tag:theconversation.com,2011:/fr/topics/shipbuilding-14851/articlesshipbuilding – The Conversation2024-02-20T04:11:34Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2238462024-02-20T04:11:34Z2024-02-20T04:11:34ZThe government has unveiled its Navy of the future. Will it solve our current problems – or just create new ones?<p>Australia’s naval surface combatant fleet is in trouble. The eight <a href="https://www.navy.gov.au/fleet/ships-boats-craft/ffh">Anzac frigates</a> are <a href="https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/auditors-warn-the-navy-s-frigates-are-wearing-out-20190319-p515co">worn out</a> after three decades of Middle Eastern adventures and <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/defence/workforce-crisis-threatens-to-put-two-more-anzac-frigates-out-of-service/news-story/adc8e4a1442831dd17e235389484c415">hard to crew</a>. The Anzac’s replacements, the <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2023/12/21/australias-anti-submarine-frigate-program-sails-rough-seas/">much-criticised</a> <a href="https://www.navy.gov.au/fleet/ships-boats-craft/future/ffg">Hunter Class frigates</a>, are late – the first will not enter service until <a href="https://www.anao.gov.au/work/performance-audit/department-defences-procurement-hunter-class-frigates">2032 or so</a>. </p>
<p>The project’s cost has also stunningly risen from <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-02-18/short-history-of-major-naval-shipbuilding-programs-in-australia/103477194">A$35 billion in 2018</a> to $45 billion a couple of years ago to now <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-02-19/naval-fleet-review-funding-hole-hunter-frigates/103486288">$65 billion</a>, even before actual ship construction starts. </p>
<p>Adding to the problems, the Navy now dislikes its 12 new <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-10-09/offshore-patrol-vessels-program-delay-costs-mount/101517060">offshore patrol vessels (OPVs)</a> currently being built; this seemingly simple project is also late, costly (<a href="https://www.anao.gov.au/work/major-projects-report/2022-23-major-projects-report">$3.7 billion</a> overall) and a “<a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/releases/2023-10-20/offshore-patrol-vessels-listed-project-concern">project of concern</a>”. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the Navy’s three brand new Hobart Class destroyers surprisingly need <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/special-reports/planning-well-advanced-for-air-warfare-destroyer-upgrade/news-story/656634c31b7a83b3caf56cf211d9577f">major, costly upgrades</a> that will take two to three years each. With luck, all three will be back in service by 2032. </p>
<p>These numbers are important as the Navy needs three ships in service to reliably maintain one ship deployed on distant operations for an extended period. Across most of the next decade, our current naval surface warship fleet will be able to dependably deploy only two, maybe three, warships simultaneously for extended periods. This is high-input cost for low-output usage.</p>
<h2>A consultant-driven solution</h2>
<p>That’s the problem. A review undertaken by <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/australia-pays-former-us-defence-chiefs-7000-a-day-for-advice-20230427-p5d3lh.html">highly paid</a>, external consultants, led by a retired US Navy admiral, has now provided the solution. </p>
<p>The review <a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/independent-analysis-navy-surface-combatant-fleet">released today</a> recommends keeping the three Hobart Class destroyers and six of the aged ANZAC frigates, building only six Hunter Class frigates and stopping the OPV program immediately at six ships. </p>
<p>The big surprise was the recommendation the Navy acquire at least seven – and “optimally” 11 – new general purpose frigates and six large optionally crewed surface vessels (LOSVs). The government agreed with both recommendations.</p>
<p>The new frigates will be a similar size to the Anzacs and effectively a half-size Hunter. Called “Tier 2” ships, they will be designed for anti-submarine warfare and used to secure seaborne trade routes, Australia’s northern maritime approaches and to escort the Navy’s amphibious ships. </p>
<p>They will have an air and missile defence capability and carry several anti-ship and land-attack missiles. Notably, the first three frigates will be built overseas – this will likely draw criticism. </p>
<p>The LOSVs will increase the Navy’s long-range strike capacity and appear to be similar to the US Navy’s planned large uncrewed surface vessels, which will enter service late this decade. </p>
<p>These vessels will mostly operate without a crew, though they may have a small crew embarked for short periods, such as when entering and leaving port or refuelling at sea. The LOSVs are expected to be lower-cost, long-endurance vessels able to carry anti-ship and land-attack missiles.</p>
<p>The review glosses over the serious inability of crewing the current 11-ship surface warship Navy, let alone a 26-vessel one. The Navy is already <a href="https://www.aap.com.au/news/defence-force-understaffed-by-thousands-in-tight-market/">about 900 people</a> short, equivalent to more than three Anzac ship crews, as it <a href="https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/slim-pickings-for-navy-as-it-struggles-to-recruit-20240105-p5evdx">struggles to meet its recruitment goals</a>. </p>
<p>The Department of Defence, however, <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_departments/Parliamentary_Library/FlagPost/2023/June/ADF-Retention">considers the problem</a> more one of retention than recruitment and is taking steps to slow the personnel loss rate, but it has much ground to make up before it can grow into a much larger force. </p>
<p>The review merely recognised the challenge and simply hoped for the best.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-much-anticipated-defence-review-is-here-so-what-does-it-say-and-what-does-it-mean-for-australia-204267">The much-anticipated defence review is here. So what does it say, and what does it mean for Australia?</a>
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<h2>Implications of the review</h2>
<p>First, the good news. Much of the money for the new ships will be spent in Australia – not just on sheet metal hull construction, but also on electronics. </p>
<p>For example, the future of the world-leading <a href="https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/media-releases/2023-04-27/albanese-government-secure-leading-edge-defence-capability">radar technology company</a> recently purchased by the federal government, appears secure. </p>
<p>There are definite benefits in both creating a more skilled <a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/sites/default/files/2024-02/ELSCF_Factsheets_Sovereign_Workforce.pdf">Australian workforce</a> and sustaining a sovereign, Australian naval shipbuilding industry. Critics will <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-04-16/naval-ship-building-in-australia-more-expensive-than-overseas/6395972">correctly argue</a> it’s more expensive than buying from overseas, but given tax claw-backs, maybe not that much. </p>
<p>Even so, the cost-benefit analysis will be hard to calculate – the decision over whether it’s good value for money needs to be a judgement call, not an analysis based on mathematics.</p>
<p>Second, the Albanese government came to office calling for much better “<a href="https://www.aspi.org.au/report/impactful-projection-long-range-strike-options-australia">impactful projection</a>” – that is, the ability to apply strategically meaningful military power at great distance from Australia’s shores using missiles. </p>
<p>The new frigates, however, will only carry some additional missiles – not many. As such, the government seems to have changed its earlier intentions and will instead focus more on the submarine threat to Australia’s trade routes. </p>
<p>The only nod to “impactful projection” in the review today is the building of six new LOSVs, each of which will be able to carry 32 missiles to sea. (One LOSV working with a Hobart Class frigate, however, will have around 88 missiles.) </p>
<p>Critics <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/rearming-the-royal-australian-navy/">will point to</a> the fact this is fewer than a single US Navy Arleigh Burke destroyer, which carries 96 missiles, and its larger Chinese counterpart, which carries 128. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-can-no-longer-afford-to-ignore-russias-expanding-naval-power-in-the-pacific-217913">Australia can no longer afford to ignore Russia's expanding naval power in the Pacific</a>
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<p>Third, the review does not call for renewing the Navy’s ageing Anzac flotilla quickly enough. Warship shortages will persist well into the next decade. This is bad news for the short term.</p>
<p>And lastly, the Navy will now have three major ship and submarine projects underway. The new plan to acquire an additional flotilla of frigates will take considerable time, soak up the country’s scarce ship-building workforce and be remarkably costly. </p>
<p>This will adversely impact the Navy operationally and the rest of the Department of Defence, Army and Air Force. As a result, we can likely expect cuts to the Army in the forthcoming budget. </p>
<p>Overall, the review is good for jobs in Adelaide and Perth and will make the Navy significantly larger over the long term. It will also partly placate some government critics who want to buy ships overseas, arguing this will mean faster delivery, and those <a href="https://www.andrewhastie.com.au/statement_marles_war_defence">who believe</a> the government needs “new money” added to currently planned defence budgets. </p>
<p>But the true cost impacts of the reform plan must await the budget. The plan will also take a long time to implement and has ignored the Navy’s chronic shortage of skilled personnel, which is surely most unwise.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223846/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Layton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Royal Australian Navy is in a mess – money has been spent on buying warships that are not making the grade. A new review aims to turn that around.Peter Layton, Visiting Fellow, Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1981982023-02-06T21:00:48Z2023-02-06T21:00:48ZNewport ship: after 20 years’ work, experts are ready to reassemble medieval vessel found in the mud<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508112/original/file-20230203-16-3271x0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=13%2C13%2C4426%2C3301&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An artistic impression of how the Newport Medieval ship may have looked . </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">David Jordan/Newport Museums and Heritage Service</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When construction work began on a new arts centre in Newport, south Wales, in 2002, the builders on site could scarcely have imagined what they would dig up. While excavating the foundations on the banks of the River Usk, a section of a medieval wooden ship was uncovered which had been perfectly preserved by the river’s waterlogged silt. Archaeologists were called in and it soon became clear the vessel was extraordinary. </p>
<p>This was not a coastal sailing boat that would have plied the Severn estuary up to the 19th century. Rather, it was a “great ship” by medieval standards, one that would have worked the long-distance routes of the Atlantic and Mediterranean. And yet, there it was, or at least a part of it, lying in an old slipway in what would have been a small Welsh port with a population of about 500 people during the Middle Ages.</p>
<p>The ship’s remains quickly caught the public’s imagination, with large numbers of <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/wales/2195072.stm">local people visiting the wreck</a>. It was a reminder that while Newport is best known historically as a 19th-century iron town, the city has a long history intimately connected to the sea. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/507861/original/file-20230202-7334-wj9b1v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A group of people wearing hard hats and high-visibility vests stand within a construction site on timber planks" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/507861/original/file-20230202-7334-wj9b1v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/507861/original/file-20230202-7334-wj9b1v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/507861/original/file-20230202-7334-wj9b1v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/507861/original/file-20230202-7334-wj9b1v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/507861/original/file-20230202-7334-wj9b1v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/507861/original/file-20230202-7334-wj9b1v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/507861/original/file-20230202-7334-wj9b1v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The Newport medieval ship as it looked in September 2002, months after construction workers made the discovery.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/3f/Newport_ship.jpg">Owain</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
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<p>So it was perhaps inevitable that <a href="https://www.southwalesargus.co.uk/news/15479544.15-years-on-how-newports-medieval-ship-was-found-and-how-it-was-saved/">locals were outraged</a> when they learned “their” ship was simply going to be recorded where it sat, before being sampled and then bulldozed. The price tag just seemed too great; preserving the remains would take decades and cost millions. </p>
<p>Excavations of other ships, such as <a href="https://www.historicdockyard.co.uk/site-attractions/attractions/the-mary-rose">Henry VIII’s Mary Rose</a>, had shown how expensive it would be. But <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/wales/2191881.stm">local passion and campaigning</a> outweighed such considerations and plans eventually changed. The ship would be saved. </p>
<p>Twenty years later and the task of excavating, preserving and recording all the timbers and artefacts is nearly complete. <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-64151535">Attention is now turning to the reconstruction of the remains</a> and consideration of how best to display the ship in the future.</p>
<p>Since its discovery, we have found out so much more about the Newport ship. It is not like the <a href="https://maryrose.org/">Mary Rose</a> or the <a href="https://www.vasamuseet.se/en">Vasa</a>, a 17th-century Swedish warship recovered in 1961. Both are complete vessels, full of artefacts. The Newport ship is the surviving part of a vessel that was wrecked while undergoing maintenance in a dry dock. </p>
<p>Most of the contents, and almost all of the upper parts of the structure, were salvaged and removed before a medieval slipway was built on top. So, only part of the hull remains intact. However, that fragment is important both because it is wonderfully preserved and because is the largest and most complete section of a 15th-century European ship discovered to date. </p>
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<span class="caption">The timbers of the Newport medieval ship undergo conservation in April 2008.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.geograph.org.uk/profile/15303">Robin Drayton/Geograph</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
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<p>Also, dendrochronology (the scientific method of dating tree rings to the year they were formed), has made it possible to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1095-9270.12052">pinpoint that the ship was built in 1450 in the Basque country</a>. The same techniques, when applied to the collapsed scaffolding used to hold the ship in place, can tell us when it was wrecked to within a year (1468). This has made it possible to situate the vessel within an eventful period, at the dawn of Europe’s age of discovery and the Wars of the Roses.</p>
<p>The Newport Medieval ship represents the final flourish of a shipbuilding tradition that stretched back centuries. This involved the construction of a shell, made from overlapping planks, into which a relatively light frame was fitted to provide stability. </p>
<p>It has more in common with Viking longships than it has with the skeleton-built ships of the early modern period. But the Newport ship is far bigger than Viking vessels. In its heyday it was capable of carrying 160 tuns (about 320,000 pints) of wine in its hold, on a voyage from Bordeaux.</p>
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<img alt="Very old, silver coin lodged within a piece of timber" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508303/original/file-20230206-25-ecp2yc.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508303/original/file-20230206-25-ecp2yc.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508303/original/file-20230206-25-ecp2yc.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508303/original/file-20230206-25-ecp2yc.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508303/original/file-20230206-25-ecp2yc.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508303/original/file-20230206-25-ecp2yc.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508303/original/file-20230206-25-ecp2yc.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A ‘petit blanc’ small French coin was found within the keel of the Newport Ship.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Newport Museums and Heritage Service</span></span>
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<p>One of the most positive aspects of the project has been the way archaeologists, curators, scientists and other experts have collaborated. A team of historians I gathered <a href="https://www.uwp.co.uk/book/the-world-of-the-newport-medieval-ship/">examined the context of the ship</a> to better understand the world it came from. </p>
<p>New recording techniques were pioneered too, including the <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/newport-medieval-ship-timber-recording-manual-digital-recording-of-ship-timbers-using-a-faroarm-3d-digitiser-faro-arm-laser-line-probe-and-rhinoceros-3d-software-with-sections-on-modelling-and-metrical-data/oclc/759825236">3D scanning of every timber</a>. This made it possible to digitally reconstruct (and even 3D print at scale) the whole vessel. In many ways, it was fitted back together long before the real timbers even touched each other. </p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">A digital reconstruction of the final journey made by the Newport Ship.</span></figcaption>
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<p>Most recently, the project curator, Toby Jones, has worked with the <a href="https://www.newportship.org">Friends of the Newport Ship</a> charity to produce complex visual reconstructions of the vessel. 3D animated films are being used to communicate the nature of the vessel to the public, as well as providing experts with fresh avenues of research to explore.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198198/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Evan Jones received £2000 from Newport City Council / The Friends of the Newport Ship to cover part of the costs for holding a conference on 'The World of the Newport Medieval Ship' in 2014. Both bodies also made contributions (totaling £3,114) towards the publication costs of the subsequent book 'The World of the Newport Medieval Ship' (University of Wales Press, 2018). </span></em></p>The Newport medieval ship is the most complete section of a 15th-century European vessel discovered to date.Evan Jones, Associate professor, University of BristolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1212922019-08-01T13:14:19Z2019-08-01T13:14:19ZHarland & Wolff: why the UK needs to keep historic Belfast shipyard – and heavy industry – afloat<p>Shipyard workers in Belfast are fighting to keep crisis-hit Harland & Wolff in business. They have called on new prime minister Boris Johnson <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-49179805">to re-nationalise the H&W yard</a> and allow the company to compete for further work. But administrators are circling, there’s no buyer in place and the firm’s Norwegian parent company has <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/67c2dbd4-b219-11e9-8cb2-799a3a8cf37b">serious cash flow issues</a>.</p>
<p>Urgent political intervention is needed to secure H&W – and other strategic UK industrial assets – before key skills and capacity are irretrievably lost. </p>
<p>The yard’s history is <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/hammer-blow-may-break-an-industry-that-has-grown-up-with-unionist-iron-in-its-soul-5371927.html">almost as troubled as Northern Ireland’s itself</a>.
During the conflict in Northern Ireland (from 1968 to 1998), the company was largely insulated from the drastic cost-cutting policies applied to other nationalised industries. Subsidising H&W rested on the assumption that inflicting unemployment on working-class Protestants (who monopolised shipyard jobs) would <a href="https://academic.oup.com/hwj/article/doi/10.1093/hwj/dbz003/5364617">aggravate an already unstable political situation</a>. </p>
<p>H&W assumed symbolic importance as a sign of Westminster’s commitment to the Union of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Other points in the company’s history, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2000/mar/10/northernireland.marktran">most recently in 2000-01</a>, have been punctuated by painful mass redundancies and serious closure threats. Yet H&W has battled on, seemingly against the odds, and has maintained a significant economic presence in Belfast. </p>
<p>Although shipbuilding at H&W <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/2666765.stm">ended in 2003</a>, the yard remained active as a structural engineering firm catering to the offshore energy sector. Fred Olsen, the Norwegian businessman who bought H&W in 1989, listed <a href="https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/business/northern-ireland/harland-and-wolff-site-must-not-become-apartments-says-uups-lord-empey-37658504.html">the business for sale in December 2018</a>, sparking renewed fears about its future and a plunder of industrial land by property developers. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/286594/original/file-20190801-169702-1kyiy2t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/286594/original/file-20190801-169702-1kyiy2t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/286594/original/file-20190801-169702-1kyiy2t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/286594/original/file-20190801-169702-1kyiy2t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/286594/original/file-20190801-169702-1kyiy2t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/286594/original/file-20190801-169702-1kyiy2t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/286594/original/file-20190801-169702-1kyiy2t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">H&W cranes, Goliath and Samson, are an iconic feature of the Belfast landscape.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.pexels.com/pl-pl/zdjecie/1650886/">Steven Hylands from Pexels</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The yard’s ability to build an entire new ship is doubtful. But H&W could play an important role in building sections of new ships, with final assembly taking place elsewhere. This technique was used in the construction of the Royal Navy’s new aircraft carriers, HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales, and H&W had expected a share in <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-shipbuilding-strategy">future construction work</a>.</p>
<p>The cost of these aircraft carriers, however, has led to the Ministry of Defence postponing its decision to order any more warships. This delay has already caused the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/mar/08/appledore-shipyard-closure-a-loss-of-jobs-skills-and-way-of-life">closure of Devon’s Appledore shipyard in March 2019</a> and further prevarication means Britain’s ability to build for its own navy is at risk.</p>
<h2>Competing visions for UK industry</h2>
<p>Recent protests at H&W have garnered much-needed attention. A BBC reporter <a href="https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=379387906047566">put it to one worker</a> that the protest, the first industrial action at H&W for decades, could make potential investors think: “That’s quite a restless workforce – do I really want to get involved with that?” </p>
<p>This commentary epitomises the way that heavy industries – and those dependent on it for their income – are often regarded in the UK. At best, they are cast as retrograde, obsolete and a barrier to economic rejuvenation. At worst, industrial workers fighting for their livelihoods have been caricatured as <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781315446202">“the enemy within”</a>. Two competing visions for the UK industry are evident – one seeking to <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt5vk6rg">“praise and bury”</a> industrial work, to “move on” (though to what, exactly, is seldom explained); and the other seeking to preserve vital community economic assets. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, Belfast’s Titanic connection is heavily used as a mechanism to market post-conflict Northern Ireland. The Titanic Belfast visitor centre, which opened in 2012, is the glamorous centrepiece of a regenerated heritage zone. Over 840,000 people <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-43780403">visited it in 2018</a>.</p>
<p>Despite its evident success, there’s a clear disconnect between Titanic Quarter – the expansive brownfield site formerly occupied by H&W in which Titanic Belfast is situated – and the former shipyard community of Ballymacarrett, today one of the <a href="https://www.belfastlive.co.uk/news/belfast-news/belfasts-most-deprived-areas-whats-14682216">most economically deprived wards in Northern Ireland</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/286597/original/file-20190801-169706-egznb3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/286597/original/file-20190801-169706-egznb3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/286597/original/file-20190801-169706-egznb3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/286597/original/file-20190801-169706-egznb3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/286597/original/file-20190801-169706-egznb3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/286597/original/file-20190801-169706-egznb3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/286597/original/file-20190801-169706-egznb3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Titanic Belfast visitor centre on the H&W site.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/titanicbelfast/37198649996">Titanic Belfast</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>Historian Steven High has described the process of deindustrialisation and urban regeneration <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-labor-and-working-class-history/article/beyond-aesthetics-visibility-and-invisibility-in-the-aftermath-of-deindustrialization/BE0EAC48C8BF0746D9006077B3E987AA">as a “one-two punch”</a>. The first punch being job losses, the second being a combination of socioeconomic cleansing and cultural erasure as brownfield sites are gentrified. </p>
<p>There is widespread anger that skilled working-class jobs stripped away by the reduction of H&W’s capacity over the years have not been replaced. Industrial heritage rarely compensates for actual lost jobs. One retired shipyard worker, I interviewed in 2017, summed things up:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The ones that own [H&W], I think, are more interested in getting rent off flats, and science park[s], things like that there … they’re going to turn it just into a residential area, and turn the [building] dock into a yacht marina. Where does that give jobs? … If you do hear of one job, it’s a call centre. And the call centre is here for a couple of months or a couple of years, and they take it to India or somewhere else. So our people are left unemployed again. </p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Not just a ‘commercial issue’</h2>
<p>We sometimes think of deindustrialisation as something that happened decades ago, with the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-life-and-death-of-king-coal-52559">closure of the coal mines</a> and other industrial giants. But it’s still happening. High-skill, high-pay industrial jobs continue to disappear as businesses scour the globe for cheaper labour, suppliers, and places to squirrel away profits. And it’s communities that suffer as a result. </p>
<p>Since the 1980s, structural economic cracks have been papered over. Instead of overhauling a system characterised by low-wage employment, underemployment and in-work poverty, austerity policies during the past decade have <a href="https://theconversation.com/employment-may-be-at-an-all-time-high-in-the-uk-but-austerity-low-pay-and-zero-hours-contracts-inflict-misery-on-millions-110252">compounded these long-term difficulties</a>. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-entrepreneurship-offers-a-route-out-of-industrial-decline-118629">How entrepreneurship offers a route out of industrial decline</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Boris Johnson refused to meet with H&W workers on his visit to Northern Ireland. His government’s press release on the matter blithely stated that it had “every sympathy for the workers” but H&W’s difficulties are “ultimately a commercial issue”. But the survival of this shipyard should be high up the political agenda. Sympathy does not pay mortgages, keep the local economy oiled, or protect decent living standards. And, strategically, the UK cannot afford to lose any more of what remains of its heavy industrial base. </p>
<p>Rather than outsourcing blame for economic conditions that, in part, the British government has helped to create, Boris Johnson’s government should provide H&W with a cash injection until a buyer can be found. It should also belatedly recognise the value, past and future, of heavy industry and its workers.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/121292/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Pete Hodson received funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council. </span></em></p>Urgent intervention is needed to secure H&W – and other strategic UK industrial assets – before key skills and capacity are irretrievably lost.Pete Hodson, Postgraduate Researcher in History, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1059842018-11-23T04:54:31Z2018-11-23T04:54:31ZBuilding our own warships is Australia’s path to the next industrial revolution<p>Naval defence procurement is very big business. <a href="https://www.baesystems.com/en-aus/article/bae-systems-australia-signs-agreement-for-the-hunter-class-frigate-program">Nine Hunter-class frigates</a> will cost Australian taxpayers A$35 billion; the <a href="http://naval-group.com.au/what-we-do/sea-1000/">12 submarines</a> to replace the existing Collins-class subs at least A$50 billion. </p>
<p>Although both the frigates and submarines will be built by foreign companies – the frigates by Britain’s BAE, the subs by France’s Naval Group – part of the deal is that they build locally. </p>
<p>The federal government isn’t shy about spruiking the local economic benefits.
“We make no apologies for deciding to invest in Australian-built ships, creating Australian jobs and using Australian steel,” said Christopher Pyne, the then defence industry minster and now the defence minister, <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-05-15/governments-89b-shipbuilding-project-at-high-risk-of-blowout/9762992">in May</a>.</p>
<p>There are critics. The Australian National Audit Office, for instance, has flagged the <a href="https://www.anao.gov.au/work/performance-audit/naval-construction-programs-mobilisation">risks</a> of <a href="https://www.afr.com/news/extreme-risk-in-89b-navy-ship-building-plan-auditorgeneral-20180514-h101m0">cost blowouts</a> in a local build. These risks will need to be proactively managed. </p>
<p>But the local shipbuilding program does present a tremendous economic opportunity. It provides a platform to invigorate advanced manufacturing and ride the wave of the next industrial revolution. </p>
<p>We need to focus on how to maximise the benefits by leveraging the program to create competitive new industries and jobs.</p>
<h2>Mapping the manufacturing ecosystem</h2>
<p>Transitioning the Australian economy towards advanced manufacturing is not easy. It is tempting to simply import cheaper products. A good example can found in the renewable energy sector. With a few <a href="http://www.tindosolar.com.au/">exceptions</a>, the majority of solar panels and wind farm components are imported. This is a missed opportunity. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/on-windmills-and-warships-46071">On windmills and warships</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>We can avoid making the same mistake in shipbuilding. Our research shows that building ships locally has huge flow-on effects, and can help underpin other advanced manufacturing.</p>
<p>To facilitate this process, we have developed a <a href="https://thesis-5081.firebaseapp.com/#!/home">map of the advanced manufacturing ecosystem</a> in Australia. The aim is to help boost the visibility of Australian organisations capable of supplying components or services to these projects.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243202/original/file-20181031-76413-1tqz1if.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243202/original/file-20181031-76413-1tqz1if.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243202/original/file-20181031-76413-1tqz1if.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=303&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243202/original/file-20181031-76413-1tqz1if.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=303&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243202/original/file-20181031-76413-1tqz1if.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=303&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243202/original/file-20181031-76413-1tqz1if.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=381&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243202/original/file-20181031-76413-1tqz1if.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=381&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243202/original/file-20181031-76413-1tqz1if.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=381&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An emerging defence innovation ecosystem in Australia, with business, university, government and other key stakeholders.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This will assist in initiating partnerships. Several Australian <a href="https://www.redarc.com.au/defence">businesses</a> and <a href="https://www.adelaidenow.com.au/business/sa-business-journal/italian-frigates-contender-fincantieris-cash-to-float-flinders-boat/news-story/9cbcc55534361bf0c969ee84af715827">universities</a> have already begun to secure relationships with the international shipbuilders. More are in the pipeline. </p>
<h2>Industry opportunities</h2>
<p>Building ships presents many opportunities for Australian organisations. </p>
<p>In Australia, <a href="https://smallcaps.com.au/micro-x-uk-ministry-defence-airport-electronic-device-scanner/">X-ray and imaging products</a> are examples of complex products we have been able to competitively export. This technology is obviously relevant to medical imaging devices. It can also be applied to surveillance systems for the defence sector. </p>
<p>Conversely local manufacturers that develop capabilities in defence shipbuilding can leverage their expertise to supply to non-defence-related supply chains and for export.</p>
<p>Relevant technologies include <a href="https://indaily.com.au/news/business/2016/11/11/engineering-jobs-shape-sa-defence-future/">autonomous vehicles and systems</a>, <a href="https://www.rolls-royce.com/products-and-services/marine/about-marine/market-sectors/naval/gas-turbines.aspx">energy management</a>, <a href="https://www.dst.defence.gov.au/video/cyber-security">cyber-security</a>, <a href="https://shipbuildingknowledge.wordpress.com/category/metallurgy/">robust and maintainable materials</a>, <a href="https://www.dst.defence.gov.au/news/2017/01/23/tool-predict-acoustic-signatures-navy-vessels">acoustics</a> and <a href="https://www.naval-technology.com/features/digital-naval-shipyard/">digital technologies</a>. These technologies can have flow-on effects for advanced manufacturing in transport, renewables, health, space and information technology.</p>
<p>In these sectors, making <a href="https://theconversation.com/economic-complexity-is-the-answer-to-pynes-innovation-problem-48730">complex</a> products is vital for competitiveness. </p>
<h2>Anchoring industry 4.0</h2>
<p>It is wrong to think advanced manufacturing is not viable in Australia. <a href="https://www.smmt.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/smmt_the-digitalisation-of-the-uk-auto-industry_kpmg-apr-2017.pdf">Britain</a> and <a href="http://www.gtai.de/GTAI/Navigation/EN/Invest/industrie-4-0.html">Germany</a> are two economies with high labour costs, yet both have been able to sustain manufacturing sectors.</p>
<p>The success of advanced manufacturers in Europe is based on an approach called <a href="https://www.plattform-i40.de/I40/Redaktion/EN/Downloads/Publikation/acatech-i40-maturity-index.pdf?__blob=publicationFile">industry 4.0</a>. The “4” refers to the advent of the fourth industrial revolution since the 18th century – integrating information and communication technology in industrial production.</p>
<p>During a visit to European manufacturing sites we saw how this involved the use of <a href="https://defence.nridigital.com/global_defence_technology_feb18/inside_bae_systems_digital_naval_shipyard">robots</a>, <a href="https://www.assemblymag.com/articles/94445-bae-to-use-cobots-to-assemble-fighter-jets">cobots</a> (or collaborative robots), <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2212827118302580">digital twins</a> and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ulMyFH1M5-4">driverless vehicles</a>. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/does-the-next-industrial-revolution-spell-the-end-of-manufacturing-jobs-80779">Does the next industrial revolution spell the end of manufacturing jobs?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<p>Automation means that shipbuilding will not provide the sorts of jobs it did in the past. In Germany’s automotive industry, for example, human labour that cost <a href="https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:Th-L6akYSZkJ:https://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx%3FDocumentUid%3Dc06aa1a3-d355-4866-beda-9a3a8779ba6e+&cd=18&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=au">40 euros an hour</a> has been replaced by robots that cost 5-8 euros an hour to operate – even cheaper than a Chinese worker. But other other jobs have been created, particularly in computing and engineering. There are now <a href="http://www.gtai.de/GTAI/Content/EN/Invest/_SharedDocs/Downloads/GTAI/Industry-overviews/industry-overview-automotive-industry-en.pdf?v=15">100,000 more jobs</a> in Germany’s auto industry than <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/587576/number-employees-german-car-industry/">in 2010</a>.</p>
<p>Another feature of industry 4.0 is digitisation of the supply chain. Information about parts can be captured and used in new ways. When a component needs be serviced or replaced can now be predicted with high accuracy. This is important in any large ship, built to be operational for decades and using vast numbers of components from thousands of suppliers. It’s even more important in a naval ships, where a <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/11/17/americas/argentina-missing-submarine-found-intl/index.html">breakdown</a> could be catastrophic. </p>
<p>Digital transformation will make our factories more competitive. Additionally, economic gains will come from defence procurement that encourages the local development of complex and competitive products. If done well, defence investment will make as powerful a contribution to the nation’s economic prosperity as its military security.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/105984/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Giselle Rampersad does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Australia’s naval shipbuilding projects could anchor the future of advanced manufacturing in the national economy.Giselle Rampersad, Associate Professor in Innovation, Flinders UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1050442018-10-17T18:57:32Z2018-10-17T18:57:32ZAustralia’s naval upgrade may not be enough to keep pace in a fast-changing region<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/240954/original/file-20181017-17692-1324noo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">As part of Australia's naval upgrade, construction of 12 future submarines will start around 2022-23.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Brendan Esposito/AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Last year, Professor Roger Bradbury and I <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-the-world-really-sleepwalking-to-war-systems-thinking-can-provide-an-answer-80461">questioned</a> whether or not there was an unacceptable risk of the world “sleepwalking” into war. </p>
<p>We cited as reasons to be concerned a lack of strong and principled leadership, the problem of a rising power contesting other major powers for influence, the rise of nationalism, and the ineffectiveness of the UN Security Council in managing conflict situations. And we said: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>the peaceful domain in the landscape shrinks rapidly as risk aversion decreases, such that, at low risk aversion, even low levels of hawkishness can drive countries to war</p>
</blockquote>
<p>So, in the aftermath of US Vice President Mike Pence’s <a href="https://www.hudson.org/events/1610-vice-president-mike-pence-s-remarks-on-the-administration-s-policy-towards-china102018">recent and provocative speech</a> to the Hudson Institute in which the US laid down the gauntlet to China over many issues, it seems timely to look at Australia’s naval shipbuilding enterprise and our readiness for the future if conflict does someday break out in our region. </p>
<h2>Slow-moving and complacent</h2>
<p>I have been watching developments in defence circles since the release of a <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/WhitePaper/Docs/2016-Defence-Industry-Policy-Statement.pdf">series</a> of <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/docs/2016-defence-white-paper.pdf">white papers</a> on <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/WhitePaper/Docs/2016-Defence-Integrated-Investment-Program.pdf">defence</a> in 2016. </p>
<p>From a naval perspective, the major thrust of these developments seems to have produced significant changes in how Australia is approaching its capability needs over the next 30 years. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-does-australia-need-submarines-at-all-58575">Why does Australia need submarines at all?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>But, in a comparative sense, we seem slow-moving and complacent in our decision-making and lack the agility to keep up with the times. </p>
<p>Why do I make this point?</p>
<p>In May 2017, the Coalition government <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/NavalShipBuilding/Plan/">released</a> its Naval Shipbuilding Plan. The government announced it was embarking on a large shipbuilding enterprise to equip the nation to meet future challenges. Its vision is:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>to deliver and sustain modern, capable naval vessels, on time and on budget, maximising Australian industry involvement and contributing to a secure and prosperous future for our nation.</p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/240962/original/file-20181017-17668-vxy0c1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/240962/original/file-20181017-17668-vxy0c1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/240962/original/file-20181017-17668-vxy0c1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/240962/original/file-20181017-17668-vxy0c1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/240962/original/file-20181017-17668-vxy0c1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/240962/original/file-20181017-17668-vxy0c1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/240962/original/file-20181017-17668-vxy0c1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Turnbull government’s shipbuilding plan may not be adequate in a constantly shifting region.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">David Mariuz/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In summary, the plan included: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>A rolling acquisition program to produce a new submarine fleet at the Osborne Naval Shipyard in South Australia. Construction of 12 future submarines will commence around 2022-23. The last submarine to enter service will be delivered in the early 2050s. This plan means the present Collins class submarines will have to remain in service until the late 2030s. There would also be no capability gap (with at least two serviceable submarines available for operations at all times).</p></li>
<li><p>The construction of nine future frigates would commence in 2020, also at the Osborne Naval Shipyard. The last of these frigates will be delivered in 2039. These ships would allow us to create surface task groups comprising one air warfare destroyer and three frigates able to be deployed quickly, with a second surface task group able to be deployed at no more than 90 days notice for up to six months. These measures could enable us to operate in two separate geographic areas at the same time.</p></li>
<li><p>A continuous build program for minor naval vessels that was to begin with the Pacific patrol boat replacement project in 2017 at the Henderson Maritime Precinct in Western Australia and the construction of 12 offshore patrol vessels. Construction of the first two offshore patrol vessels will begin in 2018. The remainder will be built at the start of the future frigate project, with the final vessel delivered in 2030.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The key to successful delivery and sustainment of our “enhanced” naval capabilities will be a coherent national approach formed through strategic partnerships with the defence industry, state and territory governments, foreign allies and other suitable partners, commercial enterprises, academics, and science and technology research organisations. </p>
<h2>Adequate force for a changing region?</h2>
<p>Earlier this month, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute <a href="https://www.aspi.org.au/report/thinking-through-submarine-transition">released a report</a> about submarines detailing many of the problems yet to be solved in maintaining our current naval capability and simultaneously constructing a future fleet of 12 submarines. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1049109975069417473"}"></div></p>
<p>The plan certainly looks challenging enough, but is it even adequate to meet our needs now – and in the future?</p>
<p>I note, for example, that the new naval surface fleet will deliver about the same level of capability that Australia has had since I joined the Navy in 1961 – one surface task group of four ships. But in 1961, we also had the possibility of adding to the mix the power of a small aircraft carrier.</p>
<p>To assess the adequacy of our current plans, we need to look ahead to what our region will look like in 2050. </p>
<p>In a snapshot: there will be an estimated <a href="https://population.un.org/wpp/DataQuery/">5.3 billion people</a> in the Asia-Pacific region. Indonesia will have about 321 million people and a defence budget equal to ours. Australia’s population is expected to reach 33 million, just 0.6% of the total regional population. </p>
<p>And, we have little idea where China will be positioned by that time!</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/is-the-world-really-sleepwalking-to-war-systems-thinking-can-provide-an-answer-80461">Is the world really sleepwalking to war? Systems thinking can provide an answer</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Given these circumstances, will we have the assets to meet our needs if conflict does arise, or if there is a period of escalating tensions? </p>
<p>The size of our force structure has been limited since 1945. But, if war were to break out, the numbers we have been thinking about in our current naval programs will be at the low end of our needs.</p>
<p>From this strategic perspective, there are a range of questions:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Will these plans deliver sufficient capability in time to meet significant strategic challenges?</p></li>
<li><p>Will our shipbuilding enterprise be able to ramp up quickly to deliver more vessels if there is a sudden deterioration in our strategic circumstances?</p></li>
<li><p>To what extent will we be able to build more vessels that are dependent on systems supplied from other countries?</p></li>
<li><p>How dependent will these new capabilities be on the provision of spare parts and sophisticated weapons from overseas suppliers?</p></li>
<li><p>By what measures should we assess that our capability plans are adequate to meet Australia’s needs at any time?</p></li>
<li><p>And to what extent can the success of our international relationships ameliorate the need to go it alone?</p></li>
</ul>
<p>I do not have answers to these questions. I raise them because I think we need to bear them in mind in today’s fast-moving strategic environment. </p>
<p>It’s also important to recognise that our plans require all levels of government, and many foreign governments, to pull together in a clearly defined way. </p>
<p>In addition, our ability to play in the big game in our region and retain a military advantage if conflict does break out depends a lot on the capabilities of our opposing forces. And even here, an analysis of the current situation is not re-assuring.</p>
<h2>China’s new Navy</h2>
<p>In May, the ANU Strategic and Defence Study Centre <a href="http://sdsc.bellschool.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/2018-05/cog_41_chinas_new_navy-_a_short_guide_for_australian_policy-makers.pdf">published a paper</a> by <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/contributors/articles/sam-roggeveen">Sam Roggeveen</a> about China’s new Navy. It’s a reminder of the complexities of the issues that Australia will have to confront over the next three decades and is intended to be a guide for policymakers. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/240959/original/file-20181017-17692-w9393h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/240959/original/file-20181017-17692-w9393h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/240959/original/file-20181017-17692-w9393h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/240959/original/file-20181017-17692-w9393h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/240959/original/file-20181017-17692-w9393h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/240959/original/file-20181017-17692-w9393h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/240959/original/file-20181017-17692-w9393h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Chinese sailors aboard a PLA Navy frigate in Singapore last year.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wallace Noon/EPA</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>According to Andrew Erickson of the US Naval Institute, the Chinese PLA Navy is:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>poised to become the world’s second largest navy by 2020, and – if current trends continue – a combat fleet that in overall order of battle is quantitatively and even perhaps qualitatively on a par with that of the US Navy by 2030. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The US naval predominance will continue to erode in north Asia and give way to a multi-polar balance. And in Southeast Asia, China will become predominant.</p>
<p>In addition, China may already be building a “post-American navy” – one designed not to confront US naval predominance in the Pacific, but to inherit it as the US balks at the increasing cost of continued regional leadership.</p>
<p>The final point of China’s naval ambitions is worth emphasising:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>China wants a powerful surface fleet to signal to the region and the
world its great-power ambitions, thereby eroding incentives to resist China’s agenda. </p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/240961/original/file-20181017-17671-13je80.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/240961/original/file-20181017-17671-13je80.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/240961/original/file-20181017-17671-13je80.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/240961/original/file-20181017-17671-13je80.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/240961/original/file-20181017-17671-13je80.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/240961/original/file-20181017-17671-13je80.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/240961/original/file-20181017-17671-13je80.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">US aircraft carriers in the western Pacific. By 2030, the US is no longer expected to be the predominant power in the region.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">US Navy/EPA</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What can Australia do better?</h2>
<p>For policy recommendations, Roggeveen proposes that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Australia must plan for a future in which its major ally is not the uncontested maritime leader in our region, and in which America’s will to maintain a preeminent place in the region will be severely tested. </p>
<p>Australia should follow China’s example by focusing its maritime force structure on anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities. The plan to double the size of Australia’s submarine fleet is welcome, but given the leaps in Chinese capability, there are major questions around the pace of this program.</p>
<p>Australia cannot pursue an A2/AD strategy without Indonesia’s consent, and preferably its cooperation. Our defence diplomacy should be concentrated on Jakarta. </p>
</blockquote>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/despite-strong-words-the-us-has-few-options-left-to-reverse-chinas-gains-in-the-south-china-sea-97089">Despite strong words, the US has few options left to reverse China's gains in the South China Sea</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>But it is too easy to think that China’s ambitions will be uncontested as the trade war between China and the US unfolds. The presumption about the decline of US power may well be overstated. </p>
<p>Also, China does not yet have global military and naval forces suited to superpower interests, though this could change in the next two decades. </p>
<p>For Australia, this means that we cannot be sure how we should balance our economic interests with our security requirements. </p>
<p>It also suggests we are not planning to do enough in this uncertain climate to assure Australians of a secure future in our region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/105044/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Barrie is a retired admiral in the Australian Navy and former Chief of the Defence Force.</span></em></p>Compared to China’s naval ambitions, we seem slow-moving and complacent and lack the agility to keep up with the times.Chris Barrie, Honorary Professor, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/902072018-01-29T13:24:23Z2018-01-29T13:24:23ZSanchi oil tanker disaster: how spills and accidents can make ships safer<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/203772/original/file-20180129-100905-ov53d7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Sanchi disaster.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.irna.ir/en/News/82793067">IRNA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Sanchi tanker was carrying 136,000 tonnes of oil from Iran to South Korea <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/14/iranian-oil-tanker-sinks-off-china-no-hope-of-survivors">when it collided</a> with the Hong Kong-flagged cargo ship CF Crystal, 160 nautical miles off the coast of Shanghai, China. The collision on January 6, 2018 caused a serious fire, and the oil tanker eventually sank eight days later. All 30 Iranian and two Bangladeshi seafarers died in the accident. The other vessel, CF Crystal was damaged at a comparatively minor scale and all of its 21 Chinese crew were rescued.</p>
<p>Although this was the most significant oil tanker accident since the Prestige tanker <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2002/nov/20/spain.qanda">spilled 77,000 tonnes</a> of heavy oil into the Atlantic off the coast of Spain in November 2002, its environmental impact was, at least, less severe than other similarly large disasters. Its cargo was light crude oil and most of it entered the atmosphere following the fire so it had less impact on the ocean. The accident also happened in the open sea, far from places where people live so the impact on human activity is likely to be minimal.</p>
<p>But every time a disaster like this happens, it forces shipping companies and governments to look again at how tankers are designed and operated. For example, the loss of the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/24/newsid_2531000/2531211.stm">Amoco Cadiz in 1978</a> led to the requirement for there to be two or more identical power units operating the rudder for tankers of 10,000 gross register tonnage and above. So the Sanchi accident will likely have an impact on future ships. </p>
<p>Once the causes leading to the accident are clearly identified, it will then be possible to work out where risks can be reduced and how this could be fed back into the design of new tankers and improve how ships run. The most important improvements are likely to be those that target the weakest link in the operation: the fallible human crew.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/203774/original/file-20180129-100896-npfzmv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/203774/original/file-20180129-100896-npfzmv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203774/original/file-20180129-100896-npfzmv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203774/original/file-20180129-100896-npfzmv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203774/original/file-20180129-100896-npfzmv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203774/original/file-20180129-100896-npfzmv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203774/original/file-20180129-100896-npfzmv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The sinking of the Amoco Cadiz changed shipbuilding forever.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Amoco_Cadiz_1_edit1.jpg">Wikipedia</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Other previous oil spills have had more of an effect on the physical design of ships and the technology they use. For example, the Prestige tanker disaster shocked the public and focused attention on tanker safety. As a result, the EU <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2551721.stm">banned single hull tankers</a> carrying heavy oil from entering its ports, bringing it in line with US restrictions introduced after the 1989 <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2014/03/the-exxon-valdez-oil-spill-25-years-ago-today/100703/">Exxon Valdez disaster</a>. It is less likely for double hulled and double bottomed ships to have oil spills because the inner hull and bottom provide an extra layer of protection for leakage. </p>
<p>Yet while ship design may be improved through the introduction of risk-mitigating measures, <a href="https://trove.nla.gov.au/work/35097092?selectedversion=NBD42388578">around 80%</a> of maritime accidents are actually caused (directly or indirectly) by human error. For example, the motor tanker Sea Empress, <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/picture_gallery/06/uk_the_sea_empress_disaster/html/1.stm">which grounded</a> off the coast of Wales in 1996, released 2,500 tonnes of crude oil, with a further 69,000 tonne lost during salvage. The main cause was an error by the pilot, who failed to take appropriate and effective action to keep the vessel in the deepest part of the channel because they had insufficient training and experience of large tankers. The impact was that pilots subsequently had to be appropriately trained using simulators.</p>
<h2>Human error</h2>
<p>Given that the Sanchi collided with another ship, it’s highly likely human error played a similar role in this accident. Human error can be reduced through more <a href="http://www.resilientdesign.org/the-resilient-design-principles/">resilient design</a> with greater redundancy so that if one system stops working, another takes over. Traditionally this has meant things like using two engines instead of one. But new technology such as <a href="https://www.scientific.net/AMM.29-32.1051">intelligent sensors</a> can also make a difference by automatically detecting when problems occur, such as faults in a hull structure. Similarly, introducing more safety warning devices and improving crew training, supervision and communication could help prevent human errors and catch them earlier when they do occur.</p>
<p>The other technology that could reduce human error is automation. All ship operations including navigation, propulsion and things like loading and unloading can be automated – although eliminating human crew altogether would introduce other safety issues by making the ship entirely dependent on software. Much of the technology to make this possible <a href="https://theconversation.com/unmanned-ghost-ships-are-coming-83324">already exists</a> or is under development.</p>
<p>But in the near future, it is unlikely for many shipping companies will introduce such automation. Unmanned ships aren’t yet allowed to operate in international waters and there are many other obstacles yet to be overcome relating to things like insurance and regulations. The other issue is that the marine industry always tries to minimise possible costs, and so often accepts a certain amount of risk if it is cheaper to do so. Unless shipping companies have evidence automation will reduce their costs, they are unlikely to change their operational culture in a short period of time.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/90207/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jin Wang receives funding from Liverpool John Moores University.</span></em></p>The shipping industry can learn from oil spills – if it wants to.Jin Wang, Professor of Marine Technology, Liverpool John Moores UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/778652017-05-18T05:00:43Z2017-05-18T05:00:43Z$89b shipbuilding plan is a major step forward – but sovereignty remains a problem<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/169882/original/file-20170518-24325-7fkw17.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The naval shipbuilding plan is undoubtedly a major step forward for industrial capability in Australia.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/David Mariuz</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Australia’s long-awaited <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/navalshipbuildingplan/">naval shipbuilding plan</a>, released earlier this week, claims it is a national endeavour:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… larger and more complex than the Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric Scheme and the National Broadband Network.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Irrespective of this particular claim’s validity, the investment of A$89 billion for nine new frigates, 12 submarines and 12 offshore patrol vessels is a substantial commitment to Australia’s security. The plan is a comprehensive approach to establishing a continuous program for building these platforms in Australia. </p>
<p>Apart from the future introduction of these and other vessels into service, one of the plan’s key outcomes is a “sovereign Australian capability to deliver affordable and achievable naval shipbuilding and sustainment”. The development of a sovereign capability is stated as “the government’s clear priority”.</p>
<p>But what is sovereignty in this context? And is it attainable from the naval shipbuilding plan?</p>
<h2>Two clear weaknesses</h2>
<p>The plan has two interconnected weaknesses when it comes to sovereignty.</p>
<p>First, the Australian defence industry environment is dominated by companies whose parentage and ultimate control rest offshore. This is not necessarily a bad thing. But given the shipbuilding plan’s focus on Australian jobs and resources, it is a reality that needs confronting. </p>
<p>To that end one might have expected to see, both in this document and in earlier ones, a definition of Australia’s defence industry – what it is and, importantly, what it is not. </p>
<p>The UK’s <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/272203/6697.pdf">2005 description</a> of its defence industry embraces the combination of local and offshore companies contributing to defence outcomes in terms of:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… where the technology is created, where the skills and intellectual property reside, where the jobs are created and sustained, and where the investment is made. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>A similar definition for Australia would provide a foundation for sovereignty in the shipbuilding environment to be properly assessed. The plan suggests the Australian subsidiaries of offshore companies will be considered as sovereign without discussing how local control might be maintained, and how Australian sensitivities might be tackled.</p>
<p>The proposed definition for defence industry also highlights the second weakness of the shipbuilding plan: it is focused on building and sustaining the structural component (the “float” and “move” aspects), rather than the total capability the ship or submarine represents.</p>
<p>The lists of skills cited as necessary are those primarily associated with building and sustaining the structure. The shipbuilding plan gives scant coverage to the important combat system and weapons elements upon which the war-fighting capability rests. </p>
<p>The plan does not address the industrial capabilities necessary for the local maintenance and improvement of these ships. Access to the detailed design information for the combat and sensor systems in particular is required so that such systems can be upgraded locally if required. An offshore equipment supplier may not give the same priority to our needs. </p>
<p>The plan for naval shipbuilding in Australia says it will source many systems of the future frigate and other naval platforms from the US. However, the closest it gets to recognition of this reality in the context of sovereignty is that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Australia’s alliance with the US, and the access to advanced technology and information it provides, will remain critical. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The plan therefore implies that sovereignty is sought for the “float” and “move” aspects of the naval capabilities, but not necessarily for the important “fight” aspects. This means the systems elements of ships and submarines will be tackled in some other context – outside the naval shipbuilding plan.</p>
<h2>More than just ‘doing stuff’</h2>
<p>The naval shipbuilding plan is undoubtedly a major step forward for industrial capability in Australia. </p>
<p>A successful implementation will provide significant benefits for the Navy in terms of force structure, for industry in terms of a long-term enterprise upon which to grow overall capability and capacity, for innovation, for workers in terms of continuity of effort, and for the development of shipbuilding-related STEM skills. These are all worthy outcomes.</p>
<p>But sovereignty is more than just “doing stuff” in the country. </p>
<p>If the plan really wanted to tackle sovereignty, it should have provided a foundation on which aspects of industrial and operational sovereignty could be properly assessed, prioritised and managed. It would also have addressed the systems aspects of ships, rather than just the structure.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77865/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Graeme Dunk does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Australia’s long-awaited naval shipbuilding plan has two interconnected weaknesses when it comes to sovereignty.Graeme Dunk, PhD Candidate, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/442042015-08-06T05:33:14Z2015-08-06T05:33:14ZResearchers are looking to a surprisingly old idea for the next generation of ships: wind power<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/90449/original/image-20150731-17158-r5iv1d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">University of Tokyo</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In many ways, it’s an obvious solution. For many centuries, world trade over the oceans was propelled by wind power alone. Now that we’re seeking an alternative to the fossil fuel-burning vehicles that enable our modern standard of living, some people are turning again to renewable solutions such as wind to power our tankers, bulk carriers and container ships. Globalisation and economic growth might mean a direct reversion to the wooden sailing boats of yore makes no sense, but there are several 21st-century ideas that could make wind-powered shipping commonplace again.</p>
<p>Ship design certainly has a way to go to return to its heritage and take advantage of the wind’s free, renewable resource in the same way we have reinvented the windmill to produce electricity. However, it’s worth remembering <a href="http://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/3-540-29284-5">wind turbines</a> took a long time to evolve into the structures optimised and deployed at scale we have today. In fact, they’re still developing. Scientists and engineers have debated for years about the relative merits of two, three or more blades, of horizontal versus vertical configurations, and of onshore versus offshore generation.</p>
<p>For ships, the design process for wind technologies is potentially even more complicated and multi-dimensional. There are soft sails, rigid “wing” sails, flettner rotors (a spinning cylindrical vertical column that creates lift using the <a href="http://www.britannica.com/science/Magnus-effect">Magnus effect</a>, originally <a href="http://www.compositesworld.com/articles/sailing-the-sea-with-composite-wings">conceived by Flettner</a> in the 1920s) and kites all vying for a share of this market. Soft sails are fabric sails, most reminiscent of existing sailing ship designs, examples include the Dynarig and <a href="http://www.smartgreenshippingalliance.com/fastrigs/">Fastrig</a>. Rigid wing sails replace the fabric with a rigid lifting surface like a vertically mounted aircraft wing - for example the <a href="http://oceanfoil.com">oceanfoil design</a>. </p>
<p>A flettner rotor is a vertical cylinder rotated by a motor. The rotation modifies the air flowing around the cylinder to generate lift much like the lift generated by an aircraft wing (it’s referred to as the Magnus effect). While there are many examples of all four, so far it’s the kites and the flettners that have seen the most significant implementation on large merchant ship designs. </p>
<p>Notable examples include the work that <a href="http://www.cargill.com/news/releases/2011/NA3040908.jsp">Cargill</a> and <a href="http://www.wessels.de/index.php?ID=78&action=article&articles_ID=143">Wessels </a>have done trialing kite systems , and the experience of two separate operators, <a href="http://www.enercon.de/en-en/2224.htm">Enercon</a> and <a href="http://www.norsepower.com/SiteAssets/news/Norsepower%20Press%20Release%202015-06-01%20EN%20FI%20SE.pdf">Norsepower</a> with installations of different flettner designs on different ships. These trials have produced important full-scale experience, lessons about costs, performance data, and evidence for investment cases. All of which are undoubtedly taking us closer to the tipping point when wind once again becomes a ‘no brainer’.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/90451/original/image-20150731-17143-n1lzcn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/90451/original/image-20150731-17143-n1lzcn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/90451/original/image-20150731-17143-n1lzcn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/90451/original/image-20150731-17143-n1lzcn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/90451/original/image-20150731-17143-n1lzcn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/90451/original/image-20150731-17143-n1lzcn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/90451/original/image-20150731-17143-n1lzcn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Enercon’s E-Ship 1 with flettners.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Cargo_E-Ship_1,_Emder_Hafen,_CN-02.jpg">Carschen/Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Trials of these new technologies, in combination with the history of wind turbines, can help us understand why any transition to modern wind-powered ships won’t happen overnight. For one thing, no one yet knows which of the many candidate designs will be the most successful.</p>
<p>Modern wind-powered shipping technology also carries a significant engineering challenge that wind turbines don’t: it needs to be mobile. It’s not as simple as bolting a rig to the deck. The highest safety standards have to be maintained and the rig must pose no constraints to loading and unloading cargoes in an uncertain and wide range of different ports (many of which might be obstructed by bridges). </p>
<p>Resolving these issues will take time, money and investors with the appetite for risk and stamina to see an emerging technology from a prototype to a fully developed new product. But I believe the change will happen because of the price of fossil fuels and environmental regulation. Wind power is free so the technology will become a worthwhile investment once it can be clearly evidenced that the saving from moving away from fossil fuels outweighs the costs of installing and operating a wind-powered ship. </p>
<p>Many think that threshold oil price has already been achieved and exceeded, as evidenced by the large and <a href="http://wind-ship.org/wasp/">growing number of projects</a> proposing wind propulsion solutions, even allowing for the recent fall in oil prices. </p>
<p>While there is currently only weak regulation on shipping’s greenhouse gas emissons, the sector – like all those producing carbon dioxide – is likely to face more stringent controls as its <a href="http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/PollutionPrevention/AirPollution/Pages/Greenhouse-Gas-Studies-2014.aspx">emissions continue to grow</a>. Exactly what form such controls will take remains the subject of further ongoing work. But any meaningful regulation would reinforce the case for wind-powered shipping as a favourable investment.</p>
<p>Shipping is a vital, if somewhat hidden, part of modern economies. Decarbonising those economies is the only way to avoid destroying them (and the environment). Wind power presents an astoundingly obvious and elegant solution to these combined challenges. But it will languish in the sidelines until we see rapid change from investors, politicians, or ideally both.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/44204/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tristan Smith consults to a number of organisations on the subject of wind assistance technologies. He receives funding from both the UK government, and a number of industry and NGO parties, to undertake work to understand the mix of technologies (including wind assistance) and policy solutions which might enable shipping to transition to lower carbon emissions.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nishatabbas Rehmatulla works for UCL Energy Institute and receives funding from the UK government (EPSRC) and a number of industry parties and NGO's to undertake research on barriers to implementation of technologies that enable shipping to reduce its CO2 emissions.</span></em></p>Innovative ideas about how to decarbonise shipping are helping to harness the original renewable power source once more.Tristan Smith, Lecturer in energy and transport, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/373672015-02-10T19:39:30Z2015-02-10T19:39:30ZToo much at stake for weasel words on submarines<p>It appeared to be the announcement Australian industry had been waiting for. Finally, political pressure on prime minister Tony Abbott’s leadership had forced a “fair go” for Australian shipbuilding. On Sunday, the prime minster appeared to <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/abbott-leadership-crisis-pm-woos-mps-with-20bn-submarine-contract/story-fn59niix-1227212271695">commit to a competitive tender</a> for Australia’s future submarine.</p>
<p>Or did he? In a backflip that echoes the government’s refusal to honour its pre-election promises on the subject, it appears that we’ve been misled. The promise of a <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-02-10/labor-accuses-pm-of-making-up-defence-term-to-win-spill-votes/6081676">“competitive evaluation process”</a> may be meaningless. There is no such term in the world of defence procurement.</p>
<p>What, then, is the reality? Perhaps this was a “captain’s call” offering nothing new. No guarantees for Australian industry; no change in policy.</p>
<p>In my <a href="http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Economics/Naval_shipbuilding/Submissions">submission</a> to the Senate’s Economics Reference Committee last year, I used defence procurement terminology to outline a proposed competitive tender process for the future submarine.</p>
<p>That process would be rigorous and transparent, in line with Australian procurement legislation. No weasel words here.</p>
<p>The government would articulate its requirements for the fleet and the four leading contenders (Japan, Germany, France and Sweden) would be asked to submit their proposals as to how the submarines would be designed, built and sustained.</p>
<p>Known as a “contested project definition study” this phase would be partly funded by the Australian government: it would ensure that the contenders’ proposals met Australia’s economic and strategic requirements.</p>
<p>Crucially, the study would also establish how the contenders plan to work with Australian industry. This is fully in line with the Economics References Committee’s <a href="http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Economics/Naval_shipbuilding">inquiry</a> into the future of Australia’s naval shipbuilding industry and the future submarine.</p>
<p>In its final report, the committee said: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Given the weight of the evidence about the strategic, military, national security and economic benefits, the committee recommends that the government require tenderers for the future submarine project to build, maintain and sustain Australia’s future submarines in Australia.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>That requirement – if followed by the government – would ensure that Australian submarine and shipbuilders work in partnership with the winning contender. The design, build and sustainment phases would all be based in Australia.</p>
<p>Until now there have been four contenders: DCNS, the French manufacturers of the SMX Ocean Class; Japan and its much-debated Soryu; the German submarine builder TKMS and the Swedish manufacturer Saab Kockums.</p>
<p>Now it appears there are three, after a Japanese government source <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/09/us-australia-japan-defence-idUSKBN0LD0D020150209">suggested</a> that Japan would be unlikely to proactively participate in a competitive process. </p>
<p>“If we are asked that’s not a problem, but we can’t really be seen to be
going out and actively pursuing a deal,” the unnamed source told Reuters, echoing comments Japanese sources have previously made about taking part in an open tender. The question must be asked: what promises have been made to Japan by the PM or the federal government regarding the procurement process, for them to reject any prospect of actively competing?</p>
<h2>What’s needed</h2>
<p>As the Senate inquiry identified, the winning contender must demonstrate the ability and the readiness to establish a design, manufacturing and sustainment base in Australia. Given the complexity, secrecy and strategic importance of submarine technology, the tender process must ensure Australia’s sovereign capability.</p>
<p>“It is critical that Australia has full access to those technologies that underpin Australia’s Submarine Force strategic interests,” explained two former submarine Commanding Officers in their submission to the inquiry. “Otherwise the effectiveness of the new submarines will always be reliant on the relationship with the overseas parent navy and its industry base.”</p>
<p>As a nation, we need control of our defence assets and the freedom to engage in military operations without overseas approval or support. To achieve that we need the expertise, the capability and the supply chains to equip, sustain and defend ourselves.</p>
<p>For Australia’s submarine and shipbuilders, this means a tender process that prioritises their involvement from the start. The winning contender must be prepared to establish a design office at the building shipyard in Australia, share technology and engage fully with Australian industry to build capability.</p>
<p>It also requires a tender process that is both rigorous and transparent. To date, the government’s preoccupation with the Soryu has prevented adequate exploration of alternatives from Europe. It has also failed to recognise the expertise we have at home.</p>
<p>Australia’s submarine industry has learnt many lessons. As David Johnston acknowledged himself – before his “rhetorical flourish” undermined his position – the Australian Submarine Corporation has made remarkable progress in implementing change. The <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/AboutDMO/CurrentReviews/ColesReview/">findings</a> of the Coles Review into ASC’s submarine sustainment programs have been taken seriously.</p>
<p>Today, ASC is internationally recognised as an authority in submarine design and engineering: the US submarine designer and builder Electric Boat has assessed ASC to be an authority in submarine design and manufacture by international benchmarking standards.</p>
<p>ASC has more than 300 degree-qualified engineers with know-how spanning 16 engineering disciplines. Their expertise is highly specific to submarines; ASC is the largest organisation of its kind in the southern hemisphere.</p>
<p>ASC’s expertise is beyond doubt: it is ready, willing and capable of playing a significant role in the manufacture and sustainment of Australia’s future submarine. All that’s needed now is the right design partner, identified through a contested project definition study and a competitive tender process.</p>
<p>Built into that process should be a guarantee for Australian industry and the wider community. It makes no sense for Australian taxpayers to invest in innovation that benefits another country’s economy, with little benefit at home.</p>
<p>According to the National Institute of Economic and Industry Research (NIEIR), Australia would conservatively <a href="http://economicdevelopmentboardsa.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/2014_10_22-EDB-economic-analysis-of-Australias-future-submarine-program.pdf">lose out by around A$21 billion</a> if comparing the costs of building the future submarine overseas to building it at home. </p>
<p>This is not counting the benefit to the country’s long-term wealth generating capability, through the increase in economic complexity. This is essential to retain as we face the loss of a similar complexity provided by the automotive industry and its ecosystem.</p>
<p>For months, Australia’s submarine experts have been proposing a way forward that defends both economic and national security. On Sunday, it appeared the prime minster was listening.</p>
<p>With so much to gain, let’s not allow weasel words to get in the way.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/37367/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Goran Roos is: Fixed-term position as Professor in Strategic Design in the Faculty of Design at Swinburne University of Technology, Melbourne Chair, Venture Capital Assessment Panel (joint South Australian Government – University of South Australia Panel), Member of the Advisory Board of the ARC Centre of Excellence for Nanoscale Biophotonics, International Reference Panel member for the CSIRO Wealth from Waste Research Cluster, Member of the Defence and Systems Institute (DASI) Advisory Board, School of Engineering, University of South Australia, Stretton Fellow appointed by the City of Playford, Stretton Centre, University of Adelaide, Adjunct Associate Professor, College of Business, Nanyang Business School, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Adjunct Professor, University of Technology Sydney Business School, Sydney, Adjunct Professor, Mawson Institute, University of South Australia, Adelaide, South Australia, Adjunct Professor, Entrepreneurship, Commercialisation and Innovation Centre (ECIC), University of Adelaide, Adelaide, Member of the South Australian Economic Development Board, Member of the Council of Flinders University, Member of the Board of Seeley International, Founding Member of Australian Design Integration Network (ADIN), Fellow of the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering</span></em></p>It appeared to be the announcement Australian industry had been waiting for. Finally, political pressure on prime minister Tony Abbott’s leadership had forced a “fair go” for Australian shipbuilding. On…Goran Roos, Professor of Business and Strategic Design, Swinburne University of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.