industry-plan-rejected-rick-perry">rejected</a> by some of his own appointments on the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. </p>
<p>In similarly hierarchist fashion, electricity supply monopolies in Georgia and South Carolina started building new nuclear power stations after regulatory agencies allowed them to collect mandatory payments from electricity consumers to cover costs at the same time. </p>
<p>Yet even hierarchists cannot ignore economic reality entirely. The South Carolina project <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-25/duke-asks-to-cancel-planned-south-carolina-nuclear-reactors">has been</a> abandoned and the Georgia project only survives <a href="https://www.fitsnews.com/2017/09/29/georgia-gets-nuclear-windfall-from-federal-government/">through</a> a very large federal loan bailout. </p>
<p>Contrast this with casino complexes in Nevada like <a href="https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/how-mgm-prepared-itself-to-leave-nevadas-biggest-utility#gs.F2Ag7fY">MGM Resorts</a> not only installing their own solar photovoltaic arrays but paying many millions of dollars to opt out from the local monopoly electricity supplier. They have campaigned successfully to win a state referendum supporting electricity liberalisation. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/210999/original/file-20180319-31624-1bykk42.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/210999/original/file-20180319-31624-1bykk42.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/210999/original/file-20180319-31624-1bykk42.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=374&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210999/original/file-20180319-31624-1bykk42.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=374&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210999/original/file-20180319-31624-1bykk42.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=374&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210999/original/file-20180319-31624-1bykk42.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=470&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210999/original/file-20180319-31624-1bykk42.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=470&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210999/original/file-20180319-31624-1bykk42.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=470&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Casino solar, Las Vegas.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The UK, meanwhile, is an example of how different biases can compete. Policy has traditionally been formed in hierarchical style, with big companies producing policy proposals which go out to wider consultation. It’s a cultural bias that favours nuclear power, but this conflicts with a key priority dating back to Thatcher that technological winners are chosen by the market. </p>
<p>This has led policymakers in Whitehall to favour both renewables and nuclear, but the private electricity companies have mostly refused to invest in nuclear, seeing it as too risky and expensive. The only companies prepared to plug the gap have been more hierarchists – EDF, which is majority-owned by France, and Chinese state nuclear corporations. </p>
<p>Even then, getting <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/dec/21/hinkley-point-c-dreadful-deal-behind-worlds-most-expensive-power-plant">Hinkley C</a> in south-west England underway – the first new nuclear plant since the 1990s – required an extensive commitment by the UK treasury to underwrite bank loans. There is also an embarrassingly high price to be paid for the electricity over a very long 35-year period. Such has been the bad publicity that it’s hard to imagine a politician agreeing to more plant on such terms. </p>
<p>Where does this reality leave hierarchists? Increasingly having to explain prohibitive nuclear costs to their electorates – at least in democracies. The alternative, as renewable energy becomes the new orthodoxy, is to embrace it. </p>
<p>In Australia, for example, a big utility company called AGL is trying to seduce homeowners to agree to link their solar panels to the company’s systems to centralise power dispatch in a so-called a “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/australia-utilities/panel-beaters-australia-utilities-branch-out-as-customers-shift-to-solar-idUSL3N1KH2M2">virtual</a> power plant”. </p>
<p>When the facts change, to misquote John Maynard Keynes, you can always change your mind.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/93519/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Toke has received funding from the ESRC, the EU, the World Future Council, Friends of the Earth, UNISON, and the Combined Heat and Power Association, for research into various issues involving renewable energy and energy. David Toke is a member of the trade association, RenewableUK. He is a member of the Green Party of England and Wales and also a member of the Scottish Green Party.</span></em></p>To understand what happened to our love of giant radioactive kettles, take a look at cultural theory.David Toke, Reader in Energy Policy, University of AberdeenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/655242016-09-16T15:59:50Z2016-09-16T15:59:50ZHinkley C must be the first of many new nuclear plants<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/138093/original/image-20160916-17005-jwg55k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The country needs more nuclear power – but not more Hinkleys.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ganibal / shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Despite Hinkley Point C’s obvious problems, Britain badly needs the proposed nuclear power station. But Hinkley, which was finally <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/sep/15/hinkley-point-c-nuclear-power-station-gets-go-ahead">given the go-ahead</a> on September 15 after a six week government review, must be just the start of a major programme of new nuclear plants in the UK. Coal and gas are too dirty – and wind and solar too intermittent – for the country to be able to rely solely on any of these technologies. </p>
<p>Only nuclear can provide the consistent and secure supply of low-carbon electricity that the UK needs to secure the long-term supply to its national grid.</p>
<p>In order to maintain a stable flow of electricity, Britain needs at least some large fossil or nuclear-fuelled generators. Wind and solar alone can’t do it as the technologies are inherently <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-energy-grid-handles-the-surge-after-a-solar-eclipse-38922">unable to hold the grid frequency stable at 50Hz</a>. Yet the UK’s dirty coal-fired plants will be gone by 2025 – so that leaves gas and nuclear plants to provide this stability into the future.</p>
<p>The debate surrounding the proposed nuclear power plant at Hinkley Point C has focused largely on <a href="https://theconversation.com/hinkley-point-c-delay-how-to-exploit-this-attack-of-common-sense-in-energy-policy-63293">the price EDF will get</a> for electricity generated. This was set four years ago at an inflation-linked £92.50/MWh. That’s more expensive than generation from gas, or Britain’s soon-to-be-defunct coal plants, but it should be affordable. </p>
<p>Wind power can take up some of the slack. The UK now has enough turbines installed that, on windy days, total generation is similar to that from nuclear. Things will only accelerate thanks to several <a href="https://theconversation.com/britain-is-only-just-beginning-to-exploit-its-vast-resources-of-offshore-wind-64134">huge projects in the pipeline</a> such as DONG Energy’s Hornsea One, which will become the world’s first offshore windfarm with greater than 1GW of generating capacity. All this has been achieved under an industry target of reducing the cost of energy from offshore wind to below £100/MWh by 2020.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/138098/original/image-20160916-17031-uh33rz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/138098/original/image-20160916-17031-uh33rz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/138098/original/image-20160916-17031-uh33rz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/138098/original/image-20160916-17031-uh33rz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/138098/original/image-20160916-17031-uh33rz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/138098/original/image-20160916-17031-uh33rz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=453&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/138098/original/image-20160916-17031-uh33rz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=453&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/138098/original/image-20160916-17031-uh33rz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=453&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Coal power is being phased out.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Brian Maudsley</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>An unavoidable consequence of the drive towards cleaner and more sustainable power is that the industry will rely on government subsidies and more expensive electricity prices in order to incentivise the necessary new technologies. Electricity from regular, dirty coal is by far the cheapest form of large-scale generation, but the decision has already been made to move away from this. Many UK coal stations are now closed and in some cases pulled down. So Hinkley C is expensive, but not out of line with the direction of travel in the industry.</p>
<h2>The long-term nuclear option</h2>
<p>The larger questions concerns the long-term security of Hinkley’s supply. After all, it will take a minimum of ten years to build the plant and all the evidence suggests it is highly likely to be <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/new-nuclear-finlands-cautionary-tale-for-the-uk">much longer</a> before it actually comes online. </p>
<p>Hinkley C will use the new third-generation Areva EPR nuclear reactor design which is not yet in commercial operation anywhere in the world. New nuclear plants at Flamanville (France), Olkiluoto (Finland) and Taishan (China) are all currently under construction with this new type of reactor – and all of these projects are <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/edf-britain-idUKL8N15C22S">experiencing long delays and significant cost over-runs</a>.</p>
<p>At the moment the <a href="http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-t-z/united-kingdom.aspx">UK’s nuclear plants</a> consist of a number of Advanced Gas Cooled Reactor (AGR) stations (including Hinkley B) and the Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR) station at Sizewell B. The AGRs have now all passed their original design lives and have been specially licenced for <a href="http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/C-UK-nuclear-plant-gets-ten-year-extension-2001157.html">extended operation</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/138096/original/image-20160916-17023-4isbf9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/138096/original/image-20160916-17023-4isbf9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/138096/original/image-20160916-17023-4isbf9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=339&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/138096/original/image-20160916-17023-4isbf9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=339&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/138096/original/image-20160916-17023-4isbf9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=339&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/138096/original/image-20160916-17023-4isbf9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/138096/original/image-20160916-17023-4isbf9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/138096/original/image-20160916-17023-4isbf9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Dungeness B was supposed to close in 2018 but has been extended until 2028.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/llamnuds/8552274609/">Shaun Dunmall</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But as the plants get older, the risks inevitably increase. Only two winters ago <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/11169625/Nuclear-reactor-heat-turned-down-to-stop-boilers-cracking.html">cracks were found in the steam generators</a> on the AGR units at Heysham, Lancashire. Not only was Heysham shut down for inspection and repair, but also its sister units in Hartlepool. The result was that a significant proportion of the UK’s nuclear generators were not available for several months over the winter demand-peak, leading to concerns at the time over the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/2d3c0786-329b-11e4-93c6-00144feabdc0">availability of reserve generating capacity</a>.</p>
<p>With a variety of creaky old nuclear plants dating back to the 1970s or 1980s, and question marks over exactly when Hinkley C will be available, what the UK needs is a nuclear building plan that severely reduces the risk of supply gaps.</p>
<p>Fortunately, other nuclear options are potentially more secure. <a href="https://theconversation.com/everything-you-need-to-know-about-mini-nuclear-reactors-56647">Small Modular nuclear Reactors (SMRs)</a> are now receiving increased attention and government interest. Each SMR unit is typically capable of delivering 100-200MW of electricity. That’s far smaller than Hinkley C’s planned two units totalling 3,200MW, but their size means they can be built quickly, each one requires a fraction of the capital investment of Hinkley, and they could even be built locally. </p>
<p>New SMR reactor designs are available. <a href="http://en.cnnc.com.cn/2016-04/28/c_51725.htm">China National Nuclear Corporation’s ACP100</a> for example, passively cools the nuclear core in the event of a complete power failure in the same way as the much larger EPR reactor design planned for Hinkley C will do. </p>
<p>The UK needs viable new nuclear plants – and Hinkley C has only ever been one part of the solution. Many more will be needed. Britain is running out of time to deliver further nuclear power before major disruption to its future electricity supply. The door may be opening for small modular nuclear reactors.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/65524/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Hogg holds the DONG Energy Chair in Renewable Energy at Durham University. He receives government funding through RCUK and industry funding from Dong Energy and GE Power to support his research activity.</span></em></p>This is a big opportunity for smaller reactors that can be built quickly and cheaply.Simon Hogg, Executive Director of the Durham Energy Institute, Durham UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/635732016-09-16T12:18:03Z2016-09-16T12:18:03ZHinkley C power project offers a lesson in how not to deal with China<p>The British government has <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-confirms-hinkley-point-c-project-following-new-agreement-in-principle-with-edf">given the go-ahead</a> to the Hinkley Point C nuclear power project, in partnership with the China General Nuclear Power Company (CGNPC) and EDF of France. Its announcement was as perfunctory as the previous announcement that the project would be placed under review <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/07/29/theresa-may-delays-hinkley-nuclear-decision-amid-concerns-over-c/">back in July</a> by Theresa May, the new prime minister. Apparently, new safeguards, giving the government the right to prevent other partners taking a majority stake, have made all the difference. </p>
<p>It is difficult not to arrive at a rather different interpretation. Namely, that the decision to review the project was carried out in a way that quite unnecessarily put Britain’s future relations with China in jeopardy. As a result, the only way out was to reinstate the project with the fig-leaf of new safeguards.</p>
<p>The Hinkley deal, agreed by Theresa May’s predecessor in 2015, was the culmination of the Cameron government’s policy of closer co-operation with China. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/if-the-hinkley-c-nuclear-deal-looks-astonishing-thats-because-it-is-47947">main criticisms</a> of the project were financial: the huge cost of building the power plant and how it locks British consumers into paying for energy above the market rate. There have also been questions about EDF’s <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/04d4d886-e6c2-11e5-bc31-138df2ae9ee6">financial viability</a>.</p>
<p>There were therefore many reasons why the UK government might wish to review the project. The one that was given prominence, however, was that it was unwise from a security point of view to embark on a strategic energy project with the Chinese. Why did this receive prominence? <a href="http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/comment/article-3735031/MAGGIE-PAGANO-Theresa-ammunition-needs-block-China-s-involvement-Hinkley.html">Reports</a> claim that a key adviser to May, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/6467ec08-5a6b-11e6-8d05-4eaa66292c32">Nick Timothy</a>, was instrumental. </p>
<p>His <a href="http://www.conservativehome.com/parliament/2016/07/what-nick-timothy-wrote-on-conhome-about-china-and-hinckley-point.html">views</a> on the deal – and China’s involvement in particular – were that MI5 had serious concerns because “[China’s] intelligence services continue to work against UK interests at home and abroad”. Whatever the truth behind this allegation about security, what the episode demonstrates is the danger of letting political advisers, such as Nick Timothy, rather than civil servants, call the shots on policy and its presentation. </p>
<h2>A crucial juncture</h2>
<p>Let us suppose that the security concerns were genuine. If this were an episode of the sitcom Yes Minister, the all-powerful Sir Humphrey would have quietly pushed the project into review on some abstruse financial grounds that could take years to clarify, without any hint of security concerns about the UK’s Chinese partners. This kind of tact is a fundamental tenet of diplomacy. Instead, it was broadcast loud and clear to Beijing that the UK didn’t trust them, to the point of considering them enemies. </p>
<p>Compounding the issue, the same week that the review was announced, Britain’s new chancellor of the exchequer, Philip Hammond, <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/24/philip-hammond-has-no-doubt-britain-will-be-able-strike-a-free-t/">was in Beijing</a>, in an attempt to start negotiations for a trade deal with China – something post-Brexit Britain could be heavily dependent upon. This was already a thankless task, given that the Chinese were <a href="http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2016/07/06/Brexit-The-view-from-China.aspx">known to be sceptical</a> about the practicality of such an agreement. Their enthusiasm for deepening ties with the UK had been very much in the context of Britain as a member of the EU. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/138066/original/image-20160916-6307-q246oi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/138066/original/image-20160916-6307-q246oi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=585&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/138066/original/image-20160916-6307-q246oi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=585&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/138066/original/image-20160916-6307-q246oi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=585&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/138066/original/image-20160916-6307-q246oi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=735&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/138066/original/image-20160916-6307-q246oi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=735&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/138066/original/image-20160916-6307-q246oi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=735&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Chinese ambassador to the UK, Liu Xiaoming.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/chathamhouse/28480809261/in/photolist-pSTz6Y-qxkin9-dpMr22-yuZpRi-yNgSmk-yKbZWy-JzeAFB-KoKAkx-qYRbJm-r9MvE4-9Ugc6W-jNFa9Z-r7D6tm-ePhsZb-9Ugc6C-9Ugc6S-C9mZkE">Chatham House</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The diplomatic ineptitude did not stop there. A <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/aug/08/china-warns-uk-relations-historical-juncture-hinkley-point-liu-xiaoming">speech</a> by the Chinese ambassador to the UK, Liu Xiaoming, in which he spoke of Britain and China being at a “crucial historical juncture” was widely interpreted as a warning from China that it should be trusted over the Hinkley plans. </p>
<p>Nobody, it seems, took the trouble to notice that the same phrase had figured in an entirely positive <a href="http://www.chinese-embassy.org.uk/eng/ambassador/t1092820.htm">speech by the ambassador on October 24, 2013</a>. Here he similarly referred to British-Chinese relations as being at a “critical juncture”, but in the sense that co-operation was accelerating at an unprecedented pace. Close followers of his speeches are therefore more likely to interpret his more recent one in the same way. If this was a warning it was at least a diplomatic one, which is more than could be said for what was emanating from London. </p>
<p>The clumsy way in which security concerns dominated discussion of the Hinkley review raised the diplomatic stakes so high that no serious review could take place and a rapid climbdown by Britain became inevitable. The strategic partnership will continue except that now it has been made clear to all concerned that Britain is only working with China because it has no alternative. All in all, this was the worst of all possible outcomes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/63573/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adrian Campbell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The decision to review Hinkley Point C was carried out in a way that quite unnecessarily put Britain’s future relations with China in jeopardy.Adrian Campbell, Senior Lecturer in International Development, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/632932016-07-29T15:01:10Z2016-07-29T15:01:10ZHinkley Point C delay: how to exploit this attack of common sense in energy policy<p>These are extraordinary times for energy policy in the UK. After years of resigned acceptance that the Hinkley Point C nuclear power station would be built no matter how much of a basketcase it was, the government has surprised everyone by <a href="https://next.ft.com/content/181077e2-54dc-11e6-befd-2fc0c26b3c60">calling a halt to the process</a> until the autumn.</p>
<p>The proposed Hinkley Point C would have two European Pressurised Reactors (EPRs), providing around 3GW of electricity or about 7% of the UK’s total usage. The construction would be paid for by French energy firm EDF and Chinese nuclear companies, but the expense of building it would be underpinned by long-term supply contracts with the UK government, as well as a series of other financial undertakings designed to reduce the financial risks for the developers.</p>
<p>Few people argue that Hinkley Point C makes sense. The project’s budget has grown from original estimates of <a href="https://next.ft.com/content/372216e6-4ec0-11e4-b205-00144feab7de">£16 billion to £24.5 billion</a> today. Even this might be an underestimate given the experience of cost overruns similar reactors under construction in <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/new-nuclear-finlands-cautionary-tale-for-the-uk">Finland</a>, <a href="http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Flamanville-EPR-timetable-and-costs-revised-0309154.html">France</a> and <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1763315/taishan-nuclear-reactors-did-not-receive-most-updated-safety-tests">China</a>.</p>
<p>The long-term supply contracts – known as Contracts for Difference (CfDs) – are designed to guarantee a set income of £92.50 per MegaWatt hour of output, regardless of the actual price of electricity in the market. Since the contracts were agreed, the wholesale price of electricity has fallen, meaning that the estimated subsidy for the lifetime of the project has risen from <a href="https://www.nao.org.uk/report/nuclear-power-in-the-uk/">£6.1 billion to £29.7 billion</a>, a huge burden for UK electricity consumers.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/132505/original/image-20160729-25643-1pqmh4u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/132505/original/image-20160729-25643-1pqmh4u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/132505/original/image-20160729-25643-1pqmh4u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132505/original/image-20160729-25643-1pqmh4u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132505/original/image-20160729-25643-1pqmh4u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132505/original/image-20160729-25643-1pqmh4u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132505/original/image-20160729-25643-1pqmh4u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132505/original/image-20160729-25643-1pqmh4u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">France gets most of its energy from nuclear plants – managed by EDF.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">hal pand / shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>And the CfD subsidy is complemented by a <a href="https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Nuclear-power-in-the-UK.pdf">suite</a> of other UK taxpayer subsidies and guarantees designed to mitigate investment risks for the French and Chinese investors and to guarantee costs for dealing with nuclear waste or paying compensation for nuclear accidents.</p>
<p>Putting all of these subsidies in place has required the UK government to essentially redesign the electricity market over the past few years in an effort to create a situation where investment in a new plant looked attractive. Pretty much every major policy design has been geared towards creating a perfect environment for Hinkley Point C. That’s why it’s such a surprise to see the government has now stepped back – a bit – from the brink.</p>
<h2>The get-out clauses?</h2>
<p>The contracts to put many of the subsidy structures are not yet signed – that was meant to happen today, as part of the official approval process – so the government could still pull out. Obviously that wouldn’t please the French and Chinese, but risking their short-term displeasure could avoid locking the UK into the extortionate project for decades to come. Once the contracts are signed the legal and financial ramifications are so high that the project will go ahead, whatever the evidence against it. </p>
<p>The UK has form on this, notably the <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Nuclear_Entrapment.html?id=z-T6MDZrq1MC&redir_esc=y">THORP</a> nuclear fuel reprocessing plant at Sellafield, which began operation despite the case for it collapsing on every front. But without those contracts in place the project can still falter at the last hurdle.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/132504/original/image-20160729-25637-u46yoh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/132504/original/image-20160729-25637-u46yoh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/132504/original/image-20160729-25637-u46yoh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=262&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132504/original/image-20160729-25637-u46yoh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=262&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132504/original/image-20160729-25637-u46yoh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=262&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132504/original/image-20160729-25637-u46yoh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=329&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132504/original/image-20160729-25637-u46yoh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=329&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132504/original/image-20160729-25637-u46yoh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=329&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The controversial Sellafield is due to close in 2018.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/ashleycoates/8022929287/">Ashley Coates</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>So why the delay? There is all sorts of speculation going round: the new Theresa May administration is not <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/oct/21/britain-nuclear-power-station-hinkley-edf">ideologically linked</a> to new nuclear plants in the way that Cameron’s administration was – and therefore has had an attack of common sense about the costs of the project. The government also has security concerns over <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/07/29/theresa-may-delays-hinkley-nuclear-decision-amid-concerns-over-c/">allowing significant Chinese investment</a> in the UK electricity system – in a post-Brexit world the government is worried about the level of <a href="https://www.lovemoney.com/guides/22318/who-owns-uk-big-energy-companies">overseas ownership</a> of UK electricity assets – most are owned by European rather than British companies. Then there was the less than ringing endorsement of the EDF board (which reportedly voted <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-edf-britain-nuclear-idUSKCN1082CB">only 10-7 in favour</a> of going ahead, following a couple of high-profile <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/jul/28/resignation-edf-director-hinkley-point-gerard-magnin">resignations</a>) which has rung alarm bells in both the UK and French governments.</p>
<p>The real reason behind the decision may emerge over the next few weeks as the government mulls over the pros and cons of the project. That will be fascinating. Equally fascinating, though, will be the debate that must take place at the same time about <a href="http://projects.exeter.ac.uk/igov/new-thinking-hinkley-point-c-time-for-a-plan-b/">what an alternative might look like</a>. What might the UK energy landscape look like without the project that has shaped it for so many years?</p>
<p>Energy policy is often seen as a bit of a backwater – little tweaks to existing approaches tend to be preferred to massive shifts in strategy. The latest decision has the potential to change that. Without Hinkley Point C, the potential to have a real and considered debate about the future shape of the electricity system has loomed into view. Now is the time to start considering the sorts of options being considered widely around the world, with measures to encourage more flexible, smaller-scale, renewable systems incorporating demand-side measures and new technologies such as storage. A system that is the <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-hinkley-point-c-put-on-ice-the-uk-needs-to-get-over-energy-megaprojects-63166">absolute antithesis of what Hinkley Point C represents</a>. Suddenly UK energy policy has become very exciting indeed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/63293/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bridget Woodman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>For years UK energy policy has been focused on creating a perfect environment for a new nuclear plant. Now things just got exciting.Bridget Woodman, Course Director, MSc Energy Policy, University of ExeterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/631662016-07-28T15:37:52Z2016-07-28T15:37:52ZAs Hinkley Point C put on ice: the UK needs to get over energy megaprojects<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/132356/original/image-20160728-12097-jziwhv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Hinkley Point B was built in the 1970s. The proposed plant, Hinkley C, will be built next door.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">jgolby / Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The board of French energy giant EDF has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/jul/28/hinkley-point-c-to-go-ahead-after-edf-board-approves-project">voted in favour of investing</a> in a new nuclear power station at Hinkley Point in Somerset, England. However, in a surprise move the UK government has delayed a final decision on the project, sparking new debate on what is the right step forward for energy in the UK.</p>
<p>A recent <a href="https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Nuclear-power-in-the-UK.pdf">report</a> by the UK’s National Audit Office added to a long-running argument about how much new nuclear will cost in higher bills, higher subsidies or a mix of the two. The deal offered by the UK government had set a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/oct/29/hinkley-point-c-nuclear-power-station-cost-customers-4bn">price for electricity from Hinkley</a> of £92.50/MWh (in 2012 prices) which is index-linked and runs for 35 years from when the power station starts. That’s roughly double recent wholesale electricity prices.</p>
<p>But what’s missing is a fresh discussion on what to do instead of large projects like Hinkley. This requires a challenge to the mindset that’s led the UK to paint itself into a corner.</p>
<h2>Central or distributed?</h2>
<p>There’s long been a culture of big is better when the UK considers energy – find the next big gas field or build another big power station and the problem is sorted.</p>
<p>Locally produced solar and wind energy is now more common. We have all seen how prices for panels and turbines have tumbled with forecasts that costs for solar and onshore wind will <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/company/new-energy-outlook/">fall a further 41% and 60% by 2040 respectively</a>. That’s great news but, as the much-missed David MacKay <a href="https://www.withouthotair.com/about.html">pointed out</a>, the space for such distributed supplies will become an issue at some point.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/132358/original/image-20160728-12089-bpf3v3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/132358/original/image-20160728-12089-bpf3v3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132358/original/image-20160728-12089-bpf3v3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132358/original/image-20160728-12089-bpf3v3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132358/original/image-20160728-12089-bpf3v3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132358/original/image-20160728-12089-bpf3v3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132358/original/image-20160728-12089-bpf3v3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A finite resource.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/ell-r-brown/6949115457/">Elliott Brown</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Supply or consumption</h2>
<p>The big is better culture goes hand-in-hand with a focus on the supply side. Addressing Britain’s energy shortages traditionally meant finding new gas fields or building more power plants, but we’re now seeing a shift in investment to the consumption side with more focus on efficient cars, buildings or industrial processes. Across the world, <a href="http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/weo2015/">32% of energy sector investment</a> in 2015 went on efficiency measures that reduce demand – up from just 17% the previous year.</p>
<p>UK policy needs to reflect this shift. For the past eight years the government has had a standalone Department of Energy and Climate Change with a remit that often left transport, construction and industry in the control of other, larger departments. The new <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-business-energy-and-industrial-strategy">Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy</a> can aim for a balance between addressing both the supply and consumption of energy.</p>
<h2>Governments or Markets</h2>
<p>Moving DECC to within the business department raises the interesting question of what role energy might play in any industrial strategy.</p>
<p>EDF’s difficulty securing the investment for Hinkley is a reflection of the financial challenges faced by all of the major European power companies. In 2013, Gerard Mestrallet, the then CEO of GDF Suez (now renamed Engie) led a delegation of the major energy firms to the European parliament and <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c5f0949e-9316-11e3-8ea7-00144feab7de.html#slide0">said</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>European energy companies are experiencing difficulties for which there is no precedent: the impairment of their European assets, the early closure of power plants, and a reduction in investments amongst other problems. The entire sector’s business situation is under severe pressure. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Results since then have merely illustrated those pressures with mounting losses and plans for companies like E.On and RWE to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/jan/04/eon-completes-split-of-fossil-fuel-and-renewable-operations">split themselves</a> into “old” and new" parts.</p>
<p>The oil and gas industry faces similar challenges. Its return on capital peaked in 2008, nearly halved by 2013, and now has <a href="http://www.guinnessfunds.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/2014.06-Return-of-returns.pdf">slumped</a> with hydrocarbon prices that look to be “lower for longer”. The UK’s North Sea oil and gas industry’s <a href="http://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/nationalaccounts/uksectoraccounts/bulletins/profitabilityofukcompanies/octobertodecember2015">net rate of return</a>, a measure of profitability, hit an all-time low of 0.6% in the fourth quarter of 2015, well below the country’s manufacturing sector at 7.2% or the service sector at 22%. Returns in oil and gas measured this way used to vary between 20% and 60% and consistently outpaced the other sectors.</p>
<p>The traditional investors in British energy look smaller and less able to take on very large scale projects than in the past. The evidence from Hinkley is that the UK government won’t invest up front in such projects. As EDF is 85% owned by the French government, the board’s decision will tell us something about the French state’s investment appetite.</p>
<p>The UK needs to get over the idea that huge megaprojects are the solution to everything. Instead, it should think of a new mix between smaller and larger, be more joined up in considering consumption as well as supply and think more decentralised than central. That expands the industries, companies, institutions and government departments involved. That calls for an industrial strategy focused on energy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/63166/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Elmes receives funding from the UK Research Council's End Use Energy Demand programme. </span></em></p>Britain should focus on energy efficiency and small-scale renewable projects, not huge new power plants.David Elmes, Head, Warwick Business School Global Energy Research Network, Warwick Business School, University of WarwickLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/485532015-10-14T05:28:25Z2015-10-14T05:28:25ZAll at sea: making sense of the UK’s muddled nuclear policy<p>The chancellor of the exchequer, George Osborne, has recently been waving huge wads of cash at different (but similarly delinquent) parts of UK nuclear policy. In August, he sailed triumphantly up the Clyde to the Trident-hosting Faslane Naval base to announce <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/aug/31/faslane-naval-base-clyde-500m-jobs-george-osborne">£500m of investment</a>. This was a move many considered to be jumping the gun, <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/georgeosborne/11834734/George-Osborne-denies-jumping-the-gun-over-Trident.html">or even “arrogant”</a> given that no final decision has been made on its renewal. </p>
<p>A few weeks later, on his tour of China, Osborne was announcing <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/earth/energy/11878566/Hinkley-Point-new-nuclear-plant-edges-closer-with-2-billion-Government-guarantee.html">an astonishing £2 billion loan guarantee</a> to city investors if the developers of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/if-the-hinkley-c-nuclear-deal-looks-astonishing-thats-because-it-is-47947">Hinkley C reactor</a> go bust. And this is additional to a <a href="http://news.sky.com/story/1157272/hinkley-point-nuclear-plant-deal-to-go-ahead">guaranteed strike price of £92.50 per megawatt hour</a> for 35 years (roughly double the current price of electricity – and <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/407059/Contracts_for_Difference_-_Auction_Results_-_Official_Statistics.pdf">significantly more than the current strike price for several renewables</a>). As <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/sep/23/hinkley-point-squandermania-george-osborne-china">Simon Jenkins writes</a> in relation to the chancellor’s recent announcements: “You can accuse George Osborne of many things, but austerity isn’t one of them”.</p>
<h2>No laughing matter</h2>
<p>It has got to the point with Hinkley C where one must wonder how Osborne, the secretary of state for Energy and Climate Change, Amber Rudd and the chief executive of EDF, Vincent de Rivaz, manage to keep straight faces while repeating what a good deal the project will be for everybody. The French state-owned energy firm EDF is due to partner with the Chinese under the deal <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/sep/25/george-osborne-presses-on-with-hinkley-power-station-despite-criticism">announced by Osborne</a> in Beijing, and Rivaz’s boss, Jean-Bernard Levy, has admitted that the Chinese state is the only investor that can be <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/only-china-wants-to-invest-in-britains-new-2bn-hinkley-point-nuclear-plant-because-no-one-else-10513752.html">persuaded that the project is viable</a>. </p>
<p>Even this is only possible, with still-secret commitments that the Chinese can then build <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-33092379">their own further nuclear power stations in the UK</a>. Indeed, there is now <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/environment/damian-carrington-blog/2015/sep/21/hinkley-point-nuclear-station-enemies">virtually no commentator in the British media</a>, or elsewhere, who seriously considers the Hinkley C project to be a sensible idea. As the <a href="http://new.spectator.co.uk/2014/02/why-has-britain-signed-up-for-the-worlds-most-expensive-power-station/">most expensive nuclear power station ever built</a>, left and right are united in recognising it as one of the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/sep/23/hinkley-point-squandermania-george-osborne-china">worst infrastructure project decisions in British history</a>. <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2005/dec/16/greenpolitics.environment">Experts formerly claiming nuclear to be a “necessity”</a> now <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/earth/energy/nuclearpower/11244499/Nuclear-power-may-not-be-needed-says-top-atomic-advocate.html">seem to have realised</a> that other low-carbon pathways are not only possible, <a href="http://www.theecologist.org/blogs_and_comments/commentators/2985547/shame_upon_them_the_governments_nuclear_lies_exposed.html">but manifestly more attractive</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/98104/original/image-20151012-17849-7n2ki.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/98104/original/image-20151012-17849-7n2ki.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/98104/original/image-20151012-17849-7n2ki.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=318&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98104/original/image-20151012-17849-7n2ki.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=318&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98104/original/image-20151012-17849-7n2ki.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=318&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98104/original/image-20151012-17849-7n2ki.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98104/original/image-20151012-17849-7n2ki.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98104/original/image-20151012-17849-7n2ki.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Off the grid. Power games.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/nayukim/5704133786/in/photolist-9G4bff-8fB3n1-7fPcNv-6hxGTB-dDhLgN-dMa93K-6f4tHd-6ujT2p-exjV6s-e6dsaa-6xcXpM-jGQXWA-5AvSJX-eAj9Hi-wNG4wT-aiigho-6YuaPm-az4yEU-56aTUt-7mpwpq-4drMr4-6H5j8H-unXgdr-qaR3J-dGymt1-Bh48K-7LoPYX-rebJBm-qjKuiC-2tkDrw-6j6GCU-aERAyd-7g6wZH-mT4QF-62sb1b-tDMLSG-DnExC-87bmts-2Ns44B-5sPkjb-ax47SF-bjoEkR-4S8cbC-ftqfCt-6Pdhim-yxi2xG-6jbgEq-2tkMyd-BkQGQ-9QZckg">Nayu Kim</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>British journalists who were noisily <a href="http://www.monbiot.com/2012/10/09/the-heart-of-the-matter/">insisting people were wrong</a> to protest against Hinkley C are now themselves <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/sep/18/we-are-pro-nuclear-but-hinkley-c-must-be-scrapped">equally vociferously arguing</a> against the power station. As support for renewables are cut and commitments to Hinkley remain, international observers <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/sep/22/al-gore-puzzled-by-ukcuts-to-renewable-energy-support">look on in wonder at UK energy policy</a> – but for all the wrong reasons. </p>
<p>It seems a sorry end for the <a href="https://blogs.sussex.ac.uk/sussexenergygroup/2015/02/17/the-politics-of-the-uk-nuclear-renaissance/">unusual partisan attachment</a> that the UK government has shown for new nuclear since 2008. With all the <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/85470214/Letter-to-David-Cameron-on-nuclear-power">efforts of orchestrated pro-nuclear advocacy</a> – <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2011/jun/15/italy-nuclear-referendum">lambasting anyone</a> daring to depart from complete ideological commitment to new nuclear – it might be expected that nuclear plans would be looking more secure. But the main aims now seem to be <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/sep/18/nuclear-environmentalists-scrap-hinkley-c-plans">blame management</a> and <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/c9e9fe1e-604c-11e5-a28b-50226830d644,Authorised=false.html?siteedition=uk&_i_location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ft.com%2Fcms%2Fs%2F0%2Fc9e9fe1e-604c-11e5-a28b-50226830d644.html%3Fsiteedition%3Duk&_i_referer=&classification=conditional_standard&iab=barrier-app#axzz3nJQv5ZzR">saving face</a>.</p>
<h2>Route map</h2>
<p>Never plausible to anyone recalling past episodes of nuclear enthusiasm, the latest bout of zeal for a “nuclear renaissance” has now lost all credibility. With global investments in renewable electricity two years ago <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-14/fossil-fuels-just-lost-the-race-against-renewables">overtaking those in all fossil fuel generation put together</a>, the direction of change is clear. <a href="http://www.irena.org/DocumentDownloads/Publications/IRENA_RE_Power_Costs_2014_report.pdf">Numerous</a> <a href="http://www.iiasa.ac.at/web/home/research/Flagship-Projects/Global-Energy-Assessment/GEA-Summary-web.pdf">international assessments</a> show renewables are already price-competitive even with optimistic costings for new nuclear. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/98106/original/image-20151012-17831-8uipae.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/98106/original/image-20151012-17831-8uipae.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/98106/original/image-20151012-17831-8uipae.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98106/original/image-20151012-17831-8uipae.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98106/original/image-20151012-17831-8uipae.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98106/original/image-20151012-17831-8uipae.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98106/original/image-20151012-17831-8uipae.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98106/original/image-20151012-17831-8uipae.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Panel beaters. Renewables are outpacing nuclear.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/126337375@N05/15986041648/in/photolist-33fGbC-goDsq4-a8779z-zpfY7D-99MMwG-9QUEgj-a89Zsh-qmCDeJ-rzeVyL-qmM3ic-uWtVef-9QUEJ7-8Wid58-cDri8b-uXZC2x-b89YkF-m5fNmZ-m5gzW7-9QUEqw-9QRPdv-9QRPic-9QUEmu-9QRNWP-9QUE8W-a877h4-9QUECf-uWtYbh-uWtUPY-uWtXNJ-uEvv9R-uXeqta-uWXYFx-u17Hcg-uEo4kQ-uWXV5z-u17HBe-uEnT99-u17HPP-uEvAFH-tZX2UC-uEo3a3-dbg82N-vrJry5-v9rpuS-qM3sRp">BELECTRIC UK</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
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<p>Despite better nuclear engineering and a worse renewable resource, <a href="https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=2015-18-swps-johnston-stirling.pdf&site=25">developments in Germany reinforce the picture</a>. Even in the UK, where official analysis tends to remain <a href="http://www.michaelmeacher.info/weblog/2011/04/how-is-this-nuclear-obsession-explained/">eccentrically romantic about nuclear</a>, the picture has long been clear for anyone with an open mind. As early as <a href="http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.berr.gov.uk/files/file10719.pdf">2003</a> the most detailed energy white paper for decades found nuclear power “unattractive” – before being overturned by a <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/272376/6887.pdf">cursory revision</a> that was itself rejected by <a href="http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/new-nuclear-power-plans-unlawful-452507">judicial review for being too superficial</a>. </p>
<p><a href="http://infrastructure.planninginspectorate.gov.uk/wp-content/ipc/uploads/projects/EN010049/2.%20Post-Submission/Representations/ExA%20Questions/Round%201/Responses/2.1.2%20Poyry%20Report.pdf">Specialist analyses</a> for the UK government – of kinds that the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) <a href="http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-question/Commons/2015-07-13/6774/">has resisted making public</a> – repeatedly find many renewables to offer better value than new nuclear. This is borne out in the <a href="http://www.carbonbrief.org/blog/2015/02/uk-renewables-auction-pushes-down-costs/">government’s own data for electricity contracts</a>. And, for any project with such a long lifetime, perhaps even more damning is that <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/db44f166-d927-11e4-b907-00144feab7de.html#axzz3nJQv5ZzR">renewable costs keep dropping</a>, while <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/08/hinkley-point-european-commission-nuclear-power-station-somerset">nuclear costs keep rising</a>.</p>
<p>So it is an understatement to say it is odd that DECC is cutting support for <a href="http://www.carbonbrief.org/blog/2015/07/decc-amber-rudd-reduces-subsidies-for-renewable-energy/">onshore wind, solar power</a> and <a href="http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/news/2411785/energy-efficiency-support-faces-gbp40m-cuts-as-decc-trims-budget">ending support for home energy efficiency</a> – while unswervingly staying committed to extortionate new nuclear power. Former minister for energy, Ed Davey, puts it bluntly:</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/98110/original/image-20151012-17849-ohrxg1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/98110/original/image-20151012-17849-ohrxg1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/98110/original/image-20151012-17849-ohrxg1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=268&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98110/original/image-20151012-17849-ohrxg1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=268&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98110/original/image-20151012-17849-ohrxg1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=268&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98110/original/image-20151012-17849-ohrxg1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98110/original/image-20151012-17849-ohrxg1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98110/original/image-20151012-17849-ohrxg1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://twitter.com/edwardjdavey">Twitter</a></span>
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<p>For Davey, the only explanation can be one of partisan commitment by Osborne – because <a href="https://twitter.com/TimPBouverie/status/645971907695804416">“he just wanted a nuclear power plant”</a>. It is sure that Osborne <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2011/jun/15/italy-nuclear-referendum">is no environmentalist</a>. With so much nuclear work contracted abroad and UK employment allowed to haemorrhage in other sectors – for instance in <a href="http://www.gazettelive.co.uk/business/business-news/osbornes-low-watt-indifference-failed-10154181">steel</a> and <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/aug/27/slashing-household-solar-subsides-kill-off-industry-government-feed-in-tariff">solar power</a> – it doesn’t seem Osborne is motivated by jobs. </p>
<p>Attracting Chinese infrastructure investment may play a role, but the realities make it clear there are many more economically promising alternatives than nuclear. And encouraging Chinese involvement in a <a href="https://theconversation.com/serious-issues-for-george-osborne-on-chinas-role-in-the-uks-nuclear-future-48541">technology with such grave national security implications</a> further compounds the oddity. George Osborne’s nuclear obsession really does require some kind of explanation.</p>
<h2>‘Deep state’</h2>
<p><a href="http://www.theguardian.com/science/political-science/2015/aug/07/shining-a-light-on-britains-nuclear-state">As we have explored elsewhere</a>, perhaps the best clue lies in Osborne’s trip up the Clyde to Faslane; maybe the real commitment here is to maintaining Britain’s nuclear arsenal. Amid the clamour of the recent China visit, it was also announced that <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-34342784">a big slice of Hinkley contracts would go to Rolls Royce</a> – the makers of Britain’s nuclear submarine reactors. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/98112/original/image-20151012-17858-1a0pygo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/98112/original/image-20151012-17858-1a0pygo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/98112/original/image-20151012-17858-1a0pygo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98112/original/image-20151012-17858-1a0pygo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98112/original/image-20151012-17858-1a0pygo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98112/original/image-20151012-17858-1a0pygo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=567&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98112/original/image-20151012-17858-1a0pygo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=567&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/98112/original/image-20151012-17858-1a0pygo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=567&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">HMS Vigilant returns to port.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/defenceimages/14419385728/in/photolist-nYc81L-tcz62k-5EE7UC-evC8Kz-s99WjK-s99WZn-rcmy8z-rPQ2QT-s6S2AJ-rRyCS7-rRGQVF-rc9Wd1-s99WaM-s99WCv-rcmxi8-9oNtW6-5FdFB8-jEbTQ-qBite-9ab9pK-9xGrka-qBkbE-qBkcd-qBits-qBfRR-qBisZ-qBisU-eoigDM-eoih3T-23fm5q-yrqGKS-5EnLjR-3fTs2u-5EzPc2-9NEnS2-o7tgZe-o79Xeo-o2HyZT-5EzPiT-5EzPnr-qBitg-qBfRo-qBfRs-qBfRM-qBkbw-qBfRF-qBkc1-qBkbN-qBfRx-qBitk">Defence Images</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>The calculation seems to be, that trickle-down from foreign power reactor manufacturers may be just enough to sustain a national industrial capability sufficient to continue the nuclear-armed status that current debates remind is so <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/04/09/uk-britain-election-nuclear-idUKKBN0N00HO20150409">emotively cherished both by Tories</a> and at the <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/11839043/The-case-for-renewing-Trident-is-irrefutable.html">top of Labour</a>. There are <a href="http://steps-centre.org/author/philj/">tantalising signs</a> that this lay behind the strange reversal in nuclear white papers mentioned above. If this is not at the bottom of Osborne’s mind, it is difficult to know what is.</p>
<p>If so, the implications for the health of UK politics are extremely serious. The Jeremy Corbyn-led Labour Party is <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/oct/01/trident-corbyn-shadow-cabinet-labour">raising these issues anew</a>. All sides are limbering up for the coming argument over Trident. But if the above analysis is true, then massive financial pre-commitments are being made (<a href="http://www.robedwards.com/2014/11/revealed-westminsters-37-million-us-deal-for-trident-missile-launchers.html">and some already firmly in place</a>) on an unprecedented scale, that risk effectively locking in a decision before the process of making it has ostensibly begun. </p>
<p>With mainstream press reports of senior British Army figures <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/british-army-could-stage-mutiny-under-corbyn-says-senior-serving-general-10509742.html">mooting mutiny under a Corbyn government</a>, this carries more than a whiff of something akin to an unaccountable British <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/anthony-barnett/is-there-uk-deep-state">“deep state”</a>. For anyone who cares about <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-germany-is-dumping-nuclear-power-and-britain-isnt-46359">democracy</a> – whatever their views on nuclear power or nuclear weapons – now is the moment to ask some searching questions about what nuclear policy is doing to British politics. And there seems no-one better to ask than Osborne.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/48553/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Philip Johnstone receives funding from The ESRC and works at the Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU), University of Sussex. Phil is also a member of the Nuclear Consulting Group. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andy Stirling receives funding from the ESRC for research on this topic. Alongside many other commitments (including advisory roles for the UK Government on energy and other technology policy issues and for the nuclear industry on energy diversity), he has worked in the past for Greenpeace International and currently serves (unpaid) on the board of Greenpeace UK.</span></em></p>Is George Osborne deploying the ‘Deep State’ to secure a long-term nuclear arsenal for Britain?Philip Johnstone, Research Fellow, SPRU, University of Sussex Business School, University of SussexAndy Stirling, Professor of Science & Technology Policy and co-director of the ESRC STEPS Centre, University of Sussex Business School, University of SussexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/485412015-10-05T10:04:45Z2015-10-05T10:04:45ZSerious issues for George Osborne on China’s role in the UK’s nuclear future<p>George Osborne will address the Conservative party conference on Monday fresh from a <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/sep/21/george-osborne-uk-should-do-more-business-with-china">sales trip to Beijing</a>. His efforts to drive more trade between the two nations saw Chinese state-owned companies <a href="https://theconversation.com/if-the-hinkley-c-nuclear-deal-looks-astonishing-thats-because-it-is-47947">invited to participate</a> in the development of nuclear generating plants in Britain. They will have the chance to work with French state-owned company, EDF at Hinkley Point, Somerset and will be the sole operators at Bradwell, Essex. The move has already <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/britain/21667932-britains-nuclear-plans-look-over-expensive-and-over-reliant-china-china-syndrome">attracted doubts</a> but there are other vital issues that have yet to be aired. These can be crystallised into five clear questions that Osborne and his government must answer.</p>
<h2>Safety concerns</h2>
<p>Two Chinese companies are involved with Hinkley Point: <a href="http://www.cnnc.com.cn/tabid/141/">China National Nuclear Corporation</a> (CNNC) and <a href="http://en.cgnpc.com.cn/">China General Nuclear Power Corporation</a> (CGN). The latter was responsible, under its previous guise (China Guangdong Nuclear Power) for building and running China’s first nuclear station, Daya Bay, near Hong Kong. It was initially improperly built – with reinforcement rods missing from the concrete base under the reactor – and there have <a href="http://www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/413/problems-daya-bay">since been reports</a> of minor leakages of radioactive materials (though this is difficult to check, given China’s lack of transparency). </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/29/china-punishes-249-officials-laziness-corruption-crackdown">deeply corrupt environment</a> in which many Chinese companies operate compounds the possibility of these companies being lax on safety measures and it’s simply not good enough to say that Britain has one of the <a href="http://www.onr.org.uk/documents/a-guide-to-nuclear-regulation-in-the-uk.pdf">tightest nuclear safety regimes</a> in the world. Confronted with the power of the Chinese government and the British government’s enthusiasm for unceasing flows of Chinese investment, the risk must be that the regulatory agency will be sidestepped or unable to cope.</p>
<h2>Who builds what and with which workers?</h2>
<p>The public needs to know whether Chinese construction companies will be involved in building Hinkley Point and other power stations and, if so, whether they will seek to use workers from China. Unions have already <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/sep/21/george-osborne-chinese-nuclear-power-station-bradwell-essex">voiced their own fears</a> and in all cases where state-owned Chinese companies are involved in major civil engineering and other projects (mining, oil drilling etc) – in Africa, Latin America and South Asia, for example – imported Chinese workers are almost invariably <a href="http://www.chinaafricarealstory.com/p/chinese-workers-in-africa-anecdotes.html">preferred to local ones</a>.</p>
<p>We know that if Chinese companies (which again will be CGN and/or CNNC) build and run the proposed Bradwell nuclear station, they will be allowed to use their own reactors (a development from an old French PWR design, initially developed by Framatome, now AREVA). But will they be involved in building the Hinkley Point reactor? The official version is that the reactor will be built by AREVA (as with EDF, another French state-owned company). However, AREVA has a long-standing technology cooperation <a href="http://www.areva.com/EN/news-10556/francechina-areva-signs-three-agreements-with-its-partners-cnnc-cgn-and-edf.html">agreement with CGN</a>. This surely opens up the possibility that the Hinkley reactor will at least in part – for cost reasons – be built in China.</p>
<h2>Political and security concerns</h2>
<p>Chinese state-owned companies are not like EDF, Deutsch Bahn, SNCF, or any of the other foreign state-owned companies that deliver our electricity, rail services (which, though publically owned, operate rather like private companies). The government seems not to understand (or doesn’t care) that the Leninist nature of the Chinese state means that it’s the Communist Party (CCP), not government agencies, that effectively controls all elements of the state, including state-owned companies.</p>
<p>The dividing line between the CCP and the state is both thin and porous; the former envelops the latter. This means that the £2 billion guarantee – and the undoubtedly far higher sums that will follow – will effectively result in the British taxpayer subsidising the Chinese Communist Party.</p>
<p>One of the companies involved at Hinkley Point – China National Nuclear – produces China’s nuclear weapons. This means that as well as the Communist Party, CNNC is almost certainly controlled by the People’s Liberation Army (as all Chinese military-related companies are). Given geopolitical uncertainty (with rising tensions between China, Japan and the US over China’s territorial claims in the East and South China Seas), allowing such a company anywhere near Britain – not to mention in an industry as strategic as power generation – verges on the insane. Has MI5 been consulted on this, and if it has, what was its advice?</p>
<p>At its heart, the question of Chinese state (and thus Communist Party) involvement in Britain’s power generation, is a matter of national security. In its desire to help financial services (the only economic sector it privileges) penetrate the Chinese market, the government’s nuclear quid pro quo means it is set to embark on a potentially very dangerous path. Had this deal been negotiated by Jeremy Corbyn as prime minister, the media would have been wondering if he were in the pay of the Chinese government. But George Osborne? Surely not.</p>
<p>Osborne may address some of these concerns in Monday’s speech, but it seems unlikely. In any case, before any binding commitments are made, it’s vital that the government’s proposal be opened up to public debate and subject to parliamentary scrutiny.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/48541/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jeffrey Henderson is a member of the Labour Party.</span></em></p>The Chancellor has to face some hard scrutiny of a deal which would look like a communist coup under a Labour PM.Jeffrey Henderson, Professor of International Development, University of BristolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/479472015-09-22T11:39:42Z2015-09-22T11:39:42ZIf the Hinkley C nuclear deal looks astonishing, that’s because it is<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/95673/original/image-20150922-16682-s7t8ss.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.shutterstock.com/cat.mhtml?lang=en&language=en&ref_site=photo&search_source=search_form&version=llv1&anyorall=all&safesearch=1&use_local_boost=1&autocomplete_id=&searchterm=nuclear%20power&show_color_wheel=1&orient=&commercial_ok=&media_type=images&search_cat=&searchtermx=&photographer_name=&people_gender=&people_age=&people_ethnicity=&people_number=&color=&page=1&inline=136242767">Gui Jun Peng</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>I was rather perplexed to wake up to hear the <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/earth/energy/11878566/Hinkley-Point-new-nuclear-plant-edges-closer-with-2-billion-Government-guarantee.html">news that</a> George Osborne was pledging £2bn in loan guarantees for the ill-fated Hinkley C nuclear power project in England. Hadn’t he <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/jun/27/nuclear-power-10billion-financial-guarantee">already</a> pledged £10bn in loan guarantees more than two years ago? </p>
<p>Hinkley C, all 3.2 gigawatts of it, was <a href="http://www.carbonbrief.org/blog/2014/11/how-the-uks-nuclear-new-build-plans-keep-getting-delayed/">according to</a> earlier proud boasts supposed to be up and running in 2018, but will now <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-34149392">be lucky to be started by 2025</a>. As recently as 2008, the total cost of such a plant <a href="http://www.carbonbrief.org/blog/2014/11/how-the-uks-nuclear-new-build-plans-keep-getting-delayed/">was estimated</a> by the UK department of energy at £5.6bn. Now it could easily be five times higher. </p>
<p>Has Osborne decided to cut the support he is offering French group EDF and the Chinese state nuclear companies to build the plant from £10bn to £2bn? No, it seems he is offering an “initial” £2bn. Has George made his <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-34311675">current trip</a> to Beijing with £2bn in £50 notes in a secure luggage arrangement? No, of course not. So what does this mean? Well, absolutely nothing apart from, no doubt, some PR consultant coming up with a bright idea to distract attention from the sheer awfulness that is the British nuclear programme.</p>
<p>Although some may feel that how this (awfulness) is all an aberration and that somewhere else nuclear power is being done much better, in my studies I can’t find much evidence of this, certainly not in the US and Europe. Both of the two “generation III” reactors being developed, <a href="https://www.euronuclear.org/info/encyclopedia/e/epr.htm">EPR</a> (Finland, France, China) and <a href="http://www.westinghousenuclear.com/New-Plants/AP1000-PWR">AP1000</a> (China, US, Bulgaria), are taking ages to build and costing mountains more money than originally anticipated. Hitachi’s ABWR, another reactor tipped to be built in the UK, has a <a href="http://world-nuclear.org/NuclearDatabase/reactordetails.aspx?id=27570&rid=F98DE7C7-0F7F-467C-B98C-8E633BBD50D5">very chequered reliability record</a> that would make it a no-go zone for investors.</p>
<p>Even in China the <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/chinas-coming-nuclear-power-boom/">much-vaunted</a> nuclear construction programme is, as much as you hear about these things from Chinese authorities, <a href="http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/927146.shtml">a lot less vaunted</a> than one would think. And we need to understand that this is before we even know whether any of these upcoming generation III reactors work well or not. </p>
<h2>Nuclear numbers</h2>
<p>Really this is not much of a change compared with what went on in previous decades. The marvellous hype from the nuclear people suckered an eager-to-be-suckered UK body politic that there really is a magical nuclear answer to our problems. So why do we find this out now? </p>
<p>The answer is actually surprisingly simple. Up until now, nuclear power has not been treated like other energy sources. In the UK and many other countries it has always been given a blank cheque to cover its construction costs and its electricity has never been costed according to commercial risk criteria. Now, in a bowdlerised way, it has been costed according to some commercial criteria under the UK’s <a href="https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/electricity/wholesale-market/market-efficiency-review-and-reform/electricity-market-reform-emr">Electricity Market Reform</a> system for incentivising low-carbon power generation. </p>
<p>This produced what many found to be a surprising answer. Two years ago Hinkley C ended up <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/initial-agreement-reached-on-new-nuclear-power-station-at-hinkley">being offered</a> (still not signed) £92.50 per MWh (now £94 per MWh, rising with inflation) over 35 years with a £10bn loan guarantee – <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/251157/251157_1615983_2292_4.pdf">said to</a> rise to £16bn with interest payments. This means the contract price is more than double the wholesale power price and the consumer will have to pay the difference for 35 years after generation starts. </p>
<p>It is a higher subsidy than that offered to onshore wind farms (which also get no loan guarantees and get 15-year contracts). Earlier in the year, the government awarded <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/407059/Contracts_for_Difference_-_Auction_Results_-_Official_Statistics.pdf">premium price contracts</a> to onshore wind farms for around £80 per MWh. And if nuclear had the same contract lengths as other power plants: 15 years – and certainly no more than 20 years – its contract price would rise to well over £100 per MWh. That would make it look more expensive than offshore wind. Well, we couldn’t have that, could we? And if the £16bn was not guaranteed, it would never be built. The risk of cost overruns would be considered far too great. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/95677/original/image-20150922-16666-1npo57t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/95677/original/image-20150922-16666-1npo57t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/95677/original/image-20150922-16666-1npo57t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/95677/original/image-20150922-16666-1npo57t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/95677/original/image-20150922-16666-1npo57t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/95677/original/image-20150922-16666-1npo57t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/95677/original/image-20150922-16666-1npo57t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/95677/original/image-20150922-16666-1npo57t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Off the agenda: onshore wind subsidies.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.shutterstock.com/cat.mhtml?lang=en&language=en&ref_site=photo&search_source=search_form&version=llv1&anyorall=all&safesearch=1&use_local_boost=1&autocomplete_id=&search_tracking_id=g_f2fDHQkzwXwKKIWG4Unw&searchterm=wind%20farm%20uk&show_color_wheel=1&orient=&commercial_ok=&media_type=images&search_cat=&searchtermx=&photographer_name=&people_gender=&people_age=&people_ethnicity=&people_number=&color=&page=1&inline=214633147">Alastair Wallace</a></span>
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<p>Meanwhile the <a href="http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-T-Z/United-Kingdom/">other nuclear power plant proposals</a> for the UK currently held by EDF, Hitachi and Toshiba seemed to have melted into the background. Even with the government’s very generous offer to get new nuclear power projects off the ground, will these players take the risk of investing in these new projects? Only the Chinese seem to be at the table, having <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/sep/21/george-osborne-chinese-nuclear-power-station-bradwell-essex">apparently been</a> promised they can build their own reactor at Bradwell in Essex as part of the Hinkley C deal. </p>
<p>Of course many would point out that we could have lots of other things, including wind farms and solar farms generating loads of clean energy by the time (if ever) that our nuclear power programme gets going. But the government has made sure this is not going to happen, by <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-34319458">cutting the incentives</a>. Even the CBI, the voice of business, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-34319458">is raising concerns</a> about this. Instead the government seems to be pinning its hopes on a nuclear programme happening at the end of a Chinese rainbow. Stand by for the crock of gold at Bradwell to be just as eye-watering.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/47947/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David received funding from the ESRC for the project 'Delivering Renewable Energy Under Devolution' (2011-13).</span></em></p>The UK’s first new nuclear power station since the 1990s is coming at the expense of renewable energy and leaving us unnervingly in hock to the Chinese.David Toke, Reader in Energy Policy, University of AberdeenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.