tag:theconversation.com,2011:/fr/topics/isolationism-32219/articlesIsolationism – The Conversation2023-08-22T12:26:51Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2118562023-08-22T12:26:51Z2023-08-22T12:26:51ZFirst Republican debate set to kick off without Trump – but with the potential to direct the GOP’s foreign policy stance<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544022/original/file-20230822-17-xf9lph.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=37%2C0%2C8206%2C5487&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">GOP candidates will likely debate whether the US should continue to pour support into Ukraine's effort to defeat Russia.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/ukrainian-armored-vehicles-maneuver-and-fire-their-30mm-news-photo/1485528240?adppopup=true">Scott Peterson/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When Republican presidential hopefuls take the stage in Milwaukee on Aug. 23, 2023, for the <a href="https://ballotpedia.org/Presidential_debates,_2024">first debate of the 2024 campaign season</a>, attention will center on how the candidates position themselves <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/08/20/1194905052/republican-presidential-candidates-avoid-speaking-on-trump-at-a-party-conference">vis-à-vis former President Donald Trump</a> and his four criminal indictments. </p>
<p>What candidates say about foreign policy is another critical issue. </p>
<p>Republican leaders are sharply divided over how the United States should position itself in the world. While some <a href="https://www.poynter.org/fact-checking/2022/what-is-a-maga-republican/">Trump supporters</a> are pressing for the U.S. to pull back from world affairs, more traditional Republicans are calling for robust international engagement.</p>
<p>Ever since the presidency of Dwight Eisenhower in the 1950s, most Republican leaders have <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/03/28/politics/gop-foreign-policy-debate-2024/index.html">supported an active U.S.</a> role in the world. This <a href="https://encyclopedia.pub/entry/30892">internationalist approach</a> was first fueled by Eisenhower’s view that the U.S. needed strong military and diplomatic alliances during the Cold War. </p>
<p>In my own <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=W1MuqgYAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">research on U.S. foreign policy</a>, I have found that most Republican politicians continued to support international engagement after the Cold War ended in 1991. </p>
<p>From former Presidents Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush to current Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell and House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Michael McCaul, the prevailing <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Hard-Line-Republican-Foreign-Policy/dp/0691141827">GOP view</a> has been that membership in military alliances like NATO, a strong U.S. military presence overseas and active American diplomacy make the U.S. safer. </p>
<p>But traditional Republican positions on foreign policy are now in flux. Trump’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/trumps-foreign-policy-is-still-america-first-what-does-that-mean-exactly-144841">“America First”</a> vision, which prioritizes American exceptionalism and isolation, challenges traditional Republican internationalism. The Republican primary campaign will help determine the GOP’s foreign policy platform and course. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543781/original/file-20230821-28-6lxefy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Dwight Eisenhower is one of two men shown in an open-top car in a black and white photo. He waves his hat in the air at a crowd of people." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543781/original/file-20230821-28-6lxefy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543781/original/file-20230821-28-6lxefy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=461&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543781/original/file-20230821-28-6lxefy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=461&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543781/original/file-20230821-28-6lxefy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=461&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543781/original/file-20230821-28-6lxefy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=579&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543781/original/file-20230821-28-6lxefy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=579&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543781/original/file-20230821-28-6lxefy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=579&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Former President Dwight Eisenhower, left, a Republican, championed the idea that the U.S. should remain strongly engaged in the world.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-eisenhower-waves-to-well-wishers-sitting-news-photo/517833370?adppopup=true">Bettmann/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Trump’s split from the GOP</h2>
<p>Trump has pursued an <a href="https://theconversation.com/trumps-foreign-policy-is-still-america-first-what-does-that-mean-exactly-144841">inward-looking</a> approach to the world, questioning the value of alliances and calling on other countries to take care of security problems themselves. </p>
<p>As president, he pulled out of several <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/01/politics/nuclear-treaty-trump/index.html">international treaties</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/19/us/politics/trump-israel-palestinians-human-rights.html">councils that are part of the United Nations</a>. He toyed with <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/14/us/politics/nato-president-trump.html">exiting NATO</a> and tried to withdraw all U.S. troops <a href="https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2022/10/13/trump-ordered-rapid-withdrawal-from-afghanistan-after-election-loss/">from Afghanistan</a>.</p>
<p>Some <a href="https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/The-Room-Where-It-Happened/John-Bolton/9781982148034">senior advisers</a> and Republican <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/trump-s-foreign-policy-faces-growing-dissent-congress-n965641">Congress members</a> pushed back on these plans.</p>
<p>Today, as the U.S. actively supports Ukraine with arms and supplies, Trump advocates for a neutral U.S. stance on the war between Russia and Ukraine. He has <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/05/10/politics/ukraine-russia-putin-trump-town-hall/index.html">promised to resolve</a> the conflict within “24 hours” by talking with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.</p>
<p>Although Trump has been the dominant figure among Republicans for seven years, his brand of isolationism has been slow <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2021/05/27/trump-gop-foreign-policy-polling-490768">to catch on</a> with other Republicans. </p>
<p>Trump, for example, proposed in each year of his presidency to slash the State Department’s budget by about one-third. Republicans in Congress worked with Democrats to <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3393170">reject these proposals</a> every time. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/02/23/trump-putin-ukraine-invasion-00010923">Trump also called</a> Putin a “genius” following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Congress then passed a series of laws in 2022 – with strong <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/defense/3781964-final-funding-bill-includes-45b-for-ukraine/">support from Republicans</a> – that imposed sanctions on Russia and provided Ukraine with large amounts of foreign aid. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543784/original/file-20230821-15-djqmdg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Tim Scott is seen, partially obscured by a blue curtain, sitting in a beige chair on a stage." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543784/original/file-20230821-15-djqmdg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543784/original/file-20230821-15-djqmdg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543784/original/file-20230821-15-djqmdg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543784/original/file-20230821-15-djqmdg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543784/original/file-20230821-15-djqmdg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543784/original/file-20230821-15-djqmdg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543784/original/file-20230821-15-djqmdg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Republican presidential candidate Senator Tim Scott qualified to appear at the debate on Aug. 23, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/republican-presidential-candidate-u-s-sen-tim-scott-speaks-news-photo/1608744302?adppopup=true">Megan Varner/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Republicans distancing themselves from Trump</h2>
<p>Nine <a href="https://www.wisn.com/article/milwaukee-first-republican-presidential-debate/44838820#">Republican candidates have qualified</a> for the Aug. 23 presidential debate, and eight of them – all but Trump – are likely to be on the debate stage. Trump has said that he <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-says-he-wont-take-part-republican-debates-2023-08-21/">will not participate</a> in the debates.</p>
<p>While the top GOP presidential candidates are largely united in favoring a tough stance toward China, they differ sharply on Ukraine. </p>
<p>Several of the candidates, including former Vice President Mike Pence, former U.S. Ambassador to the <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2023/07/11/2024-presidential-candidates-on-ukraine/70325435007/">United Nations Nikki Haley</a>, <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2023/07/11/2024-presidential-candidates-on-ukraine/70325435007/">Senator Tim Scott</a> and former New Jersey Governor Chris Christie, <a href="https://www.politifact.com/article/2023/jun/09/where-do-republican-presidential-candidates-stand/">advocate strong U.S. support</a> for Ukraine. </p>
<p>But some other high-profile candidates, including Florida Governor Ron DeSantis and entrepreneur Vivek Ramaswamy, have called for scaling back U.S. involvement in the war, arguing that America’s involvement is <a href="https://www.politifact.com/article/2023/jun/09/where-do-republican-presidential-candidates-stand/">a distraction</a> from more important problems. </p>
<p>There are also signs that overall Republican support for Ukraine is slipping.</p>
<p>Some <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/08/04/politics/cnn-poll-ukraine/index.html">recent polls suggest</a> that most Republican voters oppose giving Ukraine additional military aid, on top of the more than US$46 billion that the U.S. <a href="https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-aid-has-us-sent-ukraine-here-are-six-charts?gclid=Cj0KCQjwrfymBhCTARIsADXTabljIE1qo4x7czQDkgXX8KFCPkk4knxAfniFbEaBQaICm9O8mFGYkC0aAqMjEALw_wcB">has already given</a>. </p>
<p>This flagging support for Ukraine aid may reflect the fact that the war continues unabated, without a clear sign of peace talks ahead. Ukraine, meanwhile, has only taken back a small portion of its territory from Russia during its current counteroffensive, leading some Ukraine supporters to <a href="https://www.politico.com/newsletters/huddle/2023/08/17/ukraines-top-freedom-caucus-ally-gets-cold-feet-00111608">question whether U.S. military aid</a> is effective enough to merit its high cost. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543782/original/file-20230821-31965-5w6nio.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Nikki Haley is seen sitting on a stage and speaking, as seen from multiple television screens in a dark roo." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543782/original/file-20230821-31965-5w6nio.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543782/original/file-20230821-31965-5w6nio.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543782/original/file-20230821-31965-5w6nio.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543782/original/file-20230821-31965-5w6nio.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543782/original/file-20230821-31965-5w6nio.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543782/original/file-20230821-31965-5w6nio.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543782/original/file-20230821-31965-5w6nio.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Presidential nominee Nikki Haley is one of the Republican politicians who has spoken out in favor of continued U.S. support for Ukraine.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/republican-u-s-presidential-candidate-and-former-u-s-news-photo/1608484593?adppopup=true">Megan Varner/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The topic is: Ukraine</h2>
<p>When foreign policy comes up in Milwaukee or at future Republican primary debates, it will be telling whether candidates say they still strongly back U.S. efforts to help Ukraine, or not. </p>
<p>If some of them hold firm on their support, it will be a sign that the Republican debate over foreign policy remains alive. </p>
<p>But if they change their position, this may be a sign that Trump’s hold over the Republican Party is spreading to a policy area that he previously did not strongly influence. It would also suggest that the MAGA – Make America Great Again – movement has been effective in propagating Trump’s policy views, even while he is not in office. </p>
<p>Beyond the war in Ukraine, America’s global role is at stake this election season. Although the country has acted on its principles inconsistently and highly imperfectly, the U.S. – through Democratic and Republican administrations – over the past eight decades helped to <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/220215/the-world-america-made-by-robert-kagan/">foster a more peaceful, prosperous</a> and democratic world. </p>
<p>In the meantime, I think that Trump’s Republican rivals have an opportunity to make the case for preserving and strengthening the international alliances and partnerships that <a href="https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300271010/a-world-safe-for-democracy/">help keep the U.S.</a> safe. If they make this case effectively, the GOP debate over foreign policy will be primed to continue well beyond 2024.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211856/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jordan Tama does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>While a few Republican politicians have aligned with former President Donald Trump’s isolationist foreign policy position, most candidates continue to push for the traditional stance of engagement.Jordan Tama, Provost Associate Professor of International Relations, American University School of International ServiceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1462832020-10-01T12:25:21Z2020-10-01T12:25:21ZWill German Americans again put Donald Trump over the top in the presidential election?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/359677/original/file-20200923-22-5embu4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=50%2C33%2C5505%2C3639&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Trump campaigning for votes in Pittsburgh in late September 2020.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/Election2020Trump/1cc484497acf448697d0678ae94de255/photo?Query=Trump%20AND%20campaigning&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=23881&currentItemNo=19">Evan Vucci/AP</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>German Americans paved Donald Trump’s road into the White House in 2016 <a href="http://www.electionanalysis2016.us/us-election-analysis-2016/section-4-diversity-and-division/why-are-the-german-americans-trumps-most-loyal-supporters/">through Iowa, Wisconsin, Michigan, Ohio and Pennsylvania</a>. </p>
<p>This ethnic group barely receives attention in American media and politics.</p>
<p>The Midwest, home to many German Americans, is a battleground for the 2020 presidential election. Will this inconspicuous group yet again cast the deciding votes in the upcoming election? </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/359678/original/file-20200923-14-fw3t2d.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="An old Wisconsin farmhouse around the Civil War period." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/359678/original/file-20200923-14-fw3t2d.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/359678/original/file-20200923-14-fw3t2d.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=434&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359678/original/file-20200923-14-fw3t2d.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=434&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359678/original/file-20200923-14-fw3t2d.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=434&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359678/original/file-20200923-14-fw3t2d.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=546&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359678/original/file-20200923-14-fw3t2d.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=546&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359678/original/file-20200923-14-fw3t2d.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=546&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">German immigrant Peter Glass came to the United States from Bavaria in 1844. This is his family’s homestead in Scott, Wisconsin, some time after 1862.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://americanhistory.si.edu/many-voices-exhibition/peopling-expanding-nation-1776%E2%80%931900/pushed-and-pulled-european-immigration-0">Smithsonian National Museum of American History</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The German American experience</h2>
<p>Forty-four million Americans claim German ancestry. They constitute a large white heritage group in the United States, and the largest by far in the Midwest. </p>
<p>Between 1850 and 1890, Germans arrived in the millions to settle in the U.S. German American farmers and workers transformed the frontier wilderness into farmland and fueled the Midwestern region’s industrialization with manpower and <a href="https://www.immigrantentrepreneurship.org/">entrepreneurial spirit</a>. </p>
<p>Politically, they were never a unified voting bloc. Many were <a href="https://wisconsinhistory.org/Records/Article/CS1926">freethinkers</a>, fighting against slavery and for women’s suffrage. They founded <a href="https://www.loc.gov/rr/european/imde/gernews2.html">newspapers</a> and led <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691006000/the-haymarket-tragedy">labor movements</a>. Others were leading Evangelicals, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Lutheran-Church-Missouri-Synod">forming the Missouri Synod</a>, one of the most conservative religious bodies of the country. </p>
<p>For decades, political parties vied for <a href="https://books.google.de/books?id=XpCgCNZwpvoC&printsec=frontcover&hl=de&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false">the vote of this heterogeneous immigrant group</a>.</p>
<p>Things changed in the wake of two world wars. To avoid stigmatization, German Americans <a href="https://www.dukeupress.edu/the-life-and-death-of-texas-german-2">stopped speaking German</a>, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/how-do-immigrants-respond-to-discrimination-the-case-of-germans-in-the-us-during-world-war-i/73E94E2B4C8EFB3B5B11B4AEB95DAFEE">anglicized their German names</a> and became outwardly more American than any other European immigrant group. </p>
<p>As a result, most contemporary German Americans have lost an authentic connection to their cultural heritage. Unlike other ethnic groups, they do not collectively link their identity to political action. </p>
<p>Yet, despite this low level of community organization and activism, German Americans show common voting patters. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/359682/original/file-20200923-17-11semee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A German-American farm family in 1938 in Lincoln County, Nebraska." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/359682/original/file-20200923-17-11semee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/359682/original/file-20200923-17-11semee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=459&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359682/original/file-20200923-17-11semee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=459&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359682/original/file-20200923-17-11semee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=459&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359682/original/file-20200923-17-11semee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=577&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359682/original/file-20200923-17-11semee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=577&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359682/original/file-20200923-17-11semee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=577&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A German American farm family in 1938 in Lincoln County, Nebraska.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.loc.gov/item/2017762739/">John Vachon/Library of Congress</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>‘Ghost pain of the past’</h2>
<p>Today’s German Americans are more conservative than their ancestors. Most counties of heavy German American heritage are <a href="https://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/media/Lehrstuehle/sowi/Gschwend/Articel/A_Swing_Vote_from_the_Ethnic_Backstage.pdf">rural and vote Republican</a>.</p>
<p>We conducted a post-election analysis of this group’s behavior in the 2016 election. After we looked at occupational distributions, <a href="http://www.electionanalysis2016.us/us-election-analysis-2016/section-4-diversity-and-division/why-are-the-german-americans-trumps-most-loyal-supporters/">we suggested in 2016</a> that the steady economic decline in agriculture and domestic manufacturing in the Midwest made German Americans receptive to populist messages with racist overtones, a view implied by other <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/polq.12737">political scientists</a> and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00380253.2019.1580543?journalCode=utsq20">sociologists</a>.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/media/Lehrstuehle/sowi/Gschwend/Articel/A_Swing_Vote_from_the_Ethnic_Backstage.pdf">new, empirical study</a> suggests that German Americans’ support of Trump in 2016 was not a simple outcome of party affiliation and not primarily an articulation of racism.</p>
<p>Rather, German Americans were enticed by Trump’s isolationist agenda, an ideological preference their communities had developed long before 2016. In fact, presidential candidates with policies of protectionism and anti-interventionism have consistently benefited from the German American vote. </p>
<p>For example, in the 1992 race, third-party candidate Ross Perot <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-giant-sucking-sound-of-nafta-ross-perot-was-ridiculed-as-alarmist-in-1992-but-his-warning-turned-out-to-be-prescient-120258">opposed NAFTA</a> and <a href="https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1992-06-14-9202220789-story.html">the first Gulf War</a>. He shared many views on trade and foreign policy with <a href="https://newrepublic.com/article/132044/donald-trumps-foreign-policy-revolution">Donald Trump</a> and performed <a href="https://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/media/Lehrstuehle/sowi/Gschwend/Articel/A_Swing_Vote_from_the_Ethnic_Backstage.pdf">better among German Americans than among any other descendants of 19th-century immigrants</a>.</p>
<p>Interestingly, the tendency to support anti-interventionist presidential candidates even extended to Democrat Barack Obama. More successful than any Democrat in presidential elections in decades among German American voters, Obama put forth a <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/03/obama-doctrine-wars-numbers/474531/">prospective foreign policy agenda</a> that contrasted sharply with that of John McCain, who stood for the continuation of George W. Bush’s unpopular wars in the Middle East. </p>
<p>German American support for America’s first African American president reached <a href="https://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/media/Lehrstuehle/sowi/Gschwend/Articel/A_Swing_Vote_from_the_Ethnic_Backstage.pdf">close to 60% in many counties of America’s heartland</a>, making it very unlikely that racism was the primary force behind the swing toward Trump in 2016 in these counties. </p>
<p>Rather, this phenomenon shows a consistent attraction to isolationist candidates in these communities rooted in the first half of the 20th century. That’s when German Americans vehemently opposed U.S. military intervention in Europe while being <a href="https://www.npr.org/2017/04/07/523044253/during-world-war-i-u-s-government-propaganda-erased-german-culture?t=1600435433459">forced to rapidly assimilate</a>. </p>
<p>But can past traumas influence voting behavior 80 years later? </p>
<p>Research on the persistence of historical legacies such as the voting behavior in <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/686631">former slaveholding counties in the South</a> shows that political attitudes indeed can be passed down over generations even while the experiential link to their origin is lost. It appears that German American attraction to isolationism is a ghost pain of the past.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/359904/original/file-20200924-18-mx57ud.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Lots of people at a 2016 Trump rally." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/359904/original/file-20200924-18-mx57ud.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/359904/original/file-20200924-18-mx57ud.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359904/original/file-20200924-18-mx57ud.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359904/original/file-20200924-18-mx57ud.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359904/original/file-20200924-18-mx57ud.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359904/original/file-20200924-18-mx57ud.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359904/original/file-20200924-18-mx57ud.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The economic boom Trump promised to Midwestern voters like these in Warren, Michigan, in 2016 hasn’t materialized.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/Campaign2016Roadto270/974ca907c441412fac77e25f222fbc98/photo?Query=midwest&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=&totalCount=255&currentItemNo=64">Carlos Osorio/AP</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What will happen in November?</h2>
<p>Trump <a href="https://theconversation.com/trumps-foreign-policy-is-still-america-first-what-does-that-mean-exactly-144841">has been an isolationist president</a>. He <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/01/politics/usmca-nafta-replacement-trump/index.html">abolished NAFTA</a>, <a href="https://www.state.gov/on-the-u-s-withdrawal-from-the-paris-agreement/">withdrew from the Paris Agreement on climate change</a>, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html">pulled out of the Iran nuclear deal</a>, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-china-effects/drag-from-trumps-trade-wars-continues-to-ripple-through-u-s-economy-idUSKBN1ZD2GU">started trade wars</a>, <a href="https://www.axios.com/donald-trump-rhetoric-military-soldiers-armed-forces-299f8507-94ef-4b40-a5a7-1ce576ed9675.html">snubbed military leaders</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-53589245">announced troop withdrawals from NATO allies</a>. </p>
<p>These decisions will increase his popularity among many voters who favor isolationist candidates, including German Americans.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, we believe that Trump’s campaign faces a problem in attracting a similarly large number of German Americans voters this November. Expectations that <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/in-manufacturing-midwest-signs-of-trouble-amid-good-times/2019/10/29/f4fd41cc-f118-11e9-89eb-ec56cd414732_story.html">isolationist policies would lead to greater prosperity in the Midwest</a> were disappointed. Moreover, throughout Trump’s presidency, his record as an isolationist was overshadowed by <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/09/the-end-of-denial/614194/">his image as a racist</a>. </p>
<p>[<em>Deep knowledge, daily.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>.]</p>
<p>We believe that many of those German American swing voters, who voted for a noninterventionist Obama in 2008 and then were attracted by Trump’s isolationist agenda in 2016, are alienated by his incendiary response to police killings and the Black Lives Matter protests. </p>
<p>A central tenet of isolationism is a strong desire to stay out of trouble through noninvolvement. This applies all the more at home. A growing understanding that the president’s actions did not deescalate but instead amplified violence and chaos on American streets will likely keep many German Americans from voting for Trump a second time.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/146283/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There are 45 million Americans of German ancestry. They gave Donald Trump his winning margin in 2016. Will they do it again?Per Urlaub, Associate Dean of the Language Schools and Associate College Professor, MiddleburyDavid Huenlich, Research Assistant, Leibniz Institute for the German LanguageLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/897252018-01-08T12:45:18Z2018-01-08T12:45:18ZWoodrow Wilson’s famous US speech makes a mockery of Donald Trump<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/201129/original/file-20180108-83563-ej88x6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Thomas Woodrow Wilson (1856-1934)</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Woodrow_Wilson#/media/File:President_Wilson_1919.jpg">Wikimedia</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>We have reached the centenary of US President Woodrow Wilson’s speech to Congress on January 8, 1918, outlining his <a href="http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp">Fourteen Points</a> for brokering a lasting peace in Europe after World War I. It was the famous roar of idealism from across the Atlantic that would be <a href="https://www.historyonthenet.com/world-war-one-the-treaty-of-versailles/">whittled back</a> in the name of self-interest by the victorious allies at Versailles the following year. </p>
<p>The speech would go on to shape many features of American foreign policy, however, particularly the broader points like open diplomacy, removal of economic and trade barriers, freedom of the seas and a general association of nations working together. Wilson <a href="http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/woodrow-wilson-suffers-a-stroke">would suffer</a> a stroke that would partially paralyse him in the fallout from Versailles, but his Congress speech would ensure his legacy as one of America’s most influential presidents. </p>
<p>The centenary takes place just days before the anniversary of the inauguration of Donald Trump. With the media currently full of the astonishing claims about the administration contained in <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/01/05/michael-wolff-claims-spent-three-hours-talking-donald-trump/">Michael Wolff’s new book</a>, one wonders what the 45th president’s legacy will be. Certainly foreign policy looks more uncertain than for many years. What, then, do the Fourteen Points tell us about Donald Trump?</p>
<h2>America front and centre</h2>
<p>Wilson’s speech that day in 1918 reflected his conviction that the United States should take a central place on the world stage – securing global peace and stability while furthering American interests at the same time. His approach would be largely rejected by his countrymen during the isolationist 1920s and 1930s, before ultimately coming to define many Americans’ view of their country’s role in the world. </p>
<p>Since Trump came to power last January, it looks as if America has entered a new era. Many conservatives and rural middle Americans – the bedrock of President Trump’s support – have long been suspicious of America’s global role and complained about the ways in which the country’s foreign policy has been viewed by the rest of the world. </p>
<p>They feel that when America intervenes – as in the first Gulf War or in Afghanistan – it is accused of putting self-interest before the good of the international community. But when it doesn’t intervene – as in Bosnia or Syria – the accusations are little different. Why, they argue, should the United States be the world’s policeman? </p>
<p>This is clearly reflected in Trump’s <a href="http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2017/">National Security Strategy</a>. Released in mid-December, it rejects many of the principles of previous American foreign policy, stating quite clearly that it must be “guided by outcomes, not ideology”. It is pure realpolitik. </p>
<p>The document promises explicitly to “put the safety, interests and well-being of our citizens first”. This includes building <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-mexico-has-nothing-to-fear-from-donald-trump-55362">the infamous wall</a> along America’s border with Mexico, withdrawing from many trade agreements which it sees as unfair, and beginning a substantial conventional and nuclear arms build up. It is America first from top to bottom – almost point by point a rejection of the ideas contained in Wilson’s Fourteen Points. </p>
<h2>The great game</h2>
<p>If this Trump strategy rejects the 20th-century concept of internationalism, it has surprising echoes of much earlier mid-19th century diplomacy. It says:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>After being dismissed as a phenomenon of an earlier century, great power competition has returned.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Trump developed this point while outlining his policy to journalists, <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/donald-trump-new-era-global-competition-america-going-to-win/4169607.html">explaining</a>: “America is in the game, and America is going to win.” The idea that foreign policy is a great game that can be won has echoes of Victorian men’s clubs, and is one of the most worrying changes initiated by Trump’s administration. It suggests a binary explanation of the world where there are only winners and losers, where those not participating in the game can be ignored. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/201136/original/file-20180108-83556-wy6yex.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/201136/original/file-20180108-83556-wy6yex.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/201136/original/file-20180108-83556-wy6yex.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=803&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201136/original/file-20180108-83556-wy6yex.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=803&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201136/original/file-20180108-83556-wy6yex.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=803&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201136/original/file-20180108-83556-wy6yex.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1009&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201136/original/file-20180108-83556-wy6yex.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1009&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201136/original/file-20180108-83556-wy6yex.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1009&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Bird brain.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-vector/america-first-presidential-inauguration-pledge-isolated-560804350?src=EV8H1eezXw3XBcsYfMYJ6A-1-58">Barry Barnes</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But perhaps the most concerning shift of all, which probably echoes Trump’s personality more than his policy advisers, is the determination to conduct foreign policy “without apology”. Not only will the US put its own interests first, in other words, it will not deeply consider the interests of its allies. </p>
<p>Two recent policy changes reflect this. Following America’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-climate-usa-paris-idUSKBN1AK2FM">withdrawal</a> from the Paris Climate Agreement, the security strategy makes no mention of climate change as one of the issues facing the world, although it repeatedly discusses “the business climate”. </p>
<p>An even clearer rejection of internationalism was the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-will-trumps-declaration-on-jerusalem-mean-to-palestinians-88841">December 6 decision</a> to move the American Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. This was apparently against the specific advice of Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, both of whom feared the impact on American diplomatic influence in the Middle East. </p>
<h2>Big button diplomacy</h2>
<p>This brings us to Twitter. Rather like 19th-century diplomats, where telegrams could spark wars, Trump seems often to have resorted to “Twitter diplomacy” to shape, or more often seemingly frustrate, American foreign policy. </p>
<p>President Teddy Roosevelt famously counselled that American foreign policy should “speak softly, and carry a big stick”. Perhaps nothing sums up Trump’s contrast to his predecessors than his tweeting – most recently the <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2018/01/02/politics/donald-trump-north-korea-nuclear/index.html">New Year’s Day reminder</a> to North Korea’s Kim Jong-Un, in language more reminiscent of a primary school playground than international diplomats, that “I too have a nuclear button, but it is a much bigger & more powerful one than his”. </p>
<p>None of this is to lionise Wilson, it should be said. America’s 28th president was no progressive <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/11/wilson-legacy-racism/417549/">on race</a>, for example, and he <a href="https://millercenter.org/president/wilson/foreign-affairs">invaded</a> Haiti and the Dominican Republic. </p>
<p>But his Fourteen Points speech remains one of the great pieces of statesmanship of the modern era. Where it fought hard for stability, President Trump’s foreign policy seems more likely to produce instability. Where it fought for openness, the Trump administration turns inwards. It is a moment to reflect on what American leadership offered the world 100 years ago, and what it might learn to offer again.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89725/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Ward does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>America finds itself in uncharted territory under Donald Trump – not least when it comes to climate change and Israel policy.Matthew Ward, Senior Lecturer in History, University of DundeeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/813482017-08-15T09:36:09Z2017-08-15T09:36:09ZWashington’s foreign policy consensus fell apart long before Donald Trump<p>Donald Trump’s latest bombastic remarks on North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme, <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2017/08/09/politics/north-korea-donald-trump/index.html">threatening Kim Jong-un</a> with “fire and fury” for his continued provocations are a stark reminder of how drastically the rhetoric of national security has changed in Washington. Where the <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/">Obama doctrine</a> offered measured pragmatism and a mix of restraint, targeted counter-terrorism measures and diplomatic engagement, Trump has responded with martial swagger.</p>
<p>From launching cruise missiles on Syria to dropping the so-called “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/15/us-mother-of-all-bombs-moab-afghanistan-donald-trump-death-toll">mother of all bombs</a>” on IS fighters in Afghanistan, however, the Trump doctrine is neither coherent nor consistent. Instead of providing a strategic rationale for US foreign policy, the White House offers sabre-rattling and one-off military fireworks. </p>
<p>But there is a deeper problem: the US’s political consensus on national security has all but completely broken down. The world’s only remaining superpower is in a full-blown identity crisis about its current purpose, future position and adequate role on the world stage; Trump’s bluster is only a symptom of this malaise.</p>
<p>By now, political polarisation and the fracturing of political parties are more or less the defining features of American politics. Senate Republicans’ <a href="http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/343823-senate-rejects-obamacare-repeal-replacement-amendment">recent failure</a> to replace and repeal “Obamacare” laid bare their deep divisions; on the other side of the aisle, the Democrats are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jun/25/civil-war-raging-inside-democratic-party">tussling</a> over whether or not to embrace Bernie Sanders’s “democratic socialist” ideas and move beyond Hillary Clinton’s orthodox centrism. </p>
<p>But these are more than mere shock waves from Trump’s victory; they’re part of something much more complicated. As I argue in my new book, <a href="https://edinburghuniversitypress.com/book-american-grand-strategy-under-obama.html">American Grand Strategy under Obama</a>, the US’s political dysfunction did not begin with Trump, and it’s not confined to domestic politics. Even before Barack Obama was first sworn in, America was losing its sense of its role in the world.</p>
<h2>Indispensable no more</h2>
<p>Starting at the end of World War II, the US followed a grand strategy of <a href="https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2016C40_rdf.pdf">liberal hegemony</a>: using American diplomatic leverage, military might and economic weight to deter potential aggressors, foster the global spread of democracy, uphold the international rule of law, and guarantee free trade in support of a globalised economy.</p>
<p>Underwriting this strategic vision was the belief in <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/the-myth-of-american-exceptionalism/">American exceptionalism</a>. The US wasn’t just different from other nations; it had a unique mission to lead the world and make it “safe for democracy”, via the use of force if necessary. Obama himself <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2015/06/03/obama-and-american-exceptionalism/?utm_term=.990d24ca998e">declared the US exceptional on several occasions</a>, singling out its constitution, the size of its economy, and its unmatched military capability. </p>
<p>But at the same time, Obama challenged the established Washington consensus by frequently questioning the <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/05/28/remarks-president-united-states-military-academy-commencement-ceremony">virtues of military intervention</a>. As commander-in-chief, he clearly articulated how much war had cost the US in both blood and treasure; he <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/03/11/weakness-or-realism-in-foreign-policy/obamas-focus-is-on-nation-building-at-home">preferred</a> “nation-building at home” over remaking the Middle East in America’s image. </p>
<p>The elite consensus on American exceptionalism, liberal hegemony and military interventionism fractured, and not least in the president’s own words and actions. In 2011, Obama simultaneously <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS/06/22/afghanistan.troops.drawdown/index.html">announced</a> a “surge” and then withdrawal in Afghanistan; he “led from behind” <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/leading-from-behind">in Libya</a>“, and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/10/04/the-problem-with-obamas-account-of-the-syrian-red-line-incident/?utm_term=.902a58bfd0e0">drew – and then failed to enforce</a> – a military "red line” on chemical weapons use in Syria.</p>
<p>But the most serious (and most surprising) split over America’s role in the world happened on the political right.</p>
<h2>One party, three strategies</h2>
<p>GOP establishment figures such as <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/mitt-romneys-neocon-war-cabinet/">Mitt Romney</a> and <a href="http://www.nationalreview.com/article/389598/neocons-return-eliana-johnson">Marco Rubio</a>, supported by neoconservative intellectuals, pundits and think tanks, had not moved far beyond the notorious <a href="http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/articles/03spring/record.pdf">Bush doctrine</a>, under which the global primacy of the US was enforced via premptive, unilateral military action. But come the late 2000s, their party was racked with ideological dissent.</p>
<p>The Tea Party movement, which kicked off in 2009 to oppose Obama on a platform of limited government, tax cuts and fiscal austerity, soon came into direct conflict with the Republican establishment and its intelligentsia, helping to unseat several established members of Congress.</p>
<p>On the one side, libertarian Republicans such as Kentucky <a href="http://nationalinterest.org/feature/rand-paul-found-his-voice-can-he-find-non-interventionist-13866">Senator Rand Paul</a> and like-minded organisations such as the Cato Institute rejected the large defence budgets and foreign interventions through which America had responded to 9/11, questioning an open-ended “War on Terror” and warning that the military-industrial complex and state surveillance could eventually corrupt republican government and civil liberties. </p>
<p>Then there was the Jacksonian populist wing of the Tea Party, among them Trump White House strategist Steve Bannon and his co-creation Breitbart News. They rejected liberal hegemony in favour of a neo-isolationist nationalism, a philosophy that runs through Trump’s mantra of <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/america-first-foreign-policy">America First</a>. Instead of spreading democracy, this strategic vision of America disdains immigration and free trade while questioning the value of longstanding alliances such as NATO.</p>
<p>It wasn’t just the Republican party however. The Obama years saw the orthodoxy of American grand strategy attacked by a diverse array of critics from both right and left, including libertarian and populist conservatives, progressive liberals such as <a href="https://berniesanders.com/issues/war-and-peace/">Bernie Sanders</a>, and <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-06-13/case-offshore-balancing">neo-realist international relations scholars</a>. From their different standpoints, they all argued that the strategic vision of liberal hegemony and military interventionism had overextended American commitments and squandered financial and military resources; instead of making America safer, they charged that interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya had turned out to be destabilising liabilities.</p>
<p>Both Obama and Trump reflected some of that criticism, albeit in dramatically different ways. Where Obama endorsed military restraint on several occasions – not least in a <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/">much-read interview on the Atlantic</a> – Trump called NATO “obsolete” and at one point suggested that the US could <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/22/us/politics/donald-trump-foreign-policy-interview.html?_r=1">withdraw its troops from South Korea and Japan</a>. As president Trump may have been softening those views on some fronts (not least NATO), but the message is clear: US allies can no longer take America for a “free ride”.</p>
<p>In the end, whereas Obama attempted to open up the prevailing Washington consensus, trying to reconcile American exceptionalism with a more limited use of US power, Trump and his coterie are trying to dissolve it altogether. For now “fire and fury” seem to have taken its place.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/81348/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Georg Löfflmann is the author of American Grand Strategy under Obama, published by Edinburgh University Press</span></em></p>What should America’s role in the world be? A lot of people have an answer, but few of them agree.Georg Löfflmann, Research and Teaching Fellow in International Security, University of WarwickLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/699632016-12-06T21:09:55Z2016-12-06T21:09:55ZHow the attack on Pearl Harbor shaped America’s role in the world<p>The bombing of Pearl Harbor was a pivotal moment in U.S. and world history. The attack thrust the U.S. into World War II and set in motion a series of events that would transform the country into a global superpower and guardian of international order. Seventy-six years later, this legacy of Pearl Harbor now faces perhaps its biggest challenge.</p>
<p>Japan killed <a href="https://visitpearlharbor.org/how-many-pearl-harbor-deaths-were-there/">2,403 Americans</a> on Dec. 7, 1941. More than <a href="http://www.nationalww2museum.org/learn/education/for-students/ww2-history/ww2-by-the-numbers/world-wide-deaths.html?referrer=https://www.google.com/">400,000</a> U.S. soldiers would die in the four years that followed. Their blood helped purchase the defeat of fascism in Europe and Asia and laid the foundation for a post-war international order made in America’s image.</p>
<p>Whether the U.S. would have entered World War II absent Pearl Harbor is a matter of some debate. Scholars such as John Schuessler of Texas A&M <a href="http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.2010.34.4.133">argue</a> that President Franklin D. Roosevelt had long been angling for U.S. intervention. From this view, FDR was very much aware that Japanese expansionism in Asia and German aggrandizement in Europe meant trouble for America.</p>
<p>Yet anti-war sentiment at home meant that FDR had to tread carefully. A succession of <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/neutrality-acts">Neutrality Acts</a> restricted the kinds of assistance that could be rendered to the Chinese, French and British governments, while anti-war groups such as <a href="https://theconversation.com/trumps-america-first-echoes-from-1940s-59579">America First</a> boasted hundreds of thousands of members.</p>
<p>We will never know if FDR would have succeeded in maneuvering the U.S. into open hostilities with the fascist powers. Pearl Harbor gave him more than enough cause to declare war on Japan and its allies in Europe. But viewed in historical perspective, it is clear that Pearl Harbor was more than just the gateway to America’s entry into World War II. </p>
<p>Rather, the attack constituted a critical juncture in the history of U.S. foreign relations, sidelining isolationism as a powerful force in domestic politics and making overseas engagement the accepted norm.</p>
<h2>Expanding overseas commitments</h2>
<p>The war effort required a massive mobilization of the U.S. economy and society. By the time of its conclusion in 1945, the U.S. had built for itself the largest <a href="http://www.nationalww2museum.org/learn/education/for-students/ww2-history/ww2-by-the-numbers/us-military.html">fighting force</a> in its history, with a military basing structure that spanned the globe. Japan and large parts of Germany were under U.S. occupation.</p>
<p>After victory, President Truman showed an initial inclination to <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=PTEV0CPuhRcC&pg=PA574&lpg=PA574&dq=truman+four+policemen&source=bl&ots=noapJ0a9xc&sig=qXilBoOmvjzkY0lI_xCddOGTaiY&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjCiYGA9t3QAhVnslQKHQPBA3U4ChDoAQgaMAA#v=onepage&q=truman%20four%20policemen&f=false">share responsibility</a> for global order with the country’s wartime allies: Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the nationalist government of China. But extricating the U.S. from world affairs proved difficult, and Truman’s presidency would instead see a marked expansion of America’s overseas commitments.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=DoSGzXQln_oC&lpg=PP1&dq=Iron%20Curtain%3A%20The%20Crushing%20of%20Eastern%20Europe%2C%201944-1956&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q&f=false">Eastern Europe</a>, the Soviets began to establish political control over the countries that they occupied, like <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=ZU4EAAAAMBAJ&lpg=PA98&dq=poland%20election%201947%20fraudulent&pg=PA98#v=onepage&q=poland%20election%201947%20fraudulent&f=false">Poland</a> and <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=qBBcqDludakC&lpg=PA135&dq=czech%20coup%201948&pg=PA135#v=onepage&q=czech%20coup%201948&f=false">Czechoslovakia</a>. These actions fueled <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/1947-07-01/sources-soviet-conduct">consternation</a> in the U.S. that Moscow was not a responsible partner but rather was bent on further expansion, perhaps across <a href="http://dh.oxfordjournals.org/content/22/3/399.short">Western Europe</a> or into the <a href="http://dh.oxfordjournals.org/content/21/3/383.short">Middle East</a>. Fear of communism appeared to be vindicated when, in 1950, North Korean forces <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/coldwar/korea_hickey_01.shtml">crossed the 38th parallel</a> intent on forcibly unifying the Korean Peninsula under communist rule. This act of aggression <a href="http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/24/4/563.abstract">catalyzed</a> a massive military buildup by the Truman administration.</p>
<p>Containment of communism became the organizing principle of U.S. foreign policy for the next four decades, benefiting from broad bipartisanship consensus on the question. What began after Pearl Harbor as an attempt to defeat fascism had morphed by 1950 into an all-out global struggle to resist communism and maintain the independence of nations in the so-called “Free World.”</p>
<p>Ignoring Thomas Jefferson’s <a href="http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jefinau1.asp">advice</a> on the perils of “entangling alliances,” the U.S. offered security guarantees – formal and informal – to a host of nations in Europe, Asia and elsewhere. U.S. forces were involved in toppling governments from <a href="http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB4/">Guatemala</a> to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/19/cia-admits-role-1953-iranian-coup">Iran</a> to <a href="http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=82588">Chile</a>. And of course, a costly <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-choice-lbjs-decision-to-go-to-war-in-vietnam-38410">war of choice</a> was waged in Vietnam.</p>
<p>In concert with its allies, the U.S. set about building a liberal international order that would embed international cooperation and create safe spaces for capitalist economies to flourish. The <a href="http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2005/08/art-320747/">Bretton Woods financial institutions</a>, the <a href="http://www.un.org/en/sections/history/history-united-nations/">United Nations</a> and the <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min96_e/chrono.htm">General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</a> (now the World Trade Organization) all can be considered part of this ambitious order-building project.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148939/original/image-20161206-25749-2rcwo8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148939/original/image-20161206-25749-2rcwo8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148939/original/image-20161206-25749-2rcwo8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148939/original/image-20161206-25749-2rcwo8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148939/original/image-20161206-25749-2rcwo8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148939/original/image-20161206-25749-2rcwo8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=498&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148939/original/image-20161206-25749-2rcwo8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=498&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148939/original/image-20161206-25749-2rcwo8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=498&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Monetary Conference at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in July 1944, attended by representatives of 44 nations, including M.S. Stepanov of Russia, Lord John Maynard Keynes and Vladimir Rybar of Yugoslavia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The U.S. used its power to shape and reshape the world during the decades that followed 1945. But it is now <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/december/25/newsid_2542000/2542749.stm">25 years</a> since the Soviet Union voted itself out of existence, and America’s <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Base-Nation-Military-America-American/dp/1627791698?tag=quartz07-20">global footprint</a> remains substantial.</p>
<p>Why has America maintained its deep engagement overseas? Why have its leaders still not seen fit to return U.S. foreign policy to a pre-Pearl Harbor footing?</p>
<h2>Trade and security concerns</h2>
<p>One reason is that the U.S. economy – or, at least, a large segment of it – has <a href="https://ustr.gov/about-us/benefits-trade">benefited</a> enormously from a liberal international architecture that might collapse without the application of U.S. power to keep trade routes open, energy sources flowing and anti-capitalist forces at bay.</p>
<p>Another explanation is that successive presidents have concurred with FDR that national security cannot be divorced from international security. From defeating the Axis powers to containing the Soviet Union to tackling “rogue states” and terrorist organizations, it has appeared more attractive to fight America’s enemies overseas rather than risk another Pearl Harbor.</p>
<p>For 76 years, such arguments for U.S. internationalism have more or less held sway in Washington. Today, however, they are increasingly falling upon deaf ears.</p>
<p>President-elect Donald Trump puts little stock in the open international economy, accusing foreign entities of cheating American workers. He has promised to <a href="http://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2016/06/28/donald_trumps_seven-point_plan_to_reform_nafta_and_wto_cheaters.html">renegotiate</a> trade deals and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-threatens-consequences-for-us-firms-that-relocate-offshore/2016/12/01/a2429330-b7e4-11e6-959c-172c82123976_story.html">punish</a> businesses for investing overseas. Trump purports to represent not those who have become rich from global capitalism, but those whose livelihoods have been lost to the vicissitudes of foreign competition.</p>
<p>Nor does Trump see the international environment as posing many bona fide security threats. Trump has promised to forge <a href="https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/world/2016/12/05/how-trump-putin-alliance-would-change-world/WRBbyzjIfHCs4xYOyKv7wL/story.html">friendly relations</a> with Russia, for example, and hopes to encourage Moscow to shoulder the burden of defeating the Islamic State. He does not seem to lose sleep over the possibility of conflict with China, baiting the Beijing government over <a href="http://www.cnbc.com/2016/12/05/donald-trump-insults-china-with-taiwan-phone-call-and-tweets-on-trade-south-china-sea.html">Twitter</a>. Trump has questioned cornerstones of U.S. defense policy such as <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2016/07/trump-nato/492341/">NATO</a>, and has suggested that U.S. allies can look after themselves, perhaps with the aid of their own <a href="http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/what-does-donald-trump-really-think-about-using-nuclear-weapons-n655536">nuclear arsenals</a>.</p>
<p>For better or worse, the post-Pearl Harbor world has been one in which the U.S. always has faced compelling incentives to remain preponderant in international affairs. But there was never anything inevitable or immovable about this internationalist consensus. As the conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1991-02-01/unipolar-moment">noted</a> at the end of the Cold War, isolationist tendencies on both the right and left of U.S. politics were bound to resurface eventually.</p>
<p>With Trump’s election, Krauthammer’s prophecy is perhaps finally coming to pass. With an avowedly “America First” president occupying the White House, what the attack on Pearl Harbor had banished from American public life will, at last, be mainstream once more.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/69963/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Harris does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Japanese attack on a US naval base on Dec. 7, 1941 set in motion a series of events that transformed the United States into a global superpower. Will Donald Trump bring that era to an end?Peter Harris, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Colorado State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/683232016-11-07T22:04:32Z2016-11-07T22:04:32ZGrowing inequality in the US is bad news for climate change<p>This week’s US Presidential election will likely be more important for climate change action than the <a href="http://cop22.ma/en#">United Nations (UN) Climate Change Conference</a> which started in Marrakech yesterday. Whichever candidate makes it to the White House, progressive action on climate change in America, and therefore globally, is going to take a hit.</p>
<p>We have already seen stagnation on climate change action in the lead up to the US election. The mudslinging and controversy of the campaign has taken climate change off the front pages. Climate change has had even less visibility in the US election campaign than it did in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-has-climate-change-disappeared-from-the-australian-election-radar-59809">Australian election</a> in July.</p>
<p>It was telling that Hillary Clinton, who had talked up climate policy in the primaries when competing against Bernie Sanders, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/sep/20/hillary-clinton-dropped-climate-change-from-speeches-after-bernie-sanders-endorsement">dropped the climate ball</a> as soon as she had the Democratic party’s nomination.</p>
<p>It wasn’t simply that there was no longer any point taking on climate change in order to win more Sanders supporters, but that climate change was so far down the list of ways Clinton could differentiate herself from the Republican candidate Donald Trump that it seemed pointless to insert it into the election campaign at all.</p>
<p>Trump’s worldview projects a complete <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-05-18/trump-says-he-will-renegotiate-us-role-in-climate-north-korea/7424412">abnegation of climate change</a>, as shown by his <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2016-36401174">intention to undo</a> America’s commitment to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-trump-presidency-would-spell-disaster-for-the-paris-climate-agreement-59737">Paris climate agreement</a> should he get to the White House.</p>
<p>Trump’s <a href="http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2016/jun/03/hillary-clinton/yes-donald-trump-did-call-climate-change-chinese-h/">negative attitude</a> towards climate change is another example of his belief in <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-the-us-electoral-system-really-rigged-63798">conspiracy theories</a>. But his neglect of climate change is not to be found in deploying <a href="http://www.news.com.au/world/breaking-news/trump-climate-denial-at-odds-with-leaders/news-story/561898b4176fec917d38d866d44b4649">denier myths</a>, but his abandonment of a policy stance about anything in favour of filling the airwaves with insults more suited to a bar room brawl.</p>
<p>For many Americans, its 240 year old system of democracy is in great danger. Because so many unemployed and dispossessed Americans feel that neither capitalism nor the two great parties can meet their needs, they are rejecting the political elites and the establishment politics that keep the <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/pikettys-inequality-story-in-six-charts">unequal distribution of wealth</a> in check.</p>
<p>Of course, such a system has always been part of American life. It’s just that it is now at breaking point. It is of no consequence that Trump is himself part of the US economic elite. It is enough that he has himself been a “loser” many times over, and that he speaks the reality-TV language of those who want America to be “great again” both at rallies and on <a href="https://theconversation.com/trump-the-media-and-the-populist-politics-of-the-pogrom-66364">social media</a>. </p>
<p>Ironically, America is a greater power now than it has been in the past. But due to the automation of the increased manufacturing output in heavy industries and the reliance on China for consumer goods, unemployment and income inequality have risen to unacceptable levels. It’s now the turn of working class Americans to be the “losers of globalisation”. </p>
<p>This has given rise to a loss of faith in American institutions, and the celebration of Trump as a bad boy who should be able to do whatever he wants to rail against the establishment.</p>
<p>Many analysts have <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/this-is-how-fascism-comes-to-america/2016/05/17/c4e32c58-1c47-11e6-8c7b-6931e66333e7_story.html?hpid=hp_no-name_opinion-card-b%3Ahomepage%2Fstory">drawn the comparison</a> between Trump’s version of America and fascism — military isolationism, the ridiculing of “others” (including Muslims, Hispanics, women, Chinese and Mexicans), high levels of paranoia (the media is “<a href="http://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2016/10/17/13304574/donald-trump-twitter-tirade-rigged-election">rigged</a>”, the election is “<a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2016-37682947">rigged</a>”), and the fairy tale conviction that one person alone can save America.</p>
<p>But the real danger for the US is in <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-new-breed-of-post-trump-populist-leaders-could-put-the-us-on-the-path-to-fascism-67645?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Latest%20from%20The%20Conversation%20for%20October%2027%202016%20-%205894&utm_content=Latest%20from%20The%20Conversation%20for%20October%2027%202016%20-%205894+CID_368ae9e626455f9d93cd9b9496498b0b&utm_source=campaign_monitor&utm_term=A%20new%20breed%20of%20post-Trump%20populist%20leaders%20could%20put%20the%20US%20on%20the%20path%20to%20fascism">four years from now</a>. If Trump doesn’t win the presidency, a smarter Republican candidate – one who is actually supported by the floor of the Grand Old Party, actually has policies and appeals to the disaffected – will take US politics to a climate inactive isolationist extreme.</p>
<p>However, a moderating force for climate change is the success of the Paris agreement, which is <a href="https://theconversation.com/paris-climate-agreement-enters-into-force-international-experts-respond-68124">now in full force</a>. The Paris agreement, which replaces the Kyoto framework, has been ratified extremely quickly by UN standards. It now has almost 100 countries signed up – needing only the 55 countries that account for 55% of global emissions.</p>
<p>This is impressive progress given the scale and complexity of the UN’s framework convention on climate change. The momentum of the Paris agreement provides a kind of political guardrail for achieving stronger action on climate change, leaving no country with an excuse not to join in.</p>
<p>The only counter-force that could reverse this momentum would be the rise of populist support for isolationism within the states signed up to the treaty. And a Trumpist America, whether it eventuates this week or in the future, offers an archetypal case.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/68323/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Whether it’s Clinton on Trump in the White House, progressive action on climate change in America - and therefore globally - is going to take a hit.David Holmes, Senior Lecturer, Communications and Media Studies, Monash UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/666652016-10-17T01:05:41Z2016-10-17T01:05:41ZBrexit and Trump are bad for our health<p>Politics in America and Europe may be increasingly isolationist, but deadly pathogens aren’t. Votes for Brexit and Donald Trump may in fact be votes for worsening pandemics and fewer doctors and researchers to fight them.</p>
<p>This summer <a href="http://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/644178/EU-referendum-dates-European-Union-Brexit-David-Cameron-Brussels">Brits chose to leave the EU</a> and Americans nominated Trump as the Republican Party candidate. On both sides of the Atlantic, Brexiters and Trump supporters voted to go it alone. Their leaders preach keeping out immigrants and shunning multilateral organizations like the EU and NATO. But economic downturn and international criticism may not be the worst fallout. </p>
<p>As a global health researcher, I think the potential impact on our health could be even scarier. Here’s why. </p>
<p>The isolationism championed by Brexit architects and Trump alike endanger the coordinated <a href="https://www.cartercenter.org/news/features/h/hispaniola/border-cooperation-06012016.html">efforts</a> required to <a href="http://www.pepfar.gov/about/strategy/global_context/134287.htm">keep pandemics</a> <a href="http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/news/2015-12-17_Global_Fund_Outlines_Investment_Case_to_End_Epidemics/">under control</a>. The xenophobia that has been their rallying cry threatens health care delivery and critical health research at home.</p>
<h2>Less cooperation, more disease</h2>
<p>The Brexiters have parodied the <a href="http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-klaas-dirsus-leave-victory-in-britain-20160623-snap-story.html">EU as hamstrung</a> and woefully inefficient. Trump has threatened to <a href="http://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/donald-trump-nato-reaction-225967">renege on NATO</a> commitments due to unequal financial contributions of member states. </p>
<p>These critiques are not without basis: Multilateral organizations can be slow and at any given time, the costs and benefits may not be evenly shared. Some were even criticized for delays in responding to the exceedingly urgent <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/experts-criticize-world-health-organizations-slow-ebola-outbreak-response-1431344306">Ebola crisis</a>. But there are also intrinsic advantages to large-scale, multicountry cooperation, particularly when it comes to global health.</p>
<p>Pooling funds from more than 50 donor nations, The Global Fund for AIDS, TB and Malaria has supported low- and middle-income countries in saving an estimated <a href="http://theglobalfund.org/en/blog/2015-09-21_17_Million_Lives/">17 million lives since 2002</a>.</p>
<p>Why is this approach better than each country providing its own unilateral assistance? </p>
<p>First, the Global Fund has streamlined the funding process; instead of applying to four dozen different funding sources, the government of Rwanda can expect to receive US$148 million to fight AIDS from a <a href="http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/">Global Fund grant</a> over 18 months starting July 2015, according to the organization’s website. </p>
<p>Second, the Global Fund, in turn, <a href="http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/sourcing/ppm/">pools country requests for lifesaving HIV and malaria treatments and buys drugs in bulk</a> at cheaper prices. Their pooled procurement process is essentially the Costco of the global pharmaceutical market. Purchasing in huge quantities allows <a href="http://www.economist.com/node/12446567">economies of scale</a> and wholesale pricing that have helped bring the cost of first-line HIV treatment down from as much as $10,000 per person per year in 2000 to <a href="http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2015/11/27/breakthrough-brings-cost-of-hiv-treatment-to-under-100-per-patient-per-year.html">as little as $100</a> in 2016, according to a recent MSF report.</p>
<h2>Growing isolationism</h2>
<p>Yet, whatever the potential benefits for recipient countries, some may say treating HIV and malaria in Africa and Asia is simply not a priority in hard economic times at home. “Let’s fund our NHS instead,” the <a href="http://www.commongrounduk.com/2016/09/12/hello-boris-happened-350m-nhs-promise/">Brexit campaign</a> plastered on its infamous bus wrap. <a href="http://www.latimes.com/nation/politics/trailguide/la-na-republican-convention-2016-trump-trump-says-he-s-america-first-but-1469158441-htmlstory.html">“America First” </a> pledges Trump. </p>
<p>On both sides of the Atlantic, the current political trend is not just unilateral; it is also inward-facing and isolationist. This is a losing strategy in the face of global epidemics like Ebola and Zika.</p>
<p>The notion that the epidemics of poor countries do not concern Europe and the U.S. is not just morally dubious, it’s dangerously incorrect. <a href="http://who.int/csr/disease/ebola/top-stories-2016/en/">The Ebola outbreak</a> showed just how quickly a deadly virus can make its way from <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/07/31/world/africa/ebola-virus-outbreak-qa.html?_r=0">a rural village in Guinea to a subway car in New York</a>. </p>
<p>In fact, Ebola was brought under control only by a coordinated <a href="http://ebolaresponse.un.org/un-stresses-need-ebola-surveillance-border-towns">cross-border response</a>, international collaboration throughout the regions most affected and worldwide contact tracing. Fragmented, uncoordinated responses allowed the epidemic to get out of control in the first place. </p>
<p>With more than half a million people now returned home from Zika-affected Brazil after this summer’s Olympics, we need to share information across borders and collaborate financially, strategically and operationally on control measures.</p>
<h2>Turning away doctors and scientists</h2>
<p>Ultimately, the political trend of isolationism isn’t just bad for controlling emerging epidemics. It threatens the day-to-day health of Brexit and Trump supporters alike. Migration has allowed medical systems in Europe and the U.S. to attract top global talent. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/09/dr-sarah-wollaston-defects-vote-leave-remain-campaign">Dr. Sarah Wollaston</a>, a member of the British Parliament, said, “If you see a migrant in the NHS, they’re more likely to be treating you than standing in line in front of you.” A former GP and onetime Euro-skeptic, she campaigned to stay in the EU out of concern for the national health system. </p>
<p>Beyond direct medical care, isolationism risks crippling scientific research leading to new vaccines and medicines by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/education/2016/jul/12/uk-scientists-dropped-from-eu-projects-because-of-post-brexit-funding-fears">restricting the flow of scientists</a> and students to universities and research centers. Brexit could threaten funding for <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/education/2016/jul/16/research-funding-hit-by-brexit-vote">cancer and mental health research </a>as well as the U.K.’s ability to attract and retain scientific talent. Likewise in the U.S., xenophobic policies and sentiments could have a dire effect on advances in science; <a href="https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/10/11/foreign-born-professors-account-us-nobel-haul">all six of the U.S.-based scientists who won Nobel Prizes this week are immigrants</a>. Even with visa exceptions for certain professions, a nativist ethos makes any country a far less appealing destination for migrants with in-demand scientific and technical skills.</p>
<p>This summer, both Britain and America saw elites in populist clothing whipping up a frenzy by chanting “Vote Leave, Take Control” and “Make America Great Again.” The public health threat posed by these xenophobic, isolationist movements is just another indication of how ill they serve the public interest. </p>
<p>The Brexit referendum has already steered Britain down a dangerous path. But with global epidemics and domestic health care at stake, the U.S. still has time for cooler heads to prevail this fall before Trump is in the White House and his policies literally make us sick.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/66665/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Elizabeth Radin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Increasing isolation threatens global health. International cooperation is critical to fighting diseases that will not respect borders.Elizabeth Radin, Associate Research Scientist, Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.