tag:theconversation.com,2011:/fr/topics/sadc-17140/articlesSADC – The Conversation2024-01-03T09:38:27Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2192642024-01-03T09:38:27Z2024-01-03T09:38:27ZSouth Africa to lead new military force in the DRC: an expert on what it’s up against<p><em>The United Nations peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Monusco, is ending after 20 years. It will be replaced by troops from the Southern African Development Community (<a href="https://www.sadc.int/latest-news/operationalisation-sadc-standby-force-mechanism-intervention-crises-situations-remain">SADC</a>), led by the <a href="http://www.dod.mil.za/">South African military</a>. Thomas Mandrup, an expert in African security governance and South African military and foreign policy, recently wrote a <a href="https://www.sun.ac.za/english/faculty/milscience/sigla/Documents/Briefs/Briefs%202023/SIGLA%20Brief%2012%2023%20Mandrup.pdf">paper</a> on the subject. We asked him about the new mission and what awaits it.</em></p>
<h2>What prompted the deployment?</h2>
<p>The security situation in the eastern DRC has deteriorated <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/11/1143937">in recent months</a>, and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/21/dr-congo-president-says-un-peacekeepers-to-begin-withdrawal-this-year">criticism</a> has been raised against the UN force, <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/monusco">Monusco</a>, which was due to start its <a href="https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/pr-government-democratic-republic-congo-and-monusco-sign-disengagement-plan-withdrawal-mission">drawdown</a> shortly after the national elections <a href="https://theconversation.com/drc-elections-three-factors-that-have-shaped-tshisekedis-bumpy-first-term-as-president-217018">on 20 December</a>.</p>
<p>There was also <a href="https://adf-magazine.com/2023/11/fog-of-eastern-drc-fighting-clouds-eacrf-effectiveness/">increased frustration</a> with the <a href="https://www.eac.int/eac-regional-force">East African Community Regional Force</a> because of its lack of positive impact on the security situation in the eastern DRC. In addition, there was competition between the East African Community and SADC member states for future influence in the DRC. </p>
<p>The DRC became a member of the East Africa Community in 2022 and has historical trade relations with east Africa.</p>
<h2>What challenges await the SADC mission?</h2>
<p>The SADC mission in the DRC – which carries the acronym (<a href="https://www.dirco.gov.za/president-ramaphosa-to-participate-in-virtual-extraordinary-sadc-summit/">SAMIDRC</a>) – is expected to replace the East African Community Regional Force and help the national security forces in fighting especially the <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/drc-signs-an-agreement-for-the-deployment-of-sadc-troops--4437868">M23 rebels</a>, a group allegedly <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-democratic-republic-congo">supported by Rwanda</a>.</p>
<p>The SADC force is expected to attempt, in cooperation with the local security forces, to neutralise the main rebel groups operating in the eastern DRC. This is something that Monusco and the East African Community Regional Force have not been able to do for the last 20 years.</p>
<p>The rebel groups have operated in that area for many years, know the terrain, and are integrated with the local population.</p>
<p>The lessons learned from the <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/asking-the-right-questions-about-the-force-intervention-brigade">SADC/Monusco Force Intervention Brigade</a> show that the new intervention force must be sizeable, and have proper air cover as well as transport and air elements. It must also have special forces capabilities, and mobility in very difficult terrain. Also required are tactical and operational intelligence and enough fire-power. </p>
<p>In addition, a SADC internal document is instructive: it says the regional force found it difficult to fulfil <a href="https://www.sadc.int/latest-news/samim-shifting-scenario-six-scenario-five">its mandate</a> of disarming the Al-Sunnah insurgents in Mozambique because of a lack of a clear mandate and the necessary capabilities.</p>
<h2>What role will the South African National Defence Force play? What resources does it have?</h2>
<p>Post-apartheid South Africa has played a central role as a mediator and peacemaker in Africa. The DRC has been at the centre of these efforts. The South African National Defence Force will lead the SADC intervention force. </p>
<p>However, the South African National Defence Force is <a href="https://www.gov.za/news/speeches/minister-thandi-modise-defence-dept-budget-vote-202223-24-may-2022">overstretched and underfunded</a> and has been for <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-army-is-in-steady-decline-and-nothings-being-done-to-fix-it-74712">a long time</a>.</p>
<p>There is a discrepancy between what the politicians want it to do and the <a href="https://www.gov.za/news/speeches/minister-thandi-modise-defence-dept-budget-vote-202223-24-may-2022">resources available</a> for this. In addition, the South African government has increasingly used the military for <a href="https://theconversation.com/military-not-a-magic-bullet-south-africa-needs-to-do-more-for-long-term-peace-164717">domestic security and policing tasks</a> while also <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/money-recovered-from-crime-will-go-to-fight-crime/">deploying soldiers</a> and equipment in complex international peace missions, including combat missions in the DRC and Mozambique and <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/extension-of-sandf-deployments-in-mozambique-and-drc-to-cost-r2-billion/">ad hoc shorter international deployments</a>.</p>
<p>The South African National Defence Force faces a host of challenges. The politicians are seemingly unwilling to prioritise its tasks. Instead of releasing forces by closing one operation, the force is expected to handle an ever increasing number of tasks and deployments at the same time. Many of these are of a more civilian nature, such as sending out army engineers to stop the pollution of the Vaal River or <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/extension-of-sandf-deployments-in-mozambique-and-drc-to-cost-r2-billion/">protecting installations of Eskom</a>, the power utility, without additional funding. </p>
<p>The defence force has problems keeping its equipment operational and has, for instance, only one operational C-130 transport aircraft. It has only a few helicopters available for all domestic and international missions – <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/aerospace/aerospace-aerospace/saaf-in-crisis-as-aircraft-serviceability-drops-to-less-than-20/">five Oryx</a>, out of an initial 39, and three Rooivalk, out of 11.</p>
<p>Hence it will not be able to provide the much-needed air transport and air cover for offensive operations. The soldiers will have to use road transport in the DRC. But the country has very limited functional roads, making it especially difficult to operate and move around <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/aerospace/aerospace-aerospace/saaf-in-crisis-as-aircraft-serviceability-drops-to-less-than-20/">during the rainy season</a>.</p>
<p>The specialised elements and mobile elements, like the paratroops, the reconaissance units and the <a href="https://www.recce.co.za/the-hq/">Special Forces</a>, which can be effective against groups like the M23, are overstretched to such an extent that it negatively affects their operational readiness.</p>
<p>The reserve force, in principle numbering 19,000, constitutes an important augmenting tool for the permanent force. Due to personnel shortages, the reserve force has increasingly been used for both <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/sandf-holds-second-defence-reserves-indaba/">domestic and international deployments</a>.</p>
<p>However, it is ageing and only at half its supposed strength. The average age of the personnel is 46 years old, which is a big operational challenge. Active soldiers <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/press-releases/media-statement-defence-department-must-urgently-consider-appointment-chief-defence-reserves-and-chairperson-reserve-force-council">should be young and fit</a>. Ideally the majority of the force (private-level) should be 25 or younger. Officers and non-commissioned officers will have a higher average age. </p>
<p>The South African National Defence Force has reached a stage where it can no longer continue to deploy without significant additional funding and intake of recruits. The force will also have to take a critical look at its institutional structure and set-up. It has <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-mulls-future-of-its-military-to-make-it-fit-for-purpose-146423">too many expensive senior officers</a>, and too few young deployable soldiers. </p>
<h2>What are the risks?</h2>
<p>The risks are multifaceted. If the needed funding is not secured, the troop contributing countries will have to fund the missions from their own budgets. The <a href="https://www.sadc.int/latest-news/sadc-mission-mozambique-samim-brief">SADC mission in Mozambique</a>, for instance, <a href="https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/36712/">has struggled</a> with funding, which has hampered its operational capabilities. </p>
<p>The next challenge is whether the SADC member states will make the needed capabilities and equipment available to the new force, allowing it to successfully fulfil its mandate. The discrepancy between what a mission needs and what is provided has been seen in Mozambique, negatively affecting the mission’s ability to achieve its operational objectives. </p>
<p>In the operational area the new force will face an adversary allegedly supported by Rwanda. If the SADC force comes under-equipped or wrongly equipped, it increases the risk to the soldiers. The lessons learned from the strategic failure of the South African National Defence Force <a href="https://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za/pub/article/view/1322">in 2013 in Central African Republic</a> is a clear warning. Then a small bilateral South African training mission, augmented by a few hundred lightly armed special operation forces and paratrooper elements, fought a rebel force of 7,000 for two days. A small airborne element was left stranded, facing an overwhelming enemy without air cover, logistical support, heavy equipment or extraction possibilities.</p>
<p>It was only the bravery and skills of the deployed force that limited the number of casualties to 17. However, the mission was a strategic failure, which illustrated the limitation of the South African National Defence Force in logistically and practically supporting a force deployed several thousand kilometres away. Notably, the South African National Defence Force is in a worse shape than it was in 2013.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219264/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thomas Mandrup receives funding from The Carlsberg Foundation. </span></em></p>The new intervention force must be sizeable, and have proper air cover as well as transport and air elements. None are guaranteed.Thomas Mandrup, Associate Professor, Security Institute for Governance and Leadership In Africa (SIGLA), Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2195002023-12-11T14:51:17Z2023-12-11T14:51:17ZEast Africa’s troops are leaving the DRC: what went wrong and what comes next<p><em>The East African Community <a href="https://theconversation.com/east-african-troops-hope-to-bring-peace-in-the-drc-but-there-may-be-stumbling-blocks-195937">deployed a regional force</a> for the first time into eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2022. Just over a year later, the troops have <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/it-s-official-the-eac-troops-are-leaving-eastern-dr-congo-4445094">started withdrawing</a> amid <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67239214">tension</a> with the host state. We asked <a href="https://www.ipinst.org/by/jenna-russo">Jenna Russo</a>, who has covered the conflict and interventions in the DRC for more than a decade, what happened with the regional force and where the DRC goes from here.</em></p>
<h2>What was the mandate of the East African Community’s intervention in the DRC?</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.eac.int/communique/2537-communiqu%C3%A9-of-the-22nd-ordinary-summit-of-the-east-african-community-heads-of-state">July 2022 decision</a> to deploy an East African Community Regional Force to eastern DRC was prompted by renewed violence from the <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">armed group, M23</a>. </p>
<p>However, the scope of the force’s mandate has been a point of contention between the East African Community and the Congolese government. <a href="https://www.eac.int/statements/2791-status-of-the-east-african-community-regional-force-in-eastern-democratic-republic-of-congo">According to the regional bloc</a>, the regional force was to oversee the withdrawal of armed groups – including M23 – from areas in eastern DRC. There are estimated to be more than <a href="https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/democratic-republic-of-the-congo/#:%7E:text=More%20than%20120%20militias%20and,against%20humanity%20and%20war%20crimes.">120 armed groups</a> in this region. It was also to ensure that a <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/53-armed-groups-in-dr-congo-commit-to-end-war-4046010">ceasefire</a> negotiated in December 2022 was observed. </p>
<p>The Congolese government wanted a more <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/tshisekedi-gives-ultimatum-to-eacrf-4229574">assertive posture</a>, but the regional force has refused to engage in offensive operations. </p>
<p>It’s not clear how the two parties came to interpret the force’s mandate so differently, and this has been a major point of contention throughout its deployment.</p>
<h2>What were the force’s challenges and achievements?</h2>
<p>It’s much easier to speak of the force’s challenges than its achievements, which have been limited. It did experience some <a href="https://theconversation.com/east-african-troops-hope-to-bring-peace-in-the-drc-but-there-may-be-stumbling-blocks-195937">early victories</a>, in particular the December 2022 <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/53-armed-groups-in-dr-congo-commit-to-end-war-4046010">ceasefire</a> that included 53 armed groups. However, these and other efforts have been largely ineffective, with violence growing over the past year. And M23, the principal target of the intervention, has taken over new areas in the eastern region, including <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20231203-east-african-regional-force-begins-withdrawal-from-drc">some where the east African troops were stationed</a>.</p>
<p>It’s not only the DRC government that has been critical of the east African regional force. Many community members <a href="https://www.voaafrica.com/a/drc-downs-eac-protest/6923424.html">have expressed their anger</a> at the force’s lack of effectiveness. In some cases, this has led to riots and outbreaks of violence against the force. </p>
<p>There is also an overall <a href="https://theconversation.com/peace-in-the-drc-east-africa-has-deployed-troops-to-combat-m23-rebels-whos-who-in-the-regional-force-204036">lack of trust</a> in foreign forces, given the history of military and economic meddling by the DRC’s neighbours. The exploitation of the DRC’s natural resources by regional actors has been <a href="https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/22074/UNEP_DRCongo_MONUSCO_OSESG_final_report.pdf#page=3">well documented</a>. Further, some members of the East African Community Regional Force, including Burundi and Uganda, have <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/case/116">illegally occupied</a> areas of DRC territory.</p>
<p>Frustrations are also high over continued insecurity following years of intervention, including nearly 25 years of <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/monusco">UN peacekeeping</a> in the country. Yet, violence continues to grow, with <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/sadc-fails-to-signal-military-deployment-to-dr-congo-4426108">more than six million people</a> currently displaced in the east.</p>
<p>The military presence of the east African force was <a href="https://theconversation.com/east-african-troops-hope-to-bring-peace-in-the-drc-but-there-may-be-stumbling-blocks-195937">intended to complement a political process</a> that also involved the regional bloc’s leadership. However, this political process has stalled amid mounting tension between the DRC and Rwanda. <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/4/rwanda-backing-m23-rebels-in-drc-un-experts">Accusations of Rwanda’s support for M23</a> remain a crucial point of discord between the two countries. Rwanda officially <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/03/31/rwanda-denies-supporting-m23-rebel-group-in-eastern-drc//">denies</a> these accusations. </p>
<p>While the East African Community has expressed its intention to remain engaged politically even after its troops withdraw, overcoming regional political tensions remains a major obstacle.</p>
<h2>What prompted the exit from the DRC?</h2>
<p>After just over a year, the DRC government decided not to renew the mandate of the East African Community Regional Force past its 8 December 2023 expiration. President Felix Tshisekedi has accused the force of not only being ineffective but even of <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20231203-east-african-regional-force-begins-withdrawal-from-drc">colluding with rebels</a>. </p>
<p>The more likely reason for the force’s exit, however, is Tshisekedi’s dissatisfaction with its unwillingness to use proactive force against M23. This posture would entail the force undertaking offensive operations to neutralise non-state groups in partnership with government forces. </p>
<p>Similar frustrations have been directed at the UN peacekeeping operation, which also <a href="https://monusco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/pr-the_government_of_the_democratic_republic_of_the_congo_and_monusco_sign_a_disengagement_plan_for_the_withdrawal_of_the_mission.pdf">begins its drawing down in December 2023</a>. While most of the benchmarks identified for the UN mission’s withdrawal have not been met, the government has made it clear the mission is no longer welcome in the country. In the <a href="https://www.congoresearchgroup.org/en/2023/02/23/a-majority-of-congolese-reject-east-african-community-regional-force/">eyes of the government and many community members</a>, if foreign forces cannot tamp down non-state armed groups, they should leave the country.</p>
<h2>What comes next?</h2>
<p>Though the east African force and UN peacekeepers will begin leaving the country this month, this is not the end of foreign forces in the DRC. The Southern African Development Community, which the DRC is a part of, <a href="https://theconversation.com/southern-african-troops-versus-m23-rebels-in-the-drc-4-risks-this-poses-218282">has agreed to provide troops</a>. While the exact timing of their deployment has not yet been specified, it may correspond with the east African force’s withdrawal to ensure continuity of presence.</p>
<p>Underpinning the southern African deployment is the DRC’s renewed hope that the force will provide more robust operations. Tshisekedi noted that this regional bloc had resolved to help the DRC “<a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/drc-signs-an-agreement-for-the-deployment-of-sadc-troops--4437868">annihilate</a>” its enemies. The country’s deputy prime minister for foreign affairs, Christophe Lutundula, similarly <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/drc-signs-an-agreement-for-the-deployment-of-sadc-troops--4437868">stated</a> that the force would </p>
<blockquote>
<p>support the Congolese army in fighting and eradicating the M23 and other armed groups.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Even if southern African forces are willing to engage offensively, the chances of them facilitating longer term peace in the country are small. </p>
<p>This is because such operations rest on the DRC government’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/protests-against-un-in-eastern-congo-highlight-peace-missions-crisis-of-legitimacy-187932">flawed assumption</a> that it can achieve peace through <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2021.1992272">sheer military force</a>. The lack of sustained political engagement by the main parties to the conflict has undermined numerous attempts at peace. </p>
<p>The DRC is not the only accountable party in this situation – Rwanda carries its fair share of responsibility. But unless the government can facilitate a viable political process, more boots on the ground – whether international, regional or bilateral – are unlikely to bring the peace that the Congolese people seek.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219500/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jenna Russo is the Director of Research at the International Peace Institute (IPI), and Heads IPI's Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations.</span></em></p>Chances of longer term peace are small because of the DRC’s assumption that it can achieve peace through sheer military force.Jenna Russo, Researcher and lecturer, City University of New YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2182822023-11-24T11:26:29Z2023-11-24T11:26:29ZSouthern African troops versus M23 rebels in the DRC: 4 risks this poses<p>The security situation in the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) continues to deteriorate. The region comprises North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri provinces. It’s about seven times the size of neighbouring Rwanda. </p>
<p>The violence in North Kivu has drawn most of the attention of the DRC’s neighbours and the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/11/21/readout-of-director-of-national-intelligence-avril-hainess-travel-to-democratic-republic-of-congo-and-rwanda/">international community</a>. This close attention is aimed at preventing <a href="https://medafricatimes.com/32898-un-fears-direct-confrontation-between-drc-and-rwanda.html">possible confrontation between Rwanda and the DRC</a>. </p>
<p>Since late 2021, North Kivu has been confronted by <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">M23 rebels</a> who have executed people and forcibly displaced thousands within the province and outside the DRC. The <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/un-again-accuses-rwanda-of-backing-m23-rebels-4281916">DRC and UN officials have accused</a> Rwanda of supporting M23 rebels. Kigali denies this.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://theconversation.com/east-african-troops-hope-to-bring-peace-in-the-drc-but-there-may-be-stumbling-blocks-195937">mid 2022</a>, the East African Community sent <a href="https://www.eac.int/eac-regional-force">a regional force</a> into the DRC to halt the military advancement of M23 in an effort to address rising tension between the DRC and Rwanda. The DRC shares a <a href="https://www.trademarkafrica.com/democratic-republic-of-congo/">2,500km border</a> with five east African countries: Burundi, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. </p>
<p>Since this deployment, however, DRC president Felix Tshisekedi and residents of North Kivu have <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/tshisekedi-gives-ultimatum-to-eacrf-4229574">criticised the east African force</a>, accusing it of deferring to the M23. The East African Community heads of states <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/it-s-official-the-eac-troops-are-leaving-eastern-dr-congo-4445094">recently agreed</a> to withdraw the force starting in December 2023.</p>
<p>The DRC’s leadership is now seeking <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/drc-signs-an-agreement-for-the-deployment-of-sadc-troops--4437868#:%7E:text=Saturday%20November%2018%202023&text=The%20Democratic%20Republic%20of%20Congo,ceremony%20in%20Kinshasa%20on%20Friday.">support</a> from another regional bloc, the Southern African Development Community (SADC). SADC <a href="https://www.sadc.int/latest-news/communique-extra-ordinary-summit-sadc-heads-state-and-government">has pledged</a> to deploy a military unit to North Kivu <a href="https://www.voaafrica.com/a/drc-announces-deployment-of-sadc-troops/7362075.html">in the coming days</a>. The DRC is a member of SADC, as are its neighbours Tanzania, Zambia and Angola.</p>
<p>The SADC mission will <a href="https://www.radiookapi.net/2023/11/19/actualite/securite/la-rdc-signe-laccord-de-deploiement-des-militaires-de-la-sadc-dans">support the Congolese army</a> in its quest to root out M23 and other armed groups operating in eastern Congo. It’s still unclear if these troops will replace the east African force, or cooperate with it. Either way, this deployment comes on the heels of the gradual planned <a href="https://monusco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/pr-the_government_of_the_democratic_republic_of_the_congo_and_monusco_sign_a_disengagement_plan_for_the_withdrawal_of_the_mission.pdf">exit of UN peacekeepers from DRC starting in December 2023</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/rwanda-and-drcs-turbulent-past-continues-to-fuel-their-torrid-relationship-188405">Rwanda and DRC's turbulent past continues to fuel their torrid relationship</a>
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<p>As a researcher on micro-level violence, I have <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=4SlemykAAAAJ&hl=en">studied</a> the drivers of conflict in eastern DRC since 2017. In my view, there are four risks to the proposed SADC mission. These are: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>it would primarily target M23 rebels, leaving out the other armed groups in eastern DRC</p></li>
<li><p>it could give Rwanda more room to exploit the M23 rebel force</p></li>
<li><p>it could antagonise the East African Community, which the <a href="https://theconversation.com/drc-is-set-to-become-7th-member-of-the-east-africa-trading-bloc-whats-in-it-for-everyone-179320">DRC joined in 2022</a></p></li>
<li><p>the SADC force could end up being outnumbered in a vast region. </p></li>
</ul>
<h2>The focus on M23 rebels</h2>
<p>The primary mission for the SADC force would be to stabilise and contribute towards peacebuilding in eastern DRC. The danger is that this mission, especially if deployed under the banner of the Congolese national army, could end up condoning the army’s perspective. </p>
<p>This perspective tends to concentrate on the danger posed by M23 and disregards the <a href="https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/democratic-republic-of-the-congo/#:%7E:text=More%20than%20120%20militias%20and,against%20humanity%20and%20war%20crimes.">armed groups (more than 120)</a> operating in eastern Congo. Further, it tends to accommodate other armed groups that commit atrocities against civilians. In countering M23 attacks, <a href="https://ipisresearch.be/weekly-briefing/m23-crisis-flares-again-in-north-kivu-context-dynamics-and-risks/">the army has co-opted foreign and local militias</a>, providing them with <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/conflict-in-eastern-dr-congo-flares-again/a-67203737">guns and ammunition</a>. </p>
<p>The SADC mission in the DRC may end up trapped in the Congolese army’s approach. This would be dangerous for the stability of the region. Some of these local and foreign <a href="https://www.genocidewatchblog.com/post/addressing-the-banyamulenge-s-plight-in-dr-congo-part-1">militias have vowed to wipe out</a> ethnic communities whom they believe are not “real Congolese”. </p>
<p>Any regional force aiming to stabilise eastern Congo should remain neutral in its actions and be alive to the ways the <a href="https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/democratic-republic-of-the-congo/">Congolese army has fanned violence and committed atrocities against civilians</a>.</p>
<h2>Rwanda and the M23</h2>
<p>Efforts to stabilise eastern DRC should dissociate Rwanda’s grievances from those of the M23. </p>
<p>The rebel group claims to be <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">fighting for the rights of Congolese Tutsis and other ethnic communities</a> in the Kivus. Rwanda, on its part, <a href="https://theconversation.com/rwanda-and-drcs-turbulent-past-continues-to-fuel-their-torrid-relationship-188405">accuses the DRC</a> of working with a rebel force, the FDLR, that seeks to overthrow the Rwandan government and operates out of Congo. In a 2022 report, a group of UN experts on the DRC <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/06/dr-congo-atrocities-rwanda-backed-m23-rebels">claimed that Rwanda armed M23 rebels</a> to enable them to go after FDLR combatants. Rwanda has dismissed such allegations.</p>
<p>The M23 cause shouldn’t be <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/06/dr-congo-atrocities-rwanda-backed-m23-rebels">exploited</a>. Instead, preference should be given to enabling peaceful negotiations between the rebels and the Congolese government to address grievances. </p>
<p>However, the Congolese army and Tshisekedi’s stance <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/m23-rebels-fight-on-in-eastern-drc-despite-truce-/6850531.html">against the M23</a> – particularly ahead of the DRC’s general elections in December 2023 – could push SADC forces to opt for a military solution to the rebel group’s offensive. SADC should be careful not to back a stance that would end up forcing M23 to remain a rebel force that regional countries could manipulate for their own agenda. </p>
<p><strong>DRC and its neighbours</strong></p>
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<h2>Antagonising the East African Community</h2>
<p>The East African Community’s force is <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67239214">largely criticised</a> by Kinshasa and residents of North Kivu for failing to attack M23 rebels. The public – under the influence of Congolese political figures – tends to see the threat posed by M23 and disregards other forms of violence in the region. </p>
<p>Kinshasa has demonised the rebel force and its links to Rwanda for political mileage. Calling the east African troops’ efforts to root out M23 a failure after less than two years is premature. Particularly since the UN peacekeeping mission, <a href="https://theconversation.com/protests-against-un-in-eastern-congo-highlight-peace-missions-crisis-of-legitimacy-187932">Monusco</a>, has been in the DRC for more than two decades. </p>
<p>The upside to the East African Community’s intervention is that it <a href="https://www.eac.int/communique/2660-communique-of-the-consultative-meeting-between-the-chairperson-of-the-summit-and-the-facilitator-of-the-eac-led-eastern-drc-peace-process-on-the-security-situation-in-eastern-drc">combines</a> political consultations and dialogue among different belligerents. It is unclear what will happen to the peace talks initiated by <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/kenyatta-says-drc-peace-restoration-talks-to-resume-4185714">former Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta</a> should the SADC mission replace the east African one. </p>
<h2>Limited force strength in a vast area</h2>
<p>Eastern DRC contains at least 120 armed groups, and borders Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Burundi. The SADC mission in the DRC will, therefore, be taking on multiple rebel forces in a vast area with complex politics. It runs the risk of having its efforts criticised just like those of the East African Community because of its limited capacity to tackle the [underlying causes of violence <a href="https://theconversation.com/conflict-in-the-drc-5-articles-that-explain-whats-gone-wrong-195332">in eastern Congo</a>. </p>
<p>The SADC force could choose to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-democratic-fighting-idUSBRE97M0WA20130823/">focus on attacking</a> M23 rebels – which is how the group was first rooted out in <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">2012-2013</a>. Or it will get lost in the vast jungles of eastern Congo. Either scenario won’t bring lasting peace. </p>
<p>Many of the drivers of violence in eastern DRC are linked to <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-un-is-under-attack-in-eastern-congo-but-drc-elites-are-also-to-blame-for-the-violence-187861">the state’s absence</a> in the daily life of ordinary Congolese. This is largely driven by the political elites’ focus on their own survival. A purely military approach to addressing the violence would, therefore, be ill-advised.</p>
<p><em>This article was updated to reflect the East African Community’s decision to withdraw its regional force in the DRC.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218282/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Delphin R. Ntanyoma does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The international effort to address three decades of violence in eastern DRC has drawn in the UN, east African troops and now a southern African force.Delphin R. Ntanyoma, Visiting Researcher, University of LeedsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2172012023-11-10T09:18:21Z2023-11-10T09:18:21ZVisa-free travel for Africans: why Kenya and Rwanda have taken a step in the right direction<p>President William Ruto of Kenya recently <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67254349">announced</a> that Kenya’s borders would be open to visitors from the entirety of Africa, with no visas required, by the end of 2023. He said</p>
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<p>When people cannot travel, business people cannot travel, entrepreneurs cannot travel, we all become net losers.</p>
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<p>A few days later, President Paul Kagame of Rwanda <a href="https://apnews.com/article/rwanda-visa-africans-actfa-africa-09edb93691babd5e0cebd2e131fd7ecb">followed suit</a>, saying all Africans would be able to enter Rwanda without visas.</p>
<p>Neither Kenya nor Rwanda will be the first. By the end of 2022, <a href="https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/africa-visa-openness-report-2022#page=38">Benin, The Gambia and Seychelles</a> had already implemented a system of visa-free access for all Africans. Perhaps more will follow soon. Some regions, some sub-regional groups and some bilateral arrangements have also resulted in visa-free access and even passport-free access in certain cases. </p>
<p>Within the broader East African Community, Uganda, Rwanda and Kenya <a href="https://immigration.go.ug/services/interstate-pass">allow</a> cross border travel without passports. Botswana and Namibia recently <a href="https://www.tralac.org/blog/article/15940-botswana-and-namibia-concluded-an-agreement-on-the-movement-of-persons.html">signed</a> a similar agreement. </p>
<p>Despite this progress, by the end of 2022 <a href="https://www.visaopenness.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/VOI%E2%80%932022_final2_9dec22.pdf#page=12">only 27%</a> of African routes allowed Africans to travel visa-free. </p>
<p>Actions such as those of Kenya and Rwanda take the African Union’s agenda further. Regularising freer movement of people across African borders is one of the continent’s great developmental challenges. It is one of the flagship projects of the African Union’s <a href="https://au.int/agenda2063/flagship-projects">Agenda 2063</a>. </p>
<p>But even if all African countries no longer required visas from Africans, this would not necessarily give the visitors a right to apply for jobs, establish a business or build a home in the receiving country. The 2018 African Union Free Movement of Persons protocol <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10220461.2021.2007788">aims</a> for full free movement, through three phases – entry, residence and establishment. This includes full economic rights, including employment. It has not been widely ratified, however. </p>
<p><a href="https://nsi.org.za/publications/analysis-trends-patterns-migration-africa/">Our new study of migration trends</a> underscores the potential contributions of migration to economic development in the countries of origin and destination. This is realised through the transfer of skills, knowledge and remittances. The study also shows that intra-African migration is firmly rooted in geographical, social and economic ties. Movement is predominantly within regions, and moderately between them.</p>
<h2>Free trade and movement of people</h2>
<p>African Union policies support freer intracontinental trade, investment and movement of people to promote the continent’s economic, social and political development. The continent has <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10220461.2021.2007788">made progress</a> on the aspects of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement that deal with trade and investment. There hasn’t been much progress on the free movement of people. And yet the success of the trade agreement requires freer movement of people.</p>
<p>This interdependence between trade and free movement of people was the focus of the recent <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20231031/8th-pan-african-forum-migration-pafom8-kicks">Pan-African Forum on Migration</a> held in Gaborone, the Botswana capital. The forum brings together African Union member states, the continent’s regional economic communities, UN agencies and intergovernmental organisations <a href="https://www.iom.int/pan-african-forum-migration-pafom">to deliberate on migration and human mobility issues</a> in Africa. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/free-movement-of-people-across-africa-regions-are-showing-how-it-can-work-197199">Free movement of people across Africa: regions are showing how it can work</a>
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<p>The conference noted that most African countries had failed to ratify the African Union’s <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36403-treaty-protocol_on_free_movement_of_persons_in_africa_e.pdf">Free Movement of Persons protocol</a>. At the same time, there was evidence of improvements in policies and practices at national, bilateral and multilateral levels that facilitate the freer movement of Africans.</p>
<p>Apart from recent announcements by Rwanda and Kenya, other instances would be a growing number of <a href="https://theconversation.com/free-movement-of-people-across-africa-regions-are-showing-how-it-can-work-197199">reciprocal</a> arrangements between countries.</p>
<h2>Regional migration a norm</h2>
<p>The history of African statehood, with strong social ties across national boundaries, makes regional mobility a norm rather than an exception. This can be seen from the migration routes, mostly found within the same regions and which proceed in both directions. </p>
<p>For example, Burkina Faso to Côte d’Ivoire is the largest migrant route in the continent and within the Economic Community of West Africa (<a href="https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/africa/regional-economic-communities-rec/economic-community-west-african-states">Ecowas</a>) – the economic bloc of 15 west African states. Côte d’Ivoire to Burkina Faso is equally popular. This trend is ubiquitous throughout the continent, except within the <a href="https://www.sadc.int/">Southern African Development Community</a> region, where most migrant routes tend to lead to South Africa.</p>
<p>Among the major regional economic communities, Ecowas has the most intense regional migration. It is followed by the Southern African Development Community and the East African Community. By contrast, Ecowas has the least inter-regional migration while the East African Community has the most.</p>
<p>Variations in development across Africa mean that some countries experience contrasting patterns, particularly in extra-continental migration. While most African migrants migrate to and from other parts of the continent, in middle income countries such as South Africa, Kenya and Nigeria extra-continental emigration is greater.</p>
<p>Immigration and emigration are generally <a href="https://nsi.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/An-analysis-of-trends-and-patterns-of-migration-in-Africa.pdf#page=6">low in low income countries</a> and higher in middle income countries. In rich countries, people tend not to emigrate. The relatively low level of migration in Africa follows this pattern.</p>
<p>Only <a href="https://nsi.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/An-analysis-of-trends-and-patterns-of-migration-in-Africa.pdf#page=11">14% of total world emigrants</a> come from Africa. The average migrant density, or percentage of migrants living on the continent, is 1.89% compared to a global average of <a href="https://nsi.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/An-analysis-of-trends-and-patterns-of-migration-in-Africa.pdf#page=6">3.6%</a> where Europe and North America are at 12% and 16% respectively. African migration is thus not only comparatively low compared with the global averages, but characteristically depicts low income.</p>
<p>High income countries tend to have more immigrants than emigrants. The converse is true for low income regions. Africa as a whole has more emigrants than immigrants, confirming the link between migration and development. </p>
<h2>Legal restrictions matter little</h2>
<p>Much migration in Africa is impervious to legal constrictions or definitions of national boundaries, and even to logistical constraints. Government dictates succeed in making much of this migration irregular but fail to stop it. Though regional integration and liberalisation of migration rules are helpful, they do not yet solve this challenge.</p>
<p>The main migrant sending country to Kenya is Somalia, despite not being in the same regional economic community. And despite efforts by the government of Kenya to deter Somali migrants to Kenya. The main destination country for Nigerian emigrants in Africa is Cameroon, even though it does not belong to Ecowas.</p>
<p>While African migration governance reforms are making <a href="https://theconversation.com/free-movement-of-people-across-africa-regions-are-showing-how-it-can-work-197199">considerable progress</a> it will still be a while till they catch up and are able to deal fairly and rationally with the reality of migration patterns in Africa.</p>
<p><em>Michael Mutava of the New South Institute authored the report on which this article is based.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217201/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alan Hirsch is employed as a research fellow at the New South Institute where he supervised some of the research on which this article is based.</span></em></p>Regularising freer movement of people across African borders is one of the continent’s great developmental challenges.Alan Hirsch, Research Fellow New South Institute, Emeritus Professor at The Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2010392023-07-05T13:25:43Z2023-07-05T13:25:43ZMozambican terror group is strikingly similar to Nigeria’s deadly Boko Haram<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/535867/original/file-20230705-17871-w4xgot.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mozambican Armed Defence Forces being inspected in Cabo Delgado Province.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Simon Wohlfahrt/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Terrorism is a global problem affecting many countries. Until 2017, however, southern Africa was largely spared from this phenomenon. The bloody conflict sparked by <a href="https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/african-conflicts-to-watch-in-2022">Ansar al-Sunna</a> in northern Mozambique has since changed the region’s security landscape.</p>
<p>Ansar al-Sunna, also called Al-Shabaab Mozambique, is an Islamic extremist movement which has <a href="https://issafrica.org/research/southern-africa-report/the-genesis-of-insurgency-in-northern-mozambique">gained prominence</a> in Mozambique’s northern Cabo Delgado province. Despite military intervention by the <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/rwandan-and-mozambican-army-bosses-meet-ahead-of-sadc-meeting-on-insurgency-20220110">Southern African Development Community (SADC)</a> and <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/rwandan-and-mozambican-army-bosses-meet-ahead-of-sadc-meeting-on-insurgency-20220110">Rwanda</a> since 2021, the bloody insurgency is far from quelled.</p>
<p>The group’s goals and operations, and the challenges it poses, are similar to those of the most feared terrorist groups in other African countries. These are in particular <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/terrorism-in-africa/">Al Shabaab</a> in Somalia and <a href="https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/systemfiles/Is%20Might%20Right.pdf">Boko Haram</a> in Nigeria.<br>
Boko Haram has posed a significant threat to the Nigerian state since 2009. It has also undermined the security of several neighbouring states. It preys on <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2018/06/13/nigeria-is-a-fragile-state-international-studies-prove-it/">state fragility</a> and the resultant <a href="https://www.inss.org.il/he/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/systemfiles/SystemFiles/MASA8-1Eng.06Bamidele413395087.pdf">socio-economic challenges</a>. Poverty <a href="https://www.csef.it/WP/wp495.pdf">disproportionately affects the rural, northern region</a>, where Boko Haram is most active.</p>
<p>Decades of <a href="https://scholar.google.co.za/citations?user=iKCKnrkAAAAJ&hl=en">research</a> on conflict in Africa made me aware of similarities between Ansar al-Sunna and Boko Haram. This prompted me to compare their origins, doctrines and acts of terror. </p>
<p>I recently delivered a <a href="https://www.academia.edu/104218615/Boko_Haram_and_Ansar_al_Sunna_A_Comparative_Analysis_of_Insurgency_Dynamics_and_Governance_Failures">paper</a> on the subject at<a href="https://ecasconference.org/2023/programme#12436.68172"> a conference in Germany</a>. The paper deals with:</p>
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<li><p>the emergence of the two groups </p></li>
<li><p>their ideological linkages and links with regional and international jihadist groups </p></li>
<li><p>the socio-economic conditions that facilitate radicalism and recruitment </p></li>
<li><p>how the two groups source their funds </p></li>
<li><p>the security responses of the Nigerian and Mozambican governments.</p></li>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/mozambique-insurgency-focus-needs-to-shift-to-preventing-criminality-at-sea-166138">Mozambique insurgency: focus needs to shift to preventing criminality at sea</a>
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<h2>Similarities</h2>
<p>The first similarity is that both Ansar al-Sunna (“the youth” in Arabic) and Boko Haram emerged as militant Islamist movements committed to establishing Islamic caliphates in their countries. </p>
<p>In Nigeria, Boko Haram set out to separate from secular society, and draw students from poor Muslim families to an Islamic school in Borno State. Its founder, Mohammad Yusuf, argued that Islam <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/FP_20200507_nigeria_boko_haram_afzal.pdf">forbade western education</a>. The group eventually went beyond targeting western education to <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/FP_20200507_nigeria_boko_haram_afzal.pdf">attacking Nigeria’s political system</a>. This included the country’s constitution, national anthem, national flag and other formal symbols.</p>
<p>Ansar al-Sunna, too, was not primarily politically active at first. It started by rejecting Mozambique’s educational, health and legal systems on religious grounds. It demanded that its followers support alternative services offered <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/the-many-drivers-enabling-violent-extremism-in-northern-mozambique/">at its mosques</a> – a counter-society of a kind. </p>
<p>Second, there is no real documented evidence of direct control of either Boko Haram or Ansar Al-Sunna by foreign jihadists. This implies a strong local context and drivers. But there are clear ideological linkages or sentiments. They both communicate with regional or international jihadist groups. The United States alleges the two movements are <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/19361610.2021.1882281">connected to ISIS</a>. It also links Boko Haram to al-Qaeda.</p>
<p>Third, I argue in my <a href="https://www.academia.edu/104218615/Boko_Haram_and_Ansar_al_Sunna_A_Comparative_Analysis_of_Insurgency_Dynamics_and_Governance_Failures">paper</a> that both Boko Haram and Ansar al-Sunna are largely <a href="https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/crime-illicit-markets-violence-instability-nigeria/">funded by dubious and illegal sources</a>. For Boko Haram, cross-border cattle rustling has been a substantial source of income. So are ransom payments for kidnapping, bank robberies and “tax” collections. </p>
<p>Ansar al-Sunna <a href="https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/GITOC-ESAObs-Insurgency-illicit-markets-and-corruption-The-Cabo-Delgado-conflict-and-its-regional-implications.pdf#page=7">receives its funding</a> primarily from local business people, as well as cash and goods seized during attacks. </p>
<p>Fragile public institutions and the limitations of state security explain the two movements’ ability to get funding and potent large-calibre weapons.</p>
<p>Fourth, poor and even desperate socio-economic conditions provided opportunities for Boko Haram and Ansar al-Sunna to emerge in the political landscapes of Nigeria and Mozambique. Both operate in the less governed, poverty-stricken parts of their countries – north-eastern Nigeria and northern Mozambique. </p>
<p>Those poor conditions are typical of state fragility and limited statehood. Among the <a href="https://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/poverty/987B9C90-CB9F-4D93-AE8C-750588BF00QA/AM2021/Global_POVEQ_NGA.pdf">almost 40% of Nigerians living in poverty</a> in 2018–2019, close to 85% lived in rural areas. Almost 77% were in the predominantly Muslim north. In Mozambique, Cabo Delgado has an illiteracy rate of about 60%. Some of <a href="https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/sar-27.pdf">the poorest schools and health facilities</a> in the country are in Cabo Delgado. Unemployment is as high as 88%. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-lies-behind-mozambiques-failure-to-find-lasting-peace-and-true-democracy-171434">What lies behind Mozambique's failure to find lasting peace and true democracy</a>
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<p>There is a striking parallel in the inequality and socio-economic exclusion of the affected regions. In both, the central government and relevant state institutions are simply absent, or can’t meet the basic needs of their populations. They don’t provide schools, hospitals, roads and other public infrastructure. They have massive youth unemployment, corruption, poverty and underdevelopment. </p>
<p>Fifth, both militant groups sparked heavy-handed security responses from the respective governments. Confrontations between Boko Haram and the Nigerian state eventually led to a <a href="https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/systemfiles/Is%20Might%20Right.pdf#page=13">state of emergency in 2013</a> in three north-eastern states. But the group’s violent campaign escalated, taking a heavy toll on lives and property.</p>
<p>Similarly in Mozambique, the emergence of Ansar al-Sunna got a strong response from the security forces in 2020. Foreign private military companies joined later. In both cases, the government adopted a militaristic approach to the insurgency, without any positive outcomes. </p>
<p>In both countries, the insurgency dynamics and problems required political and economic solutions. These are strategies that address the root causes of conflict. Instead, regional military responses were unleashed – by <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/slow-progress-for-west-africas-latest-counter-terrorism-plan">ECOWAS</a> in Nigeria, and the <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/06/regional-security-support-vital-first-step-peace-mozambique">SADC and Rwanda</a> in Mozambique. Both interventions are hampered by inadequate resources and <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/slow-progress-for-west-africas-latest-counter-terrorism-plan">insufficient funding</a>. This clearly rules out a military solution or victory.</p>
<h2>Looking forward</h2>
<p>State fragility and governance limitations not only provided fertile ground for the rise of Boko Haram and Ansar al-Sunna. They also prevent the relevant state institutions in Nigeria and Mozambique from solving the problem.</p>
<p>Inequality and socio-economic exclusion in north-eastern Nigeria and northern Mozambique continue.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/regional-military-intervention-in-mozambique-is-a-bad-idea-heres-why-161549">Regional military intervention in Mozambique is a bad idea. Here's why</a>
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<p>The central governments and state institutions are unable to address the dire socio-economic conditions and related instability. </p>
<p>This is why counterinsurgency efforts have had limited impact. The conflict in northern Mozambique could become a long, low-intensity war, as it has in Nigeria and Somalia. That is unless the authorities adopt counter-insurgency measures that go beyond military operations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201039/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Theo Neethling receives funding from the National Research Foundation. </span></em></p>In parts of Nigeria and Mozambique, the central governments and state institutions are either absent or unable to address the dire socio-economic conditions and related instability.Theo Neethling, Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1865162022-08-31T07:26:39Z2022-08-31T07:26:39ZSouthern African countries can do better at infrastructure: what the choices might look like<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/481094/original/file-20220825-11-ova39k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Hawkers carry their produce to the market walking past a truck yard on on the border of Zambia and Zimbabwe.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Gideon Mendel/Corbis via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Countries in southern Africa are under a crushing burden brought about by a confluence of factors. These include the unprecedented growth in the number of young people, the remarkable speed of urbanisation and the rise of informal settlements in urban centres. </p>
<p>The physical infrastructure needed to meet these challenges requires exceptional solutions. But these call for alternative approaches. These include deep collaboration between member states and the private sector. And the development of a robust relationship between economic and social infrastructure, on the one hand, and the underlying policy framework that drives decisions on the other.</p>
<p><a href="https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Policy-Insights-124-wenthworth-cloete.pdf">Research </a> by the <a href="https://saiia.org.za/about/">South African Institute of International Affairs</a> highlights scenario options for the future of infrastructure in the region. And issues guidance on how to avoid the undesired options. </p>
<p>Infrastructure projects take a long time to come to fruition - often in the order of one or two decades. This introduces a whole range of uncertainties. To better navigate uncertainty, upheaval and inevitable change decision makers should employ strategic foresight. It’s an approach that helps the development of alternative futures and options that better anticipate and prepare for new opportunities and challenges. Strategic foresight spurs new thinking about the best policies to address long term opportunities and challenges through proactive and adaptive policy innovation. </p>
<p>Any infrastructure plan needs thorough stress testing to determine its viability against a range of future scenarios. Foresight builds the capacity to learn about change as quickly as possible and to be flexible enough to respond to that change in creative and effective ways. </p>
<p>The scenarios present potential infrastructure pathways. Each is briefly unpacked according to four quadrants. These are regenerative infrastructure, exploitative infrastructure, fossil fanatics and building backwards. </p>
<h2>Regenerative infrastructure</h2>
<p>Under this scenario, political decision-making creates regional climate policy certainty. In turn this leads to effective implementation of green infrastructure developments. Governments and the private sector partner on projects aimed at inclusive, low-carbon, green alternatives that adapt to changing socio-economic conditions. </p>
<p>The relationship between government, academia and the private sector creates an interactive system to promote green and more effective technologies. In turn this accelerates efforts to combat climate change. </p>
<p>The intelligent infrastructure that’s developed serves society’s needs better. This is because services are “always-on”. And infrastructure is only used on an as-needed basis to eliminate waste. </p>
<p>High-tech initiatives deliver modern infrastructure. These mitigate the effects of climate change. New technology-based infrastructure assets support infrastructure, manufacturing and services in a region that’s more integrated. </p>
<p>At the same time, domestic and international private finance is crowded in. This allows for an influx of investments. At the same time recognition of distinct yet mutually reinforcing and overlapping infrastructure types eases the fiscal constraints facing governments. </p>
<p>Coordinated efforts by finance ministries and national and local governments incorporate the management of non-tariff barriers. This includes customs, physical and administrative infrastructure. </p>
<p>Governments recognise the importance of regional trading and begin breaking down barriers. </p>
<h2>Fossil fanatics</h2>
<p>Under this scenario countries infrastructure developments in the region remain untransformed. </p>
<p>Non-tariff barriers remain stubbornly in place. Regional trade suffers from inadequate infrastructure and bureaucratic processes at borders. More local and international businesses close due to low demand. Member states and citizens are left to fend for themselves. And many member states adopt protectionist policies to prevent economic refugees from entering pockets of growth with employment potential. </p>
<p>A hobo protectionist mentality is adopted. This is a defensive policy to shield a country’s businesses from foreign competition. Tariffs and quotas are imposed on imported goods and services. Short-sighted politicians try to develop and foster domestic industries. But capacity constraints reinforce regional poverty. </p>
<p>Politicians collude with corrupt individuals and sophisticated organisations to create patronage networks by selling access to state infrastructure development. Regional democracies and institutions are weakened through corrupt rackets and the strong political will for corrupt activities. </p>
<p>The illusion of steps towards sustainable and resilient infrastructure is created. But the sole purpose is to secure networks of patronage. Infrastructure assets are in the hands of shadow state actors.</p>
<h2>Exploitative infrastructure</h2>
<p>Under this scenario there are low levels of policy reform and political will. This leaves the private sector and citizens to develop decentralised infrastructure solutions. Examples include green, off-grid energy and new technology water and sanitation models. </p>
<p>The private sector drives practical models to reach distant townships and rural areas. For their part, governments resist development because the cost of last-mile solutions is prohibitive. </p>
<p>Citizens flock to flourishing regions where corporations become quasi-state actors. </p>
<p>New innovations, products and models are rolled out by climate-conscious oligarchs in isolation. There’s no overarching policy, regulatory governance and institutional frameworks. The result is the creation of monopolies. </p>
<p>New technological developments help to drive better designed infrastructure assets. But merger and acquisition systems don’t exist because they are in the hands of oligarchs. These individuals hold more political power than many individual countries. The unencumbered oligarchs take de facto control of infrastructure assets due to weak regional and national institutional guidance and governance.</p>
<h2>Building backwards</h2>
<p>Under this scenario owners of fossil-powered infrastructure refuse to relinquish control. This happens despite government efforts to transform through policy reform. There is no adoption of practical models to develop climate-resilient infrastructure that will reach distant townships and rural areas. This is partly due to prohibitive costs. </p>
<p>Governments promote innovative, green, off-grid energy and water and sanitation. But citizens and private players consider these too expensive. The result is increased inequality. </p>
<p>Education systems emphasise old curriculum approaches. There is a high supply of old-economy jobs and skills. But employers don’t need traditional skills. This leads to massive unemployment. </p>
<p>Various developments tip the scales towards robotics. Corporations employ robots, leaving governments with a useless class of workers.</p>
<h2>Next steps</h2>
<p>To achieve the preferable scenarios and divert the unpreferable ones, member states should start by focusing on greater regional interconnectedness and collaboration. And on improving their ability to discover new possibilities for innovation, resilience, and preparedness for future global shocks. </p>
<p>Education systems should implement new economy skills development. Examples include digital modalities, green skills coupled with creativity, complex problem solving, people management and critical thinking skills.</p>
<p>Regional trade and value chains should be encouraged. The <a href="https://au.int/en/cfta">African Continental Free Trade Area</a> presents a unique opportunity for intra-regional collaboration. In particular, for eliminating non-tariff barriers. </p>
<p>There should also be more collaboration between the regional body’s secretariat and member state ministries, academia, and the private sector.</p>
<p>Member states should reverse the trend away from the self-interests of leaders and national protectionism. They should use their collective economic power to transform the networked nature of infrastructure assets to create more cooperative and resilient economies. </p>
<p>This will change the narrative of African states relying on foreign investment and financial aid where the opportunity costs exceed the economic value in the long term.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/186516/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lesley Wentworth and SAIIA gratefully acknowledge the support and funding received from the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung for this publication. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dr Deon Cloete and SAIIA gratefully acknowledge the support and funding received from the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung for this publication.</span></em></p>Countries in southern Africa should start focusing on greater regional interconnectedness and collaboration.Lesley Wentworth, Managing Director, University of KwaZulu-NatalDeon Cloete, Head SAIIA Futures Programme, South African Institute of International AffairsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1855422022-07-04T13:28:13Z2022-07-04T13:28:13ZLesotho due to hold elections despite lack of progress on key political reforms<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/471817/original/file-20220630-17-3f141a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A woman votes in Lesotho's 2017 national election. New elections are due in October. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Gianluigi Guercia/AFP via Gettty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Lesotho is due to hold national elections in <a href="https://lestimes.com/polls-on-mid-october-iec/">mid-October</a>. The polls were expected to be held under a new constitutional regime resulting from a reform process that started in 2012. But, the process has not yielded much fruit. </p>
<p>There’s widespread consensus – locally and internationally – that the constitutional kingdom of about 2.2 million must reform its political system to overcome recurrent political instability. But successive governments have failed to bring about the necessary changes. </p>
<p>Now, with parliament legally required to dissolve by 14 July 2022 and elections held within three months, there is simply no time to undertake and complete the reforms. So, Basotho look set to vote without the much-needed political changes, at least the important ones. </p>
<p>The proposed reforms that have not been passed by parliament pertain to the excessive powers of the prime minister, unprofessional media, politicised security agencies and judiciary, parliament and the formation of government.</p>
<h2>The reasons for reforms</h2>
<p>The biggest deficiency of Lesotho’s political system is that the prime minister wields excessive powers.</p>
<p>These deficiencies became apparent with the advent of fragile coalition politics in 2012. In 2014 to 2015, the then prime minister, Thomas Thabane, capriciously replaced the chief justice, the president of the court of appeal as well as the leadership of the security agencies.</p>
<p>He also <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2014-06-19-parliament-suspended-amid-fears-of-a-coup-in-lesotho/">prorogued parliament</a> and changed most of the senior personnel of the civil service. Consequently, calls for reform grew louder while disagreements in the then tripartite coalition became pronounced. </p>
<p>The then deputy prime minister, Mothejoa Metsing’s party, <a href="https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/286041994.pdf">Lesotho Congress for Democracy</a>, withdrew its support for Thabane’s government. The government, which was formed through a hairbreadth majority in parliament – <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/abs/10.10520/EJC183723">collapsed in 2015</a>.</p>
<p>A new government was elected, led by Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/cnews-us-lesotho-election-idCAKBN0MD1S220150317">in 2015</a>. It made the reforms its main agenda. But it didn’t have a clear process for executing the reform programme. Instead, it was consumed by the assassination of the then commander of the Lesotho Defence Force, <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2015-06-29-killing-of-former-lesotho-army-chief-deepens-instability">Maaparankoe Mahao</a>, in June 2015 by rogue army operatives. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/lesotho-cant-afford-incremental-changes-to-its-constitution-it-needs-a-complete-overhaul-140747">Lesotho can't afford incremental changes to its constitution: it needs a complete overhaul</a>
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<p>The country was thrown into instability, culminating in the Southern African Development Community establishing a <a href="http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2015/sadc0706.htm">commission of inquiry in July 2015</a> to investigate the death and related matters. A key recommendation of the commission was that the country undertake a comprehensive constitutional reform programme. </p>
<p>Mosisili’s government made reforms <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/sites/www.un.org.africarenewal/files/70_LS_en.pdf">one of its key objectives</a>. But the government failed to make any meaningful progress until it <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/3/1/pakalitha-mosisili-loses-parliament-vote">collapsed in 2017</a>.</p>
<h2>Fresh attempts at reform</h2>
<p>A new government was elected in 2017, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/6/16/thomas-thabane-sworn-in-as-lesothos-prime-minister">led by Prime Minister Thabane</a> for the second time. There was renewed vigour to execute the reforms programme. The government proposed the National Reform Commission Bill of 2018 to parliament to establish an executive-based commission to <a href="https://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/lesotho-commended-signing-reforms-agreement">implement the reforms</a>. </p>
<p>The bill never became law as it was greatly criticised by civil society and other stakeholders because government had <a href="http://www.lcn.org.ls/news/REFORM%20PROCESS.pdf">designed the process unilaterally</a>. A much more consultative approach was taken in 2018 when the first <a href="https://www.sadc.int/files/5515/4384/2128/Multi-Stakeholders_National_Dialogue_Communique_pdf.pdf">muti-stakeholder dialogue</a> was organised. This resulted in the enactment of the <a href="https://www.ls.undp.org/content/lesotho/en/home/news-centre/articles/The-Lesotho-National-Reforms-Bill-to-safeguarding-and-insulate-Lesotho-Reforms-Process-passed.html">National Reforms Dialogue Act</a>.</p>
<p>The law established the National Leaders’ Forum and the National Dialogue Planning Committee to organise the second national dialogue on the <a href="http://www.lcn.org.ls/Resource/MSND%20Plenary%20II%20Report.pdf">content and process of the reforms</a>.
The second Multi-Stakeholder National Dialogue was held <a href="http://www.lcn.org.ls/Resource/MSND%20Plenary%20II%20Report.pdf">in November 2019</a>, after which the National Reforms Authority Act of 2019 was enacted.</p>
<p>The act established the <a href="https://nra.org.ls/">National Reforms Authority (NRA)</a>. The NRA was responsible for implementing the broad and often vague <a href="http://www.lcn.org.ls/Resource/MSND%20Plenary%20II%20Report.pdf">decisions of the Multi-Stakeholder National Dialogue</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-lesotho-can-teach-eswatini-and-south-africa-about-key-political-reforms-184260">What Lesotho can teach Eswatini and South Africa about key political reforms</a>
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<p>The process suffered a setback in 2020 after Prime Minister Thabane resigned, following allegations that he was implicated in the murder of his ex-wife, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-52707752">Lipolelo Thabane</a>. A new prime minister, Moeketsi Majoro, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/5/20/moeketsi-majoro-sworn-in-as-lesothos-new-prime-minister">was sworn in</a>. The reform programme continued under the stewardship of the National Reforms Authority.</p>
<p>However, the reforms authority exceeded its statutory lifespan without getting a single change to the constitution approved by parliament. Before its disbandment in <a href="https://sundayexpress.co.ls/nra-challenges-dissolution/">April 2022</a>, the reforms authority had completed proposed constitutional changes – the <a href="https://publiceyenews.com/parties-pledge-to-salvage-reforms-bills/">11th Amendment to the Constitution Bill 2022 </a>.</p>
<p>The so-called Omnibus Bill that is now before parliament is not perfect. But it promises to arrest some of the longstanding constitutional problems. These include the excessive powers of the prime minister, a judiciary that is controlled by the executive, politicised security agencies and a weak parliament.</p>
<h2>Implications of failure</h2>
<p>Despite the hype about passing the Omnibus Bill <a href="https://publiceyenews.com/parties-pledge-to-salvage-reforms-bills/">before the election</a>, it is almost certain that parliament will not have passed all the changes by its dissolution in mid-July. It is, therefore, expected that the country will hold election under the old political design.</p>
<p>The main hurdle is that the majority of critical provisions in the bill seek to amend the entrenched provisions of the constitution. These include changes on the judiciary, parliament and security. These provisions need a two-thirds majority in both houses of parliament – Senate and the National Assembly. Some changes even require a referendum. </p>
<p>Given the improbability of especially the entrenched provisions being amended before parliament is dissolved, what then? </p>
<p>An option is to cherry-pick and pass the amendments that need a simple majority vote. But, that may not make any meaningful impact. Most of the problematic provisions of the constitution are entrenched. </p>
<p>The only viable option, albeit regrettable, is that parliament must avoid tampering with the Omnibus Bill, and wait for the new parliament after the elections to resuscitate the entire reform programme.</p>
<h2>Why reforms always fail in Lesotho</h2>
<p>This latest false start on reforms indicates that Lesotho is struggling to implement much-needed constitutional changes. The country has had five governments in 10 years. Every time a government collapses, the reform programme follows suit. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-efforts-to-stabilise-lesotho-have-failed-less-intervention-may-be-more-effective-137499">South Africa's efforts to stabilise Lesotho have failed. Less intervention may be more effective</a>
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<p>Another major cause of regular failure is the lack of clarity about the process of reforms. While there is some consensus about the broad areas for reform – parliament, the constitution, judiciary, civil service, security and media – there is a lack of clarity and consensus about the process of undertaking such thoroughgoing changes to the constitution.</p>
<p>The fact that the Omnibus Bill is now held up in parliament is emblematic of a lack of clear process. There was no plan about how different changes, including changes to the entrenched provisions of the constitution, would be undertaken.</p>
<h2>Where to from here?</h2>
<p>Now that the National Reforms Authority has been disbanded, and parliament has failed to pass the Omnibus Bill, it means the next election will be held under the old legal framework. Then after elections, yet another government will be expected to reinvigorate the reforms.</p>
<p>When the new programme starts after election, the country must pay particular attention to the process as previous attempts at reform were undermined by, among other factors, a poor process.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/185542/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hoolo 'Nyane was the consultant for the National Reforms Authority(NRA) during the drafting of the Omnibus Bill.</span></em></p>The country has had five governments in 10 years. Every time a government collapses, the reform programme follows suit.Hoolo 'Nyane, Head of Department, Public and Environmental Law Department, University of LimpopoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1842602022-06-09T13:55:02Z2022-06-09T13:55:02ZWhat Lesotho can teach Eswatini and South Africa about key political reforms<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466793/original/file-20220602-22-zj686t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Basotho men wearing the traditional blankets during the annual horse race held on the king's birthday. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Two southern African countries, South Africa and Eswatini, are undergoing important reforms. South Africa is reviewing its <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-is-ripe-for-electoral-reform-why-its-time-might-have-come-157149">electoral system</a> while Eswatini is revisiting the powers of the monarch through a <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-11-15-the-king-is-still-bent-on-determining-the-tone-and-character-of-national-dialogue-in-eswatini/">national dialogue</a>. </p>
<p>South Africa and Eswatini can look to Lesotho for lessons. It’s a fellow member of the <a href="https://www.sadc.int/member-states/">Southern African Development Community</a> and has grappled with these issues for decades. The three countries share geographic, historical and economic ties. </p>
<p>The kingdom of Lesotho returned to electoral politics in 1993, after a long haul of <a href="https://www.eisa.org/wep/lesoverview6.htm">dictatorship capped by a military junta</a>. Since then, it has experienced <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10246029.1998.9627833?journalCode=rasr20">mutinies</a>, <a href="https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ_French/journals_E/Volume-08_Issue-3/benyera_e.pdf">coups</a> and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02589001.2020.1749246">electoral violence</a>. </p>
<p>The advent of tumultuous <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/lesotho-after-may-2012-general-elections-making-the-coalition-work">coalition politics in 2012</a> laid bare the longstanding problems associated with the prime minister’s excessive powers. He compromised the security forces, the judiciary, civil service and even parliament, thereby <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00083968.2020.1834418">fuelling instability</a>.</p>
<p>The Southern African Development Community has intervened in Lesotho in <a href="https://www.eisa.org/pdf/JAE14.2Weisfelder.pdf">almost every electoral cycle</a>. Its interventions have ranged from diplomatic to <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/abs/10.10520/EJC16147">military</a>. The country is now effectively under the trusteeship of the regional bloc as it sails through a turbulent reform programme. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, there are certain aspects that Lesotho has handled quite well. Its successes offer lessons for other states that are undergoing reforms in similar areas. </p>
<p>First, it has made its electoral system more inclusive. Second, it has curbed the powers of the monarch in a constitutional democracy. </p>
<h2>South Africa’s electoral system</h2>
<p>South Africa faces a critical period in its electoral history. The country is <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/bill/2300397">reviewing its electoral system</a> in the light of a debate that has raged since pre-constitution negotiations in the 1990s. The <a href="https://eisa.org/pdf/JAE2.1.pdf#page=76">contest</a> is between the proponents of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/proportional-representation">proportional representation</a>, and those favouring a <a href="https://www.etu.org.za/toolbox/docs/govern/elections.html">constituency-based</a> electoral system.</p>
<p>Under proportional representation, candidates contest elections as party candidates – not as individuals. In parliament, the <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/ajcr/article/view/39377/30302">representatives occupy proportional seats allocated to parties</a>.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.etu.org.za/toolbox/docs/govern/elections.html">constituency-based electoral system</a> divides a country into relatively equal territorial units called constituencies. The system is often credited with <a href="https://www.eisa.org/pdf/faure.pdf">increased accountability</a> to the voters by their representatives. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/constitutional-court-ruling-heralds-changes-to-south-africas-electoral-system-140668">Constitutional Court ruling heralds changes to South Africa's electoral system</a>
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<p>South Africa’s <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/saconstitution-web-eng.pdf">constitution</a> envisages an electoral system “that results, in general, in proportional representation”. The country has used this system for national and provincial elections since 1994.</p>
<p>But arguments over it have never been settled. Occasionally, the Constitutional Court is asked to intervene. </p>
<p>Its first major intervention was in 2002. The court had to decide whether floor-crossing – MPs switching parties – was in keeping with a proportional representation system. It found that floor-crossing at national, provincial and local government levels was <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2002/33media.pdf">consistent with the constitution</a>. </p>
<p>The second time was in 2020. Independent candidates had not been seen as having a place in an electoral system based on proportional representation of political parties. Then the court was asked to decide whether excluding independent candidates from contesting national and provincial elections <a href="https://theconversation.com/constitutional-court-ruling-heralds-changes-to-south-africas-electoral-system-140668">was constitutional</a>. </p>
<p>It decided that <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2020/11.html">excluding independents was unconstitutional</a>. This partly invalidated the <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/act73of1998.pdf">1998 Electoral Act</a>. The decision triggered a <a href="https://theconversation.com/constitutional-court-ruling-heralds-changes-to-south-africas-electoral-system-140668">search for an electoral system</a> that would allow independents to stand for election in an essentially proportional electoral system.</p>
<p>Lesotho grappled with the same questions following its <a href="http://journals.ufs.ac.za/index.php/jch/article/download/4110/3694">controversial 1998 elections</a>. In 2001, it adopted a <a href="https://www.academia.edu/download/72989383/j.electstud.2003.12.00520211017-17059-u63y2z.pdf">“mixed member proportional”</a> system, the <a href="https://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/es/annex/esy/esy_ls">first country in Africa</a> to do so. </p>
<p>It remains a species of proportional electoral system, but permits individuals to stand in constituencies, either as independents or sponsored by political parties. As a result, some MPs are elected as constituency representatives, others as proportional representatives of political parties. The system has performed relatively well. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://lesotholii.org/ls/legislation/act/2001/4/ls_amend_4th_2001_og.pdf">fourth amendment to the constitution of Lesotho</a> of 2001 can come in handy for the conversation <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/Bills/2022/B1_2022_Electoral_Amendment_Bill/B1_2022_Electoral_Amendment_Bill.pdf">under way in the South African parliament</a> regarding electoral reform. </p>
<p>The lesson is that independent candidates can be allowed to stand for elections in a system that results, by and large, in proportional representation as required by section 46 of the <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/saconstitution-web-eng.pdf">constitution</a>. </p>
<h2>Eswatini’s monarchy</h2>
<p>The most recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-lies-behind-uprisings-in-eswatini-the-unfinished-business-of-democratic-reform-171844">wave of discontent</a> in Eswatini reignited calls to reduce the powers of the only remaining absolute monarch in Africa. The king’s place in Eswatini’s democracy has been an issue since <a href="https://lib.ugent.be/catalog/ebk01:4100000009375057">independence from Britain in 1968</a>. At independence, the <a href="https://oxcon.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:ocw/law-ocw-cd19.regGroup.1/law-ocw-cd19#law-ocw-cd19-miscMatter-1">constitution</a> provided for a constitutional monarch along the lines of Lesotho’s. </p>
<p>The independence constitutions of both countries were cast in <a href="https://academic.oup.com/pa/article-abstract/36/2/218/1532256">classical Westminster moulds</a>. But, hardly five years into independence, in 1973, <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/national-orders/recipient/king-sobhuza-ii-1899-1982">King Sobhuza II</a> of Swaziland (now Eswatini) suspended the constitution and claimed <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10246029.2003.9627233?journalCode=rasr20">absolute powers</a>. This is still the position despite the new <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/abs/10.10520/EJC53235">constitution of 2005</a>. The king has unlimited executive powers and political parties are prohibited. </p>
<p>Discontent over the king’s powers has been growing. There is now agreement in Eswatini that there must be <a href="https://www.google.co.za/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwjhmqL4j474AhULXsAKHbSUAHsQwqsBegQIAhAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3D1M9EAOyMJgA&usg=AOvVaw3rKTXbS1bmmWTJG_24fKfW">candid dialogue</a> about the king’s powers, and greater democratisation. The <a href="https://www.sadc.int/news-events/news/statement-chairperson-sadc-organ-politics-defence-and-security-cooperation-his-excellency-matamela-cyril-ramaphosa-president-rep/">Southern African Development Community</a> is facilitating the dialogue. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-monarch-in-lesotho-should-be-given-some-powers-but-not-extreme-powers-165914">The monarch in Lesotho should be given some powers: but not extreme powers</a>
</strong>
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<p>Lesotho has been grappling with the question of the king’s powers since pre-independence negotiations. Temptations to have an executive monarch have occasionally thrown the country into <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-monarch-in-lesotho-should-be-given-some-powers-but-not-extreme-powers-165914">turmoil</a>. But it is now generally accepted that executive powers must vest in the democratically elected prime minister. The monarchy is <a href="http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S2225-71602020000100011">ceremonial</a>.</p>
<p>Politicians have run Lesotho into many constitutional problems, but at least voters can replace them periodically. The monarch is cherished but within a democratic system based on multi-partyism. The people of Eswatini do not have this under an absolute monarchy.</p>
<p>The usual tendency to look to Europe and elsewhere to solve problems in Africa is not always helpful. This may be an opportune moment to find <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26890401?casa_token=18Uxn8Ll5WIAAAAA:xmqDg7YoIPrBXRUs1JN-wscLp124zhjdaZdAW3oE1nnHXHO5mTbuwu7qsjNm0mV_L3QJpUF9VCpCL9ER9Ge8DkgWWqPEBH8GYF_HAQJIEVkKxYVejjs9">African solutions to African problems</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/184260/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hoolo 'Nyane does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Lesotho has done a good job of curbing the powers of its monarch and making its electoral system inclusive.Hoolo 'Nyane, Head of Department, Public and Environmental Law Department, University of LimpopoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1747202022-01-16T07:20:23Z2022-01-16T07:20:23ZAfrican countries are stuck on the free movement of people. How to break the logjam<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/440252/original/file-20220111-17-eh047t.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">African countries are still fixated on individual economic interests</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons/Flickr</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Most African countries signed onto the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36403-treaty-protocol_on_free_movement_of_persons_in_africa_e.pdf">Free Movement of Persons protocol</a> in Addis Ababa in January 2018. Its <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36403-treaty-protocol_on_free_movement_of_persons_in_africa_e.pdf">rationale</a> was set out clearly: the free movement of people – as well as capital goods and services – would promote integration and herald in a host of other benefits. These included improving science, technology, education, research and fostering tourism. </p>
<p>In addition, it would facilitate inter-African trade and investment, increase remittances within the continent, promote the mobility of labour, create employment and improve the standards of living.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep29589?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">Research supports</a> the developmental premises of the protocol. </p>
<p>The protocol was the codification of the commitment to free movement made by African countries in declaring the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/37636-treaty-0016_-_treaty_establishing_the_african_economic_community_e.pdf">establishment of the African Economic Community</a> in Abuja in 1991. Free movement is also one of the key goals for <a href="https://www.africa.undp.org/content/rba/en/home/blog/2015/10/23/he-Sustainable-Development-Goals-and-the-African-Union-s-Agenda-2063-A-comparative-analysis.html?utm_source=EN&utm_medium=GSR&utm_content=US_UNDP_PaidSearch_Brand_English&utm_campaign=CENTRAL&c_src=CENTRAL&c_src2=GSR&gclid=Cj0KCQiA8vSOBhCkARIsAGdp6RRNJIhm8dz7g2h6MMUakU9G7sGDwb0CZMQtEA4bnNNA1QEC9Tv6VRkaAihJEALw_wcB">Africa’s Agenda 2063</a>. </p>
<p>And yet, four years after its ratification, only a handful of relatively small African states have fully ratified the Free Persons protocol. Over 30 countries signed the protocol in January 2018. But only Rwanda, Niger, São Tomé and Principe, and Mali have fully ratified it.</p>
<p>In 2018 <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-free-movement-of-people-is-an-au-ambition-whats-standing-in-its-way-100409">I noted</a>, that driving the protocol forward would not be straightforward. Unfortunately, progress has been slower than most observers expected at the time. It has become a real concern for African policymakers. </p>
<p>After <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2021.2007788">recent research</a>, including fieldwork in Africa and Europe on the slow progress of the protocol, I identified some revealing patterns in policymaking and implementation. After reflection it is possible to make some suggestions about how to move the process forward.</p>
<h2>Slow progress</h2>
<p>It is striking that there have been significant advances towards free movement by many African countries on a unilateral basis. This has been as a result of a range of innovative visa-openness and travel document solutions being adopted. But most of the countries at the vanguard of this movement are relatively poor, or small island states. </p>
<p>For example, Benin and Seychelles offer visa-free access to all African visitors with appropriate travel documents. The two are listed as the most liberal African countries according to the <a href="https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/2019-visa-openness-index-report">2019 Visa Openness Index</a> of the African Development Bank.</p>
<p>Senegal and Rwanda have a combination of visa-free access and visa on arrival policies for all Africans. Comoros, Madagascar and Somalia offer visa on arrival policies for all Africans.</p>
<p>Richer and larger African countries are the laggards in opening their borders. </p>
<p>Some regional economic communities, such as the East African Community and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), have strong multilateral border opening agreements. But these are unevenly implemented.</p>
<p>In other regions, notably the Southern African Development Community (SADC), there’s been a heavier reliance on bilateral agreements within multilateral frameworks.</p>
<p>The reluctance of many African countries, especially the larger, richer countries, derives from several concerns. </p>
<p>The first is that they are sensitive to citizens who fear that foreigners might take their economic opportunities. This issue is especially present in highly unequal countries where populist politicians can stir up emotions. </p>
<h2>What needs to be done</h2>
<p>In my view, the threat of xenophobic mobilisation can be reduced if legitimate concerns are addressed.</p>
<p>For <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2019/12/05/african-countries-are-struggling-to-build-robust-identity-systems">example</a>, many countries in Africa have inadequate systems of civil registration. Many also have inadequate identity documentation systems. This makes it difficult for home countries of migrants to vouch for their citizens to the satisfaction of host countries.</p>
<p>When it comes to data on criminal and security issues, it’s important that information is well-managed and shared with partner countries when necessary. There should also be agreement on repatriation processes.</p>
<p>All these concerns are opportunities for cooperation. Systems can be developed in collaboration between countries, and officials trained in poorer countries. This should ideally be as part of regional or continental processes.</p>
<p>At present it seems easier to move forward on a regional basis than at a continental level. Smaller groupings seem to be able to move forward more easily. Where there is regional leadership and consistent internal or external support, progress can be made even in fragile states. </p>
<p>Slow progress in the adoption of the continental free movement protocol may be due to misunderstandings or concerns about the implementation process. Some key stakeholders believe that the protocol is not sufficiently understood and that publicising and championing it will lead to more ratifications.</p>
<p>My view, however, is that the implementation process set out in the implementation roadmap which accompanied the protocol isn’t clear. Clarification and practical commitment to address some of the underlying concerns is more likely to take the process forward.</p>
<p>In addition, free movement across the continent could be promoted by encouraging regional groupings – and even ad hoc groupings – to move forward, even if they are moving ahead of other countries. </p>
<p>When groups of countries agree to move forward together within the framework of the protocol, they should be expected to mutually open their borders when the preconditions are met. Reasonable preconditions could be specified in a revised roadmap or implementation guide.</p>
<p>Another strategy for driving the process forward, as suggested <a href="https://ecdpm.org/talking-points/connecting-people-markets-africa-2021/">recently</a> , is that the free movement process could be more explicitly and organisationally linked to the free trade process. </p>
<p>In addition, the initiative needs a proactive process to enable poorer countries on the continent to progressively meet the preconditions for higher levels of integration at appropriate standards. This would entail the establishment of technical committees of senior officials of the member states and experts from the region at both the regional and continental levels to address issues holding the free movement project back. </p>
<p>It would also require setting out a process to support poorer countries in achieving agreed preconditions for integration. </p>
<p>There are already several initiatives around foundational prerequisites – such as civil registration and identity documents – that could be harnessed. An example is the <a href="https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/325451527084344478-0190022018/original/ID4DProgramFlyerV52018.pdf">World Bank’s ‘Identification for Development</a>’. </p>
<p>Another is the EU’s work on migration management in Africa. This could be extended beyond its preoccupation with emigration to Europe. </p>
<p>But to be a part of a credible continental strategy, the initiatives should be led and owned by African countries and regional organisations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/174720/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alan Hirsch received a Bradlow Fellowship through the South African Institute of International Affairs which allowed him to undertake the research on which this article is based.</span></em></p>African countries are struggling to implement the African Union’s protocol on free movement four years after its ratification.Alan Hirsch, Professor and Director of The Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1661382021-08-29T07:49:22Z2021-08-29T07:49:22ZMozambique insurgency: focus needs to shift to preventing criminality at sea<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/418068/original/file-20210826-6524-fyv73z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mozambican soldiers on patrol in Palma,
Cabo Delgado, following the terrorist attack in March.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Joas Relvas</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The insurgency in the Cabo Delgado province of Mozambique has been placed firmly in the international spotlight since radicals linked to Islamic State launched their audacious attack on the town of Palma <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-mozambique-insurgency-pemba-idUSKBN2BS0R4">in March</a>, killing over 50 people.</p>
<p>A large <a href="https://www.africa-press.net/mozambique/all-news/mozambique-nyusi-confirms-arrival-of-rwandan-forces-in-cabo-delgado-watch">Rwandan military and police contingent</a> and <a href="https://clubofmozambique.com/news/tanzania-air-force-freighter-unloads-military-logistics-at-pemba-airport-noticias-198278/">troops from the Southern African Development Community (SADC)</a> have entered the theatre. These are helping Mozambique’s army and police to stem the tide and step up their act over the longer term.</p>
<p>There is also support from the <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/us-military-providing-additional-training-to-mozambican-armed-forces">US and the European Union</a>, largely in the form of training assistance. This adds to training support promised by Angola and Zimbabwe as part of the <a href="https://www.myzimbabwe.co.zw/news/64130-latest-on-deployment-of-zimbabwean-special-soldiers-in-mozambique-story-fresh-details-emerge.html">SADC contingent arriving in Cabo Delgado</a>. </p>
<p>But there’s a problem. </p>
<p>The combined military response against the insurgents is primarily on land, with very limited maritime response capabilities. But the insurgent threat is not limited to the interior. Insurgents stormed and held the port of Mocímboa da Praia in August 2020 and attacked communities on nearby <a href="https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-terrorists-attack-island-off-palma-coast-aim-report-171133/">islands off Palma, halting its tourism flows</a>.</p>
<p>The fixation on landward efforts ignores the fact that the insurgency also poses a maritime threat. Significantly, the insurgency has hobbled the energy sector. This was set to make Mozambique an important global energy player following the discovery of <a href="https://www.africanglobe.net/business/oil-gas-discoveries-mozambique">large offshore gas fields</a>. The discoveries hold regional and global implications. Mozambique could well become a gas emirate in southern Africa, and bringing the industry on line could propel Mozambique into the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/03/africa/mozambique-oil-and-gas-hub/index.html">top seven global gas producing countries</a>. </p>
<p>These optimistic outlooks all depend on whether Mozambique can contain the impact of the ongoing violent insurgency in Cabo Delgado. This precondition extends offshore.</p>
<h2>Maritime security</h2>
<p>Mozambique’s future economy relies heavily on maintaining a safe offshore domain. To this end the government must make use of every opportunity to build the required <a href="https://africabriefing.org/2019/08/an-analysis-of-mozambiques-maritime-security/">capacity and partnerships</a> to maintain the rule of law at sea.</p>
<p>Bringing gas production on line has been severely disrupted because of the insurgency. Much of the landward activity and construction of infrastructure has come to a standstill.</p>
<p>In April, <a href="https://totalenergies.com/media/news/press-releases/total-declares-force-majeure-mozambique-lng-project">Totalenergies</a>, the French energy multinational, declared a force majeure. This was after the insurgents occupied and held the port of Mocímboa da Praia in 2020 and attacked Palma early in 2021. </p>
<p>The port is of significance for the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53756692">delivery of goods by sea and air</a> for the construction projects under way to develop onshore infrastructure in support of the gas industry. It has since been reclaimed by the <a href="https://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/africa/mozambican-rwandan-forces-retake-port-town-from-insurgents/">Mozambique and Rwandan forces</a>. But given how risk perception unfolds, construction remains stalled. </p>
<p>In my view Mozambique’s ocean territories must receive due attention for three reasons. These are: events on land spilling offshore, perceptions of dangerous seas off Mozambique, and criminality at sea left unchecked.</p>
<h2>Cost of insecurity at sea</h2>
<p>First, insecurity on land has maritime repercussions. This is the reality in the waters off Somalia, Nigeria, Libya and Yemen. Weak security governance on land affects the maritime economy, with shipping and resource extraction particularly vulnerable. </p>
<p>This land and sea interplay is a potential risk facing Mozambique’s decision-makers.</p>
<p>Second, perceptions of dangers in the waters off Mozambique hold negative repercussions. This is even more so if international measures are implemented to mitigate a threat to shipping. A <a href="https://maritimecyprus.com/2015/12/18/anti-piracy-update-updated-chart-for-hra-available-to-download/">high risk area</a> at sea akin to those off Somalia and Nigeria directs shipping to take preventive actions. This has multiple knock-on effects.</p>
<p>Higher insurance costs are incured; shipping must follow longer routes, increasing the cost of doing business; private security personnel are often taken on; and the safety and livelihoods of crews are at higher risk. All this is evident in the demarcated danger zone now operational off Nigeria. </p>
<p>Third, the waters off Cabo Delgado must not be allowed to become a playground for criminals to enter and exploit. If ungoverned, this sea space offers the potential for criminal syndicates and insurgents to prosper side by side. </p>
<h2>Connecting the dots: five risks to mitigate</h2>
<p>The insurgency has resulted in or compounded the following problems: </p>
<p><strong>Transnational criminal syndicates:</strong> These already operate into Cabo Delgado. If weak governance on land is mirrored at sea, syndicates become dangerous competitors, and even more so if allied with insurgent elements as in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.</p>
<p><strong>Illegal oil trafficking:</strong> Energy infrastructure for gas and oil are difficult to take over. Nevertheless illegal oil trafficking from <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/6/26/libya-calls-on-un-to-block-illegal-oil-sale">rebel-held territories in the east of Libya</a> shows how brazen non-state actors can take over or infiltrate energy infrastructure and port facilities and use this to join an illegal industry.</p>
<p><strong>Attacks on infrastructure and shipping at sea:</strong> Sri Lanka provides a good example. The Sea Tiger wing of the insurgent movement <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2007/6/11/sri-lanka-battles-tigers-at-sea">Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam</a> <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2007/6/11/sri-lanka-battles-tigers-at-sea">attacked</a> Sri Lanka’s navy with suicide vessels for several years. </p>
<p><strong>Drone attacks:</strong> The <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/gulf-shipping-attacks-leave-global-economy-vulnerable-trade/">recent drone attack</a> on a commercial vessel passing through the Gulf of Oman, with Yemen and Iranian connections, must also serve as a warning. There have been allegations of the presence of <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/aerospace/unmanned-aerial-vehicles/iss-drones-in-the-hands-of-insurgents-how-africa-can-prepare/#:%7E:text=In%20the%20Democratic%20Republic%20of%20the%20Congo%2C%20insurgents,drones%20for%20precision%20targeting%20in%20Cabo%20Delgado%20province">drones in Cabo Delgado</a>.</p>
<p><strong>Drug smuggling:</strong> Insecurity at sea off Cabo Delgado carries the risk of compounding the problem posed by <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202006080902.html">drug smuggling networks</a> operating in the area. No effort should be spared to prevent the insurgents and the smugglers cooperating.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Children attend a class sitting on the ground under a tree." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/418072/original/file-20210826-15-1qcut5m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/418072/original/file-20210826-15-1qcut5m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418072/original/file-20210826-15-1qcut5m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418072/original/file-20210826-15-1qcut5m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418072/original/file-20210826-15-1qcut5m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418072/original/file-20210826-15-1qcut5m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418072/original/file-20210826-15-1qcut5m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Displaced children in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, learn under a tree.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Joao Relvas</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Overall, the tactics I’ve outlined call for a comprehensive response, one most probably beyond anything the Mozambique authorities can mobilise on their own. </p>
<p>Some small steps with a maritime focus have taken place.</p>
<p>Two small, lightly armed <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/sandf-equipment-spotted-in-mozambique/#:%7E:text=In%20addition%20to%20vehicles%20on%20land%2C%20naval%20vessels,Development%20Community%E2%80%99s%20intervention%20brigade%20%28SADC%20Mission%20in%20Mozambique%29.">South African naval patrol vessels</a> arrived in Pemba harbour for patrols off Cabo Delgado.</p>
<p>A training team from the <a href="https://www.unodc.org/unodc/frontpage/2021/August/unodc-and-mozambique-cooperate-to-promote-maritime-security.html">United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</a> recently arrived to help train maritime personnel from Mozambique to increase maritime security governance.</p>
<p>The Rwandan military contingent includes a <a href="https://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Rwandan-Mozambican-forces-retake-port-from-16374076.php">limited small boat capability</a> to extend their presence off the coast, albeit only near harbour patrols. </p>
<p>Fourth – in recapturing Mocímboa da Praia from the insurgents in early August 2021, the operation included a <a href="https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-most-important-mission-yet-to-come-says-army-commander-aim-198891/">surprise attack by a small contingent of Mozambique soldiers from the sea</a>. </p>
<h2>Looking forward: what needs to happen</h2>
<p>The maritime situation in Mozambique must not be allowed to emulate the maritime threats found off Nigeria, Somalia and the rebel-held territories in Libya. Allowing this would hold dire implications for international shipping and subsequently for Mozambique and the landlocked countries in the region. </p>
<p>It is precisely this threat that underscored <a href="https://pmg.org.za/committee-question/14632/">the need for cooperation</a> between South Africa, Mozambique and Tanzania to prevent piracy from gaining a foothold in Mozambique. Ongoing maritime operations between South Africa and Mozambique also need to be maintained.</p>
<p>Cooperation with a wide array of partners to promote maritime security governance over the longer term must remain a priority. This is a long term objective to be addressed in the context of the current armed insurgency, and sustained beyond the present volatility. </p>
<p>Stability on land and at sea must be addressed simultaneously.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://news.africa.com/south-african-military-deploys-troops-to-pemba-northern-mozambique-1635.html">South African Navy</a> and UN Office on Drugs and Crime are the first naval and capacity building respondents to arrive. But the SADC should seriously consider using its Standing Maritime Committee to assist Mozambique. The aim would be to bring about a formal regional arrangement for cooperation to secure regional economic and security interests in the southwestern Indian Ocean over the longer term.</p>
<p>Mozambique is in no position to contribute significantly to the broader array of maritime security endeavours. That’s why international partners need to play a role. </p>
<p>The SADC must now pass the acid test of stemming the insurgent threats from spilling over and threatening the region’s wider landward and maritime interests.</p>
<p>The intervention forces currently fighting the insurgents should extend their role offshore to prevent a collapse of security at sea off Mozambique or at the minimum, any such perception among the international maritime community.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/166138/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Francois Vreÿ receives funding from Stellenbosch University and the National Research Foundation.</span></em></p>The maritime situation in Mozambique must not be allowed to emulate the maritime threats found off Nigeria, Somalia, and the rebel-held territories in Libya.Francois Vreÿ, Research Coordinator, Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1659142021-08-24T14:16:00Z2021-08-24T14:16:00ZThe monarch in Lesotho should be given some powers: but not extreme powers<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/417444/original/file-20210823-23-pqrvtj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">King Letsie III of Lesotho. Frustration with politicians has led to a rise in popularity of the monarchy in recent times.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> CChris Jackson via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The kingdom of Lesotho has been marked by waves of <a href="https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/20.500.12413/6196/Khabele%20Matlosa.pdf;sequence=1">political instability</a> since independence from Britain in 1966. This has manifested in several forms – such as coups, mutinies, electoral disputes, forced exile of political opponents and assassinations. The most recent wave of instability, which necessitated the current long-running facilitation by the Southern African Development Community (SADC), was from <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/appraising-the-efficacy-of-sadc-in-resolving-the-2014-lesotho-conflict/">2014 to 2015</a>. </p>
<p>Now the country is discussing wide-ranging <a href="https://www.gov.ls/reforms/">constitutional reforms</a> with the aim of achieving lasting peace and stability. The reforms are locally led by the <a href="https://www.ls.undp.org/content/lesotho/en/home/news-centre/articles/The-Lesotho-National-Reforms-Bill-to-safeguarding-and-insulate-Lesotho-Reforms-Process-passed.html">National Reforms Authority</a> – a statutory body comprising several stakeholders such as political parties, government, civil society and other formations.</p>
<p>The reform process dates back to 2012 but gained momentum in 2015 as a result of the strong recommendation of the <a href="https://www.gov.ls/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/phumaphi-report_201602081514.pdf">SADC Commission of Inquiry</a> into the assassination of the former army commander, Lieutenant General Maaparankoe Mahao. There are <a href="https://www.gov.ls/reforms-forum-achieves-goal/">seven themes</a> to the reform programme. They entail a review of the constitution, parliament, public service, justice, security, economic and media. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/lesothos-new-leader-faces-enormous-hurdles-ensuring-peace-and-political-stability-139320">Lesotho's new leader faces enormous hurdles ensuring peace and political stability</a>
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<p>The reform process has once again raised the perennial question of the place of the monarch in the constitutional design. At present it’s mostly a ceremonial role. But recently there’s been a <a href="https://media.africaportal.org/documents/ad413-basotho_endorse_greater_role_for_traditional_leaders-afrobarometer_dispa_B4YDfRj.pdf">rise in popularity</a> of traditional leadership, and the monarch in particular, amid growing frustration with the elected leadership.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.gov.ls/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/EXPERT-REPORT-OF-CONSTITUTUIONAL-REFORMSFINAL-23-OCT-19.pdf">citizens’ voices</a> on the reforms suggest that people want the monarch to have more power - including the control of the army. This is a change from earlier <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/lwati/article/view/57490">trends</a>. </p>
<p>The reforms are a wholesale enterprise to review all the institutions in Lesotho, including the institution of the monarch. But, the extent to which the reforms can overhaul the entire design is a matter of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00083968.2020.1834418?journalCode=rcas20">intense discourse</a>. </p>
<h2>Traditional leadership</h2>
<p>After independence from Britain <a href="https://books.google.co.ls/books?hl=en&lr=&id=B2TWVN92hYYC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=Independence+of+Lesotho&ots=iQftFOeTWM&sig=OkpQYBbasG3b6S--auSdyiOa4pY&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=Independence%20of%20Lesotho&f=false">in 1966</a>, there was a steady decline in the power of traditional leadership in Lesotho. The powers of traditional leaders on key matters such as land allocation and dispensing of justice all dissipated. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.scielo.org.za/pdf/dejure/v53/11.pdf">1993 constitution</a> took away the little powers that the king had in terms of the 1966 constitution. He is now expected to act “on the advice” of the prime minister, cabinet or <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Lesotho_2011.pdf?lang=en">Council of State</a>. The real political power has drifted, almost entirely, to the cabinet and the prime minister in particular. </p>
<p>But not everyone wants <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/41231177.pdf?casa_token=G5L71YENm8sAAAAA:8JmPmKVKo1g7xlmn4XOluKUkVpzX78HN6d5561OdxIFeKsBI_JD8NPjkBx44vnWheCr97hFeDxu8tBQpnuthKu4p83JRG8XwB_l7nnv-Fbap96Y9n8E">the total abolition</a> of traditional leadership in Lesotho. The resilience of the monarch is arguably based on <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/112/448/353/124493">two pillars</a>. Firstly, the institution is still culturally embedded in the psyche of the society. Therefore, it still enjoys legitimacy. Secondly, the failure of democracy has led people to hope that other forms of government, like monarchism, can offer a better alternative. </p>
<h2>Failed democracy</h2>
<p>Lesotho’s constitutional democracy has not lived up to its lofty promises. Those who were chosen to represent the people have not performed any better <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/abs/10.10520/EJC46008?casa_token=Jy412EVkS4MAAAAA:E-lGNAyej1APF-OZOTSpMZI2lu0FqeWAyYMCqcy7qVPw05cFNyHHXbGcLoTKql28_ddV3GMwW7X8Bg">than the pre-existing traditional institutions</a>. The country’s <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/lesotho/overview">grinding poverty</a> and <a href="https://www.eisa.org/pdf/JAE14.2Weisfelder.pdf">political instability</a> continue.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-efforts-to-stabilise-lesotho-have-failed-less-intervention-may-be-more-effective-137499">South Africa's efforts to stabilise Lesotho have failed. Less intervention may be more effective</a>
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<p>Lesotho’s Auditor General always expresses <a href="http://www.auditgen.org.ls/images/OAG_Documents/AUDIT_CERTIFICATE_2016.pdf">disclaimer or adverse opinions</a> on government’s annual financial statements because of embezzlement and misappropriation, among other causes. Access to public office has been a <a href="https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/ldr-2018-0025/html">licence to loot state resources</a> and <a href="https://www.voanews.com/africa/lesotho-exiled-opposition-wants-sadc-intervention">torment political opponents</a>. </p>
<p>When citizens have an opportunity to rank politicians in surveys, they <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/publications/ad413-citizens-endorse-traditional-leaders-see-greater-role-contemporary-lesotho">show dissatisfaction</a>. </p>
<p>The recent rise in the popularity of traditional leadership is not due to its achievements but to the failure of democratically elected leadership.</p>
<h2>Power balance</h2>
<p>In view of this resurgence in the popularity of the monarch, the powers of the monarch in the constitution may change somewhat. That is if the reforms are genuinely consultative. </p>
<p>There is not necessarily anything inherently wrong with giving power to the monarch in a system based on the constitutional monarchy. It may even enhance the constitution when power is balanced between the monarch and liberal politicians. That will build in checks and balances.</p>
<p>But restoring some powers to the monarch should be considered extremely carefully. A monarch with absolute powers is just as dangerous as self-serving politicians in a democracy. </p>
<p>Fortunately, the current constitutional reform process in Lesotho happens against the backdrop of <a href="https://www.voanews.com/africa/pro-democracy-protests-continue-rock-eswatini">pro-democracy demonstrations</a> in eSwatini – the southern African region’s only absolute monarchy. </p>
<p>In eSwatini the king wields all the power and there is no political participation of other political groups. The king has <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02500167.2014.974639">monopolised the economy</a> too. </p>
<p>The frustration with politicians among Basotho should not evoke the decision to discard democracy completely. Democracy - the ability to choose public representatives and hold them to account - is still an <a href="https://books.google.co.ls/books?hl=en&lr=&id=VNez0rhiE44C&oi=fnd&pg=PA26&dq=democracy+and+elections&ots=vIflLnL7Yq&sig=OvWNmPV5GLDB484LG_fGpTLmjyg&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=democracy%20and%20elections&f=false">essential principle of constitutionalism</a>. It should prevail over heredity. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/pasha-86-why-its-wrong-to-be-pessimistic-about-democracy-in-africa-149927">Pasha 86: Why it's wrong to be pessimistic about democracy in Africa</a>
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<p>In a constitutional democracy, no single institution must wield untrammelled powers, even an elected one. The problem with Lesotho’s 1993 constitution is that it gives the prime minister near-absolute powers. The most brazen consequence has been the abuse of power to control the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02589001.2020.1749246">army</a>. For years, politicians have used the army to stoke <a href="https://www.voanews.com/africa/lesotho-exiled-opposition-wants-sadc-intervention">unrest and persecute opponents</a>.</p>
<h2>Time to talk about it</h2>
<p>The conversation about the place of the king in Lesotho’s constitution is timely. The monarch’s lack of power has not worked for constitutional development in the country.</p>
<p>The monarchy is embedded in society but has no significant role. This is counter-intuitive and costly. Taxpayers foot a hefty bill for an institution that has no significant role in checking on the excesses of elected politicians. </p>
<p>The monarch must be given some powers, but not extreme powers. That would equally harm efforts to consolidate democracy. Reformers must strike a balance between the principle of democracy and the doctrine of checks and balances.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165914/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hoolo 'Nyane does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A monarch with absolute powers is just as dangerous as self-serving politicians in a democracy.Hoolo 'Nyane, Head of Department, Public and Environmental Law Department, University of LimpopoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1615492021-05-27T16:42:38Z2021-05-27T16:42:38ZRegional military intervention in Mozambique is a bad idea. Here’s why<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/403140/original/file-20210527-21-mrjc1d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Displaced people arrive in Pemba, Mozambique, after fleeing Palma following a brutal attack by Islamist insurgents in March.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">John Wessels/AFF via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The heads of state of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have endorsed plans to deploy troops to Mozambique to help it fight <a href="https://www.sadc.int/news-events/news/communique-extraordinary-summit-sadc-heads-state-and-government/">extremists in the Cabo Delgado province in the north of the country</a>. Regional leaders also urged members states to continue working with humanitarian agencies to continue providing humanitarian support.</p>
<p>The insurgency, led by an Islamist group known as the Sunnar (popularly known locally as Al-Shabaab), has destabilised the region <a href="https://theconversation.com/mozambiques-own-version-of-boko-haram-is-tightening-its-deadly-grip-98087">since October 2017</a>. Its strength has grown tremendously since last year. In October <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53756692">it made a daring raid</a> on one of the major towns in the north, Mocimbao da Praia. And then in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-mozambique-insurgency-pemba-idUSKBN2BS0R4">March this year</a> it targeted foreign contract workers, including South Africans.</p>
<p>This rang alarm bells in the region.</p>
<p>But is an intervention by the regional body a good idea? And will it help?</p>
<p>Past experiences suggest it’s not. And that it won’t help. </p>
<p>I suggest that the SADC does not have a remarkable record of military interventions in civil conflicts in the region. It would therefore be misguided to attempt an intervention without adequate understanding of the political dynamics at play in northern Mozambique. </p>
<p>Interventions that are hastily prepared by military leaders without deep contextual knowledge of the drivers of conflict are not likely to end well.</p>
<h2>Mixed legacy of intervention</h2>
<p>SADC interventions in internal conflicts in its neighbourhood haven’t worked out well. </p>
<p>In <a href="http://wis.orasecom.org/content/study/UNDP-GEF/NAP-SAP/Documents/References/tda.nap.sap/SA-%20Lesotho%201998.pdf">1998</a> Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe took the lead on behalf of the regional body to restore order and constitutional legality in Lesotho. The haste in which the SADC conceived the operation guaranteed that it would not produce clear outcomes. South African troops <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-09-19-mandela-and-military-force-its-use-is-determined-by-the-situation/">lost their lives</a> and SADC troops had to withdraw in ignominy. </p>
<p>The SADC has since had to <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-efforts-to-stabilise-lesotho-have-failed-less-intervention-may-be-more-effective-137499">continually intervene</a> as a peacemaker in the fractious terrain of Lesotho politics.</p>
<p>The other major experience in intervention was through the <a href="https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/ipi_e_pub_un_intervention_brigade_rev.pdf">Force Intervention Brigade</a> composed of Malawi, Tanzania and South Africa. This was put together to defeat the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2013/11/5/qa-who-are-dr-congos-m23-rebels">M23 Movement</a> in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2013. It was deployed under a United Nations Security Council <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc10964.doc.htm">resolution</a> to assist the United Nations <a href="https://monusco.unmissions.org/en">Mission</a> for the Stabilisation of the DRC. </p>
<p>Initially, the Force Intervention Brigade made a difference. It <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20131105-drc-congo-m23-rebels-announce-end-of-rebellion-insurgency">routed the M23</a> and contributed to a return to some form of stability. But the militia menace in the region has continued unabated, raising questions about the long term <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/democratic-republic-congo/b150-averting-proxy-wars-eastern-dr-congo-and-great-lakes">efficacy of the brigade’s work.</a>. </p>
<p>The brigade remains in place, though countries contributing troops have lost enthusiasm for managing the multiple problems in the region.</p>
<h2>Lessons learnt from past forays</h2>
<p>What can we learn from these military experiences to inform the envisaged Mozambique intervention? </p>
<p>First, military interventions in complex internal conflicts are fraught with profound obstacles. The biggest are inadequate knowledge about the parties to the conflict and what drives the conflict, and uncertainties about the outcomes. </p>
<p>In Mozambique, the insurgents have grown because of preexisting grievances. This includes the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Policy-Brief-The-rise-and-root-causes-of-Islamic-insurgency-in-Mozambique-1.pdf">political marginalisation</a> of the largely poor and rural Muslim-dominated region. This has coincided with the discovery of one of the world’s largest natural gas deposits, which has <a href="https://theconversation.com/offshore-gas-finds-offered-major-promise-for-mozambique-what-went-wrong-158079">attracted French, Italian and American companies</a>.</p>
<p>The rich gas finds have turned Mozambique into a typical resource-cursed nation, where natural resource abundance in marginalised communities predictably <a href="https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/125773/ARI172-2010_DiJohn_Resource_Course_Theory_Evidence_Africa_LatinAmerica.pdf">fuels dissent and rebellion</a>. </p>
<p>Second, it is dangerous for regional actors to pick a fight with a group they believe they can easily subdue. The insurgents started low level guerrilla attacks targeted at government installations and gradually <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17531055.2020.1789271?journalCode=rjea20;%20https://reliefweb.int/report/mozambique/growing-insurgency-mozambique-poses-danger-southern-africa;https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56411157">escalated</a> to widespread massacre of civilians and the acquisition of territory. </p>
<p>This escalation, in part, follows the government’s response to the crisis. Rather than engaging with the communities on stemming the crisis, the immediate response was to <a href="https://sofrep.com/news/wagner-group-russian-mercenaries-still-foundering-in-africa/">hire Russian mercenaries</a> to fight the rebellion. </p>
<p>But the rebels launched a <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/scorched-earth-policy">scorched-earth</a> counteroffensive that led to the <a href="https://globalriskinsights.com/2021/02/too-many-mercenaries-in-mozambique/">defeat and withdrawal</a> of the mercenaries. The consequences were obvious: militarising the conflict inflamed local passions and expanded the recruitment of people into the rebellion. </p>
<p>The deployment of the mercenaries also showed the government wasn’t confident in the capabilities of its own security forces. </p>
<h2>Intervention in a quagmire</h2>
<p>The SADC is now being asked to intervene in a conflict that it has neither resources nor the political will to manage. When the body bags begin to come home, there will be tremendous pressure on SADC forces to withdraw.</p>
<p>Rather than the folly of an intervention, the region should be encouraging the Mozambican state to address the grievances of the communities in Cabo Delgado. </p>
<p>Throughout Africa, military approaches to grievances over resources have often ended in disaster. For many years, the discovery of oil in South Sudan encouraged the government in Khartoum to militarise a conflict that was, at heart, <a href="https://www.africaportal.org/features/nexus-between-oil-and-conflict-south-sudan/">about self-determination and dignity for Southerners</a>. South Sudan did attain independence in 2011, but after tremendous loss of lives. </p>
<p>Similarly, a low-level insurgency in Angola’s Cabinda oil-rich region has persisted because of Luanda’s <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/fr/node/213484">indifference to the plight of the local population</a>.</p>
<p>Since the early 2000s, Nigerian governments have learnt to use political approaches in meeting the demands of the Niger Delta oil-producing communities. In a conflict that has festered for decades, the minorities in the region have <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/towards-ending-conflict-and-insecurity-niger-delta-region">contested the exploitation of oil resources</a> by multinational companies, in collaboration with the federal government, to the detriment of their livelihoods and welfare.</p>
<p>Mozambique can learn from these and many other experiences. </p>
<h2>What’s needed</h2>
<p>It took years for the Mozambican government to address the need to decentralise power and resources to the provinces. This had been a long-standing demand by the former rebel movement, Renamo.</p>
<p>But Frelimo, the dominant ruling party, continued to depend on a heavily centralised form of governance where provinces were mere outposts of the central government. Alternative actors and voices were prevented from participation in major decisions. </p>
<p>In the negotiations to resolve the resumption of the Renamo insurgency in 2013, Renamo prioritised decentralisation. Frelimo reluctantly gave in to this demand. But <a href="https://constitutionnet.org/news/conflict-and-decentralization-mozambique-challenges-implementation">implementation has remained sluggish</a>.</p>
<p>The resource curse is not inevitable. Many countries have avoided it through prudent natural resource governance and improving the access of local communities to the resources generated in their communities. </p>
<p>Botswana is an example. It has used creative institutions and political will to <a href="https://www.afdb.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/could_oil_shine_like_diamonds_-_how_botswana_avoided_the_resource_curse_and_its_implications_for_a_new_libya.pdf">manage its mineral wealth</a>. Ghana has also put in place robust mechanisms to ensure that its oil resources are used <a href="https://theconversation.com/ghana-has-tried-to-be-responsible-with-its-oil-wealth-this-is-how-136887">for the common good and not to enrich elites</a>.</p>
<p>It should not take decades for the government to build credible and transparent natural resource governance institutions that meet the yearnings of impoverished communities in Cabo Delgado. </p>
<p>The SADC’s military intervention will only embolden die-hards in Frelimo who are reluctant to find peaceful and political solutions to the crisis. And the intervention will postpone a problem that is not going to go way any time soon. </p>
<p><em>Updated opening paragraph to reflect latest developments.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/161549/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gilbert M. Khadiagala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Southern African Development Community does not have a remarkable record of military interventions in civil conflicts in the region.Gilbert M. Khadiagala, Jan Smuts Professor of International Relations and Director of the African Centre for the Study of the United States (ACSUS), University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1597532021-05-26T18:09:57Z2021-05-26T18:09:57ZDelay in sending regional forces to Mozambique could exact a high price<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/402876/original/file-20210526-17-2ro1xf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Some of the thousands of people displaced by the killings in the Cabo Delgado province.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Joas Relvas</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-05-20-sadc-leaders-will-meet-this-month-to-consider-mozambique-intervention-plan/">poised</a> to intervene militarily on the side of the Mozambican government to stop the emerging deadly Islamist insurgency in the Cabo Delgado Province, in the north of the country.</p>
<p>This comes after the regional body of <a href="https://www.sadc.int/about-sadc#:%7E:text=The%20Southern%20African%20Development%20Community,%2C%20Tanzania%2C%20Zambia%20and%20Zimbabwe.">16-nation states</a> sent a technical team to verify events in the area and advise its heads of state forum on the way forward. </p>
<p>The technical team has recommended that SADC deploys a 3 000-strong <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-04-28-sadc-ministers-agree-to-deploy-a-regional-force-in-mozambique/">robust intervention force</a> comprised of land, air and naval assets to help quell the insurgency.</p>
<p>The decision to intervene militarily is a clear indicator that the deadly insurgency, which began in earnest <a href="https://theconversation.com/mozambiques-own-version-of-boko-haram-is-tightening-its-deadly-grip-98087">in October 2017</a>, has long passed the stage where it can be seen as a purely domestic problem to be addressed by Mozambique as a <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0030438705001018?casa_token=zVwfnh-fXPsAAAAA:85qqLoMgXk36_IE257qYPMUesqoDdZq80T2FtQP8d8sutOaZ5Up2TXsChVU0PqnWm8a-jLGU6A">sovereign state</a>.</p>
<p>Having failed to act to prevent the insurgency escalating, SADC and Mozambique are now in the difficult position of having to react after extensive damage has already been done. They will thus have to help stop the insurgency as well as embark on post-conflict rebuilding. These two responses are more complicated, expensive and more dangerous than prevention.</p>
<p>SADC’s late entry into the fray raises the need to deal with its own array of bureaucratic and other pitfalls that make it less than agile. Its overcautious and sluggish response has resulted in the loss of initiative and opportunities to prevent the insurgency escalating. </p>
<p>But, the problem is not purely of its own making. The African Union took too long to designate it as the preferred regional actor to address the Mozambican insurgency problem in a timely way. </p>
<p>Intervention in Cabo Delgado is a potentially dangerous move with far-reaching consequences for SADC if its efforts fail, or it becomes a protracted intervention. </p>
<h2>The basis of intervention</h2>
<p>The SADC response to events in Mozambique is in line with the United Nation’s <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.shtml">“responsibility to protect principle”</a> to prevent human catastrophe. </p>
<p>The principle has <a href="https://idl-bnc-idrc.dspacedirect.org/bitstream/handle/10625/18432/IDL-18432.pdf?sequence=6&isAllowed=y">three elements</a>. These are to prevent conflict, to react once conflict has started with a view to stopping the violence, and to rebuild in the aftermath of the conflict. </p>
<p>The SADC intervention fits in with the commitment by African leaders to find <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/277886206_AFRICAN_SOLUTIONS_TO_AFRICA'S_PROBLEMS_AFRICAN_APPROACHES_TO_PEACE_SECURITY_AND_STABILITY">“African solutions for African problems”</a>. It is underpinned by SADC’s <a href="https://www.sadc.int/documents-publications/show/Protocol_on_Politics_Defence_and_Security20001.pdf">peace and security protocol</a> and its <a href="https://www.sadc.int/themes/politics-defence-security/regional-peacekeeping/standby-force/">Standby Force and SADC Brigade</a> to guide and execute decisions.</p>
<p>SADC is also guided by its 2003 <a href="https://www.sadc.int/documents-publications/show/1038">Mutual Defence Pact</a> regulating responses to armed attacks on a fellow SADC member state. The pact outlines the type of responses to be undertaken to defend a member state under attack. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.sadc.int/files/3613/5292/8367/Protocol_on_Politics_Defence_and_Security20001.pdf">Protocol on Politics Defence and Security Cooperation</a> stipulates that a member state under siege should invite SADC to intervene. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/offshore-gas-finds-offered-major-promise-for-mozambique-what-went-wrong-158079">Offshore gas finds offered major promise for Mozambique: what went wrong</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Mozambique has been slow to invite SADC to intervene. A final decision is likely at a meeting of SADC and Mozambique set for the <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-05-20-sadc-leaders-will-meet-this-month-to-consider-mozambique-intervention-plan/">end of May</a>. </p>
<p>In terms of SADC protocols and the report of the technical team following its visit to Mozambique, military support is recommended as an instrument to assist the Mozambique government. The recommendation points to assembling a military contingent with mixed military capabilities. That aligns with the following functions under the <a href="https://www.sadc.int/files/3613/5292/8367/Protocol_on_Politics_Defence_and_Security20001.pdf">SADC Protocol</a> on politics, defence and security cooperation. </p>
<ul>
<li><p>Observation and monitoring missions such as peace support missions,</p></li>
<li><p>Interventions for peace and security restoration at the request of a member state, and</p></li>
<li><p>Actions to prevent the spread of conflict to neighbouring states, or the resurgence of violence after agreements have been reached.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Dangers and vulnerabilities</h2>
<p>At the moment, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) provides an example of ongoing military intervention in a fellow SADC member country. SADC member states - South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi - are actively involved in a UN peacekeeping mission, <a href="https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/un-drc">MUNOSCO</a>, in the country. </p>
<p>It is the largest ongoing UN mission and dates back to 2010. Elements from SADC are now largely concentrated in the <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/sadc-interventions-democratic-republic-congo/">Force Intervention Brigade</a> to pursue armed groups in the east and help the DRC government regain control of its territory.</p>
<p>The operation in Mozambique will be different as SADC will be operating without the cover of the UN. This places it in a precarious position. It will have to take full responsibility for any fall-out resulting from failure. </p>
<p>There’s no precedent for an intervention of this kind. <a href="http://wis.orasecom.org/content/study/UNDP-GEF/NAP-SAP/Documents/References/tda.nap.sap/SA-%20Lesotho%201998.pdf">In 1998</a> South Africa and Botswana sent troops into Lesotho. In the same year <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/sadc-interventions-democratic-republic-congo/">Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe intervened in the DRC</a>. In both cases the interventions were controversial and messy. SADC authorisation came after deployment and placed great strain on relationships within the regional body.</p>
<p>SADC’s decision to intervene in Mozambique comes with its own set of difficulties. Chief among these is to get member states to commit resources to establish an <a href="https://www.thezimbabwean.co/2021/04/sadc-to-deploy-force-intervention-brigade-in-mozambique/">intervention brigade</a> to deploy against the insurgents.</p>
<p>The size of the final force will be depend on how extensive the armed conflict has become, and what level of intervention the Mozambican government is willing to accept from SADC.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-south-africa-has-a-keen-interest-in-extremist-violence-in-northern-mozambique-140745">Why South Africa has a keen interest in extremist violence in northern Mozambique</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>To succeed, SADCS’s intervention in Mozambique will require extensive investment in time, human resources and money. The extent of this investment will, of course, be determined by the speed with which it contains – or even defeats – the insurgents.</p>
<p>Military action will need to entail a parallel process of rebuilding physical infrastructure and assisting with returning people to their normal life. Most of all, it must help the Mozambique government prevent a resurgence of the violence. </p>
<p>The violence has had a devastating effect on security and rule of law. The impact spilled offshore as gas companies placed extensive foreign infrastructure development for the energy sector on hold. </p>
<p>Rebuilding the confidence needed <a href="https://clubofmozambique.com/news/opinion-the-extractive-gas-industry-in-mozambique-has-done-more-damage-than-good-for-mozambicans-by-iiham-rawoot-153657/">for the gas industry</a> to resume activities is a major incentive to get the insurgency under control.</p>
<h2>Costly and dangerous mission ahead</h2>
<p>Success in turning the tide against militants in Cabo Delgado could give SADC’s image a major boost. Failure, however, could tarnish its image of protecting a fellow member country and the region for years to come.</p>
<p>In essence, Cabo Delgado shows how a slow and over-cautious approach to a potentially explosive security situation can allow matters to deteriorate to such an extent that deadly violence can’t be prevented.</p>
<p>The scene is now set for a military response that leaves SADC facing an expensive and dangerous intervention, and rebuilding costs that a poor country such as Mozambique can ill afford.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/159753/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Prof Francois Vreÿ receives funding from the NRF and Stellenbosch University.</span></em></p>Intervention in Cabo Delgado is a potentially dangerous move with far-reaching consequences for SADC if its efforts fail, or it becomes a protracted intervention.Francois Vreÿ, Research Coordinator, Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1540852021-01-31T14:55:02Z2021-01-31T14:55:02ZPresident Mnangagwa claimed Zimbabwe was open for business. What’s gone wrong<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/380858/original/file-20210127-21-12mklr4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwe's President Emmerson Mnangagwa meets his Chinese counterpart President Xi Jinping in Beijing, in 2018. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Lintao Zhang / POOL</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In November 2017 Zimbabwe’s military <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2017/11/20/africa/zimbabwe-military-takeover-strangest-coup/index.html">replaced</a> Robert Mugabe as head of state with his long-time confidante Emmerson Mnangagwa. He declared Zimbabwe <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/24/zimbabwe-is-open-for-business-new-president-emmerson-mnangagwa-tells-davos.html">“open for business”</a>, linking foreign relations with economic policy. As he <a href="https://irp-cdn.multiscreensite.com/ff7b7050/files/uploaded/HE%20INAUGURATION%20SPEECH.pdf">stated</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>We look forward to playing a positive and constructive role as a free, democratic, transparent and responsible member of the family of nations.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>International expectations (more so than those among local people) looked forward to <a href="https://www.odi.org/blogs/10581-zimbabwe-after-mugabe-three-reasons-hope">translating these promises into policy</a>. This was despite the fact that Mugabe’s departure had been anything but democratic.</p>
<p>But there have been few if any changes in Zimbabwe’s political trajectory. A <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-shattered-economy-poses-a-serious-challenge-to-fighting-covid-19-135066">deepening economic crisis</a> combined with a brutal crackdown on the government’s domestic opponents has resulted <a href="https://theconversation.com/fantasy-that-mnangagwa-would-fix-zimbabwe-now-fully-exposed-110197">in disappointments</a>.</p>
<p>On the foreign policy front Mnangagwa has fared no better. In a recently published <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0021909620986579">analysis</a> we examine the status of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy. We identify what’s gone wrong in its efforts at rapprochement with Western countries in a bid to get sanctions lifted, and why its efforts at cosying up to China haven’t gone to plan either. </p>
<p>We conclude that Mnangagwa’s hopes of reorienting Zimbabwe’s foreign policy have been confounded by his government’s own actions. Its repressive response to mounting economic and political crisis increased rather than diminished its isolation. The more the Mnangagwa government <a href="https://theconversation.com/repression-and-dialogue-in-zimbabwe-twin-strategies-that-arent-working-122139">fails to engage democratically</a> with its own citizens, the more it will negate any prospect of re-engagement. </p>
<h2>Relations with its neighbours</h2>
<p>Since the <a href="https://theconversation.com/robert-gabriel-mugabe-a-man-whose-list-of-failures-is-legion-121596">Mugabe</a> era the African Union and Southern African Development Community (SADC) have been tolerant of the Zanu-PF regime’s politics.</p>
<p>SADC’s annual summit in 2019 demanded an <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-49386829">end to Western sanctions</a>.
But the continued repressive nature of Mnangagwa’s regime is not making this loyalty easy.</p>
<p>Tensions have begun to show. In August 2020, South Africa <a href="https://theconversation.com/repression-in-zimbabwe-exposes-south-africas-weakness-144309">dispatched official envoys</a> to Harare to press for restraint on the Mnangagwa government in its actions against opposition figures. The envoys weren’t greeted warmly. Instead they were subjected to a presidential harangue and <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-08-11-mnangagwa-blocks-ramaphosa-envoys-from-meeting-opposition-leaders/">denied the opportunity to meet the opposition</a>. </p>
<p>A subsequent mission by South Africa’s governing party the African National Congress (ANC), acting as a fellow liberation movement, was as <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/zim-not-a-province-of-sa-zanu-pf/">shoddily treated</a>.</p>
<p>South Africa’s patience may be wearing thin. But, for its part, the Southern African Development Community has preferred to officially ignore developments by remaining silent. But while “business as usual” translates into continued political loyalty, it does not translate into increased economic collaboration.</p>
<h2>The West</h2>
<p>Two decades ago the US and European Union imposed sanctions on those linked to the government in <a href="https://academicjournals.org/journal/AJPSIR/article-full-text-pdf/AB5078E40670">response to human rights abuses</a>. Mugabe’s regime reacted by blaming its economic woes on the West. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41995876">Mnangagwa</a> decried sanctions as western attempts to bring about <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202008280420.html">“regime change”</a>.</p>
<p>Unimpressed by the rhetoric, the US extended restrictive measures against targeted individuals and companies <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/2779/text">in August 2018</a>. In March 2019, US sanctions <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-zimbabwe-sanctions-idUSKCN1QM01Q">were renewed</a>.</p>
<p>In contrast, the EU demonstrated more willingness to reengage with Harare. In October 2019 the EU announced an aid package, bringing support during the year to €67.5 million. Aid to Zimbabwe since 2014 stood at <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_6170">€287 million in 2020</a>. This made the EU Zimbabwe’s biggest donor. To ease the woes of the COVID-19 pandemic, it added another €14.2 million humanitarian assistance <a href="https://www.enca.com/news/eu-gives-zimbabwe-nearly-r14-billion-aid">in 2020</a>.</p>
<p>Mnangagwa, however, continued to blame the West for sanctions he compared with cancer. Responding to criticism <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2019/10/we-aint-moved-by-march-eu-us/">the EU declared</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>Zimbabwe is not where it is because of the so-called sanctions, but years of mismanagement of the economy and corruption.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Similarly, the US Ambassador <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/analysis/zimbabwe-s-anti-sanctions-march-much-ado-about-nothing/1652712">dismissed</a> “any responsibility for the catastrophic state of the economy and the government’s abuse of its own citizens”. </p>
<p>US Senate Foreign Relations Committee chair Jim Risch called upon the Southern African Development Community’s 16 members states to </p>
<blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2019/10/we-aint-moved-by-march-eu-us/">focus their energies on supporting democracy, not kleptocratic regimes</a>. </p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Looking East</h2>
<p>The deterioration of Zimbabwe’s relations with the West coincided with growing Chinese interest in access to African resources for its own rapidly expanding industries. Zimbabwe’s growing isolation offered a convenient entry point. </p>
<p>But, China’s greater involvement was spurred less by solidarity than by self-interest. And it’s singular importance in throwing a life-line to the Zimbabwean regime in need gave it enormous influence in directing the collaboration. Failure to mend relations with the West and other global institutions leaves Zimbabwe with no other partners for development and cooperation, thus <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0974928417749642">vulnerable to manipulation by China</a>.</p>
<p>An initial honeymoon started at the turn of the century, after Zimbabwe became isolated from the West through its <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03056244.2019.1622210">fast-track land reform</a> of 2000, and the increased repression of the political opposition. But China became increasingly concerned about Mugabe’s <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329144700_The_Indigenisation_Policy_and_Economic_Emancipation_in_Zimbabwe_A_Case_Study_of_the_Zimunya-Marange_Communities">indigenisation policy</a>. With Chinese companies the largest foreign direct investors, the announced enforcement of the 51% Zimbabwean ownership in assets exceeding US$ 500,000 from April 2016 <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2016/04/26/chinas-pains-over-zimbabwes-indigenization-plan/">caused discomfort</a>. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa’s elevation to the presidency may have received China’s blessing as the best option available. Nonetheless, strains soon appeared. When it became increasingly apparent that Zimbabwe was unable to service its debts, China wrote off some of the liabilities <a href="https://www.news24.com/fin24/Economy/china-writes-off-zims-debt-report-20180405">in 2018</a>. </p>
<p>What particularly rankled Beijing was that Harare’s incapacity to pay its debts was deemed to be due to the government’s misappropriation or misuse of Chinese funds. Accordingly, there was need to tighten controls. This culminated in the signing of a currency swap deal <a href="https://qz.com/africa/1786207/chinas-currency-swap-deal-with-zimbabwe-could-backfire/">in January 2020</a>.</p>
<p>Back in mid-2019 China’s embassy in Harare had already <a href="http://zw.china-embassy.org/eng/gdxws/t1677101.htm">stressed</a> that development relied mainly on a country’s own efforts. It expressed hope that the Zimbabwean side would continue to create a more favourable environment for all foreign direct investment, including Chinese enterprises.</p>
<p>Indications suggest that China’s patience with the ailing Zimbabwean “all weather friend” is <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3037104/will-china-ever-tire-zimbabwes-corruption-and-bad-debt">wearing thinner</a>. The new economic challenges following the COVID-19 pandemic might have shifted priorities in global supply chains. This is also affecting the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative">Belt and Road Initiative</a>, China’s massive global infrastructure project. This might reduce interest in <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26937614?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">what Zimbabwe has to offer</a> by way of natural resources. </p>
<h2>No stability, no money, few friends?</h2>
<p>Zimbabwean foreign policy remains locked in the parameters of recent times past: looking to regional solidarity, estranged from the West, and increasingly dependent on China. </p>
<p>Yet China has its own very clearly defined interests. These focus on resource extraction in mining and agriculture for its own domestic economy. As a strategic and developmental partner, Zimbabwe is of <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/polp.12373">minor interest</a>. </p>
<p>Chinese-Zimbabwean relations serve <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0021909619848783">an elite in the Zanu-PF government</a>. They are accused of <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/03/zimbabwe-opposition-leader-wants-to-give-china-investors-the-boot.html">“asset stripping”</a>. They exclude any oversight, civil society involvement, and lack transparency and accountability. The absence of visible benefits for ordinary Zimbabweans has engendered <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0975087820971443">anti-Chinese sentiments</a>.</p>
<p>Having failed to restore friendly relations with the West, and its “look east policy” not bearing fruits, has left the Mnangagwa regime with few options. Russia has entered the arena, showing increased interest in the extractive industries, arms trade and <a href="https://saiia.org.za/research/russias-resurgence-in-africa-zimbabwe-and-mozambique/">political fraternisation</a>.</p>
<p>This sounds not much like an alternative to the current ties with China. The bedfellows remain more than less of the same. And an old adage comes to mind: with friends like these one does not need enemies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/154085/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The more President Mnangagwa’s government fails to engage democratically with its own citizens, the more it will negate any prospect of re-engagement with the West.Henning Melber, Extraordinary Professor, Department of Political Sciences, University of PretoriaRoger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1520292021-01-19T14:28:36Z2021-01-19T14:28:36ZCOVID-19 policy briefs must be realistic: a review by young southern African scientists<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/379221/original/file-20210118-21-movumy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Hand hygiene is important to fight COVID-19 but how can you do that without water</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Just over a year after the coronavirus was first reported in China countries are still reeling from its effects. Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), the virus that causes COVID-19 disease, has infected over <a href="https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html">90 million</a> people globally and resulted in more than <a href="https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html">1.9 million</a> deaths. In January 2021, South Africa has the highest number of cases on the <a href="https://africacdc.org/covid-19/">African continent</a> and has seen a <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/trending/455928/mkhize-declares-second-wave-of-covid-19-in-south-africa-as-new-cases-pass-6000-in-a-day/">surge</a> in daily infections since December.</p>
<p>The race to find and provide effective vaccines and therapeutics continues. <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(20)31142-9/fulltext">Non-pharmaceutical interventions</a> are still needed to limit the transmission of COVID-19. They include isolating cases, quarantining contacts as well as relevant, accurate and timely risk communication. Hand and respiratory hygiene, infection control and prevention are also vital.</p>
<p>Evidence-based research and interventions are important in the fight against COVID-19. But it is equally important to pay attention to <a href="https://preventepidemics.org/covid19/science/insights/3-ws-to-reduce-the-risk-of-covid-19/">social measures and people’s everyday experiences</a>. These contribute to adherence to government regulations relating to COVID-19. Adherence isn’t always easy or possible in certain circumstances. For example, living conditions may make it difficult to keep a safe distance, and access to <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2020-04-12-covid-19-and-the-call-for-solidarity-challenges-for-informal-settlements/">water</a> may be limited.</p>
<p>In view of these potential difficulties, <a href="https://www.sayas.org.za/">a group of young scientists</a> who are part of <a href="https://www.zimbabweyas.org/">South Africa Young Academy of sciences</a> came together to discuss how policy briefs that focus on non-pharmaceutical interventions could be made more accessible for the general public and policy makers alike. The group comprised experts in the behavioural, social, natural, health and human sciences.</p>
<p>In particular, we drew from policy briefs compiled by a public health initiative called <a href="https://resolvetosavelives.org/">Resolve to Save Lives</a>. This initiative puts together data on COVID-19 trends in Africa from multiple sources. These briefs target decision makers involved in the COVID-19 response in Africa, including national task forces and emergency operation centres. </p>
<h2>Issues and possible solutions</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://preventepidemics.org/covid19/perc/">briefs</a> are intended to inform public health and social measures in Africa. They are based on social, economic, epidemiological, population movement, and security data from 20 African Union member states. The briefs highlight the various strategies African governments have taken in responding to COVID-19 and whether these are effective or not. </p>
<p>We discussed the briefs in a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NrB6za1jr1w&feature=youtu.be">closed webinar</a>. It aimed to assess whether the briefs take into account the real experiences of people in our communities. The people invited to the webinar included academics, students and representatives of non-governmental organisations.</p>
<p>The webinar highlighted some big issues. These are listed below.</p>
<p>Environmental factors are important in the southern African region’s responses to COVID-19. Most countries in the region did not have a disaster management plan in place, and this contributed to environmental challenges. An example is the disposal of used masks in the streets, with many ending up in rivers and other <a href="https://twentytwo13.my/issues/used-face-masks-sanitiser-bottles-end-up-in-rivers/">water bodies</a>. There is, therefore, a need for a disaster management plan which would guide the safe disposal of these waste materials. </p>
<p>There is an overuse of hand sanitisers (for example in shopping malls when people move from one store to the next), which may lead to <a href="https://theconversation.com/coronavirus-heavy-use-of-hand-sanitisers-could-boost-antimicrobial-resistance-136541">antimicrobial resistance</a>. Some ways to limit the negative impact of overuse of hand sanitisers on the skin should entail thorough washing of hands with water and soap when available. There should also be extreme caution and avoidance of diluting and combining different sanitisers. A point also highlighted by <a href="https://theconversation.com/coronavirus-heavy-use-of-hand-sanitisers-could-boost-antimicrobial-resistance-136541">Winston Morgan</a>, a reader in toxicology and clinical biochemistry at the University of East London, in his assertion that we should “avoid combining pre-prepared products with other ones”.</p>
<p>While government task teams have some diversity and interdisciplinary experts, there is a <a href="https://www.biznews.com/thought-leaders/2020/06/05/government-misreads-people-covid-19-friedman">bias towards the health and “core science”</a> professionals. Psycho-social and political sciences should also be represented in policy decision making processes. The role of traditional leaders, faith groups and businesses must also be taken into consideration. It is important to have this <a href="https://preventepidemics.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/PERC_RespondingtoCovidData.pdf">multi-sectoral response</a> as COVID-19 is more than just a health problem. </p>
<p>Governments should strengthen evidence-based risk communication and engage community leaders and trusted people to encourage adherence to public health measures and dispel misinformation. In addition, there needs to be an open and honest conversation between traditional leaders and governments on cultural practices and people’s need to perform rituals. </p>
<p>For example, in many communities, initiation schools are an integral part of community life. Such rituals are an integral part of many communities and people want to practise and observe <a href="https://health-e.org.za/2020/11/20/initiation-schools-covid-19/">traditional rites</a>. But these events may be high risk as the initiates might find it difficult to observe COVID-19 safety protocols. Working closely with traditional leaders who have in-depth understanding of such rituals can assist in ensuring adherence.</p>
<h2>Looking ahead</h2>
<p>It is important to acknowledge that COVID-19 has affected all aspects of people’s lives. The young scientists’ webinar was an opportunity to understand the similarities and differences in challenges associated with COVID-19 in communities across southern Africa. </p>
<p>It highlighted the need for policies that are appropriate for people’s real lives. These need to be “living documents”. This can only happen if communities are consulted in making decisions affecting their lives. Pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical interventions have to be adopted alongside one another.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/152029/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Puleng Segalo receives funding from the National Research Foundation and the National Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences.. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adeyemi Oladapo Aremu receives funding from the National Research Foundation, Pretoria, South Africa. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Pradeep Kumar receives funding from the National Research Foundation, the South African Medical Research Council, and the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. </span></em></p>African leaders can make strategies to fight COVID-19 more accessible to the people.Puleng Segalo, Professor of Psychology, University of South AfricaAdeyemi Oladapo Aremu, Associate professor, North-West UniversityPradeep Kumar, Associate Professor of Pharmaceutics at Department of Pharmacy and Pharmacology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1490132020-11-05T15:30:48Z2020-11-05T15:30:48ZAs the malaria season begins in southern Africa, COVID-19 complicates the picture<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/367685/original/file-20201105-19-o8fc2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mosquitoes and parasites do not respect country borders.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">CDC/James Gathan</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Two of the nine global public health awareness days are associated with malaria: World Malaria Day, observed on <a href="https://www.gov.za/world-malaria-day-0">25 April</a>, and World Mosquito Day, which commemorates the discovery by Sir Ronald Ross on <a href="https://www.daysoftheyear.com/days/world-mosquito-day/">20 August 1897</a> that Anopheles mosquitoes transmit malaria parasites to humans.</p>
<p>Both World Malaria Day and World Mosquito Day are particularly relevant to Africa. The continent shoulders the <a href="https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789241565721">greatest burden of malaria</a> globally. Ninety-three percent of the 228 million malaria cases and 94% of the 405,000 malaria-related deaths reported worldwide in 2018 were from Africa. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/malaria-still-kills-1-100-a-day-it-cant-afford-to-lose-resources-to-coronavirus-136976">Malaria still kills 1,100 a day. It can't afford to lose resources to coronavirus</a>
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<p>Unfortunately the observation of these days falls outside the <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-017-02680-6">peak malaria</a> transmission season in most African countries south of the equator. This dampens the impact of these awareness days. For this reason, the Southern African Development Community declared the first or second week of November to be the region’s Malaria Week, with November 6 designated as <a href="https://www.gov.za/SADCMalariaDay2020#:%7E:text=Commemoration%20of%20Southern%20African%20Development,signs%20and%20symptoms%20of%20malaria">Southern African Development Community Malaria Day</a>. The aim was to provide accurate malaria messaging at the start of the malaria transmission season in southern Africa. </p>
<h2>Malaria in southern Africa</h2>
<p>Malaria is endemic to 14 of the 16 southern African countries, with the exception of Lesotho and the Seychelles. But the distribution of malaria in these 14 countries is extremely varied.</p>
<p>Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo are among the <a href="https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789241565721">six countries that accounted for more than 50%</a> of all cases reported in 2018. At the other extreme, <a href="https://www.who.int/malaria/publications/atoz/9789241504461/en/">Mauritius</a> eliminated malaria in 1998 and is now preventing the reintroduction of the disease. </p>
<p>Currently four other countries in the region, namely Botswana, Eswatini, Namibia and South Africa, are attempting to eliminate malaria.</p>
<p>But countries in southern Africa are highly connected. Large numbers of highly mobile and migrant populations and frequent cross-border movements pose significant challenges to achieving a malaria-free region. This is particularly so as mosquitoes and parasites do not respect country borders. </p>
<p>The Southern African Development Community created a regional malaria control coordinating body, the <a href="https://malariaelimination8.org/">Elimination Eight (E8)</a>, to coordinate malaria control activities in eight of the region’s countries. This has since been expanded to include all malaria-endemic Southern African Development Community countries. The Elimination Eight also focuses on ensuring that accurate messaging about malaria is widely available.</p>
<h2>Malaria control in the time of COVID-19</h2>
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<p>South Africa is an example of the challenges the whole region faces. The constant introduction of malaria from neighbouring countries remains a major obstacle to the country’s ambitions to eliminate the disease. </p>
<p>South Africa’s already heavily burdened healthcare system has been negatively affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. Routine healthcare such as tuberculosis and HIV services was <a href="https://mg.co.za/health/2020-10-18-covid-19-disrupts-hiv-and-tb-services/">severely disrupted</a>. </p>
<p>The World Health Organisation also <a href="https://www.who.int/news/item/23-04-2020-who-urges-countries-to-move-quickly-to-save-lives-from-malaria-in-sub-saharan-africa">warned</a> that COVID-19 could significantly disrupt malaria control activities. </p>
<p>South Africa responded rapidly by modifying malaria control practices and protocols. The goal was to ensure the safety of healthcare workers, malaria control staff and the communities they serve. As fever is a symptom of both malaria and COVID-19, people from malaria endemic districts were tested for both COVID-19 and malaria during the community-testing phase of the COVID-19 control strategy.</p>
<p>South Africa’s strict lockdown restrictions on provincial and international movements greatly reduced the country’s malaria burden, with just over <a href="https://www.nicd.ac.za/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Malaria.pdf">1,000</a> cases reported between May and October this year. The opening of South Africa’s borders has generated much enthusiasm. But this increased mobility at the start of the country’s malaria season is a concern. </p>
<p>Healthcare workers and the general public must remember that not all fevers are due to COVID-19. Other infectious diseases could be the cause. In addition, patients with fever must remember to provide detailed travel histories to their healthcare provider to assist with correct diagnosis.</p>
<p>Gauteng has a substantial number of malaria deaths for a province where malaria is not endemic. This is because the disease is misdiagnosed in a number of patients who did not travel. These are patients who suffer from <a href="http://www.samj.org.za/index.php/samj/article/view/7684/5943">Odyssean malaria</a>, colloquially referred to as “taxi malaria”. These cases are due to an infective mosquito that has “hitched a ride” from an endemic area. Now, more than ever, it is crucial that when a patient presents with a fever, malaria is considered.</p>
<p>The COVID-19 pandemic has already changed the world and presented many public health challenges. But it must not be allowed to let preventable, treatable diseases like malaria rebound.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/149013/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jaishree Raman is affiliated with the Centre for Emerging Zoonotic and Parasitic Diseases, National Institute for Communicable Diseases; Wits Research Institute for Malaria, University of the Witwatersrand and UP Institute for Sustainable Malaria Control, University of Pretoria</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shüné Oliver is affiliated with the Centre for Emerging Zoonotic and Parasitic Diseases, National Institute for Communicable Diseases and the Wits Research Institute for Malaria, University of Witwatersrand and receives funding from the National Research Foundation of South Africa and the National Health Laboratory Services Research Trust. </span></em></p>Southern African Development Community countries are very connected. Highly mobile and migrant populations frequently cross borders, posing significant challenges to reaching a malaria-free region.Jaishree Raman, Laboratory for Antimalarial Resistance Monitoring and Malaria Operational Research, National Institute for Communicable DiseasesShüné Oliver, medical scientist , National Institute for Communicable DiseasesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1450722020-09-20T07:44:57Z2020-09-20T07:44:57ZWhy South Africa’s new plan to fortify its borders won’t stop irregular migration<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/358433/original/file-20200916-16-1jgpbnk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwean migrants illegally cross Into South Africa.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">John Moore/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa has just passed a <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/border-management-authority-act-2-2020-english-sepedi-21-jul-2020-0000">new law</a> in response to growing concerns in the country about its porous borders. The socioeconomic and <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2019-08-14-porous-borders-biggest-threat-to-domestic-security-in-sa-new-spy-boss/">security dangers</a> posed by having large numbers of undocumented migrants have become key political issues in the country in recent times.</p>
<p>It’s <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2018/09/17/fact-check-are-the-11-million-undocumented-migrants-in-sa">difficult to ascertain</a> how many undocumented migrants there are in the country, leading to <a href="https://africacheck.org/reports/do-5-million-immigrants-live-in-s-africa-the-new-york-times-inflates-number/">exaggerated estimates</a>. According to Statistics South Africa figures from 2011, legal migrants were about 4.2% of the total population, or about <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/Report-03-01-79/Report-03-01-792011.pdf">2.1 million people</a>. Over 75% came from the African continent, with the majority (68%) from within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region. Over 45% of those from the SADC region were Zimbabweans. </p>
<p>The new law provides for the establishment of a <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202007/43536gon799.pdf">Border Management Authority</a>. Its primary function is to provide integrated border law enforcement. Its core functions include the governance and management of the lawful movement of people and goods within the border law enforcement areas and at ports of entry. It’ll work with other arms of government and relevant stakeholders in the discharge of border law <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202007/43536gon799.pdf">enforcement functions</a>.</p>
<h2>Why the change</h2>
<p>Migration and immigration are not efficiently managed at the moment, being undertaken by several entities. These include the Department of Home Affairs, South African Revenue Service, the Defence Force and the State Security Agency.</p>
<p>The functions and roles of these and other organs of state have been reconfigured. They will now basically fall on committees providing advice to the new agency on, inter alia, politics, security, defence and economy.</p>
<p>It is envisioned that the new agency and stronger policing will secure the porous borders, stop undocumented migration and enhance legitimate trade. But a closer reading of the new Act, particularly Chapter 6, shows that there is a strong move towards the militarisation of the country’s borders. This approach, which is similar to what European countries have implemented, is bound to fail in curbing undocumented migration. Undocumented migration is the crossing of borders without meeting immigration requirements.</p>
<h2>Militarisation and securitarisation</h2>
<p>Border militarisation involves the deployment of, among others, military technologies, equipment and <a href="https://rgs-ibg.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/tran.12115#:%7E:text=In%20contrast%20to%20claims%20of,into%20new%20spaces%20and%20arenas">personnel</a> to protect borders.</p>
<p>Border securitisation involves stringent immigration requirements as well as the reinforcement of the physical border, by for example, <a href="https://gizmodo.com/5-european-countries-have-built-border-fences-to-keep-o-1731065879">erecting walls or fences</a>.</p>
<p>In the case of South Africa, this will, among other things, entail the deployment of border guards who have powers to arrest and detain anybody deemed to have transgressed the new law. The border guards will have extensive powers. They will, for example, be empowered to search any person, premise, goods and vehicles as well as question any person about any matter related to the passage of people, goods or vehicles through a port of entry or <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202007/43536gon799.pdf">across the borders</a>. </p>
<p>This has parallels with other parts of the world. Examples include the European Union (EU) borders between Morocco and <a href="https://beatingborders.wordpress.com/2015/06/17/the-militarisation-of-the-european-borders-the-daily-terror-in-morocco/">Spain at Ceuta and Melilla</a>, where the objective is to keep migrants and refugees out, particularly those from Africa. </p>
<p>This involves the use of security technologies so sophisticated that they can <a href="https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2017/05/treacherous">sense the heartbeat</a> of a border jumper. </p>
<h2>Lessons from elsewhere</h2>
<p>Nation states are entitled to secure their borders. Indeed, they are constitutionally bound to uphold their territorial sovereignty. But the militarisation of borders and securitisation of migration have always failed to stop irregular migration. </p>
<p>This can be seen in the case of the EU where they have failed to stop migrants from <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/12/06/impact-externalization-migration-controls-rights-asylum-seekers-and-other-migrants">crossing into Europe</a>.</p>
<p>Instead, the migrants have been led to find alternative ways to cross the border. I expect the same thing to happen in the case of South Africa. </p>
<p>No single country can effectively address the problem of irregular migration on its own in the southern African setting. Beefing up security at borders through military and security strategies is not the answer. An effective response lies in a regional approach to the management of migration and its root causes.</p>
<h2>Regional approach to illegal migration</h2>
<p>Such an approach should recognise that migration is a multidimensional phenomenon in terms of its causes, patterns, settings and consequences. </p>
<p>The 16 member states of the <a href="https://www.sadc.int/member-states/">Southern African Development Community</a> should jointly deal with the issue of undocumented migration through a regional migration mechanism which promotes free human mobility. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.sadc.int/files/8613/5292/8378/Declaration__Treaty_of_SADC.pdf">Declaration and Treaty of the SADC of 1992</a> and the subsequent <a href="https://www.sadc.int/files/9513/5292/8363/Protocol_on_Facilitation_of_Movement_of_Persons2005.pdf">SADC Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons</a> provide a good starting point for the region to formulate a regional migration management architecture that enables unlimited migration between member states. </p>
<p>The declaration and treaty commit the SADC to promoting regional integration and free human mobility. The protocol on the <a href="https://www.sadc.int/files/9513/5292/8363/Protocol_on_Facilitation_of_Movement_of_Persons2005.pdf">movement of persons</a>, which is not yet in full force, is a move in this direction.</p>
<p>Its main objective is to develop policies aimed at the progressive elimination of obstacles to the movement of people in the SADC region and within member states. It calls for the harmonisation of respective national laws in fulfilment of <a href="https://www.sadc.int/files/9513/5292/8363/Protocol_on_Facilitation_of_Movement_of_Persons2005.pdf">this objective</a>.</p>
<p>I posit that undocumented migration occurs because of stringent immigration regimes which force people to resort to such illegal acts as <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/15562948.2019.1570416">smuggling people across borders</a>. Differently stated, if there were free movement between countries in the region, the issue of undocumented and irregular migration would not arise. </p>
<p>This raises the related question of what nation states should do in the absence of a regional migration governance mechanism. In other words, should countries like South Africa stop improving the safety and management of their borders? </p>
<p>By all means countries should maintain their territorial integrity. But in an African setting, the historical context of borders and migration matters. </p>
<p>Africa’s borders were drawn arbitrarily by colonial powers, often separating people who had always lived together. These contiguous borders have <a href="https://theconversation.com/southern-africas-porous-borders-pose-a-problem-for-containing-the-coronavirus-135386">always been ignored and breached</a>. Thus, no amount of border militarisation and securitisation can stop such irregular migration.</p>
<h2>Addressing causes of irregular migration</h2>
<p>The multifaceted nature of migration in the SADC region requires the regional body to also address the issues which uproot people from their countries. These include bad governance and human rights abuses. </p>
<p>For example, if the SADC had responded swiftly and appropriately to the crisis in Zimbabwe in the 2000s, when that country embarked on questionable political programmes with regional political and economic ramifications, Zimbabweans would not have been forced to migrate in such great numbers to South Africa for economic reasons.</p>
<p>The SADC should have collectively leaned on the Zimbabwean government to stop human rights abuses. Instead, only the late Zambian president Levy Mwanawasa openly criticised the Zimbabwean government and called on the SADC <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-sadc/zambian-president-calls-zimbabwe-sinking-titanic-idUSL2140021620070321">to help address the country’s economic and political problems</a>. This never happened. </p>
<p>The Zimbabwean crisis continues unabated two decades later, leading many people to continue to flee to South Africa, some of them swimming across the <a href="https://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/smuggling-at-beit-bridge-border-continues-despite-r37-million-fence/">crocodile infested Limpopo River</a>. This shows that nothing can stop irregular migration – short of addressing its root causes, over and above a regional migration management approach. Given that most migrants in South Africa are from the SADC countries, with over 45% coming from Zimbabwe, it makes sense to deal with the issue of migration within the SADC first, before addressing those from other parts of Africa.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/145072/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Inocent Moyo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The militarisation of borders and securitisation of migration have always failed to stop irregular migration.Inocent Moyo, Senior Lecturer and Head of Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of ZululandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1407452020-06-22T14:32:54Z2020-06-22T14:32:54ZWhy South Africa has a keen interest in extremist violence in northern Mozambique<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/342951/original/file-20200619-43225-4yacj4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Mozambican military has proven to be inept at stopping atrocities by extremist insurgents in the Cabo Delgado province.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Antonio Silva</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A growing insurgency in the northern parts of Mozambique has caught the attention of conflict analysts and observers worldwide. There is now even a possibility that the South African National Defence Force <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/sunday-tribune/jihadist-insurgency-crisis-could-spill-over-into-kzn-warn-analysts-48747883">might become involved</a> in the most northern Cabo Delgado province, with a view to ending the deadly violence and <a href="https://www.cnbcafrica.com/opinion/2020/04/09/op-ed-mozambique-islamist-militants-continue-attacks-in-cabo-delgado/">litany of atrocities</a>, abductions and destruction of infrastructure.</p>
<p>Should the South African government decide to send in its military, the main aim would be to focus on the violent activities of an extremist and militant Islamic group, <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2020/02/12/Mozambique-Cabo-Delgado-militancy-Islamic-State-Al-Shabab">Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jammah</a>. It is also locally known as Al Shabaab, even though it has no connections with the Somali movement of the same name. The group aims to <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2020/02/12/Mozambique-Cabo-Delgado-militancy-Islamic-State-Al-Shabab">establish its own mosques and madrassas</a> to enhance the spread of its radical dogma.</p>
<p>Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jammah started as a <a href="https://theconversation.com/mozambiques-own-version-of-boko-haram-is-tightening-its-deadly-grip-98087">religious sect which turned into a guerrilla group</a>. Initially its goal was to impose <a href="https://theconversation.com/harsh-punishments-under-sharia-are-modern-interpretations-of-an-ancient-tradition-115211">Sharia law</a> (Islamic law) in Cabo Delgado. It rejected the state’s schooling, health system and laws, which resulted in much tension in the province. Some analysts argue that the movement is <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44320531">motivated more by greed</a> than by dogma or grievance: that it is making millions of dollars a week through criminal activities relating to mining, logging, poaching and contraband.</p>
<p>Be that as it may, many of its members appear to be socio-economically marginalised young people without a proper education and formal employment. They have been joined by young immigrants in a similar marginalised position. It is estimated that the movement’s members are <a href="https://theconversation.com/mozambiques-own-version-of-boko-haram-is-tightening-its-deadly-grip-98087">organised in tens of small cells</a> along the coast of northern Mozambique.</p>
<p>There is rightly widespread concern over these developments. Should South Africa – and specifically its defence force – get involved, it would certainly be venturing into a highly violent and complex landscape, requiring a counter-terrorism type of operations. </p>
<p>Such operations are always highly challenging. Countering terrorist and insurgent forces in Mozambique could be as challenging as the protracted operations <a href="https://www.inonafrica.com/2015/02/03/boko-haram-and-al-shabaab-comparable-threats-to-african-security/">against Boko Haram and Al Shabaab</a>, the militant Islamist sects that operate predominantly in Nigeria and Somalia, destabilising large areas with their terror campaigns.</p>
<p>Why should there be serious concern over the situation in Mozambique? </p>
<p>Mozambique borders Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, South Africa and eSwatini. Four of these six countries are landlocked, and hence depend on <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/mozambique/overview">Mozambique as a gateway to global markets</a>. Events in Cabo Delgado could thus threaten regional stability. </p>
<p>Even though <a href="https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-insurgents-leave-mocimboa-da-praia-after-1-day-occupation-which-showed-local-support-by-joseph-hanlon-156346/">Mocímboa da Praia</a>, which is regarded as the headquarters of the extremists, is about 2,500km from South Africa, the group nevertheless poses a challenge to the country too. After all, Mozambique has strong economic ties with South Africa as the region’s economic engine. Regional stability is certainly in the interest of South Africa.</p>
<p>From a South African standpoint, four main issues stand out. These are: the danger of the spread of Islamist extremism so close to home; the strategic importance of the area under siege; weakness of Mozambican security forces; and combating organised crime. </p>
<h2>Violent extremism</h2>
<p>This is the first case of violent extremism of this kind in southern Africa. It is also the first manifestation of a militant movement which is <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/mozambique-admits-presence-isil-affiliated-fighters-200424200048073.html">associated with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria</a>, and the notion of a <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/is-islamic-state-taking-charge-of-mozambiques-jihadist-insurgency">jihadist insurgency</a>.</p>
<p>Until recently, acts of terror conducted by extremists in southern Africa were confined to Tanzania and Zanzibar. </p>
<p>The death toll and displacements of Mozambican locals in Cabo Delgado are difficult to verify. But reports indicate that <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/sunday-tribune/jihadist-insurgency-crisis-could-spill-over-into-kzn-warn-analysts-48747883">more than 1,000 people have died</a> and <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/mozambique/mozambique-deteriorating-humanitarian-situation-cabo-delgado-province-short-note">about two million are affected</a> by the crisis overall.</p>
<p>Secondly, in recent years massive <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/gas-rich-mozambique-headed-disaster-200223112556449.html">offshore natural gas deposits</a> have been identified, drawing some of the world’s biggest energy players. Offshore exploration in the Cabo Delgado area is among Africa’s three largest liquid natural gas projects. </p>
<p>Investments of billions of dollars have already been made, but an escalation of violence is <a href="https://www.inonafrica.com/2020/06/02/mozambiques-energy-sector-caught-in-southern-africas-first-terrorist-insurgency/">putting the future of these investments at risk</a>.</p>
<p>These projects could be of major importance to poverty alleviation in the country. Poverty affects most of those in rural areas with low levels of formal education. <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/mozambique/overview">Economic activity in Mozambique</a> has improved in recent years and has the potential to strengthen in the foreseeable future. But much will depend on the megaprojects in Cabo Delgado, debt restructuring, COVID-19, macroeconomic stability and improved political and economic governance, among other key factors. </p>
<p>For decades, South Africa has experienced an illegal influx of Mozambicans due to development challenges in their country. Thus, economic, political and social development in Mozambique are of the utmost importance to South Africa, which is battling massive poverty and unemployment of its own.</p>
<p>Although exploration in Mozambique is offshore, support facilities are onshore and most vulnerable to attacks. The foreign companies with their massive investments feel threatened, especially now that <a href="https://www.inonafrica.com/2020/06/02/mozambiques-energy-sector-caught-in-southern-africas-first-terrorist-insurgency/">final investment decisions</a> have to be taken. </p>
<p>South Africa has another interest in these developments. The South African energy and chemical multinational <a href="https://www.sasol.com/growing-our-upstream-base-mozambique">Sasol</a> has invested heavily in gas exploration projects since 2014. </p>
<p>The arrival of foreign companies has led to deep discontent among local people who are deeply aggrieved by their activities. They had to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/gas-rich-mozambique-headed-disaster-200223112556449.html">relocate to make way</a> for the infrastructure development, amid complaints about the compensation they received. They’re also aggrieved that they have been resettled inshore, away from the coastal fishing areas. </p>
<p>These factors further complicate security challenges in the <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2020/02/12/Mozambique-Cabo-Delgado-militancy-Islamic-State-Al-Shabab">very delicate social landscape</a>. Moreover, the insurgents can easily exploit local grievances as matters play into their hands.</p>
<p>The Mozambican military and police have proven to be no match for the militants. They have been unable to prevent them from taking the <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-03-26-islamist-insurgents-capture-second-town-in-northern-mozambique-within-48-hours/#gsc.tab=0">northern strategic town of Mocímboa de Praia</a>, as well as invading a town near Quissanga.</p>
<p>To counter the growing insurgency, the Mozambican government has contracted <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-11-29-wagner-private-military-force-licks-wounds-in-northern-mozambique/#gsc.tab=0">the Wagner group</a>, a private Russian military company, to assist government forces. But the situation appears to have gone from <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/is-islamic-state-taking-charge-of-mozambiques-jihadist-insurgency">bad to worse</a>.</p>
<p>A South African security group, the <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/private-military-contractors-appear-to-be-active-in-mozambique/">Dyck Advisory Group</a>, was also allegedly assisting the Mozambican government.</p>
<p>A fourth cause for concern over dynamics in the Cabo Delgado province relates to organised crime. The area is a major conduit for <a href="https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/2018-06-27-research-paper-heroin-coast-pdf.pdf">smuggling drugs and other contraband</a>. The volume of heroin produced and shipped from Afghanistan along a network of routes, via East and southern Africa, has increased considerably in recent years. </p>
<p>Cabo Delgado is a key point for smuggling drugs, wildlife, timber, gems and gold. The insurgency makes it more difficult to enforce the law in the province.</p>
<h2>No choice</h2>
<p>Operations aimed at countering Islamist extremists tend to continue for many years. Success at curbing violent terrorist attacks requires careful and long term responses.</p>
<p>Ideally, these should comprise a mixed set of interventions, including social reform, economic development and varying degrees of military force.</p>
<p>South African political involvement is now almost inevitable as the Southern African Development Community <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-05-20-leaders-commit-sadc-to-helping-mozambique-fight-jihadist-insurgency/#gsc.tab=0">has already undertaken to help Mozambique</a> in its fight against the insurgency. This makes it highly likely that South Africa’s military forces will somehow get involved.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/140745/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Theo Neethling receives funding from the National Research Foundation. </span></em></p>Should South Africa’s military get involved, it would be venturing into a highly violent and complex landscape, requiring a counter-terrorism type of operations.Theo Neethling, Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1407472020-06-22T14:32:50Z2020-06-22T14:32:50ZLesotho can’t afford incremental changes to its constitution: it needs a complete overhaul<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/342974/original/file-20200619-43214-hhxia0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Moeketsi Majoro, Lesotho's new Prime Minister. A minor constitutional amendment enabled his ascension to power. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS/Flickr</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ever since Lesotho, the mountainous southern African constitutional kingdom of about 2.2 million, attained independence from Britain in 1966, its development has been punctuated by all manner of constitutional breakdowns. These have ranged from coups, dictatorships and military rule. </p>
<p>Among the long list of factors that account for the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10246029.1995.9627804?journalCode=rasr20">long-running political instability</a> in the country, the flawed <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Lesotho_2011.pdf?lang=en">constitution</a> ranks high.</p>
<p>It is now a matter of common course that successive interventions by the Southern African Development Community, in a bid to bring peace to Lesotho, <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-efforts-to-stabilise-lesotho-have-failed-less-intervention-may-be-more-effective-137499">have failed</a>. One of the main reasons is that the solutions often provided are palliative; they ignore the need for fundamental constitutional reform. </p>
<p>The organisation of Lesotho’s state institutions is fundamentally flawed. Almost every institution is an appendage of the executive: oversight institutions, security agencies, parliament, and the judiciary. There is a very weak balance between key state institutions. </p>
<p>Despite the fact that it was adopted only as recently as 1993, Lesotho’s constitution is fairly outmoded. The country had a chance to adopt a new constitution when it emerged from dictatorship under <a href="https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/lesotho-1966-present/">Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan</a> and <a href="https://journals.co.za/content/afrins/20/4/AJA02562804_1157">rule by a military junta</a>, both of which lasted for about twenty years. Instead, what followed was a mere rehash of the 1966 constitution. </p>
<p>As such, the current constitution is cast in the <a href="http://www.cplo.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/BP-380-South-Africas-Parliamentary-System-May-2015.pdf">classical Westminster conceptions</a> that countries in Africa and elsewhere have long jettisoned. The fundamental structure of the constitution is bad and unsuited for modern-day constitutionalism.</p>
<h2>Different approaches</h2>
<p>While there is some consensus about the need for constitutional changes, there is considerable disagreement in the country about the kind of constitutional changes that are needed, and how extensive they should be. </p>
<p>There are those who say that the changes must be <a href="https://www.gov.ls/documents/expert-report-of-constitutional-reforms/">incremental and phased</a>. The justification for this approach is that there are minor and urgent changes that can be effected with relative ease. These can be carried out within a short space of time, and without a need for huge resources. This include, for example, reducing the powers of the Prime Minister in relation to other branches of government.</p>
<p>This justification is largely based on expediency. The proponents of this approach use the recently adopted <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lesotho-politics/lesothos-king-assents-to-bill-limiting-pm-thabanes-powers-idUSKBN22J2UD">Ninth Amendment to the constitution</a>
as an example of the success of the incremental approach. The amendment, in the main, prevents a Prime Minister who has lost a vote of no confidence in parliament from calling an early election. It leaves him or her with just one option; to resign. The amendment had an <a href="https://theconversation.com/lesothos-new-leader-faces-enormous-hurdles-ensuring-peace-and-political-stability-139320">immediate application</a> in May 2020 after then Prime Minister Tom Thabane lost the confidence of the National Assembly.</p>
<p>On the other hand, there are those who believe that this success is shorlived; that the country should seize this opportune moment to change the entire constitution. I belong to this group. Lesotho needs a new constitution altogether, and as a matter of urgency. A new constitution is needed that will design new institutions that work in a balanced manner and contribute to the <a href="https://journals.co.za/content/ju_slr/22/1/EJC54773">transformation of the country</a> from its historic <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10246029.1996.9627810?journalCode=rasr20">shackles of instability</a>, poverty and abuse of fundamental rights.</p>
<h2>What’s wrong</h2>
<p>The fundamental principles on which the current constitution is based are outmoded. It is based, among other things, on a very weak model of separation of powers and <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/ajls/6/1/article-p49_3.xml">checks and balances</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/342972/original/file-20200619-43229-64gt5e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/342972/original/file-20200619-43229-64gt5e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=805&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/342972/original/file-20200619-43229-64gt5e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=805&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/342972/original/file-20200619-43229-64gt5e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=805&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/342972/original/file-20200619-43229-64gt5e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1012&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/342972/original/file-20200619-43229-64gt5e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1012&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/342972/original/file-20200619-43229-64gt5e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1012&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">PM Tom Thabane recently stepped down as Lesotho’s PM.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/MIchael Reynolds</span></span>
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<p>The executive is virtually untrammelled. It appoints and dismisses, almost single-handedly, the heads of security agencies, heads of oversight institutions, and the heads of the superior courts. It even appoints all chief accounting officers in the civil service. </p>
<p>This kind of institutional design is typical of classical <a href="https://parliament.nt.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/379278/The-Westminster-System.pdf">Westminster constitutions</a>. Most of them are cast on monarchical prerogative. Thus, when political power in Lesotho shifted from the palace to cabinet with the 1993 constitution, <a href="http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S2225-71602020000100011&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en">all the prerogatives of the monarch shifted to the Prime Minister</a>. The Prime Minister, therefore, virtually exercises all the erstwhile prerogative powers of the King.</p>
<p>When power is so concentrated in the hands of one person, abuse is inevitable. Indeed, the office of the Prime Minister has been the fulcrum of instability in Lesotho. The successive incumbents have used other state institutions to suppress dissent and perpetuate administrative malfeasance. The army, the parliament, and the judiciary have been the major instruments in this onslaught.</p>
<p>Another fundamental problem with the constitution is that the country has a bad <a href="https://journals.co.za/content/lesotho/23/1/EJC185615">Bill of Rights</a>. All the rights in it are fraught with claw-back clauses, to the extent that the “fundamental rights” it supposedly enshrines are reduced to an empty list of promises.</p>
<p>For instance, section 18 provides for the freedom from discrimination. But it then provides for a long list of limitations to the right. It even outrageously includes one that says freedom from discrimination does not apply to members of the “disciplined forces” such as members of the army, police and correctional services. It also says that the right does not apply when the basis for the violation is customary law. </p>
<p>Effectively, women whose rights are often <a href="http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1727-37812019000100027">suppressed through the use of customary law in Lesotho</a>, can hardly expect meaningful protection of their rights from the Bill of Rights. Most importantly, it excludes social and economic rights. This is despite the fact that Lesotho is trapped in the <a href="https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/least-developed-country-category-lesotho.html">least developed countries category</a>.</p>
<p>The importance of having <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/journals/LDD/1998/9.pdf">enforceable economic rights</a> is that it changes the constitutional orientation of the country entirely, from a liberal constitution to a post-liberal one. A <a href="https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/tlj54&div=4&id=&page=">post-liberal </a> constitution - such as neighbouring South Africa’s - embodies the positive obligations of the state to remedy historical realities. It’s imperative for Lesotho to move in this direction. </p>
<h2>Time for boldness</h2>
<p>There is no amount of gradual change that can remedy these fundamental deficiencies. It’s time for an overhaul of the entire constitution. Its deficiencies are both structural and fundamental. </p>
<p>Lesotho would do well to follow the example set by the likes of <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/SAConstitution-web-eng.pdf">South Africa</a> and <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/kl/index.php?id=398">Kenya</a>, whose constitutional projects became a success. Instead of just tinkering, they bravely adopted completely new constitutions that marked a clear break with the past. </p>
<p>This is the path that Lesotho needs to take. The incremental approach only adds to the already existing confusion about relations between state institutions in the country. That will only amount to an unsustainable patchwork.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/140747/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hoolo 'Nyane does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The fundamental structure of the current constitution, which is cast in classical Westminster conceptions, is unsuited for modern-day constitutionalism.Hoolo 'Nyane, Head of Department, Public and Environmental Law Department, University of LimpopoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1393202020-05-26T14:18:26Z2020-05-26T14:18:26ZLesotho’s new leader faces enormous hurdles ensuring peace and political stability<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/337376/original/file-20200525-106823-ny354.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Lesotho's former Prime Minister Tom Thabane, left, and his successor Moeketsi Majoro, at the latter's swearing in ceremony at the Royal Palace in Maseru.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Molise Molise/AFP-GettyImages</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Tom Thabane (81), the embattled veteran Lesotho politician, has finally bowed to pressure to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/18/world/africa/lesotho-thomas-thabane-resigns.html">resign</a> as the Prime Minister of the politically volatile southern African nation of 2.2 million. This comes at least two years before the end of his term. </p>
<p>But, will his replacement by <a href="https://www.gov.ls/people/honourable-dr-moeketsi-majoro/">Moeketsi Majoro</a> (58) enable Lesotho to move in a more progressive direction? Majoro is an economist, former executive at the International Monetary Fund as well as the country’s former finance minister. He was recently <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-52707752">appointed to lead</a> the governing coalition of the majority <a href="https://www.facebook.com/All-Basotho-Convention-Page-713458675486895/">All Basotho Convention</a>, and the <a href="https://www.facebook.com/groups/258295724248074/">Democratic Congress of Lesotho</a>, ahead of Thabane’s resignation.</p>
<p>The Thabane <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/will-ramaphosas-new-reform-timetable-save-thabanes-skin">saga</a>, revolving around allegations that he was party to a conspiracy to murder his then estranged wife, and that his new wife interferes in state matters, has been dragging on for more than a year. </p>
<p>These events have fed into a the raging political conflict within his ruling party, All Basotho Convention, and its governing coalition with the Democratic Congress of Lesotho. This has provided a major distraction to any attempt to address the country’s <a href="https://theodora.com/wfbcurrent/lesotho/lesotho_economy.html">massive developmental problems</a>. </p>
<p>But, setting Lesotho on a significantly different political trajectory will not be easy.</p>
<p>Majoro’s installation as Prime Minister is welcome. But it does not guarantee much needed political stability in an era of complex coalition politics in which none of Lesotho’s parties has a clear majority. Nor does it guarantee internal peace when the military and police both remain significant political players, with linkages to different political parties and actors.</p>
<p>Questions have correctly been posed whether Majoro, a technocrat with a great deal of international experience, has the political skills to hold his governing coalition together. For the moment, Thabane remains leader of the All Basotho Congress, and cannot be guaranteed to lend his support to the new government.</p>
<h2>Balancing act</h2>
<p>Thabane can be expected to use his position to try to secure <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-lesothos-constitution-says-about-immunity-for-a-sitting-prime-minister-133089">immunity for himself from prosecution</a> for his alleged role in the murder of his estranged wife, Lipopelo Thabane (58). She was shot dead in <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2017-06-15-estranged-wife-of-lesothos-incoming-pm-shot-dead/">June 2017</a> - two days before he was sworn in as the Prime Minister. Maesaiah Liabiloe Ramoholi (42), the woman he was living with at the time, and eventually married, is <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-lesothos-constitution-says-about-immunity-for-a-sitting-prime-minister-133089">on trial for the murder</a>. Thabane was also later charged with the murder.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-efforts-to-stabilise-lesotho-have-failed-less-intervention-may-be-more-effective-137499">South Africa's efforts to stabilise Lesotho have failed. Less intervention may be more effective</a>
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<p>Majoro must know that if he concedes this immunity, he will lose a great deal of domestic and global credibility. But if doesn’t show some leniency he may lose the support of a disgruntled element of his party which continues to back Thabane.</p>
<p>How this plays out may influence whether Majoro can secure the leadership of the party at its next congress, expected in February 2021. </p>
<p>This may not be plain sailing. One of the big factors will be the willingness of the deputy leader of the party, Nqosa Mahao, to support him. </p>
<p>Mahao defeated Majoro for leadership position in the party in February 2020. Though both will now want Thabane out of the way (a conviction in court would be convenient), it’s not clear whether they will work cooperatively together.</p>
<h2>Key challenges</h2>
<p>Beyond the immediate political problems, there are three major issues which need to be confronted. One is whether the country’s electoral system can be restructured to render the political landscape more predictable. Another is whether a recent tendency for the judiciary to be politicised can be reversed. A third is whether the political entanglements of the police and military can be neutralised. </p>
<p>To appreciate how difficult this may be, it is necessary to
recall that Lesotho is governed by a small elite (military and judicial as well as political), whose members’ knowledge of each other and their families often goes back decades. </p>
<p>In a country where <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2019/12/18/lesotho-reduces-poverty-but-nearly-half-of-the-population-remains-poor">poverty is intense</a> and resources are so few, personal feuds can easily translate into political issues.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/will-ramaphosas-new-reform-timetable-save-thabanes-skin">National Dialogue process</a>, launched in 2015 under the auspices of the Southern African Development Community, has led to proposals for electoral reform. Introduced in 2002, Lesotho’s <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/272466990_The_Case_of_Lesotho's_Mixed_Member_Proportional_System">Mixed Member Proportional electoral system</a> combines <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/0/first-past-the-post-voting-explained/">first-past-the-post</a> constituency elections with a national list <a href="http://www.elections.org.za/content/Elections/Election-types/">proportional representation system </a> to ensure proportionality of party representation.</p>
<p>But, its outcomes have been undermined by politicians crossing the floor for personal advantage, upsetting the intended proportionality and encouraging fragmentation of political parties. The Southern African Development Community has now proposed that such floor crossing should be banned, and parties should obtain a minimum proportion of the vote before they secure representation in parliament.</p>
<p>The real issue still to be resolved is how to form political parties which are genuinely constructed around political programmes rather than personal ambitions.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/events-in-lesotho-point-to-poor-prospects-for-political-stability-130498">Events in Lesotho point to poor prospects for political stability</a>
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<p>Lesotho’s political parties have often sought to resolve their problems by directing them to the courts. Most recently, the battle for control of the All Basotho Convention led to Thabane throwing his weight behind Acting Chief Justice ‘Maseforo Mahase, whose curious rulings in Thabane’s favour were to be <a href="http://lestimes.com/court-of-appeal-slams-shocking-justice-mahase-conduct/">thrown out by the Court of Appeal</a>, amid popular accusations of her political bias.</p>
<p>It seems unlikely, with Thabane out of the way, that Mahase will now be
confirmed in her position. But, Majoro will need to avoid the temptation of securing the appointment of a crony as the Chief Justice. Prior to Thabane’s politicking, the judiciary had more or less been kept above the political fray. This neutrality now needs to be restored.</p>
<p>Yet the major problem confronting stability in Lesotho is presented by the military and police. They have been a <a href="https://media.africaportal.org/documents/The_Lesotho_Election.pdf">major factor</a> in the country’s politics, stretching back to 1970, when the then Police Mobile Unit backed Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan to <a href="https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/lesotho-1966-present/">overthrow the adverse results</a> of the first post-independence election. </p>
<h2>Headache for new PM</h2>
<p>The military’s penchant for <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-lesotho-could-abandon-its-army-and-put-the-money-to-better-use-106179">direct intervention in the political</a> arena has been curtailed by the insistence of South Africa, Southern African the Development Community, and the African Union that <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-a-chance-for-the-au-to-refine-support-for-countries-in-crisis-118463">the legitimacy of coups will not be accepted</a>. But this has not stopped governments seeking protection from political opponents by forging strong links with the senior military. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-lesotho-could-abandon-its-army-and-put-the-money-to-better-use-106179">How Lesotho could abandon its army and put the money to better use</a>
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<p>In an era of unstable government coalitions, this has itself become a source of major tension, with incoming governments seeking to counter-balance military leaderships left over by the previous government by cosying up to the police. Determined efforts to neutralise the military have been made via training programmes carried out by, among others, South Africa, the Southern African the Development Community, India, Britain and Zimbabwe. None have yet succeeded.</p>
<p>For all that Majoro may want attend to tackling Covid-19 and the economy, his
biggest headache may yet turn out to be the army.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/139320/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall has previously received research funding from the National Research Foundation</span></em></p>Moeketsi Majoro’s installation as Prime Minister is welcome. But it does not guarantee much needed political stability in an era of complex coalition politics.Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1374992020-05-05T13:51:38Z2020-05-05T13:51:38ZSouth Africa’s efforts to stabilise Lesotho have failed. Less intervention may be more effective<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/332360/original/file-20200504-83721-1pxbc0p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Lesotho's embattled prime minister deployed troops onto the streets in April, ostensibly to 'restore order'.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Molise Molise/AFP-GettyImages</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Lesotho has been plagued by political <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-lesothos-in-such-a-mess-and-what-can-be-done-about-it-79678">instability</a> since its return to democracy in 1993. </p>
<p>Throughout this period, South Africa, often under the auspices of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), has intervened on numerous occasions to steady the political situation in its small, landlocked neighbour. Unfortunately, its frequent involvement in Lesotho’s politics has not helped the mountain kingdom achieve lasting peace. Instead, it has had the unintended consequence of encouraging Basotho politicians to act in intransigent and inflammatory ways.</p>
<p>During the most recent South African attempt to calm conflict in the kingdom, President Cyril Ramaphosa <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/sa-brokers-deal-for-lesotho-prime-minister-tom-thabanes-dignified-retirement-46942711">dispatched a delegation</a> headed by former minister Jeff Radebe to Maseru, the capital. Radebe’s visit came in response to the decision by the embattled prime minister, Tom Thabane, to send the army onto the streets of the capital.</p>
<p>While Thabane claimed the deployment was to restore law and order, his actions are widely seen as an attempt to cling to power and avoid prosecution for his alleged role in the <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/africa/2020-02-24-thabane-finally-in-court-in-connection-with-murder-of-his-wife/">murder of his estranged wife</a>. </p>
<p>South Africa’s intervention seems to have temporarily quieted this recent crisis. But it will do nothing to alleviate the long-term problems that cause instability in the country. In fact, it may worsen them. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-lesothos-constitution-says-about-immunity-for-a-sitting-prime-minister-133089">What Lesotho's constitution says about immunity for a sitting prime minister</a>
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<p>There are a number of reasons for Lesotho’s <a href="https://saiia.org.za/research/lesotho-in-2019-looking-back-to-find-a-way-forward/">chronic instability</a>, including unhealthy civil-military relations, parliamentary rules that encourage the formation of factions, a small and moribund economy that makes holding political office one of the most profitable positions in the country, and a culture of combative politics. </p>
<p>Another factor that aggravates political tensions in Lesotho is the role recurring South African interventions have come to play in the political calculations of competing Basotho actors. While well-intentioned and stabilising in the short term, repeated South African interventions have encouraged the country’s political actors – the government, opposition parties and the monarchy – to spurn compromise and seek conflict.</p>
<h2>Brinkmanship and belligerence</h2>
<p>Over the years Basotho political actors have been willing to risk instability, even violence, to achieve their maximum positions. This is in part because they have come to expect that if political confrontation in Lesotho skids toward violent confrontation, or reform efforts grind to a halt, South Africa will step in. </p>
<p>Over the past 27 years all of Lesotho’s political actors have at one point or another either requested or engaged in provocative behaviour that induces their larger neighbour’s involvement in the hope that the power of Pretoria will help them prevail over domestic rivals.</p>
<p>The result is continued brinkmanship and belligerence. Political scientists Timothy Crawford and Alan Kuperman <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=jdO3AwAAQBAJ&pg=PR10&lpg=PR10&dq=long-term+history+of+intervention+in+a+state+perpetuates+its+instability.&source=bl&ots=E_EvhqreWC&sig=ACfU3U0pVPaZIGM5ydhc24dxd2ArBnKnhg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjEu971npzpAhV3ShUIHUrYB9QQ6AEwAHoECAoQAQ#v=onepage&q=long-term%20history%20of%20intervention%20in%20a%20state%20perpetuates%20its%20instability.&f=false">describe this as</a> “chronic moral hazard”, a situation in which a</p>
<blockquote>
<p>long-term history of intervention in a state perpetuates its instability.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>History of conflict</h2>
<p>There is a long history of South Africa intervening in Lesotho’s politics. In the early 1990s democratic transitions in both Lesotho and South Africa held out promise for greater peace both within and between these two countries. </p>
<p>In Lesotho, that hope was immediately undercut. Early in 1994 a conflict within the country’s military broke out. Fighting between two factions of the defence force escalated and gun fire was exchanged across Maseru. </p>
<p>Desperate for help, prime minister Ntsu Mokhehle wrote to the South African president, FW de Klerk, asking that he dispatch</p>
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<p>a peacekeeping force to Maseru, in order to separate the two sides in the army who are definitely on a bloody collision course…</p>
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<p>After discussions with South Africa’s presumptive future president, Nelson Mandela, De Klerk demurred. Instead, <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/king-of-lesotho-told-he-must-reverse-coup-1378683.html">intense diplomatic intervention by Southern African Development Community</a> helped to temporarily steady Lesotho’s precarious politics.</p>
<p>But a pernicious precedent was set. When confronted with domestic problems Lesotho’s political actors would look for assistance beyond their borders, rather than seek to compromise with their compatriots. This dynamic has manifested itself many times since. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/332364/original/file-20200504-83730-8ww4mc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/332364/original/file-20200504-83730-8ww4mc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/332364/original/file-20200504-83730-8ww4mc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/332364/original/file-20200504-83730-8ww4mc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/332364/original/file-20200504-83730-8ww4mc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/332364/original/file-20200504-83730-8ww4mc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/332364/original/file-20200504-83730-8ww4mc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Lesotho’s prime minister, Tom Thabane.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Gianluigi Guercia/AFP-GettyImages</span></span>
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<p>In August 1998, with protests over a contested election in Lesotho mounting, King Letsie III asked Mandela, who was by then president of South Africa, to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10220461.2019.1585282?src=recsys&journalCode=rsaj20">help resolve the situation</a>. South Africa’s attempted solution, a Southern African Development Community commission to look into the elections, was inconclusive. A mutiny in Lesotho’s military compounded the <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-09-19-mandela-and-military-force-its-use-is-determined-by-the-situation/">crisis</a>. </p>
<p>In September 1998 prime minister Pakalitha Mosisili <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10220461.2019.1585282?src=recsys&journalCode=rsaj20">asked that Southern African Development Community leaders</a></p>
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<p>put together quickly a strong military intervention to help Lesotho return to normalcy.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The ensuing regional intervention force did restore stability, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1998/09/23/world/tiny-neighbor-gives-south-african-army-rude-surprise.html">but at a high cost</a>. About 90 lives were lost and Maseru, Mohale’s Hoek and Mafeteng incurred heavy damage. </p>
<p>In August 2014, after an attempted coup against Thabane, he fled to South Africa. He then called on Pretoria to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/01/lesotho-tom-thabane-south-africa">send troops</a> to stabilise Lesotho. </p>
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<em>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/lesothos-prime-minister-plays-for-time-but-the-end-beckons-137410">Lesotho's prime minister plays for time. But the end beckons</a>
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<p>These are only the most dramatic examples of how South Africa – and the Southern African Development Community – have been sucked into Lesotho’s politics.</p>
<p>A more mundane but no less important example is <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/will-ramaphosas-new-reform-timetable-save-thabanes-skin">the much-delayed Roadmap for Reforms and National Dialogue</a>. South Africa’s former deputy chief justice, <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/moseneke-outlines-lesotho-peace-plans-16159383">Dikgang Moseneke</a>, is doing his best to shepherd this toward completion. </p>
<h2>The alternative</h2>
<p>It will be difficult for South Africa to alter this damaging dynamic because it has an important national interest in preserving stability in Lesotho. </p>
<p>The Lesotho Highlands Water Project provides Gauteng, South Africa’s economic hub, with much of its <a href="http://www.lhda.org.ls/lhdaweb">water</a>. For this supply to continue, there needs to be relative stability in Lesotho. </p>
<p>What’s more, insecurity in Lesotho would spill into South Africa. It could lead to problems like the diffusion of weapons and an increase in criminality.</p>
<p>One strategy South Africa can adopt is to limit its interventions to situations that truly threaten to escalate into violence. This approach runs contrary to the <a href="https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/ISS_Africa-policybrief103.pdf">African Union’s emphasis on conflict prevention</a>. But it has the virtue of forcing the country’s leaders to find compromise themselves or deal with the consequences if they don’t. </p>
<p>The key to this strategy is good intelligence. South African officials must have the necessary information to discern when a political crisis in Lesotho will burst into violent conflict. </p>
<p>Stepping back in all but the most extreme cases would be a major departure from past South African policies. It has potential downsides if a political crisis in the kingdom unexpectedly spins out of control. But it might be worth a try – more than a quarter century of close South African involvement has brought Lesotho no closer to stability.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/137499/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christopher Williams does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>South Africa’s numerous interventions in Lesotho contribute to the acrimonious nature of its political culture.Christopher Williams, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1374102020-04-29T12:33:08Z2020-04-29T12:33:08ZLesotho’s prime minister plays for time. But the end beckons<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/331050/original/file-20200428-110770-nrahb3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Tom Thabane, prime minister of Lesotho, during a recent visit to Ethiopia.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Minasse Wondimu Hailu/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Recent reports saying Lesotho’s prime minister, Tom Thabane, has agreed to an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/20/lesotho-pm-thomas-thabane-stand-down-sides-agree-dignified-retirement">immediate retirement</a> are proving premature. He has now made it plain that <a href="https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/africa/2020-04-20-lesotho-pm-accused-of-using-army-to-hang-on-to-power/">he’s going nowhere</a> and is continuing to play for time to ensure his personal safety. This has been phrased as the need to guarantee him a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/lesotho-government-commits-secure-retirement-pm-200420152612118.html">“dignified and secure retirement”</a>.</p>
<p>We may presume that Thabane will be insisting that this will provide him with a guarantee of immunity from prosecution for his alleged role in the murder of his estranged first wife <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-51571405">Lipolelo Thabane</a>. But those wanting him out of office are seemingly not prepared to commit themselves to that – yet.</p>
<p>Lipolelo Thabane was shot dead in <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2017-06-15-estranged-wife-of-lesothos-incoming-pm-shot-dead/">June 2017</a>, two days before Tom Thabane’s inauguration as prime minister of the tiny kingdom, which is completely landlocked by South Africa. He was, at the time, involved in a relationship with the woman he was later to marry. His new wife, Maesaiah Thabane, was charged with Lipolelo’s murder <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-51387964">in February this year</a>. The prime minister was later <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2020/02/24/lesotho-pm-thabane-appears-in-maseru-court-after-friday-no-show">also charged with the murder</a>. </p>
<p>The long running crisis surrounding Thabane came to a head after he deployed the army on the streets of the capital, Maseru, on the weekend of 18-19 April. He claimed this was necessary to restore order against <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/lesothos-embattled-pm-thomas-thabane-deploys-army-to-streets-46880264">“rogue elements”</a> wanting to destabilise the nation. </p>
<p>Yet this was manifestly a move by Thabane to strengthen his hand and defy the recent agreement around his immediate departure. This is a bad move for democracy in the country and people’s trust in its institutions.</p>
<h2>Dramatic developments</h2>
<p>The deployment of the army followed dramatic political developments.</p>
<p>Firstly, coalition partners and major figures within Thabane’s own All Basotho Congress challenged his earlier decision, without consultation, to <a href="https://africanlii.org/article/20200409/controversial-lesotho-pm-prorogues-parliament%2C-gets-taken-court">suspend parliament</a> over the coronavirus pandemic. The constitutional court ruled that his decision was <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2020/04/18/lesotho-concourt-found-thabane-acted-irrationally-in-suspending-parliament">“irrational” and unconstitutional</a>.</p>
<p>The court’s decision meant that all bills that were pending before parliament could be concluded. These include a constitutional amendment that strips the prime minister of powers to unilaterally dissolve parliament and call for elections if he <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/lesotho-government-commits-secure-retirement-pm-200420152612118.html">loses a vote of no confidence</a>. Passage of the amendment would enable the national assembly to force Thabane to resign in the event he lost such a vote of no confidence.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-lesothos-constitution-says-about-immunity-for-a-sitting-prime-minister-133089">What Lesotho's constitution says about immunity for a sitting prime minister</a>
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<p>Secondly, in March the high court of Lesotho interdicted Thabane’s earlier suspension of the commissioner of police, <a href="http://lestimes.com/court-blocks-fresh-attempt-to-oust-molibeli/">Holomolo Molibeli</a>. The police chief had been spearheading the investigation into <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/police-chief-links-lesotho-pm-in-murder-of-own-wife-20200106">Thabane’s alleged involvement</a> in the murder of his estranged wife. The court had <a href="http://sundayexpress.co.ls/court-blocks-thabanes-bid-to-suspend-molibeli/">ruled the suspension invalid</a>.</p>
<p>The deployment of the army was accompanied by Thabane’s order of the arrest of the police commissioner, his deputy Paseka Mokete, and assistant commissioner Beleme Lebajoa by military police. Thabane claimed the move was necessary to facilitate investigations against the police boss, after a case of perjury had been filed against him by one of his subordinates. But in a move which indicated the increasing fragility of Thabane’s hold on power, Lesotho defence force commander Lt General Mojalefa Letsoela defied orders to arrest the trio of senior police.</p>
<h2>Yes he will, no he won’t</h2>
<p>With his hands full managing the coronavirus crisis in his own country, South African president Cyril Ramaphosa – charged by the Southern African Development Community with mediating political tensions in Lesotho – cannot have been pleased with this latest distraction. </p>
<p>But he may be forgiven if he regarded Thabane’s latest attempts as a blatant attempt to thwart democracy and stay in power courtesy of the army. In a country which has seen multiple <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-lesotho-could-abandon-its-army-and-put-the-money-to-better-use-106179">military coups and attempted coups</a>, this was clearly a major threat to peace and order in Lesotho.</p>
<p>Accordingly, Ramaphosa immediately dispatched a former senior minister, Jeff Radebe, as his envoy to help defuse the latest crisis.</p>
<p>Matters moved fast, and Radebe was enabled to swiftly announce agreement by the coalition government and political parties that Thabane would be allowed a dignified retirement. </p>
<p>It was reported that Thabane would <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/20/lesotho-pm-thomas-thabane-stand-down-sides-agree-dignified-retirement">stand down immediately</a>. But days later, he was stating that he would <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lesotho-politics/lesotho-pm-shows-no-signs-of-leaving-to-defuse-crisis-idUSKCN225330">not be pushed out of office before he was ready</a>.</p>
<p>Power is visibly draining away from Thabane. But, even close to 81 years old, he remains a wily operator, and it would seem that he is determined to cause maximum trouble to secure his immunity from prosecution.</p>
<p>He already has an application before the constitutional court challenging the constitutionality of the bringing of murder charges <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-51615327">against a sitting prime minister</a>. No date has been set for the outcome. But it may be reckoned that Thabane calculates that retaining his power until that time will assist his cause.</p>
<p>He may be hoping that his deputy prime minister, Monyane Moleleki, leader of his main coalition partner, the Alliance of Democrats, will manage to cobble together a successor coalition along with other political parties, notably the Basotho National Party and the Reformed Congress of Lesotho. Such a coalition might then offer Thabane the protection he’s seeking. But the chances of Moleleki succeeding him remain thin. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/events-in-lesotho-point-to-poor-prospects-for-political-stability-130498">Events in Lesotho point to poor prospects for political stability</a>
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<p>Following his suspension of parliament, the majority of MPs within his own party signed a memorandum of understanding with the opposition Democratic Congress, which has 26 MPs, to vote together to elect a successor to Thabane, and to form a new coalition. </p>
<p>Although it is reckoned that Thabane retains the support of around 18 MPs from his own party, this would not be enough to save him from a defeat in parliament, and being forced to resign.</p>
<p>What happens next remains unclear. But what’s certain is that Thabane’s latest antics are further undermining the trust of the Basotho people in their political institutions and the politicians who control them.</p>
<p>It also risks the danger that incumbent prime ministers will be able to “get away with murder” – literally.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/137410/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall has previously received funding from the National Research Foundation</span></em></p>Power is visibly draining away from Tom Thabane. But, even at 80 years old, he remains a wily operator, and seems determined to cause maximum trouble to secure his immunity from prosecution.Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1270402019-12-04T15:18:26Z2019-12-04T15:18:26ZTelling the complex story of ‘medical xenophobia’ in South Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/304709/original/file-20191202-67002-r5vx8b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">People affected by xenophobic violence queue prior to being transported back to their countries from Johannesburg, South Africa. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kim Ludbrook/EPA-EFE</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The phrase <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1369183X.2013.830504">“medical xenophobia”</a> is often used to describe the negative attitudes and practices of South African health care professionals towards refugees and migrants. It is used whenever foreign nationals are denied access to any medical treatment or care. </p>
<p><a href="https://samponline.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Acrobat54.pdf">Research</a> on migration and health in South Africa has documented public health care providers as indiscriminately practising “medical xenophobia”. But this dominant, single narrative around migrants and health care is misleading. </p>
<p>My recent <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0309-7">research</a> showed that there was more complexity, ambivalence and a range of possible experiences of non-nationals in South Africa’s public health care system. I conducted the research in a public health clinic in Musina, a small town on the border of South Africa and Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>I found that frontline health care workers provided services, including HIV treatment, to black African migrants who are often at the receiving end of <a href="https://ewn.co.za/video/10839/state-of-nation--xenophobic-violence-in-south-africa">xenophobic sentiment and violence</a>. This was in spite of several institutional and policy-related challenges. </p>
<p>Discretion and innovation played a crucial role in inclusive health care delivery to migrants in a country marred by high xenophobic sentiment. This was because health care providers subscribed to an ethos of what was right for the patient. </p>
<h2>Public health and individual discretion</h2>
<p>There are a few issues with the current framing of “medical xenophobia”. First, the focus on attitudes – and not health care delivery – reflects a particular generalisation of how health providers are perceived to treat African migrants in South Africa.</p>
<p>This framing does not consider challenges facing the health system. These include shortages of medical personnel. Many migrants seeking care in South Africa’s public health system do <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/12/07/no-healing-here/violence-discrimination-and-barriers-health-migrants-south-africa">face challenges</a> arising from being “foreigners”. But there are <a href="https://genderjustice.org.za/card/refugees-migrants-and-health-care-in-south-africa-explained/the-reality-of-accessing-healthcare-in-south-africa/">other grounds</a> beyond citizenship or legal status on which medical care might be denied. Not all cases of poor treatment are “medical xenophobia”.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25875464">South Africans also face challenges</a> with the public health care system. These are related to the <a href="https://health-e.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/A-disposable-workforce-Foreign-health-professionals-in-the-South-African-public-service.pdf">general shortages of nurses and doctors</a>. <a href="http://ftp.bhfglobal.com/files/bhf/overview1994-2010.pdf">Other challenges</a> include high bed occupancy, high workload, low morale among nurses in public health facilities and the burden of the HIV pandemic.</p>
<p>Second, existing policy responses to communicable diseases in South Africa and the southern African region <a href="https://journals.co.za/content/journal/10520/EJC-c80eeea50">do not adequately cater for migrants</a>. For example, treatment guidelines in South Africa <a href="http://www.samj.org.za/index.php/samj/article/view/10210">have been found to be incomplete or inapplicable to migrant patients</a>. Policies and programmes in the Southern African Development Community on communicable diseases such as HIV do not extend to migrant patients.</p>
<p>Health care providers often have to operate within these institutional, bureaucratic and policy constraints. </p>
<p>This scenario makes frontline discretion unavoidable. Health care providers have to rely on their own judgement to determine what “best practices” to invoke with relatively little input or interference from other institutions.</p>
<p>In spite of these challenges, frontline health care providers were doing their best to provide health services to black African migrants. They bypassed institutional and policy-related barriers to registering and treating undocumented migrants, non-native speaking migrants and migrants without referral letters.</p>
<p>This suggests that the experiences of non-nationals in South Africa’s public health care system were more complex and varied than implied by the dominant discourse on “medical xenophobia”. </p>
<p>It is true that some health care providers stereotyped migrant patients and blamed them for their destitution. But my research showed that these stereotypes didn’t directly translate to the exclusion of migrant patients from health care services. This was because of the health workers’ strong professional conduct and an awareness of the public health implications of not providing migrant patients with HIV treatment. </p>
<h2>Working around the system</h2>
<p>Health care providers in the clinic I visited came up with a system of using the date of birth to identify and keep a record of undocumented migrant patients. This replaced the 13-digit South African identity number, which is normally used to open patient files. Several of them used notions of morality, ethics and public service to frame their decision making. They understood health care to be a right for everyone, in line with <a href="https://section27.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/Chapter2.pdf">Section 27</a> of the country’s constitution.</p>
<p>Others provided HIV treatment to migrant patients without referral letters.
This decision was also mediated by how patients professed their “belonging” through “alternative” forms of knowledge and expertise. For example, one nurse claimed that she only provided anteretroviral therapy if migrant patients demonstrated knowledge of their medication, or if they brought a medicine container for a refill. </p>
<p>Health care providers reported difficulties interacting with migrant patients who spoke Swahili, French, Portuguese or Chewa. <a href="https://40000wordstogo.wordpress.com/2016/11/07/vamwe-havahwi-others-do-not-understand-towards-an-understanding-of-the-politics-of-deference-and-inclusion/">Staff and local patients worked together</a> to ensure that migrant patients accessed health care services, often in extremely demanding circumstances. Health care providers made the effort to connect with migrant patients through informal interpreters by asking co-workers or patients fluent in these non-native languages to translate in English or other native languages.</p>
<p>These health care providers didn’t use language, documentation and referral letters to discriminate against migrant patients. They used innovation, creativity and compromise to provide services to migrant patients living with HIV.</p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>Policymakers need to recognise the importance of human relationships, communication networks, leadership and motivation in strengthening the country’s ailing public health system. </p>
<p>More crucially, activists need to identify the informal, inclusive and innovative practices of health care providers in addressing challenges related to documentation, referrals and language. </p>
<p>This should be coupled with calls to strengthen and invest in these grassroots responses to build greater solidarity. This is what can be done while waiting for policymakers to respond to ongoing calls for public health care systems to adequately engage with mobility.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/127040/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kudakwashe Vanyoro does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The experiences of non-nationals in South Africa’s public health care system are more complex and varied than implied by the dominant discourse on “medical xenophobia”Kudakwashe Vanyoro, Research Communications Officer and Doctoral Researcher at the African Centre for Migration & Society, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1211442019-07-31T11:40:52Z2019-07-31T11:40:52ZMigration and health: what southern Africa needs to do to plug the gaps<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/286437/original/file-20190731-186797-5rimkj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>A global commission <a href="https://www.migrationandhealth.org/">on health and migration</a> has released its report on how health care systems fail migrants. The aim is to provide the basis for evidence-based approaches to policy. The <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(18)32114-7/fulltext">report</a> calls on civil society, academics, and policy makers to maximise the benefits and reduce the costs of migration on health. Ina Skosana asked three of the commissioners to explain what the report found on the challenges facing countries in southern Africa.</em></p>
<p><strong>What do we know about migration and health in South Africa and regionally? Why is there a concern?</strong></p>
<p>Both internal and cross-border migrants play a crucial role in sustaining household livelihoods and bolstering the South African economy. The concern is two-fold. The first is to strengthen health systems to serve both host populations and internal migrants most effectively. The second is to ensure a public health system that is capable – despite resource constraints – of responding humanely and effectively to cross-border migrants. </p>
<p>But, in reality, we know far less than we should to design effective health systems. This is surprising since the South African mining economy – and to a degree, regional economies – rested for decades on a web of coercive labour legislation designed to ensure the supply of low-wage migrant workers. Levels of temporary (often labour) migration remain as high as they were before South Africa become a democracy in 1994. </p>
<p>The profile of internal labour migrants is changing. The majority are men. But growing numbers of younger women are migrating to join the labour force, many leaving young children in the care of family members. </p>
<p><strong>Are health systems prepared to deal with the movement of people within and across borders?</strong></p>
<p>As the commission report explains, health systems are generally structured around nation-states. This means that migration, especially mobility across national borders, can lead to challenges. For one thing, access is critical. Aspects of access include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Patient engagement. This covers the social and cultural preparedness of public health systems to serve migrants and families, whether internal or cross-border. Practitioners’ sensitivity to the beliefs and practices of others shouldn’t be assumed. It can be learned. Patient engagement is thus closely tied to:</p></li>
<li><p>Clinical competence. Clinicians are trained to provide care to all patients, irrespective of background, who present to their clinic, ward or surgery. But
cross-cultural awareness is vital to effective history taking and clinical examination. This is true whether care is provided by a nurse, doctor or allied professional. Similarly, treatment prescription, adherence to medication and suggesting changes in behaviour to lower personal risk depend on quality communication between practitioner and patient.</p></li>
<li><p>System preparedness. A major challenge to health systems is continuity of care. This holds for both mobile and settled populations especially when – as increasingly happens – patients present with chronic or long-term conditions. Examples include those affecting the vascular system (like strokes), the metabolic system (notably diabetes), infections (TB) or mental ill-health (such as depression). </p></li>
</ul>
<p>In South Africa, the lack of a common identity number to support care provision means that internal migrants – a substantial proportion of the adult population – tend to access episodic rather than continuous care. This has serious consequences for the clinical management of conditions like hypertension, diabetes or HIV/AIDS.</p>
<p>Key competencies are also needed for care of special groups like adolescents and older people. </p>
<p>Altogether, this is a major challenge for South Africa’s health and medical training institutions. The upside is that, if addressed effectively, both host and migrant populations will benefit. </p>
<p><strong>Are there countries that are worse or better off? And why?</strong></p>
<p>Good examples of migrant-inclusive health systems exist. But there’s no mechanism to systematically review practices and outcomes. This makes it difficult to compare country experiences and recommend models. The World Health Organisation and World Bank have <a href="https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/174536/9789241564977_eng.pdf;jsessionid=70D75BA9866B150F75A9C2CDF8270B90?sequence=1">implemented a global system</a> to track progress in universal health coverage. But coverage for migrants, refugees and other mobile populations is not part of that process. </p>
<p>Countries that have ensured migrant health is high on the public health agenda include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p><a href="https://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/italy/reception-conditions/health-care">Italy</a>. Despite the profoundly divisive political debate underway, the right to health for migrants is enshrined in Italy’s Constitution. Irregular migrants can access essential health services anonymously and free of charge. They are also entitled to preventive care, including maternity and chronic conditions. Health promotion campaigns, interpreters and cultural mediators are widely used to overcome barriers.</p></li>
<li><p>Sri Lanka. The country launched an inclusive <a href="http://srilanka.iom.int/iom/?q=pbn/national-migration-health-policy-launched-sri-lanka">National Migration Health Policy</a> in 2013. Restrictions that might limit access by non-citizens have been removed. Community health services that are provided free to Sri Lankans are also available to migrants and refugees, including immunisations, antenatal and emergency care. Sri Lanka has promoted the migration and health agenda regionally, globally and at the highest political level.</p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://thailand.iom.int/sites/default/files/document/publications/Thailand%20Report%202019_22012019_LowRes.pdf">Thailand</a>. Undocumented migrants can buy low-cost subsidised health insurance once they’re registered with government under the One Stop Service Policy. Using the Health Insurance Card Scheme, migrants can access free care in public hospitals; similarly, the uninsured can access services but at a cost.</p></li>
</ul>
<p><strong>How will the Commission’s findings contribute to the improvement of the situation faced by migrants?</strong></p>
<p>First, we expect the findings to focus attention – at national level, in the sustainable development community and among regional and international bodies such as the UN – on migration health as a public health priority, an issue as relevant to internal migrants as it is to cross-border migration.</p>
<p>Second, the Commission documents clearly that those who migrate tend to be healthier than their resident counterparts and, in general, contribute meaningfully to local economic development, a priority for South Africa where jobs and employment are critical concerns.</p>
<p>Third, where cross-border or international migrants have experienced great hardship, an effective response by health care systems is called for. This will also benefit host communities, and may traverse the range of conditions from infections to mental health.</p>
<p>Fourth, a migrant-prepared health care system is likely to be more effective for all patients and conditions. This will boost public sector care for all users in South Africa. Quality of care will benefit from extending rather than restricting engagement with migrant communities.</p>
<p>Fifth, there are complexities and trade-offs given human resource, health system and funding constraints. But it’s better to have these foster concerted efforts by public sector leadership and stakeholders to optimise care in the spirit of universal health coverage, than to exclude communities with palpable needs.</p>
<p><em>Nyovani Madise, director of research and development policy at the African Institute for Development Policy, contributed to this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/121144/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Tollman receives funding from the SAMRC, Dept of Science and Technology SA, National Institutes of Health USA, UK Medical Research Council, and (previously) Wellcome Trust UK. He is affiliated with the SA Population Research Infrastructure Network (SAPRIN) and INDEPTH Network of population-based health and socio-demographic information systems.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Miriam Orcutt is the coordinator of the UCL-LANCET commission on health and migration. She also sits on the steering committee of the Syria public health network
</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Davide Mosca does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Health systems are generally structured around nation-states. Migration, especially across national borders, therefore leads to challenges.Stephen Tollman, Director: MRC/Wits Rural Public Health and Health Transitions Research Unit (Agincourt), University of the WitwatersrandDavide Mosca, Honorary Associate Professor, UCLMiriam Orcutt, Migration and Health Research Associate, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1211512019-07-31T10:32:44Z2019-07-31T10:32:44ZSouthern Africa needs better health care for women and girls on the move<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/286285/original/file-20190730-186829-tfwls0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Women and girls on the move are often framed as victims. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Women are on the move throughout southern Africa. They move within the countries they were born in, or cross borders in the region. Although more men than women migrate the data shows that the number of women migrating within the Southern African Development Community region <a href="https://www.odi.org/publications/10476-women-move-migration-gender-equality-and-2030-agenda-sustainable-development">is rising</a>. The percentage of female migrants moving within southern Africa increased from <a href="https://www.un.org/development/desa/publications/international-migration-report-2017.html">40.9% in 2000 to 44.5% in 2017</a>. </p>
<p>There are many reasons why women move within the region, and many different ways in which they do so. In line with global trends, they do so mostly for economic reasons. These include searching for better education and work opportunities.</p>
<p>But there’s a limited understanding of migrant women’s complex experiences. And this means that women migrants are often categorised as being vulnerable, and at risk of poor health. While women can – and do, sometimes – face increased risks, this is not the sum of their experiences. </p>
<p>Women are increasingly moving independently. They make choices, strategising to contribute as wage earners and heads of households. But these experiences are often lost. As a result, policy responses and interventions don’t reflect the complex – and nuanced – realities of women on the move.</p>
<p>The 2030 <a href="https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdgs">Sustainable Development Goals</a> – with the aspiration to “leave no one behind” – recognise gender, migration and health as central to the social, economic and environmental dimensions of sustainable development. </p>
<p>But the implementation of the goals presents major and complex challenges in the southern African region, not least due to the high disease burden and increasing levels of inequality. And there are fundamental policy gaps in addressing the health needs of migrants. Where they do exist, gender is inadequately considered. </p>
<p>This was underscored in a <a href="https://genderjustice.org.za/publication/gender-migration-and-health-in-sadc">recent study</a> we undertook in partnership with <a href="https://genderjustice.org.za">Sonke Gender Justice</a>, a non-governmental organisation. Our report explores the gendered dimensions of migration and health across southern Africa. It also examines the ways in which policy and practice has shaped and – in turn – been shaped by migration-related concerns and priorities. </p>
<h2>Mapping the policy terrain</h2>
<p>The study is based on case studies that explored responses in South Africa and Zambia, within the Southern African Development Community region, and more widely within the African Union. This included exploring if responses to migration and health engage with gender, particularly the needs of women and girls in the Southern African Development Community. </p>
<p>In the policy review part of the report, we assessed the extent to which the three issues – mobility, gender and health – were considered in policies at the national, regional and continental level. Key policies, protocols, guidelines and frameworks dealing with these issues were categorised to identify broader, discernible trends.</p>
<p>We identified key gaps in the development and implementation of responses to migration, gender and health. And found that, where responses existed, the gendered dimensions of migration and health were lacking. </p>
<p>In addition, our review found that policies failed to engage with the complexity of the experiences of female migrants. This meant that women are mostly seen as vulnerable and at risk of poor health without recognition of agency, responsibility and choices made.</p>
<p>In some cases, policy and practice were found to directly contradict one another. In South Africa, for example, there’s an increasing shift towards the restriction of international migration, as well as a regression in the right to access healthcare and education despite evidence showing that women need better access and support. </p>
<p>Findings from a policy review and interviews with 20 key informants in South Africa, Zambia, and the region secretariat showed that while key gender issues in relation to migration and health were recognised in policy debates, these didn’t translate into practice. </p>
<p>For example, a number of respondents, highlighted how border restrictions and challenges faced in accessing the documentation required to be in any given country legally can heighten the vulnerabilities faced by women and girls on the move. But shifts in immigration and health policy indicate that women and girls face increasing restrictions. </p>
<p>Overall, five key themes were identified in relation to the responses to migration and health for women and girls in the Southern African Development Community:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>Insufficient policy engagement with migration and health. Where responses do exist, the gendered dimensions were lacking. Responses were mostly driven by non-governmental and international organisations.</p></li>
<li><p>Political agendas and popular perceptions are driving policy-making processes. This includes scapegoating migrants for the poor performance of public health systems. This also means that there is insufficient use of existing evidence in the development of policy responses to migration and health.</p></li>
<li><p>A poor understanding of gender. This was evident in the fact that gender was often equated with women and girls alone without consideration of the needs of male and LGBTIQ+ migrants. Heteronormative assumptions about gender, sexuality and family structures were also prevalent. This included framing migrant women and girls as vulnerable, lacking agency and therefore in need of protection.</p></li>
<li><p>Increasingly restrictive approaches to international migration which include hardening control and security at the borders is making it much harder to safely move across borders and access documentation. This is likely to affect the health and wellbeing of people on the move, including women and girls. </p></li>
<li><p>And limited regional coordination, cooperation, and policy coherence</p></li>
</ol>
<h2>Moving forward</h2>
<p>Currently, policies within the region relating to international migration aim to increase security at national borders. This can have negative implications for women and girls crossing borders, heightening their risk of abuse.</p>
<p>Our findings highlight the need for improved migration and health governance to address the needs of women and girls on the move in the region. This requires effective engagement across different sectors – including state, civil society, academia, international organisations, and the private sector – at multiple levels, from local to global. </p>
<p>The Southern African Development Community struggles to design, coordinate and implement evidence-informed responses at a regional level, member states need to drive their own responses. This requires engagement in bilateral arrangements with neighbouring states to ensure that migration is built into all health responses.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/121151/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jo Vearey receives funding from the Wellcome Trust.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rebecca Walker does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Health responses need to take on board the fact that the number of women and girls migrating across borders as well as within countries is growing.Rebecca Walker, Postdoctoral Fellow at the African Centre for Migration & Society , University of the WitwatersrandJo Vearey, Associate Professor, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.