tag:theconversation.com,2011:/fr/topics/king-bhumibol-adulyadej-12754/articlesKing Bhumibol Adulyadej – The Conversation2016-12-02T07:06:50Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/679852016-12-02T07:06:50Z2016-12-02T07:06:50ZThailand’s future under King Rama X: lessons from three Asian countries<p>Thailand’s crown prince has <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-38168912">become King Maha Vajiralongkorn Bodindradebayavarangkun</a> or Rama X, the tenth monarch of the Chakri dynasty, succeeding his father who died on October 13. But great uncertainly remains about Thailand’s future – and that of the monarchy – both within the country and <a href="https://kyotoreview.org/issue-13/the-future-of-the-monarchy-in-thailand/">among international observers</a>. </p>
<p>Much attention has focused on the personality of the <a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/thailand-succession-playboy-prince-must-work-hard-improve-his-tainted-reputation-1586226">unpopular Crown Prince</a>. While the international media has noted his <a href="http://www.news.com.au/finance/work/leaders/scandal-sex-and-crop-tops-the-scandalplagued-life-of-playboy-prince-vajiralongkorn/news-story/c66430cb5f508259c4d5270347ea72bd">erratic personal life</a>, of much greater concern is his reputation for <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21678277-purge-prominent-people-causing-alarm-thailand-never-saw-it-coming">ruthlessness</a>, which could harm the overwhelming respect for the monarchy in Thailand.</p>
<p>Despite the superficial appearance of a modern constitutional monarchy (carefully crafted by palace propaganda), Thailand’s monarchy is, in reality, <a href="http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/149942.The_King_Never_Smiles">deeply conservative</a>. Can it modernise itself after the death of King Bhumibol Adulyadej and survive a changing world?</p>
<p>Thai royalists like to claim that no other country can be compared to Thailand. But there are at least three comparable cases in Asia’s recent history that may shed light on Thailand’s possible political future.</p>
<h2>Mao Zedong’s China</h2>
<p>The first is China, following the death of Mao Zedong in 1976. The <a href="http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674058156">last decade of Mao’s premiership</a> in China – like the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-15641745">last ten years of King Bhumibol’s reign</a> in Thailand – was a period of great political turmoil. </p>
<p>Although ideologically from opposite ends of the political spectrum, both leaders played crucial roles in establishing the regimes that came to dominate their country: the <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/chinese-rev">Communist Party of China</a> and the <a href="http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/08/08/thailand-returns-to-military-monarchy/">military-bureaucracy-monarchy power bloc in Thailand</a>. </p>
<p>Both figures were the subject of <a href="http://share.nanjing-school.com/dphistory/files/2013/06/Extended-Essay_February_Cesar-Landin-2403vg5.pdf">totalitarian personality cults</a> spread <a href="http://www.thenational.ae/world/southeast-asia/king-bhumibol-the-personality-cult-surrounding-thailands-father-of-the-nation">by the mass media</a> and <a href="http://alphahistory.com/chineserevolution/cult-of-mao/">the education system</a>. Both were politically untouchable. </p>
<p>In both countries, conformity to the <a href="http://www.chaipat.or.th/chaipat_english/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4103&Itemid=293">idiosyncratic ideas</a> of the ruler took the place of rational political debate. In both cases, ideologically extreme groups took advantage of the power vacuum created by the ageing and weakening of the ruler to seize power, ostensibly to protect his legacy: the <a href="http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/gangoffour/Gangof4.html">“Gang of Four” and the Red Guards</a> in China, and in Thailand, <a href="http://www.academia.edu/25820151/2016_Thailand_s_Hyper-royalism_Its_Past_Success_and_Present_Predicament">hyper-royalist street movements and an arch-royalist clique</a> within the military. </p>
<p>Yet shortly after Mao’s death in 1976 the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/special_report/1999/09/99/china_50/gang.htm">Gang of Four were swiftly overthrown</a> and <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/shared/minitext/prof_dengxiaoping.html">Deng Xiaoping manoeuvred his own rise to power</a>. As Deng consolidated his authority, Mao’s supporters within the CCP were eventually sidelined. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/09/27/china-under-deng-xiaopings-leadership/">Deng brought</a> an end to the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution, strengthened relations with the West, and began the process of reforming China’s economy and opening the country up to the world. </p>
<h2>Suharto’s Indonesia</h2>
<p>Another comparison is with Thailand’s regional neighbour, Indonesia. The two countries share many similarities. Both King Bhumibol and the former military dictator General Suharto came to power during the acutely polarised politics of the Cold War in Southeast Asia. And military dictatorships were established in both countries. </p>
<p>King Bhumibol and <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/903024.stm">Suharto were fervent anti-communists</a> and played key roles in the <a href="http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/10/14/what-is-king-bhumibols-legacy/">suppression of communism</a>. Both cultivated <a href="http://bigstory.ap.org/article/8258058a7a7d44d0873dfcd301a2660e/thai-king-bhumibol-was-bridge-close-relations-us">close relations with the United States</a>, which <a href="http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB52/doc427.pdf">supported their regimes</a> financially, militarily, and diplomatically. And both were crucial to the <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/27/AR2008012700506.html">adoption of policies of economic liberalisation</a> and the <a href="http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/10/14/what-is-king-bhumibols-legacy/">capitalist transformation of their countries</a>. </p>
<p>Suharto, who increasingly acted in the manner of a Javanese sultan, styled himself the “<a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/27/AR2008012700506.html">father of development</a>”, while King Bhumibol was lauded in North Korean-style state propaganda as the “<a href="http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/149942.The_King_Never_Smiles">development king</a>”.</p>
<p>When Bhumibol came to the throne in 1946 the finances of the <a href="https://silkwormbooks.com/products/thai-capital-after-1997-crisis">Thai royal family were in dire straits</a>. Today, Thailand’s monarchy is the <a href="http://www.richestlifestyle.com/richest-royals-in-the-world/">the wealthiest in the world</a>, surpassing the Arab oil monarchs and the United Kingdom’s Queen Elizabeth II.</p>
<p>But following Suharto’s resignation in May 1998, amid the economic disaster of the Asian Financial Crisis, <a href="http://www.insideindonesia.org/how-the-new-order-collapsed">the New Order military dictatorship collapsed</a>. Indonesia went through a process of <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/book/18855">rapid and far-reaching political reform</a> that transformed the country. For all its problems, Indonesia today is <a href="http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/10/26/how-is-indonesias-democracy-doing/">perhaps Southeast Asia’s most democratic nation</a>.</p>
<p>But the chairman of a communist party and the president of a newly formed nation are modern political offices. The Thai king, by contrast, is conceived of, on the one hand, as the descendant of an ancient caste of <a href="http://www.sjonhauser.nl/naresuan-the-great.html">warrior-kings</a>, and on the other as a <a href="http://www.sunypress.edu/p-6222-thailands-theory-of-monarchy.aspx">future Buddha</a>. The military and religious legacy of the Thai institution of monarchy <a href="http://www.royalty.nu/Asia/Thailand/">dates back to the 13th century</a>. </p>
<p>While Mao and Suharto are gone, the Chinese Communist Party and the Indonesian presidency remain. Yet, it is by no means certain that Thailand’s monarchy can survive King Bhumibol’s passing in the same way.</p>
<h2>The Shah of Iran</h2>
<p>The third comparison is Iran after the Shah. At first glance, Buddhist Thailand might not appear to bear comparison with Islamic Iran, yet there are, in fact, startling similarities.</p>
<p>Both countries had old monarchies which, unlike many in Asia, <a href="https://www.quora.com/Why-was-Thailand-never-colonized">survived the colonial era unscathed</a>. The kingdoms they ruled, though formally independent, were dominated by the European imperial powers – especially the British Empire. In the aftermath of World War II, the monarchy in each country was weak, parliamentary democracies were evolving, and the political forces of the Left were on the rise.</p>
<p>The Cold War changed everything. With US assistance, reactionary forces in each country crushed the emerging democratic regimes – famously in the case of Iran <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/19/cia-admits-role-1953-iranian-coup">with the assistance of a CIA and Mi6-sponsored coup</a> that overthrew the democratically-elected Prime Minister, Mohammed Mossadegh, and restored the autocratic Shah. </p>
<p>Iran and Thailand became key US allies in the <a href="http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/how-the-shah-entangled-america-8821">struggle against communism in the Middle East</a> and <a href="http://bigstory.ap.org/article/8258058a7a7d44d0873dfcd301a2660e/thai-king-bhumibol-was-bridge-close-relations-us">Southeast Asia</a> respectively. The US bolstered the authority of these monarchies as symbols of conservative stability.</p>
<p>In both countries <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2016/10/the-truth-about-thailands-social-media-surveillance/">networks of surveillance</a> and <a href="http://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1913&context=jil">repression were set up</a> to eliminate threats to the regime.</p>
<p>With democratic and leftist forces murdered, imprisoned, or in hiding, and farmers’ organisations, unions, and political parties banned or co-opted by the state, the two monarchs threw their authority behind policies of rapid economic development that transformed and polarised their societies. </p>
<p>Here the similarities end. </p>
<p>Shah Reza Pahlavi was overthrown in a massive revolution in 1978-9 that ended the two-and-a-half millennia-old Iranian monarchy and <a href="http://www.historytoday.com/blog/2013/07/revolutionary-iran-history-islamic-republic">established the Islamic Republic of Iran</a>. </p>
<p>Despite the victory of communist forces in Indochina and a home-grown Thai communist insurgency, Thailand’s <a href="http://www.cfr.org/thailand/mixed-legacy-king-bhumibol-adulyadej/p38398">King Bhumibol and its monarchy survived</a> – until now.</p>
<h2>Tipping point</h2>
<p>In all three Asian countries the passing of authoritarian rulers – Mao, Suharto, and Shah Reza Pahlavi – was followed by sweeping political and social change. </p>
<p>Thai society has been <a href="http://www.mei.edu/content/map/political-polarization-transition-and-civil-society-thailand-and-malaysia">acutely polarised for a decade</a>. The long duration of the conflict may encourage the perception that the country will just muddle through the succession, and that some political compromise will eventually be reached – as had been the case during previous periods of political turmoil during the late king’s reign.</p>
<p>But if the dramatic experiences of the three Asian countries discussed here following the passing of their powerful rulers provide any example, it would be short-sighted not to consider that a more far-reaching transformation than a royal succession might not also be in store for the Kingdom of Thailand.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/67985/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Patrick Jory does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It would be short-sighted to believe that a more far-reaching transformation than a royal succession might not also be in store for the Kingdom of Thailand.Patrick Jory, Senior Lecturer, Southeast Asian History, School of Historical and Philosophical Inquiry, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/671942016-10-20T06:27:18Z2016-10-20T06:27:18ZThe next king and a new constitution: a dangerous combination for Thailand<p>The next King of Thailand, Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn, has long been notorious for his unpredictability – a reputation that appears deserved with <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/13/thailand-maha-vajiralongkorn-crown-prince-king">his recent refusal</a> to ascend the throne immediately after the death of his father, Bhumibol Adulyadej. </p>
<p>Vajiralongkorn’s recalcitrance is particularly alarming, as the <a href="http://www.un.or.th/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/2016_Thailand-Draft-Constitution_EnglishTranslation_Full_Formatted_vFina....pdf">2016 constitution</a>, adopted in a referendum on August 7, is now awaiting royal approval. But will the new king do so?</p>
<p>A week-long throne vacancy has never happened in the history of constitutional monarchy in Thailand. Bhumibol was proclaimed king on the day his brother, Ananda Mahidol, Rama VIII, <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/flash/june/siam46.htm">was found dead</a> in his bedroom on June 9 1946. </p>
<p>Ananda’s proclamation as king had happened the same way, the day his predecessor abdicated the throne – even though he was a young boy of ten, and living abroad at the time. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142015/original/image-20161017-12416-1awll79.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142015/original/image-20161017-12416-1awll79.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142015/original/image-20161017-12416-1awll79.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142015/original/image-20161017-12416-1awll79.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142015/original/image-20161017-12416-1awll79.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142015/original/image-20161017-12416-1awll79.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142015/original/image-20161017-12416-1awll79.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mom Sangwal Mahidol na Ayudhya with Princess Galyani Vadhana, Prince Ananda Mahidol and Prince Bhumibol Adulyadej in 1929.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>‘The king is dead. Long live the king’</h2>
<p>Following Bhumibol’s death, the Prime Minister of Thailand, General Prayuth Chan-Ocha, announced on live television “The king is dead. Long live the king”. This formula is odd for Thailand, and a direct import from the Western doctrine of the two bodies of the king, developed in the late Middle Ages to <a href="http://press.princeton.edu/titles/6168.html">consolidate the institution of the monarchy</a>.</p>
<p>If Prayuth Chan-Ocha used this anachronistic phrase, it’s because it was needed to assert that Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn would indeed accede to the throne as Rama X. Prayuth was trying to avert any speculation that the crown prince could be sidelined in the succession process.</p>
<p>For many years, rumours had spread that Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn
who is <a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/princess-angel-v-playboy-prince-while-vajiralongkorn-mourns-sister-once-touted-succeed-king-1586316">more popular than the prince</a>, could be crowned queen instead of her brother, or at least become regent until Vajiralongkorn’s son, Dipangkorn, 11, comes of age. </p>
<p>Speculation was rife that any delay in making Vajiralongkorn king after the announcement of the death of the Bhumibol would lead to chaos. The <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-asian-studies/article/thailands-relapse-the-implications-of-the-may-2014-coup/9441736E71EB6A64531436AA748149F6">2014 military coup</a> was at least partly staged in order to manage a smooth handover and prevent any “<a href="http://as.ucpress.edu/content/55/6/1193">succession crisis</a>”.</p>
<h2>A constitutional crisis</h2>
<p>Succession seemed to be under control. But when Prayuth was granted an audience with Vajiralongkorn, the latter refused to become king, arguing he <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/world/coronation-of-thailands-crown-prince-vajiralongkorn-delayed-more-than-a-year-20161016-gs3c76.html">needed some time</a>. This created a vacancy of power and made the President of the Privy Council, <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/10/thailand-picks-pm-caretaker-king-death-161015130301947.html">Prem Tinsulanonda</a>, automatic regent. </p>
<p>A regent is a representative of a king in case of his incapacity or absence, and all the king’s powers are exercised by the regent. But, in the history of Thailand, there’s never been a regent without a king. What is particularly striking in the present situation is that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/245161">Prem’s mistrust of Vajiralongkorn is well known</a>.</p>
<p>The confusion over Vajiralongkorn’s ascension offers a glimpse of the even further erosion of the value of law in a country that has repeatedly violated its own laws and abolished its many constitutions in coups endorsed by the monarchy. </p>
<p>Since the end of absolute monarchy in Thailand in 1932, there have been <a href="http://www.springer.com/us/book/9789400772434">13 successful coups d'etat and 20 constitutions</a>. On average, a constitution lasts for 4.5 years and there is a coup every 6.5 years. </p>
<h2>Royal constitutional duties</h2>
<p>We tend to forget that even in a constitutional monarchy, there are a lot of constitutional duties for a king, signing legislation into law being the most obvious. </p>
<p>Along with duties come constitutional powers – most are written in the constitution, such as veto power over legislation – but also conventional “rights”, such as the right to be consulted, to encourage and to warn. This famous formula was used by Walter Bagehot in his seminal work published in 1867, <a href="http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/bagehot/constitution.pdf">The English Constitution</a>. </p>
<p>Thai constitutional lawyers, such as <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/people/person.asp?personId=8188823&privcapId=4484344">Bowornsak Uwanno</a>, used the English doctrine and applied it to the Thai monarchy. Those conventional powers were widely exercised by King Bhumibol, to such an extent that the he was able to build for himself crisis powers through several political interventions, some more controversial than others. </p>
<p>In the least controversial instance, during <a href="https://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg/publication/1451">the 1992 crisis</a> – which saw a street confrontation between protesters and the military government – Bhumibol summoned both the leader of the protests and the military dictator Suchinda Krapayoon, and called for an end to the conflict. As a result, Suchinda resigned.</p>
<p>More controversial was <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4945196.stm">Bhumibol’s speech to judges in April 2006</a> when he advised the courts to cancel a general election that had returned <a href="http://www.forbes.com/profile/thaksin-shinawatra/">Thaksin Shinawatra</a>, former prime minister, to power. The constitutional court did so, and paved the way for the <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00472330701652026">2006 military coup</a>.</p>
<p>The cautious exercise of crisis powers by King Bhumibol was rarely overridden or disregarded by political actors. Given the fear surrounding the crown prince, one might expect that no prime minister, senator, or judge, would dare to challenge him once he is head of state and erratically uses his nominal powers, such as veto powers and the power to dissolve the legislative assembly.</p>
<p>The 2016 constitution tries to avert this type of anticipated crisis by <a href="https://kyotoreview.org/yav/constitutional-court-2016-thailand-post-bhumibol">giving permanent super-crisis powers</a> to the constitutional court and maximum power to the army during a five-year transitional period. But the likelihood of clashes between the next head of state, the army and the constitutional court (<a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00472336.2016.1151917?journalCode=rjoc20">all part of a deep state insulated from elected civilian control</a>) remains high. </p>
<p>One thing is sure. As during the previous reign, the form of government will swing between that of full military dictatorship and “<a href="https://books.google.fr/books?id=GwjeCwAAQBAJ&pg=PT15&lpg=PT15&dq=H.+Kumarasingham+eastminster&source=bl&ots=giUJxm_xdC&sig=zIdYSAGrcPaZTjN50L3wr1_f5iU&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwirxPel2uHPAhWoL8AKHSLrB7gQ6AEIIjAB#v=onepage&q=H.%20Kumarasingham%20eastminster&f=false">Eastminster</a>”, a term coined by H. Kumarasingham to refer to India and Sri Lanka’s adaptation of the British Westminster model. The difference with Thailand is that in India and Sri Lanka, the head of state is elected. In Thailand, Eastminster means an imbalance of power in favour of the king and a general disregard for the law. </p>
<p>Uncertainty prevails, but what is certain is that the <a href="http://www.prachatai.com/english/node/6028">democratisation</a> that started in 1997 and was halted a few years later by a military coup, will be even further delayed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/67194/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eugénie Mérieau does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Will the next King of Thailand be able to bear his constitutional duties?Eugénie Mérieau, Lecturer, Sciences Po Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/326072014-10-08T00:32:26Z2014-10-08T00:32:26ZAn ailing king and succession intrigue put coup leaders on edge<p>Late last Friday the <a href="http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/64202/Bhumibol-Adulyadej">King of Thailand</a> was rushed from his seaside palace in Hua Hin to Siriraj hospital in Bangkok. The Palace issued an announcement that the King was suffering from a fever and a rapid heartbeat, but was responding to treatment. A subsequent <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-29502108">statement reported</a> that his gall bladder had been removed on Sunday night. </p>
<p>The King, aged 86 and for a long time in declining health, may very soon pass from the scene. He is the longest-serving head of state in the world. His passing is a once-in-a-century event.</p>
<p>Due to a religious taboo about speaking ill of the King, not to mention the country’s strict <a href="http://www.asiaobserver.org/on-thailand-lese-majeste-law">lèse majesté law</a> forbidding criticism of the King and royal family, the true state of the King’s health is unclear. Respected journalist <a href="https://www.facebook.com/zenjournalist?fref=nf">Andrew MacGregor Marshall</a> claims that the King has suffered a stroke, his second in two months.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"519136744420040704"}"></div></p>
<p>On Monday Thailand’s SET stock market index dropped sharply. A hard-line royalist social media site has warned people not to spread “inauspicious” rumours. The leader of the military junta and now prime minister, General Prayuth Chan-ocha, has led his Cabinet to the hospital to pay respects to the King.</p>
<p>Thailand could be entering a period of interregnum. If so, the ramifications for Thailand’s military dictatorship, and Thailand more generally, will be enormous.</p>
<h2>Was the coup a move to control succession?</h2>
<p>According to <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-good-coup-military-rule-is-unlikely-to-heal-thailand-28589">one theory</a>, the military coup in May this year was a pre-emptive strike by Thailand’s royalist establishment to seize control of the National Assembly from the elected government in preparation for the imminent succession. Under the constitution, changes to the succession arrangements require the approval of the National Assembly.</p>
<p>For nine years the royalists have been in a political war of attrition with the popular telecommunications businessman-turned-politician, <a href="http://www.lrb.co.uk/v36/n12/richard-lloydparry/the-story-of-thaksin-shinawatra">Thaksin Shinawatra</a>. His political platform of cheap health care, debt alleviation for farmers and accelerated rural development has made his political parties hugely popular among rural and lower-class urban voters – who make up over half the electorate. Pro-Thaksin parties have easily won the last six national elections. </p>
<p>For the first time in Thailand’s political history the masses have had a direct say in national politics, through the mechanism of electoral politics.
In doing this, Thaksin has challenged the grip that the military and bureaucracy, under the symbolic leadership of the King and royal family, have held on Thailand’s politics since the Cold War. The Thai word for bureaucrat – which includes the military – is <em>kha ratchakan</em>: “servant of the king”.</p>
<p>Thailand’s succession will be critical to the outcome of this political conflict. The monarch is enormously influential, belying the country’s official status as a constitutional monarchy. For example, all appointments to the military leadership must be approved by the Privy Council, the King’s hand-picked council of advisers. </p>
<p>The King is also the wealthiest monarch in the world. According to Thai law, he has sole control of assets worth around $US41 billion. The monarch’s role is legitimised by the propaganda organs of the Thai state, which promote a modern-day Buddhist version of divine kingship through all levels of the education system and the mass media.</p>
<p>The successor to the throne will inherit this immense store of political, economic and ideological power. It is understood that there is deep-seated resistance among Thailand’s royalist elite to the designated successor to the throne, Crown <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vajiralongkorn">Prince Vajiralongkorn</a>. The prince also lacks popular support. </p>
<h2>Royalists fear heir friendly with Thaksin</h2>
<p>The prince is, however, believed to be close to Thaksin, presumably due to Thaksin’s electoral popularity. Herein lies the existential fear that preoccupies this royalist elite.</p>
<p>Should Vajiralongkorn succeed to the throne, Thaksin would not only control the electorate, but effectively the monarchy too. This would represent the final defeat of the royalist establishment and all the interests that depend on it. </p>
<p>Their survival, therefore, depends on doing everything possible to prevent this scenario from taking place. According to this theory, in order to block Vajiralongkorn and Thaksin, the military regime and its royalist backers may engineer a change to the succession, perhaps elevating the more popular <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sirindhorn">Princess Sirindhorn</a> to the position of regent.</p>
<p>This would be an extreme course of action, but not unprecedented. In Thailand the principle of primogeniture has a weaker historical precedent in royal successions than in European monarchies. Succession struggles were not unusual.</p>
<p>Since seizing power in May, the military regime has tried to destroy Thaksin’s support base. Hundreds of mostly pro-Thaksin supporters have been detained. Pro-Thaksin politicians, democratic activists and intellectuals have fled the country.</p>
<p>Media organs linked to Thaksin have been closed down. Regime loyalists have replaced officials regarded as sympathetic to Thaksin. The interim constitution gives virtually absolute power to the junta leader. <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/world/martial-law-remains-as-thailands-military-ruler-appoints-reform-council-20141007-10r8to.html">Martial law remains in place</a> for most of the country.</p>
<p>A new constitution currently being drafted is expected to dilute the influence of elected politicians with the aim that they will never again be able to challenge the power of the military and the bureaucracy. This extreme centralisation of power, together with the high level of repression and heavy propaganda – excessive even by Thai standards – stems from acute uncertainty over the imminent passing of the King and the threat this poses to the establishment.</p>
<h2>Military’s hold on power is not secure</h2>
<p>Despite the regime’s propaganda to the contrary, the military lacks popular support. Prayuth has few political skills; he has even succeeded in alienating sections of his own support. His relations with the media are testy.</p>
<p>The crackdown on academic freedom and the rare detention of a number of high-profile academics have angered the more liberal sections of the academic community. Already corruption scandals and charges of cronyism in political appointments are being discussed, even in the compliant media. Tourism, a major revenue earner for the country, is down and the recent <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-10-03/thai-police-say-myanmar-men-confess-british-tourists-murder/5788200">murder of two British tourists</a> has been handled poorly by the military regime.</p>
<p>Most importantly, the economy (which had always been Thaksin’s strength), is in trouble. The World Bank <a href="http://englishnews.thaipbs.or.th/world-bank-cuts-thai-growth-forecast-1-5/">has forecast</a> a mere 1.5% growth this year - the lowest in ASEAN. Rumours of a counter-coup refuse to go away.</p>
<p>The regime has few foreign friends. The United States, the European Union and Japan condemned the coup. The Australian government has banned travel to Australia by the junta leaders. The military leadership’s apparent attempt to turn to China for diplomatic support has done little to win the confidence of Western states.</p>
<p>The regime is therefore less secure than it appears. The political situation is unstable and volatile. Having stayed loyal to Thaksin after coups, party dissolutions and the killing of upwards of 90 Red Shirt protesters and wounding of thousands, it is difficult to imagine that the pro-Thaksin forces will simply vanish in the face of the regime’s repression. More likely they too are waiting for the succession.</p>
<p>The King came to the throne in 1946. The one constant over the last 69 politically turbulent years will soon disappear from the scene. The succession is not simply about the future of the monarchy but also the authoritarian political edifice that formed around the King from the late 1950s. Thailand will soon be entering uncharted territory.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/32607/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Patrick Jory receives funding from the University of Queensland.</span></em></p>Late last Friday the King of Thailand was rushed from his seaside palace in Hua Hin to Siriraj hospital in Bangkok. The Palace issued an announcement that the King was suffering from a fever and a rapid…Patrick Jory, Senior Lecturer, Southeast Asian History, School of History, Philosophy, Religion and Classics, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.