tag:theconversation.com,2011:/fr/topics/prince-maha-vajiralongkorn-12755/articlesPrince Maha Vajiralongkorn – The Conversation2016-10-25T06:12:49Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/670212016-10-25T06:12:49Z2016-10-25T06:12:49ZThailand 10.0: why the nation’s political and military elite need a reset to succeed<p>The Thai monarchy’s tenth transition of power will be smooth, but the future of the nation’s economy and democracy will be far from it. </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/thailands-controversial-king-to-be-faces-a-challenge-to-gain-the-peoples-respect-67046">Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn will accede</a> to the throne within the next few months, thus officially beginning the tenth reign of the Chakri Dynasty. </p>
<p>Detailed analyses of the legacy of his father, King Bhumibol, <a href="https://theconversation.com/thailand-mourns-its-king-and-heads-into-the-unknown-67031">both positive and critical accounts</a>, have invited much attention. But not much has been said about the political economy and deep-rooted challenges that Thailand 10.0 will confront.</p>
<p>The country faces a knotty growth–stability dilemma. Since the new millennium, in the three periods Thailand has been under military rule, social order has been attained at the expense of economic growth. Yet when elected governments rule the nation, their growth strategies usually lead to political turmoil, paving the way to coups d'état. </p>
<p>This contradiction has been increasingly acute over time, from the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13891650">Thaksin Shinawatra era</a> (2001 to 2006) to the Prayuth Chan-Ocha regime that has been in place since the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-27297478">coup of 2014</a>.</p>
<h2>Social stability leads to economic stagnation</h2>
<p>Since the 2000s, Thailand has seen three military, or military backed governments, under <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/5392722.stm">Surayud Chulanont</a> (2006–7), <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13298394">Abhisit Vejjajiva</a> (2008–11), and the current Prayuth regimes. </p>
<p>If you ask Thai people what they remember from these administrations, they’ll say something about <a href="http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2014/10/thailands-economy">social order and royalist campaigns</a>. Economic prosperity and income redistribution are not the issues most people would associate with them.</p>
<p>This is not simply a result of policy rhetoric or leadership styles, it’s about the particular power and legitimacy that underpin this kind of regime. Take the Prayuth government; the junta has been highly successful in restoring “stability” to Thailand. But stability has a very specific meaning in Thai society. </p>
<p>Since the patrimonial authority of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat (1958–63), stability has been framed to mean a regime where royal dominance prevails in the political realm, in addition to hard-budget constraints in the economic realm and the minimisation of anti-incumbent forces in the social realm.</p>
<p>By this definition, order and stability are the easiest task of any military government. In Thailand, such governments simply employ an ultra-royalist stance to legitimise their interventions, appoint traditional technocrats and familiar tycoons in key positions across the state apparatus, and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/22/bangkok-big-brother-politics-ruling-party-democracy">suppress all political dissidents</a>.</p>
<p>But it’s exactly these political alliances and this kind of ideological legitimacy that deter military governments from doing things that would reform the economy in the progressive sense.</p>
<p>They cannot support conglomerates outside their small circle. They cannot pursue meaningful bureaucratic restructuring. They cannot take a pro-globalisation stance. And they cannot allow much political or ideological competition. </p>
<p>How far can all these disincentives lead the economy? Can technological innovation flourish without a substantial level of freedom?</p>
<p>Thailand’s economic “catch-up” from the 1960s to the <a href="http://www.wright.edu/%7Etdung/asiancrisis-hill.htm">1997 Asian financial crisis</a> was only a partial success, and it left the country with a number of institutional problems. These range from centralised and bloated state structures to oligarchic capitalism and a highly unequal society. </p>
<p>Sadly, the power and legitimacy that brought the military juntas to office subsequently diverted them away from addressing these pitfalls. Most of the feasible policies the military governments could implement to promote growth can be characterised as “<a href="http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=race-to-the-bottom">race to the bottom</a>” ideas, a desperate attempt to attract overseas capital, such as <a href="http://www.prachatai.com/english/node/5658">easy grants for foreign investors</a> and exorbitant <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/china-thailand-railway-project-gets-untracked/">high-speed train projects</a>. </p>
<p>Accordingly, the worst economic outcome of military governments is stagnation, while the best scenario is moderate growth driven by short-sighted liberalisation. </p>
<h2>But growth leads to political conflict</h2>
<p>The tricky part for Thailand is that elected governments don’t seem to have the right answers either. They just face a different set of structural impediments, as seen in the Thaksin era and, to a lesser extent, the <a href="http://www.bk.mufg.jp/report/ecorev2008e/ecoreview_e20080310.pdf">Samak Sundarajev</a>/<a href="http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1841767,00.html">Somchai Wongsawat</a> (2008) and <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13723451">Yingluck Shinawatra</a> (2011–14) governments. </p>
<p>In contemporary Thailand, for any political party to win a majority vote and deliver growth and redistribution impressive enough to get re-elected, the following are almost prerequisites. </p>
<p>It has to ally with rural voters; restructure and streamline the bureaucracy (including the army); move further with free trade agreements; and increase public spending. But doing all these things is likely to, sooner or later, cause political discontent and <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-25127436">a quick resumption of street protests</a>.</p>
<p>Why? Because such electoral tactics incite class politics (by arousing expectations of rural voters); marginalise military–technocrat alliance (by putting the genie back in the bottle); and, consciously or not, challenge the sole leadership of the monarchy (by claiming to be an alternative saviour of the poor).</p>
<p>Contest also emerges in the economic realm. Expansionary fiscal policies – especially money poured into the countryside and the resulting deficits – and high inflation, always get the mandarins nervous. </p>
<p>After all, this is a country that considers the “<a href="http://agris.fao.org/agris-search/search.do?recordID=US2012420432">stable macroeconomy</a>” to be the major source of its partially successful catch-up (while South Korea attributes its even better performance to industrial policy). </p>
<p>Political conflict, then, is inherent in the route that takes a political party to be elected and win re-elections.</p>
<p>If political parties aim to be small targets to avoid such conflict, then Thai politics may revert to that of the 1990s, when all civilian governments were multi-party, short-lived and indecisive enough to <a href="http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/?GCOI=80140100214560">partly cause and subsequently mismanage the 1997 Asian financial crisis</a>.</p>
<h2>The King’s real legacy: men can make history</h2>
<p>If these contradictions are becoming increasingly prominent, what could the solution possibly be? If anything, the late King Bhumibol has already offered a crucial lesson to Thailand. </p>
<p>His reign well illustrates how determined human agency is able to defeat and take control of threatening nemeses, ranging from the internal military to communist insurgencies. To put it another way, as Karl Marx <a href="https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/ch01.htm">once said</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Men make their own history, but neither of their own free will, nor under circumstances they themselves have chosen. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Royal hegemony under King Bhumibol was a man-made phenomenon that developed over seven decades and led Thailand’s political economy to the landscape hardly imaginable at the end of the Second World War in 1945.</p>
<p>For Thailand 10.0 to be prosperous – both politically and economically – either military or civilian governments have to go beyond their comfort zones and exercise the power of human agency against the status quo, rather than following structurally determined paths. </p>
<p>A military junta could achieve economic and social progress if it dares to reduce military budgets, rationalise the bureaucracy, and allow more political and ideological competition. </p>
<p>A civilian government that could pull off both economic and social stability would need to reconcile Bangkok’s middle class with rural voters, and conventional technocrats with growth-enhancing sympathisers. All the while standing tall for radical redistributive measures, such as progressive tax reform. </p>
<p>Without such bravery against the odds, Thailand is poised to continue to suffer frequent regime changes, alternating between governments of peaceful stagnation and those of growth-led turmoil.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/67021/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Veerayooth Kanchoochat does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>To end Thailand’s cycle of military and failed civilian governments, its politicians have to go beyond their structurally determined paths and challenge the status quo.Veerayooth Kanchoochat, Associate Professor of Political Economy, GRIPSLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/671942016-10-20T06:27:18Z2016-10-20T06:27:18ZThe next king and a new constitution: a dangerous combination for Thailand<p>The next King of Thailand, Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn, has long been notorious for his unpredictability – a reputation that appears deserved with <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/13/thailand-maha-vajiralongkorn-crown-prince-king">his recent refusal</a> to ascend the throne immediately after the death of his father, Bhumibol Adulyadej. </p>
<p>Vajiralongkorn’s recalcitrance is particularly alarming, as the <a href="http://www.un.or.th/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/2016_Thailand-Draft-Constitution_EnglishTranslation_Full_Formatted_vFina....pdf">2016 constitution</a>, adopted in a referendum on August 7, is now awaiting royal approval. But will the new king do so?</p>
<p>A week-long throne vacancy has never happened in the history of constitutional monarchy in Thailand. Bhumibol was proclaimed king on the day his brother, Ananda Mahidol, Rama VIII, <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/flash/june/siam46.htm">was found dead</a> in his bedroom on June 9 1946. </p>
<p>Ananda’s proclamation as king had happened the same way, the day his predecessor abdicated the throne – even though he was a young boy of ten, and living abroad at the time. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142015/original/image-20161017-12416-1awll79.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142015/original/image-20161017-12416-1awll79.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142015/original/image-20161017-12416-1awll79.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142015/original/image-20161017-12416-1awll79.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142015/original/image-20161017-12416-1awll79.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142015/original/image-20161017-12416-1awll79.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142015/original/image-20161017-12416-1awll79.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mom Sangwal Mahidol na Ayudhya with Princess Galyani Vadhana, Prince Ananda Mahidol and Prince Bhumibol Adulyadej in 1929.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>‘The king is dead. Long live the king’</h2>
<p>Following Bhumibol’s death, the Prime Minister of Thailand, General Prayuth Chan-Ocha, announced on live television “The king is dead. Long live the king”. This formula is odd for Thailand, and a direct import from the Western doctrine of the two bodies of the king, developed in the late Middle Ages to <a href="http://press.princeton.edu/titles/6168.html">consolidate the institution of the monarchy</a>.</p>
<p>If Prayuth Chan-Ocha used this anachronistic phrase, it’s because it was needed to assert that Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn would indeed accede to the throne as Rama X. Prayuth was trying to avert any speculation that the crown prince could be sidelined in the succession process.</p>
<p>For many years, rumours had spread that Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn
who is <a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/princess-angel-v-playboy-prince-while-vajiralongkorn-mourns-sister-once-touted-succeed-king-1586316">more popular than the prince</a>, could be crowned queen instead of her brother, or at least become regent until Vajiralongkorn’s son, Dipangkorn, 11, comes of age. </p>
<p>Speculation was rife that any delay in making Vajiralongkorn king after the announcement of the death of the Bhumibol would lead to chaos. The <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-asian-studies/article/thailands-relapse-the-implications-of-the-may-2014-coup/9441736E71EB6A64531436AA748149F6">2014 military coup</a> was at least partly staged in order to manage a smooth handover and prevent any “<a href="http://as.ucpress.edu/content/55/6/1193">succession crisis</a>”.</p>
<h2>A constitutional crisis</h2>
<p>Succession seemed to be under control. But when Prayuth was granted an audience with Vajiralongkorn, the latter refused to become king, arguing he <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/world/coronation-of-thailands-crown-prince-vajiralongkorn-delayed-more-than-a-year-20161016-gs3c76.html">needed some time</a>. This created a vacancy of power and made the President of the Privy Council, <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/10/thailand-picks-pm-caretaker-king-death-161015130301947.html">Prem Tinsulanonda</a>, automatic regent. </p>
<p>A regent is a representative of a king in case of his incapacity or absence, and all the king’s powers are exercised by the regent. But, in the history of Thailand, there’s never been a regent without a king. What is particularly striking in the present situation is that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/245161">Prem’s mistrust of Vajiralongkorn is well known</a>.</p>
<p>The confusion over Vajiralongkorn’s ascension offers a glimpse of the even further erosion of the value of law in a country that has repeatedly violated its own laws and abolished its many constitutions in coups endorsed by the monarchy. </p>
<p>Since the end of absolute monarchy in Thailand in 1932, there have been <a href="http://www.springer.com/us/book/9789400772434">13 successful coups d'etat and 20 constitutions</a>. On average, a constitution lasts for 4.5 years and there is a coup every 6.5 years. </p>
<h2>Royal constitutional duties</h2>
<p>We tend to forget that even in a constitutional monarchy, there are a lot of constitutional duties for a king, signing legislation into law being the most obvious. </p>
<p>Along with duties come constitutional powers – most are written in the constitution, such as veto power over legislation – but also conventional “rights”, such as the right to be consulted, to encourage and to warn. This famous formula was used by Walter Bagehot in his seminal work published in 1867, <a href="http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/bagehot/constitution.pdf">The English Constitution</a>. </p>
<p>Thai constitutional lawyers, such as <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/people/person.asp?personId=8188823&privcapId=4484344">Bowornsak Uwanno</a>, used the English doctrine and applied it to the Thai monarchy. Those conventional powers were widely exercised by King Bhumibol, to such an extent that the he was able to build for himself crisis powers through several political interventions, some more controversial than others. </p>
<p>In the least controversial instance, during <a href="https://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg/publication/1451">the 1992 crisis</a> – which saw a street confrontation between protesters and the military government – Bhumibol summoned both the leader of the protests and the military dictator Suchinda Krapayoon, and called for an end to the conflict. As a result, Suchinda resigned.</p>
<p>More controversial was <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4945196.stm">Bhumibol’s speech to judges in April 2006</a> when he advised the courts to cancel a general election that had returned <a href="http://www.forbes.com/profile/thaksin-shinawatra/">Thaksin Shinawatra</a>, former prime minister, to power. The constitutional court did so, and paved the way for the <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00472330701652026">2006 military coup</a>.</p>
<p>The cautious exercise of crisis powers by King Bhumibol was rarely overridden or disregarded by political actors. Given the fear surrounding the crown prince, one might expect that no prime minister, senator, or judge, would dare to challenge him once he is head of state and erratically uses his nominal powers, such as veto powers and the power to dissolve the legislative assembly.</p>
<p>The 2016 constitution tries to avert this type of anticipated crisis by <a href="https://kyotoreview.org/yav/constitutional-court-2016-thailand-post-bhumibol">giving permanent super-crisis powers</a> to the constitutional court and maximum power to the army during a five-year transitional period. But the likelihood of clashes between the next head of state, the army and the constitutional court (<a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00472336.2016.1151917?journalCode=rjoc20">all part of a deep state insulated from elected civilian control</a>) remains high. </p>
<p>One thing is sure. As during the previous reign, the form of government will swing between that of full military dictatorship and “<a href="https://books.google.fr/books?id=GwjeCwAAQBAJ&pg=PT15&lpg=PT15&dq=H.+Kumarasingham+eastminster&source=bl&ots=giUJxm_xdC&sig=zIdYSAGrcPaZTjN50L3wr1_f5iU&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwirxPel2uHPAhWoL8AKHSLrB7gQ6AEIIjAB#v=onepage&q=H.%20Kumarasingham%20eastminster&f=false">Eastminster</a>”, a term coined by H. Kumarasingham to refer to India and Sri Lanka’s adaptation of the British Westminster model. The difference with Thailand is that in India and Sri Lanka, the head of state is elected. In Thailand, Eastminster means an imbalance of power in favour of the king and a general disregard for the law. </p>
<p>Uncertainty prevails, but what is certain is that the <a href="http://www.prachatai.com/english/node/6028">democratisation</a> that started in 1997 and was halted a few years later by a military coup, will be even further delayed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/67194/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eugénie Mérieau does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Will the next King of Thailand be able to bear his constitutional duties?Eugénie Mérieau, Lecturer, Sciences Po Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/326072014-10-08T00:32:26Z2014-10-08T00:32:26ZAn ailing king and succession intrigue put coup leaders on edge<p>Late last Friday the <a href="http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/64202/Bhumibol-Adulyadej">King of Thailand</a> was rushed from his seaside palace in Hua Hin to Siriraj hospital in Bangkok. The Palace issued an announcement that the King was suffering from a fever and a rapid heartbeat, but was responding to treatment. A subsequent <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-29502108">statement reported</a> that his gall bladder had been removed on Sunday night. </p>
<p>The King, aged 86 and for a long time in declining health, may very soon pass from the scene. He is the longest-serving head of state in the world. His passing is a once-in-a-century event.</p>
<p>Due to a religious taboo about speaking ill of the King, not to mention the country’s strict <a href="http://www.asiaobserver.org/on-thailand-lese-majeste-law">lèse majesté law</a> forbidding criticism of the King and royal family, the true state of the King’s health is unclear. Respected journalist <a href="https://www.facebook.com/zenjournalist?fref=nf">Andrew MacGregor Marshall</a> claims that the King has suffered a stroke, his second in two months.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"519136744420040704"}"></div></p>
<p>On Monday Thailand’s SET stock market index dropped sharply. A hard-line royalist social media site has warned people not to spread “inauspicious” rumours. The leader of the military junta and now prime minister, General Prayuth Chan-ocha, has led his Cabinet to the hospital to pay respects to the King.</p>
<p>Thailand could be entering a period of interregnum. If so, the ramifications for Thailand’s military dictatorship, and Thailand more generally, will be enormous.</p>
<h2>Was the coup a move to control succession?</h2>
<p>According to <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-good-coup-military-rule-is-unlikely-to-heal-thailand-28589">one theory</a>, the military coup in May this year was a pre-emptive strike by Thailand’s royalist establishment to seize control of the National Assembly from the elected government in preparation for the imminent succession. Under the constitution, changes to the succession arrangements require the approval of the National Assembly.</p>
<p>For nine years the royalists have been in a political war of attrition with the popular telecommunications businessman-turned-politician, <a href="http://www.lrb.co.uk/v36/n12/richard-lloydparry/the-story-of-thaksin-shinawatra">Thaksin Shinawatra</a>. His political platform of cheap health care, debt alleviation for farmers and accelerated rural development has made his political parties hugely popular among rural and lower-class urban voters – who make up over half the electorate. Pro-Thaksin parties have easily won the last six national elections. </p>
<p>For the first time in Thailand’s political history the masses have had a direct say in national politics, through the mechanism of electoral politics.
In doing this, Thaksin has challenged the grip that the military and bureaucracy, under the symbolic leadership of the King and royal family, have held on Thailand’s politics since the Cold War. The Thai word for bureaucrat – which includes the military – is <em>kha ratchakan</em>: “servant of the king”.</p>
<p>Thailand’s succession will be critical to the outcome of this political conflict. The monarch is enormously influential, belying the country’s official status as a constitutional monarchy. For example, all appointments to the military leadership must be approved by the Privy Council, the King’s hand-picked council of advisers. </p>
<p>The King is also the wealthiest monarch in the world. According to Thai law, he has sole control of assets worth around $US41 billion. The monarch’s role is legitimised by the propaganda organs of the Thai state, which promote a modern-day Buddhist version of divine kingship through all levels of the education system and the mass media.</p>
<p>The successor to the throne will inherit this immense store of political, economic and ideological power. It is understood that there is deep-seated resistance among Thailand’s royalist elite to the designated successor to the throne, Crown <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vajiralongkorn">Prince Vajiralongkorn</a>. The prince also lacks popular support. </p>
<h2>Royalists fear heir friendly with Thaksin</h2>
<p>The prince is, however, believed to be close to Thaksin, presumably due to Thaksin’s electoral popularity. Herein lies the existential fear that preoccupies this royalist elite.</p>
<p>Should Vajiralongkorn succeed to the throne, Thaksin would not only control the electorate, but effectively the monarchy too. This would represent the final defeat of the royalist establishment and all the interests that depend on it. </p>
<p>Their survival, therefore, depends on doing everything possible to prevent this scenario from taking place. According to this theory, in order to block Vajiralongkorn and Thaksin, the military regime and its royalist backers may engineer a change to the succession, perhaps elevating the more popular <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sirindhorn">Princess Sirindhorn</a> to the position of regent.</p>
<p>This would be an extreme course of action, but not unprecedented. In Thailand the principle of primogeniture has a weaker historical precedent in royal successions than in European monarchies. Succession struggles were not unusual.</p>
<p>Since seizing power in May, the military regime has tried to destroy Thaksin’s support base. Hundreds of mostly pro-Thaksin supporters have been detained. Pro-Thaksin politicians, democratic activists and intellectuals have fled the country.</p>
<p>Media organs linked to Thaksin have been closed down. Regime loyalists have replaced officials regarded as sympathetic to Thaksin. The interim constitution gives virtually absolute power to the junta leader. <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/world/martial-law-remains-as-thailands-military-ruler-appoints-reform-council-20141007-10r8to.html">Martial law remains in place</a> for most of the country.</p>
<p>A new constitution currently being drafted is expected to dilute the influence of elected politicians with the aim that they will never again be able to challenge the power of the military and the bureaucracy. This extreme centralisation of power, together with the high level of repression and heavy propaganda – excessive even by Thai standards – stems from acute uncertainty over the imminent passing of the King and the threat this poses to the establishment.</p>
<h2>Military’s hold on power is not secure</h2>
<p>Despite the regime’s propaganda to the contrary, the military lacks popular support. Prayuth has few political skills; he has even succeeded in alienating sections of his own support. His relations with the media are testy.</p>
<p>The crackdown on academic freedom and the rare detention of a number of high-profile academics have angered the more liberal sections of the academic community. Already corruption scandals and charges of cronyism in political appointments are being discussed, even in the compliant media. Tourism, a major revenue earner for the country, is down and the recent <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-10-03/thai-police-say-myanmar-men-confess-british-tourists-murder/5788200">murder of two British tourists</a> has been handled poorly by the military regime.</p>
<p>Most importantly, the economy (which had always been Thaksin’s strength), is in trouble. The World Bank <a href="http://englishnews.thaipbs.or.th/world-bank-cuts-thai-growth-forecast-1-5/">has forecast</a> a mere 1.5% growth this year - the lowest in ASEAN. Rumours of a counter-coup refuse to go away.</p>
<p>The regime has few foreign friends. The United States, the European Union and Japan condemned the coup. The Australian government has banned travel to Australia by the junta leaders. The military leadership’s apparent attempt to turn to China for diplomatic support has done little to win the confidence of Western states.</p>
<p>The regime is therefore less secure than it appears. The political situation is unstable and volatile. Having stayed loyal to Thaksin after coups, party dissolutions and the killing of upwards of 90 Red Shirt protesters and wounding of thousands, it is difficult to imagine that the pro-Thaksin forces will simply vanish in the face of the regime’s repression. More likely they too are waiting for the succession.</p>
<p>The King came to the throne in 1946. The one constant over the last 69 politically turbulent years will soon disappear from the scene. The succession is not simply about the future of the monarchy but also the authoritarian political edifice that formed around the King from the late 1950s. Thailand will soon be entering uncharted territory.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/32607/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Patrick Jory receives funding from the University of Queensland.</span></em></p>Late last Friday the King of Thailand was rushed from his seaside palace in Hua Hin to Siriraj hospital in Bangkok. The Palace issued an announcement that the King was suffering from a fever and a rapid…Patrick Jory, Senior Lecturer, Southeast Asian History, School of History, Philosophy, Religion and Classics, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.