tag:theconversation.com,2011:/fr/topics/hutu-23224/articlesHutu – The Conversation2024-01-30T10:09:59Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2177022024-01-30T10:09:59Z2024-01-30T10:09:59ZBurundi’s quota for women in politics has had mixed results, but that’s no reason to scrap it<p>Since 2005, Burundi has <a href="https://adsdatabase.ohchr.org/IssueLibrary/BURUNDI_Constitution.pdf#page=23">set quotas</a> to ensure that the country’s three ethnic groups (Hutu, Tutsi and Twa), as well as women, are represented in its parliament, central government and municipal administrations. Its constitution states that women should make up at least <a href="https://adsdatabase.ohchr.org/IssueLibrary/BURUNDI_Constitution.pdf#page=23">30% of these institutions</a>. </p>
<p>The senate, Burundi’s highest chamber of parliament, recently started a <a href="https://constitutionnet.org/news/review-constitutionalized-ethnic-quotas-burundi-turning-point">process of evaluating</a> ethnic quotas in political institutions. This <a href="https://www.voaafrica.com/a/burundi--ethnic-quota-system-under-senate-evaluation/7210281.html">process</a> is expected to lead to recommendations on whether quotas should continue to be used. Regrettably, the evaluation lacks methodological rigour and transparency.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=fr&user=hAOjiu8AAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">researchers</a> with a focus on <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=fr&user=9Gwdmm8AAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">gender representation</a> in <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/search?q=Stef%20Vandeginste">politics</a>, we believe this is a missed opportunity. Gender and ethnic quotas have been adopted in Burundi as a forward-looking solution to sustainable peace. A decision about removing them should be based on whether they have met (or can meet) their goals. </p>
<p>In a <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/epub/10.1177/00020397231203021">recent paper</a>, we examined whether gender quotas foster Burundian women’s political representation. </p>
<p>We drew on data covering the period between October 2001 and June 2020 to determine three things:</p>
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<li><p>whether Burundian political actors abide by the gender quotas</p></li>
<li><p>the relative importance of ministerial portfolios allocated to women </p></li>
<li><p>whether these gender quotas have had an effect on government positions where they aren’t mandated. </p></li>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/political-representation-ethnicity-trumps-gender-in-burundi-and-rwanda-104146">Political representation: ethnicity trumps gender in Burundi and Rwanda</a>
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<p>We found that gender quotas have gradually resulted in women being assigned to prominent ministerial portfolios. The impact of this, however, has been mixed. </p>
<p>Women have remained confined to typically “feminine”, care-giving ministerial portfolios, such as health and education, over nearly two decades. They have been excluded from portfolios such as defence, security and foreign affairs. Their representation as senior advisers to the president or as CEOs of parastatals has remained marginal. </p>
<p>Our research illustrates that embedding gender quotas in the constitution can fast-track representation. But it doesn’t necessarily spiral beyond the targeted positions and institutions. This implies that any policy targeting an increase in women’s representation needs to take into account the broader political setting. </p>
<p>While <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13537113.2022.2047248">formal mechanisms</a> to enforce gender quotas in government and parliament in Burundi are in place, they are absent in other important and sought-after positions, such as parastatal CEO or provincial governor.</p>
<h2>Meeting the gender quota</h2>
<p>Gender quotas have been consistently respected in Burundi since 2005. </p>
<p>The country has one of the highest shares of women in parliament. It ranks <a href="https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2023.pdf#page=18">41st</a> out of 145 countries in the 2023 global political empowerment metric. </p>
<p>This is mostly because gender quotas are compatible with clientelistic politics. Most women positions are <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/00020397231203021#page=4">allocated</a> to people related to key regime figures. This has led to the <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/00020397231203021">increasing assignment</a> of women to key portfolios like justice, health and education. </p>
<p>In theory, one might <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/CBA8C55CF243B6364C5DCE5D0D0AAAC6/S1743923X15000434a.pdf/div-class-title-rules-of-ministerial-recruitment-div.pdf">expect</a> that gender quotas would affect both the supply and demand side of women political elites, triggering an upsurge in women’s representation. </p>
<p>Burundi’s cabinet ministers, of whom 30% are women, nominate individuals to head departments under their jurisdiction. The pool of qualified candidates for such positions has increased as more women take on political responsibilities. Ideally, this should facilitate the nomination of women, even when there are no quotas.</p>
<p>But the gender quotas in Burundi have <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/burundian-women-want-greater-say-running-country">fallen short</a> of spilling over into quota-free positions. Women are still under-represented as senior advisers to the president, permanent secretaries in ministries or CEOs of parastatals.</p>
<p>Our interviews with political elites and women civil society activists revealed two ways women are sidelined.</p>
<p>First, women are not fully embedded in the formal and informal structures that decide who to appoint where and when. </p>
<p>For instance, women are not in the ruling party’s main decision-making body, <a href="https://brill.com/display/book/9789004355910/B9789004355910_031.xml">Conseil des Sage</a> (council of the wise). They are also not part of the ruling party’s Cercle des Généraux (circle of generals). This is a group of former army and police generals who enjoy a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13698249.2017.1381819">de facto veto right</a> to any important decisions. Equally important, women aren’t appointed as provincial and municipal party executive secretaries. These are the career brokers and connectors between grassroots ruling party structures, the party’s leadership and the president.</p>
<p>Second, the ruling party has increasingly <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13698249.2016.1205561">relied on coercion</a> to maintain its dominance in politics since 2005. It relies heavily on hardliners, most of whom are former combatants in Imbonerakure, the party’s youth league, or Abahumure, party veterans. </p>
<p>In the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13698249.2016.1205561">paramilitary power configuration</a> that has prevailed in Burundi since the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Pierre-Nkurunziza">ruling party’s accession to power</a>, the ability to wage violence has become a valued “skill set”. This is a comparative disadvantage for women, leading to their under-representation in appointed positions where gender quotas don’t apply.</p>
<h2>Opportunistic use of quotas</h2>
<p><a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/00020397231203021#page=11">Our research found</a> that women made important gains in high-value ministerial positions, in cabinet positions and in provincial governor positions in the 2015-2020 legislature. Their representation in high-visibility ministries increased, growing their political role. </p>
<p>On the surface of it, it may appear to be due to the gender quota policy. However, this would have taken a longer time to produce the desired effects. In our view, the 2015-2020 legislature resulted from a <a href="https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context=hrbregionalcoverage-spring2016#page=2">chaotic and contested electoral process</a> in 2015 that was marred by massive human rights violations. </p>
<p>This election prompted key donors, such as the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/mar/15/eu-suspends-aid-to-burundi-government">European Union</a>, to withdraw support to the government. We see what resulted as an <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/2CB1F142F6235323B08B506601376DE9/S0017257X2200032Xa.pdf/div-class-title-the-appointment-of-women-to-authoritarian-cabinets-in-africa-div.pdf">opportunistic use</a> of gender quotas as a window dressing strategy. It was an effort to sanitise a regime that had become an international pariah. </p>
<h2>What next</h2>
<p>Gender quotas have the potential to increase women’s representation in decision-making positions. However, to lead to sustainable change, governments need to take into account informal political practices. These include the role played by multiple layers of clientelistic networks in accessing key political positions. Women’s integration in political parties’ formal and informal structures would better level the playing field.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217702/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Any state policy looking to increase women’s representation must take into account formal and informal political practices.Reginas Ndayiragije, Associate researcher, University of AntwerpPetra Meier, Professor of Politics, University of AntwerpStef Vandeginste, Associate Professor, University of AntwerpLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2048342023-06-21T14:58:31Z2023-06-21T14:58:31ZRwanda: Paul Kagame is a dictator who clings to power but it’s not just for his own gain<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/524433/original/file-20230504-25-9wocho.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Paul Kagame at a commemoration of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda in April 2023. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mariam Kone/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Rwanda’s president Paul Kagame <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/cwlw3xz0zdet/rwanda">recently said</a> he was looking forward to his retirement after 23 years in power. Speaking to the press in April 2023, he claimed he “may join journalism in my old age” – a somewhat surprising choice, given the poor <a href="https://rsf.org/en/country/rwanda">state of the freedom of the press</a> in Rwanda.</p>
<p>But the chances that Kagame will actually step down seem rather small. After a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-rwanda-politics-idUKKBN0U209D20151219">controversial referendum</a> in 2015, Rwandans voted to extend presidential term limits, allowing Kagame to rule potentially until 2034. More recently, Kagame was <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/video/20230404-paul-kagame-re-elected-as-head-of-rpf">re-elected to head the ruling party</a> – the Rwandan Patriotic Front – for another five years. And last year he suggested that he might <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2OBIiz0PJgQ">run for president again</a> in Rwanda’s 2024 elections. He said:</p>
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<p>I would consider running for another 20 years. I have no problem with that. Elections are about people choosing.</p>
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<p>While the 65-year-old leader seems to be open to the idea of retirement, he continues to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/cwlw3xz0zdet/rwanda">feel duty-bound</a> to serve his country, saying:</p>
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<p>We have been having this discussion within our (ruling) party since 2010 but circumstances, challenges and the history of Rwanda tend to dictate certain things.</p>
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<p>My <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/5982/chapter-abstract/149350840?redirectedFrom=fulltext">research</a> suggests Kagame is not only acting out of self-interest. For the past decade, I have studied dictators – broadly defined as leaders who <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26798255?casa_token=H1VtUP6OXN4AAAAA%3ACN4ZMpqRQLjTVWADVkXNAy7DkihYbR37keo8XMMpN6KUdqpLTa1nJyH40iUKhIp-ZKKCl_xcF_PWJnL83ej-Sf_QMuCsg95AIYSyk3X67O8ptoy1N_AH">cannot be removed through elections</a>, or where political opposition doesn’t operate on a level playing field. I have tried to <a href="https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/289/289">nuance the assumption</a> that all dictators are <a href="https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/the-rationality-of-dictators-towards-a-more-effective-implementat">power hungry</a>. Some dictators are. But often their motives to rule their countries are more complex.</p>
<p>In my view, this is the case with Kagame. While staying in power is necessary to attaining his vision for Rwanda, it isn’t a goal in itself. Kagame’s end goal seems to be a safe and prosperous Rwanda, but not one that’s meant to benefit all Rwandans equally. </p>
<p>Although it’s prohibited by law to differentiate among Hutu and Tutsi, ethnic differences <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/abs/recycled-rhetoric-examining-continuities-in-political-rhetoric-as-a-resilience-strategy-in-preindependence-and-postgenocide-rwanda/CED46BA1D5DD5615E259DDDA4F5412E5">still matter in Rwanda</a> – <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/abs/rhetorical-legacies-of-leadership-projections-of-benevolent-leadership-in-pre-and-postgenocide-rwanda/916F556DD2CFAB34AEF40A509E4D9229">favouring</a> <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2021/11/from-ethnic-amnesia-to-ethnocracy-80-of-rwanda-top-officials-are-tutsi/">Tutsi refugees</a> who were driven out of their country in pre-1994 episodes of genocidal violence. Former refugees like Kagame.</p>
<p>Kagame is indeed a <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/5982/chapter-abstract/149350840?redirectedFrom=fulltext">dictator</a> who <a href="https://vu.on.worldcat.org/oclc/714811956">restricts</a> serious political opposition, independent media and civil society. But he doesn’t rule only for the sake of being in power. I argue that he’s motivated by more than innate self-interest, which is likely to make him more <a href="https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/the-rationality-of-dictators-towards-a-more-effective-implementat">persevering</a> in the pursuit of his goals.</p>
<h2>Kagame’s Rwanda</h2>
<p>The circumstances, challenges and history of Rwanda are intertwined with Kagame’s own life story. Following a genocidal killing spree that began in 1959 and targeted his ethnic community, the Tutsi, Kagame and his family <a href="https://vu.on.worldcat.org/search/detail/56058176?queryString=waugh%20kagame&clusterResults=true&groupVariantRecords=false">were forced to flee to Uganda</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/919559500">Life as a refugee</a> was difficult. Kagame was confronted with discrimination and became politically conscious as he grew older. This culminated in his role as the leader of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Rwandan-Patriotic-Front">Rwandan Patriotic Front</a>, which fought in Rwanda’s civil war in 1990, and eventually to end the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26875506">1994 genocide</a>. </p>
<p>Throughout his ascent to Rwanda’s highest office in 2000, Kagame has been <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/5982/chapter-abstract/149350840?redirectedFrom=fulltext">pragmatic and ruthless</a>. </p>
<p>The Rwandan Patriotic Front’s <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/rwanda-progress-or-powder-keg/">invasion of Rwanda from Uganda</a> in 1990 sparked a civil war. Kagame was <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Stephen-Kinzer-Thousand-Rwandas-5-2-2008/dp/B00HTKBBR0">realistic</a> about what his forces were able to do and was <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/919559500">more open to the eventual peace talks</a> than many others in his ranks were. </p>
<p>Yet, when mediation failed and the 1994 genocide needed to be ended, Kagame didn’t shy away from <a href="https://www.utpjournals.press/doi/pdf/10.3138/gsi.12.2.03">perpetrating mass atrocities</a> to <a href="https://vu.on.worldcat.org/oclc/714811956">attain this end</a>. After he got into power, his <a href="https://uwpress.wisc.edu/books/4876.htm">ruthless tactics</a> targeted anyone he believed to be an enemy at home and abroad <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/1/article/586476/summary?casa_token=fIZfzS2BSB0AAAAA:e79DaDyhEhWY5BqB4gCoA-JyMoDKnyGaFnrdv2tyHkX-ugS8M9lCzRfu5M7CRfhKic3IeK3iU6k">in the Democratic Republic of Congo</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/paul-kagame-could-be-president-of-rwanda-until-2035-whats-behind-his-staying-power-204051">Paul Kagame could be president of Rwanda until 2035 - what's behind his staying power</a>
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<p>Kagame is also idealistic. He has consistently worked towards the same goal, against all odds, for most of his adult life. He sees the end as justifying the means – whether this entails sacrificing innocent lives to save others during the genocide, or sacrificing freedom for prosperity in post-genocide Rwanda. But for Kagame, <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/919559500">idealism</a> goes hand in hand with pragmatism: </p>
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<p>If you are driven by the ideal, but you are able to recognise and work with reality, then managing this reality will help you to embrace it and get there. So, the marathon is the long journey we take towards development, it is reality. But we are driven by an ideal, and this ideal allows us to sprint forward; it motivates us; it helps us to achieve our goals and manage reality.</p>
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<p>Kagame has <a href="https://vu.on.worldcat.org/search/detail/828735733?queryString=rwanda%20crisafulli%20redmond&stickyFacetsChecked=false&clusterResults=true&groupVariantRecords=false&format=Book&subformat=Book%3A%3Abook_printbook&subformat=Book%3A%3Abook_digital&changedFacet=format">received</a> credit for the manner in which Rwanda prospered after the genocide into a clean, modern country with a growing economy. </p>
<p>These achievements are <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/rwanda/overview">impressive</a> in many respects. But as various <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/abs/recycled-rhetoric-examining-continuities-in-political-rhetoric-as-a-resilience-strategy-in-preindependence-and-postgenocide-rwanda/CED46BA1D5DD5615E259DDDA4F5412E5">studies</a> have <a href="https://vu.on.worldcat.org/oclc/714811956">shown</a>, this growth hasn’t benefited all Rwandans equally. </p>
<p>This is because the president’s <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/23018900">allegiance</a> <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2021/11/from-ethnic-amnesia-to-ethnocracy-80-of-rwanda-top-officials-are-tutsi/">lies with</a> his fellow Tutsi.</p>
<h2>Kagame’s mission</h2>
<p>In my view, <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/5982/chapter/149350840">Kagame’s goal</a> is to create a home for the Tutsi population that was chased out of Rwanda before the 1994 genocide. </p>
<p>The president launched a project of social engineering where, on the surface, ethnicity <a href="https://vu.on.worldcat.org/search/detail/714811956?lang=nl&clusterResults=true&groupVariantRecords=false&queryString=remaking%20rwanda&stickyFacetsChecked=false">no longer matters</a> and the economy is thriving due to extensive modernisation. </p>
<p>But <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-rwandas-annual-genocide-commemoration-fans-the-flame-of-ethnicity-186244">ethnicity continues to matter</a>. An example of this is that, for nearly 10 years, the Tutsi have come to be recognised as the only genocide survivors in the country. In <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-rwandas-annual-genocide-commemoration-fans-the-flame-of-ethnicity-186244">2014</a>, Kagame officially renamed the genocide “the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi”. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-rwandas-annual-genocide-commemoration-fans-the-flame-of-ethnicity-186244">How Rwanda's annual genocide commemoration fans the flame of ethnicity</a>
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<p>The name change suggests that only the Tutsi are victimised. Consequently, the Hutu are perceived as either <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/abs/recycled-rhetoric-examining-continuities-in-political-rhetoric-as-a-resilience-strategy-in-preindependence-and-postgenocide-rwanda/CED46BA1D5DD5615E259DDDA4F5412E5">culpable bystanders or perpetrators</a>. It obscures the fact that moderate Hutus were targeted as well in 1994. </p>
<p>In addition, some scholars have <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Political-Chronicles-African-Region-French/dp/9057187574">questioned the extent of Rwanda’s economic progress</a>. An Ansoms, a professor in development studies, states that the country’s apparent modernisation hides “<a href="https://vu.on.worldcat.org/oclc/714811956">the true extent of poverty and inequality in the countryside</a>”. </p>
<p>For as long as Kagame believes he hasn’t <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/5982/chapter/149350840">fulfilled his goal</a> of creating a prosperous and stable Rwanda that can be home to former Tutsi refugees like himself, he will continue to seek power.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204834/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Maartje Weerdesteijn does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The circumstances, challenges and history of Rwanda are intertwined with Paul Kagame’s own life story.Maartje Weerdesteijn, Assistant Professor, Vrije Universiteit AmsterdamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2074232023-06-12T14:51:41Z2023-06-12T14:51:41ZRwanda genocide accused Félicien Kabuga is ruled unfit to stand trial: this will further erode trust in international justice<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531219/original/file-20230610-107201-wj7ibu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Simon Wohlfahrt/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals recently <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-65826274">concluded</a> a two-year court hearing on Félicien Kabuga. Kabuga is accused of crimes against humanity during the Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda in 1994. The court ruled that he was <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/06/07/africa/felicien-kabuga-trial-incapable-intl/index.html">not mentally fit for trial</a>.</em> </p>
<p><em>The court proposed that the tribunal judges find an “alternative procedure that resembles a trial as closely as possible, but without the possibility of a conviction”. What this “alternative procedure” will look like is still not fully known. Rwanda’s ambassador to the Netherlands, Olivier Nduhungirehe, <a href="https://twitter.com/onduhungirehe/status/1666435782435905538">has suggested</a> a court case would still occur, but without Kabuga. Questions will be raised about how this falls within international legal procedures. Jonathan Beloff, who has <a href="https://www.kcl.ac.uk/people/jonathan-r-beloff-phd">researched post-genocide Rwanda</a>, explores the implications of the tribunal’s decision for genocide victims.</em></p>
<h2>Who is Félicien Kabuga?</h2>
<p>Kabuga, who <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-rwanda-kabuga-idUSKBN22W1L9">claims to be 90</a>, was a <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/rwanda/News/The-humble-social-man-who-grew-to-be-rich-and-influential-/1433218-1459342-91ulchz/index.html">successful businessman</a> before and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi. </p>
<p>He gained considerable wealth from tea production during the presidency of Juvénal Habyarimana between 1973 and 1994. </p>
<p>In 1997, Kabuga was accused by the <a href="https://www.irmct.org/en/cases/mict-13-38">International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda</a> of seven criminal charges. These included providing funds to <a href="https://www.ktpress.rw/2022/11/ex-militia-says-felicien-kabuga-supplied-ak47-rifles-to-commit-genocide/">import weapons</a> used to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26875506">kill an estimated 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus</a> over 100 days in 1994.</p>
<p>He was also accused of <a href="https://www.irmct.org/en/cases/mict-13-38">funding</a> a <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/354894105_The_Role_of_Radio-Television_Libre_Des_Mille_Collines_in_The_Rwandan_Genocide_An_Analysis_From_The_Theoretical_Perspectives_of_Intergroup_Threat_and_Aggression">radio station</a> that broadcasted anti-Tutsi messages. </p>
<p>Kabuga fled Rwanda during the Rwandan Patriotic Front’s <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno15-8-03.htm#:%7E:text=The%20Rwandan%20Patriotic%20Front%20ended,April%20and%20ended%20in%20July.">operation</a> to end the genocide.</p>
<p>He was named among <a href="https://unictr.irmct.org/en/tribunal">93 suspected leaders</a> of the genocide by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. However, he remained in hiding in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2020/5/24/the-risky-business-of-tracking-rwandan-fugitive-felicien-kabuga">Kenya</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/lindamelvern/status/1666390119203450880">Switzerland</a> and later France. </p>
<p>In May 2020, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-rwanda-kabuga/rwandan-genocide-fugitive-kabuga-due-before-french-court-idUSKBN22V1FY">French authorities arrested him at his Paris home</a>. Kabuga has, however, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/rwandan-felicien-kabuga-calls-genocide-charges-lies/a-53590828">denied</a> the charges against him. </p>
<h2>What happened after his arrest in France?</h2>
<p>The International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals at The Hague gained custody of Kabuga shortly after his arrest. His alleged crimes fell under its jurisdiction. The Hague-based court took over from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, whose mandate ended <a href="https://unictr.irmct.org/en/tribunal">in 2012</a>. </p>
<p>Prosecution in Rwanda was never a realistic option – Kabuga was wanted by an international court, which holds legal precedence over Rwanda’s judicial demands.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/rwandans-will-want-felicien-kabuga-tried-at-home-why-this-wont-happen-139010">Rwandans will want Félicien Kabuga tried at home. Why this won't happen</a>
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<p>Additionally, international human rights groups, such as <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/07/25/law-and-reality/progress-judicial-reform-rwanda">Human Rights Watch</a> and <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr47/013/2007/en/">Amnesty International</a>, have questioned the credibility of Rwanda’s judicial system, often claiming unfair practices and political interference. This has affected the Rwandan government in extradition applications for other genocide perpetrators. Nevertheless, Rwanda’s National Public Prosecution Authority committed to assisting the international tribunal in Kabuga’s prosecution.</p>
<p>The central focus of Kabuga’s case at the tribunal was his ability to participate in the hearings meaningfully. By the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/rwanda-genocide-kabuga-trial-dementia-f49f92513ef7f6ecbdefb993e4a86e23">time of his arrest</a>, he had suffered physical deterioration from old age and <a href="https://www.alz.org/alzheimers-dementia/what-is-dementia">dementia</a>. Dementia covers a range of conditions that include a loss of memory, problem-solving and language skills.</p>
<p>Kabuga’s lawyers argued that he was unfit for trial because of these medical conditions. Since his arrest, he has been held by The Hague-based court. </p>
<p>Rwandan genocide survivor organisations, such as Ibuka, have <a href="https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/113158-kabuga-trial-for-rwandans-the-old-man-is-still-hiding.html">previously protested</a> against any hindrance to what they perceive as necessary justice. But Kabuga’s lawyers’ arguments on their client’s mental well-being convinced the judges. </p>
<h2>What are the implications of this judgement for Rwandans?</h2>
<p>The recent court decision on Kabuga’s inability to fruitfully participate in any trial reinforces what <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/article/8129/news/crime/un-court-decision-on-kabuga-trial-disappointing---activists">some Rwandans expected as a failure of the international system and justice</a>. </p>
<p>Shortly after his arrest, some Rwandans <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/6/2/who-should-try-rwandan-genocide-suspect-felicien-kabuga">expressed scepticism</a> about Kabuga’s trial that would be in Europe rather than Kigali. They say those suspected of participating in <a href="https://survivors-fund.org.uk/news/cnlg-and-ibuka-call-out-uk-judiciary/">Rwanda’s genocide must be prosecuted in the country</a> where the crime occurred. As the Ibuka executive secretary <a href="https://survivors-fund.org.uk/news/cnlg-and-ibuka-call-out-uk-judiciary/">once put it</a>:</p>
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<p>Rwanda has all it requires to deliver standard justice. </p>
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<p>Some Rwandans have also <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26893864?seq=1">questioned</a> the effectiveness of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20200528-debate-who-is-f%C3%A9licien-kabuga-rwandan-genocide-kingpin-arrested-in-france">claiming</a> it sought to make up for the international community’s inaction during the genocide rather than provide justice for the victims.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/rusesabagina-vs-rwanda-how-kagame-wields-soft-power-to-get-his-way-with-the-west-202963">Rusesabagina vs Rwanda: how Kagame wields soft power to get his way with the west</a>
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<p>This tribunal cost nearly <a href="https://unictr.irmct.org/en/tribunal">US$1 billion</a>, and convicted 61 out of 93 Rwandan perpetrators from 1995 to 2012. In contrast, Rwanda’s domestic judicial and reconciliation system, <a href="https://www.africaresearchinstitute.org/newsite/publications/how-rwanda-judged-its-genocide-new/">gacaca</a>, prosecuted an estimated one million people for various crimes and offences during the genocide at a <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/dpr.12281#:%7E:text=Clark%20notes%20that%20the%20Gacaca,%2C%20%26%20Gasanabo%2C%202016">much lower cost</a> between 2002 and 2012. <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Rwanda-genocide-of-1994/Aftermath#ref1111323">Gacaca courts</a> were presided over by local leaders. They gave the accused opportunities to admit guilt and reconcile with victims. </p>
<p>This latest international court ruling on Kabuga will <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/rwanda-challenges-icc-role-as-court-marks-fifteen-years/1703692.html">reinforce the belief</a> that the international community has abandoned Rwandans who seek meaningful justice. The decision, particularly in light of the fact that <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/article/6482/news/kwibuka/29-years-after-genocide-over-1000-suspects-still-at-large">genocide suspects are still at large in other countries</a>, is likely to erode Rwandan trust in international courts’ capabilities to properly prosecute suspects and deliver justice.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207423/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan Beloff receives funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council.</span></em></p>Kabuga’s release raises questions about the international community’s commitment to delivering justice for genocide victims.Jonathan Beloff, Postdoctoral Research Associate, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2029632023-04-17T14:24:19Z2023-04-17T14:24:19ZRusesabagina vs Rwanda: how Kagame wields soft power to get his way with the west<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/518430/original/file-20230330-24-wcc5fm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kagame prefers partnership with successful European football clubs to market Rwanda.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/the-president-of-rwanda-paul-kagame-takes-part-in-a-news-photo/1473747030?adppopup=true"> Luke Dray/FIFA via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In politics, <a href="https://wcfia.harvard.edu/publications/soft-power-means-success-world-politics">soft power</a> is a persuasive approach to international relations. A leader can use soft power by exerting economic, cultural or reputational influence. </p>
<p>His hard power aside, soft power is something Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame possesses in spades.</p>
<p>One of Africa’s long serving leaders, Kagame wields soft power to deal with international criticism of his <a href="https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/36687207.pdf">authoritarianism</a> and <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/africa/east-africa-the-horn-and-great-lakes/rwanda/report-rwanda/">human rights abuses</a>.</p>
<p>As a political scientist I have been tracking developments in Africa’s <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.14321/j.ctt9qf58g">governance and democracy</a>, <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/ajps/article/view/226326">integration</a> and <a href="https://www.academia.edu/49586531/African_Peacekeeping_and_African_Integration_Current_Challenges">peace-keeping</a>. In my view, the recent Paul Rusesabagina saga was the first misstep that seriously dented Kagame’s image and influence in the west, but will likely prove only a hiccup in the long term.</p>
<p>Rwanda organised the <a href="https://www.perseus-strategies.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Complaint-to-UNSRT_Paul-Rusesabagina_FINAL-1.pdf">extraordinary rendition</a> of Paul Rusesabagina in August 2020. Rusesabagina, now a permanent US resident and a critic of Kagame, is known internationally for a role in saving a thousand Tutsis from genocidal gangs. His actions were portrayed in a Hollywood film, <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0395169/">Hotel Rwanda</a>. </p>
<p>He was abducted in Dubai and flown to face trial in Kigali on charges of supporting insurgents. The Rwandan court eventually <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/20/rwanda-court-finds-hotel-rwanda-hero-guilty-in-terrorism-case">sentenced</a> him to 25 years in prison.</p>
<p>Rusesabagina’s trial and jailing caused <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/hotel-rwanda-hero-to-be-released-from-rwandan-prison-575462">an outcry</a> in the west – perhaps more than all previous actions, such as assassinations, of the Rwandan government.</p>
<p>The US government spent several months in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/hotel-rwanda-heros-release-came-desire-end-diplomatic-sore-point-2023-03-25/">negotiations</a> with Kagame to get Rusesabagina released in a grant of clemency, and it strained relations.</p>
<h2>The source of Kagame’s soft power</h2>
<p>Kagame’s phenomenal power – both soft and hard – has its <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/110/438/1/78893">origin</a> in the horrific genocide of 1994 when <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/news/rwandans-take-stock-10-years-after-genocide">about 800,000</a> Tutsi and moderate Hutu were massacred within 100 days in Rwanda. Kagame’s Rwandan Patriotic Front overthrew the regime responsible for the genocide in three months. Ever since, he has enjoyed in the west the sort of deference accorded to Israeli governments, also viewed as the heir of survivors of genocide. </p>
<p>This is not the only unique feature of Kagame’s rule. Many African presidents-for-life are <a href="https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/jrobinson/files/jr_dividerule.pdf">notorious</a> for self-enrichment. But Kagame focuses on accumulating wealth for the <a href="https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/appp-wp16-developmental-patrimonialism-the-case-of-rwanda-david-booth-frederic_Np9JXni.pdf">ruling party</a>. The Rwandan Patriotic Front’s holding company, Crystal Ventures, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/congorepublic-industry-rwanda-idUSL1N2QX2P7">dominates</a> the Rwandan stock exchange. The party is also efficient at appealing to the Tutsi diaspora around the world for donations. </p>
<p>Rwanda also enjoys a glowing reputation in the west for its gender reforms. Rwanda’s parliament holds the <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.rw/women-representation#:%7E:text=Rwanda%20is%20the%20first%20country,proportionally%20than%20any%20other%20country">world record</a> for the percentage of MPs who are women, at 61%. Women also serve in record numbers as <a href="https://practiceguides.chambers.com/practice-guides/corporate-governance-2022/rwanda/trends-and-developments">nonexecutive directors</a> of Rwandan companies.</p>
<p>And at least two actions of Kagame won the admiration of pan-Africanists. His government imposed import duty on <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44252655">secondhand US clothes</a>, to support Rwanda’s clothing manufacturers. When the US government punished Rwanda by removing it from the <a href="https://agoa.info/">African Growth and Opportunity Act</a> he stood his ground.</p>
<p>In 2016 the African Union (AU) <a href="https://au.int/en/aureforms/overview">appointed</a> Kagame to head a commission to recommend reforms of the AU itself. These were all adopted, though few were implemented, beyond the uneven taking up of his report’s <a href="https://au.int/en/aureforms/overview">Kaberuka reform</a> of AU annual dues: a 0.2% tax on imports.</p>
<h2>How Kagame uses his soft power</h2>
<p>Kagame has used this soft power to deploy hard power to accumulate more soft power. He <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/10/rwanda-deploys-1000-soldiers-to-mozambique-cabo-delgado">dispatched</a> 1,000 soldiers to the troubled gas-rich northern Cabo Delgado province of Mozambique in 2021. Though officially labelled as peacekeepers, the Rwandan troops also guarded the oil and gas installations belonging to French company Total Energies against an extremist Islamist insurgency. This was even <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2022/02/rwanda-a-force-for-good-in-mozambiques-war-on-terror">before</a> the Southern African Development Commmunity states could deploy their own peacemaking force there. Soon, <a href="https://mg.co.za/africa/2022-03-28-rwanda-eyes-the-spoils-of-war-in-mozambique/">a civil engineering subsidiary</a> of Crystal Ventures won contracts for clearing and structural work on the Mozambique gas fields.</p>
<p>Similarly, 700 Rwandan troops are in <a href="https://www.africaintelligence.com/west-africa/2023/03/02/kigali-set-to-postpone-benin-deployment,109919518-art">Benin</a>, helping that government to suppress a local extremist Islamist insurgency. All this peacekeeping effort <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/21/how-rwanda-became-africas-policeman/">wins allies</a> for Rwanda’s government every time a vote needs to be taken in the African Union.</p>
<p>Kagame’s government has also shown other ways to project itself as an indispensable ally of western governments. He has pushed for partnerships with <a href="https://www.africa-press.net/rwanda/sport/which-big-european-club-could-be-rwandas-next-tourism-partner">successful European football clubs</a> as part of his efforts to market Rwanda to the world. Rwanda has also signed treaties with <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jan/17/rwanda-uk-asylum-seekers-deportees-israel-scheme">Israel</a> and with the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/explainers-61782866">United Kingdom</a> – both under right-wing governments – to allow for deportation of unwanted illegal immigrants to Kigali. These hapless undocumented migrants are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jan/17/rwanda-uk-asylum-seekers-deportees-israel-scheme">given</a> a few months’ allowance and accommodation, after which they are on their own.</p>
<p>These actions enabled Rwanda to be admitted to the <a href="https://thecommonwealth.org/our-member-countries">Commonwealth</a> although it was never a British colony.</p>
<h2>Kagame vs critics</h2>
<p>Criticism has surfaced in the west against Rwanda’s government. The most serious concern is its penchant for <a href="https://www.hrw.org/africa/rwanda">arresting opponents</a>. It also carries out <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2023/3/24/rwanda-has-to-investigate-killings-of-opposition-members">assassinations</a>, <a href="https://www.publicaffairsbooks.com/titles/michela-wrong/do-not-disturb/9781610398435/">reportedly</a>, of opponents who have never taken up arms against the regime. Activists have <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2023/3/24/rwanda-has-to-investigate-killings-of-opposition-members">“disappeared”</a>.</p>
<p>The fact that the Rwanda government always got away with it inevitably led it to overreach. </p>
<p>The Rusesabagina abduction marked the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/aug/15/from-hero-of-hotel-rwanda-to-dissident-facing-life-in-prison">first serious dent</a> in western admiration for Kagame. Rwanda’s alleged backing for Congolese rebels <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">the M23</a> could sooner or later cause another rift with the west, and concern among AU friends of the Democratic Republic of Congo.</p>
<p>Kagame’s soft power has consequences for the lives of Rwandans. The assassination of opponents beyond Rwanda’s borders is a grim warning about human rights and governance in the great lakes region and the continent. Kagame will have to learn what the limits and consequences of soft power are.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/202963/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Gottschalk is a member of the African National Congress, but writes this article in his professional capacity as a political scientist.</span></em></p>With Africa’s solid support and his pro-west military and policy adventures, Kagame is able to take on critics.Keith Gottschalk, Political Scientist, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2027852023-03-30T09:57:33Z2023-03-30T09:57:33ZRwanda: Paul Rusesabagina’s release and apology – a master stroke by Kagame<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/518163/original/file-20230329-16-lfc7wl.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Paul Rusesabagina receives the Medal of Freedom from US President George W Bush in 2005.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mark Wilson/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Rwanda’s ministry of justice recently announced the <a href="https://static.poder360.com.br/2023/03/indulto-Ruanda-24-mar-2023.pdf">pardon and release</a> of Paul Rusesabagina from jail. Rusesabagina was involved in events portrayed in the 2004 Hollywood film <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0395169/">Hotel Rwanda</a>.</p>
<p>In September 2021, Rusesabagina was <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/9/25/hotel-rwanda-hero-admits-forming-armed-group-behind-attacks">sentenced</a> to 25 years in jail over his ties to groups opposed to Rwandan president Paul Kagame. His release followed intense diplomatic talks between Washington and Kigali, and was <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/03/28/freed-hotel-rwanda-hero-arrives-in-qatar//">negotiated by Qatar</a>. </p>
<p>While Rusesabagina’s release may be celebrated by his supporters in the west, it’s a bit more complicated within and for Rwanda. His pardon needs to be understood within the greater context of <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Foreign-Policy-in-Post-Genocide-Rwanda-Elite-Perceptions-of-Global-Engagement/Beloff/p/book/9780367436452">Rwandan foreign policy</a>, whose primary objectives are state security, reduction of foreign aid reliance and economic diplomacy.</p>
<p>Rusesabagina’s arrest illustrated the Rwandan government’s determination to neutralise threats it sees to its national security. His subsequent release provides important narrating elements for both domestic and foreign audiences. </p>
<p>In his <a href="https://static.poder360.com.br/2023/03/indulto-Ruanda-24-mar-2023.pdf#page=4">official request</a> for pardon from Kagame, Rusesabagina <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/9/25/hotel-rwanda-hero-admits-forming-armed-group-behind-attacks">admitted</a> to working with anti-Rwanda groups and took responsibility for their actions. This legitimises Kigali’s move to <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/hotel-rwanda-hero-arrested-terror-charges-say-police-n1238904">arrest</a> him. It also provides the government with ammunition to combat future criticisms of <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/09/10/rwanda-rusesabagina-was-forcibly-disappeared">human rights abuses over the arrest</a>. </p>
<p>But perhaps more importantly, Rusesabagina’s release portrays Kagame as a pragmatist on the international stage – one willing to negotiate once a security threat is neutralised. </p>
<p>The pardon also helps restore the close ties Rwanda and the US have historically enjoyed. Senior US political leaders, including secretary of state <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/aug/11/blinken-kagame-hotel-rwanda-paul-rusesabagina">Antony Blinken</a>, had censured Rwanda over the arrest.</p>
<p>Domestically, the government has said Rusesabagina’s release fits within its truth and reconciliation process following the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Rwanda-genocide-of-1994">1994 genocide against the Tutsi</a>. </p>
<h2>Who is Rusesabagina?</h2>
<p>In Hotel Rwanda, Rusesabagina (played by Don Cheadle) is depicted as being the primary person to save the lives of 1,268 people hiding inside Hotel Des Mille Collines during the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi. Over the course of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26875506">100 days</a>, more than 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed.</p>
<p>However, the Hollywood narrative has been <a href="https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1999&context=jss">challenged by genocide survivors</a> who say it misrepresented facts. Instead, they say, Rusesabagina ran the hotel as a personal profit-making venture. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/hotel-rwanda-a-film-that-proved-to-be-a-double-edged-sword-for-kigali-192253">Hotel Rwanda: a film that proved to be a double-edged sword for Kigali</a>
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<p>Rusesabagina left Rwanda in 1996, and eventually became a US resident and Belgian citizen. Following the film’s release, he received several humanitarian awards, including the <a href="https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/11/images/20051109-2_p110905pm-0363jpg-515h.html">US Presidential Medal of Freedom in 2005</a>. He used his newfound platform to promote his political ambitions and ideology. </p>
<p>The Rwandan government <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-58624691">accused Rusesabagina</a> of terrorism over his funding of the Rwandan Movement for Democratic Change, which has the National Liberation Front and PDR-Ihumure military wings. These groups have called for a change of government in Rwanda and a return to ethnic divisions.</p>
<p><a href="https://twitter.com/YolandeMakolo/status/1639740480291307521">Kigali</a> viewed this as harmful to the country’s post-genocide social development under the <a href="https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1480&context=gsp"><em>Ndi Umunyarwanda</em></a> (I am Rwandan) ideology. </p>
<p>Rusesabagina <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4ZegIcDyowo">aired a call for armed resistance against Kagame</a>, and soon after, National Liberation Front militants attacked Rwanda. In June and December 2018, the group carried out two attacks in southwestern Rwanda. Nine civilians <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/article/180402/News/victims-of-mrcd-fln-attacks-in-southern-rwanda">died</a>. </p>
<p>These attacks sparked a harsh response from the Rwandan government, which issued an arrest warrant against Rusesabagina. He was captured on 27 August 2020, and subsequently tried and convicted. His 25-year jail term was effectively a life sentence – he is 68. </p>
<p>Rusesabagina’s arrest put Kagame on a collision course with Washington. The Rwandan government had arrested an American resident, and the move was seen as an attempt to silence a critic. US secretary of state Blinken and senator Robert Menendez, who chairs the senate’s foreign relations committee, were among high-profile political leaders who <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/u-s-senator-questions-aid-to-rwanda-over-human-rights-role-in-congo-/6674174.html">demanded</a> Rusesabagina’s release. </p>
<p>Rusesabagina’s family petitioned the Belgian and American governments to intervene. Hollywood actors started a “<a href="https://paulr.org/">Free Rusesabagina</a>” clothing campaign. Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and other rights groups <a href="https://paulr.org/timeline-2/">added their voices</a>. </p>
<h2>Why pardon Rusesabagina?</h2>
<p>Rusesabagina’s release followed his <a href="https://static.poder360.com.br/2023/03/indulto-Ruanda-24-mar-2023.pdf#page=4">request for pardon</a> from Kagame on 14 October 2022. In his letter, he acknowledged that violence is not the solution for Rwanda’s post-genocide development. </p>
<p>More importantly, he agreed to respect Rwanda’s current political system with Kagame as its leader, saying:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Moving forward, I know you will focus on securing a peaceful future for all Rwandans.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>He also said he wouldn’t dive into Rwandan politics again, and would instead “spend the remainder of my days in the United States in quiet reflection”. The pardon can be interpreted as effectively silencing Rusesabagina. </p>
<p>Rwanda’s Minister of Justice said Rusesabagina would still have to <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/article/6108/news/law/rusesabagina-clemency-will-not-affect-reparations-justice-ministry">pay reparations</a> to victims of the 2018 attacks. The <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/article/189531/News/victims-of-fln-attacks-awarded-rwf400-million-in-compensation">courts awarded</a> them 412 million Rwandan francs (US$374,000). </p>
<h2>Who wins?</h2>
<p>Rusesabagina’s release is still shrouded in mystery, with few details released. So far, the Rwandan government has said the Qatari government negotiated his release, not the US. </p>
<p>Despite Kigali <a href="https://www.ktpress.rw/2023/03/rusesabagina-pardon-rwanda-did-not-yield-to-pressure-deputy-govt-spokesperson/">denying US pressure</a>, the release does benefit the Rwanda-US relationship. Washington can say, whether officially or informally, it helped free a US resident and took a hard stance against its African ally. For Rwanda, it illustrates <a href="https://twitter.com/PressSecRwanda/status/1639282783112556544?s=20">the government’s willingness</a> to constructively engage with its most important global ally. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-us-and-rwanda-how-the-relationship-has-evolved-since-the-1994-genocide-188115">The US and Rwanda: how the relationship has evolved since the 1994 genocide</a>
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<p>Rusesabagina’s release eases tensions with US political leaders, including Blinken, who privately discussed Rusesabagina’s release with Kagame during an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/aug/11/blinken-kagame-hotel-rwanda-paul-rusesabagina">August 2022 visit to Rwanda</a>. The pardon also effectively removes a lightning rod that US politicians and activists have used to criticise Rwanda’s human rights record.</p>
<p>It also benefits the Rwandan government at home. Forgiveness is a central tenet of the country’s “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/02/59162/">gacaca</a>” judicial system. This traditional form of justice pursued reconciliation outcomes rather than punishment after the genocide. It was used to try <a href="https://theconversation.com/rwanda-how-to-deal-with-a-million-genocide-suspects-38642#:%7E:text=In%20total%2C%20an%20estimated%20one,such%20as%20looting%20or%20theft">one million suspects</a>. Rusesabagina’s pardon reinforces the importance of forgiveness for those who confess their crimes.</p>
<p>Finally, by publicly disclosing Rusesabagina’s pardon request, the government has illustrated to both Rwandans and foreign nations how even harsh critics can change tune and support Kagame. This helps reinforce the government’s narrative that Kagame is the best leader for national development.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/202785/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan R Beloff receives funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council (Project Reference: AH/W001217/1). </span></em></p>Rusesabagina’s release portrays Rwanda’s president as a pragmatist – one willing to negotiate once a security threat is neutralised.Jonathan Beloff, Postdoctoral Research Associate, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1922532022-11-07T13:50:13Z2022-11-07T13:50:13ZHotel Rwanda: a film that proved to be a double-edged sword for Kigali<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/491348/original/file-20221024-25-fvcj8m.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Paul Rusesabagina at the Supreme Court in Kigali, Rwanda, in February 2021. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Simon Wohlfahrt/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Paul Rusesabagina is perhaps one of the world’s best <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/18/world/africa/rwanda-paul-rusesabagina.html">known</a> Rwandans. His actions during the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi were made famous in the 2004 Hollywood film <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0395169/">Hotel Rwanda</a>. </p>
<p>The film was inspired by what happened inside Hotel des Mille Collines in the capital, Kigali. Here, 1,268 Rwandans, both Tutsis and Hutus, were saved from genocidal forces waiting beyond its walls.</p>
<p>The film depicts Rusesabagina – who <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/rusesabagina-i-am-not-rwandan-try-me-as-a-belgian-2486428">left Rwanda</a> in 1996 – as a hero who saved these lives. Following the film’s release, Rusesabagina received several humanitarian awards, including the <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/pictures/presidential-medal-of-freedom-9-11-05/6/">US Presidential Medal of Freedom</a> in 2005 from former president George W Bush. He eventually became a US resident and Belgian citizen.</p>
<p>On 27 August 2020, however, Rwandan officials arrested Rusesabagina. Human Rights Watch accused the Rwandan government of <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/09/10/rwanda-rusesabagina-was-forcibly-disappeared">intentionally misleading</a> him into a flight to Kigali. </p>
<p>The government accused Rusesabagina of supporting anti-Rwanda groups. He was charged with terrorism, arson, kidnapping and murder over two <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-rwanda-security-idUSKCN1S61AG">attacks</a> in 2018 that killed nine Rwandans. On 20 September 2021, Rusesabagina was convicted of these charges. He was sentenced to 25 years in prison.</p>
<p>Since his conviction, Rwanda has <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/rwanda-rejects-calls-to-release-rusesabagina-3911342">rebuffed</a> growing international pressure for Rusesabagina’s release. </p>
<p>In August 2022, during a visit to Kigali, US secretary of state Antony Blinken <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/aug/11/blinken-kagame-hotel-rwanda-paul-rusesabagina">urged the government</a> to release Rusesabagina. In Hollywood, actors and actresses have highlighted the issue through a “Free Rusesabagina” clothing campaign.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-us-and-rwanda-how-the-relationship-has-evolved-since-the-1994-genocide-188115">The US and Rwanda: how the relationship has evolved since the 1994 genocide</a>
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<p>In my most recent <a href="https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1999&context=jss">research paper</a>, I focused on the Rusesabagina case. Based on interviews with Rwandans, I conclude that Hollywood’s interpretation of historical events significantly differs from those who lived in the hotel during the genocide. </p>
<p>Hotel Rwanda is a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/nov/17/hotel-rwanda-hollywood-ending">double-edged sword</a> for the country. </p>
<p>On one hand, it introduced the horrific <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26875506">1994 genocide</a> to a world that knew little of what had happened in the small African nation. Over 100 days between 6 April and 19 July, Rwanda witnessed the deaths of up to one million Tutsis and moderate Hutus.</p>
<p>On the other hand, the film’s historical inaccuracies <a href="https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2022-08-17/now-jailed-for-terrorism-one-time-hotel-rwanda-hero-has-become-point-of-u-s-contention-with-rwanda">built up</a> Rusesabagina’s profile. Based on what I found during the course of the interviews I did, I argue that he used his fame to promote his version of Rwandan history and his <a href="https://www.expressnews.com/news/local/article/African-hero-now-living-in-S-A-will-run-for-6791393.php">desire for political power</a>. My research findings echo those of others, including <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hotel-Rwanda-Tutsi-genocide-Hollywood-ebook/dp/B008FXI9EI">Rwandan academics</a>, who have explored the <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Inside-Hotel-Rwanda-Surprising-Matters-ebook/dp/B00APDFXF4">mismatch</a> in narratives. </p>
<p>Many in the global north, whose primary knowledge of Rwanda consists of the film, were swayed to Rusesabagina’s rather than Rwandans’ expression of their history, goals and desires. This narrative was driven to a large extent by human rights groups, which have been highly critical of the country’s <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/rwanda">human rights record</a>. </p>
<h2>Differing narratives</h2>
<p>Between 2008 and 2018, more than 100 Hotel des Mille Collines survivors discussed with me their historical experiences and belief that Rusesabagina was not the reason they were still alive. I conducted most of these interviews at the hotel and the Kigali Genocide Memorial, which houses the remains of more than 250,000 genocide victims. My research also used existing networks within the Rwandan government and civil society organisations. </p>
<p>Survivors who were at the hotel <a href="https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1999&context=jss">said</a> Rusesabagina ran the hotel as a personal profit-making venture. </p>
<p>If one could not pay him, one would face expulsion from the hotel’s grounds, which meant certain death. One survivor said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>If you could pay, you would stay in a room. If you couldn’t pay for a room, you could pay to stay in a hallway. If you couldn’t pay that, you could pay to stay by the pool. If you couldn’t pay that, he (Rusesabagina) would demand you to leave. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>One hotel worker told me this:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>He (Rusesabagina) didn’t care about any of us (workers). I begged him to let them (my family) stay as I was working there (at the hotel) for a long time. He didn’t care and demanded I pay him money or he would throw them out to be killed.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Several other <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/survivors-rusesabagina-was-no-hero-hotel-rwanda-film--1934890">survivor stories</a> suggest a different narrative from the one in the film. In Hotel Rwanda, Rusesabagina is depicted as collecting money only to pay off genocide perpetrators. </p>
<h2>Rusesabagina during the genocide</h2>
<p>Prior to the genocide, Rusesabagina worked at the neighbouring Hotel des Diplomates. He took over the management of Hotel des Mille Collines after discovering that its European manager, Bik Cornelis, had been evacuated. One former hotel worker told me:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>…a few days into the killings, Rusesabagina walked in one day and saw that the old manager (Cornelis) was taken with the other Europeans. He called (the hotel owners) and told them to … only work with him. They had no idea what was going on and probably hadn’t talked to Cornelis yet, so they agreed.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>While the film credits Rusesabagina with creating an oasis during the conflict, he’s not the reason the hotel – one of the few areas offering refuge at the time – survived attacks from those behind the genocide. </p>
<p>Not depicted in the film are the seven to 10 United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) soldiers who were constantly positioned in front of the facility. </p>
<p>In his <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Shake-Hands-Devil-Failure-Humanity/dp/0786715103">book</a>, Roméo Dallaire, a former commander of this UN mission, says he stationed troops at the hotel’s only entrance as a symbolic indication that it was under the UN’s protection. Dallaire has <a href="https://www.huffpost.com/archive/ca/entry/romeo-dallaire-senator-slams-hotel-rwanda-film-as-revisionist_n_1174607">spoken out</a> against Hotel Rwanda as historical revisionism.</p>
<p>Further, the Interahamwe, the primary Hutu death squads responsible for the
genocidal killings, had been directed to stay outside the walls of the hotel. They allowed people to run into it, but would threaten or kill those who tried to leave. </p>
<p>One former Interahamwe who had been stationed about 20 metres from the hotel’s entrance told me that he received instructions from his regional commander to “just stay put by the hotel and to allow the Tutsis and others to have access”. The hotel was also used for prisoner exchanges “and it would be the final spot for us to cleanse (murder the Tutsis) once we beat the RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front)”.</p>
<p>The Rwandan Patriotic Front, led by Paul Kagame, took control of the country in July, ending the genocide. The horrors of the 100-day period led to Rwanda’s focus on forming a new single ethnic identity: “Rwandan”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192253/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan Beloff receives funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council. </span></em></p>Rwanda has rebuffed international pressure to release Paul Rusesabagina, a man made famous by Hollywood.Jonathan Beloff, Postdoctoral Research Associate, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1913512022-10-02T08:41:52Z2022-10-02T08:41:52ZBurundi’s Gatumba massacre offers a window into the past and future of the DRC conflict<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486859/original/file-20220927-18-9tkhfy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Men hold up protest signs in front of the coffins of DRC refugees killed in August 2004 in Gatumba, Burundi. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Simon Maina/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>For nearly three decades, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been embroiled in violence. Millions of people have been killed and an <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/events/the-future-of-the-drc/">estimated 5.6 million</a> others displaced by civil wars, local feuds and cross-border conflicts. The neighbouring countries of Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda have been locked into this ongoing cycle, too.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.easterncongo.org/about-drc/history-of-the-conflict/">The First Congo War</a> began in 1996, with a coalition of the DRC’s neighbours supporting a rebel group that toppled the dictator Mobutu Sese Seko. Laurent Kabila was installed as head of state in 1997. A year later, however, a bloodier war began amid violent jostling for power and influence.</p>
<p>In December 2002, a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/dec/17/congo">peace deal</a> was signed. The DRC got a national army and new constitution. Democratic elections were held in 2006, the country’s first in more than 40 years. </p>
<p>But the violence soon resumed. Consolidating peace efforts across the vast territory proved difficult. Since then, the Congo has received tens of billions of dollars in humanitarian aid and hosts one of the largest <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/monusco">United Nations peacekeeping missions</a>.</p>
<p>Various studies have fronted several reasons for the persistence of war in the Congo. These include <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/democratic-republic-congo/congos-peace-miracle-or-mirage">flaws</a> in the 2002 peace deal, a Congolese elite that <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-un-is-under-attack-in-eastern-congo-but-drc-elites-are-also-to-blame-for-the-violence-187861">benefits from the chaos</a> and <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/countries/africa/2010-drc-mapping-report">ethnic intolerance</a>. </p>
<p>The events that have shaped the DRC mean different things to different actors. The fact that sub-Saharan Africa’s largest country has over <a href="https://minorityrights.org/country/democratic-republic-of-the-congo/">250 ethnic groups</a> gives a sense of the complexity of its plight.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-conflicts-intertwined-over-time-and-destabilised-the-drc-and-the-region-185432">How conflicts intertwined over time and destabilised the DRC – and the region</a>
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<p><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Chris-Davey-9/research">My research</a> adds to debate on the factors driving the violence. I focused on the narratives of Banyamulenge soldiers. The Banyamulenge are a sub-group of the Congolese Tutsi ethnic group, and originally come from the province of South Kivu in eastern DRC.</p>
<p>They are an important constituency to consider because their experiences offer a window into past and current Congolese conflicts. </p>
<p>They illustrate how violence in the Congo multiplies across borders, blurs the lines between victim and perpetrator, and is used to win a place in government rather than to overthrow it. </p>
<p>From my research, I believe that to stop the cycle of violence, the DRC and its regional allies need a new status quo that doesn’t reward rebellion but decreases its appeal. Politics that facilitates peaceful livelihoods is essential.</p>
<h2>Tracing the pattern</h2>
<p>In August 2004, 166 members of the <a href="https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2071779/ACCORD_DR+Congo_Situation+of+Banyamulenge.pdf">Congolese Banyamulenge community</a> were <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/burundi/2004/0904/index.htm">killed in Gatumba</a>, a small town in Burundi near its border with DRC. They were at a UN-protected refugee camp. </p>
<p>The killings were <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3564358.stm">perpetrated</a> by a group of armed rebels, many of them from the Forces for National Liberation, a Burundian Hutu militia group. The group claimed their Banyamulenge victims were planning a new war in the Congo.</p>
<p>I <a href="https://commons.clarku.edu/gatumba/">spoke to</a> survivors of the 2004 massacre. Most felt that the attack wasn’t a one-off event, but part of a pattern of mobilising anti-Tutsi violence. </p>
<p>This began before Gatumba and persists into the present day. </p>
<p>An <a href="https://commons.clarku.edu/gatumba/">archive of Gatumba survivor accounts</a> that I was involved in curating attests to this ongoing persecution and the wider dysfunctions of the region. These include the lack of robust democracy or transparent governance, and high levels of insecurity. </p>
<p>Like most participants in Congolese conflicts, the rebels and refugees involved in the Gatumba massacre regularly crossed the DRC’s border. The Banyamulenge refugees fled to Burundi to escape turmoil in <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/drcsouth-kivu-jun-2004-situation-report-and-recommendations">South Kivu in 2004</a>. The Forces for National Liberation moved between DRC and Burundi to recruit, fight and cooperate with armed groups in both countries. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-drcs-colonial-legacy-forged-a-nexus-between-ethnicity-territory-and-conflict-153469">How DRC's colonial legacy forged a nexus between ethnicity, territory and conflict</a>
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<p>The DRC’s borders are <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/103/412/359/81797?redirectedFrom=fulltext">porous</a>, with the central government too weak to control its eastern region or its boundaries. DRC borders nine countries: Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo Brazzaville, Rwanda, South Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia.</p>
<p>These porous borders have allowed armed groups – like the Ugandan <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00358533.2011.542297">Allied Democratic Front</a> and Congolese-Tutsi <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-m23s-on-and-off-insurgency-tells-us-about-drcs-precarious-search-for-peace-182520">March 23 Movement</a> – to use the DRC as a base and battlefield, connecting civil conflicts across borders.</p>
<h2>Beyond ethnic conflict</h2>
<p>Gatumba was a border refugee camp. Hutu rebels found an easy target in Banyamulenge refugees, whom they associated with the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jul/11/congo.rorycarroll">Tutsi rebels</a> behind the violence in the DRC. </p>
<p>The Forces for National Liberation deployed religious-flavoured anti-Tutsi rhetoric to motivate their political base. But there’s rarely a straight line between politics and ethnicity. The Hutu rebels <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/000203971605100202">were in political competition</a> against other Hutu-labelled militias and parties. </p>
<p>Contemporary rebel groups, too, act in multiple directions as they destabilise border areas, displacing and killing civilians. </p>
<p>The March 23 Movement, for instance, provides anti-Tutsi fodder for extremist politicians across the DRC. These politicians benefit from promoting <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14623528.2022.2078578">discrimination and hate speech</a>, and fuelling <a href="https://theconversation.com/protests-against-un-in-eastern-congo-highlight-peace-missions-crisis-of-legitimacy-187932">protests</a> against the UN mission. The movement’s use of force has <a href="https://chrispdavey.blogspot.com/2022/06/m23-memory-remains.html">hardened lines</a> between Tutsis and other Congolese. </p>
<h2>Illegal violence to legitimate power</h2>
<p>The Forces for National Liberation, like other rebel groups, committed atrocities to improve its bargaining position in peace talks. </p>
<p>By 2004, other Burundian rebels had cut a peace deal with the Burundi government to become politicians and army officers. The Forces for National Liberation was marginalised. It, therefore, stopped trying to overthrow the state and focused on killing civilians, hoping to use the threat of terrorism to negotiate its way into power. It worked. </p>
<p>Agathon Rwasa, the leader of the Forces for National Liberation, signed a deal. He now leads <a href="https://apnews.com/article/africa-kenya-burundi-agathon-rwasa-b10afc3bb09daf8e4b87782b057fb56d">Burundi’s opposition party</a> in parliament and has not gone to trial for any crimes.</p>
<p>This elevation of a guerrilla into government is not unique to Burundi. </p>
<p>Rebel groups in the DRC typically aren’t looking to overthrow the state. Instead, they’re <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ia/article-abstract/98/3/873/6581695?redirectedFrom=fulltext">using rebellion</a> to prove themselves a threat. They then sue for <a href="https://riftvalley.net/publication/recycling-rebels-demobilization-congo">limited peace</a> and an improved position either in DRC or in neighbouring countries like Burundi or Uganda. </p>
<p>As one Gatumba survivor observed:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the reward for killing people is a promotion in our country. </p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>It’s been 18 years since the Gatumba massacre. Groups like the <a href="https://www.gatumbasurvivors.org/">Banyamulenge Gatumba Refugee Survivors Foundation</a> are <a href="https://www.wishtv.com/news/hundreds-gather-for-18th-anniversary-of-the-gatumba-massacre/">working internationally</a> to pursue accountability and justice. Yet, addressing their own community’s past and current involvement in DRC’s multi-directional violence is largely taboo. </p>
<p>Until a broader sense of the past is more widely shared among Congolese groups, rebels will flit across borders, civilians will be both victims and perpetrators, and groups will purchase political power with demonstrations of violent disruption.</p>
<p>Interstate collaboration between the DRC and Burundi governments for justice in Gatumba would be a first step towards building a future without impunity.</p>
<p><em>Ezra Schrader, a research assistant at the Strassler Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies with the Gatumba Survivors Project, contributed to this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191351/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christopher P. Davey works for Clark University.</span></em></p>Violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo is used to win a place in government, not to overthrow it. And it keeps working.Christopher P. Davey, Visiting Assistant Professor, Clark UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1884052022-08-09T07:06:15Z2022-08-09T07:06:15ZRwanda and DRC’s turbulent past continues to fuel their torrid relationship<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478120/original/file-20220808-1331-j07zmx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">DRC President Félix Tshisekedi (left) and Rwanda President Paul Kagame in Kigali in 2021.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Habimana Thierry/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) make for very unhappy neighbours. Both sides claim the other is set on bringing down their government, and violating past agreements and international norms. </p>
<p>Rwanda accuses the DRC of working with the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda) or FDLR. The rebel group’s stated aim is to overthrow the Rwandan government. </p>
<p>For its part, the DRC accuses Rwanda of violating its sovereignty by supporting the Mouvement du 23 Mars (March 23 Movement, M23). The rebel group, <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/democratic-republic-of-the-congo/#:%7E:text=According%20to%20the%20UN%2C%20there,these%20armed%20groups%20as%20terrorists.">along with multiple others</a>, is active in the DRC. </p>
<p>A recent United Nations report supports Kinshasa’s contention. A group of experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/4/rwanda-backing-m23-rebels-in-drc-un-experts">detailed its accusations</a> in a 131-page report. Kigali, however, dismissed the findings as “false allegations”.</p>
<p>Rwanda is a country of 13 million people and occupies 26,000 square kilometres. DRC, on the other hand, has 90 million people and covers a territory of 2.3 million square kilometres. The DRC lies to the west of Rwanda. The two countries share a border of about 217 kilometres.</p>
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<p>Tensions between the two nations date back to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda when an estimated <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1462352042000225958">one million Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed</a>. Many of the perpetrators of the violence fled to the DRC, at the time called Zaire. The post-genocide Rwandan government launched military operations in a bid to force the perpetrators back home to face justice.</p>
<p>Rwanda believes the DRC continues to provide refuge for those behind the 1994 attack. </p>
<p>The two countries have gone through two major wars and multiple skirmishes. They have also had periods of stability and trade growth. The latest tensions, however, are <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/rwanda-dr-congo-tension-threatening-regional-integration-3837838">cause for concern</a>. They risk destabilising the Eastern Africa region, disrupting trade routes and allowing for the establishment of opportunistic militia groups.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-un-is-under-attack-in-eastern-congo-but-drc-elites-are-also-to-blame-for-the-violence-187861">The UN is under attack in eastern Congo. But DRC elites are also to blame for the violence</a>
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<p>The issue is on <a href="https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-travel-to-cambodia-the-philippines-south-africa-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-rwanda/">US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s agenda</a> as he tours three African nations in August 2022. He will meet with Congolese and <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-us-and-rwanda-how-the-relationship-has-evolved-since-the-1994-genocide-188115">Rwandan leaders</a> to negotiate for a peaceful resolution to the current conflict.</p>
<p>But, based on a decade of research into relations between the two countries, I do not believe Blinken’s visit will to lead to any significant reduction in tensions. The most recent events are not new. Both nations hold old suspicions of each other.</p>
<h2>How it started</h2>
<p>Since the 1994 genocide, the Rwandan government has kept a close eye on DRC. While 4 July is marked in Rwanda as the day the genocide ended, it was a temporary pause. </p>
<p>After two years of inaction from the then Zaire president Mobutu Sese Seko, Rwanda went after those it believed were behind the attacks and were hiding in Zaire. It carried out military operations that triggered the <a href="https://www.easterncongo.org/about-drc/history-of-the-conflict/">First Congo War (1996-1997)</a>. </p>
<p>This war had two objectives. The first was to disband the refugee camps that were hosting the remnants of the genocide perpetrators. An estimated two million refugees were forced back into Rwanda. </p>
<p>The second objective was the removal of Mobutu on the grounds that he was providing a haven for genocide actors. The Zairian dictator was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1997/05/17/world/mobutu-gives-up-leaving-kinshasa-and-ceding-power.html">removed from power</a> in May 1997.</p>
<p>Within nine months, the war was over. With Rwanda’s support, <a href="https://theconversation.com/from-mobutu-to-kabila-the-drc-is-paying-a-heavy-price-for-autocrats-at-its-helm-79455">Laurent Kabila</a> and his Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo, AFDL) took over power.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-m23s-on-and-off-insurgency-tells-us-about-drcs-precarious-search-for-peace-182520">What M23's on-and-off insurgency tells us about DRC's precarious search for peace</a>
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<p>But a much bloodier Second Congo War (1998-2003) soon followed. This was catalysed by two events. First, the dismissal of the Congolese defence minister James Kabarebe, who was Rwandan and largely responsible for conducting the First Congo War. Second, Congo’s support for the remnant genocide forces, Armée pour la Libération du Rwanda (Army for the Liberation of Rwanda, ALiR).</p>
<p>The Second Congo War dragged on for five years. It led to the deaths of millions of people. This was as a result of the actual fighting, and an increase in disease and malnutrition.</p>
<p>The lack of a quick resolution to the war resulted in various parts of the DRC being run by either militia groups or the governments of neighbouring countries. Even allies during the start of the war, such as Uganda and Rwanda, <a href="https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/41712-drc-victims-of-kisangani-s-six-day-war-urge-tshisekedi-to-act.html">fought against each other</a>.</p>
<p>Eventually, the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2009/10/secretary-general-hails-pretoria-agreement-political-milestone-peace">2002 Pretoria agreement</a> led to the withdrawal of the Rwandan military from Congolese territory. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, Rwanda continues to contend that Congo supports genocide remnants, now operating as the FDLR. </p>
<p>For its part, DRC accuses Rwanda of supporting Congolese rebel groups, such as the Congrès National pour la Défense du People (National Congress for the Defence of the People, CNDP) and the M23.</p>
<h2>Divisions in Kigali</h2>
<p>The Rwandan government is divided on the future of relations with its giant neighbour. </p>
<p>One group of policy leaders perceives the DRC as a continual threat to Rwandan security. They view the Congolese military as being ineffective in combating forces stationed in the DRC that are expressly against the Rwandan government, such as the FDLR. </p>
<p>This group often dominates public policy decisions in Rwanda’s foreign relations with the DRC. </p>
<p>But there’s a second group that focuses on the economic opportunities of closer Rwandan-Congolese relations. They believe that Rwandan development should focus on the export of domestically produced goods to the Congolese market of 90 million potential customers. Many within this group believe that the economic benefits outweigh the security concerns, which they argue have decreased in recent years.</p>
<p>Following the 2018 election, which saw Félix Tshisekedi become Congolese president, relations between Rwanda and the DRC <a href="https://www.e-ir.info/2021/08/18/opinion-rwanda-and-the-drc-converging-at-last/">improved</a>. This included increased trade activity between the two nations. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/tshisekedis-victory-in-the-drc-is-historic-but-controversial-109673">Tshisekedi’s victory in the DRC is historic -- but controversial</a>
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<p>It seemed for a while that the beliefs of Rwandans who wanted rapprochement with Kinshasa had the upper hand, hinting at a positive future for the two nations. </p>
<p>But in recent months, these hopes have been dashed. Once more, the dominant narratives involve allegations of DRC collaborating with the FDLR, and Rwanda with M23.</p>
<p>The two countries are likely to continue experiencing periods of stability and tension. Another major conflict, like the Congo wars, is unlikely, but the continual tensions prevent trade integration that would boost development and peace between the two nations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188405/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan Beloff receives funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC).</span></em></p>Rwanda believes DRC continues to provide refuge for those behind the 1994 genocide.Jonathan Beloff, Postdoctoral Research Associate, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1862442022-08-02T14:05:56Z2022-08-02T14:05:56ZHow Rwanda’s annual genocide commemoration fans the flame of ethnicity<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473875/original/file-20220713-9357-jjdkei.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A billboard highlights Rwanda's 100-day commemoration of the 1994 genocide.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Thierry Falise/LightRocket via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Each year, Rwandans at home and in the diaspora remember those <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26875506">killed in the 1994 genocide</a>. This is not a single-day event. Kwibuka (“to remember” in the local Kinyarwanda language) consists of 100 days of official commemoration. It’s characterised by explicit acknowledgement and public discussions of ethnic identity.</p>
<p>But there’s a puzzling contradiction of state policy at play during Kwibuka. </p>
<p>In 2003, Rwanda adopted a policy of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/09/world/a-decade-after-massacres-rwanda-outlaws-ethnicity.html">ethnic non-recognition</a>. There are no Hutus or Tutsis; only Rwandans. The aim is to achieve national homogeneity in a country that was torn apart by ethnic genocide. </p>
<p>The policy is strictly enforced, but relaxes during the 100 days of Kwibuka. </p>
<p>This has led to seemingly opposed practices: legally erasing identity groups because of their link to conflict, contrasted against three months of saturated reminders in the form of public speeches, memorial programming, burials and commemorative signage.</p>
<p>In 2014, 20 years on, the genocide was officially renamed from the Rwandan genocide to “the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi”. This decision was recognised by the United Nations General Assembly in <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/ga12000.doc.htm">2018</a>. </p>
<p>The change marked a distinct shift from an inclusive naming. It also centred Tutsi people as the sole targets of genocidal violence. This, despite Rwanda and the international community historically acknowledging that moderate Hutus were victimised, too. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/in-rwanda-genocide-commemorations-are-infused-with-political-and-diplomatic-agendas-160283">In Rwanda, genocide commemorations are infused with political and diplomatic agendas</a>
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<p><a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/constructing-identity-through-commemoration-kwibuka-and-the-rise-of-survivor-nationalism-in-postconflict-rwanda/CFE362C810D66B522D751AC1938DCF59">My research</a> pinpointed four anomalies that were not present during the rest of the year but emerged during Kwibuka:</p>
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<li>a perceived increase in violence towards survivors</li>
<li>an increase in accusations and convictions of genocide ideology and denial</li>
<li>widespread youth involvement in identity rhetoric</li>
<li>a reported increase in prisoner confessions. </li>
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<p>These anomalies highlight how Kwibuka exacerbates social tensions. My research was done five years ago, but the <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/rib-warns-against-genocide-ideology-ahead-kwibuka27">anomalies</a> I observed <a href="https://www.ktpress.rw/2022/04/kwibuka-28-killed-and-dumped-in-river-rubyiro-remembered-for-the-first-time/">persist</a>.</p>
<h2>Studying state-led commemoration</h2>
<p>In <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/CFE362C810D66B522D751AC1938DCF59/S0022278X19000259a.pdf/constructing-identity-through-commemoration-kwibuka-and-the-rise-of-survivor-nationalism-in-post-conflict-rwanda.pdf">my research</a>, I examined the rhetoric coming from the Rwandan state on the 1994 genocide. I also observed nine commemoration events to see how attendees reacted to and spoke about Kwibuka.</p>
<p>I additionally conducted interviews to help me understand the differences between the commemoration period and the rest of the year. </p>
<p>I was curious to follow what effect this sudden shift from ethnic non-recognition to recognition might have on people. </p>
<p>In the aftermath of the genocide, the Rwandan Patriotic Front, the country’s leading political party, has “<a href="https://advox.globalvoices.org/2020/08/07/the-chilling-tale-of-mass-surveillance-and-spying-in-rwanda/">positioned itself</a> as the only guarantor of peace, security and development”, as Rwandan lawyer Louis Gitinywa writes. </p>
<p>My research shows this message is reinforced through commemoration programming. This commonly emphasises that only the ruling party and current political leadership stand between ordinary Rwandans and a reemergence of genocidal violence. </p>
<p>The ethnic non-recognition policy is linked to Rwandan laws against “genocide ideology” and <a href="https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4ac5c4302.pdf">“sectarianism”</a>. The government claims that such laws keep Rwandans safe. However, <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr47/005/2010/en/">critics</a> point out their chilling effect on legitimate political opposition and dissent. I was at times told that simply asking questions about genocide commemoration and ethnicity could be seen as being at odds with the law.</p>
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<h2>Anomalies</h2>
<p>I discovered four anomalies that are only present during the commemoration period. </p>
<p>First, there is heightened sensitivity across the country. Survivors told me they were worried about violence against them and their property. This is not baseless. National radio and television stations report threats against survivors throughout Kwibuka. These include their livestock being tortured, property destroyed and bones mailed to memorial sites.</p>
<p>The second anomaly is the emergence of “survivor youth” and their engagement with ethnic rhetoric. Among my interviewees, “survivor” was synonymous with “Tutsi”. </p>
<p>This self-claimed identity held even among young people who have spent most of their lives in a country with an ethnic non-recognition policy. Notably, my youth interviewees identified themselves by ethnicity unprompted, and when asked if they knew any non-Tutsi who would refer to themselves as “survivors”, they all said no or were unsure.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.cnlg.gov.rw/index.php?id=2">National Commission for the Fight Against Genocide</a> shared data with me on accusations and convictions related to genocide denial and ideology during Kwibuka. It showed that many of these cases involved people born well after 1994. This happened despite the state’s insistence that the next generation is free of the old biases or violent inclinations that drove the genocide.</p>
<p>The third anomaly is the increase in accusations and convictions of genocide ideology, denial and sectarianism. My interview data was consistent with <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/call-unity-kwibuka27-activities-draw-closer">statistics</a> from the Rwanda Investigation Board showing that such accusations and convictions are concentrated during Kwibuka. It’s not clear why, but heightened sensitivity and the fear rhetoric promoted by the Rwandan Patriotic Front during the 100 days may be among the reasons.</p>
<p>Finally, Kwibuka always marks an increase in confessions from imprisoned génocidaires. This relates directly to an <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/genocide-over-18000-victims-exhumed-kigali-mass-graves">increase</a> in bodies of genocide victims being discovered. Confessions are made each year, even though authorities say incentives for prisoners who share information ended some time ago.</p>
<p>I have <a href="https://www.erudit.org/en/journals/ateliers/2019-v14-n2-ateliers05462/1071136ar/">argued</a> that this continual discovery of bodies merits further attention. Exhumation and reburial can lead to <a href="https://www.cigionline.org/publications/promoting-reconciliation-through-exhuming-and-identifying-victims-1994-rwandan-0/">closure</a> for families and communities, and is an important part of commemoration. However, a claim that prisoners confess because they are “moved by the spirit of Kwibuka” is at odds with documented <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/10/10/we-will-force-you-confess/torture-and-unlawful-military-detention-rwanda">coercion and human rights violations</a> in Rwandan prisons.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/rwandans-discuss-how-best-to-commemorate-genocide-94452">Rwandans discuss how best to commemorate genocide</a>
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<h2>Memory without exclusion</h2>
<p>My research in no way aims to promote covering up history. But there is a difference between teaching history and stoking historical social divisions. The exclusionary “us versus them” form of nationalism that emerges during Kwibuka may threaten Rwanda’s precarious peace. </p>
<p>One solution may lie in the fact that the commemoration period is highly mutable. It adapts and changes every year. This means it’s possible to have more inclusive events that favour a <a href="https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/agaciro-vernacular-memory-and-the-politics-of-memory-in-postgenocide-rwanda(2e914106-f314-4a45-a6f2-7927a68d2be6).html">balance</a> between official narratives and ordinary people’s memories.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/186244/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gretchen Baldwin received funding for this research from the Advanced Consortium on Cooperation, Conflict, and Complexity (AC4) in 2017. She is currently a Researcher with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. </span></em></p>In 2003, Rwanda adopted a policy of ethnic non-recognition. However, for 100 days in a year, it centres ethnicity in the country’s psyche.Gretchen Baldwin, Researcher, Stockholm International Peace Research InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1868442022-08-01T13:55:11Z2022-08-01T13:55:11ZBurundi at 60 is the poorest country on the planet: a look at what went wrong<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474611/original/file-20220718-72671-x6b330.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Sorting newly picked coffee beans.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Thierry BrŽsillon-GODONG/GettyImages</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Burundi, which marked 60 years of independence on 1 July 2022, ranks as the <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/256547/the-20-countries-with-the-lowest-gdp-per-capita/">poorest country on the planet</a> in terms of GDP per capita. This must be understood in the light of a <a href="https://recherche-afriquedesgrandslacs.pantheonsorbonne.fr/activites-et-programmes/burundi-recherche-son-histoire">history punctuated by political upheavals</a>. Until 1996, the country lived to the rhythm of <a href="https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/burundi-1962-present/">coups</a>, <a href="https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/burundi-killings-1972.html">massacres</a> and political <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/burundi-military-behind-1993-assassination-president">assassinations</a> – before plunging into a long civil war. </p>
<p>Peace was eventually restored in 2005. However, the country returned to authoritarian governance in 2015. Since then, the UN has noted progress but continues to <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/09/1100092">denounce</a> the political violence that plagues the country. </p>
<p>How did Burundi come to this? Why is change so slow to arrive?</p>
<p>I have studied the politics and economies around the Great Lakes region for more than 40 years – including the links between governance and poverty. The countries that form the region are Burundi, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda. , Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda. It’s my view that the end of the Belgian and British colonial empires <a href="https://www.persee.fr/issue/tiers_0040-7356_1986_num_27_106">upset</a> the political, economic and social frameworks of the two nations formed out of the former <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Ruanda-Urundi">Ruanda-Urundi</a> colonial entity. </p>
<p>Present-day Rwanda and Burundi served as reservoirs of labour for the exploitation of the wealth of the vast agricultural and mining areas of the Belgian Congo to the west and the British colonies in the east. Refocused within their borders following independence in the 1962, they were reduced to small, overcrowded and landlocked micro-states.</p>
<p>Burundi is a country familiar with <a href="https://www.persee.fr/doc/tiers_0040-7356_1991_num_32_127_4651">various military regimes since independence</a>. These regimes have succeeded in appropriating state resources while ordinary citizens – mostly rural farmers – have borne the brunt of the civil war.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-whats-gone-wrong-in-burundis-search-for-stability-54014">Explainer: what’s gone wrong in Burundi’s search for stability</a>
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<p>The divide that has emerged between military elites and “people of the hills” – as rural farmers are commonly referred to – runs deeper than ethnic and regional differences. The peasantry still provides almost all the resources of the party-state. But most of the agrarian policy decisions are taken without consultation, including at the grassroots levels where party delegates, often peasants, do as directed. </p>
<p>The state has imposed itself as the exclusive economic operator. Civil servants and party cadres programme and direct investments. Ordinary people are for the most part powerless.</p>
<h2>Nkurunziza’s missed opportunity</h2>
<p>Following the gradual return of peace nearly 20 years ago, Pierre Nkurunziza was elected president in 2005. Drawn from the majority Hutu ethnic group, Nkurunziza ended 25 years of pro-Tutsi military regimes. The <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/422339#metadata_info_tab_contents">minority Tutsi make up 14% of the population and the Hutu 85%</a>. In the next five years, the president and his party – the National Council for the Defense of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) – <a href="https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/notes-de-lifri/post-nkurunziza-total-supremacy-cndd-fdd">went about consolidating power</a>.</p>
<p>Hopes for stability were stronger at the next election in 2010. For the first time in the country’s history, voters were called upon to vote at the normal end of an electoral cycle. CNDD-FDD secured another mandate thanks to a <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/burundi-ruling-party-wins-parliamentary-elections-99322559/155447.html">divided opposition</a> and the charismatic personality of the incumbent president, who enjoyed massive support from rural populations. </p>
<p>A party that had managed to reconcile ethnic divisions and to <a href="https://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/HSFK/hsfk_publikationen/Burundi-CNDD-FDD-1994-2004.pdf">integrate</a> the armed forces with former rebels now had a resounding national mandate.</p>
<p>Unchallenged, Nkurunziza concentrated power in his hands under a de facto one-party state. A youth militia loyal to his party kept an eye on dissent among local populations and neutralised any organised opposition. But the mood soured quickly when Nkurunziza <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32588658">sought a “third term”</a> in the 2015 elections, contrary to the constitution.</p>
<p>A popular protest was immediate and strengthened despite the mobilisation of the police. Within weeks a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/14/burundi-violence-coup-protests-bujumbura-president-pierre-nkurunziza">failed military coup</a> laid bare the fractures within the armed forces. A <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/05/26/april-2015-june-2020-chronology-repression-media-and-civil-society-burundi">violent repression</a> followed in which freedom of expression and independent media were crushed. </p>
<p>In July 2015, after elections “<a href="https://news.un.org/fr/story/2015/07/315472-burundi-lonu-estime-que-lenvironnement-general-netait-pas-propice-des-elections">neither free nor credible</a>” according to the UN, the CNDD-FDD exceeded the two-thirds majority in the National Assembly.</p>
<p>Nkurunziza’s victory was Burundi’s loss. Amid the repression of opponents, the country’s economy slowed down, foreign capital took flight and infrastructure crumbled. There was looting of public resources and a sharp reduction in social benefits. </p>
<p>At the end of his third term, the leaders of the CNDD-FDD party were happy to see the back of the <a href="https://gl-news.com/news/burundi-to-pay-530-thousand-dollars-to-the-president-who-leaves-office/">“eternal supreme leader”</a> who had become a liability. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nkurunziza-left-a-troubling-legacy-burundis-new-leader-has-much-to-mend-140972">Nkurunziza left a troubling legacy: Burundi's new leader has much to mend</a>
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<h2>The electoral rescue of 2020</h2>
<p>Burundi’s GDP had been <a href="https://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Burundi-report-v2.pdf">battered badly</a> during the civil war, which ended in 2005. It was on the rise for ten years from 2005 to 2014. Following the Nkurunziza-instigated political crisis in 2015 the economy dipped sharply again. Ranked second poorest country in the world in 2013 and 2014, it fell to the poorest in 2015 and has remained there ever since. The UN <a href="https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/human-development-index#/indicies/HDI">Human Development Index</a>, which measures longevity, education and inequality, also attests to this deterioration. Burundi was ranked 180th in 2015, falling to 185th in 2019 and 2020.</p>
<p>Thus, in almost all socio-economic measures, Burundi’s performance is among the lowest on the planet thanks mainly to conflict and <a href="https://iwacu.global.ssl.fastly.net/une-annee-du-president-ndayishimiye-un-bilan-economique-indolent/">elite corruption</a>. </p>
<p>The failed coup of May 2015 upset a delicate balance in which the army – including former rebels – and the police were jointly managed. Pro-Nkurunziza <a href="https://information.tv5monde.com/afrique/coup-d-etat-au-burundi-32942">elements</a> in the army who crushed the coup sensed an opportunity for <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/fr/africa/central-africa/burundi/au-coeur-de-la-crise-burundaise-iv-la-rente-du-maintien-de-la-paix-en-question">self-enrichment</a> to match the fortunes of their senior Tutsi colleagues and graduates of military schools. </p>
<p>Hitherto contained or concealed, <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/fr/africa/central-africa/burundi/au-coeur-de-la-crise-burundaise-iv-la-rente-du-maintien-de-la-paix-en-question">this “financial catch-up”</a> was transformed into an open competition for personal enrichment commensurate with each person’s powers.</p>
<p>In May 2020, General Evariste Ndayishimiye, <a href="https://information.tv5monde.com/afrique/burundi-qui-est-evariste-ndayishimiye-candidat-du-systeme-cndd-fdd-343510">a wise and withdrawn man</a>, became the new president. Nkurunziza died shortly afterwards officially from COVID-19, a disease whose danger he had always underestimated. Burundi, on the other hand, continues to suffer the effects of Nkurunziza’s political legacy. </p>
<h2>Struggle between elites</h2>
<p>Having experienced since independence all forms of divisions that can be exploited by authoritarian regimes, the “people of the hills” now know that their lot is the result of struggles between elites for the capture of national resources.</p>
<p>Only the re-appropriation of the state, to make it legitimate once more in the eyes of the population, could free resources for their purposes. This implies that peasants emancipate themselves from <a href="https://iwacu42.global.ssl.fastly.net/quand-le-ministre-ndirakobuca-prend-la-grosse-seringue/">co-opted administrative and economic bureaucracies</a> which have appropriated power and wealth by force, first for the benefit of a Tutsi and then of a Hutu elite. Burundians need to impose themselves through free and credible elections as self-organised citizens responsible for the future of a democratic country.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/186844/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>André Guichaoua does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The peasantry still provides almost all the resources of the party-state, yet most of the agrarian policy decisions are taken without consultation.André Guichaoua, Professeur des universités, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-SorbonneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1854322022-07-27T14:48:43Z2022-07-27T14:48:43ZHow conflicts intertwined over time and destabilised the DRC – and the region<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476301/original/file-20220727-13-rou5w0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A soldier from the armed forces of the DRC on foot patrol in the village of Manzalaho near Beni.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alexis Huguet / AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna34958903">one of the deadliest the world has ever witnessed</a>. One report estimates the death toll at <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/irc-study-shows-congos-neglected-crisis-leaves-54-million-dead">5.4 million</a> while <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/review-halves-congo-war-toll-20100120">a more conservative count</a> puts it at one million dead. Much of the conflict is centred in North Kivu and South Kivu provinces, which lie on the DRC’s eastern border. The provinces border on Uganda in the north-east, Rwanda and Burundi to the east and Tanzania towards the south-east. </p>
<p>Different scholars have attributed the recurrent conflict to <a href="https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v33/n02/mahmood-mamdani/the-invention-of-the-indigene">ethnicity</a> and <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4006793">nationality</a>. In recent years much of the focus has been on the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-way-that-minerals-are-mined-affects-conflict-in-eastern-congo-120833">illegal exploitation</a> of Congolese natural resources. However, this does not explain the prevalence of the other two drivers of the conflict. </p>
<p>For this reason, I set out to rethink the ongoing conflict in North Kivu and South Kivu as part of my <a href="http://etd.uwc.ac.za/xmlui/handle/11394/6641">PhD research</a>. I sought to establish whether the conflict can be considered as a political struggle between indigenous Congolese and Kinyarwanda-speaking Congolese. I also sought to investigate the contest for survival between Hutu and Tutsi elites. </p>
<p>Most scholarly works identify a conflict in North Kivu that dominated headlines in 1993 as the starting point of violence in the region. But based on my <a href="http://etd.uwc.ac.za/xmlui/handle/11394/6641">research</a>, I have concluded that the conflict is two distinct conflicts that became intertwined over one-and-a-half centuries. The first is a much older conflict which started during colonialism and has as its source a local struggle for belonging.</p>
<p>The second is relatively new, and is a regional contest for survival between the Hutu and Tutsi elites. </p>
<h2>The two conflicts</h2>
<p>The first conflict is rooted in Belgian and German colonialism in present-day DRC, Rwanda and Burundi. Based on a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/179896">racist notion popular among African colonists at the time</a>, the two colonial administrations gave <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691102801/when-victims-become-killers">privileged status</a> to some of the local population based on ethnicity. This explains how the Tutsi became the intermediate rulers for German and Belgian colonial powers in Ruanda-Urundi, the colony that gave birth at independence to Rwanda and Burundi. </p>
<p>In addition, when Belgium became the sole colonial power following Germany’s exit in 1917, Tutsi overlords were brought into <a href="http://etd.uwc.ac.za/xmlui/handle/11394/6641">North Kivu</a> as rulers over the Hutu-dominated Banyarwanda. The aim was to recreate the system in Ruanda-Urundi where the Hutu were deployed on menial jobs and hard labour under the watch of Tutsi overlords holding a brief for Belgian colonisers. </p>
<p>Since the 20th century Banyarwanda (or “those from Rwanda”) was the common identity for Kinyarwanda-speaking Congolese in eastern DRC. As the latest arrivals from Ruanda-Urundi, the Tutsi transplanted in the 1930s were also considered Banyarwanda by the indigenous Congolese – primarily the Hunde, Nyanga and Nande. </p>
<p>It became clear after the second world war that colonial powers would not be able to hang on to their colonies. The African elites who instigated the independence struggles needed the support of the rural masses. This is the point at which the postcolonial contest over who had a right to belong began to shape the politics in the Great Lakes region. </p>
<p>Ethnic groups which claimed to have belonged to the region first – or the autochthones – branded others as foreigners even though they had lived in the region before Belgian and German colonialism. These so-called foreigners had to leave and return to where they came from.</p>
<h2>Struggle between Hutu and Tutsi elites</h2>
<p>The second conflict is postcolonial. As Belgium left the scene, Ruanda-Urundi was split into Rwanda and Burundi. In Burundi, the Tutsi maintained their control over the postcolonial state. However, in Rwanda, the Hutu gained control after a period of ethnic conflict between the majority Hutu and the Tutsi. The so-called <a href="https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/9780691193830-008/html?lang=en">Social Revolution</a> lasted between 1959 and 1962.</p>
<p>Many Tutsi in Rwanda were subjected to violence, fleeing to neighbouring countries such as Uganda, Burundi and DRC to escape death. This sparked the start of an inter-regional conflict of survival between Hutu and Tutsi elites. Subsequent events of political violence (from 1972 to the present) resulted in wave after wave of refugee migration between Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC. </p>
<p>The result is that ethnicity, nationality, allegiance, place of origin and current place of residence are not neatly separated; the question of who “belongs” where cannot be solved. But people continually try to do so through violence.</p>
<p>The subsequent events of political violence in Rwanda and Burundi resulted in a contest for survival between Hutu and Tutsi elites. Power changed between these two ethnic groups in Rwanda and Burundi. Up to the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, the Hutu were in control of the Rwandan state and the Tutsi of the Burundian state.</p>
<p>However, after 1994 the Tutsi took control of the Rwandan state and the Hutu of the Burundian state.</p>
<h2>‘Foreigner’ is a complex word</h2>
<p>The consequences of years of conflict are twofold. </p>
<p>First, it has created two levels to being considered a “foreigner” in the Great Lakes. The first level is nationality. I found that the Banyarwanda and Barundi identities must be perceived as references to particular nationalities. For example, Banyarwanda must be seen as a reference to Rwandan nationality and Barundi to Burundian nationality. </p>
<p>Therefore, in the Kivus, the Banyarwanda and Barundi identities evoke a politics of belonging. </p>
<p>In the 1970s, Kinyarwanda-speaking Congolese of Tutsi origin rejected the Banyarwanda identity and opted for the Banyamulenge identity. In response, Kinyarwanda-speaking Congolese of Hutu origin also rejected the Banyarwanda identity and opted for the Banyabwisha identity. </p>
<p>Both these identities make them indigenous to Congo and evoke a counterclaim of belonging to the DRC. </p>
<p>At the second level is the notion that the Tutsi are not from the Great Lakes region. But this is not true. </p>
<p>The first level is restricted to the DRC, and the second level is regional. However, this complex regional politics of belonging is playing itself out in the eastern DRC, and it was here that it became intertwined after some time.</p>
<p>Will there be an end to the violence? It is possible if the geographical scope of the conflict is broadened to include all neighbouring countries and if the focus is a negotiated settlement followed by a period of reconciliation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/185432/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jacob Cloete does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Violence in the DRC can be brought to an end if the geographical scope of the conflict is broadened to include all neighbouring countries.Jacob Cloete, Manager, Zone Learning, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1602832021-05-05T14:56:14Z2021-05-05T14:56:14ZIn Rwanda, genocide commemorations are infused with political and diplomatic agendas<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398888/original/file-20210505-17-eehaii.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Rwanda's presidential couple at the 2021 genocide commemoration. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">SIMON WOHLFAHRT/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Created in 2003, the <a href="https://cnlg.gov.rw/index.php?id=2&L=20">National Commission for the Fight Against Genocide</a> is responsible for Rwanda’s genocide remembrance policy. It is a programme that has, over time, influenced all aspects of politics across all sectors.</p>
<p>Each year, on 7 April, themed memorial events are organised by the commission, in close collaboration with the president. </p>
<p>This article addresses the period following the 20th anniversary of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Rwandan-Civil-War">Rwandan Civil War</a> and its <a href="https://news.trust.org/item/20140402113037-u315s/">1994 genocide</a>. </p>
<p>What follows is a review of the commemorations from 2014 to the present – and a view on the challenges ahead.</p>
<h2>2014 - 2019: internationalising the remembrance</h2>
<p>In 2014 Rwanda entered the final phase of its genocide remembrance public policy, the “second internationalisation” phase. The aim was to urge recognition and commemoration of the Rwandan genocide as an ethical obligation across the world.</p>
<p>This gave rise to commemorations in Kigali in 2014 that were considered particularly offensive, <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20140406-france-boycott-rwanda-genocide-commemoration">especially by the French government</a>. On the morning of the event, the French ambassador’s accreditation was withdrawn. The day culminated in an <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S9otQUZtd3Y">accusatory speech</a> by Rwandan president Paul Kagame at a ceremony attended by the <a href="https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2014-04-07/remarks-commemoration-20th-anniversary-rwandan-genocide-english-and">UN Secretary General</a> and foreign heads of state.</p>
<p>With widespread international genocide commemorations in 2017, Rwanda submitted a draft <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/N17/439/57/PDF/N1743957.pdf">resolution</a> to the United Nations General Assembly to rename the day. On 26 January 2018, the assembly adopted a decision – without vote – for the “International Day of Reflection on the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda” to become the <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/ga12000.doc.htm">“International Day of Reflection on the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda”</a>. This decision was highly criticised, given the new name excludes victims from other ethnic groups.</p>
<p>In 2019, the 25th anniversary commemorations consecrated the international community’s recognition of its responsibility towards the genocide and unwillingness to try to stop it. Official ceremonies were characterised by remorse from many countries.</p>
<p>Even France, usually in the crosshairs, was spared. A few months prior, a French court had <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/32489/rwanda-genocide-paris-drops-investigation-into-attack-of-plane-carrying-habyarimana/">dismissed</a> a case against prominent Rwandans for the 6 April 1994 attack on Rwandan president Juvenal Habyarimana’s plane. This sparked the genocide. </p>
<p>A long-running dispute between France and the new Rwandan regime was resolved. But even as the investigation was being closed in 2017, Rwanda enlisted a prestigious US law firm to explore bringing France before international courts for complicity in genocide.</p>
<p>In a 2019 declaration, French president Emmanuel Macron highlighted his desire to “break with the way in which France had understood and taught the Tutsi genocide”. He made 7 April a French national <a href="https://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/questions/detail/15/QE/28557">day of commemoration</a> and a commission was <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/macron-orders-probe-into-frances-role-in-rwanda-genocide/a-48227839">set up</a> “to examine all French archives relating to Rwanda between 1990 and 1994”. A French court also dismissed a case against French officers involved in <a href="https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/05/14/assessment_of_opration_turquoise_113440.html">Operation Turquoise</a> in Rwanda. </p>
<p>This indicated an educational approach towards French sovereign institutions, who were invited to recognise the “errors” of the past. </p>
<h2>2020: the return of controversial commemorations</h2>
<p>The 2020 anniversary was particularly complicated for Rwanda. On top of COVID-19 restrictions and on the eve of commemorations, the UN secretary general António Guterres and UN General Assembly president Volkan Bozkir unexpectedly questioned the new title. </p>
<p>Guterres <a href="https://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/commemorations-2020-sg-message.shtml">specified</a> that among the one million people murdered in the genocide, “the victims were overwhelmingly Tutsi, but also included Hutu and others who opposed the genocide”.</p>
<p>The following day, 7 April, Kagame’s <a href="https://youtu.be/-8WZlmZ_pUY">short public declaration</a> took note of the statements. It was addressed to “all Rwandans”, speaking of “what happened to our country and what we learned”. It didn’t specifically mention the “genocide against the Tutsi”.</p>
<p>Such a transgression of the official wording drew such criticism from survivor organisations that Kagame eventually backtracked.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/-8WZlmZ_pUY?wmode=transparent&start=45" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">President Kagame’s 7 April address in 2020.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Rwanda’s draft resolution required a formal vote to be passed in the UN General Assembly. During debates, the <a href="https://d2v9ipibika81v.cloudfront.net/uploads/sites/296/4.20.2020-Letter-to-GA-President.pdf">US</a> and <a href="https://www.un.org/pga/74/wp-content/uploads/sites/99/2020/04/UK-EOP-on-Rwandan-genocide-resolution-20-April.pdf">UK</a> <a href="https://usun.usmission.gov/explanation-of-position-on-the-un-general-assembly-resolution-on-the-rwandan-genocide/">denounced</a> the rewriting of history implied by this wording. Following Rwandan pressure, the <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N20/101/35/PDF/N2010135.pdf?OpenElement">resolution</a> was nevertheless passed.</p>
<p>Rwanda <a href="https://www.undocs.org/en/A/74/830">lamented</a> the US and UK positions, saying they “bring ambiguity that feeds the resurgent genocide denial movement” in the <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/conflict-great-lakes-region/">Great Lakes Region</a>.</p>
<p>All objectives of the active commemoration policy promoted by the National Commission for the Fight Against Genocide have therefore been formally achieved. The “genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda” is now recognised and commemorated internationally as an ethical obligation. So is the genocide remembrance policy, now divorced from its historical context.</p>
<p>By dissociating the genocide from actions undertaken by the two politico-military blocs during the 1990–94 war, Rwanda’s official version has ended the debates that characterise the historical work relating to this region since independence. </p>
<p>It’s no longer a matter of rebuilding, using factual <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14623528.2019.1709611">research</a> to provide depth. It is about criminalising those who dare to disagree, citing various genocide denial laws.</p>
<h2>2021: Rwanda’s other fights</h2>
<p>In 2021, two major events provided the backdrop to commemorations. On 26 March, a <a href="https://www.vie-publique.fr/sites/default/files/rapport/pdf/279186_0.pdf">report</a> on French archives relating to the genocide was <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20210326-france-braces-for-historians-report-over-rwanda-genocide-failings">published</a>. It was followed by the announcement that Macron would likely travel to Rwanda. In Kigali, everything pointed towards the commemorations capitalising on these advances.</p>
<p>They were indeed capitalised on, but Kagame’s long <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/kwibuka27-address-president-paul-kagame">speech</a> consisted mainly of justifying the authorities’ resolutions. He denounced countries that have not tried genocidal perpetrators living on their soil and refused to extradite them to Rwanda. “It’s the same people who question the use of ‘Genocide against Tutsi’,” he said. “But the problem of definitions started way back in 1994, of just simply naming what it was.”</p>
<p>The accusations are surprising, given that Kigali is preparing to host a <a href="https://thecommonwealth.org/chogm">meeting of the Commonwealth</a> in June. Rwanda’s membership goes beyond the fact that part of the population speaks English. It’s mainly based on adhering to the Commonwealth Charter values, including human rights.</p>
<p>Rwanda’s human rights violations have been denounced by major Anglo-Saxon human rights organisations <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021">Human Rights Watch</a> and <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/3202/2021/en/">Amnesty International</a>. In rebuttal, Kagame has quoted the French archive report, that then French president François Mitterrand “knew that a genocide against Tutsi was being planned by their allies in Rwanda”. The French report in fact provides strong critique of France’s role supporting the Habyarimana regime between 1990 and 1994, but stops short of stating France was complicit in the genocide.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398961/original/file-20210505-21-1six2do.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A crowd of people in the dark, lit by candles that they hold." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398961/original/file-20210505-21-1six2do.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398961/original/file-20210505-21-1six2do.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398961/original/file-20210505-21-1six2do.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398961/original/file-20210505-21-1six2do.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398961/original/file-20210505-21-1six2do.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398961/original/file-20210505-21-1six2do.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398961/original/file-20210505-21-1six2do.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">AKigali vigil during the 25th commemoration of the genocide.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">ASUYOSHI CHIBA/AFP via Getty Images</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But the most important part was yet to come. On 19 April, Rwandan authorities finally revealed their own “investigative <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/19/france-enabled-1994-rwanda-genocide-report-says">report</a>” on France’s role in the genocide. This was updated in light of the French report’s conclusions, but was much harsher. According to Rwanda’s foreign affairs minister, French political leaders “enabled a foreseeable genocide”. </p>
<p>The report states France did not participate in the genocide and “the French government is not complicit. But it’s a question of law and the Rwandan government will not bring this question before a court.” In this way, the foundations for a “healthy relationship” have been laid, contingent on an official apology, which “would be a step in the right direction to rebuild trust”.</p>
<h2>2022: challenges ahead</h2>
<p>It seems next year’s commemorations will involve a wealth of events. It’s worth mentioning two other international commemorations concerning Rwanda in 2022. The first will be held on 1 July, the anniversary shared by “warring brothers” Rwanda and Burundi, celebrating 60 years of independence.</p>
<p>In Rwanda, 1 July is just a bank holiday and the regime will probably continue to mainly celebrate 4 July, the date that they took Kigali in 1994. In Burundi, it’s the opposite. Authorities intend to give strong meaning to 1 July, remembering both independence and the 50th anniversary of the genocide against the Hutu in 1972. Giving recognition to this <a href="https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/burundi-killings-1972.html">“hidden” genocide</a> will be at the heart of commemorations.</p>
<p>The various massacres and genocides in 1959–61, 1965, 1969, 1972, 1988, 1973, 1993–94 and 2015 remain profoundly fixed in the memories of both <a href="https://theconversation.com/burundi-and-rwanda-a-rivalry-that-lies-at-the-heart-of-great-lakes-crises-63795">Burundians and Rwandans</a>. The “Tutsi” domination of Burundi and “Hutu” domination of Rwanda (now reversed after two civil wars) have established the political authoritarianism of the military regimes. The debate sparked about commemorating one group of victims over the other will endure in various forms.</p>
<p>For the vast majority of Burundians, 50 years after the 1972 genocide and a return to peace, it is high time to honour the memory of all victims of national divisions. Debates established by Burundi’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission alongside the <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/03/20/burundi-s-truth-and-reconcilliation-commission-presents-new-findings//">current work</a> of exhuming and registering genocide victims, have allowed for liberating moments of expression for Hutu and Tutsi populations. </p>
<p>This could finally pave the way for the writing of a plural, shared, national history.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/160283/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Professor at University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne., André Guichaoua is affiliated with UMR "Développement et Sociétés". FMSH, Member of International Scientific Committee of ANR Program "Exit from Violence"</span></em></p>A survey of the commemorations since 2014 reveals the politicking behind the writing of history and Rwanda’s place in the world.André Guichaoua, Professeur des universités, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-SorbonneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1454602020-09-02T14:44:47Z2020-09-02T14:44:47ZPaul Rusesabagina’s arrest shows there’s no space for critical voices in Rwanda<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/356015/original/file-20200902-22-13tr736.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Paul Rusesabagina, chairman of the Rwandan Movement for Democratic Change political party. </span> </figcaption></figure><p><em>Paul Rusesabagina, who saved hundreds of Rwandans during the genocide by sheltering them in the hotel he managed - and saw his story made into the Hollywood film, ‘Hotel Rwanda’ - <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2020/08/31/africa/rwanda-genocide-paul-rusesabagina-arrest/index.html">has been</a> arrested by Rwandan authorities who allege “terror related offences”.</em></p>
<p><em>In an interview with Moina Spooner from The Conversation Africa, political scientist Timothy Longman - an authority on the Rwandan genocide and its aftermath - provides insights into who Rusesabagina is and the build up to his arrest.</em></p>
<p><strong>Who is Paul Rusesabagina and what role did he play during the genocide of the Tutsi in Rwanda?</strong></p>
<p>In the early 1990s, Rusesabagina was the manager of a hotel in Rwanda’s capital, the Hôtel des Diplomats. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13431486">Within hours</a> of the plane crash that killed Rwanda’s president Juvenal Habyarimana on April 6, 1994, the president’s supporters spread throughout Kigali killing opposition politicians, civil society activists, and members of the Tutsi ethnic minority. </p>
<p>Many targeted people sought refuge in the country’s most prestigious hotel, the Hôtel des Mille Collines. With the hotel’s manager out of Kigali, Rusesabagina stepped in to manage the situation at the Mille Collines. Rusesabagina, a member of the Hutu majority, succeeded in keeping death squads out of the hotel. Ultimately <a href="https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4700721">over</a> 1,000 people were safely evacuated.</p>
<p>In the aftermath of the genocide of the Tutsi, Rusesabagina was recognised for saving Tutsi lives. His story became the basis of the 2004 movie, Hotel Rwanda, with Don Cheadle portraying him. In 2006, he published an autobiography, <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/298143/an-ordinary-man-by-paul-rusesabagina-with-tom-zoellner">An Ordinary Man</a>. </p>
<p>Rusesabagina went on to become one of the best known Rwandans in the world. He travelled and spoke internationally, and received awards for his humanitarian work. </p>
<p>He eventually faced a backlash, however, as some survivors <a href="https://groups.google.com/g/igihuha/c/5apIo9TcQ6k?pli=1">argued</a> that he exaggerated his heroism. They also questioned his motives during the genocide, and criticised him for profiting from their suffering through self-promotion.</p>
<p><strong>Why was Rusesabagina arrested?</strong></p>
<p>After the genocide, Rusesabagina returned to his position as manager of Hôtel des Diplomats. I met him there in 1995 and heard from others, including several survivors from Mille Collines, the story of his saving people. </p>
<p>Rusesabagina was a political moderate, a Hutu married to a Tutsi. But through personal conversations, he told me he was increasingly troubled by what he saw as growing authoritarianism and anti-Hutu ethnic chauvinism of the post-genocide regime. In 1995, the Rwandan government <a href="https://anzacday.org.au/witness-to-genocide-a-personal-account-of-the-1995-kibeho-massacre">used violence</a> to close camps for displaced people. And in 1996, Rwandan troops <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/zaire2/zaire0397web.pdf">bombed</a> Rwandan refugee camps across the border in the Democratic Republic of Congo (then known as Zaire) and drove refugees back into Rwanda.</p>
<p>Rusesabagina left Rwanda in 1996 and received asylum in Belgium. But he felt threatened there and moved his family to Texas, where they settled.</p>
<p>There has been <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-rwanda-genocide-film/hotel-rwanda-hero-in-bitter-controversy-idUSL0420968620070404">tremendous friction</a> between Rusesabagina and Paul Kagame’s government.</p>
<p>Rusesabagina’s <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/298143/an-ordinary-man-by-paul-rusesabagina-with-tom-zoellner">autobiography</a> published strong criticisms of the post-genocide government. As a result the regime, led by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), began a concerted <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2006/05/10/smearing-a-hero-span-classbankheadsad-revisionism-over-hotel-rwandaspan/63b20dbb-fab6-4569-9558-a0be2a8b6eaa/">smear campaign</a>, attacking his reputation. </p>
<p>Survivors from the Mille Collines <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-rwanda-genocide-film/hotel-rwanda-hero-in-bitter-controversy-idUSL0420968620070404">began to challenge</a> his actions during the genocide more forcefully. For example they questioned why he charged room fees to people staying at the hotel during the genocide. The survivor’s group Ibuka <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-internationale-des-sciences-sociales-2006-3-page-525.htm">claimed that</a> he was lying about his role in saving people and should be arrested, and Kagame even <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB116528240652840686">publicly argued</a> that Rusesabagina’s claims to heroism were false.</p>
<p>Facing <a href="https://www.editions-harmattan.fr/index.asp?navig=catalogue&obj=livre&no=26115">harsh criticism</a>, Rusesabagina become increasingly harsh in his own condemnation of Kagame and the post-genocide government. </p>
<p>He <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-rwanda-rusesabagina/hotel-rwanda-hero-fears-new-hutu-tutsi-killings-idUSL1192073920070111">spoke regularly</a> about Hutu killed by the RPF, and his positions seemed to become more extreme. He even argued that there had been a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/africonfpeacrevi.3.2.129#metadata_info_tab_contents">“genocide against Hutu intellectuals”</a>, a position that resembles the double genocide theory <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3176203?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">widely rejected</a> by scholars. </p>
<p>In recent years while living in Texas, he publicly supported opposition groups, like the Rwandan Movement for Democratic Change (MRCD), which <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fnn0lAkUAnk">he co-founded</a>. His arrest <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53972924">stems from accusations</a> that he has supported the Front for National Liberation (FLN), said to be the armed wing of the MRCD, and RUD-Uranana, an armed group that <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-rwanda-security/rwanda-detains-rebel-leader-from-group-behind-deadly-attacks-minister-idUSKCN1S61AG">launched</a> a deadly attack on Rwanda in 2018. </p>
<p><strong>What is the significance of his arrest for Rwandan opposition? And what does political opposition in Rwanda look like today?</strong></p>
<p>The details of Rusesabagina’s detention remain murky. </p>
<p>His arrest was announced in Kigali, but he appears to have been arrested outside Rwanda. His family have claimed that he was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/01/hotel-rwanda-activist-paul-rusesabagina-kidnapped-from-dubai">kidnapped</a> in Dubai, but we don’t know yet whether he was detained by authorities in the United Arab Emirates on an international warrant and then turned over to Rwandan authorities or captured by Rwandan agents.</p>
<p>Many observers of Rwandan politics are suspicious of the charges against Rusesabagina, because the RPF regime has <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/memory-and-justice-in-postgenocide-rwanda/B210063216D7C6BFC5038D5563834815">a record</a> of using prosecution to intimidate opponents. </p>
<p>As I’ve written in my book, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/memory-and-justice-in-postgenocide-rwanda/B210063216D7C6BFC5038D5563834815">“Memory and Justice in Post-Genocide Rwanda”</a>, the major challengers to President Kagame in each presidential election have been arrested and tried on trumped up charges. Former President Pasteur Bizimungu in 2002 and opposition party leader Victoire Ingabire in 2010 were tried on the vaguely defined crime of “divisionism” and imprisoned. Both later had their sentences commuted by President Kagame. </p>
<p>In 2017, businesswoman Diane Rwigara – a genocide survivor and women’s rights activist who attempted to stand as an independent candidate in the 2017 Rwandan presidential election – was charged with corruption. She was eventually <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/10/rwanda-opposition-activist-diane-rwigara-released-bail-181005174901472.html">acquitted</a> on appeal, but only after spending a year in jail and having all of her family’s assets seized and auctioned off by the state. </p>
<p>The regime has also sought the extradition of critics living abroad and in some cases has kidnapped and repatriated opponents. For instance, former RPF official turned Kagame critic Patrick Karageye <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26752838">was assassinated</a> in South Africa in 2014, while his associate Kayumba Nyamwasa survived <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-28981317">at least</a> two assassination attempts.</p>
<p>We cannot know for certain whether Rusesabagina provided material support to armed groups and supported terrorism, as he is <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/paul-rusesabagina-of-hotel-rwanda-fame-arrested-on-terrorism-charges/2020/08/31/24e6d5ca-eb7c-11ea-bd08-1b10132b458f_story.html">accused</a> of. </p>
<p>From my perspective, the tragedy of his story is that someone who took heroic actions to protect the lives of others became more radical because of unrelenting attacks on his character. </p>
<p>Sadly, in a political environment as polarised as Rwanda’s, there is no room for moderates and no space for critical voices.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/145460/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Timothy P Longman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In a political environment as polarised as Rwanda’s, there is no room for moderates and no space for critical voices.Timothy P Longman, Professor of Political Science and International Relations, Boston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1453742020-09-02T13:50:42Z2020-09-02T13:50:42ZDid machete imports to Rwanda prove that the genocide against the Tutsi was planned?<p>Félicien Kabuga, a Rwandan businessman who was recently arrested for his involvement in the 1994 Rwandan genocide, is <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/kabuga-could-be-transferred-arusha-year">set to</a> stand trial. </p>
<p>His trial brings to the fore the argument that the Rwandan genocide was planned against the Tutsi community because it is <a href="https://www.chronicles.rw/2020/02/28/how-581-tons-of-machetes-were-purchased-for-genocide/">widely reported</a> that, in the months leading up to the genocide, 581 tonnes of machetes were imported by supporters of the Habyarimana regime. Kabuga is accused of using his companies to import the vast quantities of machetes. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/rwanda-les-enjeux-du-proces-de-felicien-kabuga-144987">Rwanda : les enjeux du procès de Félicien Kabuga</a>
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<p>This narrative and infamous machete statistic has become accepted as part of history because of a <a href="https://archives.globalresearch.ca/articles/CHO403E.html">report</a> by Belgian economist Pierre Galand and Canadian Economy Professor Michel Chossudovsky. They were part of a 1996 mission to identify the role of international financial institutions, donors and creditors in relation to the genocide.</p>
<p>However, the data used for that report displays a number of inconsistencies and internal errors. This, in conjunction with other aspects, pokes a significant hole in the report’s conclusions.</p>
<h2>Issues in the Galand-Chossudovsky report</h2>
<p>The report states that its sources are the Ministries of Planning and Finance, the National Bank of Rwanda (BNR) and the World Bank. Using that information, the authors recreated the import flows by product type and year. </p>
<p>The report presented to Rwandan authorities in 1996, publicised their findings that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>According to BNR data, huge quantities of machetes were imported as of 1992 from China…[and that] between 1992 and 1994, 581,000 kg of machetes were imported. </p>
</blockquote>
<p><a href="http://www.francegenocidetutsi.org/UsageDetteExtGalandChossudovskyAnnexes.pdf">Appendices</a> to the report mostly consist of summary tables created by the authors. </p>
<p>One of these is the “Summary table 1991/1994 - Importers” (hereafter called the “Importers” table), which lists 18 importers and dozens of commercial operations. It covers the period between 1991 and 1994.</p>
<p>Strangely, no purchases were recorded in 1991 and 1992, and very few for 1994. Eleven entries for “billhooks and machetes”, ordered by ten importers, do come to a total of 581 tonnes. The biggest importer was La Trouvaille (a trader), with 288 tonnes (50% of the net weight), followed by Félicien Kabuga with 96 tonnes (16%).</p>
<p>Based on these statistics, the authors drew a link between machete imports and genocidal intent. They wrote that “there was an enormous amount of imports in 1993” and that “the year 1993 was of key importance in the intensive preparation efforts for the genocide”. It’s important to note that the report didn’t compare this figure to machete imports in previous years.</p>
<h2>Not reliable</h2>
<p>Yet the data used for the analysis is not reliable. For example, the “Importers” table lists 17 operations for “shovels and spades” for between 2 and 2.5 million FRW (between about US$15,000 and US$19,000) per 10 tonnes. But one of the 1993 imports of 108 tonnes is billed at 2.45 million FRW (about US$19,000) – that is, ten times cheaper than the others. It seems highly likely that there is a typographical error in the table. These errors skew totals and the conclusions that are drawn from them. </p>
<p>What’s more, as we mentioned earlier, there are no entries in the 1991 and 1992 columns. The authors write that, in these two years, “no machetes or other agricultural supplies were imported”. It seems extremely unlikely that, for a period of 18 months, not a single piece of farm equipment was imported into Rwanda. </p>
<p>In addition, there are gaps in the information presented. For instance, the authors mention imports in the second half of 1992, which do not appear in the summary table. And the missing import flows for several years in the summaries mean that any unusual operations cannot be identified. </p>
<p>Without this information, it is difficult to hypothesise about the planning of the genocide.</p>
<p>Furthermore, the “Importers” table is contradicted by a table titled “Definitive imports by price heading 1991/1994. Summary table” (hereafter called the “Definitive” table). This table features a list of imports over four years with their net weight (in kilograms) and value (in Rwandan francs). It gives a total of 366 tonnes of machetes imported from 1991 to 1994, that is, 215 tonnes less than the “accepted” total. </p>
<p>How can we account for that difference? </p>
<p>We have two hypotheses: </p>
<ol>
<li><p>The figure is inflated as not all listed machetes actually made it to Rwanda. The “Importers” table lists businesses with an import licence, which does not necessarily mean that the operation was completed. If operations were planned but not brought to completion they should be subtracted from the 581 tonnes of machetes. The “Definitive” table appears to feature only finalised commercial operations, giving a better idea of the actual imports during that period. For machetes as well as other products, it shows a relatively stable import market between 1991 and 1994.</p></li>
<li><p>Hidden military imports were counted as agricultural tools. The report specifies that “many so-called non-military imports were actually disguised military imports”. For instance, machetes purchased as agricultural supplies. But a choice must be made: the same commercial transaction cannot be both a <em>hidden</em> purchase of military equipment and a <em>declared</em> purchase of machetes, whether in preparation for the genocide or not. </p></li>
</ol>
<p>As well as the Galand-Chossudovsky report, other documents relating to machete imports are available. This allows us to test the reliability of the “Importers” table.</p>
<h2>Other documents</h2>
<p>One of these documents is a file from a Kenyan transporter who delivered about 26 tonnes of machetes to Félicien Kabuga. This was published in <a href="https://www.fidh.org/fr/regions/afrique/rwanda/Aucun-Temoin-ne-doit-survivre-Le">a report</a> by Alison Desforges for the International Federation for Human Rights. The operation does not appear in the “Importers” table, though there are two import licences for 48 tonnes in Kabuga’s name.</p>
<p>Another document describes a delivery of 19,200 machetes in 1992 which was flown from Tianjin to Kigali, via Kenya. These were ordered by importer Tatien Kayijuka. With an <a href="https://www.knivesandtools.fr/fr/ct/machettes-et-coupe-coupe.htm">average weight</a> of 600g per machete, these 19,200 machetes would have weighed around 11.52 tonnes. </p>
<p>Because the “Importers” table didn’t show any imports in 1992, two scenarios are possible:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>There is a transaction of 11.52 tonnes of machetes in 1993. So perhaps it was listed in 1993. </p></li>
<li><p>There were two separate transactions, meaning Kayijuka imported machetes as part of yearly routine commercial activity. In this case, the “Importers” table is inaccurate in not reporting imports in 1992. </p></li>
</ol>
<p>These documented imports weaken the credibility of the “Importers” table used by the authors of the report. But, they support the data in the “Definitive” table, which shows regular and almost identical imports between 1992 and 1993. </p>
<p>The machete data used in the Galand-Chossudovsky report is, therefore, incomplete, inaccurate and unreliable.</p>
<p>Furthermore, with the statements that “the year 1993 was of key importance in the intensive preparation efforts for the genocide” and that “nearly all Rwandan economic operators imported machetes in 1993”, the authors infer a plan that is not backed up by the data. Given that the described increase of machete imports remains unproven, and nothing in the report indicates the intent of planning the genocide, the report’s conclusion misuses the evidence.</p>
<p><em>This article was written in collaboration with Roland Tissot, a member of the <a href="http://www.fmsh.fr/fr/recherche/24279">Platform on Violence and Exiting Violence at Fondation Maison des Sciences de l’Homme</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>Translated from French by Rosie Marsland for <a href="http://www.fastforword.fr/en">Fast ForWord</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/145374/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Witness-expert at the ICTR Prosecutor's Office (1996-2010) and other national courts</span></em></p>Between 1992 and 1994, the former regime is said to have imported 581 tonnes of machetes into Rwanda. This figure appears to establish that the genocide was planned. But is this number accurate?André Guichaoua, Professeur des universités, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-SorbonneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1409722020-06-18T08:50:52Z2020-06-18T08:50:52ZNkurunziza left a troubling legacy: Burundi’s new leader has much to mend<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/342633/original/file-20200618-41234-152e7l0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Burundi's president-elect Evariste Ndayishimiye signs a condolence book for Burundian president Pierre Nkurunziza. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Photo by Evrard Ngendakumana/Xinhua via Getty) </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Pierre Nkurunziza, who presided over Burundi’s destiny for 15 years, died in June at the age of 55. He died three weeks after the election of his successor, after which he’d been bestowed with the title of the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-burundi-politics/outgoing-burundi-president-nkurunziza-famed-for-soccer-and-violence-dies-idUSKBN23G24H">“supreme guide of patriotism”</a>. </p>
<p>The cost of Nkurunziza’s re-election in 2015 for an unlawful third – and final – term is well-known. It brought oppressive laws, brutal repression, arbitrary arrests and huge groups of refugees fleeing overseas. The GDP per person fell to the world’s lowest, overseas investment collapsed, the country was marginalised both regionally and internationally. Ethnic rhetoric underpinned political mobilisation that feeds on the pervasive confrontation with the Rwandan model. </p>
<p>His death means that his successor, Évariste Ndayishimiye, faces a great challenge. It’s a challenge that he is not prepared for, given the pressing demands that result from the country’s deteriorated political, economic and social situation. </p>
<p>Initial decisions by a president usually define the rest of their term. A good place for Ndayishimiye to start would be the immediate release of journalists and various observers condemned for simply doing their job. That is, providing information and monitoring the electoral process. </p>
<p>He would thus show that he is willing to entertain questions on the functioning of institutions, even the abuses of his peers. Hopefully, he might even be willing to deal with the corruption of some of his colleagues. </p>
<p>But above all, at the end of an election that was not dominated by ethnic contestation, he could be the first president likely to put an end to all forms of partisanship that could encourage or revive this cleavage. </p>
<p>It’s a deep and troubling legacy that he’s been bequeathed.</p>
<h2>The history</h2>
<p>Nkurunziza’s rise to power was hardly auspicious. </p>
<p>In 1993, after 30 years of military rule led by ethnic minority Tutsi officers, Burundi held its first democratic elections. Melchior Ndadaye, a Hutu, was elected president in July, but was assassinated three months later during an attempted military coup. The country convulsed in a <a href="https://theconversation.com/heurs-et-malheurs-du-modele-burundais-53279">decade of violence and wars</a>.</p>
<p>Painstaking negotiations facilitated by former South African president Nelson Mandela culminated in the Arusha Accords in August 2000. But the conflict dragged on for five more years, before a ceasefire eventually took effect and <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/burundin%C3%A9gociations-la-pr%C3%A9sidence-de-la-transition-pose-probl%C3%A8me-%C3%A0-la-veille-du">the means of political transition</a> and the future constitutional framework were defined.</p>
<p>In 2003, the National Defence Force, which had been leading the country since 1966 after overturning the monarchy and proclaiming a republic, merged with the National Council for the Defence of Democracy – Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), the main arm of the pro-Hutu armed rebellion led by Nkurunziza. CNDD-FDD became a political party.</p>
<p>In 2005, a new constitution was adopted by referendum. The general elections followed in which CNDD-FDD candidates won nearly all seats by a landslide. These elected representatives carried Nkurunziza to the head of state. Nkurunziza quickly ingratiated himself with the population through <a href="https://www.dw.com/fr/bilan-des-r%C3%A9formes-sociales-de-l%C3%A8re-nkurunziza-au-burundi/a-53431355">reforms</a> that aimed to meet urgent social demands such as healthcare and education. </p>
<p>However, the true power was still in the hands of a small council of the main officers who had organised the guerrilla movement and led the civil war. </p>
<p>At the same time, the party strengthened its position in all municipalities. Bit by bit, CNDD-FDD members took charge of all the social and economic activities for rural populations. <a href="https://www.jeuneafrique.com/459791/politique/burundi-milliers-de-jeunes-imbonerakure-defilent-bujumbura/">Imbonerakure, the youth wing of the party</a>, became operational during the 2010 electoral campaign.</p>
<p>Five years later, the CNDD-FDD <a href="https://www.jeuneafrique.com/155301/politique/large-victoire-du-cndd-fdd-aux-l-gislatives/">overwhelmingly won the 2010 municipal, presidential and legislative elections</a>. As the only candidate in the presidential election, due to boycotts from the opposition parties, Nkurunziza won <a href="http://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20100630-reelection-surprise-president-nkurunziza-tete-burundi">with a substantial majority</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.hrw.org/fr/report/2010/11/23/des-portes-qui-se-ferment/reduction-de-lespace-democratique-au-burundi">Thus began the slide into an authoritarian regime</a>. The main reason for this comes from the fact that during the 2010 elections, Nkurunziza’s party found itself in a position of strength that even they did not expect. The turmoil and division among the disordered opposition powers gave them free rein.</p>
<p>From then on, “civil society” organisations became the main areas of debate and mobilisation for political, economic and societal issues. </p>
<p>CNDD-FDD leaders were openly intent on taking control of civil society organisations. But this proved impossible in the run-up to the commemorations of the <a href="https://bdiagnews.com/economie/burundi-preparatifs-des-50-ans-dindependance-2/">50th anniversary of independence, in July 2012</a>, which thrust Burundi into the international spotlight. This required that authorities display an atmosphere of apparent political openness and relative national consensus.</p>
<p>The media and civil society organisations thrived like never before and were credited with the success of the public events organised for the occasion. Freedom of expression went far beyond the political issues at hand, and shows explicitly discussed the daily experience and aspirations of citizens. Debates on poverty, healthcare and unemployment were fair game.</p>
<p>All these endeavours found a large audience <a href="http://umr-developpement-societes.univ-paris1.fr/menu-haut/recherche/projets-de-recherche/afrique-des-grands-lacs/">in the country and beyond</a>. But this Burundian exceptionalism didn’t survive the president’s decision to aggressively end it for his own convenience.</p>
<h2>A third term at any cost</h2>
<p>There were mass demonstrations when Nkurunziza announced his candidature for a third term in <a href="https://www.jeuneafrique.com/251198/politique/presidentielle-burundi-scrutin-calme-libre-credible-inclusif-selon-lonu/">2015</a>. This was a direct challenge to the constitution, which allows for a maximum of two terms. An attempted military rebellion was quickly snuffed out and the country found itself facing an insurmountable political impasse. </p>
<p>The president and generals <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/fr/archive/burundi-des-poids-lourds-du-r%C3%A9gime-limog%C3%A9s/97191">Adolphe Nshyirimana and Guillaume Bunyoni</a> opted for <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-africaine-2015-1-page-169.htm">heavy-handed tactics</a>. These included neutralising opposition parties, arresting and exiling CNDD-FDD dissidents and destroying independent radio stations. </p>
<p>The grim outcome forced CNDD-FDD leaders to push out a president who was also increasingly facing regional and international isolation. A new constitution, adopted in 2018, eliminated the main gains from the Arusha Accords in terms of democratic representation of all parties. The institutions in charge of truth-telling and laying down justice (the press, the courts, the electoral monitoring body) were brought into line. </p>
<p>After guaranteeing the outgoing president a sumptuous pension, the “most neutral” candidate, General <a href="https://information.tv5monde.com/afrique/burundi-qui-est-evariste-ndayishimiye-candidat-du-systeme-cndd-fdd-343510">Évariste Ndayishimiye</a>, became the new president in a contested election. His victory in the presidential election in May was <a href="https://www.france24.com/fr/20200525-burundi-%C3%A9variste-ndayishimiye-d%C3%A9clar%C3%A9-vainqueur-de-l-%C3%A9lection-pr%C3%A9sidentielle">made official</a> only a few days before Nkurunziza’s death.</p>
<p>The maturity of the opposition, the firm <a href="https://www.iwacu-burundi.org/elections-2020-le-bilan-alarmant-des-eveques-catholiques/">position of the Catholic Church</a> on these results and, above all, a common fear, prevented a new crisis.</p>
<p>Whether Burundi can chart a different course under Ndayishimiye is unclear. Burundians must be hoping that it does.</p>
<p><em>Translated from the French by Rosie Marsland for <a href="http://www.fastforword.fr/en">Fast ForWord</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/140972/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>André Guichaoua does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The sudden death of Burundi’s former president, Pierre Nkurunziza, marks the end of a long reign, characterised by violent political crises.André Guichaoua, Professeur des universités, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-SorbonneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1161352019-05-16T19:59:18Z2019-05-16T19:59:18ZRwanda and Sri Lanka: A tale of two genocides<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/274801/original/file-20190516-69174-1jtoosb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=125%2C0%2C2026%2C1566&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Tamil man who was paralyzed by shelling during the final weeks of the conflict in Mullivaikkal in 2009 is seen in this 2018 photo in the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Priya Tharmaseelan</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>This year marks the 25th anniversary of the Rwandan <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf">genocide</a> and the 10th year since the Tamil genocide in Sri Lanka. While the 1994 <a href="https://undocs.org/A/RES/58/234">Rwandan genocide</a> has become part of the world’s collective memory, the 2009 Tamil genocide has not.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.tamilguardian.com/content/mayor-toronto-marks-may-18-tamil-genocide-remembrance-day">Mullivaikkal Genocide Remembrance Day</a> on May 18, named after the village that was the site of cataclysmic violence, is a day to remember those who died in the Sri Lankan conflict. Mullivaikkal commemoration events have been taking place around the world this month.</p>
<p>However, 10 years and a series of <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24371&LangID=E">United Nations reports</a> and <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/G19/065/61/PDF/G1906561.pdf?OpenElement">resolutions</a> have made little progress toward truth, accountability or reparations for the survivors of atrocity crimes in Sri Lanka. In the aftermath of the recent <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/24/world/asia/sri-lanka-easter-bombing-attacks.html">Easter Sunday bombings</a>, the spectre of ethnic violence has resurfaced.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/sri-lanka-has-a-history-of-conflict-but-the-recent-attacks-appear-different-115815">Sri Lanka has a history of conflict, but the recent attacks appear different</a>
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<p>The Rwandan genocide offers important lessons for Sri Lanka.</p>
<h2>Tutsis slaughtered</h2>
<p>An estimated 800,000 Tutsis and politically moderate Hutu were killed in just <a href="https://www.vox.com/2014/4/10/5590646/rwandan-genocide-anniversary">100 days</a> in 1994. Thousands more were subjected to sexual violence and tortured in a <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/04/oped-25-years-after-rwanda-genocide-politics-of-demonization-as-dangerous-as-ever/">systematic campaign</a> by the Hutu ethnic majority.</p>
<p>Fifteen years later, another slaughter unfolded — this time in northern Sri Lanka. The protracted civil war between the national government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was coming to a catastrophic end. The goal of an independent state for the minority Tamils was slipping away.</p>
<p>Throughout the conflict, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2008/country-chapters/sri-lanka">both sides</a> failed to respect human rights and international humanitarian law. Unlawful killings and enforced disappearances carried out by the Sri Lankan security forces were <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/64000/asa370192007en.pdf">daily occurrences</a>. The LTTE was condemned for its suicide bombings and forcible recruitment of child soldiers.</p>
<p>For most of the 2000s, the LTTE was operating as a <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/House_of_Representatives_Committees?url=pjcis/proscription/submissions/sub35.pdf.">de facto state</a> in the north and east. By early 2009, military losses had gradually crushed the LTTE’s civil administration of these areas. </p>
<p>The LTTE and an estimated <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/sri-lankas-dead-and-missing-need-accounting">330,000</a> Tamil civilians were trapped in a small piece of land on the northeast coast in the Mullaithivu District. The government ordered the UN to evacuate their last few international workers from the region while international media were excluded and local journalists <a href="https://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/sri-lanka-witness-war-crimes">silenced</a>.</p>
<h2>Carnage unfolded</h2>
<p>Transatlantic cellphone photos and a few video clips had begun circulating with images of the unfolding carnage. <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/05/08/sri-lanka-repeated-shelling-hospitals-evidence-war-crimes">Hospitals</a> on the front lines were systematically <a href="http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/War%20Crimes%20In%20Sri%20Lanka.pdf">shelled</a>, as were food distribution lines and even Red Cross ships attempting to evacuate <a href="https://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/POE_Report_Full.pdf">the wounded</a>. </p>
<p>Within a few months, a brutal siege of the officially declared “safe zone” and the indiscriminate shelling of Tamil civilians concentrated there brought the war to an end. The Sri Lankan government celebrated its successful “humanitarian rescue operation.” In fact, it was genocide.</p>
<p>By August 2009, Britain’s Channel 4 News was broadcasting <a href="https://www.channel4.com/news/sri-lanka-execution-video-new-war-crimes-claims">gruesome footage</a> of summary executions and rape perpetrated by Sri Lankan soldiers. Dozens of surrendering Tamils, including senior Tiger political leaders and their families, had been <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/01/17/death-of-the-tiger">shot dead</a> by soldiers as they walked out of the safe zone hoisting white flags.</p>
<p>In 2012, the UN Secretary General estimated <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/sri-lankas-dead-and-missing-need-accounting">that 40,000</a> civilians were killed over the final five months of the conflict. The exact number, as in many conflict situations, remains contested and is likely higher.</p>
<p>Once the conflict ended, hundreds of thousands of Tamils were interned in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/may/26/sri-lanka-tamil-tigers-camps">squalid camps</a> in the northern Vanni region. Even today, thousands of Tamils <a href="http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/sri-lanka">remain displaced</a> in their own country.</p>
<h2>‘War without witness’</h2>
<p>If the Rwandan genocide was a genocide foretold, yet no action was ever taken by the international community, then the Tamil genocide was <a href="https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2013/11/04/sri_lankas_hidden_genocide.html">deliberately hidden</a> and dubbed the “<a href="https://www.journalism.co.uk/news-commentary/frances-harrison-sri-lanka-journalists-failed-to-tell-the-story-of-war-crimes/s6/a549285/">war without witness</a>.”</p>
<p>In <a href="http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/sri_lanka_press_release15april09.pdf">both cases</a>, the UN and the European Union had <a href="https://cpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/blogs.gwu.edu/dist/b/1590/files/2018/08/Why-the-U.S.-Government-Failed-to-Anticipate-the-Rwandan-Genocide-27hp2at.pdf">direct warnings</a> but opted against <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/09/bystanders-to-genocide/304571/">taking action</a>. The international community’s inertia <a href="https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/201-rwanda/39240.html">in Rwanda</a> and <a href="https://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/The_Internal_Review_Panel_report_on_Sri_Lanka.pdf">Sri Lanka</a> has been acknowledged as “grave failures.”</p>
<p>The establishment of an <a href="http://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/legal-library/100131_Statute_en_fr_0.pdf">international criminal tribunal</a> was an explicit attempt to grapple with Rwanda’s past. Convictions were secured <a href="http://unictr.irmct.org/en/cases/key-figures-cases">in the cases</a> of 61 “ringleaders.” A <a href="https://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1241&context=bjil">groundbreaking decision</a> on sexual violence as an act of genocide was among its many rulings. Local “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/02/59162/?utm_term=.3a1cca04ea70">gacaca courts</a>” conducted some two million trials. A <a href="http://www.nurc.gov.rw/index.php?id=69">truth commission</a> continues efforts to promote reconciliation between the Hutu and Tutsi peoples. </p>
<p>While highly imperfect, these <a href="https://www.ictj.org/about/transitional-justice">transitional justice</a> mechanisms have generated a record of what really happened and why it happened.</p>
<p>In contrast, Sri Lanka has repeatedly reneged on pledges to investigate and prosecute war-time atrocity crimes. Abductions, torture in custody and <a href="http://www.fhr.org.za/files/5514/0015/7674/An_Unfinished_war-_Sexual_violence-YS.pdf">sexual violence</a> remain rampant amid a long history of <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/asia-and-the-pacific/sri-lanka/report-sri-lanka/">failed promises</a>.</p>
<h2>Occupied land not returned</h2>
<p>The harassment of Tamil activists as well as <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-48257299">targeted violence</a> against the Muslim community <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/05/sri-lanka-authorities-must-protect-muslims-against-violence/">continue</a>. Commitments to <a href="http://adayaalam.org/mapping-militarisation-in-mullaitivu/">demilitarize</a> and return occupied land are unfulfilled. Weak state structures, the lack of an independent judiciary and a <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/2019/02/06/long-read-why-has-sri-lankas-transitional-justice-process-failed-to-deliver/">culture of impunity</a> remain significant <a href="https://r2pasiapacific.org/files/2479/Risk%20Assessment%20Sri%20Lanka%20September%202018%20FINAL.pdf">obstacles</a>.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-commonwealth-must-take-action-against-sri-lankan-war-crimes-3473">Why the Commonwealth must take action against Sri Lankan war crimes</a>
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<p>As Harvard University scholar <a href="https://hls.harvard.edu/faculty/directory/10589/Minow">Martha Minow</a> suggests, the relentless repetition of atrocity requires a pathway between “too much forgetting” and “too much memory,” between vengeance and forgiveness. In Sri Lanka today, memory and memorialization are radical counterpoints to official state narratives that resist accounting for the past.</p>
<p>Holocaust survivor Primo Levi once said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“It happened; therefore, it can happen again… it can happen everywhere.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>So long as impunity and the failure to address the root causes of atrocity crimes continue in Sri Lanka, lasting peace will remain elusive. Acknowledging the past must be a precondition to meaningful reconciliation.</p>
<p>A poem in Cheran’s anthology <a href="https://www.arcpublications.co.uk/books/cheran-in-a-time-of-burning-488"><em>In a Time of Burning</em></a> evokes the challenge of closure in the wake of mass violence:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“there is neither sea nor wind</p>
<p>for us to dissolve the ashes</p>
<p>proclaim an end</p>
<p>and close our eyes.”</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/116135/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sharry Aiken is an Associate Professor at the Faculty of Law, Queen's University. She is a recipient of research and conference funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council. She is a co-researcher with the Canadian Partnership for International Justice, former president of the Canadian Council for Refugees, and past co-chair of the Board of Directors of the Canadian Centre for International Justice. She is also an Advisory Council member of the Sri Lanka Campaign for Peace and Justice. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cheran Rudhramoorthy is a recipient of research funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council and the International Development Research Centre. </span></em></p>This spring marks the 25th anniversary of the Rwandan genocide and the 10th year since the Tamil genocide in Sri Lanka. The world knows what happened in Rwanda. What about Sri Lanka?Sharry Aiken, Associate Professor of Law, Queen's University, OntarioCheran Rudhramoorthy, Associate Professor, University of WindsorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1145122019-04-01T12:52:25Z2019-04-01T12:52:25ZDebate continues about the media’s role in driving Rwanda’s genocide<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266532/original/file-20190329-70986-1nyct8d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Inside the Genocide Memorial Church in Karongi-Kibuye - Western Rwanda. 11,000 people were killed here during the 1994 genocide.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Choral_Group_Rehearses_inside_Genocide_Memorial_Church_-_Karongi-Kibuye_-_Western_Rwanda_-_01.jpg">Adam Jones/WikiMedia</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Twenty-five years ago, the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14093238">Rwandan</a> government launched a meticulously planned <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13431486">genocide</a> against its Tutsi minority. It killed approximately 800 000 people in 100 days. </p>
<p>We can’t reflect on the history of the 1994 genocide without considering the critical role the media played in both inciting and prolonging the violence. </p>
<p>In the summer of 1993 the government, ruled by the pro-Hutu National Revolutionary Movement for Development, engaged in a peace process with the mostly-Tutsi rebel army, the Rwandan Patriotic Front. They negotiated an end to the civil war and the repatriation of Tutsi exiles. At the same time, however, the Movement was also preparing for genocide. </p>
<p>The youth wing of the National Revolutionary Movement for Development established the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno4-7-03.htm">Interahamwe</a>. This paramilitary group would eventually lead attacks on Tutsi civilians. Hardliners from the party also launched <a href="http://www.genocidearchiverwanda.org.rw/index.php/Radio_T%C3%A9l%C3%A9vision_Libre_des_Mille_Collines">Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines</a> (RTLM - French for “Thousand Hills Free Radio and Television”). It was a radio station that disseminated hate propaganda and prepared its listeners for the coming violence. The broadcaster provided a popular platform for ideas already circulating in <a href="http://genocidearchiverwanda.org.rw/index.php/Category:KANGURA"><em>Kangura</em></a>, an extremist magazine founded in 1990. </p>
<p>In its early broadcasts, the station used Radio Rwanda’s transmission equipment. The new broadcaster developed lively, informal and accessible programming that targeted ordinary citizens. Unlike Radio Rwanda, it played popular music from neighbouring Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo). This was particularly appealing to younger listeners. </p>
<p>In the weeks prior to the April 1994 genocide the station ramped up its anti-Tutsi, pro-Hutu propaganda. Broadcasters used increasingly dehumanising language to speak about the Tutsi minority. This mobilised ordinary Hutu citizens against the Tutsi. Historian Alison Des Forges <a href="https://www.idrc.ca/en/book/media-and-rwanda-genocide">wrote</a> that, once the genocide was underway, government leaders used the station to promote violence. It also gave specific directions for carrying out the killings.</p>
<p>A quarter of a century on, media scholars, historians and journalists are still debating the precise role of RTLM in the genocide. Did radio broadcasts directly incite violence? Or did they simply amplify the fear and genocidal ideology that was already circulating throughout the Hutu population? </p>
<h2>Media effects</h2>
<p>Most early scholarship about the genocide views RTLM as a lethal influence. In 2001, researcher, war correspondent and diplomat Samantha Power <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/09/bystanders-to-genocide/304571/">suggested</a> that,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>killers often carried a machete in one hand and a transistor radio in the other.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The refusal of international actors like the US and the UN Security Council to use radio jamming technology to stop RTLM’s broadcasts is another flash-point for discussion. It reflects the <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/report-of-independent-inquiry-actions-of-united-nations-during-1994-genocide-rwanda-s19991257">general failure</a> of the international community to intervene and stop the genocide. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/10.1162/ISEC_a_00100">More recent studies</a> question the primacy of radio broadcasts in directly motivating the killers’ actions. These scholars see radio as an extension of years of state propaganda which was disseminated through schools, churches, and other government institutions. </p>
<p>In a detailed empirical study published in 2007, social scientist <a href="http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/?GCOI=80140100622570">Scott Straus</a> found that only 15% of perpetrators cited radio broadcasts as a key influence in their decision to kill Tutsi. Face-to-face intimidation and communication between peers appeared to have a stronger influence. Radio broadcasts were a secondary factor. </p>
<h2>Enduring debate</h2>
<p>The enduring debate about the role of media was central to a <a href="http://unictr.irmct.org/en/cases/ictr-99-52">case</a> before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. The tribunal was tasked with prosecuting high level perpetrators and the masterminds of the genocide. The defendants in what was known as the Media Case included RTLM co-founder Ferdinand Nahimana, its executive Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and <em>Kangura</em> founder and editor, Hassan Ngeze. </p>
<p>In 2003, all three were <a href="http://unictr.irmct.org/en/news/three-media-leaders-convicted-genocide">convicted</a> of genocide, incitement to commit genocide, and persecution using radio broadcasts and newspaper articles as a crime against humanity. The conviction for committing genocide was overturned on appeal, but much of the original ruling was retained. </p>
<p>The Media Case was precedent-setting. It held media executives accountable for inciting genocide, regardless of other factors that may have influenced the perpetrators. <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-journal-of-international-law/article/prosecutor-v-nahimana-barayagwiza-and-ngeze-case-no-ictr-9952a/FBD07F6AB3AD4108BCED83978DF1A9B0">Legal scholars suggest</a> that the judgement will have a significant impact on future cases of incitement to genocide. </p>
<h2>International response</h2>
<p>We may never definitively settle the “media effects” debate – that is, did radio and other media directly incite violence, or were they a secondary driver?</p>
<p>But the establishment of RTLM in 1993 was undoubtedly a clear warning sign to the world. In a <a href="https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4d1da8752.pdf">2000 report</a>, the Organisation of African Unity suggested that silencing RTLM during the genocide would have had limited impact. The international community should have moved to address the hate propaganda before the killing started. It should have recognised the broadcasts as an essential part of the preparation for the genocide. </p>
<p>One mechanism for countering RTLM’s hate propaganda could have come from the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda, which was deployed by the Security Council in 1993 to oversee the peace process. However, due to typical delays, the Mission’s radio broadcast equipment was never shipped to Rwanda. The absence of an effective communication tool left the UN without the means to produce counter broadcasts. It could also not provide airtime for the voices of moderate Hutu leaders. </p>
<h2>Lessons remain</h2>
<p>Although many years have passed, the Rwandan genocide still has much to teach us about the centrality of media in cases of state violence. An analysis of media opens up important discussions about genocide prevention, the regulation of hate speech, and the appropriate forms of international intervention.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/114512/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amanda Grzyb receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC). </span></em></p>Although many years have passed, the Rwandan genocide still has much to teach us about the centrality of media in cases of state violence.Amanda Grzyb, Associate Professor and Faculty Scholar of Media and Information Studies, Western UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1049952018-10-29T14:19:54Z2018-10-29T14:19:54ZA look back in history provides fresh insights into Rwanda today<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/242684/original/file-20181029-76396-1io2j2o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Except during the relatively brief period of colonial rule, Rwanda was, and is, a violent society.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Olivier Matthys</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>At first sight, three fundamental ruptures occurred in modern Rwandan history: colonisation, starting at the end of the 19th century; the revolution of 1959-1961 followed by independence in 1962; and the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26875506">1994 genocide</a> followed by the seizure of power by the Rwandan Patriotic Front.</p>
<p>Of course, these are breaks with the past. But I <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2018.1462985">argue</a> that there are also striking continuities spanning the entire period, from the mid-19th century to the 2010s. These include the concentration of power, intra-regime conflict, the salience of ethnicity, and the nature of the state. </p>
<p>Another characteristic – the pervasiveness of the military institution and of military ethics – disappeared during colonial days and the first two republics. But it resurfaced from 1994 onwards, resuming continuity after a century-long interval.</p>
<p>This longue durée view is very illuminating. It offers a better understanding of crucial characteristics of governance in Rwanda today, at home and in the region. </p>
<h2>Concentration of power</h2>
<p>A first continuity throughout the four periods (precolonial, colonial, post-revolution and post-genocide) is the concentration of power. The precolonial kingdom became increasingly centralised, particularly from the latter part of the 18th century. </p>
<p>In a structure like a pyramid, regional authorities were dependents of the mwami (king). Below them were hill chiefs who tightly controlled the population. </p>
<p>Authoritarian centralisation continued in colonial days in two ways. On the one hand, indirect rule reinforced and stabilised the power of the court and the chiefs. On the other, the Belgian administration was authoritarian and, like the indigenous one, ignored principles like the separation of powers and the rule of law. </p>
<p>The elective principle and checks and balances were introduced less than two years before independence. It’s therefore not surprising that, in Rwanda as elsewhere in Africa, the new political elites continued colonial modes of governance. In this respect, there is not much of a break between colonial rule, the de facto single-party first republic, the de jure single-party second republic and de facto single-party regime in post-genocide Rwanda. </p>
<h2>Internal strife</h2>
<p>Intra-regime conflict is a second continuity. Internal strife within the royal court and among ruling elites was common in precolonial days. Most successions to the throne were contested and led to bitter and often violent infighting, and even to civil war. Regime infighting resumed after independence. The gradual narrowing of the ruling party’s power base through the elimination of important constituencies eventually led to the downfall of the first republic. </p>
<p>A similar phenomenon occurred under the second republic. A number of regime leaders were arrested in 1980. Fearing a similar fate, others fled the country. </p>
<p>The Rwandan Patriotic Front has also fallen prey to intense struggle. This pitted factions against each other from the first days of the invasion. This evolution became more pronounced after 2000 and took a radical turn in 2010 when four leading figures who fled published a <a href="http://rwandatekaiteka.over-blog.com/article-declaration-on-rwanda-by-gerald-gahima-general-kayumba-nyamwasa-colonel-patrick-karegeya-dr-theogene-rudasingwa-56727400.html">long diatribe</a> against the regime. </p>
<h2>Ethnicity</h2>
<p>A third major continuity is the importance of ethnicity, although it has had different political implications depending on the period. </p>
<p>Political ethnicity emerged clearly in the 19th century. The distinction between ethnic groups that earlier referred to political positions and economic and military occupations became institutionalised. </p>
<p>From the 1870s, the awareness of ethnic distinction spread all over the country and led to several revolts. The 1897 insurrection showed that the population was conscious of a great divide between the <a href="https://uwpress.wisc.edu/books/2909.htm">two ethnic groups</a>. </p>
<p>Colonial rule further institutionalised and rigidified ethnicity. Belgium first entrenched Tutsi rule. However, in the 1950s it switched sides when democratisation and independence came to the fore. </p>
<p>Although there were underlying social, political and economic grievances, the revolution of 1959-1961 took place under an almost exclusively ethnic banner. On assuming power, the Rwandan Patriotic Front set out to pursue a policy of de-ethnicisation. But the denial of ethnicity is an essential element of the hegemonic strategies of the party-dominated elite. The claim that <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/09/world/a-decade-after-massacres-rwanda-outlaws-ethnicity.html">“there are no Hutu or Tutsi, we are all Rwandans now”</a> allows them to hide a Tutsi ethnocracy. </p>
<p>The regime’s narrative merely reflects the public transcript. But the hidden transcript – that of oppressed Hutu and Tutsi – is <a href="https://uwpress.wisc.edu/books/5148.htm">very different</a>. </p>
<h2>The state</h2>
<p>A fourth strong continuity lies in the nature of the state which, unlike in much of Africa, is strong and well internalised by citizens. </p>
<p>Rwanda is not a colonial creation, and an ancient state tradition plays an undeniable role in the maintenance of an efficient pyramid-like structure. The Rwandan Leviathan is highly centralised and hierarchical – it reaches every inch of the territory and every citizen. </p>
<p>Echoing the situation in earlier days, a mere two years after the extreme human and material destruction of 1994, the state had been rebuilt, and Rwanda was again administered from top to bottom. Before – as after the genocide – the regimes displayed a strong belief in managing, monitoring, controlling, and mobilising the population. Both showed a strong belief in using the state in projects of economic and social engineering implemented under the stewardship of forward-looking and enlightened leaders.</p>
<p>A final determining continuity is the pervasiveness of the military institution and of warrior ethics and values. What is particularly striking is the re-emergence of this in 1994, after it had virtually disappeared during colonial days and the two Hutu republics. After that century-long gap, it reappeared almost seamlessly. Beyond the army as an institution, military values are disseminated throughout the entire society by the widespread use of means like <a href="https://www.berghahnbooks.com/title/PurdekovaMaking">ingando and itorero (re-)education practices</a>. </p>
<h2>History as a reference point</h2>
<p>Clearly the continuities outweigh the ruptures. Except during the relatively brief period of colonial rule, Rwanda was, and is, a violent society. Throughout the entire period, central political power has been almost absolute. In today’s Rwanda, constant references to history, whether factually true or not, are used as a tool of legitimation. The idealised glorification of the precolonial era supports the political objectives and strategies of the current rulers. </p>
<p>Rwanda’s history matters in a concrete way. Hence efforts by the Rwandan Patriotic Front to impose and tightly police its narrative. The problem is that the public and the hidden transcripts often don’t tally.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/104995/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Filip Reyntjens does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Throughout the entire period, central political power has been almost absolute.Filip Reyntjens, Emeritus Professor of Law and Politics Institute of Development Policy (IOB), University of AntwerpLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/949252018-04-25T13:06:39Z2018-04-25T13:06:39ZRwanda can’t achieve reconciliation without fixing its democracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/215027/original/file-20180416-587-ss3tux.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Rwanda's Genocide Memorial burial site.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ahmed Jallanzo/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>This month Rwanda marks 24 years since the <a href="http://thefactfile.org/rwandan-genocide-facts/">genocide</a> that left almost one million people dead. Healing is paramount in a society that’s not quite moved beyond the horrors of 1994. To ensure the past isn’t repeated, Rwanda needs to work towards meaningful political representation for all the country’s ethnic groups.</p>
<p>There is a model that other countries have adopted that could help it do this. It has been shown that <a href="http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199572786.001.0001/acprof-9780199572786-chapter-5">consensus democracy</a> is the best political mechanism to eradicate violent competition for power.</p>
<p>This kind of democracy – which is based on a power sharing model of government – has proven to be effective in the <a href="https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/A_Great_Compromise.htm">United States</a>, <a href="https://miliux.wordpress.com/dutch-consensus-democracy/">The Netherlands</a> and <a href="https://nl.search.yahoo.com/yhs/search?hspart=adk&hsimp=yhs-adk_sbyhp&p=consensus+democracy+in+switzerland&param2=e3c5f38c-dfa6-4846-90f0-5d008e68eb9f&param3=email_1.3%7ENL%7Eappfocus94&param4=bing-bb9%7EChrome%7Econsensus+democracy+in+switzerland%7E036BF5C38C06692EE0397501EA8B0530&param1=20180327&type=">Switzerland</a>. It also worked in <a href="http://overcomingapartheid.msu.edu/unit.php?id=65-24E-6">South Africa</a> during the country’s transition to democracy. </p>
<p>The challenge facing Rwanda is that it’s an <a href="http://rwandaises.com/2011/07/rwanda-briefing-by-general-kayumba-nyamwasa-col-patrick-karegeya/">autocratic regime</a>. The democratic space in the country has shrunk dramatically. Independent thinkers and alternative voices have been <a href="https://www.timeshighereducation.com/comment/letters/truly-hostile-environment/2009939.article">silenced </a>. President Paul Kagame has walked in the footsteps of his predecessors by <a href="https://kellogg.nd.edu/content/political-governance-post-genocide-rwanda-filip-reyntjens">concentrating power</a> in the hands of a tiny political and military elite.</p>
<p>Should Rwanda continue <a href="https://medium.com/@dhimbara/power-addiction-and-the-rwandan-tragedy-65fff19d6c1b">this legacy</a>, Kagame could be violently replaced by another autocrat. Experience has shown that a change of guard without deep structural transformation is not sustainable. </p>
<p>What is the way forward from here? We believe consensus democracy holds the answers.</p>
<h2>Genesis of a genocide</h2>
<p>To understand how Rwanda has reached this point, it’s important to explore the country’s history. </p>
<p>The intensity and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21681392.2015.1028206?src=recsys">destructive scale of the genocide</a> in 1994 were unprecedented. But the underlying <a href="https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/rwanda-chronology-1867-1994#title1">dynamics of ethnic violence</a> started in the late <a href="https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/rwanda-chronology-1867-1994#title6">1950s</a> when Rwanda was struggling to achieve independence from Belgium and <a href="https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/rwanda-chronology-1867-1994#title6">to establish a democratic republic. </a></p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/rwanda-chronology-1867-1994#title8">First Republic</a> led by President <a href="https://informationcradle.com/africa/gregoire-kayibanda/">Grégoire Kayibanda</a> and his Republican Democratic Movement – also known as the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Party-for-Hutu-Emancipation">MDR-Parmehutu</a> – was established in 1962 to heal the wounds left by colonialism and the Tutsi monarchy. The monarchy had been <a href="https://faroutliers.wordpress.com/2011/05/30/the-hutu-jacobin-revolution-1959/">overthrown in 1961</a> by a Hutu elite which was backed by the <a href="http://education.seattlepi.com/impact-did-belgian-presence-rwanda-spark-further-conflict-5558.html">Belgian administration</a>. </p>
<p>The overthrow forced the monarch, his followers, and many ordinary Tutsis into exile. In the face of threats posed by <a href="http://www.olny.nl/RWANDA/Archives/Dossier_Premiere_Republique/C_Nkurunziza_Republique_Inyenzi_Divisions.html">exiled Tutsi insurgents</a>, President Kayibanda <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17531050902972956?journalCode=rjea20&">consolidated his power</a>, making Rwanda a Hutu republic, not a motherland for all its sons and daughters. Tutsis were executed or forced into exile. Those who remained became second class citizens. </p>
<p>The MDR-Parmehutu regime used the Tutsi insurgency <a href="https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/rwanda-chronology-1867-1994">as a pretext to silence all its political rivals</a>. It killed some of their leaders and co-opted others. By 1965, Rwanda had become a <a href="https://www.revolvy.com/main/index.php?s=Rwandan+general+election,+1965&item_type=topic">one-party state</a>. </p>
<p>It came as no surprise, then, that at the end of Kayibanda’s term in 1973 his associates called for constitutional change <a href="http://perspective.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/servlet/BMEve?codeEve=601">to allow him seek a third term in office</a>. </p>
<p>But rather than focus on a power struggle that was simmering among the Hutu elites, the regime sponsored another wave of violence against the Tutsi. This scapegoating strategy proved counter productive and paved the way for a <a href="https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/rwanda-chronology-1867-1994#title9">coup d’état in July 1973</a>. The coup ended with the death of Kayibanda and his close aides. Many other key figures of the First Republic were imprisoned and held under harsh conditions. </p>
<p>The coup leader, Major General <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Juvenal-Habyarimana">Juvénal Habyarimana</a>, took over and vowed to build the Second Republic around the triple goal of <a href="https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/rwanda-chronology-1867-1994#title9">“peace, unity, and development”</a>. For many years, he succeeded at maintaining relative stability and economic development, becoming the darling of the donor community. Rwanda was hailed as a “<a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233151232_Development_Ideology_the_Peasantry_and_Genocide_Rwanda_Represented_in_Habyarimana's_Speeches">model of African development</a>.”</p>
<p>But Habyarimana failed to tackle two vital challenges: the ethnic tensions between the Hutu and Tutsi, and the Tutsi refugee problem. </p>
<p>The unresolved refugee problem paved the way for the 1990-1994 war, which pitted the Tutsi dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) against the Hutu-dominated government. The war also paved the way for the assassination of the president himself on April 6, 1994. This triggered the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi, from which Kagame’s RPF emerged as the new ruling force. </p>
<p>Like its predecessors, Kagame’s RPF put forth <a href="http://gsdrc.org/document-library/supporting-the-post-genocide-transition-in-rwanda-the-role-of-the-international-community/">impressive objectives</a>, including reconciliation and national unity, good governance, and resolution of the refugee problem. </p>
<p>But the regime soon proved to be yet another <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/31027704_Rwanda_ten_years_on_From_genocide_to_dictatorship">dictatorship</a>. It has been widely reported that Kagame’s regime is responsible for <a href="https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/14/issue/38/un-mapping-report-documenting-serious-crimes-democratic-republic-congo">war crimes and crimes against humanity</a> and serious <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Front-Line-Rwanda-Disappearances-Intimidation/dp/095478832X">human rights violations</a> against both the Hutu and the Tutsi. The regime operates on a <em>de facto</em> single-party system that’s increasingly <a href="https://politicalmatter.org/2015/09/02/rwanda-inc-paul-kagames-odyssey-from-rebellion-to-tyranny-by-dr-noel-twagiramungu/">intolerant of dissenters</a>. </p>
<h2>Consensus as a path to reconciliation</h2>
<p>Consensus democracy in Rwanda would be characterised by free and fair elections, political accountability, rigorous check-and-balance mechanisms and concerted power-sharing arrangements. This model would entail the representation of all ethnic groups in every branch of government including in strategic cabinet departments and top security services.</p>
<p>Without these guarantees, extremists from each community will continue to have unfettered access to hijack the political system by harking back to past grievances and amplifying legitimate fears.</p>
<p>Consensus democracy could lay the foundation for healing by creating a sense of physical and emotional security within Rwanda’s two main ethnic communities. This would put an end to the historical cycle of vengeful violence.</p>
<p>It may seem unlikely at this stage to convince Kagame and his supporters that this is the way to go. As <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/jan/27/rwanda-freedom-of-speech">American journalist Stephen Kinzer once wrote</a>, Kagame, who seemed to have “the chance to enter history as one of the greatest modern African leaders”, could also be remembered as another failed African big man.</p>
<p>It’s high time Rwanda and its true friends heeded the call for collective healing through consensus democracy. Such a move would mark the beginning of a new journey that frees the energy and resources necessary to build a Rwanda that is reconciled, democratic and prosperous.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/94925/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As Rwanda marks the 24th anniversary of the 1994 genocide, much more needs to be done to unite the country.Noel Twagiramungu, Visiting Assistant Professor, UMass LowellJoseph Sebarenzi, Ph.D., Visiting Professor, SIT Graduate InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/944522018-04-06T15:36:55Z2018-04-06T15:36:55ZRwandans discuss how best to commemorate genocide<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/213577/original/file-20180406-125161-11q39dr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A memorial to the victims of the 1994 Rwanda genocide in Kigali. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Ahmed Jallanzo</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Rwanda is commemorating the 24th anniversary of the 1994 Tutsi genocide. This claimed the lives of between 800,000 and one million Tutsis and moderate Hutus <a href="http://unictr.unmict.org/en/genocide">over 100 days</a>.</p>
<p>This is a good time to reflect on the history of policy and practice of memory, justice, and recovery in the country over the past 24 years. Two questions are especially pertinent: how have Rwandans engaged in various forms of memory after genocide? How have these processes been meaningful?</p>
<p>From a series of nearly <a href="https://commons.clarku.edu/chgspapers/9/">60 interviews</a> conducted in the country since 2015, I have learned from a diversity of perspectives about memory and justice. </p>
<p>The findings suggest that genocide memory in Rwanda is diverse and dynamic. The interviewees’ often offered surprising and unexpected perspectives. These could not have been assumed from reading secondary reports or by observing the commemorations from a distance. </p>
<p>For example many people – including genocide survivors and former perpetrators – have a more holistic concept of justice than punishing perpetrators. And there is a huge desire for spaces for dialogue about how memories of genocide emerge impact everyday life. These spaces would bring together survivors, perpetrators, returnees, and ordinary citizens. There is also a great desire for knowledge about how to use these memories to seek justice, validation, and promote coexistence, especially for future generations.</p>
<h2>What we learnt</h2>
<p>I interviewed genocide survivors, former perpetrators and ordinary citizens who were neither targeted for genocide but who did not take part in killing. Officials engaged in memory processes in Rwanda were also interviewed.</p>
<p>The commemoration ceremonies take place over 100 days, known as the Kwibuka period, beginning on April 7 each year. During this period Rwandans visit village, district, or national memorial sites known as <em>urwibutso</em> where genocide victims are buried. There they hold memorial ceremonies which include listening to survivor testimonies and representatives from survivors’ organisations. Local and national leaders relate the history of the genocide, and sometimes perpetrators give testimonies. </p>
<p>Bodies of victims are still being found to this day, in pits or on farms. These bodies are reburied in communal memorial sites during the <em><a href="http://kwibuka.rw/">kwibuka</a></em> period. Sometimes <em><a href="https://rwandanights.wordpress.com/2012/04/29/icyunamo/">icyunamo</a></em> (time of mourning) is observed. This is the cultural practice of informal mourning that takes place throughout the night, usually around a fire. </p>
<p>Regardless of the programme of <em>kwibuka</em>, each process ideally pays respect to genocide victims and works to bring Rwandans together. </p>
<p>But not all acts of memory are necessarily guided by the intention of achieving peace and justice, unity and reconciliation. Some of this is because of individual differences in perspective and resilience. Simply put, some people cope better with the harms that they suffered for various reasons, among them faith, education and economic gains since the genocide.</p>
<p>Some individuals do not feel particularly connected to the memorial sites. Yet they still attend the ceremonies. This can cause conflicts of memory, especially when what is being remembered differs according to an individuals’s experience of the genocidal process. So it is important to ask Rwandans how urwibutso and kwibuka have or have not led to senses of justice, and what aspects of these processes are meaningful.</p>
<h2>Local cultures of memory</h2>
<p>It is also important to go back into the culture of Rwanda to inform the process of reflecting on and remembering the genocide. That serves to ensure that these processes are salient to Rwandans themselves, regardless of their backgrounds.</p>
<p>Achieving these goals is not an easy process. For example, proximity matters, as genocide survivors, genocidaires, returnees, and others still live together in close contact, in local communities and villages in Rwanda. </p>
<p>In addition, the genocide took place during a time of a <a href="https://ipfs.io/ipfs/QmXoypizjW3WknFiJnKLwHCnL72vedxjQkDDP1mXWo6uco/wiki/Rwandan_Civil_War.html">civil war (1 October 1990-4 July 1994)</a> and it was planned by a government that had abandoned its people. The government coerced many to participate in the killings. It used years of deliberate propaganda, hate speech and dehumanisation tactics to indoctrinate others into <a href="https://blogs.library.duke.edu/rubenstein/2013/05/10/radio-in-the-rwandan-genocide/">hate ideology</a>.</p>
<p>Many of the survivors were born of so-called mixed marriages, with one Hutu and one Tutsi parent. This reality challenges the binary nature of victimisation and perpetration of genocide in Rwanda. </p>
<h2>Meaning making and memorialisation</h2>
<p>The interviews raise further questions: what are Rwandans empowered by and what do they find meaningful about memorial sites and <em>kwibuka</em>, in order to sustain these processes over time?</p>
<p>For example, the research shows that, although some survivors feel validated when former perpetrators join them at commemoration ceremonies, others fear that requiring former genocidaires to attend when they still don’t accept their guilt might result in a backlash.</p>
<p>Some individuals attend <em>kwibuka</em> to support their neighbours but do not consider it their “own story.” Others consider it to be one of the most significant and emotional days of their lives each year. Some embrace <em>kwibuka</em> as a chance to remember their loved ones among the comfort of friends and neighbours. Yet, others fear it, because of the retraumatisation, grief, depression, and anger they might feel. </p>
<p>These are some examples of the diverse perspectives of <em>kwibuka</em>, all of which are valid and coexist in the same physical and emotional space every April in Rwanda.</p>
<p><em>Eric Ndushabandi, Director, Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace, Rwanda, co-authored this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/94452/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Samantha Lakin consults with the Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace. She receives funding from Fulbright-IIE. She is affiliated with the Fulbright Association and SURF. </span></em></p>The genocide memory in Rwanda is diverse and dynamic.Samantha Lakin, PhD Candidate, Strassler Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies; Fulbright Scholar, Clark UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/757512017-04-06T13:23:50Z2017-04-06T13:23:50ZWhy it’s important that the world still reflects on Rwanda’s genocide<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164160/original/image-20170405-14591-163w230.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Stephen Morrison</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>23 years ago, <a href="https://theconversation.com/rwanda-how-to-deal-with-a-million-genocide-suspects-38642">genocide was unleashed</a> in Rwanda. Almost a million Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed in about 100 days.</p>
<p>Consider not just the scale of the violence but the intimate means by which some 10,000 people a day lost their lives. Men, women, and children were killed at close proximity – often butchered with machetes, knives, scythes, clubs, picks, and sharpened sticks. </p>
<p>Their killers were not only members of the Rwandan army and the government-backed <em>Interahamwe</em> and <em>Impuzamugambi</em>, the <a href="https://global.britannica.com/event/Rwanda-genocide-of-1994#ref1111308">Hutu militias</a>. They were also the victims’ own neighbours, those they had sat next to at school, played soccer with, worked alongside. Many were tortured and raped before they were killed.</p>
<p>Instinctively, we recoil from such horror. Yet, in 2003, the United Nations General Assembly designated April 7 the “International Day of Reflection on the <a href="http://repository.un.org/handle/11176/246860">Genocide in Rwanda”</a>.</p>
<p>Why should we stop to reflect on such inhumanity and brutality, an episode that evokes shame, despair, and revulsion, now decades behind us, when current global problems abound and hope already often seems in short supply? </p>
<p>Looking back as a means of trying to gain perspective on today’s complex crises might seem naive. One might even argue that the Rwandan genocide was an aberration, a temporary slip into collective insanity, a result of some unique confluence of circumstances, still unfathomable. </p>
<p>Yet, the events of 1994 do warrant reflection today. They serve to remind us of two things: the culpability that can accompany simply looking the other way; and the risks, including <em>to ourselves,</em> of building walls (both real and metaphorical) between ‘us’ and ‘them’. </p>
<h2>Acknowledging responsibility for inaction</h2>
<p>The Rwandan genocide is not only a litany of unimaginable acts and intimate violence. It’s simultaneously a story of unimaginable omissions and the distanced <em>“allowing”</em> of such violence. Inhumanity was not only revealed in the horrifyingly callous manner in which the machetes were wielded but in carefully calculated denial, in silence and inaction, in dithering and stalled deliberation.</p>
<p>Blame shouldn’t be apportioned only to those who carried out or choreographed the killings. Other actors are also to blame, including institutional agents.</p>
<p>The multiple failures of the UN to prevent or mitigate the genocide in Rwanda are acknowledged in its <a href="http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/POC%20S19991257.pdf">1999 report</a> which followed an independent inquiry. Inaction when the UN had a capacity to act, and could have averted great harm, is inexcusable.</p>
<p>Of course, the member states of the UN were also blameworthy for their own discrete failures. The US, for example, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/mar/31/usa.rwanda">stubbornly skirted around the one label</a> that was rapidly revealed to be appropriate: <em>genocide,</em> a label that highlights an intention to eliminate, in whole or part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group. </p>
<p>Its utterance would have indicated recognition by the US – a signatory to the <a href="https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%2078/volume-78-i-1021-english.pdf">1948 Genocide Convention</a> – of its obligation to act. So, the word was avoided, and the US’s obligation to act with it. Yet, it was clear that the world was witnessing genocide. </p>
<p>The killings were meticulously planned and orchestrated by those in power. They were executed with brutal efficiency. Weapons had been stockpiled; lists of targets had been compiled and were distributed to local groups. The <a href="http://www.crimesofwar.org/a-z-guide/rwanda-refugees-and-genocidaires/"><em>genocidaires</em></a> (those involved in the genocide) were infamously urged on by <a href="https://www.concordia.ca/research/migs/resources/rwanda-radio-transcripts.html">regime-sponsored radio broadcasts</a> that, at first, ushered in the genocide with hate propaganda against the Tutsis and then identified who and where the Tutsis were, and provided instructions on how to kill them. By the time the killing came to a halt in July, three out of every four ethnic Tutsis were dead.</p>
<h2>One step forward</h2>
<p>Within Rwanda, a slow and painful <a href="http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/about/bgjustice.shtml">process of reconciliation</a> followed. The international community offered expressions of remorse – and even apology. US President Bill Clinton, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R_6CFNwJ9ww">speaking in Rwanda in 1998</a>, acknowledged that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[t]he international community… must bear its share of responsibility for this tragedy. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>On the tenth anniversary of the genocide, former Secretary-General <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2004/sgsm9223.doc.htm">Kofi Annan lamented</a> that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[i]f the international community had acted promptly and with determination, it could have stopped most of the killing.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>He led the call to define a clear set of prospective responsibilities so that the UN would never again stand idly by as blatant and preventable mass atrocities were carried out.</p>
<p>At the 2005 World Summit, all member states signed up to the groundbreaking, if imperfect, <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/487/60/PDF/N0548760.pdf?OpenElemen">“responsibility to protect” </a>vulnerable populations from mass atrocity. Post-Rwanda the world seemed united in its rallying cry of “never again”.</p>
<h2>A world of diluted international obligations?</h2>
<p>Yet, in an increasingly inward-looking world of <a href="https://theconversation.com/article-50-triggered-but-is-a-brexit-deal-really-possible-in-two-years-74435">Brexit </a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/america-first-donald-trump-becomes-the-45th-president-of-the-united-states-70479">Donald Trump</a>, fear and myopia threaten to obscure even the formally acknowledged international obligations that the experience of Rwanda supposedly bolstered. </p>
<p>International obligations – to refugees, to those threatened with mass atrocity crimes – seem weakened. The relevance of intergovernmental organisations and supranational bodies has been questioned amid populist proclamations of <a href="https://theconversation.com/trumps-america-first-pledge-has-echoes-of-rhodesias-racist-white-nationalists-71815">“my country first”</a>. Cosmopolitan sentiments appear diminished when confronted with often xenophobic distinctions between fellow citizens and “foreigners”.</p>
<p>One of the many things that the 1994 genocide can teach us is how easily fear can be fostered, how effectively divisions can be constructed and manipulated, how quickly ties that we take for granted can unravel – and how our individual and collective security is sacrificed as a result.</p>
<p>If we don’t learn this lesson, I worry that we are poised to take two steps back. </p>
<p>As shameful as the strategic avoidance of the word “genocide” was in 1994, there was some solace in the weight that it was understood to carry. Denial that the violence in Rwanda constituted genocide was, in fact, recognition of the strength of the principle that genuine cases must be acted on. </p>
<p>Today, I am wary of a time when there might be no hesitation to name genocide simply because the expectation to respond has become so thoroughly eroded, and our international responsibilities (as corollaries to human rights) so meaningless, that nothing hangs on inaction. </p>
<p>How to avoid that possible future is worthy of serious reflection.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/75751/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Toni Erskine does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The 1994 Rwandan genocide evokes shame, despair, and revulsion.Yet, the events warrant reflection and remind us about the risks of looking the other way.Toni Erskine, Professor of International Politics, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/717302017-01-26T13:45:44Z2017-01-26T13:45:44ZAuschwitz to Rwanda: the link between science, colonialism and genocide<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/154387/original/image-20170126-30401-14ypwmk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The remainsof victims of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda displayed at Kigali Memorial Center.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Dai Kurokawa </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When the Soviet army liberated the Auschwitz death camp on <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/27/auschwitz-short-history-liberation-concentration-camp-holocaust">27 January 1945</a>, among the prisoners left behind were a number of young twins. The surviving children and many more who had died were the subject of disturbing human experiments by Josef Mengele, a physician known as the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-30933718">“Angel of Death”</a>. </p>
<p>About 3,000 twins were selected from an estimated <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005189">1.3 million people who arrived at Auschwitz</a> for Mengele’s deadly “scientific” experiments. Only about <a href="http://history1900s.about.com/od/auschwitz/a/mengeletwins.htm">200 of them survived</a>.</p>
<p>Mengele is significant for understanding the complicity of science with the mass atrocities of the 20th century. The elegant young doctor defied the stereotypical image of the Nazi brute. He was no crazy drunken beast with a whip. This was an ambitious researcher of human genetics, holding <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=nmthADUYzQYC&pg=PT35&lpg=PT35&dq=Mengele,+doctrates+in+Anthropology+and+Medicine&source=bl&ots=GlzWoQtAAC&sig=Jp2ueycLi3TLkMQu_osEyHC9qUc&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi7j8Hfy9_RAhWGBsAKHQOlD60Q6AEIJzAC#v=onepage&q=Mengele%2C%20doctrates%20in%20Anthropology%20and%20Medicine&f=false">doctorates in anthropology and medicine</a>.</p>
<p>Mengele worked in Auschwitz from May 1943. The death camp presented him with a “perfect” laboratory. It provided an unlimited supply of human specimens to study genetics, and he wouldn’t get into trouble if they died following lethal injections and other <a href="http://history1900s.about.com/od/auschwitz/a/mengeletwins.htm">gruesome experiments</a>.</p>
<p>Mengele was well-connected. In 1942 his former doctoral supervisor, <a href="http://www.estherlederberg.com/Eugenics%20(Anecdotes)/Otmar%20Freiherr%20von%20Verschuer.html">Otmar von Verschuer</a>, a scientist conducting genetics research with a particular interest in twins, had become the director of the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institute for Anthropology, Human Heredity and Eugenics <a href="http://eugenicsarchive.ca/discover/connections/5233cdc25c2ec500000000a8in">(KWI-A)</a> in Berlin. Under Verschuer the KWI-A played a key role as an institution of science in the implementation of Nazi racist ideology and policy during the holocaust. Mengele also spent time as a <a href="https://books.google.de/books?isbn=0252029305">researcher at the KWI-A</a>.</p>
<p>The KWI-A’s story connects the Nazi atrocities of the 1940s with the colonial origins of racial science.</p>
<h2>Nazis and colonial ‘racial science’</h2>
<p>The institute’s first director in 1927 was the well-known physical anthropologist <a href="http://www.estherlederberg.com/Eugenics%20(Anecdotes)/Eugen%20Fischer.html">Eugen Fischer</a>. Fischer was a prolific researcher who had earned his scientific merits in genetics and racial science in the then German colony of German South West Africa (today’s Namibia).</p>
<p>His 1908 field study, published in 1913, focused on the effects of racial mixing (“miscegenation”), applying the genetic theory of <a href="http://www.dnaftb.org/1/bio.html">Gregor Mendel</a>. Fischer examined 310 children of the <a href="http://rehobothbasters.org/news/241-who-are-the-rehoboth-basters-n">“Basters” of Rehoboth</a>, a community of “mixed-race” people living to the South of Windhoek in Namibia. </p>
<p>The Rehobother offspring of Nama women and white men were observed and subjected to physical measurements. Based on these “scientific” methods, Fischer classified the mixed-race population. </p>
<p>His verdict that African blood imparted impurity resulted in the <a href="http://www.estherlederberg.com/Eugenics%20(CSHL_List)/Eugen%20Fischer.html">prohibition of mixed-race marriages</a> in all German colonies by 1912. In Namibia interracial marriage was already <a href="http://namibian-studies.com/index.php/JNS/article/viewFile/107/76">prohibited in 1905</a>. </p>
<p>German colonialism ended after World War I. This, however, was not the end of racial science. Incubated in the colonial laboratories of southern Africa, it was brought back and applied in “civilised” central Europe. Fischer first followed up his <a href="http://www.estherlederberg.com/Eugenics%20(Anecdotes)/Bastard%20studies.html">“bastard studies”</a> in the 1920s and early 1930s with the <a href="http://www.estherlederberg.com/Eugenics%20(Anecdotes)/Eugen%20Fischer.html">“Rhineland bastards”</a>, children born to German mothers and fathers from the French African colonies. Few black Germans perished during the Nazi era. But, many were <a href="http://www.dreamdeferred.org.uk/2014/04/the-holocausts-forgotten-victims-the-rhineland-bastards/">forcibly sterilised</a>.</p>
<p>The story of the KWI-A demonstrates how several significant dimensions connect 20th century racial science, colonialism and genocide. </p>
<h2>Race, politics and economics of science</h2>
<p>Firstly, the concept of <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/race/">“race”</a> as a classification of humans according to supposed genetic givens links science, colonial rule, and the Nazi mass murders. </p>
<p>The similarities in the ways physical anthropologists and colonial officials classified Africans at the beginning of the 20th century, and the Nazis’ classification of the Jews are obvious. Like Africans in the German colonies, Jews were regarded as alien and threats to the purity of German ‘blood’, who had to be excluded from the body of the German “Volk” (people). </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/154395/original/image-20170126-30428-d644xk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/154395/original/image-20170126-30428-d644xk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/154395/original/image-20170126-30428-d644xk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/154395/original/image-20170126-30428-d644xk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/154395/original/image-20170126-30428-d644xk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=519&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/154395/original/image-20170126-30428-d644xk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=519&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/154395/original/image-20170126-30428-d644xk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=519&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Prisoners who survived the Nazi German Auschwitz death camp in Poland.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Fischer only joined the Nazi party in 1940. But he made antisemitic utterances earlier. His private correspondence provides evidence that he regarded the “Jewish question” as a <a href="http://www.estherlederberg.com/Eugenics%20(Anecdotes)/Eugen%20Fischer.html">“question of race”</a></p>
<p>The social construction of the category “race” to classify humans was a prerequisite of the Nazi mass murders. In the 1930s, the KWI-A was centrally involved in the application of race-based laws to exclude Jews from the German “Volk”. Stellenbosch University anthropologist Steven Robins has shown this in his book, <a href="http://www.penguinrandomhouse.co.za/book/letters-stone/9781776090242">“Letters of Stone”</a>, which tells his family’s story from Nazi Germany to South Africa. </p>
<p>Secondly, however, the KWI-A demonstrates the pitfalls of typical, unbridled ambition in scientists. This is disturbing indeed. Fischer did not so much become involved in the Nazi racial policy because he was a vicious racist, but because of the politics and economics of research. </p>
<p>In exchange for their scientific services for the Nazi regime, Fischer and his Institute received official recognition. Most importantly, the scientists obtained privileged access to very generous state funding. </p>
<p>Thirdly, the KWI-A and its scientists provide chilling illustrations of some significant writings on the colonial origins of the dehumanisation and objectification of racially and the “eugenically undesirable”. The philosopher Hannah Arendt, herself a holocaust refugee from Germany, explained in 1951 that European imperialism played a crucial role in the development of <a href="Monoskop.org/images/7/7e/Arendt_Hannah_The_Origins_of_Totalitarianism_1979.pdf">Nazi totalitarianism</a> and associated genocides.</p>
<h2>Belgians and Rwanda</h2>
<p>The Nazi genocides have gone down in history as unique. They were organised with German industrial precision during the infamous Wannsee-Konferenz of 19 January 1942. The connection of science, racial policy and genocide, however, has a strong <a href="http://hgs.oxfordjournals.org/content/29/1/132.short">international dimension</a>.</p>
<p>Rwanda is a horrid example. In central Africa, the Belgians drew on <a href="http://www.dictionary.com/browse/craniology">craniology</a> specifically, the “scientific” study of the shape and size of the skulls of different human “races”. With additional differences in height and skin tone, the colonial administration fixed earlier social stratification between Tutsi, Hutu and Twa - all identified as Banyarwanda - into racial categories. From 1933 onwards, those were included in <a href="http://www.genocidewatch.org/images/AboutGen_Group_Classification_on_National_ID_Cards.pdf">Rwandan ID cards</a>. </p>
<p>In the years before Rwandan independence, finally granted in 1962, the colonial ideology of Tutsi racial superiority was turned around by politicians who created a <a href="http://www.beyondintractability.org/casestudy/fornace-rwandan">Hutu racial philosophy</a>. In 1994 hundreds of thousands Rwandans were murdered because their ID cards identified them as Tutsi. Others died because their physical appearance corresponded with the racial stereotype. </p>
<h2>The dark underbelly of Western modernity</h2>
<p>In 1955 the writer from Martinique, Aimé Césaire made a radical statement on the colonial origins of the holocaust. He wrote that in the 1940s <a href="http://www.rlwclarke.net/theory/SourcesPrimary/CesaireDiscourseonColonialism.pdf">the Nazis</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>applied to Europe colonialist procedures which until then had been reserved exclusively for the Arabs of Algeria, the coolies of India, and the niggers of Africa.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>These were important observations during the decade of African struggles to end colonialism. Sixty years later, the recurrent connections of science and genocide still demonstrate the dark underbelly of Western modernity in Africa, Europe, and the global world.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/71730/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Heike Becker does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Significant links connect racial science in colonial southern Africa with the holocaust of the European Jews. Colonial racial science also contributed to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.Heike Becker, Professor of Anthropology, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/691222016-12-12T18:05:19Z2016-12-12T18:05:19ZBurundi edges closer to the abyss in 2016<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/149385/original/image-20161209-31370-j197sj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A protestor uses grass to obscure his identity during a protest against President Pierre Nkurunziza's decision to run for a third term in Bujumbura, Burundi. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Goran Tomasevic</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Burundi’s President Pierre Nkurunziza was hardly a household name. That was before he turned his country into a hellhole following his unconstitutional <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33590991">decision</a> in 2015 to run for a third term. </p>
<p>Burundi <a href="http://www.swarthmore.edu/SocSci/soconne1/documents/Nkurunziza.pdf">is</a> an overpopulated and immensely corrupt state. It shares much the same ethnic map as Rwanda. But it hardly attracted a fraction of the attention claimed by its neighbour to the north during and after the <a href="http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/education/rwandagenocide.shtml">1994 genocide</a>. If anything, its principal claim to fame was that it successfully managed its <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/burundi">transition</a> to multi-party democracy after a vicious 10-year civil war.</p>
<p>The key to this remarkable achievement was a power-sharing arrangement. The arrangement gave a share of executive and legislative power to the two principal, and once bitterly antagonistic, ethnic communities, the Hutu and Tutsi. The Tutsi account for approximately 30% – this is a guesstimate as no reliable recent census figures are available – of a population of some ten million.</p>
<p>At first, the experiment seemed highly promising. It was formalised in the <a href="http://africacenter.org/spotlight/burundi-why-the-arusha-accords-are-central/">Arusha accords</a> of 2000, and later enshrined in the <a href="http://aoma.ukzn.ac.za/Libraries/Newsletters_2011/Constitution_of_Burundi_English.sflb.ashx">2005</a> constitution. It offered a striking counter-example to Rwanda’s tragic destinies. It all went well until the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32724083">failed coup</a> of May 13 2015. The coup was a desperate attempt by a group of dissident officers to seize power by force. The light was shone on the regime’s savagery. The precipitating factor was Nkurunziza’s decision to run for a third term, in violation of the constitution.</p>
<h2>The Burundi enigma</h2>
<p>Burundi today seems dangerously close to a Rwanda-like scenario. The Tutsi minority was targeted once again as a potential victim of genocidal violence. On closer inspection, the events of 2016 reveal a more ambivalent state of affairs. A <a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/burundi-hears-echoes-anti-tutsi-hate-speech-that-sparked-rwanda-genocide-1527836">significant number</a> of Tutsi elites, civil servants, army men, journalists and human rights activists have been killed by pro-regime elements. Scores of Tutsi <a href="http://time.com/4179101/rape-burundi/">women have been raped</a>.</p>
<p>But the same could be said of the hundreds of <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/29/world/africa/burundi-crackdown-puts-hutus-and-tutsis-and-the-west-on-edge.html?_r=0">Hutu victims</a>. One can’t ignore the large number of extra-judicial killings <a href="http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/burundi_report_english-2.pdf">committed</a> by anti-Nkurunziza rebels. These are opponents of Nkurunziza and both Hutu or Tutsi are targets. </p>
<p>Since 2015, <a href="http://eng.imirasire.com/news/all-around/out-of-rwanda/article/burundians-living-in-terror-after">at least</a> 1,000 people have been killed. Thousands of others have been arbitrarily arrested and tortured. An estimated 330,000 have fled their homeland to <a href="https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/burundi">neighbouring states</a>. </p>
<p>But we have to be cautious in speaking of a straight Hutu-Tutsi confrontation. The conflict is not strictly speaking ethnic. It’s political. It revolves around the pro- and anti-Nkurunziza’s third term option.</p>
<p>At the heart of the Burundi enigma lies a paradox. This is the power-sharing formula devised in the Arusha accords – the critical element behind the transition to democracy – and it still holds. Nonetheless, everything points to a diffuse yet distinctly anti-Tutsi political climate.</p>
<h2>Hutu takeover</h2>
<p>Today 60% of government positions and parliamentary seats are <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/burundi1105/2.htm">controlled</a> by Hutu and 40% by Tutsi. The army, as prescribed by the constitution, is evenly split between Hutu and Tutsi, each accounting for 50% of the officer corps and troops. Left out of the accounting, however, is:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>The growing number of Hutu hard-liners in positions of authority</p></li>
<li><p>The presence of parallel security organisations under tight Hutu control</p></li>
<li><p>The systematic clamping down on civil society organisations, and</p></li>
<li><p>The climate of pervasive fear created by the omnipresent Hutu-dominated youth militia known as <em>imbonerakure</em>. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Burundi is seen by many as alarmingly close to the edge of the abyss. Given the salience of such informal control mechanisms this is hardly surprising. Such is the consensus of most Burundi experts. Their views are corroborated by the International Federation of Human Rights Leagues <a href="https://www.fidh.org/en/region/Africa/burundi/repression-and-genocidal-dynamics-in-burundi">report</a>, the <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/UNIIB/Pages/UNIIB.aspx">2016 report</a> of the UN High Commission for Human Rights, many Human Rights Watch <a href="https://www.hrw.org/africa/burundi">reports</a> and the <a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/burundi-will-soon-be-one-africas-biggest-refugee-crises-says-msf-1591871">international media</a>.</p>
<h2>A bleak future</h2>
<p>But what adds to the sense of pessimism is such actions as the appointment of notorious hard-liners to key positions. </p>
<p>For example, General Evariste Ndayishimiye’s <a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/burundian-opposition-concerned-by-appointment-army-general-ndayishimiye-head-cndd-fdd-1577368">appointment</a> as the secretary general of the Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie – the current ruling party in Burundi. This leaves few doubts about the intransigence of the regime. He is known to be a tough-minded general and viscerally anti-Tutsi. </p>
<p>Ethnicity is becoming more noticeable as a policy issue. A growing number of Tutsi elements have been excluded from key government positions. In February of 2016 some 700 Tutsi troops <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21697289-political-ethnic-and-economic-crises-stalk-rwandas-neighbour-sliding-towards">were forced</a> into early retirement. The police force and the ruling party’s youth wing, now <a href="http://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2016/06/07/briefing-%E2%80%93-who%E2%80%99s-who-burundi%E2%80%99s-armed-opposition">undergoing</a> regular military training, have become virtually mono-ethnic, and so too the security units operating alongside the normal channels. </p>
<p>Perhaps even more ominous is the <a href="https://africanvoicess.wordpress.com/2015/11/07/discours-du-president-du-senat-du-burundi-reverien-ndikuriyo-on-va-travailler-invitation-au-genocide/">outrageous language</a> used by the president of the Senate, Reverien Ndikuriyo. Some of his utterances have been reminiscent of the coded euphemisms employed during the Rwanda genocide as synonyms for killing Tutsi. He even made <a href="https://africanvoicess.wordpress.com/2015/11/07/discours-du-president-du-senat-du-burundi-reverien-ndikuriyo-on-va-travailler-invitation-au-genocide/">reference</a> to “going to work”, a metaphor for killing.</p>
<p>It is easy to see why the thinly veiled anti-Tutsi posturings of the Nkurunziza regime should be seen by many as payback for the <a href="http://migs.concordia.ca/documents/The-Burundi-Killings-of-1972Lemarchand.pdf">1972 tragedy</a>. Some 200,000 Hutu were killed at the hands of a predominantly Tutsi army. Hundreds if not thousands of Tutsi civilians were killed by Hutu insurgents. </p>
<p>The prospects for reconciliation are bleak. Formal gestures by the government to nudge the legitimate opposition parties to join an intra-Burundi dialogue have consistently <a href="http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Burundi-peace-talks-fail-to-take-off-in-Tanzania-/2558-3027236-fa0un7/index.html">failed</a>. As for the weak and fragmented rebel forces in exile, nothing short of a miracle would enable them to capture power in the foreseeable future. </p>
<p>There have been repeated attempts by organisations like the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/burundi/african-union-and-burundi-crisis-ambition-versus-reality">African Union</a> to impose sanctions aimed at stopping atrocities and prepare the ground for the presence of an international protection force. These efforts have not been successful. <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-13/u-s-russian-tensions-threaten-to-paralyze-un-security-council">Internal rifts</a> in the UN Security Council between supporters of Nkurunziza, like China and Russia, and their opponents ensured the failure of a concerted diplomatic initiative. </p>
<p>Burundi’s <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-burundi-politics-idUSKCN12622V">planned withdrawal</a> from the international criminal court in response to pressure to investigate the country’s human rights situation stands as another ill omen for the future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/69122/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rene Lemarchand does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The prospects for reconciliation are bleak. Formal gestures by the government to nudge the opposition parties to join an intra-Burundi dialogue have consistently failed.Rene Lemarchand, Emeritus professor of Political Science, University of FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/515972015-12-08T04:20:09Z2015-12-08T04:20:09ZWhy the world can’t stand by as Burundi becomes a failed state<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/104682/original/image-20151207-3108-1u66cqr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Maintaining law and order in Burundi is proving increasingly difficult as the number of militias organised along ethnic lines increases.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Goran Tomasevic</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The unfolding <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/burundi/11995805/Belgium-tells-citizens-to-leave-Burundi-as-crisis-escalates.html">human tragedy</a> in Burundi needs urgent intervention from the international community before it is too late. The seemingly hands-off attitude by the <a href="http://www.eac.int/">East African Community</a>, <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-burundi-politics-idUSKCN0SB0JM20151017">African Union</a> and even the <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-burundi-unrest-idUSKCN0T20ZJ20151113#ukm4Pgbderu3TEvL.97">United Nations</a> raises many questions. </p>
<p>The crisis has been characterised by sporadic violence, assassinations, intimidation, and the grouping of <a href="https://www.scholars-press.com/catalog/details/store/cn/book/978-3-639-70955-1/peace-building-strategies-and-sustainable-peace-in-rwanda-and-burundi?search=Computational%20Analysis%20of%20Nonnegative%20Polynomial%20Systems">militias along ethnic lines</a>. The situation is eerily reminiscent of the start of the <a href="http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/burundi.htm">1993-2006</a> civil war in which an estimated 300,000 people died. The underlying issues of ethnic balance of power, corruption and poor governance linked to that conflict appear to be re-emerging.</p>
<p>The current crisis began in April with multi-ethnic protests by the opposition and civil society against President <a href="http://global.britannica.com/biography/Pierre-Nkurunziza">Pierre Nkurunziza’s</a> decision to vie for a <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/24/burundi-pierre-nkurunziza-wins-third-term-disputed-election">third term</a>.</p>
<h2>Ethnic balance of power</h2>
<p>In Burundi, ethnic balance of power seems to be the major threat to stability. The two dominant ethnic groups, Hutu and Tutsi, have had <a href="http://www.insightonconflict.org/conflicts/burundi/conflict-profile/">altercations</a> since the precolonial era. </p>
<p>Their squabbling became more serious in the aftermath of Burundi’s independence in <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/burundi-gains-independence-belgium">1962</a>. The ethnic conflict culminated in the genocidal violence of 1993-2006 that killed more than <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13087604">300,000 people</a>. </p>
<p>The 1998 <a href="https://www.issafrica.org/cdburundipeaceagreements/No%201%20arusha.pdf">Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement</a>, specifically Article 7, made efforts to diminish the ethnic cleavage. But the tragedy of the peace effort was that it was anchored on power sharing among ethnic elites. </p>
<p>This was done without consideration for genuine justice and reconciliation across Burundi’s ethnic society. Nor with an eye on the establishment of strong governance institutions. </p>
<p>The “quick fix” nature of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement seems to have come back to haunt Burundi. Ethnic protests threaten to tear the country apart, leading it to the path of a failed state.</p>
<p>There has been a mass exodus of Burundians to neighbouring countries since the new violence. This has been driven by <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=JVP9gdreY6gC&pg=PA150&lpg=PA150&dq=negative+ethnicity+in+burundi&source=bl&ots=st0ZcDRfmg&sig=qXsbWj_pOSqQRI5znLX5FTljl3Q&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjujM2D7snJAhXGbhQKHfzKB7QQ6AEIHzAA#v=onepage&q=negative%20ethnicity%20in%20burundi&f=false">negative ethnicity</a> – described as people fighting for their rights by destroying the rights of others – especially among the elites. </p>
<p>The UN refugee agency estimates that by November more than 200,000 people had <a href="http://data.unhcr.org/burundi/regional.php">fled Burundi</a> in anticipation of ethnic conflict. </p>
<p>An outbreak of a full scale civil war seems inevitable. </p>
<p>Bad governance and corruption by the Nkurunziza regime also threaten the survival of Burundi as a state. The ripple effects of these have seen a rise of <a href="http://globalriskinsights.com/2014/12/impact-2015-elections-burundis-economy/">poverty</a> and unemployment, <a href="http://www.equaltimes.org/poverty-and-unemployment-fuel?lang=en#.VmWQq7h97IU">especially among the youth</a> who constitute the majority of Burundi’s population of <a href="http://countrymeters.info/en/Burundi">11.2 million</a>. </p>
<p>The large population of disenfranchised young people makes them vulnerable targets for recruitment into militias. This is evident in the high number who have aligned themselves with key actors across the political divide. The buildup of youth militia, leading to a highly militarised society, has created a tinderbox. All it requires is a spark to set off civil war that will consume Burundi’s state and national fabric.</p>
<h2>Militarisation and ethnic militias</h2>
<p>Rising militarisation, especially among youths allied to rival Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups, is a clear indication of Burundi’s possible descent into the club of failed states. </p>
<p>The central government is weak and has little control over the country. It faces clear challenges in providing public services and is riddled with widespread corruption and criminality. Refugee numbers are climbing as more people flee their homes and the economy is in sharp decline.</p>
<p>Intimidation is on the rise and ethnic militia groups are retreating to their ethnic strongholds. Targeted assassinations across the political spectrum are increasing in the capital Bujumbura, akin to the initial stages of the 1993 civil war.</p>
<p>The most notorious case of militia hemmed along ethnic lines is the Hutu dominated and pro-government militia, the <a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/burundi-who-are-feared-imbonerakure-youth-1504301">Imbonerakaure</a>. It has continuously waged a campaign of intimation against Tutsis. </p>
<p>The militarisation of ethnic groups indicates a clear pattern of a failing state incapable of using state institutions, such as the police and other security forces, to maintain law and order. The division of military along ethnic lines, which led to the aborted coup, is another symptom of gradual decline in the state’s capabilities.</p>
<h2>Why neighbours aren’t helping</h2>
<p>There is no easy solution to the dangerous crisis in Burundi. The East African Community, which should be the obvious arbiter, doesn’t seem to be suited to resolve the crisis. </p>
<p>Kenya is busy with its own International Criminal Court <a href="http://www.ijmonitor.org/category/kenya-cases/">cases</a> and seems not to have time for the crisis. In Tanzania, President <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/30/world/africa/tanzania-presidential-election-john-magufuli.html?_r=0">John Magufuli</a> is new and needs time to establish his government.</p>
<p>For his part, President Paul Kagame of Rwanda has <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34760943">overtly declared</a> that Nkurunziza’s regime is targeting minority Tutsi groups in Burundi. He has threatened to <a href="http:%20//www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/16624/burundi-rwanda-spat-stokes-fear-of-revived-ethnic-tensions.">intervene</a> if the crisis turns genocidal to protect Tutsis. </p>
<p>Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni – who is the current mediator – is facing a stiff competition from the opposition <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/11/03/can-anyone-defeat-president-yoweri-museveni-in-uganda/">in elections</a> slated for January 2016 and may have no time for Burundi. </p>
<p>Museveni, just like Nkurunziza, has been accused by the Ugandan opposition of manipulating the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12421747">constitution</a> to extend his stay in power. Hence, in the eyes of Burundi opposition, he lacks credibility to resolve a crisis sparked by his counterpart’s machinations to cling to power. </p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>Any attempt to resolve the crisis and find a long term solution must tackle political, constitutional, economic and social problems in Burundi. For instance, the trigger issue in the recent conflict was the ambiguities in the interpretation of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement and the country’s 2005 constitution.</p>
<p>Hence the Burundian peace process, while addressing the current political and constitutional crises, should also take into account the economic, ethnic and social issues behind the conflict.</p>
<p>In the meantime the UN should send a <a href="http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/pkmandates.shtml">Chapter 7</a> peacekeeping mission to Burundi. Such missions apply to volatile:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… post-conflict settings where the State is unable to maintain security and public order. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>This would enable it to be given a mandate to use force to stop the killings by both the opposition and the government. After this, the African Union must lead in creating an inclusive political dispensation acceptable to all parties.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/51597/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Patrick Muthengi Maluki does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The “quick fix” nature of the Arusha Peace Agreement seems to have come back to haunt Burundi. Ethnic protests threaten to tear the country apart, leading it to the path of a failed state.Patrick Muthengi Maluki, Lecturer, Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, University of NairobiLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.