tag:theconversation.com,2011:/fr/topics/peacekeeping-16500/articlesPeacekeeping – The Conversation2024-02-20T13:12:43Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2225192024-02-20T13:12:43Z2024-02-20T13:12:43ZSouth Sudan: some spoilers want peace to fail, putting 2024 elections at risk<p>South Sudan is expected to hold its first general election in <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/can-south-sudan-meet-its-election-deadline-this-time">December 2024</a>. It became an independent state in <a href="https://www.usip.org/programs/independence-south-sudan">2011</a>. </p>
<p>The long overdue election is one of the pillars of a <a href="https://docs.pca-cpa.org/2016/02/South-Sudan-Peace-Agreement-September-2018.pdf">peace agreement</a> signed in 2018. It helped end the 2013-2018 civil war that killed <a href="https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/IN10975.pdf#page=1">nearly 400,000 people and displaced millions</a>. </p>
<p>Since then, the country has progressed in relative peace, with fewer incidences of conflict reported between 2018 and 2023. However, UN experts have <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/12/1144822">voiced concerns</a> about the likelihood of elections being held within agreed timelines. </p>
<p>The election has been slated for December 2024, provided a number of <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/s-sudan-risks-delayed-2024-elections-due-to-the-stuck-deal-4472812">issues</a> listed in the peace agreement are addressed. These include the making of a <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-sudans-constitution-making-process-is-on-shaky-ground-how-to-firm-it-up-177107">permanent constitution</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/peace-in-south-sudan-hinges-on-forging-a-unified-military-force-but-its-proving-hard-181547">unifying command of the military</a>.</p>
<p>But there have been major hurdles in the way of implementing the agreement. One of them is the <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/jolte/article/view/248083">presence of spoilers</a> within the South Sudanese political landscape. </p>
<p>Spoilers, as I define them, are detractors who attempt to undermine the successful implementation of peace agreements. </p>
<p>I have researched <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/jolte/article/view/248083">South Sudan’s peace process</a> for eight years. I have studied the evolution of the country’s conflict since 2013, and the <a href="https://erepo.usiu.ac.ke/handle/11732/6971">various hurdles</a> that warring parties face in their quest for peace.</p>
<p>In my view, spoilers comprise leaders and parties who view peace as a major threat to their interests and power. They willingly risk using any means, including violence, to derail peace agreements due to feelings of exclusion or betrayal. </p>
<p>South Sudan’s elections were initially planned for <a href="https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/counting-down-to-south-sudans-elections">2022, and then pushed to 2023 and now 2024</a>. These delays have been as a result of the lack of real peace. Instead, there’s negative peace: a peace deal exists but there are simmering tensions between warring factions and those left out of negotiations. </p>
<p>This exclusion has led to the proliferation of spoilers. As I warn in <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/jolte/article/view/248083">my research</a>, in this context, a more inclusive process needs to be prioritised to save the country’s fragile peace and get the elections on track.</p>
<h2>What happened to negotiate peace in South Sudan</h2>
<p>A protracted <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan#:%7E:text=In%20December%202013%2C%20following%20a,ethnic%20groups%20in%20South%20Sudan.">political power struggle</a> between South Sudan’s president, Salva Kiir, and his deputy, Riek Machar, to lead the main political party, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, sparked a civil war in 2013.</p>
<p>Violence first broke out after a <a href="https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/interview-kiir-has-deliberately-destroyed-splm-and-is-not-interested-in-bringing-genuine-peace-pagan-amum">volatile meeting</a> in July 2013 to decide who – between Kiir, Machar and Pagan Amum, then the secretary-general of the party – would be its flagbearer in elections scheduled for 2015. In <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/23/south-sudan-state-that-fell-apart-in-a-week">December 2013</a>, fighting between military forces loyal to either Kiir or Machar – who are from the country’s two largest ethnic groups – escalated. </p>
<p>The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement splintered into two factions in 2014. One is led by Kiir, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-In Government; the other by Machar, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-In Opposition.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.usip.org/south-sudan-peace-process-key-facts#:%7E:text=The%20South%20Sudan%20peace%20process,a%20post%2Dconflict%20political%20transition.">International and regional interventions</a> led to a long peace process that resulted in the signing of several peace agreements. Between 2013 and 2018, six main agreements and five addenda were signed to help resolve the South Sudan conflict. </p>
<p>The key sticking points in these deals were around how power would be shared between the warring parties, military integration of armed forces, addressing the root causes of the conflict, and healing the nation through a truth, justice and reconciliation process. </p>
<p>The last peace agreement was <a href="https://horninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/No.-17.-The-Revitalized-Agreement-for-Resolution-of-Conflict-in-South-Sudan-R-ARCSS-1.pdf#page=1">signed</a> in September 2018 by five key actors and a group of smaller opposition parties, signalling an end to the five-year conflict. </p>
<p>Elections were originally slated for <a href="https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/counting-down-to-south-sudans-elections">December 2022</a>. They were later postponed due to delays in implementing the peace agreement. </p>
<h2>Who are the spoilers?</h2>
<p>Spoilers can destroy peace agreements. There are two main types of spoilers: <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/jolte/article/view/248083">insiders and outsiders</a>. </p>
<p>Insider spoilers participate in the peace process, sign the peace agreement and even signal support for its implementation. However, they fail to follow through. Their motives for this include the need to achieve their goals by maintaining the guise of supporting the peace process. They are especially sensitive to decisions that would weaken them militarily. </p>
<p>In South Sudan, insider spoilers include <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/kiir-puts-south-sudan-on-edge-4154634">the two breakaway parties</a> of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement. They are the main signatories of the 2018 peace agreement. Their spoiling role has been exhibited by a <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/is-south-sudan-s-peace-deal-holding-/7004434.html">lack of political goodwill</a> in upholding the spirit and letter of the agreement on various issues. A good example of this is a recent <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/30/s-sudan-president-appoints-defence-minister-breaching-peace-deal">breach</a> when Kiir unilaterally appointed a defence minister from his own faction in total disregard of the peace agreement. </p>
<p>Outsider spoilers exclude themselves from the peace process because they feel their demands won’t be addressed. They openly declare their hostility to the process. They eventually use any means, including open violence, to disrupt and upset the process.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.voaafrica.com/a/south-sudan-s-holdout-rebel-groups-resume-talks/7016828.html">New negotiations</a> were held in 2023 to include outsider spoilers like <a href="https://www.radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/gen-cirillo-we-were-right-not-to-sign-the-peace-agreement">General Thomas Swaka</a> of the National Salvation Front and <a href="https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/q-a-nss-gen-akol-koor-cannot-convince-me-to-return-to-juba-gen-paul-malong">General Paul Malong</a>, a leader of the South Sudan United Front. These two parties are new entrants into the South Sudan political space and generally accommodate former Kiir allies. The negotiations didn’t bear fruit.</p>
<p>In my view, insider spoilers are more likely to disrupt the South Sudan peace process. They span both the political and military landscape and are very influential. Insider spoilers tend to have a large support base within the population. </p>
<h2>What happens now?</h2>
<p>New threats continue to emerge in the South Sudanese landscape, particularly as December 2024 draws closer. There have been <a href="https://www.radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/jonglei-two-spla-io-generals-defect-in-major-blow-to-machar">major defections</a> of influential generals from the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-In Opposition. They have expressed dissatisfaction with the progress of reforms and implementation of the current peace agreement. </p>
<p>This strains the delicate balance of power that has existed between the warring factions since 2018. These generals have a substantive following among the public and pose a serious risk to the South Sudan peace agenda. Failure to accommodate these generals could result in insecurity in the regions where they have influence, affecting the chances of holding peaceful elections.</p>
<p>South Sudan needs to reassess its commitment to peace. It can do this by including all aggrieved parties in the political peace process. This will help ensure that the country returns to normalcy under a government that’s legitimately in power after credible polls.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222519/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Edgar Githua does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A major hurdle in South Sudan is the presence of detractors who could undermine the successful implementation of peace agreements.Edgar Githua, Lecturer in International Studies, Strathmore UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2155332023-12-14T22:54:08Z2023-12-14T22:54:08ZAustralia has invested heavily in a Pacific peacekeeping hub. So, where are the recruits?<p>Nestled not far from Fiji’s Nadi airport is the Blackrock Peacekeeping, Humanitarian and Disaster Relief Camp. Before reopening in March 2022, this military complex was renovated and expanded in a <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/australia-hands-over-redeveloped-blackrock-military-training-camp-to-fiji/2534521">A$100 million</a> <a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/programs-initiatives/pacific-engagement/blackrock-camp-fiji">joint collaboration</a> between Australia and Fiji. </p>
<p>The complex is <a href="https://www.fbcnews.com.fj/news/plans-to-certify-rfmf-blackrock-camp/">envisioned</a> as a future training and regional response hub for both natural and man-made disasters in the Pacific. It’s also emblematic of Australia and Fiji’s <a href="https://ministers.dfat.gov.au/minister/zed-seselja/transcript/opening-blackrock-peacekeeping-and-humanitarian-assistance-and-disaster-relief-camp">commitment</a> to an international rules-based order. This is made more notable by the fact Australia narrowly <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/366386/australian-offer-over-fiji-base-beats-china-s">outbid</a> China as the funder for the camp’s renovation.</p>
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<p>The need for a regional humanitarian logistics hub is clear. Oceania and South-East Asia experience <a href="https://www.undrr.org/publication/2020-non-covid-year-disasters">roughly 40%</a> of the world’s natural disasters – often in the form of volcanic eruptions, earthquakes and increasingly destructive cyclones.</p>
<p>The new complex is based on a Pacific-centric and co-operative approach to addressing disasters, guaranteeing a speedy deployment of humanitarian relief workers and supplies when emergencies occur. As such, other Pacific Island countries have <a href="https://pina.com.fj/2022/09/19/pacific-ministers-endorse-fiji-militarys-blackrock-camp-as-disaster-relief-depot/">endorsed</a> it. </p>
<p>Nearly two years after opening, however, Blackrock’s value as a Pacific peacekeeping hub is not as clear. </p>
<h2>A history of Pacific peacekeeping</h2>
<p>Fiji has long been a consistent contributor to UN peacekeeping operations. The country <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors">sends</a> more than 300 peacekeepers to global hot spots every year. <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/fiji-the-peacekeepers/">Per capita</a>, Fiji provides more peacekeepers than any other country. </p>
<p>Other countries in the Pacific have been far less engaged. Besides Fiji, only Papua New Guinea and Tonga have traditional militaries from which they can draw soldiers to become peacekeepers. </p>
<p>PNG first fielded personnel on peace operations as part of the <a href="https://www.ramsi.org/about/">Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands</a> in 2000. While national pride and a belief in the importance of “nation building” have <a href="https://www.aspi.org.au/report/mapping-pacific-peacekeeping">motivated</a> PNG deployments, the country only has the capacity to contribute a few peacekeepers at a time. </p>
<p>Tonga has participated in US-led coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in the past, as well as Australia and New Zealand-led operations in Bougainville and Solomon Islands. However, it has never contributed to a UN peace operation.</p>
<p>The remaining Pacific Islands have contributed to peacekeeping in other ways. Samoa, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste and Vanuatu have all provided police, military advisers or other personnel in small numbers.</p>
<p>Despite historically limited engagement, many Pacific countries <a href="https://www.aspi.org.au/report/mapping-pacific-peacekeeping">want</a> to increase their participation in peacekeeping operations. They are motivated by: </p>
<ul>
<li>a desire to support countries wracked by conflict</li>
<li>political and cultural links in the region </li>
<li>national pride</li>
<li>the opportunity to gain operational experience </li>
<li>financial incentives.</li>
</ul>
<p>So far, Blackrock has been able to train roughly 400 Fijian peacekeepers every year. It has also begun to host training and joint exercises with troops and military experts from key partner <a href="https://www.contactairlandandsea.com/2022/09/18/multinational-shoot-house-exercise-in-fijis-new-blackrock-camp/">nations</a>, such as the US, Australia, Britain, New Zealand and <a href="https://www.fijitimes.com/blackrock-camp-gets-france-backing/">France</a>. Most recently, Blackrock <a href="https://images.defence.gov.au/assets/Home/Search?Query=20230329adf8671822_3002.jpg&Type=Filename">hosted</a> 14 Fijian and 10 Australian defence personnel for their first joint peacekeeping pre-deployment training. </p>
<p>Despite these notable achievements, the camp has not attracted peacekeeping candidates from elsewhere in the Pacific. </p>
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<h2>What Australia can do to help</h2>
<p>Pacific countries already have a high level of co-ordination on peace and security initiatives through the Pacific Islands Forum and other regional <a href="https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/linked-documents/pacific-robp-2015-2017-sd.pdf">programs</a>. Therefore, a co-operative approach to peacekeeping seems reasonable.</p>
<p>As Inia Seruiratu, Fiji’s minister for defence, national security and foreign affairs, <a href="https://www.ipinst.org/2019/03/a4p-troop-contributing-countries-key-stakeholders#8">put it</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>For small developing countries like Fiji, partnerships are the way forward. It is the new model of peacekeeping for us. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>However, there are formidable challenges to making Blackrock a truly successful training base for a future Pacific peacekeeping force. </p>
<p>First, many Pacific countries cannot afford to lose high-performing police and military personnel to peace operations. </p>
<p>Then there is the cost of operating a peacekeeping training centre year in, year out. This includes the massive cost of moving potential recruits around the region, as well as trainers and other personnel. </p>
<hr>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/in-the-wake-of-the-china-solomon-islands-pact-australia-needs-to-rethink-its-pacific-relationships-181702">In the wake of the China-Solomon Islands pact, Australia needs to rethink its Pacific relationships</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<p>This is where the support of partner countries like Australia is vital.</p>
<p>Australia will likely <a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/programs-initiatives/pacific-engagement/infrastructure/maintenance-sustainment-program#:%7E:text=The%20Maintenance%20and%20Sustainment%20Program,of%20infrastructure%20assets%20is%20realised.">continue</a> to support the day-to-day operating costs of Blackrock as part of its enhanced engagement in the Pacific. </p>
<p>Beyond that, Australia can help meet the challenge of finding recruits by leveraging its old and new defence initiatives in the region.</p>
<p>For example, in recent days, Australia and PNG signed a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/dec/07/australia-to-train-papua-new-guinea-police-as-two-nations-strike-new-security-deal">A$200 million deal</a> to help boost PNG’s security capacities, in part by establishing a new police recruit and investigations training centre. Earlier this year, Australia also <a href="https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/transcript/joint-statement-tarawa-kiribati">signed</a> a memorandum of understanding with Kiribati to help expand its police training, including training for UN peacekeeping operations. </p>
<p>These agreements should include Australian financial and transportation support for police and military personnel who are being upskilled to travel to Blackrock. </p>
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<h2>Why a regional peacekeeping force matters</h2>
<p>Supporting Pacific peacekeeping partnerships is a complex challenge that will require sustained support from Australia, but the benefits are substantial.</p>
<p>For one, Pacific countries’ security forces will continue to develop and professionalise by training in a multinational environment. These links will also improve the interoperability between the Australian Defence Force and its counterparts in the Pacific.</p>
<p>From a geo-strategic standpoint, cultivating regional security networks helps position Australia as the “security provider of choice” for Pacific Island states. </p>
<p>Lastly, the entire region will benefit from the creation of a well-trained force capable of deploying in support of conflicts and disasters. It will take the pressure off outside powers (including Australia, the US and even China) to do so.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215533/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shannon Zimmerman is affiliated with Deakin's Centre for Future Defence and National Security </span></em></p>The new $100 million Blackrock peacekeeping training facility in Fiji has high ambitions, but will need Australia’s ongoing support to succeed.Shannon Zimmerman, Lecturer in Strategic Studies, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2162052023-11-27T14:01:41Z2023-11-27T14:01:41ZRwanda’s troops in Mozambique have done well to protect civilians – the factors at play<p><a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Rwanda">Rwanda</a>’s involvement in <a href="https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/ipi-pub-ppp-rwanda.pdf#page=1">peacekeeping operations</a> for the United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) has increased since 2004. </p>
<p>The relatively small east African nation is Africa’s most active troop-contributing country and the fourth most active worldwide. It has <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors">nearly 6,000 soldiers and police</a> committed to UN peacekeeping missions.</p>
<p>In recent years, however, Rwanda has deployed its army independently of the UN or AU. In 2020, it sent 1,000 troops to fight anti-government rebels in the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic-rwanda/b191-rwandas-growing-role-central-african-republic">Central African Republic</a>. A year later, it sent soldiers to deal with jihadist militants in northern Mozambique, and now has <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2022/03/08/military-intervention-has-not-stopped-mozambique-jihadist-conflict">2,500 troops</a> there. </p>
<p>These two missions aim to confront and eliminate armed enemies of the host state. The operations – which aren’t under the UN and AU protocols – raise questions about the conduct of Rwanda’s army and its counterinsurgency doctrine. Specifically when it comes to avoiding civilian casualties. </p>
<p>Traditional peacekeeping missions have a <a href="https://www.globalr2p.org/improving-peacekeeping-and-civilian-protection/">disappointing record</a> on protecting innocent bystanders. UN and AU forces have been <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/united-nations-peacekeeping-forces-expelled-mali-drc-somalia-africa-by-adekeye-adebajo-2023-10">criticised</a> for being risk averse and under-resourced in preventing crimes and violence against civilians. </p>
<p>In 2015, Rwanda was one of several countries arguing that the UN should do more to defend civilians in conflict. It sponsored a set of recommendations eventually codified as the <a href="https://r2pasiapacific.org/files/2942/2018_kigali_principles.pdf">Kigali Principles on the Protection of Civilians</a>. They identified various shortfalls that handicap many peacekeeping missions. </p>
<p>I’m a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=ncVlZRkAAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">conflict researcher</a> who has examined Rwanda’s military intervention in Mozambique. In a recent <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09592318.2023.2261400?src=">paper</a>, I used the deployment to evaluate the Rwandan army’s commitment to protecting civilians.</p>
<p>The Mozambique mission is independent of the UN and AU. Therefore, the Rwandan military is less subject to the monitoring that guards against excessive force and abusive practices. As an offensive counterterrorism operation, the mission is also potentially more aggressive and violent than peacekeeping. </p>
<p>Conventional wisdom would predict that an <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2016/02/death-solves-all-problems-the-authoritarian-counterinsurgency-toolkit/">authoritarian government</a> like Rwanda’s would be heavy-handed in putting down an insurrection. But my findings suggest that’s not so in Mozambique.</p>
<p>The Mozambique campaign is unlike the disaster across Rwanda’s border in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). There, Rwanda’s army stands <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/4/rwanda-backing-m23-rebels-in-drc-un-experts">accused</a> of backing the <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">M23 rebels</a> who have committed war crimes and accelerated a humanitarian crisis.</p>
<h2>The Mozambique mission</h2>
<p>The province of Cabo Delgado in northern Mozambique had been struggling with a <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/southern-africa/mozambique/303-stemming-insurrection-mozambiques-cabo-delgado">vicious jihadist insurgency</a> since <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17531055.2020.1789271">2017</a>. Efforts by Mozambique’s security forces and foreign mercenaries failed to stop decapitations, village burnings and attacks on government forces and infrastructure. </p>
<p>When militants threatened <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tGB6c-gn5Fw&themeRefresh=1">oil and gas development projects</a> that once promised to lift Mozambique out of poverty, President <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_mozambique-rwanda-armies-retake-key-jihadist-held-town/6209325.html">Felipe Nyusi turned to Rwanda for help in 2021</a>. The Rwandan Defence Forces began to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03932729.2022.2132046">attack</a> Islamic State-aligned militants. </p>
<p>Yet, the Rwandan army has balanced the pursuit of insurgents and the protection of the population. Operations to annihilate insurgents often kill and injure civilians as well. Strategies that focus narrowly on protecting civilians, on the other hand, tend to make <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13698249.2022.1995680">counterinsurgent forces gun shy</a>. </p>
<h2>What worked</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09592318.2023.2261400?src=">My study</a> suggests how Rwanda has been able to hold down civilian casualties while battling insurgents. The Rwandan army was in Mozambique nearly a year before inflicting its first recorded <a href="https://www.caboligado.com/reports/cabo-ligado-weekly-27-june-3-july-2022">civilian fatality</a> – a single curfew breaker in a tense recovered town.</p>
<p>First, Rwandan troops actively patrol and interact with the community to collect information about the local people and the insurgents who threaten them. Rwandan soldiers benefit from their knowledge of Swahili, which enables them to communicate directly with the locals. It helps them tell friend from foe.</p>
<p>The second factor is restraint: a more disciplined use of firepower. As the experience of western armies in Iraq and <a href="https://direct.mit.edu/daed/article/146/1/44/27133/Limiting-Civilian-Casualties-as-Part-of-a-Winning">Afghanistan</a> has shown, maintaining restraint under the persistent threat of ambush isn’t easy. It comes with some risk too. </p>
<p>Other conditions likely contributed to <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/rwandas-military-intervention-in-mozambique-raises-eyebrows/a-58957275">Rwanda’s early success</a> in Mozambique. The insurgents don’t use suicide tactics, for instance. And at least <a href="https://adf-magazine.com/2023/08/insurgents-strike-cabo-delgado-with-remote-controlled-ieds/">until recently</a> they have lacked sophisticated explosives. </p>
<p>Also, portions of the affected area in Cabo Delgado were largely abandoned when the Rwandans arrived. This helped in sorting insurgents from innocents. </p>
<p>Still, these considerations shouldn’t discount the Rwandan army’s achievements. Its record in the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic-rwanda/b191-rwandas-growing-role-central-african-republic">Central African Republic</a> is also consistent with its conduct in Mozambique. There as well, Rwandan forces have attained impressive battlefield results without inflicting substantial civilian harm. </p>
<h2>Rwanda in DRC</h2>
<p>The story is different in the DRC. <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/feature/central-africa%E2%80%99s-strategic-balance-crumbling-206022">A case has been made</a> that Rwanda’s destabilising activities there are motivated by <a href="https://theconversation.com/rwanda-and-drcs-turbulent-past-continues-to-fuel-their-torrid-relationship-188405">strategic interests</a> that don’t apply in Mozambique or the Central African Republic. </p>
<p>This doesn’t explain the mentality of rank-and-file soldiers, though. The army’s record in Mozambique and the DRC suggests instead that Rwandan battlefield behaviour may be conditioned by cognitive framing and service culture. </p>
<p>Studies of the way foreign armies approach missions in places like Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Lebanon have found that <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09636412.2017.1306393">culture and framing</a> often shape how troops perceive their environment, interpret threats and understand their role.</p>
<p>Fighting in eastern DRC may be perceived differently by Rwandan soldiers because it’s so intimately tied to the traumas of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Rwanda-genocide-of-1994">1994 genocide</a>. They may worry about spillover violence affecting stability in Rwanda, or about ethnic discord tearing the army itself apart. </p>
<p><a href="https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/46/4/48/111176/Soldiers-Dilemma-Foreign-Military-Training-and">Armed forces elsewhere</a> have demonstrated a tendency to prize their own cohesion above human rights concerns in high-stress scenarios.</p>
<h2>The civilian factor</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09592318.2023.2261400?src=">My research</a> suggests the Rwandan army’s actions in Mozambique have been consistent with the core promises of the Kigali Principles. </p>
<p>In response to <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/southern-africa/mozambique/winning-peace-mozambiques-embattled-north">persistent militant raids</a>, Rwandan troops in Cabo Delgado have conducted pursuits across district boundaries. Troops have gone further afield at Maputo’s request. </p>
<p>The presence of Rwanda’s soldiers has also helped to curb the mistreatment of local inhabitants by Mozambique’s police and armed forces. These forces have a history of <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/publication/ad687-amid-increasing-insecurity-mozambicans-fault-police-for-corruption-lack-of-professionalism/">corruption</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/12/04/mozambique-security-forces-abusing-suspected-insurgents">abuse</a>. </p>
<p>The Islamist insurgency in Mozambique, however, has yet to be defeated. A long-term solution will require more fundamental political and social measures, as well as reform of Mozambique’s security services. </p>
<p>Rwandan army operations have demonstrated what a competent African force can do when properly resourced and committed to the mission. It also suggests that soldiers are more effective when empowered to <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iDsIPgJGKQU">exercise discretion</a> in applying force.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216205/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ralph Shield does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Rwandan forces have been able to keep civilian casualties low in Cabo Delgado despite carrying out a counterterrorism operation.Ralph Shield, Conflict researcher, US Naval War CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2182822023-11-24T11:26:29Z2023-11-24T11:26:29ZSouthern African troops versus M23 rebels in the DRC: 4 risks this poses<p>The security situation in the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) continues to deteriorate. The region comprises North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri provinces. It’s about seven times the size of neighbouring Rwanda. </p>
<p>The violence in North Kivu has drawn most of the attention of the DRC’s neighbours and the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/11/21/readout-of-director-of-national-intelligence-avril-hainess-travel-to-democratic-republic-of-congo-and-rwanda/">international community</a>. This close attention is aimed at preventing <a href="https://medafricatimes.com/32898-un-fears-direct-confrontation-between-drc-and-rwanda.html">possible confrontation between Rwanda and the DRC</a>. </p>
<p>Since late 2021, North Kivu has been confronted by <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">M23 rebels</a> who have executed people and forcibly displaced thousands within the province and outside the DRC. The <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/un-again-accuses-rwanda-of-backing-m23-rebels-4281916">DRC and UN officials have accused</a> Rwanda of supporting M23 rebels. Kigali denies this.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://theconversation.com/east-african-troops-hope-to-bring-peace-in-the-drc-but-there-may-be-stumbling-blocks-195937">mid 2022</a>, the East African Community sent <a href="https://www.eac.int/eac-regional-force">a regional force</a> into the DRC to halt the military advancement of M23 in an effort to address rising tension between the DRC and Rwanda. The DRC shares a <a href="https://www.trademarkafrica.com/democratic-republic-of-congo/">2,500km border</a> with five east African countries: Burundi, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. </p>
<p>Since this deployment, however, DRC president Felix Tshisekedi and residents of North Kivu have <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/tshisekedi-gives-ultimatum-to-eacrf-4229574">criticised the east African force</a>, accusing it of deferring to the M23. The East African Community heads of states <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/it-s-official-the-eac-troops-are-leaving-eastern-dr-congo-4445094">recently agreed</a> to withdraw the force starting in December 2023.</p>
<p>The DRC’s leadership is now seeking <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/drc-signs-an-agreement-for-the-deployment-of-sadc-troops--4437868#:%7E:text=Saturday%20November%2018%202023&text=The%20Democratic%20Republic%20of%20Congo,ceremony%20in%20Kinshasa%20on%20Friday.">support</a> from another regional bloc, the Southern African Development Community (SADC). SADC <a href="https://www.sadc.int/latest-news/communique-extra-ordinary-summit-sadc-heads-state-and-government">has pledged</a> to deploy a military unit to North Kivu <a href="https://www.voaafrica.com/a/drc-announces-deployment-of-sadc-troops/7362075.html">in the coming days</a>. The DRC is a member of SADC, as are its neighbours Tanzania, Zambia and Angola.</p>
<p>The SADC mission will <a href="https://www.radiookapi.net/2023/11/19/actualite/securite/la-rdc-signe-laccord-de-deploiement-des-militaires-de-la-sadc-dans">support the Congolese army</a> in its quest to root out M23 and other armed groups operating in eastern Congo. It’s still unclear if these troops will replace the east African force, or cooperate with it. Either way, this deployment comes on the heels of the gradual planned <a href="https://monusco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/pr-the_government_of_the_democratic_republic_of_the_congo_and_monusco_sign_a_disengagement_plan_for_the_withdrawal_of_the_mission.pdf">exit of UN peacekeepers from DRC starting in December 2023</a>. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/rwanda-and-drcs-turbulent-past-continues-to-fuel-their-torrid-relationship-188405">Rwanda and DRC's turbulent past continues to fuel their torrid relationship</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>As a researcher on micro-level violence, I have <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=4SlemykAAAAJ&hl=en">studied</a> the drivers of conflict in eastern DRC since 2017. In my view, there are four risks to the proposed SADC mission. These are: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>it would primarily target M23 rebels, leaving out the other armed groups in eastern DRC</p></li>
<li><p>it could give Rwanda more room to exploit the M23 rebel force</p></li>
<li><p>it could antagonise the East African Community, which the <a href="https://theconversation.com/drc-is-set-to-become-7th-member-of-the-east-africa-trading-bloc-whats-in-it-for-everyone-179320">DRC joined in 2022</a></p></li>
<li><p>the SADC force could end up being outnumbered in a vast region. </p></li>
</ul>
<h2>The focus on M23 rebels</h2>
<p>The primary mission for the SADC force would be to stabilise and contribute towards peacebuilding in eastern DRC. The danger is that this mission, especially if deployed under the banner of the Congolese national army, could end up condoning the army’s perspective. </p>
<p>This perspective tends to concentrate on the danger posed by M23 and disregards the <a href="https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/democratic-republic-of-the-congo/#:%7E:text=More%20than%20120%20militias%20and,against%20humanity%20and%20war%20crimes.">armed groups (more than 120)</a> operating in eastern Congo. Further, it tends to accommodate other armed groups that commit atrocities against civilians. In countering M23 attacks, <a href="https://ipisresearch.be/weekly-briefing/m23-crisis-flares-again-in-north-kivu-context-dynamics-and-risks/">the army has co-opted foreign and local militias</a>, providing them with <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/conflict-in-eastern-dr-congo-flares-again/a-67203737">guns and ammunition</a>. </p>
<p>The SADC mission in the DRC may end up trapped in the Congolese army’s approach. This would be dangerous for the stability of the region. Some of these local and foreign <a href="https://www.genocidewatchblog.com/post/addressing-the-banyamulenge-s-plight-in-dr-congo-part-1">militias have vowed to wipe out</a> ethnic communities whom they believe are not “real Congolese”. </p>
<p>Any regional force aiming to stabilise eastern Congo should remain neutral in its actions and be alive to the ways the <a href="https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/democratic-republic-of-the-congo/">Congolese army has fanned violence and committed atrocities against civilians</a>.</p>
<h2>Rwanda and the M23</h2>
<p>Efforts to stabilise eastern DRC should dissociate Rwanda’s grievances from those of the M23. </p>
<p>The rebel group claims to be <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">fighting for the rights of Congolese Tutsis and other ethnic communities</a> in the Kivus. Rwanda, on its part, <a href="https://theconversation.com/rwanda-and-drcs-turbulent-past-continues-to-fuel-their-torrid-relationship-188405">accuses the DRC</a> of working with a rebel force, the FDLR, that seeks to overthrow the Rwandan government and operates out of Congo. In a 2022 report, a group of UN experts on the DRC <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/06/dr-congo-atrocities-rwanda-backed-m23-rebels">claimed that Rwanda armed M23 rebels</a> to enable them to go after FDLR combatants. Rwanda has dismissed such allegations.</p>
<p>The M23 cause shouldn’t be <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/06/dr-congo-atrocities-rwanda-backed-m23-rebels">exploited</a>. Instead, preference should be given to enabling peaceful negotiations between the rebels and the Congolese government to address grievances. </p>
<p>However, the Congolese army and Tshisekedi’s stance <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/m23-rebels-fight-on-in-eastern-drc-despite-truce-/6850531.html">against the M23</a> – particularly ahead of the DRC’s general elections in December 2023 – could push SADC forces to opt for a military solution to the rebel group’s offensive. SADC should be careful not to back a stance that would end up forcing M23 to remain a rebel force that regional countries could manipulate for their own agenda. </p>
<p><strong>DRC and its neighbours</strong></p>
<iframe title="" aria-label="Locator maps" id="datawrapper-chart-8iMZR" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/8iMZR/1/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" height="600" data-external="1" width="100%"></iframe>
<h2>Antagonising the East African Community</h2>
<p>The East African Community’s force is <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67239214">largely criticised</a> by Kinshasa and residents of North Kivu for failing to attack M23 rebels. The public – under the influence of Congolese political figures – tends to see the threat posed by M23 and disregards other forms of violence in the region. </p>
<p>Kinshasa has demonised the rebel force and its links to Rwanda for political mileage. Calling the east African troops’ efforts to root out M23 a failure after less than two years is premature. Particularly since the UN peacekeeping mission, <a href="https://theconversation.com/protests-against-un-in-eastern-congo-highlight-peace-missions-crisis-of-legitimacy-187932">Monusco</a>, has been in the DRC for more than two decades. </p>
<p>The upside to the East African Community’s intervention is that it <a href="https://www.eac.int/communique/2660-communique-of-the-consultative-meeting-between-the-chairperson-of-the-summit-and-the-facilitator-of-the-eac-led-eastern-drc-peace-process-on-the-security-situation-in-eastern-drc">combines</a> political consultations and dialogue among different belligerents. It is unclear what will happen to the peace talks initiated by <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/kenyatta-says-drc-peace-restoration-talks-to-resume-4185714">former Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta</a> should the SADC mission replace the east African one. </p>
<h2>Limited force strength in a vast area</h2>
<p>Eastern DRC contains at least 120 armed groups, and borders Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Burundi. The SADC mission in the DRC will, therefore, be taking on multiple rebel forces in a vast area with complex politics. It runs the risk of having its efforts criticised just like those of the East African Community because of its limited capacity to tackle the [underlying causes of violence <a href="https://theconversation.com/conflict-in-the-drc-5-articles-that-explain-whats-gone-wrong-195332">in eastern Congo</a>. </p>
<p>The SADC force could choose to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-democratic-fighting-idUSBRE97M0WA20130823/">focus on attacking</a> M23 rebels – which is how the group was first rooted out in <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">2012-2013</a>. Or it will get lost in the vast jungles of eastern Congo. Either scenario won’t bring lasting peace. </p>
<p>Many of the drivers of violence in eastern DRC are linked to <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-un-is-under-attack-in-eastern-congo-but-drc-elites-are-also-to-blame-for-the-violence-187861">the state’s absence</a> in the daily life of ordinary Congolese. This is largely driven by the political elites’ focus on their own survival. A purely military approach to addressing the violence would, therefore, be ill-advised.</p>
<p><em>This article was updated to reflect the East African Community’s decision to withdraw its regional force in the DRC.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218282/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Delphin R. Ntanyoma does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The international effort to address three decades of violence in eastern DRC has drawn in the UN, east African troops and now a southern African force.Delphin R. Ntanyoma, Visiting Researcher, University of LeedsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2159482023-10-20T20:13:13Z2023-10-20T20:13:13ZDelivering aid during war is tricky − here’s what to know about what Gaza relief operations may face<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555019/original/file-20231020-15-c3rj3t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=120%2C613%2C6589%2C3852&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Palestinians on the outskirts of Gaza City walk by buildings destroyed by Israeli bombardment on Oct. 20, 2023. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/APTOPIX%20Palestinians%20Israel/33e1c2cf97f4452e9e17e88c2bec58a4?Query=gaza&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=now-14d&totalCount=2526&currentItemNo=1">AP Photo/Ali Mahmoud</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The 2.2 million people who live in Gaza are facing <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-depends-on-un-and-other-global-aid-groups-for-food-medicine-and-basic-services-israel-hamas-war-means-nothing-is-getting-in-215514">economic isolation</a> and <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/09/middleeast/israel-gaza-hamas-fighting-monday-intl-hnk/index.html">experiencing incessant bombardment</a>. Their <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/10/18/world/israel-hamas-war-biden-gaza">supplies of essential resources</a>, including food and water, are quickly dwindling.</p>
<p>In response, U.S. President Joe Biden has pledged <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/10/18/biden-will-seek-unprecedented-israel-aid-package-.html">US$100 million in humanitarian assistance</a> for the citizens of Gaza.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=kXfdkJwAAAAJ&hl=en">scholar of peace and conflict economics</a> who served as a World Bank consultant during the <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/2014-gaza-conflict">2014 war between Hamas and Israel</a>, I believe that Biden’s promise raises fundamental questions regarding the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-gaza-hamas-war-b084e9c453cc99f7bec6f66d7b5913d9">delivery of humanitarian aid in a war zone</a>. Political constraints, ethical quandaries and the need to protect the security of aid workers and local communities always make it a logistical nightmare.</p>
<hr>
<iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/delivering-aid-during-war-is-tricky-heres-what-to-know-about-what-gaza-relief-operations-may-face-215948&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p><em>You can listen to more articles from The Conversation <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/audio-narrated-99682">narrated by Noa</a>.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>In this specific predicament, U.S. officials have to choose a strategy to deliver the aid without the perception of benefiting Hamas, a group the U.S. and Israel both classify as a <a href="https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/">terrorist organization</a>.</p>
<h2>Logistics</h2>
<p>When aiding people in war zones, you can’t just send money, a development strategy called “<a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/sief-trust-fund/brief/evaluations-conditional-cash-transfers">cash transfers</a>” that has become increasingly popular due to its efficiency. Sending money can boost the supply of locally produced goods and services and help people on the ground pay for what they need most. But injecting cash into an economy so completely cut off from the world would <a href="https://www.stlouisfed.org/education/feducation-video-series/episode-1-money-and-inflation">only stoke inflation</a>.</p>
<p>So the aid must consist of goods that have to be brought into Gaza, and services provided by people working as part of an aid mission. <a href="https://spherestandards.org/handbook-2018/">Humanitarian aid can include</a> food and water; health, sanitation and hygiene supplies and services; and tents and other materials for shelter and settlement. </p>
<p>Due to the closure of the border with Israel, aid can arrive in Gaza only via the <a href="https://theconversation.com/egypts-rafah-crossing-is-a-lifeline-to-palestinians-living-in-gaza-but-opening-it-is-still-unresolved-215718">Rafah crossing</a> on the Egyptian border.</p>
<p>The U.S. Agency for International Development, or USAID, will likely turn to its longtime partner on the ground, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, or UNRWA, to serve as supply depots and distribute goods. That agency, originally founded in 1949 as a temporary measure until a two-state solution could be found, serves in effect as a parallel yet unelected <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-depends-on-un-and-other-global-aid-groups-for-food-medicine-and-basic-services-israel-hamas-war-means-nothing-is-getting-in-215514">government for Palestinian refugees</a>. </p>
<p>USAID will likely want to tap into UNRWA’s network of <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/what-we-do/education">284 schools</a> – many of which are now <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rb2JBK91dWI">transformed</a> into humanitarian shelters housing <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-5">two-thirds</a> of the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-20415675">estimated 1 million</a> people displaced by Israeli airstrikes – and 22 hospitals to expedite distribution.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555054/original/file-20231020-27-3z9fjw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of Gaza and its neighbors" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555054/original/file-20231020-27-3z9fjw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555054/original/file-20231020-27-3z9fjw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555054/original/file-20231020-27-3z9fjw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555054/original/file-20231020-27-3z9fjw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555054/original/file-20231020-27-3z9fjw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=655&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555054/original/file-20231020-27-3z9fjw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=655&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555054/original/file-20231020-27-3z9fjw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=655&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Gaza is a self-governing Palestinian territory. The narrow piece of land is located on the coast of the Mediterranean Sea, bordered by Israel and Egypt.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/illustration/the-gaza-strip-and-surroundings-a-royalty-free-illustration/1737027311?phrase=gaza+map&adppopup=true">PeterHermesFurian/iStock via Getty Images Plus</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Politics</h2>
<p>Prior to the Trump administration, the U.S. was typically the <a href="https://stats.oecd.org/qwids/#?x=2&y=6&f=3:51,4:1,1:24,5:3,7:1&q=3:51+4:1+1:6,9,10,13,14,23,24+5:3+7:1+2:134+6:2017,2018,2019,2020,2021,2022">largest single provider</a> of aid to <a href="https://theconversation.com/israels-west-bank-settlements-4-questions-answered-127560">the West Bank</a> and Gaza. USAID administers <a href="https://www.foreignassistance.gov/">the lion’s share</a> of it.</p>
<p>Since Biden took office, total yearly U.S. assistance for the Palestinian territories has totaled around <a href="https://www.foreignassistance.gov/">$150 million</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/apr/08/joe-biden-restores-us-aid-palestinians-donald-trump">restored</a> from <a href="https://www.foreignassistance.gov/">just $8 million in 2020</a> under the Trump administration. During the Obama administration, however, the U.S. was providing more aid to the territories than it is now, with <a href="https://www.foreignassistance.gov/">$1 billion</a> disbursed in the 2013 fiscal year.</p>
<p>But the White House needs Congress to approve this assistance – a process that requires the <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/patrick-mchenry-house-speaker-pro-tempore-threaten-quit-rcna121314">House of Representatives to elect a new speaker</a> and then for lawmakers to approve aid to Gaza once that happens.</p>
<h2>Ethics</h2>
<p>The United Nations Relief and Works Agency is a U.N. organization. It’s not run by Hamas, unlike, for instance, the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-gaza-hamas-war-biden-rafah-e062825a375d9eb62e95509cab95b80c">Gaza Ministry of Health</a>. However, Hamas has frequently undermined UNRWA’s efforts and diverted international aid for military purposes.</p>
<p>Hamas has repeatedly used UNRWA schools as <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/rockets-found-in-unrwa-school-for-third-time/">rocket depots</a>. They have repeatedly <a href="https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/israel/158903-171029-tunnel-found-under-un-school-in-gaza-for-second-time-in-months">tunneled beneath</a> UNRWA schools. They have dismantled <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MvvqBcA-9yA">European Union-funded water pipes</a> to use as rocket fuselages. And even since the most recent violence broke out, the UNRWA has accused Hamas of <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/un-agency-accuses-hamas-of-stealing-fuel-medications-from-its-gaza-premises/">stealing fuel and food</a> from its Gaza premises.</p>
<p>Humanitarian aid professionals regularly have to contend with these trade-offs when deciding to what extent they can work with governments and local authorities that commit violent acts. They need to do so in exchange for the access required to help civilians under their control.</p>
<p>Similarly, Biden has had to make concessions to Israel while brokering for the freedom to send humanitarian aid to Gaza. For example, he has assured Israel that if any of the aid is diverted by Hamas, the <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/international/4266108-biden-warns-hamas-against-blocking-aid-deliveries-to-palestinian-civilians/">operation will cease</a>. </p>
<p>This promise may have been politically necessary. But if Biden already believes Hamas to be uncaring about civilian welfare, he may not expect the group to refrain from taking what they can.</p>
<h2>Security best practices</h2>
<p>What can be done to protect the security of humanitarian aid operations that take place in the midst of dangerous conflicts?</p>
<p>Under <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-laws-of-war-apply-to-the-conflict-between-israel-and-hamas-215493">International Humanitarian Law</a>, local authorities have the primary responsibility for ensuring the delivery of aid – even when they aren’t carrying out that task. To increase the chances that the local authorities will not attack them, aid groups can give “<a href="https://guide-humanitarian-law.org/content/article/3/deconfliction-humanitarian-identification-and-notification/">humanitarian notification</a>” and voluntarily alert the local government as to where they will be operating.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.ajc.org/news/israel-hamas-and-international-law-what-you-need-to-know">Hamas has repeatedly flouted</a> international norms and laws. So the question of if and how the aid convoy will be protected looms large.</p>
<p>Under the current agreement between the U.S., Israel and Egypt, the convoy will <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/19/world/middleeast/gaza-israel-aid-egypt-rafah.html">raise the U.N. flag</a>. International inspectors will make sure no weapons are on board the vehicles before crossing <a href="https://theconversation.com/egypts-rafah-crossing-is-a-lifeline-to-palestinians-living-in-gaza-but-opening-it-is-still-unresolved-215718">over from Arish, Egypt, to Rafah</a>, a city located on the Gaza Strip’s border with Egypt.</p>
<p>The aid convoy will likely cross without militarized security. This puts it at some danger of diversion once inside Gaza. But whether the aid convoy is attacked, seized or left alone, the Biden administration will have demonstrated its willingness to attempt a humanitarian relief operation. In this sense, a relatively small first convoy bearing water, medical supplies and food, among other items, serves as a test balloon for a sustained operation to follow soon after.</p>
<p>If the U.S. were to provide the humanitarian convoy a military escort, by contrast, <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4253360-us-troops-gaza-hamas-israel/">Hamas could see its presence as a provocation</a>. <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/10/19/1207037984/josh-paul-resign-state-department-military-assistance-israel-gaza">Washington’s support for Israel is so strong</a> that the U.S. could potentially be judged as a party in the conflict between Israel and Hamas.</p>
<p>In that case, the presence of U.S. armed forces might provoke attacks on Gaza-bound aid convoys by Hamas and Islamic jihad fighters that otherwise would not have occurred. Combined with the <a href="https://www.stripes.com/branches/navy/2023-10-18/us-navy-israel-hamas-middle-east-11746432.html">mobilization of two U.S. Navy carrier groups</a> in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, I’d be concerned that such a move might also stoke regional anger. It would undermine the Biden administration’s attempts to cool the situation.</p>
<p>On U.N.-approved missions, aid delivery may be secured by <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/principles-of-peacekeeping">third-party peacekeepers</a> – meaning, in this case, personnel who are neither Israeli nor Palestinian – with the U.N. Security Council’s blessing. In this case, tragically, it’s unlikely that such a resolution could conceivably pass such a vote, much less quickly enough to make a difference.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215948/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Topher L. McDougal does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The politics of delivering aid in war zones are messy, the ethics fraught and the logistics daunting. But getting everything right is essential − and in this instance could save many Gazans’ lives.Topher L. McDougal, Professor of Economic Development & Peacebuilding, University of San DiegoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2122732023-08-29T13:33:47Z2023-08-29T13:33:47ZBrics: African countries face opportunities and risks in alienating China or the US - an expert weighs in<p><em>South Africa recently hosted a <a href="https://brics2023.gov.za/">Brics summit</a>. The event attracted international attention because the group has recently begun to emerge as a possible rival against US dominance of world affairs. The US and China lie at the heart of this debate. They are the two biggest trading partners of most African countries and both have strategic interests that they are determined to protect. The Conversation Africa’s politics editor, Thabo Leshilo, asked international relations expert Christopher Isike to explain.</em></p>
<h2>How might Brics affect US-African ties?</h2>
<p>Altering diplomatic relations between African countries and the US on account of Brics would have its pros and cons for the continent. Some potential gains from alienating the US would include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Increased autonomy for African countries in their foreign policy decisions. They might be able to align more closely with their own interests and priorities without the perceived influence of a major global power. </p></li>
<li><p>The potential of diversifying partnerships and alliances with other countries or regional blocs that Brics presents. This could lead to more economic, political and security relationships, reducing reliance on any single nation. </p></li>
<li><p>Stronger regional cooperation and integration. This could unify efforts to address common challenges such as security, infrastructure development and economic growth. Such regional cooperation offers more fertile ground for the <a href="https://au-afcfta.org/">African Continental Free Trade Area</a>to thrive. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>However, a strained relationship with the US could also come at a cost. Some of the losses would include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Reduced trade opportunities, foreign direct investment and economic aid, potentially leading to economic setbacks for the continent. Beneficiaries of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (<a href="https://agoa.info/about-agoa.html">Agoa</a>), which provides preferential access to the US market, would be hit the hardest. </p></li>
<li><p>The US has been accused of militarising the continent to advance its own interests. But it plays a significant role in <a href="https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/io/pkpg/c10834.htm">supporting peacekeeping efforts</a> and <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/commentary-who-thinks-wins-how-smarter-u-s-counterterrorism-in-the-sahel-can-pay-dividends-for-great-power-competition/">counterterrorism initiatives</a> in various African regions. Alienation could therefore affect security and stability, leaving a void in terms of resources, expertise, and coordination in these critical areas. </p></li>
<li><p>Alienating a major global player like the US could also lead to diplomatic isolation for many African countries on the international stage. This could weaken their influence in international organisations, negotiations and decision-making processes.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>What if African countries alienated China?</h2>
<p>On gains, African countries would be able to diversify their economic and political partnerships by reducing dependence on China. This could lead to increased engagement with other countries and regions, potentially resulting in a more balanced and varied international relations portfolio.</p>
<p>African countries could also enhance their bargaining power in negotiations. This could lead to more favourable terms in trade deals, investment agreements and development projects. Other countries including the US, EU members and Australia might see an opportunity to fill the void. </p>
<p>Some Africans see China’s influence as overly dominant, potentially leading to <a href="https://www.google.co.za/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwik_ufxrv-AAxX3YPEDHanLDBcQFnoECDUQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.theelephant.info%2Ffeatures%2F2021%2F05%2F10%2Fwhat-africans-think-of-china-and-america%2F&usg=AOvVaw27sl28dalUXdGrayDchrvJ&opi=89978449">concerns about sovereignty and autonomy</a>. Alienating China could be seen as a way to assert national interests and prevent over-reliance on a single foreign partner.</p>
<p>That said, African countries can ill afford to alienate China. </p>
<p>China is a major economic partner for many African countries, providing investments, trade opportunities and infrastructure projects. Alienating it could lead to economic setbacks, including reduced trade and foreign direct investment. </p>
<p>Second, China is involved in various <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/183370/china-is-delivering-over-30-of-africas-big-construction-projects-heres-why/">infrastructure development projects across Africa</a>. These include roads, railways, ports and energy facilities. A strained relationship with China might hinder the completion of these projects or slow down future infrastructure development, potentially affecting economic growth and connectivity.</p>
<p>Third, China is a significant player in international diplomacy and geopolitics. So, alienating it could lead to reduced influence in global forums where China has a presence. These include the United Nations and various other international organisations. This might limit African countries’ ability to advance their interests on the global stage.</p>
<p>However, it must be noted these gains and losses from alienating either the US or China are speculative and would depend on a wide range of factors. For example, the relationship between African countries and both of these superpowers is multifaceted and complex. Any decision to alienate either of them should involve careful assessment of both the short-term and long-term consequences, and the evolving geopolitical landscape. The trick is for Africa to articulate its own interests and pursue them consistently. </p>
<h2>Is there a common African position on the US and China?</h2>
<p>African countries have diverse foreign policy priorities and alliances. Their responses to international conflicts can vary widely. Some might choose to align with major powers like the US, China, the European Union or Russia. Others might opt for neutrality or noninterference in the conflicts of other regions.</p>
<p>These strands have played out in the voting patterns on the three UN General Assembly votes to <a href="https://theconversation.com/african-countries-showed-disunity-in-un-votes-on-russia-south-africas-role-was-pivotal-180799">condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine</a>. </p>
<p>It would help African countries to have a common position on the Ukraine war. This should be based on its impact on food and energy security in the continent. They should act consistently in line with that common position. They could also have a common position on Brics instead of leaving it entirely to South Africa to define an African agenda for Brics.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212273/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christopher Isike does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It would help African countries to have a common position on the Ukraine war. This should be based on its impact on food and energy security in the continent.Christopher Isike, Director, African Centre for the Study of the United States, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2055862023-06-26T13:56:58Z2023-06-26T13:56:58ZMilitary interventions have failed to end DRC’s conflict – what’s gone wrong<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533552/original/file-20230622-29-mfl86e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Soldiers on patrol in Goma, eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, in November 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Guerchom Ndebo/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>For 30 years, the Democratic Republic of Congo has suffered from communal violence, armed conflict and insecurity. Diverse actors have tried to stop it but conflict has intensified, particularly in the eastern provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri and Tanganyika. Regular armed forces and non-state armed groups have been involved in the violence. </p>
<p>In mid-April 2023, it was reported that there were <a href="https://www.radiookapi.net/2023/04/18/actualite/securite/est-de-la-rdc-266-groupes-armes-locaux-et-etrangers-recenses-par-le-p">252 local and 14 foreign armed groups</a> in the eastern Congolese provinces. </p>
<p>The Congolese state’s inability to guarantee security has created fertile ground for armed groups to emerge. Aside from violence, they engage in various illicit activities, like exploiting mineral riches. </p>
<p>Weakened by decades of kleptocratic rule and armed uprisings, the Congolese state relies on support from regional and global actors. The United Nations peacekeeping and stabilisation mission has been in the DRC for more than 20 years. In February 2023, the UN force (MONUSCO) had <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/monusco">16,316</a> men and women from 62 countries operating as intervention troops, staff officers and mission experts.</p>
<p>The East African Community completed <a href="https://www.eac.int/communique/2720-communiqu%C3%A9-of-the-20th-extra-ordinary-summit-of-the-east-african-community-heads-of-state">its deployment of troops</a> in <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/eacrf-troops-now-fully-deployed-in-drc-4191138">April 2023</a>. No sooner had they settled down than the DRC asked the Southern African Development Community to “<a href="https://www.sadc.int/sites/default/files/2023-05/EN%20-%20Communique%20of%20the%20SADC%20Organ%20Troika%20Summit%20Plus%20SADC%20Troika%20and%20TCC%2008%20May%202023%20Final_0.pdf#page=5">restore peace and security in eastern DRC</a>”.</p>
<p>More than a decade of <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Felix-Ndahinda">research</a> on identity politics, indigeneity, human rights, transitional justice and peacebuilding in the region informs my view on its prospects for peace. This revolving door of military interventions raises questions about whether domestic and international actors involved genuinely examine past failures and draw useful lessons from them. Contemporary crises often reemerge from unresolved prior crises. This is the case here. </p>
<p>I argue that the DRC is being shortsighted, driven by populist pressures and political calculations. It’s making the <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">M23 rebel movement</a> the single convenient target of its actions, instead of resolving its deeper and broader problems. </p>
<h2>Disrupting the peacekeepers</h2>
<p>Many of the issues that the DRC government and other regional actors have undertaken to address are well known and documented. The UN <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/document-search?keys=&field_padate_value%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=&field_pacountry_tid=Democratic+Republic+of+the+Congo&field_paregion_tid%5B%5D=15">Peacemaker</a> database lists 19 agreements concluded since the Sirte Agreement of 1999. This preceded negotiations to end the second Congo war in 2003. </p>
<p>The DRC has committed to guarantee security for different communities, to resolve identity, citizenship and land issues, to oversee the return of refugees, and to a demobilisation process that addresses the concerns of belligerents. </p>
<p>The East African Community force’s <a href="https://www.eac.int/communique/2504-communiqu%C3%A9-the-third-heads-of-state-conclave-on-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-the-nairobi-process">mandate</a> was formulated with this in mind. The force would, in collaboration with Congolese military and administrative authorities, stabilise and secure the peace in DRC. The <a href="https://www.eac.int/communique/2720-communiqu%C3%A9-of-the-20th-extra-ordinary-summit-of-the-east-african-community-heads-of-state">initial deployment</a> of Kenyan, Burundian, Ugandan and South Sudanese troops was projected to grow to between 6,500 and 12,000 soldiers in eastern DRC.</p>
<p>The idea was to reduce tensions by enforcing a ceasefire and a withdrawal of armed groups to initial positions. Local armed groups would be demobilised in an orderly way through a political process involving talks with Congolese authorities. Finally, foreign armed groups would be repatriated.</p>
<p>What came to be known as the <a href="https://www.eac.int/communique/2504-communiqu%C3%A9-the-third-heads-of-state-conclave-on-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-the-nairobi-process">Nairobi process</a> framed the resolution of the M23 crisis within a broader goal of peacemaking. All domestic and regional armed groups active in eastern DRC would be disarmed and the emphasis was on dialogue. </p>
<p>Before long, it went wrong. DR Congo president Felix Tshisekedi bluntly <a href="https://twitter.com/StanysBujakera/status/1656066871488020480">criticised</a> the East African Community force and suggested that it might be asked to leave. </p>
<p>It seems that a comprehensive peace strategy is not an immediate priority for Congolese authorities. They have an eye on elections. These are planned for December 2023, and the current president is seeking a second term. Tshisekedi’s administration has turned the fight against the M23 and its alleged backers into a tool of <a href="https://twitter.com/PatrickMuyaya/status/1600082788895449090">popular mobilisation</a> in support of its policies. Therefore, military and diplomatic success on this front remains its priority.</p>
<h2>Towards sustainable peace</h2>
<p>Authorities in the DRC have also <a href="https://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/un-peacekeepers-expected-to-leave-dr-congo-in-six-months-authorities/">announced</a> that UN peacekeepers in the country would be withdrawn by December 2023. </p>
<p>Congolese authorities have criticised the East African force and the UN mission for their unwillingness to fight the M23. The M23 is seen as representing nothing more than a masked <a href="https://twitter.com/StanysBujakera/status/1572365176770535424">Rwandan</a> (and at times <a href="https://twitter.com/StanysBujakera/status/1545118793801900039">Ugandan</a>) intervention in the DRC, and as such the biggest threat to Congolese territorial integrity. </p>
<p>The DRC’s counter strategy is to recognise some local armed groups as resistant patriots (Wazalendo) to be officially supported in fighting an external aggression. Several public officials are on <a href="https://afrique.lalibre.be/76281/rdc-le-blanchissement-des-groupes-armes-par-les-autorites-congolaise-frustre-le-processus-de-nairobi-et-luand/">record</a> expressing their support for these Mai Mai-Wazalendo fighters. </p>
<p>None of the triggers of the DRC’s recurrent crises can be addressed in this atmosphere. It’s impossible to imagine scenarios where sustainable peace can be achieved without first addressing land rights, equal citizenship claims and inclusive governance institutions catering to the needs of the entire Congolese population. </p>
<p>Enforcement of a comprehensive strategy that addresses belligerence and the disarmament of all armed groups through a combined military and political dialogue strategy, as imagined under the Nairobi process, should be the main priority of any peace initiative. Peace between peoples and countries in the region requires a genuine commitment to addressing all local, regional and international dimensions of the crises in eastern DRC.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205586/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Felix Mukwiza Ndahinda does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A comprehensive strategy does not seem to be an immediate priority for Congolese authorities with an eye on elections.Felix Mukwiza Ndahinda, Honorary Associate Professor, College of Arts and Social Sciences, University of RwandaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2062992023-05-28T08:25:08Z2023-05-28T08:25:08ZWhat makes peace talks successful? The 4 factors that matter<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528036/original/file-20230524-15-o7zx4n.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Daniel Slim/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Peace talks that seek to end armed conflicts are underway in several African countries. Because very few conflicts are resolved on the battlefield, negotiations are fundamental. But they often fail. And even when an agreement is concluded, it doesn’t always last. </p>
<p>So what are the factors that lead to successful peace talks? </p>
<p>To start, negotiating peace is complex. If it wasn’t, conflicts would be resolved more quickly and peace would last longer. Recognising this complexity is essential. </p>
<p>Significant expertise has been developed in the field of peace mediation over the past decades. The <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/en/page/107-au-mediation-support-unit">African Union</a> and the <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/mediation-support">United Nations</a> have set up mediation teams. Several specialised non-governmental organisations have been created, like the South Africa-based organisation <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/work/peacemaking/">Accord</a> and the Switzerland-based <a href="https://hdcentre.org/about/">Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue</a>. </p>
<p>These actors, along with regional powers and other states, often roll out several peace initiatives simultaneously. This can be helpful to deal with the complexity of armed conflicts. </p>
<p>As an <a href="https://research-repository.uwa.edu.au/en/persons/philipp-kastner/publications/">international law and peace scholar</a>, I have analysed many different peace negotiations and agreements. There have been some great successes in Africa, such as the <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/MZ_921004_MozambiqueGeneralPeaceAgreement.pdf">1992 peace agreement</a> that ended the 16-year long civil war in Mozambique. </p>
<p>But there have also been spectacular failures, like in Sierra Leone, where fighting flared up just after the conclusion of a <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SL_990707_LomePeaceAgreement.pdf">comprehensive agreement in 1999</a>. And there are several ongoing conflicts that urgently require a peaceful resolution, for example in <a href="https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/jeddah-agreement-welcomed-but-also-met-with-scepticism-in-sudan">Sudan</a>, the <a href="https://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?OpenAgent&DS=A/HRC/51/59&Lang=E">Central African Republic</a> and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">Democratic Republic of Congo</a>. </p>
<p>Based on my research, I would argue that there are four key factors that make (or break) mediation efforts. These include a sustained commitment from several actors to building peace; serious efforts to develop trust and listen to grievances; an attunement to timing; and an acceptance of peace as a process. </p>
<h2>Building peace</h2>
<p>First, peace has a better chance when war is attacked from several sides. Multiple mediation processes can facilitate the inclusion of different stakeholders, such as civil society actors. This is crucial, precisely because more inclusive processes <a href="https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781786610256/Conflict-Intervention-and-Transformation-Theory-and-Practice">increase the chances</a> of durable peace. </p>
<p>At the same time, however, it can be problematic when too many actors are involved. In <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-the-longer-the-conflict-lasts-the-higher-the-risk-of-a-regional-war-204931">Sudan’s ongoing conflict</a>, this has led to a <a href="https://peacerep.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Third-Party-Mediation-in-Sudan-and-South-Sudan-Digital.pdf">piecemeal approach</a> and to <a href="https://peacerep.org/publication/third-party-mediation-in-sudan-and-south-sudan-longer-term-trends/">unhelpful competition</a> between different regional and international actors who often pursue their own interests. </p>
<p>Second, the organisation or the specific mediator in question must be trusted by the parties. A good example of this is the Catholic Community of Sant-Egidio, which facilitated the <a href="https://www.santegidio.org/pageID/34180/langID/en/Dossier-Mozambique-and-the-Community-of-Sant-Egidio.html">conclusion of the peace agreement</a> in Mozambique. </p>
<p>Building trust and listening to grievances is important. This helps find creative solutions that give guarantees to all the parties and allow them to imagine a common future.</p>
<p>But contrary to ordinary understandings of mediation, peace mediators don’t have to be perfectly neutral and unbiased. Blaise Compaoré, the former president of Burkina Faso, mediated the 2007 negotiations between the government of Côte d’Ivoire and the rebellious Forces Nouvelles, which Compaoré had <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-africaine-2003-1-page-71.htm">overtly supported</a>. In the <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CI_070304_Accord%20Politique%20de%20Ouagadougou%20%28French%29.pdf">agreement</a> that followed, the parties made Compaoré an arbitrator in the implementation phase. In other words, a mediator can be an insider who has close relationships with one of the parties.</p>
<p>A third factor for successful peace talks is timing. Since negotiations typically take place in the shadow of military gains and losses, it’s often assumed that it only makes sense to start negotiations when both sides believe that they can gain more from negotiating than from fighting. </p>
<p>But waiting for the “ripe moment” to start high-level negotiations is problematic. It can prolong a conflict unnecessarily and lead to extreme suffering. In Sudan – where the national army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces have been fighting each other since mid-April 2023 – more than <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/more-than-1-mln-people-displaced-by-sudan-crisis-un-refugee-agency-2023-05-19/">one million people</a> have already been displaced. And in the Ethiopian region of Tigray, a <a href="https://addisstandard.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/AU-led-Ethiopia-Peace-Agreement.pdf">ceasefire agreement</a> was concluded in November 2022, but only after <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/jan/11/joy-and-grief-as-tigray-reconnects-to-the-world">hundreds of thousands of people</a> had been killed over two years of conflict.</p>
<p>Therefore, peace actors should constantly search for entry points to create opportunities for building peace instead of waiting for the perfect conditions. They can convince the conflict parties that negotiations are not zero-sum games and don’t automatically lead to painful compromises. </p>
<p>Fourth, how “peace” is understood plays a major role. It’s often thought that no fighting means peace, and that an agreement will end violence and suffering almost instantly. This is rarely true. An agreement is only one small step in an often long process.</p>
<p>Moreover, while a ceasefire is always desirable because it means less violence and less suffering, it’s not absolutely necessary to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/peace-talks-ukraine-russias-red-lines-unchanged-2022-03-30/">negotiate substantive issues</a>. Many negotiations, from <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Bosnian-War">Bosnia</a> to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-20319583">Colombia</a>, have been held while fighting continued, and yet a substantive peace agreement was eventually concluded. </p>
<p>And it can be alright to agree to disagree: not everything can or needs to be resolved in the same deal. Some root causes of conflict, like the historical marginalisation of minority groups or of certain regions, can be difficult to tackle. But it’s possible to put in place measures and mechanisms to envisage improvements. </p>
<p>Partial agreements can be a good option, even if this approach obviously takes time. In Senegal, for example, it’s only earlier this year, after decades of conflict and many years of mediation, that one of the factions of the rebellious Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance <a href="https://hdcentre.org/news/une-faction-du-mfdc-signe-la-cessation-des-hostilites-avec-le-gouvernement-du-senegal-et-depose-definitivement-les-armes/">agreed to lay down its weapons</a>. </p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>It’s vital to do more to prevent armed conflicts in the first place. Continuously <a href="https://www.sipri.org/news/2023/world-military-expenditure-reaches-new-record-high-european-spending-surges-0">rising military expenditures</a> and <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/arms-control/">few restrictions</a> on weapons sales mean that weapons are easily available in many places. The international community should, therefore, urgently make more efforts to halt the massive production and circulation of weapons. </p>
<p>And although every conflict has its own dynamics, poverty, global inequalities and exploitation are always significant factors. Tackling these issues isn’t straightforward, but it would help prevent and resolve armed conflicts, and would pay off in the long run. </p>
<p>Peace is a process, and it requires significant commitment.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206299/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Philipp Kastner does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>An agreement to end conflict is only one small step in an often long process.Philipp Kastner, Senior Lecturer in International Law, The University of Western AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1953322022-11-25T08:25:28Z2022-11-25T08:25:28ZConflict in the DRC: 5 articles that explain what’s gone wrong<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497329/original/file-20221125-12-e7oxfk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Troops drive through Goma in eastern DRC in November 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Augustin Wamenya/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>For nearly three decades, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been embroiled in violence. Millions of people have been killed, and an estimated 5.6 million others displaced by civil wars, local feuds and cross-border conflicts.</p>
<p>Studies have identified several reasons for the persistence of war, especially in the volatile east of the country. These include ethnic intolerance, the illegal exploitation of the country’s vast natural resources and a Congolese elite that benefits from the chaos.</p>
<p>Neighbouring countries – including Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/259540/kenyan-peacekeepers-arrive-in-drcs-volatile-east/">most recently Kenya</a> – are locked in the ongoing conflict, which has been termed one of <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna34958903">world’s deadliest</a> since the second world war. Much of the current violence is centred in Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu provinces, which lie on the DRC’s eastern border. Combined, they are about seven times the size of Rwanda.</p>
<p>Consolidating peace efforts across the vast territory has proved difficult. Scholars writing for The Conversation Africa have highlighted a range of factors driving the conflict – and the challenges in the way of addressing them.</p>
<h2>1. The birth of M23</h2>
<p>Since the 1990s, armed groups have been part of the political economy of eastern Congo. Communities created self-defence militias in response to foreign-backed armed groups accused of using war to loot the country’s riches.</p>
<p>Over time, armed mobilisation turned into a goal in itself: to make money, to express political power or simply for the youth to cope with the chaos. Today, more than 120 armed groups are present in eastern DRC. </p>
<p>One of these is the <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">March 23 Movement (M23)</a>. Kasper Hoffmann and Christoph Vogel analyse the development of M23 since its beginnings in 2012. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-m23s-on-and-off-insurgency-tells-us-about-drcs-precarious-search-for-peace-182520">What M23's on-and-off insurgency tells us about DRC's precarious search for peace</a>
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<h2>2. Regional dynamics</h2>
<p>The DRC has accused Rwanda of violating its sovereignty by supporting M23. A United Nations report supported this contention. Kigali, however, has dismissed the findings as “false allegations”. </p>
<p>Tensions between Rwanda and DRC date back to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Many of the perpetrators of this violence, which killed about a million Rwandans, fled to the DRC, at the time called Zaire. The post-genocide Rwandan government launched military operations in a bid to force the perpetrators back home to face justice. Rwanda believes the DRC continues to provide refuge for those behind the 1994 massacre. Jonathan Beloff explains why both nations hold old suspicions of each other. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/rwanda-and-drcs-turbulent-past-continues-to-fuel-their-torrid-relationship-188405">Rwanda and DRC's turbulent past continues to fuel their torrid relationship</a>
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<h2>3. The lingering effects of colonialism</h2>
<p>Colonial ways of governing indigenous populations sowed seeds of ethnic tension in present-day Congo. Jacob Cloete’s research set out to establish whether a conflict in North Kivu in 1993 that grabbed headlines was the starting point of the current violence in eastern Congo. He argues, however, that it was the culmination of a much older one rooted in Belgian and German colonialism. As he explains:</p>
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<p>Based on a racist notion popular among African colonialists at the time, the two colonial administrations gave privileged status to some of the local population based on ethnicity.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-conflicts-intertwined-over-time-and-destabilised-the-drc-and-the-region-185432">How conflicts intertwined over time and destabilised the DRC – and the region</a>
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<h2>4. Questioning the UN’s intervention</h2>
<p>Over three decades of war, the Congo has received tens of billions of dollars in humanitarian aid and hosts one of the largest United Nations peacekeeping missions. The mission was established in 1999, and its mandate expanded in 2010 to include the protection of civilians. </p>
<p>The UN mission has long been blamed for failing to stabilise the country despite more than two decades of intervention. But as Delphin Ntanyoma explains, the UN is being blamed for what should be the DRC government’s responsibility: de-escalating violence and finding long-term solutions.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-un-is-under-attack-in-eastern-congo-but-drc-elites-are-also-to-blame-for-the-violence-187861">The UN is under attack in eastern Congo. But DRC elites are also to blame for the violence</a>
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<h2>5. Rewarding rebellion</h2>
<p>Christopher P. Davey’s research into the Banyamulenge – a sub-group of the Congolese Tutsi ethnic group who originally come from the province of South Kivu in eastern DRC – adds to debate on the factors driving Congo’s violence. He argues that the Banyamulenge’s experiences illustrate how violence in the Congo multiplies across borders, blurs the lines between victim and perpetrator, and is used to win a place in government rather than to overthrow it. Davey notes that:</p>
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<p>I believe that to stop the cycle of violence, the DRC and its regional allies need a new status quo that doesn’t reward rebellion but decreases its appeal. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/burundis-gatumba-massacre-offers-a-window-into-the-past-and-future-of-the-drc-conflict-191351">Burundi's Gatumba massacre offers a window into the past and future of the DRC conflict</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195332/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Consolidating peace efforts across the vast territory has proved difficult for close to three decades. Scholars explain why.Julius Maina, Regional Editor East AfricaKagure Gacheche, Commissioning Editor, East AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1877052022-08-11T14:53:46Z2022-08-11T14:53:46ZNot yet uhuru: the African Union has had a few successes but remains weak<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477122/original/file-20220802-19-k8vu9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Delegates at the African Union Summit held in Malabo, Capital of Equatorial Guinea, on 27 May 2022 to address worsening humanitarian crises in Africa. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The African Union (AU) was born in the South African port city of Durban <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/september-2002/african-union-launched">in 2002</a>. Under its first chair,<a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/contact-directory/thabo-mvuyelwa-mbeki-mr-0">Thabo Mbeki</a>, African leaders seemed determined to abandon the grandiose plans of its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The OAU had been established <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/organisation-african-unity-oau">in 1963</a> to promote African unity and liberation. Other aims included: to protect the territorial integrity of its member states, promote non-alignment, and advance the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7759-file-oau_charter_1963.pdf">peaceful settlement of disputes</a>.</p>
<p>The African Union, for its part, <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf">was established</a> to achieve an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa which would be led by its own citizens and play a dynamic role in global politics. Unlike the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7759-file-oau_charter_1963.pdf">OAU Charter</a>, the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf">AU’s Constitutive Act of 2000</a> allowed for interference in the internal affairs of its members to stem instability, halt egregious human rights abuses and sanction military coups d’état.</p>
<p>Military regimes in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2005/2/25/togo-suspended-from-au">Togo</a>, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mauritania-coup-idUSL855802420080809">Mauritania</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/mar/20/african-union-suspends-madagascar">Madagascar</a>, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20100219-african-union-suspends-niger-thousands-celebrate-coup">Niger</a>, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-protests-africa-idUSBRE9640EP20130705">Egypt</a>, <a href="https://au.int/en/articles/sudan-suspended-african-union#:%7E:text=On%20the%206th%20of%20June,exit%20from%20its%20current%20crisis.">Sudan</a>, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/african-union-suspends-guinea-after-military-coup/a-59144311">Guinea</a>, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2012/4/17/guinea-bissau-suspended-from-african-union">Guinea-Bissau</a>, <a href="https://au.int/en/articles/african-union-suspends-mali-participation-all-activities">Mali</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/african-union-suspends-burkina-faso-after-military-coup-2022-01-31/">Burkina Faso</a> were thus suspended from the AU. The continental body launched praiseworthy military stabilisation missions into <a href="https://issafrica.org/chapter-4-the-african-union-mission-in-burundi">Burundi</a> (2003), <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20201231-un-african-union-peacekeeping-mission-in-sudan-s-darfur-ends">Darfur</a> (2007) and <a href="https://effectivepeaceops.net/publication/amisom/">Somalia</a> (2007). However despite this progress, autocrats continued to rig electoral outcomes. </p>
<p>As the AU <a href="https://au.int/en/overview">turned 20 in July 2022</a>, it had achieved a few successes. But it remains a weak organisation embarking on sporadic bouts of illusory reforms. This is due to financial and capacity constraints. And too much decision-making power resides with its omnipotent heads of state which has denied the organisation the ability to take decisions, and act more effectively on behalf of its members.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-african-unions-conflict-early-warning-system-is-no-more-what-now-183469">The African Union's conflict early warning system is no more. What now?</a>
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<h2>Institutional sclerosis</h2>
<p>The Addis Ababa-based <a href="https://au.int/en/commission">AU Commission</a> – its implementing arm – is led by an <a href="https://au.int/en/assembly">Assembly of Heads of State</a>, with an Executive Council of foreign ministers and a Permanent Representatives Committee of ambassadors. The ambassadors work with specialised development, governance, parliamentary and judicial organs. The AU Commission has, however, struggled to establish its independence to take initiatives on behalf of its 55 member states in fulfilment of its mandate. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/RO%20Audit%20of%20the%20AU.pdf">2007 audit report</a> led by the Nigerian scholar-technocrat <a href="https://www.pambazuka.org/pan-africanism/tribute-my-mentor-professor-adebayo-adedeji">Adebayo Adedeji</a> revealed how the AU Commission headed by <a href="https://www.africaunionfoundation.org/professor-alpha-oumar-konare/">Malian Alpha Konaré</a> (2003-2008) misunderstood its mandates and authority levels, and failed to coordinate overlapping tasks. Some of these problems still persist.</p>
<p>Under the French-influenced Gabonese <a href="http://jeanping.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/CV-Jean-Ping-VGB.pdf">Jean Ping</a> (2008-2012), the commission’s annual budget had reached <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2011/01/27/short-of-cash-and-teeth">$260 million by 2011</a>. Only 40% of this sum was actually paid by members. The European Union, China and the United States mostly funded the rest. This posed the risk that AU institutional priorities could be set by its donors.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://au.int/en/assembly">AU Assembly</a> of heads of state has often failed to adhere to the principle of subsidiarity: taking decisions at the lowest practical level, as the European Union – the world’s only genuinely supranational regional organisation – does. </p>
<p>The AU also conducts most of its business through unanimity, making it difficult to reach quick decisions.</p>
<p>While the AU Commission has some impressive staff, it also has much “dead wood” inherited from the OAU era. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/african-union-needs-a-more-robust-response-to-conflict-in-cameroon-132449">African Union needs a more robust response to conflict in Cameroon</a>
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<p>The AU’s 2003 plan to set up an <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/en/page/82-african-standby-force-asf-amani-africa-1">African Standby Force</a> by 2010 was <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/joint/diplomacy-a-peace/african-union-says-progressing-to-military-force-by-end-2015/">postponed until 2015</a>. In December 2020, the organisation simply declared the force to be fully operational, despite the fantasy involved in such a statement. The deadline for “Silencing the Guns” (ending armed conflicts) <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23311886.2021.1995222#:%7E:text=The%20Africa%20Union's%20Agenda%202063,all%20illegal%20weapons%20in%20Africa.">by 2020</a>“ was casually pushed back a decade.</p>
<h2>Illusory reforms</h2>
<p>As chair of the AU Commission (2012-2016), former South African foreign minister <a href="https://www.africaunionfoundation.org/dr-nkosazana-dlamini-zuma/">Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma </a> complained that over 97% of the continental body’s programmes were <a href="https://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2012/Dec/27467/budget_challenge_for_dlamini_zuma_at_au.aspx">funded by external donors</a>. In 2013, $155 million of the $278 million annual budget (56%) was still <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/6158/african-union-its-never-too-late-to-avoid-war-dlamini-zuma/">provided by foreign partners</a>. But Dlamini-Zuma failed to reduce this dependence during her four-year tenure. AU leaders refused to back efforts to find alternative sources of funding, such as customs duties and <a href="https://archives.au.int/bitstream/handle/123456789/885/Assembly%20AU%2018%20%28XIX%29%20_E.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">taxes on flights and hotel stays</a>. </p>
<p>Among the more quixotic ideas of the Dlamini-Zuma-driven 50-year development vision, <a href="https://au.int/en/agenda2063/overview">"Agenda 2063”</a> includes increasing intra-African trade from 12% to 50% by 2045, ending armed conflicts by 2020 ](https://au.int/en/flagships/silencing-guns-2020) and eradicating poverty in two decades.</p>
<p>Under the Francophile Chadian chair, <a href="https://au.int/en/biography-he-moussa-faki-mahamat">Moussa Faki Mahamat</a>, since 2017, the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34915-file-report-20institutional20reform20of20the20au-2.pdf">report</a> chaired by <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Paul-Kagame">Rwandan president Paul Kagame</a> on reforming the AU seemed rushed and lacked substance, and its laundry list of recommendations on institutional reforms were on a level of vacuity as to be of no real utility. </p>
<p>These were physicians proposing half-baked cures to ills that had not been properly diagnosed. All the 2017 report’s “key findings” had been more coherently outlined in <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/RO%20Audit%20of%20the%20AU.pdf">Adedeji’s report</a> a decade earlier, the recommendations of which still have not been implemented. </p>
<p>Another disappointment has been the 2018 <a href="https://au.int/en/cfta">African Continental Free Trade Area</a> which seeks to facilitate trade, build infrastructure, establish a common market and ensure the free movement of people. But outside West and Eastern Africa, the free movement of people <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/africa-intracontinental-free-movement">remains a pipe dream</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/successes-of-african-human-rights-court-undermined-by-resistance-from-states-166454">Successes of African Human Rights Court undermined by resistance from states</a>
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<p>Most African governments are security-obsessed and hostile to intra-African migration. There is also a lack of convergence of African economies. Many compete to export raw materials rather than exchange diverse goods.</p>
<p>Road, rail, and port infrastructure remains poor. Rules of origin – which define where goods are made – are often restrictive, and non-tariff barriers are widespread. If integration has not worked at the national and sub-regional levels, transferring all these problems to the continental level will certainly not integrate Africa. </p>
<h2>Need for realism</h2>
<p>The 15-member <a href="https://au.int/en/psc">AU Peace and Security Council</a> has contributed substantively to peacemaking efforts across Africa, and coordinated closely with the United Nations.</p>
<p>But other AU organs have performed less well. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.nepad.org/publication/nepad-brief">New Partnership for Africa’s Development</a> clearly lacks the resources and capacity as a development agency to uplift the continent. The <a href="https://au.int/en/aprm#:%7E:text=APRM%20is%20a%20voluntary%20arrangement,economic%20growth%20and%20sustainable%20development">African Peer Review Mechanism</a>, which identifies governance challenges in 41 countries, is toothless.</p>
<p>The Pan-African Parliament remains a <a href="https://theconversation.com/toothless-pan-african-parliament-could-have-meaningful-powers-heres-how-87449">“talking shop”</a>. The <a href="https://au.int/en/about/ecosocc">Economic, Social and Cultural Council</a> has failed to provide genuine civil society participation in the AU’s institutions. The idea of the African Diaspora in the Americas, the Caribbean and Europe as a <a href="http://www.west-africa-brief.org/content/en/six-regions-african-union">sixth African sub-region</a>, along with the five continental ones, is largely devoid of substance.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/toothless-pan-african-parliament-could-have-meaningful-powers-heres-how-87449">Toothless Pan-African Parliament could have meaningful powers. Here's how</a>
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<p>The AU must thus adopt more realistic and less illusory mandates. Its approach should be based on an accurate assessment of financial and logistical realities. </p>
<p>More positively, AU members had contributed <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20220630/african-union-peace-fund-board-trustees-convene-meeting-review-progress">$295 million</a> to their <a href="https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/peace-fund-lies-dormant-as-member-states-discuss-its-use">revised Peace Fund</a> by June 2022, complementing a <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/african-union-20-much-accomplished-more-challenges-ahead/">$650 million 2022 budget </a>. African leaders must now strengthen the institutions they have created.</p>
<p>They must also establish one effective economic body in each sub-region that can promote socio-economic development and provide jobs for the continent’s youthful population.</p>
<p>The AU’s first two decades have largely represented a magical, mystical world of unfulfilled expectations. This is not yet uhuru (freedom).</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187705/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adekeye Adebajo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The AU’s first two decades have largely represented a magical, mystical world of unfulfilled expectations.Adekeye Adebajo, Professor and Senior research fellow, Centre for the Advancement of Scholarship, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1879322022-07-31T06:47:55Z2022-07-31T06:47:55ZProtests against UN in eastern Congo highlight peace mission’s crisis of legitimacy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476697/original/file-20220729-9109-i8ccly.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Congolese soldier in Goma during protests against the UN peacekeeping mission in July 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Michel Lunanga/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2022/7/26/photos-anti-monusco-protests-in-dr-congos-goma-turn-violent">Violent protests</a> erupted in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo in late July 2022, resulting in the deaths of at least three peacekeepers and several civilians. </p>
<p>The United Nations mission in the Congo has long suffered a crisis of confidence among local communities. It has been accused of failing to protect civilians and improve security in the region, despite a presence spanning <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/monusco">more than two decades</a>. </p>
<p>This is not the first time protests have broken out against UN peacekeepers in eastern Congo. However, these recent events have brought to the surface the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2021.1992272?scroll=top">persistent problems</a> facing the United Nations Organization Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Monusco). It has <a href="https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/khassim-diagne-monusco-not-responsible-death-demonstrators-who-looted-and-vandalized-its-base-goma%E2%80%9D">faced questions</a> on its operational effectiveness, consent of the host state and whether – or how – it can make a graceful exit from the country. </p>
<p>Heightened tensions in the Congo’s eastern region are the result of what is perceived by many as years of peacekeeping failures, resulting in violence, death and the displacement of millions of Congolese. </p>
<p>A great deal has been <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13533312.2017.1360139?casa_token=0oceATTE0UMAAAAA:qoyNM4-ndQKWelRNVo5J4yOKDbd-IxFr_yBy22jB2daPNQJNnrU73cRsDblt0rbUL2m5kA69__Stkg">written</a> about the perils of so-called stabilisation approaches to peacekeeping. These have been pursued in countries like the Congo, Mali and the Central African Republic, and are characterised by efforts to neutralise non-state armed groups and extend state authority. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-conflicts-intertwined-over-time-and-destabilised-the-drc-and-the-region-185432">How conflicts intertwined over time and destabilised the DRC – and the region</a>
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<p>Both the UN and the African Union increasingly reference stabilisation approaches in policy dialogue and mission mandates. However, such approaches have proven largely ineffective, in part because of their state-centric nature, which fails to take into account local drivers of conflict. </p>
<h2>Crisis of confidence</h2>
<p>When the Force Intervention Brigade was <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2013/sc10964.doc.htm">authorised by the UN Security Council</a> in 2013, it was initially praised for bringing a <a href="https://theglobalobservatory.org/2013/11/in-drc-one-militia-m23-down-49-more-to-go/">swift halt</a> to the insurrection attempt by the armed group M23. </p>
<p>Yet, since that time, the brigade has struggled to implement its mandate in the face of the continued proliferation of armed groups in the region and high levels of insecurity. In response to these challenges, the brigade recently received <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/quick-reaction-forces-to-the-rescue-in-eastern-drc">additional support</a> from several quick reaction forces.</p>
<p>Yet, the mission has been unable to stem the violence. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-m23s-on-and-off-insurgency-tells-us-about-drcs-precarious-search-for-peace-182520">resurgence of the M23</a> in the past few months has been a stark illustration of the brigade’s shortcomings. </p>
<p>At the same time, militarised approaches to peacekeeping in the Congo have come at the expense of <a href="https://nonviolentpeaceforce.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/2021_Course_Manual___Mod_1_pt_2.pdf">non-violent approaches to peacebuilding</a>, like unarmed protection methods, which may be more conducive to building lasting peace.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-un-is-under-attack-in-eastern-congo-but-drc-elites-are-also-to-blame-for-the-violence-187861">The UN is under attack in eastern Congo. But DRC elites are also to blame for the violence</a>
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<p>The result is that the UN is facing a crisis of legitimacy among the population, despite having invested a good deal of resources trying to manage its reputation. Confidence in the ability of peacekeepers to ensure security is <a href="http://www.peacebuildingdata.org/sites/m/pdf/DRC_Poll19_FinalEnglish.pdf">generally low among communities</a> in eastern Congo, and has decreased over time. It’s also notably lower than confidence in state security forces, despite the latter’s <a href="https://monusco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unjhro_-_analysis_of_the_human_rights_situation_-_may_2020.pdf">egregious human rights violations</a> and lack of capacity. </p>
<p>This raises questions of consent, including whose voices matter when it comes to maintaining cooperation with the host country. Host state consent, a <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/principles-of-peacekeeping">principle of UN peacekeeping</a>, is conventionally interpreted as consent of the host government. However, the recent scenes from the Congo suggest that greater attention ought to be paid to the voices of community members. </p>
<p>While the UN recognises the importance of maintaining trust with local communities, it’s not clear how it can – or should – respond should those relationships deteriorate beyond repair, as may now be the case. </p>
<p>Regional dynamics have further complicated this situation, given the cross-border nature of the conflict, and with Kinshasa’s military <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/6/13/m23-rebels-seize-key-congolese-town-drc-blames-rwanda">accusing Rwanda</a> of using the M23 to invade Congo. Kigali has denied these accusations.</p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>While the UN mission is in a period of drawdown, there is no clear timeline for exit. Withdrawal is instead guided by progress towards a series of agreed-upon <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2020/sc14374.doc.htm">benchmarks</a>, including a significant reduction in the threat posed by armed groups. </p>
<p>Some experts <a href="https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/IPI-E-RPT-The-Case-of-MONUSCO2021PDF.pdf">have argued</a> that the drawdown should not be bound by time. Progress has been slow, and it is not clear the benchmarks will be met in the near future.</p>
<p>In the meantime, the mission and members of the UN Security Council need to grapple with what to do if they cannot bring security conditions under control, or if the state pushes more forcefully for an early exit. </p>
<p>Protests in the region are likely to continue over the coming months, particularly in the run-up to the Congo presidential elections, which are scheduled for late 2023. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-drcs-colonial-legacy-forged-a-nexus-between-ethnicity-territory-and-conflict-153469">How DRC's colonial legacy forged a nexus between ethnicity, territory and conflict</a>
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<p>What is needed at this time is a robust regional security arrangement that would ease some of the pressure on the UN mission and make space for a stronger diplomatic response to regional tensions. </p>
<p>The 22 July 2022 <a href="https://www.eac.int/ncpr/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=27&Itemid=144">agreement</a> by the East African Community Heads of States to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/6/21/east-africa-leaders-agree-regional-force-for-dr-congo">deploy a regional force</a> to the Congo may be a timely step in the right direction. </p>
<p>But, as the UN mission’s difficulties have shown, military operations cannot be effective if they aren’t coupled with a viable political process, which has been lacking in the Congo. The current security situation, alongside contentious regional dynamics, is indicative of this.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187932/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jenna Russo is affiliated with the International Peace Institute, an independent, international not-for-profit think tank.</span></em></p>Protests are likely to continue over the coming months, particularly in the run-up to the Congo presidential elections next year.Jenna Russo, Researcher and lecturer, City University of New YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1866832022-07-29T12:22:56Z2022-07-29T12:22:56ZWhy men overwhelmingly wear the UN’s blue helmets – a former US ambassador explains why decades of recruiting women peacekeepers has had little effect<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/475901/original/file-20220725-11-nocbix.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=91%2C0%2C1036%2C688&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Female police officers working with the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Liberia participate in a parade in 2008.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://dam.media.un.org/CS.aspx?VP3=DamView&VBID=2AM94SKKB92P&SMLS=1&RW=1495&RH=648#/DamView&VBID=2AM94SKKBOX8&PN=1&WS=SearchResults">UN Photo/Christopher Herwig</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The United Nations has about <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/where-we-operate">74,000 peacekeepers</a> in uniform stationed in a dozen conflict zones around the world. It’s easy to spot them in their signature light blue helmets. It’s harder to find a woman among them. </p>
<p>There are military experts, police and infantry units who come from <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/01_contributions_to_un_peacekeeping_operations_by_country_and_post_49_april_22.pdf">121 countries</a> to help maintain peace. </p>
<p><a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/07_gender_statistics_49_april_2022.pdf">Just 8%</a> of peacekeepers are women. </p>
<p>This is a significant increase from 15 years ago – when the number of peacekeepers was about the same as today but women made up only <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/dec07.pdf">about 2%</a> of the ranks. For 20 years, the U.N. has been <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/gender">trying to improve</a> this statistic. </p>
<p>But the U.N.’s long-term goal of having as many female peacekeepers as men may well be unachievable. </p>
<p>As a U.S. diplomat and an <a href="https://sia.psu.edu/faculty/jett">international affairs scholar</a>, I have been involved in peacekeeping in Africa, Latin America and the Middle East. While dramatically increasing the number of female peacekeepers has clear benefits, including improved community relationships, the evolution of peacekeeping makes gender parity impossible. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/475897/original/file-20220725-13-79362n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Two men in suits walk past a row of female peacekeepers in camo with blue hats" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/475897/original/file-20220725-13-79362n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/475897/original/file-20220725-13-79362n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475897/original/file-20220725-13-79362n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475897/original/file-20220725-13-79362n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475897/original/file-20220725-13-79362n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475897/original/file-20220725-13-79362n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475897/original/file-20220725-13-79362n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Namibia’s vice president inspects U.N. peacekeeping troops in Windhoek, Namibia, in 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/oct-31-2020-namibias-vice-president-nangolo-mbumba-inspects-troops-picture-id1229412837?s=2048x2048">Musa C Kaseke/Xinhua via Getty</a></span>
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<h2>What the UN calls for</h2>
<p>The U.N. does not have its own military. So when the U.N. launches a peacekeeping mission, it must ask its 193 member countries to provide the personnel necessary to staff it.</p>
<p>The U.N. pays countries a bit over <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/role-peacekeeping-africa">US$1,400 a month</a> for each soldier loaned to the organization. This can help poorer countries maintain <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2010/12/why-south-asia-loves-peacekeeping/">their armies and pay </a>their soldiers. Bangladesh, Nepal, India and Rwanda <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors">give the most</a> soldiers to serve as peacekeepers, with over 5,000 people each. The U.S. currently provides only <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/01_contributions_to_un_peacekeeping_operations_by_country_and_post_49_april_22.pdf">30 staff officers</a>. </p>
<p>In 2000, the U.N. Security Council recognized the gender imbalance in peacekeeping when it approved <a href="http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1325">Resolution</a>1325, which urged that women be given more opportunities to serve. In 2018, the U.N. began specifically <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/uniformed-gender-parity-strategy-2018-2028-full-text">instructing</a> its peacekeeping missions to work toward including as many women as men. </p>
<p>Research shows that including women in resolving conflicts is a good idea, especially since they are frequently the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3877825">victims of war</a> more often than men. When women participate in peace negotiations, the <a href="https://www-tandfonline-com.ezaccess.libraries.psu.edu/doi/full/10.1080/03050629.2018.1492386?src=recsys#">resulting peace</a> is more lasting. </p>
<p>Having more female peacekeepers can also help improve <a href="https://www.proquest.com/docview/217455354?https://literature-proquest-com.ezaccess.libraries.psu.edu/lion?accountid=13158&parentSessionId=6Us3I5B86vHEja6PB%2BkbKN1ZPDOfkC8tDoSW0btbjUM%3D&pq-origsite=summon">relationships</a> with civilians. Open communication and trust between local communities and peacekeepers can lead to <a href="https://unu.edu/publications/articles/why-un-needs-more-female-peacekeepers.html">better cultural understanding and valuable intelligence</a> – including information about sexual violence that women are more likely to report to a female peacekeeper. </p>
<p>This is particularly important since in the past few years there have been <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/01/11/un-peacekeeping-has-sexual-abuse-problem">multiple cases</a> of peacekeepers being accused of <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/women-week-un-withdraws-450-peacekeepers-central-african-republic">mistreating and abusing </a>civilians – <a href="https://apnews.com/article/africa-arrests-united-nations-only-on-ap-e6ebc331460345c5abd4f57d77f535c1">including children</a>. </p>
<h2>Not so easy to achieve</h2>
<p>Despite the advantages, there are three major obstacles to getting more women involved in peacekeeping. </p>
<p>First, women make up a <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/the-countries-with-the-most-women-in-the-military/ar-AAOK9Ab">small percentage</a> of the armed forces in almost every country, ranging from less than 1% in India and Turkey to 20% in Hungary.</p>
<p>Second, very <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women_in_combat">few countries</a> train women for ground combat, which may be part of a U.N. peacekeeping mission. </p>
<p>Third, the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/01/25/map-which-countries-allow-women-in-front-line-combat-roles/">countries</a> that do train women for combat are almost always democratic and wealthier. They are also least likely to contribute troops to the more dangerous U.N. peacekeeping missions. </p>
<p>These practical challenges have become even more daunting because of the way peacekeeping has changed.</p>
<h2>Peacekeeping’s evolution</h2>
<p>The U.N. was only three years old when it initiated its <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/undof">first peacekeeping mission </a>in 1948 to respond to the war between Israel and its Arab neighbors. In that operation, and in subsequent ones dealing with conflicts between countries over territory, once the fighting stopped peacekeepers could be placed between the opposing armies to help ensure the cease-fire continued. </p>
<p>In the 1990s, peacekeeping also addressed civil wars in such places as <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/Unavem2/UnavemIIB.htm">Angola</a> and <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/onumozFT.htm">Mozambique</a>. Those operations had to demobilize former combatants, reintegrate them into civilian life and form a new national army. </p>
<p>Often the most important task was helping conduct an election. While I was the U.S. ambassador in <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/onumozS.htm">Mozambique in 1994</a>, all this was successfully accomplished and the peacekeepers went home. But this kind of peacekeeping is also mostly a relic of the past. </p>
<h2>A new broader mandate</h2>
<p>In the U.N.’s five most recent peacekeeping missions, launched between 2010 and 2014 and all in Africa, the peacekeepers are mandated to protect civilians and help the government expand its control to lessen the threat of armed rebel groups. Doing that requires large infantry units, which is why the <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/mali-suspends-rotation-of-un-forces/6659011.html">mission in Mali</a>, for example, includes 12,000 troops. </p>
<p>These are not just the largest missions, but also the most deadly – an average of 16 peacekeepers are killed each year in these missions, while an average of two peacekeepers die each year in the oldest peacekeeping operations. </p>
<p>The U.N. initially insisted that all warring parties agree to the presence of the peacekeepers and that the peacekeepers remain impartial and use force only to defend themselves.</p>
<p>In the five newest missions, the mandate required the use of force to be <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/where-we-operate">expanded</a>. This meant peacekeepers no longer had the consent of all the combatants and discarded impartiality to help the government in power. As a result, some of those opposing the government began targeting peacekeepers. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/475903/original/file-20220725-10216-rtsroy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Soldiers are seen carrying coffins draped in blue flags, in front of a white UN plane." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/475903/original/file-20220725-10216-rtsroy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/475903/original/file-20220725-10216-rtsroy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475903/original/file-20220725-10216-rtsroy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475903/original/file-20220725-10216-rtsroy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475903/original/file-20220725-10216-rtsroy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475903/original/file-20220725-10216-rtsroy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475903/original/file-20220725-10216-rtsroy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Ivorian soldiers carry the coffins of four U.N. peacekeepers in Mali in February 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/ivorian-soldiers-carry-coffins-wrapped-with-united-nations-flags-out-picture-id1230731222?s=2048x2048">Sia Kambou/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>The connection to female peacekeepers</h2>
<p>These latest peacekeeping missions require thousands of troops prepared for combat in order to be able to use force. For that reason, 86% of all of the peacekeepers are military troops, but only <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/07_gender_statistics_49_april_2022.pdf">6%</a> of the troops are women.</p>
<p>The low percentage of female troops stands in sharp contrast to the <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/07_gender_statistics_49_april_2022.pdf">other types of peacekeepers</a> who don’t risk being involved in combat – 27% of the military experts, 19% of the staff officers and 19% of the police are women. </p>
<p>While the wealthy countries pay <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/how-we-are-funded">86% of the financial cost</a> of U.N. peacekeeping, which amounts to $6.4 billion year, they contribute less than 8% of all the troops. </p>
<p>In the U.N.’s six oldest missions, like the ones in Israel, only 7% of the troops are women, and 37% of these women come from the rich countries. In the five more lethal missions, however, 5% of the troops are female and <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/07_gender_statistics_49_april_2022.pdf">only 3% </a> of them are from wealthier members.</p>
<p>So, while the rich countries pay in treasure, the poor countries pay in blood.</p>
<p>Getting more female peacekeepers would require countries to assign more women to the most dangerous peacekeeping missions. In other words, it would be necessary to give more women the chance to shed that blood.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/186683/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dennis Jett does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The UN has been working for 20 years to increase the number of female peacekeepers – but countries that give their troops to the UN are reluctant to put more women in active combat.Dennis Jett, Professor of International Affairs, Penn StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1818632022-05-22T12:35:12Z2022-05-22T12:35:12ZMuseveni’s first son Muhoozi: clear signals of a succession plan in Uganda<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/461233/original/file-20220504-13-flt98h.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Muhoozi Kainerugaba, commander of Uganda's land forces and President Yoweri Museveni's son.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Peter Busomoke/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On 8 March 2022, Ugandan politics was sent into a spin by 49 words tweeted by President Yoweri Museveni’s only son, Lt Gen Muhoozi Kainerugaba.</p>
<p>The tweet announced Muhoozi’s retirement from the Ugandan People’s Defence Forces (UPDF), which he had formally served in since 1999. Since his most recent promotion in June 2021, he has served as the commander of the land forces. The position made him the third-highest ranking officer in the defence forces.</p>
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<p>Muhoozi’s resignation would clear his legal path to formally enter electoral politics. Serving members of the armed forces are banned from political activity under Uganda’s constitution. </p>
<p>The tweet seemed to catch everyone by surprise, including senior security officials. They later <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/updf-clears-the-air-on-muhoozi-status-3745690">put out a statement</a> saying Muhoozi had not resigned. </p>
<p>While Muhoozi clarified hours later that his retirement would not come for eight years, the post fits a recent pattern that has fuelled growing public perception that he is declaring his political intentions. </p>
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<p>The most stark example of this occurred weeks after the tweet. This was in the form of a nationwide series of public events to mark <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/magazines/people-power/muhoozi-s-birthday-launch-of-the-project--3800066">Muhoozi’s 48th birthday</a>. </p>
<p>These included sports tournaments, public rallies, a party for supporters, and a state dinner. Public roads were shut for the events, and state-owned broadcasters aired some of them live. Rwandan President Paul Kagame attended the State Dinner. </p>
<p>At one of the birthday rallies held in the south-western town of Masaka on <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/the-curious-case-of-muhoozi-national-event-3791614">April 20,</a> supporters wore T-shirts with slogans such as ‘Muhoozi K is our next president’ and ‘MK Project. Team Chairman. Secure Your Tomorrow.’ </p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/we-will-take-power-says-muhoozi-3801732">subsequent tweets</a> in early May, Muhoozi dropped any remaining reticence. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1520754940502855680"}"></div></p>
<p>He later added:</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1520776987182260226"}"></div></p>
<p>At the state dinner, Museveni, who has <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/i-am-not-grooming-my-son-for-presidency-says-museveni-3544172">always denied</a> grooming his son to succeed him, <a href="https://www.observer.ug/news/headlines/73599-why-colonels-generals-support-gen-muhoozi">made comments </a> implying that Muhoozi would soon be in charge. </p>
<p>Whether or not Muhoozi makes it to State House – and a great deal still stands in the way of this happening – it is undoubtedly clear that the possibility of replacing Museveni with his son has dramatically shifted from rumour to reality in recent months.</p>
<h2>Heir apparent, apparently</h2>
<p>Muhoozi was 11 years old when his father’s National Resistance Army took Uganda’s capital Kampala in 1986. In 1999, he formally joined the Ugandan defence forces while a student at the city’s Makerere University. </p>
<p>He has been subsequently trained at elite military academies in the UK and US, and <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/special-reports/muhoozi-kainerugaba-uganda-s-cagey-heir-apparent-3726692">continually promoted</a> ahead of more experienced peers.</p>
<p>After Muhoozi’s most recent promotion to commander of the land forces, he has featured in a number of Uganda’s military deployments. These include those in the <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/updf-sends-more-troops-armoured-vehicles-into-dr-congo-in-anti-adf-rebel-operation--3639838">Democratic Republic of Congo,</a> <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/the-rise-of-gen-muhoozi-kainerugaba-3742016">Somalia</a> where Uganda is part of the African Union peacekeeping force, and the <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/we-re-coming-with-hell-muhoozi-tells-rustlers-3757124">Karamoja region</a> in Uganda’s northeast. </p>
<p>Muhoozi’s fast-tracked rise into a position of power within the military has long produced <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/probe-assasination-claims-says-tinyefuza-1542336">accusations</a> that he is being groomed by Museveni for succession. Yet, despite this ‘heir apparent’ accusation, Muhoozi’s public profile had previously remained relatively small. He is still perceived as something of ‘an unknown quantity’ among broad swathes of the Ugandan public. </p>
<p>He has rarely given interviews to traditional media outlets. For most of his adult life, the average citizen would probably not have known very much about him. </p>
<p>The reasons for this relatively subdued profile were related to the inner workings of the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17531055.2016.1279853">National Resistance Movement</a> (NRM) regime that Museveni has led since 1986. </p>
<h2>Museveni’s play book</h2>
<p>At every point in his now 36 years at the helm, the president has maintained a posture of impending retirement. Museveni consistently suggests that the next election will be his last and that he dreams of <a href="https://chimpreports.com/museveni-i-am-ready-to-retire-as-soon-as-we-get-east-africa-federation/">the simple life</a> of cattle keeping. </p>
<p>Being constantly about to step down in this way has allowed Museveni to play off the factions of the NRM against each other. He has dangled the possibility of succession before them. </p>
<p>In Uganda, this ploy has been referred to as the succession <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/magazines/people-power/what-really-happened-to-the-succession-queue--1586740">‘queue’</a> within the ruling party.</p>
<p>In recent years, however, this act has worn thin. </p>
<p>This is mainly because Museveni has successfully marginalised several powerful National Resistance Movement figures who had developed partially autonomous political bases. They include former Vice President Gilbert Bukenya, former Parliamentary Speaker Rebecca Kadaga, former Inspector General of Police Kale Kayihura, and most spectacularly former Prime Minister and Party Secretary General Amama Mbabazi. </p>
<p>The decline of these figures – all rumoured to be in the metaphorical ‘queue’ for the top job – has made even the most naive party elites incredulous to the idea that Museveni will ever hand over power to one of them. </p>
<h2>Enter Muhoozi</h2>
<p>This change has coincided with the political emergence of Muhoozi in recent years. </p>
<p>His public profile has been growing both domestically and internationally. As a presidential advisor on special operations, a post he was appointed to in 2017 alongside his military roles, Muhoozi has <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/magazines/people-power/is-former-ldu-muhoozi-eyeing-seat-of-commander-in-chief--3800078">held summits</a> with the leaders of Egypt, Kenya and Somalia. </p>
<p>He has also held regional engagements with Rwanda’s Kagame, whom he refers to as his ‘uncle’. Following a meeting between the two men in Kigali in January, Rwanda finally agreed to <a href="https://theconversation.com/rwanda-has-reopened-the-border-with-uganda-but-distrust-could-close-it-again-176861">reopen its border</a> with Uganda. It had been closed for three years following Kigali’s accusations that Uganda had been harbouring members of the opposition Rwandan National Congress. </p>
<p>The perception that Muhoozi’s intervention has been key in mending the frosty relationship between the two countries was reinforced by a further meeting, again in Kigali, in <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202203150194.html">March</a>. After this, Muhoozi and Kagame announced a broader bi-lateral agreement to stop supporting dissidents in each other’s countries. </p>
<p>Shortly afterwards, Rwandan opposition blogger, and former journalist, <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/uganda-deports-top-rwandan-rebel-robert-mukombozi-3771012">Robert Mukombozi</a>, who had been living in Kampala, was pictured boarding a plane at Uganda’s Entebbe International Airport. </p>
<p>Muhoozi confirmed on Twitter that Mukombozi had been expelled, describing him as an “enemy of Rwanda and Uganda”. It was not clear where Mukombozi was going, although it was <a href="https://taarifa.rw/robert-mukombozi-rncs-boss-in-australia-deported-to-rwanda/">possibly to Australia</a>, with which he has ties. </p>
<p>No longer a quiet figure in the background, the First Son has recently become vocal on social media about many aspects of Ugandan politics and its foreign affairs. </p>
<p>In many cases, his stances appear to have <a href="https://observer.ug/news/headlines/72924-disregard-muhoozi-s-tweet-backing-russia-on-ukraine-minister-oryem">contradicted</a> some of the official positions of the Ugandan government. These include his tweets in support of Tigrayan rebels in Ethiopia’s civil war, and Russian President Vladimir Putin in his invasion of Ukraine.</p>
<p>Alarming to many is not just the positions Muhoozi has taken, but the <a href="https://observer.ug/viewpoint/72907-what-s-beneath-muhoozi-s-ridiculous-and-outrageous-tweets">bombastic and egotistic tone</a> of his discourse. </p>
<p>He frequently states that he will destroy Uganda’s enemies, and likens himself to military and revolutionary figures throughout history. These are discursive traits that have long been components of his father’s rhetoric.</p>
<p>Yet, across the country and online, multiple ‘Team MK’ or ‘MK 2026’ <a href="https://observer.ug/news/headlines/71516-muhoozi-army-campaigns-for-his-2026-presidential-bid">groups</a> are popping up to support his future presidential run.</p>
<h2>What’s coming?</h2>
<p>The most likely explanation for Muhoozi’s recent emergence is that his once low profile is being raised to position him to succeed his father. If this is indeed the regime’s wish, it would be unwise to bet against it. </p>
<p>However, the pathway for Muhoozi to reach State House is far from guaranteed. The Ugandan public would expect him to win an election to legitimise his leadership, and in so doing he would potentially face 2021 candidate <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/120/481/629/6406415">Bobi Wine</a> in fierce competition for the nation’s increasingly young electorate.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181863/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sam Wilkins has received funding from the British Institute in Eastern Africa</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Vokes has received funding from the Australian Research Council, the Royal Society of New Zealand, the European Union, the Economic and Social Research Council (UK), the British Institute in Eastern Africa, the British Library, and the Australia-Africa Universities Network.</span></em></p>The plan to replace Museveni with his son has dramatically shifted from rumour to reality in recent months.Sam Wilkins, Lecturer, RMIT UniversityRichard Vokes, Professor of Anthropology and International Development, The University of Western AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1824422022-05-11T13:43:28Z2022-05-11T13:43:28ZPeacekeeping in South Sudan: it’s a race against time for the UN<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/461795/original/file-20220506-20-x7yukl.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Troops under the United Nations Mission in South Sudan on patrol in Juba.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Albert Gonzalez Farran/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A notable consequence of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56720589">Russia’s invasion</a> of Ukraine has been the near-complete breakdown of what was already a deeply fraught relationship among the permanent members of the UN Security Council.</p>
<p>Unsurprisingly, the war has also drawn diplomatic focus and media attention away from a depressingly long list of other crises facing the world body.</p>
<p>Efforts to overcome divisions and find common ground among key Council members on conflicts in places such as Syria and Mali have effectively ground to halt, giving way instead to a further sharpening of power rivalry and competition. </p>
<p>Considering these developments, the Council’s decision on 15 March 2022 to <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2022/sc14830.doc.htm#:%7E:text=The%20Security%20Council%20decided%20today,human%20rights%20and%20climate%20change.">renew the mandate</a> of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) stands out as a major achievement.</p>
<p>Russia and China abstained in the final vote on mandate renewal. However, the decision ensures that the mission in South Sudan maintains its existing troop ceiling of 17,000 peacekeepers and 2,100 police officers for one more year.</p>
<p>The mission, which was <a href="https://unmiss.unmissions.org/background">first established</a> in July 2011, will continue its focus on four major tasks: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>protecting civilians</p></li>
<li><p>supporting the delivery of humanitarian aid</p></li>
<li><p>assisting the peace process </p></li>
<li><p>monitoring violations of human rights.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The mandate extension grants South Sudan’s Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity much-needed time to complete the implementation of a <a href="https://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocument/2112">peace agreement</a> reached in 2018.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-sudan-peace-deal-offers-promising-end-to-conflict-but-challenges-remain-112167">South Sudan peace deal offers promising end to conflict. But challenges remain</a>
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<p>The agreement brought about a major reduction in violence arising from the <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/12/12/brief-guide-to-south-sudan-s-fragile-peace-pub-80570">civil war</a> that started in 2013, two years into South Sudan’s independence.</p>
<p>As part of a transitional period, President Salva Kiir and Vice President Riek Machar formed a coalition government in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/2/22/south-sudans-rival-leaders-form-coalition-government">February 2020</a>. </p>
<p>The transitional period was expected to culminate in “free, fair and peaceful elections” in early 2023.</p>
<p>However, the realism of this ambition - given the many challenges and unresolved issues that lie ahead for South Sudan - is looking ever more questionable. That’s because the implementation of the peace agreement’s key provisions has stalled. It is now significantly behind schedule.</p>
<h2>The roadblocks</h2>
<p>Among the major concerns are a lack of progress on the writing of the constitution. There is also the coalition government’s failure to agree on the details and the timetable for elections. This includes clarity around the UN mission’s precise role in supporting the electoral process.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-sudan-root-causes-of-ongoing-conflict-remain-untouched-133542">South Sudan: root causes of ongoing conflict remain untouched</a>
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<p>Aside from the technical and logistical arrangements required for credible elections to go ahead, there is a more formidable challenge. The country needs to establish a political, civic and security environment that is conducive to competitive electoral politics. This environment doesn’t yet exist.</p>
<p>Further, levels of local, sub-national and communal violence <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/04/1116862">remain high</a> and are increasing in parts of the country. Some <a href="https://news.un.org/en/interview/2022/04/1116802">eight million people</a> are facing severe food insecurity, and nearly two million remain <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2022/1/5/why-return-displaced-people-thorny-issue-South-Sudan">internally displaced</a>. </p>
<p>Even as it renewed the South Sudan mission’s mandate and acknowledged signs of progress over the past year, the <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2022/sc14830.doc.htm#:%7E:text=The%20Security%20Council%20decided%20today,human%20rights%20and%20climate%20change.">UN Security Council </a> expressed “deep concern regarding the political, security, economic and humanitarian crisis” in the country.</p>
<h2>Signs of progress</h2>
<p>However, the UN mission’s <a href="https://unmiss.unmissions.org/">record</a> in tackling multiple and interacting challenges should not be dismissed. The mission has responded in proactive ways to instability and persistent levels of violence in South Sudan. </p>
<p>It has reduced static peacekeeping deployments in favour of creating more temporary operating bases. These have been set up near conflict hot spots. Combined with extensive patrolling, they have enhanced the peacekeeper’s mobility and ability to respond in a timely fashion to threats against civilians. </p>
<p>The mission has also encouraged community-level dialogue and supported the negotiation of numerous local peace agreements. This has helped build trust among communities and contributed further to the protection of civilians. </p>
<p>However, despite these achievements, the larger picture remains bleak. </p>
<p>The fundamentals of South Sudan’s political economy of conflict and its <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/rethinking-south-sudans-path-to-democracy/">militarised form of governance</a> have undermined the UN’s limited capacities to control violence, let alone support the move towards more inclusive forms of governance.</p>
<p>In late 2020, an independent strategic review of the South Sudan mission requested by the Security Council <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2020_1224.pdf">concluded</a> that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>achieving durable and inclusive peace in South Sudan requires addressing deeply entrenched power dynamics and political systems that have primarily fuelled violence rather than served to protect citizens and create conditions for them to prosper. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Those power dynamics and systems have not been broken. </p>
<p>The country has a long-established pattern of shifting political allegiances among well-armed ethno-political factions. This has resulted in defections and splintering. Power-sharing arrangements are often short-lived, creating a constant threat of wider breakdown and an upsurge in violence. </p>
<p>In January 2022, President Salva Kir struck an <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/south-sudan/b179-south-sudans-splintered-opposition-preventing-more-conflict">agreement</a> on military leadership with two opposition commanders who broke away from Vice President Riek Machar. This deal is symptomatic of this pattern.</p>
<h2>Why the elections matter</h2>
<p>Against the backdrop of a deteriorating geopolitical environment – and with less than a year to go before the end of the transitional period – the preparations, conduct and aftermath of the elections in South Sudan will prove critical to the prospects for peace and stability.</p>
<p>In theory, post-conflict elections are meant to confer domestic and international legitimacy on fragile, post-war governing structures. They are meant to encourage the growth of non-violent politics and support societal transformation towards durable peace. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/peace-in-south-sudan-hinges-on-forging-a-unified-military-force-but-its-proving-hard-181547">Peace in South Sudan hinges on forging a unified military force: but it's proving hard</a>
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<p>In reality, introducing electoral competition into war-torn and deeply divided societies has often had the very opposite effect. It has sharpened and exacerbated conflict rather than mitigated it.</p>
<p>The ‘winner-takes-all approach’ to politics and elections makes this a real danger in South Sudan. As Nick Haysom, head of the UN mission in the country, <a href="https://unmiss.unmissions.org/briefing-un-security-council-secretary-general%E2%80%99s-special-representative-south-sudan-nicholas-0">noted</a> in 2021, unless technical and political preparations are in place, the elections: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>could be a catastrophe instead of a turning point. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Yet, the time for preparation is short.</p>
<p>From a political perspective, a formula for power sharing, irrespective of who wins, should be worked out before elections are held. </p>
<p>Also, the mission’s role in brokering local peace agreements and supporting non-military forms of civilian protection through its field offices will become more critical as the elections loom.</p>
<p>Last, but not least, mobilising and actively engaging neighbouring states, key regional players and organisations – specifically the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the African Union – in support of South Sudan’s peace process have become even more important. This follows the geopolitical fall-out from the war in Ukraine and the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60203208">deepening of tensions</a> within the UN Security Council. </p>
<p>The proposed 2023 elections may be postponed, as they have in the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27381509">past</a>. However, Security Council politics make this less likely.</p>
<p>If the elections were to go ahead resulting in increased violence or even a return to full-scale civil war, there is no guarantee that the Council will again renew the UN’s presence in South Sudan.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/182442/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mats Berdal does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The UN voted to extend its presence in South Sudan for another year. However, its success in the country faces many challenges.Mats Berdal, Professor and Director of Conflict, Security and Development Research Group, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1818832022-05-01T08:29:57Z2022-05-01T08:29:57ZHow Chad’s involvement in peace missions held back democracy back home<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/459735/original/file-20220426-14-agr0t0.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Chadian soldiers benefited from foreign aids and training.</span> </figcaption></figure><p>Troop contributions to international interventions by authoritarian states pose a puzzle. On the one hand, participation in such interventions indicates support for a liberal-cosmopolitan order that entails the protection of human rights at an international level. On the other, authoritarian regimes deny these rights to their own citizens. </p>
<p>Research on this puzzle has produced contradictory findings. </p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2022.2067968">Some</a> assume that, in the medium to long term, troop deployment supports democratisation efforts and eventually helps implementing a liberal-cosmopolitan order.</p>
<p>Others challenge this perspective. For example professor of international affairs Arturo C. <a href="https://www.press.jhu.edu/books/title/10959/myth-democratic-peacekeeper">Sotomayor</a> argues that this is a “myth of democratic peacekeepers”. The military, in many places a key obstacle towards democratisation, does not necessarily become democratic through their participation in peace operations. Academics in political science and international affairs Jamie Levin, Joseph MacKay, and Abouzar Nasirzadeh go even further to argue that troop deployment <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2015.1108845">impedes democratic change</a>. </p>
<p>I argue that Chad during the reign of President Idriss Déby supports this.</p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2022.2067968">My central argument</a> is that Déby used participation in international interventions for his own purposes, namely to stay in power. He lacked <a href="https://doi.org/10.3790/soc.64.1.53">domestic legitimacy</a> and presided over a little-institutionalised state between 1990 until his death in 2021. Through his participation in international interventions, Déby made himself an indispensable ally of France (and to a lesser extent of the US) and helped them further their interests in the wider Sahel. </p>
<p>Déby benefited threefold from his alignment with France and his active stance in international interventions. First, he received large-scale funding that he could feed into his patronage network and strengthen the military. </p>
<p>Second, he could reduce tensions within the military by sending parts of it abroad. </p>
<p>And finally, and most importantly, he secured the support of major external actors who helped silencing national and international criticism against his rule. In 2019, the French government even <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2019/02/airstrikes-stability-what-french-army-doing-chad/">rescued the Chadian president</a> once rebels advanced toward the capital.</p>
<h2>The dividend of troop deployment</h2>
<p>Chadian troops have participated in several international interventions on the continent. This includes France’s and the United Nation’s operations in Mali, the operations of the G5 Sahel and Multinational Joint Task Force in the Sahel, and the operations of the African Union and the Economic Community of Central African States in the Central African Republic.</p>
<p>For Déby the financial benefits of providing peacekeeping forces were significant. </p>
<p>France alone allocated €12 million a year to Chad throughout the 2010s for structural cooperation . In addition, <a href="https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/rap-info/i2114.asp">donations and other forms of aid</a> worth €53 million were provided through the French forces which maintained a large base in Chad. </p>
<p>Chad also benefited from joining the <a href="https://theconversation.com/setting-up-the-g5-sahel-why-an-option-that-seemed-unlikely-came-into-being-180422">G5 Sahel Joint Force</a> and the Multinational Joint Task Force. The two coalitions were established to fight al-Qaida, Boko Haram, and their affiliates in the region.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/setting-up-the-g5-sahel-why-an-option-that-seemed-unlikely-came-into-being-180422">Setting up the G5 Sahel: why an option that seemed unlikely came into being</a>
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<p>Donors were willing <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/291-what-role-multinational-joint-task-force-fighting-boko-haram">to spend more</a> on these mechanisms than they would have been prepared to offer on a purely bilateral basis. </p>
<p>Another source of foreign funding were the reimbursements paid by the United Nations for the peacekeepers. The 1,090 Chadian troops deployed in peace operations in 2014, for example, meant a reimbursement of an estimated US$17.4 million for that <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/deployment-and-reimbursement">year</a>. </p>
<p>These funds benefited the military as well Déby’s regime in two ways. Chadian troops became better equipped and trained, which helped the Chadian leader in his fight against domestic rebels and other challengers. And Chad received large amounts of development aid in the slipstream of military assistance. These funds could be fed into the patronage network, resembling a kind of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2017.1283926">“rentier peacekeeping.”</a></p>
<p>Déby benefited from participation in military operations in other ways too. Sending troops abroad helped him ensure that the military would not turn into a threat. Such a threat loomed large after he provided some positions within the military to his group, the Bideyat. Sending some forces abroad <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiw3Ov1uLH3AhUxQ_EDHRhpAp0QFnoECAIQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.almendron.com%2Ftribuna%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2021%2F05%2Fan-emerging-military-power-in-central-africa-chad-under-idriss-deby.pdf&usg=AOvVaw1fs6xXSp-QTMaiWjg0cHEJ">mitigated internal tensions</a> within the group.</p>
<p>It was nevertheless costly, and led to rivalries with other segments of the security apparatus. </p>
<p>Lastly, Déby saw his international reputation rise – and dependence on him increase as well. </p>
<p>Even though oil revenues had generated funds to improve the military’s capabilities and secure Déby’s regime from within (Chad became a large oil exporter in the <a href="https://www.oilandgasonline.com/doc/chad-prepares-to-be-an-oil-producer-0001">2000s</a> there were nevertheless a host of external threats especially in the early days of his rule. </p>
<p>As such, Chad had suffered from insecurity in its neighbouring states and from a proxy war fought on its soil. A different kind of threat stemmed from French politicians who had vigorously demanded democratic reforms in Chad. </p>
<p>It was the eventual support for France, the US, and their counter-terrorism agenda that led to a situation in which Déby’s rule became significantly less challenged from abroad. </p>
<p>Chad’s active participation in international interventions and Déby’s willingness to assume casualties – particularly in Mali, where his troops fought alongside France – were the main factors that brought that change. The Chadian president could translate the external recognition, visible, for example, through several visits of French presidents, into a stronger domestic position that overshadowed concerns about the legitimacy of his rule. </p>
<p>At Déby’s funeral in April 2021 Macron dignified Chad’s late president as a “friend” and <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/chad-holds-funeral-for-late-president-idris-deby-itno/a-57307686">“courageous”</a> soldier. </p>
<h2>The downside</h2>
<p>But international support for Déby and the dependence on his troops had a downside: it came at the expense of democracy and respect for human rights. </p>
<p>Chadian civil society was frequently frustrated with the unconditional support Déby received from his international backers. Western governments ignored calls from national and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/04/20/chad-deby-leaves-legacy-abuse">international NGOs</a> to hold Déby’s regime accountable for the human rights abuses and antidemocratic practices in the country. Authoritarian rule was effectively strengthened. Déby was just too important. </p>
<p>And the pattern seems to be repeating itself for his son Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno who succeeded him after his death.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181883/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The German Foundation for Peace Research kindly supported this research project.</span></em></p>International support for Déby and the dependence on Chad’s peacekeeping troops had a downside: it came at the expense of democracy and respect for human rights.Martin Welz, Lecturer of Political Science, University of HamburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1788402022-03-11T13:20:23Z2022-03-11T13:20:23ZHumanitarian corridors could help civilians safely leave Ukraine – but Russia has a history of not respecting these pathways<p>As Russia continues to target houses, apartment buildings, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60675599">hospitals</a> <a href="https://time.com/6153295/russia-ukraine-war-crimes/">and civilians in Ukraine, there</a> are <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220307-un-calls-for-safe-aid-delivery-to-ukraine-combat-zones">mounting calls</a> from international aid groups to safely evacuate and protect Ukrainians caught in the war. </p>
<p>Simultaneously, rising numbers of people still in Ukraine <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1113352">are in desperate need of food,</a> medical supplies, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60637338">water and other lifesaving materials.</a></p>
<p>Russia and Ukraine have discussed what are called “humanitarian corridors” during negotiations. These are meant to allow civilians trapped in dangerous cities to leave, with the assurance that they will be safe while evacuating. They are also often used to ensure the safety of aid workers and conveys delivering aid. </p>
<p>An <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/about-35-000-ukrainians-evacuate-zelenskyy-says-more-corridors-planned-/6478042.html">estimated 35,000 Ukrainians</a> were evacuated through such pathways on March 9, 2022, alone, according to Ukrainian President Vlodymyr Zelenskyy. </p>
<p>But these corridors <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/03/ukraine-humanitarian-corridors-for-civilians-fleeing-russian-attacks-must-provide-safety-new-testimonies/">remain unreliable transit points in Ukraine.</a> Russia has repeatedly attacked civilians traveling these routes.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/08/ukraine-refugees-2-million-russia/">More than 2 million Ukrainians</a> have left the country since the start of the war. </p>
<p>As experts on <a href="https://batten.virginia.edu/people/kirsten-gelsdorf">international humanitarian policy</a> and <a href="https://isim.georgetown.edu/profile/jacob-kurtzer/">relief efforts</a>, our experience shows that while humanitarian corridors could create safe exit routes out of besieged cities – and allow aid to reach people within Ukraine – they are only part of the solution to protecting civilians during war. </p>
<p>That’s because these routes rely on all warring parties to respect the corridors as protected spaces. In the worst case, humanitarian corridors can be manipulated to do even more harm by exposing fleeing civilians – who trust and believe they are safe – to further attack. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451444/original/file-20220310-27-qf48hz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="The body of a person lies on the ground of a destroyed bridge, with cars parked in the foreground." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451444/original/file-20220310-27-qf48hz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451444/original/file-20220310-27-qf48hz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451444/original/file-20220310-27-qf48hz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451444/original/file-20220310-27-qf48hz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451444/original/file-20220310-27-qf48hz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451444/original/file-20220310-27-qf48hz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451444/original/file-20220310-27-qf48hz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The body of a civilian is seen on a destroyed bridge used to evacuate residents from Irpin, Ukraine, on March 7, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/the-body-of-a-civilian-whose-cause-of-death-was-not-confirmed-is-seen-picture-id1382305739?s=2048x2048">Chris McGrath/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Safe zones, safe passage</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/dms/Documents/AccessMechanisms.pdf">Humanitarian corridors,</a> sometimes referred to as safe zones, or safe corridors, are routes in conflict zones that are supposed to ensure the safe passage of people and materials. </p>
<p>In practice, humanitarian corridors mean different things in different political contexts and conflicts. They can be roads where civilians can travel, but planes are not permitted to fly overhead. They sometimes connect people from one point to another within a country, or across country borders. They generally exist for a specific time period, extending from mere hours to months.</p>
<p>Warring parties agree to set up and respect these corridors for strictly humanitarian – not political – purposes. Third parties, like the United Nations, or another country involved in the conflict, may also play a role in establishing humanitarian corridors. </p>
<p>But in order for humanitarian corridors to succeed in keeping people safe and healthy, they need to be accompanied by cease-fires, security guarantees and diplomatic trade-offs. </p>
<p>This requires confidence that all parties to a conflict will not target civilians or aid workers traveling these paths. But, as in the current Ukraine war, this doesn’t always happen. Despite Russia’s promises to set up humanitarian corridors, it is targeting and killing civilians trying to leave Ukraine or leave besieged cities. </p>
<p>Because of this, emergency relief experts like ourselves sometimes view humanitarian corridors <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/report/95101/briefing-why-humanitarians-wary-%E2%80%9Chumanitarian-corridors%E2%80%9D">with great caution</a>. We see them not as the only choice, but as part of broader efforts to help civilians caught in a crisis. </p>
<h2>Where humanitarian corridors have been used</h2>
<p>Humanitarian corridors were <a href="https://brill.com/view/book/edcoll/9789004431140/BP000044.xml">used</a> in World War II, when <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/newsround/46877532">children were evacuated from Nazi-controlled territory</a> by trains to the United Kingdom. </p>
<p>More than 40 years later, the U.N. helped set up “corridors of tranquility” during the <a href="https://securelivelihoods.org/wp-content/uploads/Reviewing-key-lessons-from-Operation-Lifeline-Sudan-and-past-humanitarian-operations-in-South-Sudan.pdf">second Sudanese Civil War</a>. These corridors helped the U.N. transport essential supplies to civilians.</p>
<p>The U.N. <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/3ae6a0c58.pdf">first mandated peacekeeper-controlled humanitarian corridors</a> during the Bosnian War between 1992 and 1994, to provide civilians in Sarajevo with lifesaving supplies.</p>
<p>The U.N. also used its peacekeepers to protect <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/30/there-are-no-real-safe-zones-and-there-never-have-been-syria-iraq-bosnia-rwanda/">“safe areas” for civilians</a> within Bosnia. But these areas failed to keep people safe when the Bosnian Serb army <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/bosnia-herzegovina/srebrenica/background/safe-area">murdered and raped thousands of non-Serb</a>, Muslim women inside those areas. </p>
<p>Sometimes, warring parties do not agree to set up humanitarian corridors.</p>
<p>Humanitarian organizations requested civilian corridors in <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/interview/5l9jzb.htm">Iraq</a> in 2003 to reach civilians. They again asked Iraq and the Islamic State to establish corridors <a href="https://www.iom.int/news/iom-calls-humanitarian-corridors-access-displaced-iraq">in 2014</a>. But humanitarian corridors were not established during those conflicts. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451441/original/file-20220310-19-1rsem32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A crowd of women holding children and young people are seen in front of rows of tents" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451441/original/file-20220310-19-1rsem32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451441/original/file-20220310-19-1rsem32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451441/original/file-20220310-19-1rsem32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451441/original/file-20220310-19-1rsem32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451441/original/file-20220310-19-1rsem32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=486&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451441/original/file-20220310-19-1rsem32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=486&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451441/original/file-20220310-19-1rsem32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=486&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Refugees from the Bosnian ‘safe area’ set up by the U.N. are pictured at a refugee camp in July 1995.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/refugees-from-the-fallen-bosnian-safe-area-of-srebrenica-walk-among-picture-id881070242?s=2048x2048">Odd Andersen/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Humanitarian corridors in Ukraine</h2>
<p>Russia’s opening position in talks with Ukraine has given international negotiators <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/ukraine-rejects-russia-cease-fire-humanitarian-corridors-putin-belarus-rcna18936">serious pause</a> about Russia’s intentions and underlying ambitions.</p>
<p>For example, Russia declared a cease-fire on March 5, 2022, to <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/03/05/1084723350/russia-offers-ceasefire-in-two-parts-of-ukraine-to-allow-civilians-to-leave">evacuate civilians from Mariupol and Volnovakha,</a> two cities under siege in Ukraine. But Russia’s announcement did not ensure people’s safety. </p>
<p>Russia and close ally Belarus offered Ukrainians another safe <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/asia/top-wrap-1-ukrainians-trapped-besieged-city-fighting-blocks-evacuation-efforts-2022-03-07/">escape route on March 7, 2022</a>. Under this plan, people from Kyiv and Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest city, could cross to Belarus or Russia. A spokesperson for Zelenskyy said the Russian proposal, which Ukraine rejected, was “completely immoral.” </p>
<p>Zelenskyy has also questioned whether humanitarian corridors actually exist in Ukraine. When international relief workers tried to leave Mariupol along the agreed-upon route, alongside civilians, on March 6, 2022, they soon realized “the road indicated to them was actually mined,” Dominik Stillhart, director of operations for the International Committee of the Red Cross, <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/land-mines-proposed-ukraine-evacuations-humanitarian-corridor-red-cross-2022-3">told the BBC.</a> </p>
<p>Zelenskyy has continued to <a href="https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/zelenskyy-talks-with-eu-chief-von-der-leyen-about-humanitarian-corridors-122031000026_1.html">press for secure humanitarian corridors</a>. </p>
<p>“There was a lot of talk about humanitarian corridors,” Zelenskyy <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/land-mines-proposed-ukraine-evacuations-humanitarian-corridor-red-cross-2022-3">said in a March 6 video address</a>. “There were talks every day about the opportunity for people to leave the cities where Russians came. But there are no humanitarian corridors. Instead of humanitarian corridors, they can only make bloody ones.”</p>
<p>Russia again <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/ukraine-humanitarian-impact-situation-report-300-pm-eet-9-march-2022">agreed to six humanitarian safe passage routes</a> on March 9, 2022. But Russia has continued to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-has-switched-tactics-targeting-civilians-ukraine-adviser-says-2022-03-10/">target civilians as they leave Ukraine</a>. </p>
<p>Meanwhile fighting in Ukraine continues, and Ukrainian civilian deaths – <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/03/10/russia-invasion-killed-549-civilians-in-ukraine-united-nations-says.html">topping at least 549, including 41 children</a> – rise each day. </p>
<h2>Russia’s bad record</h2>
<p>Some experts say that Russia’s <a href="https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/approach-with-caution-lessons-for-ukraine-from-the-russian-approach-to-ceasefires-and-humanitarian-access-in-syria/">involvement in the Syrian conflict could offer a window</a> into its Ukraine war strategy. </p>
<p>Russia offered humanitarian corridors for civilians to leave Ghouta, Syria, in 2018, amid heavy fighting. But the different conflict parties, including the Syrian government and various domestic opposition groups, did not jointly agree to these corridors, and international organizations like the U.N. did not monitor them. Few civilians actually traveled those routes. </p>
<p>Russia also has a history of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/29/world/middleeast/united-nations-syria-russia.html">targeting and attacking</a> health care and other civilian facilities in Syria, for example, even after humanitarian organizations announced the location of these places and passageways. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451445/original/file-20220310-23-1yj6yss.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A row of people stand next to an open truck, filled with bags and people. An empty dirt road is behind them." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451445/original/file-20220310-23-1yj6yss.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451445/original/file-20220310-23-1yj6yss.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451445/original/file-20220310-23-1yj6yss.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451445/original/file-20220310-23-1yj6yss.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451445/original/file-20220310-23-1yj6yss.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=462&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451445/original/file-20220310-23-1yj6yss.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=462&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451445/original/file-20220310-23-1yj6yss.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=462&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A humanitarian corridor for civilians leaving the Rukban refugee camp in Syria is shown on Feb. 23, 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/humanitarian-corridor-for-refugees-leaving-the-rukban-refugee-camp-picture-id1126798355?s=2048x2048">Konstantin Machulsky\TASS via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Part of the solution</h2>
<p>While humanitarian corridors are often talked about, they have not regularly been able to ease the safe passage of large numbers of civilians or aid supplies during war.</p>
<p>There also has not been <a href="https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/20.500.12413/15662/883_Humanitarian_corridors_and_pauses.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">extensive research</a> on using humanitarian corridors, or what can make them effective. </p>
<p>As the war presses on, Ukrainian civilians need assurances of safety. But history shows us that both diplomatic and humanitarian strategies aimed to assist in a crisis can sometimes do additional harm. Above all, the priority has to be ensuring the safety of all individuals caught in a crisis, and ultimately an end to the fighting. </p>
<p>[<em>More than 150,000 readers get one of The Conversation’s informative newsletters.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?source=inline-140K">Join the list today</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178840/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Funding from United Nations, Sesame Workshop, American Red Cross
Senior Fellow with UN Centre for Humanitarian Data
</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Funding from USAID. Director and Senior Fellow of the Humanitarian Agenda at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. </span></em></p>Tens of thousands of Ukrainians are using humanitarian corridors to leave the country. But these routes are often announced for political reasons and do not always offer safetyKirsten Gelsdorf, Professor of Practice and Director of Global Humanitarian Policy, Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy, University of Virginia, University of VirginiaJacob Kurtzer, Director and Senior fellow, CSIS Humanitarian Agenda, Georgetown UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1694042021-10-08T14:47:11Z2021-10-08T14:47:11ZCircles of impunity: why sexual violence by humanitarians and peacekeepers keeps happening<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/425092/original/file-20211006-23-b5v314.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>I first visited the North Kivu region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 1994 during the genocide in neighbouring <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26875506">Rwanda</a>. In Goma’s emergency hospital, <a href="http://www.mukeshkapila.org/book/about-book.html">I witnessed</a> rows and rows of rape survivors who had fled across the border.</p>
<p>A quarter-century later, it is hurting again in the same place, for the same reason: sexual violence. But what is different is that the alleged perpetrators are humanitarians, sent to save the community from a deadly <a href="https://theconversation.com/ebola-returns-to-the-drc-for-the-10th-time-heres-what-we-know-101048">Ebola outbreak</a>. The humanitarian workers are said to have demanded sexual favours from women and girls trying to make a few dollars from low-level work in international agencies.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/2020/09/29/exclusive-more-50-women-accuse-aid-workers-sex-abuse-congo-ebola-crisis#audio">initial exposé</a> in 2019, including <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fnLPaLju5-g">testimony by victims</a>, pushed the World Health Organization to investigate its DRC operations <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2021/9/29/WHO-rocked-by-Ebola-sex-abuse-scandal-in-Congo?utm_campaign=social&utm_medium=social&utm_source=Twitter">belatedly</a> in 2020. The consequent <a href="https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/ethics/ic-final-report-28092021-en-version.pdf?sfvrsn=fef409a0_9&download=true">Independent Commission report</a> took yet another year. It identified at least 83 alleged perpetrators, mostly Congolese but also foreign employees. This is just the tip as survivors are usually reticent to come forward.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.dw.com/en/aid-workers-accused-of-sexual-abuse-in-dr-congo/a-55108146">Many women</a> were forced to have sex without condoms, several had children and others were coerced to get abortions. The psychosocial impacts and stigmatisation of affected women ruined families. </p>
<p>The report paints an appalling wider picture of prevailing <a href="https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/documents/ethics/sexual-exploitation-and-abuse-pamphlet-en.pdf?sfvrsn=409b4d89_2">sexual exploitation and abuse</a>. Sexual exploitation is the misuse of power and trust to take sexual advantage of a more vulnerable or dependent person. When this leads to actual or threatened physical intrusion, it constitutes sexual abuse (including rape).</p>
<p><a href="https://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/ituc_violence_rdc_eng_lr.pdf.pdf">Sexual violence</a> and <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/attacks-health-care-during-10th-ebola-response-democratic-republic">attacks on healthcare</a> were rife in the eastern DRC. Undeterred, the WHO resolved to do better in its Ebola response after <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5394645/">heavy criticism</a> of its poor performance in the 2014-16 <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/history/2014-2016-outbreak/index.html">West African Ebola outbreak</a>. So, it expanded rapidly – eventually deploying 2,800 personnel.</p>
<p>These factors explain the context but not excuse the WHO’s careless deployment of unvetted, untrained staff, and management systems that initially played down complaints of sexual misdeeds, created bureaucratic obstacles for victims to be heard, and delayed timely investigation and correction.</p>
<p>This appalling failure has re-focused wider attention on the sexual misconduct that surfaces with <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/feature/2021/2/11/25-years-of-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse">disgraceful regularity</a> in humanitarian, development, and peacekeeping operations worldwide. They get away with it because victims are routinely ignored, there is little accountability of perpetrators, and there are few costs for institutions that shield them.</p>
<h2>Regular incidents in the aid sector</h2>
<p>Sexual exploitation and abuse are widely prevalent. Egregious examples included criminal abuse by Oxfam staff in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/15/timeline-oxfam-sexual-exploitation-scandal-in-haiti">Haiti</a>, some of whom moved from one country to another including Chad and DRC. There was also senior-level sexual misconduct at <a href="https://www.savethechildren.org.uk/news/media-centre/press-releases/save-the-children-response-to-charity-commission-report">Save the Children</a>. The Red Cross Red Crescent has not been immune with allegations of misconduct among its 192 <a href="https://groundviews.org/2015/10/14/allegations-of-sexual-misconduct-red-cross-in-the-spotlight/">National Societies</a> and at the <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/document/taking-action-prevent-and-address-staff-misconduct">International Committee of the Red Cross</a> and <a href="https://www.devex.com/news/they-did-nothing-to-protect-me-a-survivor-questions-ifrc-s-zero-tolerance-approach-to-sexual-harassment-98271">International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent</a>.</p>
<p>Other UN bodies – including the UN refugee agency <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/un-knew-of-sex-for-food-scandal-at-top-charities-xlkgkt0kb?region=global">and the World Food Programme</a> -– were among 40 agencies implicated in a food-for-sex scandal in West Africa.</p>
<p>The response is almost standard: the organisation apologises, promises to do better, and appoints sexual exploitation and abuse focal points. They make more regulations, design further guidelines, push gender equality, and institute greater staff training. </p>
<p>These are all recommended <a href="https://theconversation.com/sexual-abuse-during-humanitarian-operations-still-happens-what-must-be-done-to-end-it-169223?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Latest%20from%20The%20Conversation%20for%20October%205%202021%20-%202078920516&utm_content=Latest%20from%20The%20Conversation%20for%20October%205%202021%20-%202078920516+CID_893bca04751e12f6438a6e133b1fc167&utm_source=campaign_monitor_africa&utm_term=points%20out">good practices</a>. But, to avoid public embarrassment that undermines <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/health-56670162">donor funding</a>, the culprits are often not prosecuted. Instead, they are quietly fired or contracts are not extended. </p>
<p>Indeed, non-disclosure exit agreements or privacy rights mean that data on offenders are often <a href="https://old.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/international-development-committee/inquiries/parliament-2017/sexual-exploitation-in-aid-sector/">not shared</a>, allowing perpetrators to join another unsuspecting organisation and re-offend. Negligent managers on whose watch such things happen may get a mild rap or move to another role. They may even be promoted. The circle of impunity is thereby completed.</p>
<h2>Peacekeeping operations</h2>
<p>Peacekeeping operations have a long history of <a href="https://www.e-ir.info/2020/02/20/sexual-abuse-in-un-peacekeeping-the-problem-of-viewing-women-as-a-quick-fix/">predatory sexual culture</a>. Underage girls were kidnapped, raped and prostituted by UN and NATO personnel in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/may/07/balkans">Kosovo</a>. In <a href="https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/06/14/bosnia_1102.pdf">Bosnia</a>, UN police officers operated a sex trafficking ring. More recently, peacekeepers from Gabon and France behaved horribly in the <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20210915-un-withdraws-gabon-peacekeepers-from-car-after-sex-abuse-claims">Central African Republic</a>. But the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/united-nations-pakistan-africa-sexual-abuse-international-news-69e56ab46cab400f9f4b3753bd79c930">record for rape and abuse</a> by UN peacekeepers is in Congo: 700 of 2,000 worldwide allegations over 12 years. </p>
<p>The UN’s <a href="https://conduct.unmissions.org/table-of-allegations">database</a> shows that abusers come from all continents. Africans are prominent as both victims and abusers, indicating the high prevalence of both peacekeeping missions on the continent and African force contributions to them. </p>
<p>The UN is not short on rhetoric around sexual abuse and exploitation. It has a <a href="https://www.un.org/preventing-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse/content/prevention">zero tolerance</a> policy, a high-level <a href="https://www.un.org/preventing-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse/content/un-special-coordinator-0">Special Coordinator</a>, a much-hyped <a href="https://www.un.org/preventing-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse/content/circle-leadership">strategy complete with its “circle of leadership”</a>, a <a href="https://www.un.org/management/">Conduct and Discipline Service</a>, and many <a href="https://conduct.unmissions.org/prevention-risk-assessment">risk management tools and training</a>. There is also as a do-no-harm <a href="https://www.un.org/preventing-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse/content/voluntary-compact">Voluntary Compact</a> signed by 103 states. </p>
<p>This impressive array is empowered by at least seven <a href="https://www.un.org/preventing-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse/content/resolutions">Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions</a> and many <a href="https://www.un.org/preventing-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse/content/statements">statements</a> issued by numerous <a href="https://www.un.org/preventing-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse/content/purpose">high-level meetings</a>.</p>
<h2>Set up to fail</h2>
<p>The system has commendable intent but is set up to fail. The UN has little authority other than to send home the errant peacekeepers. Few get disciplined by their home authorities; often cases are simply not investigated or are closed for “lack of evidence”.</p>
<p>The UN is usually reluctant to offend its Member States on whom it depends for peacekeepers. Serial abusers can get recycled from operation to operation. Cash-strapped nations can get their ill-trained and ill-disciplined militaries subsidised through <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-43046554">deployment fees</a> from the massive <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2021/gaab4368.doc.htm">UN peacekeeping budget</a>. Fragile states may also prefer to keep their soldiers abroad rather than making coups at <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022343317747668">home</a>.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the victim is left high and dry, without even the consolation of seeing her abuser held to account. Fearing that it would open the floodgates, the UN does <a href="https://pseataskforce.org/uploads/tools/faqsseabyunpersonnelandpartners_echaecpsunandngotaskforceonpsea_english.pdf">not compensate</a> victims who have suffered at the hands of its agents. The injustice is self-evident. The <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/10/02/drc-president-frustrated-by-despicable-sex-abuse-by-who-workers/">irony</a> is that she has more likelihood of redress from a domestic court in a poorly governed nation with a weak legal system, than in the zone of international operations governed by <a href="https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_1_1961.pdf">immunity</a> and <a href="https://www.ibanet.org/article/CEBC5F69-A238-49BB-B85A-5E8D878FE485">impunity</a>. </p>
<p>That is why <a href="https://healthpolicy-watch.org/humbled-and-horrified-who-reacts-to-findings-on-dr-congo-sexual-abuse-but-will-high-level-who-officials-accused-be-investigated-too/">what the WHO does</a> now is of crucial importance. Its <a href="https://www.who.int/director-general">director general</a> is commended for commissioning his own independent probe. He also earned trust by releasing its findings openly, without editing. He has boldly taken <a href="https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-remarks-at-the-press-conference-on-the-report-of-the-independent-commission-on-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse---28-september-2021">ultimate responsibility</a> for his employees’ misdeeds. </p>
<h2>What must change</h2>
<p>The WHO remains under the microscope as it brings longer-term internal changes to prevent recurrence. Meanwhile, it must not tarry to make immediate amends. Three elements are crucial.</p>
<p>First and foremost, the victims must receive meaningful financial compensation, beyond medical and psychosocial support. </p>
<p>Second, everything must be done to trace the perpetrators and bring them to court. </p>
<p>Third, WHO managers who did not ensure a safe work environment must be held publicly accountable and incur penalties commensurate with their share of the responsibility for failure.</p>
<p>The DRC Ebola operation will not be the last time that vulnerable people are <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2017/8/10/why-do-some-peacekeepers-rape-the-full-report">sexually preyed upon</a> by people sent to help or protect them. But strengthening accountability, bringing justice and giving redress can raise the costs of offending. That will also show that “saying sorry” carries meaning and “zero tolerance” is more than a slogan.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/169404/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mukesh Kapila has worked as senior director at the World Health Organization and in the United Nations system. He was also Under Secretary-General at IFRC. He also headed the humanitarian function in the UK Government (Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office), responsible for funding policy towards countries and agencies mentioned here. </span></em></p>WHO’s safeguarding failure in the DRC has re-focused attention on the sexual misconduct that surfaces with disgraceful regularity in humanitarian, development, and peacekeeping operations worldwide.Mukesh Kapila, Professor Emeritus in Global Health & Humanitarian Affairs, University of ManchesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1647172021-07-26T15:24:04Z2021-07-26T15:24:04ZMilitary not a magic bullet: South Africa needs to do more for long term peace<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/413119/original/file-20210726-26-vb3azi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African Defence Force troops on patrol in Alexandra, Johannesburg, following recent violence and looting. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In a show of force unprecedented since South Africa became a democracy in 1994, the South African National Defence Force has <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/sandf-forces-continue-to-arrive-in-kzn-following-a-week-of-violence-faae84c3-64b0-474b-9716-f5147c86fcb6">commissioned 25,000</a> soldiers for deployment across KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng, the two provinces most affected by <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/22/south-africa-unrest-death-toll-jumps-to-more-than-300">recent riots and large scale looting</a>. </p>
<p>President Cyril Ramaphosa announced the deployment of the troops to <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/speeches/address-president-cyril-ramaphosa-acts-violence-and-destruction-property">support the country’s police</a>, who had been overwhelmed by the scale of the violence.</p>
<p>Governments usually deploy the military as the last line of defence when they face an insurrection or <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/columnists/qaanitah_hunter/qaanitah-hunter-an-insurrection-or-not-why-governments-confusion-doesnt-solve-sas-crises-20210721">revolt</a>. The threat of or use of military force is the ultimate arbiter to quell unrest that threatens state stability or the safety of citizens, as seen in Nigeria, where the deployment of the army on internal security operations <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-use-of-nigerian-soldiers-in-civil-unrest-whats-in-place-and-whats-missing-149283">has increased dramatically since 1999</a>.</p>
<p>In South Africa, the military has recently been deployed to <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-army-is-being-used-to-fight-cape-towns-gangs-why-its-a-bad-idea-120455">counter gang violence</a> on the Cape Flats and during the <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-military-is-not-suited-for-the-fight-against-covid-19-heres-why-138560">COVID-19 pandemic</a>. In all these instances, there are concerns about how effective it is in these roles. </p>
<p>In South Africa, for now, the deployment of the army troops to assist the police has brought about an <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/07/21/explainer-what-caused-south-africa-s-week-of-rioting//">uneasy calm</a>. But what South Africans are seeing is a negative peace – where a degree of normality returns, but in which the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/422690?seq=2#metadata_info_tab_contents">underlying causes of the conflict remain</a>. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-army-is-being-used-to-fight-cape-towns-gangs-why-its-a-bad-idea-120455">The army is being used to fight Cape Town's gangs. Why it's a bad idea</a>
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<p>The military may help create a more stable and secure environment, curb violence and unrest in the short term, but this is unlikely to result in a <a href="https://www.redalyc.org/pdf/4135/413546002004.pdf">sustainable and lasting peace</a>. The cultural and structural issues underlying the violence need to be <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-07-15-whats-behind-violence-in-south-africa-a-sociologists-perspective/">addressed</a>. These relate to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/pandemic-underscores-gross-inequalities-in-south-africa-and-the-need-to-fix-them-135070">inequalities</a> and injustices embedded in the structure of society. </p>
<p>The military is no magic bullet.</p>
<h2>Concerns about army deployment</h2>
<p>There are many concerns around the use of the military internally in domestic operations within the borders of one’s own country.</p>
<p>The first concerns the government’s use of the military <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10246029.2019.1650787">against its own citizens</a>. As seen in both Nigeria and South Africa, the military is typically not trained or equipped to deal with civil unrest and has limited experience in riot control.</p>
<p>One risk is that communities might deliberately act out in ways that <a href="http://www.hsrc.ac.za/en/news/general/SANDF-covid-19">provoke the soldiers</a>, which could result in excessive use of force. This can affect trust in the military, affecting the legitimacy of the state. The South African government has already faced criticism for its heavy handed and highly militarised approach during the <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/SouthAfrica/News/un-human-rights-office-highlights-toxic-lockdown-culture-in-sa-20200428">early phase of lockdown in 2020</a>. However, in general the population has a far higher level of trust in the military <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ab_r6_dispatchno90_south_africa_trust_in_officials.pdf">than in other state institutions</a>.</p>
<p>The second risk pertains to prominence given to the military when faced with situations of civil unrest. Giving the military a prominent role in political decision-making in dealing with civil unrest can <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-army-is-being-used-to-fight-cape-towns-gangs-why-its-a-bad-idea-120455">lead to a culture of militarism and militarisation</a>. This results in the increased political reliance and economic investment in the military to assist with solving societal problems.</p>
<p>This can undermine attempts at finding more constructive approaches at conflict resolution. </p>
<h2>Achilles’ heel</h2>
<p>The army will inevitably be called in again to support the police. Whether the soldiers can provide this support given their <a href="https://theconversation.com/covid-19-south-africas-neglected-military-faces-mission-impossible-133250">limited capacity</a> is the big question. Those deployed are predominantly from the infantry, of which there are only 14 battalions, not all of which can deploy internally. Then there are the commitments to peacekeeping operations and the border, and now to Mozambique. </p>
<p>In its present form, the military cannot adequately respond to the threats facing the country internally and externally, due to the way it is <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-mulls-future-of-its-military-to-make-it-fit-for-purpose-146423">structured, funded and trained</a>. The military is structured for <a href="https://courses.lumenlearning.com/boundless-sociology/chapter/war-and-terrorism/">conventional warfare</a>. This requires expensive equipment and training and does not allow sufficient flexibility to perform the functions it actually does.</p>
<p>South Africa needs a military that is more capable of responding to all the challenges facing the country. These include <a href="https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/DCAF_BG_15_Gendarmeries%20and%20constabulary-type%20police_0.pdf">a mix of military and policing functions</a>. This would mean restructuring the military to be able to put more boots on the ground. What is needed is more infantry troops, trained and equipped for the tasks they are required to do. This is less costly than preparing for conventional warfare, and using the army in collateral roles as it does now.</p>
<p>These changes would ensure that it could meet roles like peacekeeping, border control, support for the police and countering terrorism more effectively. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-mulls-future-of-its-military-to-make-it-fit-for-purpose-146423">South Africa mulls future of its military to make it fit-for-purpose</a>
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<p>Beyond this is the need to address the current <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-07-14-south-africas-tipping-point-how-the-intelligence-community-failed-the-country/">inefficiencies in the state security cluster</a>. Clearly there is a lack of visionary leadership, accountability and oversight, to enable these sectors to function more effectively.</p>
<p>The lack of <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/unrestsa-ministers-cele-and-dlodlo-at-odds-over-intelligence-report-20210720">effective intelligence</a> has meant that both the military and police were unable to put preemptive defensive measures in place to tackle the recent violence and looting, which has left <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/22/south-africa-unrest-death-toll-jumps-to-more-than-300">more than 330 people dead</a>.</p>
<h2>Comprehensive approach</h2>
<p>A more comprehensive approach to security is required. As indicated by soldier-scholar Laetitia Olivier in relation to gang violence, what is needed is a coordinated and comprehensive plan to <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-soldiers-wont-end-gang-violence-a-co-ordinated-plan-might-120775">address the twin challenges of security and economic development</a>. </p>
<p>Security and economic development are intertwined; the <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/%EF%BF%BCthe-security-development-nexus-and-the-imperative-of-peacebuilding-with-special-reference-to-the-african-context/">one cannot be achieved without the other</a>. To date, the government has failed on both accounts, which has led to the current crisis.</p>
<p>What is needed is a clear national security framework to repurpose the military in terms of its most likely <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/south-africas-security-sector-is-in-crisis-reform-must-start-now">future roles, missions and goals</a>. These are the roles which the military is currently performing, but it doesn’t have the force design and structure best suited for the tasks.</p>
<p>Tough decisions have to be made in terms of personnel, rejuvenation and equipping the military for its future roles and functions, given the current security threats facing the citizens of South Africa. This does not imply more investment in defence, but better use of the resources available.</p>
<p>More than ever before, decisive leadership is needed from politicians, military leadership and civil society to march the South African National Defence Force in the right direction.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/164717/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lindy Heinecken does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The army may help create a more stable and secure environment in the short term, but this is unlikely to result in sustainable and lasting peace.Lindy Heinecken, Chair of the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1583072021-07-02T22:55:45Z2021-07-02T22:55:45ZDag Hammarskjöld: a defiant pioneer of global diplomacy who died in a mystery plane crash<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405580/original/file-20210610-19-1uob08a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons </span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>This piece is part of a new series in collaboration with the ABC’s Saturday Extra program. Each week, the show will have a “who am I” quiz for listeners about influential figures who helped shape the 20th century, and we will publish profiles for each one. You can read the other pieces in the series <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/guess-the-game-changer-106624">here</a>.</em></p>
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<p>The idea of a global institution has captivated thinkers since Immanuel Kant in the 18th century. But a body set up to create and maintain world peace and security needs the right people to make it work. </p>
<p>When the United Nations was created in 1945, old sentiments — seen in the disbanded League of Nations — threatened to prevail. Would the UN and its leadership simply comply with the great powers of the day?</p>
<p>Dag Hammarskjöld was the UN’s second secretary-general from 1953 to 1961. He showed that defiant independence in this role was possible. </p>
<h2>Political upbringing</h2>
<p>Hammarskjöld was born in Jönköping in south-central Sweden in 1905, the fourth son of Sweden’s first world war prime minister Hjalmar Hammarskjöld. </p>
<p>In 1953, <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1961/hammarskjold/biographical/">he reflected</a> on his family’s influence on his career. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>From generations of soldiers and government officials on my father’s side I inherited a belief that no life was more satisfactory than one of selfless service to your country — or humanity.</p>
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<p>After doing degrees covering literature, linguistics, history, economics and law, he entered the Swedish civil service in 1930, ending up in Ministry for Foreign Affairs. In the late 1940s he represented Sweden at the newly formed United Nations. </p>
<h2>A new secretary-general</h2>
<p>In 1953, he succeeded Norway’s Trgve Lie as UN secretary-general — easily securing enough votes for the job. At this point, the international state system was in crisis. The Cold War and the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24916040">Iron Curtain</a> threatened the paralyse the entire organisation. </p>
<p>Hammarskjöld’s <a href="https://academic.oup.com/lril/article/1/1/166/1022549">approach</a> and lasting legacy was to develop the secretary-general’s political role. He took executive action, which filled power vacuums as the colonial system broke apart after the second world war. </p>
<p>Two concepts underpinned this approach. The first was intervention to maintain international order — thereby transforming the UN from a static international body to a more engaged one. </p>
<p>These interventions including “preventative diplomacy” - trying to stem conflict from developing and spreading — fact-finding missions, peacekeeping forces and operations, technical assistance and international administration. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Former UN secretary-general Dag Hammarskjold" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405338/original/file-20210609-14857-1uqk56u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=17%2C0%2C1979%2C1362&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405338/original/file-20210609-14857-1uqk56u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405338/original/file-20210609-14857-1uqk56u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405338/original/file-20210609-14857-1uqk56u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405338/original/file-20210609-14857-1uqk56u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=567&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405338/original/file-20210609-14857-1uqk56u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=567&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405338/original/file-20210609-14857-1uqk56u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=567&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Hammarskjöld was heavily influenced by his family’s background in public service and politics.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP/AAP</span></span>
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<p>Fledgling states could rely on UN assistance till they were self-functioning. Doing so <a href="https://academic.oup.com/lril/article/1/1/166/1022549">would preserve</a> the independence of decolonised countries and forge an international system with “equal economic opportunities for all individuals and nations”. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/714842/files/A_4390_Add-1-EN.pdf">Hammarskjöld explained</a> in 1960, the UN was ideal for this task.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>a universal organisation neutral in the big power struggles over ideology and influence in the world, subordinated to the common will of the Member Governments and free from any aspirations of its own power and influence over any group or nation.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Indeed, the second key concept was a firm commitment to neutrality when maintaining international order. This was considered a vital element for an international organisation dedicated to global governance. </p>
<p>In practice, Hammarskjöld negotiated the release of United States soldiers captured by the Chinese volunteer army during the Korean War and attempted to resolve the <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/suez-crisis">Suez Canal Crisis</a> of 1956. He was also instrumental to facilitating the withdrawal of US and British troops from Lebanon and Jordan in 1958. In such conduct, he defined the secretary-general’s office in international diplomacy and conflict management and ensured the lingering role of peacekeeping operations.</p>
<h2>Making waves — and enemies</h2>
<p>But the expansion of this type of intervention by the UN was not welcomed by the traditional powers. Reflecting on the role played by Hammarskjöld during the Suez Crisis, Sir Pierson Dixon, British Ambassador to the UN, <a href="https://academic.oup.com/lril/article/1/1/166/1022549">observed</a> the secretary-general could no longer be considered a “a symbol or even an executive: he has become a force”. </p>
<p>As historian <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/who-killed-hammarskjold-2/#:%7E:text=Susan%20Williams&text=Shortly%20after%20midnight%20on%2018,bring%20peace%20to%20the%20Congo.">Susan Williams</a> writes, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Hammarskjöld sought to shield the newly-independent nations from the predatory aims of the Great Powers. His enemies included colonialists and settlers in Africa who were determined to maintain white minority rule. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>In September 1961, Hammarskjöld was on a peace mission in the newly independent Congo. But while flying from Leopoldville, former capital of the Belgian Congo, to Ndola in Northern Rhodesia (present day Zambia),
his <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/12/former-raf-pilot-shot-down-un-chief-dag-hammarskjold-1961-plane">plane crashed</a>. Everyone on board, including the secretary-general, was killed. </p>
<h2>Unsolved mystery</h2>
<p>The crash has never officially been recognised as a political assassination. But there have always been deep suspicions, making it one of the great unresolved mysteries of the 20th century. </p>
<p>As former US president Harry Truman <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/12/former-raf-pilot-shot-down-un-chief-dag-hammarskjold-1961-plane">told reporters</a> immediately after the crash, Hammarskjöld </p>
<blockquote>
<p>was on the point of getting something done when they killed him. Notice that I said ‘when they killed him.’ </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Hammarskjöld’s legacy was so profound as to encourage a range of theories as to why he died. In 1992, Australian diplomat George Ivan Smith and Irish author Conor Cruise O’Brien, both UN officials in 1961 in Congo, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/from-the-archive-blog/2011/aug/17/archive-dag-hammerskjold-crash-death-1961">opined</a> the secretary-general had been shot down by mercenaries in the pay of European industrialists. </p>
<p>In her 2011 book, <a href="https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/who-killed-hammarskj-ld-by-susan-williams">Who Killed Hammarskjöld?</a> Williams examined the possibility of an assassination or a botched hijacking. Noting details were still murky, she concluded: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>his death was almost certainly the result of a sinister intervention.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Peacekeeping, neutrality, independence</h2>
<p>To this day, Hammarskjöld’s legacy endures through the continued deployment of UN peace keeping operations <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/military#:%7E:text=United%20Nations%20military%20personnel%20are%20the%20Blue%20Helmets%20on%20the%20ground.&text=We%20work%20alongside%20UN%20Police,security%20forces%20promote%20lasting%20peace.">with the aim</a> of promoting “stability, security and peace processes”.</p>
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<p>His shaping of the general-secretary position is also marked: an international, neutral figure tasked, however successful, with using preventative diplomacy, promoting peace and securing an environment where states can develop on their own terms. </p>
<hr>
<p><em>Correction: an earlier version of this article incorrectly quoted Susan Williams to say Hammarskjöld’s death was “most certainly” the result of a sinister intervention. It has been amended to “almost certainly”. The piece has also been amended to correct Truman was the former US president at the time of the crash, not the current president.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/158307/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Binoy Kampmark does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Hammarskjöld lasting legacy was to develop the secretary-general’s political role, as the UN found its way through the Cold War.Binoy Kampmark, Senior Lecturer in Global Studies, Social Science & Planning, RMIT UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1597532021-05-26T18:09:57Z2021-05-26T18:09:57ZDelay in sending regional forces to Mozambique could exact a high price<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/402876/original/file-20210526-17-2ro1xf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Some of the thousands of people displaced by the killings in the Cabo Delgado province.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Joas Relvas</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-05-20-sadc-leaders-will-meet-this-month-to-consider-mozambique-intervention-plan/">poised</a> to intervene militarily on the side of the Mozambican government to stop the emerging deadly Islamist insurgency in the Cabo Delgado Province, in the north of the country.</p>
<p>This comes after the regional body of <a href="https://www.sadc.int/about-sadc#:%7E:text=The%20Southern%20African%20Development%20Community,%2C%20Tanzania%2C%20Zambia%20and%20Zimbabwe.">16-nation states</a> sent a technical team to verify events in the area and advise its heads of state forum on the way forward. </p>
<p>The technical team has recommended that SADC deploys a 3 000-strong <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-04-28-sadc-ministers-agree-to-deploy-a-regional-force-in-mozambique/">robust intervention force</a> comprised of land, air and naval assets to help quell the insurgency.</p>
<p>The decision to intervene militarily is a clear indicator that the deadly insurgency, which began in earnest <a href="https://theconversation.com/mozambiques-own-version-of-boko-haram-is-tightening-its-deadly-grip-98087">in October 2017</a>, has long passed the stage where it can be seen as a purely domestic problem to be addressed by Mozambique as a <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0030438705001018?casa_token=zVwfnh-fXPsAAAAA:85qqLoMgXk36_IE257qYPMUesqoDdZq80T2FtQP8d8sutOaZ5Up2TXsChVU0PqnWm8a-jLGU6A">sovereign state</a>.</p>
<p>Having failed to act to prevent the insurgency escalating, SADC and Mozambique are now in the difficult position of having to react after extensive damage has already been done. They will thus have to help stop the insurgency as well as embark on post-conflict rebuilding. These two responses are more complicated, expensive and more dangerous than prevention.</p>
<p>SADC’s late entry into the fray raises the need to deal with its own array of bureaucratic and other pitfalls that make it less than agile. Its overcautious and sluggish response has resulted in the loss of initiative and opportunities to prevent the insurgency escalating. </p>
<p>But, the problem is not purely of its own making. The African Union took too long to designate it as the preferred regional actor to address the Mozambican insurgency problem in a timely way. </p>
<p>Intervention in Cabo Delgado is a potentially dangerous move with far-reaching consequences for SADC if its efforts fail, or it becomes a protracted intervention. </p>
<h2>The basis of intervention</h2>
<p>The SADC response to events in Mozambique is in line with the United Nation’s <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.shtml">“responsibility to protect principle”</a> to prevent human catastrophe. </p>
<p>The principle has <a href="https://idl-bnc-idrc.dspacedirect.org/bitstream/handle/10625/18432/IDL-18432.pdf?sequence=6&isAllowed=y">three elements</a>. These are to prevent conflict, to react once conflict has started with a view to stopping the violence, and to rebuild in the aftermath of the conflict. </p>
<p>The SADC intervention fits in with the commitment by African leaders to find <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/277886206_AFRICAN_SOLUTIONS_TO_AFRICA'S_PROBLEMS_AFRICAN_APPROACHES_TO_PEACE_SECURITY_AND_STABILITY">“African solutions for African problems”</a>. It is underpinned by SADC’s <a href="https://www.sadc.int/documents-publications/show/Protocol_on_Politics_Defence_and_Security20001.pdf">peace and security protocol</a> and its <a href="https://www.sadc.int/themes/politics-defence-security/regional-peacekeeping/standby-force/">Standby Force and SADC Brigade</a> to guide and execute decisions.</p>
<p>SADC is also guided by its 2003 <a href="https://www.sadc.int/documents-publications/show/1038">Mutual Defence Pact</a> regulating responses to armed attacks on a fellow SADC member state. The pact outlines the type of responses to be undertaken to defend a member state under attack. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.sadc.int/files/3613/5292/8367/Protocol_on_Politics_Defence_and_Security20001.pdf">Protocol on Politics Defence and Security Cooperation</a> stipulates that a member state under siege should invite SADC to intervene. </p>
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<p>Mozambique has been slow to invite SADC to intervene. A final decision is likely at a meeting of SADC and Mozambique set for the <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-05-20-sadc-leaders-will-meet-this-month-to-consider-mozambique-intervention-plan/">end of May</a>. </p>
<p>In terms of SADC protocols and the report of the technical team following its visit to Mozambique, military support is recommended as an instrument to assist the Mozambique government. The recommendation points to assembling a military contingent with mixed military capabilities. That aligns with the following functions under the <a href="https://www.sadc.int/files/3613/5292/8367/Protocol_on_Politics_Defence_and_Security20001.pdf">SADC Protocol</a> on politics, defence and security cooperation. </p>
<ul>
<li><p>Observation and monitoring missions such as peace support missions,</p></li>
<li><p>Interventions for peace and security restoration at the request of a member state, and</p></li>
<li><p>Actions to prevent the spread of conflict to neighbouring states, or the resurgence of violence after agreements have been reached.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Dangers and vulnerabilities</h2>
<p>At the moment, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) provides an example of ongoing military intervention in a fellow SADC member country. SADC member states - South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi - are actively involved in a UN peacekeeping mission, <a href="https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/un-drc">MUNOSCO</a>, in the country. </p>
<p>It is the largest ongoing UN mission and dates back to 2010. Elements from SADC are now largely concentrated in the <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/sadc-interventions-democratic-republic-congo/">Force Intervention Brigade</a> to pursue armed groups in the east and help the DRC government regain control of its territory.</p>
<p>The operation in Mozambique will be different as SADC will be operating without the cover of the UN. This places it in a precarious position. It will have to take full responsibility for any fall-out resulting from failure. </p>
<p>There’s no precedent for an intervention of this kind. <a href="http://wis.orasecom.org/content/study/UNDP-GEF/NAP-SAP/Documents/References/tda.nap.sap/SA-%20Lesotho%201998.pdf">In 1998</a> South Africa and Botswana sent troops into Lesotho. In the same year <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/sadc-interventions-democratic-republic-congo/">Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe intervened in the DRC</a>. In both cases the interventions were controversial and messy. SADC authorisation came after deployment and placed great strain on relationships within the regional body.</p>
<p>SADC’s decision to intervene in Mozambique comes with its own set of difficulties. Chief among these is to get member states to commit resources to establish an <a href="https://www.thezimbabwean.co/2021/04/sadc-to-deploy-force-intervention-brigade-in-mozambique/">intervention brigade</a> to deploy against the insurgents.</p>
<p>The size of the final force will be depend on how extensive the armed conflict has become, and what level of intervention the Mozambican government is willing to accept from SADC.</p>
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<p>To succeed, SADCS’s intervention in Mozambique will require extensive investment in time, human resources and money. The extent of this investment will, of course, be determined by the speed with which it contains – or even defeats – the insurgents.</p>
<p>Military action will need to entail a parallel process of rebuilding physical infrastructure and assisting with returning people to their normal life. Most of all, it must help the Mozambique government prevent a resurgence of the violence. </p>
<p>The violence has had a devastating effect on security and rule of law. The impact spilled offshore as gas companies placed extensive foreign infrastructure development for the energy sector on hold. </p>
<p>Rebuilding the confidence needed <a href="https://clubofmozambique.com/news/opinion-the-extractive-gas-industry-in-mozambique-has-done-more-damage-than-good-for-mozambicans-by-iiham-rawoot-153657/">for the gas industry</a> to resume activities is a major incentive to get the insurgency under control.</p>
<h2>Costly and dangerous mission ahead</h2>
<p>Success in turning the tide against militants in Cabo Delgado could give SADC’s image a major boost. Failure, however, could tarnish its image of protecting a fellow member country and the region for years to come.</p>
<p>In essence, Cabo Delgado shows how a slow and over-cautious approach to a potentially explosive security situation can allow matters to deteriorate to such an extent that deadly violence can’t be prevented.</p>
<p>The scene is now set for a military response that leaves SADC facing an expensive and dangerous intervention, and rebuilding costs that a poor country such as Mozambique can ill afford.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/159753/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Prof Francois Vreÿ receives funding from the NRF and Stellenbosch University.</span></em></p>Intervention in Cabo Delgado is a potentially dangerous move with far-reaching consequences for SADC if its efforts fail, or it becomes a protracted intervention.Francois Vreÿ, Research Coordinator, Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1559902021-03-09T10:05:20Z2021-03-09T10:05:20ZIndonesia seeks nothing in return for its global peace and foreign aid efforts. It should<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/386621/original/file-20210226-17-15cnits.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=37%2C0%2C4230%2C2811&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Joko Widodo (foreground, second from right), flanked by then Vice President Jusuf Kalla, welcomes Afghan and Pakistani mullahs to the Trilateral Ulema Conference held at Bogor Palace in West Java, Indonesia.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wahyu Putro A/Antara Foto</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Last month, former Indonesian vice president Jusuf Kalla revealed his current efforts to broker a peace deal between <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/Interview/Indonesia-seeks-to-broker-Taliban-peace-deal-in-Afghanistan">the Afghanistan government and Islamic fundamentalist Taliban</a> group.</p>
<p>Indonesia accepted the role of <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/04/06/indonesia-steps-up-support-for-rebuilding-afghanistan.html">peace facilitator</a> following a request by Afghan President Ashraf Ghani during his visit to Indonesia in 2017. </p>
<p>Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo returned Gani’s visit by going to Kabul in January 2018. In May 2018, Indonesia <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/05/11/president-jokowi-opens-trilateral-ulema-meeting-at-bogorpalace.html">hosted the trilateral Afghan peace meeting</a> as part of its “Islamic diplomacy”.<br>
Indonesia’s commitment as a peacemaker in Afghanistan reflects its aspiration to develop external peace-building efforts. </p>
<p>However, these efforts have yet to result in tangible benefits for its national interests. Indonesia should consider developing a strategy in its peace efforts and foreign aid-giving that can achieve such benefits. </p>
<h2>Years of efforts</h2>
<p>Indonesia started its peacekeeping contributions in 1956 by joining the United Nation Emergency Forces (UNEF). </p>
<p>Since then, it has actively contributed to peacemaking and peacekeeping <a href="https://kemlu.go.id/portal/en/read/91/halaman_list_lainnya/indonesia-and-the-united-nations-peacekeeping-mission">at the regional and global level</a>. By doing so, Indonesia strengthens its self-projection as <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books/about/Indonesia.html?id=NS7dxQEACAAJ&redir_esc=y">“a true partner for world peace”</a>. </p>
<p>In the Southeast Asia region, Indonesia has been involved in various peacekeeping efforts. It became a party to the <a href="https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2011/04/11/indonesia-joins-the-international-monitoring-team/">International Monitoring Team (IMT) in Southern Philippines</a>. It <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/25798047?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">facilitated peace during the Thai-Cambodia conflict</a> in the 1990s. It also engaged with Myanmar to promote democratisation between 2011 and 2014.</p>
<p>This diplomatic activism has provided some basis for Indonesia to build its trajectory as a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24916593?seq=1">“peacebuilder and peacemaker”</a> that contributed to regional and global peace. </p>
<p>Indonesia is also known for its <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/middle-power">“middle power”</a> activism. Middle power is a term to describe a state that is not a superpower but still has significant international influence and recognition. </p>
<p>The country does so by projecting its <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/2004-05-01/soft-power-means-success-world-politics">soft power</a>, through sharing democratic and conflict resolution experiences, instead of material ones such as huge military or economic force. </p>
<p>Indonesia, for example, is part of <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/where-next-mikta">MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey, and Australia)</a>. This informal middle-power partnership was created in 2013 on the sidelines of UN General Assembly with the aim of improving global governance. </p>
<p>As an emerging donor and development partner, Indonesia also recently provided Rp36.5 billion (about US$2.5 million) in aid <a href="https://www.antaranews.com/berita/1615030/pemerintah-indonesia-kucurkan-rp365-miliar-untuk-bantu-palestina">to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic in Palestine</a>.</p>
<p>This effort resonates with Indonesia’s values of promoting <a href="https://www.un.org/development/desa/en/news/intergovernmental-coordination/south-south-cooperation-2019.html">South-South Co-operation</a>and <a href="https://www.kemenkeu.go.id/en/publications/news/soft-diplomacy-of-hand-above-indonesia-aid-time-for-indonesia-to-contribute-to-the-world/">soft-power diplomacy by giving help</a> (instead of receiving). </p>
<p>The launch of Indonesia AID (<a href="https://kemlu.go.id/portal/id/read/695/view/peresmian-indonesia-aid">IndoAID</a>) in 2019 also marked a shift from an aid recipient to an aid provider. </p>
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<h2>What’s in it for Indonesia?</h2>
<p>Measuring the impact of this activism is not easy due to the intangible nature of Indonesia’s contributions, such as the positive image of the country as “a true partner for world peace”. </p>
<p>However, Indonesia should not dismiss the need to assess what these efforts can contribute to its <a href="https://kemlu.go.id/portal/en/read/19/halaman_list_lainnya/strategic-purposes-of-the-indonesian-foreign-policy">national interests</a>. </p>
<p>In the authoritarian New Order era (1966-1998), for example, Indonesian foreign policy tended to refer to the “<a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/04/11/rethinking-ri039s-foreign-policy-concentric-circle.html">concentric circle</a>”. The immediate region – such as Southeast Asia – was the core of its foreign policy focus. </p>
<p>Even after the fall of the regime, some of Indonesia’s activities are still based on this concentric circle.</p>
<p>These include activities in <a href="https://kemlu.go.id/portal/en/read/1987/berita/indonesian-aid-strengthens-solidarity-and-partnership-in-the-pacific">Pacific Islands</a> – such as initiating the <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/indoensia-puts-meat-into-indo-pacific-agenda-launches-south-pacific-forum/articleshow/68513814.cms?from=mdr">Indonesia-South Pacific Forum</a>in 2019, and engaging with <a href="https://www.adb.org/publications/cooperation-integration-indonesia-timor-leste">Timor Leste</a> after its independence from Indonesia in 1999. There has also been an effort to <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/pacific-islands-stand-ground-west-papua-push">tame the support for West Papua separatists</a>. </p>
<p>Indonesia’s aid to Palestine is a normative commitment based <a href="https://en.antaranews.com/news/141354/indonesias-action-towards-palestine-mirrors-anti-colonialism">on anti-colonial solidarity</a>. It is also returning a favour as Palestine was the <a href="https://observerid.com/palestine-the-first-to-recognize-indonesian-independence/">first entity to recognise Indonesia’s independence back in 1945</a>. </p>
<p>More importantly, after surviving its messy democratic transition, which began in 1998, Indonesia asserted itself as the <a href="http://journal.uin-alauddin.ac.id/index.php/jicsa/article/view/712">largest Muslim moderate country</a> under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2014). </p>
<p>Contributing to the Afghanistan peace process is an articulation of this identity. It also contributes to the global movement for combating radicalism.</p>
<p>Compared to traditional Western developed countries and other emerging peace actors and donors, Indonesia is unique. </p>
<p>Underpinning its engagement is a solidarity-based movement while adopting a low-profile image with no profit-seeking attitude.</p>
<p>Foreign policy and national interest can indeed contribute to Indonesia’s image-building and identity-based solidarity. But the country needs to evaluate further how these efforts could benefit its own interests. </p>
<p>These direct impacts can take the forms of better market access, greater trade preferences, and higher people-to-people interaction. </p>
<p>These more tangible impacts will transform into political leverage. In doing so, the country could further promote its values, such as democracy and peaceful conflict resolution, to other countries.</p>
<p>In this regard, Indonesia should consider bolder engagement with countries within its concentric circle. </p>
<p>These close neighbours are often only part of the country’s short-term priorities. At times they are even neglected. Its immediate neighbours, such as Myanmar, are examples of countries with bigger stakes to engage with. </p>
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<h2>The way forward</h2>
<p>Indonesia should strategically craft its aid and peace activism to gain tangible benefits.</p>
<p>Seeking tangible benefits is not always a zero-sum game. Thinking about national priorities when conducting aid and peacekeeping activism can lead to a win-win solution. </p>
<p>It will help Indonesia create a long-term and deeper engagement instead of creating short-term, one-off events. At the same time, it will empower others. </p>
<p>To achieve this, the Indonesian government, especially the Foreign Affairs Ministry, should engage more with think-tanks, academics and other stakeholders, including private citizens, to better formulate its aid and peace activism.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/155990/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lina A. Alexandra terafiliasi dengan Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Jakarta</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Atin Prabandari tidak bekerja, menjadi konsultan, memiliki saham, atau menerima dana dari perusahaan atau organisasi mana pun yang akan mengambil untung dari artikel ini, dan telah mengungkapkan bahwa ia tidak memiliki afiliasi selain yang telah disebut di atas.</span></em></p>Indonesia needs to consider long-term engagement to produce deeper and more sustainable impacts.Lina A. Alexandra, Senior Researcher, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, IndonesiaAtin Prabandari, Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, Universitas Gadjah Mada Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1539712021-02-17T13:21:52Z2021-02-17T13:21:52ZHow the National Guard became the go-to military force for riots and civil disturbances<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/384553/original/file-20210216-13-1dg02bc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C49%2C6645%2C4383&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Virginia National Guard troops in front of the U.S. Capitol building, Feb. 5, 2021.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/virginia-national-guard-troops-walk-down-the-capitol-steps-news-photo/1230985766">Caroline Brehman/CQ-Roll Call, Inc via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.stripes.com/news/us/5-000-national-guard-troops-will-remain-in-dc-beyond-mid-march-1.659837">Pentagon has approved leaving 5,000 troops</a> deployed indefinitely to protect the U.S. Capitol from domestic extremist threats, down from about 26,000 deployed after the Jan. 6 insurrection.</p>
<p>The National Guard is a federally funded <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/03/us/what-is-national-guard-trnd/index.html">reserve force</a> of the U.S. Army or Air Force based in states. These part-time citizen soldiers typically hold civilian jobs but can be activated by state governors <a href="https://theconversation.com/can-the-president-really-order-the-military-to-occupy-us-cities-and-states-139844">or the president</a> to respond to natural disasters, health emergencies or violent protests, or to support military operations overseas. Although many Americans are <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/optics-matter-national-guard-deployments-amid-unrest-have-a-long-and-controversial-history">skeptical of any military response</a> to civilian unrest, the National Guard is widely seen as a <a href="https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=467769">reliable peacekeeping force</a>. </p>
<p>It wasn’t always this way. The National Guard has a complicated history of responding to civil disturbances.</p>
<h2>History of the National Guard</h2>
<p>The modern National Guard evolved from Colonial-era militias. </p>
<p>Because of post-Revolutionary fears over the cost and potential tyranny of a <a href="https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artI_S8_C12_1_1/">standing army</a>, the <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-1/section-8/clause-15-16/the-militia-clauses">Constitution</a> authorized citizens to form militias that would “execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.” </p>
<p>Subsequent <a href="https://constitution.org/1-Activism/mil/mil_act_1792.htm">militia acts</a> confirmed state authority over the militia with responsibility as a national military reserve for defense and peacekeeping. By the 19th century, local militias were almost everywhere, but they varied widely in <a href="https://www.nebraskapress.unl.edu/nebraska/9780803229709/">mandate and quality</a>.</p>
<p>In the South, militias – <a href="https://www.scencyclopedia.org/sce/entries/slave-patrols/">once used to hunt down escaped slaves</a> – continued to <a href="https://theconversation.com/theres-a-history-of-white-supremacists-interpreting-government-leaders-words-as-encouragement-137873">enforce white supremacy</a> after the Civil War, <a href="https://muse-jhu-edu.ezproxy.csbsju.edu/article/380947">attacking Republican politicians and killing Black voters</a>. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, in fits and starts, New York’s militias were becoming <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Rise-National-Guard-Evolution-1865-1920/dp/0803264283">well funded, trained and regulated</a>, as, increasingly, were <a href="https://www-jstor-org.ezproxy.csbsju.edu/stable/27553270?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">those in the Midwest</a>.</p>
<h2>National Guard and labor wars</h2>
<p>By the late 19th century, state and local militias were regularly being used to respond to civil disorder. </p>
<p>Still, when more than 100,000 workers across the U.S. protested wage cuts by walking off the job for up to six weeks in what was called the <a href="https://ohiohistorycentral.org/w/Great_Railroad_Strike_of_1877">Great Labor Strikes of 1877</a>, state and city officials throughout the country hesitated to call out their militias to reopen the railroads. </p>
<p>According to <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/641532">my historical research</a>, officials feared that militiamen might sympathize with the workers’ uprising. Secretary of War George McCrary was among them. In a <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=tysXAQAAMAAJ&pg=PA266&lpg=PA266&dq=%22this+fact+alone+renders+the+local+militia+unreliable+in+such+an+emergency%22&source=bl&ots=E8bS2RYDRb&sig=ACfU3U10BNcacjosfCCgzcyew-6MGIs7vA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwil6Pjvh-juAhWGB80KHe1mDSoQ6AEwAXoECAQQAg#v=onepage&q=%22this%20fact%20alone%20renders%20the%20local%20militia%20unreliable%20in%20such%20an%20emergency%22&f=false">report that year</a>, he argued that the Army was more dependable in strikes than local militias. </p>
<p>“Uprisings enlist in a greater or less degree the sympathy of the communities in which they occur,” he argued, calling local militia “unreliable in such an emergency.” </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/384616/original/file-20210217-21-bfqwyk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Black and white illustration of militia in city streets" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/384616/original/file-20210217-21-bfqwyk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/384616/original/file-20210217-21-bfqwyk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=774&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384616/original/file-20210217-21-bfqwyk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=774&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384616/original/file-20210217-21-bfqwyk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=774&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384616/original/file-20210217-21-bfqwyk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=973&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384616/original/file-20210217-21-bfqwyk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=973&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384616/original/file-20210217-21-bfqwyk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=973&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The 6th Baltimore Regiment, a Maryland militia, on strike duty in 1877.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/8/8a/Harpers_8_11_1877_6th_Regiment_Fighting_Baltimore.jpg/696px-Harpers_8_11_1877_6th_Regiment_Fighting_Baltimore.jpg">Harper's Weekly magazine</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The state militias also lacked uniform <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Rise-National-Guard-Evolution-1865-1920/dp/0803264283/ref=tmm_pap_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=1613260967&sr=1-1">discipline, centralized command structure and tactical training</a>.
Many militiamen <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=lsgscx5TyyoC&pg=PA156&lpg=PA156&dq=%22lessons+learned+the+ing+and+strike+duty,+1894-1916%22&source=bl&ots=ag3pISCgrG&sig=ACfU3U1oOUiCbEQdUtHlbrXWkYnHzPILFg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjCjavOjujuAhUFU80KHTCDAPMQ6AEwBXoECAgQAg#v=onepage&q=%22lessons%20learned%20the%20ing%20and%20strike%20duty%2C%201894-1916%22&f=false">hated being deployed on labor strike or riot duty within their own communities</a>. They did not want to be seen as pawns of big business, and unions increasingly prohibited their members from joining militias.</p>
<p>The 1877 labor strikes highlighted <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=nHsJBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA183&lpg=PA183&dq=%22local+militia+unreliable%22&source=bl&ots=p3mR4h8Zw2&sig=ACfU3U3FCTkKQ6DAj2I_o8PYX2AOFHoJlw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjn7szfkdbuAhWRK80KHVkbCOoQ6AEwAHoECAMQAg#v=onepage&q=%22local%20militia%20unreliable%22&f=false">the need for well-trained state militias</a> with clear mandates. State legislatures began to ramp up funding for militias, which came to be called the National Guard. </p>
<p>Over the next half-century, the Guard’s role as a viable federal reserve to the U.S. Army, <a href="https://history.army.mil/news/2016/160500a_natDefAct1916.html">under the control of the War Department</a>, became <a href="https://history.army.mil/documents/1901/Root-NG.htm">federally codified</a>. Between 1900 and 1915, the U.S. government invested US$60 million for National Guard training, weapons and soldier pay. </p>
<h2>Racial uprisings</h2>
<p>By the 1960s, the National Guard had an annual budget nearing <a href="https://www.nationalguard.mil/About-the-Guard/Historical-Publications/Annual-Reports/FileId/134540/">$950 million</a>. Between 1965 and 1971, the Army National Guard was deployed <a href="https://www.gao.gov/assets/210/203694.pdf">260 times</a> to maintain order during urban and anti-war civil disturbances such as those following the death of Martin Luther King Jr. </p>
<p>But the National Guard was still predominantly white and male, and its discipline and training again came under scrutiny during the era’s racial uprisings. </p>
<p>In 1967, inexperienced National Guard troops with as little as <a href="https://www.gao.gov/assets/210/203694.pdf">six hours of riot training</a> were deployed to racial uprisings by Black residents in <a href="https://detroithistorical.org/learn/encyclopedia-of-detroit/uprising-1967">Detroit</a> and in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/11/nyregion/newark-riots-50-years.html">Newark</a>, New Jersey. Rather than keep the peace, they responded with lethal force. Of 43 deaths in Detroit’s five days of protests, <a href="https://www.freep.com/story/news/detroitriot/2017/07/23/victims-detroit-riot-1967/499550001/">Guardsmen were responsible for at least nine</a>. One victim was 4-year-old Tonia Blanding, who was killed on July 26, 1967, when <a href="https://www-jstor-org.ezproxy.csbsju.edu/stable/2784247?seq=5#metadata_info_tab_contents">Guardsmen shot into her apartment building</a> based on rumors of snipers. </p>
<p>In Newark, then-police director Dominick Spina condemned the untrained Guardsmen for creating a “<a href="https://www.blackpast.org/african-american-history/national-advisory-commission-civil-disorders-kerner-report-1967/">state of hysteria</a>” in his city during demonstrations in July 1967 following rumors that a Black man had been killed in police custody. </p>
<p>President Lyndon B. Johnson formed the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, known as the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/23/us/kerner-commission-report.html">Kerner Commission</a>, to investigate 1967’s civil unrest. The commission’s report urged the federal government to develop guidelines governing riot control and <a href="http://www.eisenhowerfoundation.org/docs/kerner/Kerner_C12.pdf">fund research into such alternatives</a> to lethal weapons as tear gas and sound cannons, which were pursued.</p>
<h2>Deaths at Kent State</h2>
<p>On May 4, 1970, National Guardsmen responded to student anti-war protests at <a href="https://www.kent.edu/may-4-1970">Kent State University</a> in Ohio. When the soldiers ran out of tear gas, students threw bricks and bottles at them. The soldiers opened fire, killing four students and injuring nine.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/384554/original/file-20210216-19-1ktdd57.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Black-and-white image of three running young people, chased by a dozen armed soldiers" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/384554/original/file-20210216-19-1ktdd57.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/384554/original/file-20210216-19-1ktdd57.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384554/original/file-20210216-19-1ktdd57.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384554/original/file-20210216-19-1ktdd57.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384554/original/file-20210216-19-1ktdd57.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384554/original/file-20210216-19-1ktdd57.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/384554/original/file-20210216-19-1ktdd57.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">After the Kent State killings, students at the University of New Mexico flee the National Guard on May 4, 1970.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com.mx/detail/fotografía-de-noticias/following-the-may-4-1970-shooting-of-students-fotografía-de-noticias/526095104?adppopup=true">Steven Clevenger/Corbis via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Some <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/may/04/kent-state-massacre-marked-start-of-americas-polarization">Americans supported the Guard’s actions</a> at Kent State, while others were anguished. President Richard Nixon’s <a href="https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED083899.pdf?fbclid=IwAR1OYAUxWVXtSsUbSHlCO67UY0VLqfMz9VgUXpfwLm12RhWVNEUhD-ThbLM">Commission on Campus Unrest</a> argued in its September 1970 report that “even if the guardsmen faced danger, it was not a danger that called for lethal force.” </p>
<p>“The Kent State tragedy must mark the last time that … loaded rifles are issued to guardsmen confronting student demonstrators,” the report concluded.</p>
<h2>Making a modern Guard</h2>
<p>The outcry over civilian deaths in Detroit, Newark, Kent State and elsewhere resulted in <a href="https://www.gao.gov/assets/210/203694.pdf">changes to the National Guard</a>.</p>
<p>Guardsmen were given more protective equipment and trained in nonlethal methods of crowd control. In the past 50 years, the National Guard has also grown into a more diverse force. Today, nearly <a href="https://download.militaryonesource.mil/12038/MOS/Reports/2018-demographics-report.pdf">20% of the Guard members are women and 25% are people of color</a>. </p>
<p>[<em>Deep knowledge, daily.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>.]</p>
<p>Today, government leaders and civilians see the National Guard as a reliable force for emergency responses of all kinds, from disaster relief to delivering COVID-19 vaccinations.</p>
<p>But the future may hold more troubles. Recent investigations into <a href="https://theconversation.com/police-soldiers-bring-lethal-skill-to-militia-campaigns-against-us-government-153369">white supremacist infiltration of the military and police</a> prompted closer scrutiny of National Guard troops. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/19/us/politics/national-guard-extremist-pentagon.html">Two members were removed from duty</a> protecting the presidential inauguration because of links with extremist organizations.</p>
<p><em>A caption in this story has been corrected to reflect that the photo was taken of students fleeing the National Guard at the University of New Mexico.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/153971/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shannon M. Smith does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Some 5,000 National Guardsmen will stay in Washington to protect the Capitol into March, according to the Pentagon. The Guard is seen as a reliable peacekeeping force – but it wasn’t always that way.Shannon M. Smith, Associate Professor of History, College of Saint Benedict & Saint John's UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1464232020-09-29T14:50:17Z2020-09-29T14:50:17ZSouth Africa mulls future of its military to make it fit-for-purpose<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360281/original/file-20200928-16-1sw18de.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Some hard decisions need to be taken about the future of the South African National Defence Force</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Nic Bothma/EFE-EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>South Africa’s parliament has opened discussions about how to redesign the country’s lumbering military to make it fit-for-purpose for the 21st Century. To kick-start the process, a parliamentary committee charged with <a href="https://aejonline.org/index.php/aej/article/view/424/678">oversight</a> over the military hosted a mini-symposium addressed by military leaders and experts, academics, political parties as well as civil society. Politics Editor Thabo Leshilo asked Lindy Heinecken, a military sociologist, for her insights.</em></p>
<p><strong>Historically, a review of the country’s defence has been informed by a white paper or a defence review produced by the Ministry of Defence. What informs the parliamentary process?</strong></p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/national-defence-white-paper">1996 White Paper on Defence</a> established a broad policy framework for defence in the country’s new democracy from 1994, while <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/south-african-defence-review-1998">the 1998 Defence Review</a> outlined the appropriate size, structure, force design and tasks of the South African National Defence Force. </p>
<p>But, as the force became increasingly drawn into <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-army-is-in-steady-decline-and-nothings-being-done-to-fix-it-74712">peacekeeping</a> and internal roles - such as <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-army-is-being-used-to-fight-cape-towns-gangs-why-its-a-bad-idea-120455">fighting crime</a>, the balance between what it is trained, funded and equipped for became misaligned. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://static.pmg.org.za/170512review.pdf">2015 a new Defence Review</a> was produced given the changes in the strategic environment, and the forces’s <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/a-new-plan-to-halt-the-downward-spiral-of-the-sa-defence-force">state of critical decline</a>, resulting mainly from operational overstretch. </p>
<p>While comprehensive, the 2015 review did not specify what the design and structure of the force should look like. This was left to the politicians, military leadership and ultimately society to decide upon. Five years later, there is still no clear direction and the military continues to muddle along.</p>
<p><strong>What is wrong with the military that needs fixing?</strong></p>
<p>Some hard decisions need to be taken on the future of the defence force. Besides the misalignment of its resources, design, equipment and its additional roles, the military has also been hobbled by <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/general/2353257/sandf-blows-r51-million-in-irregular-expenditure/">misappropriation of funds</a>. </p>
<p>The National Treasury highlighted in a briefing to the Joint Standing Committee on Defence that <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/dod-salaries-highlighted-as-problem-area-by-national-treasury/">growing personnel expenditure</a> was the main issue incapacitating the defence force, leaving little money for capital and operational expenditure. This has left the military with ageing equipment, and hardly any funds for maintenance. Meanwhile, the deployment of the military has <a href="https://theconversation.com/covid-19-south-africas-neglected-military-faces-mission-impossible-133250">increased substantially</a>, both internal and externally.</p>
<p>The over expenditure on personnel stems from imbalances in the force design and structure. Over time, instead of having 40% personnel in the short term service (2-5yrs), 40 % in the medium term service (up to age 45yrs), an only 20% in the long term service (until 60yrs), 87% of the regular force personnel ended up serving <a href="https://static.pmg.org.za/docs/2004/appendices/040810dodstrategy.htm">on medium to extended long-term tenures</a>. </p>
<p>This, together with the failure to implement effective personnel exit mechanisms, has led to deviation from the ideal situation of expenditure being 40% on personnel, 30% on capital, and 30% on operations. Personnel costs are now reportedly almost <a href="https://theconversation.com/money-has-little-to-do-with-why-south-africas-military-is-failing-to-do-its-job-81216">80% of the defence budget</a>.</p>
<p>Added to this, personnel expenditure has been driven up to unsustainable levels by increases in pay and benefits that have not been budgeted for, rank inflation and the stagnation of junior and middle ranking personnel. This means that people sit in posts for long periods at the top of their scale, or end up being promoted to a higher rank, beyond the post profile. Other anomalies are a high ratio of general officers and a failure to rightsize the forces in accordance with mission demands. These problems are eroding the defence force’s <a href="https://static.pmg.org.za/170512review.pdf">capital and operating budget</a>. </p>
<p>There is a pressing need for the military to address its human resource management systems.</p>
<p>Going forward, this means accelerating the exit of unfit, overage, unhealthy and supernumerary personnel over the short to medium term. The longer term should see the military shedding all overage personnel, reversing rank inflation and rebalancing the force. This means looking at the ratio of officers to other ranks, and the ratio of support to combat personnel.</p>
<p>This is a difficult political decision. It entails putting former soldiers out onto the streets, with little other than military skills, making it hard for them <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10246029.2015.1028417">to get jobs</a>. </p>
<p>More attention needs to be paid to exit mechanisms for the short and medium terms in order to prepare them for a second career. Another problem is that there are not enough young people transferring from the full-time forces into part-time and reserve forces. This affects both the numerical and functional flexibility of the military in times of crises, when it suddenly needs extra personnel, such as during the Covid-19 crisis. </p>
<p><strong>Why is there need for national consensus on the military?</strong></p>
<p>Before the military can address these challenges, there is a need to reach national consensus on what type of defence force the country wants. At present there is a chasm between what the military leadership believes it should be doing, according to the constitution, what the government and politicians demand, and what the <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/parliament-shines-spotlight-on-civil-military-relationship/">public considers important</a>. </p>
<p>Transformation cannot happen without a clear understanding of the military’s future role. Without this, military leadership cannot design, plan, or train personnel for their future roles and missions.</p>
<p>The defence force cannot fulfil its obligations within the current organisational and budgetary <a href="https://www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org/downloads/2011-07-south-african-defence-brenthurst-paper-.pdf">constraints</a>. </p>
<p><strong>What should the future military look like?</strong></p>
<p>The defence force is caught in a time warp. It still operates with a mindset and equipment geared for the 20th Century. It has not made the transition into the 21st Century in terms of how to combat future threats, and the use of technology as a <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/sa-defence/sa-defence-sa-defence/feature-sandf-outlines-threats-priorities/">force enabler and multiplier</a>. Many tasks, like intelligence gathering and surveillance, can now be done by unmanned aerial vehicles, which are cost effective. But, there is no money for these.</p>
<p>Any restructuring should consider what the future military should look like. But right now, some pressing decisions need to be taken on whether to shut down the military, or channel it towards more pressing issues that affect the safety and security of the country’s citizens.</p>
<p>Given the current budgetary constraints, scaling down to playing only a developmental role is possibly the way to go. This means focusing only on border and maritime security, disaster relief and public order functions.</p>
<p>At the same time, there must be capacity to respond to other pressing geo-strategic security concerns unfolding on the country’s borders, and beyond, that may <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/how-serious-is-the-islamic-state-threat-to-attack-south-africa">require a military response</a>.</p>
<p><strong>Does the country have the money to afford the military it needs?</strong></p>
<p>The simple answer is “no”. But, the reality is that there needs to be a balance between the agreed mandate and budget. Within the current context, the mandate is budget driven, not the other way round, unless the security dynamics change dramatically. It is like taking a risk with an insurance policy, what to secure and what not. </p>
<p>Another way to cut costs is to reduce personnel expenditure to fit sustainably into a smaller funding allocation. This is a difficult political decision, but preferable to the military sliding into <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/time-for-a-long-hard-look-at-the-sandf/">further decline</a>.</p>
<p>The current impasse makes it the perfect time to march the defence force in a new direction in accordance with what the country needs, can afford, and deliver. Now, more than ever before, robust debate is needed on the future of South Africa’s military.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/146423/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lindy Heinecken does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Besides the misalignment of its resources, design, equipment and its additional roles, the military has also been hobbled by misappropriation of funds.Lindy Heinecken, Chair of the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1458862020-09-16T12:28:11Z2020-09-16T12:28:11ZUN: political missions are gradually replacing peacekeeping – why that’s dangerous<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/358327/original/file-20200916-20-15silxz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=151%2C44%2C870%2C714&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Moroccan UN peacekeeper in North Kivu, Democratic Republic of Congo helps raise awareness about COVID-19. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/monusco/49816053341/in/photolist-2iSLXHG-2iU5i6p-2j8ZWVK-2iG1Xx5-2iGUhUv-2iKdyH9-2iJa4i9-2iQYv9d-2iLQJr9-2iMQqVh-2jbb3ne-2jh4Feo-2j4vK6c-2jrUUPM-2jthBa9-2jyg6Kp-2iXopzQ-2iXsH1x">MONUSCO Photos/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As the world’s leaders and their diplomats prepare to meet for the 75th session of the UN general assembly, much of the discussion will be virtual – and dominated by the response to COVID-19. </p>
<p>When it comes to global peace and security, one of the UN’s core remits, coronavirus has had only a muted impact on peacekeeping operations. At the same time, longstanding calls to transform UN peacekeeping have made little progress. </p>
<p>The scale of UN peacekeeping was already in decline before coronavirus. And yet peacekeepers are a vital tool in the UN’s armoury to protect vulnerable people the world over.</p>
<h2>Peace in the time of coronavirus</h2>
<p>António Guterres, the UN secretary-general has also consistently <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/unsgs-remarks-to-security-council-covid-19-pandemic">defended the importance of UN peackeeping</a> missions in light of the pandemic. In July, Guterres eventually <a href="http://www.unscr.com/en/resolutions/2532">secured a security council resolution</a> that called for a general cessation of all hostilities around the world so an effective humanitarian response to the virus could be mounted for people caught up in conflict. But it <a href="https://theconversation.com/coronavirus-un-security-council-finally-calls-for-global-ceasefire-after-us-and-china-delay-talks-141858">took months to secure approval</a>, and while 16 armed groups did initially pause fighting, it has resumed in some places, including Yemen and Libya, before the resolution passed.</p>
<p>The UN has also adapted how its missions to build and keep the peace operate on the ground. Rotation of troops has been limited, and the management of peacekeeeping missions have moved to working remotely whenever feasible. In the Central African Republic, South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, peacekeeping missions have <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/covid-19-cases-grow-car-minusca-supports-government-urgent-response-to-halt-virus-spread">strengthened the response</a> of local authorities to COVID-19. </p>
<p>So far at least, peacekeepers are not considered responsible for spreading the virus – a particular concern for the UN given the recent history of inadvertently <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-37126747">introducing cholera to Haiti</a>. The UN may also have been lucky since, so far, COVID-19 has been less widespread in Africa, where most peacekeeping missions are deployed.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/they-put-a-few-coins-in-your-hands-to-drop-a-baby-in-you-265-stories-of-haitian-children-abandoned-by-un-fathers-114854">'They put a few coins in your hands to drop a baby in you' – 265 stories of Haitian children abandoned by UN fathers</a>
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<h2>A mission in decline</h2>
<p>At the same time, there is little evidence that coronavirus is transforming UN peacekeeping to make it part of an effective response to support the most vulnerable. </p>
<p>Action for Peacekeeping (<a href="https://www.un.org/en/A4P/">A4P</a>) – which was launched by the UN Secretary General in March 2018 – has remained the main framework to strengthen UN peacekeeping. Even though 154 countries, including the permanent members of the Security Council, have endorsed A4P and signalled their continued commitment to peacekeeping, the relevance of peacekeeping appears to be in decline.</p>
<p>In August 2020, the UN deployed <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/0_front_page_august_2020.pdf">81,820</a> peacekeepers, a reduction by nearly 25% compared to the maximum deployment of 107,805 personnel in April 2015. At that time the UN had mandated 16 missions compared to 13 today. The last large multidimensional mission – MINUSCA to the Central African Republic – was mandated in 2014. UN peacekeeping missions could have been an option since then in Colombia, Ukraine and Syria, but did not happen. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/358341/original/file-20200916-18-rl1ice.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Graph showing decline in UN peacekeeping." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/358341/original/file-20200916-18-rl1ice.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/358341/original/file-20200916-18-rl1ice.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/358341/original/file-20200916-18-rl1ice.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/358341/original/file-20200916-18-rl1ice.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/358341/original/file-20200916-18-rl1ice.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/358341/original/file-20200916-18-rl1ice.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/358341/original/file-20200916-18-rl1ice.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/0_front_page_august_2020.pdf">UN Peacekeeping</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
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<p>Instead, the UN has closed large peacekeeping missions to Haiti (2017), Côte d’Ivoire (2017) and Liberia (2018), replacing them with much smaller policing or political missions. It is taking a similar approach to the drawdown and planned closures of <a href="https://undocs.org/S/2020/202">UNAMID</a> in Sudan (Darfur) and <a href="https://undocs.org/S/2019/842">MONUSCO</a> in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.</p>
<p>The reduction in the number of large, multidimensional peacekeeping missions is in keeping with the emphasis in the A4P program on the need for political solutions to conflicts and political support for ongoing missions. In fact, over time the UN has developed a broad set of instruments – including political envoys, sanctions and political missions – in support of its peace and security mandate. As well as the 13 peacekeeping missions, it also has nine political ones. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-covid-19-offers-a-chance-to-transform-un-peacekeeping-139416">Why COVID-19 offers a chance to transform UN peacekeeping</a>
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<p>Research I’ve done with colleagues shows how the number of diplomatic initiatives and civilian-led missions <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03050629.2020.1772254">surpassed the number of peacekeeping missions</a> since 2010. Using the full array of instruments may well be more cost-effective than relying on peacekeeping alone.</p>
<h2>Hampered response</h2>
<p>At the same time, the <a href="https://www.degruyter.com/view/journals/peps/ahead-of-print/article-10.1515-peps-2020-0022/article-10.1515-peps-2020-0022.xml?language=en">trend toward fewer and smaller missions</a> reflects three main challenges to an effective global response to threats to peace and security. </p>
<p>First, the main global powers no longer agree that they share a collective responsibility to maintain global peace and stability. National interests increasingly determine their response to crises and civil wars, for example in the recent conflict in Libya. </p>
<p>Second, politicians but also the general public of potential host countries commonly express a lack of trust in foreign peacekeeping interventions. And third, UN agencies lack the necessary resources to sustain large-scale interventions. </p>
<p>The situation of civilians in conflict zones around the world remains precarious. They risk attacks from rebel factions and government forces. They had to worry about infectious diseases such as malaria, cholera, dengue and Ebola, even before COVID-19. The presence of a large peacekeeping mission can make a difference in the immediate aftermath to a crisis as shown after the <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2010/01/326472-un-rushing-aid-haiti-following-deadly-tremors">Haiti earthquake</a> in 2010 and <a href="https://theglobalobservatory.org/2014/09/role-un-peacekeepers-unmil-tackling-ebola/">Ebola</a> in west Africa in 2013. </p>
<p>So far, fortunately, the worst fears about the effect of coronavirus on conflict-affected communities and refugee sites have not come true. However, as <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-53106164">shown in Yemen</a>, COVID-19 can worsen an already horrific situation. It also illustrates the limited means available to the UN to intervene effectively and to provide necessary humanitarian support.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/145886/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Han Dorussen has received funding from the British Academy and currently receives funding from UKRI. </span></em></p>Peacekeeping had been in decline before COVID-19, but they are vital tools in the UN’s armoury.Han Dorussen, Professor, Department of Government, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1410922020-06-23T18:50:33Z2020-06-23T18:50:33ZUN Security Council: Actually, the world doesn’t need more Canada<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/343295/original/file-20200622-55009-i25qap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C45%2C6122%2C4023&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The number of Canadian peacekeeping forces deployed around the world is at an all-time low. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Lars Hagberg</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Justin Trudeau’s government has egg on its face after <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/18/canada-loses-bid-un-security-council-seat-justin-trudeau">losing its bid</a> for a two-year term on the United Nations Security Council. With his famous vow that “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EhxT53ZvzD8">Canada is back</a>,” Trudeau made winning a Security Council seat one of the benchmarks of his foreign policy. In the end, the bid garnered even fewer votes than <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/99271/canada-loses-un-security-council-seat-despite-guarantees/">Stephen Harper’s losing effort</a> in 2010. </p>
<p>What was especially notable is that Canada faced a strong campaign against its candidacy.</p>
<p>Groups and individuals who initially had high hopes for Trudeau ended up actively <a href="https://thetyee.ca/Opinion/2020/06/11/Canada-Does-Not-Deserve-UN-Security-Council-Place/">campaigning against</a> Canada’s bid through a new organization, the <a href="https://www.foreignpolicy.ca/">Canadian Foreign Policy Institute</a>. This marks a significant development. Minister of Foreign Affairs François-Philippe Champagne had few answers to criticisms from the most internationalist sectors of Canadian civil society. </p>
<p>Canada is used to winning. The country’s diplomatic self-image sees Canada as a peacekeeper, a generous donor, an independent and responsible voice in global affairs. </p>
<h2>Few peacekeepers on duty</h2>
<p>The trouble is, from outside the country, and increasingly from within, that self-portrait looks false. <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors">Canada only has 43 peacekeepers on UN duty</a>, nearly the <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/6973212/canadian-peacekeeping-numbers/">lowest number</a> ever. Winning candidate Ireland contributes 523 and claims to have never missed a peacekeeping mission.</p>
<p>Canada spends a mere <a href="https://www.cips-cepi.ca/2020/04/20/foreign-aid-flows-the-canadian-government-is-still-not-stepping-up-to-the-plate/">0.27 per cent of its gross national income</a> on overseas development, far short of the UN <a href="https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/december-2019/reconsidering-the-generosity-of-our-overseas-development-assistance/">target of 0.7 per cent</a> set by former prime minister Lester Pearson. Winning candidate <a href="https://www.norway.no/en/missions/UN/news/news-on-development-and-humanitarian-efforts/norwegian-aid-to-developing-countries-hits-record-high/">Norway gives more than one per cent</a>. Canada is rarely asked to mediate, and it’s seen, more often than not, as a <a href="http://blackrosebooks.net/products/view/The+Trudeau+Formula%3A+Seduction+and+Betrayal+in+an+Age+of+Discontent/84106">supporter of United States policy</a>. </p>
<h2>Gap between rhetoric and action</h2>
<p>There’s a vast gulf between Canada’s rhetoric and its actions. The world sees a <a href="https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/paul-martin/the-potemkin-village-of-canadian-foreign-policy/">Potemkin foreign policy</a>, mostly for show. The standard example is <a href="https://ricochet.media/en/3040/dealing-death-canada-resumes-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia">arming Saudi Arabia</a> on a massive scale, even as Trudeau talks about not wanting to do so. In practice, Canada aids and abets Saudi Arabia’s misogynist foreign policy, all the while boasting, with a touch of macho swagger, about its own “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0020702019850827">feminist foreign policy</a>.” </p>
<p>“<a href="https://ipolitics.ca/2016/06/29/obama-to-parliament-the-world-needs-more-canada/">The world needs more Canada</a>” has never been a convincing argument.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/343298/original/file-20200622-55001-162eis5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/343298/original/file-20200622-55001-162eis5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/343298/original/file-20200622-55001-162eis5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/343298/original/file-20200622-55001-162eis5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/343298/original/file-20200622-55001-162eis5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/343298/original/file-20200622-55001-162eis5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/343298/original/file-20200622-55001-162eis5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Norway’s ambassador to the United Nations, Mona Juul, casts a vote during elections for a seat on the UN Security Council. Norway and Ireland beat out Canada.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Eskinder Debebe/UN Photo via AP)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Let’s look at Canada’s three losing bids. Canada helped to shape the UN in the 1940s. Canadian leaders assumed they would win the seat reserved for a Commonwealth member. Instead, they lost to Australia, lauded for its advocacy for smaller countries and willingness to confront great powers. Red-faced Canadian diplomats withdrew from the field, though they were able to take the Commonwealth seat for 1948-49 unopposed. </p>
<h2>Sought middle positions</h2>
<p>In its first Security Council term, Canada sought middle positions on key issues such as the <a href="https://www.ubcpress.ca/fire-and-the-full-moon">Indonesian independence struggle</a>. Canada rejected Australia’s activist stance in favour of an effort to bridge U.S. advocacy for Indonesian independence and Dutch desires to keep their colony — this, in order to prevent Dutch-American divisions that might <a href="https://cihhic.ca/2019/04/03/how-a-colonial-dispute-almost-stopped-nato-from-forming/">derail the birth of NATO</a> in 1949. Canada even tried to <a href="https://www.ubcpress.ca/resisting-rights">block the Universal Declaration of Human Rights</a> in 1948. This first term, in short, saw Canada act as North Atlantic ally.</p>
<p>Through most of its <a href="https://www.ubcpress.ca/canada-on-the-united-nations-security-council">Security Council terms</a>, Canada was loyal to its allies, though it tried to “<a href="https://doi.org/10.7202/1032844ar">constrain</a>” U.S. foreign policy. Foreign ministers from Pearson to Joe Clark made it clear that Canada would mediate and advocate for developing nations only if it meant staying broadly in step with Washington and avoiding harm to Canadian business. </p>
<p>With the end of the Cold War, Canada was freer to take an independent stance. In a 1995 <a href="http://doi.org/10.2307/40203604">foreign policy review</a>, many civil society groups called for a policy centred on human rights.</p>
<h2>Land mines treaty</h2>
<p>Under foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy, Canada used its <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/archives/entry/canada-back-on-un-security-council-in-1999">Security Council term in 1999-2000</a> to promote “human security.” Though Ottawa still promoted Canadian business, Axworthy proved willing to diverge from U.S. foreign policy and ally with civil society networks. This led to <a href="https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XXVI-5&chapter=26&clang=_en">a treaty to ban land mines</a>, help for countries like Timor-Leste (formerly East Timor) emerge from colonial rule and the birth of the International Criminal Court (ICC). </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/343301/original/file-20200622-54997-b0370h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/343301/original/file-20200622-54997-b0370h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/343301/original/file-20200622-54997-b0370h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/343301/original/file-20200622-54997-b0370h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/343301/original/file-20200622-54997-b0370h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=524&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/343301/original/file-20200622-54997-b0370h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=524&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/343301/original/file-20200622-54997-b0370h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=524&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Francois-Philippe Champagne headed Canada’s unsuccessful campaign for a seat on the United Nations Security Council.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Adrian Wyld</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Those policies were snuffed out under Stephen Harper. To the surprise of some, they did not make a comeback under Justin Trudeau. The tone changed, but the substance of Harper policies lingered. (Continuing the Harper government’s contract to arm Saudi Arabia is the classic example.) When <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jun/11/trump-icc-us-war-crimes-investigation-sanctions">Donald Trump attacked the ICC</a> this month, Champagne did not join European allies in <a href="https://twitter.com/FP_Champagne/status/1273598429529354242">tweeting support</a> for the ICC until after Security Council voting closed. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1273598429529354242"}"></div></p>
<p>Canada was most effective during its last Security Council term when it teamed up with civil society. Twenty years on, with the gap between rhetoric and actions wider than ever, many civil society voices have become vocal critics.</p>
<p>There is a lesson here. As the rhetoric gap has grown, so too has the gap between Canada’s global affairs establishment and internationally oriented groups in Canadian civil society.</p>
<p>As Ottawa reviews its foreign policy, it will need to consider how it lost the confidence of what would once have been its strongest constituency.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/141092/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Webster receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council.</span></em></p>Canada sees itself as a peacekeeper and an independent voice in global affairs. The recent vote for a seat on the UN Security Council shows the world doesn’t agree with that image.David Webster, Associate Professor of History / Professeur Agrégé, Département d’Histoire, Bishop's UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.