tag:theconversation.com,2011:/fr/topics/senkaku-islands-7689/articlesSenkaku Islands – The Conversation2021-05-04T20:06:43Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1600932021-05-04T20:06:43Z2021-05-04T20:06:43ZChina does not want war, at least not yet. It’s playing the long game<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398546/original/file-20210504-15-16da3x6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">KYDPL KYODO/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-would-be-wise-not-to-pound-war-drums-over-taiwan-with-so-much-at-stake-159993">Talk of war has become louder</a> in recent days, but the “drumbeat” has been heard for some time now as China’s military capabilities have grown. China does not want war, at least not yet. It’s playing the long game and its evident intentions have become more unnerving. </p>
<p>Scholars like <a href="https://www.blackincbooks.com.au/books/four-flashpoints">Brendan Taylor have identified four flash points</a> for a possible conflict with China, including Korea, the East China Sea, the South China Sea and Taiwan, but conventional war is not likely at this stage. </p>
<h2>Where tensions are currently high</h2>
<p>The armistice between North and South Korea has <a href="https://press.anu.edu.au/publications/cold">held for nearly 70 years</a>. The pandemic has severely constrained North Korea’s economy and its testing of intercontinental ballistic missiles has ceased, for now. China has a stake in keeping Kim Jong-un’s regime in power in the North, but the prospects of reverting to a hot war have flowed and ebbed. </p>
<p>Just south of Korea, in the East China Sea, China has intensified its <a href="https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42761.pdf">military activities</a> around the Japanese-claimed but uninhabited Senkaku Islands. China appears to be wearing down Japan’s resolve to resist its claims over what it calls the Diaoyu Islands. </p>
<p>The United States has assured Japan the islands fall under their mutual defence security guarantee. But a confrontation with China could test US backing and possibly set the stage for escalated confrontation elsewhere.</p>
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<img alt="Japanese plane flies over Senkaku Islands." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398547/original/file-20210504-13-us5pcw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398547/original/file-20210504-13-us5pcw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=361&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398547/original/file-20210504-13-us5pcw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=361&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398547/original/file-20210504-13-us5pcw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=361&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398547/original/file-20210504-13-us5pcw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=454&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398547/original/file-20210504-13-us5pcw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=454&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398547/original/file-20210504-13-us5pcw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=454&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force surveillance plane flies over the disputed Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kyodo News/AP</span></span>
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<p>Similarly, China’s industrial-scale island building in the South China Sea has resulted in extensive <a href="https://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/china/">military hardware and infrastructure</a>. This will enable the Chinese to consolidate their position militarily and assert control over the so-called <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2016/06/what-does-the-nine-dash-line-actually-mean/">nine-dash line</a> — its vast claim over most of the sea. </p>
<p>The US Navy continues to conduct freedom of navigation operations (<a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/freedom-navigation-south-china-sea-practical-guide">FONOPS</a>) in the sea to <a href="https://www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/australia-fonops-and-the-south-china-sea">challenge China’s claims</a>. With thousands of marked and unmarked Chinese vessels operating there, however, the risk of an <a href="https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1296844/south-china-sea-conflict-risk-us-navy-collision-world-war-3">accident triggering an escalation is real</a>.</p>
<p>In 2016, an <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/indonesia-cites-2016-south-china-sea-arbitral-tribunal-award-at-un-is-that-a-big-deal/">international tribunal</a> rejected China’s claims to the waters in a case brought by the Philippines. Despite being a signatory to the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea, China has ignored the tribunal’s ruling and continued to intrude on islands claimed by both <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/philippines-vows-continue-maritime-exercises-south-china-sea-2021-05-02/">the Philippines</a> and <a href="https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/commentary/indonesia-china-dispute-natuna-12244200">Indonesia</a>. </p>
<p>Recently, <a href="https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/220-chinese-vessels-stake-out-another-reef-in-spratly-islands">220 Chinese vessels were anchored for months at a reef</a> inside the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone. China’s actions appear premised on the dictum that <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/asias-nightmare-could-china-take-over-south-china-sea-180026">possession is nine-tenths of the law</a>. </p>
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<p>Like <a href="https://www.bworldonline.com/the-ghost-of-the-2012-scarborough-shoal-stand-off/">China’s seizure of the Scarborough Shoal in 2012</a> that preceded its <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-expands-island-construction-in-disputed-south-china-sea-1424290852">massive island construction further south</a>, China could conceivably take the unwillingness of the US to challenge its latest moves as a cue for more assertive action over Taiwan. </p>
<p>This is, after all, <a href="https://www.afr.com/world/asia/xi-flirting-with-taiwan-seizure-to-secure-legacy-us-20210328-p57eq9">the main prize</a> Beijing seeks to secure President Xi Jinping’s legacy.</p>
<h2>Why Taiwan’s security matters</h2>
<p>Taiwan presents the US and its allies with a conundrum. It is a liberal open democracy and <a href="https://techwireasia.com/2021/02/the-dominance-of-the-worlds-largest-chipmaker-tsmc/">the world’s leading computer chip maker</a>. It also sits in the middle of what military strategists refer to as the “<a href="https://thediplomat.com/2019/09/why-chinas-military-wants-to-control-these-2-waterways-in-east-asia/">first island chain</a>” stretching from Japan in the north to the Philippines in the south. Its strategic significance is profound. </p>
<p>Having adopted a <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/one-china-policy-primer.pdf">“One China” policy</a> since 1979, the US <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/fp_20160713_taiwan_alliance.pdf">security guarantee for Taiwan</a> is conditional and tenuous. Reflecting growing unease over China’s actions, polls show <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/poll-shows-increase-in-american-support-for-defending-taiwan/">strong US public support for defending Taiwan</a>. </p>
<p>So far, ambiguity has served US interests well, providing some assurance to Taiwan while discouraging the PRC from invading. </p>
<p>This guarantee has been important for Japan, as well. With its pacifist constitution, and occasional concern over US commitment to its defence, Japan would be closely watching how the US approaches its Taiwan policy.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-would-be-wise-not-to-pound-war-drums-over-taiwan-with-so-much-at-stake-159993">Australia would be wise not to pound 'war drums' over Taiwan with so much at stake</a>
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<h2>China is so far avoiding open war</h2>
<p>Meanwhile, China has metamorphosed both economically and militarily. An exponential <a href="https://www.rand.org/paf/projects/us-china-scorecard.html">growth in China’s military capabilities</a> has been matched by a steep rise in the lethality, accuracy, range and quantity of its weapons systems. On top of this, Beijing has ratcheted up its <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-china-using-warlike-tactics-against-taiwan-former-defence-minister/">warlike rhetoric and tactics</a>. </p>
<p>Last month, Xi made a <a href="https://theconversation.com/xi-jinping-sends-message-to-us-on-chinas-rising-power-in-boao-address-159324">muscular speech to the Boao Forum Asia</a>, calling for an acceptance of China not only as an emerging superpower but also as an equal in addressing global challenges. </p>
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<img alt="China's navy has been significantly upgraded." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398550/original/file-20210504-15-y1znbr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398550/original/file-20210504-15-y1znbr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398550/original/file-20210504-15-y1znbr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398550/original/file-20210504-15-y1znbr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398550/original/file-20210504-15-y1znbr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398550/original/file-20210504-15-y1znbr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/398550/original/file-20210504-15-y1znbr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">China has significantly upgraded its navy since Xi took power eight years ago.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Li Gang/Xinhua/AP</span></span>
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<p>Sometimes actions speak louder than words. And China’s actions so far have avoided crossing the threshold into open warfare, refusing to present a <a href="https://diplomacybeyond.com/to-a-man-with-a-hammer-everything-looks-like-a-nail-chinas-foreign-ministry-spokesperson-zhao-lijian-hits-back-at-us/">“nail” to a US “hammer”</a>. This is for good reason. </p>
<p>If war did break out, China would be vulnerable. For starters, it shares <a href="https://www.chinahighlights.com/travelguide/countries-bordering-china.htm">land borders with 14 countries</a>, bringing the potential for heightened challenges, if not open attack on numerous fronts. </p>
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<p>Then there are the economic concerns. China has significant <a href="https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3095951/china-increasingly-worried-about-losing-face-japan-bankrolls">Japanese</a>, <a href="https://www.nordeatrade.com/en/explore-new-market/china/investment">US and European industrial investments</a>, and is also overwhelmingly dependent on energy and goods passing through the Malacca Strait between Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, the Indo-Pacific’s jugular vein. </p>
<p>This reliance on the Malacca Strait — referred to by one analyst as the “<a href="https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-malacca-dilemma/">Malacca dilemma</a>” — helps explain why China has invested so much capital in its <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative">Belt and Road Initiative</a> and studiously avoided open conflict, at least until it is more self-reliant. </p>
<p>To avoid outright war, China evidently reckons it is better to operate a <a href="https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/04/a-short-history-of-chinas-fishing-militia-and-what.html">paramilitary force</a> with white-painted ships and armed fishing vessels in the thousands to push its claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea and constrict Taiwan’s freedom of action. </p>
<p>It also recently <a href="https://www.lawfareblog.com/chinas-new-coast-guard-law-and-implications-maritime-security-east-and-south-china-seas">passed a new law</a> allowing its coast guard to act more like a military body and enforce maritime law — again in violation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.</p>
<p>China is also expanding its <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2020/12/grey-zone-warfare-can-taiwan-counter-china/">“grey zone” warfare</a> against Taiwan, which includes <a href="https://www.cyberscoop.com/taiwan-china-hacking-apt40/">cyber attacks</a>, repeated incursions of its air space and territorial waters, and <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/taiwans-growing-diplomatic-isolation/">diplomatic isolation</a> to undermine Taiwan’s resolve and ability to resist.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-hybrid-warfare-and-what-is-meant-by-the-grey-zone-118841">Explainer: what is 'hybrid warfare' and what is meant by the 'grey zone'?</a>
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<h2>Would America’s allies help defend Taiwan?</h2>
<p>This persistent and escalating challenge by Chinese forces has demonstrated <a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2021/04/assessing-the-patterns-of-pla-air-incursions-into-taiwans-adiz/">Taiwan’s inability to fully control its waters and air space</a>. Beijing is continuing <a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/china-military-amphibious/">to build a fleet of amphibious</a> capabilities to enable an invasion of Taiwan. </p>
<p>US pundits are also no longer confident the Americans would win in an outright war over Taiwan, with Washington’s top military officer in the region <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/10/china-could-invade-taiwan-in-next-six-years-top-us-admiral-warns">arguing one could happen within six years</a>.</p>
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<p>Taiwan lacks allies other than the United States, but Japan is mindful of the consequences of a US failure to defend Taiwan. Its <a href="https://press.anu.edu.au/publications/tools-owatatsumi">ocean surveillance and coastal defence capabilities</a> would be exposed if China took Taiwan. But Japan’s constitution <a href="https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2021/04/983deef11264-japan-govt-studies-sdf-response-in-event-of-taiwan-strait-conflict.html">precludes direct involvement in defending Taiwan</a>. </p>
<p>Under its Anzus obligations, the US could call on Australia for military support to defend Taiwan. The mutual assistance provisions <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-07-08/does-anzus-commit-us-to-come-to-australias-aid-fact-check/5559288?nw=0">are not automatically invoked</a>, but the implications of Canberra standing on the sidelines would be profound. </p>
<p>Warnings about rhetorical drumbeats of war remind us the <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0047117802016002001">US is no longer the world’s only superpower</a> and suggest Australia should prepare for a more volatile world.</p>
<p>Rather than rely solely on the US, Australia should bolster its own defence capabilities. At the same time, it should collaborate more with regional partners across Southeast Asia and beyond, <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/indonesia/Pages/plan-of-action-for-the-indonesia-australia-comprehensive-strategic-partnership-2020-2024">particularly Indonesia</a>, <a href="https://www.theglobaleye.it/quad-bolstering-the-quad-beyond-its-military-dimensions-east-asia-forum/">Japan, India</a> and <a href="https://www.defenceconnect.com.au/key-enablers/4836-south-korea-and-australia-move-to-deepen-energy-defence-and-industry-ties">South Korea</a>, to deter further belligerence and mitigate the risk of tensions escalating into open war.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/160093/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Blaxland does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There are four potential flash points where conflict with China could break out. Beijing, though, has yet to present a ‘nail’ to the US ‘hammer’.John Blaxland, Professor, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/727392017-02-14T07:28:16Z2017-02-14T07:28:16ZHas Abe got Trump’s measure? Golf diplomacy puts Japan back on the green<p>Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe managed to be the <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/donald-trump-election-latest-japanese-prime-minister-shinzo-abe-meeting-a7424106.html">first foreign leader to visit then president-elect Donald Trump</a> last November. He was already embarking on his activist personal diplomacy to counter the <a href="http://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/2016/05/22/donald-trumps-plan-to-make-americans-poor-again/#3b98d7b02db0">bellicose rhetoric Trump occasionally aimed at Japan</a> during his election campaign, accusing the country of unfair trade practices and currency manipulation, and threatening tariffs against imports.</p>
<p>Trump even implied an end to the US-Japan alliance, stating that Japan, along with other US allies, <a href="http://time.com/4437089/donald-trump-nuclear-weapons-nukes/">should develop its own nuclear weapons</a>. But Abe’s first official meeting with President Trump last week – the second world leader after British Prime Minister Theresa May – has already achieved Japan’s most fundamental diplomatic goal: ensuring the continuity its security alliance with America.</p>
<p>The trip follows a <a href="http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/02/04/national/politics-diplomacy/inada-says-hopes-mattis-visit-strengthens-regional-security-ties-south-korea/">successful preliminary visit to Japan</a> the previous week by the US Secretary of Defense James Mattis, and a <a href="http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/kaiken/kaiken4e_000339.html">similarly positive phone call</a> between Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida and US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson.</p>
<p>Mattis praised the country’s financial contribution to the hosting of US bases in Japan (around 75%, with most bases in Okinawa) as a “<a href="http://the-japan-news.com/news/article/0003502433">model of cost-sharing</a>”. And he issued a statement that the US would continue to defend Japan’s claims over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea (claimed as the Daioyus by China), under the US-Japan Security Treaty.</p>
<h2>Maintaining the status quo</h2>
<p>Reassured by his firm endorsement of the value of Japan’s contribution to the expense of the alliance, the first stage of Abe’s trip to the US produced exactly what was hoped for. In a joint press conference following talks after Abe’s arrival in Washington DC, <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/10/remarks-president-trump-and-prime-minister-abe-japan-joint-press">Trump said</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>We are committed to the security of Japan and all areas under its administrative control and to further strengthening our crucial alliance. The bond between our two nations and the friendship between our two peoples runs very, very deep. This administration is committed to bringing those ties even closer.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/10/joint-statement-president-donald-j-trump-and-prime-minister-shinzo-abe">A joint statement released afterwards</a> confirmed the US remains committed to defending Japan’s claims over the Senkaku Islands under Article 5 of the US-Japan Security Treaty, including use of conventional and nuclear military capabilities, if necessary. </p>
<p>The controversial relocation of the main US military air base on Okinawa will also continue. While maintaining rights to international freedom of flight and navigation in the East China Sea, Abe and Trump also hoped <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-02-11/trump-committed-to-us-japan-security-after-abe-meeting/8261620">any actions that would escalate tensions</a> in the South China Sea could be avoided.</p>
<p>But, in the first such encounter under the Trump administration, the US Navy has already reported an “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/10/south-china-sea-us-navy-aircraft-encounter">unsafe interaction</a>” between one of its reconnaissance aircraft and a Chinese aircraft during a patrol over the South China Sea.</p>
<p>And this is despite Trump having followed up his greeting letter to Xi Jinping, where he expressed hope they can work productively together, with his first phone call to the Chinese leader. During the call, he reiterated the <a href="http://www.vox.com/world/2017/2/10/14575442/trump-accept-one-china">USA’s long-held adherence to the “One China” policy</a> after all.</p>
<h2>The problem of trade</h2>
<p>Before and during the visit, ignoring criticism from opposition parties in Japan, <a href="http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201701310048.html">Abe remained uncritical of Trump’s controversial</a> – and possibly unconstitutional – immigration ban. Abe is hardly in any position to criticise it, given Japan’s own paltry record of accepting refugees. Despite a record number of over 10,000 applications, <a href="http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/02/10/national/record-10910-refugee-applicants-face-abysmal-odds-acceptance-japan/#.WKA43X82VOY">Japan only accepted 28 refugees in 2016</a>.</p>
<p>North Korea’s first missile launch test of the year, <a href="https://theconversation.com/forget-sanctions-reining-in-north-korea-will-need-a-whole-new-approach-70431">held in the middle of Abe’s US visit</a>, also gave the two leaders an immediate opportunity to display the ongoing strength of the alliance. <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-38947451">In a joint news conference</a>, Abe condemned the test as “absolutely intolerable”, while Trump declared “the United States of America stands behind Japan, its great ally, 100%.”</p>
<p>While the defence relationship may have been secured, trade remains the main area of contention. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which Japan strongly supported <a href="https://theconversation.com/can-the-trans-pacific-partnership-survive-after-trump-71821">is now likely to be doomed</a>, due to Trump’s condemnation of multilateral trade pacts. </p>
<p>Abe hopes Trump’s hostile campaign rhetoric against Japan over trade can also be mollified. </p>
<p>Appealing to Trump’s populist economic nationalism, Abe brought along a plan called the <a href="http://in.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-japan-trade-exclusive-idINKBN15F0LD">US-Japan Growth and Employment Initiative</a>. Projected to be worth around US$450 billion, it pledges potential investment by Japanese corporations in the US – in infrastructure, energy, and robots. The package, which promises the <a href="http://the-japan-news.com/news/article/0003498622">creation of more than 700,000 jobs</a> in America over ten years, could be incorporated into a potential bilateral trade deal with Japan. </p>
<p>At their Washington meeting, Abe and Trump <a href="http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20170211/p2g/00m/0dm/005000c">agreed to commence talks on a bilateral trade agreement</a>, in place of the TPP. A new US-Japan economic dialogue group is to be established toward that end, to be led by US Vice President Mike Pence and Japanese Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso, who also held their first separate meeting in Washington.</p>
<p>As with the TPP though, concluding a bilateral trade treaty is likely to be long, complex, fraught process, particularly over agriculture.</p>
<h2>Work and play</h2>
<p>After the formal Washington meetings, Abe flew to Florida with Trump on Air Force One, accompanied by first ladies Melania Trump and Akie Abe, to the president’s extravagantly luxurious Mar-a-Largo resort, <a href="https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/2842627/donald-trump-golfing-japanese-prime-minister-abe/">to play golf for the weekend</a>. The White House stated the cost of Abe’s visit to the resort, including golfing fees, would be paid for by Trump as a personal gift. </p>
<p>This is a further sign of the apparently warm personal ties that Abe has managed to cultivate; Trump has already accepted an invitation to visit Japan later this year.<br>
If Abe returns with US trade relations relatively intact, as well as the military alliance, he will have taken advantage of the erratic and turbulent first weeks of the Trump administration to <a href="https://theconversation.com/japans-australian-sub-bid-fits-with-its-strategic-and-economic-transformation-48156">secure favourable strategic and economic relations</a>. His government is likely to be supported by the Trump administration, as it was by president Barack Obama’s, to continue increasing defence spending, and pursuing further constitutional change.</p>
<p>In return, Abe is likely to encourage the US to challenge China’s recent domination of the South China Sea, and <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-02-09/could-the-indian-ocean-become-south-china-sea/8257204">compete with the expansion of Chinese influence into the Indian Ocean region</a>, through its planned massive “One Belt, One Road” land and sea transport infrastructure project. </p>
<p>Abe’s US visit could, in fact, eventually turn out to have been an important step in reviving his long-held ambition for <a href="http://www.nippon.com/en/column/g00339/">a “security diamond” between Japan, the US, India and Australia</a>, which he proposed during his first term as prime minister in 2006-2007. </p>
<p>These four states may now be more willing to revive this idea for a strategic alliance, but if it does proceed, this could threaten a Cold War-style hegemonic confrontation in the Asia-Pacific region. And it could have potentially catastrophic consequences if armed conflict breaks out over territorial disputes.</p>
<p>Abe is one of the most energetic practitioners of diplomacy among modern Japanese prime ministers. By flattering Trump’s ego, he has proved adept at handling Trump’s inexperience in foreign policy. He has managed to successfully challenge one of Trump’s strongest held attitudes, publicly expressed as long ago as 1987, that <a href="http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2017/02/09/what-trump-is-throwing-out-the-window/">the US is being exploited by its allies</a> in providing for their military protection. </p>
<p>Abe has demonstrated to other world leaders how to approach President Donald Trump: pay the price to strike a deal that panders to corporate interests and geostrategic nationalism of both sides. </p>
<p>This first official US visit has thus potentially become Abe’s most far-reaching diplomatic achievement so far. That is, if the notoriously temperamental, inconsistent and contradictory Trump can be counted on to stick to his deals.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/72739/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Craig Mark does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe may have just demonstrated to other world leaders how to possibly approach President Donald Trump.Craig Mark, Professor, Kyoritsu Women's UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/439532015-07-01T05:12:55Z2015-07-01T05:12:55ZTaiwan’s presidential election could start a pivot to Beijing<p>Taiwan is limbering up for its 2016 presidential election. Its two main parties have picked their candidates – and gotten very different receptions.</p>
<p>When the ruling Nationalist Party (KMT) nominated <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/the-strange-case-of-the-kmts-hung-hsiu-chu/">Hung Hsiu-chu</a> as its candidate for the 2016 Taiwan presidential elections, the reaction was disbelief. Instead of picking its much younger chairman, <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/04/taiwan-ruling-party-leader-affirms-support-for-unity-with-mainland-china">Eric Chu</a>, who has a PhD in accounting and who’s already served as deputy premier in government, the KMT has instead chosen a quirky party apparatchik with no substantial record in government.</p>
<p>Hung, who has been <a href="http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2015/06/21/2003621191">dubbed</a> Taiwan’s Sarah Palin, offers an outspoken antidote to President Ma Ying-jeou and Chairman Chu’s temperate demeanour and sagely tenor. But she faces a tough opponent in the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) Tsai Ying-wen.</p>
<p>Though younger than Hung, Tsai has considerably more executive experience. Like Chu, she has served as deputy premier in the past – and a recent <a href="http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2015/06/06/2003620029">visit she paid to Washington</a> was widely deemed a success. Crucially, she is said to have allayed American fears that a DPP victory would destabilise Taiwan’s delicate relations with China, potentially dragging the US military into a conflict it would rather avoid. After all, US-China tensions are already mounting over China’s maritime disputes with the <a href="https://theconversation.com/dispute-over-the-south-china-sea-could-put-east-asia-at-war-again-37825">Philippines</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/japan-is-regaining-lost-military-muscle-and-the-us-needs-it-42277">Japan</a>.</p>
<p>Tsai’s visit was proof that Taiwanese politics has come full circle. The KMT, once the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) fiercest enemy, is now pushing for closer links with a CCP-led mainland; Hung’s own father was smeared as a CCP agent and jailed for three years, and yet she is now suggesting she would steer Taiwan even closer to Beijing’s orbit. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, Tsai is going out of her way to portray herself as the status quo candidate par excellence – definitively breaking with her party’s history of exuberant opposition to Beijing.</p>
<h2>About face</h2>
<p>Tsai’s success at the DPP helm has convinced many observers in the West that the KMT is headed for a crushing defeat in 2016; the ruling party has already taken a drubbing in the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-30257504">2014 local elections</a>, and the popular tide in Taiwan seems to be turning against its policy of compromise with Beijing, which many Taiwanese see as a step towards “peaceful reunification” on Beijing’s “one country, two systems” terms. </p>
<p>Indeed, the 2014 protests by the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-32229214">Sunflower Movement</a> – a groundswell of opposition to Ma’s proposed free trade agreement with Beijing – badly rattled Taiwan’s establishment. The last local elections confirmed the movement was not just a student uprising, but in fact a reflection of broader public discontent at the KMT government.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/86877/original/image-20150630-5827-tz13o4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/86877/original/image-20150630-5827-tz13o4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/86877/original/image-20150630-5827-tz13o4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/86877/original/image-20150630-5827-tz13o4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/86877/original/image-20150630-5827-tz13o4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/86877/original/image-20150630-5827-tz13o4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/86877/original/image-20150630-5827-tz13o4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The KMT’s Hung Shiu-chu.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Hung-shiu-chu-3by2.png">Gibsontom4 via Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Given that clear signal from the electorate, many Western observers expected the KMT to pick a centrist candidate who would appeal to these popular currents without changing Taiwan’s relationship with China. In Hung, they see a Beijing appeaser who is likely to alienate not just the electorate but also the Taiwanese military top brass, who are still understandably suspicious of Beijing’s grand strategy. </p>
<p>Hung has gone beyond Ma by suggesting she would end Taiwanese arms procurement from the US if elected president. Before the KMT elders prevailed on her to change tack, she even hinted she would break with the tradition of visiting Washington in the lead-up to the presidential elections.</p>
<h2>Wind of change</h2>
<p>But Tsai has not shown any real enthusiasm for a new push for true independence from China. Whatever the Taiwanese people’s sentiments, she clearly has no intention of reviving the policies that typified her DPP predecessor <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-30677700">Chen Shui-bian</a>’s controversial presidency in the early 2000s. </p>
<p>At its height, the Chen era saw a carefully orchestrated “<a href="http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2007/07/01/2003367611">de-sinification</a>” campaign. Chen pushed Beijing’s patience to the limit by adding the word Taiwan to the cover of new passports alongside the familiar Republic of China emblem, and besought Ban Ki-Moon to readmit Taiwan to the UN as an independent polity.</p>
<p>Things have changed greatly in Taiwan since then. What Western analyses of the DDP tend to miss is that its policies may be beginning to converge with the KMT’s – and could build a new bridge between Taipei and Beijing even if Tsai is the one elected. Thus, for example, the DPP position on the South China Sea as well as the Senkaku/Diaoyu maritime disputes is very similar to the KMT’s. This is a position that aligns with Beijing’s ethnocentric claims by and large. Moreover, the DDP’s position is surprisingly at odds with the position of Tokyo and Manila in spite of the fact that Taipei, like Tokyo and Manila, is heavily tied to a US security umbrella.</p>
<p>Today’s Taiwan is much more reliant on China economically than it was when Chen took power, and it’s highly unlikely Tsai would renege on her assurances to Washington by changing course. As president, she might opt to tone down the DPP’s rejection of the <a href="http://www.china.org.cn/english/taiwan/7956.htm">“One China” principle</a> too. </p>
<p>Tsai is even backing off the party’s longtime military posturing against China, keeping relatively quiet about the KMT’s <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21583271-conscripts-death-has-brought-young-out-streets-blooded">plan to abolish conscription</a>. She reportedly wants to combine compulsory and voluntary military service into one system, but that hardly means she would increase the size of Taiwan’s armed forces or send the armed forces on a weaponry procurement spree in Washington.</p>
<p>This emerging consensus speaks to a long-running narrative of Chinese identity, at least amongst the older, mainland-born population of Taiwan. And while one might imagine Taiwanese youth to be increasingly disdainful of mainland China, in recent years some younger Taiwanese have <a href="http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2012/08/18/2003540562">made a show</a> of landing on disputed Japanese and Philippine islands while toting the Republic of China flag.</p>
<p>Whether Hung would be roundly defeated by Tsai in 2016, as suggested, or post an upset remains to be seen. A Tsai win, at any rate, would not necessarily preclude accommodation with Beijing. </p>
<p>What is also clear is that Taiwan would have a new female president in 2016 for the first time in its history. This would be another major achievement toward gender equality in Asia, following Park Geun-hye’s sweeping to power in South Korea. It has to be remembered in this context that none of the seven members in China’s peak policy-making body (CCP politburo central committee) is female. China – like Japan or the US for that matter – has not had a female leader yet. In that sense, the 2016 elections in Taiwan are globally significant. Female presidents have been a common sight in Southeast Asian politics but not in the more economically powerful region of Northeast Asia.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/43953/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Niv Horesh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>If the 2016 presidential candidates are anything to go by, Taiwan’s relationship with Beijing could be in for a major defrost.Niv Horesh, Professor of Modern Chinese History and Director of the China Policy Institute , University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/422772015-05-27T05:37:33Z2015-05-27T05:37:33ZJapan is regaining lost military muscle – and the US needs it<p>After years spent delicately staying out of military disputes around the world, Japan is suddenly reasserting itself as a serious player in regional and international disputes – and America is ushering it along. </p>
<p>And while circumstances in Japan’s neighbourhood mean that the country needs to show more muscle, there’s an inescapable irony in seeing these two countries holding hands militarily.</p>
<p>After World War II, Japan <a href="http://www.loc.gov/law/help/japan-constitution/article9.php">renounced war</a> and outlawed the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes in <a href="http://www.loc.gov/law/help/japan-constitution/article9.php">Article 9</a> of its constitution. This set the stage for decades of explosive economic development on the home front.</p>
<p>Japan spent the postwar decades transitioning from military to economic power, with the US sheltering it under the <a href="http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html">Treaty of Mutual Co-operation and Security</a> that the two countries signed in 1960.</p>
<p>But now, with the Asia-Pacific region under intense pressure from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the US-Japan alliance is reverting back to a more muscular and defensive posture.</p>
<p>Things hit a peak in April 2015, when President Obama reminded the Asia-Pacific – specifically the PRC – that the US and Japan’s mutual security treaty covers Japanese’s maritime disputes in the East China Sea. Therefore, America will defend the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/24/obama-in-japan-backs-status-quo-in-island-dispute-with-china">Senkaku Islands</a>, an uninhabited archipelago at the heart of a long-running territorial dispute with the PRC.</p>
<p>And now, America is standing shoulder-to-shoulder with Japan as the latter steps up both regionally and internationally, transforming back into the sort of power it had apparently decided never to be again. </p>
<h2>Revival</h2>
<p>In July 2014, Japanese PM Shinzō Abe and his cabinet <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/01/us-japan-defense-idUSKBN0F52S120140701">approved</a> a reinterpretation of Article 9, which granted the nation the right of collective self-defence. </p>
<p>Although Japan is the <a href="http://www.un.emb-japan.go.jp/topics/un_budget.html">second largest financial contributor</a> to the United Nations and has been sending troops on UN peacekeeping missions <a href="http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/reinterpreting-article-9-enhancing-japans-engagement-in-un-peacekeeping/">since 1992</a>, Article 9 has always limited Japan’s direct participation from any possible combat missions. Now the grey area is gone, and no misgivings have been raised by the US.</p>
<p>Seven months after the shift, Abe <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/02/world/departing-from-countrys-pacifism-japanese-premier-vows-revenge-for-killings.html?_r=0">took a strong stand</a> against Islamic State, calling for revenge after the capture and killing of two Japanese hostages. Such a bold statement is rare coming from Japan – and combined with the reinterpretation of Article 9, it suggests at the very least that Japan will engage in future peacekeeping missions in a more involved way that possibly participate in combat operations, especially if Islamic State is the target. </p>
<p>With this new assertiveness, Japan is starting to regain the status as a “normal” state. And this is shaking up the Asia-Pacific balance of power in a big way.</p>
<h2>Stand-off</h2>
<p>Besides the backup it gets from America, Japan’s new foreign policy posture enjoys substantial internal support. Abe’s programme of “<a href="https://theconversation.com/despite-abenomic-growth-japan-still-needs-reform-14447">Abenomics</a>” has actually made a pretty good job of bringing Japan’s stagnant economy back to its feet, and that was the main reason his administration was <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/afp-japan-pm-set-for-re-election-after-abenomics-poll-win-2014-12?IR=T">re-elected</a> last year. </p>
<p>Whether Abe took a strong stance on foreign policy was not a main consideration when the Japanese voted. But as Abe’s domestic legitimacy improves, he and his cabinet are getting more licence to engage in international affairs and regional maritime disputes, and responding to the PRC’s maritime belligerence with a strikingly belligerent tone. </p>
<p>Even though the PRC is testing the red lines of maritime disputes with <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-28322355">oil drilling in Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone</a>, various <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11225522">vessel collisions near the Senkakus</a> and its recent <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/05/20/uk-southchinasea-usa-idUKKBN0O50T420150520">land-reclamation work</a> around reefs in the South China Sea, the party-state has backed off or at least stopped escalating hostilities when it has pursued these aggressive actions.</p>
<p>Clearly, Beijing is not yet prepared to trigger full-scale hostilities with even relatively weak states like Vietnam, never mind an ever more muscular Japan. But if the party-state continues with its red line tests, and the maritime disputes it insists on inflaming could blow the fuse on the region’s fragile stability. After all, nearly every state in the Asia-Pacific has at least one maritime dispute with its neighbours rumbling away. </p>
<p>Yet America chooses to engage with Japan to a level that could possibly upset Washington’s other alliances across East Asia. The growing US-Japanese alliance is clearly intended to counterweight the PRC, and to shift the volatile balance of power in the region in ways we cannot foresee. </p>
<p>But one thing’s for sure: the land of the rising sun is rising again.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/42277/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Neville Chi Hang Li does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Japan has spent decades proudly staying out of military matters, but China’s maritime belligerence has changed all that.Neville Chi Hang Li, PhD Candidate in International Security and Demography, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/402252015-04-24T02:01:23Z2015-04-24T02:01:23ZWar anniversary promises year of difficulty for Asia’s rival powers<p>Australia has been gripped by war commemoration fever. The centenary of the Anzac landings at Gallipoli is dominating media, politics and public debate.</p>
<p>The central place of the Anzac myth in the story Australians tell about themselves makes this understandable. But this introspection shouldn’t blind us to 2015 marking an anniversary of a more profoundly important event than the ill-fated efforts to seize the Dardanelles from a sclerotic Ottoman empire.</p>
<h2>How WW2 changed the Asian order</h2>
<p>August 1945 was a turning point in modern history. It brought to an end Japan’s imperial ambitions in Asia. </p>
<p>Australians think of the war in the Pacific as part of the broader canvas of the second world war. But the conflict with the Western powers was only the final act of two generations of colonial expansion by Asia’s first industrial power. </p>
<p>At its peak in the early 1940s, Japan controlled all of the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan, large swathes of northern and coastal China, and virtually all of what we now call Southeast Asia. It was strategically threatening Australia.</p>
<p>The anniversary of the second world war’s end is important today for two main reasons. First, virtually all of Asia’s flashpoints have their origins in the war and its aftermath. The division of Korea, the status of Taiwan and the maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas have as their root cause the wash-up of Japan’s defeat.</p>
<p>The politics of history is the second reason why 1945 has such salience – and particularly the ways in which powerful waves of nationalist sentiment are ramping up strategic rivalry in Asia today.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/78422/original/image-20150417-3249-1dtrn7h.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/78422/original/image-20150417-3249-1dtrn7h.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/78422/original/image-20150417-3249-1dtrn7h.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=762&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/78422/original/image-20150417-3249-1dtrn7h.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=762&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/78422/original/image-20150417-3249-1dtrn7h.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=762&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/78422/original/image-20150417-3249-1dtrn7h.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=958&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/78422/original/image-20150417-3249-1dtrn7h.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=958&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/78422/original/image-20150417-3249-1dtrn7h.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=958&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands continue to be a source of tension in the Sino-Japanese relationship.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Hiroya Shimoji</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Sino-Japanese tensions have spiked in recent years around <a href="https://theconversation.com/senkaku-islands-the-latest-battleground-as-japan-gets-tough-under-abe-19650">disputed islands</a> in the East China Sea, which the Japanese call the Senkaku and the Chinese call the Diaoyu. Frequent harassment of each other’s coastguards, fishing fleets and at times highly risky engagements – including Chinese air force jets flying dangerously close to Japan’s – have ratcheted up tensions. </p>
<p>Conflict between Asia’s two largest economies over barren and uninhabited islands has become a very real possibility.</p>
<p>But in November 2014, a bilateral <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/10/xi-jinping-shinzo-abe-ice-breaking-meeting-apec-starts">meeting</a> on the sidelines of APEC between Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Chinese President Xi Jinping seemed to signal a thaw in relations. Further high-level security talks were <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21647340-first-meeting-foreign-ministers-three-years-heralds-milder-spell-buds-march">held</a> in March 2015 – the first since 2011. </p>
<p>It is hoped that a <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/japan-china-maritime-crisis-management-talks-are-on-the-horizon/">crisis-management mechanism</a> designed to defuse aerial and maritime clashes could be in place by the end of 2015. China has also hinted that it might even <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1747010/china-invites-japans-shinzo-abe-ww2-anniversary-beijing-says-source">invite</a> Japan’s leader to commemorations marking the end of the second world war.</p>
<h2>The risks involved in commemoration</h2>
<p>Necessary as these initiatives are, the underlying sources of conflict remain fundamentally unchanged. Japan feels threatened by China’s rise and refuses to relinquish its administrative control of the disputed territories. China believes that the islands remain unfinished business from 1945, that Japan acquired them wrongfully and that they are part of China.</p>
<p>Both the Communist Party in China and Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party in Japan have very little scope for compromise given how important nationalist sentiment is to their political fortunes.</p>
<p>China’s support for the proposed crisis-management mechanism is closely tied to what Abe says in an upcoming second world war commemoration <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/63767eae-bd96-11e4-9d09-00144feab7de.html#slide0">speech</a>. Should he fail to express Japanese remorse, all bets are off. </p>
<p>The Chinese war commemorations are to be held at Marco Polo Bridge near Beijing – the place where a Japanese <a href="http://www.chinapost.com.tw/editorial/taiwan-issues/2009/07/07/215168/The-Marco.htm">attack</a> began its full-blown invasion of China in the late 1930s. Japan sees this as provocative: Abe is unlikely to take part in such an event.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/78423/original/image-20150417-3235-1gvnzz1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/78423/original/image-20150417-3235-1gvnzz1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/78423/original/image-20150417-3235-1gvnzz1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/78423/original/image-20150417-3235-1gvnzz1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/78423/original/image-20150417-3235-1gvnzz1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/78423/original/image-20150417-3235-1gvnzz1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/78423/original/image-20150417-3235-1gvnzz1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/78423/original/image-20150417-3235-1gvnzz1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">China’s war commemorations will be held here, at Marco Polo Bridge.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Michael Reynolds</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>2015 is thus a year not only of commemoration but of very real risk. Conflict between China and Japan remains a real prospect and one that has very immediate consequences for Australia. These flow not only from Australia’s economic interests with the two Northeast Asian giants, but from its strategic links with the US and increasingly Japan.</p>
<p>Conflict between China and Japan is by no means inevitable, but responsibility for avoiding it does not only rest with their respective governments. Their narrow fight over rocky islands and their resources is one in which we all have a stake. The region as a whole must work to avoid war. </p>
<p>To do this, concrete steps need to be taken to manage crises, reduce tensions and ultimately resolve the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. After all, 2015 is not just the 70th anniversary of the end of the second world war, it is also the 120th anniversary of the <a href="http://china.usc.edu/treaty-shimonoseki-1895">Treaty of Shimonoseki</a> – signed after Japan’s much earlier defeat of China. </p>
<p>It is the festering wounds of that conflict with which we still grapple today.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/40225/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brendan Taylor receives funding from the Australian Department of Defence.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nick Bisley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The fog of the second world war and the murkiness of the post-war settlement laid the contours of Asia’s complex and uncertain strategic landscape.Nick Bisley, Executive Director of La Trobe Asia and Professor of International Relations, La Trobe UniversityBrendan Taylor, Head, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, School of International, Political & Strategic Studies, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/209422013-12-02T03:40:40Z2013-12-02T03:40:40ZChina’s ADIZ and Australia’s commitment to America’s Asian order<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/36562/original/zvmw54yj-1385807724.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">What has the international response been to China establishing an Air Defence Identification Zone over the East China Sea?</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Hiroya Shimoji</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Last week, China announced the creation of a new Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea, encompassing the <a href="https://theconversation.com/senkaku-islands-the-latest-battleground-as-japan-gets-tough-under-abe-19650">disputed Senkaku Islands</a>. The move has significantly escalated tensions in the region and <a href="https://theconversation.com/does-china-know-what-its-doing-20932">set off debate</a> about just why China chose to do this and what its intentions might be. </p>
<p>In response, the US dispatched a <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-25110011">pair of B-52 bombers</a> to show that it was not going to submit to China’s demands that all aircraft lodge plans in advance of flying through the zone. <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-25133957">Japan and South Korea</a> have followed suit with their own military planes. </p>
<p>Australia has, somewhat surprisingly, very publicly <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/australia-summons-chinese-ambassador-over-air-defence-zone-20131126-2y7vi.html">voiced its opposition</a> to China’s move. Foreign minister Julie Bishop issued a short but pointed press release and called in the Chinese ambassador for a diplomatic dressing-down. These are strong steps to take, and not without risk given that China is by some measure Australia’s <a href="http://www.china.embassy.gov.au/bjng/relations1.html">number one trading partner</a>. </p>
<p>For some, Australia’s action is mistaken. It unnecessarily aggravates relations with China, inflames tensions in the region and risks Australia being seen as part of an effort by the US and Japan to contain China.</p>
<p>However, the move does have a greater strategic logic than may at first be apparent. By taking such a firm stand, Australia is sending a clear signal about its strategic interests in Asia. This follows a pattern established by prime minister Tony Abbott’s remarks that Japan is Australia’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/politics-of-the-closest-friend-abbott-japan-and-the-asia-pacific-19069">“closest friend in Asia”</a>, and the most recent Australia-US ministerial meeting <a href="http://foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2013/jb_mr_131120.html">communique</a>. The response to the ADIZ is part of a deliberate effort to make very clear where Australia stands in relation to Asia’s international order.</p>
<p>For a long time, Australian politicians and officials have used the somewhat tired formulation that Australia does not have to choose between the US and China. They have also been working assiduously – and effectively – at improving relations with both of the region’s giants. But the unintended consequence of these efforts has been a degree of murkiness about just what Australia’s long-term priorities are during a period of considerable change. </p>
<p>The Abbott government is speaking much more clearly and directly about Australia’s strategic policy and the kind of regional setting which it prefers. At the centre of its policy is the firm belief that the region is best served by the continuation of American military predominance, sometimes called <a href="http://www.foreignaffairs.com/features/readinglists/what-to-read-on-american-primacy">“primacy”</a>. A stable regional balance of power organised around American pre-eminence is thought best both for Australia’s interests and the region more generally. </p>
<p>The region also needs clear “road rules” adhered to by all. Australia believes that these need to have their origins in international law. Asia is a congested geopolitical space and mechanisms are needed to manage the inevitable frictions that will occur. And Asia needs an open economic order that drives prosperity and binds the fates of the region’s many peoples. </p>
<p>Put simply, Australia believes that the region needs to continue on the path established in the mid-1970s as a result of Sino-American rapprochement. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/36563/original/2zgcv8c6-1385816523.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/36563/original/2zgcv8c6-1385816523.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/36563/original/2zgcv8c6-1385816523.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/36563/original/2zgcv8c6-1385816523.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/36563/original/2zgcv8c6-1385816523.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=551&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/36563/original/2zgcv8c6-1385816523.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=551&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/36563/original/2zgcv8c6-1385816523.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=551&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Australia has very firmly tied itself to a vision of Asia’s future that is American-led.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Dita Alangkara</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The more assertive turn that Chinese foreign and defence policy has taken in recent years appears to indicate that China is no longer satisfied with these arrangements. Whether in its expansive claims in the South China Sea or in its establishment of the new ADIZ, China seems to be trying to bend and stretch an order that it feels no longer serves its interests. </p>
<p>America and its allies have responded firmly because of the challenge China’s actions present to arrangements that they believe are necessary for regional stability over the longer run.</p>
<p>Australia is of the view that the region will work best when China accepts the current order – both its military and diplomatic terms – and its interests are accommodated within that setting. The problem is, in the past, this view was less than clear. It was well-known that Australia was a strong ally of the US but there was considerable uncertainty about how it would position itself in relation to China’s long-term ambition. </p>
<p>In taking public umbrage at the ADIZ and acting in line with the US and Japan, Australia has nailed its strategic colours to the mast. The more direct language does have some diplomatic downside in the short term, but this is a price is worth paying. It will make the longer-term process of managing Asia’s international relations less complex. </p>
<p>Is Australia right to think that the continuation of an American-brokered regional order will provide the best future for itself and the region? This depends entirely on the extent to which China believes it can achieve its interests under these circumstances. Whatever path China chooses, Australia has very firmly tied itself to a vision of Asia’s future that is American-led. </p>
<p>In speaking plainly about this, Bishop reminds Australians that they need to begin to think hard about both the costs and benefits that such a commitment brings.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/20942/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nick Bisley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Last week, China announced the creation of a new Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea, encompassing the disputed Senkaku Islands. The move has significantly escalated tensions…Nick Bisley, Executive Director, La Trobe Asia, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/209882013-11-29T15:41:41Z2013-11-29T15:41:41ZMore than a neighbourly dispute awaits Joe Biden in Asia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/36549/original/cxqs2zp5-1385735325.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">All parties are posturing for influence.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Fotopedia</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>US Vice President Joe Biden’s trip to Asia next week could not come at a more timely moment. It is the first high level visit since President Obama cancelled his trip during the government shutdown in October and comes amidst renewed tensions in the region. </p>
<p>Countries on Joe Biden’s list include Japan, South Korea and China – all currently involved in a spat following China’s abrupt <a href="http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Press/2013-11/23/content_4476180.htm">announcement last week</a> of an Air Defence Identification Zone in the East China Sea. </p>
<p>The air defence zone covers territory also claimed by Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. China has said all planes transiting the zone must file flight plans and identify themselves, or face “defensive emergency measures”.</p>
<p><a href="http://blogs.nottingham.ac.uk/chinapolicyinstitute/2013/11/28/chinas-new-adiz-do-not-panic-yet-do-worry/">As noted elsewhere</a>, the
establishment of such a zone is not exceptional, nor is it in contradiction with <a href="http://www.usnwc.edu/Research---Gaming/China-Maritime-Studies-Institute/Publications/documents/Dutton-NC-1st-proofs-(9-29-09)-(3)1.pdf">international law</a>. Many nations have done so in the past, including all the other regional stakeholders in the case of the East China Sea. But, the devil is always in the details. In this case, the details lie in <a href="http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-11/23/c_132911634.htm">the rules governing China’s zone</a> and its overlap with Japan’s. Plus, Beijing has established its zone over the contested Senkaku islands, which fall between the two.</p>
<p>The stakes here are not negligible. Japan and China have both been rattling sabres over who has sovereignty of the islands and China has been trying hard to challenge the US-Japan defence alliance. This year they have made frequent incursions into Japan’s <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2013/10/chinas-expanding-cabbage-strategy/">waters</a> and <a href="https://medium.com/war-is-boring/545cebcdfe00">air space</a>, and patrolled their borders.</p>
<p>None of this has succeeded in driving a wedge between Washington and Tokyo. Quite the opposite. U.S. officials have moved from somewhat <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/21/world/asia/china-criticizes-clintons-remarks-about-dispute-with-japan-over-islands.html?_r=0">ambiguous statements</a> about their mutual defense treaty with Japan to explicit recognition that the <a href="http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=16392">Senkaku Islands are covered by Article V</a> of the treaty. This implies that any Chinese attempt to seize the islands will result in US intervention.</p>
<p>Perhaps China felt encouraged by a similar affair in the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/newsgraphics/2013/10/27/south-china-sea/">South China Sea</a>, the so-called Scarborough Shoal. A standoff with the Philippines in mid-2011 resulted in China’s effective control of the area. But the Senkakus are not just uninhabited rocks with no significance. The area is an important source of fish stocks for all surrounding states and it is likely to contain significant deposits of oil and natural gas.</p>
<p>More important than natural resources – the South China Sea has those too – is territorial integrity. The Philippines made a stand against China despite having no navy and air force to speak of because it felt its territorial integrity is under the threat. Joe Biden should take note.</p>
<p>China is playing a multidimensional game. Asserting territorial claims and challenging America’s alliance structure in the region forms an important part of it. Beijing is also testing reactions so it can adjust future steps and planned actions elsewhere. </p>
<p>Making predictions in the realm of international politics is a tricky business, especially when the situation is still developing as it is now. Yet, it is more likely that Beijing will go for soft enforcement as opposed to strict enforcement of the announced rules. That is not a reason to rejoice though. Already Japan has begun considering how to deal with increasing incursions of Chinese air patrols, including drones. And <a href="http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201310020040">shooting them down</a> is one of the options that Tokyo has mooted. The establishment of China’s air defence identification zone does not make this dilemma any less urgent.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/20988/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michal Thim does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>US Vice President Joe Biden’s trip to Asia next week could not come at a more timely moment. It is the first high level visit since President Obama cancelled his trip during the government shutdown in…Michal Thim, PhD candidate, China Policy Institute, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/196502013-10-31T03:36:14Z2013-10-31T03:36:14ZSenkaku Islands the latest battleground as Japan gets tough under Abe<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/34132/original/g7tq5stt-1383175983.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Japanese prime minister has reiterated his desire to maintain control of the disputed Senkaku Islands in his latest show of assertiveness.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe has received praise from financial markets and economists for <a href="http://www.cfr.org/japan/abenomics-japanese-economy/p30383">“Abenomics”</a>, his set of economic stimulus policies which have so far returned <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/24/opinion/krugman-japan-the-model.html">positive growth</a> to the long-stagnant Japanese economy. However, the <a href="http://www.stasiareport.com/the-big-story/asia-report/japan/story/guide-japans-remilitarisation-20130828">potential remilitarisation</a> of Japan by Abe’s conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) government is proving to be far more confrontational.</p>
<p>In recent media statements - most prominently at the annual review of the Self Defense Forces (SDF) this week - Abe <a href="http://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2013/10/28/japans-abe-keeps-up-heat-on-china/">reiterated</a> that Japan has to increase its defence preparedness to secure Japan from threats, and to allow it to play a greater role in international security. Abe <a href="http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/10/27/national/abe-issues-fresh-warning-to-china-on-isle-row/#.UnGyrmQW3B9">directly warned</a> that Japan would not allow China to make any changes by force to the territorial status quo of the region. </p>
<p>In doing so, Abe raised the prospect of Chinese drones being shot down over Japanese territory, with China <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-10-28/japan-china-war-of-words-erupts-regional-tensions/5048744">angrily responding</a> that any such action would be an act of war.</p>
<p>This escalation of rhetoric over the <a href="http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2013/09/11/senkakudiaoyu-islands-a-tense-anniversary/">disputed Senkaku Islands</a>, claimed as the Diaoyus by China (and Taiwan), continues the near-constant confrontation between maritime security forces of China and Japan in the waters and skies surrounding the disputed islands in the East China Sea. These have increased since the former Democratic Party of Japan government nationalised the islands, purchasing them from private owners in September last year.</p>
<p>Since coming to power in December 2012 - and <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-07-21/an-japan-election/4834032">winning a majority</a> for the LDP in the Upper House in July - Abe has been rolling out a more strident national security agenda. Defence spending is undergoing its largest increase in 22 years, with an emphasis on developing greater capability for carrying out amphibious assaults, overtly aimed at retaking islands captured by hostile powers.</p>
<p>Previous Japanese governments have gradually expanded the use of the SDF, stretching the boundaries of the notionally pacifist <a href="http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html">Article 9 clause</a> of the US-designed Japanese constitution. Participation in UN peacekeeping began in the 1990s, and in UN-authorised multinational anti-piracy operations since 2008. The LDP under prime minister Junichiro Koizumi <a href="http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2006/5-1-2.pdf">committed the SDF</a> to non-combat support roles in the US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.</p>
<p>Abe has long sought to “normalise” Japan’s defence and foreign policy, with the goal of renaming the SDF as the “National Defense Forces”. This would allow it to deploy the full military powers of a sovereign state, as permitted under the UN Charter. However, the LDP still does not have the two-thirds majority required in parliament to easily change the constitution, which would also have to be approved by public referendum. Abe nevertheless is <a href="http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/08/19/reference/clearing-way-for-wider-military-role/#.UnBzq9X6t9o">proposing to re-interpret</a> the constitution to allow the SDF to participate in “collective self-defence” with its allies, principally the US.</p>
<p>To this end, the tempo and size of joint military exercises alongside the US have already increased. US forces are already deployed in Japan, primarily based in Okinawa, and also further afield. Amphibious landing manoeuvres were held between the SDF and US forces in June <a href="http://nation.time.com/2013/06/12/japan-sends-its-troops-into-uncharted-waters/">this year in California</a>, with more exercises conducted recently on mainland Japan. Trilateral exercises have <a href="http://www.voanews.com/content/north-korea-denounces-joint-us-south-korea-miitary-pact-exercises/1764345.html">also been held</a> between the US, Japan and South Korea, aimed at deterring North Korea, the other main security threat faced by Japan. </p>
<p>This more nationalistic policy also appeals to the LDP’s conservative support base. This is reflected in more frequent visits by LDP politicians to the controversial Yasukuni war memorial shrine, much to the <a href="http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20131020p2g00m0dm004000c.html">displeasure</a> of neighbours China and Korea.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/34147/original/qprz8jbq-1383187306.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/34147/original/qprz8jbq-1383187306.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/34147/original/qprz8jbq-1383187306.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/34147/original/qprz8jbq-1383187306.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/34147/original/qprz8jbq-1383187306.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/34147/original/qprz8jbq-1383187306.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/34147/original/qprz8jbq-1383187306.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Senkaku Islands, the source of a long-running dispute between Japan and China.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Coast Guard Administration</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Abe’s more robust approach has also been pursued domestically this week, with legislation approved by Cabinet - and being voted on in parliament - to establish a National Security Council, following the US model. This will enable more coordinated responses to national security crises, which will be further developed in Japan’s first post-war National Security Strategy, <a href="http://ajw.asahi.com/article/views/editorial/AJ201310230047">expected to be approved</a> by the Cabinet in December. </p>
<p>Bills are also being enacted to more tightly secure government information, with heavier penalties against leakers from the public service and for journalists who “encourage” or benefit from leaks. The Abe government claims this is necessary to secure intelligence sharing and cooperation with the US and other allies (which could include Australia). </p>
<p>These measures have been criticised by the <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/25/us-japan-secrecy-idUSBRE99N1EC20131025">Japanese Bar Association</a> and media outlets as harming freedom of speech, potentially allowing the government to evade transparency on a wide range of issues it could designate as “state secrets”. This could include nuclear safety, as well as diplomacy and national security overall. </p>
<p>The US is welcoming the more assertive Japanese policy as complementary to its “pivot” of military forces to the Pacific, with a <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/04/world/asia/japan-and-us-agree-to-broaden-military-alliance.html?pagewanted=1">new security agreement</a> signed earlier this month allowing US surveillance drones to operate from Japan. </p>
<p>And, of course, Australian prime minister Tony Abbott recently described Japan as Australia’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/politics-of-the-closest-friend-abbott-japan-and-the-asia-pacific-19069">“closest friend in Asia”</a>, strengthening security ties through the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue. Abbott and Australian foreign minister Julie Bishop have optimistically expressed their hope that effective diplomacy will maintain peace in the region. </p>
<p>The need for such diplomacy to actually be pursued far more energetically is becoming urgent.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/19650/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Craig Mark does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe has received praise from financial markets and economists for “Abenomics”, his set of economic stimulus policies which have so far returned positive growth to the long-stagnant…Craig Mark, Associate Professor of International Studies, Kwansei Gakuin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.