tag:theconversation.com,2011:/fr/topics/international-organisations-1424/articlesInternational organisations – The Conversation2020-12-22T09:02:44Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1511152020-12-22T09:02:44Z2020-12-22T09:02:44ZHow member states and partners impede the African Union’s quest for financial autonomy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/371995/original/file-20201130-23-zcyljp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Addis Ababa, November 2018. The African Union launches its own Peace Fund with the aim to ensure predictable financing for peace and security activities in Africa.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/paulkagame/45934294071/in/photolist-49pQg5-2bArPi4-JxXPZB-2adz2KE-2bArPeM-2bArPgF-2adz2WG-2cZ4gir-2cZ4g7e-2bArNVF-2adz2UC-2bArNUP-2bArNFH-2bArNZt-2cZ4fT8-6XMPfE-PgdTBE-Dqs8Ab-CDCz6F-DAXe7B-D9VHMs-zyz4nW-CDkYAm-25h7Kxm-DCMx8Z">paulkagame/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The African Union (AU) has developed ambitious plans for the continent, ranging from <a href="https://au.int/en/flagships/silencing-guns-2020">security</a> to <a href="https://theconversation.com/more-work-lies-ahead-to-make-africas-new-free-trade-area-succeed-118135">trade</a>. But when it comes to financing these ambitions the organisation is caught between a rock and a hard place. Since the AU does not have an independent source of income, it either has to affront members for their irregular payments or remain dependent on external partners.</p>
<p>Financing the AU goes to the heart of its pan-African agenda, which is driven by decolonial integration and development objectives. Having examined the <a href="https://www.routledge.com/The-Finances-of-Regional-Organisations-in-the-Global-South-Follow-the-Money/Engel-Mattheis/p/book/9780367152468">finances of numerous organisations in the Global South</a>, we observe that the double dependency on member states and external donors poses important challenges for the establishment of independent and powerful administrations. The AU is a particularly telling case of this trend.</p>
<p>Unsustainable funding has hindered the AU from developing its full potential. Irregular payments from member states and fragmented external funding have led to repeated cash flow crises, often with serious consequences. For instance, in 2016 the AU’s mission in Somalia <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36624520">failed to pay allowances to its soldiers</a> for six months. </p>
<p>Achieving financial autonomy requires member states to improve their payment record. Simultaneously, the AU needs to wean itself from external funding, even if its administrative and institutional reforms make it ever more attractive to external partners.</p>
<h2>AU sanctions and member states’ arrears</h2>
<p>Although the 55 member states have in principle agreed to provide the AU with reliable and adequate financial means, African governments do not always consider it a priority in practice. Many states pay their yearly fees late or only in part. However, the AU is not powerless. </p>
<p>In 2018, a <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/36425-ext_assembly_dec._1-4xi_e.pdf">three-stage sanctions regime</a> came into effect to deal with defaulting states. The longer a member state fails to pay its financial contributions, the more rights it loses (see table below). While some consequences are primarily symbolic, others severely curtail their leeway in foreign policy, such as losing the right to host summits or run for office.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/372006/original/file-20201130-23-1pfdpyl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/372006/original/file-20201130-23-1pfdpyl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=187&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372006/original/file-20201130-23-1pfdpyl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=187&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372006/original/file-20201130-23-1pfdpyl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=187&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372006/original/file-20201130-23-1pfdpyl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=235&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372006/original/file-20201130-23-1pfdpyl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=235&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372006/original/file-20201130-23-1pfdpyl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=235&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">AU sanctions regime for non-payment of assessed contributions.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author's compilation based on AU Assembly decisions</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In an institution that traditionally prefers consensus over confrontation, the imposition of sanctions constitutes a drastic measure. In one recent case, the new assertiveness has proven to be effective. In June 2020, it became public that South Sudanese officials had been <a href="https://www.voanews.com/africa/south-sudan-focus/african-union-sanctions-south-sudan-nonpayment">barred from attending AU meetings</a>. The country rushed to reduce its arrears just enough to have their sanctions lifted. In another recent case, Tunisia’s foreign minister publicly lamented his country’s first ever <a href="https://www.tap.info.tn/en/Portal-Politics/13388173-au-imposes-sanction">sanctions for non-payment</a>.</p>
<p>However, the implementation of AU financial autonomy is much harder to achieve than general political agreements as it generates <a href="https://www.cabri-sbo.org/en/publications/programme-based-budgeting-the-rollout-of-complex-reform-in-africa">conflict over public finances at the national level</a>. The urgency to cover AU membership dues is doubtlessly relayed by ambassadors in Addis Ababa, but time and time again, domestic budgeting issues undermine the disbursement. </p>
<p>Many treasuries are reluctant to give in because AU membership is a sizeable budgetary item. For example, in 2019 South Sudan’s contribution to the AU amounted to $2.2 million. This is a considerable percentage of its <a href="http://www.mofep-grss.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/FY-2019-2020-Approved-Budget-Book.pdf">foreign ministry’s annual budget of $56 million</a> and far more than any of its other membership fees. </p>
<p>This widespread situation limits the capacity of the AU. As of October 2020, one third of member states were under <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20181127/african-union-strengthens-its-sanction-regime-non-payment-dues">sanctions for non-payment</a>. Overtly pushing them for payment would generate a plethora of diplomatically embarrassing situations. The resulting rumblings in national governments would then provoke a backlash to the AU’s newly acquired sanction powers. </p>
<p>The AU prefers to deal with the delicate issue of non-payment behind closed doors. Public confrontations, as in the cases of South Sudan and Tunisia, are thus not instigated by the AU. They begin when foreign affairs officials relay the AU’s grievances to their governments. </p>
<h2>Old dependencies revisited</h2>
<p>The three-tier sanctions regime is part of <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34915-file-report-20institutional20reform20of20the20au-2.pdf">broader financial reforms</a> which aim to reduce the heavy dependency of the AU on external funding. However, international partners continue to flock to their ‘donor darling’. </p>
<p>Thanks to the reforms, the AU Commission is becoming more efficient and transparent in its spending. As a consequence the reforms that were supposed to wean the AU off its external dependence have had the unintended consequence of making the AU an ever more attractive partner for development aid. </p>
<p>In addition, the COVID-19 crisis amplified the AU’s attractiveness to international partners. It became a clearing house for donations to the continent. The African Centres for Disease Control has seen record contributions from around the globe, both from <a href="https://africacdc.org/news-item/the-european-union-supports-africas-covid-19-continental-response/">traditional partners such as the EU</a> and <a href="https://africacdc.org/news-item/jack-ma-and-alibaba-foundations-donate-covid-19-medical-equipment-to-african-union-member-states/">new private sector actors</a>. Although this income is a welcome cash injection it ultimately undermines the AU’s claim to financial autonomy.</p>
<h2>Overcoming the AU’s reform gridlock</h2>
<p>For now, AU financial reform has not durably addressed the low payment morale among its members. Its new sanctions regime is a step in the right direction but many member states still prioritise other expenses. The COVID-19 crisis could further increase the rate of non-payment, as countries embark on <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2020/10/08/world-bank-confirms-economic-downturn-in-sub-saharan-africa-outlines-key-polices-needed-for-recovery">costly national recovery plans</a>. </p>
<p>Eventually, the AU will need to secure its own sustainable source of income, starting with the <a href="https://au.int/en/aureforms/financing">0.2% levy on imports from outside the continent</a>. This will make the budget independent from the benevolence of members and international partners. But it faces many obstacles. <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/38739-doc-report_on_financing_of_the_union_jun_2020_002.pdf">Only 17 countries</a> have implemented the levy since 2017.</p>
<p>Given the current challenges, the AU will have to change its approach in at least one of three regards: budget size, donor dependency, and culture of consensus. </p>
<p>First, a decrease of the budget, which <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20180706/financial-reforms-african-union-lead-massive-cuts-unions-budget">the AU Commission has already proposed</a>, would reduce the financial pressure. Second, acknowledging international partners as permanent stakeholders would enable the AU to treat them as similar to members by enforcing more transparency and giving them sanctionable duties. Lastly, naming and shaming members for their lack of commitment undermines the AU’s culture of consensus but is likely to improve payments, at least in the short term.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/151115/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Frank Mattheis coordinates a Jean Monnet project on the relations between the European Union and African regionalisms, which receives support of the Erasmus+ Programme of the European Union.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ueli Staeger receives funding from the Swiss National Science Foundation for his doctoral research.</span></em></p>Wavering commitment in African capitals and the continued attractiveness of the African Union to external funders risk stalling the crucial path to financial autonomy.Frank Mattheis, Researcher, Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB)Ueli Staeger, PhD researcher, International Relations/Political Science, Graduate Institute – Institut de hautes études internationales et du développement (IHEID)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1036362018-09-24T10:56:32Z2018-09-24T10:56:32ZSports anti-doping bodies won’t reform themselves, but nation states can break the deadlock<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/237711/original/file-20180924-85758-14jg4se.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Anti-doping control bodies are themselves in need of control.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.visitcampnou.com">visitcampnou</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Following the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/13/sports/russia-doping-sochi-olympics-2014.html?_r=0">extraordinary state-sponsored doping scandal</a> of the Russian Olympic team, the international sport’s anti-doping regime faces its worst credibility crisis in decades. The latest decision of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2018/sep/20/wada-crisis-lifts-russia-suspension-anti-doping">reinstate the Russian Anti Doping Agency</a> and its Moscow laboratory after their multi-year suspension has again focused attention on the viability of the regime to tackle cheating in sport.</p>
<p>The international anti-doping system, recognised as having longstanding inefficiencies, has responded inadequately to the Russian scandal. The sanctioning policy, directed by the International Olympic Committee (IOC), remains ad-hoc, as seen in the inconsistent, delayed, and many believe lenient measures against Russian teams in multiple sports. The regime’s accountability structure has not changed in a way that would create incentives for the IOC and WADA as the global anti-doping regulator to do better. Under the current structure there is no forum for these organisations to be held accountable for the outcomes of their policies. </p>
<p>The recent establishment of the <a href="https://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1060521/independent-testing-authority-moves-closer-to-becoming-operational-after-first-meeting">Independent Testing Authority</a>, intended to take over the role of testing athletes from (conflicted) international sporting federations, national anti-doping organisations and laboratories, is a welcome step. But it was driven by the IOC, and hardly qualifies as revolutionary change. WADA has not been given the tools to effectively combat doping, nor has sanctioning policy been sufficiently tightened to deter future cheating. In fact, despite <a href="https://theconversation.com/athletics-doping-report-should-spark-radical-rethink-on-drugs-in-sport-50376">various reform proposals</a>, the system is steering away from meaningful change towards preserving the status quo. </p>
<p>So it’s unlikely that the international anti-doping system will reform from within, and the opportunities for those outside the Olympic institutions are very limited. Even though it is a hybrid regime that features both public and private regulation, the sports governance system is dominated by one private organisation: the IOC. Is the system doomed to stagnate in spite of calls for reform? Not necessarily. One way forward is through greater government involvement. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/237712/original/file-20180924-85764-bwcgmm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/237712/original/file-20180924-85764-bwcgmm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/237712/original/file-20180924-85764-bwcgmm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/237712/original/file-20180924-85764-bwcgmm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/237712/original/file-20180924-85764-bwcgmm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/237712/original/file-20180924-85764-bwcgmm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/237712/original/file-20180924-85764-bwcgmm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Anti-doping laboratories have historically been accurate, but the anti-doping organisations themselves lack oversight.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Bartlomiej Zborowski/EPA</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Reform-minded states lead the way</h2>
<p>While not key players in international sports governance, national governments could spur on reform in several ways.</p>
<p>First, in the absence of robust international action to police and sanction cheating, anti-doping measures can be tightened at domestic level. Doping schemes can be criminalised, and international authorities can be assisted to prosecute their perpetrators abroad. </p>
<p>A notable effort is the recently proposed <a href="https://www.csce.gov/sites/helsinkicommission.house.gov/files/RADA%20signed.pdf">Rodchenkov Anti-Doping Act</a> in the US, which would criminalise doping cartels and authorise state authorities to prosecute violations committed overseas, on the grounds that they have harmed US interests. While it is not certain whether this will become law, the more countries that introduce similar measures the greater potential there is for deterring and prosecuting organised doping schemes. </p>
<p>Second, states can enhance anti-doping regulation through international legislation. The current <a href="http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/anti-doping/international-convention-against-doping-in-sport/">UNESCO International Convention against Doping in Sport</a> harmonises global anti-doping standards, but does not regulate the workings of the anti-doping regime. There is scope for further regulation to strengthen anti-doping tools and to introduce accountability mechanisms for Olympic organisations.</p>
<p>Given the public interest and investment in sport and the need to protect the rights of athletes, using international law to update anti-doping policy could be readily justified. Just as states managed in the late 1990s to mobilise stakeholders to <a href="https://www.iilj.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Casini-Global-hybrid-public-private-bodies-2009.pdf">create the anti-doping regime</a>, with a new global regulator, they can similarly spearhead efforts now to break the deadlock. </p>
<p>Governments can also step up their involvement in WADA. Half the seats on WADA’s governing bodies are held by state delegates (representing states as co-funders of WADA). Even though these delegates have little power over the anti-doping regime, they can still have a larger impact. For example, the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/sport/44227689">recently announced candidacy for WADA president</a> of Linda Helleland, former Norwegian sports minister and current WADA vice-president, is significant for the 2019 elections. Were Helleland elected she could be the springboard for change for reform-minded governments. While the position lacks direct powers, the WADA presidency is an agenda-setting role that sets the direction of debate. This would add to the pressure on the IOC from within.</p>
<p>So, not only has the anti-doping regime been exposed as dysfunctional, but there seems little appetite for change. Despite the role of the state in the Russian doping scandal, we would argue that more, rather than less, state involvement could be a promising way to break the deadlock. It might seem paradoxical that the anti-doping system, having been “hacked” by those within governments, might also find that governments are their saviour. But the collaborative efforts of many states is the best way to address the disruptive role of a few and “keep them honest”. The alternative – that the same governing bodies that have failed sports so far will reinvent themselves without further oversight – seems vanishingly unlikely.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/103636/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The initial research for this article was conducted while Slobodan Tomic was employed by sports governance consultancy I Trust Sport.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rebecca Schmidt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Anti-doping laboratories have historically worked well, but the anti-doping organisations themselves lack oversight.Slobodan Tomic, Post-Doctoral Marie Currie Fellow, University College DublinRebecca Schmidt, Assistant Professor in Law, Dublin City UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/993402018-07-10T07:06:38Z2018-07-10T07:06:38ZWhy the NATO summit could deal a major blow to the international order<p>While most of Europe heads off on holiday, NATO heads of state and government will soon gather in NATO’s brand new headquarters in Brussels for their <a href="https://www.politico.com/story/2018/07/09/trump-criticize-nato-summit-702296">2018 summit</a>. The outcomes of these meetings are usually known in advance, meaning they aren’t usually all that exciting – but this time, there’s real trepidation in the air. The Western foreign policy community is worried that Donald Trump may repeat his petulant behaviour at last month’s G7 meeting and turn against his allies in public, thereby bringing the unity and credibility of the alliance into question.</p>
<p>Why does this matter? Because along with trade, security forms the core of the liberal international order. With a global trade war now <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-china-trade-china-is-building-bridges-with-the-rest-of-the-world-while-the-us-puts-up-walls-99038">all but inevitable</a> thanks to the Trump administration’s punitive tariffs, NATO needs to signal that the security element of the liberal international order is in good health. This is especially important before Trump’s upcoming meeting with Vladimir Putin in Helsinki, as American scorn for NATO plays straight into Putin’s hands.</p>
<p>That would be a radical disruption to the global order. NATO was built by and for the West with the explicit intention of creating a peaceful and prosperous Europe while underpinning American leadership and power. If this year’s NATO Summit turns out to be the disaster some fear, it may lead to uncertainty not only about the credibility of NATO, but also about the resilience of the liberal international order.</p>
<p>And unfortunately, the summit the world gets will probably be nothing like the one it needs.</p>
<h2>Off the rails</h2>
<p>In an ideal world, this would be a show of unity around shared values and a shared commitment to international security. The allies would demonstrate that NATO is ready to meet the many challenges of the new security environment; they would agree a new command structure, set up a framework for a more constructive relationship with the EU, decide on new counterterrorism initiatives in Iraq and Afghanistan, and start a long overdue discussion of NATO’s role in new security domains such as <a href="https://theconversation.com/donald-trumps-space-force-the-dangerous-militarisation-of-outer-space-98588">space</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/diplomacy-not-sanctions-are-needed-to-tackle-state-cyberespionage-47429">cyberspace</a>.</p>
<p>The NATO allies should also agree to reconcile long-running differences between allies worried about the threat of a resurgent Russia and those more focused on the challenges posed by migration and political instability to the south of the NATO sphere.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/226703/original/file-20180709-122247-1argx44.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/226703/original/file-20180709-122247-1argx44.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/226703/original/file-20180709-122247-1argx44.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/226703/original/file-20180709-122247-1argx44.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/226703/original/file-20180709-122247-1argx44.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/226703/original/file-20180709-122247-1argx44.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/226703/original/file-20180709-122247-1argx44.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The NATO secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/brussels-belgium-january-31-2017-nato-579400957?src=ULduvjli-xDWH1Wolw5XVA-1-24">Belish/Shutterstock.com</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But in reality, the summit will probably revolve almost exclusively around the toxic subject of burden sharing and the 2% target, apparently the only agenda item to have captured Trump’s interest. To be fair, he’s right that the European member states have for too long neglected to pay a fair share for their security. But the Europeans know this, and they’ve taken measures to reverse the downward trend in defence spending; <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-jens-stoltenberg-donald-trump-8-countries-to-hit-defense-spending-target/">six EU countries</a> have now reached the target.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, the worry is that Trump will disregard these ongoing efforts and instead approach the burden sharing issue in a way that undermines the credibility of the security guarantee. If Trump makes the American promise to underwrite Europe’s security conditional, or decides to withdraw some or all of the 35,000 American troops stationed in Europe, the <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/ie/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm">core NATO principle</a> that “an attack against one is an attack against all” will be severely compromised.</p>
<h2>Sabotage and struggle</h2>
<p>The liberal international order rests on the rule of law and multilateral diplomacy, and it operates via institutions set up to deal with issues such as trade, security, human rights, arms control and climate change. Since entering politics, Trump has shown these institutions little but contempt.</p>
<p>In the last couple of months alone, he has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/video/2018/06/10/trump-torpedoes-g7-united-front-as-summi?videoId=434599181">sabotaged a G7 summit</a>, started a trade war with his allies, and described North Korean dictator <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/12/trump-heaps-praise-on-kim-jong-un-during-nuclear-weapons-summit.html">Kim Jong-un</a> as “a very talented man”. He described NATO as <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/donald-trump-told-g7-leaders-nato-bad-nafta-it-too-costly-us-999805">too costly for the US</a> and “as bad as NAFTA” (the <a href="https://theconversation.com/trumps-protectionism-continues-long-history-of-us-rejection-of-free-trade-91190">North American Free Trade Agreement</a>, which he loathes); he <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-eu-was-set-up-to-take-advantage-of-us-trade-tariffs-protectionism/">falsely claimed</a> that the EU was set up to “take advantage” of the US. More worryingly, he has proved that he’s prepared to make good on his word, withdrawing from the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/planetpolicy/2018/06/01/one-year-since-trumps-withdrawal-from-the-paris-climate-agreement/">Paris Climate Agreement</a>, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/donald-trump-backs-out-of-iran-nuclear-deal-now-what-96317">Iranian nuclear deal</a>, and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-us-left-the-un-human-rights-council-and-why-it-matters-98644">UN Human Rights Council</a>. A de facto withdrawal from the US’s existing security arrangements with Europe could be a fatal blow.</p>
<p>Among all these institutions, NATO is particularly crucial. Although the other issues certainly are important, they can all limp along without the US’s cooperation. But Europe cannot entirely provide for its own security in the foreseeable future – and while Trump’s ambivalence will almost certainly lead to renewed efforts to build a more independent security and defence establishment for the EU, that process will be slow and uncertain.</p>
<p>For now, the European allies have no other option than to ride the storm by making promises to meet the demands of its leader. This can be done for a couple of years while hoping for better times, but the transatlantic relationship has been hurt. And if Trump wins another term or is replaced with a president of similar views, the liberal international order in its current form will almost certainly end.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/99340/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Trine Flockhart does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Trump’s assault on the global trade system could be just a prelude to his next moves.Trine Flockhart, Professor of International Relations, University of Southern DenmarkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/702942016-12-13T05:29:07Z2016-12-13T05:29:07ZWhat good does the Global Forum on Migration and Development do?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/149727/original/image-20161212-26051-1fb5vhe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A line of Syrian refugees crossing the border of Hungary and Austria on their way to Germany Hungary Central Europe September</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fl%C3%BCchtlingspolitik_(German_Refugee_Policies)#/media/File:A_line_of_Syrian_refugees_crossing_the_border_of_Hungary_and_Austria_on_their_way_to_Germany._Hungary,_Central_Europe,_6_September_2015.jpg">Mstyslav Chernov</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Here at the end of 2016, migration issues are once more the subject of heated international debate. Today, the media regularly depicts the <a href="https://theconversation.com/europe-has-finally-woken-up-to-migrant-deaths-in-the-med-but-can-it-deliver-a-united-response-40579">innumerable deaths and tragedies</a> of migrant journeys. </p>
<p>From December 10 to 12, in Dhaka, Bangladesh, delegates of about 160 countries met during the <a href="http://www.gfmd.org/">Global Forum on Migration and Development</a>. Organised by the Bangladeshi government, this edition had the motto “Time to Act”, focusing on better global governance on migration. Its aim was not to make decisions: rather, in this consultative process, states would engage in dialogue and draft the basis of a new international migration policy. </p>
<p>For those interested in international migration, 2016 has been both sombre and overwhelming. Fuelled by the <a href="http://www.ibtimes.com/syrian-civilian-death-toll-2016-isis-assad-regime-fuel-refugee-crisis-growing-war-2415265l">war in Syria</a>, about <a href="https://theconversation.com/compter-les-morts-aux-frontieres-qui-comment-pourquoi-59095">4,000 migrants</a> died in Europe and the Mediterranean region, making 2016 the worst year ever for migrants and refugees. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/149416/original/image-20161209-31352-1vp7g2v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/149416/original/image-20161209-31352-1vp7g2v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/149416/original/image-20161209-31352-1vp7g2v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/149416/original/image-20161209-31352-1vp7g2v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/149416/original/image-20161209-31352-1vp7g2v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/149416/original/image-20161209-31352-1vp7g2v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/149416/original/image-20161209-31352-1vp7g2v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Calais’s ‘jungle’ migrants on the move again in North of France, February 2016.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/67570481@N04/24370012780/">Malachybrowne/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In October, the French government tore apart the Calais “jungle”. The massive camp that had provided temporary shelter for the numerous people seeking to immigrate to the UK, but who were blocked on the French side of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-the-calais-jungle-is-there-a-long-term-solution-views-from-france-and-britain-67352">English Channel</a> </p>
<p>In June Britain had voted to end their membership of the European Union– a decision motivated, among other factors, by the hope of reducing immigration by <a href="http://theconversation.com/la-question-migratoire-au-c-ur-du-referendum-sur-le-brexit-61101">avoiding the EU’s freedom-of-movement rights and rules</a>. </p>
<p>November saw the election of a new president in the United States, Donald Trump, who has promised to build a wall at the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-wall-and-the-beast-trumps-triumph-from-the-mexican-side-of-the-border-68559">Mexican border</a>.</p>
<p>That decision is not new, but it will exacerbate existing tensions around <a href="https://theconversation.com/harsh-republican-immigration-rhetoric-is-invigorating-latino-voters-54682">Latin American immigrants</a> in American society.</p>
<h2>What the forum can actually do</h2>
<p>The consensual and plush atmosphere of the Global Forum contrasted with the chaos and violence that often characterise global migration dynamics. </p>
<p>As its name suggests, the Global Forum focuses on links between migration and development. Its primary aim is to make sure that migration policies are useful for economic development of migrants’ home countries such that, in the long run, people don’t need to leave anymore. </p>
<p>Such a virtuous circle would first take the shape of a new policy for temporary migration. Such policies were <a href="https://books.google.fr/books?id=_GyhQAJeOZoC&pg=PA153&dq=The+Pompidou+years,+1969-1974+number+of+homes+with+running+water+rose&hl=en&sa=X&ei=NTIjT9eREISl8QOo1ODFBw&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false">widely used in Western Europe in the 1930s</a> to bring Turkish workers to Germany, North Africans to France and South Asians to the United Kingdom. </p>
<p>After the oil crisis of the 1970s, the programmes were dropped. Such an approach has since become unpopular as governments realised that working migrants often settled in Europe rather than returning to their countries of origin. </p>
<iframe frameborder="0" marginheight="0" marginwidth="0" scrolling="no" src="https://fresques.ina.fr/jalons/export/player/InaEdu01064/360x270" width="100%" height="320" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<p>Today these policies seem to be in favour again. Canada for example, which used to attract permanent migrants, is <a href="http://ccrweb.ca/fr/lessor-de-la-migration-temporaire-au-canada-un-changement-de-cap-radical">increasing</a> its hiring of temporary workers.</p>
<p>According to supporters, these programmes present a good deal for destination states: they get a cheap work force for fields that need it, like construction, agriculture, catering and personal care services. For out-migration countries, these programs help them regulate their labour markets and encourage remittances.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2016/10/06/remittances-to-developing-countries-expected-to-grow-at-weak-pace-in-2016-and-beyond">According to the World Bank</a>, global remittances – cash flows from country to country – amount for more than US$440 billion a year, and more than the total sum of development aid. In Senegal or Philippines, for example, it represents over <a href="http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS">10% of GDP</a>.</p>
<p>Such programs could be an alternative to irregular immigration which is today the main drive behind hiring of migrant workers. As a reminder, in the US, 5% of working population is comprised of <a href="http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/03/5-facts-about-illegal-immigration-in-the-u-s/">clandestine workers, mainly Mexicans</a>.</p>
<p>The forum also insists on the many advantages of security rights and labour protection, so that workers will not be forced to work illegally, under the rules of the black market.</p>
<h2>A sensitive but necessary cooperation</h2>
<p>But for these policies to work, states must cooperate. And this is the other major objective of this forum. For instance, countries that recruit migrant workers need to be assured that their states of origin will take them back at the end of their stay. Out-migration states also need to ensure that other countries do not attract too significant a portion of necessary workers. In Kenya for example, 600 doctors are trained annually, but 30% to 40% of them <a href="http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2016/01/18/how-severe-is-africas-brain-drain">immediately leave the country</a> to work abroad, which is a major issue for public health there.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/149426/original/image-20161209-31370-5gb8em.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/149426/original/image-20161209-31370-5gb8em.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/149426/original/image-20161209-31370-5gb8em.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/149426/original/image-20161209-31370-5gb8em.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/149426/original/image-20161209-31370-5gb8em.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/149426/original/image-20161209-31370-5gb8em.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/149426/original/image-20161209-31370-5gb8em.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Many Kenyan doctors have joined US army research programs.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/usarmyafrica/4553107475">US Africa/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This cooperation is sensitive; migration is a sovereignty issue. Even within the EU, where state cooperation is very high, members are not keen to adopt a <a href="https://theconversation.com/europes-migration-and-asylum-policy-disintegrates-before-our-eyes-47236">common migration policy</a>. </p>
<p>It is indeed interesting to notice that the Global Forum is organised by countries, and not by the UN, because governments fear the interference of this international organisation in their national policies. Developed countries are concerned that their Global South neighbours could use the UN influence to criticise the way their countrymen are treated and question local governance over immigrants. </p>
<p>This forum was thus only one step in long reflection that should lead to a common and consultative global migration policy. Like trade or climate change, migration is transnational. Yet it is not the subject of real international cooperation. This year’s forum is not the first nor the only step in this process: it is its 9th edition, and the UN has been meeting on these issues since the early 2000s. </p>
<p>Last September, the UN organised a conference called <a href="http://refugeesmigrants.un.org">Addressing Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants</a>. Similarly, the UN’s <a href="http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/">Sustainable Development Goals</a>, adopted in 2015, bring up for the first time a strong commitment regarding migration. <a href="http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/inequality/">Goal 10</a> is to: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well managed migration policies</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>A meeting of cynics ?</h2>
<p>Not everyone is convinced by the sincerity of the process. After all, the same states <a href="http://www.globalresearch.ca/walls-of-shame-the-world-of-walls-security-zones-and-electrified-fences/5332750">that build walls and exclude migrants</a> by any means possible send their envoys to Bangladesh to discuss the urgency of migration policies. </p>
<p>But perhaps states will take seriously the propositions put forward by the Global Forum. It’s possible that its aims, seemingly charitable, actually hide a political agenda, focused on the necessity of organising international labour mobility. </p>
<p>We should remember that goods and capital cross borders very easily, while labour often stays stuck at national frontiers. This situation is unsustainable. Though industrial work can be outsourced to countries with cheaper labour, the same is not true for other professions such as <a href="http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/the-labour-market-effects-of-immigration/">cleaning services or construction</a>. Consequently, even developed economies need <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1478-9302.12073_57/abstract">low-skilled labour</a>. </p>
<p>These considerations have played a significant role in the German decision regarding <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-09-09/why-germany-welcomes-refugees">generous refugee policies</a> since 2015: feeding, housing, training, offering health care services and shelter for a cost a little over <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/germany-puts-migration-related-costs-at-over-86-billion-over-next-four-years-1467392402">86.2 billion dollars in the next four years</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/149429/original/image-20161209-31367-1mh632v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/149429/original/image-20161209-31367-1mh632v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=193&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/149429/original/image-20161209-31367-1mh632v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=193&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/149429/original/image-20161209-31367-1mh632v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=193&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/149429/original/image-20161209-31367-1mh632v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=243&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/149429/original/image-20161209-31367-1mh632v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=243&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/149429/original/image-20161209-31367-1mh632v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=243&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Migrant workers in sweet potato fields in North Carolina, United States.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/gerrydincher/21654058188/in/photolist-yZuH5Q-z45Woq-z5nhZo-DzvsmW-DRcmN3-DZicb1-Dt8P3z-DZibv3-y9vtNr-yTwQKx-yZuJ29-z7FHuY-yTs7xJ-zb482F-zbY8Fg-Dzvsw5-z8K63Q-z8JNDY-PGXkZE-DZic4s-DRcmY3-yTBV8F-yTshmS-yTxchK-zb41GX-ye2tfu-yeaTZn-yeaSHp-ye2nUu-yeaNi2-yeaM2p-bGeEwv-bGeDQK-btjMDA-btjNaf-btjKh9-btjMmS-bu41AE-btjNyb-bu43b1-bu41Yb-bGeAat-y9mHiw-z7cYHZ-z6onbz-E2BVbK-D4U1F5-HgsEjS-E2BTLv-D4U1Wf">Gerry Dincher/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Often, the political answer to this dilemma is black market labour and irregular immigration, which creates controversy and tension. Global governance on migration policies would create an alternative, based on the necessary circulation of workers but under strict conditions controlled by countries. </p>
<p>It would also initiate a strong competition for workers worldwide and, with it, mounting pressure on labour rights and protections. Under cover of making migration policies a tool for sustainable development, the Global Forum would actually push a free-market economic agenda, which would control borders, security and grant access to a flexible, unprotected labour force. </p>
<p>Unions have always been careful <a href="http://www.ituc-csi.org/migration">on this point</a>, insisting on giving migrants the same social rights and protection that national citizens and workers enjoy in order to avoid a <a href="https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/industrial-relations-dictionary/social-dumping-0">“dumping”</a> of labour.</p>
<p>Without jumping to conclusions about the intentions of the countries meeting in Dhaka, I would underline one fact: <a href="https://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2016/09/16/hidden-failure-europe%E2%80%99s-migration-policy-billions">current migration policies are failing</a>, and new approaches must be found. A multi-nation forum may or may not be the best frame or solution. But it is a sufficient and necessary step for making progress on the issues. The Global Forum must be seen as more than an obscure meeting, disconnected from the sharp realities it is supposed to address.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/70294/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Antoine Pécoud ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>International institutions make up a stage on which States vehemently and openly denounce world problems and suffering while they actually have no intention to act.Antoine Pécoud, Professeur de sociologie, Université Sorbonne Paris NordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/343172014-11-17T17:34:50Z2014-11-17T17:34:50ZWhen UN peacekeepers commit atrocities, someone has to act<p>Sexual exploitation, child <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7420798.stm">abuse</a>, corruption and torture. These are just some of the many crimes committed by United Nations peacekeepers.</p>
<p>Such abuses have the potential to undermine and even delegitimise the work of the UN, yet they regularly go undetected or unpunished. A culture of impunity pervades, largely because of deficiencies in the laws governing peacekeeping operations.</p>
<p>UN peacekeeping troops have legal immunity from prosecution in the host state. The country that sent the troops to the host state in the first place is supposed to prosecute its soldiers for any crimes they commit there. But in practice, many don’t have the laws needed to conduct trials for acts committed abroad. Others systematically fail to uphold their obligation to prosecute. UN peacekeepers are essentially free to get away with terrible crimes because they know this jurisdictional gap provides them with impunity.</p>
<p>Peacekeeping activities were not anticipated by the UN’s creators. Now they are a fundamental part of the organisation’s work. When a country descends into chaos, army troops, police officers or civilian personnel from UN member states are drafted in to contain conflict, protect civilians, undertake peace-building activities and support national governments in post-conflict state-building. </p>
<p>There are up to 300,000 peacekeeping personnel operating in countries around the world. And while these troops work to handle crisis situations with great effect for much of the time, there have been high-profile cases in which they have been accused of human rights abuses. </p>
<p>Peacekeepers have been accused of <a href="http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1058&context=facpub">sexually exploiting</a> women in the Congo, being involved in sex trafficking in Bosnia and <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3686173.stm">Kosovo</a>, child abuse in Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti, as well as corruption, stealing, drink-driving and manslaughter. </p>
<p>UN peacekeeping operations have evolved from early boots-on-the-ground operations to complex missions over the past two decades as global politics have shifted. But the rules governing their work have developed on an ad hoc basis. As a result, there are different laws governing the actions of different categories of peacekeeping personnel. While there has been reformist movement, particularly on very specific issues such as sexual violence, there has been little change in practice for a variety of political and practical reasons.</p>
<p>The UN has tried to tackle the problem with reviews and recommendations but has had little success. A new opportunity has arisen to make a difference though. <a href="http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sgsm16301.doc.htm">The United Nations High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations</a> is having its first meeting, which could lead to an overhaul of the laws governing peacekeeping operations and an end to the culture of impunity. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, so far the signs are not good. When the panel was first discussed over the summer, there was some hope that it would address the abuses committed by peacekeeping personnel. But it soon became clear that the panel’s terms of reference would be broad and vague. It is tasked with looking at issues including <a href="http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=8151">“the changing nature of conflict” </a> and “human rights and protection of civilians” but not at specific issues or the legal framework governing such operations. The panel is free to interpret the terms as it sees fit, so the members might easily choose to ignore the issue.</p>
<h2>Making the law work for the people</h2>
<p>One thing is certain – peacekeeping has to change. At the moment, international criminal law only covers the most heinous crimes of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes of aggression. Those laws are too narrow to address many of the abuses committed by peacekeepers. And international humanitarian law governs only parties to armed conflicts. It doesn’t cover many of the people involved in the peace-building that happens after the conflict.</p>
<p>It might be more feasible to use international human rights law to pursue peacekeepers who commit atrocities though. Human rights law is a strong mechanism for addressing the systemic issues that enable the crimes of peacekeepers to go unpunished, not least because the UN is bound by human rights obligations.</p>
<p>The right to access a court, for example, could be used to counteract the accountability issues that arise when UN peacekeepers are accused of wrongdoing. Under the current system, the country that sends peacekeepers into a situation retains jurisdiction over those troops, even when they commit a serious crime. So if the country doesn’t pursue that matter, it simply doesn’t get pursued. </p>
<p>It might also be possible to use international human rights law to address issues relating to transparency, preserving evidence and the rights of victims. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.un.org/sg/rightsupfront/">UN’s 2013 Human Rights Up Front action plan</a> would provide the perfect basis for a new approach. This document was published after UN failures in Sri Lanka, and reminds all UN staff of the need to ensure that human rights are at the fore of all UN activities. A rights-based approach to peacekeeping would address the root cause of those issues and will result in changes to the laws and policies to bring them in line with existing international human rights laws. This would end years of tinkering around the edges and would result in the systemic changes needed to strengthen the legitimacy and credibility of peacekeeping operations.</p>
<p>The panel would be remiss to ignore the need to review the laws governing UN peacekeeping. It would also be remiss not to consider adopting a rights-based approach to those activities. The breadth and ambiguity of the panel’s terms of reference leave plenty of room for it to investigate and discuss those core and difficult issues, as long as they are willing to do so.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/34317/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Sexual exploitation, child abuse, corruption and torture. These are just some of the many crimes committed by United Nations peacekeepers. Such abuses have the potential to undermine and even delegitimise…Rosa Freedman, Senior Lecturer (Law), University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/312512014-09-04T11:23:52Z2014-09-04T11:23:52ZWhat does the public really think about NATO?<p>World leaders are congregating in Wales this week for the <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-whats-on-the-agenda-at-the-nato-summit-31138">2014 NATO summit</a>, where some of the most pressing political issues of the day will be on the agenda. Despite the high stakes, a survey of the general public in the UK and France shows only about a third see NATO as the most important component to their nation’s defence.</p>
<p>The survey of 4,027 people in the UK and 6,045 people in France was carried out in May 2014, just after Russia annexed Crimea and tensions in the region were high. Only 33% of respondents in the UK and 31% in France agreed that NATO was the bedrock of their security, presumably preferring to see their own nation’s forces as more important.</p>
<p>That said, the public doesn’t necessarily want to leave NATO. A total of 55% of Britons thought that leaving NATO would pose a security risk. The French were less convinced, with 42% agreeing on this point.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/58135/original/8k6392n6-1409738692.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/58135/original/8k6392n6-1409738692.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/58135/original/8k6392n6-1409738692.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=334&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/58135/original/8k6392n6-1409738692.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=334&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/58135/original/8k6392n6-1409738692.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=334&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/58135/original/8k6392n6-1409738692.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/58135/original/8k6392n6-1409738692.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/58135/original/8k6392n6-1409738692.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Public views on NATO.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Overall, it seems the British public takes a more favourable view of NATO than the French. A slight majority of UK respondents (51%) favoured greater military co-operation between NATO and their own military. The appeal of this option is slightly lower in France, at 45%. Perhaps French respondents remember that their country did not suffer any substantive harm when President de Gaulle kicked NATO troops out of the country in the late 1960s and withdrew French forces from the centralised NATO command structure.</p>
<h2>The Russia question</h2>
<p>The NATO summit is likely to be heavily dominated by talk of Eastern Europe and its borders. Given Russian incursions in Ukraine, this summit has the potential to serve as a turning point. After the fall of the Soviet Union, relations between NATO and Russia calmed but member states could well push to reaffirm the original aim of NATO – to protect members against Russian aggression.</p>
<p>Recent entrants into NATO, such as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have been made nervous by Russian bellicosity and are seeking credible commitments from Western powers that they will be protected. They hope to see Britain and France vocally pledging to uphold <a href="http://www.nato.int/terrorism/five.htm">article five</a> of the North Atlantic Treaty, which says that members must see an armed attack against one of their group as an aggression against them all.</p>
<p>Poland has already asked for up to <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/10737838/Ukraine-crisis-Poland-asks-Nato-to-station-10000-troops-on-its-territory.html">10,000 NATO troops</a> to be stationed on its territory and plans appear to be afoot to send troops from Western NATO members to <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21614140-western-alliance-responding-better-russian-aggression-ukraine-there-more">bases in the Baltic states</a>.</p>
<p>The expansion of NATO activity in Eastern Europe is indeed a challenge to the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997, which was agreed by former Russian President Boris Yeltsin and the leaders of the 15 countries that were members of NATO at the time. The act set the tone for relations between Russia and NATO nations in the post-Cold War era and, most importantly, contained a limited pledge by NATO that it would not deploy nuclear weapons or a significant number of troops in the Eastern European nations that were soon to <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21614140-western-alliance-responding-better-russian-aggression-ukraine-there-more">join the alliance</a>. </p>
<p>Only one third of British and French respondents believed that expanding NATO troops into Eastern Europe would serve to provoke Russia. But they didn’t show great enthusiasm for sending troops from their own country into the area. Among the Britons, less than half agreed that national forces to be sent East as part of a NATO force and there was even less support in France, where just 30% though French troops should go. </p>
<p>It could be that some respondents support expansion of the alliance in principle but balk at specific actions that could be taken by Russia as a sign of aggression. But it might also be that the public has not really thought much about the obligations Western powers assumed when they agreed to let more nations into NATO.</p>
<p>NATO has been involved in military operations throughout much of the post-Cold War period, including in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya, but they don’t often make the headlines. Public awareness of NATO’s military role appears low, potentially as a result.</p>
<p>We know from previous studies on such “distant” topics that sentiments can shift quickly, though. Public opinion could change on these issues if significant coverage is given to the issues being discussed at NATO. And with the world watching Russia, that just might happen.</p>
<p>NATO is one of these “taken for granted” international organisations which don’t commonly register with the public unless there is a crisis. The murder of hostages in Iraq and the situation in Ukraine are raising its profile and, in a sense, giving it a new lease of life. This could well change public opinion about interventions and any potential decisions about putting boots on the ground in these areas.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/31251/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thomas Scotto receives funding from ESRC grant RES-061-25-0405 and ESRC grant ES/L011867/1. He thanks Essex’s Research Centre on Micro-social Change (MISOC) for providing him with the time necessary to write this post.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Harold D Clarke receives funding from ESRC grant ES/L011867/1.
</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jason Reifler receives funding from ESRC grant ES/L011867/1.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Whiteley receives funding from ESRC grant ES/L011867/1.</span></em></p>World leaders are congregating in Wales this week for the 2014 NATO summit, where some of the most pressing political issues of the day will be on the agenda. Despite the high stakes, a survey of the general…Thomas Scotto, Professor of Government, University of EssexHarold D Clarke, Ashbel Smith Professor, University of Texas at DallasJason Reifler, Senior Lecturer of Politics, University of ExeterPaul Whiteley, Professor, Department of Government, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/248252014-03-31T14:20:18Z2014-03-31T14:20:18ZRussia should not have been included in G8 in the first place, and it should be left out now<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/45042/original/6qq8kqy6-1396086471.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Where's Vladimir?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:36th_G8_summit_member_cropped_36th_G8_summit_member_20100625.jpg">White House</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Imagine you’d organised a much-anticipated party but because of something you’d said or done nobody turned up? To dismiss the party in the first place would smack of sour grapes but this pretty much captures Sergei Lavrov’s reaction to the Hague Declaration. The leaders of France, the US, the UK, Germany, Japan, Italy and Canada seek to punish Russia over the Ukrainian Crisis by suspending its membership of the G8 and cancelling their attendance at this June’s Sochi Summit. </p>
<p>Instead, the remaining seven intend to hold their own summit in Brussels, no doubt to discuss the black sheep of the family. Lavrov is apparently “<a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/24/us-ukraine-crisis-lavrov-g-idUSBREA2N1D820140324">not bothered</a>” and now questions the relevance of the G8, stressing instead Russia’s membership of a more relevant group: the G20, <a href="http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2014/03/25/BRICS-countries-extend-statement-of-support-for-Russian-participation-in-G20/6841395755441/">many members of which oppose</a> taking a similar line to the G8 of suspending Russia’s membership.</p>
<p>Lavrov’s comments tap into a debate that has been rumbling along for some time but has gained momentum since the Global Financial Crisis. The G8’s response to the crisis was <a href="http://www.globalissues.org/article/720/g8-summits-empty-promises-each-year">found wanting</a> and instead the G20 with its mix of traditional great powers and rising powers offered a forum with the right people sat round the table. The figures support such a claim – the G8 represents 50% of global economic output but only 12% of population. In contrast, the G20 represents 85% of global economic output and two-thirds of the world’s population. The upgrading of the G20 to a meeting of leaders in November 2008 and its self-appointment the following year as the “premier forum for international economic co-operation” appeared to sound the death knell for the G8.</p>
<p>However, the G8 has not disappeared and continues to meet, suggesting that the leaders have found value in such a forum. It may have lost a leading role in the discussion of international economic co-operation but it continues to be a gathering of the world’s main aid donors. It has also led on a number of issues as disparate as supporting Japan’s recovery from the triple disasters of 2011, or tax avoidance and the role of women in conflict under the UK’s presidency last year.</p>
<p>At the same time, the initial enthusiasm for the G20 has faded for a number of reasons. Its agenda was short-circuited for a time as the eurozone crisis came to dominate successive summits to the exclusion of other issues. As a larger and more diverse forum than the G8, its ability to reach a consensus has also been questioned. Finally, its own legitimacy has come under attack from the overwhelming majority of countries that are not represented at the summit table. Regardless of the above figures, 20 appears to be only marginally more representative than eight.</p>
<p>The result has seen both forums running in parallel and settling into a pattern in the calendar of international summitry whereby the G8 meets in the early summer and the G20 in the late summer/early autumn. With the G8 meeting ahead of the G20, some have suggested that discussions in the former shape those in the latter. Moreover, for some, the G20 is a mechanism by which the rising powers can be socialised into the priorities and norms of the G8.</p>
<h2>Join the club</h2>
<p>Rather than prioritising a particular forum of global governance or asking what the division of labour between them may be, the more important question concerns Russia’s position in and commitment to the G8 since it officially joined in 1998.</p>
<p>As part of the West’s efforts to manage post-Cold War Russia’s peaceful transition to free-market economics and democratic principles, the original G7 sought to embrace Russia throughout the 1990s. Russia’s chief motivation was to secure the great power status that came with membership of this elite club. Ultimately, Russia’s membership of the G8 was seen as a quid pro quo for <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1997_09/nato">Russia’s acceptance of NATO expansion</a>.</p>
<p>One dissenting voice at the time was that of Japan. Partly motivated by its historically poor relationship and ongoing territorial dispute, but also concerned that the founding principles of the G7 would be compromised, Japan resisted Russia’s inclusion. In the absence of formal membership criteria, the <a href="http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/2000/past_summit/01/e01_a.html">Rambouillet Declaration</a> of the G6’s (minus Canada) first summit in November 1975 stressed the leaders’ belief in “open, democratic society, dedicated to individual liberty and social advancement”, providing the ideological glue to bind like-minded leaders together. By ignoring these principles, the G7 sowed the seeds of the forum’s subsequent existential crisis. Japan has reason to gloat.</p>
<p>Russia could have redeemed itself through its actions, but in reality it has contributed little to the G8 over the past 16 years. Its levels of compliance with G8 commitments are low. It is not a significant aid donor. The commitment of its leaders is also far from exemplary. G7 leaders have historically made considerable efforts to attend summits, even when fighting electoral campaigns at home. In 2012, the G8 was originally to be held immediately before the NATO summit in Chicago. As the latter’s agenda included security issues sensitive to Russia, the US hosts sought to assuage Russian sensibilities and changed the G8’s venue at the last minute. Regardless, by staying at home and sending Medvedev in his place, Putin became the only leader to ever snub the G8.</p>
<p>Russia has been in the G8 but not of the G8 and membership is clearly no longer part of Russia’s definition of great power status today. However, this doesn’t mean that the group is irrelevant. Perhaps it is best if Russia is not allowed back into the club. The G7 could then maintain its coherence as a group of like-minded leaders.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/24825/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hugo Dobson receives funding from Arts and Humanities Research Council.</span></em></p>Imagine you’d organised a much-anticipated party but because of something you’d said or done nobody turned up? To dismiss the party in the first place would smack of sour grapes but this pretty much captures…Hugo Dobson, Head of Department, National Institute of Japanese Studies and School of East Asian Studies, University of SheffieldLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/181642013-09-23T01:00:35Z2013-09-23T01:00:35ZExplainer: what is the IPCC anyway, and how does it work?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/31737/original/rw8xgjt9-1379694360.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">So good, they gave it a Nobel Peace Prize (2007)</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">IPCC</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The latest climate change assessment from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the IPCC, is due to arrive this weekend. This will be the fifth comprehensive assessment report (AR5) prepared by the IPCC since it was established in 1988. But what is this IPCC, whose <a href="http://www.ipcc.ch/activities/activities.shtml">process</a> is so labour intensive, time consuming and exhaustive that it takes six years?</p>
<p>The IPCC is an international body whose governing Panel is made up of government members representing 195 countries. But the Assessment Reports the IPCC produces are drawn up by a very large, global group of scientists and experts who contribute their time in drafting and revising and reviewing. These reports bring together the best of the recently published scientific and technical literature, and are intended to be “policy relevant but not policy prescriptive”.</p>
<p>The IPCC is organised into <a href="http://www.ipcc.ch/working_groups/working_groups.shtml">three Working Groups and a Task Force</a>. Working Group I deals with “The Physical Science Basis of Climate Change”, Working Group II deals with “Climate Change Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability”, and Working Group III deals with “Mitigation of Climate Change”. The Task Force refines the methodology for the calculation and reporting of national greenhouse gas emissions and reductions. All these groups have two co-chairs, one from a developed country and one from a developing country.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/31736/original/j5j3g3dr-1379694269.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/31736/original/j5j3g3dr-1379694269.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/31736/original/j5j3g3dr-1379694269.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/31736/original/j5j3g3dr-1379694269.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/31736/original/j5j3g3dr-1379694269.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/31736/original/j5j3g3dr-1379694269.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/31736/original/j5j3g3dr-1379694269.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The organisation’s research groups may include many hundreds of scientists and experts.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">IPCC</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Draft, review, draft, review</h2>
<p>Governments and other bodies nominate potential IPCC authors who are experts in their field, and are selected also to try and produce a geographical and gender balance. Groups of around 10-20 experts prepare individual chapters covering their area of expertise. The first step in bringing these chapters together to form an assessment report starts when authors and co-chairs meet to develop a Zero Order Draft, which will take about three months, perhaps involving additions from invited Contributing Authors. The draft is then distributed to a small number of reviewers, who for each chapter provide feedback on how well the structure and proposed content works.</p>
<p>The next step is to prepare a First Order Draft, which is distributed for expert review. At this stage anyone can self-nominate as an “expert”, if they can justify their credentials and expertise, and on condition that they agree to adhere to the rule of confidentiality, so there are no leaks of early drafts.</p>
<p>Several months are allowed for expert comments, which are individually identified and linked to the expert offering them. The First Order Draft of Working Group I for forthcoming AR5 report for example received 21,400 comments from 659 experts. The authors respond to each of the comments, and these responses are also tagged and recorded.</p>
<p>A Second Order Draft is prepared based on review comments, including a Summary for Policymakers (SPM) that summarises the most important conclusions. This draft is returned to the experts for another review, and also to government panel members for their comments. The AR5’s Second Order Draft for Working Group I received 31,422 comments from about 800 experts and 26 governments.</p>
<h2>Tying things together</h2>
<p>At this stage we approach the cut-off date for scientific literature that can be cited in the report, usually about six months before the final Plenary meeting where the document is approved.</p>
<p>Authors meet again to consider the comments on the Second Order Draft, and to start preparing the Final Draft. This, once ready, is passed to government members for a final review. The final author meeting is held immediately prior to a Working Group Plenary and responds to government comments on the final draft. The revised draft is then taken into the Working Group Plenary for discussion and, ultimately, approval.</p>
<p>The Summary for Policymakers is discussed and approved line-by-line and, if necessary, word-by-word. Lead Authors explain and defend their chapter’s contributions. If there is a dispute, a smaller group may be established to refine the language. The role of the Plenary is to ensure what ends up in the document governments will read is appropriate and clear, but still accurately reflects the science. </p>
<p>The Working Group Plenary will then accept the report made up of the chapters prepared and reviewed by authors and approve the final Summary for Policymakers. This usually happens in the early hours of the morning after the final of four days of tough negotiations between all parties, and generally only a few hours before a scheduled launch press conference.</p>
<h2>Is it all worth it?</h2>
<p>For more than 20 years the IPCC process has managed to assimilate the rapidly expanding scientific literature about climate
change, and summarise it for those that need to know. The interest shown in the IPCC reports illustrates how important these Assessments have been in trying to keep track of and understand what the science tells us. And the unique if longwinded IPCC process - open, transparent, and involving as many relevant parties as possible - is why its work is respected. </p>
<p>The scientists work very hard to explain their levels of confidence in their conclusions, using very defined language to express this confidence. Some may disagree with parts of the IPCC assessment, but at least they will see, laid out for them in <a href="http://theconversation.com/lost-in-translation-confidence-and-certainty-in-climate-science-17181">clear and formal language</a> exactly how the scientists writing the assessments arrived at their conclusions. I can’t see how a fairer, more comprehensive, or more credible alternative could be designed.</p>
<p><em>A version of this article was published at the <a href="http://www.amos.org.au/publications">Australian Meteorological and Oceanographic Society</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/18164/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Professor Neville Nicholls is the immediate past President of the Australian Meteorological and Oceanographic Society. He was trained as a weather forecaster by the Bureau of Meteorology in 1971, and worked for the Bureau undertaking climate research until 2005. He joined Monash University in 2006 where he teaches the geopolitics of climate change. He was a Coordinating Lead Author for the IPCC Second Assessment (1996) and the recent Special Report on Extremes (“SREX”, 2012), and a Lead Author for the Fourth Assessment in 2007 and for the 1992 Supplement to the First Assessment.</span></em></p>The latest climate change assessment from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the IPCC, is due to arrive this weekend. This will be the fifth comprehensive assessment report (AR5) prepared by…Neville Nicholls, Professor, Monash UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/33462011-09-13T20:39:15Z2011-09-13T20:39:15ZAustralia’s role in reforming the World Health Organisation<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/3528/original/WHO.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">WHO Director-General Dr Margaret Chan called for assistance in reforming the WHO at the 64th World Health Assembly.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">WHO</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="http://www.who.int/en/">World Health Organisation (WHO)</a> remains the most important player in global health despite growing problems with its structure and funding. Australia is in an excellent position to help modernise the WHO and save the organisation from irrelevance. </p>
<p>The WHO is a deeply political organisation. Each year the nations of the world turn up in Geneva for its annual meeting, the World Health Assembly, to discuss, consider, complain, cajole and carry on. But they <em>do</em> turn up. </p>
<p>Yet in its current form, my estimate is that WHO is probably funded at about 10% of what it needs to provide strong support in managing global health problems.</p>
<p>Still if you want to secure a multilateral international program in health you need to go through the WHO – there is no other show in town. So it survives. </p>
<p>When you have an old organisation or institution such as this, the question arises, “If we try to improve it, will it fall to pieces?” </p>
<p>So we need to very clear about <em>why</em> we are setting out to change the WHO before we ask, “So what are we going to do?” </p>
<p>Let’s consider the <a href="http://theconversation.com/truth-to-power-reforming-the-world-health-organization-2584">options posed by Professor Lawrence Gostin</a>:</p>
<p><strong>1) Increase the voice of stakeholders</strong></p>
<p>The number of the World Health Organisation’s stakeholders is increasing as we identify and improve our understanding of the inter-related nature of the health impacts of food security, climate change, poverty, inequity and mass-migrations resulting from political unrest and the increasing competition for finite resources. </p>
<p>So there’s an obvious need for a higher degree of interagency coordination and collaboration embracing the WHO, <a href="http://www.fao.org/">Food and Agriculture Organization</a>, <a href="http://www.ilo.org/global/lang--en/index.htm">International Labour Organization</a>, <a href="http://www.unicef.org/">UNICEF</a> and <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home">UNHCR</a>. </p>
<p>The upcoming <a href="http://www.un.org/en/ga/president/65/issues/ncdiseases.shtml">UN High Level Meeting on Non-Communicable Diseases</a> in New York provides an excellent forum for a range of voices to be heard. </p>
<p>Australia has the rare opportunity to provide leadership in these discussions and to cement our place as stakeholders with considerable practical expertise in population health.</p>
<p><strong>2) Increase transparency and accountability</strong></p>
<p>We send a lot of statistics to WHO and Australia could be strongly supportive of the organisation publishing more about where its money goes and what it achieves.</p>
<p><strong>3) Regain control over the regions</strong></p>
<p>The WHO regional offices have become highly autonomous and Australia can ensure that its participation in regional WHO activities is diplomatically tinged with recognition of the importance of keeping the head office on side and in the loop. </p>
<p><strong>4) Establish legal authority</strong></p>
<p>Australia has been a supporter of and is a signatory of the <a href="http://www.who.int/fctc/en/">Framework Convention for Tobacco Control</a>, one of the WHO’s two formal treaties. </p>
<p>The tobacco treaty is a good beginning, and we now need to look at the contribution that law can make around food security or minimum standards for healthy urban development.</p>
<p>Clearer governance structures, coordinated with the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, could explore the interface between the legal frameworks around human rights and human health. </p>
<p>This could be done by strengthening the World Health Organisation’s partnership with the <a href="http://www.idlo.int/english/Pages/Home.aspx">International Development Law Organisation</a>. Australia could ensure that it supports efforts inside WHO to strengthen its legal capacity, especially, in relation to non-communicable disease control.</p>
<p><strong>5) Ensure predictable sustainable financing</strong></p>
<p>As with climate change, Australia could set an example by increasing its own contribution to the World Health Organisation and applying diplomatic pressure for a manifold scaling up of the funding base of WHO. </p>
<p>One has to sympathise with the the current Director General Margaret Chan, who has increasingly obtained funding outside the core budget to keep the ship afloat. This is a very tough one indeed.</p>
<p>That change is needed inside WHO was <a href="http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA64/A64_3-en.pdf">recognised by the Margaret Chan</a> at this year’s <a href="http://www.who.int/mediacentre/events/2011/wha64/en/index.html">World Health Assembly</a>. And Australia can and should accept Dr Chan’s invitation and help WHO reform. </p>
<p>We should take every chance to ensure the World Health Organisation achieves its original grand objectives of leading the world into an unprecedented era of good health. </p>
<p>And we can do this by assisting with the achievement of the major governance reforms that professor Gostin has proposed. We just need the political leadership and public commitment to achieve these goals.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/3346/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Leeder does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The World Health Organisation (WHO) remains the most important player in global health despite growing problems with its structure and funding. Australia is in an excellent position to help modernise the…Stephen Leeder, Professor, Menzies Centre for Health Policy, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/25842011-09-13T20:39:00Z2011-09-13T20:39:00ZTruth to power: reforming the World Health Organization<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/3526/original/US_Mission_Geneva.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The World Health Organisation is the undoubted leader in global health but faces a crisis of leadership.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">US Mission Geneva</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="http://www.who.int/en/">World Health Organisation</a> has a vital role to play in global health but 65 years after it came into being, it’s plagued by ossified structures that prevent it from exercising the flexibility it needs to become an efficient and effective organisation. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.un.org/en/">United Nations</a> created the World Health Organization (WHO) on April 7th, 1948 as the first UN agency — a date we now celebrate annually as World Health Day. The <a href="http://www.who.int/governance/eb/who_constitution_en.pdf">WHO Constitution</a> expresses the universal aspiration that health is “basic to the happiness, harmonious relations and security of all peoples”.</p>
<p>The WHO today remains the undoubted leader in global health: there is no substitute for the organisation, with its incomparable expertise, global influence, and normative powers. </p>
<p>Despite this rich endowment, the organisation faces a crisis of leadership. Even its <a href="http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/12/08/is_the_who_becoming_irrelevant">former Assistant Director-General recently asked, “Is WHO becoming irrelevant?”</a> Given the importance of global health cooperation, few would dispute that a stronger, more effective World Health Organisation would benefit all. </p>
<p>My colleague Devi Sridhar and I have made <a href="http://ssrn.com/abstract=1799432">five proposals for re-establishing WHO’s leadership</a>. </p>
<p><strong>1) Give voice to multiple stakeholders</strong></p>
<p>As an agency of the United Nations, the World Health Organisation is comprised solely of member countries, which govern through the <a href="http://www.who.int/mediacentre/events/governance/wha/en/index.html">World Health Assembly</a> (WHA) and <a href="http://www.who.int/mediacentre/events/governance/eb/en/">Executive Board</a> (EB). </p>
<p>Yet, WHO would be more effective if it gave a voice and representation to key stakeholders, including philanthropies, businesses, public/private partnerships, and civil society.</p>
<p>The world of global health is rapidly changing with powerful new players such as the Gates Foundation and the <a href="http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/">Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria</a>. </p>
<p>The WHO is currently taking a major step in proposing a Global Health Forum—regular multi-stakeholder meetings under the guidance of the WHA. </p>
<p>The Global Health Forum must afford stakeholders’ real voice and representation for effectively shaping WHO decisions. Most importantly, the World Health Organisation must capture the energy and power of civil society, which is yearning for fundamental improvements in global health.</p>
<p><strong>2) Improve transparency, performance, and accountability</strong></p>
<p>Good governance also requires clear objectives, transparent decision-making, information dissemination, monitoring progress, and accountability. </p>
<p>Stakeholders will demand clarity on how their resources will achieve improved health outcomes, as they shift towards results-based financing and performance-based measures. </p>
<p>But a <a href="http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/mar/multilateral_aid_review.pdf">recent evaluation of multilateral organizations</a> graded the WHO as “weak” on key parameters, such as cost-consciousness, financial management, public disclosure, and fulfilling development objectives. </p>
<p>To improve its standing, the organisation must rigorously evaluate programs and demonstrate that they effectively translate into better health for all. </p>
<p><strong>3) Exercise closer oversight of regions</strong></p>
<p>The WHO’s decentralized, regional structure poses a significant challenge in demonstrating results and delivering on priorities. The <a href="http://www.who.int/about/regions/en/index.html">six WHO regional offices</a> are uniquely independent within the UN system, with full power over regional personnel, including appointment of country representatives. </p>
<p>The World Health Organisation’s headquarters should exercise more oversight and control over regional personnel, funding, and decision-making. It is vital that the world’s leading global health organization speaks with one powerful voice. </p>
<p><strong>4) Exert legal authority as a rule-making body</strong></p>
<p>The WHO Constitution grants the agency extraordinary rule-making powers, but in more than 60 years the agency has promulgated only two major treaties: the International Health Regulations and the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. </p>
<p>The organisation could take a more active role in regulating key global health issues, including counterfeit medicines, alcoholic beverages, food safety, and nutrition. </p>
<p>It could be more engaged and influential in international regimes with powerful health impacts, such as trade, intellectual property, arms control, and climate change. </p>
<p>The agency could exert normative power through innovative international treaties or through “soft” power such as codes of practice. </p>
<p>There must be strong enforcement and incentives for compliance. A <a href="http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/88/10/10-082636.pdf">Framework Convention on Global Health</a>, for instance, could act as a powerful international treaty to set priorities, coordinate fragmented actors, and deliver results. The <a href="http://www.section27.org.za/2010/11/23/jali/">Joint Action and Learning Initiative on National and Global Responsibilities for Health (JALI)</a> is a mass civil society movement advocating for this framework convention. </p>
<p>The WHO must offer leadership for urgent challenges facing the global health, such as emerging infectious diseases and noncommunicable diseases (cardiovascular diseases, diabetes and cancer). </p>
<p><strong>5) Ensure predictable, sustainable financing</strong></p>
<p>The World Health Organisation is financed through two main streams. First, member-states pledge a set amount based on each country’s wealth and population. The second stream is through voluntary contributions often earmarked for specific diseases. </p>
<p>The WHO is currently in a dire budget crisis, with a deficit of more than $300 million. More importantly, its extra-budgetary expenditure rose from 48.8% to 77.3% from 1998/99 to 2008/09. </p>
<p>It is unsustainable and unreasonable to have voluntary funding represent nearly 80% of the agency’s budget. Extra-budgetary funding has transformed the WHO into a donor-driven organization, restricting its ability to direct and coordinate the global health agenda. </p>
<p>Extra-budgetary funding also skews global health priorities. Mandatory contributions are more aligned with the actual global burden of disease than voluntary funding. </p>
<p>The WHO’s voluntary funding, for instance, is primarily for infectious diseases (60%), with negligible allocations for non-communicable diseases (3.9%) and injuries (3.4%). Yet, non-communicable diseases account for 62% of all deaths worldwide, and injuries constitute 17% of the global burden of disease.</p>
<p>The ideal solution for this is to set higher member state mandatory contributions. Member states must become genuine shareholders in the World Health Organisation’s future, act collectively, and refrain from exerting narrow political interests. </p>
<p>The WHO must undergo fundamental reform if it’s to retain its rightful place as the leader in global health. While remaining true to its normative and bold vision of health-for-all, the organisation must adapt to a new political climate, demonstrate global leadership, and deliver results.</p>
<p><strong><a href="http://theconversation.com/australias-role-in-reforming-the-world-health-organisation-3346">Read an article by Professor Stephen Leeder</a> about how Australia could help with reforming the World Health Organisation.</strong></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/2584/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lawrence O. Gostin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The World Health Organisation has a vital role to play in global health but 65 years after it came into being, it’s plagued by ossified structures that prevent it from exercising the flexibility it needs…Lawrence O. Gostin, Prof. Global Health & Dir. O'Neill Institute, Georgetown UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.