tag:theconversation.com,2011:/fr/topics/nuclear-arms-treaty-13603/articlesNuclear arms treaty – The Conversation2023-05-26T16:10:35Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2064702023-05-26T16:10:35Z2023-05-26T16:10:35ZKissinger at 100: his legacy might be mixed but his importance has been enormous<p>Henry Kissinger, who <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/05/23/opinions/henry-kissinger-100-birthday-legacy-andelman/index.html">turns 100 on May 27</a>, is widely regarded as one of the most influential figures in 20th-century international relations. The German-born American diplomat, scholar and strategist has left an indelible legacy in global politics that continues to act as a bookmark for international relations scholars, students and today’s practitioners of statecraft.</p>
<p>From the late 1960s, Kissinger played a momentous role in shaping US foreign policy and navigating the complex dynamics of the cold war era. His contributions to international relations have had a lasting impact, earning him recognition as a visionary strategist and diplomat. </p>
<p>Few would disagree that Kissinger’s influence on US foreign policy has been immense, importantly as a thinker and academic. But his most significant impact was through his work as secretary of state and national security adviser to US presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford. </p>
<p>One of his key contributions was his work towards US rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China, planning Nixon’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/nixon-mao-meeting-four-lessons-from-50-years-of-us-china-relations-176485">historic trip to China in 1972</a> through covert negotiations and deft diplomacy. It was a milestone event in US foreign policy that has shaped Washington’s engagement with Beijing since.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nixon-mao-meeting-four-lessons-from-50-years-of-us-china-relations-176485">Nixon-Mao meeting: four lessons from 50 years of US-China relations</a>
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<p>Kissinger’s participation in negotiations for the <a href="https://ash.harvard.edu/50-years-later-legacy-paris-peace-accords-isn%E2%80%99t-one-peace">Paris peace accords</a> from 1968 to 1973, which effectively ended the direct US involvement in the Vietnam War, was another key achievement. His relentless efforts in shuttle diplomacy between the US, North Vietnam and South Vietnam, contributed to establishing a ceasefire and evacuating US soldiers, ending direct US involvement.</p>
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<img alt="Henry Kissinger, Richard Nixon and John Wayne sit around a desk in an office in front of flags." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528612/original/file-20230526-21-6lc99m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528612/original/file-20230526-21-6lc99m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528612/original/file-20230526-21-6lc99m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528612/original/file-20230526-21-6lc99m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528612/original/file-20230526-21-6lc99m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528612/original/file-20230526-21-6lc99m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528612/original/file-20230526-21-6lc99m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">All smiles: Henry Kissinger with Richard Nixon and actor John Wayne at Nixon’s home in San Clemente, California, July 1972.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Wayne_meets_with_President_Richard_Nixon_and_Henry_Kissinger_in_San_Clemente,_California,_July_1972.jpg">EatPay3/Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span>
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<p>But despite the accolades, triumphs – and even the <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1973/kissinger/acceptance-speech/#:%7E:text=Though%20I%20deeply%20cherish%20this,of%20social%20and%20political%20discontent.">Nobel peace prize in 1973</a> for his contribution to the Paris accords – Kissinger’s record and legacy are controversial. There has long been a debate concerning Kissinger’s approach to international affairs, which according to his many detractors often overlooked ethical considerations. </p>
<p>Concerns about links to violations of human rights and the undermining of democratic values were sparked by his backing for authoritarian regimes such as <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/feb/28/pinochet.chile">Chile under Augusto Pinochet</a>. Regardless, Kissinger never wavered in his conviction that his diplomacy should put US interests first while appreciating the complexity of the international scene.</p>
<h2>Foreign policy</h2>
<p>From his days in government, and then through his continuing influence as a renowned scholar, Kissinger’s strategic thinking and diplomatic approach have shaped US foreign policy in significant ways.</p>
<p>The biggest contribution Kissinger made to US foreign policy was his advocacy for <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2015/12/the-kissinger-effect-on-realpolitik/">“realpolitik”</a>. He believed that the US should base its foreign policy decisions on a clear and systematic assessment of power dynamics and the pursuit of geopolitical stability. </p>
<p>It was an approach that emphasised the pragmatic pursuit of national interests instead of a strict adherence to abstract ideological principles. </p>
<p>The key feature of this realpolitik was the importance of maintaining a balance of power, believing the US should actively engage with other major powers to prevent any one nation from gaining hegenomy or threatening US dominance. </p>
<p>This approach shaped his handling of major geopolitical events during the cold war, such as the aforementioned <a href="https://www.kcl.ac.uk/the-50th-anniversary-of-kissingers-secret-trip-to-china-from-the-cold-war-to-a-new-cold-war">normalisation of the relations with China</a> as well as the development of a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/45181235">détente policy towards the USSR</a> in the early 1970s. This perspective also emerged clearly in <a href="https://unherd.com/thepost/henry-kissinger-nato-membership-for-ukraine-is-appropriate/">his approach towards the Russian invasion of Ukraine</a>.</p>
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<p>Kissinger also made significant contributions to arms control and nuclear non-proliferation efforts during his tenure at the state department. His thinking on nuclear deterrence emphasised strategic stability and the need to prevent proliferation. </p>
<p>In this sense, his emphasis on negotiations and diplomatic engagement – intensified by his shuttle diplomacy method – managed to reduce the nuclear threat. </p>
<p>He played a pivotal role in negotiating the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Strategic-Arms-Limitation-Talks">strategic arms limitation talks</a> (Salt) in the 1970s, which resulted in the landmark agreements <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/salt">Salt I (1972) and Salt II (1979)</a>, fostering <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/45331142">stability in US-USSR relations</a>. </p>
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<img alt="Henry Kissinger, Richard Nixon and Golda Meir stood smiling with aides." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528613/original/file-20230526-21-83cym8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528613/original/file-20230526-21-83cym8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528613/original/file-20230526-21-83cym8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528613/original/file-20230526-21-83cym8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528613/original/file-20230526-21-83cym8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528613/original/file-20230526-21-83cym8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528613/original/file-20230526-21-83cym8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Big player: Kissinger with US president Richard Nixon and Israeli prime minister Golda Meir outside the White House in 1973.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://picryl.com/media/israeli-prime-minister-golda-meir-standing-with-president-richard-nixon-and">Library of Congress</a></span>
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<p>In the Middle East, his <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1148069">shuttle diplomacy</a> once again demonstrated his ability to bring adversaries to the negotiating table, notably during the Arab-Israeli conflicts of the 1970s and the negotiation of the <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/egyptisrael-interimagreement75">Sinai II agreement</a> in 1975, which – temporarily at least – stabilised relations between Israel and Egypt.</p>
<h2>J'accuse: Kissinger’s critics</h2>
<p>But Kissinger’s legacy has also attracted foreceful criticism. Among his most vocal and persistent critics was the late British writer and journalist Christopher Hitchens. Hitchens’ book “<a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Trial-Henry-Kissinger-Christopher-Hitchens/dp/1859843980">The Trial of Henry Kissinger</a>” presented a series of arguments about alleged war crimes committed by his American “nemesis”. </p>
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<img alt="Cover of Christopher HItchens' book, The Trial of Henry Kissinger." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528614/original/file-20230526-23-i8ocrh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528614/original/file-20230526-23-i8ocrh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=825&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528614/original/file-20230526-23-i8ocrh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=825&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528614/original/file-20230526-23-i8ocrh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=825&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528614/original/file-20230526-23-i8ocrh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1037&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528614/original/file-20230526-23-i8ocrh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1037&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528614/original/file-20230526-23-i8ocrh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1037&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Christopher Hitchens accused Henry Kissinger of war crimes.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Amazon</span></span>
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<p>Hitchens accused Kissinger of disregarding international law and violating the sovereignty of many nations. His alleged involvement in controversial military actions such as the <a href="https://gsp.yale.edu/sites/default/files/walrus_cambodiabombing_oct06.pdf">secret bombing campaigns</a> of Cambodia and Laos has drawn substantial criticism and raised concerns about accountability and transparency in US foreign policy decision-making. </p>
<p>Moreover, America – under his guidance – also stands accused of launching in covert operations to <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/september/11/newsid_3199000/3199155.stm">overthrow the legitimately elected president of Chile</a>, Salvador Allende, in 1973 in order to install Pinochet), and of turning a blind eye to human rights abuses that occurred during Pinochet’s regime. </p>
<p>Similarly the country’s ostensible support for the Suharto dictatorship in Indonesia disregarded human rights and basic ethics. Of this, Kissinger had <a href="https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/there-are-three-possible-outcomes-to-this-war-henry-kissinger-interview/">this to say</a> in a interview with The Spectator in 2022:</p>
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<p>I am, by instinct, a supporter of a belief that America – with all its failings – has been a force for good in the world and is indispensable for the stability of the world. It is in that region that I have made my conscious effort.</p>
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<p>Despite all the criticism, Kissinger endured and remains a respected international relations scholars and advisor to this day. After leaving government in 1977, he reentered academia, serving as a professor at Harvard University, where he had previously earned his doctorate in government. As a scholar, Kissinger wrote several influential books, including Diplomacy (1994), On China (2011), and World Order (2014).</p>
<p>That he was <a href="https://www.weforum.org/events/world-economic-forum-annual-meeting-2023/sessions/a-conversation-with-henry-kissinger-historical-perspectives-on-war">invited to address the World Economic Forum at Davos</a> this year shows that, although divisive, even today Henry Kissinger remains a highly influential figure.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206470/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anurag Mishra is affiliated with ITSS Verona. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>André Carvalho and Zeno Leoni do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Love him or hate him, you can’t ignore the importance of Henry Kissinger’s legacy in government and as a public intellectual.André Carvalho, PhD Researcher, Department of War Studies, King's College LondonAnurag Mishra, PhD Researcher at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University Zeno Leoni, Lecturer, Defence Studies Department and Lau China Institute, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2003952023-02-22T09:08:57Z2023-02-22T09:08:57ZRussia pulls out of New Start nuclear treaty – we’ve already seen how such agreements have limited aggression against Ukraine<p>Vladimir Putin’s decision to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/21/putin-russia-halt-participation-new-start-nuclear-arms-treaty">pull out of the New Start nuclear weapons treaty</a> with the United States will have predictable responses. </p>
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<p>Stocks in defence corporations will rise at the prospect of new markets for nuclear missiles. Disciples of deterrence will reassure the public that arms control was never really needed. Those who fear the end of the world as we know it will sound the alarm – playing into Putin’s hands, some will say, by causing alarm and weakness in the west.</p>
<p>Others may point out that the US and Nato have such <a href="https://www.theweek.co.uk/news/defence/104574/nato-vs-russia-who-would-win#:%7E:text=The%20combined%20total%20of%20Nato,times%20as%20many%20military%20ships.">technical and financial dominance</a> that Putin is damaging his own interest by giving up controls. On the contrary, leaving Russia unconstrained to attach comparatively cheap and terrifying nuclear weapons to any aircraft, vessel or missile will be a nightmare for deterrence planners.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/what-is-new-start-nuclear-arms-treaty-2023-02-21/">new strategic arms reduction treaty</a> was the latest in a series of agreements stretching back half a century <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/USRussiaNuclearAgreements">between the US and Russia (and before, the USSR) </a> on their nuclear weapons. The treaty limits each state to no more than 1,550 nuclear weapons fitted to up to a total of 700 missiles and aircraft. </p>
<p>There have been no limits on anti-missile missile systems since 2002 when the US <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002-07/news/us-withdraws-abm-treaty-global-response-muted">ended an agreement on these</a>. This is one factor motivating Putin to abandon controls on missiles as <a href="https://theconversation.com/could-the-us-win-world-war-iii-without-using-nuclear-weapons-94771">US defences improve along with conventional strike missiles</a>. </p>
<p>New Start includes provisions for each side to inspect the other’s weapons to verify the agreement is working. And, at present, neither the US or Russia are accusing the other of violations.</p>
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<p><em>Since Vladimir Putin sent his war machine into Ukraine on February 24 2022, The Conversation has called upon some of the leading experts in international security, geopolitics and military tactics to help our readers <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/ukraine-12-months-at-war-134215?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">understand the big issues</a>. You can also <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">subscribe to our weekly recap</a> of expert analysis of the conflict in Ukraine.</em></p>
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<p>The types of missiles and planes governed by New Start can carry thousands more weapons than they do at present. Back in the 1970s, nuclear bombs were routinely as small as 10cm in diameter so that large numbers of <a href="https://armscontrolcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Multiple-Independently_New-1.pdf">multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles</a> could be fitted to a single missile. </p>
<p>It was the prospect of unlimited production of such weapons that concentrated the minds of US and Soviet decision makers to realise that they had a collective interest in limits.</p>
<p>From the Russian perspective, ending New Start is a natural result of <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/12/putin-russia-us-missile-defense-nato-ukraine/">failing to get US agreement on missile defences</a> and conventional strike weapons.</p>
<h2>Arms treaties can work</h2>
<p>One treaty in particular has shown the value of disarmament during the Ukraine war. It might be surprising given the bombardments of Ukraine, but the 1987 <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/INFtreaty">intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) treaty</a> has <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-how-gorbachevs-1987-inf-missile-treaty-has-limited-the-arsenal-available-to-putin-189750">denied Russia thousands more missiles</a> that it could have used.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-how-gorbachevs-1987-inf-missile-treaty-has-limited-the-arsenal-available-to-putin-189750">Ukraine war: how Gorbachev's 1987 INF missile treaty has limited the arsenal available to Putin</a>
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<p>Thanks to the agreement struck by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, leaders of the US and USSR respectively at the time, Russian forces attacking Ukraine have not been able to use ground-to-ground ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges from 500km to 5,500km.</p>
<p>The treaty was actually <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-nuclear-treaty-between-russia-and-the-us-is-falling-apart-can-it-be-saved-111024">cancelled by Donald Trump in 2019</a>. But only <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_162996.htm">one Russian missile type</a> that apparently violated the treaty – <a href="https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/ssc-8-novator-9m729/#:%7E:text=The%20SSC%2D8%20is%20a,a%20range%20of%202%2C500%20km.">the 9M729</a> – exists. And as it has a nuclear-only role, it has not, so far, been used in Ukraine. </p>
<p>When the INF treaty was implemented, thousands of the Soviet Union’s most modern missiles were decommissioned, along with their US equivalents. Today a huge proportion of Russian munitions used in Ukraine are <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/06/19/world/europe/ukraine-munitions-war-crimes.html">vintage Soviet systems</a>. </p>
<p>With conventionally armed INF missiles of similar vintage with ranges over 500km, Lviv and other centres in western Ukraine could have been devastated. Russia has instead had to use limited numbers of missiles built for air and sea launch as well as manned bombers to attack targets deeper than 500km from Russian (and Belarusian) territory.</p>
<p>The process that produced the extraordinarily effective INF treaty provides important guidance for a renaissance in disarmament in the 21st century. Back then – despite an intense confrontation between the two antagonists – successful agreements were reached to avert a catastrophic nuclear exchange. </p>
<h2>Negotiate from strength</h2>
<p>How could new arms reduction treaties be put in place? “Negotiate from strength” is a powerful argument in diplomacy. Fortunately, the US and its allies already enjoy a more than <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/nato-force-planning-and-impact-ukraine-war#:%7E:text=If%20one%20uses%20the%20NATO,17.8%20times%20the%20Russian%20figure.">ten-to-one superiority</a> in military spending over Russia. </p>
<p>Unless western taxpayers have been badly served, this spending has translated into effective technologies, despite the Kremlin’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/hypersonic-missiles-are-fuelling-fears-of-a-new-superpower-arms-race-172716">rhetoric over hypersonics</a> and Putin’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-produces-first-nuclear-warheads-poseidon-super-torpedo-tass-2023-01-16/">doomsday nuclear torpedoes</a>. </p>
<p>Nuclear powers often argue that nuclear disarmament is necessarily connected to concerns they have about non-nuclear forces and security in their regions. This is evident in the outbreaks of violence between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan, as well as the devastation caused by conventional forces which has been so evident in Ukraine.</p>
<p>A new global initiative might pick up the call from the G20 that “<a href="https://www.theweek.in/news/world/2022/11/15/g20-communique-set-to-state-that-todays-era-must-not-be-of-war.html">ours must not be an era of war</a>” the subject of an upcoming <a href="https://scrapweapons.com/todays-era-must-not-be-of-war/">event at SOAS University of London</a>. Following the INF treaty mantra of a <a href="https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/0113keeperfile/">zero option</a>, such an initiative could seek a global zero on missiles of all kinds down to a range of, say, 150km. </p>
<p>Negotiation is rarely easy, but Putin’s Russia is far weaker than was the Soviet Union with whom solid agreements were made. Meanwhile, Ukraine should have all the support it needs to restore its territorial integrity and the return of its citizens – not least the thousands of <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-identify-nearly-14000-children-abducted-deported-russia-1774522">kidnapped children</a>. But in the end weapons control is essential to survival in the long term.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200395/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dan Plesch receives funding from the the Rowntree |Trust. </span></em></p>Russia is walking away from the last remaining treaty designed to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons.Dan Plesch, Professor at the Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1990632023-02-02T13:21:55Z2023-02-02T13:21:55ZRussia is violating the last remaining nuclear treaty with the US, according to Washington<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/507686/original/file-20230201-11291-35u59a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Russian nuclear missiles are paraded in Red Square in Moscow in 2020. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1222402724/photo/parade-in-moscow-to-celebrate-75th-anniversary-of-defeat-of-nazi-germany.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=eSwfFyA_I816ton_JlA7AKeJ4SM0IZP_6mYnzFClQZs=">Mikhail Svetlov/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>After decades of progress on limiting the buildup of nuclear weapons, Russia’s war on Ukraine has prompted renewed <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-nato-europe-6d1e374e77504838ba9ca78dd8bce46c">nuclear tensions</a> between Russia and the U.S.</p>
<p>The U.S. State Department <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/31/us/politics/us-russia-nuclear-treat.html">told Congress</a> on Jan. 31, 2023, that Russia is not complying with the countries’ last remaining nuclear arms agreement, which was renewed for five years in 2021. Russia has <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/8063d76b-ed19-4fc0-b162-cc27a225ebec">denied these accusations and accused</a> the U.S. of violations as well.</p>
<p>This agreement, known as New START, is critical to nuclear cooperation and preventing a new arms race. It is the only remaining agreement between the U.S. and Russia limiting the development of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. It allows both countries to regularly, and with limited advance notice, inspect each other’s nuclear weapons arsenals.</p>
<p>Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly ignited concern <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world-report/articles/2023-01-03/russian-setbacks-in-ukraine-set-tone-for-2023">that Russia’s setbacks during</a> its nearly year-old war with Ukraine – as well <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-64404928">as Western involvement</a> in the conflict – <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2022/03/29/would-russia-really-launch-nuclear-weapons">could result</a> in Russia launching a <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/01/24/putins-nuclear-threats-move-doomsday-clock-closest-ever-to-armageddon-atomic-scientists-say.html">nuclear attack</a> on Ukraine or another country in the West.</p>
<p>A single nuclear weapon today in a major city <a href="https://www.icanw.org/modeling_the_effects_on_cities">could immediately kill</a> anywhere from 52,000 to several million people, depending on the weapon’s size.</p>
<p>I have <a href="https://dornsife.usc.edu/cf/faculty-and-staff/faculty.cfm?pid=1022718">worked on</a> and <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/abs/price-of-peace-motivated-reasoning-and-costly-signaling-in-international-relations/931AC830FEB7D24D26800E22558D9F9D">researched nuclear</a> nonproliferation for <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90978-3">two decades</a>. </p>
<p>Convincing countries <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/USRussiaNuclearAgreements">to reduce</a> their nuclear weapons stockpiles <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/09/north-korea-south-africa/539265/">or renounce</a> the pursuit of this ultimate weapon has always been extremely difficult. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456693/original/file-20220406-20442-bd5h6l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Young students hide under their desks and look out in a black and white photo" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456693/original/file-20220406-20442-bd5h6l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456693/original/file-20220406-20442-bd5h6l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456693/original/file-20220406-20442-bd5h6l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456693/original/file-20220406-20442-bd5h6l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456693/original/file-20220406-20442-bd5h6l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456693/original/file-20220406-20442-bd5h6l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456693/original/file-20220406-20442-bd5h6l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Students at a school in Brooklyn, N.Y., conduct a nuclear attack drill in 1962.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/students-at-a-brooklyn-middle-school-have-a-duck-and-cover-practice-picture-id566420175?s=2048x2048">GraphicaArtis/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A history of nonproliferation</h2>
<p>The Soviet Union, U.S., United Kingdom, France, Israel and China <a href="https://doi.org/10.2968/066004008">had active nuclear</a> weapons programs in the 1960s. </p>
<p>Countries recognized the risk of a nuclear war in the future. </p>
<p>Sixty-two countries initially agreed to what’s been called the “<a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_12/Weiss">Grand Bargain</a>” in 1967, an essential element of the <a href="https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/">Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons</a>. One hundred and ninety-one countries eventually signed this treaty. </p>
<p>The agreement prevented the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that didn’t already have them <a href="https://www.atomicarchive.com/resources/timeline/timeline1960.html">by 1967</a>. Countries with nuclear weapons, like the U.S. and the U.K., agreed to end their nuclear arms race and work toward eventual disarmament, meaning the destruction of all nuclear weapons. </p>
<p>This landmark agreement laid the groundwork for agreements between the U.S. and the Soviet Union to further reduce their nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. It also stopped other countries from developing and <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/test-ban-treaty-at-a-glance">testing</a> nuclear weapons until the end of the Cold War. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.nti.org/countries/israel/">Israel</a>, <a href="https://fas.org/blogs/security/2021/12/indias-nuclear-arsenal-takes-a-big-step-forward/">India</a> and <a href="https://thebulletin.org/premium/2021-09/nuclear-notebook-how-many-nuclear-weapons-does-pakistan-have-in-2021/">Pakistan</a> never joined the agreement due to regional security concerns. They all now possess nuclear weapons. North Korea <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005-05/features/npt-withdrawal-time-security-council-step">withdrew</a> from the agreement and developed nuclear <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41174689">weapons</a>. </p>
<h2>Some successes</h2>
<p>There have been <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2020.1824500">major achievements</a> in preventing countries from gaining nuclear weapons and dramatically reducing nuclear weapons stockpiles since the Cold War. </p>
<p>The global nuclear stockpile has been reduced by 82% since 1986, from a peak of 70,300, with nearly all of the reductions in the U.S. and Russia, who held the largest stockpiles at the time.</p>
<p><a href="https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/">Globally</a> there are now around 12,700 nuclear weapons, with about 90% held by <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat">Russia and the U.S.</a> – or between 5,000 to 6,000 weapons each.</p>
<p>Several other countries have nuclear weapons, and most of them have a few hundred weapons each, including the United Kingdom, France and China – though China has been building up its nuclear stockpile. <a href="https://www.visualcapitalist.com/cp/nuclear-warheads-by-country-1945-2022/">Newer nuclear countries</a> like India, Pakistan and Israel have around 100 each, while North Korea has around 20. </p>
<p>Starting in the late 1960s, countries agreed to more <a href="https://nuke.fas.org/control/index.html">than a dozen</a> legally binding agreements, or treaties, that limited new countries from getting nuclear weapons and prohibited nuclear weapons testing, among other measures.</p>
<p>But they have not reduced the number of <a href="https://armscontrolcenter.org/u-s-nonstrategic-nuclear-weapons/">nuclear weapons</a> with <a href="https://www.heritage.org/missile-defense/commentary/russias-small-nukes-are-big-problem">short-range</a> missiles.</p>
<p>No agreements cover <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-00794-y">these weapons</a>, which <a href="https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/limited-tactical-nuclear-weapons-would-be-catastrophic/">could also cause</a> widespread destruction and deaths. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456664/original/file-20220406-14533-6aj5iw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Two people wearing suits and large cut out faces of Putin and Biden hold fake ballistic missiles high above their heads." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456664/original/file-20220406-14533-6aj5iw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456664/original/file-20220406-14533-6aj5iw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456664/original/file-20220406-14533-6aj5iw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456664/original/file-20220406-14533-6aj5iw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456664/original/file-20220406-14533-6aj5iw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456664/original/file-20220406-14533-6aj5iw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456664/original/file-20220406-14533-6aj5iw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Peace protesters in Berlin call for more nuclear disarmament in 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/peace-activists-wearing-masks-of-russian-president-vladimir-putin-and-picture-id1230850574?s=2048x2048">John MacDougall/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>U.S.-Russia cooperation declines</h2>
<p>U.S.-Russia engagement on nuclear weapons changed when Russia forcibly <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/03/17/crimea-six-years-after-illegal-annexation/">annexed Crimea</a> from Ukraine in 2014. </p>
<p>Russia <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/russias-controversial-9m729-missile-system-a-not-so-secret-secret/a-46606193">built up land missiles</a> in <a href="https://baltic-review.com/defence-lithuania-is-preparing-for-a-russian-invasion/kaliningrad-map/">Kaliningrad</a>, an enclave of Russia in the middle of Eastern Europe, in 2014.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2014-09/news/russia-breaches-inf-treaty-us-says">U.S.</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-46443672">NATO</a> then accused Russia of violating a <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/INFtreaty">1987 nuclear agreement</a> on short- and intermediate-range land missiles. From Russia, these could travel between 500 to 5,500 kilometers (311 to 3,418 miles), hitting targets as far as London. </p>
<p>The U.S. <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/u-s-withdrawal-from-the-inf-treaty-on-august-2-2019/index.html">also terminated</a> this agreement in 2019 due to reported Russian violations. Now, there are no international nuclear agreements in Europe. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.state.gov/new-start/">New START</a> agreement, signed by Russia and the U.S., remains the one main strategic nuclear weapons agreement in place. It was to continue <a href="https://www.state.gov/on-the-extension-of-the-new-start-treaty-with-the-russian-federation/">until at least 2026</a>. But, the recent State Department report to Congress on Russia’s alleged violations of the treaty raises questions about whether this agreement will survive. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/New-START-Treaty-Annual-Implementation-Report.pdf">U.S. says</a> that it cannot make certain that Russia is in compliance with the deal since Putin is “refusing to permit the United States to conduct inspection activities on Russian territory.”</p>
<p>The U.S. and Russia halted all inspections of each other’s nuclear weapon sites and operations in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In November 2022, <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/us/articles/2023-01-31/russia-not-complying-with-inspection-obligation-under-nuclear-arms-treaty-u-s-says">Russia canceled</a> talks to resume inspections. The U.S. considers these violations of the agreement, but <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/8063d76b-ed19-4fc0-b162-cc27a225ebec">not an altogether outright material breach</a> of the treaty. </p>
<h2>Impact of Ukraine war</h2>
<p>The U.S. and Russia’s arms control regime was successful in the Cold War because it included significant verification mechanisms – direct inspections of each party’s nuclear arsenal with <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/publications/interactive/new-start">less than 24 hours’ notice</a>.</p>
<p>Russia and the U.S. have <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/publications/interactive/new-start">conducted 306 inspections</a> since New START took effect in 2011. Without New START, all inspections of nuclear bases and support facilities will end. </p>
<p>During nuclear talks in 1987, President Ronald Reagan translated a Russian maxim, saying, “<a href="https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4757483/user-clip-trust-verify">trust, but verify</a>,” the foundation of the nuclear arms control regime. </p>
<p>If the U.S. and Russia are no longer transparent about their nuclear arsenals and developments, pressure for both countries to develop new nuclear weapons and delivery systems will increase, along with the risk of miscalculations. </p>
<p>While the U.S. State Department declares that Russia has a “<a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/us/articles/2023-01-31/russia-not-complying-with-inspection-obligation-under-nuclear-arms-treaty-u-s-says">clear path</a>” for returning to compliance, <a href="https://tass.com/politics/1569745">the war in Ukraine</a> complicates this effort.</p>
<p>Anatoly Antonov, the Russia ambassador to the U.S., for example, has said that Western assistance to Ukraine impacts the New START treaty. “There can be no progress on arms control without the United States <a href="https://tass.com/politics/1569745">reconsidering its policy of inflicting strategic defeat on Russia</a>,” he said.</p>
<p>While Putin has not followed through on <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/no-russian-muscle-movements-after-putins-nuclear-readiness-alert-us-says-2022-02-28/">his threat</a> of a nuclear strike, the potential for a nuclear attack has meant the <a href="https://www.vox.com/2022/3/13/22975269/ukraine-poland-us-mig-fighter-jets-military-aid-escalation">U.S.</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18023383">NATO have responded to Russia’s attack on Ukraine</a> with this lingering threat in mind.</p>
<p>The U.S. and NATO members announced in January 2023 plans to escalate their military assistance to Ukraine, sending <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-receive-120-140-tanks-first-wave-deliveries-minister-2023-01-31/">120 to 140 Western-made tanks</a>, alongside other <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62002218">war machinery</a>. This might signal a change to the U.S.‘ and NATO countries’ strategy, so far, of limiting their direct support to Ukraine and avoiding further escalation with Russia in the conflict.</p>
<p><em>This is an updated version of an <a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-is-sparking-new-nuclear-threats-understanding-nonproliferation-history-helps-place-this-in-context-180533">article originally published on April 8, 2022</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199063/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nina Srinivasan Rathbun does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Russia’s refusal to allow the US to inspect its nuclear arsenal could reignite pressure for the US to develop new nuclear weapons.Nina Srinivasan Rathbun, Professor of International Relations, USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1897502022-08-31T17:14:43Z2022-08-31T17:14:43ZUkraine war: how Gorbachev’s 1987 INF missile treaty has limited the arsenal available to Putin<p>Thanks to the final Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, who has <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-consequential-but-ultimately-tragic-figure-last-leader-of-the-ussr-mikhail-gorbachev-dies-aged-91-189676">died aged 91</a>, a disarmament treaty has denied Vladimir Putin thousands more missiles which he could have ordered to be used against Ukraine. Russian forces attacking Ukraine have not been able to use land-based missiles with ranges of between 500km and 5,500km because this entire category of weapons was scrapped under the 1987 <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/INFtreaty">Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty</a>, which the former Soviet leader was instrumental in establishing. </p>
<p>When the treaty was implemented, thousands of the Soviet Union’s most modern missiles were, along with their American equivalents, crushed, sawn or blown up. While the treaty was cancelled in 2019 by the then US president, Donald Trump, only one <a href="https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/ssc-8-novator-9m729/">Russian missile</a> type now exists that has this range (in violation of the treaty). As this SSC-8 missile has a nuclear-only role, it has not, so far, been used in Ukraine. </p>
<p>A huge proportion of Russian munitions used in Ukraine are vintage Soviet systems. With conventionally armed Soviet-era INF missiles with ranges over 500km, <a href="https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/05/russian-sub-launched-missiles-damaged-lviv-training-center-ukraine-says/366968/">Lviv</a> and other centres in western Ukraine could have been devastated. </p>
<p>But because of the INF Treaty, Russia has not been able to field new generations of ground-to-ground conventional missiles or non-nuclear variants of the cold war stocks. Instead, it has had to use limited numbers of missiles built for air and sea launch as well as bombers to attack targets deeper than 500km from Russian (and Belarusian territory).</p>
<h2>Negotiate from strength</h2>
<p>The process that produced the extraordinarily effective INF treaty provides important guidance for a renaissance in disarmament in the present century. Alarmed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and new Soviet missiles – notably the SS-20 – Nato embarked on a twin-track strategy in 1979: arm, but negotiate while arming. </p>
<p>Eight years later the INF treaty was signed, implementing the demand of western anti-nuclear campaigners and eastern dissidents for “No Cruise, No Pershing, No SS-20s”. The Reagan administration – under public pressure and informed by a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2018/sep/19/the-spy-and-the-traitor-by-ben-macintyre-review">key Soviet defector</a> of the USSR’s real fear of a US nuclear attack – picked up the movements’ demands. </p>
<p>Initially they couldn’t have imagined that the Soviet Union would accept this “zero option”. In fact, Gorbachev went even further and called for all weapons under 500km to be scrapped. However, Nato refused, arguing that this would damage its deterrent. It is missiles in this category that are raining down on Ukraine today.</p>
<p>“<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20633876">Negotiate from strength</a>” has long been a powerful argument in diplomacy. Today, the US and its allies enjoy a ten to one superiority in military spending over Russia and many times that of China. Unless western taxpayers have been very badly served, this spending has translated into effective technologies despite rhetoric over hypersonics and Putin’s doomsday nuclear torpedoes. </p>
<p>US <a href="https://twitter.com/nukestrat/status/1552763497557155841">allies</a> in <a href="https://defence24.com/armed-forces/air/radom-air-show-2018-polish-f-16-carrying-the-jassm-missile">Nato</a> and the <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/japans-ministry-of-defense-confirms-plans-to-procure-new-stand-off-missiles/">Pacific</a> are now deploying <a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/jassm-xr.htm">conventional</a> missiles for their fighter jets able to reach Moscow and Beijing from outside Russian and Chinese territory.</p>
<h2>New approach needed</h2>
<p>That such supremacy does not appear to soothe the concerns of further Russian aggression points to the risks of miscalculation so apparent in Vladimir Putin’s “special military operation” and how far deterrence strategies rely on luck. A disarmament track is once more essential to counter the now almost uncontrolled deployments of weapons of all types and act independently to reduce arms and states to increase them.</p>
<p>Where to start? The UN’s <a href="https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/tpnw/">Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons</a> is one positive initiative as states without nuclear arms try to build a consensus to influence those with nuclear arms – <a href="https://www.icanw.org/united_states">so far unsuccessfully</a>. </p>
<p>But clearly more is needed. Picking up the INF Treaty mantra of a zero option, campaigners need to seek a global zero on missiles of all kinds, down to a range of say 150 km. Such an initiative would be a boon to taxpayers, and a relief to states to trying to keep up with the west. Modern verification technologies can provide early warning of cheating.</p>
<p>Zero missiles can provide the heart of a new <a href="https://www.scrapweapons.com/">UN global negotiation on disarmament</a>. The project for a Strategic Concept for the Removal of Arms and Proliferation at the University of London brings experts, non-governmental organisations, governments and religious figures together for a global process of disarmament comparable to those helping tackle climate change. It offers new ideas on checking up on cheating using digital tech and draft treaty building on the best practices of the Gorbachev era.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/189750/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dan Plesch receives funding from the Rowntree Trust</span></em></p>The INF treaty signed by Gorbachev and US president Ronald Reagan prohibited medium-range missiles.Dan Plesch, Professor at the Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1254772019-10-23T20:35:18Z2019-10-23T20:35:18ZWhy the US has nuclear weapons in Turkey – and may try to put the bombs away<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/298409/original/file-20191023-119405-1e0opx3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A B-61 bomb, like the ones stored at the US Incirlik Airbase in Turkey. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/rocbolt/40276834965/in/photolist-24n8iP4-dhoKtF-HAjmmG-dL7Tcq-dL2q1e-rSaJDa-ruu1mt-rsivrG-rbgXkg-dL86wY-rd27Kh-HAjvh7-HAjqAJ-nnMxP5-hpsT2L-nnMVHK-nnMuCB-nnMWo2-d5V8km-hpsafk-amcyYF-hpsmnv-dsWHoC-ruuTUu-rzEvWh-somHzH-dL2A3D-qVsDRH-ruuS7m-qxAJmG-u8t3DP-ruufir-ruAjhR-soitsR-ruuHP9-ruu2ge-2eZCa8t-2eZC8x4-rzN6L8-2dAPgaB-24DjhFo-rd22yW-qxAJiA-22YiTCC-nG4JqR-rd1PeA-rd1YvS-25JiGxT-22YiR5w-efi8X1">Flickr/Kelly Michals</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As the Syrian crisis pits Turkish troops against former U.S.-allied Kurdish forces, Pentagon officials have been reviewing plans to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/14/world/middleeast/trump-turkey-syria.html">remove 50 nuclear bombs stored at a U.S air base in Turkey</a>. </p>
<p>A congressional directive to the Pentagon to quickly assess alternative homes for U.S. “<a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/10/congress-calls-us-scout-nuclear-alternatives-turkey-base.html">personnel and assets</a>” currently stationed at Incirlik Air Base is part of a broader bipartisan bill, still being debated, that proposes sanctions against Turkey. President Donald Trump has been forced to issue <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2019/10/18/us/politics/ap-us-united-states-turkey-nukes.html">public reassurances that the weapons are secure</a>.</p>
<p>During the Cold War, the U.S. stationed <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B61_nuclear_bomb">B-61 nuclear bombs</a> in Turkey, among other NATO countries. Formally, the U.S. controlled the weapons during peacetime, but the host countries’ <a href="https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL32572.pdf">forces trained and equipped planes</a> so <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/18/americas-nukes-arent-safe-in-turkey-anymore/">they could drop the bombs</a> with U.S. support in the case of war. The idea was to deter Soviet ground forces and reassure U.S. allies by making clear that the U.S. would be willing to risk nuclear war to block a Soviet invasion of a country hosting the bombs. </p>
<p>In addition, in the years before the U.S. developed intercontinental ballistic missiles, they presented a way for NATO to demonstrate it could act quickly to respond to a Soviet attack.</p>
<p>The 50 bombs still at Incirlik Air Base, in southern Turkey – and others in <a href="https://newrepublic.com/article/155381/us-nuclear-bombs-still-turkey">Belgium, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands</a> – are the last nuclear remnants of that <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/cuban-missile-crisis">Cold War strategy</a>. The U.S. began <a href="https://fas.org/_docs/Non_Strategic_Nuclear_Weapons.pdf">pulling nuclear bombs out of NATO countries</a> after the Cold War ended, and since 2000 has <a href="https://fas.org/blogs/security/2019/10/nukes-out-of-turkey/">removed 40 bombs from Turkey</a>.</p>
<p>Two decades ago, the <a href="https://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/05-06/larsen.pdf">Turkish Air Force stopped equipping its planes</a> to drop B-61s. Now the bombs at Incirlik could only be used if <a href="https://fas.org/blogs/security/2019/10/nukes-out-of-turkey/">U.S. pilots first flew nuclear-weapon-capable planes there</a> to load them up. The bombs were left in Turkey even after a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36815476">2016 coup attempt</a> raised serious concerns about their safety. After that event, the U.S. Defense and Energy departments began <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/20/world/middleeast/erdogan-turkey-nuclear-weapons-trump.html">planning how to remove them</a> – but didn’t actually bring them back to the U.S.</p>
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<h2>How secure are they?</h2>
<p>U.S. nuclear weapons are stored in hardened bunkers, protected by electronic systems and <a href="https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/4873/leaving-nuclear-weapons-in-turkey-is-just-poor-strategy">heavily armed U.S. troops</a>. The Pentagon has <a href="https://fas.org/blogs/security/2019/10/nukes-out-of-turkey/">recently reinforced</a> both of those methods of defense.</p>
<p>The bombs themselves also require 12-digit codes to activate them, However, those protections are <a href="https://twitter.com/b_radzinsky/status/1186654541917413376">only strong enough to delay unauthorized use</a>, rather than actually prevent it. If those barriers were overcome, U.S forces could disable the weapons by destroying electrical components or detonating their chemical high explosive without causing a nuclear release. In the worst case, they could blow up the weapons or the facilities at Incirlik. </p>
<p>Still the U.S. procedures are not designed to prevent skilled attacks or sabotage, especially from an ally. With enough time, Turkey could make use of the nuclear material – if not to detonate in an actual nuclear explosion, then to “<a href="https://newrepublic.com/article/155381/us-nuclear-bombs-still-turkey7">release disastrous and deadly radiation</a>.”</p>
<h2>What’s wrong with removing them?</h2>
<p>Taking the weapons out of Turkey carries some physical risks. The bombs aren’t terribly heavy – <a href="https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/19263/get-to-know-americas-long-serving-b61-family-of-nuclear-bombs">roughly 700 pounds</a> each – but moving nuclear material requires significant security. In addition, the Turkish government would have to help – or at least not stand in the way – of <a href="https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/30417/u-s-reviewing-options-for-pulling-nuclear-bombs-out-of-turkey-heres-how-they-might-do-it">landing transport planes or sending cargo convoys by land or sea</a>. </p>
<p>The greater risks are likely to be political. Those concerns have discouraged previous U.S. administrations from removing the bombs, even though <a href="http://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Ensuring-Deterrence-against-Russia.pdf">Turkey’s defense community isn’t particularly interested in using them</a>.</p>
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<p>One U.S. concern is that Turkey could perceive the move as a push away from NATO. That could lead to Turkey seeking closer ties with Russia. </p>
<p>In addition, pulling the nuclear weapons out of Turkey could prompt requests to remove other bombs from Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany, where they are <a href="https://www.icanw.org/campaign-news/polls-public-opinion-in-eu-host-states-firmly-opposes-nuclear-weapons">publicly unpopular</a>.</p>
<p>A new worry just arose, when Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan recently mused whether <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/20/world/middleeast/erdogan-turkey-nuclear-weapons-trump.html">perhaps Turkey should leave the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty</a> and develop its own nuclear arsenal. U.S. officials have long feared that pulling the American nuclear bombs out could encourage Ergodan to try to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/some-worries-about-nuclear-weapons-at-turkey-base/2019/10/19/88f8ca0e-f231-11e9-bb7e-d2026ee0c199_story.html">turn that bluster into reality</a>.</p>
<p>Unintentionally, Trump’s efforts to provide reassurance may have made this challenge more difficult. The presence of B-61s in the five countries <a href="https://www.apnews.com/182a2170a1d24ac6b4f0c7242d8ff514">is an open secret</a>, confirmed by independent observers. But it has nonetheless been NATO policy not to acknowledge the deployments, giving local politicians and the U.S. a shield from parliamentary and public oversight.</p>
<p>By publicly confirming that the weapons were in Turkey, Trump has raised the political stakes should he try to remove them, and made it more difficult for the United States and Turkey to strike a quiet deal to that effect.</p>
<p>[ <em>You respect facts and expertise. So do The Conversation’s authors and editors.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=yourespect">You can read us daily by subscribing to our newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/125477/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Miles A. Pomper does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The US has 50 nuclear bombs stored in Turkey. As tensions rise between the two countries, a look at how they got there and what might happen next.Miles A. Pomper, Senior Fellow, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, MiddleburyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/846722017-10-02T23:28:10Z2017-10-02T23:28:10ZCanada is missing its chance to shut the gate on nuclear weapons everywhere<p>Last month, the <a href="http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=57139#.WcAtmneGN-U">Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons</a> (or the Ban Treaty) opened for signatures to all member states at the United Nations. The treaty is a product of sustained activism by civil society and key non-nuclear weapon states.</p>
<p>As researchers who study nuclear policy, we see this development as a landmark in the struggle to eliminate nuclear weapons.</p>
<p>The Ban Treaty would make it illegal for signatories to develop, produce, test, possess, use, threaten to use, or transfer nuclear weapons, among other restrictions.</p>
<p>Within days of being opened for signature, 53 countries have signed the treaty, and <a href="http://www.icanw.org/status-of-the-treaty-on-the-prohibition-of-nuclear-weapons/">three have ratified</a>. After signature and ratification by at least 50 countries, it comes into force. </p>
<p>Canada, a historical supporter of nuclear disarmament, has <a href="http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/un-treaty-ban-nuclear-weapons-1.4192761">neither signed nor even participated in the negotiations</a> that led to the treaty, which could become the most significant step toward nuclear disarmament since the <a href="https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/">Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT)</a> of 1970. </p>
<h2>Humanitarian shift in nuclear arms control</h2>
<p>The Ban Treaty was motivated by a clear recognition that the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons use and testing should be at the forefront of all discussions about these weapons. <a href="https://peaceandhealthblog.com/2017/03/29/we-may-not-have-a-second-chance/">Dr. Tilman Ruff</a>, co-president of <a href="http://www.ippnw.org/">International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War</a> testified at the United Nations in March: “An understanding of what nuclear weapons do invalidates all arguments for continued possession of these weapons and requires that they urgently be prohibited and eliminated as the only course of action commensurate with the existential danger they pose.” </p>
<p>The Ban Treaty, therefore, represents a shift in nuclear arms control, away from talking about nuclear weapons in terms of security and deterrence to focusing on the horrendous consequences of nuclear warfare. </p>
<p>This shift is reflected in the language of the <a href="http://www.icanw.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/TPNW-English1.pdf">Preamble of the Treaty</a> which highlights concerns that the “catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons” would “transcend national borders” and “pose grave implications for human survival.” The Treaty also posits that “complete” elimination “remains the only way to guarantee that nuclear weapons are never used again under any circumstances.”</p>
<h2>Canada abandons traditional arms control emphasis</h2>
<p>An emphasis on the humanitarian consequences, however, is not unique within arms control. Other forms of warfare, such as land mines, biological and chemical weapons, have also been outlawed because of such concerns. And such humanitarian concerns have often guided Canada’s diplomacy in the past, as illustrated by its <a href="http://canadianlandmine.org/the-issues/the-treaty">leading role</a> in the appropriately named <a href="https://www.un.org/disarmament/geneva/aplc/">Ottawa Convention</a> to ban landmines.</p>
<p>Not in this case. In seeking to justify not attending the negotiations at the United Nations, a spokesperson for Canada’s minister of foreign affairs, Chrystia Freeland, <a href="http://nationalpost.com/news/politics/federal-government-called-irresponsible-for-skipping-upcoming-nuclear-disarmament-talks">dismissed the Nuclear Ban Treaty as “certain to be ineffective”</a> because of a lack of participation by nuclear weapon states.</p>
<h2>Treaties can reshape behaviour</h2>
<p>Even in the case of the Ottawa Treaty, many countries that deployed landmines, such as the United States, declined to sign onto it in 1997. Yet, the treaty did affect policies in countries beyond those that signed it. </p>
<p>In 2014, the <a href="https://www.state.gov/t/pm/wra/c11735.htm">United States stopped using landmines, except in the Korean Peninsula</a>. Treaty negotiations do in fact shift global norms and impact military plans, even if they may not be legally enforceable in countries that are non-signatories.</p>
<p>Multilateral treaties can serve to unify the international community against those who use them. Chemical weapons use in Syria “triggered an unprecedented international response” and “led to the creation of an ambitious plan to eliminate Syria’s chemical weapons program and prevent future use or proliferation of these abhorrent weapons,” as the <a href="http://international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/peace_security-paix_securite/chemical-chimique.aspx?lang=eng">Global Affairs Canada website on chemical weapons policy</a> explains. </p>
<p>Without a treaty in place, such a concerted global effort would be much harder to mount.</p>
<h2>Step-by-step process at standstill</h2>
<p>Rather than involve itself with the Ban Treaty, Canada has emphasized the so-called step-by-step process for nuclear disarmament. The <a href="http://international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/peace_security-paix_securite/nuclear-nucleaire.aspx?lang=eng">Global Affairs Canada website on nuclear weapons policy</a> offers “NPT universalization, entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)” as “more practical and realistic options to pursue in the short and medium term.”</p>
<p>Characterizing these as practical and realistic is misleading. The <a href="https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/ctbt/">CTBT</a> was negotiated in 1996 and has still not come into force, largely as a result of <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1999_09-10/ctbso99">opposition within the U.S. Congress</a>. The Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, or <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/fmct">FMCT process</a>, has been stalled as well — the last time it gained momentum was in 1995 with the establishment of the <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G95/610/27/PDF/G9561027.pdf?OpenElement">mandate under Canadian Ambassador Gerald Shannon</a>. </p>
<p>That did not lead to actual negotiations — which still have not begun. The step-by-step process isn’t going anywhere anytime soon.</p>
<p>Furthermore, arguments about what is more practical and realistic only distract from potential action. Nothing prevents Canada or any other country without nuclear weapons from pursuing both traditional arms control measures like the FMCT and engaging with the Ban Treaty. The latter is sure to open up several options to further nuclear disarmament. </p>
<p>Constructive participation in the evolving effort to prohibit nuclear weapons, regardless of whether Canada signs the Ban Treaty or not, is the only way to explore this space and identify fruitful next steps.</p>
<h2>Looking ahead on nuclear disarmament</h2>
<p>There has been widespread political support within Canada for being more active in furthering nuclear disarmament. In 2010, both the Senate and House of Commons unanimously adopted a <a href="http://nuclearweaponsconvention.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Motion%20Senate%20House%20bilingual%20revised%20December%202010.pdf">resolution encouraging the Government of Canada</a> “to engage in negotiations for a nuclear weapons convention” and “deploy a major worldwide Canadian diplomatic initiative in support of preventing nuclear proliferation and increasing the rate of nuclear disarmament.” The dynamic set off by the Ban Treaty offers a suitable opening for launching such an initiative.</p>
<p>In April of this year, Chrystia Freeland issued the following <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2017/04/statement_by_foreignaffairsministeron20thanniversaryofchemicalwe.html">statement</a> to mark the 20th anniversary of the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention: “Twenty years ago today, the international community was united in denouncing the use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere, under any circumstance.” </p>
<p>Isn’t it time for the same to be said about nuclear weapons?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/84672/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons recently opened to signatures at the United Nations. Canada broke with history and did not join negotiations, nor has it signed. Here’s why it must.MV Ramana, Simons Chair in Disarmament, Global and Human Security at the Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British ColumbiaLauren J. Borja, Incoming post-doctoral fellow, School of Public Policy and Global Affairs, University of British Columbia, University of British ColumbiaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/837152017-09-13T19:34:26Z2017-09-13T19:34:26ZNorth Korea tests not just a bomb but the global nuclear monitoring system<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/185757/original/file-20170912-3785-9bg4qm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Lassina Zerbo, Executive Secretary of the CTBTO at a press briefing following the recent suspected nuclear test in North Korea. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.ctbto.org/">CTBTO</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>North Korea’s apparent nuclear detonation on September 3 has drawn our attention to a remarkable international organisation that helps detect and identify nuclear tests. </p>
<p>For the Vienna-based Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (<a href="https://www.ctbto.org/">CTBTO</a>), the latest North Korean explosion was easy to detect and locate. With a <a href="https://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/developments-after-1996/2017-sept-dprk/">seismic magnitude of 6.1</a> and a blast yield of 160 kilotons (Hiroshima was around 15), the purported hydrogen bomb test mimicked a major earthquake. It was quickly sourced to North Korea’s nuclear test site. </p>
<p>Confirming that the event was definitely a nuclear test, as opposed to another type of explosion or an earthquake, is trickier. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kim-jong-uns-nuclear-ambition-what-is-north-koreas-endgame-83428">Kim Jong-un's nuclear ambition: what is North Korea's endgame?</a>
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</em>
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<p>For that we rely on detection of short-lived radioactive isotopes that may leak from the test site, notably the noble gas xenon. The CTBTO has not yet announced such a finding, although South Korean monitors have <a href="http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2017/09/08/0200000000AEN20170908009900315.html">reportedly detected xenon-133</a>. </p>
<p>Other potential sources of the gas must be eliminated before a definitive conclusion can be reached.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/185629/original/file-20170912-19567-yl39eo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/185629/original/file-20170912-19567-yl39eo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/185629/original/file-20170912-19567-yl39eo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=778&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185629/original/file-20170912-19567-yl39eo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=778&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185629/original/file-20170912-19567-yl39eo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=778&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185629/original/file-20170912-19567-yl39eo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=978&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185629/original/file-20170912-19567-yl39eo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=978&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185629/original/file-20170912-19567-yl39eo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=978&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Global network of seismic and radionuclide monitoring stations.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">CTBTO / The Conversation</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the past, such fallout has usually been discerned after a North Korean test, but <a href="https://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/highlights/2014/zero-tolerance-for-xenon/">not always</a>. Much depends on whether the cavity created by the test leaks or collapses.</p>
<h2>Nuclear test ban treaty</h2>
<p>The CTBTO’s International Monitoring System, which detected the North Korean test, is designed to verify compliance with the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which bans all nuclear tests in all environments for all time. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/185630/original/file-20170912-19567-wo939.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/185630/original/file-20170912-19567-wo939.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/185630/original/file-20170912-19567-wo939.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185630/original/file-20170912-19567-wo939.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185630/original/file-20170912-19567-wo939.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185630/original/file-20170912-19567-wo939.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185630/original/file-20170912-19567-wo939.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185630/original/file-20170912-19567-wo939.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Network of infrasound monitoring stations.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">CTBTO / The Conversation</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The International Monitoring System comprises 321 monitoring systems worldwide, using four technologies: </p>
<ul>
<li>seismic – to detect tests under ground</li>
<li>radionuclide detection – to detect breakdown products</li>
<li>hydroacoustic – to detect tests under water, and</li>
<li>infrasound – for atmospheric tests. </li>
</ul>
<p>The CTBTO’s international monitoring system is sensitive enough to detect underground nuclear tests below one kiloton.</p>
<p>Construction of the system began in 1996 and is now 90% complete.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/185631/original/file-20170912-19514-mnwemn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/185631/original/file-20170912-19514-mnwemn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/185631/original/file-20170912-19514-mnwemn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185631/original/file-20170912-19514-mnwemn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185631/original/file-20170912-19514-mnwemn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185631/original/file-20170912-19514-mnwemn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185631/original/file-20170912-19514-mnwemn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185631/original/file-20170912-19514-mnwemn.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Network of hydroacoustic monitoring stations.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">CTBTO / The Conversation</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Australia hosts six seismic, two infrasound and one hydroacoustic station, including a large seismic array and infrasound station at Warramunga in the Northern Territory. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/185581/original/file-20170912-3875-1e8axew.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/185581/original/file-20170912-3875-1e8axew.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/185581/original/file-20170912-3875-1e8axew.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185581/original/file-20170912-3875-1e8axew.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185581/original/file-20170912-3875-1e8axew.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185581/original/file-20170912-3875-1e8axew.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=664&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185581/original/file-20170912-3875-1e8axew.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=664&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185581/original/file-20170912-3875-1e8axew.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=664&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.ctbto.org">CTBTO / The Conversation</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Data from the International Monitoring System is transmitted to Vienna via a global communications satellite network, mostly in real time, where it is compiled, analysed and distributed to member states. Sixteen laboratories are available for analysing radioactive fallout. </p>
<p>The treaty also provides for on-site inspections to confirm that a nuclear test has been conducted. The system is funded by member states according to the usual United Nations formula based on national GDP.</p>
<h2>A difficult, important achievement</h2>
<p>As a member of the Australian delegation, I observed the complex preparatory scientific talks on the system at the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva in the early 1980s. It is a miracle of statecraft and science that this collaborative international infrastructure has actually come into being. </p>
<p>The scientists did not get everything they wanted due to political and financial constraints. Some errors were made in the rush to complete the technical specifications. Installation of some of the stations in remote and inaccessible areas has proved daunting. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"906578061184978944"}"></div></p>
<p>The hydroacoustic system, for instance, passed a significant milestone in June when the final station was completed, on France’s Crozet Islands in the southern Indian Ocean. </p>
<p>After 20 years of planning and construction and the investment of millions of dollars, not only is the International Monitoring System almost complete, but it is functioning far better than its designers anticipated. </p>
<p>It also has unexpected side benefits, such as providing early warning of tsunamis and detecting nuclear disasters. The network successfully detected the <a href="https://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/press-releases/2005/northern-sumatra-earthquake-and-the-subsequent-tsunami-on-26-december-2004/">2004 Indian Ocean tsunami</a> and tracked radioactive plumes from the <a href="https://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/newsletters/newsletters/the-11-march-japan-disaster/">2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster</a>. </p>
<h2>Nuclear test ban treaty</h2>
<p>The test ban treaty itself is not in such good shape. More than two decades after it was opened for signature it is still not in force, rendering the CTBTO only “provisional”. This is due to the requirement that all 44 states with a significant nuclear capacity must ratify it. </p>
<p>Currently 183 states have signed, and 162 have ratified. But 8 of the 44 with a nuclear capacity have still not ratified: China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, North Korea and the United States. China, Egypt, Iran, Israel and the US have at least signed. China says it is awaiting US ratification before it moves.</p>
<p>After a flawed lobbying effort, President Bill Clinton’s administration failed to secure Senate approval for <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1999_09-10/ctbso99">US ratification in 1999</a>. The treaty has not been resubmitted since, despite <a href="http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/white-house-again-lobby-congress-ctbt-ratification/">President Barack Obama’s undertaking</a> that he would try. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"778910892859719682"}"></div></p>
<p>Given President Donald Trump’s apparent focus on <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/03/world/americas/donald-trump-us-military.html">emphasising American military prowess</a>, it seems unlikely that he will favour ratification of the treaty. </p>
<p>More immediately threatening is the return of periodic <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/09/26/whats-the-deal-with-senate-republicans-and-the-test-ban-treaty/">Republican attempts to defund the CTBTO</a>. These are usually beaten back on the grounds that the US benefits greatly from the worldwide monitoring that only a global system can provide, notwithstanding impressive US national capabilities. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/qanda-what-earthquake-science-can-tell-us-about-north-koreas-nuclear-test-83415">Q&A: what earthquake science can tell us about North Korea's nuclear test</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>As it has in the past, the Australian government should make representations in Washington in support of CTBT ratification and preservation of funding for the system.</p>
<p>Paradoxically though, even if the other seven holdouts ratify, the one country that continues to conduct nuclear tests into the 21st century, North Korea, can stymie entry into force forever. Its accession to the CTBT should be part of any negotiation with North Korea on its nuclear program. </p>
<p>The good news is that the global monitoring system continues to go from strength to strength, providing reassurance that all nuclear tests, including those less brazen than North Korea’s, will be caught. </p>
<p>The CTBTO’s verification system provides hope that science can quietly triumph while political solutions elude us.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/83715/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Trevor Findlay receives funding from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. He is a member of the CTBT International Coalition which supports entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and sustainment of its verification system.</span></em></p>A former member of the Australian delegation to the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva explains how the CTBTO monitoring system detects nuclear tests.Trevor Findlay, Senior Research Fellow Department of Social and Political Sciences, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/752092017-03-27T19:14:07Z2017-03-27T19:14:07ZWhy we signed the open letter from scientists supporting a total ban on nuclear weapons<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162583/original/image-20170327-18974-2kt054.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The UN is debating a total ban on all nuclear weapons.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Peacekeeper_in_silo_1987.jpg">Wikimedia</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>These are dangerous times. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-the-doomsday-clock-and-why-should-we-keep-track-of-the-time-71990">Doomsday Clock</a> sits at just two and a half minutes before midnight, which represents global catastrophe.</p>
<p>The Doomsday Clock has been maintained by the <a href="http://thebulletin.org/">Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists</a> since 1947, and has only ever been closer to midnight back in 1953, when the United States and Soviet Union tested their first hydrogen bombs, and the world was locked in a very dangerous nuclear arms race. </p>
<p>A single hydrogen bomb, thousands of times more powerful than the devices used on Hiroshima or Nagasaki, would be capable of obliterating a whole city. </p>
<p>An all out war, detonating even a fraction of the roughly <a href="https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/">14,000 nuclear weapons</a> in existence today, might trigger a mini ice age. Winter would last year-round, agriculture would be destroyed, and civilisation would likely collapse. </p>
<p>The then US president Ronald Reagan put it <a href="http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=40205">simply and clearly</a>: “A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”</p>
<p>Today we face these fears once more. Russia and China are again flexing their military might. The United States is led by President Donald Trump, who has a more hawkish take on international affairs than his predecessors. He has also said that if any country is to have nuclear weapons, then he wants the United States to be at the “<a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2017/02/25/politics/trump-nuclear-arsenal/">top of the pack</a>”.</p>
<p>There are many potential flashpoints around the world – including Syria, the Korean peninsular, the South China Sea, Iraq, and Ukraine – and many despots and terrorists looking to cause problems. </p>
<p>There is, however, reason for hope. This week’s talks at the United Nations aim to <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/dc3685.doc.htm">negotiate a total ban on nuclear weapons</a>. These talks are the first of their kind ever to take place at the UN.</p>
<p>The aim is to stigmatise nuclear weapons, as with biological and chemical weapons. The ultimate goal is a world free of these weapons of mass destruction.</p>
<p>In support of these discussions, thousands of scientists from around the world have today released <a href="https://futureoflife.org/nuclear-open-letter/">an open letter</a> urging our national governments to achieve this goal of banning nuclear weapons.</p>
<p>The letter is signed by 23 Nobel Laureates, a past US Secretary of Defense, and many well-known scientists such as Stephen Hawking, Steven Pinker, Martin Rees and Daniel Dennett. I, too, have signed the letter. </p>
<p>As scientists, we bear a special responsibility for having invented these weapons of mass destruction. And as scientists, we are also very aware of the disastrous
effects that they could have on our planet. </p>
<p>Nuclear weapons threaten not merely those who have them, but all people who walk the Earth.</p>
<p>We urge the diplomats meeting in the United Nations today to find a way to rid the world of this evil.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/75209/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>This article reflects Toby Walsh's personal opinion and does not represent the position of Data61.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rob Brooks does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Talks begin today at the United Nations to negotiate a total ban of nuclear weapons. Over 3,600 scientists have signed an open letter supporting the ban.Toby Walsh, Professor of AI at UNSW, Research Group Leader, Data61Rob Brooks, Scientia Professor of Evolutionary Ecology; Academic Lead of UNSW's Grand Challenges Program; Director, Evolution & Ecology Research Centre, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/733992017-02-21T15:24:10Z2017-02-21T15:24:10ZAs Trump flounders on foreign policy, Russia flexes its nuclear muscles<p>Thirty years after Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev signed a <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/december/8/newsid_3283000/3283817.stm">landmark nuclear arms treaty</a> which laid the foundations of post-Cold War relations between the West and the Soviet Union, recent developments suggest that the Kremlin has quietly restarted the nuclear arms race with the deployment of a new generation of nuclear weapons which could wind back the clock to the bad old days of superpower confrontation. </p>
<p>Of course, there have been episodes since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 that have put considerable strain on relations between the two powers – chief among them Yugoslavia, Iraq, Chechnya, Georgia, Libya and Ukraine. But the latest news from Russia suggests a more fundamental shift. According to a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/14/world/europe/russia-cruise-missile-arms-control-treaty.html">report in the New York Times</a> US officials confirmed on February 14 that the Russians had secretly deployed new ground-launched cruise missiles known as SSC-8s with a range capability of between 500km and 5,500km in the area around Volgograd in south-west Russia. A second operational unit was deployed elsewhere, but its location is as yet undisclosed.</p>
<p>These missiles are <a href="http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/ssc-8.htm">intermediate range</a> nuclear weapons that carry multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). They are not intercontinental, but the target range of the Volgograd site covers the entirety of Western Europe – including Britain. </p>
<p>This latest round of missile deployments is a <a href="http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/ssc-8.htm">gross breach</a> of the <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/INFtreaty">Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty</a> signed in 1987 in Washington by Reagan and Gorbachev. It was an historic superpower agreement, the product of three years of negotiations and summits and the first ever to ban an entire category of nuclear weapons. It set a pattern for mutual arms reduction that paved the way to the <a href="https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/pcw/104210.htm">Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty</a> (START) signed in 1991 and 1993 – and updated <a href="https://www.state.gov/t/avc/newstart/">by New START in 2010</a>. In short, the INF Treaty was a crucial milestone on the road to ending the Cold War.</p>
<h2>Making Russia ‘great again’</h2>
<p>The reasons for the new deployment are obvious enough. The SSC-8s are the latest manifestation of Vladimir Putin’s reassertion of Russian power. Although he shed no tears for the failed communist experiment, he <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/4480745.stm">called the collapse of the Soviet Union</a> “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century. Once secure in power, Putin <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-26769481">set about building</a> a "strong Russian state and rebuilding the country’s damaged global position. In this he had enthusiastic support from the military and the defence industry. Russian <a href="http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/mo-budget.htm">annual military expenditure grew</a> from €46.2 billion a year in 2012 to €71 billion in 2016. Enhancing the country’s nuclear capacity across all weapon types is a central plank of the programme to achieve equal status with America.</p>
<p>In order to achieve his objectives, Putin has gradually pulled Russia out of the cooperative forums and agreements forged with the West after the Cold War. In 2007, he withdrew from the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/nov/30/russia.nato">Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty</a> in protest at Washington’s plans for a NATO missile defence "shield” in Eastern Europe. In 2014, he <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/nov/30/russia.nato">annexed the Crimea</a> in defiance of international law and intervened militarily in the domestic tumult in Ukraine. </p>
<p>In October, he suspended an historic agreement with the US to <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-37539616">dispose of surplus weapons-grade plutonium</a>, arguing that the Americans were already reprocessing their own surplus plutonium for military use. He also stationed <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/08/russia-confirms-deployment-of-nuclear-capable-missiles-to-kaliningrad">nuclear-capable short-range Iskander missiles</a> in the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad on the borders of Poland and Lithuania. This, he said, was a response to the deployment of 4,000 troops to bolster NATO’s conventional forces in the Baltic area. </p>
<p>There have also been successful Russian tests of the new <a href="http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/ss-31.htm">RS-26 Rubezh</a> intercontinental ballistic missile and the first images of the <a href="http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/ss-30.htm">RS-28 Sarmat</a>, a new “super-heavy” intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) of a kind that the Americans do not yet possess, were released in November 2016.</p>
<p>Russia rejected a US proposal in 2013 to <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/20/world/europe/obama-asks-russia-to-join-in-reducing-nuclear-arms.html">reduce strategic warheads</a> to 1,000 and Russia has consistently refused to engage in bilateral negotiations on non-strategic nuclear weapons reduction with Washington. The currently unfolding deployment of SSC-8s around Volgograd should therefore be seen as the latest phase of a process of escalation that threatens to spiral into a new arms race between Russia and United States.</p>
<h2>Getting back on track</h2>
<p>We have been here before, of course. In 1976, the Soviet Union deployed the first generation of Intermediate Range Nuclear Missiles, <a href="https://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/theater/rt-21m.htm">the SS20s</a>, triggering crisis for Western Europe. The problem then, as now, was that these missiles threatened only Western Europe – not the US. Partly for that reason, the Carter administration in Washington was slow to respond. </p>
<p>It took several years for the NATO alliance, prodded by the then German chancellor, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/b1e95cb6-1479-11e5-9bc5-00144feabdc0">Helmut Schmidt</a>, to rise to the challenge of the new threat. Fearing that his country would be the primary theatre of a future nuclear conflict in Europe, Schmidt pressed for a coordinated Euro-Atlantic response. The result was the “<a href="http://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/nato_press_communique_on_the_double_track_decision_on_theatre_nuclear_forces_brussels_12_december_1979-en-7d068b4c-63b6-4248-9167-fe9085a0032b.html">NATO dual-track decision</a>” of 1979, in which the Soviets were offered arms reduction negotiations and simultaneously threatened with Europe-based rearmament if they refused.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/157715/original/image-20170221-18646-1ibi2iu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/157715/original/image-20170221-18646-1ibi2iu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=414&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157715/original/image-20170221-18646-1ibi2iu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=414&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157715/original/image-20170221-18646-1ibi2iu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=414&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157715/original/image-20170221-18646-1ibi2iu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157715/original/image-20170221-18646-1ibi2iu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/157715/original/image-20170221-18646-1ibi2iu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev outside the 1986 Reykjavik Summit.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">White House Photo Office</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the longer run, this tactic succeeded: in the INF Treaty of 1987 the Soviets and the Americans agreed to decommission the intermediate-range weapons on both sides. It was this treaty that framed the ban on ground-launched INFs that would remain in place until the recent deployments in Volgograd.</p>
<h2>Meanwhile, in the White House</h2>
<p>There are many parallels, then, between the current situation and the crisis that flared in the late 1970s. But there are also some important differences. The Trump White House is far more dysfunctional than Carter’s. His stated views about NATO have been contradictory – oscillating between damning the alliance as “obsolete” and pledging “100%” support.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"712969068396093440"}"></div></p>
<p>The assurances offered by his vice-president, Mike Pence, and the US secretary for defence, General James Mattis, at the recent <a href="https://www.securityconference.de/en/">Munich Security Conference</a> are not enough to dispel doubts about America’s commitment to Europe and the ability of the Trump administration to handle a crisis such as this.</p>
<p>Trump’s policy regarding Russia is difficult to read, especially in the aftermath of the sudden <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/13/us/politics/donald-trump-national-security-adviser-michael-flynn.html">exit of his national security adviser</a>, General Mike Flynn, amid speculation about the administration’s allegedly close ties with the Kremlin. To cap it all, uncertainties remain about who is really making foreign policy in today’s White House.</p>
<p>In such a climate, forging an agreement with the European allies is not going to be easy. There was much talk at the Munich Conference of “alliance solidarity”, “unwavering support” and “historical connections”, but a concerted Euro-Atlantic response is yet to emerge. As the decision-makers work their way towards a solution, it is crucial they ponder on the lessons of 1979. Like the “dual-track” policy of the early 1980s, an effective resolution of the current predicament will have to balance two objectives: to strengthen the missile defence shield and Western counterstrike capability while drawing Moscow back into arms-reduction negotiations.</p>
<p>It would be foolish to underestimate the obstacles ahead. The current Russian leadership has unpicked the fabric of the international peace woven at the end of the Cold War. And Russia’s foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov has made no secret of his contempt for the Western alliance. At the Munich Conference, <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/lavrov-calls-for-post-west-world-order-dismisses-nato-as-cold-war-relic/a-37614099">he declared</a> that NATO “remained a Cold War institution” and that his country intended to build a “post-West world order” based on the supposedly self-balancing competition among autonomous nation-states.</p>
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<p>Against this mood music, dialogue and predictability will be difficult to re-establish. And yet it remains an indispensable key to peace and security. Russia and America are currently talking past each other. Both sides indulge in megaphone diplomacy, febrile twittering and accusations of “fake news”. And – as <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=epcDDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA114&lpg=PA114&dq=helmut+schmidt+the+logic+of+military+calculations&source=bl&ots=Ww4t2ZFuAZ&sig=Zx34nZlsEXxk94kxs8UgmtI94yQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjSkZLPpaHSAhVLCMAKHa27Ci0Q6AEIHDAA#v=onepage&q=helmut%20schmidt%20the%20logic%20of%20military%20calculations&f=false">Helmut Schmidt knew very well</a> – it is easy when diplomacy fails, to get trapped in “the logic of military calculations” to the point where a small crisis could “escalate quickly into a direct military confrontation between the great powers”.</p>
<p>The task of conducting a genuine dialogue with Russia will fall to the US president, who must first reunite the Western alliance. Is President Trump – who sometimes has sensible things to say – capable of quitting Twitter, thinking big and acting like a statesman? It should be hoped that he is, and that the world’s leaders will relearn the habits of civility and diplomatic seriousness that enabled Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev to transcend the Cold War.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/73399/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kristina Spohr does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Vladimir Putin’s aggressive nuclear strategy threatens to unpick decades of careful negotiation.Kristina Spohr, Associate Professor of History, London School of Economics and Political ScienceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/427222015-06-08T10:17:18Z2015-06-08T10:17:18ZThe failed effort to ban the ultimate weapon of mass destruction<p>A flawed nuclear weapons treaty has finally come unstuck at the United Nations. </p>
<p>For decades, non-nuclear armed states have been asking the nuclear armed states (primarily the US, Russia, Britain, France and China – referred to as the NPT-P5 - but also India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea) to fulfill the promises they have made to eliminate their nuclear weapons.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/background.shtml">UN’s meeting</a>, held between April 27 and May 22, was the latest in a set of reviews of the 1970 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It did not end well. </p>
<h2>Some success but limited</h2>
<p>Held every five years, the NPT reviews assess progress made towards a) preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons; b) enabling states adhering to the treaty to access nuclear technology for peaceful purposes; and c) in moving towards the eventual disarmament of the nuclear weapons held by the P5 states.</p>
<p>The NPT has been remarkably successful in many ways: 191 of the 195 states in the world have signed up, and the treaty’s guiding influence has helped to keep the number of countries acquiring nuclear weapons down to a handful. </p>
<p>Together with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the NPT has been important in regulating the peaceful use of nuclear technology and strengthening the legal case against weapons proliferation. One hundred and eighty-six states have forsworn any ambition to develop nuclear weapons in exchange for a promise made by the nuclear armed states – under <a href="http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/text.shtml">Article VI of the Treaty</a> – that they will eliminate their nuclear arsenals. </p>
<p>But the treaty’s success in achieving this disarmament has been extremely limited. </p>
<p>This is essentially because the P5 states seem wedded to holding on to their arsenals indefinitely, regardless of the fact that the non-nuclear states have kept their end of the bargain.</p>
<p>It was against this acrimonious background that states gathered between April and May at the UN in New York to review progress. Uppermost in the minds of the non-nuclear states was the need for the P5 to take their disarmament obligations seriously, and their frustration towards the nuclear states was palpably evident. </p>
<p>The non-nuclear states had assiduously conducted studies and reports and put together step-by-step processes and action plans designed to lead the nuclear states to disarmament. </p>
<p>But 45 years after negotiating the NPT and 25 years after the Cold War ended, <a href="https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/">there are still almost 16,000</a> nuclear weapons in existence, many of them on hair-trigger alert and far more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. </p>
<p>It is an arsenal capable of destroying our world hundreds of times over.</p>
<p>Given this, it was not surprising that last month’s meeting ended with states unable to reach a consensus document. It showed that the majority of states in the world have now given up hope that disarmament can be achieved via the NPT process. </p>
<h2>Enduring Risks</h2>
<p>But the continued possession of nuclear weapons puts all states in the international system at risk. As the non-nuclear states have pointed out over and over again, and as Australia’s <a href="http://dfat.gov.au/international-relations/security/non-proliferation-disarmament-arms-control/nuclear-weapons/canberra-commission/Pages/canberra-commission.aspx">Canberra Commission</a> noted back in 1996, as long as any one state has nuclear weapons, other states will want them too; as long as there are nuclear weapons in existence, there is a strong risk that – sooner or later – they will be used; and any use of nuclear weapons will be catastrophic. We have been fortunate in avoiding a nuclear weapons disaster so far, but there is no guarantee that this luck will hold. </p>
<p>Recent <a href="http://www.npr.org/2014/08/11/339131421/nuclear-command-and-control-a-history-of-false-alarms-and-near-catastrophes">books</a> and <a href="http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/home/chatham/public_html/sites/default/files/20140428TooCloseforComfortNuclearUseLewisWilliamsPelopidasAghlani.pdf">reports</a> show just how close we have come to nuclear weapons being used – either deliberately or by accident – and reveal an uncomfortable truth: we cannot remain blasé about this situation and continue to run that appalling risk.</p>
<h2>The impasse in New York</h2>
<p>The non-nuclear states had long pinned their hopes on Article VI of the NPT, and many other pledges made by the P5 over the years reiterated this obligation. But last month’s stalemate was the straw that seemed to break the camel’s back. </p>
<p>When the US and Britain (supported by Canada) refused to accept the RevCon’s draft final document - even with its watered-down language on disarmament - it was clear that the existing treaty was going nowhere. These states rejected a proposal to hold a conference to address the establishment of a Middle East WMD Free Zone, something that Arab and other non-aligned states had been repeatedly promised over the past twenty years. </p>
<p>Britain, the US and Canada refused to be bound by what they called an “arbitrary” timetable for such a conference. In reality, they were protecting their regional ally, Israel, which is widely known to possess around 80 nuclear weapons and <a href="http://www.haaretz.com/news/barak-israel-won-t-be-pressured-into-signing-nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty-1.284258">which refuses to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty</a>.</p>
<p>As the South African head of delegation <a href="http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/dc3561.doc.htm">noted</a>,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“The failure on the Middle East leaves us in a perverse situation [in which] a state that is outside of the Treaty has expectations of us and expects us to play by rules it will not play by and be subjected to scrutiny it will not subject itself to.” </p>
</blockquote>
<p>She added that, “there was a sense that the NPT had degenerated into minority rule — as in apartheid-era South Africa — where the will of the few reigned supreme over the majority.” </p>
<p>This was perhaps the most telling indictment of the P5’s failure to disarm, and it drew support from the many NGO and academic delegates gathered at the UN’s General Assembly hall observing the process late into the final evening of the conference. </p>
<h2>A new ‘humanitarian initiative’ to ban nuclear weapons</h2>
<p>The result of the diplomatic fracture at the NPT conference is that most non-nuclear armed states will now take their cause elsewhere. </p>
<p>Disappointed that the NPT is really only a charade in which the interests of a small but defiant minority (the nuclear armed states) will inevitably prevail, and with no prospect of nuclear disarmament in sight, 107 states have now signed the “<a href="http://www.icanw.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/HINW14vienna_Pledge_Document.pdf">humanitarian pledge</a>” to work toward a treaty banning nuclear weapons. </p>
<p>This pledge was initiated by Austria in December 2014, following a series of high-level gatherings that explored what has now come to be called the <a href="http://www.chathamhouse.org/about/structure/international-security-department/humanitarian-impact-nuclear-weapons-project">Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear Weapons</a> (HINW) project. The failure of the NPT process, evident in New York last month, means that these states consider themselves free to pursue the de-legitimization of nuclear weapons in this way. </p>
<p>And this way, with its emphasis on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, HINW is rapidly gaining support. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/84181/original/image-20150608-8706-w4dsu3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/84181/original/image-20150608-8706-w4dsu3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/84181/original/image-20150608-8706-w4dsu3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84181/original/image-20150608-8706-w4dsu3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84181/original/image-20150608-8706-w4dsu3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84181/original/image-20150608-8706-w4dsu3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84181/original/image-20150608-8706-w4dsu3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84181/original/image-20150608-8706-w4dsu3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Dr. Strangelove (Peter Sellers in the 1964 film) smiles from beyond the grave.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Dr._Strangelove.png">From Wikipedia</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The HINW project has shown the <a href="http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/publications-and-research/publications/7422-unspeakable-suffering-the-humanitarian-impact-of-nuclear-weapons">devastating impact</a> that any use of these weapons will have on human life (with hundreds of thousands, if not millions, killed outright in the most gruesome and cruel way, and with ongoing radiation impacts on future generations); on <a href="http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/nuclear/">climate and the environment</a> (where the effects of a nuclear winter are likely to devastate the planet, affecting water resources and food production with <a href="http://www.ippnw.org/pdf/nuclear-famine-ippnw-0412.pdf">up to two billion people facing starvation</a>); and on other aspects of life, leading to a dystopian world barely imaginable to us today.</p>
<p>Not surprisingly, the nuclear armed states (<a href="http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=17323">and some US allies</a>) have <a href="http://www.sipri.org/research/disarmament/eu-consortium/publications/nonproliferation-paper-41">dismissed</a> the humanitarian approach as a diversion from “serious” efforts to address disarmament. </p>
<p>There are also those who think that the ban-treaty envisaged by the non-nuclear states will not bring about disarmament, because the nuclear states will simply <a href="http://www.sipri.org/research/disarmament/eu-consortium/publications/nonproliferation-paper-41">not sign it</a>. </p>
<p>They are right; but this is not necessarily the objective. A <a href="http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/publications-and-research/publications/8654-a-treaty-banning-nuclear-weapons">treaty banning nuclear weapons</a> will fill the legal gap that currently exists with regard to weapons of mass destruction: both chemical and biological weapons have been successfully banned, but no such ban exists against the most destructive of WMDs, nuclear weapons.</p>
<p>Just as the chemical and biological weapons, and also landmines and cluster munitions, have been outlawed, leading to dramatic reductions in the use of these weapons and an increasing sense that no “civilized” states would use them, so too will a nuclear ban focus on the unacceptable use of nuclear weapons. </p>
<p>In time, and with growing adherence, this ban is likely to be taken seriously by the nuclear weapon states and their allies.</p>
<p>Disarmament may still be a long way off, but at least this new vehicle promises more than the nuclear weapon states in the Non-Proliferation Treaty have been willing to provide. The NPT will continue to exist, as a somewhat hollow five-yearly diplomatic exercise, but there are no illusions now that it can lead to disarmament. </p>
<p>Dispiriting though this might seem, the failed conference now liberates the world to seek safety from nuclear annihilation by other, more promising means. This was the real achievement in New York last month.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/42722/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marianne Hanson receives funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for research on Revitalizing Disarmament Debates. </span></em></p>A number of states have given up on pursuing nuclear disarmament through the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Instead they are moving to create a new legal mechanism for banning nuclear weaponsMarianne Hanson, Associate Professor of Internatioanl Relations, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/404402015-04-27T15:36:18Z2015-04-27T15:36:18ZThe science behind the Iranian nuclear deal: why Iran is open for business but not a bomb<p>Marathon bargaining sessions aimed at curbing Iran’s nuclear program between Iran and the US, UK, Germany, France, Russia and China finally ended earlier this month, culminating in a set of key parameters to be negotiated for a final agreement. </p>
<p>The details of the parameters differ among the participants. The US released a <a href="http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/240752.pdf">factsheet</a> describing the arrangement in great detail – even including a schedule – while Iran and the EU presented a joint <a href="http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2015/150402_03_en.htm">statement</a> that is consistent with the factsheet but devoid of numbers or explicit information.</p>
<p>When the parameters of the agreement became public, many analysts were pleasantly surprised. If a deal is completed, Iran will be able to keep all of its facilities open, but Iran’s nuclear program will be significantly curtailed and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be given sufficient access to verify the agreement. </p>
<p>The problem with a nuclear energy program producing fuel from scratch is that it can easily hide a nuclear weapons program, which the West has long suspected, but Iran has steadfastly denied that this is their objective.</p>
<p>To restrict Iran from developing atomic bombs, the proposed deal includes a number of restraints on Iran’s technical facilities. Those measures are designed to limit production from its nuclear facilities to only medical uses and domestic energy production. </p>
<h2>What analysts fear</h2>
<p>Most nuclear reactors use uranium fuel enriched in <a href="http://www.iranfactfile.org/2014/05/21/irans-centrifuge-program-fact-sheet/">centrifuges</a>. Centrifuges are machines that increase the proportion of the useful form, or useful <a href="http://www.chem4kids.com/files/atom_isotopes.html">isotope</a>, of uranium to 3–5% relative to all other uranium isotopes present. </p>
<p>To create enriched uranium, uranium ore is chemically processed, converted into a gas and loaded in centrifuges, which spin the material at high speed. In centrifuges, a tiny difference in weight between the useful and less-useful isotopes separates the two types to create higher enrichment. </p>
<p>The problem is that only a small quantity of gas can be loaded in centrifuges, and the enrichment capabilities of Iran’s centrifuges are low. This is why Iran currently has a colossal number of centrifuges installed – estimated by IAEA officials to be <a href="http://www.iranfactfile.org/2015/04/03/guide-to-iran-nuclear-deal-parameters-sheet/">19,000</a> – and is spinning half of them to enrich uranium.</p>
<p>What most analysts fear is that gas already enriched 3%-5% for the reactor fuel program could be enriched further to be useful for a bomb. Generally, fuel for most nuclear power plants is enriched 3%-5% – that is, the uranium has that percentage of the desired isotope in it. Weapons-grade material typically is enriched to more than 90%.</p>
<p>The crucial point is that the same equipment used to enrich uranium for nuclear power plant reactors can be used to enrich uranium to weapons-grade, and the process is not linear. Once a certain quantity is enriched for reactors, it only takes a little bit more effort to enrich that quantity to a level useful for nuclear weapons.</p>
<p>Imagine the process of enrichment to weapons-grade as running a marathon. Gas enriched to 5% is comparable to starting the marathon with an 18-mile head start: there are only a few more miles to reach the finish line of highly enriched uranium of more than 90%. </p>
<p>To respond to this concern, Iran will have a two-thirds overall reduction in centrifuges at its main site, Natanz, and its underground site at Fordow. The quantity and level of enrichment kept in Iran will also be limited, stretching the time to enrich enough uranium gas for a bomb to one year, while still allowing Iran to produce some fuel for its reactors. The situation now is thought to be about two to three months – the so-called breakout time. </p>
<p>In addition, Fordow will be used solely for enrichment of other elements, not uranium, and will become a nuclear physics and technology center. For example, centrifuges will probably be used to enrich certain isotopes of the element molybdenum as part of the process to produce an isotope used in 80% of all nuclear medicine procedures worldwide.</p>
<p>Both the factsheet and the joint statement lack detail on Iran’s extensive centrifuge research and development program. Iran will have to dismantle many of its centrifuges that are used for production, but the agreement is not clear about what will happen to research on its next-generation centrifuges, which could produce enriched uranium much faster. </p>
<h2>Then there’s plutonium</h2>
<p>Another route for producing a nuclear bomb is to use plutonium, which is produced in all uranium-fueled reactors. </p>
<p>The best-quality plutonium for a bomb is produced in heavy-water reactors like the <a href="http://www.iranfactfile.org/2014/04/18/irans-ir-40-heavy-water-moderated-nuclear-research-reactor/">Iranian Arak reactor</a>, the development of which has been frozen since the negotiations started in early 2014. In fact, India, Pakistan, and Israel have all used similar heavy-water reactors to produce plutonium for their weapons programs. </p>
<p>The EU statement and US-produced factsheet both stated that Iran has agreed to redesign the reactor so that it will not produce weapons-grade plutonium. And the fact sheet stated that Iran will commit to using the reactor solely for medical isotope production. </p>
<p>Plutonium is extracted from the used nuclear fuel through a chemical separation process called reprocessing, requiring elaborate industrial-scale facilities. As a further step meant to reduce risk, Iran has agreed on three actions: it will not build such reprocessing facilities, engage in reprocessing, and it will ship all used fuel out of the country after it is removed from the reactor.</p>
<p>If an agreement that adheres to the key parameters is realized, it could potentially be a new start for a responsible nuclear-energy program for Iran, and it could herald a new era of international cooperation in the region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/40440/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ferenc Dalnoki-Veress receives funding from James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) in Monterey, CA. CNS is my employer. I am the main provider of content for the website iranfactfile.org, which tries to explain technical issues of the Iranian nuclear program to the public.</span></em></p>Centrifuges, plutonium, uranium enrichment – what’s the nuclear science behind the deal to curb Iran’s atomic weapons program.Ferenc Dalnoki-Veress, Scientist-in-Residence and Adjunct Professor, MiddleburyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/388352015-03-20T19:51:36Z2015-03-20T19:51:36ZRepublican fear and loathing of Iran has international consequences<p>Iran watchers have had an exciting few weeks. </p>
<p>First, we witnessed the controversy over Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s speech to the US Congress. The resulting bickering between Republicans and Democrats highlighted the extreme partisan divide in Washington DC.</p>
<p>Then came the “open letter” to Iranian leaders, written by Senator Tom Cotton and signed by 46 other Senate Republicans. This provided those outside America with yet another glimpse of the fears of many Washington insiders about the efficacy of the nuclear deal being negotiated with Iran. </p>
<p>The letter also illustrated how fears of Iran and partisan politics have helped pushed debate about the issue into the realm of the absurd, even as the <a href="https://theconversation.com/most-americans-want-diplomatic-engagement-with-iran-36585">actual negotiations </a>continue to be conducted.</p>
<p>These spectacles have focused attention on American political dysfunction and the ability of a handful of US senators to hijack the media spotlight over a multilateral diplomatic process underway for years. </p>
<h2>Not just about US</h2>
<p>As Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif helpfully reminded the authors of the letter, the negotiations are multilateral, not bilateral. </p>
<p>The response to the Republican letter by Javad Zarif made this point eloquently: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“I should bring one important point to the attention of the authors and that is, the world is not the United States, and the conduct of inter-state relations is governed by international law, and not by US domestic law.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>What’s more the concerns about Iran’s nuclear program are not just American concerns. The implications of possible nuclear proliferation in the Middle East have the potential to destabilize an already fragile and, in some parts, broken region. </p>
<p>Likewise the addition of Iran to the nuclear weapons club would be a disaster for the global non-proliferation <a href="http://www.cfr.org/nonproliferation-arms-control-and-disarmament/global-nuclear-nonproliferation-regime/p18984">regime.</a> As well as further exacerbating Israeli and Saudi Arabian fears, a nuclear Iran could potentially trigger an arms race in the region. This would be a truly terrible development.</p>
<p>However, the <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/22/tom-cotton-corruption-of-blood_n_3322251.html">hysteria </a>with which Senator Cotton has consistently viewed Iran highlights his lack of a nuanced understanding of US options and the consequences should diplomacy fail. </p>
<h2>What’s at stake</h2>
<p>First, Iran does not have a nuclear weapon. </p>
<p>The most <a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/news/director-of-national-intelligence-james-clapper-on-iran-nuclear-capability-negotiations/">recent statements </a> by intelligence officials indicate Iran has not made a decision to develop a nuclear weapon. </p>
<p>However, and this is an important caveat, Iran has the expertise and the ability to develop one, if the Iranian leadership do make that decision. </p>
<p>Whether Iran’s leaders ever decide to do so will depend to some degree on how it perceives its own security interests. The negotiations can help provide a context in which Iran has little incentive to develop a weapon.</p>
<p>What the current multilateral negotiations hope to achieve is a framework that will do two things:</p>
<p>First, through ongoing inspections and monitoring, the international community will be able to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program is only being used for peaceful purposes. If the Iranian regime did engage in any activities related to developing a weapons capability, it would be able to respond.</p>
<p>This leads to the second aspect of the diplomatic deal. The P5+1 (US, Russia, China, the UK, France and Germany) are negotiating a set of conditions in Iran that significantly limits the scope of its nuclear program; this would provide the international community with a significant lead time in which to respond to prevent Iran from developing a weapon. This is called a “break out” capability, or alternatively, a “sneak out” capability. Either way, we want to extend as much as possible the amount of time it would take Iran to develop a weapon.</p>
<p>It’s important to acknowledge that any agreement between Iran and the P5+1 will be deeply problematic. Iran currently possesses the knowledge and the skill to develop a nuclear weapon. No deal is going to change that. </p>
<h2>How best to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons</h2>
<p>The international community now finds itself in this uncomfortable position largely because the George W Bush Administration <a href="http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/03/iran-nuclear-program-negotiations-115877.html#.VQtHskLgLlI">was reluctant</a> to negotiate with Iran back in 2003 when its nuclear infrastructure and expertise was far less advanced than they are today.</p>
<p>The success or failure of the Iran negotiations has broader implications beyond the relationship between Iran and the US. America is just one actor in an important global non-proliferation regime that works towards <a href="http://www.cfr.org/nonproliferation-arms-control-and-disarmament/strengthening-nuclear-nonproliferation-regime/p21807">preventing </a>the spread of nuclear weapons. </p>
<p>In many ways the current Iranian crisis represents a test of that regime, which includes the <a href="http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT.shtml">Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, (NPT)</a>the monitoring and inspections work through the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the numerous other international legal agreements and treaties that control and limit aspects of nuclear weapons development and proliferation.</p>
<p>Jeffrey Lewis, of the <a href="http://armscontrolwonk.com">Arms Control Wonk Blog</a>, succinctly summed up the potential consequences of a failed diplomatic agreement and the misguided hope that the US can somehow pressure Iran to dismantle its entire nuclear program: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“This is a fantasy, a unicorn, the futile pursuit of which ends with a half-assed airstrike against Iran, a region in flames, and eventually an Iranian nuclear weapon.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>I would add to this scenario the fundamental weakening of the global non-proliferation regime. The relevance of the NPT would be further undermined, and the efficacy of diplomacy as an effective and beneficial tool in the fight to prevent nuclear proliferation would be materially damaged. </p>
<p>It would also be a signal that short of military action, there is very little the world can do to stop a country from developing a nuclear weapon. This is an extremely dangerous message to send, especially when even the most optimistic assessments of military strikes against Iran predict they would only result in winding the nuclear program back a few years, and that they certainly wouldn’t destroy a weapons capability completely.</p>
<p>This is a disturbingly high price to pay because some Republicans in Congress have such loathing for the Iranian regime that they can’t bring themselves to acknowledge that a diplomatic solution, while certainly not perfect, is the best hope the international community currently has of limiting, and containing the Iranian nuclear program.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/38835/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kumuda Simpson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The US is just one actor in an important global non-proliferation regime that works towards preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.Kumuda Simpson, Lecturer in International Relations, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/362972015-01-19T19:25:21Z2015-01-19T19:25:21ZWhat can climate talks learn from the fight against nuclear weapons?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/69343/original/image-20150119-2710-z9kl5j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Could people get just as concerned about climate change as nuclear war? </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.shutterstock.com/">Nuclear war image from www.shutterstock.com</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>From the 1950s until the 1990s, nuclear weapons were viewed as the greatest threat to human life on the planet. Jonathan Schell, whose book <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/books/98/12/06/specials/schell-fate.html">The Fate of the Earth</a> (1998) perhaps best crystallised the danger and fear of such weapons for a popular audience, referred to life after a nuclear holocaust as a “republic of insects and grass”.</p>
<p>Today the world faces a different global threat of our own making: climate change. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change <a href="http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg2/">has documented</a> the possibly catastrophic impacts of unchecked warming. This November, nations around the world will <a href="http://climate-l.iisd.org/events/unfccc-cop-21">meet in Paris</a> in an attempt to develop a global climate agreement beyond 2020. </p>
<p>The threat of nuclear war was substantially reduced through several successful strategic arms-control agreements in the 1970s and 1980s.</p>
<p>What – if anything – can such successful agreements, designed to address a global threat, tell us about climate change agreements and their success? </p>
<h2>A brief history of nuclear treaties</h2>
<p>On May 26, 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union signed two strategic arms-control treaties: the <a href="http://www.state.gov/t/isn/4795.htm">Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms</a> (the “Interim Agreement”) and the <a href="http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/abm/abm2.html">Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty</a>, as part of <a href="http://www.armscontrol.org/documents/salt">ongoing talks</a> to limit nuclear arms. </p>
<p>In the Interim Agreement, both superpowers agreed for the first time to limit the number of offensive nuclear weapons they could deploy, while the missile treaty limited the number of <em>defensive</em> weapons. This was just as important, and worked off the recognition that mutual vulnerability could produce strategic stability. </p>
<p>A <a href="http://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm">second agreement</a> in 1987 between the United States and the Soviet Union, eliminated nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with a range between 500 and 5,500 km.</p>
<p>At the end of July 1991 the US and the Soviet Union signed the <a href="http://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/146007.htm">Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty</a> (START). It took nine years to negotiate and, for the first time, required a reduction in warheads deployed on strategic offensive weapons. The treaty provided that the US cut its ballistic missile warheads by about 38% and the Soviet Union cut its missiles by 48% to equal levels.</p>
<p>START II was signed in 1993 and START III in 2002. The latest START agreement was signed in 2011. Since the 1986 Reykjvic summit at which the foundations for START were laid, there has been a two-thirds decline in nuclear weapons in the arsenals of Russia and the United States.</p>
<h2>Why did they work?</h2>
<p>All of these agreements were designed to address a global threat – nuclear war and a possible nuclear holocaust. There was a clear and present danger, a danger that manifested itself across decades. It was also a danger increasingly (and easily) understood by the public. </p>
<p>The danger could be seen: missiles being paraded, missiles being tested, missiles being deployed. Fear, especially in Europe, was almost visceral. There was public support for the agreements.</p>
<p>Books and films also played a role. Movies such as <a href="http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0085404">The Day After</a> (1983) and <a href="http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0086429/?ref_=fn_al_tt_1">Testament</a> (1983) and enormously popular books such as Jonathan Schell’s <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/books/98/12/06/specials/schell-fate.html">The Fate of the Earth</a> (1988) and Helen Caldicott’s <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/1308578.Missile_Envy?from_search=true">Missile Envy</a> (1986) fed public demand for action. </p>
<p>Public demonstrations against nuclear weapons became defining global moments.</p>
<p>The agreements were not multilateral; they involved a small number of parties. The technical issues were often difficult, but the parameters of what needed to be negotiated were clear. The objective was also clear: the reduction of nuclear weapons or a strategy whereby they would not be used.</p>
<p>There are, of course, successful multilateral nuclear weapons agreements - the <a href="http://www.iaea.org/publications/documents/treaties/npt">Non-Proliferation Treaty</a> (NPT), for example, to which 189 states are party. It should be noted, however, that the mere fact of the treaty can’t prevent <a href="http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat">proliferation</a> of nuclear weapons, the retention of such weapons or, of course, the desire to obtain them – thus the great number of state parties. </p>
<h2>Could it work for climate?</h2>
<p>These arms control treaties show that small numbers of countries can agree on matters that affect the future of the planet. They also show that it helps if the danger is clear and present, and the issues are clearly understood and recognised by the public. </p>
<p>Bill McKibben, the activist and founder of 350.org, has said that, in terms of both the nuclear and climate change crises, <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/04/07/jonathan-schell">citing</a> Schell: “the jeopardy to our species and the rest of the species on the earth, adds a dimension that we have never seen before”.</p>
<p>Perhaps climate agreements between small numbers of state parties could be the solution, rather than a global deal. </p>
<p>The late Nobel laureate in economics, <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elinor_Ostrom">Elinor Ostrom</a> proposes a <a href="http://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/pe/2009/04268.pdf">solution</a> at many levels: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>[t]he likelihood of developing an effective, efficient, and fair system to reduce greenhouse gas emissions that can be rapidly initiated at the global level appear to be very low. Given the severity of the threat, simply waiting for resolution of these issues at a global level, without trying out policies at multiple scales because they lack a global scale, is not a reasonable stance. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>A recent example is the 2014 climate <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/11/fact-sheet-us-china-joint-announcement-climate-change-and-clean-energy-c">deal</a> between just the US and China in which the US commits (but is not legally bound) to reducing emissions by up to 28% on 2005 levels by 2025. China aims to cease emissions growth before 2030. China and the US account for 42% of global emissions.</p>
<p>If the world’s <a href="http://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/14/hl-full.htm#regionalFF">four largest emitters</a>, came to an agreement – between China (28%), the US (14%), the EU (10%) and India (7%), together with Russia and Brazil – it would cover about 70% of world emissions.</p>
<p>However, for much of the public, unlike the threat of nuclear war, the climate change threat is not a visceral one; this may well account for a lack of progress in concluding legally-binding climate change agreements.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/36297/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>From the 1950s until the 1990s, nuclear weapons were viewed as the greatest threat to human life on the planet. Jonathan Schell, whose book The Fate of the Earth (1998) perhaps best crystallised the danger…David Hodgkinson, Associate Professor, Law School, The University of Western AustraliaRebecca Johnston, Adjunct Lecturer, Law School, University of Notre Dame AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/358712015-01-07T06:17:40Z2015-01-07T06:17:40ZFears of a new nuclear arms race are wildly overblown<p>Many in the West suddenly seem to think we’re on the road to a new Cold War. Talk of a <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/04/us-russia-era-nuclear-rivalry">return to the era of nuclear rivalry</a> swirls around Russia’s muscular and belligerent grandstanding over Ukraine, and the conflict has certainly cut the chances for a new treaty to further reduce nuclear stockpiles. </p>
<p>But the idea that a wholesale breakdown of nuclear arms control is imminent is misguided. It overlooks the specific military and defence-political context in which the current debates occur – and it’s based on a very limited understanding of what arms control is actually for.</p>
<p>In fact, the recent news of escalating fears over nuclear matters could be read as a sign that the norms of arms control diplomacy are holding strong. Instead of being a problem, renewed focus on the problem of arms control may well provide a venue in which to defuse some of this worrying and retrograde East-West tension.</p>
<h2>Here we go again</h2>
<p>First of all, these worries are not new. Stories about Russian cruise missiles and a possible Russian violation of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty were in the air <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/30/us-russia-nuclear-arms-treaty-cruise-missile">almost exactly a year ago</a>; references to it have long been popping up in Russian defence policy documents, most importantly the <a href="http://www.deepcuts.org/publications/issuebriefs/136-new-deep-cuts-issue-brief-by-vincent-fournier-and-ulrich-kuehn-assesses-russia-s-nuclear-posture-modernization-and-the-state-of-arms-control">2010 military doctrine</a>. President Putin and other Russian politicians have often played the nuclear card in order to <a href="http://english.pravda.ru/russia/politics/12-11-2014/129015-russia_nato_nuclear_surprise-0/">assert Russia’s international clout</a>. </p>
<p>In any case, the debate over whether and how to modernise ageing nuclear weapons is not unique to Russia, nor is it purely a fact of the Ukraine conflict. It’s a symptom of the massive shift in the parameters of defence policy and strategic insecurity in many nations after the end of the Cold War. </p>
<p>Many of the US weapons systems have also come of age, and are in the process of <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/22/us/us-ramping-up-major-renewal-in-nuclear-arms.html">redevelopment and renewal</a>. Britons are used to hearing about the renewal and up-dating of the nuclear <a href="https://theconversation.com/scotland-no-vote-has-halted-a-wider-debate-about-trident-31987">Trident</a> submarine-based weapons system, whose future has been a staple of the country’s foreign and defence policy debate for decades. </p>
<p>The global financial crisis and recession of the past few years added some extra urgency to all these problems, what with across-the-board budget cuts and the poor state of existing Cold War-era equipment and resources. In the post-crisis austerity era, the question for nuclear-armed states is whether weapons unlikely ever to be used in battle are really a justifiable expense.</p>
<h2>Get with it</h2>
<p>The right-wing British and American voices clamouring for a more assertive nuclear stance towards Russia have to be heard with that question in mind.</p>
<p>The armed forces of both countries have been left haggling over increasingly scarce resources and funds, and advocates of nuclear defence systems are now faced with stiff competition from those who argue that definitions of security from the Cold War era are dangerously out of date. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, few (if any) Western nations still see national security in principally military terms, as they did for most of the Cold War. They now pay just as much attention to issues of welfare and international development, environmental risks, and cyber-terrorism. </p>
<p>In short, nuclear weapons are just part of a much broader and more complex security landscape – and for many even in the Anglo-American defence establishment, it’s no longer self-evident why nations would still require them. </p>
<p>But behind the current debate about Russia’s potential violations of the <a href="http://www.armscontrol.org/node/6451">INF Treaty</a> and an end to the arms control regime as we know it lurks a fundamental issue: the ever-shifting shape of international politics since the end of Cold War, and the implications for what defence and foreign policy should look like. </p>
<h2>Parallel worlds</h2>
<p>Russia obviously views the post-Cold War sphere in a very distinctive way. German chancellor Angela Merkel was correct when she argued in early 2014 that Putin lived “<a href="http://theweek.com/speedreads/index/257259/speedreads-germanys-merkel-vladimir-putin-is-living-in-another-world">in another world</a>”. </p>
<p>He is clearly trying to further Russia’s national interest and to gain domestic political advantage by highlighting his country’s nuclear prowess – and he hopes this will counterweight Russia’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/vladimir-putin-and-russias-incredible-shrinking-ruble-35638">deteriorating performance</a> in the global economy.</p>
<p>We need to be careful not to be drawn into Putin’s world, with its illusions of untrammelled national sovereignty propped up by nuclear weapons. Many Republicans in the United States and Conservatives in the UK are driven by similar “sovereignty panic”, albeit within democratic political systems. </p>
<p>But at the same time, these tactics are nothing new. Nuclear weapons have always been tools for countries to demarcate their sovereignty – and arms control mechanisms have never been purely about numbers of weapons, their type, or seeing out international treaties. They are also processes for creating international norms for conflict resolution more broadly. </p>
<p>Put simply: diplomacy matters. </p>
<h2>Stay the course</h2>
<p>The norms of negotiation and how to do it held fast, against the odds, across a number of severe international crises during the Cold War. Given this history and the deep institutional knowledge of it in Moscow, London, Washington and elsewhere, it is inconceivable that today’s governments would give up on the process out of mere pique or exhaustion. </p>
<p>And positive efforts continue. The US and its allies on the one hand and Russia on the other continue to engage with Iran to find a solution to nuclear proliferation there, and while the process has been slow, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-the-mixed-up-middle-east-can-the-us-and-iran-work-together-in-2015-35451">political will for it to succeed</a> is clearly there on all sides.</p>
<p>Ultimately, Cold War ideas of a “strong nuclear stance” are unhelpful, and don’t reflect the reality. Nuclear arms control is a core part of politics and political negotiation; it has come back into the public domain principally because it still works and still matters, and of that we should be glad.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/35871/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Holger Nehring does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Many in the West suddenly seem to think we’re on the road to a new Cold War. Talk of a return to the era of nuclear rivalry swirls around Russia’s muscular and belligerent grandstanding over Ukraine, and…Holger Nehring, Professor in Contemporary European History, University of StirlingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/346072014-11-25T19:24:23Z2014-11-25T19:24:23ZA cricketing ally, but will India play a straight bat on Aussie uranium?<p>Behind the flag-waving and cheers surrounding Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/shared-values-common-interests-modis-mantra-in-australia-34133">visit to Australia</a> are serious questions about the safety and security implications of Australia’s <a href="http://www5.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/ATNIF/2014/26.html">agreement to supply uranium to New Delhi</a>.</p>
<p>When he inked the uranium deal in India in September, Tony Abbott <a href="http://www.pm.gov.au/media/2014-09-04/doorstop-interview-mumbai-india">praised</a> India’s “absolutely impeccable non-proliferation record”. He refused to answer questions about alleged serious deficiencies in India’s civil nuclear sector and was <a href="http://www.pm.gov.au/media/2014-09-05/address-indian-chambers-commerce-lunch-new-delhi-india">reduced to white-flannelled cliché</a>, declaring that Australia and India trust each other on issues like uranium safeguards because of “the fundamentally ethical principle that every cricketer is supposed to assimilate – play by the rules and accept the umpire’s decision”.</p>
<p>Yet despite the assurances of peaceful purposes, this deal has serious nuclear security implications. After all, India has form. It used Canadian peaceful nuclear technology to develop weapons, provoking Pakistan to follow suit. Even if all goes well – and in the aftermath of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/fukushima">Fukushima disaster</a> that is a big assumption – Australian sales could potentially free up India’s domestic uranium stocks for military use. </p>
<p>Whatever happens, the new deal certainly won’t reduce the continuing tension with nuclear rival Pakistan, or promote nuclear non-proliferation. </p>
<h2>Checks and balances</h2>
<p>India is a nuclear-armed nation that has not signed the <a href="http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html">Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty</a>, and as such is not subject to the (admittedly fragile) checks and balances provided by full international nuclear safeguards. It is engaged in an active nuclear weapons program, has <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/interactive/2013/03/world/nuclear-weapon-states/">an estimated 80-100 nuclear warheads</a>, and explicitly refuses to renounce nuclear testing. </p>
<p>Contrary to Abbott’s statement, India is neither playing by the rules nor recognising the authority of the international umpire. Add these facts together and the plan to sell Australian uranium to India is in clear and direct conflict with Australia’s international obligations under the <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/documents/rarotonga">South Pacific Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty</a>, which says:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>States Parties are obliged not to manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess, or have control over any nuclear explosive device anywhere inside or outside the Treaty zone; not to seek or receive any assistance in this; not to take any action to assist or encourage the manufacture or acquisition of any nuclear explosive device by any State; and not to provide sources or special fissionable materials or equipment to any non-nuclear weapon State (NNWS), or any nuclear weapon State (NWS) unless it is subject to safeguards agreements with the (International Atomic Energy Agency) IAEA.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Prime Minister Modi is intent on expanding India’s civil and military nuclear ambitions but there are big question marks around the safety and security arrangements for India’s nuclear sector. In 2012 a <a href="http://saiindia.gov.in/english/home/our_products/audit_report/government_wise/union_audit/recent_reports/union_performance/2012_2013/SD/Report_9/ReportNo_9.html">scathing report</a> by India’s then Auditor-General Vinod Rai warned of a “Fukushima or Chernobyl-like disaster if the nuclear safety issue is not addressed”. </p>
<p>The issues identified in this frank assessment from one of India’s own senior officials have not been addressed, and there is no guarantee that they ever will be. The safety of India’s nuclear reactors remains shaky, because the sector’s regulation and governance is deficient. As we have seen with Fukushima and Chernobyl, the cost of errors or accidents can be catastrophic.</p>
<h2>Australian uranium’s role</h2>
<p>Fukushima is a continuing nuclear crisis that has been directly fuelled by Australian uranium, so its lessons are significant. If Japan, the world’s third-largest economy and a nation steeped in technological expertise, could not control the atomic genie, it bodes poorly for the application of this technology in other countries. In the aftermath of Fukushima, instead of opening up uranium exports to insecure and conflict-prone regions, we should tread more carefully. </p>
<p>With Australia’s renewable energy expertise and resources, we are perfectly placed to turn on the lights in Indian villages while ensuring that the Geiger counter stays off.</p>
<p>The deal has even prompted doubts among pro-nuclear commentators. For two decades until 2010, <a href="http://www.lowyinstitute.org/people/john-carlson">John Carlson</a> was director general of the <a href="http://www.dfat.gov.au/asno">Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office</a> and charged with overseeing Australian uranium sales. Now he has <a href="http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/10/01/Is-the-Abbott-Government-abandoning-Australias-nuclear-safeguards-standards-for-India.aspx?COLLCC=1577267652&">raised serious concerns</a>, including his worry that Australia may be unable to keep track of what happens to uranium once it’s sold to India.</p>
<p>As Carlson makes clear, without proper reporting Australia has no way of knowing whether India is really meeting its obligations to identify and account for all the material that is subject to the agreement, and to apply Australia’s safeguard standards. It is not good enough simply to take India on trust as a fellow cricket-mad nation, or to appeal to an “impeccable” non-proliferation record that it doesn’t actually have.</p>
<p>Carlson’s assessment is that the planned deal is short-sighted, self-defeating, and compromises Australia’s standards. That warning should ring loud alarms in Canberra. The deal has yet to be examined by the <a href="http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Treaties">Joint Standing Committee on Treaties</a>, which is taking public comments on the planned deal until November 28. The rigour that the committee brings to this issue will be a test of whether radioactive rhetoric or real-world responsibility is in the ascendency in Canberra.</p>
<p>Uranium is not just another mineral. It fuels nuclear reactors and devastating weapons. Whether used for electricity or bombs, it inevitably produces radioactive waste that must be stored for geological timescales.</p>
<p>As home to around a third of the world’s uranium supply, Australia’s decisions on this issue matter. It is important that those flagging concerns are listened to just as much as those waving flags.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/34607/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ian Lowe was from 2004 to earlier this year president of the Australian Conservation Foundation.</span></em></p>Behind the flag-waving and cheers surrounding Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visit to Australia are serious questions about the safety and security implications of Australia’s agreement to…Ian Lowe, Emeritus Professor, School of Science, Griffith UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/341232014-11-20T10:14:18Z2014-11-20T10:14:18ZIs the Obama presidency over?<p>Is the Obama presidency over? This has been the burning question on the lips of many Washington DC pundits and beltway insiders in the wake of devastating Democratic midterm election losses. </p>
<p>According to the ubiquitous Chuck Todd of NBC’s Meet the Press, the answer would seem to be a resounding yes as he has described the midterms as “a full-fledged repudiation” of the president. </p>
<p>Yet if history is any guide, such bold predictions are premature at best. For President Obama can take heart that two of his most recent predecessors in the Oval Office, Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton, overcame comparable political debacles to record signature domestic and foreign policy triumphs in their final years in power.</p>
<h2>Reagan: overcoming Iran-Contra</h2>
<p>In Reagan’s case, it certainly seemed that he was down for the final political count when it was publicly revealed in 1986 that his administration had been secretly selling arms to the terrorist-sponsoring Ayatollah Khomeini regime in Iran and illegally siphoning off the profits from the transactions to fund a US-backed Contra rebel force in Nicaragua. </p>
<p>Talk of impeachment subsequently filled the air on Capitol Hill but Reagan soldiered through it all by convincingly denying any direct knowledge of the sordid affair and pulling off one of the great diplomatic breakthroughs of the twentieth century.</p>
<p>Having carved out a political career as being a fervid foe of the “evil empire” and communism in general, Reagan shocked everyone, including many of his staunchest conservative supporters, by <a href="http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/speech-3924">engaging in negotiations </a>with the Soviet Union and its dynamic new leader Mikhail Gorbachev to help wind down nearly a half century of Cold War tensions between the East and West.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/64984/original/image-20141119-31612-1gbulb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/64984/original/image-20141119-31612-1gbulb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/64984/original/image-20141119-31612-1gbulb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/64984/original/image-20141119-31612-1gbulb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/64984/original/image-20141119-31612-1gbulb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/64984/original/image-20141119-31612-1gbulb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/64984/original/image-20141119-31612-1gbulb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/64984/original/image-20141119-31612-1gbulb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Reagan and Gorbachev signing the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">White House Photographic Office/National Archives and Records Administration , courtesy Ronald Reagan Presidential Library:</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>“We have a choice,” <a href="http://www.randomhouse.com/book/109143/reagan-and-gorbachev-by-jack-matlock">Reagan told Gorbachev</a> when the two first met in person. “We can agree to reduce arms-or we can continue the arms race, which I think you know you can’t win. We won’t stand by and let you maintain weapon superiority over us. But together we can try to do something about ending the arms race.” </p>
<p>Amazingly, the two leaders were in unprecedented accord on this issue. In 1987, they signed off on the 1987 landmark Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which eliminated all intermediate range nuclear missiles in both sides’ arsenals, a prelude to the even more comprehensive arms and military force reduction agreements between the two superpowers. </p>
<p>“What we have achieved is the revival of hope,” said Gorbachev who would go on to preside over the official demise of the USSR in 1991. For Reagan the event arguably marked the crowning moment of his presidency and a healthy respect if not admiration for a determined adversary. </p>
<p>“Looking back now,” he wrote in his 1990 autobiography, “it’s clear that that there was a chemistry between Gorbachev and me that produced something very close to a friendship.” Not even the Iran-Contra imbroglio could take that away.</p>
<h2>Clinton: defying impeachment</h2>
<p>While Reagan faced possible impeachment in his second term, Bill Clinton was impeached thanks to a tawdry extramarital relationship between himself and a 24-year-old White House intern named Monica Lewinsky. </p>
<p>“I did not have sexual relations with that woman, Miss Lewinsky,” he memorably told a nation before admitting that he indeed had amidst a mountain of irrefutable evidence.</p>
<p>Refusing to take the option of resigning from office as Richard Nixon had done during the height of the Watergate scandal in 1974, Clinton doggedly persevered through a Constitutionally mandated trial in the Senate where he was finally acquitted of committing any “high crimes or misdemeanors” against the Republic. </p>
<p>Still, the political damage was done. Only one other Commander in Chief, Andrew Johnson, had ever been impeached in American history and that was in the tumultuous political aftermath of the Civil War and the assassination of Abraham Lincoln. None of this seemed to deter the aptly nicknamed “Man From Hope,” however.</p>
<p>As he defiantly <a href="http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=55349">said</a> on the eve of his impending impeachment, “The real test of our ideas is whether they outlive this presidency; whether they are bigger than any candidate, any speech, any campaign and debate.” His notion of an expanding and prosperous national economy of opportunity, to go with the unexpected bonus of the first federal budget surplus in decades, was realized in his closing years along with a breakthrough peace agreement in Northern Ireland between traditionally warring Protestant and Catholic factions.</p>
<p>As both Reagan and Clinton examples prove, you can never count out a president irrespective of how badly the second term political situation around him may appear. </p>
<p>Evidence would suggest that Barack Obama has already grasped this fundamental point. </p>
<p>Just this past week, he came to an <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/us-china-climate-agreement">historic international agreement</a> with Chinese leader Xi Jinping to limit both countries’ carbon emissions in the atmosphere over the coming years, announced major US troop increases to Iraq to combat the growing Islamic State threat and stated his intentions to take executive action on long delayed immigration reform at home.</p>
<p>Far from being done, Obama is catching his second political wind.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/34123/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thomas J. Whalen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Is the Obama presidency over? This has been the burning question on the lips of many Washington DC pundits and beltway insiders in the wake of devastating Democratic midterm election losses. According…Thomas J. Whalen, Associate Professor of Social Sciences, Boston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.