tag:theconversation.com,2011:/fr/topics/morwell-9178/articlesMorwell – The Conversation2017-03-29T19:20:56Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/752172017-03-29T19:20:56Z2017-03-29T19:20:56ZHazelwood power station: from modernist icon to greenhouse pariah<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163100/original/image-20170329-1642-1asoej8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Hazelwood in happier times.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Centre for Gippsland Studies</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The roar of the furnaces, the rattle of the conveyors, and the occasional whoop of a siren marked out both day and night at Hazelwood. The pungent smell of brown coal permeates the air, and the fine particles would work their way into your clothes, hair and shoes. </p>
<p>On quiet evenings you could hear it all the way over in the nearby town of Churchill, seven kilometres away. That distant hum has been a comforting one as the station produced power in all weathers, day and night, for more than five decades. For many in Churchill and the other coal towns of Victoria’s Latrobe Valley, the noise also represented continuity of employment for more than 450 workers. </p>
<p>Those old certainties are now disappeared. The eight units that make up the 1,600 megawatt power station were progressively decommissioned this week. All are now shut off ahead of Hazelwood’s official closure on March 31. While some 250 workers will remain, the distant hum has settled to a whisper.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163101/original/image-20170329-1642-1jgkd2t.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163101/original/image-20170329-1642-1jgkd2t.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163101/original/image-20170329-1642-1jgkd2t.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163101/original/image-20170329-1642-1jgkd2t.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163101/original/image-20170329-1642-1jgkd2t.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163101/original/image-20170329-1642-1jgkd2t.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163101/original/image-20170329-1642-1jgkd2t.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163101/original/image-20170329-1642-1jgkd2t.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Noisy no longer: the turbine hall.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Erik Eklund</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>When the brand-new Hazelwood power station was officially opened on March 12, 1971, it represented a new and confident future for the Latrobe Valley region and the state of Victoria. Plans for this major infrastructure project were first made in 1956 and the first contracts signed in 1959. The Victorian premier, Sir Henry Bolte, spoke of the Latrobe Valley as the “<a href="http://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/71769968?searchTerm=ruhr%20bolte&searchLimits=l-decade=195%7C%7C%7Cl-state=Victoria">Ruhr of Australia</a>”.</p>
<p>The first six generating units were constructed between 1964 and 1967. The plant was eventually expanded to include another two. All eight were operational by the time of the <a href="http://www.gdfsuezau.com/media/UploadedDocuments/Hazelwood%20Closure/History/Hazelwood%20History%20Brochure.pdf">official opening in 1971</a>. </p>
<p>The station was fed by the Morwell open cut brown coal mine and was built right next door to the mine’s open-cast pit. The Morwell mine eventually grew to such mammoth proportions that the nearby Morwell River had to be <a href="http://www.gdfsuezau.com/hazelwood-closure/Hazelwood-History">diverted three times</a>. Each day, the mine fed more than 55,000 tonnes of brown coal into Hazelwood’s eight furnaces.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163137/original/image-20170329-22771-17g0tnt.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163137/original/image-20170329-22771-17g0tnt.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163137/original/image-20170329-22771-17g0tnt.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163137/original/image-20170329-22771-17g0tnt.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163137/original/image-20170329-22771-17g0tnt.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163137/original/image-20170329-22771-17g0tnt.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163137/original/image-20170329-22771-17g0tnt.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163137/original/image-20170329-22771-17g0tnt.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Alive no longer.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Erik Eklund</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Hazelwood station was planned, built and operated by the State Electricity Commission of Victoria (SECV). This government-owned body was formed in 1921 and had overseen the development of the power generation network in the Latrobe Valley. </p>
<p>The first power station at Yallourn (now decommissioned) began providing Victoria with power in 1924. It was followed by further expansion at Yallourn with newer units that still operate today. The Morwell power station and briquette factory were completed in 1959 (and shut down in 2014). The nearby Hazelwood completed the picture by 1971. </p>
<h2>A postwar coal community</h2>
<p>These power stations, along with the Morwell and Yallourn coal mines, defined the industrial heart of the Latrobe Valley as part of a postwar push to create entire communities in the region, centred on the coal industry. The SECV and then the state government had a meticulously planned vision, deciding on the location of new developments and entire new towns. By 1981 electricity generation and mining employed <a href="http://www.australianhumanitiesreview.org/archive/Issue-November-2010/tomaney&somerville.html">more than 10,000 workers</a> in an overwhelmingly male-dominated workforce.</p>
<p>It had not all been plain sailing. Completion of the Morwell power station was delayed by financial constraints and then technical problems. Coal from the Morwell mine proved to be unsuitable for briquette manufacture, so the SECV reverted to using Yallourn coal in the briquette furnaces. </p>
<p>The SECV also met with considerable local criticism over its decision to close the planned township of Yallourn so as to dig out the coal underneath it. Polluted though it was, many Yallourn residents had no desire to leave their tree-lined community.</p>
<p>The new town of Churchill, built to house the industrial workforce and their families, would accompany the Hazelwood development. Churchill was a model town located to avoid the prevailing winds from existing power stations. The town was perched on a hill with views across the Latrobe valley, the distant <a href="http://parkweb.vic.gov.au/explore/parks/baw-baw-national-park">Baw Baw ranges</a> and newly created lakes of <a href="http://www.visitlatrobevalley.com/pages/hazelwood-pondage/">Hazelwood Pondage</a>. Churchill joined other new public housing developments in nearby Moe and Morwell to house the expanding workforce.</p>
<p>Yet life in the coal heartland came with its own problems. Issues with <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-842X.1998.tb01438.x/full">air quality</a> began to become evident as early as the 1970s, while the privatisation of Hazelwood and the other power stations from 1996 led to <a href="http://www.australianhumanitiesreview.org/archive/Issue-November-2010/tomaney&somerville.html">8,000 job losses</a>. A 2004 WWF report named Hazelwood as the dirtiest power station in Australia, producing the most greenhouse emissions per megawatt of energy. </p>
<p>Hazelwood became a powerful political symbol and rallying cry for those concerned about the impact of carbon dioxide emissions on global warming. It has been credited with producing <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/gallery/2017/mar/28/powering-down-the-last-days-of-hazelwood-power-station-in-pictures">5% of the nation’s power and 3% of its carbon dioxide emissions</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163136/original/image-20170329-22782-wfub0n.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163136/original/image-20170329-22782-wfub0n.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163136/original/image-20170329-22782-wfub0n.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163136/original/image-20170329-22782-wfub0n.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163136/original/image-20170329-22782-wfub0n.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163136/original/image-20170329-22782-wfub0n.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163136/original/image-20170329-22782-wfub0n.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163136/original/image-20170329-22782-wfub0n.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The symbolic face of brown coal power.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Erik Eklund</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The media image of Hazelwood today, its eight stacks standing as a visual image of greenhouse emissions and industrial pollution, was forged in the decade since the WWF report. Worse was to come when it became the site of a <a href="http://report.hazelwoodinquiry.vic.gov.au/">coalmine fire that blazed for 45 days</a> in February-March 2014. It showered Morwell with smoke and ash, creating <a href="http://hazelwoodhealthstudy.org.au/">a major public health disaster</a>. </p>
<p>The confident, modernist image of 1970s Hazelwood went up in smoke, but this image has not been forgotten by many in the Latrobe Valley who lived through it.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Federation University, through the <a href="https://federation.edu.au/faculties-and-schools/faculty-of-education-and-arts/research/fea-research-groups/centre-for-gippsland-studies/cgs-events">Centre for Gippsland Studies</a>, is planning to take part in a project to record the memories and experiences of Hazelwood workers. The author thanks Engie, who approved a site visit to research this article, and Mark Richards, a Hazelwood worker and CFMEU delegate who acted as a tour guide.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/75217/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Erik Eklund does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Hazelwood power station will this week fall silent after a half-century during which it went from a beacon of progress to an emblem of fossil fuel pollution.Erik Eklund, Professor of History, Federation University AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/555772016-03-16T03:55:55Z2016-03-16T03:55:55ZThe two-year wait for Hazelwood mine fire charges shows the system needs to change<p>Victoria’s Environmental Protection Authority has <a href="http://www.epa.vic.gov.au/about-us/news-centre/news-and-updates/news/2016/march/15/charges-laid-following-epa-investigation-into-hazelwood-mine-fire">brought charges against four companies</a> over the <a href="https://theconversation.com/victorias-coal-fire-poses-a-rare-challenge-for-firefighting-23698">Hazelwood coal mine fire</a>, which burned for 45 days in February and March 2014, blanketing the nearby town of Morwell in smoke.</p>
<p>The charges allege that the pollution from the fire broke environmental laws by making the air:</p>
<blockquote>
<ul>
<li>noxious or poisonous or offensive to the senses of human beings;</li>
<li>harmful or potentially harmful to the health, welfare, safety or property of human beings;</li>
<li>detrimental to any beneficial use made of the atmosphere.</li>
</ul>
</blockquote>
<p>The charges follow a two-year investigation featuring <a href="http://hazelwoodinquiry.vic.gov.au/">several inquiries</a> into the fire, including a <a href="http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/file_uploads/10826_HAZ_Hazelwood_Mine_Fire_Inquiry_Report_2015_16_Volume_II_____Term_of_Reference_6_LoRes_58CA_4NfZvjW2.pdf">report</a> which concluded that the blaze probably contributed to deaths in the community. </p>
<p>The mine’s owner is already facing <a href="http://www.worksafenews.com.au/component/k2/item/473-hazelwood-power-corporation-charged.html">charges from Worksafe Victoria</a>, which it says it <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-02-04/hazelwood-mine-operator-charged-over-devastating-2014-blaze/7138378">will defend</a>. It is majority-owned by the power multinational GDF Suez (known internationally as <a href="http://www.engie.com/en/journalists/press-releases/gdf-suez-becomes-engie/">Engie</a>). </p>
<p>Some, including Victoria’s environment minister Lisa Neville, have <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/environment/victorian-environment-minister-lisa-neville-hits-out-at-epa-over-hazelwood-charges-delay-20160204-gmli2v.html">raised questions</a> over why it has taken so long for the EPA to lay its own charges. This chimes with our ongoing research, which indicates that Australian citizens and campaign groups have less power to bring environmental prosecutions than in other comparable countries.</p>
<h2>Compare and contrast</h2>
<p>We compared the situation in Australia with an Italian case involving another Engie subsidiary, Tirreno Power. In 2014, while Hazelwood was burning, Tirreno’s coal-fired power plant in Vado Ligure, Italy, was <a href="http://reneweconomy.com.au/2014/hazelwood-owner-told-to-shut-italian-coal-plant-blamed-for-deaths-18375">seized and shut down</a> in response to <a href="http://www.penalecontemporaneo.it/upload/1399222800Trib.%20Savona%20-%20decreto%20sequestro%20Tirreno%20Power.pdf">judicial findings</a> that the company had violated its environmental conditions, causing hundreds of deaths and thousands of illnesses as a result of the facility’s emissions.</p>
<p>Unlike at Hazelwood, there was no single disaster such as a fire, but rather a realisation of the damage being done by chronic pollution.</p>
<p>In Italy, not only is environmental protection improving under the guidance of the European Union, but citizens also have their own systems to report potential violations, balancing to some degree the rights of corporations against those of other parties. In the Tirreno case, the campaign group <a href="http://www.internazionale.it/reportage/2015/11/07/vado-ligure-carbone-inquinamento">Rete Savonese Fermiamo il Carbone</a> (Savonese Stop the Coal Network) was instrumental in raising the issue and ultimately securing a victory for local citizens.</p>
<p>Victorian state laws have some similar provisions, particularly under the <a href="http://www.legislation.vic.gov.au/domino/web_notes/ldms/pubstatbook.nsf/f932b66241ecf1b7ca256e92000e23be/750e0d9e0b2b387fca256f71001fa7be/$file/04-107a.pdf">Occupational Health and Safety Act</a>. If a citizen feels that an incident has breached health and safety laws and authorities do not prosecute within six months, they can make a written request to <a href="http://www.worksafe.vic.gov.au/">Worksafe Victoria</a> to prosecute. </p>
<p>This is probably how Worksafe’s recent action against GDF Suez came about about. Acting on behalf of campaign group <a href="http://www.votv.org.au/">Voices of the Valley</a>, Environmental Justice Australia <a href="https://envirojustice.org.au/blog/worksafe-to-prosecute-hazelwood-power-corp-over-mine-fire">asked Worksafe to pursue legal action</a>.</p>
<p>But similar provisions do not exist under Victoria’s <a href="http://www.epa.vic.gov.au/about-us/legislation/acts-administered-by-epa">environmental laws</a>, which date back to 1970. Only the EPA can bring charges, but if it chooses not to, there is no way for citizens to ask the authority to reconsider.</p>
<h2>Citizens’ rights</h2>
<p>In some ways this is rather startling. It begs the question of who will uphold environmental standards if the regulator chooses to look the other way. It is little wonder that citizens are resorting to <a href="https://newmatilda.com/2016/02/09/climate-angels-santos-csg/">protest</a> and <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/comment/coal-marketing-should-come-with-a-health-warning-20160309-gnegkv.html">media pressure</a> to be heard.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, there are worrying signs that corporations are being given special privilege on account of their role as drivers of economic development. This includes mining companies who, for example, have until recently been relatively free simply to <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-09-19/taxpayers-may-foot-bill-for-mine-rehabilitation/6787954">abandon mines</a> once extraction has finished. Even now they only have to pay nominal rehabilitation bonds, with the result that Hazelwood is one of roughly <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-should-we-do-with-australias-50-000-abandoned-mines-18197">50,000 abandoned mine sites</a> across the country, many of which pose serious risks. The current Hazelwood Mine Fire Inquiry report on mine rehabilitation at the site was due March 15, but <a href="http://hazelwoodinquiry.vic.gov.au/">this has been delayed for an unspecified period or reason</a>.</p>
<p>Society’s capacity to call on governments to prosecute is clearly mediated by how the law defines <a href="http://phg.sagepub.com/content/39/1/96.short">who can take legal action</a>. The federal government’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/brandis-changes-to-environmental-laws-will-defang-the-watchdogs-46267">ongoing bid to strip green groups of the right to challenge environmental approvals</a> is case in point.</p>
<p>The Hazelwood fire has exposed many environmental issues. But the slow pace of the investigation also highlights a real weakness in our legal system. Making this system more just and democratic is vital – not just to increase our capacity to respond to catastrophic events like the Hazelwood fire, but also to begin tipping the balance of power back towards society and away from corporations who must always be fully accountable.</p>
<p><em>This article was co-authored with Melanie Birkbeck, who has researched these issues as an intern at the <a href="http://sustainable.unimelb.edu.au/">Melbourne Sustainable Society Institute</a> and as a postgraduate student at the University of Melbourne’s <a href="http://environment.unimelb.edu.au/">Office for Environmental Programs</a>. It is based on research supported by the Melbourne Sustainable Society Institute and RMIT Centre for Urban Research.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/55577/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lauren Rickards does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Two years after Morwell was blanketed in smoke from the Hazelwood fire, environmental charges have been laid against the mine’s operators. But the process should be more open and democratic - and quicker.Lauren Rickards, Senior Lecturer, Sustainability and Urban Planning, School of Global Urban and Social Studies; Co-leader, Climate Change and Resilience research program, Centre for Urban Studies, RMIT UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/317822014-09-28T19:18:49Z2014-09-28T19:18:49ZDirty air, dodgy politics: why it’s easier to attack science than listen to Morwell fire death stats<p>I’m quite nervous about writing this. I’m going to stray from my familiar academic world into a political one, and it’s on an issue that may very well have killed several people. My reputation has already been debased in the Victorian Parliament, by Health Minister David Davis. I’m expecting more political dirt to come my way.</p>
<p>First, the back story. The issue is the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/hazelwood">Hazelwood coalmine fire</a>, which burned from February 9 to March 10 this year in Victoria’s Latrobe Valley. It covered the surrounding area in thick smoke and ash, and caused <a href="https://theconversation.com/young-and-old-told-to-leave-morwell-south-amid-smoke-fears-23823">eye-wateringly high levels</a> of particulate pollution in the nearby town of Morwell. </p>
<p>The scientific literature on exposure to coal smoke is crystal clear. London’s famous 1952 smog caused <a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1241789">an estimated 12,000 deaths</a>, whereas Dublin’s 1990 ban on coal has saved <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140673602112815">350 lives a year</a>. </p>
<p>So it’s understandable that a group of local residents has <a href="http://www.votv.org.au">raised concerns</a> about their health after being exposed to the Hazelwood pollution. They enterprisingly collated death notices from local papers and, based on some troubling numbers, they then sought out the official numbers of monthly deaths. </p>
<p>With help from an <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-09-12/morwell-residents-fear-fire-was-fatal/5741170">ABC journalist</a> they passed this data on to me and I ran a statistical analysis that compared average death rates during February and March 2014 with monthly average data going back to 2009. </p>
<p>My <a href="http://eprints.qut.edu.au/76230">results</a> revealed an 89% probability that death rates were above average during this period, with an estimated 11 to 14 extra deaths.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/60132/original/vfw42zmf-1411699897.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/60132/original/vfw42zmf-1411699897.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/60132/original/vfw42zmf-1411699897.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/60132/original/vfw42zmf-1411699897.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/60132/original/vfw42zmf-1411699897.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/60132/original/vfw42zmf-1411699897.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/60132/original/vfw42zmf-1411699897.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/60132/original/vfw42zmf-1411699897.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Deaths in the Morwell area for selected months in 2014 (red line) and the preceding years. High numbers in early 2009 are probably due to extreme heat and high pollution levels from bushfires.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Disappointing response</h2>
<p>The Victorian health minister’s response to these figures has been disappointing. Rather than consider the evidence, Davis tried instead to blacken my reputation and has claimed publicly that my analysis is biased. He (or his staff) has trawled the archives of <a href="https://theconversation.com/creating-a-stink-about-traffic-pollution-7661">The Conversation</a> and <a href="http://www.hlth.qut.edu.au/ph/about/staff/barnett/cv_Adrian_Barnett.pdf">my CV</a> for ammunition. </p>
<p>First he appeared on <a href="http://blogs.abc.net.au/victoria/2014/09/debate-over-latrobe-valley-deaths-during-mine-fire.html?site=gippsland&program=gippsland_mornings">ABC radio</a> and stated that it was “important for the community to know” that I have “done work for a political party”, referring to my “expert review work for the Queensland Greens”. </p>
<p>Back in 2008 I read the Queensland Greens’ policy on air pollution and provided some comments. It took me about 30 minutes and I did it for free. I was happy to do it and would do it again. Hopefully I was able to update the policy with the latest scientific evidence.</p>
<p>Next, Davis used parliament to accuse me of presenting the results “in a certain way for political purposes”. He also called me an “ideologue”, a “well-known activist”, and (most bizarrely) a “<a href="http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/images/stories/Council_Daily_Extract_Tuesday_16_September_2014_from_Book_13.pdf">climate change person</a>”.</p>
<p>To claim that I would skew an analysis to misrepresent the data is a very serious allegation and one that I wholly reject. I’ve made my analysis <a href="http://eprints.qut.edu.au/76230">publicly available</a> – if you can see where I’ve added a political bias then let me know.</p>
<h2>Political attacks on science</h2>
<p>While irritating on a personal level, this episode is yet another example of a political attack on science. Clearly, the message that the Hazelwood fire may well have killed people won’t be a popular one with the state government. Disappointingly, it seems the government has responded by trying to discredit the messenger.</p>
<p>We have seen similar attacks by politicians before, most notably against climate science, when scientists are harangued for <a href="https://theconversation.com/an-insiders-story-of-the-global-attack-on-climate-science-21972">making perfectly legitimate statistical adjustments</a> or the Bureau of Meteorology is <a href="http://theconversation.com/no-the-bureau-of-meteorology-is-not-fiddling-its-weather-data-31009">wrongly accused of fiddling data</a>.</p>
<p>Mr Davis’s logic is that because I once gave advice to a political party, all of my subsequent scientific research can be discredited. The message he is sending to scientists is: don’t ever work with political parties. </p>
<p>This is exactly the opposite of what’s currently needed. If more scientists talked to politicians, we would probably have more evidence-based policy on <a href="http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/baillieus-wind-farm-crackdown-20110829-1jig4.html">wind farms in Victoria</a>, a national <a href="http://theconversation.com/states-should-stand-up-to-the-food-industry-on-traffic-light-labelling-4504">food labelling system</a>, and <a href="http://theconversation.com/how-to-reduce-opioid-overdose-deaths-in-australia-10197">supervised drug-injection facilities</a>. </p>
<p>Sadly, these are just a few of the many areas where current government policy is completely at odds with the science.</p>
<p>Australia’s air is relatively clean. A <a href="http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736%2812%2961766-8/abstract">global analysis</a> ranked particulate air pollution as the 26th biggest health problem in Australasia, whereas it was the 4th biggest in East Asia. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, given that <a href="http://www.bitre.gov.au/publications/2005/wp_063.aspx">1,400 Australians are killed every year by traffic pollution</a> and that there is no real safe level for air pollution, we could still deliver massive health benefits by making our air cleaner.</p>
<p>How would our politics rank on a global table of cleanliness? Wherever we sit, we can always do better. One thing our air and our politics have in common is that the cleaner they get, the better off we are.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/31782/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adrian Barnett receives funding from the National Health and Medical Research Council.</span></em></p>I’m quite nervous about writing this. I’m going to stray from my familiar academic world into a political one, and it’s on an issue that may very well have killed several people. My reputation has already…Adrian Barnett, Associate Professor of Public Health, Queensland University of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/313752014-09-08T05:47:59Z2014-09-08T05:47:59ZThe real disaster, at Hazelwood and elsewhere, is brown coal itself<p>Fittingly for a report on a huge fire, the findings of the <a href="http://hazelwoodinquiry.vic.gov.au">Hazelwood Mine Fire Inquiry</a> act as a smokescreen for the bigger issues behind the disaster.</p>
<p>Partly because of its narrow <a href="http://hazelwoodinquiry.vic.gov.au/terms-of-reference">terms of reference</a>, the inquiry viewed the 45-day fire as an “emergency event”, similar to other previous botches and disasters. But this approach ignores the wider point: that the real risks of brown coal can’t be managed.</p>
<p>As the <a href="http://report.hazelwoodinquiry.vic.gov.au/executive-summary-2/hazelwood-mine-fire">inquiry found</a>, the disaster could have been <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-hazelwood-mine-disaster-could-easily-have-been-avoided-31335">easily avoided</a>. This might leave us with the impression that, with certain minor measures, such a fire will never happen again because the danger was so clearly foreseeable.</p>
<p>But “foreseeable” doesn’t always mean “preventable”. Sometimes it just means realising the risks and deciding to accept them, much like farmers are told to accept the possibility of drought as a normal business risk.</p>
<p>Where brown coal is concerned, accepting the risks means accepting crises like fires and pollution as normal – a condition, not an event. Is that really what we want?</p>
<h2>Power plays</h2>
<p>In his 1984 book <a href="http://press.princeton.edu/titles/6596.html">Normal Accidents</a>, Yale University sociologist Charles Perrow wrote that “the issue is not risk, but power”. That phrase is particularly apt for Hazelwood: a power station as well as a mine, only open by virtue of the power of vested interests. </p>
<p>Brown coal fails all tests of being a suitable energy source except for its apparent cost. Thanks to its environmental and human costs being radically discounted or completely ignored, brown coal appears delightfully cheap. </p>
<p>But of course, it is not actually cheap. As <a href="http://www.theage.com.au/comment/we-must-kill-dirty-coal-before-it-kills-us-20140902-10b8lk.html">Tim Flannery and Fiona Stanley recently pointed out</a>, residents in coalmining regions often suffer from a range of health problems, which impose huge costs on people and society alike. Studies of children show increased levels of neurotoxins like lead and mercury, alongside other pollutants.</p>
<p>Living in fear of insidious, silent toxins can be a lasting effect of a human-induced disaster. It is a characteristic of what another Yale sociologist, Kai Erikson, has called “<a href="https://www.kirkusreviews.com/book-reviews/kai-erikson/a-new-species-of-trouble">a new species of trouble</a>” facing modern society. </p>
<p>As the Hazelwood inquiry shows, efforts to tame this new species include presenting the problem as one with preventable causes. As Erikson explains, there is always a moral to be drawn, always some blame to be assigned, always a story to be told.</p>
<p>But the real story of Hazelwood is much bigger than the one told in the 450-odd pages of the commission’s report. The mine is not just the setting for the story; it is its lead character, protagonist, and victim. </p>
<p>The power of the mine in the story is illustrated by the way it reframes the value of native trees in the landscape. Over numerous pages, the report describes eucalypts within a wind’s breath of the mine as a future risk to it. The rationale is that they are flammable and, if alight, may release embers that subsequently reach and ignite the mine. </p>
<p>In this way, the report not only normalises the unquestioned ongoing importance of the mine, but also places the trees at risk by raising the possibility of their removal in the name of disaster risk reduction. The mine and its vulnerability to fire cast another haze over the landscape: a risk haze that darkens our view of otherwise positive elements such as trees.</p>
<p>Native trees being benighted on account of posing a distant risk to a large polluting coal mine is deeply ironic. Not only are such trees part of the original vegetation of the land, they are flammable because fire is a natural part of the Australian landscape. But now it is fossil fuel combustion that is naturalised, while bushfire has been perverted by climate change.</p>
<h2>The hole in the story</h2>
<p>And so we come to the other gaping hole (besides the mine itself) in the inquiry’s version of the story: climate change. It’s difficult to avoid the suspicion that the report’s silence on climate change is political. If so, it wouldn’t be a surprise, but it would be damaging. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/australias-climate-time-to-act-on-rising-heatwaves-and-fires-23927">increasing frequency of extreme fire weather</a> is mentioned in the report, but climate is not. So the fact that such “extreme” days are emerging on the back of increasing aridity, droughts and water shortages is omitted, which in turn allows water-intensive fire prevention and firefighting plans to be presented as rational.</p>
<p>Carbon is also mentioned in the report, but only in relation to the localised and short-term issue of carbon monoxide. The megatonnes of carbon dioxide released into the atmosphere during the 45 days of the fire, which will go on to threaten the health of people everywhere, are ignored.</p>
<p>Allowing climate change into the story lets in a dense cloud of other issues. It radically extends our sense of which communities have been affected by the fire. It forces the story out of its neat linear sequence and into a dizzying spiral of feedbacks. </p>
<p>Above all, the Hazelwood mine fire is a feedback effect of climate change. The mine itself has become the scene of a head-on collision between the status quo and the need to adapt. </p>
<h2>A double disaster</h2>
<p>Erikson warned that those directly exposed to human-induced disasters such as the Hazelwood fire often experience a loss of sense and meaning. This experience of an altered, disordered world can transform an initial disaster into a double one. Already, the quality of life of those living in mining regions is depressed daily by the mines, which harm the environment, damage health, and entrench socioeconomic disadvantage. To quote John Lennon and Harry Nilsson, life can feel like “<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Old_Dirt_Road">trying to shovel smoke with a pitchfork in the wind</a>”.</p>
<p>In a sense, the Hazelwood mine fire and its subsequent inquiry represents a double disaster for all of us. Shaped by politics, the inquiry’s efforts to frame the fire as an emergency event similar to any other misses the point: that brown coal presents huge dangers no matter how we govern it. We have to stop hiding this new species of trouble in our midst.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/31375/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lauren Rickards has received funding in the past from what was the Climate Adaptation Flagship of CSIRO, the now discontinued Victorian Climate Change Centre for Adaptation Research and the National Climate Change Adaptation Research Facility.</span></em></p>Fittingly for a report on a huge fire, the findings of the Hazelwood Mine Fire Inquiry act as a smokescreen for the bigger issues behind the disaster. Partly because of its narrow terms of reference, the…Lauren Rickards, Research Fellow, Melbourne Sustainable Society Institute, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/313352014-09-07T20:37:14Z2014-09-07T20:37:14ZThe Hazelwood mine disaster could easily have been avoided<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/victorias-coal-fire-poses-a-rare-challenge-for-firefighting-23698">Hazelwood coalmine fire</a>, which burned for 45 days earlier this year, was a catastrophe for the town of Morwell in Victoria’s Latrobe Valley. </p>
<p>Homes were blanketed in smoke and ash, many residents were <a href="https://theconversation.com/young-and-old-told-to-leave-morwell-south-amid-smoke-fears-23823">told to evacuate</a>, and the overall damage bill has been estimated at more than A$100 million.</p>
<p>Yet the disaster could have been avoided, according to the Hazelwood Mine Fire Commission, which recently <a href="http://report.hazelwoodinquiry.vic.gov.au">handed down its findings</a> regarding the origin of the fire, the firefighting response, and the preparedness measures taken by mine operator GDF Suez. </p>
<h2>A foreseeable fire</h2>
<p>The commission disagreed with GDF Suez’s <a href="https://au.news.yahoo.com/vic/a/24884031/hazelwood-mine-fire-inquiry-gdf-suez-defends-actions-during-blaze">argument</a> that the fire was created by a “perfect storm of events”. Rather, it pointed to a failure to implement adequate risk management procedures, saying GDF Suez had approached the risk-management process as one of minimum compliance, rather than best practice and continuous improvement. </p>
<p>In the words of the commission, the possibility of disaster “could have been foreseen”, but this foreseeable risk was not properly managed. </p>
<p>The commission also found a lack of clarity over who was responsible for the implementation and review of fire management plans – a factor that it said significantly exacerbated the risk. All of the factors that contributed to the ignition and spread of the fire were found to be foreseeable. </p>
<p>After a previous fire at the coalmine in September 2008, GDF Suez failed to carry out a proper risk assessment to see if further preventative work was needed in other worked-out areas of the mine, despite having been recommended to do so. This, the commission noted, could have reduced the severity of the 2014 fire. A golden opportunity to reduce the risk had been missed.</p>
<p>The Commission concluded that GDF Suez did not adequately recognise the risk of a bushfire sparking a major fire in the worked-out areas of the Hazelwood mine, or the potential impacts such a fire might have on Morwell and surrounding communities.</p>
<p>When the fire broke out, the situation was worsened by the fact that large amounts of coal in the worked-out areas had been left exposed to the air, and that pipework from the fire service network had been removed because of deterioration. Under GDF Suez’s self-imposed guidelines, these areas were still classed as protected because they were within five minutes’ travel from a tanker filling point or hydrant manifold. But Country Fire Service volunteers who fought the blaze told the commission they had trouble finding and using these water sources. </p>
<p>The commission <a href="http://report.hazelwoodinquiry.vic.gov.au/executive-summary-2/recommendations/recommendations-gdf-suez">recommended</a> that GDF Suez conduct a thorough risk assessment of the worked-out areas of the Hazelwood mine. It also <a href="http://report.hazelwoodinquiry.vic.gov.au/executive-summary-2/recommendations/recommendations-state">recommended</a> that the Victorian government introduce legislation to require miners to draw up integrated fire-management plans. The commission made it clear that in the circumstances, doing nothing was simply not an option.</p>
<h2>In rehab</h2>
<p>The fact that the fire burned through worked-out areas of the mine also raised questions about the adequacy of GDF Suez’s mine rehabilitation program.</p>
<p>The original Hazelwood mine licence was granted on May 10, 1996. The original application was subsequently revised and a new 30-year licence was issued a few month later. On 11 July 2006, the mining licence was amalgamated with four other mining licences that had been issued to create a single larger mine. This licence was varied to allow mining to take place on the west field of the Hazelwood mine, and to require the licensee to spend A$667,930 per year on mining work in the licensed area. </p>
<p>In all, the work plan for the Hazelwood mine, which was approved on 10 September 1996, was varied seven times, with the latest and most substantial variation to the work plan being made in 2009. The 2009 variation was required to further expand the mine into the west field development region. </p>
<p>GDF Suez paid a rehabilitation bond of A$15 million in 1996. While this was initially intended to be an interim figure based, according to the commission, on “an estimate of rehabilitation costs for ongoing progressive rehabilitation and final rehabilitation at present day values”, it was clearly an underestimate. Despite this, the rehabilitation bond was never revised, even though the commission estimated that the cost of complete rehabilitation for the mine would have been about A$100 million. </p>
<p>Significantly, the rehabilitation bond was not reassessed in 2009 when the land area subject to the mining licence was substantially increased, even though this would obviously have resulted in an increase of land requiring rehabilitation. But the commission did not find that the failure to reassess the rehabilitation bond was a breach of regulations, because of the discretionary nature of the bonds which made assessment variable.</p>
<p>The commission did, however, find deficiencies in the rehabilitation program. From 1996 to 2000, several sections of the worked-out areas of the mine were not effectively rehabilitated. It was argued before the commission that the rehabilitation program was a complex, costly and time-consuming exercise and that the failure to remediate was the consequence of several factors, including a lack of dirt and clay (or “overburden”) to cover the top of the coal, bad weather hampering rehabilitation projects, and the fact that future mining activity would have resulted in the removal of any overburden put into place anyway. The commission confirmed that to privatisation, no rehabilitation works were undertaken within the pit or on any of the worked-out areas of the Hazelwood mine.</p>
<p>Despite these findings, the commission found that the rehabilitation obligations set out in the 2009 variation were technically being met. The first trigger for remediation did not actually come into full effect until 2019. Hence, although initial remediation had not occurred, the Commission felt that there was still time for GDF Suez to meet its requirements. </p>
<p>The commission did not recommend changes to the regulatory framework for rehabilitation obligations. While it noted that rehabilitation obligations were important, it argued that they should not be relied upon as the primary strategy for fire prevention.</p>
<p>GDF Suez responded to the report by strongly defending its actions, maintaining its argument that it could not have predicted the events that led to the blaze, that it had implemented many of the regulations raised by the commission, and that the findings were largely a matter of degree and interpretation. </p>
<p>The company did not accept liability for the fire, and did not indicate whether it would <a href="https://au.news.yahoo.com/vic/a/24884031/hazelwood-mine-fire-inquiry-gdf-suez-defends-actions-during-blaze">provide compensation for losses caused by it</a>.</p>
<h2>It didn’t have to happen</h2>
<p>The frustrating thing for the people of Morwell, which is confirmed by the commission’s report, is that the social, environmental and economic devastation caused by the fire was easily avoidable. With proper fire management and a comprehensive mine rehabilitation plan, the risk of a disaster of this scale would have been significantly reduced. </p>
<p>Hopefully, the commission’s recommendations will help to avoid any similar event occurring in the future, although they should not be treated as a panacea. The brown coal industry must learn from this event and make absolutely sure that it is fully prepared through the implementation of careful, coordinated integrated fire management plans and a strict adherence to rehabilitation responsibilities. The most effective way of shifting behaviour is through the implementation of stronger and more focused regulation. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.latrobevalleyexpress.com.au/story/2353550/inquiry-hazelwood-manager-expresses-regret">Appearing before the inquiry in June</a>, GDF Suez senior manager George Graham said “hindsight’s a great thing”, adding: “obviously we’ve had a huge event which is deeply regrettable and we will ensure we won’t have another event like that again”.</p>
<p>Hindsight is one thing, but much greater foresight is needed if the industry is to put an end to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/accidents-or-bad-regulation-why-victorias-coal-mines-keep-failing-26376">spate of accidents</a> that have befallen Victoria’s mining industry.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/31335/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Samantha Hepburn does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Hazelwood coalmine fire, which burned for 45 days earlier this year, was a catastrophe for the town of Morwell in Victoria’s Latrobe Valley. Homes were blanketed in smoke and ash, many residents were…Samantha Hepburn, Professor, Faculty of Business and Law, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/263762014-05-22T20:18:10Z2014-05-22T20:18:10ZAccidents or bad regulation? Why Victoria’s coal mines keep failing<p>The fire that burned for more than <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/backgroundbriefing/2014-03-23/5331252">40 days at the Hazelwood coal mine in the Latrobe Valley</a> earlier this year is the latest in a spate of mining failures over the past few years. It might seem like plain bad luck, but a recent report shows that Victoria’s coal mines have experienced a significant number of mine failures.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.justice.vic.gov.au/home/safer+communities/emergencies/emergency+risks+in+victoria+report">Emergency Risks in Victoria report</a> said both open-cut and subsurface mines, particularly coal mines, are highly susceptible to infrastructure, operational, environmental, and safety failures.</p>
<p>The report calculates the annual likelihood of a “medium-impact” mine failure in Victoria is almost 100% - making mines more of a threat than storms, bushfires, marine pollution or heatwaves.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2014/05/17/world/europe/turkey-mine-accident/">deaths of 301 coal miners in Turkey</a> last week reminds us mines have the potential to cause catastrophic tragedy. There is no room for complacency. </p>
<h2>Serious impacts</h2>
<p>The social, environmental and economic impacts of mining failures can be significant. At Hazelwood, the fire found its way into the mine’s coal seam, causing a potentially catastrophic situation. Elderly and vulnerable residents were evacuated from Morwell, and the remaining community was forced to breathe toxic fumes and live in houses covered with ash. </p>
<p>Open-cut mine walls are also vulnerable to extreme weather events, because they can be weakened by water and seismic activity, potentially triggering a collapse. </p>
<p>In 2007, the open-cut mine walls (also called batters) at <a href="http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/victoria/landslide-cuts-power-flow/story-e6frf7kx-1111114879075">Yallourn Mine failed</a>, causing a landslide that diverted the Latrobe River into the mine pit, forced the operators to cease coal production, and left the nearby power station running at less than one-third capacity. </p>
<p>In 2012, an embankment that had been explicitly constructed to divert the Morwell River across the Yallourn mine <a href="http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/yallourn-coal-mine-flood-worsens-20120715-224ef.html">failed during extreme rainfall</a>. The resulting flood severely disrupted the mine’s operations and required months of costly remediation work. </p>
<p>Across the border in New South Wales, mining failures associated with <a href="https://theconversation.com/topics/coal-seam-gas">coal seam gas</a> operations have led to environmental and health safety fears over the chemical contamination of groundwater. For example, Santos spilled 250 litres of algaecide in the Pilliga in December 2011 as a result of a pipe rupture causing widespread water contamination. This followed the the leaking of 10,000 litres of saline water at the Narrabi CSG Project just prior to this.</p>
<h2>Why does it happen?</h2>
<p>Mining failure is, to some extent, an inevitable risk associated with an inherently dangerous industry. But these events are not mere happenstance, and it is possible for them to be more effectively managed through the use of careful, focused regulation. </p>
<p>The margin for error can be small when dealing with technical, operational and safety issues involving mineral extraction and energy production. </p>
<p>But despite this, we need to try and ensure that mine failures are less frequent and less serious, by introducing focused regulatory measures. This should include: creating technical advisory boards, standardising safety management plans, and closely monitoring safety, rehabilitation and environmental operations rather than allowing miners to regulate themselves.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/48970/original/87hwh5p4-1400565428.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/48970/original/87hwh5p4-1400565428.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/48970/original/87hwh5p4-1400565428.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/48970/original/87hwh5p4-1400565428.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/48970/original/87hwh5p4-1400565428.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/48970/original/87hwh5p4-1400565428.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/48970/original/87hwh5p4-1400565428.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Rehabilitation work is under-regulated at mining sites.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/abeckstrom/6111229090/in/photolist-5xaFGH-aj2DuN-9MNiKs-9VPR5A-9GjG8c-dt3tDk-HuTfk-dTABHA-6aLqCw-cuTZrE-ctVxxd-6aLqM9-6aLruw-6aGhnR-6aGgZV-6aGhcx">Ammon Beckstram/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Victoria could learn a lot from Queensland’s <a href="https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/LEGISLTN/CURRENT/P/PetrolmGasA04.pdf">Petroleum and Gas (Safety and Production) Act</a>, which requires miners to submit publicly accessible safety plans and not to carry out activities that represent “avoidable risks” such as the utilization of old or faulty equipment. </p>
<p>In contrast, Victoria’s regulations are in urgent need of reform. One of the biggest problems is that there is no external monitoring of mine rehabilitation programs. Miners largely regulate themselves and are not required to make their plans public, meaning that breaches can go undetected, even if they have the potential to endanger public safety or the environment.</p>
<h2>Counting the cost</h2>
<p>The Hazelwood fire is now the subject of a <a href="http://hazelwoodinquiry.vic.gov.au">state government inquiry</a>, with results due in August. One question for the inquiry is whether shortcomings in the mine’s rehabilitation program were a factor not only in the outbreak of the fire, but also in its impact on nearby communities.</p>
<p>In 2008, the <a href="http://www.energyandresources.vic.gov.au/earth-resources/policy-and-legislation/regulatory-reviews/yallourn-coal-mine-inquiries/mining-warden-yallourn-mine-batter-failure-inquiry-government-response">inquiry into the Yallourn landslide</a> identified several ways to reduce the chances of similar events, such as creating technical review boards to advise miners about geological risks.</p>
<p>These suggestions were never followed up. If they had been, it’s possible that the 2012 flood, which occurred at the same mine, might well have been avoided.</p>
<h2>A few steps forward</h2>
<p>Nevertheless, Victoria does have some protective provisions. The <a href="http://www.legislation.vic.gov.au/Domino/Web_Notes/LDMS/LTObject_Store/LTObjSt5.nsf/DDE300B846EED9C7CA257616000A3571/813CA9695125BB24CA2577BF007CAD09/$FILE/90-92a080.pdf">Mineral Resources Act</a> requires all coal miners in the Latrobe Valley to pay the relevant Minister a mine stability levy. This levy is then used to reduce geotechnical and hydrogeological risks to coal mines in the region. </p>
<p>The levy functions in the same way as a rehabilitation bond as it seeks to act as an incentive for operators to maintain safe, stable mines. However, financial incentives can never take the place of strong, external regulation. Indeed, it is arguable that where the cost of maintenance and rehabilitation is more than the cost of the bond, these measures might actually encourage miners to behave irresponsibly. </p>
<p>The consequences of a mining failure can be devastating, and all Australian governments should carefully consider whether their safety laws are performing optimally. The spate of catastrophic mining failures that have occurred in Victoria’s open-cut coal mines, combined with a weak regulatory framework for safety and rehabilitation, suggest that such a review has become a priority in that state. </p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/26376/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Samantha Hepburn does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The fire that burned for more than 40 days at the Hazelwood coal mine in the Latrobe Valley earlier this year is the latest in a spate of mining failures over the past few years. It might seem like plain…Samantha Hepburn, Professor, Faculty of Business and Law, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/236982014-02-27T19:14:23Z2014-02-27T19:14:23ZVictoria’s coal fire poses a rare challenge for firefighting<p>Victoria’s Hazelwood coal mine is still burning, nearly three weeks after it started from a grassfire during severe fire conditions. Police are <a href="http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/police-suspect-arsonist-behind-hazelwood-open-cut-mine-fire-20140225-33eq0.html">currently investigating</a> the original fire for arson. Meanwhile <a href="http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/minister-rejects-fire-health-risk-20140223-33amd.html">health concerns</a> continue for firefighters and <a href="http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/morwell-residents-scared-to-stay-but-unable-to-leave-as-coalmine-fire-burns-on-20140226-33ii1.html">residents in the nearby town of Morwell</a>, with air quality very poor due to particulates produced in the fire. </p>
<p>Although rare, <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/science/news/enviro/EnviroRepublish_786127.htm">coal fires can burn for decades</a> — though the Hazelwood fire will probably not last that long, especially given the current firefighting effort. (The latest <a href="https://news.cfa.vic.gov.au/news/latrobe-open-cut-mine-info.html">Country Fire Authority updates are here</a>.)</p>
<p>But what does the current fire tell us about our preparation for potential future fires? </p>
<h2>Coal fires: rare, but dangerous</h2>
<p>The Morwell Open Cut Mine is a large brown coal mine, close to homes and the Hazelwood power station (which is why the fire is being referred to by the <a href="https://news.cfa.vic.gov.au/news/latrobe-open-cut-mine-info.html">Country Fire Authority and others as the Hazelwood fire</a>). These factors mean that the Hazelwood fire poses a threat to safety of the community and <a href="http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/hazelwood-power-station-threatened-by-fire-again-as-crews-aim-for-upper-hand-20140226-33ghh.html">energy supplies</a>. </p>
<p>It is rare for a coal mine fire to pose such a significant threat. The <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jharia#Coal_field_fire">Jharia coal fire</a> in India has been burning since at least 1916 and has caused serious health problems and subsidence in nearby villages and slums. </p>
<p>Another fire <a href="http://www.theage.com.au/news/National/Massive-coal-mine-blaze-still-burning/2006/10/13/1160246290407.html">in 2006 at the Hazelwood mine</a> did cause loss of generating capacity to the nearby power station. </p>
<p>The risk of a fire in an open-cut coal mine depends on several factors.</p>
<p>Fire is caused by the combination of three elements: a fuel that can burn, an air supply, and the heat generated by the combustion process. Coal is, of course, the fuel, while the atmosphere supplies the air, and any coal reacting with air will generate heat. </p>
<p>Most coal mined in Australia is black coal, which is geologically older and much less reactive than brown coal. </p>
<p>In the Hazelwood situation the coal fire was <a href="http://www.skynews.com.au/topstories/article.aspx?id=953255&vId=4351597&cId=Top%20Stories">started by the grass fire</a>. The coal seam at this mine is very close to the surface, so the heat from the grass fire would easily transfer to the coal seam. </p>
<p>If the seam is fractured and porous, the air would get into the coal and the coal would quickly dry out to a point where it will react with the air, until the coal temperature could increase to flame point and burn. The thickness of the coal seam also meant that there was a large mass of coal available to combust.</p>
<p>It is very rare to get a coal fire of the scale found at Morwell. Most open-cut coal fires in Australia have been caused by unusual circumstance, such as the intersection of the open cut mine with old underground coal mine roadways, which facilitate air paths into the coal seam. At these mines, the fire is controlled through prevention by isolating the underground areas, covering the exposed tunnels to prevent air getting in and only exposing small amounts of coal at a time for mining. </p>
<h2>Fighting fire with more than water</h2>
<p>Treatment of a fire at a coal mine depends upon the size and location of the fire and the available resources. If the fires are small they can be quenched with water, covered in foam and the offending area dug out and removed. </p>
<p>Large underground fires are often sealed in and the area is filled with inert gas. If possible, and the topography of the coal seam suits it, the area may be flooded.</p>
<p>Open-cut fires similarly depend upon size, location and access. </p>
<p>Often the fire consists of relatively small amounts of smouldering coal under the surface (such as <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burning_Mountain">Burning Mountain</a> in New South Wales, 6,000 years old and considered the oldest coal fire in the world). This can be treated by drilling into the areas and injecting with water, foams or other wetting and suppression agents. They can also be treated by compacting the surface above the coal seam and covering the surface with an impervious layer to prevent air entering the seam.</p>
<h2>Why is Morwell’s blaze so hard to put out?</h2>
<p>Large scale open-cut fires such as at Morwell are far more difficult to manage. The scale of the fire precludes the use of many high-tech solutions due to the lack of bulk materials. </p>
<p>Water is usually the first resort to quench the active fire. Additives can be used in the water to enhance its capacity to quench the fire.</p>
<p>The location of the fire at Morwell makes close access problematic as the smoke and fumes pose a significant health risk to the firefighters (not to mention other emergency workers like <a href="http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/union-warns-of-health-risks-posed-by-hazelwood-mine-fire-20140226-33i9y.html">paramedics</a>, along with local residents). The logistics of dealing with this size of fire are quite staggering in terms of people, machinery, water and length of time.</p>
<p>The danger is that the visible fire will be extinguished but the underlying coal will remain hot. If this is the case and air can get into the seam, the fire can rekindle, days, months or even years into the future. This has been observed here and overseas on many occasions. Brown coal has to be kept moist to prevent it spontaneously combusting.</p>
<h2>Better risk management</h2>
<p>Now, there needs to be a review of fire management plans at the Hazelwood mine. Clearly the mine can’t prevent arson, but it should be able to prevent the coal igniting and spreading through the coal seam. </p>
<p>Where the fire is currently burning has not been mined for many years. Theoretically, this could have been rehabilitated and capped, although this is not without difficulties. </p>
<p>Perhaps the simplest solution is to have water supplies in the abandoned areas. While we can’t control where the coal is or what starts a fire, the mine can ensure precautions are in place to prevent future fires. </p>
<h2>How do we stop this happening again?</h2>
<p>It would be reasonable of the regulator to ask the mine to demonstrate that a fire like the current one cannot recur.</p>
<p>The previous fire in 2006 should have triggered a review of the safety management system in accordance with the requirements of Australian Standard AS4804 and the OHS regulations. The controls before 2006 and implemented as a result of that event are clearly not adequate. </p>
<p>Adequate controls may well be very expensive. Consideration could be given to reshaping the batters and capping with an inert material before revegetation occurs.</p>
<p>Controls need to be effective. Access to the grassland could be restricted with better security and inspections. Improved fire detection systems could be installed, such as are used to detect bushfires. Improved water reticulation systems could be installed. </p>
<p>A thorough investigation should also look at the issue of the initial response. When was the fire first detected? What was the early response? When was it realised that the mine was under threat?</p>
<p>Any argument about the cost of controls must recognise the direct and indirect costs of the current incident to Victorians – and particularly the locals living in and around Morwell.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/23698/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Cliff receives funding from Australian Coal Association Research Program on projects related to the prevention and control of coal mine fires.</span></em></p>Victoria’s Hazelwood coal mine is still burning, nearly three weeks after it started from a grassfire during severe fire conditions. Police are currently investigating the original fire for arson. Meanwhile…David Cliff, Professor of Occupational Health and Safety in Mining, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.