tag:theconversation.com,2011:/fr/topics/hr-mcmaster-36739/articlesHR McMaster – The Conversation2023-03-01T20:37:03Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2009532023-03-01T20:37:03Z2023-03-01T20:37:03ZA more hawkish China policy? 5 takeaways from House committee’s inaugural hearing on confronting Beijing<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/512995/original/file-20230301-26-fkv0ly.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=14%2C67%2C4977%2C3255&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Bipartisan committee with Beijing in its sights.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/63de0b1c563247e89d38f83e447affdf?ext=true">AP Photo/J. Scott Applewhite</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>In a <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/28/politics/chinese-communist-party-committee-hearing/index.html">rare show of bipartisanship</a>, Republican and Democratic House members put on a united front as they probed how to respond to the perceived growing threat of China.</em></p>
<p><em>The inaugural hearing of the <a href="https://clerk.house.gov/committees/ZS00">Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party</a> comes at a delicate time – amid concerns in the U.S. over <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-spy-balloon-inflatable-eyes-in-the-sky-have-been-used-in-war-for-centuries-199268">Chinese espionage</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/china-why-beijing-has-decided-this-is-the-year-to-unify-with-taiwan-199726">tensions over Taiwan</a> and <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/28/politics/us-china-relations-ukraine-covid/index.html">China’s position on the Ukraine war</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>Michael Beckley, an <a href="https://facultyprofiles.tufts.edu/michael-beckley/about">expert on U.S.-China relations</a> at Tufts University, was among those watching on as witnesses gave evidence during the committee’s prime-time session. Here are his takeaways from what was discussed.</em></p>
<h2>1. The days of engagement are over</h2>
<p>What was abundantly clear from the lawmakers was the message that the <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/12/getting-china-wrong-engagement-change/">era of engagement</a> with China is long past its sell-by date.</p>
<p>Engagement had been the policy of successive government from <a href="https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/nixons-trip-china">Nixon’s landmark visit to China in 1972</a> onward. But there was a general acceptance among committee members that the policy is outdated and that it is time to adopt if not outright containment then certainly a more competitive policy. This would include “<a href="https://www.ft.com/content/5ca525f7-cb40-468a-a294-5938d11af6a5">selective decoupling</a>” – that is, the disentangling – of technology and economic interests, along with a more robust stance on confronting China’s military and providing a barrier to Chinese conquest in East Asia.</p>
<p>This proposed hardening of the U.S. policy is driven by internal developments in China as well as any perceived external threat. President Xi Jinping is viewed as having installed himself as “<a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/09/17/xi-jinping-chinas-dictator-for-life-00056783">dictator for life</a>” and created an Orwellian internal control system, complete with <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/new-details-torture-cover-ups-china-s-internment-camps-revealed-n1270014">concentration camps</a> and <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/surveillance-cameras-made-by-china-are-hanging-all-over-the-u-s-1510513949">hundreds of millions of security cameras</a> all over the country; this is a regime that is only becoming more authoritarian as the years go by. It has dispelled any idea that with its economic opening China would also become a more open society.</p>
<p>And the committee appears to want to set course for the long term, not just for the near future. The general idea is U.S. policy over the next 10 years could determine the relationship between the U.S. and China for the next century. Rep. Mike Gallagher, the panel’s Republican chair, <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/china-house-select-committee-hearing-tiktok-hr-mcmaster-matthew-pottinger/">said as much</a> in his opening comments: “This is an existential struggle over what life will look like in the 21st century – and the most fundamental freedoms are at stake.”</p>
<h2>2. Reframing the debate</h2>
<p>As Gallagher’s remarks suggest, the panel implied that U.S. issues with China do not boil down to just disagreement over a few issues. Rather, it was framed as a battle between two very different visions of society.</p>
<p>The committee is clearly modeled on the <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/house-select-committee-to-investigate-the-january-6th-attack-on-the-united-states-capitol-108166">Jan. 6 House panel</a> – for example, by airing hearings in prime time and with dramatic testimony from witnesses. The idea seems to be that the issue is of such importance that to pursue it successfully the U.S. public needs to be educated, invested and mobilized. To that end, the inaugural session had testimony from an activist jailed for two years for supporting pro-democracy movements. The point was to get across the idea that the way of life that the U.S. is trying to promote – both at home and abroad – is antithetical to that of the Chinese Communist Party.</p>
<p>President Joe Biden has similarly framed his administration’s policy around the idea that this is an <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/26/us/politics/biden-china-democracy.html">epic struggle between democracy and autocracy</a>. Indeed, in some ways Biden has been more hawkish than previous presidents on China. In terms of tightening economic restrictions on China and stressing U.S. concerns over China’s human rights record, Biden has <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/live/is-americas-china-policy-too-hawkish/">picked up the baton</a> from his predecessors and run with it.</p>
<p>But the panel was keen to stress this as a bipartisan push for a more hawkish policy. And this is important. It gives the panel’s recommendations more heft, especially as the U.S. heads into the 2024 presidential race, during which both parties will be looking to stress how tough they are on the U.S.’s adversaries.</p>
<h2>3. Confronting China’s leaders, not its people</h2>
<p>Although framed as a battle between democracy and autocracy, the panel appears conscious that the debate shouldn’t be framed as a clash of Western and Asian civilizations. </p>
<p>With anti-Asian sentiment having risen during the COVID-19 pandemic, U.S. lawmakers are walking a fine line here – they will need to focus any criticism on Chinese leaders rather than its people. Gallagher <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/28/politics/chinese-communist-party-committee-hearing">made this point</a>, noting: “We must constantly distinguish between the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people themselves, who have always been the party’s primary victims.”</p>
<p>This balancing act may be more difficult in future hearings when issues of Chinese students at U.S. universities, immigration and cooperation with China on certain scientific issues come up. That is when they will need to weigh concerns over Chinese espionage against not coming across as anti-Chinese visitors and immigrants.</p>
<h2>4. Reshaping policy on three fronts</h2>
<p>Although this first hearing was very much a table-setter, there were three broad policy recommendations implicit in the testimony:</p>
<ul>
<li><p><strong>Taiwan</strong> – The panel heard evidence suggesting that the U.S. needs to mobilize for the potential of a hot war with China over the island of Taiwan, the status of which is contested. Former National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/politics/mcmaster-warns-next-two-years-could-dangerous-period-us-china-taiwan-during-debut-china-cmte-hearing">told the panel</a> that in regards to China, the next two years would be a particularly “dangerous” period. He suggested that U.S. capabilities to deter an invasion of Taiwan were not adequate. Meanwhile, there were mentions of a backlog in weapon sales to Taiwan. And as the war in Ukraine has underscored, there is an imperative to get weapons on the ground before any shooting starts.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>Economic competitiveness</strong> – The panel heard evidence from the U.S. National Association of Manufacturers pointing out how China had stacked global trade in its favor through unfair subsidies and corporate espionage. To improve America’s competitiveness, the panel could look at recommending the expansion of export controls or tax reforms to make U.S. products more competitive. The U.S. is also eyeing a strategic decoupling with China on the economic front, which is encouraging U.S. businesses to divest from Chinese operations and restricting Chinese businesses operating in the U.S., such as the social media platform TikTok.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>Human rights</strong> – The committee made it clear that human rights should be front and center in the U.S. China policy going forward. The hearing repeatedly stressed that this was not just an economic and security disagreement but a clash of values.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>5. A boilerplate response from Beijing</h2>
<p>China’s response to the committee’s inaugural hearing was standard. </p>
<p>In a statement, the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/china-criticizes-new-congress-committee-ae52d13b740dee3495c7ba4e41f520a8">foreign ministry in Beijing</a> said it rejected Washington’s attempt to engage in what it called a “Cold War” mindset. Chinese media also tried to make it sound as if anti-China policy is driven by special interests, including defense contractors and members of the Taiwanese diaspora.</p>
<p>The narrative that the U.S. is warmongering was aided by the interjection of two protesters from the <a href="https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2023/feb/28/code-pink-protesters-disrupt-inaugural-house-china/">Code Pink activist group</a>, who held up a sign during the hearing stating that “China is not our enemy.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200953/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Beckley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>US lawmakers heard testimony that suggests the era of engagement with China is over. Rather, policy may be hardening.Michael Beckley, Associate Professor of Political Science, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/933822018-03-14T15:09:57Z2018-03-14T15:09:57ZRex Tillerson and the shambles of Trump’s ‘family and friends’ foreign policy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/210314/original/file-20180314-113482-1hc81kp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>To fire one adviser is a misfortune. To fire two appears careless. To fire yet another through Twitter can really only be described as an <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-43391982">omnishambles</a>.</p>
<p>Let’s be clear. As Donald Trump uses a tweet to dismiss secretary of state Rex Tillerson, the conduct of US foreign policy is at its most chaotic point since 1945. Even in the dying months of the Nixon administration, with Henry Kissinger trying to prop up an often-drunk and sometimes-drugged president, there was a semblance of competence and order.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"973540316656623616"}"></div></p>
<p>In 2018, we have a chief executive who relies on Fox TV and was called a “f****** moron” by the secretary of state he has now removed. The State Department is gutted: seven of nine top posts are now vacant even after current CIA Director Mike Pompeo is confirmed to replace Tillerson. Hundreds of other positions remain unfilled or have been slashed, and a budget cut of more than 30% looms on the immediate horizon. In its place, foreign policy is driven on an ad hoc basis by the whims of Trump and the interests – political and financial – of family and friends: son-in-law Jared Kushner, hard-right adviser <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/02/12/stephen-miller-31-year-old-senior-adviser-behind-donald-trumps/">Stephen Miller</a>, yes-man Pompeo, billonaire commerce secretary Wilbur Ross. </p>
<h2>No crossing the Trump ego…or the family</h2>
<p>Tillerson’s termination was both long-planned and sudden. The main driver for his departure is a combination of a president who needs to be in the spotlight and a son-in-law who wants to share that light as chief foreign policy adviser.</p>
<p>Trump never forgot the “f****** moron” remark – reportedly made during a meeting of <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/10/16/rex-tillerson-at-the-breaking-point?irgwc=1&utm_medium=10078&utm_campaign=Online%20Tracking%20Link&utm_source=IR&irgwc=1&utm_medium=Skimbit%2C%20Ltd.&utm_campaign=Online%20Tracking%20Link&utm_source=IR">top security advisers</a>. He bristled whenever Tillerson made a comment which grabbed media attention, such as when he revealed last December that the US was ready to talk to North Korea.</p>
<p>In the hours before he was fired, Tillerson had again taken over from Trump. This time he declared that the US would stand in alliance with the UK over Russia’s suspected attack on former spy Sergey Skripal and his daughter Julia on English soil. The president had himself been notably quiet on the topic and certainly did not offer his overt support to the UK.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/jared-kushner-37735">Kushner faction</a> saw Tillerson as a major obstacle, too. Trump’s son-in-law might be the envoy to the Middle East, declaring that he will bring peace to the region. He might be the key contact for Saudi Arabia’s de facto ruler Mohammad Bin Salman. He might have Russian links – some of which involve his business. He might see himself as the mover-and-shaker in discussions with China, Israel, the UAE, and Mexico (all of whom identified Kushner’s eagerness and financial interests as vulnerabilities which can be exploited). But as long as Tillerson was in post, Trump’s wannabe Kissinger would always play second fiddle.</p>
<p>So last December, Kushner’s group started telling the media that the secretary of state was out and would be replaced by Pompeo by the start of 2018. They could not quite get Trump to pull the trigger then, but the pressure was sustained with the help of allies in the media, who cast doubt on Tillerson’s loyalty to Trump. There was a foreign element, too – both Saudi Arabia and the UAE, with ties to Kushner, railed about Tillerson because he called for moderation in their blockade of Qatar. His position was further weakened because of staff demoralised by department cuts.</p>
<p>The Kushner camp’s chance came when Tillerson left for Africa while Trump fumed over the Russia investigation. With the president desperate for credit for his I’m-meeting-Kim manoeuvre – and possibly seeing Tillerson as casting shade on it – the pressure paid off.</p>
<h2>McMaster next to go?</h2>
<p>Last summer, after months of White House turmoil and amid the expanding Russia inquiry, the story was that the military figures in the administration would maintain a semblance of order over foreign policy. General Jim Mattis was the bulwark as defense secretary since Trump took office. General <a href="http://uk.businessinsider.com/hr-mcmaster-threatened-to-quit-white-house-trump-2018-3?r=US&IR=T">H R McMaster</a> had replaced Michael Flynn (forced out because of his Russia links) as national security adviser. General John Kelly became chief of staff.</p>
<p>But Kelly, far from containing Trump, has increasingly provided cover for the president’s whims. And with Tillerson out of the way, McMaster could be vulnerable.</p>
<p>The Kushner faction are no fans of the national security adviser, and he is also a villain for the hard right which has had so much influence with Trump. An immediate threat was removed when White House chief strategist and hard-right icon Bannon was dismissed last August, but paradoxically the firing only fed the determination of Bannon’s allies – using outlets such as Breitbart and Fox – to oust the general.</p>
<p>A #McMasterOut campaign, fed on social media not only by domestic opponents but by Russian-linked accounts, came up short in the autumn. But already, as Trump hinted at more dismissals on Tuesday with his “I’m close to getting the Cabinet I want”, McMaster’s name is at the top of the list for Downfall of the Day.</p>
<p>Tillerson’s firing means that almost half of the White House staff from January 2017 are gone. The chief economic advisor, Gary Cohn, was the most recent to give up, after the protectionists surrounding the president – such as Wilbur Ross – got their tariffs on steel and aluminium. Even Trump’s close confidante, communications director Hope Hicks, has jumped.</p>
<p>As special counsel Robert Mueller closes in on Trump, and as foreign affairs are just too complicated to understand let alone control, the president has an ever-decreasing inner circle to give him comfort and the affirmation that he is #Winning.</p>
<p>Still, there is always Jared and daughter Ivanka. Stephen Miller, the scourge of immigrants and the author of Trumpian insults like “Little Rocket Man”, holds forth. Pompeo is brought in as a defender of the camp. That won’t reassure American allies, from Canada to South Korea to Europe. But Donald Trump’s priority is not American allies. It is not even the presidency, at least in the orderly and effective manner in which it is supposed to operate.</p>
<p>Donald Trump’s priority is Donald Trump. All else – including a US foreign policy for a modicum of stability – falls before this.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/93382/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Scott Lucas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The secretary of state entered the firing line even before he uttered his infamous ‘f****** moron’ comment.Scott Lucas, Professor of International Politics, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/914462018-02-20T13:46:56Z2018-02-20T13:46:56ZWhy it’s so hard to make sense of Trump’s foreign policy<p>Under Donald Trump, trying to predict, dissect and understand the US’s attitude to the world has become almost impossible – not that plenty of observers aren’t giving it a go. Tellingly, they’re all coming to different conclusions.</p>
<p>Some see a spiral into outright chaos, citing the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-40026828">strain on crucial alliances</a>, Trump’s <a href="https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/12/trumps-vladimir-putin-national-security-nightmare">strange embrace of Vladimir Putin</a>, and his reckless rhetoric, which sometimes gets to the point of <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/08/trump-warns-north-korea-threats-will-be-met-with-fire-and-fury.html">implicitly threatening nuclear war</a>. </p>
<p>Other analysts claim to identify some semblance of order, but they disagree profoundly on what that order is. To some, Trump’s “America First” theme is an <a href="http://time.com/4820160/trump-america-first-global-leadership/">isolationist rallying cry</a>, with its implications of economic protectionism and rejection of international agreements; others see an administration <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/03/01/the-trump-presidency-ushers-in-a-new-age-of-militarism/?utm_term=.76e06dd80664">even more committed to military intervention</a> than its predecessors. And still others say that for all Trump’s sound and fury, <a href="https://theconversation.com/when-it-comes-to-foreign-and-defence-policy-trumps-us-is-more-about-continuity-than-change-76201">not much has changed</a> – that US foreign policy, for better or worse, is hewing to the same methods and objectives pursued in the Obama era.</p>
<p>So how can we cut through all this noise and really make sense of it all? In the interests of clarity (and perhaps sanity) the first thing is to recognise that there isn’t just one Trump foreign policy. There are several. They frustrate each other with various irreconcilable differences. And collectively, they add up not to a coherent US strategy, nor even an incoherent one, but instead a gaping hole where a strategy should be.</p>
<h2>The family-and-friends foreign policy</h2>
<p>One key difference from his predecessors is Trump’s promotion in certain areas of a foreign policy set and pursued on an ad hoc basis by his family and their business allies. That approach has radically altered, even dismantled, the longstanding US approach to the Middle East – and in particular to the Israel-Palestine conflict.</p>
<p>Instead of assigning someone with relevant experience to handle what may be the world’s single most intractable dispute, Trump instead tapped his son-in-law, Jared Kushner. Kushner has no grounding in Middle Eastern affairs, nor even in diplomatic negotiations more generally. Having failed to disclose his meetings with foreign officials before Trump became president, he <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/jared-kushner-without-security-clearance-after-one-year-white-house-783965">doesn’t even have a full security clearance</a>. And yet Trump reportedly <a href="https://www.vox.com/world/2017/8/1/16077600/jared-kushner-middle-east-peace-leaked-interview">told him</a>, with not a hint of irony: “If you can’t produce peace in the Middle East, nobody can.”</p>
<p>The reckless cronyism doesn’t stop there. To assist Kushner, Trump chose <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/an-unlikely-negotiator-jason-greenblatt-is-pushing-ahead-by-listening-up/">Jason Greenblatt</a>, the executive vice-president and chief legal officer to Donald Trump and The Trump Organisation. The administration’s chosen US Ambassador to Israel, <a href="https://il.usembassy.gov/our-relationship/our-ambassador/">David Friedman</a>, was previously a member of the law firm Kasowitz, Hoff, Benson and Torres – which represents Donald Trump. Along with <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-palestinians-kushner/for-hardline-west-bank-settlers-jared-kushners-their-man-idUSKBN15G4W2">Kushner</a>, both have <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-what-does-trump-s-negotiator-think-about-a-two-state-solution-1.5478326">helped</a> <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/friedman-blasts-haaretz-after-writer-calls-out-settlement-donations-1.5806064">support</a> (individually or through foundations) Jewish settlements in the West Bank, while the Kushner Company continues to do business in Israel. </p>
<p>With Trump’s family and friends running the show, it seems that American influence in the Middle East writ large is no longer a sure thing. More than a year later, as Saudi Arabia still goes about its deadly business in <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-yemeni-women-are-fighting-the-war-89951">Yemen</a>, and the Syrian conflict <a href="https://theconversation.com/syria-update-why-no-one-is-really-winning-the-war-89947">remains intractable</a>, this triad’s chief accomplishment has been to antagonise most of the world and endanger the peace process by having the US <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-trumps-recognition-of-jerusalem-as-the-capital-of-israel-means-for-the-middle-east-88722">recognise Jerusalem as Israel’s capital</a>.</p>
<h2>The Twitter foreign policy</h2>
<p>Then there are Trump’s tweets, which too often drive the global news cycle at the US’s reputational expense. His 280-character missives can recalibrate America’s foreign policy posture in an instant – whether <a href="https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/914497947517227008">contradicting his own secretary of state</a> on North Korea, <a href="http://www.thejournal.ie/trump-germany-3294763-Mar2017/">denouncing fellow NATO members</a>, blowing hot and cold over <a href="https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/946416486054285314">China</a>, or souring the “special relationship” with the UK by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jun/04/trump-berates-london-mayor-sadiq-khan-terror-attacks">deriding the mayor of London</a> and blithely retweeting videos from the far right Islamophobic group <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-britain-first-the-far-right-group-retweeted-by-donald-trump-88407">Britain First</a>.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"914497947517227008"}"></div></p>
<p>What matters here isn’t just the content, but that Trump actually revels in the chaos it creates. As he <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-12-05/trump-s-unpredictable-starting-now-foreign-policy-already-here">said</a> in his first speech on foreign policy during the campaign: “We must as a nation be more unpredictable.” </p>
<p>Trump probably did not think of his statement as a reworking of the <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/donald-trump-madman-strategy-north-korea-nuclear-weapons/">Nixon-Kissinger “madman” ploy</a> of the 1970s. Nor is he likely to have thought through its effects. What matters, in the end, is capturing the world’s attention and settling petty scores.</p>
<h2>The alt-right foreign policy</h2>
<p>Before Trump’s ascendancy, the “alt-right” had little direct influence on policy of any kind. But with Trump elected, its leaders suddenly had their foot in the door. Led by hard right White House chief strategist <a href="http://nationalinterest.org/feature/steve-bannon-launches-his-big-foreign-policy-crusade-22881">Steve Bannon</a>, they pushed for confrontation with China and detachment from NATO as well as protectionism and departure from international agreements such as the Paris climate agreement. Bannon put himself on a key committee of the National Security Council, along with Fox News commentator-turned-Deputy National Security Adviser <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2017/12/03/politics/kt-mcfarland-donald-trump/index.html">K T McFarland</a>.</p>
<p>As 2017 unwound, the the “firebreathers” were eventually checked by pragmatists. General H R McMaster, brought in as National Security Adviser in March, <a href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/4/5/15191532/bannon-removed-nsc-mcmaster-trump">removed Bannon from the National Security Council</a> (he was later <a href="https://theconversation.com/with-bannon-back-at-breitbart-what-will-war-mean-for-the-white-house-82787">fired by Trump altogether</a>). Senior staff <a href="https://www.politico.com/story/2017/07/27/derek-harvey-trump-middle-east-adviser-dismissed-241037">Derek Harvey</a> and <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2017/08/02/politics/nsc-ezra-cohen-watnick/index.html">Ezra Cohen-Watnick</a> were dismissed, as was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/apr/09/kt-mcfarland-national-security-council-singapore-ambassador">McFarland</a>.</p>
<p>But one of the alt-right’s polyps is still at the heart of the Trump operation. <a href="https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/05/stephen-miller-duke-donald-trump">Stephen Miller</a>, who within two years went from e-mail spammer of Washington journalists to senior White House adviser, is not only the main architect of the crackdown on immigration but also the speechwriter behind Trump’s <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-72nd-session-united-nations-general-assembly/">provocative UN General Assembly debut</a> in September 2017 – an address that railed against “a small group of rogue regimes”, threatened to “totally destroy” North Korea, and called its leader Kim Jong-un “Rocket Man”. </p>
<p>As far as Miller is concerned, it seems, the more incendiary and derisory the US government’s tone, the better – whatever the diplomatic and strategic consequences.</p>
<h2>The institutional foreign policy</h2>
<p>These competing tendencies are a brutal test for the structures of US foreign policy, and the stewards of those institutions are clearly on high alert. </p>
<p>McMaster, Defence Secretary James Mattis, and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson are all trying to contain Trump and his inner circle. They have championed the US’s traditional alliances, taken charge of operations in areas such as Afghanistan and Syria, toned down Trump’s fire-and-fury threats to North Korea by discreetly encouraging a diplomatic path, and tried to curb some of the family’s inclinations – especially a Saudi-first approach that threatens the security of a key American military base in Qatar.</p>
<p>But it’s hard to win a fight against true chaos. Kushner and his allies can brief the media against the pragmatists. Trump’s profound impulsiveness can unsettle any plan, especially given his widely reported <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/?utm_term=.1d12a0afa593">lack</a> <a href="http://theweek.com/articles/666931/donald-trump-allknowing-knownothing">of</a> <a href="https://www.axios.com/the-wolff-lines-on-trump-that-ring-unambiguously-true-1515262293-78cf5551-daf2-4c2e-a3de-83da6971f578.html">knowledge</a>. And those who do know what they’re doing are jumping ship: Tillerson has overseen a dramatic depletion of expertise at the State Department, with <a href="http://www.govexec.com/management/2018/02/state-department-lost-12-its-foreign-affairs-specialists-trumps-first-8-months/145874/">12% of foreign service officers departing in just eight months</a>.</p>
<h2>America on the sidelines</h2>
<p>Amid all the competing philosophies and factions, the only thing that’s certain is <a href="https://theconversation.com/north-korea-missile-test-how-trumps-unpredictability-changes-the-game-77908">unpredictability</a>. The administration has issued a <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/new-national-security-strategy-new-era/">National Security Strategy</a>, but with all the chaos and policy clash the inexpert Trump constantly introduces, any “strategy” is doomed to the paper shredder.</p>
<p>And just as Trump’s agencies try to contain him, other countries try to contain the US by sidelining it. Russia has <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/blogs/middleeast/2017/10/syria-war-russia-dominates-astana-talks-171031162925260.html">seized the initiative in Syria</a>; Iran <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/15/world/middleeast/iran-iraq-iranian-power.html">wants it in Iraq</a>; Saudi Arabia pursues it from <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-29319423">Yemen</a> to <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-lebanon-faces-another-crisis-and-what-saudi-arabia-stands-to-lose-87287">Lebanon</a>; Turkey warns that it may <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/the-us-alliance-with-turkey-just-lunged-toward-the-breaking-point/2018/01/23/ebd8c576-008d-11e8-bb03-722769454f82_story.html">walk away from the Americans altogether</a>, and China increasingly calls the shots in East Asia, from the <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-leaders-and-citizens-are-losing-patience-with-north-korea-75262">North Korean problem</a> to the <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2133864/chinas-rising-challenge-us-raises-risk-south-china-sea">South China Sea</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-new-silk-road-is-all-part-of-its-grand-strategy-for-global-influence-70862">economic development</a>. Even European partners are thinking twice about their reliance on what no longer looks like a dependable superpower.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, US-based analysts scramble to find a framework that can express what’s going on while still conveying some sense of American primacy. “Soft power”, which under Obama became “<a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/11/06/hillary-clinton-doctrine-obama-interventionist-tough-minded-president/">smart power</a>”, is now proclaimed as “<a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-01-24/how-sharp-power-threatens-soft-power">sharp power</a>”. And all the while, US power – if measured in the respect for America at the centre of global affairs – plummets in the opinion polling of peoples across the planet.</p>
<p>In his UN speech in September, Trump declared, “As long as I hold this office, I will defend America’s interests above all else.” It remains to be seen, for all his “American First” front, how his multiple foreign policies are defending those interests.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>On February 21, Scott Lucas joined the panel for The Conversation’s joint event with the British Academy, <a href="https://www.eventbrite.co.uk/e/trump-how-to-understand-an-unconventional-president-tickets-42320948095">Trump: How to understand an unconventional President</a>. You can watch a video of the discussion on our <a href="https://www.facebook.com/ConversationUK/">Facebook page</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/91446/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Scott Lucas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Donald Trump doesn’t have one foreign policy – he has several, and they all clash.Scott Lucas, Professor of International Politics, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/894152018-01-04T04:33:16Z2018-01-04T04:33:16ZShould military men draft our nation’s security strategy?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/200764/original/file-20180104-26145-jaggi2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Trump with National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster, left, and Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, center.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Pablo Martinez Monsivais</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>President Donald Trump greeted the new year with an angry tweet about U.S. ally Pakistan. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"947802588174577664"}"></div></p>
<p>Among other things, the tweet accuses Pakistan of giving “safe haven to terrorists we hunt in Afghanistan.” The Pakistani prime minister responded that the tweet was “completely incomprehensible.”</p>
<p>While the subjects of Trump’s tweets are often erratic, this one didn’t come out of nowhere. The Pakistan tweet followed just weeks after Trump unveiled his administration’s National Security Strategy – a document presidents have provided to Congress <a href="http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2017/">since the 1980s</a>. </p>
<p>The 2017 National Security Strategy includes the statement that the “United States continues to face threats from transnational terrorists and militants operating from within Pakistan.”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/200765/original/file-20180104-26148-1jqitnn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/200765/original/file-20180104-26148-1jqitnn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/200765/original/file-20180104-26148-1jqitnn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/200765/original/file-20180104-26148-1jqitnn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/200765/original/file-20180104-26148-1jqitnn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/200765/original/file-20180104-26148-1jqitnn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/200765/original/file-20180104-26148-1jqitnn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A rally to condemn Trump’s New Year’s Day tweet in Karachi, Pakistan on Jan. 2, 2018.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Fareed Khan</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Indeed, it’s possible that the president’s bellicose tweet was inspired by this document – which also happens to be the first National Security Strategy ever shaped primarily by two generals. The office of Army Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster, the national security adviser, coordinated the drafting of the document with the secretary of defense, retired Marine Gen. James Mattis. While military men have served as secretary of defense and national security adviser before, this is the first time both positions are filled by generals at the same time. </p>
<p>I’m currently researching yet another general – Maxwell Taylor – who was engaged in comparable strategy reviews during the 1960s. Taylor was a former Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman, ambassador to South Vietnam and adviser to John F. Kennedy. </p>
<p>Thinking about Taylor’s struggles back during the <a href="http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/journals/10.1163/22115757-03201003">Cold War</a> led me to approach this year’s security document with one main question: Could two military men succeed as the nation’s primary authors of strategy?</p>
<h2>What is strategy?</h2>
<p>The 2017 National Security Strategy, largely in keeping with its predecessors, does a good job at listing problems. It enumerates geopolitical and economic challenges from Russia and China as well as threats from Iran, North Korea and Islamic fundamentalists. It also points at military and other tools for addressing these threats. </p>
<p>Despite President Trump’s dark picture of the world and his rhetorical emphasis on “<a href="https://theconversation.com/trumps-america-first-echoes-from-1940s-59579">America First,</a>” a campaign theme he reiterated in an unusual presidential speech <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/12/18/five-takeaways-from-trumps-national-security-strategy/">unveiling the document</a>, it is <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-administrations-national-security-strategy/">not an isolationist strategy</a>. It also doesn’t disavow globalism, the guiding principle of foreign policy for most of the past century. </p>
<p>Its four pillars – protecting the homeland, promoting prosperity, securing peace through strength and defending American interests – echo themes found in National Security Strategy documents of the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations. McMaster described the new National Security Strategy as <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/mcmaster-we-need-to-act-urgently-to-stop-north-korea">a sober accounting of current threats</a>. </p>
<p>Yet in this year’s document there is a marked absence of political objectives – like spreading democracy – which had been shared by Republican and Democratic administrations all the way back to Woodrow Wilson’s vision of <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/12/18/trumps-national-security-strategy-has-a-values-deficit/">a new world order after World War I</a>.</p>
<p>In this respect, it replicates a flaw already apparent in past decades: The National Security Strategy does not provide actual strategy, but rather guidance on drafting policy. Sound strategy goes beyond simple problem solving. It links means to ends in order to attain a broader political objective.</p>
<p>This document also departs from predecessors in showing less pronounced faith in alliances and international agreements than what underpinned <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/28/us/politics/trump-world-diplomacy.html?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Fmark-landler&action=%CE%A9click&contentCollection=undefined&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=2&pgtype=collection">U.S. foreign policy since 1945</a>. </p>
<h2>Soldiers and strategy</h2>
<p>While Mattis and McMaster appear to work well together, they have different views on the roles of soldiers in shaping strategy.</p>
<p>McMaster made his name as a historian with a book on <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Dereliction-Duty-Johnson-McNamara-Vietnam/dp/0060929081">the flawed decisions that led the U.S. into the Vietnam War</a>. He concluded that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not heard, mainly because civilian leaders in the Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson administrations did not trust them. McMaster believed these military men had a better sense of how to win in Vietnam – or could have prevented the nation from getting involved in an unwinnable war effort in the first place. In a <a href="http://www.pbs.org/video/trump-agenda-1513640521/">Dec. 18 PBS interview</a>, when asked about his lessons from the Vietnam War, McMaster noted it was essential to present the president with all available options. </p>
<p>Mattis, a history major and avid reader, has come to different conclusions about soldiers and strategy. In <a href="http://www.hooverpress.org/Warriors-and-Citizens-P627.aspx">“Warriors and Citizens”</a>, his 2016 book on civil-military relations, co-edited with Kori Schake of the Hoover Institution, Mattis notes that there was a problem with generals taking the lead in defining strategy because they are likely to view threats in isolation from a wider context and end up devising a depoliticized strategy. </p>
<p>Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, who should provide a counterweight to a military-driven strategy, appears to sit on the sidelines. No other major actors on foreign policy have emerged from within the Cabinet or Congress. Even though some pundits have welcomed the steadying role played by <a href="https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/08/04/donald-trump-generals-mattis-mcmaster-kelly-flynn-215455">generals in a mercurial administration</a>, this influence could also be seen as representing an imbalance in civil-military relations that threatens to <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2017/09/why-no-general-should-serve-as-white-house-chief-of-staff/">pull the armed services into the partisan maelstrom</a>. </p>
<p>So how did the military men do? </p>
<p>They may have softened the president’s desire for unilateral action and kept open the door for more international cooperation. McMaster has lauded Trump’s unconventional approach that forced him to <a href="http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/366731-mcmaster-trumps-foreign-policy-approach-is-out-of-my-comfort-zone">reconsider dogma</a>. But this approach, in my opinion, threatens to destabilize a world order largely upheld by the United States, the premier military and diplomatic power since World War II, and one that boosted the American economy to unprecedented heights. </p>
<p>Strategy ought to be the process wherein policymakers and soldiers link operational plans and capabilities to policy objectives. Instead, over the past decades, soldiers have relied overly optimistically on military strength. Civilian leaders, meanwhile, have misidentified policy guidance as strategy. Neither can deter or defeat the threats facing the nation by itself.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89415/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ingo Trauschweizer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The National Security Strategy does a good job at listing problems and suggesting fixes. But there’s more to strategy than that.Ingo Trauschweizer, Associate Professor of History; Director, Contemporary History Institute, Ohio UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/760762017-04-12T00:38:34Z2017-04-12T00:38:34ZDo Ivanka Trump and Jared Kushner have too much power?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164917/original/image-20170411-26736-6d26s0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Donald and Ivanka Trump walk to board Marine One on the South Lawn of the White House, Feb. 1, 2017. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Evan Vucci</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Much attention has been focused recently on President Trump’s “new” foreign policy.</p>
<p>This policy change is symbolized by the U.S. <a href="https://theconversation.com/trumps-attack-on-syria-four-takeaways-75970">missile attack on Syria’s Shayrat airfield</a>, which followed Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s alleged chemical weapon attack on rebels in that country’s Idlib province.</p>
<p>The National Security Council has also been restructured. Former Director Michael Flynn <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/13/politics/michael-flynn-white-house-national-security-adviser/">resigned after lying</a> about his meetings with the Russian ambassador to the U.S. Deputy K.T. McFarland was <a href="http://www.dictionary.com/browse/cashiered">cashiered</a> and <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-04-09/mcfarland-to-exit-white-house-as-mcmaster-consolidates-power">became</a><a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-04-09/mcfarland-to-exit-white-house-as-mcmaster-consolidates-power">U.S. ambassador-designate to Singapore</a>. They have been replaced by retired <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/20/us/politics/mcmaster-national-security-adviser-trump.html?_r=0">General H. R. McMaster</a> as director, and his deputy for strategy, Dina Powell. The removal of Trump adviser Steve Bannon from the principals committee of the council also represents an apparent move to follow more traditional foreign policy-making.</p>
<p>What is driving this apparently positive change? The movement toward an apparently more traditional approach suggests the greater influence of Trump’s daughter Ivanka, <a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/mar/24/ivanka-trump-a-white-house-force-just-not-an-emplo/">who was recently named a regular employee of the White House</a>, and her husband Jared Kushner, a senior adviser to the president over Bannon. Both may be trying to repair what “The Gatekeepers” author <a href="http://www.chriswhipple.net">Chris Whipple</a> has called “the most dysfunctional White House chief of staff and presidency in U.S. history.” </p>
<p>The two family members have strengthened a White House faction Bannon describes, not admiringly, as the “New Yorkers” or simply “Goldman Sachs.” Bannon himself leads an opposing <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/inside-battle-trumps-ear-can-bannon-beat-kushner-581572">faction</a> that is more nationalist, isolationist and populist.</p>
<p>However this rivalry plays out, what has been clear during the “honeymoon phase” of the Trump presidency is that influential individuals have created an incoherent, impulsive style of governance, dominated by personal decision-making processes, such as the overnight decision to bomb Syria. This spasmodic style, ignoring interagency reviews, is new in the modern presidency, even among presidents like Kennedy and Clinton, who involved family members in their administrations. Trump relies on personal relationships, rather than the institutions of democracy.</p>
<p>As a comparative political scientist who studies different types of governments, I’m interested in how personal rule linked to family can erode democratic institutions in favor of authoritarianism. Academics call this “sultanism.”</p>
<p>Let me explain.</p>
<h2>What sultanism means</h2>
<p>It was over a century ago that the famous political sociologist Max Weber developed the concept of sultanism, which, he wrote, <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Economy-Society-Set-Max-Weber/dp/0520280024">“operates primarily on the basis of discretion.”</a></p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/153328/original/image-20170118-26555-l5ezbt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/153328/original/image-20170118-26555-l5ezbt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=728&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/153328/original/image-20170118-26555-l5ezbt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=728&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/153328/original/image-20170118-26555-l5ezbt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=728&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/153328/original/image-20170118-26555-l5ezbt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=915&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/153328/original/image-20170118-26555-l5ezbt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=915&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/153328/original/image-20170118-26555-l5ezbt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=915&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">35th sultan of the Ottoman Empire and 114th caliph of Islam, Mehmed V.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Sultan_Mehmed_V_of_the_Ottoman_Empire_cropped.jpg">Library of Congress</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>“Sultans,” or kings, of the Ottoman Empire were absolute rulers, their power made legitimate by theology. They used arbitrary and despotic powers. Their lifestyles were <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=cTnMY_D63FMC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Ottoman+Empire+decline&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjqtYXQ54DRAhWDRCYKHZxtB44Q6AEIHDAA#v=onepage&q=Ottoman%20Empire%20decline&f=false">lavish and decadent.</a> And over time they lost their power. While rival European empires such as the Hapsburgs’ Austro-Hungary and Weber’s native Germany <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=jGboBAAAQBAJ&pg=PT233&dq=Hapsburg+Kaiser+Wilhelm+Bureaucracy&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwig04Pc6IDRAhUESSYKHdM3D1kQ6AEIUzAI#v=onepage&q=Hapsburg%20Kaiser%20Wilhelm%20Bureaucracy&f=false">were rising</a> in the 19th century as they developed impressive civil and military bureaucracies and procedures, the Ottoman Empire was declining. </p>
<p>Alfred Stepan and the late Juan J. Linz of Columbia University <a href="https://jhupbooks.press.jhu.edu/content/problems-democratic-transition-and-consolidation">argued</a> that sultanism is both a regime type (like democracy and authoritarianism) and an adjective describing a style of personal rule that is possible under all regime types, including democracy. They wrote:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“The essence of sultanism is unrestrained personal rulership … unconstrained by ideology, rational-legal norms, or any balance of power.”<br>
Sultanism, in other words, is most common under authoritarian and autocratic rule, but it can also be present in democracies, when leaders personalize decision-making instead of following established institutional or legal processes.</p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/153324/original/image-20170118-26582-2ax3mn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/153324/original/image-20170118-26582-2ax3mn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=801&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/153324/original/image-20170118-26582-2ax3mn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=801&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/153324/original/image-20170118-26582-2ax3mn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=801&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/153324/original/image-20170118-26582-2ax3mn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1007&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/153324/original/image-20170118-26582-2ax3mn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1007&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/153324/original/image-20170118-26582-2ax3mn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1007&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">‘Papa Doc’ Duvalier of Haiti in 1968.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Some might assume it irrelevant to compare any U.S. leader to <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=rPNSnRYzIdgC&printsec=frontcover&dq=sultanistic+regimes+juan+Linz&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiT7tC_74DRAhVCwiYKHRanCr8Q6AEIJTAA#v=onepage&q=sultanistic%20regimes%20juan%20Linz&f=false">classic sultanistic rulers</a> such as the <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=0ezGBQAAQBAJ&pg=PT202&dq=Francois+Jean+Claude+Duvalier&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjagv3Z7oDRAhWM24MKHSaBD9EQ6AEINzAF#v=onepage&q=Francois%20Jean%20Claude%20Duvalier&f=false">Duvaliers</a> of Haiti, Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines or Joseph Stalin of the Soviet Union. These regimes were nondemocratic and dominated by a single personality with family members intensely involved. </p>
<p>However, like the U.S., South Korea is a democracy and its president, Park Geun-hye, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/12/12/south-koreas-president-was-just-impeached-this-is-what-it-means-and-what-comes-next/?utm_term=.0c810fad4782">was impeached Dec. 9</a> for corrupt activities, many connected to a close family adviser. The adviser, allegedly a <a href="http://www.dictionary.com/browse/shaman">shaman</a>, is herself the daughter of another Rasputin-type religious figure <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/840b203a-b177-11e6-a37c-f4a01f1b0fa1">who had also secretly advised</a> the president’s father during his 18 years in office. </p>
<p>Another example can be found in Nicaragua. President Daniel Ortega – who packed his Supreme Court to allow him a third consecutive term – has as his vice president his wife, Rosario Murillo. She is one of the few leaders he trusts, <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/31/world/americas/nicaragua-daniel-ortega-rosario-murillo-house-of-cards.html">having alienated much of his party.</a> </p>
<h2>American precedents</h2>
<p>For its part, the U.S. has had sultanistic tendencies of its own in the past. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/153325/original/image-20170118-26582-1f1rmpb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/153325/original/image-20170118-26582-1f1rmpb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/153325/original/image-20170118-26582-1f1rmpb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/153325/original/image-20170118-26582-1f1rmpb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/153325/original/image-20170118-26582-1f1rmpb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=597&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/153325/original/image-20170118-26582-1f1rmpb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=597&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/153325/original/image-20170118-26582-1f1rmpb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=597&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President John F. Kennedy and Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy with FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/pingnews/274988824">National Archives</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>President John F. Kennedy’s closest adviser and his attorney general was his younger brother, Robert, indispensable during the perilous time of the Cuba Missile Crisis. And JFK, while in office and sometimes with his brother Robert involved, took enormous risks in having flings with women with dubious political connections - from a <a href="http://articles.latimes.com/1999/sep/26/news/mn-14342">socialite with links to the mob</a> to a <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/books/97/11/30/reviews/971130.30powerst.html">possible East German spy</a>. This is not mere indiscretion.</p>
<p>The reaction of Congress to all this was to pass, in 1967, the <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/3110">Anti-Nepotism Statute</a> – nicknamed the <a href="http://time.com/4574971/donald-trump-transition-jared-kushner-legal-anti-nepotism-law/">“Bobby Kennedy Law”</a> – to make sure close relatives no longer assume official positions. <a href="https://concurringopinions.com/archives/2012/06/nepotism-and-the-cabinet.html">Some suggest</a>, however, that the law does not exclude unofficial advisers.</p>
<p>Another example of sultanistic practices is Hillary Clinton, who was her president-husband’s lead and unpaid adviser on health care reform. </p>
<p>And then, in George W. Bush’s Cabinet, the two most powerful foreign policy advisers – Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Cheney – were both alumni of George H. W. Bush’s administration. After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Rumsfeld and Cheney, with Bush’s approval, established <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/05/books/review/spies-and-spymasters.html">arbitrary policy</a> that permitted <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Official-Senate-Report-Torture-Interrogation/dp/1634506022/ref=pd_sbs_14_t_1?_encoding=UTF8&psc=1&refRID=X8SN4WTC04VSQQA6MC6J">torture</a>, warrantless surveillance and targeted assassinations. </p>
<p>These Bush-era “law-free” zones in national security matters, which some have called <a href="http://illinoislawreview.org/wp-content/ilr-content/articles/2013/2/Alexander.pdf">dictatorial</a>, were based on the legal concept of the “unitary executive.” The idea is that the judicial and legislative branches cannot check or regulate the president on “executive” matters, especially those involving national security.</p>
<p><a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/The_Imperial_Presidency.html?id=zbLO9aNL6ncC">The unitary executive</a> facilitated sultanism by asserting that the president monopolizes all executive power, however exercised. As <a href="http://loc.gov/law/help/usconlaw/pdf/senate%20judiciary%20sept_16_%202008.pdf">some noted constitutional scholars</a> have said, this theory basically places the president above the law. </p>
<h2>What makes Trump different</h2>
<p>Most modern American presidents have risen through the institutions of U.S. democracy – state political parties, Capitol Hill, the military. They have been vetted and embedded in institutional rules, attitudes and relationships. Someone like Trump, coming in “from the cold,” in contrast, brings his family and close associates and makes decisions outside of those formal and informal institutions. </p>
<p>Having masterminded his unexpected victory based on an unconventional campaign, Trump has already shown a tendency to trust his instincts on major decisions of governance, creating impulsive, unpredictable decisions. His past record as CEO and his outsider status make Trump self-reliant and assured that most of the world is misguided and only he and his few trusted advisers, including his family, have the answers. </p>
<p>When questioned, for example, on <a href="https://www.donaldjtrump.com/press-releases/donald-j.-trump-statement-on-preventing-muslim-immigration">his pledge</a> to ban Muslims from entering the country “until our country’s representatives can figure out what is going on,” Trump said: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“What I’m doing is no different than FDR. If you look at what he was doing, it was far worse … and he’s one of the most highly respected presidents — they name highways after him.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Here Trump was evoking the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korematsu_v._United_States">1944 Korematsu decision</a>, which upheld almost unlimited executive powers over immigration to permit the detention of Japanese-Americans without any evidence (and none existed) of subversion. This decision is considered by many <a href="http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2015/12/trumps-muslim-comments-start-a-debate-with-constitutional-scholars/">constitutional scholars</a> as the most ignominious in Supreme Court history, a “tragic mistake that we should not repeat.” Even the late Justice <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/02/08/justice-scalia-on-kelo-and-korematsu/?utm_term=.dce59aacb4ae">Antonin Scalia disavowed it as an “error.”</a> </p>
<p>The U.S. presidency has always been prone to sultantistic tendencies, but under a Trump presidency what were once isolated incidents have predictably become a way of governing. When the closest advisers, both institutional (like Ivanka and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/01/09/tumps-son-in-law-jared-kushner-expected-to-join-white-house-as-a-senior-adviser/?utm_term=.1e5a5de2104b">Kushner</a>) and informal (in the case of his two adult sons), are dominated by family members, the decision-making process will not only be erratic and possibly influenced by private family interests but also tend to ignore legal procedures that have also met the test of time. </p>
<p>Instead of <a href="https://hbr.org/2009/04/leadership-lessons-from-abraham-lincoln">a “team of rivals”</a> under the rule of law, the Trump presidency may be akin to medieval monarchy, with decisions made by court politics, not legal procedures.</p>
<p><em>Editor’s note: This piece updates <a href="https://theconversation.com/sultan-donald-trump-68921">Sultan Donald Trump?</a>, which originally ran on Jan. 20, 2017.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76076/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Henry F. (Chip) Carey does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Does Trump’s family have too much sway in the White House? We consider parallels ranging from the Ottoman empire to the Clinton administration.Henry F. (Chip) Carey, Associate Professor, Political Science , Georgia State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/740162017-03-13T19:52:39Z2017-03-13T19:52:39ZWhat’s the purpose of President Trump’s Navy?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/160361/original/image-20170310-19266-1baq8bj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The USS Gerald Ford in Newport News, Virginia, cost nearly $13 billion to build. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Steve Helber</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>President Trump visited Newport News at the beginning of March to deliver a <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/02/politics/donald-trump-navy-speech-virginia/">speech</a> aboard the soon-to-be commissioned USS Gerald R. Ford aircraft carrier. It provided a timely reminder of his campaign <a href="http://conservativetribune.com/what-trump-promised-navy/">pledge</a> that he would increase the size of the fleet from the current figure of 272 to 350 ships over the next three decades. This is significantly more than the Obama-era plans to increase the fleet to <a href="http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/national/national-security/article107782747.html">308 ships.</a></p>
<p>How this decision fits with any broader grand strategy is <a href="http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-us-navys-great-magic-numbers-challenge-18771">unclear</a>. Critics have debated whether Trump has <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/31/trumps-grand-strategic-train-wreck/">one.</a> Indeed, a recent New York Times story suggested the growth of the military may simply be for the purpose of possessing raw military power rather than part of any serious <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/03/world/americas/donald-trump-us-military.html?smprod=nytcore-ipad&smid=nytcore-ipad-share&_r=0">strategizing.</a> </p>
<p>Trump’s decision to focus on building a more powerful global Navy, however, fits with a longstanding American strategic tradition. It dates back to naval officer and historian Alfred Thayer Mahan’s classic <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Influence-History-1660-1783-Military-Weapons/dp/0486255093/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1488581457&sr=8-1&keywords=Alfred+Thayer+Mahan">“The Influence of Seapower on History</a>,” which was written on the cusp of America’s emergence as a global power at the end of the 19th century. In Mahan’s vision, a great Navy would promote America’s commercial interests at home and abroad. It was, and for many still <a href="http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/?GCOI=80140100743820">is</a>, the foundation of any “grand strategy.” </p>
<p>But a key question remains: Does Trump’s specified goal of 350 ships meet the needs of the nation in the 21st century? How does this fit into a strategic vision for U.S. security? </p>
<h2>Why 350 ships?</h2>
<p>The new budget proposal reportedly calls for increasing the 2018 Defense Budget <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/27/us/politics/trump-budget-military.html?_r=0">by US$54 billion.</a> This won’t itself pay for an ambitious expansion of the Navy. The USS Gerald R. Ford alone cost about <a href="http://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-us-navys-new-13-billion-aircraft-carrier-will-dominate-the-seas-2016-03-09">$13 billion</a>. It will, therefore, take many years of spending to move building projects forward. But as the Trump administration’s plans, if enacted, make clear, buying more ships will mean cuts to <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/27/politics/trump-budget-proposal/">foreign aid, environmental protection and a series of regulatory agencies.</a> These are choices that have been <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2017/02/28/us/politics/ap-us-trump-diplomatic-cutbacks.html?_r=0">roundly criticized</a> by former military officials and senior policymakers. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/160362/original/image-20170310-19247-j659pc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/160362/original/image-20170310-19247-j659pc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/160362/original/image-20170310-19247-j659pc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160362/original/image-20170310-19247-j659pc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160362/original/image-20170310-19247-j659pc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160362/original/image-20170310-19247-j659pc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160362/original/image-20170310-19247-j659pc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160362/original/image-20170310-19247-j659pc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Trump visiting the Newport News Shipbuilding in early March to announce his plans for the Navy.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Steve Helber</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Moreover, there are few civilian officials available to answer the question of what purpose the Navy’s growth serves. That is because there is currently a dearth of administrative appointments to key leadership positions in the Navy and the Department of Defense. So there is no evident strategy to justify this new target.</p>
<p>The man <a href="http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/defense/314491-why-theres-only-one-choice-for-trumps-navy-secretary">initially anointed by the Washington rumor mill</a> as the next secretary of the Navy was ex-congressman Randy Forbes, formerly of the Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces of the House Arms Services Committee and a vocal supporter of American naval power. </p>
<p>Forbes was passed over in favor of Phillip Bilden, a businessmen with ties to both the Army and the Navy. Bilden, however, <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/navy-secretary-nominee-withdraws_us_58b36fa7e4b0a8a9b7833b52?whi9ajh5kuj6ob6gvi&">withdrew from consideration</a> when it became clear that ethics rules would require him to disentangle himself from his extensive business holdings. The vacuum remains unfilled. Now, in a strange turn of events, <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/president-trump-considers-two-candidates-for-navy-secretary-1488928814">Forbes is once again in the running</a>. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the preferences of the new Secretary of Defense General Mattis and National Security Adviser General H.R. McMaster regarding the size, shape and purposes of the Navy are unknown. </p>
<p>Both are well-read, broadly educated, deep thinkers on U.S. and global security. But both participated in ground wars in the Middle East. They are therefore assumed to be advocates of land forces, not naval power. In the past, they have focused on conventional wars, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, rather than maritime challenges. </p>
<h2>The Navy’s view</h2>
<p>Even in normal periods, fleet design is a complicated bureaucratic dance with budgets, internal procedures and external interventions from Congress to be negotiated. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/160557/original/image-20170313-9637-s5dxjk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/160557/original/image-20170313-9637-s5dxjk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=853&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160557/original/image-20170313-9637-s5dxjk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=853&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160557/original/image-20170313-9637-s5dxjk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=853&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160557/original/image-20170313-9637-s5dxjk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1073&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160557/original/image-20170313-9637-s5dxjk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1073&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160557/original/image-20170313-9637-s5dxjk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1073&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ronald Reagan was a big Navy fan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ron Edmonds/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In times of crisis or great political change, the strong preferences of presidents, their advisers and the civilian leaders or the military services can play a decisive role. Most famously, <a href="http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/1990/1990%20mearsheimer.pdf">Secretary of the Navy John Lehman,</a> at the behest of President Reagan, championed a 600-ship Navy to counter the rapidly growing Soviet fleet and threats to Europe, the Far East and elsewhere.</p>
<p>Even before candidate Trump shined the spotlight on the Navy, the service was, of course, planning for the future. </p>
<p>The Navy released its latest vision statement, <a href="http://www.navy.mil/cno/docs/cno_stg.pdf">“A Design for Maritime Superiority,”</a> in January 2016. It resoundingly defended the ideal that the United States is a maritime nation and a premier naval power, specifically naming China and Russia as potential aggressors on the high seas. It didn’t specify a target fleet size although the documents could be construed as justifying the sort of overall budget growth proposed by Trump. </p>
<p>Still Congress, forcefully egged on by Representative Forbes, who felt the Obama administration and the Navy itself were <a href="https://news.usni.org/2014/10/01/randy-forbes-cno-greenert-navy-desperately-needs-strategy">neglecting</a> naval strategy, mandated three independent studies to examine the future fleet. Interestingly, when completed, none of the three alternatives proposes anything like a 350-ship fleet by 2030, despite errant reports to the contrary. </p>
<p>Recent news reports suggesting that the alternative fleet architecture proposed by the think tank <a href="https://www.mitre.org/publications">the MITRE Corp.</a> called for <a href="http://breakingdefense.com/2017/02/414-ships-no-lcs-mitres-alternative-navy/">over 400 ships</a> misinterpreted the study. In fact, the MITRE authors recommend a far smaller fleet because they explicitly recognize the costs of building up to such a large number.</p>
<p>All three studies focus on new war-fighting concepts such as <a href="https://news.usni.org/2016/09/13/navy-fleet-embracing-distributed-operations-as-a-way-to-regain-sea-control">distributed maritime operations</a>, new types of platforms including unmanned systems and new technologies including rail guns (that can repeatedly launch a projectile <a href="http://www.popsci.com/article/technology/navy-wants-fire-its-ridiculously-strong-railgun-ocean">at more than 5,000 miles per hour</a>). Capacity and fleet size are obviously not the same thing, despite the current focus on numbers of ships.</p>
<p>The point is that analysis underpinning the Navy’s own vision for the future is different from that of the new president. </p>
<p>To date, the president has concentrated on the overall number of ships while the Navy and the congressionally mandated studies focused on war-fighting capabilities and war-fighting concepts. What is missing from the president’s target of a 350-ship Navy is an underlying strategy – one that links what is proverbially called the “ways, means and ends” necessary to defend American interests on the high seas. </p>
<p>Working outward, the national security community, the public and indeed America’s allies and adversaries need to understand the logic underlying any historic naval buildup. A clear statement regarding the primary threats facing the U.S., the types of adversaries it will face and the nature of future conflict would help explain why the American taxpayer is investing so much national treasure in the military services. </p>
<p>After all, if Russia is not the enemy, and we don’t need a big Navy to defeat the Islamic State, then why spend so much? </p>
<h2>‘Military operations other than war’</h2>
<p>So far, Trump has not offered an answer for the nation to rally behind and to reassure his critics. </p>
<p>In its absence, experts have sought reassurance in the president’s fragmentary and sporadic pronouncements to support their own vision. Neo-isolationists have <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2017-02-24/nigel-farage-at-cpac-brexit-trump-show-isolationism-is-winning">cheered his efforts</a> to close American borders. Others have warmed to the notion that he has suggested our allies assume <a href="http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/12/03/europes-security-dilemma/">more responsibility</a> for their own defense. Even proponents of old-fashioned primacy have sought luster by interpreting the president’s defense buildup as <a href="http://www.fpri.org/article/2016/01/detached-primacy-musings-trump-doctrine/">a return to the unilateralist days</a> of American military prowess through intervention. </p>
<p>Our own research suggests that the truth is that none of these grand visions may apply. The Navy, and indeed the other military services, face a growing demand for their services. They are now being asked to perform an increasing number of functions that are <a href="http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/History/Monographs/Other_Than_War.pdf">not associated with fighting wars</a>. </p>
<p>The military even has a term for it: “MOOTW” (<a href="http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/jp-doctrine/jp3_07.pdf">military operations other than war</a>). And the U.S. Navy’s MOOTW ranges from conventional war-fighting against other countries’ navies to policing the globe against pirates, drug flows and the smuggling of nuclear materials, humanitarian assistance and even fighting Ebola in Africa. These activities consume much of the Navy’s time. And their increasing demands require increased resources. Military budgets therefore often reflect the requirements entailed in providing these services as much as the need to conform to any one image.</p>
<p>Of course, congressional democrats may yet scuttle plans for an enlarged Navy. Alternatively, the president may move beyond discussing discrete missions to a more coherent grand strategy – perhaps tutored by his new senior military appointments – that justifies acquisition decisions. </p>
<p>The types of ships (and aircraft, and unmanned systems and equipment) purchased in the coming years will make sense only if they are employed in an operationally coherent manner. Only then will the American public be able to judge if the trade-offs made to fund such an enterprise were worth it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/74016/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Reich receives funding from The Gerda Henkel Foundation</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Dombrowski does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Does the president’s specified goal of 350 ships meet the needs of the nation in the 21st century? The answer is not yet clear.Simon Reich, Professor in The Division of Global Affairs and The Department of Political Science, Rutgers University - NewarkPeter Dombrowski, Professor, Strategic Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, US Naval War CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.