tag:theconversation.com,2011:/fr/topics/military-alliances-37231/articlesMilitary alliances – The Conversation2023-07-25T12:24:41Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2097632023-07-25T12:24:41Z2023-07-25T12:24:41ZNATO isn’t the only alliance that countries are eager to join – a brief history of the Five Eyes<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538355/original/file-20230719-19-92axgr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=47%2C23%2C5182%2C3457&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The July 2023 NATO summit in Lithuania saw movement toward expanding the alliance.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/LithuaniaNATOSummit/379be0fe4c174cd79e040b362b0c85ad/photo">Paul Ellis/Pool Photo via AP</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>After the recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/3-takeaways-from-the-nato-summit-and-where-it-leaves-the-military-alliance-209665">NATO summit</a> in <a href="https://theconversation.com/nato-vilnius-summit-will-reflect-fresh-sense-of-purpose-over-ukraine-war-but-hard-questions-remain-over-membership-issues-208293">Vilnius</a>, Lithuania, it is anticipated that <a href="https://theconversation.com/sweden-a-history-of-neutrality-ends-after-200-years-183583">Sweden</a> will soon become <a href="https://theconversation.com/sweden-is-joining-nato-what-that-means-for-the-alliance-and-the-war-in-ukraine-209539">the alliance’s 32nd member</a>.</p>
<p>The heart of this <a href="https://theconversation.com/at-70-is-nato-still-important-5-essential-reads-128267">alliance</a> – which was <a href="https://theconversation.com/soviet-aggression-prompted-the-birth-of-the-nato-alliance-heres-why-that-matters-now-209608">established</a> in the aftermath of World War II to promote the collective security of its mostly Western European members – is <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm">Article 5</a> of the <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_89597.htm">North Atlantic Treaty</a>, which requires that <a href="https://theconversation.com/could-poland-demand-nato-act-in-event-of-russian-attack-an-expert-explains-article-4-and-5-commitments-following-missile-blast-194714">if one member is attacked</a>, then all of the other members will respond as if they themselves had been attacked.</p>
<p>Its most recent addition came in April 2023, when <a href="https://theconversation.com/finland-joins-nato-in-a-major-blow-to-putin-which-doubles-the-length-of-the-alliances-border-with-russia-203217">Finland</a> became <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_213448.htm">the 31st country</a> to join.</p>
<p>At present, NATO currently recognizes <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49212.htm">Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, and Ukraine</a> as aspiring members.</p>
<p>But <a href="https://theconversation.com/beyond-nato-new-alliances-could-defend-democracy-and-counter-putin-177683">NATO isn’t the only alliance</a> that countries across the globe are eager to join.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/1338655960">For more than 75 years</a>, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the U.K. and the U.S. have been <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/newly-disclosed-documents-five-eyes-alliance-and-what-they-tell-us-about-intelligence-sharing">sharing intelligence with one another</a> as part of what they call the Five Eyes alliance.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.afio.com/publications/HOLZER_GIBSON_Ultra_Diplomacy-WIMAD_AFIO_Intelligencer_WinterSpring_2023_Vol28_No1.pdf">I am a former U.S. Army intelligence analyst</a> who now studies and teaches <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=vXXZBEkAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">political science</a>. I know from personal experience that the Five Eyes is still very active in the 21st century, even though it’s not as well known as its younger sibling NATO.</p>
<h2>Origins</h2>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538356/original/file-20230719-25-to4yyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="An image of a typewritten letter with handwritten markings and a 'Most Secret' stamp across the top." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538356/original/file-20230719-25-to4yyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538356/original/file-20230719-25-to4yyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=732&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538356/original/file-20230719-25-to4yyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=732&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538356/original/file-20230719-25-to4yyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=732&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538356/original/file-20230719-25-to4yyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=920&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538356/original/file-20230719-25-to4yyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=920&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538356/original/file-20230719-25-to4yyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=920&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A 1941 document in which U.K. Prime Minister Winston Churchill approved sharing key intelligence secrets with the U.S.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.nationalchurchillmuseum.org/">Image courtesy of America’s National Churchill Museum</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In 1940, <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/1083458138">during the prime ministership of Winston Churchill</a>, a secret effort by U.K. codebreakers to deconstruct Germany’s Enigma machine succeeded, allowing the British to read German military messages. These messages ended up being a major source of intelligence throughout World War II, <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/1075737">providing much-needed information</a> about German troop numbers, military maneuvers and technological developments.</p>
<p>British mathematician <a href="https://theconversation.com/imitation-game-will-finally-bring-alan-turing-the-fame-he-so-rightly-deserves-34324">Alan Turing</a> is probably the <a href="https://theconversation.com/alan-turing-visionary-war-hero-and-the-only-choice-for-the-50-note-106470">most widely recognized</a> <a href="https://theconversation.com/alan-turing-was-one-of-many-persecuted-by-whitehall-for-their-sexuality-58018">person</a> who worked to help crack the Enigma machine. But in reality it was the <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/575581/geniuses-at-war-by-david-a-price/">collective effort</a> of hundreds of men <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-female-enigmas-of-bletchley-park-in-the-1940s-should-encourage-those-of-tomorrow-36640">and women</a>, including <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/universitypress/subjects/management/organisation-studies/decoding-organization-bletchley-park-codebreaking-and-organization-studies">mathematicians, linguists and even chess champions</a>.</p>
<p>Parallel to these developments, <a href="https://www.afio.com/publications/BROOKS_Stealing_the_Japanese_Codebooks_from_AFIO_Intelligencer_Vol25_No2_Fall_2019.pdf">U.S. codebreakers</a> were able to successfully <a href="https://www.afio.com/publications/OLESON_WIMAD_Breaking_of_JN-25_from_AFIO_Intelligencer_Vol26_No2_WinterSpring_2021.pdf">crack diplomatic codes</a> used by the Japanese.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/16/world/europe/bletchley-park-us-britain-surveillance.html">In February 1941</a>, an American military delegation was invited to visit the U.K. codebreaking operation, based on an estate called <a href="https://bletchleypark.org.uk">Bletchley Park</a>. However, when “approving the visit, Churchill … <a href="https://youtu.be/nLlzHSmI5tw?t=633">prohibited any British discussion of their success against the Enigma</a>” machine, according to a 2016 speech by Richard Ledgett, then the <a href="https://www.nsa.gov/Press-Room/Press-Releases-Statements/Press-Release-View/Article/1621334/richard-h-ledgett-jr-named-nsas-new-deputy-director/">deputy director of the U.S. National Security Agency</a>.</p>
<p>Upon their arrival, the American officers “<a href="https://news.wcmo.edu/features-carousel/conversation-with-nsa-ledgett/">explained how to break the Japanese codes</a>,” Ledgett said, going on to observe that the information “<a href="https://youtu.be/nLlzHSmI5tw?t=698">caused the British to re-examine their initial decision</a>” to keep their Enigma success a secret.</p>
<p>Afterward, <a href="https://youtu.be/nLlzHSmI5tw?t=3001">Churchill approved a request</a> to reveal “<a href="https://www.afio.com/publications/HOLZER_GIBSON_Ultra_Diplomacy-WIMAD_AFIO_Intelligencer_WinterSpring_2023_Vol28_No1.pdf">to our American colleagues the progress</a> … made in probing German Armed Force cryptography.”</p>
<p><a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/1231608251">Throughout the remainder of the war</a>, the U.K. and U.S. continued working together to enhance their codebreaking capabilities. In 1943, this informal relationship was formalized with the Britain-United States of America, or <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/0161-119791885742">BRUSA</a>, agreement.</p>
<p>This intelligence alliance was further strengthened by <a href="https://www.gchq.gov.uk/information/brief-history-of-ukusa">the UKUSA agreement</a> signed on March 5, 1946. That same day, Churchill was at <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZA5ISi9yhhs&t=59s">Westminster College</a> in <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X2FM3_h33Tg">Fulton, Missouri</a> – the <a href="https://www.wcmo.edu">college</a> where I now teach – giving his “<a href="https://winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1946-1963-elder-statesman/the-sinews-of-peace/">Iron Curtain</a>” speech.</p>
<p>In 2010, <a href="https://www.nsa.gov/Portals/70/documents/news-features/declassified-documents/ukusa/agreement_outline_5mar46.pdf">this top-secret agreement was declassified</a> and made publicly available for the first time. </p>
<p>Canada joined the UKUSA agreement in 1948. Australia and New Zealand joined in 1956. Thus, the <a href="https://www.afio.com/publications/HOLZER_GIBSON_Ultra_Diplomacy-WIMAD_AFIO_Intelligencer_WinterSpring_2023_Vol28_No1.pdf">the Five Eyes was born</a>.</p>
<h2>Recent developments</h2>
<p>To address the <a href="https://www.economist.com/china/2021/05/08/china-wants-the-world-to-know-that-resistance-to-its-rise-is-futile">rising power of China</a>, members of the Five Eyes have recently expanded the scope of the alliance <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/five-eyes-blurring-lines-between-intelligence-policy">beyond intelligence sharing into the realm of policy</a>. Five Eyes <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/public-safety-canada/news/2019/08/five-country-ministerial-and-quintet-of-attorneys-general-concludes.html">attorneys general</a> now regularly <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/quintet-attorneys-general-statement-support-prosecutor-general-ukraine-and-investigations-and">meet</a>, as do <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1039">finance</a> <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2228642/joint-statement-five-eyes-defense-ministers-meeting/">and defense</a> <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2384146/five-eyes-defence-ministers-meeting-press-release/">ministers</a>. </p>
<p>In November 2020, the once-secretive Five Eyes alliance took the bold step of publicly issuing a joint statement condemning China’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-52765838">National Security Law</a> for “<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20201119004529/https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-hong-kong-2/">undermin[ing] Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy</a>.”</p>
<p>China responded by warning that “<a href="http://au.china-embassy.gov.cn/engsghdxwfb_1/202112/t20211221_10473480.htm">attempts by certain countries to meddle in Hong Kong politics</a> … are futile and doomed to fail.”</p>
<p>Notably, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-56970640.amp">China is New Zealand’s largest export market</a>. At the time, New Zealand was also hoping to conclude an <a href="http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/enarticle/ennewzealand/ennewzealandnews/201911/41742_1.html">upgraded free trade deal</a> with China.</p>
<p>In January 2021, the Five Eyes countries – except New Zealand – issued a joint statement condemning “the <a href="https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/marise-payne/media-release/joint-statement-arrests-hong-kong">mass arrests of 55 politicians and activists in Hong Kong</a> for subversion under the National Security Law.” That same month, China and New Zealand signed <a href="http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/enarticle/ennewzealand/ennewzealandnews/202102/44483_1.html">the upgraded free trade deal</a>.</p>
<p>Since that time, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3130094/new-zealand-uncomfortable-growing-scope-five-eyes-members">New Zealand</a> has <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/east-asia-pacific_new-zealand-criticized-five-eyes-alliance-stance-china/6205205.html">continued to avoid</a> taking as strong a position <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/03/asia/new-zealand-xinjiang-china-intl-hnk-dst/index.html">as the rest of the Five Eyes</a>. <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/07/new-zealand-will-not-join-the-us-coalition-against-china-anytime-soon/">As a result</a>, the U.S. has sought to circumvent New Zealand’s reluctance by formalizing <a href="https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2021/09/22/john-bolton-on-how-a-new-era-of-american-alliances-is-under-way">other agreements</a> without the Kiwis.</p>
<p>For example, in September 2021, Australia, the U.K. and the U.S. announced <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-aukus-pact-born-in-secrecy-will-have-huge-implications-for-australia-and-the-region-168065">the AUKUS partnership</a>. Under this agreement, the three countries “<a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus/">will expand and accelerate [the] sharing of sensitive information</a>.” <a href="https://theconversation.com/canadas-exclusion-from-the-aukus-security-pact-reveals-a-failing-national-defence-policy-168235">Canada</a> has expressed a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/08/canada-aukus-defence-pact">desire</a> to <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/canadian-membership-aukus-time-action">join</a> the <a href="https://www.economist.com/international/2021/09/19/the-strategic-reverberations-of-the-aukus-deal-will-be-big-and-lasting">AUKUS</a> partnership. This would leave New Zealand as the only Five Eyes member <a href="https://theconversation.com/approach-with-caution-why-nz-should-be-wary-of-buying-into-the-aukus-security-pact-203915">outside of the pact</a>.</p>
<p>The Five Eyes alliance has had to deal with other <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/suspicion-creeps-five-eyes">internal difficulties</a> as well. For example, the U.S. has had several notable intelligence failures, including the leaks of classified documents by <a href="https://theconversation.com/redefining-privacy-in-the-age-of-edward-snowden-21891">Edward Snowden</a> and former President Donald <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-exposure-of-highly-classified-documents-could-harm-us-security-and-why-there-are-laws-against-storing-them-insecurely-207484">Trump’s alleged hoarding of classified documents</a>. Both of those events undermine <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/10/ukraine-russia-war-leaks-classified-damage-control/">U.S. assurances</a> to its allies that it can keep a secret.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538358/original/file-20230719-29-c4lisd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A crowd looks at a large sign with the Australian, U.K. and U.S. flags, while three men stand at lecterns just below it." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538358/original/file-20230719-29-c4lisd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538358/original/file-20230719-29-c4lisd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538358/original/file-20230719-29-c4lisd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538358/original/file-20230719-29-c4lisd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538358/original/file-20230719-29-c4lisd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538358/original/file-20230719-29-c4lisd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538358/original/file-20230719-29-c4lisd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The leaders of the U.S., U.K. and Australia make an announcement about the AUKUS alliance in March 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/USBritainSunak/65a989fb98ac4a08b7d11a699f2c509c/photo">Stefan Rousseau/Pool via AP</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Looking ahead</h2>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2019.1633186">Over the years</a>, several countries have been considered as potential candidates to join the Five Eyes, including <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/could-india-join-five-eyes">India</a>, <a href="https://www.australianjewishnews.com/calls-for-israel-to-join-five-eyes-intelligence-network/">Israel</a>, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/us-lawmakers-push-for-german-entrance-to-five-eyes-spy-alliance/a-17246049">Germany</a> and <a href="https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3148806/chinas-top-diplomat-wang-yi-slams-us-move-south-korea-join">South Korea</a>.</p>
<p>Currently, the most likely candidate is probably <a href="https://theconversation.com/from-five-eyes-to-six-japans-push-to-join-the-wests-intelligence-alliance-159429">Japan</a>. At the end of 2016, Australia and the U.S. signed a <a href="https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016-Australia-Japan-U-S-Trilateral-Information-Sharing-Arrangement-Signing.pdf">trilateral agreement</a> with Japan to deepen their covert security cooperation. As of 2020, Japan’s minister of defense was enthusiastically <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/Interview/Japan-wants-de-facto-Six-Eyes-intelligence-status-defense-chief">in favor of joining</a> the Five Eyes. In 2021, Japan’s ambassador to Australia argued that “in terms of interests and capability, <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/japan-should-join-five-eyes-intelligence-network-says-ambassador-20210420-p57kv6.html">Japan is the best candidate</a>” to consider for enlarging the Five Eyes. </p>
<p>In 2022, the U.S. House <a href="https://armedservices.house.gov/subcommittees/intelligence-and-special-operations-117th-congress">Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations</a> “acknowledge[d] that the <a href="https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20210901/114012/BILLS-117HR4350ih-ISOSubcommitteeMark.pdf">threat landscape has vastly changed</a> since the inception of the Five Eyes arrangement, with primary threats now emanating from China and Russia.” It recommended “<a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CRPT-117hrpt118/html/CRPT-117hrpt118.htm">expanding the Five Eyes arrangement to include … Japan</a>.”</p>
<p>Regardless of whether <a href="https://www.economist.com/asia/2022/01/01/how-japan-sees-china">Japan</a> – or others – ends up joining the alliance, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman warned in 2020 that “no matter how many eyes they have, five or 10 or whatever, should anyone dare to undermine China’s sovereignty, security and development interests,” they should “<a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/china-threatens-to-poke-the-eyes-of-five-eyes-nations-over-hk-20201120-p56gep.html">be careful not to get poked in the eye</a>.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209763/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joshua Holzer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>NATO gets the headlines, but the Five Eyes alliance is another close connection between key Western powers, and it may expand.Joshua Holzer, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Westminster CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1994182023-02-14T13:43:04Z2023-02-14T13:43:04ZWhen two elephants fight: how the global south uses non-alignment to avoid great power rivalries<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509129/original/file-20230209-24-gfvsje.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An Indonesian military honour guard marks the 60th anniversary of the Asian-African Conference in Bandung in 2015. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Achmad Ibrahim /AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>An African proverb notes that “when two elephants fight, it is the grass underneath that suffers”.</p>
<p>Many states in the global south are, therefore, seeking to avoid getting caught in the middle of any future battles between the US and China. Instead, they are calling for a renewal of the concept of non-alignment. This was an approach employed in the 1950s by newly independent countries to <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-the-non-aligned-movement-in-the-21st-century-66057">balance</a> between the two ideological power blocs of east and west during the era of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Cold-War">Cold War</a></p>
<p>The new non-alignment stance is based on a perceived need to maintain southern sovereignty, pursue socio-economic development, and benefit from powerful external partners without having to choose sides. It also comes from historical grievances during the era of slavery, colonialism and Cold War interventionism. </p>
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<p>These grievances include unilateral American military interventions in <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/U-S-invasion-of-Grenada">Grenada</a> (1983), <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-50837024">Panama</a> (1989) and <a href="https://origins.osu.edu/milestones/march-2013-us-invasion-iraq-10-years-later?language_content_entity=en">Iraq</a> (2003) as well as support by the US and France for autocracies in countries like Egypt, Morocco, Chad and Saudi Arabia, when it suits their interests. </p>
<p>Many southern governments are particularly irked by America’s Manichaean division of the world into “good” democracies and “bad” autocracies. More recently, countries in the global south have highlighted north-south trade disputes and <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9168349/">western hoarding</a> of COVID-19 vaccines as reinforcing the unequal international system of <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2022-01-04/vaccine-apartheid-risks-rising-global-shortages-in-2022">“global apartheid”</a>. </p>
<p>A return of non-alignment was evident at the March 2022 UN General Assembly special session on Ukraine. Fifty-two governments from the global south did not support western sanctions against <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/10/1129492">Russia</a>. This, despite Russia’s clear violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty, which southern states have historically condemned.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/five-essential-reads-on-russia-africa-relations-187568">Five essential reads on Russia-Africa relations</a>
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<p>A month later, 82 southern states <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/04/1115782">refused to back</a> western efforts to suspend Russia from the UN Human Rights Council.</p>
<p>These included powerful southern states such as India, Indonesia, South Africa, Ethiopia, Brazil, Argentina and Mexico. </p>
<h2>The origins of non-alignment</h2>
<p>In <a href="https://www.southcentre.int/question/revisiting-the-1955-bandung-asian-african-conference-and-its-legacy/">1955</a>, a conference was held in the Indonesian city of Bandung to regain the sovereignty of Africa and Asia from western imperial rule. The summit also sought to foster global peace, promote economic and cultural cooperation, and end racial domination. Governments attending were urged to abstain from collective defence arrangements with great powers. </p>
<p>Six years later, in 1961, the 120-strong Non-Aligned Movement <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Non-Aligned-Movement">emerged</a>. Members were required to shun military alliances such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact, as well as bilateral security treaties with great powers.</p>
<p>Non-alignment advocated “positive” – not passive – neutrality. States were encouraged to contribute actively to strengthening and reforming institutions such as the UN and the World Bank. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/rethinking-how-we-look-at-africas-relationship-with-china-159747">Rethinking how we look at Africa's relationship with China</a>
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<p>India’s patrician prime minister, <a href="https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/former_pm/shri-jawaharlal-nehru/">Jawaharlal Nehru</a>, is widely regarded to have been the intellectual “<a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/non-alignment-was-coined-by-nehru-in-1954/articleshow/2000656.cms">father of non-alignment</a>”. He regarded the concept as an insurance policy against world domination by either superpower bloc or China. He also advocated nuclear disarmament.</p>
<p>Indonesia’s military strongman, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Suharto">Suharto</a>, championed non-alignment through “<a href="https://asean.org/opening-statement-his-excellency-mr-soeharto-president-of-the-republic-of-indonesia/">regional resilience</a>”. South-east Asian states were urged to seek autonomy and prevent external powers from intervening in the region.</p>
<p>Egypt’s charismatic prophet of Arab unity, <a href="https://www.presidency.eg/en/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A4%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%82%D9%88%D9%86/%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B5%D8%B1/">Gamal Abdel Nasser</a>, strongly backed the use of force in conducting wars of liberation <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2008/6/20/arab-unity-nassers-revolution">in Algeria and southern Africa</a>, buying arms and receiving aid from both east and west.
For his part, Ghana’s prophet of African unity, <a href="https://theconversation.com/kwame-nkrumah-why-every-now-and-then-his-legacy-is-questioned-120790">Kwame Nkrumah</a>, promoted the idea of <a href="https://www.internationalscholarsjournals.com/articles/kwame-nkrumah-and-the-proposed-african-common-government.pdf">an African High Command</a> as a common army to ward off external intervention and support Africa’s liberation.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-and-regimes/non-aligned-movement-nam/#:%7E:text=The%20Non%2DAligned%20Movement%20was,to%20remain%20independent%20or%20neutral">Non-Aligned Movement</a>, however, suffered from the problems of trying to maintain cohesion among a large, diverse group. Many countries were clearly aligned to one or other power bloc. </p>
<p>By the early 1980s, the group had switched its focus from east-west geo-politics to north–south geo-economics. The Non-Aligned Movement started advocating a “<a href="http://www.un-documents.net/s6r3201.htm">new international economic order</a>”. This envisaged technology and resources being transferred from the rich north to the global south in order to promote industrialisation. </p>
<p>The north, however, simply refused to support these efforts.</p>
<h2>Latin America and south-east Asia</h2>
<p>Most of the recent thinking and debates on non-alignment have occurred in Latin America and south-east Asia. </p>
<p>Most Latin American countries have refused to align with any major power. They have also ignored Washington’s warnings <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/us-and-europe-deteriorating-relations-with-latin-america-china-by-ana-palacio-2022-07">to avoid doing business with China</a>. Many have embraced Chinese infrastructure, 5G technology and digital connectivity. </p>
<p>Bolivia, Cuba, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela refused to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Many of the region’s states declined western requests to impose sanctions on Moscow. The return of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Luiz-Inacio-Lula-da-Silva">Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva</a> as <a href="https://theconversation.com/five-big-challenges-for-lulas-presidency-of-brazil-197967">president</a> of Brazil – the largest and wealthiest country in the region – heralds the “second coming” (following his first presidency between 2003 and 2011) of a champion of global south solidarity.</p>
<p>For its part, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (<a href="https://asean.org/member-states/">ASEAN</a>) has shown that non-alignment has as much to do with geography as strategy. Singapore sanctioned Russia over the invasion of Ukraine. Indonesia condemned the intervention but rejected sanctions. Myanmar backed the invasion while Laos and Vietnam <a href="http://www.taiheinstitute.org/UpLoadFile/files/2022/6/30/11206652fbb64821-c.pdf">refused to condemn Moscow’s aggression</a>.</p>
<p>Many ASEAN states have historically championed “declaratory non-alignment”. They have used the concept largely rhetorically while, in reality, practising a promiscuous “multi-alignment”. Singapore and the Philippines forged close military ties with the US; Myanmar with India; Vietnam with Russia, India, and the US; and Malaysia with Britain, Australia, and New Zealand. </p>
<p>This is also a region in which states simultaneously embrace and fear Chinese economic assistance and military cooperation. This, while seeking to avoid any external powers dominating the region or forming exclusionary military alliances.</p>
<p>Strong African voices are largely absent from these non-alignment debates, and are urgently needed. </p>
<h2>Pursuing non-alignment in Africa</h2>
<p>Africa is the world’s most insecure continent, <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/data">hosting 84%</a> of UN peacekeepers. This points to a need for a cohesive southern bloc that can produce a self-sustaining security system – <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/the-quest-for-pax-africana/">Pax Africana</a> – while promoting socio-economic development.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/peace-and-security-in-africa-how-china-can-help-address-weaknesses-156219">Peace and security in Africa: how China can help address weaknesses</a>
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<p>Uganda aims to champion this approach when it takes over the three-year rotating chair of the Non-Aligned Movement <a href="https://www.newvision.co.ug/category/news/uganda-to-chair-non-aligned-movement-in-2023-117191">in December 2023</a>. Strengthening the organisation into a more cohesive bloc, while fostering unity within the global south, is a major goal of its tenure.</p>
<p>Uganda has strong potential allies. For example, South Africa has championed “strategic non-alignment” in the Ukraine conflict, advocating a UN-negotiated solution, while <a href="http://www.taiheinstitute.org/UpLoadFile/files/2022/6/30/11206652fbb64821-c.pdf">refusing to sanction its BRICS ally, Russia</a>. It has also relentlessly courted its largest bilateral trading partner, China, whose <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative">Belt and Road Initiative</a> and <a href="https://www.escr-net.org/sites/default/files/brics-ndb-factsheet-final-1.pdf">BRICS bank</a> are building infrastructure across the global south.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-and-russia-president-cyril-ramaphosas-foreign-policy-explained-198430">South Africa and Russia: President Cyril Ramaphosa's foreign policy explained</a>
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<p>Beijing is Africa’s largest trading partner at US$254 billion, and <a href="https://www.statista.com/chart/27880/trade-between-china-and-africa/">builds a third of the continent’s infrastructure</a>.</p>
<p>If a new non-alignment is to be achieved in Africa, the foreign military bases of the US, France and China – and the Russian military presence – must, however, be dismantled.</p>
<p>At the same time the continent should continue to support the UN-led rules-based international order, condemning unilateral interventions in both Ukraine and Iraq. Pax Africana would best be served by:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>building local security capacity in close cooperation with the UN; </p></li>
<li><p>promoting effective regional integration; and </p></li>
<li><p>fencing off the continent from meddling external powers, while continuing to welcome trade and investment from both east and west.</p></li>
</ul><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199418/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adekeye Adebajo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>If a new non-alignment is to be achieved in Africa, the foreign military bases of the US, France, and China - and the Russian military presence - must be dismantled.Adekeye Adebajo, Professor and Senior research fellow, Centre for the Advancement of Scholarship, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1947142022-11-16T02:49:11Z2022-11-16T02:49:11ZCould Poland demand NATO act in event of Russian attack? An expert explains Article 4 and 5 commitments following missile blast<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/495529/original/file-20221116-19-o0ccgm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=22%2C45%2C3735%2C2287&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Police officers gather at the site where offcials say a Russian-made missile fell.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/PolandRussiaUkraineWar/77c6e3fdba804d7cbf828dad1159e648/photo?Query=Poland&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=87316&currentItemNo=0">AP Photo</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The risk of the conflict in Ukraine expanding further into Eastern Europe escalated on Nov. 15, 2022, with <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-zelenskyy-kherson-9202c032cf3a5c22761ee71b52ff9d52">reports of a Russian-made missile straying</a> into neighboring Poland.</em></p>
<p><em>It was not immediately clear if the apparent strike – in which two people were killed – was intentional or accidental, or where the missile had originated. Later, the Polish president said that the projectile <a href="https://twitter.com/AFP/status/1592841693443035136">likely originated from Ukrainian air defense</a>. Nonetheless, concern that a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO, could become further embroiled in the conflict led to questions over <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/202%202/11/15/what-is-article-5-nato/">whether Poland may invoke Article 4 or Article 5</a> of the NATO treaty if attacked – something that could lead to military intervention by other member countries.</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation asked John R. Deni, <a href="https://www.american.edu/sis/faculty/deni.cfm">research professor at the U.S. Army War College, a lecturer at American University</a>, and author of “<a href="https://librarycatalog.ecu.edu/catalog/4809141">NATO and Article 5: The Transatlantic Alliance and the Twenty-First-Century Challenges of Collective Defense</a>,” to explain what invoking these articles would mean – and what would happen next.</em></p>
<h2>What is Article 5 of the NATO Treaty?</h2>
<p>Article 5 really is the heart and soul of the NATO alliance. It is the <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm#:%7E:text=Article%205%20provides%20that%20if,to%20assist%20the%20Ally%20attacked.">part of the treaty</a> that says that if one member is attacked, then all of the other members will treat it as an attack on them all. In effect, it calls for a collective response once requested by any of the current 30 members of NATO and invoked by the entire alliance.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm">NATO treaty</a> was signed in April 1949 and Article 5 is central to it. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, Western European countries sought a way to defend themselves in the event Germany again arose as a security challenge. By the late 1940s, concerns shifted toward the threat posed by the Soviet Union, which stationed large military forces across Eastern Europe, <a href="https://scalar.usc.edu/works/dissolution-of-czechoslovakia/1948-czechoslovak-coup-dtat">staged a coup in Czechoslovakia</a>, and <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_136188.htm#:%7E:text=Joseph%20Stalin%2C%20the%20Soviet%20leader,come%20to%20West%20Berlin's%20aid.">blockaded Berlin</a>.</p>
<p>Initially, the United States was skeptical of joining any kind of post-war alliance in Europe, but Soviet actions convinced American leaders to sign on as a way of maintaining Western Europe as free and open. </p>
<p>Article 5 doesn’t automatically get triggered once a NATO member is attacked; the country attacked needs to request that the alliance invoke it – in this case, that would mean Poland, should Polish officials conclude that Russian missiles were sent deliberately. </p>
<h2>What is the U.S. responsibility should it be triggered?</h2>
<p>In practice, invoking Article 5 would mean that the United States would be called upon to help defend any European ally, or Canada, if attacked.</p>
<p>But, there is an important caveat. Article 5 was <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm#:%7E:text=Article%205%20provides%20that%20if,to%20assist%20the%20Ally%20attacked.">written in such a way</a> that it allows each ally to decide for itself the best course of action to take – there is no prescribed response once the article is invoked.</p>
<p>In the case of U.S., the executive branch – that is, the president – would need to consider the views and responsibilities of the Congress. If the president were to decide on direct military action, then Congress would likely be involved in some capacity – and of course only <a href="https://www.senate.gov/about/powers-procedures/declarations-of-war.htm">Congress has the power to declare war</a>.</p>
<p>But Article 5 doesn’t necessarily require a military response. In fact, there is enough flexibility in the language of the treaty for a more nuanced response.</p>
<p>This is vital. Each member of NATO remains a sovereign state, and can’t be compelled into military action. Decision-making over the use of force remains at the national level; such choices are not simply handed over to a supranational organization.</p>
<p>That said, U.S. President Joe Biden – as with previous presidents – has been very clear about America’s willingness to <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XHPokI1FsFE">defend “every inch</a>” of NATO territory.</p>
<p>As such, if there were a deliberate attack on a NATO ally, I’d expect a robust response by the U.S. and potentially a military one.</p>
<p>It would, of course, depend on what the attacked ally requested, and what the U.S. believes it can and should provide.</p>
<h2>In what instances has it been triggered in the past?</h2>
<p>Article 5 has only been triggered <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm">once in the seven decades</a> of NATO’s existence. That was on Sept. 12, 2001 – the day after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States.</p>
<p>The European allies came to the U.S.’s defense on that occasion. They did this by deploying patrol aircraft in U.S. airspace. Additionally, when the decision was made to invade Afghanistan, several NATO countries in which American troops are based – especially Germany – provided guards for U.S. military bases overseas so that American soldiers could deploy.</p>
<h2>Could this apparent missile strike on Poland trigger Article 5?</h2>
<p>That is tricky to assess at the moment, as not all the details are known – there are lots of variables at play.</p>
<p>It makes a massive difference whether this was a targeted attack on Polish military or civilian sites, or whether it was stray missiles. There is also the possibility that this was debris from a strike in Ukraine. We know that the missiles fell close to the Polish-Ukrainian border, in a village <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/explosion-kills-two-poland-near-ukraine-border-2022-11-15/">just a few miles away from the border</a>. The loss of any innocent lives is tragic in any case, but I think the number of deaths resulting from the strike will also be a factor in whether Poland requests invocation of Article 5.</p>
<p><iframe id="0QTpk" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/0QTpk/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>If it looks like an accident, that will definitely affect how and if the alliance responds. And even if it was deemed an intentional strike, the Poles may still decide not to request invocation of Article 5. This is when Article 4 of the NATO Treaty comes into play.</p>
<h2>What is Article 4?</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49187.htm">Article 4</a> can be invoked by any NATO member that feels threatened. Under its terms, a member state can request a consultation of the <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49763.htm">North Atlantic Council</a>, or NAC – the highest political decision-making body in the NATO alliance.</p>
<p>A NAC meeting in itself isn’t unusual. Every NATO summit is a NAC meeting at the level of heads of states. And a NAC meeting takes place every Wednesday at ambassadorial level in Brussels.</p>
<p>But what Article 4 does is open the way for a special meeting of the NAC to consult over the next steps that the alliance should take. This is still a big deal – just not as weighty as invoking Article 5.</p>
<p>Article 4 has been invoked several times over NATO’s lifetime. It was <a href="https://www.elojodigital.com/contenido/10978-syria-crisis-turkey-invokes-article-4-nato-charter">invoked by Turkey</a> amid concerns over cross-border terrorism as a result of the Syrian War. More recently, it was <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-invasion-why-eight-nato-members-triggered-article-4-of-the-north-atlantic-treaty-178054">invoked by eight NATO members</a> in Eastern Europe after the Feb. 24 Russian invasion of Ukraine.</p>
<p>Poland is <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/poland-considering-nato-article-4-activation-says-spokesman-2022-11-15/">currently assessing whether to invoke Article 4</a>.</p>
<p><em>Editor’s note: This article was updated on Nov. 16, 2022 to account for new statement from Polish president.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194714/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Deni does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Polish authorities are investigating what they initially believed to be a Russian-made missile blast close to the border with Ukraine. Later, the country’s president said it was likely to have been an accident.John Deni, Adjunct Professorial Lecturer, American University School of International ServiceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1885202022-08-21T20:03:06Z2022-08-21T20:03:06ZAustralia’s pursuit of ‘killer robots’ could put the trans-Tasman alliance with New Zealand on shaky ground<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479984/original/file-20220818-546-nyccc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C242%2C8986%2C4944&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Australia’s recently <a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/defence-strategic-review">announced</a> defence review, intended to be the most thorough in almost four decades, will give us a good idea of how Australia sees its role in an increasingly tense strategic environment.</p>
<p>As New Zealand’s only formal military ally, Australia’s defence choices will have significant implications, both for New Zealand and regional geopolitics.</p>
<p>There are several areas of contention in the trans-Tasman relationship. One is Australia’s pursuit of nuclear-powered submarines, which clashes with New Zealand’s anti-nuclear stance. Another lies in the two countries’ diverging approaches to autonomous weapons systems (AWS), colloquially known as “killer robots”. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Boeing Australia's autonomous 'loyal wingman' aircraft" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479242/original/file-20220816-20306-j1c4ti.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479242/original/file-20220816-20306-j1c4ti.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479242/original/file-20220816-20306-j1c4ti.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479242/original/file-20220816-20306-j1c4ti.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479242/original/file-20220816-20306-j1c4ti.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479242/original/file-20220816-20306-j1c4ti.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479242/original/file-20220816-20306-j1c4ti.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Boeing Australia is developing autonomous ‘loyal wingman’ aircraft to complement manned aircraft.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flightglobal.com/defence/boeing-australia-pushes-loyal-wingman-maiden-flight-to-2021/141691.article">Boeing</a>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In general, AWS are <a href="https://www.beehive.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2021-11/Autonomous-Weapons-Systems-Cabinet-paper.pdf">considered</a> to be “weapons systems that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further human intervention”. There is, however, no internationally agreed definition.</p>
<p>New Zealand is involved with international attempts to ban and regulate AWS. It seeks a ban on systems that “are not sufficiently predictable or controllable to meet legal or ethical requirements” and advocates for “rules or limits to govern the development and use of AWS”. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1424978867614228485"}"></div></p>
<p>If this seems vague to you, it should. This ambiguity in definition makes it difficult to determine which systems New Zealand seeks to ban or regulate.</p>
<h2>Australia’s prioritisation of AWS</h2>
<p>Australia, meanwhile, has been developing what it more commonly refers to as robotics and autonomous systems (RAS) with <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10357718.2022.2095615">gusto</a>. Since 2016, Australia has identified RAS as a priority area of development and substantially increased <a href="https://www.dst.defence.gov.au/nextgentechfund">funding</a>. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/new-zealand-could-take-a-global-lead-in-controlling-the-development-of-killer-robots-so-why-isnt-it-166168">New Zealand could take a global lead in controlling the development of 'killer robots' — so why isn't it?</a>
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</p>
<hr>
<p>The Australian <a href="https://www.navy.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/RAN_WIN_RASAI_Strategy_2040f2_hi.pdf">navy</a>, <a href="https://researchcentre.army.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-03/robototic_autonomous_systems_strategy.pdf">army</a> and defence force (<a href="https://tasdcrc.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/ADF-Concept-Robotics.pdf">ADF</a>) have each released concept documents since 2018, discussing RAS and their associated benefits, risks, challenges and opportunities.</p>
<p>Key systems Australia is pursuing include the autonomous aircraft <a href="https://news.defence.gov.au/service/introducing-ghost-bat">Ghost Bat</a>, three different kinds of <a href="https://www.australiandefence.com.au/defence/sea/navy-s-uncrewed-undersea-plans">extra-large underwater autonomous vehicles</a> and <a href="https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/melissa-price/media-releases/autonomous-truck-project-passes-major-milestone">autonomous trucks</a>.</p>
<h2>Why is Australia seeking to develop these technologies?</h2>
<p>The short answer is three-fold: seeking military advantage, saving lives and economics.</p>
<p>Australia and its allies and partners, particularly the US, are <a href="https://www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/us-china-technology-competition-and-what-it-means-for-australia">fearful</a> of losing the technological superiority they have long held over rivals such as China. </p>
<p>Large military capabilities, like nuclear-powered submarines, take both time and money to acquire. Australia is further limited in what it can do by the size of its defence force. RAS are seen as a way to potentially maintain advantage, and to do more with less.</p>
<p>RAS are also seen as a way to save lives. A <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2020/Nov/23/2002540369/-1/-1/1/WYATT.PDF">survey</a> of Australian military personnel found they considered reduction of harm and injury to defence personnel, allied personnel and civilians among the most important potential benefits of RAS. </p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/un-fails-to-agree-on-killer-robot-ban-as-nations-pour-billions-into-autonomous-weapons-research-173616">UN fails to agree on 'killer robot' ban as nations pour billions into autonomous weapons research</a>
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<p>The Australian Defence Force also <a href="https://tasdcrc.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/ADF-Concept-Robotics.pdf">believes</a> RAS will be cheaper than large platforms. Inflation means money already committed to defence has less purchasing power. RAS present an opportunity to achieve the same outcomes at a lower cost.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, in 2018, the Australian government outlined its intention to become a top-ten <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/d743d758-04b2-11e8-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5">defence exporter</a>. There are keen <a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2022/03/aussies-aim-for-1b-in-exports-of-loyal-wingman-now-ghost-bat/">hopes</a> the Ghost Bat will become a successful defence export. </p>
<p>At the same time, the government is keen to <a href="https://apo.org.au/sites/default/files/resource-files/2016-02/apo-nid93621.pdf">build</a> closer ties between defence, industry and academia. Industry and academia both vie for defence funding, and this drives development of RAS.</p>
<p>Of course, the technology is new. It’s not guaranteed RAS will save lives, save money or achieve military advantage. The extent to which RAS will be used, and what they will be used for, is not foreseeable. It is in this uncertainty that New Zealand must make judgments about AWS and alliance management.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Armed Autonomous aerial vehicle on runway" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479985/original/file-20220818-164-hnhgr1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479985/original/file-20220818-164-hnhgr1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479985/original/file-20220818-164-hnhgr1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479985/original/file-20220818-164-hnhgr1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479985/original/file-20220818-164-hnhgr1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479985/original/file-20220818-164-hnhgr1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479985/original/file-20220818-164-hnhgr1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Autonomous systems are seen as a way to save lives.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What this means for the trans-Tasman relationship</h2>
<p>The nuclear-powered submarines captured attention when Australia’s new AUKUS partnership with the US and UK was announced, but its primary purpose is a much broader partnership that shares defence technology, including RAS. </p>
<p>The most recent statement from the AUKUS working groups <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/readout-of-aukus-joint-steering-group-meetings--2">says</a> they “will seek opportunities to engage allies and close partners”. Last week, US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman made it clear New Zealand was one such <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/472583/us-would-have-conversations-with-new-zealand-if-time-comes-for-others-to-join-aukus-top-diplomat">partner</a>.</p>
<p>Australia’s focus on RAS, particularly in the context of AUKUS, may soon bring alliance questions to the fore. Strategic studies expert Robert Ayson has argued AUKUS, combined with increased strategic tension, <a href="https://pacforum.org/publication/pacnet-48-new-zealand-and-aukus-affected-without-being-included">means</a> that “year by year New Zealand’s alliance commitment to the defence of Australia will carry bigger implications”. AWS will play a role in these implications.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nukes-allies-weapons-and-cost-4-big-questions-nzs-defence-review-must-address-188732">Nukes, allies, weapons and cost: 4 big questions NZ's defence review must address</a>
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<p>AWS may seem an insignificant trans-Tasman difference compared to the use of nuclear technologies. But AWS come with a lot more uncertainty and fuzziness than, say, <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/oceania/not-in-our-waters-ardern-says-no-to-visits-from-australia-s-new-nuclear-subs-20210916-p58s7k.html">banning</a> nuclear-powered submarines in New Zealand waters. This fuzziness creates ample room for misperceptions and poor communication.</p>
<p>Trust in alliance relationships is easily damaged, and difficult to manage. Clear communication and ensuring a good understanding of each other’s positions is essential. The ambiguity of AWS makes these things difficult. </p>
<p>New Zealand and Australia may need to clarify their respective positions before Australia’s defence review is released next March. Otherwise, they run the risk of fuelling misunderstandings at a delicate moment for trans-Tasman relations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188520/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sian Troath receives funding from The Royal Society of New Zealand Marsden Fund.</span></em></p>Diverging views on automated weapons systems could make it difficult for Australia and New Zealand to manage military ties at a delicate time in trans-Tasman relations.Sian Troath, Postdoctoral fellow, University of CanterburyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1776832022-02-25T17:39:25Z2022-02-25T17:39:25ZBeyond NATO, new alliances could defend democracy and counter Putin<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/448151/original/file-20220223-17-rcdldu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=3%2C9%2C2193%2C1238&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">NATO has struggled to remain unified in recent years.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/nato/51736186097">NATO via Flickr</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.americamagazine.org/politics-society/2022/01/25/just-war-nato-ukraine-putin-242271">Russian aggression</a> <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2022/02/17/russia-war-cyberattacks-disinformation-future/6831721001/">toward Ukraine</a> continues. The nations of the world, and their current alliances, have so far proved ineffective at curbing Russian President Vladimir Putin’s <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-02-23/invasion-incursion-putin-russia-ukraine-internal-law-definitions/100853010">ambitions</a>.</p>
<p>Right now at the United Nations, dictators and theocratic rulers get an equal voice with democratically elected governments. For almost anything urgent or relating to <a href="https://theconversation.com/can-the-world-stop-israel-and-hamas-from-committing-war-crimes-7-questions-answered-about-international-law-155105">international security</a> to get accomplished, <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/content/security-council">Russia, China, the United Kingdom, France and the U.S. must all agree</a>. Imagine the U.N. without them, and the NATO military alliance expanded across the globe, not <a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/592124-putins-effort-to-split-nato-may-depend-on-germany">dependent on one or two powerful nations</a> to effectively <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/declaration">prevent war and build democracy</a>.</p>
<p>How the global community responds to its new challenges may well decide the future of <a href="https://www.un.org/en/global-issues/democracy">democracy and the cause of human rights</a> in the 21st century. After years analyzing Putin’s rise and the existential threat he poses, former Russian chess grandmaster and human rights advocate <a href="https://www.kasparov.com/our-generation-will-either-renew-democracy-or-lose-it-forever-cnn-opinion-november-8-2021/">Garry Kasparov</a> summed up the situation this way in late 2021: “We can either be the generation that renews democracy, or loses it forever.”</p>
<p>My research finds that new alliances may be needed to replace, or at least expand and support, the familiar ones built to keep global peace in the wake of World War II, when <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/21/russia-ukraine-invasion-nato-future-europe/">global politics were very different</a>. </p>
<p>That is why in my 2018 book, I suggested that the leading democratic nations all across the world join their economic, military, technological and moral power into “<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351050036">A League of Democracies</a>.” This concept built on ideas from U.S. Sen. John McCain and others such as <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/an-alliance-of-democracies/">foreign policy experts Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay</a>.</p>
<p>Developed democracies could work together to effectively counter not only the influence of <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/putin-calls-for-international-recognition-of-russia-e2-80-99s-2014-annexation-of-crimean-peninsula-in-ukraine/ar-AAUaBJ5">Russia</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-china-welcomes-the-world-to-winter-olympics-its-economy-is-ever-more-isolated-from-the-west-176390">China</a>, but also <a href="https://cddrl.fsi.stanford.edu/news/larry-diamond-warns-%E2%80%98creeping-autocracy%E2%80%99">creeping despotism</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/global-2">mass atrocities</a>. This group could discourage <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-55902070">military</a> <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-59719765">coups</a>, support protest movements demanding democratic rights, prevent new arms races and <a href="https://www.cfr.org/excerpt-pathways-freedom">help developing democracies</a> strengthen their civil services.</p>
<p>Beyond my own proposal, below are three promising new ideas for alliances that have recently emerged to meet the growing power of dictatorships. Imagine, for instance, that more than 40 democratic countries with more than 70% of the world’s economic activity issued a total trade blockade of Russia after Putin invaded Ukraine.</p>
<h2>Copenhagen Charter</h2>
<p>The Copenhagen Charter was created in 2018 by the <a href="https://www.allianceofdemocracies.org/initiatives/the-copenhagen-democracy-summit/copenhagen-charter/">Alliance of Democracies Foundation</a>, a nonprofit founded by former Prime Minister of Denmark and NATO Secretary-General <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/who_is_who_56703.htm">Anders Fogh Rasmussen</a>. It is not yet a formal international treaty, but the goal is to create a powerful economic alliance similar to the military alliance that is NATO.</p>
<p>Its members would coordinate international sanctions and aid, using their trade and financial power in the global economy. For instance, its members could collectively respond with tariffs or boycotts if Russia became too dominant in <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/24/russia-is-pumping-less-natural-gas-to-europe-as-nord-stream-2-nears-completion.html">supplying natural gas to Europe</a>, or if <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/chinese-influence-in-australia-media-2018-5">China tried to silence Australian critics</a> by cutting off its imports from Australia.</p>
<h2>Coalition for a World Security Community</h2>
<p>Also founded in 2018, the Coalition for a <a href="https://worldsecuritycommunity.org/proposal/">World Security Community</a> proposes a global military alliance to protect democratic nations from autocratic forces. It would include Asian democracies like South Korea, Australia and India that are not yet part of any major multinational security agreements.</p>
<p>One step in this direction is the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/12/quad-leaders-joint-statement-the-spirit-of-the-quad/">Quadrilateral Security Dialogue</a> between the U.S., Japan, India and South Korea. It was established in 2007 by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in response to China’s economic and military rise, and could help deter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. </p>
<h2>An Alliance of Free Nations</h2>
<p>The Copenhagen Charter and the World Security Community ideas have been combined by political scientists Ash Jain and Matthew Kroenig at the Atlantic Council, a nonprofit policy think tank in Washington. They propose extending mutual protection among democracies through an “<a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/report-launch-present-at-the-re-creation-a-global-strategy-for-a-world-at-risk/">Alliance of Free Nations</a>.”</p>
<p>This group would be a <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/an-alliance-of-democracies-from-concept-to-reality-in-an-era-of-strategic-competition/">formal institution</a> linking Western democracies with democratic allies in South America and Asia. It would replace temporary coalitions that gather only to deal with a single crisis, such as the <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/western-nations-scramble-response-after-putin-orders-troops-into-pro-russian-regions-of-eastern-ukraine/ar-AAUanoh">Western nations</a> that tried to negotiate with Putin before his invasion of Ukraine.</p>
<p>Jain and Kroenig suggest starting this alliance by adding to the seven major industrialized democracies, who now meet <a href="https://theconversation.com/whats-the-g-7-an-international-economist-explains-162586">as the Group of Seven, often called the “G-7</a>.” Adding <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/10/g7-d10-democracy-trump-europe/">South Korea, India and Australia</a> could turn this group into a “Democratic 10,” perhaps with the Philippines and Brazil as guests or observers at meetings. Ultimately, this group would be open to all the nations who support <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege">key democratic principles</a>, like basic human rights, independent courts and free multi-party elections. </p>
<p>U.S. President Joe Biden’s <a href="https://www.state.gov/summit-for-democracy/">Summit for Democracy</a> in December 2021 invited those nations and others to <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/12/09/fact-sheet-announcing-the-presidential-initiative-for-democratic-renewal/">support democratic systems around the world</a>. A <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2022/02/23/the-summit-for-democracy-commitments-are-out-now-what/">second summit</a> is expected in late 2022.</p>
<p>[<em>More than 150,000 readers get one of The Conversation’s informative newsletters.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?source=inline-140K">Join the list today</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177683/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>I am on the board of the World Security Community, which is mentioned, but this is not a paid position. Other than that, I do a little TV interviewing, but my only paid employment is with Fordham.</span></em></p>Existing alliances arose in the wake of World War II, when global politics were very different and today’s challenges were yet unimagined.John Davenport, Professor of Philosophy and Peace & Justice Studies, Fordham UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1754122022-02-02T22:01:26Z2022-02-02T22:01:26ZUS troops head to Eastern Europe: 4 essential reads on the Ukraine crisis<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/444128/original/file-20220202-27-1rpv0cj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4728%2C2689&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A US soldier at a training area in Germany.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/soldier-stands-at-a-tank-type-m1a2-sep-which-are-decorated-news-photo/530688706?adppopup=true">Christof Stache/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>American troops <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/02/02/world/ukraine-russia-news">are heading to Eastern Europe</a> in the latest countermove by the U.S. to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/28/us/politics/russia-ukraine-invasion-pentagon.html">Russia’s military buildup</a> on the country’s border with Ukraine.</p>
<p>The development, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/02/politics/us-troops-europe-russia/index.html">announced on Feb. 2, 2022</a>, will see around 3,000 additional U.S. service personnel deployed to NATO member states Germany, Poland and Romania.</p>
<p>U.S. officials framed the move as one that would reassure countries in the NATO military alliance of U.S. support in the face of a possible invasion of Ukraine, which is not a member. But it is likely to anger President Vladimir Putin, who has demanded that NATO <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/world/russia-central-asia/article/3164305/russia-wants-nato-troops-out-bulgaria-and-romania">pull back troops</a> from Eastern European countries that were once members of the Soviet Union. Putin has accused the West of ignoring Russia’s security concerns and trying to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-announces-plan-boost-army-foreign-leaders-rally-2022-02-01/">lure the country into a war</a>.</p>
<p>Behind the rhetoric and troop movement is a very real – and complex – crisis. The Conversation’s bank of experts has been on hand to explain what is at stake, and why Ukraine has become a flashpoint between Russia and the West.</p>
<h2>1. What it means to have US boots on the ground</h2>
<p>The deployment of thousands of American troops to Eastern Europe wasn’t unexpected. The Pentagon had already said that it was prepared to send up to 8,500 additional members of its armed services to the region.</p>
<p>It marks a reversal of a trend in Europe that has seen America’s military presence dwindle over the past few decades, say <a href="https://www.boisestate.edu/sps-politicalscience/faculty/michael-a-allen/">Michael Allen of Boise State University</a> and two scholars from Kansas State University, <a href="https://www.k-state.edu/polsci/faculty-staff/martinezmachain-carla.html">Carla Martinez Machain</a> and <a href="https://www.k-state.edu/polsci/faculty-staff/Flynn.html">Michael Flynn</a>.</p>
<p>The three scholars note that <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-us-military-presence-in-europe-has-been-declining-for-30-years-the-current-crisis-in-ukraine-may-reverse-that-trend-175595">U.S. troop numbers in Europe</a> stood at a high of over 400,000 in the 1950s. But this dropped sharply after the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s.</p>
<figure>
<div class="placeholder-container" style="--aspect-ratio-percent:75.06631299734748%;--background-color:#a1665e"><img alt="" class=" ls-is-cached lazyloaded" data-src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/442365/original/file-20220124-27-1x6ja1g.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&w=754&fit=clip" data-srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/442365/original/file-20220124-27-1x6ja1g.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442365/original/file-20220124-27-1x6ja1g.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442365/original/file-20220124-27-1x6ja1g.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442365/original/file-20220124-27-1x6ja1g.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442365/original/file-20220124-27-1x6ja1g.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442365/original/file-20220124-27-1x6ja1g.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/442365/original/file-20220124-27-1x6ja1g.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442365/original/file-20220124-27-1x6ja1g.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442365/original/file-20220124-27-1x6ja1g.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442365/original/file-20220124-27-1x6ja1g.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442365/original/file-20220124-27-1x6ja1g.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442365/original/file-20220124-27-1x6ja1g.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/442365/original/file-20220124-27-1x6ja1g.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&w=754&fit=clip"></div>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">US military deployments to European states, 1989-2021.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the post-Soviet era, U.S. troop presence in Europe has been a delicate matter, the scholars note: “The U.S. and Russia have historically been cautious in not placing troops in places that would be considered a provocation. They generally avoid each other’s sphere of influence, even when responding to the other’s deployments. Yet the NATO allies in Eastern Europe, many of which were once Soviet satellite states, provide a gray area that both the U.S. and Russia may view as within their own sphere of influence.”</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-us-military-presence-in-europe-has-been-declining-for-30-years-the-current-crisis-in-ukraine-may-reverse-that-trend-175595">The US military presence in Europe has been declining for 30 years – the current crisis in Ukraine may reverse that trend</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<h2>2. What it means to be a NATO member</h2>
<p>The reason U.S. troops are heading to Germany, Poland and Romania, and not to Ukraine itself, is that the former Soviet country isn’t a member of NATO. As <a href="https://www.clarkson.edu/people/alastair-kocho-williams">Alastair Kocho-Williams at Clarkson University</a> writes, this <a href="https://theconversation.com/whats-nato-and-why-does-ukraine-want-to-join-175821">isn’t out of a lack of desire on Ukraine’s part</a>.</p>
<p>“Membership with NATO would significantly increase Ukraine’s international military backing, allowing for NATO military action within Ukraine and alongside members of its military. This guarantee of military might would act as a firm deterrent to Russian aggression,” Kocho-Williams writes.</p>
<p>In fact, NATO’s principle of “collective defense” – under which an attack on one member is considered an attack on all – is, the U.S. says, the very reason American troops are heading to Poland and Romania. It is out of the NATO commitment to protect members – the implication being that an invasion of Ukraine could possibly mean that NATO states bordering Russia could be next.</p>
<p>But Kocho-Williams cautions that allowing Ukraine to join the military alliance now may pose a problem. “The threat of an imminent conflict between Ukraine and Russia would commit NATO to take military action against Russia,” he writes.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/whats-nato-and-why-does-ukraine-want-to-join-175821">What's NATO, and why does Ukraine want to join?</a>
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<h2>3. How the Russian media might view this troop move</h2>
<p>The U.S. stated aim in deploying troops to Eastern Europe – to reassure NATO members – was <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/biden-orders-us-troop-deployments-reassure-nato-allies/story?id=82622507">reported faithfully</a> by the American media. It is unlikely that Russian newspapers and TV news broadcasts will present it in the same way.</p>
<p>Cynthia Hooper at College of the Holy Cross says that <a href="https://theconversation.com/its-just-a-panic-attack-russian-media-blames-us-for-escalating-ukraine-crisis-175482">the Russian media</a> have portrayed the U.S. as being “hysterical” in its insistence that Putin is hell-bent on invasion. Writes Hooper, “Joe Biden, Russian reporters claim, is building up a false sense of threat from Moscow to deflect attention away from domestic problems.”</p>
<p>Whether the Russian public is buying this line from state-controlled media is, however, another matter. For many, there are bigger things to worry about. Hooper quotes a Russian friend who told her that people “are sick and tired of those endless political TV shows about the Ukraine; they are absolutely indifferent to international issues.”</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/its-just-a-panic-attack-russian-media-blames-us-for-escalating-ukraine-crisis-175482">It's just a 'panic attack' – Russian media blames US for escalating Ukraine crisis</a>
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<h2>4. Will deployment deter Putin?</h2>
<p>The question is whether the U.S. troop buildup in Eastern Europe will succeed where international agreements have failed; will it deter Putin from transgressing Ukraine’s border?</p>
<p>In 2014, Russia <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine/The-crisis-in-Crimea-and-eastern-Ukraine">annexed the Crimean peninsula</a>. It was an illegal military land grab – and one that contravened the Budapest Memorandum, a 1994 commitment in which Russia, the U.S. and the U.K. pledged to “respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine.”</p>
<p>[<em>Over 140,000 readers rely on The Conversation’s newsletters to understand the world.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?source=inline-140ksignup">Sign up today</a>.]</p>
<p>Part of the the problem, as <a href="https://www.law.indiana.edu/about/people/bio.php?name=feinstein-lee-a">Lee Feinstein of Indiana University</a> and <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/person/mariana-budjeryn">Mariana Budjeryn at Harvard Kennedy School</a> note, is that <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-got-a-signed-commitment-in-1994-to-ensure-its-security-but-can-the-us-and-allies-stop-putins-aggression-now-173481">the memorandum is not legally binding</a>. Even if it were, it might not have been enough to stay Putin’s hand.</p>
<p>“International law matters, but it does not determine what states do.
Strong deterrence, diplomacy and international solidarity can influence Russian decision-making. … Ultimately, however, the de-escalation decision is Russia’s to make,” Feinstein and Budjeryn write. All the U.S. can do is make clear to the Kremlin the consequences of its actions.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-got-a-signed-commitment-in-1994-to-ensure-its-security-but-can-the-us-and-allies-stop-putins-aggression-now-173481">Ukraine got a signed commitment in 1994 to ensure its security – but can the US and allies stop Putin's aggression now?</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/175412/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
What’s the significance of the US beefing up its military presence in Europe? The Conversation provides a roundup of articles addressing the crisis in Ukraine.Matt Williams, Senior International EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/787862017-06-02T22:40:11Z2017-06-02T22:40:11ZTrump to Europe: You’re on your own<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/172086/original/file-20170602-20605-18vkwgp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Merkel consider her options after meeting with Trump on May 26, 2017, in Italy. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Evan Vucci</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>During his recent trip to Europe for meetings at NATO Headquarters in Brussels and with the Group of Seven in Italy, Donald Trump delivered on his campaign promise to disrupt business as usual. In the process, he is undoing U.S. policies undertaken since World War II to promote security and stability in Europe. </p>
<p>After Trump’s visit, German Chancellor <a href="http://www.politico.eu/article/angela-merkel-europe-cdu-must-take-its-fate-into-its-own-hands-elections-2017/">Angela Merkel stated</a>, “We Europeans truly have to take fate into our own hands.”</p>
<p>Europeans taking fate into their own hands is something we have not seen since the 1930s. And, while major war in Europe is unlikely given the strong ties within the EU, greater uncertainty is a recipe for insecurity. The United States has benefited economically, politically and militarily from its close partnership with Europe. Throwing that away is a grave – and completely unnecessary – step.</p>
<h2>US support a given</h2>
<p>For more than seven decades, U.S. presidents – Democrat and Republican alike – bought into an idea born out of the experience of two world wars. It’s the idea that U.S. leadership was necessary to rescue Europeans from the horrors they inflicted on one another in the first half of the 20th century. It has been conventional wisdom since 1945 that rather than sit back and respond when Europe falls into crisis, the United States should foster European unity, preserve peace and create broader prosperity.</p>
<p>During the Cold War, this meant building NATO and supporting the development of a Western European community. As communism collapsed in 1989, President George H.W. Bush stated that America’s goal would be to promote a Europe “<a href="http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=17085">Whole and Free</a>.” As I demonstrated in <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/book/not-whether-but-when/">my book on NATO enlargement</a>, the Bill Clinton administration used this mantra as justification for expanding NATO’s membership to the East and supporting the eastern extension of the European Union that naturally followed. </p>
<p>Relations with Europe became fraught during the first George W. Bush term over <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/09/world/europeans-like-bush-even-less-than-before.html?mcubz=0">the use of torture and the war in Iraq</a>. But even during Bush’s first term, the United States continued to push forward on the enlargement of NATO to the East. The Bush administration sought to repair the damage with European allies in <a href="https://www.cfr.org/interview/bush-second-term-repairs-damage-european-relations">its second term</a>, an effort that continued through the Barack Obama years.</p>
<h2>Game changer</h2>
<p>And then came Donald Trump. </p>
<p>During his campaign and into the first few months of his presidency, he was not just indifferent to the European Union but actively hostile to it. Equally disturbing, he was indifferent to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine rather than being hostile to it.</p>
<p>Prior to entering office, he praised the United Kingdom’s 2016 <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jan/15/trumps-first-uk-post-election-interview-brexit-a-great-thing">referendum vote to the leave the European Union</a>. As president, he <a href="http://www.politico.com/story/2017/04/21/trump-supports-marine-le-pen-237464">praised French presidential candidate Marine Le Pen</a>, who was avowedly hostile to the EU. Meanwhile, he indicated to Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov that he was only showing concern about Ukraine because some domestic critics cared about it – <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/19/us/politics/trump-russia-comey.html?mcubz=0&_r=0">not because he was personally interested</a>. </p>
<p>Less than two weeks after Trump’s inauguration, European Council President <a href="http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/01/31-tusk-letter-future-europe/?utm_source=dsms-auto&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=%22United+we+stand%2c+divided+we+fall%22%3a+letter+by+President+Donald+Tusk+to+the+27+EU+heads+of+state+or+government+on+the+future+of+the+EU+before+the+Malta+summit">Donald Tusk wrote</a> to the EU heads of state and government that the main threats to Europe included “worrying declarations by the new American administration,” in addition to an assertive China, an aggressive Russia and the threat posed by “radical Islam.” </p>
<p>In the aftermath of Trump’s recent visit to Europe, where <a href="http://www.nationalreview.com/article/448194/trump-refuses-affirm-nato-article-5">he failed to affirm</a> the United States dedication to NATO’s <a href="http://www.nato.int/cps/cn/natohq/topics_110496.htm">Article 5</a>, which commits all members to a collective defense, followed quickly by his announcement of the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on climate change, Europe’s leaders realize they are on their own for the first time since the United States entered World War II.</p>
<p>Although <a href="http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/01/donald-trump-foreign-policy-213546">Trump has long viewed America’s allies as taking advantage</a> of Uncle Sam’s largesse and believes his “America First” strategy will serve U.S. interests better than previous American policy, having allies has set the United States apart from countries like Russia and China and enhanced the ability of the United States to lead. While there has long been bipartisan support for the U.S. role as global leader, Trump has taken aim directly at this long-standing consensus. It is thus perfectly natural that countries like Germany will seek to step into the void created by an American withdrawal from the world.</p>
<p>But this won’t be as easy as it sounds. Germany is Europe’s leading economic power, but it is not an uncontroversial leader given its history. One of the appeals to many countries of U.S. leadership in Europe – and Asia – is that it is far away. Germany’s neighbors will be ambivalent about its assumption of a more powerful role. Merkel understands that she will need support from France, Italy and others as she moves forward.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Russia lurks to the East, threatening Europe not only because of its military action in Ukraine but <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/04/russia-election-europe-us/524208/">its interference in elections</a> across the continent. The United States has previously helped Europe counter an aggressive Russia. On its own, Europe may find a stiff posture in the face of aggression – and even its own unity – <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2017-01-24/trump-takes-aim-european-union">harder to maintain</a>, thereby giving Russia freer rein to pursue its nationalist goals. </p>
<p>None of this seems to bother Trump. In fact, he appears to relish his role as the president who is setting a new course for the U.S., one in which longstanding relationships mean little, and the United States uses its muscle solely to serve its own interests and not the world’s. The United States has had an enormous advantage in international affairs because of the web of alliances around the world supporting its interests. Tossing alliances like NATO aside is a self-inflicted wound that is likely to haunt the United States for years to come.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/78786/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Goldgeier does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>For more than seven decades, US presidents have encouraged peace in Europe. Trump seems eager to toss that legacy aside. Here’s what is at stake.James Goldgeier, Professor at the School of International Service and Visiting Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, American University School of International ServiceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/754402017-04-06T15:02:08Z2017-04-06T15:02:08ZDuring World War I, a silent film spoke volumes about freedom of speech<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164307/original/image-20170406-16685-ejvvjd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Chief John Big Tree, Dark Cloud, Jack Cosgrave, Adda Gleason and Robert Goldstein in The Spirit of '76 (1917).</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0182444/mediaviewer/rm1417546496">IMDb</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the United States, “The Great War” led to unprecedented efforts by the federal government to control and restrict “unpatriotic” speech. But the boundary between speech that undermined the government and legitimate criticism was often unclear. </p>
<p>As a scholar and lawyer focused on <a href="http://bloglawonline.com/">freedom of speech in the U.S.</a>, I have studied the restrictions on speech during WWI and the legal cases that challenged them. These cases helped form the modern idea of the First Amendment right of free speech. But the conflict between patriotism and free expression continues to be an issue a century later. </p>
<h2>Thousands silenced</h2>
<p>The onset of war led to a patriotic fervor, fed by an intense government <a href="https://www.nypl.org/events/exhibitions/overhere/more">propaganda campaign</a>. It also led to new challenges to the concept of free speech.</p>
<p>Within a few weeks of declaring war, President Woodrow Wilson signed the <a href="http://www.legisworks.org/congress/65/publaw-24.pdf">Espionage Act of 1917</a>. This law, which is still largely in effect, makes it a crime to do three things. First, convey false information in order to interfere with the American military, or promote the success of America’s enemies. Second, cause or attempt to cause insubordination within the military. Third, willfully obstruct military recruitment or enlistment. </p>
<p>The following year, Congress passed the more restrictive <a href="http://www.legisworks.org/congress/65/publaw-150.pdf">Sedition Act of 1918</a> on May 16, and President Wilson signed it, criminalizing disloyal, profane, scurrilous or abusive speech about the United States or its symbols; speech to impede war production; and statements supporting a country with which the U.S. was at war.</p>
<p>These laws – the first wartime restrictions on speech in American history – were unprecedented challenges to the right of free expression. But the courts, including the United States Supreme Court, generally upheld them as necessary wartime restrictions. </p>
<p>“When a nation is at war,” the Supreme Court unanimously ruled in <a href="https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/schenck-v-united-states-defining-the-limits-of-free-speech/">Schenk v. United States (1919)</a>, “many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight, and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right.”</p>
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<span class="caption">Anarchist political activist and writer Emma Goldman.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AEmma_Goldman_seated.jpg">Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
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<p>More than 2,000 people were <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=KrIqAAAAYAAJ&lpg=PR4&ots=Oz8foBdBRa&dq=%22Government%20prosecutions%20under%20espionage%20act%22&pg=RA7-PA1#v=onepage&q=%22Government%20prosecutions%20under%20espionage%20act%22&f=false">prosecuted</a> under the Espionage and Sedition acts during the war. About half were convicted, many of whom were given jail time. These included several individuals who distributed leaflets arguing that the draft constituted slavery, and leaders of the Socialist and Communist parties. </p>
<p>Robert Goldstein, the writer and producer of “The Spirit of ‘76”, a silent film about the American Revolution, was <a href="https://www.nypl.org/blog/2014/07/30/us-v-spirit-76">prosecuted</a>. The film, although largely fictional, included a depiction of a historical incident in which British soldiers – enemies in the Revolution, but allies in the world war – killed women and children. Those convicted also included anarchist writer <a href="http://www.lib.berkeley.edu/goldman/">Emma Goldman</a> and Socialist presidential candidate <a href="http://debsfoundation.org">Eugene V. Debs</a>.</p>
<p>A few judges – notably U.S. Supreme Court justices Louis Brandeis and Oliver Wendell Holmes – expressed concerns that the prosecution of war dissenters was contrary to the First Amendment protection of free speech. As Holmes explained in his dissent in <a href="http://www.pbs.org/wnet/supremecourt/personality/landmark_abrams.html">Abrams v. United States (1919)</a>, “Congress certainly cannot forbid all effort to change the mind of the country.”</p>
<h2>‘Imminent lawless action’</h2>
<p>The war ended in November 1918, but the Sedition Act was not <a href="http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9801E0DD133CE533A25757C0A9659C946095D6CF&legacy=true">repealed</a> until Wilson’s last day in office in 1921. In 1924, then Attorney General Harlan Fiske Stone concluded that law enforcement should be concerned with only the conduct of individuals, not their “political or other opinions.” All those who were jailed under the laws had their sentences <a href="http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9D07EFDB1130E233A25755C1A9649D946295D6CF&legacy=true">commuted</a> by 1923, and in 1931 President Franklin Roosevelt <a href="http://todayinclh.com/?event=president-roosevelt-grants-amnesty-to-last-of-ww-i-political-prisoners">offered amnesty</a> to all those convicted under the Espionage or Sedition Acts during the war.</p>
<p>With the end of the war, the idea that speech could be restricted when it presented a “clear and present” danger to social order was transformed by the courts in later cases. Under the new standard, speech could be restricted if it presented a <a href="https://www.oyez.org/cases/1900-1940/268us652">“dangerous tendency”</a> toward disorder: a standard that allowed for even more restrictions on speech. In 1940 Congress adopted the <a href="http://legisworks.org/sal/54/stats/STATUTE-54-Pg670.pdf">Smith Act</a>, which barred speech and organizations intended to overthrow any government in the United States and was used during World War II and the Red Scare of the 1950s to suppress Communist ideas and thought.</p>
<p>Eventually, however, <a href="https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/cases/brandenburg-v-ohio/">in 1969</a> the Supreme Court settled on the current legal standard, under which speech can be restricted only if it presents a threat of <a href="http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/incitement.htm">“imminent lawless action,”</a> based on the circumstances in which it is made. This standard allows for controversial, even incendiary, speech, unless there is an immediate threat that the speech will lead to illegal behavior by the audience.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164202/original/image-20170405-18533-19i2jp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164202/original/image-20170405-18533-19i2jp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164202/original/image-20170405-18533-19i2jp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=526&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164202/original/image-20170405-18533-19i2jp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=526&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164202/original/image-20170405-18533-19i2jp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=526&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164202/original/image-20170405-18533-19i2jp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=661&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164202/original/image-20170405-18533-19i2jp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=661&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164202/original/image-20170405-18533-19i2jp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=661&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">United States Army draft cards set ablaze in protest in Los Angeles, May 1969.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo</span></span>
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<p>So, for example, peaceful protests against the Vietnam War and the Vietnam-era draft were permitted. However, the Supreme Court <a href="https://www.oyez.org/cases/1967/232">held</a> that burning military draft cards was punishable because it was a destruction of government property and disrupted the draft system.</p>
<p>Since the 1960s, the federal government has not pursued dissenters in the way it did under the 1918 Sedition Act. Even after the Sept. 11 attacks, despite the calls for repression of dissent, <a href="http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2975&context=journal_articles#page=16">no direct restrictions</a> on speech were enacted. More recently, there have been <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/28/us/isis-influence-on-web-prompts-second-thoughts-on-first-amendment.html">some calls</a> for limitations on speech online because of the threat of terrorism, but none have been enacted.</p>
<p>Hopefully this reflects the lessons learned from the excesses of the repression of speech under the Espionage Act a century ago. The First Amendment right of free speech exists as a means of keeping a critical eye on government. Such scrutiny is always important, but is especially critical during times of war.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/75440/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eric P. Robinson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>During the war, fear of being undermined by the enemy sparked restrictions on freedom of speech. As a result, thousands of Americans were prosecuted.Eric P. Robinson, Assistant Professor (media law and ethics), University of South CarolinaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/745152017-03-31T02:00:33Z2017-03-31T02:00:33ZPeace dividends of military alliances go farther than you’d think<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162758/original/image-20170327-3303-xgvdua.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Armed forces in Iraq, January 2017.</span> </figcaption></figure><p>In life, we often find the friend of a friend likable.</p>
<p>In a <a href="http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/3/3/e1601895">recent study</a>, our interdisciplinary team of researchers found that this logic applies to military alliances as well. The study – produced by a team of researchers with combined expertise in political science, statistics, mathematics, physics and network science – shows that the impact of alliances extends beyond those countries directly involved. Allies of allies – and allies of allies of allies – are more likely to have peaceful relations.</p>
<h2>Less likely to go to war</h2>
<p>Conventional wisdom and <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00611.x">scholarly research</a> agree that when countries form military alliances, they solidify cooperation and peaceful relations with one another. For example, we don’t expect two countries to fight each other if they are both members of NATO or have signed a bilateral alliance.</p>
<p>Most research on military alliances focuses on pairs of countries. However, our study shows that the effect of alliances goes beyond that direct connection and ties states together in ways that are not always immediately obvious. </p>
<p>The formation of an alliance between two countries also creates indirect ties between all of the states connected to those new allies. If countries A and B have an alliance and countries B and C have an alliance, then A and C are indirectly linked through their mutual connection to B. One would expect that A and C are unlikely to fight one another, since they each had enough in common with B to form an alliance. </p>
<p>By studying indirect alliance ties, our research was able to test this truism. We used statistical models designed for the analysis of network connections to study the link between indirect alliances and conflict from 1965 to 2000. We found that countries with a common ally are less likely to fight one another than pairs without this common bond. And the effect doesn’t stop there. Military alliances also reduce the risk of conflict between more distant indirect allies. </p>
<p>Think of international alliances as a web linking countries across the globe through ties both direct and indirect. The “path length” between any two countries can be defined as the number of steps it takes to link the two in the network. For example, if country A is allied to country B, which is allied to country C, then A and C have a path length of two. In other words, there are two degrees of separation between A and C. </p>
<p>Our study finds that neighboring countries separated by up to three degrees in the alliance network are significantly less likely to fight each other than pairs of states less closely connected. </p>
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<p>This dynamic played out in the case of Turkey and Iran. Between 1965 and 1979, the two countries were not allied to each other, but both had alliances with the United States. During this period, Iran and Turkey did not have any serious military conflicts. Following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, however, Iran and the United States severed their alliance, breaking the indirect connection between Turkey and Iran. From 1981 to 2000, Iran and Turkey <a href="http://cow.dss.ucdavis.edu/data-sets/MIDs">clashed</a> over allegations that Iran was offering safe harbor to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a militant group active in southeastern Turkey. This dispute <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/398409.stm">periodically escalated</a> to cross-border helicopter raids and aerial bombings.</p>
<p>In any study of war, it’s important to remember that military conflict between countries is a rare event. Most countries are not fighting each other at any given time. In fact, as our research shows, in any given year, there is about a 3 to 4 percent chance that any two neighboring countries separated by three degrees in the alliance network will experience a serious conflict involving some use of military force. For countries separated by four degrees, the chance of conflict rises sharply to nearly 6 percent. </p>
<p>The suppressing effect of indirect alliance ties on conflict does not gradually decrease with each new link in the chain. Instead, a country is almost equally unlikely to fight its allies, the allies of its allies, and the allies of its allies of its allies. At four degrees, the risk of conflict rises suddenly, and these countries have almost twice the probability (5.7 percent) of fighting one another than countries separated by two (3.2 percent) or three (3.6 percent) degrees. </p>
<p>Connections of five degrees are rare. For instance, the only five-degree connections to the U.S. are Kenya from 1981 to 1986 and Cuba from 1994 to 1996. </p>
<h2>Local conflicts more common</h2>
<p>An important point about the effect of indirect alliance ties is that these links matter precisely for the pairs of countries most at risk of conflict – in other words, neighbors. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/174478">A well-established finding</a> in the study of international conflict is that war is more likely to occur between neighboring countries. Not only are neighbors more likely to have grievances to fight over, but most countries aren’t capable of fighting distant foes, even if they wanted to. No matter how much their governments may disagree, the militaries of Bolivia and Botswana are unlikely to ever fight one another. </p>
<p>Connections of one, two and three degrees in the alliance network reduce the risk of conflict for at-risk neighboring states.</p>
<p>Our research suggests that international alliances matter more than previously thought. Alliances do not just promote cooperation among their members; they also reduce the risk of serious conflict between the countries they indirectly tie together in the global network of alliance connections. Any evaluation of the importance of current military alliances would do well to consider the far-reaching effects of these agreements.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/74515/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>New research from a multidisciplinary teams of scholars suggests military alliances tie nations together in ways that are not always immediately obvious.Skyler Cranmer, Carter Phillips and Sue Henry Associate Professor of Political Science, The Ohio State UniversityAisha Bradshaw, Graduate Student in Political Science, The Ohio State UniversityCaitlin Clary, Ph.D. Student in Political Science, The Ohio State UniversityWeihua Li, Ph.D. Candidate of applied mathematics, Beihang UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/708652017-03-30T02:19:44Z2017-03-30T02:19:44ZIs Brexit the beginning of the end for international cooperation?<p>It’s official: Britain is done with Europe.</p>
<p>Prime Minister Theresa May has <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-brexit-divorce-bill-explained-74466">formally triggered</a> the process for withdrawing from the European Union, ensuring that the United Kingdom, one of the largest and most prosperous countries in the EU, will soon leave the 28-member bloc. </p>
<p>While the process could drag on for two years or more, the Brexit decision serves as a historic and stinging rebuke to proponents of a unified Europe. Perhaps more importantly, it calls into question the very future of the EU. </p>
<p>Pro-Europe commentators, on both sides of the Atlantic, have argued that Brexit is a historical blip, a rash decision made by an uninformed electorate after a vicious and one-sided campaign. But to dismiss Britain’s decision as an anomaly is to ignore the facts. We may be witnessing the twilight of the multilateral era.</p>
<h2>A not-so-perpetual peace</h2>
<p>The history of civilization has been one of peoples coming together in larger and larger collectives – from villages to city-states, from city-states to nations and from nations to international organizations. Today, we live in an era typified by the proliferation of global bodies like the United Nations, the World Trade Organization and the European Union. </p>
<p>People have created these greater communities for a number of reasons, but the overriding one has always been the most basic: security. As German philosopher Immanuel Kant wrote in 1795 <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=AFRgKZySxi8C&pg=PA530&lpg=PA530&dq=%22establish+a+nation+of+peoples%22&source=bl&ots=3ASHMzwJsG&sig=4eUvcjDneWbsxWCY36EvUxuziVY&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwidt8q-kvzSAhUPHGMKHeRXCMEQ6AEIHzAB#v=onepage&q=%22establish%20a%20nation%20of%20peoples%22&f=false">in his essay “Perpetual Peace,”</a> the only means for nations to emerge from a state of constant war was to “give up their savage, lawless freedom… and, by accommodating themselves to the constraints of common law, establish a nation of peoples that (continually growing) will finally include all the people of the earth.”</p>
<p>The European Union is arguably the greatest example of this ideal. An organization <a href="https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history_en">forged</a> from the desolation of two world wars, the EU brought the states of Europe together in a continent-wide commitment to cooperation and integration. Its ultimate aim was to draw nations together so closely that war would become unimaginable.</p>
<p>An impeccable aspiration, to be sure. But Britain’s vote last year to leave the EU illustrates the costs associated with that aspiration, and with multilateralism more generally. Governments have become increasingly <a href="https://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/754118/MEP-European-Parliament-lazy-detached-Martin-Schulz?video=">detached</a> from the people they govern. Local communities have <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/05/AR2005060501026.html">surrendered</a> control over an ever-growing array of matters to distant bureaucrats. And people increasingly perceive that their own groups and beliefs are under siege by outsiders.</p>
<p>This sentiment is not isolated to the United Kingdom. Disillusionment with multilateral agreements is widespread today. Just look at President Donald Trump.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163218/original/image-20170329-8593-v7pdmm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163218/original/image-20170329-8593-v7pdmm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=363&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163218/original/image-20170329-8593-v7pdmm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=363&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163218/original/image-20170329-8593-v7pdmm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=363&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163218/original/image-20170329-8593-v7pdmm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=456&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163218/original/image-20170329-8593-v7pdmm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=456&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163218/original/image-20170329-8593-v7pdmm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=456&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">President Donald Trump signs an Energy Independence Executive Order.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Pablo Martinez Monsivais</span></span>
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<p>During and after the presidential campaign, Trump has repeatedly denounced America’s international agreements. The targets of his ire have ranged from free trade deals (think <a href="http://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/28/nafta-and-trump-president-plans-two-new-executive-orders.html">NAFTA</a> and the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/us/politics/tpp-trump-trade-nafta.html">Trans-Pacific Partnership</a>) to defense pacts (e.g., <a href="http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/03/27/trump-handed-merkel-374b-nato-bill-during-talks.html">NATO</a>) to environmental accords (see the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2016-36401174">Paris climate deal</a>). In January, The New York Times even <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/25/us/politics/united-nations-trump-administration.html">reported</a> that the Trump administration was preparing an executive order entitled “Auditing and Reducing U.S. Funding of International Organizations.” This rhetoric has struck a chord with many Americans who fear that international agreements have destroyed American industry and cost Americans jobs. </p>
<p>But to say that we are disillusioned with multilateralism does not provide an answer to the more difficult question: If not multilateralism, then what? </p>
<h2>Going it alone</h2>
<p>The answer, it appears, is aggressive unilateralism. Instead of working through multilateral institutions to solve their problems, countries are increasingly <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2826708">going it alone</a>. </p>
<p>The United States, for example, has responded to the failure of international negotiations on a range of topics by imposing its domestic laws abroad. The U.S. forces foreign banks to abide by its <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-law-that-makes-u-s-expats-toxic-1444330827">financial regulations</a>, foreign businesses to comply with its <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2636921">corruption laws</a> and foreign producers to adopt its climate change-related emissions <a href="https://www.epa.gov/importing-vehicles-and-engines">standards</a>. All of these laws were made and enforced without international agreement. </p>
<p>In many ways, the rise of unilateralism may be a great boon for societies. The outpouring of activism and political engagement in the U.K. both before and after the Brexit vote signals a certain optimism about the ability of Britons to govern themselves. With any luck, this optimism will lead to a rejuvenation of democracy in the country, a welcome contrast to the deep cynicism more typical of politics today. Similarly, U.S. action to regulate foreign companies may help provide solutions to problems that have been stubbornly resistant to global agreement and treaty-making.</p>
<p>But the disillusionment with multilateralism also comes with a dark side. It is one thing when countries like the U.S. and Britain decide to start taking action in the face of stalled negotiations over climate change and corruption. It is another when countries with very different concepts of the rule of law and democratic processes start imposing their own rules, unilaterally, on American companies. </p>
<p>Just look at Russia’s recent prosecution of Google for <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/12/business/international/google-fine-russia-antitrust-android.html">anti-trust violations</a> or China’s <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/beijing-regulator-orders-apple-to-stop-sales-of-two-iphone-models-1466166711">injunction against the sale of iPhones</a> as examples.</p>
<p>Multilateralism has been a great engine of peace over the course of human civilization, and we should tread carefully in rejecting it. As Kant warned, the alternative is for us to “find perpetual peace in the vast grave that swallows both atrocities and their perpetrators.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/70865/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>William Magnuson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Trump’s agenda to pull America from key global alliances is more evidence that suggests it is. A law professor probes the unknown of what a world without such cooperation might look like.William Magnuson, Associate Professor of Law, Texas A&M UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.