tag:theconversation.com,2011:/fr/topics/south-african-national-defence-force-24215/articlesSouth African National Defence Force – The Conversation2020-09-29T14:50:17Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1464232020-09-29T14:50:17Z2020-09-29T14:50:17ZSouth Africa mulls future of its military to make it fit-for-purpose<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360281/original/file-20200928-16-1sw18de.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Some hard decisions need to be taken about the future of the South African National Defence Force</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Nic Bothma/EFE-EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>South Africa’s parliament has opened discussions about how to redesign the country’s lumbering military to make it fit-for-purpose for the 21st Century. To kick-start the process, a parliamentary committee charged with <a href="https://aejonline.org/index.php/aej/article/view/424/678">oversight</a> over the military hosted a mini-symposium addressed by military leaders and experts, academics, political parties as well as civil society. Politics Editor Thabo Leshilo asked Lindy Heinecken, a military sociologist, for her insights.</em></p>
<p><strong>Historically, a review of the country’s defence has been informed by a white paper or a defence review produced by the Ministry of Defence. What informs the parliamentary process?</strong></p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/national-defence-white-paper">1996 White Paper on Defence</a> established a broad policy framework for defence in the country’s new democracy from 1994, while <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/south-african-defence-review-1998">the 1998 Defence Review</a> outlined the appropriate size, structure, force design and tasks of the South African National Defence Force. </p>
<p>But, as the force became increasingly drawn into <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-army-is-in-steady-decline-and-nothings-being-done-to-fix-it-74712">peacekeeping</a> and internal roles - such as <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-army-is-being-used-to-fight-cape-towns-gangs-why-its-a-bad-idea-120455">fighting crime</a>, the balance between what it is trained, funded and equipped for became misaligned. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://static.pmg.org.za/170512review.pdf">2015 a new Defence Review</a> was produced given the changes in the strategic environment, and the forces’s <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/a-new-plan-to-halt-the-downward-spiral-of-the-sa-defence-force">state of critical decline</a>, resulting mainly from operational overstretch. </p>
<p>While comprehensive, the 2015 review did not specify what the design and structure of the force should look like. This was left to the politicians, military leadership and ultimately society to decide upon. Five years later, there is still no clear direction and the military continues to muddle along.</p>
<p><strong>What is wrong with the military that needs fixing?</strong></p>
<p>Some hard decisions need to be taken on the future of the defence force. Besides the misalignment of its resources, design, equipment and its additional roles, the military has also been hobbled by <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/general/2353257/sandf-blows-r51-million-in-irregular-expenditure/">misappropriation of funds</a>. </p>
<p>The National Treasury highlighted in a briefing to the Joint Standing Committee on Defence that <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/dod-salaries-highlighted-as-problem-area-by-national-treasury/">growing personnel expenditure</a> was the main issue incapacitating the defence force, leaving little money for capital and operational expenditure. This has left the military with ageing equipment, and hardly any funds for maintenance. Meanwhile, the deployment of the military has <a href="https://theconversation.com/covid-19-south-africas-neglected-military-faces-mission-impossible-133250">increased substantially</a>, both internal and externally.</p>
<p>The over expenditure on personnel stems from imbalances in the force design and structure. Over time, instead of having 40% personnel in the short term service (2-5yrs), 40 % in the medium term service (up to age 45yrs), an only 20% in the long term service (until 60yrs), 87% of the regular force personnel ended up serving <a href="https://static.pmg.org.za/docs/2004/appendices/040810dodstrategy.htm">on medium to extended long-term tenures</a>. </p>
<p>This, together with the failure to implement effective personnel exit mechanisms, has led to deviation from the ideal situation of expenditure being 40% on personnel, 30% on capital, and 30% on operations. Personnel costs are now reportedly almost <a href="https://theconversation.com/money-has-little-to-do-with-why-south-africas-military-is-failing-to-do-its-job-81216">80% of the defence budget</a>.</p>
<p>Added to this, personnel expenditure has been driven up to unsustainable levels by increases in pay and benefits that have not been budgeted for, rank inflation and the stagnation of junior and middle ranking personnel. This means that people sit in posts for long periods at the top of their scale, or end up being promoted to a higher rank, beyond the post profile. Other anomalies are a high ratio of general officers and a failure to rightsize the forces in accordance with mission demands. These problems are eroding the defence force’s <a href="https://static.pmg.org.za/170512review.pdf">capital and operating budget</a>. </p>
<p>There is a pressing need for the military to address its human resource management systems.</p>
<p>Going forward, this means accelerating the exit of unfit, overage, unhealthy and supernumerary personnel over the short to medium term. The longer term should see the military shedding all overage personnel, reversing rank inflation and rebalancing the force. This means looking at the ratio of officers to other ranks, and the ratio of support to combat personnel.</p>
<p>This is a difficult political decision. It entails putting former soldiers out onto the streets, with little other than military skills, making it hard for them <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10246029.2015.1028417">to get jobs</a>. </p>
<p>More attention needs to be paid to exit mechanisms for the short and medium terms in order to prepare them for a second career. Another problem is that there are not enough young people transferring from the full-time forces into part-time and reserve forces. This affects both the numerical and functional flexibility of the military in times of crises, when it suddenly needs extra personnel, such as during the Covid-19 crisis. </p>
<p><strong>Why is there need for national consensus on the military?</strong></p>
<p>Before the military can address these challenges, there is a need to reach national consensus on what type of defence force the country wants. At present there is a chasm between what the military leadership believes it should be doing, according to the constitution, what the government and politicians demand, and what the <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/parliament-shines-spotlight-on-civil-military-relationship/">public considers important</a>. </p>
<p>Transformation cannot happen without a clear understanding of the military’s future role. Without this, military leadership cannot design, plan, or train personnel for their future roles and missions.</p>
<p>The defence force cannot fulfil its obligations within the current organisational and budgetary <a href="https://www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org/downloads/2011-07-south-african-defence-brenthurst-paper-.pdf">constraints</a>. </p>
<p><strong>What should the future military look like?</strong></p>
<p>The defence force is caught in a time warp. It still operates with a mindset and equipment geared for the 20th Century. It has not made the transition into the 21st Century in terms of how to combat future threats, and the use of technology as a <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/sa-defence/sa-defence-sa-defence/feature-sandf-outlines-threats-priorities/">force enabler and multiplier</a>. Many tasks, like intelligence gathering and surveillance, can now be done by unmanned aerial vehicles, which are cost effective. But, there is no money for these.</p>
<p>Any restructuring should consider what the future military should look like. But right now, some pressing decisions need to be taken on whether to shut down the military, or channel it towards more pressing issues that affect the safety and security of the country’s citizens.</p>
<p>Given the current budgetary constraints, scaling down to playing only a developmental role is possibly the way to go. This means focusing only on border and maritime security, disaster relief and public order functions.</p>
<p>At the same time, there must be capacity to respond to other pressing geo-strategic security concerns unfolding on the country’s borders, and beyond, that may <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/how-serious-is-the-islamic-state-threat-to-attack-south-africa">require a military response</a>.</p>
<p><strong>Does the country have the money to afford the military it needs?</strong></p>
<p>The simple answer is “no”. But, the reality is that there needs to be a balance between the agreed mandate and budget. Within the current context, the mandate is budget driven, not the other way round, unless the security dynamics change dramatically. It is like taking a risk with an insurance policy, what to secure and what not. </p>
<p>Another way to cut costs is to reduce personnel expenditure to fit sustainably into a smaller funding allocation. This is a difficult political decision, but preferable to the military sliding into <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/time-for-a-long-hard-look-at-the-sandf/">further decline</a>.</p>
<p>The current impasse makes it the perfect time to march the defence force in a new direction in accordance with what the country needs, can afford, and deliver. Now, more than ever before, robust debate is needed on the future of South Africa’s military.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/146423/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lindy Heinecken does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Besides the misalignment of its resources, design, equipment and its additional roles, the military has also been hobbled by misappropriation of funds.Lindy Heinecken, Chair of the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1207752019-07-23T07:34:16Z2019-07-23T07:34:16ZSouth Africa’s soldiers won’t end gang violence. A co-ordinated plan might<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/285298/original/file-20190723-110187-10dh1k1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Deploying the army in the Cape Flats constitutes nothing more than simply sticking band aid on a festering wound.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ground Up - Ashraf Hendricks</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The South African government has taken a decision to <a href="https://www.enca.com/news/sandf-deployed-cape-town-townships">deploy</a> members of the South African National Defence Force to areas that have been ravaged by gang violence. </p>
<p>At least the deployment of the army shows some commitment by government to address the dire security problems these communities face. But it’s too little too late. It constitutes nothing more than simply sticking band aid on a festering wound. </p>
<p>The arrival of the soldiers has made headlines in the country. But will they make any difference? </p>
<p>In the short term they are likely to silence some of the guns. But they are unlikely to net any of the important kingpins behind the violence. Firstly, many of them don’t live in the neighbourhoods in which they conduct their business. Secondly, those who were living there would have decamped long before the soldiers arrived.</p>
<p>Lasting solutions to gangsterism and organised crime on the Cape Flats require a much more comprehensive approach than has been put into action. It requires a plan that pulls together various government agencies as well as different departments. The country in fact <a href="https://nationalgovernment.co.za/department_annual/128/2016-department:-defence-annual-report.pdf">has a framework</a> for joint action. Outlined in the Department of Defence’s review in 2015, it lists how the approach should be implemented. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, four years on, no progress has been made to structure this kind of approach. This pertains not only to issues of future force design and command-and-control, but to the need for better coordination in the sharing, storing and analysis of information and intelligence among all the departments involved. </p>
<p>This coordination is not happening. Soldiers, for instance, collect and process data into actionable intelligence to inform when and where to launch attacks. For their part, the South African Police Service, the Department of Correctional Services and the judiciary collect data and information to translate it into evidence that could be presented in courts of law. These diverse organisational end states limit the chances for lasting success. Unless all the efforts are focused, continually managed and controlled to achieve mutual support, none of the institutions can act effectively.</p>
<p>This won’t be easy. I know this from firsthand experience. As a serving South African Army officer who was deployed with members of the police in cordon and search operations during the 1990s, I can attest to the difficulties experienced in coordinating activities among state departments and agencies. </p>
<h2>A joint approach tested, then abandoned</h2>
<p>In the 1990s joint, interdepartmental and inter-agency structures were established from local, to provincial to national level. These bespoke structures were tailored to serve the operations and intelligence communities from tactical, to provincial to national levels that played a vital role in the collection, processing and dissemination of the intelligence collected. </p>
<p>Intelligence officers were also deployed in specific areas for extended periods of time which provided them with opportunities to gain detail intelligence of their areas of operations, as well as to register sources who provided them with information.</p>
<p>After 1994, a decision was made to disband these networks. The tactical intelligence structures of the Air Force, Navy and South African Medical Health Services were shut down. The South African Army was the only service that retained its tactical intelligence capability, albeit with an extremely limited mandate, namely that of overt collection only. For example, its intelligence corps was not permitted to conduct the processing and dissemination of intelligence anymore. These activities were centralised at Defence Intelligence Headquarters in Pretoria from about 1997. </p>
<p>The implications of these changes for the current deployments is that the South African Army members deployed on the Cape Flats will be depended on information and intelligence that will be mostly re-active and historical. And, although it could be used to provide context to their deployments, it would not necessarily be of any use as actionable intelligence.</p>
<h2>Defence in democracy</h2>
<p>The debates on the topic of the internal deployment of members of the South African National Defence Force has again highlighted the need for South Africans to debate what “Defence in Democracy” actually means. The result is that the military is expected to perform tasks for which it is not trained, funded or structured. The deployment of the army to the Cape Flats can therefore, at least, serve as a reason for debates on the topic of the role and future functions of the army and how it could be restructured.</p>
<p>In the interim, the successes to be achieved by the South African National Defence Force and the South African Police Services on the Cape Flats will be directly linked to the levels of cooperation established on an ad hoc basis by the role-players on a personal, individual level, rather than as a result of the integrated efforts of all the role-players. </p>
<p>There is a need for comprehensive <a href="https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/CTBSP-Exports/Capability-Development-in-Support-of-Comprehensive-Approaches.pdf?ver=2017-06-16-110221-453">approaches</a> that should include all the relevant government departments, as well as all organisations in society that can play a role in fighting the crime and violence which has become endemic.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/120775/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Laetitia Olivier does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Successes by the army and police on the Cape Flats will depend entirely on levels of cooperation established on an ad hoc basis.Laetitia Olivier, Lecturer at the Department of Strategic Studies, Faculty of Military Science (Military Academy), Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/815852017-08-06T16:17:27Z2017-08-06T16:17:27ZMandela’s last years: a narrative shrouded in conflict and assumption<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/181199/original/file-20170807-16786-1ok6of8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A controversial book about Nelson Mandela's last years has been withdrawn. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Flickr</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Amid conjecture, speculation and a sea of assumptions about a book – <a href="http://www.sundayworld.co.za/news/2017/07/25/mandelas-last-years-now-a-collectors-item">“Mandela’s last years”</a> – that most people have not been at liberty to read, including myself – it’s only fair and reasonable to raise a number of questions we hope will be addressed in the near future.</p>
<p>The book was released at bookstores throughout South Africa in <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2017-07-24-controversial-mandela-book-hits-the-shelves/">late July</a>. The author, Dr Veejay Ramlakan, head of Mandela’s medical team, reportedly wrote the book to document the courage and strength of this global icon up to <a href="http://www.news24.com/Books/mandelas-last-years-in-the-bleak-midwinter-20170718">the very end of his life</a>.</p>
<p>But, some family members - notably his widow <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/news/special-features/mandela/new-book-on-mandelas-last-days-angers-graa-10407174">Graca Machel</a> - and executors of the Mandela estate, have publicly distanced themselves from the book. Machel also reportedly sought legal counsel.
Objections have been raised about alleged breaches of confidentiality and disclosure of private information. </p>
<p>While the author claims that he wrote the book with the permission of a <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2017-07-21-family-members-gave-blessing-for-doctors-book-on-mandela-publisher/">family member</a>, the identity of this member remains unknown. The publishers, in acknowledgement of respect for family unhappiness and threats of legal action, subsequently <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-07-25-mandela-book-withdrawn-after-outrage-from-widow">withdrew the book</a>.</p>
<p>Many questions remain about the content of this book. What was already in the public domain prior to publication? What new information was disclosed? Does the public have a legitimate interest in the alleged disclosures in the book?</p>
<p>Historically, many books have been written and published about public figures. Think of <a href="http://www.mkgandhi.org/bk123.htm">Mahatma Gandhi</a>, Diana, <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/Books/2013/0701/5-books-about-Diana-the-people-s-princess/Diana-by-Sarah-Bradford">Princess of Wales</a> and other prominent politicians, statesmen and leaders including <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/13/books/review/Ledgard-t.html?pagewanted=all">Nelson Mandela</a> himself. What is unique about this book is that it has been written by a medical doctor and anti-apartheid activist. And that it has been written about the last years of his patient and comrade who is also a global icon. </p>
<p>It’s not the first time that a medical professional has written about his life, work or patients. But most such works have been written with the subject being portrayed anonymously, or with consent – to adhere to the sacrosanct rules of professionalism that promote confidentiality around the doctor-patient relationship. In this case, however, it is clearly impossible to anonymise a story about someone as uniquely identifiable as Mandela. </p>
<p>One can only imagine that this dilemma must have created several competing conflicts of interest for the author based on competing loyalties. These include loyalty to a patient during his lifetime and posthumously (as enshrined in the <a href="https://www.wma.net/policies-post/wma-declaration-of-geneva/">World Medical Association’s Declaration of Geneva</a>), his loyalty to the state as an employee of the <a href="http://www.dod.mil.za/">South African Defence Force</a> and his personal right to freedom of expression. On the face of it, satisfying all these loyalties would have required a number of negotiations and engagements – with professional bodies, medical ethicists, the South African Defence Force as well as the next of kin and executors of Mandela’s estate. This is an assumption and so the extent to which this did or did not occur remains unclear at this point in time. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/181014/original/file-20170804-2386-rywg2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/181014/original/file-20170804-2386-rywg2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/181014/original/file-20170804-2386-rywg2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=919&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/181014/original/file-20170804-2386-rywg2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=919&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/181014/original/file-20170804-2386-rywg2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=919&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/181014/original/file-20170804-2386-rywg2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1155&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/181014/original/file-20170804-2386-rywg2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1155&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/181014/original/file-20170804-2386-rywg2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1155&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<h2>Family dynamics</h2>
<p>Family dynamics are complex and challenging at the best of times in almost all families. This has been illustrated globally with the British Royal family, the Kennedys, Obamas, European monarchy and many others. </p>
<p>In Africa, the personal and public lives of leaders, statesmen and politicians have been widely discussed in the public media. When such disclosures, debates and publications are in the public interest, it’s often easily sanctioned by civil society. The public figures and their families accept such transparency as an integral part of public life. </p>
<p>In South Africa the complexity of family dynamics is increased in traditional cultures where individuals are embedded tightly within communal structures such as families and communities. In the context of such a communitarian ethic, value systems of families need to be explored. This is so because such value systems are linked to respect for family, elders and even ancestors. Respect for those who may exist in the afterlife is a strongly held value. </p>
<p>Hence one can assume a heightened sensitivity to literary works that may be perceived to dishonour not only the deceased but the family as well.</p>
<h2>What the law says</h2>
<p>Legally, journalism and authorship fall within the limits of contractual relationships. It is not uncommon for claims of defamation and invasion of privacy to arise in the setting of disclosure in literary media. This must often be balanced with rights to freedom of thought and expression which is constitutionally protected in South Africa. </p>
<p>Is it possible for claims of defamation or invasion of privacy to be raised on behalf of those who are no longer living? This falls out of my area of expertise and more directly in the realm of legal experts and publishers. One can only assume that such matters were discussed and that the publishers involved secured written consent from next of kin/executors and that this was included in any contractual arrangements with the author.</p>
<p>Evidently, this contentious book has focused attention on potential ethical and legal issues related to both the medical and literary worlds. Many questions remain unanswered and in keeping with the ethical principle of justice, judgement must be suspended until a detailed account of factual, objective content of the book is in the public domain.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/81585/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keymanthri Moodley is a Professor in the Department of Medicine and Director of the Centre for Medical Ethics and Law, Stellenbosch University. She is a member of the Academy of Science of South Africa and serves as the Chair of the South African Medical Research Council Research Ethics Committee. The views reflected in this opinion piece are the author's and not those of any of the institutions she works for or is affiliated with.
She currently holds 4 grants from the National Institutes of Health, United States and she has received funding from the Medical Research Council, the EDCTP and the National Research Foundation. None of these funding sources or projects are linked to this article.</span></em></p>The contentious book documenting Nelson Mandela’s last days that was pulled of the shelves left many unanswered questions. Judgement must be suspended until it’s content is made public.Keymanthri Moodley, Director, The Centre for Medical Ethics & Law, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/812162017-07-19T18:22:22Z2017-07-19T18:22:22ZMoney has little to do with why South Africa’s military is failing to do its job<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178679/original/file-20170718-10316-wlsu7w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A soldier with the 9th South African Infantry Battalion during a biennial training exercise with the US military in the Eastern Cape.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">US Army/ Taryn Hagerman</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Much has been said about the size of South Africa’s <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/07/16/sandf-unable-to-meet-mandate-due-to-reduced-budget">defence budget</a>, the tension between commitments and capabilities, and the need to arrest the decline in <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-army-is-in-steady-decline-and-nothings-being-done-to-fix-it-74712">defence</a>. Despite the fact that the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) is still a major player in <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/general/112885/south-africas-military-power-vs-the-world-in-2016/">Southern Africa</a>, it has real problems.</p>
<p>For one, directing vital peacekeeping funds, which should be part of the defence budget, away from the military to the
national budget, is a <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-06-30-00-diverted-funds-puts-soldiers-at-risk">major problem</a>.
But, it’s time for the <a href="http://www.dod.mil.za/">SANDF</a> to face some serious realities. </p>
<p>Firstly, it should not place its hope in the rollout of the current <a href="http://www.gov.za/documents/south-african-defence-review-2014">Defence Review</a>. The review doesn’t provide an honest outline of the threats and vulnerabilities facing the country, defence capabilities needed, military organisation or the cost to taxpayers.</p>
<p>The review saw the light in 2014 when the country’s economic outlook was substantially better. It was deliberately drafted without considering the costs and threats facing the country. As nothing more than an honest internal analysis of the state of South African defence, the document is of little strategic significance.</p>
<p>Secondly, in view of the social, educational and other economic realities, there is no fat in the national budget for defence. It needs to accept the reality that it is not to receive a cent more than what’s already allocated. For the foreseeable future, defence spending will remain at about 1% of GDP. South Africa cannot afford the 2% of GDP that’s accepted for defence spending across the world. </p>
<p>In addition, the SANDF also confronts a number of critical political realities. It is, for all practical purposes, the face of South African foreign policy in Africa and is, to a large extent, functioning in a domestic political conundrum shaped by the policy and political cravings of the governing party and its elite.</p>
<p>It’s also subject to the political expressions of policy documents such as the <a href="http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/Executive%20Summary-NDP%202030%20-%20Our%20future%20-%20make%20it%20work.pdf">National Development Plan</a>, which aims to eliminate poverty and reduce inequality by 2030. The Force is also hostage to the factional battles within the governing African National Congress (ANC), as reflected in the fallout over such slogans as <a href="http://www.fin24.com/Economy/radical-economic-transformation-zuma-vs-ramaphosa-20170502">“radical economic transformation”</a>. Like all sectors of the society, defence is also victim to the political manoeuvring, underpinning the current national executive’s need for survival.</p>
<h2>Political whims trump strategy</h2>
<p>For the SANDF, these realities unfold along the lines of a need to be everything for everybody, with little strategic guidance and priorities forthcoming <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-06-11-op-ed-the-sandfs-misguided-role-in-africa/#.WW8LPoSGOos">from the political domain</a>. In practice, this means that there’s no emphasis on defence priorities and that the demands for the Defence Force to “assist” unfolds through a process of adhocracy. </p>
<p>Generals, functioning in a self sanctioning institutional culture of misplaced political loyalty, stretch the defence capacity to please their political masters. In the process, they oversee the breakdown of the institution they command, because there are limits to what a defence force can do.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178811/original/file-20170719-13593-de0czj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178811/original/file-20170719-13593-de0czj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=365&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178811/original/file-20170719-13593-de0czj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=365&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178811/original/file-20170719-13593-de0czj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=365&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178811/original/file-20170719-13593-de0czj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=458&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178811/original/file-20170719-13593-de0czj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=458&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178811/original/file-20170719-13593-de0czj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=458&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Jacob Zuma and government ministers visit a border gate and temporary army base.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Politicians don’t necessarily understand the borders of these limitations and, if not clearly outlined, this may have disastrous consequences for the military as an institution.</p>
<p>From a theoretical perspective, there are two broad approaches to deal with a problematic defence budget. The so-called interests-driven approach accepts the need to prioritise defence commitments in line with national interests, which the Force needs to extend or protect.</p>
<p>The priorities should provide a clear indication of what funding level is required to execute the defence function. This approach, though, has to be content with the reality that no country in the world has the capacity to fund all its defence priorities.</p>
<p>The budget driven approach, in contrast, takes the national budget as a point of departure. The question that drives this approach is what can be done with the money allocated for defence. This is the question central to South Africa’s defence budget woes.</p>
<p>An analysis of the structure of South African defence spending provides a better understanding of the military’s budgetary problems. As a guideline, defence forces around the world accept that the budget, irrespective of its size, ought to be divided between personnel, operational and capital expenditure, more or less in equal portions. </p>
<p>In reality this boils down to between 30 and 35% for operational and capital expenditures and 35 to 40% for personnel. This represents the first major challenge in South Africa’s defence budget: almost 80% of it is for <a href="http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2017/enebooklets/Vote%2019%20Defence%20and%20Military%20Veterans.pdf">personnel expenses</a>. </p>
<p>The rest is allocated for operational expenditure, with only limited money available for any capital projects. It’s no surprise then that the Defence Force complains about the maintenance of equipment, infrastructure, training, administration and force preparation. </p>
<p>The truth is: if personnel are the problem; they are also the solution. The failure of the defence force over many years to implement an <a href="http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/pentagon/2015/06/11/up-or-out-carson-pentagon/71067386/">up-or-out personnel management system</a> is very much at the heart of its budgetary problems. The nature of military work relies on the availability of young people. In a typical military hierarchical personnel system, most of them must be out by age 30.</p>
<h2>The veterans burden</h2>
<p>Another problem is the way in which the defence budget has been taxed with veterans’ affairs. Since the Ministry of Defence was renamed the <a href="http://www.dod.mil.za/ministry/minister.htm">Ministry of Defence and Military Veterans</a>, the <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/legis/num_act/aaa2011311.pdf">Veterans Act, Act 18 of 2011</a> has been adopted. The name change is significant. </p>
<p>This is to a large extent a reflection of the intimate link between the executive and the military veterans of <a href="https://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02424/04lv02730/05lv02918/06lv02985.htm">Umkhonto we Sizwe</a>, the former armed wing of the governing ANC. This is embodied in the appointment of <a href="https://www.pa.org.za/person/emmanuel-ramaotoana-kebby-maphatsoe/">Kebby Maphatsoe</a> as the deputy minister of Defence and Military Veterans. </p>
<p>In line with the Veterans Act, a new body has been created to deal specifically with military veterans’ affairs. The new <a href="http://www.archivalplatform.org/registry/entry/south_africannational_militaryveterans_associationsanmva/">South African National Military Veterans Association</a> is a public entity, state-funded, and accountable to the department. The SANDF is now increasingly financially and socially directly responsible for military veterans.</p>
<h2>Time for hard choices</h2>
<p>Thus, the problem is not in the size of the budget; the problem is how that budget is divided. A bigger defence budget is not the solution. Almost every problem in the SANDF is personnel related. </p>
<p>Money has very little to do with many of the challenges the military faces. Yet, its leadership sees the lack of money as its single most important challenge. Searching for the solution in the budgetary domain is the easy way out. </p>
<p>Blame it on a lack of money and no thinking is required; no innovation; no initiative; no dynamism; no drive. All one has to do is drift along. The solution is rooted in difficult political and strategic decisions about the future of the Defence Force. Decisions that will address, among other things, the professionalism and effectiveness of the organisation, the oversized bureaucratic corporate army in Pretoria, and the age brackets of serving personnel. More specifically, the SANDF should not be allowed to spend more than 40% of its budget on personnel!</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/81216/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abel Esterhuyse is an associate professor of strategic studies at the Faculty of Military Science at Stellenbosch University</span></em></p>One of the problems bedevilling South Africa’s army is being compelled to be everything to everybody. Its strategic direction is compromised by generals who pander to the whims of politicians.Abel Esterhuyse, Associate Professor of Strategy, Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/633602016-08-08T14:10:10Z2016-08-08T14:10:10ZMilitary women need to trouble gender relations and roles for peace’s sake<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/133133/original/image-20160804-470-1dodzv9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The South African military leads on gender representation, with a third of its full time personnel being women. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The South African military, like many others around the world, has opened up all positions to women, including <a href="https://www.academia.edu/223215/The_Politics_of_Race_and_Gender_in_the_South_African_Armed_Forces_Issues_Challenges_Lessons">combat roles</a>.</p>
<p>This remains a contentious issue given that women generally lack the physical strength and endurance to serve in these roles. In the past, this and their unsuitability for warfare excluded women from some combat branches and more senior posts.</p>
<p>While these debates continue, there is a wider development influencing the integration of women in the military. It is based on the recognition that a more people-centric approach to security is necessary given the effect of war on civilians, and <a href="http://peacebuild.ca/Lopes%20website%20ready.pdf">mostly women and children</a>.</p>
<p>As military organisations become less oriented towards violence, the traditional, aggressive, warrior-like culture of the military has to be balanced with <a href="http://peacebuild.ca/Lopes%20website%20ready.pdf">new task requirements</a>.</p>
<p>This requires a more conciliatory approach to security, especially where military tasks include the protection of populations. This has led to demands to increase the number of women in peacekeeping operations. These are based on <a href="http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/women/womeninpk.shtml">claims</a> that women:</p>
<ul>
<li>are more able to interact with the local population,</li>
<li>enhance the access of local women to services, </li>
<li>improve community relations, </li>
<li>reduce the incidence of sexual and gender-based violence, </li>
<li>build the capacity of local women, and</li>
<li>break down traditional views that discriminate and marginalise women.</li>
</ul>
<p>While this may be so, it is context specific. Together with the recognition that war affects men and women <a href="http://beijing20.unwomen.org/en/in-focus/armed-conflict">differently</a>, this has driven the demand to increase the number of women in the military and on peacekeeping missions. It has also made it necessary to mainstream gender in all facets of decision-making. </p>
<h2>Tensions in gender integration</h2>
<p>South Africa is an exemplary case when it comes to integration of women in the military. Just under a quarter of its full-time forces (24%) are women. An estimated 15% are deployed on <a href="https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/20980/">peacekeeping missions</a>.</p>
<p>But, while there is acceptance that women may serve in the military, they continue to confront challenges based on gender differences. This is because <a href="http://forums.ssrc.org/kujenga-amani/2015/04/09/are-female-peacekeepers-making-a-difference-and-if-not-why-not/#.V6R0fLh97IU">masculinity is embodied</a> in every layer of the military.</p>
<p>This has brought forth different tensions in terms of managing gender integration. These relate to the accommodation of gender equality, recognising gender difference and having to accommodate alternative values. </p>
<p>Although women are afforded equal rights, they are still obliged to conform to existing physical training standards. These are based on seemingly rational gender-neutral arguments. </p>
<p>Women are under tremendous pressure to meet these standards due to their relative lack of physical strength, based on biological difference with men. Given this, women are typically not judged as “equals”. Even where they do meet these standards, they are generally perceived as <a href="http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/03/01/the-truth-about-women-in-combat.html">less able </a>than men.</p>
<p>The perception seems not to be changing along with the increase in the numbers of women in the military. This is accentuated when women are sent to combat branches, like the infantry, to fill gender quotas, instead of being selected for their physical abilities.</p>
<h2>Suppressing femininity</h2>
<p>The result is tension around issues of meritocracy that are not only influenced by women’s physical abilities, but perceptions of their suitability to serve in certain posts based on cultural norms, practices and values. <a href="http://afs.sagepub.com/content/40/4/765.abstract">Research shows</a> that women need to not only meet the physical standards to be accepted as equals, but also assimilate masculine values embedded in military culture.</p>
<p>In so doing, they typically need to suppress feminine traits like being compassionate, sensitive, softhearted, conciliatory and peace-loving. Such traits are neither valued, nor promoted in the military. They run counter to masculine traits embodied in military culture, such as dominance, aggression and toughness. Such militarised masculinities are highly functional in an organisation whose_ raison d’être_ is combat.</p>
<p>For women to be judged as respected soldiers, they have to dilute or suppress their femininity to conform to existing rules and the masculine culture of the military. To fit in, they typically shape their gender identities according to the masculine image of the combat soldier. They mimic the bodily and discursive practices of men.</p>
<p>This runs counter to the ideals of gender mainstreaming initiatives. These call for more women in the military, based on the contribution they can make as a result of their femininities. Also, for the need to infuse alternative values into the organisation.</p>
<p>The argument is that women can contribute something different by bringing <a href="https://www.academia.edu/5926106/Does_the_Presence_of_Women_Really_Matter_Towards_Combating_Male_Sexual_Violence_in_Peacekeeping_Operations">different skills</a> sets and perspectives to the military. These can enhance operational success. They can bring about security sector reforms in a more gender-sensitive way.</p>
<p>But even where women’s contribution <em>as</em> women is recognised, this is typically <a href="http://forums.ssrc.org/kujenga-amani/2015/04/09/are-female-peacekeepers-making-a-difference-and-if-not-why-not/#.V6R0fLh97IU">not valued equally</a> by men and women. Yet, research on the South African National Defence Force shows that women regard their contribution to peacekeeping operations far more highly than men do. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/133122/original/image-20160804-466-1lh4sum.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/133122/original/image-20160804-466-1lh4sum.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=414&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/133122/original/image-20160804-466-1lh4sum.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=414&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/133122/original/image-20160804-466-1lh4sum.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=414&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/133122/original/image-20160804-466-1lh4sum.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=520&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/133122/original/image-20160804-466-1lh4sum.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=520&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/133122/original/image-20160804-466-1lh4sum.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=520&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Philippine soldiers joining a UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Erik De Castro</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In addition, women’s civilian identities as mothers, their sexuality and vulnerability are often used in various ways to “other” women and to justify their exclusion from certain roles in the military. </p>
<h2>Underlying power structures</h2>
<p>There are also other underlying power structures that contribute to the subordination of women within the military. These stretch beyond issues of physical capability and cultural aspects, and relate more specifically to issues of sexuality and patriarchy embodied in the structures, cultures and practices of the military. </p>
<p>These often result in women’s authority being undermined and their leadership capabilities being questioned. Women also have to face different degrees of gender and sexual harassment. These are typically under-reported for fear of the antagonism they may evoke, the effect they may have on women’s careers, and social isolation.</p>
<p>The consequence is that even those who reach the top are not willing to change the rules. An easier option is to “lose one’s womanhood and act like a man to get noticed and heard”. So instead of infusing alternative values based on femininities, women “simply adjust to organisational practices and make no <a href="https://experts.griffith.edu.au/publication/nc3561617194c454b92907bd8730c53fb">real difference</a>” in changing this.</p>
<p>What research in South Africa and elsewhere has <a href="https://www.academia.edu/5435259/The_Military_in_a_Globalized_Environment_Perpetuating_an_Extremely_Gendered_Organization">shown</a> is that militarised masculinities remain embodied in military culture. Few military women are prepared to adopt an assertive feminist stance to bring about a military culture that is more appreciative of gender differences.</p>
<p>This is unfortunate, as military missions that entail the protection of populations - which are mostly women and children - require “all” soldiers to possess a combination of both positive femininities (compassion) and masculinities (aggression).</p>
<p>This cannot be achieved where femininity is undervalued and suppressed. Military women need to “trouble” gender relations and adopt a more militant feminist stance to bring about this change for the greater good, peace and security.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/63360/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lindy Heinecken receives funding from National Research Foundation and African Peace-building Network.</span></em></p>As military organisations become less oriented towards violence, the traditional, aggressive, warrior-like culture of the military has to be balanced with new task requirements.Lindy Heinecken, Lecturer in Industrial and Political Sociology in the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/533912016-01-26T04:05:09Z2016-01-26T04:05:09ZWhy South Africa’s plans to militarise humanitarian work are misguided<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/109049/original/image-20160122-417-19ufjhc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African National Defence Force soldiers help to unload maize for flood victims in
Mozambique.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The South African Defence Review, the country’s new defence policy, was approved in March 2014. It guides policy-making for the next two to three decades. </p>
<p>The promotion of stability and peace in Africa is a priority for South Africa. The <a href="http://www.gov.za/documents/south-african-defence-review-2014">Defence Review</a> says it will contribute to the prevention and resolution of conflict by integrating its diplomatic, military and other efforts. In some instances this will be supported by appropriate military capabilities that strengthen the country’s capacity to influence international developments. </p>
<p>South Africa’s involvement is informed by a desire to support conflict management, peace-building and reconstruction in Africa. There are also geopolitical, security and economic interests at play.</p>
<p>The Defence Review took three years to complete. One would expect this to have been enough time to come up with a sound policy document. But there are two major problems with the role envisaged for the <a href="http://www.dod.mil.za/">South African National Defence Force</a> in relation to African peace and stability.</p>
<h2>“Armed” humanitarian assistance</h2>
<p>The first is the plan to involve the country’s military in providing</p>
<blockquote>
<p>critical humanitarian assistance and reconstruction capabilities during and immediately after military operations.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The <a href="https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/OOM_HumPrinciple_English.pdf">four principles</a> which guide humanitarian activities in conflict zones are:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>humanity,</p></li>
<li><p>neutrality,</p></li>
<li><p>impartiality, and</p></li>
<li><p>independence. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Using armed forces to distribute humanitarian assistance in conflict or complex post-conflict areas violates the humanitarian principles. This includes foreign peacekeepers. The review does not even acknowledge humanitarian principles. This is an odd omission as they have been endorsed by the <a href="http://www.southafrica-newyork.net/speeches_pmun/view_speech.php?speech=3647798">government</a>. And they are crucial in any debate about engagement in conflict zones.</p>
<p>Humanitarian and military actors differ profoundly in terms of their training. This includes differences in skills, aims, mandates, agendas, operational methods and institutional cultures. Because of this, the responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance rests primarily with humanitarian and aid organisations. </p>
<p>The role of peacekeepers is to contribute to creating stability and security. They are also tasked with ensuring freedom of movement for local and international humanitarian aid workers.</p>
<p>South African peacekeepers will endanger humanitarian efforts if they get involved in humanitarian work. Instead of helping bring peace, stability and relief, they will compromise the work of humanitarian organisations.</p>
<h2>Developmental peacekeeping</h2>
<p>The second problem with South Africa’s new defence policy is the plan to engage in “developmental peacekeeping.” The review notes that the defence force</p>
<blockquote>
<p>can contribute greatly to socio-economic development by employing its diverse capabilities, such as its planning capability, in line with peace-operation forces.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The SANDF’s capabilities for socio-economic development are questionable. The force is in a critical state of <a href="http://www.gov.za/documents/south-african-defence-review-2014">decline</a>. Its myriad problems include high HIV/Aids infection rates, skills and equipment shortages, indiscipline and an ageing force. </p>
<p>The army has limited capacity to meaningfully assist South Africa’s own development and growth, let alone post-conflict reconstruction and development in Africa’s conflict zones.</p>
<p>But the real problem is the envisaged involvement of the military in socio-economic development in war torn countries. Post-conflict reconstruction <a href="http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lang=en&id=112187">takes place</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>in synergy with peacekeeping and peace-enforcement. On a practical level this would mean that post-conflict reconstruction practitioners and resources are deployed alongside peacekeepers. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>In short, peacekeepers are supposed to contribute to the establishment of stability and security that enables reconstruction and development.</p>
<h2>Irresponsible and misguided policy-making</h2>
<p>South Africa needs to do more to help Africa’s war-torn countries stabilise and recover. But it is puzzling that the new policy would envisage the defence force being involved in humanitarian assistance and reconstruction and development in complex crises.</p>
<p>It is even more puzzling that this irresponsible and misguided thinking is part of a defence policy that will steer the defence force in the next few decades.</p>
<p>This could have been avoided if the defence review committee had consulted the literature on aid and development in conflict and post-conflict settings, and particularly these two documents:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the UN’s Civil-Military Guidelines and Reference for <a href="http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/47da82a72.pdf">Complex Emergencies</a>, and</p></li>
<li><p>South Africa’s own Revised White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace <a href="https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/16893/">Missions</a>.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>South Africa needs to engage in Africa in a strategic and pragmatic way. It also needs to ensure that tasks and responsibilities are delegated correctly. The defence force’s modest peacekeeping capabilities must be used properly. Most importantly, the guiding principle of any engagement should be “do no harm”.</p>
<p>Humanitarian work in Africa should be left to humanitarian and aid agencies. Reconstruction and development should be left to the New Partnership for Africa’s <a href="http://www.nepad.org/">Development</a>, development organisations and local actors.</p>
<p><em>This article is based on my <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10246029.2015.1124794">paper</a> published in African Security Review.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/53391/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Savo Heleta does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The South African military’s capabilities for socio-economic development are questionable, even in its own country. The force is in critical decline, but is expected to aid humanitarian efforts.Savo Heleta, Manager, Internationalisation at Home and Research, Nelson Mandela UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.