tag:theconversation.com,2011:/fr/topics/sunni-muslims-10940/articlesSunni muslims – The Conversation2021-09-12T08:22:29Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1673132021-09-12T08:22:29Z2021-09-12T08:22:29ZWhy Algeria cut diplomatic ties with Morocco: and implications for the future<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/420075/original/file-20210908-25-1s4hkj9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Moroccan foreign minister Nasser Bourita (R) welcomes his Israeli counterpart Yair Lapidis to Rabat, in August 2021.
The normalisation of relations between the two precipitated the breakup of Moroccan-Algerian diplomatic ties. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Alal Morchidi</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The breakup of diplomatic relations between Algeria and Morocco <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/algeria-says-cutting-diplomatic-ties-with-morocco-2021-08-24/#:%7E:text=Speaking%20at%20a%20news%20conference,on%20the%20Western%20Sahara%20issue">in August</a> is the product of a long history of tension. The two nations have never had long periods of friendship, notwithstanding the many factors that bring them together. Indeed, they belong to the same <a href="https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/report-regional-integration-maghreb-2019-challenges-and-opportunities-private-sector-synthesis">Maghreb region</a>, share the same religion (Sunni Islam and Maleki rite) and identity, and speak a similar dialect. They also share a <a href="https://artsandculture.google.com/entity/algeria%E2%80%93morocco-border/g1229dss0?hl=en">1,550km common border</a>.</p>
<p>In fact, Algerian and Moroccan people are so close that it is difficult to distinguish them. But, historical, political and ideological dissimilarities since their respective independence weigh heavily in the relations between these “brotherly” countries. </p>
<p>How can one account for the tensions that have characterised their relations, which have now gone through a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv1169bh2">second breakup in diplomatic relations</a>? The first, initiated by Morocco, was from 1976 to 1988.</p>
<p>I have researched relations between Algeria and Morocco for more than 40 years and published studies on the topic. Relations between the Algerian and Moroccan governments have seldom been cordial. This is due to the different nature of their anti-colonial struggle, their dissimilar political systems, and opposite ideological orientations. </p>
<p>In the last decade, Morocco exploited the lethargy of Algeria’s diplomacy and the paralysis of the political system to advance its interests, often to the detriment of Algeria. The reawakening of Algeria’s diplomacy and its decision to counter what it considers Morocco’s “hostile acts” resulted in the latest breakup.</p>
<p>Their tumultuous relationship has been an impediment to the integration of the region, which could bring sizeable benefits to both. Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia founded the <a href="https://maghrebarabe.org/fr/union-du-maghreb-arabe/">Arab Maghreb Union in 1989</a>. But since 1996, the union has become moribund due to repeated tensions in Moroccan-Algerian relations.</p>
<p>The divergences of recent years are potentially far more consequential. They could threaten the stability of the whole North Africa region.</p>
<h2>History of Algerian-Moroccan relations</h2>
<p>Algerian nationalists had relatively good relations with <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-relations-internationales-2011-2-page-77.htm.">King Mohammed V of Morocco</a> He died in 1961, one year before Algeria gained its sovereignty. Morocco became independent <a href="https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2020/11/326269/morocco-celebrates-64-years-of-independence-from-european-colonizers">in 1956</a> and <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Algerian-War">Algeria</a> in 1962. </p>
<p>King Mohammed’s son, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Hassan-II">King Hassan II</a>, who succeeded him, made claims over Algerian territory. He invaded the country <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-349-21026-8_19">in 1963</a>. This resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Algeria’s ill-equipped fighters.</p>
<p>Although short, this war shaped the minds of the Algerian military-political establishment. There was an era of cooperation between 1969 and the mid-1970s. But the conflict in Western Sahara, invaded by Morocco under the so-called Green March <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/magazine-34667782">in 1975</a>, resulted in another era of tensions.</p>
<p>Indeed, in March 1976, Algeria’s recognition of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, proclaimed by the Sahrawi nationalist movement, the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Polisario-Front">Polisario Front</a>, saw Morocco break diplomatic relations with Algeria. Many other African countries recognised the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. Relations were restored <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14123260">in May 1988</a>. </p>
<p>The renewal of relations was based <a href="https://www.tsa-algerie.com/rupture-des-relations-avec-le-maroc-le-texte-integral-de-la-declaration-de-lamamra/">on a number of agreements</a>. These were:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>a commitment to enduring relations of peace </p></li>
<li><p>good neighbourliness and cooperation</p></li>
<li><p>hastening the building of the Great Arab Maghreb</p></li>
<li><p>Algeria’s noninterference in Morocco’s domestic affairs </p></li>
<li><p>solving the Western Sahara conflict through a referendum on self-determination. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>From Algeria’s perspective, Morocco has reneged on all of them. </p>
<p>In the background, there has been a continuous buildup of Algerian-Moroccan tensions.</p>
<h2>Growing tensions</h2>
<p>In the 1990s, Algeria underwent a bigger crisis than it had ever known. The country was <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/remembering-algeria-1992-first-arab-spring-never-became-summer">devastated</a> by civil strife opposing the state, and armed Islamist groups. In 1994, in the midst of that crisis, Moroccan authorities <a href="https://en.yabiladi.com/articles/details/56799/attack-hotel-asni-marrakech-straw.html">falsely accused Algerian intelligence</a> of being behind the deadly terrorist attacks at the Asni hotel in Marrakech.</p>
<p>Morocco imposed visas on Algerians, including those holding another citizenship. Algeria retaliated in imposing visas and closed its land borders with Morocco. In late 1995, Morocco froze the institutions of the Arab Maghreb Union due to Algeria’s support for the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic.</p>
<p>A shift in relations seemed to have occurred when <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14118854">Abdelaziz Bouteflika</a> became president of Algeria in April in 1999. He planned on meeting King Hassan II to iron out differences. But the king died in July that year. His successor <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1559304">Mohammed VI</a> showed no inclination for a resolution of Western Sahara under United Nations terms.</p>
<p>Amazingly, during his presidency, Bouteflika not only neglected the question of Western Sahara, he also instructed officials not to respond to any Moroccan hostile actions.</p>
<p>Following his <a href="https://theconversation.com/bouteflika-steps-aside-as-algerians-push-to-reclaim-and-own-their-history-114380">forcible removal in April 2019</a>, Algeria reiterated its support for the principle of self-determination. </p>
<p>For its part, Morocco had been lobbying the <a href="https://au.int/en">African Union</a>, Europe and the US for support for its claims of sovereignty over Western Sahara. Two events in the last 10 months escalated tensions. The first was an attack on Sahrawi demonstrators <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/13/world/middleeast/morocco-military-operation-western-sahara.html">in El-Guergarat</a>, the buffer zone in the south of Western Sahara, by Moroccan troops. Then there was <a href="https://www.undispatch.com/western-sahara-conflict-upended-by-a-trump-tweet/">a tweet from President Donald Trump</a> announcing US recognition of Moroccan sovereignty in Western Sahara.</p>
<p>These constituted part of Algeria’s decision to break up diplomatic relations with Morocco. </p>
<p>Trump had traded Moroccan occupied Western Sahara in exchange for <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Joint-Declaration-US-Morrocco-Israel.pdf">Morocco normalising relations with Israel</a>. Other Arab states did the same thing in the framework of the <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-abraham-accords/">Abraham Accords</a> brokered by Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner. </p>
<p>Before the Abraham Accords, Moroccan officials displayed relentless hostility toward Algeria to which the Algerian government did not respond. Trump’s tweet on <a href="https://twitter.com/ap/status/1337069459551506432?lang=en">10 December</a> seemed to galvanise Morocco’s hostile attitude toward Algeria. </p>
<p>Algeria perceived both decisions as a real threat to its national security. </p>
<p>Algiers’ threshold of tolerance against acts it considered hostile came <a href="https://fr.sputniknews.com/amp/international/202107191045896006-soutien-marocain-aux-separatistes-kabyles-le-debut-dune-dangereuse-escalade-entre-alger-et-rabat/">in mid-July</a> when Morocco’s ambassador to the UN distributed a note expressing support for a group fighting for the secession of the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24042103">Kabyle coastal region of Algeria</a>. The group is listed as a terrorist group by Algeria. This resulted in Algeria recalling its ambassador in Morocco for “consultations” and <a href="http://www.mae.gov.dz/news_article/6594.aspx">asking Morocco to clarify</a> whether this was the ambassador’s sole decision or the government’s. It never received a response. </p>
<p>Another hostile act in the eyes of Algeria was a <a href="https://www.afrik.com/pegasus-plus-de-6000-algeriens-espionnes-par-le-maroc-dont-lamamra">vast spying scandal</a> revealed by a consortium of international newspapers and human rights organisations. They found that Morocco had targeted more than 6,000 Algerians, including many senior political and military officials.</p>
<p>Algeria decided to break diplomatic relations with Morocco as of 24 August.</p>
<h2>Implications of the breakup</h2>
<p>The breakup may result in geopolitical realignments. But all will depend on whether Morocco will escalate tensions and use the Israeli card against Algeria, or whether it will seek to reduce tensions. </p>
<p>Algeria has already begun strengthening its control at the Algerian Moroccan border. It could create serious problems for Morocco if it decided to expel the tens of thousands of Moroccans (many of whom are illegal migrants) from Algeria. </p>
<p>There are wider implications too.</p>
<p>The breakup has marked the death knell of the Arab Maghreb Union, which was already dormant. The strained relations will either mean the regional grouping remains at a standstill or a new grouping might emerge.</p>
<p>And the rivalries between Algeria and Morocco can be expected to intensify at the African Union over <a href="https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/PoliticalStudies/Pages/The-Admission-of-Israel-as-an-Observer-in-the-African-Union.aspx">Israel’s observer status at the AU</a>, and over Western Sahara. </p>
<p>In the economic realm, the Algerian energy minister announced in late August that the contract for the Maghreb-Europe gas pipeline (GME), which goes through Morocco, will not be renewed after it <a href="https://www.algeriepatriotique.com/2021/08/26/lalgerie-ne-renouvellera-pas-le-contrat-du-gazoduc-traversant-le-maroc/">expires on 31 October 2021</a>. The decision has now <a href="https://www.olcnbvc4jz.com/renouvellement-du-gazoduc-maghreb-europe-lalgerie-a-tranche/">been confirmed</a>. The pipeline goes directly from northwest Algeria and then crosses Mediterranean.</p>
<p>Instead, Algeria will distribute natural gas to Spain and Portugal via the pipeline, MEDGAZ.</p>
<p>The term impact of this breakup is unpredictable. What’s certain, however, is that Algerian-Moroccan rivalry will intensify.</p>
<p><em>The views and opinions expressed in the article are the sole responsibility of the author and are not endorsed by Business Kedge School or those of the Brookings Doha Centre.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/167313/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yahia H. Zoubir does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In the last decade, Morocco exploited the lethargy of Algeria’s diplomacy and the paralysis of the political system to advance its interests, often to the detriment of AlgeriaYahia H. Zoubir, Visiting fellow at the Brookings Doha Center and Senior Professor of International Studies and Director of Research in Geopolitics, Kedge Business SchoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1093992019-02-20T11:37:25Z2019-02-20T11:37:25ZIraq’s brutal crackdown on suspected Islamic State supporters could trigger civil war<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257578/original/file-20190206-174857-lq01ke.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Family members of Sunni men and boys in Iraq accused of supporting ISIS hold up pictures of their arrested relatives. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.mayaalleruzzo.net/blog-1/2018/5/11/iraqs-counterterrorism-court">AP Photo/Maya Alleruzzo</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Large portions of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-isis-and-where-did-it-come-from-27944">Islamic State</a> in Iraq have been either <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/04/world/middleeast/iran-airstrikes-hit-islamic-state-in-iraq.html">killed, captured or forced underground</a> over the past three years. </p>
<p>Eleven years after the U.S. invasion toppled dictator Saddam Hussein, triggering a war between Islamic State militants and the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-withdrawal/last-u-s-troops-leave-iraq-ending-war-idUSTRE7BH03320111218">U.S.-backed Iraqi government</a>, Iraq has finally achieved some measure of stability.</p>
<p>But the Iraqi government isn’t taking any chances that this terrorist organization, commonly known as “IS,” could regroup. </p>
<p>Over <a href="https://www.apnews.com/aeece6571de54f5dba3543d91deed381">19,000</a> Iraqis suspected of collaborating with IS have been detained in Iraq since the beginning of 2013, according to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/iraq">Human Rights Watch</a>. Most of them are Sunni Muslims, according to reporting by <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/12/24/iraqs-post-isis-campaign-of-revenge">Ben Taub</a> of the New Yorker. Sunnis are members of the sect of Islam from which IS predominantly recruits. </p>
<p>Suspected terrorists are often tortured into offering confessions that justify death sentences at trial. According to <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/middle-east-and-north-africa/iraq/report-iraq/">Amnesty International</a>, common forms of torture include “beatings on the head and body with metal rods and cables, suspension in stress positions by the arms or legs, electric shocks, and threats of rape of female relatives.”</p>
<p>The government’s crackdown on Sunnis – even those with no evidence of ties with Islamic militants – sends a troubling signal about Iraq’s prospects for peace.</p>
<p>Our <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14678802.2017.1420313">research into conflict zones</a> shows that when post-war governments use violence against citizens, it greatly increases the risk of renewed civil war.</p>
<h2>Repression following civil wars</h2>
<p>The period after an armed conflict is fragile. </p>
<p>Citizens traumatized by violence wish fervently for peace. Defeated armed factions may have their sights set on revenge. </p>
<p>The post-war government’s priority, meanwhile, is to consolidate its control over the country. <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03050629.2017.1296834">Sometimes,</a> leaders <a href="https://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/islam-and-nation-separatist-rebellion-aceh-indonesia">use violent repression</a> to ensure their grip on power. </p>
<p>It is a risky strategy.</p>
<p>We studied 63 countries where civil war occurred between 1976 and 2005, including El Salvador, Sierra Leone and Sudan. The results, which were published in the academic journal <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/ccsd20/current">Conflict, Security and Development</a> in January, show a 95 percent increase of another civil war in places where governments engaged in the kind of torture, political imprisonment, killings and disappearances that Iraq’s government is now undertaking.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257553/original/file-20190206-174880-1bndax6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257553/original/file-20190206-174880-1bndax6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257553/original/file-20190206-174880-1bndax6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257553/original/file-20190206-174880-1bndax6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257553/original/file-20190206-174880-1bndax6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257553/original/file-20190206-174880-1bndax6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257553/original/file-20190206-174880-1bndax6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Iraqi Special Forces shoots at an Islamic State militant drone, December 2016.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Mideast-Iraq-Mosul/4475e96b7e1543b19a2b40791b556bd4/2/1">AP Photo/Manu Brabo</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Civil war is most likely to break out in former conflict zones if civilians believe they will be targeted by the state regardless of whether or not they actually support an insurgency.</p>
<p>Often, our results show, people respond to indiscriminate clampdowns by arming themselves. That is easy to do in conflict zones, which are home to many former rebels with <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022343304043775">extensive battlefield training and access to weapons</a>, including both active militant groups and the remnants of vanquished insurgencies. </p>
<h2>Assessing the risk of renewed war in Iraq</h2>
<p>Sadly, Iraq has been down this road before. </p>
<p>In 2007, the U.S. military surge sent more than <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/11/world/middleeast/11prexy.html">20,000 additional American troops into combat</a> in Iraq to help the government of <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2012/12/10/world/meast/nuri-al-maliki---fast-facts/index.html">Nuri al-Maliki</a> – which came to power after Hussein’s demise – fight Al-Qaida and other Islamic militants. </p>
<p>The U.S. enlisted <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/06/did-the-iraq-surge-finger-sunni-insurgents-for-maliki-and-his-allies/">Sunni insurgents to help them find, capture or kill Al-Qaida operatives</a> during this period of the Iraq war, which is often called “the surge.”</p>
<p>That decision inflamed the <a href="http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/06/18/the-sunni-shia-divide-where-they-live-what-they-believe-and-how-they-view-each-other/">centuries-old sectarian divide</a> between Iraq’s two dominant religious groups, Sunni and Shia Muslims. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257569/original/file-20190206-174873-1tupavk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257569/original/file-20190206-174873-1tupavk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257569/original/file-20190206-174873-1tupavk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257569/original/file-20190206-174873-1tupavk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257569/original/file-20190206-174873-1tupavk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257569/original/file-20190206-174873-1tupavk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257569/original/file-20190206-174873-1tupavk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi leads a Shia-dominated government.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://i1.wp.com/www.middleeastmonitor.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Adel-Abdul-MahdiDomACLKXgAYnz2f.jpg?resize=1200%2C800&quality=75&strip=all&ssl=1">ACMCU/Twitter</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>During former Iraqi President Hussein’s rule, Sunni Muslims controlled the country, and his government actively repressed Shia citizens. Since Hussein’s ouster, however, Iraq’s government has been run by Shia Muslims. </p>
<p>After the U.S. withdrew its troops in 2011, the U.S.-backed al-Maliki government <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-us-needs-to-hold-nouri-al-maliki-accountable/2013/10/31/66af359e-424e-11e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.f3cc98d63029">began a brutal campaign to consolidate its authority</a>. From 2012 to 2013, he <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/20/world/middleeast/fading-hopes-of-unity-in-iraq-as-sectarian-tensions-rise.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FMaliki%2C%20Nuri%20Kamal%20al-&action=click&contentCollection=timestopics&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=167&pgtype=collection">expelled all Sunni officials</a> from Iraq’s government and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/11/opinion/renewed-tensions-in-iraq.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FMaliki%2C%20Nuri%20Kamal%20al-&action=click&contentCollection=timestopics&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=185&pgtype=collection">silenced opponents</a> using torture, political imprisonment, killings and disappearances.</p>
<p>At the time, our study of renewed fighting in conflict zones had just begun. The preliminary findings made us concerned that <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-violence-idUSBRE95004P20130601">al-Maliki’s use of violence</a> to assert control over Iraq could restart the civil war by pushing angry Sunnis into the arms of militant groups. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, we were right.</p>
<p>Starting in 2014, the Islamic State began moving swiftly from Syria – where it was based – to conquer major cities across neighboring western Iraq. </p>
<p>Iraqi Sunnis, who were excluded from politics after Hussein’s overthrow and fearful of government repression, <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/in-their-own-words-sunnis-on-their-treatment-in-malikis-iraq/">did little</a> to stop the incursion. Islamic militants increased their recruitment among Iraqi Sunnis by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/26/world/middleeast/iraq-isis-sunni.html">promising a return to Sunni dominance</a> in Iraq. </p>
<p>Many Sunnis took up arms against their own government not because they supported IS’s goal of establishing an Islamic caliphate across the Middle East but because they <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/04/18/304187407/sunni-discontent-fuels-growing-violence-in-iraqs-anbar-province">hated al-Maliki’s administration</a>. </p>
<p>By June 2014, the Islamic State had <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/07/mosul-isis-propaganda/532533/">captured Mosul</a>, Iraq’s second-largest city, just 250 miles north of Baghdad. It took three years of fighting and the combined force of Iraqi, U.S. and Kurdish troops, as well as <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/this-iran-backed-militia-helped-save-iraq-from-isis-now-washington-wants-them-to-disband">Iranian-backed militias</a>, to rid the country of this terrorist organization. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/11/world/middleeast/isis-syria.html">In September 2017</a>, Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Abadi claimed victory over IS in Iraq. The international community turned its focus toward Syria, where Islamic militants were continuing their war on citizens and the government.</p>
<h2>What’s next for Iraq</h2>
<p>Still, the Islamic State remains a persistent and legitimate threat to both Syria and Iraq, with some <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/">30,000 active fighters in the region</a>. Its commanders have reportedly buried large stockpiles of munitions in Iraq in preparation for renewed war.</p>
<p>American intelligence officials have <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/19/us/politics/trump-syria-turkey-troop-withdrawal.html">warned against President Donald Trump’s plan to withdraw U.S. troops from Syria</a>, saying it will <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/30/us/politics/trump-intelligence.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FIslamic%20State%20in%20Iraq%20and%20Syria%20(ISIS)&action=click&contentCollection=timestopics&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=6&pgtype=collection">give IS more freedom to regroup</a> there and in Iraq.</p>
<p>The Iraqi government’s crackdown on Sunnis is, in part, an effort to eliminate this threat, since IS could draw renewed support from disaffected Sunni Iraqis across the border. </p>
<p>But many observers think Prime Minister Abdul-Mahdi is also <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/12/24/iraqs-post-isis-campaign-of-revenge">exacting revenge</a> on Sunnis for previously joining IS in armed warfare against Iraq’s government.</p>
<p>Rather than prevent more fighting, our research suggests, Iraq’s clampdown on Sunnis may spark another civil war.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/109399/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eric Keels receives funding from The National Science Foundation. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Angela D. Nichols does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Iraq beat the Islamic State. Now, its Shia government is jailing and even executing all suspected terrorists – most of them Sunni Muslims. The clampdown may inflame a centuries-old sectarian divide.Eric Keels, Research Associate at One Earth Future Foundation & Research Fellow at the Howard H. Baker Center for Public Policy, University of TennesseeAngela D. Nichols, Assistant Professor, Florida Atlantic UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1021612018-09-19T10:40:16Z2018-09-19T10:40:16ZHow an ancient Islamic holiday became uniquely Caribbean<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/236942/original/file-20180918-146148-1irg90t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Hosay procession in St. James.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/nicholaslaughlin/5271820234/in/photolist-92Rsuj-93G17k-93G266-dxpNUo-93K6pb-pV58nw-93K6zW-dxj6Bv-6QAyyH-dvXECR-93K6KQ-fP4epm-fP4hBb-dxpwyu-2ehUmX-fNLHVT-92Rt49-fP4heS-92RR4q-92NJqc-92Ru8w-7rMSiF-92RsMb-fP4hmu-92RGff-92RGZW-53mpsM-4jCZRt-a1LZxg-pWZRHB-dxjckM-aSwYyV-dxjkyF-dxpzU7-dxpDfs-5QUe6o-92Nkgz-fP4fbh-92Nm9r-fNLGPV-fP4eU9-92RRib-92Nn86-92NJbi-92RGTU-92NHZc-92NHtV-92NHcT-92RRKA-92RGBU">Nicholas Laughlin</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A throng of Trinidadians line up along the streets of St. James and Cedros to admire the vibrant floats with beautifully bedecked models of mausoleums. Their destination is the waters of the Caribbean, where the crowds will push them out to float.</p>
<p>This is part of the Hosay commemorations, a religious ritual performed by Trinidadian Muslims, that I have observed as part of the <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&view_op=list_works&gmla=AJsN-F41GSnDbtBMMGKRcnlscgBXMvXPniHqtBzNEj1yU-fJRmovJpK9BacUyqgrBfeJtnBGtps-SGjRfFrLADgbDK9Qc5hz3Q&user=IHuvSrIAAAAJ">research</a> for my forthcoming book on Islam in Latin America and the Caribbean.</p>
<p>What fascinates me is how a practice from India has been transformed into something uniquely Caribbean.</p>
<h2>Re-enacting tragedy</h2>
<p>During the 10 days of the Islamic month of Muharram, Shiite Muslims around the world <a href="http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/ashura-COM_0068">remember the martyrdom of Hussein,</a> Prophet Muhammad’s grandson, who was killed in a battle in Karbala, today’s Iraq, some 1,338 years ago. For Shiite Muslims Hussein is the rightful successor to Prophet Muhammad.</p>
<p>Ashura, the 10th day of Muharram, is marked by public mourning and a re-enactment of the tragedy. Shiite Muslims put on passion plays that include inflicting suffering, as a way to remember Hussein. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/05/world/middleeast/bloody-and-belittled-shiite-ritual-draws-historic-parallels-in-iraq.html">In Iraq</a>, Shiite are known to beat themselves with swords. <a href="http://www.mmg.mpg.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Subsites/Diversities/Journals_2012/2012_14-02_art7.pdf">In India</a>, mourners whip themselves with sharp blades. Some Shiite also visit Hussein’s shrine in Iraq. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/236943/original/file-20180918-146148-1o3k8g3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/236943/original/file-20180918-146148-1o3k8g3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=355&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/236943/original/file-20180918-146148-1o3k8g3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=355&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/236943/original/file-20180918-146148-1o3k8g3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=355&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/236943/original/file-20180918-146148-1o3k8g3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=447&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/236943/original/file-20180918-146148-1o3k8g3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=447&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/236943/original/file-20180918-146148-1o3k8g3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=447&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ashura procession in Pakistan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/diariocriticove/8221405538/in/photolist-dwuRrm-hEM9vs-hEMB95-dkGQkL-7rLkeT-8jZnJZ-5588zs-asA3qM-hEMahC-pUh4Zb-dxYiWG-dkGMSD-bfiND2-hEMC6W-hELTKV-AXiXQB-8jZp8B-hELTVe-7rLkG6-hEMBWh-7qNmH7-AjmLV8-aSHV8c-asA8c2-hx2AKF-hEMAUN-dkGQnQ-sgLcH-dX3JQv-AjoFmt-7qKd5v-6Bw12k-asD52m-4eMe78-AmG7BK-8pu2bY-dwSaxX-7rLkrB-92JNeg-GtYhP-5SDDPp-aZzJU8-8w594d-M4zh97-dnxmLG-7sz1VY-hx3kPL-dwXEuW-aszUJz-6RscBF">Diariocritico de Venezuela</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The commemoration has also become a symbol for <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-the-shia-sunni-divide-78216">the broader Shiite struggle for justice</a> as a minority in the global Muslim community.</p>
<h2>Early history</h2>
<p>In Trinidad, the <a href="https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007%2F978-3-319-08956-0_267-1">100,000 Muslims who make up 5 percent</a> of the island’s total population, celebrate the day of Ashura, as Hosay – the name derived from “Hussein.” </p>
<p>The first Hosay festival was held in 1854, just over a decade after the first Indian Muslims began to arrive from India to work on the island’s sugar plantations.</p>
<p>But Trinidad at the time was under British colonial rule and large public gatherings were not permitted. In 1884, the British authorities <a href="https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007%2F978-3-319-08956-0_267-1">issued a prohibition against Hosay commemorations.</a> Approximately 30,000 people took to the streets, in Mon Repos, in the south, to protest against the ordinance. Shots fired to disperse the crowd killed 22 and injured over 100. The ordinance was later overturned. </p>
<p>The “Hosay Massacre” or <a href="https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007%2F978-3-319-08956-0_267-1">“Muharram Massacre,”</a> however, lives in people’s memories. </p>
<h2>Colorful floats of Trinidad</h2>
<p>These days, Hosay celebrations in St. James and Cedros not only recall Hussein, but also those killed during the 1884 Hosay riots. Rather than recreate the events through self-flagellation or other forms of suffering, however, people in Trinidad create bright and beautiful floats, called “tadjahs,” that parade through the streets to the sea.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/236945/original/file-20180918-158219-1ne4t6d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/236945/original/file-20180918-158219-1ne4t6d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/236945/original/file-20180918-158219-1ne4t6d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/236945/original/file-20180918-158219-1ne4t6d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/236945/original/file-20180918-158219-1ne4t6d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=553&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/236945/original/file-20180918-158219-1ne4t6d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=553&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/236945/original/file-20180918-158219-1ne4t6d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=553&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The tadjah, a colorful model of a mausoleum.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/nicholaslaughlin/3178639298/in/photolist-5QTmHQ-7ma37X-aS3gCF-dxpP71-92NHZc-92NHtV-fP4h5S-dxjgjM-5QTTCw-dxj7q4-fNLFXr-a1PSgu-93K6KQ-7orMV7-92RRKA-92NmWP-92Rui1-dxpzDS-a1LWmz-92RGqS-5QQ8QZ-fNLHPr-92RGNQ-nEEjpT-MBiJxe-93G1ja-NrwYAZ-93K6gG-aSwYyV-fP4gYo-fP4gru-dxjkyF-fP4frb-dxpx2C-fP4hmu-fP48qL-fNLK7Z-9rjt92-fNLHTF-fP4hhd-fP4gLU-i6Gmqg-i6FYqW-i6G9k7-b9EFRi-i6G2zH-63DjHr-i6G6vD-i6G7GL-i6GnoD">Nicholas Laughlin</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Each tadjah is constructed of wood, paper, bamboo and tinsel. Ranging from a height of 10 to 30 feet, the floats are accompanied by people parading along and others playing drums, just as is the practice in India’s northern city of Lucknow. Meant to reflect the resting place of Shiite martyrs, the tadjahs resemble mausoleums in India. To many, their domes might be a reminder of the Taj Mahal. </p>
<p>Walking ahead of the tadjahs are two men bearing crescent moon shapes, one in red and the other in green. These symbolize the deaths of Hussein and his brother Hassan – the red being Hussein’s blood and the green symbolizing the supposed poisoning of Hassan. </p>
<p>The elaborateness of the tadjahs continues to increase each year and has become somewhat of a status symbol among the families that sponsor them. </p>
<h2>A bit carnival, a bit Ashura</h2>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/236944/original/file-20180918-158219-10oichg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/236944/original/file-20180918-158219-10oichg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/236944/original/file-20180918-158219-10oichg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/236944/original/file-20180918-158219-10oichg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/236944/original/file-20180918-158219-10oichg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/236944/original/file-20180918-158219-10oichg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/236944/original/file-20180918-158219-10oichg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Trinidad’s Hosay brings in a more carnival-like joy to a somber remembrance.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/nicholaslaughlin/5271899626/in/photolist-92RS69-93G17k-92NHcT-92RGTU-2ehUmX-dxjckM-53mpsM-pWZRHB-92RR4q-4jCZRt-dxpzU7-dxpDfs-7rMSiF-92RGBU-92RsMb-a1PSom-dxpAfL-5QUe6o-dxpGhU-dxpMoq-93K6pb-92RR7u-dxpB99-dxjhaT-92Nn86-fP489m-92NJbi-96jXVv-93K6zW-92RGZW-dxpBnU-5RmkvJ-dxpvJu-dFBhKN-dxjcLg-dxjhLH-9UJM7a-i6Gpst-i6GvLR-5Rmkr5-i6FLp1-7rRqRa-dxpA55-5QTmHQ-7ma37X-aS3gCF-dxpP71-92NHZc-92NHtV-fP4h5S">Nicholas Laughlin</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>While the festival is certainly a somber one in terms of its tribute, it is also a joyous occasion where families celebrate with loud music and don festive attire. This has led some to compare <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40653916">Hosay to Trinidad’s world-famous carnival</a> with its accompanying “joie de vivre.”</p>
<p>But there are also those who believe that the occasion should be a more somber remembrance of the martydom of Hussein. More conservative Muslims in Trinidad have <a href="http://www.upenn.edu/pennpress/book/13848.html">made attempts to “reform” such celebrations</a>. These Muslims believe local customs should be more in line with global commemorations like those in Iraq or India. </p>
<p>What I saw in the festival was an assertion of both the Indian and Trinidadian identity. For Shiite Muslims, who have dealt with oppression and ostracism – both in the past and in the present – it is a means of claiming their space as a minority in Trinidadian culture and resisting being pushed to the margins. At the same time, with its carnival-like feel, the festival could not be <a href="http://www.upenn.edu/pennpress/book/13848.html">more Trinidadian</a>. </p>
<p>Indeed, the celebrations each year illustrate how Indian and Trinidadian rituals and material culture merged to create a unique festival.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/102161/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ken Chitwood does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Hosay, a religious ritual performed by Trinidadian Muslims, combines the somber Islamic observance of Ashura, brought by immigrant Indians, and the joy of Trinidad’s famous carnival.Ken Chitwood, Ph.D. Candidate, Religion in the Americas, Global Islam, University of FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/869042018-05-24T10:28:57Z2018-05-24T10:28:57ZSome Sunnis voted for a Shiite – and 3 more takeaways from the Iraqi election<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/220220/original/file-20180523-51091-1bzj9ch.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An Iraqi woman shows her ink-stained finger after voting in the first national election since the declaration of victory over the Islamic State group. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Hadi Mizban</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The results of May 2018 the Iraqi parliament election shocked many. The surprising results could mean a different phase in Iraq’s political trajectory has begun.</p>
<p>Most observers were expecting an easy win for <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/iraq-abadi-maliki-elections-different-lists/28974954.html">Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi‘s slate</a> of candidates from all 19 of the country’s provinces. As <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=KkYQ2BAAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">an analyst of Iraqi politics and security</a>, that’s what I thought would happen. My colleague <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1536504211418460">Munqith Dagher</a>, who is the most prolific pollster in Iraq and who helped research and write this piece, came to the same conclusion based on our extensive analysis of the run-up to the elections. </p>
<p>But the Saeroun (“Forward”) Alliance — supported by the anti-American, anti-Iranian cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, <a href="http://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/180520182">won the most votes</a> – 54 of the parliament’s total 329. The pro-Iranian Fatah (“Victory”) Alliance came in second, and the Prime Minister’s slate – called Nasr (“Conquest”) – came in third. </p>
<p>The country has had five elections since the U.S. invasion and the toppling of Saddam Hussein in 2003, but this could be the most significant since it changed a number of the important pillars of the political process. </p>
<p>Here are some lessons from this election.</p>
<h2>1. Turnout is declining</h2>
<p>This was the first election after the Iraqi government declared victory over the Islamic State group in all Iraqi territories and the second election after the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq in 2011. </p>
<p>Yet despite the most peaceful conditions in 15 years, this election witnessed the lowest turnout rate of all post-2003 elections.</p>
<p><iframe id="dsHBz" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/dsHBz/2/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>2. A desire for independence</h2>
<p>The victorious Saeroun Alliance is <a href="http://www.niqash.org/en/articles/politics/5829/">a unique coalition</a> between the Sadr religious party and communists in Iraq. It shows that a marriage between secularity and religiosity is possible and wanted by the people. </p>
<p>This could be a good example for other Muslim countries if the unusual political alliance survives the expected political maneuvers. </p>
<p>That’s not yet clear since Iraqi electoral law and the fractious nature of Iraqi politics make it nearly impossible to have single-party majority governments. As in many parliamentary systems, forming governing coalitions is a necessary yet difficult process after national elections. </p>
<p>It’s not certain that the Saeroun Alliance will be part of the new government currently being formed, despite winning the most votes. One reason is because <a href="http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2018/May-21/450158-sadr-promising-iraq-reform-is-constrained-by-iran.ashx">Iran</a> is working hard to keep the relatively anti-Iranian Saeroun Alliance out of the Iraqi government. Iran is trying to create a governing coalition among other Shia-dominated political parties, and has dispatched <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/05/iraq-election-abadi-maliki-sadr-iran.html">General Qassem Soleimani</a>, Iran’s top regional security official, to Baghdad to try to cobble together a pro-Iran governing coalition. This is a matter of the highest national security importance to Iran. </p>
<p>Regardless of how the final government looks, this victory of the Sadrists sends a strong message to all foreign influences in Iraq. This message is especially clear for Iran and the U.S., as al-Sadr opposes both countries’ influences and asked for <a href="http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2018/May-19/450001-us-prepares-to-embrace-old-iraq-foe.ashx">independent Iraqi policies</a>. </p>
<p>Interestingly, al-Sadr might consider not nominating any of his candidates to be the next prime minister of Iraq as he knows that it is nearly impossible to ignore the Iranian-American power struggle in Iraq. Indeed, al-Sadr has previously said the current Prime Minster al-Abadi could serve for a second term as long as he responds positively to Sadr’s governmental reform wishes, which are not far from <a href="http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2018/May-21/450159-sadr-meets-with-abadi-hinting-at-large-coalition.ashx?utm_source=Magnet&utm_medium=Related%20Articles%20widget&utm_campaign=Magnet%20tools">al-Abadi’s own plans</a>.</p>
<h2>3. Clergy still powerful</h2>
<p>Although the highest Shia clergy in Najaf avoided backing any candidates in this election, they proved that they are still important players that cannot be ignored. We believe that the clergy’s indifferent position toward voting, or, for that matter, boycotting the election, had a big impact on the low turnout. In previous elections, the Najaf clergy had encouraged people to participate.</p>
<p>On the other hand, the clergy offered guiding instructions to their followers who did want to vote. The slogan of <a href="https://apnews.com/f84fea4771c64fc0bffbfb5b842478cc/Top-Iraqi-cleric-warns-of-'foreign-influence'-in-elections?utm_source=Pew+Research+Center&utm_campaign=88d068bdaf-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_05_04&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_3e953b9b70-88d068bdaf-400098637">“Not voting for those who were already tried before”</a> seems to have hurt many top Shia political leaders, such as Nouri al-Maliki and others. It is also likely that this slogan negatively affected the chances of the current prime minister’s slate of candidates.</p>
<h2>4. Growing less sectarian</h2>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/220222/original/file-20180523-90281-7sa1q6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/220222/original/file-20180523-90281-7sa1q6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/220222/original/file-20180523-90281-7sa1q6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/220222/original/file-20180523-90281-7sa1q6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/220222/original/file-20180523-90281-7sa1q6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/220222/original/file-20180523-90281-7sa1q6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/220222/original/file-20180523-90281-7sa1q6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An Iraqi soldier stands guard as voters wait in west Mosul, May 12, 2018.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Maya Alleruzzo</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Generally speaking the election results indicate that Iraqi voters have started to vote independently of their religious and sectarian identities. Al-Abadi, who is one of the top leaders of the Da’wa Shia sectarian party, received almost 30 percent of his votes from <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-the-shia-sunni-divide-78216">Sunnis</a> – especially in areas freed from IS occupation recently, such as Mosul. <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/09/14/iraqi-sunnis-are-impressed-by-the-defeat-of-isis-heres-what-that-could-mean/?utm_term=.83676c78ee9d">Sunnis</a> who have been freed from IS occupation are thankful for al-Abadi’s efforts to defeat IS.</p>
<p>A number of Shia parties, which had militias that fought against IS, also received some votes from Sunnis in these areas as well. These votes are also an appreciation of the militias helping to drive IS out of their areas.</p>
<p>It is still early to say there is a significant, permanent shift away from sectarian voting, yet this new behavior will encourage top Shia leaders who dominated the Iraqi political arena for the last 15 years to consider Sunnis’ hopes and needs in their future political decisions. This could be important and effective in fighting Sunni extremist terrorism in Iraq.</p>
<p>Despite their involvement behind the scenes, it also looks like Iran will be less adamant that the government be led by an explicitly pro-Iranian politician. At any rate, the main Shia power blocs in Iraq are fragmented and it will be difficult for Iran to bring – and keep – them back under one umbrella. Iran may have to be satisfied by a prime minister who is not opposed to Iranian influence in the country. </p>
<p>And finally, none of this can be seen independently of the U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal. That withdrawal strengthened the Shia extremists in Iraq and helped them to get more votes. Now Iran needs a moderate Iraqi leader who could play the role of mediator with the U.S. administration to avoid more sanctions or even armed actions.</p>
<p><em>Munqith Dagher of the <a href="http://iiacss.org/">Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies</a> in Baghdad contributed to the research and writing of this piece.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/86904/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Karl Kaltenthaler does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The recent parliamentary election in Iraqi may have been the most transformative of the post-Saddam era, a pollster from Baghdad and an American academic explain.Karl Kaltenthaler, Adjunct Professor, Case Western Reserve UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/782162017-05-24T02:20:39Z2017-05-24T02:20:39ZWhat is the Shia-Sunni divide?<p>Tensions between Sunnis and Shias have been flaring up, with several incidents of violence reported in recent months: Most recently a suicide bomber killed at least 29 people when he blew himself up at the <a href="http://religionnews.com/2017/08/02/blast-at-shiite-mosque-in-afghanistan-kills-dozens/">largest Shiite Muslim mosque</a> in Afghanistan’s Herat province on Tuesday, August 1. </p>
<p>Earlier in June, the <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2017-06-07/iranian-media-shooting-at-parliament-wounds-security-guard">Islamic State claimed responsibility</a> for two attacks that claimed at least 12 lives in Iran. Iran is a Shia Muslim majority state often in tension with Sunni states and <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/islamic-state">extremist groups</a> like the Islamic State or al-Qaeda. </p>
<p>As a scholar of Islam and a public educator, I often field questions about Sunnis, Shias and the sects of Islam. What exactly is the Shia-Sunni divide? And what is its history?</p>
<h2>History of divide</h2>
<p>Both Sunnis and Shias – drawing their faith and practice from the Qur’an and the life of the Prophet Muhammad – agree on most of the fundamentals of Islam. The differences are related more to historical events, ideological heritage and issues of leadership. </p>
<p>The first and central difference emerged after the death of Prophet Muhammad in A.D. 632. The issue was who would be the caliph – the “deputy of God” – in the absence of the prophet. <a href="https://books.google.de/books?id=O36yXxCMiQIC&printsec=frontcover&dq=islam+a+brief+history&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false">While the majority sided with Abu Bakr,</a> one of the prophet’s closest companions, a minority opted for his son-in-law and cousin – Ali. This group held that Ali was appointed by the prophet to be the political and spiritual leader of the fledgling Muslim community.</p>
<p>Subsequently, those Muslims who put their faith in Abu Bakr came to be called Sunni (“those who follow the Sunna,” the sayings, deeds and traditions of the Prophet Muhammad) and those who trusted in Ali came to be known as Shia (a contraction of <a href="https://books.google.de/books?id=9HUDXkJIE3EC&pg=PA16&dq=Shiat+Ali+Esposito+Islam&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=Shiat%20Ali%20Esposito%20Islam&f=false">“Shiat Ali,” meaning “partisans of Ali”</a>).</p>
<p>Abu Bakr became the first caliph and Ali became the fourth caliph. However, Ali’s leadership was challenged by Aisha, the prophet’s wife and daughter of Abu Bakr. Aisha and Ali went to battle against each other near Basra, Iraq in <a href="https://books.google.de/books?id=1nNjDQAAQBAJ&pg=PT130&dq=history+of+islam+battle+of+the+camel&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=history%20of%20islam%20battle%20of%20the%20camel&f=false">the Battle of the Camel in A.D. 656.</a> Aisha was defeated, but the roots of division were deepened. Subsequently, Mu’awiya, the Muslim governor of Damascus, <a href="https://books.google.de/books?id=1nNjDQAAQBAJ&pg=PT130&dq=history+of+islam+battle+of+the+camel&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=history%20of%20islam%20battle%20of%20the%20camel&f=false">also went to battle against Ali</a>, further exacerbating the divisions in the community. </p>
<p>In the years that followed, Mu’awiya assumed the caliphate and founded the Ummayad Dynasty (A.D 670-750). Ali’s youngest son, Hussein – born of Fatima, the prophet’s daughter – led a group of partisans in Kufa, Iraq against Mu’awiya’s son Yazid. For the Shias, this battle, known as <a href="https://books.google.de/books?id=egGgUM_YdL8C&pg=PA8&dq=the+battle+of+karbala&hl=de&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwidyvaAvobUAhViIJoKHbmsBZQQ6AEIQTAF#v=onepage&q=the%20battle%20of%20karbala&f=false">the Battle of Karbala, holds enormous historical and religious significance.</a></p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/170634/original/file-20170523-5799-1pzvnhn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/170634/original/file-20170523-5799-1pzvnhn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/170634/original/file-20170523-5799-1pzvnhn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/170634/original/file-20170523-5799-1pzvnhn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/170634/original/file-20170523-5799-1pzvnhn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/170634/original/file-20170523-5799-1pzvnhn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/170634/original/file-20170523-5799-1pzvnhn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An Iranian Shiite Muslim mourns after covering herself with mud during Ashura rituals in Iran.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Ebrahim Noroozi</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Hussein was killed and his forces defeated. For the Shia community, Hussein became a martyr. The day of the battle is commemorated every year on <a href="https://books.google.de/books?id=6VeCWQfVNjkC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Ashura+Oxford+Encyclopedia+of+Islam&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi1xvn2wIbUAhUFFywKHaBlAakQ6AEISzAH#v=snippet&q=Ashura&f=false">the Day of Ashura</a>. Held on the tenth day of Muharram in the Islamic lunar calendar, scores of pilgrims visit Hussein’s shrine in Karbala and many Shia communities participate in symbolic acts of flagellation and suffering.</p>
<h2>Leadership disagreements</h2>
<p>Over time, Islam continued to expand and develop into evermore complex and overlapping societies that spanned from Europe to sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa to Asia. This development demanded more codified forms of religious and political leadership. </p>
<p>Sunnis and Shias adopted different approaches to these issues.</p>
<p>Sunni Muslims trusted the secular leadership of the caliphs during the Ummayad (based in Damascus from A.D. 660-750) and Abbasid (based in Iraq from 750-1258 and in Cairo from 1261-1517) periods. Their theological foundations came from the four religious schools of Islamic jurisprudence that emerged <a href="https://www.academia.edu/2310961/The_background_and_formation_of_the_Four_Schools_of_Islamic_Law">over the seventh and eighth centuries</a>. </p>
<p>To this day, these schools help Sunni Muslims decide on issues such as worship, criminal law, gender and family, banking and finance, and even bioethical and environmental concerns. Today, <a href="http://www.brill.com/products/reference-work/yearbook-international-religious-demography-2017">Sunnis comprise about 80-90 percent of the global Muslim population.</a> </p>
<p>On the other hand, Shias relied on Imams as their spiritual leaders, whom they believed to be divinely appointed leaders from among the prophet’s family. Shia Muslims continue to maintain that the prophet’s family are the sole genuine leaders. In the absence of the leadership of direct descendants, <a href="https://books.google.de/books?redir_esc=y&hl=de&id=B0OL5Z8S-V0C&q=imamate#v=snippet&q=imamate&f=false">Shias appoint representatives to rule in their place</a> (often called ayatollahs). Shias are a minority of the global Muslim population, <a href="http://www.brill.com/products/reference-work/yearbook-international-religious-demography-2017">although they have strong communities</a> in Iraq, Pakistan, Albania, Yemen, Lebanon and Iran. There are also different <a href="https://books.google.de/books?id=5h2aCgAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=denny+islam&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjvoPmbwYbUAhWKjiwKHWK1CMQQ6AEIJjAA#v=onepage&q=Twelvers&f=false">sects within Shia Islam</a>. </p>
<h2>Differences masked during Hajj</h2>
<p>Other disputes that continue to exacerbate the divide include issues of theology, practice and geopolitics.</p>
<p>For example, when it comes to theology Sunnis and Shias draw from <a href="https://oneworld-publications.com/hadith-pb.html">different “Hadith” traditions</a>. Hadith are the reports of the words and deeds of the prophet and considered an authoritative source of revelation, second only to the Quran. They provide a biographical sketch of the prophet, context to Quranic verses, and are used by Muslims in the application of Islamic law to daily life. Shias favor those that come from the prophet’s family and closest associates, while Sunnis cast a broader net for Hadith that includes a wide array of the prophet’s companions. </p>
<p>Shias and Sunnis differ over prayer as well. All Sunni Muslims believe they are required to pray five times a day, but Shias can condense those into three. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/170631/original/file-20170523-5782-1o7pzq7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/170631/original/file-20170523-5782-1o7pzq7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/170631/original/file-20170523-5782-1o7pzq7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/170631/original/file-20170523-5782-1o7pzq7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/170631/original/file-20170523-5782-1o7pzq7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/170631/original/file-20170523-5782-1o7pzq7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/170631/original/file-20170523-5782-1o7pzq7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Hajj pilgrimage in Mecca, when both Shia and Sunni Muslims come together to pray.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/aljazeeraenglish/5175696974/in/photolist-8TmNoJ-pUn3E-TFF5iw-b28wFk-8TwBJr-8UeRy7-hhsunS-8SWbdP-4qY7mM-4GsGdi-8TCUEX-hhssws-8Tz1tf-9Wtc2d-8TvDnr-7m6S5M-8SZhyQ-h4zTbi-8TzJJj-7AUpkM-8VZVMs-hhu1NN-4j3Dty-5R5Xod-8UbLax-b28voc-4HBpax-5KXLR-8TyDvy-8SWcnr-8TkxKF-hhswGG-dZNDGX-kAeFMP-hhrD6A-8TvKzV-9Wtanw-8U9pyc-9WqMr8-9Wqzxa-8TvHvx-8TyFsS-8Tikfx-9Wtz7J-wdAZ-9WqAJ8-8Tz4sU-8SZgWf-9Wt689-8SZgF1">Al Jazeera English</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>During the Hajj – <a href="http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e771">the pilgrimage to Mecca, held annually</a> and obligatory for all Muslims once in a lifetime – it may seem that these differences are masked, as both Sunnis and Shias gather in the holy city for rituals that reenact the holiest narratives of their faith. And yet, with Saudi authorities overseeing the Hajj, there have been tensions with Shia governments such as Iran over <a href="http://www.alterinter.org/spip.php?article4502">claims of discrimination.</a> </p>
<p>And when it comes to leadership, the Shia have a more hierarchical structure of political and religious authority invested in formally trained clergy whose religious authority is transnational. <a href="https://books.google.de/books?id=5h2aCgAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=denny+islam&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjvoPmbwYbUAhWKjiwKHWK1CMQQ6AEIJjAA#v=snippet&q=clergy&f=false">There is no such structure in Sunni Islam.</a></p>
<p>The greatest splits today, however, come down to politics. Although the majority of Sunni and Shia are able to live peacefully together, the current global political landscape has brought polarization and sectarianism to new levels. Shia-Sunni <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2013/06/08/sectarianism-and-the-politics-of-the-new-middle-east/">conflicts are raging in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon</a> and <a href="https://www.publishersweekly.com/978-0-19-062165-0">Pakistan</a> and the divide is growing deeper across the Muslim world. </p>
<p>This historical schism continues to permeate the daily lives of Muslims around the world.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/78216/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ken Chitwood does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There have been several attacks on Shia mosques in several parts of the world. At its heart is the centuries’-old sectarian Shia-Sunni divide.Ken Chitwood, Ph.D. Candidate, Religion in the Americas, Global Islam, University of FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/780722017-05-23T03:48:49Z2017-05-23T03:48:49ZTrump, Saudi Arabia and yet another arms deal<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/170378/original/file-20170522-7361-19zc7y2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Saudi king presents Trump with The Collar of Abdulaziz Al Saud medal on May 20, 2017. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Evan Vucci</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The first stop on Donald Trump’s first trip as U.S. president was to Saudi Arabia. </p>
<p>That was no accident. </p>
<p>His decision was surely based on the fact that the alliance between Saudi Arabia and the United States is one of the foundations of American foreign policy in the Middle East. </p>
<p>While Trump was there, Saudi King Salman awarded him the kingdom’s highest civilian honor. Trump came bearing gifts of his own in the form of <a href="https://nyti.ms/2rx4yA4">US$110 billion worth of military equipment</a>, some of which had been approved by <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/05/19/trump-comes-to-riyadh-bearing-gifts-weapons-approved-by-obama/">Barack Obama</a>. </p>
<p>The Saudi’s extravagant welcome of Trump indicates a significant warming of relations that had cooled under Obama and indicates a return to the two countries searching for linkage rather than leverage. Yet, this is far from the first time that the U.S. and Saudi Arabia have shifted their perceptions of each other.</p>
<h2>Old friends</h2>
<p>The partnership between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. emerged in 1930 with the formation of what would become the <a href="http://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=10072">Arabian American Oil Company</a>. Shared economic and security interests have kept the two partners close over the decades. This in spite of the dramatic differences in the way the two countries are governed. </p>
<p>The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia became vital for American defense during World War II when Saudi Arabia joined the Allies. During the Cold War, Saudi Arabia acted as a key support for preserving for the free flow of oil and keeping Soviet influence out of the region. Along with support for Israel, these concerns constituted the three pillars of American Middle East policy. </p>
<p>But contradictions between these objectives has insured that the Saudi-American relationship has never been trouble-free. </p>
<h2>From boycotts to Iran</h2>
<p>One troubled period was the Saudi leadership of the 1973 oil boycott against the U.S. in retaliation for American support for Israel in the October War. </p>
<p>Yet, as soon as that crisis was resolved, cooperation between the two countries returned. <a href="http://www.merip.org/mer/mer155/saudi-arabia-reagan-doctrine">Then</a> as <a href="https://nyti.ms/2rx4yA4">now</a>, Saudi Arabia spent a great deal of its oil wealth on U.S.-made weapons. Over the years the Saudis have bristled at American support for Israel, but not enough to undermine the relationship.</p>
<p>In 1979, an Islamic revolution <a href="http://iranprimer.usip.org/">overthrew the pro-American shah of Iran</a>. This transformed Iran from an ally into America and Saudi Arabia’s biggest regional adversary. While most analysis points toward the inherent conflict between Saudi’s hard-line interpretations of Sunni Islam with Iran’s post-1979 revolutionary Shi’ite activism, it is as easy to see the two states jockeying for <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/beyond-sectarianism-the-new-middle-east-cold-war/">geopolitical power</a>.</p>
<p>Saudi has pressured the United States to weaken Iran – especially its nascent nuclear program. This was famously captured when <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/150519">Wikileaks</a> released 2008 correspondence from then-King Abdullah, pressing the U.S. to “chop the head off the snake” and attack Iran. </p>
<p>The other source of tension between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia stems from the blow-back from their Cold War cooperation. Joint American and Saudi support for Sunni Islamist militants to combat the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan resulted in the <a href="http://www.democracynow.org/2004/6/10/ghost_wars_how_reagan_armed_the">birth of al-Qaida</a> when warriors returned home after the Cold War. These <a href="https://theconversation.com/who-exactly-are-radical-muslims-73098">militants</a> attacked both the Saudi and other Middle Eastern regimes despite being an outgrowth of official Saudi Islamic ideas. The militants turned to attack the U.S. and the West. The alliance between the U.S. and the Saudis continued after the fall of the Soviet Union around a new pillar of U.S. policy, counterterrorism. </p>
<h2>Obama’s legacy</h2>
<p>Under the Obama administration, Saudi–American relations weakened because of the administration’s <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/07/17/revisiting-obamas-riyadh-meeting/">disengagement</a> from the Middle East. Relations particularly <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/28/barack-obama-saudi-arabia-syria-iran">deteriorated</a> in the wake of the Arab Spring protests in 2011. My research has shown that the Saudis, and other monarchs, rode out the wave of protests <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21534764.2014.971648">better than republics in the region</a>.
Repression at home has also led to a more <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0030438711000937">adventurous foreign policy</a> abroad by supporting proxies in Syria and Yemen without coordination with the United States.</p>
<p>With the ascension of King Salman in 2015 and the rise of his son, Deputy Crown Prince and Defense Minister Mohammad bin Salman, <a href="http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/saudi-arabias-return-to-aggressive-foreign-policy/article28029555">this accelerated</a>. </p>
<p>Previously, the Saudis supported groups in the Syrian civil war that evolved into <a href="https://theconversation.com/islamic-state-versus-daish-or-daesh-the-political-battle-over-naming-50822">the Islamic State</a> terrorist group. Since 2013, however, the Saudis have turned toward supporting other, <a href="https://nyti.ms/2kcxxp3">more “moderate” groups</a> who will cooperate with the U.S. At the same time, their demand for the fall of Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad has not wavered. This has led the Syrian civil war to become a new venue for Saudi-Iranian rivalry, as Iran is one of the Syrian president’s biggest supporters.</p>
<p>The Saudis also have directly intervened militarily in next-door <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/yemen-crisis">Yemen</a> to prevent the Houthi movement, a Shi'ite group from northern Yemen, from emerging victorious in that country’s civil war. The Saudis <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-houthis-and-the-risks-of-internationalizing-the-yemeni-crisis-36729">accuse Iran of supporting</a> the Houthis. The Saudi-led campaign, however, has not resulted in a quick victory. Instead it is contributing to another stalemated <a href="http://www.care.org/emergencies/yemen-humanitarian-crisis">humanitarian emergency in the region</a>. The Trump administration may find <a href="https://www.democracynow.org/2017/5/22/medea_benjamin_congress_should_halt_trumps">congressional opposition</a> to the arms deal because of the Saudi’s possibly using these arms in Yemen. </p>
<h2>The nuclear deal</h2>
<p>But what truly annoyed Saudi leaders about Obama was his forging the agreement between Iran, the U.S. and other partners to limit Iran’s nuclear program in return for the lifting of economic sanctions. The Saudis felt that the agreement was made over their objections.</p>
<p>Candidate Trump promised to rip up the Iran agreement, but as president he has not done so yet. If he still intends to do so, that promise may have become harder to keep after Iranian voters voiced their support for the agreement by <a href="https://nyti.ms/2rGLDTy">reelecting President Hassan Rouhani</a>. </p>
<p>The Saudis are hoping that President Trump continues to walk back his campaign trail “<a href="http://wapo.st/2qCmaNc">Islam hates us</a>” talk to focus instead on shared cooperation against Iran and “<a href="http://wapo.st/2qDIeqJ">Islamic extremism</a>.” </p>
<p>However, it still remains to be seen if it is Trump’s new claim that “we are not here to tell other people how to live” or if it is the old-fashioned art of the (arms) deal that has warmed up the U.S.-Saudi relationship.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/78072/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Russell E. Lucas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Shared economic and security interests have kept Saudi Arabia and the US close over the decades despite dramatic differences in the way the two countries are governed.Russell E. Lucas, Director of Global Studies in the Arts and Humanities; Associate Professor of Arab Studies, Michigan State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/538732016-02-21T19:03:36Z2016-02-21T19:03:36ZIslamic State and the Assassins: reviving fanciful tales of the medieval Orient<p><em>How do we account for forces and events that paved the way for the emergence of Islamic State? <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/understanding-islamic-state">Our series on the jihadist group’s origins</a> tries to address this question by looking at the interplay of historical and social forces that led to its advent.</em></p>
<p><em>Today, historian Farhad Daftary debunks the idea that Islamic State is based on the so-called Assassins or hashishin, the fighting corps of the fledgling medieval Nizari Ismaili state.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>Many Western commentators have tried to trace the ideological roots of Islamic State (IS) to earlier Islamic movements. Occasionally, they’ve <a href="http://atheistpapers.com/2015/08/06/sicarii-assassins-and-the-islamic-state-a-pattern-emerges/">associated them with the medieval Ismailis</a>, a Shiʿite Muslim community made famous in Europe by returning Crusaders as the Assassins. </p>
<p>But any serious inquiry shows the teachings and practices of medieval Ismailis, who had a state of their own in parts of Iran from 1090 to 1256, had nothing in common with the senseless terrorist ideology and ruthless destruction of IS and its supporters. </p>
<p>Attacks on civilians, including women and children, and engaging in the mass destruction of property are forbidden both by Prophet Muhammad and in the tenets of Islamic law. Needless to say, the Ismailis never descended to such terrorist activities, even under highly adversarial circumstances. </p>
<p>Significant discordance exists between the medieval Ismailis and contemporary terrorists, who – quite inappropriately – identify themselves as members of an Islamic polity. </p>
<h2>Fanciful Oriental tales</h2>
<p>The Ismailis, or more specifically the Nizari Ismailis, founded a precarious state in 1090 under the leadership of Hasan-i Sabbah. As a minority Shi'ite Muslim community, they faced hostility from the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abbasid_Caliphate">Sunni-Abbasid establishment</a> (the third caliphate after the death of the Prophet Muhammed) and their political overlords, the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seljuq_dynasty">Seljuq Turks</a>, from very early on. </p>
<p>Struggling to survive in their network of defensive mountain fortresses remained the primary objective of the Ismaili leadership, centred on the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alamut_Castle">castle of Alamut</a> (in the north of modern-day Iran). Their state survived against all odds until it was destroyed by the all-conquering Mongols in 1256.</p>
<p>During the course of the 12th century, the Ismailis were incessantly attacked by the armies of the Sunni Seljuq sultans, who were intensely anti-Shiʿite. As they couldn’t match their enemies’ superior military power, the Ismailis resorted to the warfare tactic of selectively removing Seljuq military commanders and other prominent adversaries who posed serious existential threats to them in particular localities. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/110922/original/image-20160210-3283-jkrcvn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/110922/original/image-20160210-3283-jkrcvn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=430&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110922/original/image-20160210-3283-jkrcvn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=430&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110922/original/image-20160210-3283-jkrcvn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=430&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110922/original/image-20160210-3283-jkrcvn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110922/original/image-20160210-3283-jkrcvn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110922/original/image-20160210-3283-jkrcvn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An agent (fida’i) of the Ismailis (left, in white turban) fatally stabs Nizam al-Mulk, a Seljuk vizier, in 1092.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AAssassination_of_Nizam_al-Mulk.jpg">Public domain via Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>These daring missions were carried out by the Ismaili fidaʾis, who were deeply devoted to their community. The fidaʾis comprised the fighting corps of the Ismaili state. </p>
<p>But the Ismailis didn’t invent the policy of assassinating enemies. It was a practice employed by many Muslim groups at the time, as well as by <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crusades">the Crusaders</a> and many others throughout history. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, almost all assassinations of any significance occurring in the central lands of Islam became automatically attributed to the Ismaili fidaʾis. And a series of fanciful tales were fabricated around their recruitment and training. </p>
<p>These tales, rooted in the “imaginative ignorance” of the Crusaders, were concocted and put into circulation by them and their occidental observers; they’re not found in contemporary Muslim sources. </p>
<p>The so-called Assassin legends, which culminated in <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marco_Polo">Marco Polo’s synthesis</a>, were meant to provide satisfactory explanations for the fearless behaviour of the fidaʾis, which seemed otherwise irrational to medieval Europeans. </p>
<p>The very term Assassin, which appears in medieval European literature in a variety of forms, such as Assassini, was based on variants of the Arabic word hashish (plural, hashishin) and applied to the Nizari Ismailis of Syria and Iran by other Muslims. </p>
<p>In all the Muslim sources where the Ismailis are referred to as hashishis, the term is used in its pejorative sense of “people of lax morality”. There’s no suggestion that they were actually using hashish. There’s no evidence that hashish, or any other drug, was administered to the fida’is, as alleged by Marco Polo. </p>
<p>The literal interpretation of the term for the Ismailis as an “order of crazed hashish-using Assassins” is rooted entirely in the fantasies of medieval Europeans. </p>
<p>Modern scholarship in Ismaili studies, based on the recovery and study of numerous Ismaili textual sources, has now begun to dispel many misconceptions regarding the Ismailis, including the myths surrounding their cadre of fidaʾis. </p>
<p>And the medieval Assassin legends, arising from the hostility of the Sunni Muslims to the Shiʿite Ismailis as well as the medieval Europeans’ fanciful impressions of the Orient, have been <a href="http://www.ibtauris.com/Books/Humanities/History/Regional%20%20national%20history/Asian%20history/Middle%20Eastern%20history/The%20Assassin%20Legends%20Myths%20of%20the%20Ismailis.aspx?menuitem=%7BC90B73C8-B253-4CB4-A19B-025245A9366A%7D">recounted and deconstructed</a>.</p>
<h2>A culture of learning and tolerance</h2>
<p>Living in adverse circumstances, the Ismailis of Iran and Syria were heirs to the Fatimid dynasty that founded the city of Cairo and established al-Azhar, perhaps the earliest university of the world. Although preoccupied with survival, the Ismailis of the Alamut period maintained a sophisticated outlook and a literary tradition, elaborating their teachings within a Shiʿite theological framework. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/110928/original/image-20160210-12161-md8bzw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/110928/original/image-20160210-12161-md8bzw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=317&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110928/original/image-20160210-12161-md8bzw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=317&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110928/original/image-20160210-12161-md8bzw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=317&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110928/original/image-20160210-12161-md8bzw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110928/original/image-20160210-12161-md8bzw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110928/original/image-20160210-12161-md8bzw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An entirely fictional illustration from The Travels of Marco Polo showing the Nizari imam Alâ al Dîn Muhammad (1221-1255) drugging his disciples.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AAl%C3%A2_al_D%C3%AEn_Muhammad_droguant_ses_disciples.jpeg">Public Domain via Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Their leader, Hasan-i Sabbah, was a learned theologian. And the <a href="http://www.ibtauris.com/Books/Humanities/History/Regional%20%20national%20history/Asian%20history/Middle%20Eastern%20history/The%20Eagles%20Nest%20Ismaili%20Castles%20in%20Iran%20and%20Syria.aspx?menuitem=%7B84F7D96C-8E66-483F-AD63-DB241E9659C6%7D">Ismaili fortresses of the period</a>, displaying magnificent military architecture and irrigation skills, were equipped with libraries holding significant collections of manuscripts, documents and scientific instruments. </p>
<p>The Ismailis also extended their patronage of learning to outside scholars, including Sunnis, and even non-Muslims. They were very tolerant towards other religious communities. </p>
<p>In the last decades of their state, in the 13th century, even waves of Sunni Muslims found refuge in the Ismaili fortress communities of eastern Iran. These refugees were running from the Mongol hordes who were then establishing their hegemony over Central Asia. </p>
<p>All this stands in sharp contrast to the destructive policies of IS, which persecutes religious and ethnic minorities and enslaves women.</p>
<p>The medieval Ismailis embodied qualities of piety, learning and community life in line with established Islamic teachings. These traditions continue in the modern-day Ismaili ethos. And the present-day global Ismaili community represents one of the most progressive and enlightened communities of the Muslim world. </p>
<p>The Ismailis have never had anything in common with the terrorists of IS, who murder innocent civilians at random and en masse, and destroy monuments of humankind’s shared cultural heritage. </p>
<p>Global terrorism in any form under the banner of Islam is a new phenomenon without historical antecedents in either classical Islamic or any other tradition. IS’s ideology reflects a crude version of the intolerant Wahhabi theology expounded by the Sunni religious establishment of Saudi Arabia, which is itself a narrow perspective that fails to recognise any pluralism or diversity of interpretations in Islam.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>This is the fifth article in our series on the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/understanding-islamic-state">historical roots of Islamic State</a>. <a href="http://bit.ly/UnderstandingIS">Download our special report</a> collating the whole the series.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/53873/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Farhad Daftary does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In seeking to link IS to earlier Islamic movements, Western commentators have associated the jihadist group with the medieval Ismailis, made famous in Europe by returning Crusaders as the Assassins.Farhad Daftary, Co-Director & Head of the Department of Academic Research and Publications, The Institute of Ismaili StudiesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/532252016-02-16T18:23:45Z2016-02-16T18:23:45ZIslamic State lays claim to Muslim theological tradition and turns it on its head<p><em>How do we account for forces and events that paved the way for the emergence of Islamic State? <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/understanding-islamic-state">Our series on the jihadist group’s origins</a> tries to address this question by looking at the interplay of historical and social forces that led to its advent.</em></p>
<p><em>Today, historian of Islamic thought Harith Bin Ramli explains how Islamic State fits – or doesn’t – in Muslim theological tradition, and incidentally addresses a question often levelled at adherents of the religion living in the West.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>For Muslims around the world, it’s become an almost daily heartbreaking experience to see Islam associated with all the shades of <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/10/isis-confirms-and-justifies-enslaving-yazidis-in-new-magazine-article/381394/">cruelty</a> and <a href="http://www.raqqa-sl.com/en/">inhumanity</a> of so-called Islamic State (IS). It’s tempting <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/isis-call-it-the-un-islamic-state-say-muslim-groups-as-another-hostage-is-murdered-9731823.html">to dismiss</a> the group as lying beyond the boundaries of Islam. But this way of thinking leads down the same route IS has taken. </p>
<p>Let me explain.</p>
<p>Ever since the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632, there hasn’t been a single central authority that all Muslims have unanimously agreed on. The first generation of Muslims didn’t just disagree, they battled over the succession to leadership of the community. </p>
<p>The result of this division was the formation of the main <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/subdivisions/sunnishia_1.shtml">Sunni and Shi’i</a> theological traditions we see to this day. But the blood spilt over the issue also resulted in a general sense of concern about the consequences of political and theological differences. </p>
<p>A consensus quickly emerged over the need to respect differences of opinion. And it was considered important to “disassociate” oneself from anyone who had differing views on these key issues. But as long as the person in question affirmed the basic tenets of Islam, such as the unity of God and the prophecy of Muhammad, he or she was still considered a Muslim.</p>
<h2>Similar detractors</h2>
<p>The one dissenting theological view on this matter was held by a group known as the Kharijites. It adopted the view that dissenting or corrupt Muslim leaders, by their actions, had become “apostates” from Islam altogether. </p>
<p>Sub-factions of this group increasingly extended their definition of apostasy to include any Muslim who didn’t agree with them. They declared these Muslims infidels who could be killed or enslaved.</p>
<p>The brutality of these extreme Kharijites never attracted more than a minority of Muslims, and other Kharijites adopted <a href="http://islam.uga.edu/ibadis.html">a more peaceful position</a> more in line with the emerging consensus. </p>
<p>Widespread horror at the early divisions of the Muslim community and the terrors unleashed by Khariji extremism ensured that Islam generally embraced a pluralistic approach to differences of opinion. This emerged hand in hand with a culture of scholarship, based on the idea that the endeavour to seek the “true” meaning of scripture is an ongoing and fallible human effort. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/111278/original/image-20160212-29175-9bxy0z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/111278/original/image-20160212-29175-9bxy0z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/111278/original/image-20160212-29175-9bxy0z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=725&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/111278/original/image-20160212-29175-9bxy0z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=725&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/111278/original/image-20160212-29175-9bxy0z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=725&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/111278/original/image-20160212-29175-9bxy0z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=912&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/111278/original/image-20160212-29175-9bxy0z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=912&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/111278/original/image-20160212-29175-9bxy0z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=912&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
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<p>Beyond a number of issues over which there was unquestionable consensus, different interpretations could be tolerated. </p>
<p>What makes IS different to traditional Islam isn’t necessarily the religious texts the group uses. To justify their practice of slavery or war against non-Muslims, they appeal to parts of the Qur'an or prophetic traditions, or legal works that are fairly mainstream and representative of the medieval Islamic tradition. </p>
<p>But these texts – scripture or otherwise – have always been read through the mediation of past and continuous efforts of interpretation by communities of scholars. As theology scholar <a href="http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/20944/beyond-authenticity_isis-and-the-islamic-legal-tra">Sohaira Siddiqui of Georgetown University points out</a>, groups like IS deviate from mainstream Islam by their rejection of this culture of scholarly interpretation and religious pluralism, that is, the means by which the texts were interpreted. </p>
<p>This approach has roots in the group’s main theological inspiration, the Wahhabi movement. Founded on a radical interpretation of the 14th-century theologian <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-read-the-medieval-scholar-the-islamic-state-used-to-justify-al-kasasbeh-murder-37293">Ibn Taymiyya</a>, it dismissed any Muslim who didn’t subscribe to its strict interpretation of monotheism as an “apostate”. </p>
<p>It can also be traced back to radical political theorists of the 20th century, such as <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/nov/01/afghanistan.terrorism3">Sayyid Qutb</a>, who rejected the modern state and attendant ideologies, including nationalism and democracy, as “idolatrous” and not based on the rule of God. </p>
<p>By declaring the revival of the Caliphate, IS claims to have created an alternative to the prevailing political order. </p>
<h2>Harms of hastiness</h2>
<p>Adopting a simple “with us or against us” approach lets IS justify denouncing Muslim rulers as “tyrants” and the religious figures who support them as “palace scholars”. In general, Muslims who don’t “repent” and support their beliefs are at risk of being denounced as “apostates” who can be killed. </p>
<p>Effectively, the group has revived the age-old Kharijite tendency in the form of a deadly modern political ideology. </p>
<p>IS is right about one thing: the solution to the widespread problems of the Muslim world cannot lie in the reaffirmation of status quo politics and the hypocritical employment of religion to prop up corrupt and oppressive regimes. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/110885/original/image-20160210-3265-e0esfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/110885/original/image-20160210-3265-e0esfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=363&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110885/original/image-20160210-3265-e0esfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=363&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110885/original/image-20160210-3265-e0esfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=363&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110885/original/image-20160210-3265-e0esfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=456&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110885/original/image-20160210-3265-e0esfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=456&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110885/original/image-20160210-3265-e0esfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=456&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">By declaring the revival of the Caliphate, IS claims to have created an alternative to the prevailing political order.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">REUTERS/Umit Bektas</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But its dismissal of the culture of scholarly pluralism and religious tolerance seems like an easy way to select interpretations of the scripture and religious tradition to suit its political aims, not the other way round. </p>
<p>Leading Muslim religious authorities, such as the <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/en/originals/2015/02/azhar-egypt-radicals-islamic-state-apostates.html">Grand Shaykh of al-Azhar</a>, have refrained from denouncing IS as “apostates”, even though they have called for the use of <a href="http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/02/04/Al-Azhar-calls-for-killing-crucifixion-of-ISIS-terrorists-.html">full military force</a> against them. Their hesitance may be due to an awareness that such a move would simply drag the Muslim community down to the level IS wants them to be on. </p>
<p>Instead of labelling IS un-Islamic, the global Muslim community would do better to reaffirm its commitment to its culture of pluralism. This approach may also open up a crucial conversation that must take place about <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/religion-politics/">the relationship between state and religion</a> in contemporary Muslim societies. </p>
<p>Many Muslims might share the IS view that there are already many signs that the end of times is approaching. But the group departs from mainstream Muslim apocalyptic theology in two respects. </p>
<p>First, its literature seems to omit any mention of the awaited Mahdi (the Guided One) and the return of Jesus the son of Mary, who is prophesied to defeat the Great Pretender (Dajjal, or anti-Christ). And second, in contrast to the average Muslim believer who acknowledges only a limited ability to fully grasp the meaning of these prophecies, IS arrogates for itself a central role in the unfolding of such events. </p>
<p>In other words, instead of waiting for God to bring about the end of times, IS hopes to prompt it through its own actions. In this respect, it has something in common with extreme forms of <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-heilbroner/evangelicals-israel-and-t_b_391351.html">Christian</a> and <a href="http://www.timesofisrael.com/extremist-group-offers-jews-500-to-pray-on-temple-mount/">Jewish religious Zionism</a>.</p>
<p>If one were to give IS’s followers the benefit of the doubt, excluding those with mainly criminal motives, it seems that theirs is an ideology fuelled by a hasty desire for the implementation of the will of God. And an even hastier dismissal of the more careful and humble approach of other Muslims. </p>
<p>As the Qur’an states:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“<a href="http://quran.com/21/37">man was created hasty by nature</a>” (21:37), and “<a href="http://quran.com/103">all mankind is at loss, except for those who believe and advise one another concerning the Truth, and concerning patience</a>”. (103:2-3) </p>
</blockquote>
<hr>
<p><em>This article is the second in our <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/understanding-islamic-state">series on understanding Islamic State</a>. <a href="http://bit.ly/UnderstandingIS">Download our special report</a> collating the whole the series.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/53225/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Harith Bin Ramli does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>What makes Islamic State different to traditional Islam isn’t necessarily the religious texts the group uses.Harith Bin Ramli, Research Fellow, Cambridge Muslim College & Teaching Fellow, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/443832015-07-16T11:09:49Z2015-07-16T11:09:49ZWhy it’s time to give up on the idea of an Iraqi nation<p>The end of Iraq is no longer a matter of if, or a matter of when – it has already happened. The country has been on life support for too long, and no matter how hard external players try to save it, Iraq cannot save itself.</p>
<p>One of the fundamental properties of any nation state is some sense a national consciousness, a sense of belonging; shared values regardless of how abstract they may be and, most importantly, a collective commitment to the perpetuation of the nation itself, which is perceived to be organically connected to the state. Without these ingredients, there never can be a stable nation state. </p>
<p>Of course, one could argue that perhaps Iraq never had a cohesive national consciousness anyway. After all, Iraq was only constructed almost on a whim by the colonial masters of the previous century. Even at the height of “stability” under Saddam Hussein, Iraq was a state without a nation. </p>
<p>There was very little effort put into building an Iraqi nation and the obstacles were always huge. The Kurds, who made up about <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-28147263">17-20%</a> of the population, hardly subscribed to an Iraqi identity, and the Shia majority felt deeply marginalised by the political elite who were mainly Sunni.</p>
<p>But what’s happening in Iraq today is different from the realities of a classic multi-ethnic or multi-religious society in the Middle East. Similar situations and grievances exist in much of the region, but what makes the situation hopeless in Iraq is that there is no longer any strong state in power – and, more importantly, no prospect of one emerging any time soon. </p>
<h2>Out of the bottle</h2>
<p>Until 2003, Saddam’s Hussein’s repressive state at least put a lid on the chaos, but invasion, disastrous post-war policies and the opportunistic interference of regional states and sub-state actors finally let the genie out of the bottle. </p>
<p>The forces unleashed are now beyond control, and old animosities between ethno-sectarian groups are channelled into armed confrontation. This cycle of violence has effectively burned any grassroots bridges between the divided groups, who were supposed to be part of a nation, and these problems are here to stay even if Iraq cleanses itself of transnational jihadism. </p>
<p>The rise of Islamic State (IS) reflects a history of poor nation-building as much as anything else. The international coalition against IS has so far been ineffective but, in any case, cutting down IS without pulling up its roots would be nothing more than cosmetic surgery. IS is not really a threat to Iraq’s nationhood, rather a sign of its failure. The current hyper-sectarian conflict is not the cause, but the symptom of the failed nation-state model.</p>
<p>The country is divided into three parts, each of which centres around strong identities – Kurdish, Sunni and Shia – which predate the modern borders. For each of these groups, self-interest comes first. </p>
<p>The Kurds’ loyalty is first and foremost to Kurdistan – and they see an opportunity in the current chaos to realise their long-term <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15467672">dream of a Kurdish state</a>. In many aspects, the Kurdish region is already independent, and given what they have gone through over the years spent resisting IS, it would be inconceivable to imagine them embracing the old system.</p>
<p>Southern Iraq, meanwhile, is effectively a country of its own. The majority of Shia live in the south with a very strong sense of Shia identity. The Shia political elite has dominated what is left of the Iraqi state and has shown little appetite for acknowledging the interests of other ethnic and religious groups – which would have been the only way to save Iraq. After all, in this hyper-sectarian climate being attentive to other minorities could have negative implications for a “state” which is effectively dependent on Shia militia for survival.</p>
<p>Many Sunni tribes, on the other hand, are stuck between the likes of IS or a Shia majority government, which has a track record of discrimination against them. In the same week that there was an <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/03/world/middleeast/coalition-fighting-islamic-state-meets-in-paris.html?_r=0">anti-IS coalition conference</a> in Paris to try to save Iraq, 50 more Sunni tribes <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/06/sunni-sheiks-pledge-allegiance-isil-iraq-anbar-150604074642668.html">gave their allegiance</a> to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi because they feared the rise of Shia militia with links to Iran.</p>
<h2>Face facts</h2>
<p>So what could be the answer? Democracy? Federalism? Iraq’s hyper-sectarian politics would never allow a democratic system to flourish within either a federal or centrist system. Sectarianism destroys the roots of civic culture and undermines the development of any functioning civil society, which is the backbone of any democratic system. </p>
<p>As has been proven time and time again in Iraq, people vote to empower their sect, meaning the Sunni minority will be perpetually disadvantaged. This inevitably feeds the politics of victimisation and, in turn, leads to endless battles over the distribution of power between the haves and the have-nots. </p>
<p>Although there are uncertainties about the result of this painful disintegration process, there is very little chance that an Iraqi nation state like that we knew before 2003 can ever be resurrected.</p>
<p>It’s about time we faced facts: Iraq is dead.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/44383/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Afshin Shahi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Attempts to build a nation out of Iraq have failed spectacularly. Why is everyone still so intent on keeping it together?Afshin Shahi, Director of the Centre for the Study of Political Islam & Lecturer in International Relations and Middle East Politics, University of BradfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/349992014-12-11T10:25:51Z2014-12-11T10:25:51ZIslamic State has united Kurds in a national war of survival<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/66750/original/image-20141209-32159-1b3phyr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Masoud Barzani, president of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, and Peshmerga on the border.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Rudaw News Agency</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>After overrunning Mosul in June 2014, <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/islamic-state">Islamic State</a> (IS) hastily and brutally occupied soft targets in poorly protected areas of ethnic minorities – the villages of Kurds, Christians, and Yezidis on the Nineveh Plain – and headed east to threaten Erbil, the regional capital of Kurdistan. Kurdistan found itself in the cross-hairs.</p>
<p>IS’s rerouting of its major assault from the south-west towards Kurdistan is puzzling. It defies military logic, running counter to geography as much as history. In other areas of Iraq, IS expanded to fill easy socio-political and military power vacuums and receptive breeding grounds in Mosul, Ramadi, and Fallujah. </p>
<p>But Kurdistan does not present such a vacuum or breeding ground. It played a neutral, reconciling role in the Sunni-Shia conflict in Iraq and has taken a balanced stand between Turkey and Iran. Kurdistan’s cohesive tribal structure, language barriers, ethnic solidarity, experienced military and general non-involvement policy in regional conflicts all pose deterrents to invasion and raise questions about the reasons behind IS’s blitz. </p>
<h2>A new enemy for Islamic State</h2>
<p>Opening a front against Kurdistan, although inexplicable on military and political grounds, is intelligible under different criteria. The only reason that stands out among the prevailing turmoil in the region is the Kurdish leadership’s <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/07/iraq-kurds-call-independence-referendum-201473125010428418.html">call for a referendum on independence</a> and the establishment of the first nation-state of Kurdistan. A strong, diverse yet stable state of Kurdistan would be anathema to IS – an inimical foil to their vision of a metastasising, totalitarian caliphate. </p>
<p>When the pieces of this jumbled jigsaw of conflict are placed together, the picture that emerges will reveal that the objective of this assault on Kurdistan is to draw Kurdistan into a war of attrition, to drain its capabilities and divert its pursuit of independence. The history of the Middle East offers many examples of such wars of attrition that have destroyed economies and halted development. </p>
<p>Yet the political memory of Middle Eastern conflicts does not recall the levels of chaos among allied and adversarial factions that currently dominate the political and military scene. And this situation plays into IS’s hands.</p>
<h2>Lines on a map</h2>
<p>Since <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-why-a-century-old-deal-between-britain-and-france-got-isis-jihadis-excited-28643">World War I</a>, the region has witnessed the creation of states on the basis of borders drawn when France and Britain partitioned the former Ottoman Empire. These political borders cut across ethnic, tribal, and sectarian realities deeply rooted in the region. Foreign military powers kept the new states intact and their borders relatively sovereign. But in the case of the Kingdom of Iraq, the Sunni-Shia divide dominated politics from the start. </p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/66453/original/image-20141206-8661-dw5al0.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/66453/original/image-20141206-8661-dw5al0.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/66453/original/image-20141206-8661-dw5al0.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=549&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/66453/original/image-20141206-8661-dw5al0.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=549&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/66453/original/image-20141206-8661-dw5al0.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=549&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/66453/original/image-20141206-8661-dw5al0.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=690&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/66453/original/image-20141206-8661-dw5al0.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=690&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/66453/original/image-20141206-8661-dw5al0.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=690&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Sykes Picot map.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Kurdish aspirations for self-determination took a back seat. The sectarian and ethnic divisions in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon posed an enduring threat to the integrity of these nascent states, where military coups, dictatorships and border conflicts were a common denominator, compounded by the revival of historical conflicts with the political and religious heritage of their neighbours, Safawi Shia Iran and Ottoman Turkey. These old conflicts resound loudly in current hostilities.</p>
<p>The remarkable ascendancy of political Islam, both Shia and Sunni – and its arrogation of political power in Iraq and Yemen (Shia), Syria, Libya, Egypt and Tunisia (Sunni), following the so-called Arab Spring and the American occupation of Iraq, has inflicted structural damage to varying degrees in these countries, even under the watch of international powers. </p>
<p>This bi-polar political Islam exacerbates internal strife. Sectarianism, fanaticism and religious autocracy have culminated in the brutalities of IS.</p>
<p>The splintered political Islam in Syria, with support from major rivals (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey), has fomented terrorism to a degree that surpasses the operations of al-Qaida and smaller organisations. </p>
<p>The new breed of terrorism eclipses traditional, armed <em>jihad</em>. Where land and populations once held no direct value for <em>jihad</em> apart from moral and material support, the idea of a “terrorist state” occupying territory now poses a much more formidable danger. IS constitutes an extreme form of terrorist organisation that controls large expanses of land and economic resources.</p>
<p>Socio-military uprisings like that of IS were not uncommon during the <a href="http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/613719/Umayyad-dynasty">Ummayed</a> and <a href="http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/465/Abbasid-Dynasty">Abbassid</a> periods. Their decline was as rapid as their rise and expansion – and one hopes that IS will come to a similar swift end. IS replicates these historical movements, restructuring the socio-cultural, religious, and educational systems to fit their version of Islamic State. </p>
<h2>Failing states and a Kurdish state</h2>
<p>Events of recent years have exposed the sovereignty and integrity of Iraq to real risks of sectarian disintegration. The loss of central governance and control has brought about a quasi failed state, similar to the situation in Syria and, increasingly, Libya. </p>
<p>The Turkish-Iranian and Arab-Iranian rivalry for spheres of influence in Iraq, added to the new Arab-Turkish rivalry produced by the Muslim Brotherhood’s role in Arab politics, further compounded by the radical Sunni-Shia divide, have driven Kurdistan to take a stand where the future of its historical geography and the interests of its people will be protected through the formation of an independent state with internationally recognised sovereignty. </p>
<p>Such statehood, within the blurred and muddled mosaic of conflicts where the fate of nations is at stake, is a promising, pragmatic solution and justifiable right. </p>
<p>For the first time, the Kurds are conducting “state”-style warfare against an invader. Kurdistan has mobilised its material and human resources and infrastructure in order to repel IS. This is state warfare, vastly different from the Kurds’ guerrilla resistance against the previous incursions by Iraqi regimes.</p>
<p>The defensive war against IS, though it imposes economic and human sacrifices on Kurdistan and undesired involvement in regional conflicts, is also a historic opportunity to pursue the declaration of an independent Kurdistan. It can change the very nature and perception of this war from one of attrition to a war of independence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/34999/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After overrunning Mosul in June 2014, Islamic State (IS) hastily and brutally occupied soft targets in poorly protected areas of ethnic minorities – the villages of Kurds, Christians, and Yezidis on the…Kamal Y. Odisho KOLO, Professor, Soran UniversityMuslih Mustafa, President, Soran UniversityTyler Fisher, Lecturer in Peninsular Spanish Literary Studies, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/325682014-10-07T19:08:11Z2014-10-07T19:08:11ZWhy Western boots should stay out of Iraq and Syria<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/60973/original/nxmpfsx4-1412642239.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An Australian Super Hornet refuels from a KC30 tanker while flying over Iraq.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">@VCDF_Australia/Twitter</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>There are two reasons why we should ignore the growing calls in <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/30/politics/paul-ryan-isis/">the United States</a>, <a href="http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/10/05/isis-mission-reveals-liberal-divide-partys-grandees-express-support-for-robust-canadian-mission/">Canada</a> and <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/defence/terror-war-to-be-won-on-ground-experts-question-strategy/story-e6frg8yo-1227079650288">Australia</a> for Western “boots on ground” – meaning ground troops – to fight and destroy the Islamic State (IS). </p>
<p>The most often heard caution against engaging in urban warfare is the potential for civilian deaths, and the inevitable protracted engagement that creates resentment, which in turn feeds the propaganda machine. </p>
<p>But this article responds mainly to the second reason, which is of far greater consequence: the fact that in Iraq and Syria right now, there is no alternative group that could fill the void created by a defeated IS. So even if we could topple IS, who would govern the liberated lands?</p>
<h2>Behind the rise of IS</h2>
<p>The success of IS in Iraq and Syria has been dependent upon different factors. </p>
<p>In Iraq, the areas controlled by IS are largely Sunni Arab territories. Having benefited from Saddam Hussein’s rule, the shift to democracy and an eight-year Shia government of Nouri al-Maliki has turned the tables. </p>
<p>The Sunni community of Iraq has been <a href="http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=66932">disenfranchised</a> and in some cases persecuted by the dominant Shia through official and unofficial channels. </p>
<p>IS’s success was only made possible by the support of this Sunni community. Any lasting solution will require Baghdad wresting that allegiance away from the black flag of IS and back to the banner of a united Iraq.</p>
<p>This is why Obama held out against supporting Nouri al-Maliki’s efforts to retain power, recognising the need for systematic political change. </p>
<p>But the new government has only shifted personalities at the highest of levels. The vast bureaucratic and military infrastructure was and remains a Shia dominated body, with positions filled through cronyism, nepotism and <a href="http://www.transparency.org/country#IRQ">corruption</a>. </p>
<p>It is unlikely that the change of government under Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi will mean the interests of Iraq’s Sunni population are being served any better in the near future. A root and branch review of the Iraqi public sector is required which will require a concerted political effort over many years.</p>
<p>Under these circumstances, arming and supporting the Shia-dominated Iraqi military to “liberate” Sunni territories is likely to cause further angst.</p>
<h2>What comes after aerial bombing?</h2>
<p>In the first few weeks of Iraqi operations against IS, the military was accused of indiscriminate <a href="http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-iraq-civilians-20140913-story.html">bombings</a> of civilian areas (subsequently halted), its Shia militias reportedly committed <a href="http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/09/18/all_the_ayatollahs_men_shiite_militias_iran_iraq_islamic_state">atrocities</a> not dissimilar to IS, while a political settlement that responded to Sunnis concerns remains <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/11/world/middleeast/sunni-mistrust-is-major-hurdle-for-new-iraqi-leaders.html?_r=0">seemingly</a> beyond reach.</p>
<p>This is why a military response in Iraq should be limited to aerial degrading of IS assets and militarily limiting its expansion – but not encouraging, funding or providing tactical advice to government or militia combat troops in an effort to route IS.</p>
<p>Instead, the long-term response should adopt a <a href="https://theconversation.com/obamas-new-strategy-still-misses-islamic-states-weakest-link-31506">rogue state strategy</a> by containing and isolating IS while supporting alternative Sunni groups to shift their allegiance away from IS. That’s what the US did so successfully in 2006 with the same Sunni groups.</p>
<p>When this shift occurs, it will be the indigenous Sunni Arabs – not foreign fighters and Islamic militants – who will hold political authority over their territory and be in a position to negotiate a sustainable settlement with Baghdad.</p>
<h2>Hard realities in Syria</h2>
<p>In Syria, a similar course of action is more morally ambiguous. </p>
<p>As we near the fifth year of the conflict there is no clear alternative to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. </p>
<p>The Free Syrian Army, key partners with the US in the fight against IS, were described disparagingly only months ago by President Obama as being, “<a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/wp/2014/06/26/are-syrian-opposition-fighters-former-farmers-or-teachers-or-pharmacists/">former farmers or teachers or pharmacists</a>,” with little chance against a battle hardened regime. </p>
<p>Other not so appealing alternatives include al-Qaeda’s franchise in Syria, al-Nusra Front, and secessionist Kurdish fighters whose territorial gains could lead to instability in Turkey. </p>
<p>Within this complex web of competing interests and shifting alliances there is no viable group ready to fill the power vacuum that would emerge in northern Syria were IS to be destroyed.</p>
<p>Without a political succession plan, the territory currently occupied by IS would simply return to a chaotic battleground of vying rebel groups.</p>
<h2>A deal with the devil to defeat ‘evil’?</h2>
<p>If IS is what Western leaders have claimed it to be – “<a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/24/obama-isis-brand-of-evil-uk-air-strikes-iraq">evil</a>” (Obama), “<a href="http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/abbott-declares-war-on-the-islamic-state-death-cult-20140914-3fol3.html">uniquely evil</a>” (Abbott) and “<a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/isil-video-shows-beheading-of-british-hostage-cameron-vows-action.aspx?pageID=238&nID=71674&NewsCatID=359">pure evil</a>” (Cameron) – then the only course of action available to the international community is to work through Russia and Iran to support Bashar al-Assad in Syria. </p>
<p>This may already be happening. Rebels have raised <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/10/international-alliance-no-change-front-lines-syria-rebels.html?utm_source=Al-Monitor+Newsletter+%5BEnglish%5D&utm_campaign=15b8a0b861-October_2_2014&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_28264b27a0-15b8a0b861-102387341">complaints</a> asking why IS and al-Nusra Front assets have been targeted while Syrian regime targets have been untouched.</p>
<p>Why is there no <a href="http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/09/30/exclusive-america-s-allies-almost-bombed-in-syrian-airstrikes.html">coordination</a> with Free Syrian Army commanders on the ground? Other moderate groups have <a href="https://twitter.com/SCM_Syria/status/514486449606250497">spoken out</a> against the airstrikes, claiming that they will only help the regime.</p>
<p>One of the key lessons we learnt from the Afghanistan and Iraq wars is that military forays cannot succeed without a political solution. Attempting to create such a political solution only after the fact is not something that the world has proven adept at.</p>
<p>In the case of IS, there is currently no clear and viable political endgame. So as hard as it might be to accept for some, if defeating IS is the goal, the best solution is likely to be isolate the militants and work to weaken them from within in Iraq, while adopting a realpolitik approach to the return of Bashar al-Assad in Syria.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Editor’s note: Denis will be on hand for an Author Q&A session between 4 and 5pm today (October 8). Post any questions about Western intervention in Syria and Iraq in the comments below.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/32568/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Denis Dragovic does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There are two reasons why we should ignore the growing calls in the United States, Canada and Australia for Western “boots on ground” – meaning ground troops – to fight and destroy the Islamic State (IS…Denis Dragovic, Adjunct Lecturer in International Development, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/319722014-09-22T20:27:47Z2014-09-22T20:27:47ZExplainer: what is ‘sharia law’? And does it fit with Western law?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/59700/original/t88tgnc4-1411368875.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A handwritten Qur'an in Lahore Museum, Pakistan.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Usman Ahmed/Flickr</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Islam, like Judaism, is a religion of law. The usual Arabic word for Islamic law is sharia (pronounced shar-ee-ah), originally the track leading to a waterhole in the desert. For Muslims, the morally good life consists of surrendering oneself to God (Allah) by obeying his requirements – which is the meaning of the word “Islam”.</p>
<p>These obligations are most authoritatively declared in the Qur’an (Koran) or “recitation”, which was revealed in stages to the Prophet Muhammad (who lived from about 570 to 632). </p>
<p>The Qur’an is supplemented by the teaching and example of the Prophet (the sunna), known through thousands of reports or traditions (hadiths). These were passed on orally before being committed to writing. Not all hadiths are authentic, though, so Muslim scholars try to sift the genuine from the false by examining the chain of people who had allegedly passed on each report.</p>
<h2>What sharia covers</h2>
<p>Together, the Qur’an and the sunna are the material sources of the sharia. Muslim scholars have developed techniques such as analogical reasoning to deal with situations not directly explained in them. For example, since the Qur’an forbids wine, it is obvious that spirits, not known in Muhammad’s time, must also be prohibited. Another important principle for applying the sharia is maslaha: that which most benefits the community.</p>
<p>Islamic law is, in theory, extremely comprehensive. Naturally there are prescriptions about when and how to pray or fast. But the sharia also includes rules on marriage, divorce, inheritance, commerce, torts, war, international relations, and government. Muslims have traditionally agreed that an Islamic society should be governed in a manner consistent with the sharia.</p>
<p>If God is the real author of the sharia, scholars produce <a href="http://www.onislam.net/english/shariah/shariah-and-humanity/shariah-and-life/457831-what-is-fiqh.html?Life=">fiqh</a> – literally “understanding”, but in this context “jurisprudence”. This is arguably the single most important Islamic science - much more significant, for example, than theology. Legal scholars have written countless treatises and hefty tomes expounding the sharia, an activity that continues to this day.</p>
<p>Far from being produced by rulers or governments, Islamic law is elaborated by scholars, often as a critique of what the rulers are doing. </p>
<p>Scholars (the ulama) claim to know best what God requires because they have studied the Qur’an and the sunna, as well as the works of their predecessors. Naturally, they often disagree with each other on matters of detail, and there are five distinct schools of jurisprudence in the Islamic world today. Four of them are <a href="http://islam.about.com/cs/divisions/f/shia_sunni.htm">Sunni and one is Shii (Shiite)</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/59699/original/gtdg4vst-1411368664.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/59699/original/gtdg4vst-1411368664.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/59699/original/gtdg4vst-1411368664.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/59699/original/gtdg4vst-1411368664.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/59699/original/gtdg4vst-1411368664.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/59699/original/gtdg4vst-1411368664.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/59699/original/gtdg4vst-1411368664.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/59699/original/gtdg4vst-1411368664.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Inside a mosque in Jumeirah, Dubai, United Arab Emirates.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Asim Bharwani/Flickr</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
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<p>Mention of Islamic law calls to mind corporal punishments such as amputation for theft and stoning for adultery. Régimes of doubtful legitimacy tend to use such penalties enthusiastically to prove that they are good Muslims and worthy rulers. However, more liberal interpreters of the sharia usually restrict their application: for example, by requiring four adult male eye-witnesses to convict an adulterer.</p>
<p>Among both Sunni and Shii (also referred to as Shia) Muslims there are recognised institutions of learning and credentialling. But Islam is a lay religion; it has no priests. In practice, anyone can set themselves up as an interpreter of the sharia and gain a following. </p>
<p>Like radical sects in the past, movements like <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/al-qaeda">al-Qaeda</a> and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/islamic-state">Islamic State</a> claim to represent authentic Islam. But they do not command a consensus – which, for Sunni Muslims, is an essential requirement for legitimate interpretation of the sharia. Many Muslims worldwide <a href="http://www.onislam.net/english/shariah/special-coverage/477585-islam-vs-isil-extremism-isis-islamic-state-iraq-is.html">have condemned Islamic State as extremists</a>, including young British Muslims who started the <a href="https://twitter.com/search?q=%23notinmyname&src=typd">#NotInMyName</a> <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-09-22/notinmyname-young-muslims-speak-out-against-islamic-state/5761392">social media campaign</a>.</p>
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<h2>How does sharia fit with Western laws?</h2>
<p>In principle, God’s laws have to take priority over human laws, and there have always been purists who argue that Islam can only be lived properly in a state governed solely by the sharia.</p>
<p>Historically, though, most Muslims have accepted compromise in practice as long as they are not required to do anything against their understanding of God’s requirements. They are accustomed to obeying the law of the land as well as the sharia, since obedience to legitimate authority is itself a sharia requirement. </p>
<p>Muslims living in Western countries have to accept that other people can openly drink alcohol or wear skimpy clothes on the beach. In this, they are little different from other citizens with conservative moral views. Problems may arise where women are forbidden to wear a veil, but most Muslim women in the West do not consider covering their faces to be a sharia requirement. Despite the Islamic prohibition of usury, some Muslims will even take out a mortgage.</p>
<p>While there are universally agreed requirements and prohibitions, Islamic law is not codified. Even though the sharia is God’s law, fiqh, like any sophisticated legal system, is a matter of interpretation and debate. Sure, some militants’ views give their co-religionists a bad reputation. More progressive Muslims, though, are busy interpreting Islamic law in a manner more in keeping with the need to create just societies.</p>
<p><em>Do you have a question about Islamic law? Leave a question below and join our author Q&A between 10-11am AEST today (Tuesday 23 September). And if you haven’t read our <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/community-standards">Community Standards</a> before, please do – we want The Conversation to be a place for intelligent discussion, including being respectful and keeping your posts on topic and constructive.</em></p>
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<p><em><strong>Further reading:</strong>
<a href="http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2013/05/10/3756163.htm">Islamic Australia? What place is there for sacred law in a secular land?</a> by Griffith University’s Associate Professor <a href="http://www.griffith.edu.au/professional-page/mohamad-abdalla">Mohamad Abdalla</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/31972/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christopher van der Krogt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Islam, like Judaism, is a religion of law. The usual Arabic word for Islamic law is sharia (pronounced shar-ee-ah), originally the track leading to a waterhole in the desert. For Muslims, the morally good…Christopher van der Krogt, Lecturer in Religious Studies, Massey UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/306442014-08-20T05:20:36Z2014-08-20T05:20:36ZIslamic State only the latest group to fill vacuum left by long Ba'athist retreat in Syria<p>Black-clad fighters, suffering refugees and Western warplanes overhead – these <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-obama-is-telling-the-world-by-bombing-islamic-state-in-iraq-30386">are the mainstays of Iraq and Syria coverage</a> as the Islamic State (IS) continues its campaign. Notably absent from debates is how today’s Iraq and Syria emerged from their own national histories, and not just out of foreign meddling – from <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-why-a-century-old-deal-between-britain-and-france-got-isis-jihadis-excited-28643">Sykes-Picot</a> to Bush and Blair. </p>
<p>In Syria, a critical aspect of that national history was the 1960s rise of statist policies of land and wealth redistribution, and then their gradual rollback in the 1980s and 1990s. And as the Syrian state preferred to serve a small elite in the 2000s, Islamist actors – not IS-style extremists, but respectable middle class <em>ulema</em> (clerics), alongside their allies and relatives in small business – rose in importance, influencing much of Syrian society. </p>
<p>As the <a href="http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/18199/deciphering-the-escalation-of-sectarian-violence-i">savvier commentators</a> on the IS have pointed out, despite its murderous excesses, the organisation’s appeal for the Sunni populations living under it is based on stability and the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/16/isis-salafi-menace-jihadist-homeland-syria">provision of public services</a>. In that respect the IS fits into a longer history of increasing Islamist service provision dating back to the 1990s, as the Ba'athist state retreated.</p>
<h2>From colonialism to socialism</h2>
<p>Syria emerged into national independence in 1946 following three decades of French Mandate rule. The French era <a href="http://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2013/08/17/the-secret-history-democratic-thought-middle-east/dgy8n0Ode8Xk8AVoZLziXK/story.html">had been characterised</a> by military intervention, constitutional manipulation and the co-option of landowning social elites.</p>
<p>Those same elites, as in many former colonial territories, then inherited the colonial government’s system, adapting it for their own purposes. They ran Syria in the first few years of independence. Subsequently, a series of coups from 1949 until the early 1960s brought to power administrations that were steadily more socialist and more committed to land redistribution and nationalisation.</p>
<p>Notable reforms in 1958 and especially 1965 saw landless rural labourers become the owners of their own small farms, at the expense of the landowning classes for whom they had previously worked. </p>
<p>The impact of these changes on Syrian society cannot be overstated. In the 15 years after 1960, millions of Syrians who drove state buses, worked in state factories or sat at desks in the state bureaucracy all discovered a previously unknown economic security. In return, many of them gave their support to a secular Ba'athist regime. It was a government increasingly dominated by members of the once poor, rural Alawi minority who had built careers in the military. Hafez al-Assad, Syrian president from 1971 to 2000 and father of current president Bashar al-Assad, came from this Alawite community. </p>
<h2>Privatisation increased inequality</h2>
<p>That authoritarian balance began to change in the 1980s, in the context of the international debt crisis and domestic budget cuts. Internally, the infamous regime crackdowns against provincial Islamists in <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/from-the-archive-blog/2011/aug/01/hama-syria-massacre-1982-archive">the Syrian town of Hama</a> – whose activists were more critical of the government than their Damascene colleagues – left a deep chill on Syrian society. </p>
<p>As <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/195533">German economist Hans Hopfinger</a> and others have documented, an <em>infitāh</em> (opening) of the economy meant that by 1990 private investment exceeded its declining public rival. In the 1990s, the Syrian state further cut its budgets and privatised the economy, weakening the public sector and monopoly industries. </p>
<p>As political economist <a href="http://www.sup.org/pages.cgi?isbn=0804773327&item=Excerpt_from_the_Introduction_pages&page=1">Bassam Haddad has shown</a>, the result was that Syrian society became more fragile. Jobs, particularly in the civil service, became scarcer and futures more uncertain. It was harder for young people to get married or start a family in decent conditions, even as the population increased. Inequality rose. Wealth was increasingly concentrated in select networks of state officials, the security service and big businessmen. So were state contracts.</p>
<h2>Charities step into the void</h2>
<p>As a result, private providers, notably Islamic charities, stepped into the hole left by the state’s new focus on the elite. They provided education and healthcare to the middle and lower middle classes, and, importantly, offered dowries for young people to get married. </p>
<p>Researchers Thomas Pierret and Kjetil Selvik <a href="http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=6417236&fileId=S0020743809990080">have brilliantly shown</a> how such charities, rooted in the social tissue of the Sunni business classes, retained a real measure of independence from the government, rather than becoming its instrument. </p>
<p>As a result, Islamism, which in the late 1970s and early 1980s in Syria had been ferociously crushed by the government in Hama and Aleppo, returned to the political scene and rebuilt its social strength. It did so at the most basic level by partnering with business to organise the charitable support of education, marriage and health. These services were needed. As Pierret and Selvik note, by 2004, 10.36% of the population (almost two million Syrians) were living on less than $2 a day.
As political scientists Laura Ruiz de Elvira and Tina Zintl have argued, it was partly due to <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020743814000130">this context</a> of increasingly privatised and Islamised service provision that the revolt against the Assad regime occurred in 2011, leading on to the horrific civil war. </p>
<p>The subsequent dynamics of the war, with its <a href="https://theconversation.com/from-arab-spring-to-regional-sectarian-war-15009">sectarian radicalisation</a> and external actors, are well known. But the craving for a state that is able to provide effective public services – as the Syrian state of the 1960s and 1970s did, despite its authoritarianism – is a long-term legacy of Syria’s contemporary, national history, not just a result of the current, ruinous war. </p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/30644/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Jackson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Black-clad fighters, suffering refugees and Western warplanes overhead – these are the mainstays of Iraq and Syria coverage as the Islamic State (IS) continues its campaign. Notably absent from debates…Simon Jackson, Assistant Professor (Lecturer) in Modern Middle Eastern History, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/286882014-07-02T05:11:01Z2014-07-02T05:11:01ZAn ISIS caliphate is bad news for Iraq, Syria and everywhere else<p>After the death of Osama Bin Laden in May 2011, the global jihadist movement seemed to have become fragmented and considerably weakened. This happened for various reasons. First, the coincidence of the al-Qaeda leader’s death with the start of the Arab Spring suggested to many in the region that they could change their regimes without the help of al-Qaeda. </p>
<p>At the same time, the absence of a charismatic and innovative leader to replace Bin Laden weakened the organisation and highlighted its association to the “old jihad”. The internal personal rivalry among the “emirs” of the different branches of al-Qaeda, each trying to appear as the true flag-bearer of jihad after Bin Laden, made cohesion hard to manage.</p>
<p>In 2011, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) was the first branch that <a href="http://csis.org/files/publication/110901_Thornberry_AQIM_WEB.pdf">tried to establish an “Islamic state” in Africa’s Sahel region.</a> Documents found in Timbuktu, Mali, clearly show the <a href="http://resmilitaris.net/ressources/10184/89/res_militaris_article_guid_re_new_insights_about_aqim.pdf">details of this project</a> and its progress both on a doctrinal level and on the military field. </p>
<p>Through its various lieutenants in northern Mali, for several months between March 2012 and January 2013, AQIM established a <a href="http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/09/25/mali-islamist-armed-groups-spread-fear-north">kind of Islamic state</a> with “governors” and “judges” applying Sharia law. If it weren’t for the French military intervention in northern Mali, this “Islamic State” would still exist today and would probably extend across the Mali border and into part of the territories of neighbouring countries, starting from the south of Libya and Algeria and including western Niger at least.</p>
<p>Then it was the turn of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) who <a href="http://www.islampolicy.com/2011/06/islamic-revolution-in-yemen.html">tried the same experiment in Yemen</a>, controlling – almost at the same time – large areas of the south. In particular, the coastal city of Zinjibar was directly administered by leaders of the organisation for several months in 2012.</p>
<p>This jihadist project was defeated by a coalition of tribal forces backed by the Saudi intelligence services and supported by <a href="http://securitydata.newamerica.net/drones/yemen/analysis">massive US drone strikes</a>. Many leaders and key figures of AQAP were killed, hundreds of fighters of the organisation died in the fighting against the Yemeni army, but the risk of a “jihadist sanctuary” in Yemen still exists.</p>
<p>In both the Sahel region (with AQIM) and in Yemen (with AQAP), the jihadists took as their model the Taliban experience of the “<a href="http://www.afghandocproject.org/index.php/english/22-1996to2001">Islamic Emirate</a>” regime that dominated Afghanistan between 1996 and 2001. Most leaders of al-Qaeda knew this experience in detail and wanted to reproduce this “state model” on the territories that fell under their control between 2011 and 2013.</p>
<h2>State within a state</h2>
<p>With the Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham (ISIS), the situation is quite different. First, the group – although it came from al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia and was established after the <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/07/the-short-violent-life-of-abu-musab-al-zarqawi/304983/">death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi</a> – was built as a <a href="http://warontherocks.com/2014/05/state-of-jihad-the-reality-of-the-islamic-state-in-iraq-and-syria/">virtual state</a>. It had “ministers” and “secretaries” and was explicitly called: “Islamic State in Iraq”. It was not until 2013 and the stalemate in the Syrian conflict, that the “Islamic State in Iraq” became the “Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham” (ISIS).</p>
<p>The territorial unification implied in the change of name was not purely symbolic, since fighters of ISIS were present on both sides of the Iraqi border and already controlled territories in both Iraq and Syria. Gradually, they have sought to ensure territorial continuity between Iraqi Sunni and Syrian Sunni populations.</p>
<p>The political justification for such a military commitment on both sides of the border was not accidental either, since ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared his intention to “erase” the consequences of the 1916 Anglo-French Sykes-Picot agreement, that established the current borders of Iraq and Syria.</p>
<h2>Pledging allegiance</h2>
<p>The <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-28090386">declaration of the “Caliphate”</a> by al-Baghdadi now provides that legal framework that was lacking for the unification of territories on both sides of the borders. It is also an ideological justification for the forced union of jihadist fighters that was <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/06/2013699425657882.html">previously rejected in 2013</a> by the main jihadist group in Syria, the al-Nusra Front. The Syrian leader of al-Nusra Front, Abu Mohammed al-Julani, after <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-26338341">having rejected any union with ISIS</a>, immediately pledged allegiance to al-Baghdadi as the “new Caliph”.</p>
<p>The leader of AQIM, Abu Mussab Abdul Wadud, <a href="http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/middleeast/iraq/article4134801.ece">has also congratulated al-Baghdadi</a> and ensured him of his support. Abdul Wadud previously supported Zarqawi’s al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia by sending him fighters from North Africa. This message from AQIM is a typical pattern of the old process of recognition of the caliph called the “<a href="https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-tribal-allegiance-system-within-aqim">bay'ah</a>” (allegiance).</p>
<p>This practical reactivation of the concept of the “caliphate” by al-Baghdadi is particularly worrying as it creates a new unifying idea for disparate jihadist groups around a common strategic project. Since Bin Laden’s death, these groups were fragmented, but they might now be able to connect and share an ideology – and, probably, funding given the <a href="http://www.wallstreetdaily.com/2014/06/17/abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-isis-leader/">wealth of the “new caliph”</a>. The “Caliphate Utopia” may reveal to be also a much more efficient tool for jihadist recruitment, especially among <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-very-french-jihad-hundreds-head-to-syria-and-paris-fears-their-return-26077">young Westerners</a>.</p>
<p>This change might point to the marginalisation of the leader of al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, an Egyptian, who has <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/971370e0-0069-11e4-9a62-00144feab7de.html">not been able to impose himself</a> after Bin Laden’s death. But at the same time it indicates the end of the fragmentation and the beginning of the reunification of jihadi groups around the world within an even more dangerous organisation. The global war against terror may finally start …</p>
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<p><em>Next, read this: <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-isis-and-where-did-it-come-from-27944">Explainer: what is ISIS and where did it come from?</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/28688/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mathieu Guidère does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After the death of Osama Bin Laden in May 2011, the global jihadist movement seemed to have become fragmented and considerably weakened. This happened for various reasons. First, the coincidence of the…Mathieu Guidère, Professor of Middle-Eastern and Islamic Studies, Université Toulouse – Jean JaurèsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/283552014-06-24T04:41:45Z2014-06-24T04:41:45ZISIS jihadis’ use of social media and ‘the mask’ reveals a new grammar of violence<p>This week Twitter began suspending accounts related to ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham). This follows an ISIS fighter <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2014/06/14/isis-behead-policeman-picture-graphic_n_5494958.html">reportedly</a> posting the photo of the head of a decapitated Iraqi police major to #WorldCup, accompanied by the message “This is our ball. It is made of skin”.</p>
<p>This posting was one of images of hundreds of atrocities posted to social media, ranging from executions, public floggings, amputations and crucifixions. And such postings extend well beyond Twitter, with scores of videos of executions currently circulating on YouTube and other platforms, many with over 100,000 views.</p>
<p>It is urgent that we recognise the mutation of violence at work here. The executioners in Nazi death camps attempted to kill in secret, as did those responsible for the mass executions in Bosnia in the 1990s. Today’s extreme violence is not practised in secret, instead its authors seek maximum visibility. But there is more at stake here than propaganda. There is a new grammar of violence emerging, one closely associated with social media, in particular the way we all post photos and videos.</p>
<h2>Masks as metaphor</h2>
<p>The photos that circulate on social media are in the large majority about banal, day-to-day experience. We don’t “send messages” though photos, as understood in traditional ways of thinking about the media. Instead we create shared experience. In particular, we create forms of co-presence that are both virtual and intimate. This is why <a href="http://blog.p2pfoundation.net/why-tweeting-your-lunch-may-have-more-meaning-than-you-think/2012/08/21">photos of food we are about to eat</a> (often alone) are so important to social media, a legacy of the culture of the shared meal.</p>
<p>Photographs posted to social media don’t transmit a message, they share a sensation. This alerts us to critical dimensions of ISIS and its violence. </p>
<p>In the images coming out of Syria and Iraq, one striking feature is the importance of the mask. Almost all the accounts of the fighters entering Mosul last week make reference to their being masked. In the execution videos that circulate so widely, the killer is almost always masked while the victim is exposed and placed in extreme close-up.</p>
<p>The mask is primarily not a medium to hide identity. The masked person stands outside the relationships of visual exchange that constitute social life, outside the norms that shape our interactions. The mask is both a medium and a metaphor of transformation, with in many societies the wearing of masks a means to access unseen power. In Iraq and Syria the masked killer is accessing the power of <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Dawla">al-Dawla</a> (the term its supporters use to refer to ISIS) – the State.</p>
<h2>Brutality</h2>
<p>In a video posted to social media last year, and viewed by hundreds of thousands, a group of ISIS fighters pull over three lorry-drivers. These unarmed civilians are not simply killed, they are forced to squat on the ground, their identity cards presented to camera, and they are interrogated about the number of times to kneel during morning and noon prayers. Their inability to provide the correct answer proves they are Shia’, at which point they are taken to the side of the road and executed. </p>
<p>In another widely circulated video, a Shia’ Muslim is forced to recite prayers with a masked fighter holding a gun to his head – once he reaches the point where his phrasing demonstrates he is Shia’, the trigger is pulled. </p>
<p>The major beheaded last week was filmed in close-up while being forced to squat on the floor and admit to being a member of the police force. Only then does his interrogator stand behind him and cut off his head with a knife, the whole event filmed. The group of army reservists executed last week were first filmed lying on the floor, the camera again focusing on the face of each of those about to die.</p>
<p>All these killings possess a similar structure. The killer is masked, or such a great and feared leader that his power is clearly that of al-Dawla. The victim however is to be exposed, and through this a truth it to be revealed. In such violence, the humiliation of the victim and the frequent manipulation and exposure of the corpse are to establish that the person killed is less than human, as radically other.</p>
<h2>Power game</h2>
<p>Such violence is not the product of centuries of enmity, it is a uniquely modern phenomenon. Its horror is a sign that it stands outside human norms, just as the state it claims as the source of its extraordinary power. </p>
<p>What is absolutely striking is the pervasive presence of the camera phone, the close up image of the person to be killed, the intimacy of this killing despite its massive scale. The structure of this violence is one of the hidden and the revealed. It is embedded modern culture, shaped by breathless conspiracy theory and hidden enemies – central to the modern mutation that is jihadi culture. </p>
<p>Many observers have noted the unprecedented and massive role of social media in the war in Syria and increasingly now in Iraq. To understand the importance of social media we need to recognise that the camera phone does not simply film contemporary war, it plays an increasingly central role in shaping it. Recognising this is not only central to understand how al-Qaeda in Iraq, established by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 2004 and largely defeated by 2008, has now mutated into a group controlling large parts of Syria and Iraq. </p>
<p>It is also at the heart of <a href="http://www.palgrave.com/products/title.aspx?pid=283878">understanding the power that such violence exercises</a> on the thousands of fighters who have joined this war from other parts of the world, often as a result of encountering it through social media.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/28355/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kevin McDonald does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>This week Twitter began suspending accounts related to ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham). This follows an ISIS fighter reportedly posting the photo of the head of a decapitated Iraqi police major…Kevin McDonald, Professor of Sociology and Head of the Department of Criminology and Sociology, Middlesex UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/283512014-06-23T13:01:58Z2014-06-23T13:01:58ZISIS at Jordan border, but West taking military action would only help Islamists<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/51936/original/hxchvxrs-1403523825.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">ISIS appears to be attempting to recruit fighters from Europe via social media.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Twitter</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Sunni rebels in Iraq have <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/middle-east-live/2014/jun/23/iraq-crisis-isis-take-more-border-towns-live-updates">made further gains</a>, taking control of important border crossings with Syria and Jordan, the Rutba truck-stop on the main road from Baghdad to the Jordan border and two towns on the Euphrates. They may even have taken the key hydroelectric power station at the Haditha Dam and have certainly got control of the strategic airport at Tal Afar in the north. Meanwhile the fight for Iraq’s largest oil refinery at Baiji continues.</p>
<p>There is <a href="http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/1.600445">some concern</a> that controlling the border crossing with Jordan may be a prelude to greater activity within Jordan, but for now that seems unlikely. There is undoubtedly much resentment in the kingdom at the failure of the monarchy to reform sufficiently, and the country is also having serious problems trying to cope with huge numbers of refugees from Syria. Analysts have therefore cited Jordan as a candidate for major public protest, but this has not so far been reflected in a rise in radical Sunni jihadism.</p>
<h2>Shia groups mobilising</h2>
<p>In Iraq, despite Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (known as ISIS) gains, there is a sense that the sudden re-emergence of the Shia militias, especially those linked to Muqtada al-Sadr, mean that encroachment beyond the predominantly Sunni regions to the west and north-west of Baghdad will be very limited indeed.</p>
<p>The progress of ISIS over the past two weeks certainly appears remarkable, but only until one looks deeper. This is because while ISIS has certainly transformed the image of security across the region, it is actually heavily involved in a wider movement against the Iraqi government which includes many other paramilitary groups that are deeply antagonistic to al-Maliki and what they see as the Shia dominance of the country.</p>
<h2>Ba'ath era Sunnis regroup</h2>
<p>Thus a pattern is now emerging in Iraq of dedicated and highly experienced ISIS paramilitaries taking over towns but moving on while leaving behind small cadres of their own but letting more secular Sunni groups get on with the actually job of making the towns function. </p>
<p>Many of these groups go right back to the remnants of the Ba’ath Party of the Saddam Hussein era, with one of the best organised being the Naqshbandia Army also known by the acronym for its Arabic name, JRTN. This has been around since the execution of Saddam Hussein a decade ago and is reportedly still headed by one of his most trusted generals, <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10907319/Iraq-crisis-Red-haired-devil-of-Saddams-Iraq-back-in-the-fray.html">Izzar Ibrahim al-Douri</a>. JRTN seeks the overthrow of the Malaki government but is anything but Islamist, so the current involvement with ISIS is no more than a marriage of convenience for both groups.</p>
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<p>There are already strains between them, with <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10916360/Iraq-crisis-Isis-seize-Syria-border-crossing-as-Obama-blames-Iraqi-government-for-sectarian-divisions-latest.html">reliable reports</a> of actual fighting near Mosul. For ISIS, therefore, working with JRTN, other Ba’ath-era groups and local clans is no more than a temporary expedient in the longer-term aim of establishing a “proper” Islamist Caliphate across northern Syria and Iraq, this in turn being a prelude to the much longer-term aim of a far larger entity stretching across the Middle East.</p>
<h2>Beware of Western intervention</h2>
<p>What does this mean for what ISIS plans for the weeks ahead? In the short-term the most likely aim will be to consolidate its hold over the towns and cities across north-western Iraq that have been over-run, while seeking to limit the influence of groups such as JRTN and some of the clan militias. This will not be easy, given the small numbers of ISIS fighters actively involved within Iraq. While ISIS has a measure of support, this is because it is seen as the vanguard in the fight against the al-Maliki government, not through any embedded support for the Islamist fundamentalism that it espouses.</p>
<p>As a consequence, ISIS will probably refrain from being too autocratic in its demands, at least for now, and there is already evidence that in cities such as Mosul there have been few indications of the imposition of restrictions on dress, music, sport and the like.</p>
<p>In the longer term, ISIS needs to build on its success and to do this it needs more support, especially in the form of recruits from other countries. The <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/20/jihadi-recruitment-video-islamist-terror-group-isis-features-britons">release of a recruitment video</a> is likely to be the first of many, even ISIS no doubt really prefers people with combat experience from across the Middle East rather than naive if idealistic young men from the West.</p>
<p>One development that would greatly help it would be direct western military involvement, especially if it involves Israel as well. That would enable it to develop the very powerful propaganda line of a “Crusader-Zionist conspiracy” to control the Islamic world, a vision that proved an excellent recruiting tool for the al-Qaida propagandists in the early months of the Iraq War. This, alone, is a very good reason for the US and others to avoid any such intervention no matter what the provocation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/28351/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Rogers has received funding from the the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department for International Development and the Ministry of Defence. He lectures regularly at the Royal College of Defence Studies.</span></em></p>The Sunni rebels in Iraq have made further gains, taking control of important border crossings with Syria and Jordan, the Rutba truck-stop on the main road from Baghdad to the Jordan border and two towns…Paul Rogers, Professor of Peace Studies, University of BradfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/278862014-06-11T14:54:56Z2014-06-11T14:54:56ZIS sweeps across borders and takes grip of an Iraq collapsing back into civil war<p>The capture of most of Mosul, Iraq’s second city, by Islamist paramilitaries has caused shock across the Middle East and in western capitals, especially Washington, but follows a pattern developing over many months. This has involved the progressive takeover of territory in Syria and Iraq by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (IS), as it seeks to establish an Islamist state.</p>
<p>As I wrote <a href="https://theconversation.com/assad-will-win-syrias-farcical-election-and-as-the-west-hesitates-he-is-winning-the-war-27541">only last week</a>: “Taking the two countries together we are now in the remarkable position of seeing radical Islamist groups having free rein across an area larger than the UK, right in the heart of the Middle East.”</p>
<p>The collapse of the Iraqi Army and the loss of government control is certainly very sudden, especially as the defending forces appear to have had at least a 15-to-1 superiority in numbers. Of even greater concern is what happens next. <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/12/world/middleeast/iraq.html?hp&_r=0">Reports suggest</a> IS militia has already reached the important oil town of Baiji, halfway to Baghdad, and may even control parts of Tikrit, which is closer to the capital and a key centre of Sunni paramilitary opposition to US forces when they were in Iraq a decade ago.</p>
<p>Baiji itself is a town of 200,000, which was apparently abandoned overnight by government troops with few shots being fired. It is especially important because its power station is a major generating facility that supplies much of central Iraq including part of the electricity supply base for Baghdad.</p>
<p>Further south towards the capital lies Samarra, another centre of opposition. All this is happening when IS militias <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10550563/Fallujah-falls-under-Al-Qaeda-control-in-blow-for-Iraq-security.html">already control Fallujah</a>, the “City of Mosques” west of Baghdad, which was the centre of bitter fighting against US forces in April and November 2004. Fallujah is significant because it has been under insurgent control for months. The government has not even tried to re-take it, preferring to try and lay siege to the city in an operation that has been conspicuously unsuccessful.</p>
<h2>Evolving insurgency</h2>
<p>All of these recent developments have been in the context of an evolving insurgency that has been taking root for more than two years. It has led to many thousands of civilian deaths, especially in central and northern Iraq. While not yet approaching the appalling violence of 2003-2008, the situation is getting worryingly close to that. Indeed it is beginning to take on the character of a civil war that is <a href="https://theconversation.com/from-arab-spring-to-regional-sectarian-war-15009">hugely complicated</a> by the open border between Iraq and Syria and the numerous interconnections between IS and other Sunni paramilitaries in the two countries.</p>
<p>Two further elements in the evolving violence are important within and beyond the region. One is that many of the people now active in IS are highly experienced paramilitaries who gained urban combat experience against well-armed and well-trained US Army and Marine Corp units. They are determined, radical and often brutal in their actions and many are willing to die for their cause. The second is that IS and some other Islamist groups are attracting young men from well beyond the Middle East, including Britain, France and the United States. This is a source of concern to security agencies who fear a new era of domestic unrest when some of the young men return home.</p>
<p>Meanwhile the Iraqi prime minister, Nouri al-Malaki, has been trying to form a new administration after the <a href="https://theconversation.com/iraq-government-in-post-election-gridlock-as-al-maliki-stays-put-27554">inconclusive national election</a> results of April 30. As the leader of the largest Shia-orientated party he has sought in recent years to support the Shia majority in Iraq at the expense of the Sunni minority. This remains a popular stance, even now, with the Shias still having bitter memories of how they were marginalised during the decades-long Saddam Hussein era. </p>
<p>It also results in a much more recent but enduring bitterness among many Sunnis at how they are now treated. This is one of the main reasons why even a brutal and radical organisation like IS has a degree of support.</p>
<p>In this intensely fractured atmosphere, there have been repeated calls for Malaki to adopt a more conciliatory approach to the Sunni minority but it is an approach that has so far got nowhere. Indeed, the current upsurge in violence is likely to have the opposite effect as Shia communities increasingly fear the impact of the insurgency on their own lives. </p>
<p>It is a fear that is exacerbated by the frequent and very deliberate attacks by IS and other radical Sunni Islamist on Shi’a communities. These attacks are intended to increase the risk of inter-communal conflict that would bring Iraq even closer to all-out civil war.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/27886/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Rogers publishes regularly in OpenDemocracy and the Oxford Research Group. His book: A War Too Far: Iraq, Iran and the New American Century is published by Pluto Press. He has received funding from the the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department for International Development and the Ministry of Defence. He lectures regularly at the Royal College of Defence Studies.</span></em></p>The capture of most of Mosul, Iraq’s second city, by Islamist paramilitaries has caused shock across the Middle East and in western capitals, especially Washington, but follows a pattern developing over…Paul Rogers, Professor of Peace Studies, University of BradfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.