tag:theconversation.com,2011:/fr/topics/security-legislation-12181/articlesSecurity legislation – The Conversation2014-09-26T04:18:42Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/321032014-09-26T04:18:42Z2014-09-26T04:18:42ZNational security gags on media force us to trust state will do no wrong<p>It has been said that the line between good investigative reporting and inappropriate journalistic prying is never clearly drawn. Journalists usually complain long and hard when governments intervene to move the line. So they will not be impressed with what has happened this week.</p>
<p>In the shadow of the recent anti-terrorism raids across New South Wales and Queensland, the Abbott government has <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/digital-life/consumer-security/terror-laws-clear-senate-enabling-entire-australian-web-to-be-monitored-and-whistleblowers-to-be-jailed-20140926-10m8ih.html">passed legislation</a> (with Labor support) <a href="https://theconversation.com/national-security-bills-compound-existing-threats-to-media-freedom-29946">designed specifically to silence</a> those who would seek to report particular anti-terrorism measures.</p>
<h2>Government can impose blanket of silence</h2>
<p>The relevant law emerges from the <a href="http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/legislation/bills/s969_first-senate/toc_pdf/1417820.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf">National Security Legislation Amendment Bill</a> (No.1) 2014. This amends the <a href="http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2014C00613">ASIO Act 1979</a> by adding a new section 35P (amongst others) to extend existing state and federal prohibitions on the disclosure of information regarding policing for anti-terrorist purposes.</p>
<p>The amendment imposes substantial jail terms (five years) for anyone who discloses information relating to a “special intelligence operation” (SIO). That penalty doubles if there is evidence that the disclosure would endanger the health or safety of any person or prejudice the effective conduct of an SIO. The Senate <a href="http://www.news.com.au/technology/online/spy-laws-passed-in-senate-asio-given-new-powers/story-fnjwmwrh-1227071116071">accepted a Palmer United Party amendment</a> that means anyone who publicly names an ASIO agent could be jailed for up to a decade, a ten-fold increase in the existing penalty.</p>
<p>There is no “public interest” defence. There is no defence that a journalist was not aware that an SIO was even in progress.</p>
<p>Laws designed to limit the reporting of such matters are not new. In the last decade each jurisdiction in Australia has passed legislation that limits publication of information about anti-terrorism orders, or other operations. For example, section 26P of the <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/tpa2002291/">Terrorism (Police Powers) Act 2002 (NSW)</a> gives the NSW Supreme Court (upon application by the government) power to suppress anything to do with a preventative detention order or prohibited contact order.</p>
<p>What is different about the latest legislation is that the silence “blanket” now applies across Australia without the need for a court order.</p>
<h2>History of abuses makes case for transparency</h2>
<p>Respected criminologist Peter Grabosky has contributed an interesting chapter <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2482170">on this subject</a> in a forthcoming book, Unsettling Transparency. In his chapter he writes:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>While hardly anyone would suggest that national security should be managed in an environment of complete transparency, there are many who suggest that citizens of a democracy are entitled to know about acts of questionable propriety that have been committed by their government on their behalf. And prospectively, it is important for citizens to be party to informed discussion about whether the policies that may lead to these acts are misguided or not.</p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/60127/original/n2r9fpnj-1411698403.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/60127/original/n2r9fpnj-1411698403.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/60127/original/n2r9fpnj-1411698403.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/60127/original/n2r9fpnj-1411698403.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/60127/original/n2r9fpnj-1411698403.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/60127/original/n2r9fpnj-1411698403.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/60127/original/n2r9fpnj-1411698403.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The reporting of the Pentagon Papers, exposing lies to the people and Congress about the Vietnam War, wouldn’t happen under our national security laws.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Professor Grabosky analyses five international cases of unauthorised public disclosures of national security information. He concludes that the real harm to the national interest in each of the cases arose not from the initial disclosures, but from the state responses. Richard Nixon’s attempted censorship of the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pentagon_Papers">Pentagon Papers</a>, for example, only invited further opposition to the Vietnam War.</p>
<p>The difficulty for any government that invokes a cloak of secrecy under the claim of “national security” is that it invites suspicion. Is the real agenda to conceal a blunder, to justify a violation of the law, or to pursue a political end?</p>
<p>Remember the famous phrase of Ronald Reagan? “If you knew what I knew.” That rang hollow a decade later when the US government trotted out the same justification for the military pursuit of Saddam Hussein’s alleged “weapons of mass destruction” in the absence of any overt evidence.</p>
<p>In our own corner of the world the tradition continues: on the grounds of <a href="http://www.ag.gov.au/NationalSecurity/Counterterrorismlaw/Pages/default.aspx">“national security”</a> the Australian government continues to refuse to discuss allegations that it engaged in <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-australia-and-timor-leste-in-the-hague-21215">eavesdropping on cabinet ministers</a> of the government of Timor-Leste.</p>
<h2>The need to speak truth to power</h2>
<p>Into this debate come the journalists, those whose natural inquisitiveness aids their scepticism. Are there any ulterior purposes? Are governments exaggerating a threat in order to justify excessive countermeasures?</p>
<p>No-one is able to assess whether the claims are valid, and whether operations are a legitimate use of state power, unless the information is put under public scrutiny. Moreover, in the absence of reliable information, potentially damaging speculation is likely to fill the evidentiary gap.</p>
<p>So where do we go from here? One could suggest that media proprietors’ barristers should head to the High Court and argue that the law violates the <a href="http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22library%2Fprspub%2FT0610%22">freedom of political communication</a> implied in the Constitution, especially if disclosure does not pose a disproportionate threat to public safety.</p>
<p>The legislation, however, does not give any assistance in this respect. And, in the case of <a href="http://www.gtcentre.unsw.edu.au/node/169">Lodhi (2006) NSWSC 571</a>, the NSW Supreme Court held that suppressing evidence such as this was not an unconstitutional restriction on freedom of speech. </p>
<p>One could simply trust governments to do their job, and tell naysayers to desist. But we need to remember that, when officials are confident that they are not under scrutiny, it is not unfair (nor un-Australian) to suspect that some will exercise their power inappropriately. And to determine whether that has occurred we need transparency, not a wall of silence.</p>
<p>Governmental zeal, however justified by the pressures of the day, must be kept in check by the curiosity of a free press.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/32103/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rick Sarre does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It has been said that the line between good investigative reporting and inappropriate journalistic prying is never clearly drawn. Journalists usually complain long and hard when governments intervene to…Rick Sarre, Professor in Law, University of South AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/300952014-09-24T05:55:51Z2014-09-24T05:55:51ZBill targets foreign fighters before departure and after return<p>The Abbott government has today introduced the second tranche of its national security amendments – the <a href="http://www.attorneygeneral.gov.au/Mediareleases/Documents/140923-CTLegislationAmendmentForeignFightersBill2014.pdf">Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014</a> – into the Senate. As its name suggests, the Bill’s chief target is perceived threats to Australia’s security posed by “foreign fighters” – Australians who engage in conflicts in foreign countries and may seek to return home.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.attorneygeneral.gov.au/Mediareleases/Documents/140923-EMCTForeignFightersBill2014.pdf">Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the Bill</a> states that foreign fighters who have fought overseas alongside listed terrorist organisations may “return to Australia with enhanced terrorism capabilities and ideological commitment”. That would heighten the risks of a terrorist act on Australian soil.</p>
<p>In particular, the memorandum suggests that the “escalating terrorist situation in Iraq and Syria poses an increasing threat to the security of all Australians” and that existing legislation does not adequately cover domestic threats.</p>
<p>The Bill, via a series of proposed changes to various Commonwealth acts, targets foreign fighters in two ways. First, it seeks to inhibit would-be fighters from travelling overseas to join conflicts. Second, it subjects foreign fighters and individuals who have been in conflict areas to a range of augmented controls upon their return to Australia.</p>
<h2>Restrictions on travel overseas</h2>
<p>Individuals would be restricted from travelling to foreign conflicts in two ways. </p>
<p>First, it enables the minister for foreign affairs to temporarily suspend a person’s travel documents where ASIO suspects on reasonable grounds that the person “<em>may</em> leave Australia to engage in conduct that might prejudice the security of Australia or a foreign country”. <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/apa2005261/">Existing laws</a> allow a person’s passport to be cancelled if ASIO suspects on reasonable grounds that the person “<em>would be likely to</em> engage in conduct that might prejudice the security of Australia or a foreign country”. </p>
<p>These changes adopt recommendations by the Independent National Security Monitor (INSLM), who <a href="http://www.dpmc.gov.au/INSLM/docs/INSLM_Annual_Report_20140328.pdf">suggested</a> that temporary suspension measures would ease the challenge for ASIO of completing full security assessments on suspected individuals before they travel. The proposed suspensions would prevent affected individuals from travelling on a much lower threshold than the existing provisions.</p>
<p>But the suspension would be effective for 14 days only. There is no capacity for renewal unless ASIO uncovers further information. After this, to prevent a person from travelling, an ASIO request for their documents to be cancelled, satisfying the higher threshold required for this, is necessary.</p>
<p>Secondly, the Bill enables Customs officers to detain a person when they feel satisfied on reasonable grounds that the person “is, or is likely to be, involved in an activity that is a threat to national security or the security of a foreign country”. This considerably widens <a href="http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2014C00496/Html/Volume_2#_Toc394500386">existing powers</a>. Currently, Customs detention is allowed only where a person is reasonably suspected of having committed a serious Commonwealth offence, punishable by imprisonment of three years or more.</p>
<h2>Controls upon return</h2>
<p>The Bill targets returning foreign fighters with three different forms of control.</p>
<p>First, it wholly reworks existing criminal laws that apply to foreign fighters, repealing the <a href="http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2005C00715/Html/Text#_Toc76883783">Crimes (Foreign Incursions and Recruitment) Act 1978</a> and transplanting its provisions into the Commonwealth Criminal Code. It retains the basic structure of the existing offences, which criminalise engagement in “hostile activity” in foreign countries and travel abroad for this purpose. However, it slightly broadens the offences and significantly increases their maximum penalties.</p>
<p>More invasively, the Bill creates a new offence criminalising travel to any area designated by the minister on the grounds that a terrorist organisation operates within it. The designation power is broad. It allows the prescription of entire countries, or regions spanning two or more countries. </p>
<p>Significantly, this offence, which carries a maximum penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment, does not merely affect foreign fighters. It also leaves people who may have travelled to designated areas for a range of other reasons – such as visiting family, performing humanitarian aid work, or undertaking official or journalistic duties – vulnerable to prosecution. A complete defence to the charge exists where a person’s sole reason for visiting the designated area was for a “legitimate purpose” – including the above reasons.</p>
<p>However, this still places the onus on individuals to satisfy an evidential burden that travel was for a legitimate purpose. This leaves open the possibility of conviction where a person fails to discharge this burden, even if their travel <em>was</em> for a legitimate purpose. The offence is likely to have the chilling effect of discouraging people from travelling to designated areas, even when they have no intent of participating in foreign conflicts.</p>
<p>Secondly, the Bill enables individuals who return to Australia after engaging in “hostile activities” overseas to be subjected to control orders, such as those imposed on <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2007-12-21/hicks-control-order-granted/994358">David Hicks</a> and <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2006/s1726756.htm">Jack Thomas</a>. Under the Bill’s expanded scheme, a control order can be applied for where the AFP “suspects” on reasonable grounds that it would substantially assist in preventing a terrorist act. The requirements of control orders can be invasive – for instance Thomas and Hicks were subjected to overnight curfews, reporting requirements and substantial phone and internet restrictions.</p>
<p>Significantly, a person need not be found guilty of an offence to be subjected to a <a href="http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2014C00196/Html/Volume_1#_Toc390954608">control order</a>. A court does need to be satisfied, though, that the controls are “reasonably necessary and reasonably appropriate and adapted for the purpose of protecting the public from a terrorist act”. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/59856/original/4sxj9fcj-1411532430.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/59856/original/4sxj9fcj-1411532430.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/59856/original/4sxj9fcj-1411532430.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/59856/original/4sxj9fcj-1411532430.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/59856/original/4sxj9fcj-1411532430.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/59856/original/4sxj9fcj-1411532430.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/59856/original/4sxj9fcj-1411532430.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Former independent national security legislation monitor Bret Walker reported that using control orders for people who had not been convicted was ‘not effective, not appropriate and not necessary’.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The expansion of control orders was implemented in response to advice from law enforcement agencies that the current thresholds for application are too onerous. Other experts have expressed an alternative view. For instance, the INSLM has <a href="http://www.dpmc.gov.au/INSLM/docs/INSLM_Annual_Report_20121220.pdf">described</a> control orders in the absence of criminal conviction as “not effective, not appropriate and not necessary”.</p>
<p>Finally, the Bill amends a number of statutes to allow for the cancellation of welfare payments for individuals whose passports or visas have been cancelled or refused on national security grounds. Mandatory cancellation of welfare will apply wherever the attorney-general issues a discretionary security notice about an individual to the minister for social services. </p>
<p>The Explanatory Memorandum states that the cancellation of welfare is designed to occur only where denying welfare itself is appropriate or justified on security grounds. However, no such limits emerge from the Bill itself. It confers a broad executive discretion to issue security notices, with no obligation to provide reasons.</p>
<h2>The right balance?</h2>
<p>The Bill adopts a range of measures that make it difficult and unpalatable for individuals to travel overseas to engage in conflicts. It imposes onerous consequences on those who return to Australia. These measures collectively limit key human rights such as <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx">freedom of movement and the right to a fair trial</a>.</p>
<p>In light of the recent <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-09-12/australia-increases-terrorism-threat-level/5739466">decision</a> to raise Australia’s security alert level to high, it may be reasonable to expect some incursions into traditional freedoms. The task remains to ensure that the right balance is struck.</p>
<p>Some elements of the Bill, such as the passport suspension provisions, achieve this, building in recommended safeguards. Others, in particular the new travel offences, are more extreme, placing a <a href="https://theconversation.com/foreign-fighter-passports-and-prosecutions-in-governments-sights-30197#comment_445279">heavy</a> burden on people who need to visit designated places for innocuous reasons.</p>
<p>Following its introduction into the Senate, the Bill will be referred to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security for review.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/30095/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sangeetha Pillai does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Abbott government has today introduced the second tranche of its national security amendments – the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 – into the Senate. As its name…Sangeetha Pillai, PhD Researcher in Citizenship and Constitutional Law, Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/318482014-09-22T20:28:01Z2014-09-22T20:28:01ZIt’s far too early to declare counter-terrorism operations a success<p>The dust is settling after <a href="http://www.police.nsw.gov.au/news/media_release_archive?sq_content_src=+dXJsPWh0dHBzJTNBJTJGJTJGZWJpenByZC5wb2xpY2UubnN3Lmdvdi5hdSUyRm1lZGlhJTJGNDA5MjUuaHRtbCZhbGw9MQ==">the extensive police raids</a> across Sydney and Brisbane last week. Authorities say this was the <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/police-swoop-on-sydney-brisbane-homes-in-terror-raids/story-e6frg6nf-1227062160671">largest counter-terrorism operation</a> in Australia’s history. Not only was it the largest such operation, never have we seen a government so keen to inform and alarm the public about police operations in relation to potential acts of domestic terrorism.</p>
<p>While it is still too early to tell what will transpire from the raids, we can assume that the government’s recently <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2014/s4061378.htm">announced $630 million</a> to bolster national security is being well spent. But is it really?</p>
<p>What will be the ultimate result of the raids? How many of those arrested and detained are likely to be successfully prosecuted and <a href="https://www.pm.gov.au/media/2014-09-12/joint-press-conference-melbourne">end up behind bars</a> in maximum security? </p>
<p>More importantly, of those who do spend time behind bars, how many will be effectively rehabilitated at the end of their sentences? Will they be re-integrated into the community as productive citizens and players on “Team Australia”? The record of some of those convicted and jailed after <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/terrorist-raids-pendennis-nine-and-other-major-antiterrorist-operations-20140918-10isek.html">past raids</a> suggests deeply troubling answers to those questions.</p>
<h2>What do we have to show for the raids?</h2>
<p>Following last week’s raids, <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/serious-act-of-violence-thwarted-say-police-after-counterterrorism-raids-in-sydney-and-brisbane-20140918-10iiyj.html">police claim they thwarted</a> a “serious act of violence” after detaining 15 people and charging two. Police allege that at least one of the suspects was planning to snatch and behead a random member of the public in Sydney’s Martin Place. While we do not know how well advanced the plot was, NSW Police Commissioner Andrew Scipione said that the operation “reflects the reality of the threat we actually face” before declaring the plot thwarted.</p>
<p>Given that <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/comment/smh-letters/terror-raids-need-to-justified-or-we-face-much-worse-20140918-10intg.html">the alleged orchestrators</a> of this plot are innocent until proven guilty, we expect them to be dealt with fairly through judicial processes. However, it is very unlikely that some of the accomplices, like former Kings Cross bouncer now senior Islamic State (IS) recruiter <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/police-swoop-on-sydney-brisbane-homes-in-terror-raids/story-e6frg6nf-1227062160671?nk=7fbb8e03610a2159e66ce2ed2b388867">Mohammed Baryalei</a>, will ever return to Australia to face the courts.</p>
<p>At this stage, it’s hard to believe an <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/national/terror-raids-800-police-and-only-two-men-charged-20140918-10iwwh.html#ixzz3DiAOsJAp">“awkward spotty youth”</a> is capable of planning such a horrific act of public violence or, to use a more accurate term, murder. The 22-year-old Omarjan Azari looks more like a teenage shoplifter than a terrorist planning a gruesome attack. </p>
<p>One wonders if we were to remove the words “terrorist” and “Islam” from much of the discussion of this incident, would there be so much public and government attention?</p>
<p>In Azari’s case, even though no act was committed – indeed, one difficulty for the prosecution is to prove Azari capable of such a heinous crime – he may well have broken Australian law. As a person accused of conspiracy to prepare a terrorist act, <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2759903/Terror-suspects-arrested-200-police-officers-swoop-targets-series-dawn-raids-Sydney.html">Azari would be likely, if convicted, to be taken</a> to the High Risk Management Correctional Centre inside Goulburn Jail.</p>
<p>But in Azari’s case, is intent to commit a crime a punishable offence? <a href="http://www.ag.gov.au/NationalSecurity/Counterterrorismlaw/Pages/Terroristactoffences.aspx">Under Australia’s current terrorism laws</a>, you can end up in the legal system for planning or preparing a terrorist act, financing terrorism or a terrorist, providing or receiving training connected with a terrorist act, possessing things connected with terrorist acts or collecting or making documents likely to facilitate terrorist acts. Therefore, a person may be convicted of these offences if they show intent even though a terrorist act did not occur.</p>
<p><a href="http://law.jrank.org/pages/5863/Criminal-Law-Intent.html">In criminal law</a>, however, intention is one of three general classes of <em>mens rea</em> (the intention or knowledge of wrongdoing) necessary to constitute a crime. Criminal intent must be formed before the act, and it must unite with the act itself.</p>
<p>Those still under investigation after the raids are likely to face more charges. We are also likely to see police and security agencies arrest, detain and charge IS (also known as ISIS or ISIL) fighters if and when they return from Syria and Iraq. Currently, foreign fighters’ conduct is directly targeted under the <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ciara1978431/">Crimes (Foreign Incursions and Recruitment) Act 1978</a>. This act makes it a crime, punishable by 20 years’ imprisonment, to engage in a “hostile activity” in a foreign country, or to enter a foreign country with intent to do so.</p>
<p>The government has already thrown some of the $630 million into its security agencies’ enormous <a href="http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/islamic-state-plot-australia-raises-questions-25615715">“show of strength”</a>, in the words of Prime Minister Tony Abbott. The timing couldn’t have been better for the government, with the G20 Summit approaching, to show both the “terrorists” and foreign counterparts that we mean business.</p>
<p>If we still are under significant threat, are we going to see “bang for our buck”? That is, will the government’s expenditure make Australia safer? Will it all be worth it?</p>
<h2>A smarter way than shows of strength</h2>
<p>Could this money have been better spent on long-term solutions and custodial diversionary programs, instead of throwing it at the sharp end of police and security operations? For example, shouldn’t the government try to <a href="https://theconversation.com/terrorists-can-be-defeated-by-fighting-fear-with-cooperation-31842">tackle the root causes</a> of radicalisation and why some young people disengage from society?</p>
<p>If we look at Australia’s recent history of terrorist trials, significant resource were spent on incarcerating terrorist offenders in high-security prison cells with very little result.</p>
<p>For example, back in 2005, <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-09-20/benbrika-suppression-lifted/2907796">Operation Pendennis</a> uncovered a terrorist network headed by a radical Melbourne cleric, Abdul Nacer Benbrika. He and his seven followers in Melbourne were all found guilty in 2009 of planning a terrorist attack on Australian soil. Later that year five men in Sydney were found guilty of planning the same attack, after a further four men in Sydney pleaded guilty to lesser charges.</p>
<p>In August 2009, Australian security and police agencies foiled an al-Shabab associated <a href="https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-holsworthy-barracks-plot-a-case-study-of-an-al-shabab-support-network-in-australia">plot to attack Holsworthy Army Barracks</a> in Sydney. Code-named Operation Neath, the counter-terrorism operation disrupted a mass-shooting plot in its early stages. Five men were charged and three were convicted of planning to attack the barracks.</p>
<p>Yet so far we have seen few positive results from incarcerating terrorist offenders in maximum security facilities. <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-08-14/khaled-sharrouf-the-australian-radical-fighting-in-iraq/5671974">Khaled Sharrouf</a>, for example, who recently rose to international notoriety for his barbarous activities in Iraq, was one of those convicted after <a href="http://www.cdpp.gov.au/case-reports/operation-pendennis/">Operation Pendennis</a> and served time in Goulburn’s maximum-security jail. Released in 2009, Sharrouf has gone on to fight with IS. More hardened than ever before, one could argue that his time in <a href="https://theconversation.com/when-foreign-fighters-return-managing-terrorists-behind-bars-31054">prison made him worse</a>.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/4zlYnmmw8Gw?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Khalef Sharrouf was convicted after Operation Pendennis and emerged from prison as a more serious threat.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For those still in jail, corrections officials claim that <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2014/s4090613.htm">an alleged leader</a> of the Australian IS group is suspected of passing orders from inside Goulburn Jail. Several inmates convicted as a result of Operation Pendennis, <a href="http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/nsw/cell-block-terror-jailed-terrorists-continue-jihadi-activities-from-inside-goulburn-supermax/story-fni0cx12-1227065056890?nk=22a7291ecf44b129783bb3ab41486165">the officials say</a>, “are capable of plotting acts of terror” despite being held in tight security.</p>
<p>The government will <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/in-depth/terror/labor-to-back-antiterror-legislation-george-brandis-says/story-fnpdbcmu-1227065467960">introduce new counter-terrorism legislation</a> this week to give security agencies greater resources and powers to combat home-grown terrorism and Australians participating in terrorist activities overseas. Some of these new measures will make it easier to get convictions for terrorism offences, including lowering the threshold for arrest without warrant.</p>
<p>Yet with no precise game plan, Team Australia is already floundering. No wonder, considering we have left it too long to educate team members, particularly those on the sidelines or margins, about the rules and how to play “Australian”.</p>
<p>With 15 more people dropping out of the team, the endemic cycle of terrorism will continue if we continue down our path of harsh incarceration policies with no prospects for rehabilitation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/31848/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Clarke Jones does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The dust is settling after the extensive police raids across Sydney and Brisbane last week. Authorities say this was the largest counter-terrorism operation in Australia’s history. Not only was it the…Clarke Jones, Visiting Fellow, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/300412014-09-16T04:30:24Z2014-09-16T04:30:24ZSweeping security law would have computer users surrender privacy<p>Parliament is <a href="http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22legislation%2Fbillhome%2Fs969%22">about to consider a range of changes</a> to Australia’s security laws introduced by the Abbott government during its last sitting. The most controversial measures in the <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/bill_em/nslab12014440/memo_0.html">National Security Legislation Amendment Bill 2014 (Cth)</a> include stronger <a href="https://theconversation.com/drafts/29946/edit">anti-whistleblower provisions</a> and a <a href="https://theconversation.com/drafts/29946/edit">“special intelligence operations”</a> regime that would grant ASIO officers immunity from civil and criminal liability. </p>
<p>Less attention has been paid to proposals to expand ASIO’s powers to <a href="https://theconversation.com/national-security-bill-gives-asio-more-powers-and-a-tighter-gag-29261">collect intelligence held on computers</a> and computer networks. Like the government’s proposals <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/asio-chief-malcolm-turnbull-seek-to-reassure-nation-over-data-retention-laws/story-fn59niix-1227017608824">to require the retention of metadata</a>, these measures suggest the power of intelligence agencies to invade Australians’ privacy will dramatically expand. </p>
<h2>Flinging open the door to computer access</h2>
<p><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/asioa1979472/s25a.html">Section 25A of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979</a> (Cth) (ASIO Act) currently allows the attorney-general to issue a computer access warrant when requested by the director-general of security (the head of ASIO). The warrant may be issued if the attorney-general believes on reasonable grounds that access to data “held in a particular computer” would substantially assist the collection of intelligence that is important for security. </p>
<p>ASIO officers may then undertake activities to obtain that data. These include entering private premises and doing any other thing necessary to conceal their actions.</p>
<p>“Computer” is defined in the Act as “a computer, computer system or part of a computer system”. This means that a computer access warrant gives ASIO access to only a single computer.</p>
<p>The government proposes to amend the statutory definition of computer so that a single access warrant may apply to multiple computers and networks. The ASIO Act would then define “computer” as:</p>
<p>a) one or more computers;</p>
<p>b) one or more computer systems; </p>
<p>c) one or more computer networks;</p>
<p>d) any combination of the above.</p>
<p>What this means is that wherever the word “computer” (singular) appears in the ASIO Act this should be understood as referring to any number of computers or computer networks (plural). Importantly, the legislation does not attempt to define computer network. In a peculiar feat of legislative drafting, a singular noun would refer to a potentially limitless number of electronic and telecommunication systems. </p>
<p>The only effective limitation is that the warrant must specify a particular computer, a computer located on particular premises, or a computer associated with or likely to be used by a particular person. Again, these should be read as plural. This means that ASIO could, for example, specify multiple computer networks located at a university, or other computer networks to which a person has access.</p>
<p>The Bill would also allow access to data through computers owned by third parties (friends, relatives, co-workers). This would be allowed where it is “reasonable in all the circumstances to do so”. ASIO officers would be empowered to cause material interference with computers or computer networks if necessary to execute the warrant, so long as this does not cause material loss or damage.</p>
<h2>Everyone’s privacy is at stake</h2>
<p>The government’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/there-is-a-data-deficit-in-governments-metadata-plan-30225">metadata proposals have attracted far more attention</a>, but these other changes will also dramatically expand ASIO’s ability to invade the privacy of Australian citizens.</p>
<p>At its broadest, access to multiple computer networks could plausibly entail access to all computers connected to the internet. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/world-wide-web-is-going-strong-after-25-years-but-the-internet-isnt-holding-up-24297">internet is a network</a> of computer networks, so there is no reason why this would not fall within the scope of the legislation. The internet is certainly “likely to be used” by the person of security interest, as the legislation requires.</p>
<p>This is not likely the intended meaning of the provision, but it shows just how little thought the government has put into placing some sensible restrictions on the warrant provisions. </p>
<p>A more realistic scenario is that ASIO would be able to access all computers located at a university where a person of security interest is studying, or at the person’s workplace. Even if the government abides by this “narrower” interpretation, the legislation will still expose large numbers of innocent persons to potentially severe invasions of their privacy. </p>
<p>One way to restrict the potential impact of these provisions would be to define “computer network” so that it encompasses only those computers located on a particular premises or associated with a particular person. This language is already contained in the Bill, although it does not restrict the scope of the powers to this degree.</p>
<p>Another method would be to specify that ASIO can only access parts of a computer or computer network where doing so is reasonably necessary to collect relevant intelligence. Yet another would be to specify that ASIO can access multiple computers only after it has exhausted other methods of obtaining the intelligence. </p>
<p>These are all viable ways to limit the potential impact of the warrant provisions. They would still allow ASIO significant scope to access data held on multiple computers. The government, however, has made no effort to include such limiting factors in the legislation. </p>
<h2>Good law should be clearly stated</h2>
<p>The lack of any clear limits on these provisions is not merely the result of the government’s attempts to expand ASIO’s powers. The government faces an incredibly difficult task of drafting legal language in such a way that it accurately describes and accounts for new and emerging technologies.</p>
<p>The government has approached this challenge by avoiding clear definitions of key terms in the Bill. On one possible view, this is a sensible solution. It gives intelligence agencies sufficient power to collect intelligence without being confined by statutory definitions that are likely to be superseded by further advances in computer technology. </p>
<p>But in doing so the government is granting ill-defined powers to intelligence agencies when the privacy of all Australian citizens is at stake. The <a href="http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/lawcouncil/index.php/divisions/international-division/rule-of-law">law should be stated clearly</a> in advance. Vagueness and overreach are not adequate responses to difficulties in legislative drafting. </p>
<p>When Parliament considers the amendments, it should take the time to ensure that the computer access warrant powers are clearly defined and that any invasions of privacy are kept to the minimum necessary. If the period of <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-politics-of-fear-why-havent-counter-terrorism-laws-changed-6016">law-making after September 11</a> taught the country anything, it is that laws enacted hastily in response to security threats are often poorly drafted and overly broad. </p>
<p>Parliament should also be careful that debate on the amendments is not overshadowed by the government’s <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/telcos-forced-to-keep-data-as-abbott-tackles-homegrown-terror/story-fn59niix-1227014309181?nk=d7ebcf0fbe91364b30ad9b3a505b424b">next tranche of national security reforms</a>. The threat to security posed by returning foreign fighters and the threat to privacy posed by data retention are certainly important issues. But granting ASIO these powers of access in their current form also poses a real threat, particularly to the privacy of individuals in workplaces and universities.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>The National Security Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 1) 2014 has been referred to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, which will present its report during the week of the parliamentary sitting beginning September 22.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/30041/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keiran Hardy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Parliament is about to consider a range of changes to Australia’s security laws introduced by the Abbott government during its last sitting. The most controversial measures in the National Security Legislation…Keiran Hardy, PhD Researcher, Faculty of Law, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/315152014-09-11T20:29:07Z2014-09-11T20:29:07ZFirst rule of fighting terrorists: don’t do their job for them<p>It appears that Australia might be put on a higher threat alert level. ASIO director-general <a href="https://theconversation.com/terror-level-could-be-raised-asio-chief-31489">David Irvine’s comments</a> on a possible increase in the terrorism threat level (which came into force in 2003) have created a wave of flurry, concern and nervous anticipation. As <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2014/s4084420.htm">Irvine explained</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The notion of a threat level at medium is that an attack is possible or could occur. If we raise it to high it means an attack is likely.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Certainly, a fundamental security challenge is how intelligence and police agencies can best deal with potential home-grown terrorists and their allies. For instance, Britain has <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-29146008">raised its threat level</a> to “severe” in response to events in Iraq and Syria. So how should the Australian government and its citizens best respond?</p>
<h2>Back to the future</h2>
<p>Despite Osama Bin Laden <a href="https://theconversation.com/hold-the-jubilation-osama-bin-ladens-death-no-body-blow-for-terror-inc-1024">receiving a bullet</a> to the head in May 2011 and a weakened al-Qaeda - which is on the run and characterised by paralysis, incompetence and infighting - Australia’s terrorism threat level is potentially poised to rise to from medium to high for the first time since inception. </p>
<p>This seems to revolve around deteriorating conflicts in the Middle East, the evils of Islamic State (IS) and Sunni militia groups and salvos about <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/national/barack-obama-concerned-about-aussie-jihadists-20140622-zshq4.html">“Aussie jihadists”</a>. About 60 Australians are <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-09-02/prime-minister-announces-formation-of-foreign-fighters-taskforce/5713804">reportedly fighting</a> in either Iraq or Syria.</p>
<p>Yet every measure put forward to manage the threat of citizens being involved with extremist groups abroad should not be understood as automatically acceptable or validated. A plausible strategy for countering IS has not yet been clearly articulated. And talking more openly about the greatest sources of funding for IS, including the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29004253">role of Saudi Arabia</a>, would inject a bit more honesty and intricacy into the debate.</p>
<p>It is worth noting that over that past decade many have argued that Australia’s decision to join the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 was never a straight-forward “mission accomplished”. Rather it ultimately exacerbated existing ethnic and religious tensions, in turn making Australia less safe from terrorism.</p>
<p>It directly led to the “balkanisation” of Iraq. Adding insult to injury, purported WMDs eventually stood for “weapons of mass disappearance”, while the dictator Saddam Hussain had <a href="http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/09/09/1094530764777.html">no direct relationship</a> with the tragedy of 9/11.</p>
<h2>The ‘Team Australia’ narrative</h2>
<p>This has been a muddying period of scatter-gun political exchanges, mixed security narratives and gloomy media reporting. </p>
<p>We have, for instance, had the Abbott <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2014/s4078006.htm">government insist</a> that renewed or enlarged participation in military operations in Iraq and Syria will not put Australia at increased risk. Yet both intelligence agencies and government have been anxious to win support for <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/05/tony-abbott-extension-terrorism-laws-amid-jihadi-fears">expanded powers</a> under new security legislation. </p>
<p>Similarly, while team Abbott has appeared eager to focus on an escalating terrorist situation at home and abroad, security assessments have not been in lock-step with political attempts to jump-start a new <a href="http://www.theage.com.au/comment/plenty-of-smoke-but-little-fire-in-tony-abbotts-concerns-over-muslim-radicals-20140901-10ay16.html">dialogue of national security menace</a>. The threat status remained stubbornly unchanged. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/58729/original/cyznkc3q-1410398336.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/58729/original/cyznkc3q-1410398336.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=1055&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/58729/original/cyznkc3q-1410398336.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=1055&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/58729/original/cyznkc3q-1410398336.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=1055&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/58729/original/cyznkc3q-1410398336.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1326&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/58729/original/cyznkc3q-1410398336.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1326&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/58729/original/cyznkc3q-1410398336.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1326&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Revisiting the terror: the Howard government fridge magnet from a decade ago.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This might change. Yet the stronger terror assessment scenario painted by ASIO does seem rather odd. Irvine chose to speculate publicly about the threat alert being raised to the second-highest level, ostensibly before giving formal advice to the government.</p>
<p>Based on ongoing assessments, either a threat is likely to occur or it is not. If so, why the delay? If not, why prematurely raise a “worst-case” scenario? Citizens remain stuck in terror limbo.</p>
<p>Further, this drip-feed of vague warnings is being packaged by policymakers with a hyper-legislative insistence on introducing <a href="https://theconversation.com/government-retreats-on-weakening-race-act-advances-on-toughening-terror-laws-30166">another round of “tough” terror laws</a>. While some measures appear justifiable – such as up-to-date powers to suspend passports - many others do not. Some proposals remain decidedly inconsistent with <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/defence/call-to-rein-in-asios-powers-in-bid-to-soften-terror-tactics/story-e6frg8yo-1226642567202">past recommendations</a> by watchdogs like the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor. </p>
<p>Overall, it can be argued that <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-politics-of-fear-why-havent-counter-terrorism-laws-changed-6016">many shortcomings</a> and the lack of practical fine-tuning evident in core elements of Australia’s counter-terrorism legislation are the result of undue haste. Governments have rushed to pass laws without appropriate scrutiny and related checks and balances. We seem to be stuck on a rinse-and-repeat cycle to keep terrorising ourselves.</p>
<h2>A fine line between public alert and panic</h2>
<p>The head of ASIO publicly musing about terror threats has undoubtedly had a virtually identical impact to the anticipated actual adjustment (or non-adjustment) of the National Terrorism Public Alert System. It has grabbed headlines and accelerated political chatter and public speculation. </p>
<p>Problematically, this has created rolling confusion. Much work remains to be done to keep uncertainty about terrorism in perspective.</p>
<p>The alert system has limited usefulness in guiding people’s movements. It is not tied to any specific action – unless self-imposed and completely arbitrary. </p>
<p>Do we stay home? Do we avoid public transport or airports or crowded movie theatres or the <a href="http://www.theage.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/more-security-at-public-events-if-terror-alert-is-raised-attorneygeneral-george-brandis-says-20140911-10fal8.html">AFL final series</a>? Do we shun strangers with beards? Do we re-read (or re-find) our Howard government-issued fridge magnets for instructions while setting our mobile phones to automatically dial the terrorist hotline when our spider-sense tingles (sorry, I can never remember the number)? </p>
<p>This type of “alert and alarmed” scenario tends to lead in a couple of directions: it either creates wider public paranoia or greater public scepticism. Neither is particularly helpful for an effective, sustainable and clear-eyed counter-terrorism strategy.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/HWwJThlHqjs?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">When warned about terrorism, public fears come to the fore regardless of advice to stay calm.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Serving the terrorists’ agenda</h2>
<p>A variety of policymakers and media are doing their best to contribute to the manipulation of revived fears about terrorism. Social media in particular have become highly effective in spreading violent extremist ideology and propaganda. Brutal decapitations such as that of <a href="https://theconversation.com/james-foley-islamic-state-and-the-medias-treatment-of-terrorism-30763">American journalist James Foley</a> are instantaneously available worldwide.</p>
<p>But imagine that the most effective weapon against the West for the IS is actually terror. Imagine that terrorists are hoping to provoke shock and fear; they aim to terrorise. Imagine that these ugly videos are entirely ineffective in changing the direction of the US in its involvement with expanded air campaigns and drone strikes against IS. </p>
<p>That would leave the only substantial impact these beheadings can have on Western audiences as a psychological one of building IS into a sort of shadowy, omnipresent super-villain that is hell-bent on world domination. </p>
<p>Yet the noise emanating from IS is mostly crude bluff and ludicrous chest-beating. It is critical to match its well-echoed and grandiose intentions with a calculation of its actual capacity to form a self-proclaimed caliphate throughout the Middle East, North Africa and large parts of western Asia and Europe. This capacity is zero. It is based on an illusion. </p>
<p>IS is a threat to specific people in parts of Iraq and Syria. It might dictate terms within some lawless and poorly defended areas. But IS does not have the ability to march into Pakistan. Or to take Baghdad (being “close” to Bagdad does not count). In fact, this splinter movement has <a href="http://english.shafaaq.com/index.php/security/10930-isis-fails-again-to-break-into-dhuluiya-and-gather-in-tikrit">struggled to hold</a> the riverside town of Dhuluiya, which is part of a belt of Sunni Muslim towns.</p>
<p>IS is in ongoing battles not only with US hellfire missiles but with rival jihadist, terrorist and rebel groups. As al-Qaeda eventually realised, the IS brand of savagery and its core blood-thirsty organisation will continue to alienate support from both local and global Islamic communities.</p>
<p>In short, IS is a nasty piece of work, but it is not a global game-changer.</p>
<p>Frustratingly, while making nonsensical noises about IS power, reach and authority, it is head-shaking that the Prime Minister would then reward IS propaganda by implying that such unbridled violence and accompanying beheadings <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/terrorist-beheadings-could-happen-in-australia-tony-abbott-warns-as-he-pushes-tougher-security-laws-20140821-3e2fl.html">could happen on Australian soil</a> before long. </p>
<p>The instinct to “do something” and heroic calls to strong vigilant action might be good politics. However, such heavy-handedness is a careless and unhealthy national security stratagem.</p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>The bad news is that the conflict in Iraq and Syria will remain an incubator for a new generation of terrorists.</p>
<p>While individual motivations and profiles will vary, foreign fighters from all parts of the globe are joining the combat. The problem of war travellers who go to fight in foreign locations and return home after operating in radicalising environments is a serious security challenge.</p>
<p>Issues like detaining or arresting citizens before they have left for a conflict zone – without solid evidence - will continue to be complicated.</p>
<p>The good news is that the threat of foreign fighters is both manageable and marginal. The coherence and capabilities of the IS splinter group should not be overstated.</p>
<p>Another bottom line is that these Australian foreign fighters do not represent the wider Islamic community – IS is keen to kill all Muslims who they deem to be “infidels”. (This makes many calls for “community” solutions by the overwhelming moderate Muslim majority in Australia overly simplistic.)</p>
<p>This is not a <a href="https://www.princeton.edu/%7Eachaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/Clash_of_Civilizations.html">clash of civilisations</a>. Australian citizens still have more chance of being killed by bee stings or car crashes than by a rare, albeit conceivable, home-grown terrorist attack.</p>
<p>Interestingly, former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger <a href="http://www.npr.org/2014/09/06/346114326/henry-kissingers-thoughts-on-the-islamic-state-ukraine-and-world-order">recently warned</a> that traditional state-based threats remain a much more serious and long-term security headache. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I consider Iran a bigger problem than ISIS. ISIS is a group of adventurers with a very aggressive ideology. But they have to conquer more and more territory before they can became a strategic, permanent reality.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The lesson is not to dismiss the IS threat but to respond in a proportionate, carefully calibrated fashion, to avoid hyping terror risks and to invest in smart counter-radical campaigns. The building of public resilience - the ability of society to restore calm and for citizens to adapt rationally to random events and unexpected changes (from terror strikes to shark attacks) - remains indispensable.</p>
<p>The more immediate hazard is pointless overreaction and political exploitation of public fears. The build-up of these kind of tensions have had a track-record of leading into knee-jerk and totally counter-productive policy initiatives – like the unnecessary Iraq invasion of 2003. That had no clear national security benefit and contributed to much of this latest mess.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/31515/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Daniel Baldino does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It appears that Australia might be put on a higher threat alert level. ASIO director-general David Irvine’s comments on a possible increase in the terrorism threat level (which came into force in 2003…Daniel Baldino, Senior Lecturer in Politics & International Relations, University of Notre Dame AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.