tag:theconversation.com,2011:/fr/topics/post-apartheid-south-africa-35536/articlespost-apartheid South Africa – The Conversation2023-11-29T13:48:41Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2176982023-11-29T13:48:41Z2023-11-29T13:48:41ZOpera in Cape Town: critics trace how a colonial art form was reinvented as African<p><em>Many people thought that classical opera in South Africa – regarded as a western, colonial art form that was the preserve of white people during <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-apartheid-south-africa">apartheid</a> – would die with democracy in 1994. Instead the opposite happened. Black singers emerged as the new stars and the format of opera began to be Africanised for new audiences. Critics mapped this transformation as Cape Town established itself as a hotbed of the new opera. One such critic was Wayne Muller, who became an academic and wrote a <a href="https://scholar.sun.ac.za/server/api/core/bitstreams/0c2c61d1-d674-42e8-a4ac-8175d6f423bd/content">PhD</a> on the view of these changes. Now he has a <a href="https://www.google.co.za/books/edition/Opera_in_Cape_Town_The_Critic_s_Voice/mT3REAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0">book</a> on the subject called Opera in Cape Town: The Critic’s Voice. We asked him five questions.</em></p>
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<h2>How was opera established in South Africa?</h2>
<p>Like most things western European, opera in South Africa is part of a colonial legacy. Sources – from various journal articles and the South African Music Encyclopaedia (1979-1986) – refer to the early 1800s as the time when opera came to South Africa via Cape Town. </p>
<p>Travelling theatre companies from Europe staged mostly lighter operas, such as French <a href="https://www.britannica.com/art/opera-comique">opéra comique</a>. As time went by, more of these theatre companies came to Cape Town and travelled to the interior of the country. Eventually some of these artists and producers immigrated to South African, and so local opera production started to take shape. </p>
<p>In 1831, German composer <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Carl-Maria-von-Weber">Carl Maria von Weber</a>’s <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Der-Freischutz">Der Freischütz</a> was performed in Cape Town and billed in a newspaper, The South African Commercial Advertiser, as the first “serious” locally produced opera. </p>
<p>Since the early 1800s there has been a process of the professionalisation of opera, which can be seen, for instance, in the building of theatres and the training of opera singers at tertiary level. And, to put it simply, in this way opera became established and evolved as the art form that is performed in South Africa today.</p>
<h2>How did critics track opera’s transformation?</h2>
<p>My research on opera in post-apartheid South Africa looked particularly at how two Cape Town daily newspapers reported on the transformation of opera from the middle 1980s when apartheid was starting to unravel. I studied reviews of productions, news reports and other articles. Initially one sees a <a href="https://scholar.sun.ac.za/server/api/core/bitstreams/0c2c61d1-d674-42e8-a4ac-8175d6f423bd/content">survivalist approach</a> in arts reportage that highlighted a political “attack” on western art forms and questioned the place of indigenous art within the new democracy. Soon it became about “how do we ensure the survival of opera while doing the politically correct thing of giving indigenous music the same status”. </p>
<p>Also, critics expressed (albeit subtly) surprise at the emergence of black opera singers because the apartheid narrative had been that opera was the domain of white South Africans. Eventually in classical music and opera, critics’ writing started showing an embrace of a hybrid form of western classical and indigenous music that came about in opera during the 1990s. Looking at the past 30 years, it seemed that opera critics (writing mostly for a white readership) negotiated with their readers for an acceptance of emerging operatic aesthetics and expressions that were distinctly African.</p>
<h2>How did opera become “Africanised”?</h2>
<p>In the book I chart how opera became South African opera. “Africanisation” has been a process in which opera was made relevant to local South African audiences. <a href="https://scholar.sun.ac.za/items/ce3d5eab-282d-4cd9-96f6-14d0b4aef2fa">Some scholars</a> also refer to this as the indigenisation of opera. Already during the apartheid era, operas were translated into English and Afrikaans as a means of localising them. But the setting and music remained European in nature. Following translation, changing the <a href="https://www.nipai.org/post/mise-en-scene-on-stage">mise-en-scène</a> from Europe to local settings became a means of “Africanisation”. A good example is a 1997 production of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Giacomo-Puccini">Italian composer Giacomo Puccini</a>’s <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/La-Boheme-opera-by-Puccini">La Bohème</a>. It was renamed <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Shapers-Boheme-Noir-Giacomo-Puccini/dp/B000055XBB">La Bohème Noir</a> (black) and was set in the township of Soweto instead of Paris. Now the staging was set in a South African context, but the music was still European. </p>
<p>By the early 2000s, “Africanised” productions not only had a local setting, but the original music was merged with indigenous music and indigenous instruments were also included, such as in productions of Italian composer <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Giuseppe-Verdi">Giuseppe Verdi</a>’s Macbeth and English composer <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Henry-Purcell">Henry Purcell</a>’s <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Dido-and-Aeneas-opera-by-Purcell">Dido and Aeneas</a>. Later, themes were adapted to be locally relevant, such as a version of Hungarian composer <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Franz-Lehar">Franz Lehár</a>’s <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/The-Merry-Widow-operetta-by-Lehar">The Merry Widow</a>, set in an imagined African state with new character names and retitled <a href="https://www.classictic.com/en/the-merry-widow-of-malagawi-cape-town-opera/31771/">The Merry Widow of Malagawi</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/mzilikazi-khumalo-iconic-composer-who-defied-apartheid-odds-to-leave-a-rich-legacy-163283">Mzilikazi Khumalo: iconic composer who defied apartheid odds to leave a rich legacy</a>
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<p>But the most pertinent “Africanisation” of the operatic genre has been the composition of new South African operas with original music and stories – like South African composer <a href="https://theconversation.com/mzilikazi-khumalo-iconic-composer-who-defied-apartheid-odds-to-leave-a-rich-legacy-163283">Mzilikazi Khumalo</a>’s <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13696815.2015.1049245">Princess Magogo kaDinuzulu</a>. Since 1995, there have been more than 20 South African operas performed in the country, and I think each of them in their own way represent a distinct way of reinterpreting opera within a (South) African context.</p>
<p>Concurrently, we saw a transformation in opera with the emergence of black opera singers. The <a href="https://scholar.sun.ac.za/server/api/core/bitstreams/0c2c61d1-d674-42e8-a4ac-8175d6f423bd/content">Choral Training Programme</a> at the now defunct Cape Performing Arts Board (known as Capab) was established in 1993 and played a key role in providing vocal training, particularly to black singers, as a means of enabling transformation in opera. And since then, we have seen many black singers embracing opera, with the likes of <a href="https://theconversation.com/pretty-yende-a-south-african-opera-star-with-a-voice-that-shatters-glass-ceilings-200559">Pretty Yende</a> and <a href="https://www.levysekgapane.com/levy-sekgapane.html">Levy Sekgapane</a> becoming star singers in the big opera houses of the world. </p>
<h2>How reliable are just a few critics in telling history?</h2>
<p>I believe it is a reliable historical perspective if one qualifies that it is an historical account from that specific perspective. It can never be a 360-degree type of history (and the book does not claim this). There are other ways of looking at and interpreting sources on opera that could also constitute a history. However, what I have found is that our archives are inadequate to write a “full” history and much research still needs to be done from other perspectives and sources. So, this book is rather a means of capturing the historical patterns and trends in opera that have been documented by opera critics in newspapers – journalism being the first rough draft of history, as the <a href="https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2010/08/on-the-trail-of-the-question-who-first-said-or-wrote-that-journalism-is-the-first-rough-draft-of-history.html">phrase</a> goes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217698/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Wayne Muller does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A new book explores how Cape Town became a hub for African opera.Wayne Muller, Publications Editor / Research Fellow (Africa Open Institute for Music, Research and Innovation), Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2141642023-10-25T11:52:15Z2023-10-25T11:52:15ZIzikhothane: a deeper history of a South African youth subculture where luxury items are trashed<p>In South Africa, a skhothane is a young, fashionably dressed black urban resident who engages in destructive conspicuous consumption. This involves regular get-togethers on weekends in which groups of izikhothane – most likely male teenagers – gather to compete in mock battles where luxury items are often destroyed. The name is derived from a word in the Zulu language, <em>ukukhotha</em>, meaning “to lick”, but in urban slang it means to boast.</p>
<p>There’s no consensus about when exactly this “<a href="https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2014/07/sowetos-skhothanes-inside-the-south-african-townships-ostentatious-youth-subculture.html">youth craze</a>” emerged. But there’s reason to believe the ukukhothana subculture can be <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02500167.2015.1093322">traced</a> as far back as 2005, first in the townships of the East Rand of Gauteng province before spreading to other provinces. In South Africa, townships are human settlements established outside towns and cities by the white minority <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-apartheid-south-africa">apartheid</a> government as areas for people categorised as black to live in. </p>
<p>At ukukhothana events, izikhothane show up wearing expensive designer labels such as Rossimoda shoes, DMD shirts and Versace jackets and suits. They also bring what, in the township context, is considered expensive junk food, such as KFC and Debonair’s Pizza. Alcohol such as Bisquit, Hennessy and Jameson, traditionally associated with affluent people, accompanies the food.</p>
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<p>What makes the events interesting is what happens to these costly items once there’s an audience and loud music. The expensive clothes are at times torn, burnt or trampled on. The food is thrown on the ground and at each other in a playful and boastful manner. The alcohol is both consumed and used to wash hands and even poured on the ground. All this is done in order to show off wealth, style and swag, and ultimately to outdo each other in attracting cheers from the audience, attention from female spectators and respect from rival crews.</p>
<p>As one would expect, a subculture like this in a developing economy like South Africa has not been well received. It’s often <a href="https://i-d.vice.com/en/article/xwd5ed/dissecting-the-backlash-against-the-skhothane">criticised</a> as wasteful and reckless by society and in the media. Prominent investigative journalist Debora Patta, for example, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IWEcV_Ecfl4">labelled</a> izikhothane as “bling gone obscenely mad” on national TV. The question is asked: why do izikhothane embrace conspicuous consumption despite their limited means?</p>
<p>As communications scholars we have each <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02500167.2015.1093322">studied</a> this subculture for several <a href="https://www.proquest.com/openview/b7e0af6a24ea39bb8fda4d37b868145a/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=2026366&diss=y">years</a>. In a recent <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14725843.2021.1913094">research paper</a> we explore the link between consumption and the idea of rehumanisation – or restoring dignity to marginalised lives. We investigate how this subculture is a form of fashion consciousness with a long history – leading on from the “diamondfield dandies” of the 1800s and the “oswenka” of the 1900s. We argue that ukukhothana is a form of expression that has the potential to reclaim a sense of selfhood and pride in the remnants of oppression in post-apartheid South Africa.</p>
<h2>Consumption and identity</h2>
<p>UK anthropologist Mary Douglas and UK economist Baron Isherwood <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9780203434857/world-goods-baron-isherwood-mary-douglas">suggested</a> in 1979 that consumption is a purposeful act. It’s often aimed at conveying identity, cultural values and social circumstances. The goods people consume serve as markers of social identity and carry deeper meanings. US sociologist Thorstein Veblen’s <a href="https://brocku.ca/MeadProject/Veblen/Veblen_1899/Veblen_1899_04.html">concept</a> of “conspicuous consumption” aptly captures this phenomenon. It refers to the act of displaying wealth and status through ostentatious spending.</p>
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<p>Izikhothane’s behaviour can be understood within this framework. It’s an effort to signal their defiance against adversity and assert their presence in a society that has historically marginalised those who look like them. This historical marginalisation involved the treatment of black people as less than human through the system of apartheid. Black people were dehumanised during this period.</p>
<p><a href="https://philpapers.org/rec/OELDAR">Dehumanisation</a> involves viewing others as fundamentally different and inferior, perpetuating stereotypes and hindering empathy. Interestingly, this practice affects both the dehumanised and the dehumaniser. By devaluing others’ humanity, individuals strip themselves of their own humanising qualities. This underscores the complex psychological toll of perpetuating stereotypes.</p>
<p>Reversing the process of dehumanisation and reclaiming humanity is a nuanced effort that happens through a process of rehumanisation. Sartorial expression, which involves using clothing to convey identity, can play a pivotal role in rehumanisation. </p>
<p>Material possessions hold a significant influence over how we view other people’s identities. People use belongings not only to express who they are but to construct their “best” selves. </p>
<h2>Diamondfield dandies and oswenka</h2>
<p>Izikhothane are not the first and will not be the last to do this. Various sartorial subcultures appear to have arisen under conditions of dehumanisation in South Africa. These include the diamondfields dandies of the 1880s in Kimberley and the oswenka in Jeppestown in Johannesburg in the 1950s. These fashion subcultures found themselves in dehumanising conditions of migrant labour exploitation. They used expensive clothing and competitions of display to carve out a sense of their own humanity.</p>
<p>The diamondfield dandies sought to challenge racially inscribed stereotypes by parading in expensive clothing. They rebelled against the silence of black people in a bigoted white culture and created an identity outside work. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/sho-madjozi-the-pop-star-using-traditional-culture-to-shape-a-fresh-identity-for-young-south-africans-213599">Sho Madjozi: the pop star using traditional culture to shape a fresh identity for young South Africans</a>
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<p>Years later a different kind of dandy emerged through the oswenka (swankers), who performed menial labour for work. The oswenka subculture went beyond simply parading in expensive apparel in the form of suits; it involved competitive performance battles against other dandies.</p>
<p>In a similar way, izikhothane’s extravagant displays of consumption serve as a means of fulfilling psychological needs.</p>
<h2>Why this matters</h2>
<p>Izikhothane’s seemingly frivolous consumption rituals defy the constraints of their socioeconomic backgrounds. Their fashion choices assert their existence and protest against the enduring effects of apartheid. Their actions challenge conventional notions of rebellion and provide a poignant commentary on the complexities of identity, inequality and resistance.</p>
<p>The izikhothane of post-apartheid South Africa show us the power of consumption to challenge social norms and resist structural injustices. Their conspicuous consumption, while seemingly destructive, can be interpreted as a way of asserting identity and demanding recognition in a society that has historically treated those who look like them as invisible and less than human.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214164/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mthobeli Ngcongo receives funding from the National Research Foundation. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sifiso Mnisi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It’s about more than wasteful destruction; it’s a way of restoring dignity to marginalised young lives.Mthobeli Ngcongo, Lecturer in Communication Science, University of the Free StateSifiso Mnisi, Senior Lecturer in Communications and Media, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2075242023-07-04T11:23:29Z2023-07-04T11:23:29ZSouth African universities must do more to tackle staffs’ race and gender imbalances<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533992/original/file-20230626-17-5n5iwn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">There are more black African academic staff at South African universities than before.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">PeopleImages/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>At the advent of South Africa’s democracy in 1994, an <a href="https://www.ru.ac.za/media/rhodesuniversity/content/vc/documents/The_Challenges_of_Transformation_in_Higher_Eduaction_and_Training_Institutions_in_South_Africa.pdf#page=23">overwhelming majority of academics</a> in the country’s public higher education institutions were white men. Black South Africans (a group consisting of those designated as Indian, Coloured or African <a href="https://www.apartheidmuseum.org/exhibitions/race-classification#:%7E:text=Racial%20classification%20was%20the%20foundation,either%20white%20or%20non%2Dwhite">under apartheid</a>) constituted 89% of the overall population. But they made up <a href="https://www.ru.ac.za/media/rhodesuniversity/content/vc/documents/The_Challenges_of_Transformation_in_Higher_Eduaction_and_Training_Institutions_in_South_Africa.pdf#page=23">just 17%</a> of the academic workforce.</p>
<p>The situation was similar for non-academic employees like managers, administrators, and service and technical staff.</p>
<p>The higher education sector, like everything else in South Africa, needed to change to reflect the non-racial, non-sexist values foregrounded from 1994 and <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/saconstitution-web-eng.pdf#page=7">enshrined in the constitution</a> two years later. </p>
<p>The National Commission on Higher Education published <a href="https://www.ecsecc.org/documentrepository/informationcentre/higher_education_transformation.pdf">a report</a> in 1996 that outlined how such shifts could happen at the country’s <a href="https://www.ru.ac.za/media/rhodesuniversity/content/vc/documents/The_Challenges_of_Transformation_in_Higher_Eduaction_and_Training_Institutions_in_South_Africa.pdf#page=10">21 public universities</a> (there are 26 public universities today). New policies and <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/higher-education-act">legislation</a> were formulated to codify institutional change. </p>
<p>Nearly 30 years on, how has the staffing situation changed – or not – at South African universities? The Council on Higher Education, an independent statutory body which performs quality control assessments for the sector, wanted to find out. The council asked us to investigate this issue as part of <a href="https://www.che.ac.za/sites/default/files/flipbooks/2023/che_review/index.html">a broader review</a> of the sector (our submission starts on page 146).</p>
<p>Our findings reveal that staffing at public higher education institutions remains polarised in terms of race and gender. The composition of the workforce still doesn’t reflect <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/South-Africa/Conservation#ref44029">the country’s demographics</a>. White men continue to dominate.</p>
<p>The pace of change is frustratingly slow. There are a few likely reasons for this. One is that the higher education sector <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-dominance-of-big-players-is-bad-for-south-africas-economy-92058">reflects</a> many other parts of South African society, including the wider economy. Race and gender disparities are not unique to the sector.</p>
<p>It is crucial to address staff employment inequities in public higher education institutions. The sector’s political, social and economic value is <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325781607_Conceptualising_Higher_Education_and_the_Public_Good_in_Ghana_Kenya_Nigeria_and_South_Africa">fundamental</a> in a diverse society that aspires to inclusivity.</p>
<p>Genuine diversity is critical for teaching and learning, too. Research has shown that students benefit enormously from <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/238506813_The_Educational_Benefits_of_Diversity_Evidence_from_Multiple_Sectors">being at universities with diverse teaching staff</a>. They can learn both from those who share or have shared their social and economic experiences, and those who do not.</p>
<h2>Key findings</h2>
<p>The period under review was 1994 to 2019. Our findings were drawn from two data sets: the Department of Higher Education and Training’s South African Post-Secondary Education data, dating from 1994 to 2002; and Higher Education Management Information System data from 2003 to 2018. This was supplemented by secondary data and other information acquired through literature review and document analysis.</p>
<p>Here are some key findings.</p>
<ul>
<li><p>There have been gradual increases in the numbers of all previously marginalised groups (women, black Africans, Indians and Coloureds) in academic staff. However, white men remain the dominant group, especially in the professorial rank. They account for 67% (2,086) of academic staff at a professor post level. The proportion of black African academic staff at the professor level doubled, from 8% (196) in 2000 to 19% (602) in 2018.</p></li>
<li><p>There have been significant shifts in the professional support staff category. In 2002, white people accounted for 67% in this group; black Africans accounted for just 22%, while the Coloured and Indian categories were 5% each. In 2018, the proportion of white professional staff declined to 35%, black African staff increased to 41%, Coloured staff increased to 16% (785) and Indian staff increased to 8%.</p></li>
<li><p>The non-professional administration staff workforce is the most transformed. For example, 66% of professional and administrative support staff are black African and female; [51% of](https://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=15833#:~:text=More%20than%20half%20(51%2C1,households%20are%20headed%20by%20females) South Africa’s national population is female.</p></li>
<li><p>The black African majority are still under-represented within the executive and senior management echelons. Black Africans make up 37% of the people who hold executive and senior management positions despite constituting <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/south-africa-is-young-and-female-stats-sa-report-20180723">80.9% of the country’s population</a>. Of all the executive and senior managers in public higher education institutions, 45% are women, although women make up 51% of the total population.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>By 2018 black Africans made up 58% of the total workforce in this category. The white population group remained over-represented at 20% while its share in the overall population of the country was <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/south-africa-is-young-and-female-stats-sa-report-20180723">about 7.8%</a>. The representation ratios of coloureds (17%) and Indian (7%) in non-professional administration staff were also above their proportional representation in the overall population of South Africa, which is at 8.8% and 2.5%, respectively.</p>
<h2>Recommendations</h2>
<p>There are several ways to speed up the pace of change in university staffing. </p>
<p>Sector-wide mentoring programmes could provide support and guidance to early-career academics. This would help them to navigate the academic landscape and develop their skills. These programmes should be tailored to address the particular challenges faced by women, black African academics and disabled individuals. </p>
<p>Talent management strategies are needed to prepare emerging scholars. Promising academics must be identified and nurtured so they can advance to senior positions.</p>
<p>Universities also need strategies to attract and retain under-represented groups. This will help to improve gender and racial parity.</p>
<p>On paper, these strategies are already in place at many universities. But they have a fundamental flaw: they’re not <a href="https://www.intersectionaljustice.org/what-is-intersectionality">intersectional</a>. Racial and gender discrimination do not happen in a vacuum. They intersect with other forms of discrimination.</p>
<p>Mentorship, retention and support programmes at many South African universities tend to focus solely on fostering gender and racial equality. They may not adequately address the complex and intersecting challenges faced by individuals belonging to multiple marginalised groups. Meaningful, lasting change in the country’s university staffing structures requires a far more integrated approach.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207524/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>This study was funded and published by the South African Council on Higher Education.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Monwabisi K Ralarala and Nhlanhla Mpofu do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Despite some positive shifts, the staffing situation at public higher education institutions remains polarised in terms of race and gender.Mncedisi Maphalala, Director in the Centre for Excellence in Learning and Teaching (CELT), Durban University of TechnologyMonwabisi K Ralarala, Dean: Faculty of Arts and Humanities, University of the Western CapeNhlanhla Mpofu, Chair- Curriculum Studies, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1862262022-07-05T13:48:59Z2022-07-05T13:48:59ZJustice Maya’s support for African languages in South Africa’s courts is a positive sign<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/472337/original/file-20220704-14-wz0f2q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Judge President of South Africa's Supreme Court of Appeal, Mandisa Maya.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Simphiwe Nkwali (Photo by Gallo Images / The Times via GettyImages)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2022/07/25/ramaphosa-appoints-maya-as-deputy-chief-justice">new Deputy Chief Justice</a>, <a href="https://www.supremecourtofappeal.org.za/index.php/judges/judges-of-the-supreme-court-of-appeal/9-judges/maya-mandisa-muriel-lindelwa">Justice Mandisa Maya</a>, has once again put the spotlight on indigenous languages and the justice system.</p>
<p>South Africa’s post-apartheid legal profession, through legislation and policy, adopted an English-only approach. English was further elevated when the heads of the courts adopted it as the only official language of record <a href="http://vital.seals.ac.za:8080/vital/access/manager/Repository/vital:37968?site_name=GlobalView&query=zakeera+docrat+&sort=ss_dateNormalized+desc%2Csort_ss_title+asc&queryType=vitalDismax">in 2017</a>. But the country has <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/chp01.html#:%7E:text=(1)%20The%20official%20languages%20of,%2C%20isiNdebele%2C%20isiXhosa%20and%20isiZulu.">11 official languages</a>, and the majority of citizens speak an African language as mother tongue. <a href="http://vital.seals.ac.za:8080/vital/access/manager/Repository/vital:37968?site_name=GlobalView&query=zakeera+docrat+&sort=ss_dateNormalized+desc%2Csort_ss_title+asc&queryType=vitalDismax">Only 9.6%</a> of the population speak English as a mother tongue.</p>
<p>The other official languages <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/chp01.html#:%7E:text=(1)%20The%20official%20languages%20of,%2C%20isiNdebele%2C%20isiXhosa%20and%20isiZulu">are</a> Afrikaans, isiNdebele, isiXhosa, Sesotho, Setswana, Sepedi, siSwati, Tshivenda, Xitsonga and isiZulu. They all have equal status.</p>
<p>The decision to use English only is a missed opportunity for promoting multilingualism. Giving African languages intellectual status would ensure that legal practitioners became proficient in them. Using and developing all the nation’s languages is vital for their growth and survival. </p>
<p>It is often wrongly thought that language is associated with “race”. That is not the case. Language acquisition is linked to a person’s <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Languages-Identities-and-Intercultural-Communication-in-South-Africa-and/Kaschula/p/book/9780367364359">environment</a>. This is true for the two of us. We grew up in an isiXhosa environment and learnt the language at school and at university. It is not our mother tongue.</p>
<p>According to <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996-chapter-8-courts-and-administration-justice#174">Section 174 of the constitution</a>, “race” and gender must be taken into account when “appropriately qualified” judges are appointed. The primary purpose is to ensure the judiciary is transformed from the past era of racial discrimination to one that’s part of an inclusive, equal society. </p>
<p>Judges’ competence in official languages other than English is not considered.</p>
<h2>Language and the judiciary</h2>
<p>To our minds, the exclusion of proficiency in African languages runs counter to the country’s transformation agenda. No language should be seen as superior or inferior to any other. They should be seen as a rich resource which can ensure social justice.</p>
<p>Similar to the constitution, the <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/1994-009.pdf">Judicial Service Commission Act</a> makes no mention of the language abilities of judicial officers. Yet they work in multilingual courtrooms.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.judiciary.org.za/index.php/judicial-service-commission/about-the-jsc">Judicial Service Commission</a> advises the government on matters concerning the judiciary and the administration of justice. It interviews candidate judges and <a href="https://www.judiciary.org.za/index.php/judicial-service-commission/members-of-the-jsc">handles complaints against judges</a>. </p>
<p>Some commissioners and candidates have recently highlighted the importance of accepting African languages for <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/jsc-interviews-money-cant-buy-experience-judge-candidate-65-when-asked-about-age-20211007">court proceedings and records</a>.</p>
<h2>Justice Maya shows the way</h2>
<p>In her <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=frzrvsLA08Y">first interview for the position of Chief Justice</a> in February 2022, Justice Maya was commended for writing judgments bilingually (in isiXhosa and English). This was described as “extraordinary”.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.supremecourtofappeal.org.za/index.php/judges/judges-of-the-supreme-court-of-appeal/9-judges/maya-mandisa-muriel-lindelwa">Maya</a> reiterated the need to develop African languages <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=medfs6HuxMY">for use in courtrooms</a>. She suggested reviewing the law degree curriculum and enabling judges to write judgments in African languages. Maya noted that a new language policy for courts would require resources and commitment. She said she would encourage all judges to write judgments in their mother tongue.</p>
<p>In her most recent interview for <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=frzrvsLA08Y">the position of Deputy Chief Justice</a>, Maya was grilled on the fact that she wrote a bilingual judgment in the case <a href="http://www.saflii.org/cgi-bin/disp.pl?file=za/cases/ZASCA/2020/79.html&query=UNISA">Afriforum v Unisa</a>. It appeared as though commissioners were taking issue with the fact that the case, dealing with language rights of Afrikaans-speaking students, was written in isiXhosa (Maya’s mother tongue). One would expect commissioners to ask questions about Maya’s views on using African languages. </p>
<p>Maya said she needed the assistance of a legal translator when writing the judgment. This opens the possibility of employment for forensic linguistics and legal translation students and graduates. But the theme of transformation was not pursued at the interview.</p>
<p>Maya’s bold step of using isiXhosa as a language of record may chart a new course, one where African languages are finally recognised as being “official” in practice. </p>
<h2>Writing judgments in African languages</h2>
<p>Maya’s example was not the first in South Africa. It has happened in the past, primarily in the magistrates’ courts. This dates back to 1998 in the case of <a href="http://vital.seals.ac.za:8080/vital/access/manager/Repository/vital:37968?site_name=GlobalView&query=zakeera+docrat+&sort=ss_dateNormalized+desc%2Csort_ss_title+asc&queryType=vitalDismax">State v Matomela</a>. The case was heard in isiXhosa and the magistrate wrote the judgment in isiXhosa. The magistrate argued that it was practical to proceed in isiXhosa, where all parties were proficient in the language. </p>
<p>But when a high court reviewed the judgement, the judge said the most practical and efficient way to proceed in future was to have one language of record: English.<br>
In the 2004 case of <a href="http://vital.seals.ac.za:8080/vital/access/manager/Repository/vital:37968?site_name=GlobalView&query=zakeera+docrat+&sort=ss_dateNormalized+desc%2Csort_ss_title+asc&queryType=vitalDismax">State v Damoyi</a> no interpreter was available for the accused, so the magistrate heard the case in isiXhosa. On review, the judge questioned this. The magistrate responded that isiXhosa was an official language, and that it was practical to proceed in the language to safeguard the accused’s right to a fair trial.</p>
<p>In the case of <a href="https://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAWCHC/2018/106.html">State v Gordon</a> in 2018, the use of languages as part of transformation of the legal system was undermined and criticised. English was said to be the most beneficial and practical option. </p>
<h2>Language in pursuit of justice</h2>
<p>When forensic and legal linguists have argued for judgments to be written in African languages, and for cases to be conducted in African languages, they have been accused of <a href="http://vital.seals.ac.za:8080/vital/access/manager/Repository/vital:37968?site_name=GlobalView&query=zakeera+docrat+&sort=ss_dateNormalized+desc%2Csort_ss_title+asc&queryType=vitalDismax">shopping for judges on the basis of “race”</a>. But, as we have argued, the link between “race” and language is not a given. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-using-just-one-language-in-south-africas-courts-is-a-problem-134911">Why using just one language in South Africa's courts is a problem</a>
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<p>Judges should be allowed to play to their own linguistic strengths, thereby entrenching language and multilingualism in line with the constitution. The discussion should centre on how language can be used in courts of law in the pursuit of justice, rather than fixating on a particular language of record.</p>
<p><em>The article was updated following Justice Maya’s <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2022/07/25/ramaphosa-appoints-maya-as-deputy-chief-justice">appointment</a> as Deputy Chief Justice</em>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/186226/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Zakeera Docrat receives funding from the National Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences (NIHSS). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Russell H. Kaschula receives funding from the University of the Western Cape and the National Research Foundation.</span></em></p>It is important to embrace all the nation’s languages in a multilingual and multicultural society. This will ensure they are used, developed and mainstreamed.Zakeera Docrat, Postdoctoral research fellow (Forensic Linguistics/ Language and Law), University of the Western CapeRussell H. Kaschula, Professor of African Language Studies, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1821502022-05-09T13:35:03Z2022-05-09T13:35:03ZNew book unpacks the complexities of whiteness in South Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/460535/original/file-20220429-19-vyzzmr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A multiracial crowd sings the South African National Anthem at 2019 memorial service for the late rugby Springbok Chester Williams.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Rodger Bosch/AFP/ via GettyImages</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In his latest book <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/roger-southall-296862">sociologist Professor Roger Southall</a>, a prolific researcher who has written extensively about political dynamics in Southern Africa, avoids the “negative and condemnatory” approach generally seen in writing on white South Africans, the creators and beneficiaries of apartheid.</p>
<p>In the preface to the book, <a href="https://boydellandbrewer.com/9781847012890/whites-and-democracy-in-south-africa/">Whites and Democracy in South Africa</a>, he explains that he’s done this to instead undertake a nuanced and constructive assessment of white people’s adjustment to post-apartheid democracy.</p>
<p>Therefore, he enters the South African debate on critical race studies by setting his study apart from whiteness scholarship that assumes</p>
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<p>the homogeneity of white practices, ideas and attitudes and that being white is synonymous with being racist (p. 13).</p>
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<p>Southall criticises academic writing that attempts the corrective re-orientation of white people towards adopting more desirable behaviour as “sociologically overambitious” (p. 13).</p>
<p>He regards such scholarship as prescriptive and removed from the everyday experiences of white people. Instead, he insists that analysis of whiteness must be based on empirical research.</p>
<p>With this approach, Southall cuts through the sometimes shrill debate on race in South Africa with findings that are grounded in solid research. The book assists in taking the sometimes overly abstract idea of whiteness to a more useful engagement with white people, and their actions and ideas. The findings provide a welcome update on white people’s political stances after <a href="https://www.gov.za/FreedomDay2022">almost 30 years of democracy</a>.</p>
<h2>Whiteness in South Africa</h2>
<p>The book is based on data collected through eight in-depth qualitative focus group interviews, conducted in the provinces of KwaZulu Natal, Western Cape, Gauteng and Free State. Southall anchors the study with a historical contextualisation, giving the long view over time of specifically the political development of whiteness.</p>
<p>He provides an analysis of the state of liberalism. There’s renewed interest in this because of controversial stances on <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-main-opposition-party-caught-in-an-unenviable-political-bind-150296">race taken by the main opposition Democratic Alliance</a>. The party is the primary representative of liberalism among opposition parties in the country. </p>
<p>He also analyses changes in Afrikaner politics over time, white people as citizens, and explores the politics of representation through to the politics of wealth redistribution.</p>
<p>The study confirms the diversity in the political positions of white people in the country. This is also <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Whiteness-Just-isnt-What-Used/dp/B01K0UDD44">found in other work</a>. </p>
<p>Whiteness stands centrally in a racial order in which those positioned as “other” to whiteness are regarded as inferior. But it also creates internal hierarchies through overlapping regimes of domination, whether economic, patriarchal, <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/social-sciences/heteronormativity">heteronormative</a> or others. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-1994-miracle-whats-left-159495">South Africa's 1994 'miracle': what's left?</a>
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<p><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Sitting-Pretty-Afrikaans-Postapartheid-Africa/dp/1869143760">Analysis</a>, when done from a critical vantage point of taking into account ethnicity, class, gender and sexuality, shows complex intersections within whiteness. In these, women, LGBT and economically marginalised people occupy “lesser” statuses.</p>
<p>Southall’s contribution is to show the political changes within whiteness. Bringing in these internal complexities is important as it guards against <a href="https://wiser.wits.ac.za/system/files/Achille%20Mbembe%20-%20Decolonizing%20Knowledge%20and%20the%20Question%20of%20the%20Archive.pdf">mythologising whiteness</a>, which can make whiteness appear to be an insurmountable form of racial exclusion and dehumanisation.</p>
<h2>Reluctant democrats but without apartheid nostalgia</h2>
<p>One of Southall’s important findings is that limited nostalgia for apartheid exists among his respondents. Not a single respondent expressed the wish that the apartheid dispensation should have continued.</p>
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<img alt="Book cover showing no image ut the words 'Whites and Democracy in South Africa' written several times and the name 'Roger Southall' appearing once." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/460538/original/file-20220429-18-r3myzi.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/460538/original/file-20220429-18-r3myzi.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=886&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460538/original/file-20220429-18-r3myzi.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=886&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460538/original/file-20220429-18-r3myzi.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=886&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460538/original/file-20220429-18-r3myzi.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1113&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460538/original/file-20220429-18-r3myzi.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1113&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460538/original/file-20220429-18-r3myzi.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1113&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p>He shows in this book that white South Africans might be “reluctant democrats”, but they have accepted democracy (p. 239). This might seem like an underwhelming statement to make. But it serves as a reminder that an inclusive democracy in which all South Africans enjoy equal citizenship status was complete anathema to successive ruling white cliques for centuries.</p>
<p>The violent lengths that the white settler group went to, to sustain its dominance, are well recorded. As late in the day as the first half of the 1990s, the then ruling <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/South-Africa/The-National-Party-and-apartheid">National Party</a> had no intention of <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/dp/1770073051/ref=olp-opf-redir?aod=1&asin=1770073051&revisionId=&format=4&depth=1">giving up white power</a>.</p>
<p>In 1992 a whites-only <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/161008?seq=1">referendum was held</a>. The result showed support for a transition to democracy. This indicated that not only the apartheid ruling elite but also the majority of white people wished to open up the political space.</p>
<p>This contributed to, as Southall puts it, the country becoming a “failed settler state”. This is a liberating failure that has created the possibility for the extension of human dignity to all in the country. Those who lose sight of this downplay the gains made since the <a href="https://overcomingapartheid.msu.edu/unit.php?id=65-24E-6">end of official apartheid in 1994</a>.</p>
<p>However, the point is not to congratulate white people. Historical conditions mostly beyond their control forced a rethink of political positions beyond the small groups of whites who were already critical. Sustained white dissidence against colonialism and apartheid falls beyond the scope of the book. But, it is important again to keep in mind the multiplicity in white people’s political positions.</p>
<h2>Needed: a ‘politics of responsibility’</h2>
<p>The study finds that white people are willing to admit to the “wrongness” of apartheid, even as they deflect responsibility to apartheid-era securocratic and political elites. They had “a sense of relief” when the country finally transitioned to democracy in the 1990s.</p>
<p>However, respondents in the study do not support redress to correct the effects of colonial and apartheid racist policies. This is despite the legacy of white privilege that remains highly visible in the present. </p>
<p>This worrying finding assists in understanding how white resistance to wealth redistribution partly contributes to continuing black poverty in South Africa.</p>
<p>Foremost postcolonial thinker <a href="https://wiser.wits.ac.za/users/achille-mbembe">Achille Mbembe</a> is quoted in the book to make the point that what is needed among white people, specifically, is a “politics of responsibility” (p. 240). This would include white people bearing a material responsibility towards black people to undo the ravages of centuries of colonialism.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/democracy-loses-its-glow-for-south-africans-amid-persistent-inequality-181489">Democracy loses its glow for South Africans amid persistent inequality</a>
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<p>Southall provides a useful set of criteria to give flesh to South Africa’s unique contribution to the global struggle against racism, namely the decades-old idea of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/42705231?seq=1">non-racialism</a>. When it comes to a “politics of responsibility”, non-racialism necessarily involves a socio-economic dimension. This must take the form of addressing racial inequality, the property question and eradicating black poverty. All this alongside strengthening the commitment to democracy and advancing interracial inclusivity.</p>
<p>He may be circumspect about fitting his book within whiteness scholarship. But Southall’s latest work adds significant insights to <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Routledge-Handbook-of-Critical-Studies-in-Whiteness/Hunter-Westhuizen/p/book/9780367403799">a newly critical literature on studies of whiteness</a>, which seeks fresh pathways out of the destructive conundrum created by race and racism.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/182150/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christi van der Westhuizen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Avoiding trite moralisations, Professor Southall uses empirical research to shed light on white South Africans’ adjustment to democracy.Christi van der Westhuizen, Associate Professor, Centre for the Advancement of Non-Racialism and Democracy (CANRAD), Nelson Mandela UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1818742022-04-26T13:00:32Z2022-04-26T13:00:32ZLong list of unfinished business mars South Africa’s Freedom Day<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/459738/original/file-20220426-20-924sg7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">27 April 1994: South Africans vote in the nation's first free and democratic general election.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Brooks Kraft LLC/Sygma via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On 27 April 1994, South Africans from all walks of life <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/south-africas-first-democratic-elections">voted in the first democratic elections</a>. This was after many years of disenfranchisement of black people in South Africa. This day therefore marked an important democratic breakthrough in the history of the country.</p>
<p>The day, which has been declared Freedom Day, is therefore worthy of commemoration. It has been declared a public holiday to accentuate its historical significance related to the country’s democratic breakthrough.</p>
<p>But has a good society come about in the post-apartheid South Africa because of the 1994 democratic breakthrough?</p>
<p>With surging socioeconomic disparities, the anniversary of the country’s democracy makes this question apposite. In other words, is this day still worthy of commemoration? The answer to this question is not linear but a function of how various epochs fare towards creating a good society – a process of perpetual evolution marked by distinct milestones.</p>
<p>A good society <a href="https://fdocuments.in/document/manifesto-of-the-good-society-msharlowpoliticsdocumentsmanifestopdf-manifesto.html">creates opportunities for its people</a>. That doesn’t require it to be faultless. No democratic revolution has created a faultless society. However, when those faults start to cause misery in people’s lives, democracy faces the risk of turning against itself. And the days that mark its anniversary often create incendiary moments where the grimace of discontent – particularly on the faces of those who are in the margins of society – finds expression. </p>
<p>Is this what South Africa’s Freedom Day has become? In other words, almost three decades of democracy the existential question remains: what does this day mean?</p>
<p>The answer does not lie only in the history of Freedom Day, but in what has come out of it.</p>
<h2>A day for reckoning and accountability</h2>
<p>Surging socioeconomic disparities affront the very notion of a good society. Poverty, unemployment and inequality have become persistently stubborn features of the post-apartheid South Africa. They have earned the country the infamy of the <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/03/09/new-world-bank-report-assesses-sources-of-inequality-in-five-countries-in-southern-africa#:%7E:text=South%20Africa%2C%20the%20largest%20country,World%20Bank's%20global%20poverty%20database.">most unequal society in the world</a>.</p>
<p>Eighty percent of the country’s wealth <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099125303072236903/pdf/P1649270c02a1f06b0a3ae02e57eadd7a82.pdf">continues to be owned</a> by only 10% of the population. Income inequality is grossly skewed, and poverty levels are surging. Latest data on unemployment for the fourth quarter of 2021 shows that South Africa’s unemployment rate at 35.3% has reached a historic high. This is concentrated <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/business/572250/jobs-bloodbath-hits-south-africa-as-unemployment-climbs/">largely in the youth population</a> of the country where about 30 million people, using the household poverty line of R992 per month, <a href="https://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/poverty/33EF03BB-9722-4AE2-ABC7-AA2972D68AFE/Global_POVEQ_ZAF.pdf">are living in poverty</a>. </p>
<p>None of this bodes well for the meaning of Freedom Day.</p>
<h2>Unfinished business</h2>
<p>For those who bear the brunt of these socioeconomic hardships, the 1994 democratic breakthrough has spawned unfinished business of democratisation.</p>
<p>It failed <a href="https://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/poverty/33EF03BB-9722-4AE2-ABC7-AA2972D68AFE/Global_POVEQ_ZAF.pdf">to disentangle</a> “the deep-seated underlying structural causes of economic stagnation that have developed over hundreds of years of slavery, colonialism and apartheid”. </p>
<p>Various interventions to ensure social equity and economic fairness, particularly for those who were historically marginalised, got lost in translation where transformation has spawned a few black elites and middle class but not socioeconomic justice especially for those who are in the lowest strata of society.<br>
It is because of this that Freedom Day is becoming increasingly derided by many in the cynicism which has percolated into a grievance. It is often scoffed at with the intimation, whose freedom is it anyway? </p>
<p>In a democratic society this question is not inappropriate. It is worrisome as it has the potential to delegitimise Freedom Day and therefore desecrate history.</p>
<h2>What’s called for</h2>
<p>The process of establishing a democratic system in South Africa involved establishing political and governance systems based on the supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law, where equality became one of the organising principles of the post-apartheid society. A social compact was forged. And, hallmarking this was the inclusion of socioeconomic rights in the constitution, and the political and legal mechanisms to enforce them.</p>
<p>This placed an obligation on the state to maximise access to resources, opportunities and services for particularly those who are vulnerable and poverty-stricken in the margins of society.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/pdf.html">constitution</a> of the Republic of South Africa is an integral part of the continuum of the 1994 democratic breakthrough and therefore ought to go into the meaning of Freedom Day, but not as the ultimate measure of achievement. Of critical importance for the meaningfulness of the day are the democratic dividends which should spawn a good society. </p>
<p>A democratic breakthrough not followed by socioeconomic justice makes freedom hollow. This is what the grimace of public discontent says about Freedom Day and should be heeded – not with hubris or the veneration of the country’s constitutional system, but with a renewed sense of commitment to optimise the opportunities which the evolution of the post-apartheid society creates for the correction of its faults. </p>
<p>And this is the urgent task of the epoch which must start with the vigour to implement the <a href="https://www.gov.za/issues/national-development-plan-2030">National Development Plan</a>, a document released a decade ago that set out what South Africa needed to do to address its many ills with a target date of 2030. </p>
<p>In my view it continues to be the most comprehensive framework for socioeconomic transformation. In addition, it was embraced by all political parties. However, its recommendations have not been followed through earnestly.</p>
<p>This needs to change because the plan offers an important opportunity for the correction of the post-apartheid state. </p>
<p>Memorable days in the history of this country like Freedom Day are important for social cohesion. However, their meaningfulness lies in doing the right things related to reinventing the state in order to shore up its capacity to exist for the good of society. Lest they create platforms for the wrath of the poor rather than for active citizenry.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181874/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mashupye Herbert Maserumule received funding for his postgraduate studies from the National Research Foundation (NRF). He is affiliated with the South African Association of Public Administration and Management (SAAPAM). He edits its scholarly publication, Journal of Public Administration.</span></em></p>Freedom Day needs to be used by South Africans to renew their commitment to correcting their country’s faults.Mashupye Herbert Maserumule, Professor of Public Affairs, Tshwane University of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1572182021-05-06T12:30:37Z2021-05-06T12:30:37ZWhat the US can learn from Africa about slavery reparations<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/396887/original/file-20210423-17-zc24q2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=253%2C90%2C5005%2C3391&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Activists mark National Reparations Day in Washington, D.C., on July 1, 2019.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/activists-stage-a-protest-to-mark-the-national-reparations-news-photo/1159502247?adppopup=true">Alex Wong/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The House Judiciary Committee voted on April 14, 2021, to recommend the creation of a commission to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/14/us/politics/reparations-slavery-house.html">study the possibility of paying reparations to the descendants of enslaved people</a> in the United States. </p>
<p>The measure, H.R. 40, would establish a 15-person commission to offer a “national apology” for slavery, study its long-term effects and submit recommendations to Congress on how to compensate African Americans. </p>
<p>Any federal reparations bill faces long odds of being enacted due to Republican opposition, but this is the furthest this effort has advanced since a similar bill was first introduced over 30 years ago.</p>
<p>Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee, Democrat from Texas, who introduced H.R. 40, called it a needed step on the “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/reparations-slavery-commission/2021/04/14/fd421f82-9d2a-11eb-b7a8-014b14aeb9e4_story.html">path to restorative justice</a>.” </p>
<p>As the U.S. <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2020/07/10/slavery-reparations-bill-spurs-new-debate-other-nations-model/5396340002/">debates reparations</a> for descendants of U.S. slavery, looking to Africa might help clear a path forward, according to my research on <a href="https://www.colgate.edu/about/directory/kkonadu">African history and the African diaspora</a>.</p>
<h2>South Africa’s incomplete reparations</h2>
<p>In the U.S. and globally, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-race-reparations-idUSKBN2BD0B8">arguments for reparations</a> mostly <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/15/us/jesuits-georgetown-reparations-slavery.html">revolve around</a> <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/01/31/slavery-reparations-seem-impossible-many-places-theyre-already-happening/">financial restitution</a>. </p>
<p>But a closer examination of the actual reparations efforts illustrates the limits of programs solely focused on financial restitution.</p>
<p>In South Africa, Nelson Mandela and his ruling political party, the African National Congress, created a <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/trc/">Truth and Reconciliation Commission</a> in 1995 upon coming to power. The commission investigated human rights crimes during nearly five decades of apartheid, the system of legislation that upheld segregationist laws and perpetrated racist violence. </p>
<p>The commission also established a reparations program, recommending in its <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/trc/report/">2003 final report</a> that victims of apartheid receive roughly <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/south_african_truth_commission">US$3,500 over six years</a>.</p>
<p>But the commission stipulated that only those who had testified to the commission about apartheid’s injustices – about 21,000 people – could claim reparations. Some 3.5 million Black South Africans suffered under <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/africa/apartheid">apartheid rule</a>. </p>
<p>Mandela’s successor, Thabo Mbeki, issued the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/16/world/south-africa-to-pay-3900-to-each-family-of-apartheid-victims.html">one-time $3,900 payments in 2003</a>. South African governments have since made no additional payments to those who testified or other apartheid victims.</p>
<p>Nor have any post-Mandela governments put the perpetrators of the apartheid system on trial. The <a href="https://www.strifeblog.org/2021/02/05/the-struggle-continues-khulumani-support-group-and-reparations-in-south-africa/">power structure</a> that upheld apartheid has remained largely undisturbed.</p>
<p>South Africa is the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/07/africa/south-africa-elections-inequality-intl">world’s most unequal society</a>, according to the World Bank. Whites make up the majority of wealthy elites while half of the Black South African population lives in poverty.</p>
<p>Dismissing the wider <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3557322">social and economic damage caused by apartheid</a> – high-income inequality, unreturned lands seized by whites, poor community infrastructure – has kept millions who suffered violence from qualifying as victims. They may never see reparations.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/396889/original/file-20210423-21-1tdzbtb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="An anti-apartheid demonstration in South Africa." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/396889/original/file-20210423-21-1tdzbtb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/396889/original/file-20210423-21-1tdzbtb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/396889/original/file-20210423-21-1tdzbtb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/396889/original/file-20210423-21-1tdzbtb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/396889/original/file-20210423-21-1tdzbtb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/396889/original/file-20210423-21-1tdzbtb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/396889/original/file-20210423-21-1tdzbtb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An anti-apartheid demonstration in Soweto, South Africa in 1989.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/an-anti-apartheid-demonstration-in-soweto-south-africa-in-news-photo/120452893?adppopup=true">Lily Franey/Gamma-Rapho via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Sierra Leone’s underfunded effort</h2>
<p>Around the same time that South Africa created its Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the West African nation of Sierra Leone undertook a similar effort to <a href="https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/43710-reparations-in-sierra-leone-news-from-the-periphery-of-transitional-justice.html">confront the aftermath of its 10-year civil war</a>. </p>
<p>Sierra Leone’s civil war, from 1991 to 2002, killed at least 50,000 people and displaced another 2 million. In 2004, its Truth and Reconciliation Commission recommended <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2004/ecosoc6140.doc.htm">reparation measures for survivors</a>. </p>
<p>It recommended pensions, free health care and education benefits for amputees, those severely wounded, those widowed by the war and survivors of sexual violence.</p>
<p>Sierra Leone governments long ignored these recommendations, but in 2008 pressure from the country’s largest survivor organization, the Amputee and War-Wounded Association, and a $3.5 million grant from the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund <a href="https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/43710-reparations-in-sierra-leone-news-from-the-periphery-of-transitional-justice.html">restarted reparation efforts</a>. </p>
<p>Instead of implementing the TRC’s more comprehensive reparation measures, however, the Sierra Leone government in 2008 provided each of the 33,863 registered survivors a single $100 payment. The UN later provided some small payments, loans and vocational training to other survivors in subsequent years.</p>
<p>After interviewing survivors of the Sierra Leone civil war, the nonprofit <a href="https://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/HSFK/hsfk_downloads/prif129.pdf">Peace Research Institute Frankfurt</a> concluded in 2013 that Sierra Leone’s reparations program failed. It pointed to the high numbers of victims, limited funding and public health epidemics like Ebola that made reparations less a priority. </p>
<h2>Reparations through the courts</h2>
<p>In other African countries, survivors of colonial atrocities have sought redress through the courts.</p>
<p>In 2013, <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/mau-mau-british-empire-kenya-rebellion-independence-boycott-2017-election-a7474716.html">Kenyan survivors</a> of British colonial atrocities brought a legal suit to the British high courts demanding reparations. The British government recognized “that Kenyans were subject to torture and other forms of ill-treatment at the hands of the colonial administration” and agreed to pay £19.9 million – $27.6 million – in compensation to some 5,000 elderly survivors. </p>
<p>But the government stalled payments, and <a href="https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/42789-colonial-crimes-kenyans-un.html">Kenyans later demanded more than what was offered</a>.</p>
<p>A similar <a href="https://doi.org/10.13169/statecrime.7.2.0369">court case in Germany demanding reparations for</a> the <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/ewelinaochab/2018/05/24/the-herero-nama-genocide-the-story-of-a-recognized-crime-apologies-issued-and-silence-ever-since/?sh=5209818b6d8c">Germans’ 1904-1908 massacre of the Herero people</a> in colonial Namibia <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/namibia-germany-reparations/a-54535589">remains contested</a>. And negotiations over payments and other forms of redress continue.</p>
<h2>Rethinking reparations through Africa</h2>
<p>Groups representing African and Caribbean nations have offered alternative ways of thinking about the colonial slavery and racial violence driving such reparations efforts. </p>
<p>In 2019, the African Union – a regional policy body made up of 55 African countries – defined <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/36541-doc-au_tj_policy_eng_web.pdf">reparative justice</a> as redress for “losses suffered” under any circumstances where human rights have been violated. </p>
<p>That includes financial reparations – its policy document emphasizes material support for rebuilding homes and businesses damaged by oppressive colonial regimes. </p>
<p>But it also called for member countries to think beyond money to consider reparations measures aimed at healing trauma and establishing broad social justice.</p>
<p>Much of the African Union’s thinking aligns with the Caribbean-based Caricom Reparations Commission’s <a href="https://caricomreparations.org/caricom/caricoms-10-point-reparation-plan/">10-point reparation plan</a>, established in 2013. It includes debt cancellation for Caribbean countries built on colonial slavery and the right of African descendants worldwide to return to an African homeland, should they wish to, via an internationally supported resettlement program.</p>
<p>[<em>Over 100,000 readers rely on The Conversation’s newsletter to understand the world.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=100Ksignup">Sign up today</a>.]</p>
<p>For these groups, reparations isn’t just about money – it’s a plea for collective restoration, to retrieve something on behalf people who lost their labor or life to powerful white governments and institutions.</p>
<p>Through slaving and colonial rule, Africa lost people. But the continent also lost skilled labor, creativity and innovations. Those benefits were transferred to colonial societies – and their recovery remains at stake for Africa and African descended people worldwide.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/157218/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kwasi Konadu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As the US debates reparations for descendants of slavery, cases in Africa help illustrate the limits of programs focused solely in financial restitution.Kwasi Konadu, John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Endowed Chair and Professor, Colgate UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1437502020-08-09T08:14:16Z2020-08-09T08:14:16ZThe Cape Town gangsters who use extreme violence to operate solo<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/351703/original/file-20200807-20-1ddvokv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Dariusz Dziewanski</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>White minority rule under <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/africa/apartheid">apartheid</a> ended in South Africa over a quarter-century ago. But racial and class segregation in cities like Cape Town are as <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2014/apr/30/cape-town-apartheid-ended-still-paradise-few-south-africa">present</a> as ever. The vast majority of the city’s black population still lives a far cry from the shops, beaches and restaurants of its affluent and <a href="https://www.capetown.travel/cape-town-voted-best-city-in-the-world-for-7th-year-running/">touristy</a> downtown core. Many struggle in low-income and informal settlements where jobs are scant, government services are inadequate, schools and healthcare lack funding and <a href="https://time.com/longform/south-africa-unequal-country/">violence</a> is a regular occurrence.</p>
<p>These are the circumstances that have driven around <a href="https://issafrica.org/research/books/organised-crime-a-study-from-the-cape-flats">100,000 people</a> into the estimated <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2018/10/04/why-cape-towns-murder-rate-is-rising">130 gangs</a> fighting each other on the windswept sandy outskirts of Cape Town’s urban periphery. Joining a gang offers marginalised Capetonians opportunities for <a href="https://issafrica.org/research/papers/the-social-contradictions-of-organised-crime-on-the-cape-flats">income</a>, <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1466138106069517">protection</a> and <a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/G/bo6161597.html">empowerment</a>. </p>
<p>Existing gang literature typically assumes that people join gangs to seek <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1466138106069517">strength in numbers</a>. But in a recent <a href="https://academic.oup.com/bjc/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/bjc/azaa028/5843313">research paper</a> I examine how some Capetonian gangsters choose to stand alone, preferring their independence to taking orders from a gang boss. Without the protection of an armed posse, however, they must fend for themselves. They rely on extreme violence and dangerous risk-taking to survive – and thrive – amid merciless gang warfare, in a city with one of the highest <a href="http://www.seguridadjusticiaypaz.org.mx/seguridad/1567-estudio-las-50-ciudades-mas-violentas-del-mundo-2018">murder</a> <a href="https://www.news.uct.ac.za/article/-2020-07-03-cape-towns-crime-crisis">rates</a> in the world.</p>
<h2>Meeting the ‘street virtuosos’</h2>
<p>Take the story of Prince, a Capetonian gangland mercenary who chose not to join a street gang. Describing a shootout with the city’s biggest gang, the Americans, he told me in an interview: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I got around about twelve guns with me … I would position guns where I would know I would run to. I would hide here, so I would shoot then run there, and shoot – crazy stuff like that.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Prince said he sought out conflict with the gang after newly arriving in its territory. Doing so earned the Americans’ respect, which in turn gained him access to their territory to sell methamphetamines and other narcotics.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I first had to have a fight with one of the top dogs so that (the gangsters in the area) can acknowledge a person. The only language they understand is violence. You must first take them to the peak of your violence – and then bring them down to the level that you want them to be.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>I found that most gangsters are unwilling to expose themselves to this level of vulnerability. This means that few in Cape Town fly solo. </p>
<p>My study chronicles the exploits of what I call “<a href="https://academic.oup.com/bjc/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/bjc/azaa028/5843313">street virtuosos</a>”, those rare gangsters like Prince who challenge street norms by refusing to declare allegiance to a group, defend its tattoo and die for its turf. Instead, they master the “art of killing” to fight alone among the city’s gangs, breaking with the expectations of the streets and showing how radical acts of violence can upset accepted gang norms in Cape Town.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/351706/original/file-20200807-24-3uydbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/351706/original/file-20200807-24-3uydbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/351706/original/file-20200807-24-3uydbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351706/original/file-20200807-24-3uydbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351706/original/file-20200807-24-3uydbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351706/original/file-20200807-24-3uydbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351706/original/file-20200807-24-3uydbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351706/original/file-20200807-24-3uydbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A member of a community violence prevention initiative called Ceasefire.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Dariusz Dziewanski</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But one cannot just be violent to stand out in a place where murder and assault are expected. Only extraordinary hostility gets people’s attention. For example, another street virtuoso named Jerome recalls almost beating a criminal colleague to death to teach him a lesson after the man almost botched a robbery. “We were doing a job. It was very easy. But the guy didn’t do what I said he must do and I beat his head up with a hammer … If I’m very honest, I beat his head like a milk sachet,” Jerome said. </p>
<p>Callous aggression of this magnitude sends a message, showing others who is boss and bestowing status onto the perpetrator through the rumours and street gossip that follow the incident.</p>
<p>Gaining street cred is not just about how you fight though. It is also about who you fight. Just as Prince targeted the “top dogs” to gain access to drug turf, Jerome robbed high-ranking gangsters to fill his own pockets. “It is who you rob. If I know that (somebody) is a higher rank, we rob him … So the whole gang thinks, and even he thinks: what’s going on?” declared Jerome. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I would do things which the normal (street) system, there where they live in, is not used to. So I would do things out of the ordinary. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The objective of robbing in this way was to destabilise and disorient other gangsters, leaving potential foes struggling to figure out what is happening around them.</p>
<h2>Escalating violence</h2>
<p>The consequence of these violent manoeuvrings might be the scaling up of overall rates of violent criminality. It is impossible to attribute any sort of causal certainty in this regard. But gang researchers in <a href="https://books.google.ca/books?id=1t9sZcPEQ7UC&dq=born+Fi%E2%80%99+Dead.&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjsrN7Tt-7qAhVWIDQIHWqPD2UQ6AEwAHoECAIQAg">other settings</a> have suggested that exposure to more aggressive street practices can redefine gangster culture, permanently pushing the modalities of criminality towards greater violence. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/its-hard-to-leave-a-cape-town-gang-but-these-mens-stories-show-that-its-possible-141208">It's hard to leave a Cape Town gang. But these men's stories show that it's possible</a>
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</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Yet, there is also a surprising silver lining to the extraordinarily violent behaviour that I recorded in my study. The socialisations, expectations and norms associated with <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1748895815603774">violent street culture</a> are often presented as something binding and inescapable. But providing evidence that street-based practices can evolve and change negatively indicates that it might also be changed for the better. </p>
<p>Whereas street virtuosos use extraordinary force to bend the rules of the streets to their will, others can <a href="https://theconversation.com/its-hard-to-leave-a-cape-town-gang-but-these-mens-stories-show-that-its-possible-141208">break from the streets</a> altogether, transforming their own lives by leaving gangs and showing others that a way out is possible.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/143750/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dariusz Dziewanski does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A study shows that some Cape Town gangsters choose to stand alone, preferring their independence to taking orders from a gang boss.Dariusz Dziewanski, Researcher, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1412082020-07-15T14:48:44Z2020-07-15T14:48:44ZIt’s hard to leave a Cape Town gang. But these men’s stories show that it’s possible<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/346529/original/file-20200709-87067-1ndz4wb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Dariusz Dziewanski</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Cape Town, South Africa, is a city of almost four million people. Many know it as a premier <a href="https://www.capetown.travel/cape-town-voted-best-city-in-the-world-for-7th-year-running/">tourist spot</a> and a <a href="https://wdo.org/programmes/wdc/past-cities/wdccapetown2014/">World Design Capital</a>. Fewer know it is Africa’s <a href="http://www.seguridadjusticiaypaz.org.mx/sala-de-prensa/1590-boletin-ranking-2019-de-las-50-ciudades-mas-violentas-del-mundo">deadliest</a> <a href="https://www.news.uct.ac.za/article/-2020-07-03-cape-towns-crime-crisis">city</a>. Gang violence accounts for about <a href="https://www.saps.gov.za/services/annual_crime_report2019.pdf">one third</a> of its murders, an average of about two gangland killings every day.</p>
<p>The city has anywhere from <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/07/20/dispatch-south-african-army-struggle-contain-gang-war-driven/">90</a> to <a href="https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/gangs-criminal-empires-and-military-intervention-cape-towns-crime-wars">130</a> gangs, with an estimated <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-24/rising-cape-town-gang-violence-is-yet-another-legacy-of-apartheid">100,000 members</a>. For some residing in the many townships on the city’s periphery, joining a gang offsets a lack of <a href="https://issafrica.org/research/books/organised-crime-a-study-from-the-cape-flats">development and governance</a> and offers possibilities for <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1466138106069517">protection</a>, <a href="https://issafrica.org/research/papers/the-social-contradictions-of-organised-crime-on-the-cape-flats">income</a> and <a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/G/bo6161597.html">esteem</a>.</p>
<p>The general impression is that joining gangs is a death sentence. “Blood in, blood out” is a well-known Capetonian axiom. The same message is echoed in news reports about ongoing <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/gang-wars-map-who-is-fighting-who-in-cape-towns-gang-lands-20190729">gang wars</a>. </p>
<p>But this isn’t the whole truth. People do leave gangs, and create new lives for themselves. I explore this in my <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0891241620915942">recent research</a>.</p>
<h2>A gang member’s first doubts</h2>
<p>“It was too hot man. Other times were also hot – nah – but this… and with my age, you understand.” At 43, Alfred had been a gangster long enough to acquire five “death spots” on his body, places where he was shot and stabbed while a member of the Scorpions and later the Americans. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>It was a time in my life that I must take a boundary, to say this is finished now. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>His exit from Cape Town’s largest gang came after surviving a bullet to the head. Alfred is not your typical near-death epiphany though. </p>
<p>Revenge was his initial reaction. “I planned again that I must ambush the whole family of them (that shot me),” he admitted. Yet, on the day of planned hit, he had a change of heart and went instead to the hospital that had treated his gunshot wounds to get connected to a safe house. That was the beginning of his transition out of the streets.</p>
<p>Alfred is one of 24 former gang participants whose life histories were included in my study. In it I consider gang disengagement in Cape Town from the perspective of the four phases of <a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/B/bo5952245.html">role exit theory</a>: first doubts, seeking alternative roles, turning points and new role creation. Doubts are experienced when members start to question their commitment to gangs. The second stage involves evaluating alternative social roles. Turning points activate role exit in stage three. The final transition stage requires accepting the expectations and identities associated with becoming an “ex”. </p>
<p>My <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0891241620915942">study</a> found that many years may pass between first doubts emerging and a person successfully becoming an ex-gangster. Progress through the different phases of gang exit is generally difficult, uneven, and unpredictable. If the right exit opportunities do not exist, social, economic, and security challenges can counteract the desire to get out.</p>
<h2>The uneasy ceasefire</h2>
<p>The story of 37-year-old Ibrahim shows how circumstances can affect opportunities to fully become an ex-gangster. After 13 years as an Americans member, Ibrahim <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0891241620915942">told me</a> that his final turning point came after a deadly dispute with two fellow Americans. “The one who accuse me came in for the second shot (at stabbing me). But at that time he came straight into my knife. I stab him straight into his heart,” he said. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/346528/original/file-20200709-38-1gziquf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/346528/original/file-20200709-38-1gziquf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/346528/original/file-20200709-38-1gziquf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/346528/original/file-20200709-38-1gziquf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/346528/original/file-20200709-38-1gziquf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/346528/original/file-20200709-38-1gziquf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/346528/original/file-20200709-38-1gziquf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/346528/original/file-20200709-38-1gziquf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Many initial inhabitants of the Cape Flats were forcibly evicted from the city centre by the apartheid government.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Dariusz Dziewanski</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Violent incidents like this one helped raise doubts and sparked turning points for many study participants. Police ultimately determined that Ibrahim acted in self-defence. The Americans’ leaders agreed. But the siblings of the man he killed – both Americans – vowed retribution.</p>
<p>Because Ibrahim is unable to find steady work, he is stuck in small shack behind his family home. It is directly across from an Americans hideout where one of the siblings stays. Even if they “look every day in each other’s faces,” Ibrahim has little choice but to keep confronting his past. “I’m just doing what I must do, and nothing else”, he says. </p>
<p>The US flag still dominates the wall of his cramped wooded dwelling, but he insists that this important symbol of the Americans gang merely offers cover after disengagement. “I think they (are) going to kill me… This is only a way of showing them the flag is still here, but (really) it does not mean I am an American.” The strategy might keep Ibrahim alive, but it might also keep him partially embedded in his former gang role. </p>
<p>If he does not maintain a safe distance from gang associations and activities, he could be dragged back. Yet, if he does not show the gang that “the flag is still there” he risks being killed. Should this uneasy ceasefire falter, Ibrahim is prepared to fight for the freedom he has secured, returning to a type of <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1362480608089238">street violence</a> typically reserved for gangsters. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Just because of me trying to do the right thing, does not mean I am losing this power. I have it. I can still do what I have to do.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Becoming an ‘ex’</h2>
<p>In an ideal world, criminologists <a href="https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2014-21723-006">Decker, Pyrooz, and Moule</a> state that when “someone reaches the final stage, postexit validation, the role transition should be complete and the gang member of yesterday should be superseded by the father or mother, husband or wife, and employee or employer roles of today”. </p>
<p>Ibrahim’s situation is unfortunately far from ideal. It demonstrates that declaring oneself an “ex” is not enough to leave gangs. The vast majority of those in this study did disassociate totally. However, all faced restricted movement, threats from former rivals, stigma from community, criminalisation by police and inadequate job prospects. </p>
<p>Gang disengagement programmes are essential to helping individuals like Ibrahim and Alfred out of gangs by overcoming such challenges. But because former gang members are usually left coping with the same circumstances that originally pushed them into gangs, larger <a href="https://issafrica.org/research/books/organised-crime-a-study-from-the-cape-flats">structural reforms</a> are also needed to address the poverty, inequality, dearth of housing, inadequate policing and lack of services. These factors <a href="https://www.amazon.ca/Gang-Town-Don-Pinnock-ebook/dp/B01DMDBPEG">drive gang membership</a> in Cape Town. Interventions need to fight gangs holistically, whether they are trying to get people out of gangs or help them avoid gangs in the first place.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/141208/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dariusz Dziewanski does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Even after becoming an ‘ex’, former gang members must still negotiate gang associations and activities in the communities they remain in.Dariusz Dziewanski, Researcher, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/987742018-06-27T13:55:47Z2018-06-27T13:55:47ZWhy Cuban doctors in Kenya don’t deserve the treatment they’re getting<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/224886/original/file-20180626-112614-1ttmssi.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Some of the 50 Cuban medical specialists who arrived in Kenya recently to work in under served rural areas.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Supplied</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Cuban medical missions abroad are perhaps one of the most <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/8059287.stm">significant legacies </a> of the 1959 Cuban Revolution. The programme involves Cuban doctors offering health care services in host countries, often in impoverished rural communities where there’s little access. </p>
<p>The programme stemmed from Cuba’s foreign policy objectives of anti-colonialism and humanitarianism in the 1960s. It became one way in which Cuba could avoid the isolation intended by the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-19583447">trade embargo</a> imposed by the US and its <a href="https://www.oas.org/en/about/offices_detail.asp?sCode=CUB">expulsion</a> from the Organisation of American States (OAS).</p>
<p><a href="http://en.granma.cu/cuba/2016-04-12/studying-medicine-in-cuba-an-option-for-international-youth">Well over</a> 131,993 Cuban doctors have taken part in international missions in 107 countries. Kenya is the latest.
<a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/health/article/2001283029/cuban-doctors-arrive-in-kenya-photos">The first</a> 50 specialists arrived in the country recently, with 50 more to follow. All are expected to work in under served rural areas.</p>
<p>But their arrival has been met with a storm of protest. Some Kenyan health professionals have <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/health/article/2001284756/cuban-doctors-free-to-work-in-kenya-cour">strongly opposed</a> their arrival on the grounds that they’ll be taking away local jobs. </p>
<p>My understanding of the work of Cuban doctors has been greatly influenced by the fact that I spent 7 years studying medicine in Cuba, one of thousands of <a href="http://en.granma.cu/cuba/2016-04-12/studying-medicine-in-cuba-an-option-for-international-yout">students from all over the globe</a> who have had the opportunity to study medicine on the island. The experience gave me a keen understanding of how the Cuban health system works. It also helped me understand what lies behind the medical missions programme. </p>
<p>I accept that the way the programme is implemented in countries like Kenya leaves a lot to be desired. But I would also argue that the services being provided by Cuban doctors is invaluable and the reasons for not wanting them in Kenya are not justified.</p>
<h2>The national benefit is paramount</h2>
<p>The current fears of the Kenyan medical fraternity are understandable. But their fears may be based on misinformation. <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2018/06/22/senators-accuse-state-of-being-vague-on-cuban-doctors-deal_c1776547">Prior consultations</a> between Kenyan government officials and the medical fraternity would have gone a long way to allaying these.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, I believe that Kenyan doctors should focus on the national benefits of the programme. Cuban doctors are sent to rural, under-served areas – areas that local doctors often refuse to work in. In these communities, the mere presence of a doctor can make a tremendous difference in health outcomes. </p>
<p>In addition, the Cuban doctors being sent to Kenya are highly specialised in areas such as oncology and nephrology, areas of medicine which are in demand the world over. Their presence can only improve access to specialised medical care while reducing congestion in referral hospitals.</p>
<h2>Cuba’s healthcare missions</h2>
<p>Despite a level of <a href="https://www.ft.com/video/33cefce5-50d7-497f-9fc7-c9f345642d99?playlist-name=editors-picks&playlist-offset=1">economic stagnation</a>, Cuba has managed to maintain a universal health care system viewed as a <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.com/salim-lamrani/cubas-health-care-system-_b_5649968.html?guccounter=1">model</a> for other countries. Current data shows the doctor to patient ratio in Cuba is <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.MED.PHYS.ZS?locations=CU">well above</a> the United Nation’s target of 1:1000, at 7.5:1000 in 2014. By comparison, Kenya
has a ratio of <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.MED.PHYS.ZS?locations=KE">0.204 doctors per 1000 patients</a>.</p>
<p>Cuban trained doctors have been praised the world over for the level of service and compassion they offer. There are numerous examples of work that they’ve done. For example, Cuba were sent doctors to South Africa during a <a href="http://nuso.org/articulo/la-diplomacia-medica-cubana-recibe-una-pequena-ayuda-de-sus-amigos/">brain-drain in the post-apartheid era</a> as white medical doctors left that country in droves. </p>
<p>They also helped develop <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.2190/HS.37.4.k">medical faculties</a> in Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, The Gambia and Haiti between 1963-2004. And they showed tremendous humanitarian spirit during the <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/health-news/cuban-medics-in-haiti-put-the-world-to-shame-2169415.html">Haitian Earthquake</a> in 2010, the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/12/cuba-leads-fights-against-ebola-africa">Ebola outbreak</a> of 2014 and even offered the US assistance in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. The offer <a href="http://www.nbcnews.com/id/9311876/ns/us_news-katrina_the_long_road_back/t/katrina-aid-cuba-no-thanks-says-us/">was rejected</a>. </p>
<p>The argument that Kenya should invest in its own citizens rather than sign a multi-million dollar deal with the Cuban government is a fair one and should be addressed. But I don’t believe that it’s simply a question of one or the other.</p>
<p>Studying medicine is costly and requires training for between six to seven years. This excludes specialisation. But what happens in the interim to sick, impoverished individuals in rural communities while doctors are being trained? Cuban doctors should be seen as a temporary reinforcement offering a level of service every Kenyan should demand.</p>
<h2>Why Cuban doctors?</h2>
<p>Is a Cuban doctor better than a Kenyan one? No. But Cuban doctors have specific expertise in dealing with tropical diseases such as malaria. This remains a major problem in Kenya even though it was <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/lifestyle/artandculture/Cuba-to-help-in-malaria-control/1222-890294-4a2f3ez/index.html">eradicated</a> in Cuba more than three decades ago. </p>
<p>It’s also important to keep some perspective when it comes to the numbers. Foreign physicians make up below 10% of all doctors in Kenya. There are 939 foreign doctors in the country’s register – but the <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/news/358-American-doctors-licensed-to-practise/539546-4565608-2qqb2j/index.html">majority (358) are from the US</a>. Only 100 are from Cuba. This is a tiny number.</p>
<p>The presence of these foreign doctors should be seen as a benefit to the country’s health care service. It offers the opportunity for Kenyan physicians to learn from the Cubans’ experiences working in a universal health care system with emphasis on preventative medicine. They could also learn from their integrated community medicine approach, how they’ve managed to eradicate various diseases as well as policies and guidelines in place in Cuba that could be implemented in Kenya. </p>
<p>Cuban physicians will also be able to learn from their Kenyan counterparts how their system operates, difficulties and challenges of working as a physician in Kenya as well as the cultural norms that Cuban physicians would have to consider when offering services to Kenyans.</p>
<p>Ultimately, the Kenyan health care system and its people will reap the rewards of the presence of Cuban doctors.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/98774/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rich Warner does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Cuban doctors have specific expertise in dealing with diseases like malaria which remains a major problem in Kenya.Rich Warner, PhD Candidate, Anglia Ruskin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/951562018-04-23T13:47:40Z2018-04-23T13:47:40ZTeachers feel excluded from South Africa’s schools by race and culture<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/215902/original/file-20180423-133884-8bgkif.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Teachers from different backgrounds and cultures are important for pupils' learning.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Monkey Business Images/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="http://ewn.co.za/Topic/Klipspruit-West-High-School">Emotions ran high </a> at a high school south of Johannesburg in 2017 when the largely coloured community rejected the appointment of a black principal. A group of black teachers were also removed from the school because coloured parents didn’t want them there.</p>
<p>The apartheid system delineated people using racial categories – white, black, Indian and coloured – and these continue to influence post-apartheid South African society.</p>
<p>This high school’s story is just one example of the many types of exclusion teachers face regularly. The problem is that debates about exclusion focus almost exclusively on the experiences of learners as they try to overcome barriers of race, culture, gender, sexuality, class, disability and language. </p>
<p>Yet teachers also have difficulties around inclusion, participation and belonging in post-apartheid schools. Many have migrated from historically black to historically white schools because these <a href="http://repository.hsrc.ac.za/handle/20.500.11910/6479">tend to be better resourced</a>, classes are smaller, safer school environments, more learning support services and in some cases higher salaries.</p>
<p>But being employed by a school doesn’t automatically guarantee inclusion. <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1757743815586518">A study</a> I conducted with my colleague Professor Yusef Waghid showed that even when black teachers are hired at historically white schools, they have to deal with constant questions about their “competence” and whether their work is in line with a school’s stated “standards”. <a href="https://www.chet.org.za/papers/race-education-and-democracy-after-ten-years-how-far-have-we-come">Education experts argue</a> that the term “standards” is often used to justify profoundly racialised conceptions of a diametrically opposed “white competence” and “black incompetence”.</p>
<p>The ongoing exclusion of particular teachers from schools – whether on the basis of race, religion, culture, or sexuality – has serious implications for learners as well as the curriculum. On the one hand, learners do not encounter the life-worlds of diverse teachers. On the other hand, learners from minority groups struggle to find points of resonance. This leaves them with no option but to <a href="http://www.nwu.ac.za/files/files/p-saeduc/All_articles/handling.pdf">assimilate</a> into the dominant way of thinking and being.</p>
<p>Learners benefit from being exposed to multiple and unfamiliar teacher identities. They begin to experience those they previously might not have encountered. They enter life-worlds which they otherwise might not have known. </p>
<p>It’s time that policymakers paid serious attention to the problem of teacher exclusion.</p>
<h2>Teachers feel excluded</h2>
<p>One of the people involved in our study – a black woman – was appointed as a maths teacher at a school that taught predominantly coloured children. She was only allowed to teach Mathematical Literacy (a subject that involves basic problem-solving). The school said this was because she required “mentoring”, even though she was qualified and had prior experience as a maths teacher.</p>
<p>Another participant in our study, a South African of Indian descent, was appointed at a school of mostly white learners. He faced continuous complaints from parents whose children apparently couldn’t understand his accent. The teacher left the school after only 10 months. His decision was prompted by the principal asking whether he would be taking leave to celebrate the Muslim festival of Eid. The principal had seemingly failed to realise that he was in fact not Muslim, but a practising Hindu. </p>
<p>But these issues aren’t being addressed. Perhaps one of the reasons is that South Africans are preoccupied with trying to adhere to what can be measured in an <a href="http://www.dhet.gov.za/LegislationActs/Education%20Laws%20Amendment%20Act%20No.24%20of%202005.pdf">employment equity framework</a> as set out in the country’s laws. </p>
<p>As American political theorist and feminist Marion Iris Young, however, <a href="http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0198297556.001.0001/acprof-9780198297550">points out</a> these frameworks don’t necessarily equate to inclusive processes of recognition, participation or respect. Teachers might be employed at a particular school but their presence doesn’t equal participation.</p>
<p>Humans are caught up in a world of perception and cannot extricate ourselves from it. Consequently, in a country whose history is so marred by racism and colonialism, many South Africans can’t imagine that a “black” teacher is a “competent” teacher anymore than they can imagine that they might be able to learn from a teacher with an “Indian” accent. </p>
<p>What’s needed is a different way of looking at the world. Schools offer spaces where learners can be exposed to difference and diversity through employing teachers from across racial, cultural and religious lines. Policy is insufficient in cultivating these spaces. The onus rests on both school leadership and governance structures to realise their responsibility in preparing learners for what it means to participate in a pluralist society. One way of cultivating a more inclusive and diverse school environment for learners is through including diverse teachers.</p>
<h2>Solutions</h2>
<p>Tackling teacher exclusion can create an environment where teachers and learners remain conscious that there’s more to know and more to include. This is because the exclusion of any individual or group within a teaching space is, in fact, a shutting down of the imagination and uncertainty. Exclusion instils a smaller world. It promotes sameness, and defuses dissonance. It diminishes people’s capacity for critical engagement. </p>
<p>Beyond government taking action to remedy the situation, teachers also need to assert their authority and contest historical apartheid-era images of power through race and culture or ethnicity. It’s only through questioning that others can be drawn into deliberative engagements and debates. This affirms people’s presence and is an opportunity to see them as they are. South Africa’s classrooms will be better places if these perceptions begin to shift.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/95156/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nuraan Davids does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Learners benefit from being exposed to multiple and unfamiliar teacher identities.Nuraan Davids, Associate Professor of Philosophy of Education, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/881922018-02-12T14:58:41Z2018-02-12T14:58:41ZWhy tackling sexual violence is key to South Africa’s decolonisation project<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/205473/original/file-20180208-180829-14sgqi3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Africa has been dubbed "the rape capital of the world".</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Siphiwe Sibeko</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Horrific incidences of rape, sexual assault and sexual harassment are so common in South Africa that it has been dubbed the “<a href="https://www.news24.com/MyNews24/The-Rape-Capital-of-the-World-20140821">rape capital of the world</a>”. Yet these issues have been curiously neglected in the country’s politics.</p>
<p>In South African political discourse, transforming race relations is prioritised over the transformation of gender relations. Race and gender are regarded as two separate projects, and improving race relations in the aftermath of apartheid and colonialism is presented as more pressing than tackling gender issues.</p>
<p>But, as South African feminist scholar <a href="https://scholar.google.co.za/citations?user=SMB9nJoAAAAJ&hl=en">Shireen Hassim</a> argues, the country is bedevilled by a kind of race discourse which silences and displaces feminist attempts to discuss the workings of gender power politics. At the same time, she argues, political power is gendered and masculinised in ways that remain unacknowledged.</p>
<p>Many feminist scholars have shown that gender is deeply intertwined with the colonial project’s racism. Their research suggests that neither the logic nor the effects of racism within colonial and post-colonial contexts can be properly grasped without clearly understanding the gender dimension.</p>
<p>In a <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1350506817732589">recently published paper</a> a colleague and I focused particularly on the work of three such scholars: Nigeria’s <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Invention-Women-African-Western-Discourses/dp/0816624410">Oyèrónké Oyĕwùmí</a>, a sociologist; Argentinian philosopher <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=ciTuCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA49&lpg=PA49&dq=sociologist;+Argentinian+philosopher+Maria+Lugones&source=bl&ots=KuE1GyTiIQ&sig=QgwlW_qBo3FvLZx93TULGe2-gPM&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwihmtuh_p_ZAhVYOMAKHTMEDJoQ6AEILTAB#v=onepage&q=sociologist%3B%20Argentinian%20philosopher%20Maria%20Lugones&f=false">Maria Lugones</a>; and South African feminist scholar <a href="http://www.jacana.co.za/mfbooks-joburg/rape-a-south-african-nightmare-detail">Pumla Dineo Gqola</a>. </p>
<p>They argue in different ways that the sexual exploitation and objectification of black women by colonial powers and the demonisation of black male sexuality as bestial were central to the colonial project. Read together, their work shows that these constructions of black sexuality where not merely a historical aberration or mistake. They were key to the workings of colonial power. And that logic persists in the postcolony.</p>
<h2>Sex and the colonial project</h2>
<p>The Western distinction between masculine and feminine, Lugones <a href="http://www.jstor.org.ez.sun.ac.za/stable/4640051">writes</a>, served as a mark of civilisation for colonisers. Becoming “civilised” meant internalising this distinction, its concomitant norms and values. </p>
<p>The gender configurations and societal structures of the colonised did not conform to western gender norms. In terms of colonial logic this served as “evidence” of the colonised people’s bestiality and inferiority. It meant they needed to be “saved” by western conquest. </p>
<p>In her book <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Invention-Women-African-Western-Discourses/dp/0816624410"><em>The Invention of Women</em></a> Oyĕwùmí detailed how the British colonial administration in Yorùbáland, Nigeria, posited men’s superiority over woman. Administrators reduced and homogenised women into an identifiable, clearly demarcated and predetermined legal, social and biological category. This was defined by their anatomy and meant they were always subordinated to men. </p>
<p>The colonisers introduced the category “woman”. This undermined the fact that females in precolonial Yorùbá society had multiple identities that were neither gendered nor linked to their female anatomy. These could include farmer, hunter, mother, cook, warrior, ruler – “all in one body”. Oyĕwùmí writes that the creation of (Yorùbá) “woman” as a category was one of the colonial state’s very first “accomplishments” in Yorùbáland.</p>
<p>So Lugones’ and Oyĕwùmí’s work shows in different and complementary ways that the process of “civilising the native” was not only a racial one. It was also deeply gendered. The striking implication is that issues of sexuality in a post-colonial society like South Africa cannot be separated from race and culture, and vice versa.</p>
<h2>Lasting consequences</h2>
<p>In line with these arguments, <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com.ez.sun.ac.za/doi/full/10.1177/1350506817732589">I contend</a> that South Africa’s sexual violence problem can also be framed as a central part of the colonial legacy. Addressing this crisis, then, should be understood as a top priority for any serious decolonisation agenda.</p>
<p>One of Gqola’s arguments is particularly relevant here. She explains that black male sexuality is demonised through the colonial gaze as bestial and predatory. Black female sexuality is structured as its counterpart. Black women are always already raped and therefore paradoxically “unrapeable” both in law and in social understanding. </p>
<p>In other words, in the colony the sexuality of the colonised people was constructed so that nothing which was done to a black woman would be classified as rape. There were two reasons for this. Firstly, black women were portrayed as being so primitively sexual that no sexual advances were unwelcome. And, because black men were demonised as “natural rapists”, this meant black women were always <em>already</em> raped, by black men.</p>
<p>This legacy endures in South Africa. Today rape is normalised. It’s not taken seriously by society and it is left mostly <a href="http://www.heraldlive.co.za/news/2017/10/30/8-conviction-rate-disturbing-justice-system-fails-rape-victims/">unpunished by the criminal justice system</a>.</p>
<h2>Decolonisation and addressing sexual violence</h2>
<p>Scholars like Lugones, Oyĕwùmí and Gqola teach us that the colonial logic of sub-human sexual categorisation permeates and thoroughly infuses the ongoing colonial production of racial hierarchies. </p>
<p>The decolonisation of South African society requires sexual violence to be recognised and approached as a key aspect of the colony. It must be viewed as a problem that sits at the heart of colonial denigration, exploitation and abjection of the racialised body.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88192/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Azille Coetzee receives funding from the SARChi Chair in Gender Politics, Stellenbosch University.</span></em></p>South Africa has tended to prioritise race relations over gender relations since formal apartheid ended.Azille Coetzee, Postdoctoral fellow, SARChi Chair in Gender politics, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/874712018-01-08T16:52:16Z2018-01-08T16:52:16ZAfrikaner identity in post-apartheid South Africa remains stuck in whiteness<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/200167/original/file-20171220-5004-6tv1hz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Statues like these - here Paul Kruger at Pretoria's Church Square - are a reminder of a time when Afrikaners were the ruling class in South Africa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mike Hutchings/Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Why is it that when the West was turning away from direct colonialism in the mid-20th century, South Africa shifted to apartheid, an intensified form of this heinous system? </p>
<p>One of the answers lies in the country’s history of colonisation by two contending settler classes. <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/3378365-white-power-the-rise-and-fall-of-the-national-party">The Dutch, or Boer, settler class</a> on the southern most point of Africa was displaced in the 19th century by the arrival of the British. The Afrikaners – as the descendants of the Boer settlers eventually became known – constructed their identity in opposition to, on the one hand, black identities, and on the other to Anglo whiteness. </p>
<p>The reverberations of the contest between these two settler groups continue even after apartheid, as I argue in my new book <a href="http://ukznpress.bookslive.co.za/blog/2017/08/14/sitting-pretty-explores-the-postapartheid-identity-of-white-afrikaans-women-through-the-concepts-of-ordentlikheid-and-the-volksmoeder/">Sitting Pretty – White Afrikaans Women in Postapartheid South Africa</a>. </p>
<p>During apartheid a great deal of work went into justifying the imposition of inequalities on the basis of human differences. In the end apartheid collapsed due to global opprobrium that was heaped on the Afrikaner government, with both material and symbolic consequences. It tipped Afrikaner identity into turmoil, not least because their sense of themselves as moral beings was radically challenged. </p>
<p>At stake was <em>ordentlikheid</em>, analysed in my book as an ethnicised respectability. <em>Ordentlikheid</em> is an Afrikaans word that is difficult to translate: apart from respectability, its meanings include presentability, good manners, decency, politeness and humility with a Calvinist tenor. </p>
<p>Today it works as a glue that holds the identity together at the intersections of specific versions of gender, sexuality, class and race. <em>Ordentlikheid</em> serves as a mode of identification that works as a panacea to Afrikaner woes as they struggle to cleanse themselves of the stain of apartheid and adapt to changing historical conditions.</p>
<p>Examining “Afrikaner” identity through the lens of <em>ordentlikheid</em> reveals it as a lesser whiteness in relation to white English-speaking South African identity, which in turn draws on global Anglo whiteness. Unpicking <em>ordentlikheid</em> reveals a double movement: <em>ordentlikheid</em> derives from and elaborates on white English-speaking respectability. But it is also, paradoxically, what sets Afrikaner whiteness apart from white English-speaking identity.</p>
<h2>Slow-witted, simple, ignorant</h2>
<p>These dynamics can be traced historically. By the late 1800s, the Boers were regarded as “an inferior or degraded class of colonist”, as historian Timothy Keegan <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13632430120074545">writes</a>. They were depicted by European visitors as indolent, slow-witted, simple, ignorant and even dirty. </p>
<p>Lord Kitchener <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=gDku2YPTs6gC&pg=PA26&lpg=PA26&dq=Lord+Kitchener+Boers+were+savages+with+a+thin+white+veneer&source=bl&ots=rcz3as6Qnp&sig=jHOndkYoeIXDR0YxLtXBh_V_qRE&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjaoIDxob7XAhUFJ8AKHWLnBUUQ6AEIQjAK#v=onepage&q=Lord%20Kitchener%20Boers%20were%20savages%20with%20a%20thin%20white%20veneer&f=false">concluded</a> that the Boers were,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>uncivilised Afrikaner savages with a thin white veneer.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>As late as 1975, negative stereotypes about Afrikaners still abounded, for example in <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02589347508704682">an essay</a> written by priest and politics academic <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=7cU-xZI8fM0C&pg=PA107&lpg=PA107&dq=nancy+charlton+south+africa&source=bl&ots=EloipvxTsq&sig=Psk9hjRn8TKMuM0d_ZSF80Cs9ZA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjy5MiNjpjYAhWMHsAKHbK-BwIQ6AEIRjAJ#v=onepage&q=nancy%20charlton%20south%20africa&f=false">Nancy Charton</a>. She summarises the “empirical evidence” of white English-speaking attitudes to “the Afrikaner”, listing positive stereotypes such as Afrikaners being simple and warm, and negative ones such as them being uncultured, superstitious and lacking in efficiency. </p>
<p>Pejorative terms for Afrikaners included “Dutchman”, “hairyback”, “rock spider”, “mealie muncher”, “takhaar” (long hair), “bywoner” (backyard dweller), “backvelder” and “plank”. These mocking terms show “the element of cultural and social superiority” of white English-speaking identity that Charton speaks approvingly of.</p>
<p>Afrikaner whiteness resisted white English-speaking domination. Afrikaners defied being subjected to the hegemonic white English-speaking culture through a counteracting discourse of Afrikaner “volkstrots” (people’s pride), noble suffering and Calvinist decency. Afrikaner nationalist histories written in the 1960s overhauled and relaunched Afrikaners as hospitable, brave and fair Christians.</p>
<p>An eighteenth century discourse of Boers-as-unspoilt-children-of-nature was recuperated as one of Afrikaner innocence, uncorrupted mentality and closeness to God.</p>
<p>My research shows that the competitive dynamic with white English-speaking identity persists even after the fall of official apartheid but with paradoxical manifestations. One example is that conceding to Anglo culture serves to elevate Afrikaner whiteness.</p>
<h2>“That makes me angry”</h2>
<p>White Afrikaans identity hovers between two poles symbolised by the Afrikaans language. </p>
<p>It’s premised on Afrikaans as the touchstone of Afrikaner nationalism. Yet, Afrikaans contains traces of its historical “association of being the language of the underprivileged”, as political scientist Louise Vincent <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/220803?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">writes</a>.</p>
<p>Surprisingly, Afrikaans speakers abandon the language in certain social settings, even though it’s an intrinsic part of their identity. </p>
<p>To understand this complex relationship I interviewed a number of Afrikaner women in Johannesburg and Cape Town. One said that she was aware that she switched to English even when she was in the company of Afrikaans speaking people.</p>
<p>Leah (49) says: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>When I look at Johannesburg where we live [an affluent, multiracial, centrally located suburb], 70% of the people [can] speak Afrikaans, but we all speak English.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Sandra (43) expresses her frustration: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I just get angry when people knowingly in a group [speak English when most are Afrikaans].</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Pieta says: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I will speak to someone on the telephone and they will start in English and at some stage I’ll hear the person is Afrikaans and then I’d feel too bad switching to Afrikaans because I’m afraid they’ll think they speak bad English.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Nerina agrees: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>That happens to me on a daily basis.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Respondents describe switching to English as part of a routine which is also experienced as a denial of white Afrikaans identity – and therefore as an injury. Social space is ceded to white English-speaking identity. Interestingly, however, this loss allows for the appropriation of an element of English whiteness: politeness.</p>
<p>The temporary abandonment of Afrikaans is covered over with an articulation of Afrikaans-ness with “politeness” and “accommodation”. It is resonant of “manners” as a key element of “Britishness”. </p>
<p>As Willemien (33) explains: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>It is the effort we make with other people, not so? Yes, we are now going to speak English to you because you are English.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Pieta replies: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Because it is polite to do that.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In yielding to Anglo culture as a sign of “manners”, politeness becomes <em>ordentlikheid</em>. This manoeuvre shows that white Afrikaans-speakers remain trapped in a form of whiteness that competes with norm-setting white English-speaking whiteness, instead of seeking to transcend whiteness, and therefore race and racism, altogether.</p>
<p><em>This article is derived from Sitting Pretty. White Afrikaans Women in Postapartheid South Africa (UKZN Press)</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87471/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christi van der Westhuizen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Afrikaners in post-apartheid South Africa struggle with a historical sense of inferiority that reinforces their whiteness.Christi van der Westhuizen, Associate Professor, Sociology, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/871102017-11-13T14:32:48Z2017-11-13T14:32:48ZSouth Africa is still way behind the curve on transforming land ownership<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/193912/original/file-20171109-12000-f5ig5y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Land ownership patterns in South Africa have not really changed since the advent of democracy.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Mike Hutchings</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Land is a highly charged and politicised issue all over the world. South Africa, with its history of <a href="http://jacana.bookslive.co.za/blog/2015/02/11/land-reform-under-the-spotlight-in-land-divided-land-restored-edited-by-cherryl-walker-and-ben-cousins">extreme dispossession</a> through colonialism and apartheid, is no exception. </p>
<p>The democratic government has tried to redistribute land to address this legacy of dispossession. But, according to government, only around <a href="http://city-press.news24.com/News/zumas-commitment-to-land-reform-is-excellent-news-says-nkwinti-20170210">10%</a> of commercial farmland has been redistributed or restored to black South Africans in the 23 years since formal apartheid ended. Many are angry at the failure of land reform and there are <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/special-features/anc-policy-conference/ancnpc-land-expropriation-without-compensation-a-possibility---zuma-10148520">increasing calls</a> for land to be returned to black South Africans. </p>
<p>But there is very little clarity as to who owns what land in the country. This is why a recent <a href="https://www.agrisa.co.za/land-audit-transactions-approach">report</a> released by <a href="https://www.agrisa.co.za/">Agri-SA</a>, an organisation that represents the majority of South Africa’s white commercial farmers, has proved so controversial.</p>
<p>The report looks at the changing patterns of land ownership. The key question it purports to answer is the degree to which racially unequal patterns of land ownership have been altered through a combination of land reform and private land purchases by black South Africans.</p>
<p>Agri-SA argues that the initial <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/the_reconstruction_and_development_programm_1994.pdf">government target</a> of transferring 30% of agricultural land via land reform has almost been met. On the back of this it argues that the market is much more effective than the state as a vehicle for change. </p>
<p>But these claims are not borne out by Agri-SA’s own data. Even though the data in the report appears to have been rigorously collected and analysed, its interpretation by Agri-SA is flawed. We believe that many of the report’s core arguments are inaccurate and misleading. </p>
<p>It’s also clear that, contrary to the AgriSA report, we are nowhere near to hitting targets set by the government in 1994. Black South Africans remain in the minority among landowners. </p>
<p>Transformation simply has not happened.</p>
<h2>A fallacious argument</h2>
<p>The first major flaw in the report is that it adds two numbers together – the amount of land held by black people, and the amount of land held by the government. It does this for all land, but also for agricultural land, estimated at 93.5 million hectares, or 76% of the total of 122.5 million hectares. It argues that a total of around 25 million hectares – or 26.7% of South Africa’s agricultural land – is now owned by previously disadvantaged individuals and government.</p>
<p>If the rand value of the 25 million hectares is considered, it asserts that this amounts to 29.1% of the total. If the agricultural potential of this land is considered, then the share owned by black people and government is 46.5% of the total value of agricultural land.</p>
<p>Agri-SA’s argument, then, is that land reform targets are close to being met. This is fallacious because it doesn’t report on government and black ownership separately. And there’s no basis for arguing that government land is black-owned. State land is held on behalf of all citizens, including white farmers. </p>
<p>Secondly, rural land in the former <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/homelands">Bantustan</a> lands – those areas held in trust by government for black residents during apartheid – is still held in trust for communal area residents. Their occupation of around 13% of South Africa’s total land area is the result of centuries of dispossession. It cannot be counted, and has never been counted, as a contribution to achieving an initial land reform target of 30% of white commercial farmland.</p>
<p>On top of this, Agri-SA argues that only 2.2 million hectares of farmland has been purchased by government for transformation purposes, compared to 4.3 million hectares bought by black people on the open market. The latter conflates private purchase of land by black farmers with government payment for land which is then transferred to black people through land reform. These figures don’t stand up to scrutiny. In truth, we don’t know how much agricultural land has been privately purchased by black people, using their own funds or loans, since 1994.</p>
<p>The report’s data on transactions doesn’t lend support to the argument that the market is more effective that the state in changing the pattern of land ownership. According to AgriSA’s data, government and black South Africans together accounted for only 12.9% of the 69 million hectares purchased between 1994 and 2016. If anything, this data shows that market transactions by themselves cannot result in the kind of changes required by land reform – particularly if it is to target the poor, who cannot afford to buy land.</p>
<p>Overall, vast disparities in the distribution of land in relation to race and class mean that land reform still has a long way to go. The collection of proper data as a basis for monitoring, evaluation and planning is crucial, but is inadequate at present. </p>
<h2>Data are lacking</h2>
<p>Government data on land and agriculture is problematic. Statistics SA collects few reliable data on either large or small-scale agriculture, and none on land reform. Data on land reform released by the department of rural development and land reform are also thin, often inconsistent and hide as much as they reveal. For example, no figures on the average size of farms transferred or the cost per hectare have been released.</p>
<p>We now have contradictory reports on how much land has been transferred through land reform. The department says that land restitution has transferred 3.4 million <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/capetimes/news/anc-withholding-transfer-of-14-million-hectares-of-land-11521201">hectares</a> to claimants to date, and land redistribution has transferred 4.7 million <a href="https://www.oecd.org/tad/agricultural-policies/41619597.pdf">hectares</a> . That yields a total of 8.1 million hectares. But the Agri-SA report provides a total of only 6.5 million hectares of agricultural land acquired through both government and private acquisitions. Which is correct? We don’t know.</p>
<p>The absence of reliable data means that government policy on a key and highly politicised issue is being made without the benefit of rigorous evidence and informed debate on how to improve delivery. This leaves room for bodies like Agri-SA to inflame tensions with data and interpretations that misdirect society at large.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87110/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ben Cousins receives funding from the National Research Foundation. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ruth Hall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There is very little clarity as to who owns what land in South Africa. A lack of reliable data and statistics doesn’t help.Ben Cousins, Emeritus Professor, Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies, University of the Western CapeRuth Hall, Professor, Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/847172017-10-26T13:16:25Z2017-10-26T13:16:25ZA South African case study: how to transform student support efforts<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/190786/original/file-20171018-32361-ob5rlt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Getting access to a university doesn't necessarily mean feeling comfortable in that space.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ian Barbour/Flickr</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s universities have created a number of programmes to address the historic – and still existing – imbalance between black and white students. </p>
<p>Black students are more likely than their white peers to drop out <a href="http://www.justice.gov.za/commissions/FeesHET/docs/2015-HESummit-Annexure05.pdf">without completing their degrees</a>. Many experience deeply rooted <a href="http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20120720135828322">institutional racism</a>. (I use the word “black” here in the South African context to include everybody who was <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Population-Registration-Act">classified</a> as African, Coloured and Indian under apartheid.)</p>
<p>And so each year <a href="http://www.che.ac.za/sites/default/files/publications/Full_Report.pdf">about 15%</a> of those students entering higher education do so through equity development programmes. These take several different forms, such as the <a href="https://www.news.uct.ac.za/article/-2015-07-27-academic-development-programme-student-success-not-just-access">academic development programmes</a> and the <a href="http://www.humedu.uct.ac.za/">extended curriculum programmes</a>, which extend regular undergraduate study by one year. </p>
<p>All are designed to help talented but under-prepared students with financial, academic and mentoring support. </p>
<p>These development programmes have made it possible for “<a href="http://www.che.ac.za/sites/default/files/publications/Full_Report.pdf">tens of thousands of students</a>” to enter tertiary institutions since 1994. Success rates, especially for extended curriculum programmes, <a href="http://www.che.ac.za/sites/default/files/publications/Full_Report.pdf">are high</a>.</p>
<p>But this success comes at a cost. <a href="https://open.uct.ac.za/bitstream/handle/11427/16649/thesis_hum_2015_nomdo_gideon_john.pdf?sequence=1">My</a> <a href="http://www.journals.ac.za/index.php/sajhe/article/view/588/1164">research</a> and experience of working on an <a href="http://www.mmuf.uct.ac.za/">undergraduate fellowship programme</a> at the <a href="http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20121023192747849">“historically white”</a> University of Cape Town has shown how participation in development programmes profoundly affects black students’ sense of identity and their feelings of self-worth.</p>
<p>Students experience intense feelings of discomfort, confusion and even embarrassment at being classified as “different” and an “anomaly” alongside the <a href="https://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/366/Jansen%20%282004%29l.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">norm</a> of white academic success. </p>
<h2>Apartheid’s racist legacy</h2>
<p>Development programmes are designed to facilitate students’ non-discriminatory access into higher education. They also aim to promote the “<a href="http://www.adp.uct.ac.za/our-adp-mission">transformation of institutional cultures</a>” at historically white universities. </p>
<p>Students are placed in the programmes based on their final high school grades as well as <a href="https://educonnect.co.za/the-national-benchmark-tests-what-you-need-to-know/">national benchmark tests</a>. These results determine university placement as well as whether extra academic support is needed. </p>
<p>The majority of students who enter these programmes are black – and so they enter historically white universities with the labels “African”, “Coloured”, “Indian” or “previously disadvantaged” stamped on their existence – labels that symbolise “deficit”, serving to distinguish black students from the accepted norms of white academic success.</p>
<p>But this feeling of otherness doesn’t only exist with relation to whiteness. The vexed issue of racial classification takes centre stage. One student said: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I thought I would be accepted as a black person… but I found… I was ‘other’ and I was ‘Coloured’ – and that was a revelation and it’s a root of lots of resentment and disillusionment on my part. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Being “black”, then, is not a homogeneous experience. Terms such as “disadvantage”, “transformation” and “black identity” have different meanings for African, Coloured and Indian students. This is a consequence of apartheid’s hierarchy of race categories under which Coloureds and Indians enjoyed better privileges than Africans.</p>
<p>So from the outset it seems impossible that these students can attain a sense of belonging. </p>
<p>But my <a href="http://www.journals.ac.za/index.php/sajhe/article/view/588/1164">research</a> and experience have <a href="https://open.uct.ac.za/bitstream/handle/11427/16649/thesis_hum_2015_nomdo_gideon_john.pdf?sequence=1">shown</a> that this needn’t be the case. If development programmes take on the fact that students are operating in uncomfortable, emotionally charged environments, the programmes can be turned into spaces that are productive and where students can develop a true sense of belonging.</p>
<p>This means actively engaging and encouraging critical discussion about issues of race, class, identity and citizenship in white-dominated spaces. </p>
<p>The undergraduate fellowship programme, on which I based my research, has shown that this is possible.</p>
<h2>A case study of success</h2>
<p>The fellowship programmes is small – only five fellows are selected for the programme each year. </p>
<p>Fellows operate in a close-knit network which facilitates critical debates about race. In this environment students are able to raise and confront tough, uncomfortable questions. The programme acknowledges the varied experiences and perceptions of the world that its fellows bring along. These differences are used as a basis for collaborative peer engagement and for creating a sense of common purpose and belonging. </p>
<p>Another core aspect of programme is mentorship. Each student selects an academic mentor – a specialist in a particular discipline who is responsible for inducting the student into that field. Mentors guide, facilitate and create opportunities for student advancement. </p>
<p>Funding is important too. The fellowship is largely funded by international organisations and is well resourced, allowing students to travel to local and international fellowship conferences, have access to specialised mentoring, research writing retreats and funds to repay some student debt on completing their PhDs. </p>
<p>This approach creates a shift in perception: black identity comes to be viewed in terms of how one feels, in <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/heidegger/">the words</a> of German philosopher Martin Heidegger, about one’s existence and sense of “being in the world”. This allows for opportunities to create a more confident, authentic sense of “being” human that allows, as Heidegger puts it “one to feel <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/heidegger/">at home</a> within oneself”. </p>
<h2>Lessons</h2>
<p>Of course, there is no single perfect approach for developing equity within higher education. But the lessons from my research show how important it is to create spaces for reflecting on student experiences and perceptions of higher education. </p>
<p>Extended development programmes shouldn’t try to sanitise contentious issues. Instead, they should embrace the discomfort of engaging students about the necessity of the programmes and how they are meant to contribute to transformation agendas. </p>
<p>Taking ownership in this way provides a platform for students to generate their own sense of belonging.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/84717/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gideon Nomdo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Students experience intense feelings of discomfort, confusion and even embarrassment at being classified as “different” and an “anomaly” alongside the norm of white academic success.Gideon Nomdo, Course coordinator: Language in Humanities, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/783682017-06-04T12:11:15Z2017-06-04T12:11:15ZBeing black in a white skin: students with albinism battle prejudice<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171606/original/file-20170531-25673-88zoc3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">People with albinism often isolate themselves to avoid discrimination.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Myths and stereotypes about albinism abound. People with the condition are called derogatory names, like <em>inkawu</em> – the Nguni term for white baboon – and <em>isishawa</em>, a Zulu word for a person who is cursed. They are stared at, and must field ignorant questions.</p>
<p>Some beliefs about albinism are incredibly dangerous, like the idea that having sex with a woman with albinism <a href="http://en.afrik.com/article13487.html">will cure</a> a man of HIV. The bones and body parts of people with albinism are believed by some to bring good luck. In countries like Tanzania, Kenya and Zimbabwe, people with albinism <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21700294-horrific-trade-body-parts-murder-profit">are hunted</a> so their body parts, particularly their hands and genitals, can be used in traditional medicine (muthi).</p>
<p>Albinism is a word derived from the Latin <em>albus</em>, meaning white. It’s a <a href="http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/albinism/basics/definition/con-20029935">genetically inherited condition</a> where a shortage of melanin pigment affects the eyes, hair and skin. Most people with albinism tend to have light hair, skin and eyes – but their other facial features and hair texture resemble those of Africans. They are usually born into black African families. </p>
<p>This means people with albinism tend to identify with the black rather than the white community. Their physical differences, though, mean they don’t fit into either the black or white race groups. I <a href="http://www.ajod.org/index.php/ajod/article/view/106">worked with</a> two other researchers, Relebohile Phatoli and Nontembeko Bila, to try and understand the experience and contradiction of being a black person in a white skin in post-apartheid South Africa.</p>
<p>People with albinism often battle poor vision and blindness because of their condition. The students we interviewed struggled to keep up in lectures because they couldn’t see the board properly. </p>
<p>There were other struggles, too. Our <a href="http://www.ajod.org/index.php/ajod/article/view/106">findings</a> confirmed the lack of knowledge about albinism, as well as stigma, “othering” – to separate “them” from “us” – and discrimination in relation to people with this condition. </p>
<h2>Stigma and stares</h2>
<p>About <a href="http://www.hst.org.za/news/southern-africa-too-white-be-black-challenge-albinism">one out of every 4000</a> South Africans is living with albinism. Although the dangers aren’t as great in South Africa as for those in countries such as Tanzania, Kenya and Zimbabwe, people with albinism still struggle with stigma and discrimination.</p>
<p>We interviewed five university students with albinism and 10 students at the same university without the condition. The institution in question is a large urban university with several satellite campuses. There are an estimated 10 students with albinism registered at this university; it is not compulsory to register with the institution’s programme for disabled students and some people with albinism do not regard themselves as being disabled.</p>
<p>Our aim was to explore the beliefs and practices regarding albinism within a South African university. What we found exposed the sort of discrimination and “othering” that people with albinism experience.</p>
<p>One of the students with albinism said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Honestly, I think albinism is a curse because people always stare at me, talk about me behind my back and also make very nasty remarks when I pass, saying that I do not know that my father is not black but is a white person and that is why I look the way I do. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>This type of comment highlights the intersection of race, colour and gender in the social construction of such beliefs. </p>
<p>A student without albinism believed that albinos</p>
<blockquote>
<p>don’t die, they just go missing and they disappear. Last year when I was pregnant, I was told that I must not look at the albinos because if I do I will get a child with albinism or if I do look at them by mistake I should spit at them to avoid a child with albinism. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Such forms of stigma have <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/14297-007">far-reaching</a> psychopathological ramifications, such as self-exclusion from services, alienation and social withdrawal, loss of identity, poor self-image, depression and anxiety.</p>
<p>Stereotypes also dramatically affected the way people without albinism interacted with people with albinism. This in turn influenced how people with albinism viewed themselves. One student with the condition remarked: “I always have to prove myself, work extra hard and put in more effort into everything so that people can see me as ‘normal’.” </p>
<p>Isolation was another problem for students with albinism. They preferred to exclude themselves from the rest of the student population to avoid being judged or experiencing discrimination. </p>
<p>The students who didn’t have albinism said they were willing to befriend people with the condition – but wouldn’t necessarily go on dates with them. Those students who had befriended peers with albinism said they were able to value and appreciate the person behind the condition.</p>
<h2>Learning and empowerment</h2>
<p>So what are the lessons that can be learned from this research? How can young South Africans learn more about albinism and start breaking down the myths around it?</p>
<p>We recommend that schools provide knowledge and awareness programmes about the condition of albinism in the <a href="http://www.education.gov.za/Portals/0/CD/SUBSTATEMENTS/Life%20Orientation.pdf?ver=2006-08-31-121627-000">Life Orientation</a> curriculum. Life Orientation is the holistic study of the self in relation to others and to society and focuses on the personal, social, intellectual, emotional, spiritual and physical growth of learners. This subject is usually offered in the last three years of high school.</p>
<p>Universities and colleges also need to engage in awareness programmes with students and lecturers. These programmes must explore the impact of beliefs and stereotypes on people affected by this condition, and the challenges posed by reading lecture notes.</p>
<p>Social workers, psychologists, nurses and other helping professionals need to arrange support groups and educate parents, learners, teachers, traditional healers and the general public about what causes albinism. They can also teach people how to treat those with the condition and equip those with albinism to handle discrimination.</p>
<p>People living with albinism must be given the tools they need to exercise agency and help play an active role in breaking the cycle of stigma and discrimination. By being out in the world, empowered to discuss their condition, they can demystify it and be positive role models.</p>
<p>Through these strategies we can hopefully create a safer, more just, humane and caring society where the rights of all groups are respected.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/78368/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eleanor Ross does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>People with albinism tend to identify with the black rather than the white community. Their physical differences, though, mean they don’t fit into either race group.Eleanor Ross, Visiting Professor of Social Work, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/760262017-04-19T15:16:15Z2017-04-19T15:16:15ZSouth Africa’s ANC can stay a liberation movement and govern well<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165115/original/image-20170412-25898-1979v02.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Mike Hutchings</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The African National Congress (ANC), South Africa’s governing party, is <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/08/cloneofsouth-africa-anc-awaits-key-municipal-ele-160804084046975.html">weakening</a>. It has recently committed some <a href="https://theconversation.com/firing-of-south-africas-finance-minister-puts-the-public-purse-in-zumas-hands-75525">terrible mistakes</a> in government. </p>
<p>High on the list of errors is its decision to close ranks in defence of President Jacob Zuma during the <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2016/09/15/Joel-Netshitenzhe-Nkandla-state-capture-evoke-indignation">Nkandla debacle</a> where public money was used on upgrades to his private homestead. Then there’s the deployment of incompetent “cadres” to critical positions in government as well as Zuma’s ill-timed <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/columnists/2017-01-24-aubrey-matshiqi-zuma-move-will-show-who-insiders-are/">cabinet reshuffle</a>. </p>
<p>Critics argue that these problems stem from the ANC’s insistence on being a <a href="https://v1.sahistory.org.za/pages/pdf/raymond-suttner/ANC-attainment-power.pdf">liberation movement</a> which they say is incompatible with a constitutional democracy. </p>
<p>This has raised the question about the party’s very nature: Is it not time for the ANC to stop seeing itself as a liberation movement but rather a modern, professional political party?</p>
<p>But that argument is hard to sustain. There’s nothing particular about political parties that makes them compatible with constitutional democracy.</p>
<h2>Liberation movement vs political party</h2>
<p>Those opposed to the ANC’s holding place as a liberation movement argue that a movement – liberation or social – is the old way of doing politics. This, they claim, was suitable during the struggles against colonialism and apartheid. But that struggle is now over and the post-apartheid era presents a new set of challenges.</p>
<p>The idea of a liberation movement keeps archaic and obsolete traditions alive. These include the leadership collective, consensus choice of leadership, revolution, comradeship, cadre deployment and patriarchal leadership patterns.</p>
<p>The role and character of liberation movements in power is informed by the democracy theory (coming out of <a href="https://www.saylor.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/POLSC2312.1.4.pdf">liberalism ideology</a>) and the <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/party_dominance.pdf">theory of party dominance</a>. These theories suggest that for democracy to be effective, there should be vibrant political party competition because it strengthens deliberative aspects of a liberal democracy. It also engenders internal dynamism and change of groups of elites in power. </p>
<p>The party dominance theory leads to the view that the ANC dominates South Africa’s politics because of its liberation movement legacy. This dominance is seen as inimical to democratic competition. </p>
<p>But when liberation movements become political parties they enhance their efficiency and effectiveness. They also deepen their internal democracy and their ability to connect with the wider public.</p>
<p>Internal democracy within the ANC is seen as <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-a-countrys-constitutional-court-can-consolidate-and-deepen-democracy-54184">particularly important</a> given its political dominance. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165810/original/image-20170419-6375-ra1l0b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165810/original/image-20170419-6375-ra1l0b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165810/original/image-20170419-6375-ra1l0b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165810/original/image-20170419-6375-ra1l0b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165810/original/image-20170419-6375-ra1l0b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165810/original/image-20170419-6375-ra1l0b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165810/original/image-20170419-6375-ra1l0b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">ANC military veterans guard the party’s headquarters ahead of a march by the opposition DA.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Mike Hutchings</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Political parties shed the tendency towards <a href="https://www.marxists.org/history/erol/ncm-7/basoc/ch-5.htm">democratic centralism</a>, and its opaque internal political systems which insist on toeing the party line and brooks no dissent. </p>
<p>Political parties are assumed to operate like professional associations. They value accountability and transparency embracing modern systems of management and leadership. This enables them to become dynamic platforms for advancing refined political ends. </p>
<p>The conduct of Zuma and his cohort of leaders has been blamed on the ANC’s choice to remain steeped in the traditions of a <a href="http://www.politicsweb.co.za/iservice/the-marginalisation-of-parliament">liberation movement</a>. The form determines the content: it produces tendencies that cause all manner of problems. </p>
<p>The ANC has made some catastrophic mistakes. It sometimes displayed arrogance in power and has allowed corrupt leaders to go <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-is-at-an-inflection-point-will-it-resist-or-succumb-to-state-capture-66523">unpunished</a>. </p>
<p>There has also been a vacillation of policy stances on the economy, land and other crucial policy areas. Largely sound policies have been poorly implemented. </p>
<p>And there have been cases where the party and the state’s affairs have been <a href="http://www.enca.com/south-africa/anc-urges-government-to-review-madonselas-party-state-separation-findings">conflated</a>.</p>
<p>Some have argued that these problems stem from the ANC remaining essentially a liberation movement. To move with the times, they argue, it needs to assume a new, modern professional political party posture. </p>
<h2>Lessons from elsewhere</h2>
<p>The challenge in the ANC is, however, not unique to South Africa.
Liberal democrats in Japan, Christian democrats in Italy, the <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21711925-new-law-has-allowed-government-freeze-its-assets-leaving-it-unable-pay-staff-taiwans">Kuomintang</a> in Taiwan and nationalist democrats in Kenya all experienced similar challenges. </p>
<p>Although they were not liberation movements, they share a number of features with the ANC. This includes arrogance of power, personalisation of power, elitism and the preponderance of sectional interests over the common good. So, it seems these are tendencies that need to be overcome.</p>
<p>It’s hard to sustain the argument that liberation movements are not right for democratic consolidation merely because they are movements or that political parties are by nature good for competitive politics. Political parties can dominate, distort, corrupt, abuse, and complicate democratic systems just as liberation movements deepen democracy by strengthening its social basis. </p>
<h2>What the ANC needs to do</h2>
<p>The ANC doesn’t need to transition into a political party, whatever that means in practice. But, it needs to develop a leadership that’s competent to use the state to change the economy fundamentally in order to serve the majority and bring about qualitatively positive changes to the people, especially the poor.</p>
<p>The party needs to put a stop to the self-inflicted damage to its image through endless scandals, public displays of arrogance, factionalism and internal conflict. </p>
<p>The ANC also needs to end its practice of deploying poor quality cadres to critical state structures, and start heeding the counsel of its friends and foes that it must place the country’s interests before sectional interests of whatever faction of its leadership is in power. </p>
<p>It can look to the <a href="http://www.monitor.co.ug/OpEd/Editorial/What-we-can-learn-from-Tanzania-s-Chama-Cha-Mapinduzi/689360-2787692-1173726z/index.html">Chama Cha Mapinduzi</a> movement that’s been in power in Tanzania since the 1960s for example.</p>
<p>The party has ensured an open contest for leadership positions. The elected leaders are then expected to root out corruption, crime, tribalism and so forth.</p>
<p>There’s a constant change of national leadership and a level of dynamism that enables the movement to adapt to changing society. It has produced leaders like <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/former-tanzanian-president-julius-nyerere-dies">Julius Nyerere</a> and <a href="http://zikoko.com/list/8-reasons-tanzanias-john-magufuli-africas-beloved-president/">John Magafuli </a>who commands respect across party lines. </p>
<p>If liberation movements were formed to achieve total decolonisation and freedom, then for as a long the process is incomplete, they will have a good reason to exist. Like orthodox political parties, they constantly have to adapt to change.</p>
<p>Ultimately, democracy is meaningless if it doesn’t improve the material circumstances for the people. To do this, political formations must be occupied by conscientious, competent, compassionate and interested political elite.</p>
<p>This is what the ANC has shown it lacks as it attempts to “deal” with every scandal and crisis it causes. The problem isn’t its commitment to being a liberation movement, but rather that it wants to be a callous one.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76026/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Siphamandla Zondi works for Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria, which sometimes receives funding from research funding foundations like the Mellon Foundation and NRF. </span></em></p>Democracy in South Africa is meaningless if it doesn’t improve the lives of the people. To do this, the governing ANC must be led by conscientious, competent and interested leaders.Siphamandla Zondi, Professor and head of department of Political Sciences and acting head of the Institute for Strategic and Political Affairs, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/753392017-03-28T14:56:06Z2017-03-28T14:56:06ZAhmed Kathrada: exhibit A of the values imbued in South Africa’s Freedom Charter<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162943/original/image-20170328-3793-gik1ii.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nelson Mandela and Ahmed Kathrada share a moment in South Africa's Parliament in 1999.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Mike Hutchings</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Another South African legend has gone. <a href="https://v1.sahistory.org.za/pages/people/bios/kathrada,a.htm">Ahmed ‘Uncle Kathy’ Kathrada</a>, an unassuming, quiet man who has left South Africans with a legacy that’s immediate, not historical.</p>
<p>Born in 1929, two factors mark his life and his passing, as they did for Nelson Mandela: he was <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/content/what-anc">African National Congress</a> through and through. And he was a non-racialist. The byline of the <a href="http://www.kathradafoundation.org/content/foundation">Kathrada Foundation</a>, a non-governmental organisation he established, is to ‘deepen non-racialism’. This is something he believed in to his core, even as others around him <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-mandela-foundations-verdict-on-the-mandela-era-it-failed-65257">began to argue</a> for an Africanist approach. </p>
<p>He was saddened that others, in an attempt to advocate for “colour-blindness” or more strident African nationalism, watered down the noble value of non-racialism. He maintained that non-racialism was a radical solidarity that at its very soul had undoing structural and interpersonal racism, and <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books/about/Non_Racialism_in_South_Africa.html?id=oI75kQEACAAJ&redir_esc=y&hl=en">wrote</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I would still insist that meeting the modern challenges of poverty, hunger, homelessness and so on requires an approach that has a non-racial outlook embedded within it. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Kathrada <a href="https://v1.sahistory.org.za/pages/people/bios/kathrada,a.htm">was arrested</a> in 1963 – his 18th arrest for political activities – and sentenced a year later, along with Nelson Mandela and other ANC leaders, to life imprisonment at the end of the <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/rivonia-trial-1963-1964">Rivonia Trial</a>. He was 34 at the time. After 1994 Kathrada was Mandela’s political advisor in South Africa’s first democratic parliament.</p>
<p>Retirement for Uncle Kathy meant more political work, multiple engagements, setting up school, university and youth affiliates of the foundation, and then more work after that. Money was of no interest to him, nor honours or headlines. And he set a pace that most failed to maintain.</p>
<h2>Purity of political vocation</h2>
<p>His dogged, lifelong pursuit of equality and non-racialism remind many South Africans of how low they have fallen in the shadow of his generation. His passing happened on the same night that the country’s Minister and Deputy Minister of Finance were flying back to South Africa, <a href="http://www.businesslive.co.za/rdm/politics/2017-03-27-politics-live-zuma-enters-the-endgame-with-gordhan/">summarily ordered to do so</a> by the president, to the sound of the <a href="http://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/27/south-africas-zuma-recalls-gordhan-from-international-roadshow.html">currency plummeting</a> and the economy <a href="http://www.fin24.com/Economy/sipho-pityana-gordhan-recall-is-economic-sabotage-20170327">reeling</a>. </p>
<p>Uncle Kathy passing at the same time as the national economy is being sacrificed for cheap personal and political gain will perhaps provide the spark that says to all South Africans: enough! Stop the rot! He did not struggle, sacrifice, and be released from prison to work even harder, to allow it all to be stolen in front of their eyes.</p>
<p>Uncle Kathy had an uncomplicated wisdom that will far outlast his living years. He believed in the purity of political vocation, despite knowing the tendency for the office to be sullied by political vanities. He believed that the human spirit could transcend physical walls meant to divide and imprison. He loved children and believed in the possibility of remaking society through them. </p>
<p>Yet he always reminded those around him that change, freedom or an anti-racist society would never be “delivered” to South Africans. Rather it would have to be wrought through the values, responsibility and integrity of the people. Although he was well-read in the complex art of politics and sociology, he had a matter-of-fact attitude to the challenges the society faced and what was needed to tackle them. </p>
<h2>Inspired at close quarters</h2>
<p>Working closely with him at the Kathrada Foundation offered many opportunities to be struck by the profound simplicity of the task that lay before us in doing our bit to build an equal and non-racial society. He reminded us all that what people thought mattered, and that our work needed to be based on these realities (uncomfortable as they may be).</p>
<p>While we continued the academic pursuits of meanings and interpretations of race, non-racialism, anti-racism and identities he reminded us that if our deliberations did not ultimately inspire the kind of pro-active work that made the prospects of an African child better than her parents’ had been, we had ultimately failed. </p>
<p>For some time, he had refrained from public political discourse that may have been controversial, but in the past two years, his sense of integrity compelled him <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2016/04/02/Ahmed-Kathrada-pens-a-letter-asking-Zuma-to-step-down">to publicly address</a> the ANC – his party – leadership. He was the kind of man that was Exhibit A of the values imbued in the Freedom Charter. He was saddened that his party had become a shadow of its former glorious self, and had come to taint that historic document. </p>
<p>A year ago, Kathy <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/rdm/politics/2017-03-28-kathradas-letter-to-zuma-submit-to-the-will-of-the-people-and-resign/">wrote to Zuma</a>, typically casting himself as merely “a loyal and disciplined member of the ANC and broader Congress movement since the 1940s” and admitting the pain that writing was causing him. He spoke directly to Zuma – and indirectly to South Africans:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The position of president is one that must at all times unite this country behind a vision and programme that seeks to make tomorrow a better day than today for all South Africans. Now that the court has found that the president failed to uphold‚ defend and respect the constitution as the supreme law‚ how should I relate to my president? If we are to continue to be guided by growing public opinion and the need to do the right thing‚ would he not seriously consider stepping down? I am not a political analyst‚ but I am now driven to ask: ‘Dear Comrade President‚ don’t you think your continued stay as president will only serve to deepen the crisis of confidence in the government of the country?’</p>
<p>And bluntly‚ if not arrogantly‚ in the face of such persistently widespread criticism‚ condemnation and demand‚ is it asking too much to express the hope that you will choose the correct way that is gaining momentum‚ to consider stepping down? If not‚ Comrade President‚ are you aware that your outstanding contribution to the liberation struggle stands to be severely tarnished if the remainder of your term as president continues to be dogged by crises and a growing public loss of confidence in the ANC and government as a whole?</p>
<p>I know that if I were in the president’s shoes‚ I would step down with immediate effect. To paraphrase the famous MK slogan of the time‚ there comes a time in the life of every nation when it must choose to submit or fight.
Today I appeal to our president to submit to the will of the people and resign.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>He will remain, for many a warm, wise uncle, who did not succumb to political limelight, but was unapologetic about his lifelong responsibility – in everyday, and intimate interpersonal ways – to the unfinished project of freedom and liberation in South Africa and elsewhere in the world. And never, ever afraid of asking the difficult questions, or stating the truth as he saw it. </p>
<p>Hamba Kahle Malume (Rest in peace uncle), you are dearly loved. </p>
<p><em>Dr Caryn Abrahams, senior lecturer at the Wits School of Governance and former head of research at the Ahmed Kathrada Foundation, contributed to this article</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/75339/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Everatt is a member of the Board of the Ahmed Kathrada Foundation.
Caryn Abrahams was formerly head of research at the Ahmed Kathrada Foundation.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Caryn Abrahams is a member f the Antiracism Network of South Africa (ARNSA)</span></em></p>South African struggle stalwart Ahmed Kathrada believed in non-racialism to his core, even as others around him began to argue for an Africanist approach.David Everatt, Head of Wits School of Governance, University of the WitwatersrandCaryn Abrahams, Senior lecturer, School of Governance, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/722872017-02-06T14:54:30Z2017-02-06T14:54:30ZAward-winning South African punk documentary is back. Why it’s so special<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/155450/original/image-20170203-14016-1jidiam.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Fokofpolisiekar's lead vocalist Francois van Coke.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Liam Lynch</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>An <a href="http://www.flyonthewall.co.za/fokof.html">award-winning</a> documentary about the iconic South African Afrikaans punk-rock band Fokofpolisiekar (Afrikaans for “fuck off police car”) made nearly 10 years ago is back on screen; this time on the small screen. The band, which was formed in 2003, was instrumental in articulating the disillusionment and rebellion of Afrikaans youth growing up in the dreary suburbs outside Cape Town. These young people felt disconnected from their Afrikaner heritage and from the political realities of post-apartheid South Africa. </p>
<p>“<a href="http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1512131/">Fokofpolisiekar: Forgive Them for They Know Not What They Do</a>” (Bryan Little, 2009) is streaming on <a href="https://www.showmax.com/eng/welcome/za">Showmax</a>, the internet TV service, which is available in 65 countries, including 37 African countries. </p>
<p>So now you can see, from the comfort of your couch, what the fuss was about when it was first released. In 2009 it won the audience award and its screenings were sold out so quickly that extra ones had to be added at the <a href="http://archives.encounters.co.za/backup09/2010/">Encounters</a> International Documentary Film Festival. It also created a buzz at the <a href="https://www.idfa.nl/industry/tags/project.aspx?id=c4b917e4-4eaa-4e0a-95a0-fee25b225314&tab=idfa">International Film Festival Amsterdam</a>, one of the biggest and most prestigious documentary film festivals in the world.</p>
<p>The band’s popularity drew many viewers to the film at the time, but the reason the film endures is because of its form, particularly the way in which it was edited. The self-reflexive style it uses for its editing is not seen nearly as often in documentary film as continuity editing. Continuity editing, which is prevalent in conventional, mainstream films, usually tries to limit possible interpretations a viewer can make. </p>
<h2>How does it work?</h2>
<p>Self-reflexivity entails the inclusion of cues within the film that remind the viewer that it is, indeed, a film. Continuity editing is a well established style of editing for many documentaries. As a matter of fact, it is the style taught generally, and certainly taught first, at most film schools. </p>
<p>The goal of continuity editing is to make cuts invisible to the viewer, so that she is not distracted from the narrative or from emotional identification with the film. This allows viewers to focus on, and lose themselves in, the narrative and forget about how the film was made. But it is not the only way of editing a documentary. Self-reflexivity makes the audience aware of the constructed nature of the film, thereby acknowledging the subjectivity of the filmmaker(s).</p>
<p>The most overt forms of self-reflexivity in documentary films are, arguably, the inclusion of the director or other crew members on screen, or direct references (onscreen or offscreen) to the production of the film. But there are also more subtle ways of reminding the audience that they are watching a construction. The way the film is shot, edited or structured, what is included and left out, can all lead to self-reflexivity.</p>
<p>The “Fokofpolisiekar” documentary uses several devices to create visual interest in the film itself. It includes, for example, animated photographs in which the foreground, midground and background have been digitally separated and moved in relation to each other This documentary juxtaposes shot size, format and content. It also alternates behind-the-scenes handy-cam tour footage with high production value concert footage.</p>
<p>Self-reflexive editing is often fast paced, disjunctive and jarring. This increases the visual intensity of the film, heightening its effect. Fiction films like “Natural Born Killers” (1994), “Man on Fire” (2004) and “District 9” (2009) are edited in the self-reflexive style, taking their inspiration to some extent from music videos. Film theorist Ken Dancyger refers to this style as “MTV editing” in the <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books/about/The_Technique_of_Film_and_Video_Editing.html?id=IXZ8ROuUlBMC">book</a> “The Technique of Film and Video Editing”. </p>
<p>This style of editing can incorporate flash frames, jump cuts and animation. Self-reflexivity often arises from a combination of different editing styles in one film. In “Fokofpolisiekar” the editing matches the fast pace and energy of the band’s music, and so there is a conversation between <em>what</em> is shown and <em>how</em> it is shown.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/155454/original/image-20170203-14031-1yeny76.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/155454/original/image-20170203-14031-1yeny76.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=105&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/155454/original/image-20170203-14031-1yeny76.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=105&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/155454/original/image-20170203-14031-1yeny76.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=105&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/155454/original/image-20170203-14031-1yeny76.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=133&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/155454/original/image-20170203-14031-1yeny76.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=133&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/155454/original/image-20170203-14031-1yeny76.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=133&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Three consecutive close shots from Fokofpolisiekar: Forgive Them For They Know Not What They Do.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A jarring cutting pattern, characterised by cutting between close shots without the use of wider, contextualising shots, is often used, as in a sequence of seemingly unrelated close shots from “Fokofpolisiekar” shown above. Characters and details are much more important than narrative, temporal or spatial clarity. </p>
<p>Characters, events and objects may be shown, but the audience might never find out where the events occurred, what triggered them or what their consequences were. This can be effective in communicating mood or atmosphere, concepts or themes. The viewer has to engage with the film actively to draw meaning from it. Meaning is not presented to the viewer in an uncomplicated or mediated way. </p>
<p>The value of self-reflexive editing lies in its ability to engage the audience actively since, as the Academy Award winning editor Walter Murch <a href="http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/2141.In_the_Blink_of_an_Eye">says</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>suggestion is always more effective than exposition. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Past a certain point, the more effort you put into a wealth of detail, the more you encourage the audience to switch off, to become spectators rather than participants.</p>
<h2>Omission, discomfort and active engagement</h2>
<p>In the introductory sequence of “Fokofpolisiekar”, for example, a visual sequence is accompanied by audio extracts from various interviews. No interviewees are shown and no indication is given of who the various speakers are. Omitting chyrons (an interviewee’s name and designation usually provided at the bottom of the screen during a documentary interview) and faces at this point in the film signifies that the opinions of experts and laypersons should be weighed equally. It suggests that all perspectives collected here are of similar value, and that the source of an opinion is not as significant as what is being said.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/155452/original/image-20170203-13989-7handd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/155452/original/image-20170203-13989-7handd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/155452/original/image-20170203-13989-7handd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/155452/original/image-20170203-13989-7handd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/155452/original/image-20170203-13989-7handd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/155452/original/image-20170203-13989-7handd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/155452/original/image-20170203-13989-7handd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Fokofpolisiekar guitarist Wynand Myburgh.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Liam Lynch</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But these disembodied voices lead to discomfort in the viewer. We want to know who is speaking, so that we can place and weigh what they say. The omission is conspicuous and so the construction of the film is emphasised. While the audience tries to figure out who is who and how valid each perspective is, this engagement pulls them into an active conversation with the film. It encourages them to question what they see and hear, rather than take it at face value.</p>
<p>Self-reflexive editing invites the audience to engage actively with the text to make meaning of what they see on the screen. Where continuity editing largely fixes interpretation, self-reflexive editing often requires that viewers make connections between details or infer context from the actions shown. Viewers may have to wait longer to have the questions that are posed by the film answered, if indeed those questions are answered at all. And they are constantly reminded that what they are watching is, indeed, a film.</p>
<p>“Fokofpolisiekar: Forgive Them for They Know Not What They Do” is worth watching again today, almost 10 years after its completion, not just if you’re a fan of the band, but also if you’re interested in the evolution of the South African documentary form. As this film shows, South African film has certainly come a long way from the binary of apartheid state-sanctioned public broadcast television documentaries vs underground resistance films of the pre-1990s. “Fokofpolisiekar” manages to question mainstream notions of identity while remaining visually stimulating and entertaining to watch.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/72287/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Liani Maasdorp does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A pioneering documentary about South African punks, Fokofpolisiekar, doesn’t only focus on the band, but also illuminates the evolution of the documentary form.Liani Maasdorp, Senior lecturer in Screen Production and Film and Television Studies, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.