tag:theconversation.com,2011:/fr/topics/un-charter-11764/articlesUN Charter – The Conversation2023-09-21T02:00:04Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2139852023-09-21T02:00:04Z2023-09-21T02:00:04ZStripping Russia’s veto power on the Security Council is all but impossible. Perhaps we should expect less from the UN instead<p>Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/20/world/europe/zelensky-un-security-council.html">lambasted</a> the UN Security Council yet again, saying in a speech this week that as long as Russia has veto power on the body, it will remain powerless to do anything to stop the war in Ukraine – or any other conflict.</p>
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<p>Ukrainian soldiers are doing with their blood what the UN Security Council should do by its voting. […] Veto power in the hands of the aggressor is what has pushed the UN into deadlock.</p>
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<p>Every time a member of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council – the US, Russia, France, the UK and China – engages in abhorrent actions, we see a wave of voices decrying the powerlessness and failure of the UN to stop conflict and atrocities. </p>
<p>Most recently, this has been focused on the Russian war in Ukraine. We also saw this criticism in relation to the US- and UK-led <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/sep/16/iraq.iraq">invasion of Iraq</a> in the early 2000s. </p>
<p>The central part of this criticism is that the five permanent members of the Security Council (commonly referred to as the “P5”) have a veto power, which can prevent UN action when they have engaged in wrongdoing. The other 10 rotating members of the Security Council do not.</p>
<p>This veto power is what has prevented Russia from being expelled from the UN, as Zelensky has repeatedly <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/international/3259390-zelensky-calls-for-russian-expulsion-from-un-security-council/">called for</a>, because suspension or expulsion of a member from the UN requires <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-2">action from the Security Council</a>.</p>
<p>This criticism is entirely reasonable – the P5 shouldn’t be able to prevent the UN from acting against them. However, this isn’t a failure of the UN itself, but rather a design feature baked in to the whole UN system. </p>
<p>And reform of the UN is functionally impossible, which is why we need to stop expecting so much from the global body.</p>
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<h2>Some are more equal than others</h2>
<p>Article 2(1) of the UN Charter <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-1">says</a> the UN is based on the principle of sovereign equality. This, in principle, should mean all nations are equal under international law. </p>
<p>In reality, even when just considering the rest of the UN Charter, it is clear this is not the case. Yes, all nations in the UN General Assembly have one vote and all those votes have equal weight, but this is somewhat insignificant because the work of the General Assembly isn’t legally binding. </p>
<p>The only UN body that has the power to make binding international law is the Security Council. And this only happens when it is acting under <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-7">Chapter VII</a> of the UN Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security. </p>
<p>In order for a resolution to pass in the Security Council, it must have the support of at least nine members – and, critically, no opposing vote from a member of the P5. This is what is meant by the P5 veto power. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/is-international-law-powerless-against-russian-aggression-in-ukraine-no-but-its-complicated-177905">Is international law powerless against Russian aggression in Ukraine? No, but it's complicated</a>
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<p>When the UN Charter was being drafted at the end of the second world war, the allied powers and France agreed to enshrine themselves into the document as the P5.</p>
<p>Notably, the group included the “Republic of China”, the government led by Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan, which held the Security Council seat until the General Assembly expelled Taiwan and gave the seat to the People’s Republic of China in 1971. And when the Soviet Union disbanded in the early 1990s, Russia inherited its seat on the Security Council through the <a href="https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL(1994)054-e">Alma-Ata Protocol</a>. </p>
<p>The charter gave the P5 the ultimate responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, while also functionally removing them from scrutiny because they possess veto power. </p>
<p>This wasn’t a design oversight or failure, it was an intentional decision. This is clearly seen when you <a href="http://opiniojuris.org/2008/08/14/the-curious-article-273-of-the-un-charter/">examine</a> the wording of Article 27(3). This article requires a Security Council member to refrain from voting on a matter if they are party to a dispute – but it does not apply to resolutions invoking Chapter VII (that is, a legally binding resolution). </p>
<p>The fact the charter includes a restriction on the veto but only in relation to non-binding resolutions demonstrates an intention to place the P5 beyond scrutiny. </p>
<h2>So, what about veto reform?</h2>
<p>If the existence of the veto prevents any Security Council action from being taken against Russia for its invasion of Ukraine (or against any other P5 state when they engage in similar conduct), why don’t we just reform it? </p>
<p>Well, this can’t be done because the drafters of the UN Charter made reform incredibly difficult. Namely, the P5 ensured they have a right to veto any proposed reforms to the UN structure by <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-18">requiring</a> all charter amendments to be ratified by each of them, in addition to getting a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly. </p>
<p>In essence, this means reforming the UN Charter is off the table because the P5 would be able to veto a reduction of their veto power. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/dont-be-too-quick-to-condemn-the-un-security-council-power-of-veto-29980">Don't be too quick to condemn the UN Security Council power of veto</a>
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<p>The only avenue left for reform is to dissolve the UN Charter and reform the UN under a new treaty that limits or abolishes the power of the veto. </p>
<p>Given the state of global solidarity is very different today compared to the end of WWII when the UN was established, I’m loathe to test this approach. A P5 that is restrained by the Charter when it suits them is less dangerous than a P5 that opts out of international law entirely, leaving them completely unrestrained in their aggression. </p>
<h2>Tempering our expectations</h2>
<p>Yes, this means the UN is powerless to address Russian aggression in Ukraine, in the same way it was powerless to address US and UK aggression in Iraq. And yes, this seems to go against the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/preamble">initial purpose</a> of the global body, which was created to:</p>
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<p>to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind.</p>
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<p>The Security Council, too, was given the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-5">mandate of maintaining international peace and security</a> when it was created, as Zelensky has <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/04/1115632">repeatedly pointed out</a>.</p>
<p>But in accepting that mandate, the P5 ensured they wouldn’t be subject to it. In creating the UN, they placed themselves above the law and above the power of the UN specifically so they could avoid scrutiny of their actions. They also ensured they could prevent any reform of the UN to limit their power. </p>
<p>As a result, maybe it is time we start treating the UN for what it is – a diplomatic congress aimed at making the world a little better through encouraging cooperation. Rather than what we hope it to be – a world government capable of effecting peace.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213985/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tamsin Phillipa Paige received funding from the federal government for her UN Security Council research. </span></em></p>Because reform of the current UN Charter is off the table, the only avenue left is to dissolve the charter and draw up a new treaty that limits or abolishes the power of the veto.Tamsin Phillipa Paige, Senior Lecturer, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2122992023-09-05T21:03:20Z2023-09-05T21:03:20Z4 ways to rein in China and Russia, alleged superpower perpetrators of atrocity crimes<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545779/original/file-20230831-27-66cu2d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=9%2C0%2C3051%2C2018&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin toast during their dinner at the Kremlin in Moscow in March 2023. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Pavel Byrkin, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>At the latest meeting in South Africa of BRICS — a grouping of the world economies of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa — Russian President <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/08/20/europe/putin-brics-no-show-analysis-hnk-intl/index.html">Vladimir Putin was a no-show.</a> </p>
<p>Because the International Criminal Court issued an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/17/icc-arrest-warrant-vladimir-putin-explainer">arrest warrant</a> for him earlier this year over atrocity crimes allegedly committed against Ukrainian children, Moscow was apparently concerned Putin might actually be <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2023/08/21/putin-was-meant-to-be-at-a-summit-in-south-africa-this-week-why-was-he-asked-to-stay-away">taken into custody</a> if he travelled to Johannesburg. </p>
<p>Mass atrocity crimes include genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and war crimes. Amid the challenges facing the world today, the urgency of preventing mass atrocity crimes has taken centre stage. </p>
<p>In 2023, we’re grappling with an unprecedented number of forcibly displaced people — <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/insights/explainers/100-million-forcibly-displaced.html">more than 100 million</a> — in part <a href="https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/ukraine/">due to a surge</a> exacerbated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.</p>
<h2>Progress stagnating</h2>
<p>While there has been some success in efforts to curb these human rights abuses, such as the introduction of the United Nations’ <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.shtml">Responsibility to Protect</a> doctrine and the creation of the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/role-international-criminal-court">International Criminal Court</a>, recent developments have raised concerns that progress has not only stagnated but regressed. </p>
<p>Particularly troubling is the spectacle of two UN Security Council members — China and Russia — that stand accused of perpetrating mass atrocity crimes. </p>
<p>China has grown increasingly <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/how-are-chinas-neighbors-viewing-beijings-military-plans/a-64921927">bellicose and aggressive</a>, threatening its neighbours and persecuting minorities within its borders. Beijing’s actions against its Uyghur Muslim population have sparked global outrage, <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/china/case-study/current-risks/chinese-persecution-of-the-uyghurs">with allegations</a> of genocide, forced labour, mass detentions, cultural repression and destruction of mosques. </p>
<p>Similarly, Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine has raised grave concerns about human rights abuses. Many <a href="https://www.raoulwallenbergcentre.org/images/reports/2023-07-26-Genocide-Ukraine-Report.pdf">scholars and experts</a> are labelling Russia’s war as being genocidal in intent given its massacre of civilians in Ukrainian towns <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/22/video/russia-ukraine-bucha-massacre-takeaways.html">such as Bucha</a>, widespread cases of torture that were confirmed by the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/06/widespread-use-torture-russian-military-ukraine-appears-deliberate-un-expert">United Nations</a> and <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/02/targeted-destruction-ukraines-culture-must-stop-un-experts">ongoing attempts that seem aimed at destroying</a> Ukraine’s culture.</p>
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<img alt="A woman in a blue patterned dress looks at a large memorial wall with Ukrainian names etched on it." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545781/original/file-20230831-8940-rglzfg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545781/original/file-20230831-8940-rglzfg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545781/original/file-20230831-8940-rglzfg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545781/original/file-20230831-8940-rglzfg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545781/original/file-20230831-8940-rglzfg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545781/original/file-20230831-8940-rglzfg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545781/original/file-20230831-8940-rglzfg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A woman visits a memorial wall honouring people killed by Russian troops in Bucha, Ukraine. Bucha was occupied by the Russian forces for about a month in the early days of the invasion.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Jae C. Hong)</span></span>
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<h2>China, Russia ties</h2>
<p>The emerging alliance between authoritarian China and Russia is a grave cause for concern. During Chinese President Xi Jinping’s recent trip to Moscow, <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/xi-putin-pledge-new-world-order-chinese-leader-leaves-russia-rcna76048">he told Putin</a>:</p>
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<p>“Now there are changes that haven’t happened in 100 years. When we are together, we drive these changes.” </p>
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<p>A future global order shaped and led by these two autocrats gives a new ominous meaning to English novelist George Orwell’s <a href="https://www.sparknotes.com/lit/1984/quotes/character/obrien/">famous quote</a>: “If you want a picture of the future, imagine a boot stamping on a human face — forever.”</p>
<p>As Putin and Xi work to transform the international order, every country should contemplate the grave threat this could pose to human rights, democratic norms and the very essence of the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter">UN Charter</a>, especially with regards to acts of aggression. </p>
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<p>The disconcerting reality of great power perpetrators is a disheartening testament to the erosion of the global commitment to prevent such horrors.</p>
<p>The current situation underscores the dire need to rekindle the flames of progress and ensure that human rights norms and institutions are not abandoned. </p>
<p>The onus lies on the international community to reassert its commitment to preventing mass atrocities, regardless of the culprits’ geopolitical stature and economic power. To achieve this, four fundamental pillars must be pursued.</p>
<h2>Four ways to uphold global human rights</h2>
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<li><p>Awareness and education must be disseminated to amplify the voices of those allegedly targeted by Russia and China. An informed populace can apply pressure on their governments to uphold human rights and hold perpetrators accountable. They can also demand <a href="https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/china-83-major-brands-implicated-in-report-on-forced-labour-of-ethnic-minorities-from-xinjiang-assigned-to-factories-across-provinces-includes-company-responses/">companies stop doing business</a> with both countries until their behaviours and policies change. Both Moscow and Beijing are going to great lengths <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/06/22/technology/xinjiang-uyghurs-china-propaganda.html">to spread propaganda</a> <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15226.doc.htm">and disinformation</a> by targeting global audiences.</p></li>
<li><p>Diplomatic initiatives must be pursued to ensure that <a href="https://time.com/6160282/arab-world-complicit-china-repression-uighurs/">economic interests</a> don’t eclipse the need to prevent mass atrocities. Countries must band together to circumvent and counter Moscow and Beijing’s plans to achieve global hegemony that will be a death knell for human rights and democracy.</p></li>
<li><p>Strengthening the mechanisms of justice is paramount. The International Criminal Court must be empowered to investigate and prosecute all perpetrators, regardless of their positions of power. This includes exploring avenues for the court to use even when faced with <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/icc-member-states-say-russia-putting-prosecutor-wanted-list-is-deplorable-2023-05-20/">sanctions and threats</a>.</p></li>
<li><p>Countries must continue to uphold <a href="https://legal.un.org/repertory/art51.shtml">Article 51</a> of the UN Charter — “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations” — and support Ukraine in its efforts to stop Russia’s genocidal invasion. False claims of peace talks mask Russia’s <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/essay/the-war-in-ukraine-is-a-colonial-war">intention to recolonize</a> Ukraine, which will only be achieved through mass violence and the destruction of Ukrainian identity. This will also send a message to Beijing that <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/08/19/china-helping-arm-russia-helicopters-drones-metals-xi-putin/">its role in helping</a> Russia invade Ukraine, to say nothing about a prospective <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3230014/mainland-china-airs-documentary-signalling-military-preparation-taiwan-attack-and-willingness">Chinese attack</a> on Taiwan, will come with consequences.</p></li>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/nancy-pelosis-visit-to-taiwan-causes-an-ongoing-chinese-tantrum-in-the-taiwan-strait-188205">Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan causes an ongoing Chinese tantrum in the Taiwan Strait</a>
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<p>The international community must acknowledge that the era of great power nations perpetrating atrocity crimes is upon us and that it poses a real threat to global peace and security.</p>
<p>Countries that commit genocide within and outside their borders — not to mention <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/12/08/china-detains-journalists-dangers-2021-report/">imprisoning journalists</a>, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66408444">political opposition leaders</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/russia-government-against-rights-groups-battle-chronicle">civil society groups</a> — are a danger to humanity. </p>
<p>When they are permanent members of the UN Security Council and working together in unison, they represent a totalitarian threat that cannot be ignored.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212299/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kyle Matthews has received funding from the Government of Canada (Department of Canadian Heritage) and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. He is affiliated with the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, the Canadian International Council and the BMW Foundation. </span></em></p>The spectacle of two UN Security Council members — China and Russia — allegedly perpetrating mass atrocity crimes is deeply troubling. Here’s how the international community must step up.Kyle Matthews, Executive Director, The Montréal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies, Concordia UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2005242023-02-23T19:03:11Z2023-02-23T19:03:11ZUkraine a year on: the invasion changed NZ foreign policy – as the war drags on, cracks will begin to show<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511853/original/file-20230223-27-rij1g8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=11%2C22%2C7337%2C4803&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>One year to the day since Russian tanks ran over the Ukraine border – and over the UN Charter and international law in the process – the world is less certain and <a href="https://thebulletin.org/doomsday-clock/current-time/">more dangerous</a> than ever. For New Zealand, the war has also presented a unique foreign policy challenge.</p>
<p>The current generation of political leaders initially responded to the invasion in much the same way previous generations responded to the first and second world wars: if a sustainable peace was to be achieved, international treaties and law were the mechanism of choice.</p>
<p>But when it was apparent these higher levels of maintaining international order had gridlocked because of the <a href="https://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick">Russian veto</a> at the UN Security Council, New Zealand moved back towards its traditional security relationships.</p>
<p>Like other Western alliance countries, New Zealand didn’t put boots on the ground, which would have meant becoming active participants in the conflict. But nor did New Zealand plead neutrality. It has not remained indifferent to the aggression and atrocities, or their implications for a rule-based world.</p>
<p>The issue one year on is whether this original position is still viable. And if not, what are the military, humanitarian, diplomatic and legal challenges now?</p>
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<h2>Military spending</h2>
<p>While New Zealand has no troops or personnel in Ukraine, it has given <a href="https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/countries-and-regions/europe/ukraine/russian-invasion-of-ukraine/">direct support</a>. Defence force personnel assist with training, intelligence, logistics, liaison, and command and administration support. There has also been funding and supplied equipment worth more than $NZ22 million.</p>
<p>This has been welcomed, although it’s <a href="https://www.ifw-kiel.de/topics/war-against-ukraine/ukraine-support-tracker/">considerably less</a> on a proportional basis than the assistance offered by other like-minded countries. However, the deeper questions involve how the war has affected defence policies and spending overall internationally.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-year-on-russias-war-on-ukraine-threatens-to-redraw-the-map-of-world-politics-and-2023-will-be-crucial-197682">A year on, Russia's war on Ukraine threatens to redraw the map of world politics – and 2023 will be crucial</a>
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<p>While New Zealand’s current <a href="https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/defence-policy-review-ensure-future-investment-fit-post-covid-world">Defence Policy Review</a> is important at the policy level, the implications affect all citizens and political parties. Specifically, most countries – allies or not – are <a href="https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2022/world-military-expenditure-passes-2-trillion-first-time">increasing military spending</a> and collaborating to develop new generations of weapons.</p>
<p>For New Zealand, this calls into question the longer-term feasibility of its relatively low spending of <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/programmes/the-detail/story/2018838061/hitting-the-right-balance-on-defence-spending">1.5% of GDP</a> on defence. And Wellington is increasingly being left out of collaborative arrangements (<a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/national/programmes/morningreport/audio/2018852876/nz-could-eventually-join-aukus-us-diplomat">AUKUS</a> being just one example), which in turn reinforce alliances and provide pathways to technology.</p>
<p>This is tied to the largest question of all: whether New Zealand wishes to relegate itself to becoming a regional “police officer” or wants to carry its fair share of being part of an interlinked modern military deterrent.</p>
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<h2>Diplomacy and domestic law</h2>
<p>New Zealand also needs to reconsider its commitment to humanitarian assistance. So far, almost $13 million has been spent and a <a href="https://www.immigration.govt.nz/about-us/media-centre/news-notifications/important-information-for-ukrainian-nationals">special visa</a> created allowing New Zealand-Ukrainians to bring family members in for two years. With the war showing no sign of ending, this will likely need to extend.</p>
<p>But New Zealand’s non-neutral status also means it has other responsibilities, and should consider greater assistance with the Ukrainian <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/en-au/ukraine-emergency.html">refugee emergency</a>. This would require going beyond the current visa scheme, and opening and expanding the refugee quota program’s <a href="https://www.immigration.govt.nz/about-us/what-we-do/our-strategies-and-projects/supporting-refugees-and-asylum-seekers/refugee-and-protection-unit/new-zealand-refugee-quota-programme#:%7E:text=2022%2F23%20%E2%80%93%202024%2F25,%2F23%20to%202024%2F25.">current cap of 1,500</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-12-months-on-the-role-of-the-russian-media-in-reporting-and-justifying-the-conflict-199820">Ukraine war 12 months on: the role of the Russian media in reporting – and justifying – the conflict</a>
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<p>Diplomatically, New Zealand also has to start considering what peace would look like. This raises hard questions about territorial integrity, accountability for war crimes, reparations and what might happen to populations that don’t want to be part of Ukraine.</p>
<p>New Zealand has enacted a stand-alone law to apply <a href="https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2022/0006/latest/whole.html#LMS652889">sanctions</a> on Russia. But because this now sits outside the broken multilateral UN system, a degree of caution is called for, given the door is now open to sanction other countries, UN mandate or not.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511856/original/file-20230223-776-ja174s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511856/original/file-20230223-776-ja174s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511856/original/file-20230223-776-ja174s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511856/original/file-20230223-776-ja174s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511856/original/file-20230223-776-ja174s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511856/original/file-20230223-776-ja174s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511856/original/file-20230223-776-ja174s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Russian President Vladimir Putin used his state-of-the-nation speech to announce Moscow was suspending participation in the New START nuclear arms reduction treaty.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span>
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<h2>Preparing for the worst</h2>
<p>Finally, New Zealand needs to prepare for the worst. The war is showing no sign of calming down. Weapons and combatant numbers are escalating unsustainably. Nuclear arms control is in freefall, with Russian President Vladimir Putin <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-suspend-participation-start-nuclear-arms-treaty-vladimir-putin/">suspending participation</a> in the <a href="https://www.state.gov/new-start/">New START Treaty</a>, the last remaining agreement between Russia and the United States. </p>
<p>At the same time, the US has ramped up the rhetoric, suggesting China <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/19/china-may-be-on-brink-of-supplying-arms-to-russia-says-blinken">might supply arms</a> to Russia, and <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/02/20/politics/crimes-against-humanity-us-russia-what-matters/index.html">declaring unequivocally</a> that Russia has committed crimes against humanity in Ukraine. </p>
<p>Were China to go against Western demands and provide weapons, countries like New Zealand will be in a very difficult position: its leading security ally, the US, may expect penalties to be imposed against its leading trade partner, China.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-12-months-at-war-biden-visit-to-kyiv-sets-the-seal-on-a-year-of-growing-western-unity-and-russian-isolation-199569">Ukraine: 12 months at war – Biden visit to Kyiv sets the seal on a year of growing western unity and Russian isolation</a>
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<p>While Putin may be able to live with the rising death toll of his own soldiers (already <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-64616099">over 100,000</a>), at some point the Russian population won’t be. As the US discovered in Vietnam, it wasn’t the external enemy that ultimately prevailed, it was domestic unrest, as more people turned against an unpopular war.</p>
<p>How Putin will respond to a war he cannot win conventionally, while risking losing popularity and position at home, is impossible to predict. Everyone might hope his <a href="https://www.icanw.org/will_putin_use_nuclear_weapons?locale=en">nuclear threats</a> are a bluff, but New Zealand’s leaders would be wise to plan for the worst.</p>
<p>Whether a small, distant, non-neutral South Pacific nation might be a direct target or not is conjecture. What is not speculation, however, is that if the Ukraine war spins out of control, New Zealand would be in an emergency unlike anything it’s witnessed before.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200524/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexander Gillespie does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With no end in site to the Ukraine war, and the UN largely powerless, New Zealand now faces difficult military, humanitarian, diplomatic and legal challenges.Alexander Gillespie, Professor of Law, University of WaikatoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1811012022-04-13T13:51:09Z2022-04-13T13:51:09ZRussia’s war in Ukraine: how South Africa blew its chance as a credible mediator<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/457907/original/file-20220413-24-ko2adv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Russia's indiscriminate war in Ukraine has caused a large-scale humanitarian crisis.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Sergey Dolzhenko</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa has been roundly <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/18/south-africa-ukraine-russia-putin-ramaphosa-war-diplomacy-negotiation/">criticised</a> for its decision to abstain from voting on three UN General Assembly <a href="https://theconversation.com/african-countries-showed-disunity-in-un-votes-on-russia-south-africas-role-was-pivotal-180799">resolutions condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine</a>. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/3/unga-resolution-against-ukraine-invasion-full-text">first resolution, on 2 March</a>, demanded that Russia immediately stop its aggression and withdraw its troops. The <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2022/ga12411.doc.htm">second</a> on 24 March demanded full humanitarian access and protection of civilians and humanitarian personnel in Ukraine. The <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/04/1115782">third</a> on 7 April called for Russia to be suspended from the UN Human Rights Council because of its gross and systematic violation and abuse of human rights.</p>
<p>South African President Cyril Ramaphosa’s <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/newsletters/desk-president%2C-7-march-2022">defence</a> is that international criticism and economic pressure against Russia may succeed in ending hostilities, but will not result in lasting peace. Long-term peace will be only be achieved through dialogue and negotiations.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa grounds this stance in South Africa’s negotiated settlement <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/negotiations-and-transition">in the early 1990s</a>. This ensured a relatively peaceful transition from the dark days of apartheid to the bright light of a <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/EducationPubs/how-our-democracy-works.pdf">constitutional democracy</a>. </p>
<p>During the transition Ramaphosa himself was an immensely impressive negotiator for the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/african-national-congress-anc">African National Congress</a> (ANC), the leading liberation movement. But his position on a negotiated settlement for Ukraine is apolitical, ignoring the necessity for sustained pressure to compel conflict parties to engage in negotiations. Without this pressure, Russia will continue with its <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-crimes-tracker-b39137c3a96eef06f4ba1793fd694542">merciless military attacks</a>. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-fresh-warning-that-africa-needs-to-be-vigilant-against-russias-destabilising-influence-178785">Ukraine war: fresh warning that Africa needs to be vigilant against Russia's destabilising influence</a>
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<p>As an international mediation scholar and practitioner based at the <a href="https://kroc.nd.edu/">Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies</a>, I argue that South Africa’s stance is counter-productive if it wants to contribute to a peaceful resolution of the crisis in Ukraine. </p>
<h2>Pressure supports negotiations</h2>
<p>When conflict parties are locked in hostilities, they are intent on defeating their adversary. They are not interested in ending the conflict through negotiations, which inevitably entail compromises. The critical political and strategic question confronting the international community is this: what steps can be taken to convince the parties to agree to serious negotiations? </p>
<p>South Africa’s history provides an answer to this question: a combination of sustained <a href="http://www.econ.yale.edu/growth_pdf/cdp796.pdf">international sanctions</a>, <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/united-democratic-front-udf">domestic mass resistance</a> and <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/1960-1994-armed-struggle-and-popular-resistance">armed struggle – the Soviet-backed armed struggle of the ANC</a> eventually forced the minority regime to the negotiating table. Pressure is thus not the opposite of negotiations. Rather, it is a vital means for kick-starting serious negotiations.</p>
<p>Ukraine and Russia have not reached the point of serious negotiations. They remain locked in a military struggle, with Russia believing it can still make gains through the use of force. It is far-fetched to imagine that President Vladimir Putin will respond positively to mere <a href="https://www.gov.za/st/node/812866">exhortations</a> to settle the conflict peacefully. Only a combination of Ukrainian resistance and intense international pressure will change his cost-benefit calculation away from fighting and towards negotiations.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/sanctions-against-russia-will-affect-arms-sales-to-africa-the-risks-and-opportunities-180038">Sanctions against Russia will affect arms sales to Africa: the risks and opportunities</a>
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<p>Ramaphosa also opposes criticising Russia on the grounds that South Africa’s neutral stance will place it in a stronger position to help mediate an end to the conflict. The benefit of neutrality, he <a href="https://www.bloombergquint.com/politics/ramaphosa-defends-south-africa-s-neutral-stance-on-russia-s-war">says</a>, “is that we can talk to both sides”.</p>
<p>Here, too, Ramaphosa is mistaken. International mediators cannot be neutral regarding international law. They are bound by – and are expected to promote - the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter">UN Charter</a>, which prohibits states from using force other than in self-defence or as authorised by the UN Security Council. Mediators must also respect and promote the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights">Universal Declaration of Human Rights</a> and <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid/international-humanitarian-law_en#:%7E:text=International%20humanitarian%20law%20(IHL)%20is,humanitarian%20aid%20in%20armed%20conflict">international humanitarian law</a>. These instruments are upheld in the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/3/unga-resolution-against-ukraine-invasion-full-text">first</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/un-general-assembly-adopts-ukraine-aid-resolution-criticizes-russia-2022-03-24/">second</a> UN resolutions on Ukraine, which South Africa declined to endorse. </p>
<h2>South Africa seen as biased</h2>
<p>While international mediators cannot be neutral, they must endeavour to be impartial. This means they must mediate in a manner that is fair to all the conflict parties. Like a referee in a sports match, they should not exhibit bias against or in favour of any side. Their job is to assist the parties reach agreements that the parties themselves deem satisfactory. The only caveat is that the agreements must be consistent with international law.</p>
<p>In reality, Pretoria is not perceived as impartial. It refers to Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine as a “<a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/newsletters/desk-president%2C-7-march-2022">military operation</a>”, which is Putin’s euphemism for whitewashing his act of aggression. Siding with Putin in this way will undoubtedly cause Ukrainian <a href="https://www.president.gov.ua/en/president/biografiya">President Volodymyr Zelenskyy</a> to be sceptical about South Africa’s possible involvement as a mediator.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/russias-nuclear-power-exports-will-they-stand-the-strain-of-the-war-in-ukraine-178250">Russia's nuclear power exports: will they stand the strain of the war in Ukraine?</a>
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<p>When the General Assembly debated the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/un-general-assembly-adopts-ukraine-aid-resolution-criticizes-russia-2022-03-24/">second UN resolution</a>, South Africa proposed <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1114632">an alternative resolution</a> that focused on the humanitarian dimensions of the conflict and ignored Russia’s ongoing responsibility for the crisis. The proposed resolution, which <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1114632">failed to garner sufficient votes</a>, did not even mention Russia.</p>
<p>Needless to say, Russia supported this approach. Ukraine, on the other hand, <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1114632">denounced it</a>. According to the Ukrainian ambassador to the UN, focusing exclusively on humanitarian issues was </p>
<blockquote>
<p><a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1114632">(like having a) child dying in your arms and instead of administering to him the proper medicine, you opt for a placebo</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The most prominent mediator to date has been Turkey. At the end of March direct talks between Russian and Ukrainian negotiators <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/29/no-handshake-as-ukraine-russia-envoys-meet-for-peace-talks">took place in Istanbul</a>. Yet Turkey, unlike South Africa, has not refrained from <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/8/russia-suspended-from-un-human-rights-body-how-countries-voted">voting to support the UN resolutions condemning Russia</a>. </p>
<p>Ramaphosa <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/newsletters/desk-president%2C-7-march-2022">complains</a> that the UN resolution of 2 March did not make an adequate call to resolve the conflict by peaceful means. But the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/3/unga-resolution-against-ukraine-invasion-full-text">resolution</a> is actually very clear on this:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(It) urges the immediate peaceful resolution of the conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine through political dialogue, negotiations, mediation and other peaceful means.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>South Africa has squandered its potential to play a constructive mediation role in the Ukraine crisis. Instead of drawing on the lessons of its own negotiated settlement and its rich history of peacemaking in Africa, it has adopted a position that amounts to appeasing Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181101/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Laurie Nathan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Instead of drawing on the lessons of its own negotiated settlement and its rich history of peace-making in Africa, Pretoria chose to appease Russia.Laurie Nathan, Professor of the Practice of Mediation, University of Notre DameLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1809362022-04-08T12:33:07Z2022-04-08T12:33:07ZUN Security Council is powerless to help Ukraine – but it’s working as designed to prevent World War III<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456982/original/file-20220407-21-dehy7q.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=22%2C15%2C5067%2C3373&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy addresses the U.N. Security Council on April 5, 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/ukrainian-president-volodymyr-zelensky-addresses-the-united-news-photo/1389705145?adppopup=true"> Spencer Platt/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>A clearly anguished Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on April 5, 2022, castigated the U.N. Security Council members for their inaction on alleged Russian atrocities in Ukraine: “Are you ready to close the U.N.? Do you think that the time of international law is gone?” We asked <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=Ubvy59oAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">Thomas G. Weiss</a>, a veteran scholar with expertise in the politics of the United Nations, to discuss the historic role of the Security Council and what its failure to stop the carnage in Ukraine means over the long term.</em></p>
<h2>What did you think when you heard Zelenskyy’s questions?</h2>
<p>I was impressed by his honesty. There’s a saying in Washington that a gaffe is when truth is spoken inadvertently. Well, he wasn’t speaking it inadvertently. He was speaking openly and directly. He was speaking truth to power in that instance. <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter">The U.N. Charter</a> has been violated many times, but this really was an egregious violation by a single country, Russia.</p>
<p>However, we all know the shortcomings of exaggeration. The number of times that, as Mark Twain would have said, the U.N.’s <a href="https://www.mentalfloss.com/article/562400/reports-mark-twains-quote-about-mark-twains-death-are-greatly-exaggerated">death has been prematurely declared</a> are numerous. But this inaction really is a black eye for the U.N. that’s in the news, day in and day out. It’s going to be impossible to ignore this tragedy and ignore his testimony in front of the Security Council.</p>
<h2>What did you mean by saying Russia’s actions were a violation of the UN Charter?</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/kellogg">Kellogg Briand Act</a> at the end of the 1920s was an international treaty that outlawed war. Well, that didn’t go very well. But the U.N. Charter was a step in the right direction by trying to <a href="https://www.justia.com/international-law/use-of-force-under-international-law/#:%7E:text=Article%202(4)%20provides%20that,the%20purposes%20of%20the%20UN.">eliminate the illegal use of force</a>, backed up with the threat of military action. </p>
<p>The use of force was only supposed to be <a href="https://legal.un.org/repertory/art51.shtml">permitted in self-defense</a> or <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/faq">when the Security Council authorized it</a>. The Charter’s provisions have been violated on numerous occasions. But this time <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/how-russias-attack-on-ukraine-violates-international-law">is the most egregious violation seen recently</a>, with a major power trying to swallow up a smaller country next door. That’s one of the things that supposedly was put behind us, but clearly it hasn’t been.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456994/original/file-20220407-10731-te3jqd.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A dead body on the ground, dressed in a brown jacket with hands tied behind their back." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456994/original/file-20220407-10731-te3jqd.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456994/original/file-20220407-10731-te3jqd.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456994/original/file-20220407-10731-te3jqd.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456994/original/file-20220407-10731-te3jqd.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456994/original/file-20220407-10731-te3jqd.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456994/original/file-20220407-10731-te3jqd.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456994/original/file-20220407-10731-te3jqd.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">A body of a civilian killed in the Russian invasion lies on the street of Bucha, Ukraine.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/body-of-a-civilian-killed-in-the-russian-invasion-lies-on-news-photo/1239750937?adppopup=true">Mykhaylo Palinchak/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>When the UN was established, what was the Security Council supposed to be and do?</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/un-security-council">The idea was that there would be an automatic response to aggression</a>, with the condition that <a href="https://research.un.org/en/unmembers/scmembers">the five permanent members</a> - at that time, China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/91/6/1221/2326926">all allies who defeated Germany’s fascism</a> in World War II - would agree. </p>
<p>Later, that meant the U.N. would respond if the permanent members at least didn’t object, including economic, judicial and military responses. You didn’t need five affirmative votes, <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-working-methods/the-veto.php">but you couldn’t have any negative votes, which constituted a veto</a>. Unless the five agree – and that obviously is not a lot of the time because they all have friends and foes – there is no decision, and this was the way it was supposed to function.</p>
<p>So while you can agree with Zelenskyy, actually the Security Council is functioning exactly the way it was supposed to work.</p>
<h2>So one country could <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/voting-system">exercise veto power straight from the beginning</a>. Was there a recognition then that such a structure ran the risk of disempowering the organization?</h2>
<p>A greater risk was that there would be no organization.</p>
<p><a href="https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/55407.htm">Without the veto, Congress wouldn’t have signed on to the U.S. joining the U.N.</a>, and clearly <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/existing-legal-limits-to-security-council-veto-power-in-the-face-of-atrocity-crimes/origins-and-history-of-the-veto-and-its-use/E56893EC44C5C501679E0D0C53B836F2">without the veto the Soviet Union’s Josef Stalin would not have signed on</a> either. The idea was during World War II these allies got along, and they were supposed to continue getting along; but that working proposition obviously evaporated. I mean, the ink was hardly dry on the 1945 U.N. Charter before this cooperation ended — recall that <a href="https://winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1946-1963-elder-statesman/the-sinews-of-peace/">Winston Churchill already spoke of the “iron curtain” in March 1946</a>.</p>
<p>But there’s also a second reason behind the structure, which applies currently. In terms of the war on Ukraine, it explains, I think, the prudence that certainly U.S. President Joe Biden and the West in general has applied. Part of the logic at the founding was, “Listen, it’s all for one and we come automatically to the rescue if there’s aggression – unless, of course, it’s a major power. And if it’s a major power, let’s not at least make things worse. Let’s not start World War III by taking on China or the U.S. or the Soviet Union.” And that principle continues to apply, alas, to other nuclear powers. The Security Council would never agree to take on India, would never agree to take on Pakistan, and <a href="https://www.stimson.org/2021/the-united-nations-and-north-korea-denuclearization-and-human-security/">wouldn’t even agree to take on North Korea</a>.</p>
<h2>Has the five-member veto power diminished the UN’s status with the public?</h2>
<p>It certainly means that the United Nations in the area of international peace and security is really hamstrung. </p>
<p>The awful truth is that this beast works when member states want it to work, and it doesn’t when they don’t. Once governments decide to do something, and they’re on the same wavelength, it works; but that certainly is not the majority of the time. </p>
<p>I think we should still remember that, even while the hopeless Security Council is acting hopelessly in Ukraine, other parts of the U.N. continue to help. There are four and a half million Ukrainian refugees that the <a href="https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine">U.N. High Commissioner on Refugees is trying to assist</a>. At the same time, there happens to be <a href="https://www.unicef.org/emergencies/war-ukraine-pose-immediate-threat-children">UNICEF struggling to help children in the Ukraine</a> and refugee kids elsewhere while <a href="https://www.unicef.org/emergencies/delivering-support-afghanistans-children">trying valiantly to further girls’ education in Afghanistan</a>. That is the bulk of what the U.N. does most days of the week, serving in other humanitarian emergencies, protecting human rights, trying to publicize the disastrous condition of the human environment and climate change.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456999/original/file-20220407-21-e1vefm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A large meeting room with a semicircle table in front and rows of seats looking on" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456999/original/file-20220407-21-e1vefm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456999/original/file-20220407-21-e1vefm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456999/original/file-20220407-21-e1vefm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456999/original/file-20220407-21-e1vefm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456999/original/file-20220407-21-e1vefm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=526&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456999/original/file-20220407-21-e1vefm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=526&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456999/original/file-20220407-21-e1vefm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=526&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The first meeting of the United Nations Security Council in New York on March 25, 1946.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/the-first-convening-of-the-united-nations-security-council-news-photo/467824959">Underwood Archives/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Is there a danger - through the current lack of action by the Security Council - that it could be damaged by what’s going on in Ukraine? So Vladimir Putin in one way has assured the cohesion of NATO, but this war could hurt the United Nations?</h2>
<p>It certainly might. It’s a little hard to know whether the war in Ukraine would be lethal to the institution’s future. As I say, the U.N. has been declared to be on life support on numerous previous occasions. Yet, despite all of the black eyes, an annual <a href="https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/research/lester-crown-center-us-foreign-policy/chicago-council-survey">Chicago Council on Global Affairs poll</a> has found for decades that around 60% of the U.S. public support the U.N. I’d be very surprised if the handling of Ukraine ended up inflicting terminal damage on the U.N., but it is going to take awhile to recover. And we still don’t know what the end of this mess is, so we’ll probably have to have the same conversation in a month or six months.</p>
<p>[<em>Over 150,000 readers rely on The Conversation’s newsletters to understand the world.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?source=inline-150ksignup">Sign up today</a>.]</p>
<p>The U.N. could have done better on numerous occasions, as I argue in my book “<a href="https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Would+the+World+Be+Better+Without+the+UN%3F-p-9781509517251">Would the World Be Better without the UN</a>.” But it also could have done far worse. The planet would be worse off without a <a href="https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/preventive-diplomacy-united-nations">Secretary-General to do shuttle diplomacy during the Cuban Missile Crisis</a> or the U.N.’s <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/undof">deployment of peacekeepers on the Golan Heights</a>.</p>
<p>And do we really want to do without an organization that <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/05/1063582">can get rid of smallpox</a> and is close to getting rid of <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-022-00385-z">guinea worm</a> and <a href="https://unfoundation.org/blog/post/a-new-era-of-nothing-but-nets-united-to-beat-malaria/">malaria</a>? I think the answer to that is no.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/180936/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thomas G. Weiss does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>An expert on the history and politics of the UN says that the Security Council’s failure to intervene in Ukraine is a “black eye,” but the panel’s inability to act is not a design flaw.Thomas G. Weiss, Presidential Professor of Political Science, CUNY Graduate CenterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1786572022-03-11T10:23:19Z2022-03-11T10:23:19ZHistory may explain South Africa’s refusal to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451545/original/file-20220311-3190-1dr2gkd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African President Cyril Ramaphosa says the country is committed to achieving world peace through negotiation, and not force. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS/Flickr</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa abstained in a vote in the United Nations General Assembly on the resolution <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1113152">condemning the Russian invasion of the Ukraine</a>, and demanding their withdrawal.</p>
<p>The South African government has <a href="http://www.dirco.gov.za/dircoenewsletter/newsflash512-03-03-2022.html">explained</a> that it enjoys good relations with both Russia and the Ukraine; hence it abstained in the UN General Assembly vote condemning the Russian invasion.</p>
<p>President Cyril Ramaphosa subsequently said South Africa abstained</p>
<blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/from-the-desk-of-the-president/desk-president%2C-7-march-2022">because the resolution did not foreground the call for meaningful engagement</a>.</p>
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<p>At home, the official opposition, the Democratic Alliance lost no time in taunting the governing African National Congress (ANC) that its abstention was because a Russian oligarch, Victor Vekselberg, had <a href="https://www.da.org.za/2022/02/anc-slow-to-act-against-its-paymaster">donated R7.5 million to the ANC</a>.</p>
<p>But one cannot assume that a billionaire’s personal views are pro-Putin, merely because he is Russian. Besides, after the Kremlin <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/26/mikhail-khodorkovsky-life-after-prison-russia-after-putin">jailed and sequestrated the billionaire Mikhael Khodorkovsky</a> in 2005, no “oligarch” will ever again express opposition views in public.</p>
<p>In fact, the moniker “oligarch” is misleading because it implies a wielder of great power in the inner circle. The reality is that Russia’s billionaires possess their wealth solely by the grace of the Kremlin. Like <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Henry-VII-king-of-England">England’s Henry VII</a>, the Kremlin seizes the property of its critics.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-fresh-warning-that-africa-needs-to-be-vigilant-against-russias-destabilising-influence-178785">Ukraine war: fresh warning that Africa needs to be vigilant against Russia's destabilising influence</a>
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<p>Further, reality has many dimensions. And in this case history is relevant. To summarise, the ANC remembers who were its allies during the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Cold-War">Cold War</a>, and who denounced it as “terrorists”. This has drowned the other considerations. This includes that South Africa, as a small country, depends on the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter">UN charter</a> principles opposing war and invasion to seize territory, and multilateralism to protect it from invasion by a great power.</p>
<h2>Historic ties that bind</h2>
<p>The ANC and the former <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/russia/history-of-the-soviet-union">Soviet Union</a> have <a href="https://tears.org.za/product/the-hidden-thread-russia-and-south-africa-in-the-soviet-era-irina-filatova-apollon-davidson/">a long history together</a>. The first visit by an ANC leader to the Soviet Union was by <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/national-orders/recipient/josiah-tshangana-gumede">Josiah Tshangana Gumede</a>, one of the founding members of the ANC, in 1927. His visit was a spin-off of his attendance in Belgium of the <a href="https://www.open.ac.uk/researchprojects/makingbritain/content/league-against-imperialism">League against Imperialism</a>. </p>
<p>After the apartheid regime was banned the ANC in 1960 it received aid from the Soviet Union for its exiled mission in the fight to liberate South Africa from minority white rule. This aid exceeded that from the pan-African <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/organisation-african-unity-oau">Organisation of African Unity</a>- now the <a href="https://au.int/">African Union</a> - or anyone else. </p>
<p>It was only from the end of the 1970s that Scandinavian donations became higher than Soviet funding. But Scandinavian aid remained <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books/about/Social_Democracy_and_Southern_Africa_196.html?id=UaExAAAAIAAJ&redir_esc=y">limited to peaceful aid only</a>. Only the Soviet Union provided weapons and other military aid to the ANC’s armed wing, <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/umkhonto-wesizwe-mk-timeline-1961-1990">Umkhonto we Sizwe</a>.</p>
<p>By 1988, sensing that victory over apartheid was coming, Moscow supplemented training in guerilla warfare with training in conventional warfare, including naval and air force training.</p>
<p>Historical links, such as these, were evident in the <a href="https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2022/03/04/how-africa-votes-on-russia-ukraine-conflict-at-the-united-nations/">divide between African states</a> during the UN General Assembly vote to condemn Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine. </p>
<p>Namibia, which is governed by <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/south-west-africa-peoples-organisation-swapo">Swapo</a>, Angola, by the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Popular-Movement-for-the-Liberation-of-Angola">MPLA</a> and Mozambique by <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/place/mozambique">Frelimo</a> <a href="https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2022/03/04/how-africa-votes-on-russia-ukraine-conflict-at-the-united-nations/">joined South Africa in abstaining</a>. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/namibias-abstention-on-russia-violates-its-foreign-policy-principles-178548">Namibia’s abstention on Russia violates its foreign policy principles</a>
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<p>Swapo, the MPLA, and Frelimo also received Soviet foreign aid during the 20th Century Cold War when they too were liberation movements fighting guerrilla wars.</p>
<p>By contrast, Botswana and Zambia voted to condemn the Russian invasion. Significantly, their ruling parties came to power peacefully, and did not have Russian alliances. This vote for the UN resolution condemning the Russian invasion and demanding its withdrawal, was also the position of <a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-ukraine-war-decoding-how-african-countries-voted-at-the-un-178663">28 African Union members</a>. Seventeen abstained.</p>
<p>Clearly, the liberation movements of Angola, South Africa, Namibia and Mozambique regard Russia as the inheritor and custodian of the Soviet Union history and traditions.</p>
<h2>Irony of history</h2>
<p>There is some irony in this, as so often in history. While Russian President <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/world/russia-central-asia/article/3125892/vladimir-putin-biography-kgb-family-wealth-power">Vladimir Putin</a> started his career in the Soviet KGB, the political police, he now merits the western saying that there is no one more anti-communist than an ex-communist. In 2017 Putin’s government, supported by his United Russia party, had absolutely <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/06/revolution-what-revolution-russians-show-little-interest-in-1917-centenary">zero centenary celebrations of the Bolshevik revolution</a>.</p>
<p>To the contrary, today’s Kremlin ensures that today’s Communist Party of the Russian Federation faces two decades of rigged elections, cheating it of winning the vote in Vladivostok and other towns.</p>
<p>Why then do the ANC, Swapo, MPLA, and Frelimo, and the <a href="https://www.citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/politics/3037201/sacp-backs-russias-invasion-25-february-2022/">South African Communist Party</a> – the ANC’s <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02424/04lv02730/05lv03161.htm">governing alliance partner</a> – continue to retain such bonds of deference to Putin’s anti-communist government? </p>
<p>One reason could be that Russia and those southern African governments have shared resentment of the international dominance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (<a href="https://www.nato.int/">NATO)</a>, especially that of the US and the former colonial powers – the UK and French. This is regardless of the sea-change in party politics within the Kremlin.</p>
<p>The relationship between South Africa and the US, especially, has <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40971797?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">a complex history</a>. Not least because US governments designated ANC leaders fighting the apartheid regime as <a href="https://time.com/5338569/nelson-mandela-terror-list/">terrorists</a>. There is also memory of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/white-malice-how-the-cia-strangled-african-independence-at-birth-176597">CIA'a unsavoury role in Africa</a>.</p>
<p>Most of the anti-Ukrainian commentary in the South African internet and letters to the editors reflects the commentators’ stance against previous US government foreign policy of wars in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/sep/16/iraq.iraq">Iraq</a>, <a href="https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-war-afghanistan">Afghanistan</a> and elsewhere. They don’t reflect facts unfolding on the ground. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-russia-ukraine-conflict-could-influence-africas-food-supplies-177843">How Russia-Ukraine conflict could influence Africa's food supplies</a>
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<p>For the governments of South Africa, Namibia, Angola, and Mozambique, the historical alliances and enemies of the last century’s Cold War seem destined to tip the scales when it comes to their voting at the UN, the African Union, and in other forums. This is despite the fact that, as small countries with severely constrained defence capabilities, they depend on the support for multilateralism and the UN system against any invasions by a great power.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178657/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Gottschalk is an ANC member, but writes this article in his professional capacity as a political scientist.</span></em></p>The relationship between South Africa and the West, especially the US, has a complex history. Not least because the US designated those fighting the apartheid regime, as terrorists.Keith Gottschalk, Political Scientist, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1779052022-02-25T03:32:59Z2022-02-25T03:32:59ZIs international law powerless against Russian aggression in Ukraine? No, but it’s complicated<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/448484/original/file-20220225-27-dvp2x6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C43%2C4513%2C3781&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Andrew Harnik/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The world was treated to a grotesque spectacle this week. Russia, the current president of the UN Security Council, launched an invasion of Ukraine <em>while</em> the Security Council was holding an urgent meeting to try to resolve the crisis. </p>
<p>This has many people asking whether there is <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-02-23/invasion-incursion-putin-russia-ukraine-internal-law-definitions/100853010">any point</a> to international law – is it powerless to control the conduct of states?</p>
<h2>Has Russia broken the law?</h2>
<p>Yes. There is no question Russia has breached the rules of international law. Ukraine has a right to territorial integrity and political independence. Russian “<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-russias-recognition-of-breakaway-parts-of-ukraine-breached-international-law-and-set-the-stage-for-invasion-177623">recognition</a>” of the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk does not change this, nor do any historical claims to Ukrainian territory on the part of Russia.</p>
<p>Russia has also committed an act of aggression against Ukraine. Aggression is an old concept in international law, predating the creation of the UN. </p>
<p>War has been outright illegal since the <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/kellogg">1928 Kellogg-Briand pact</a>. The charter establishing the <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/WebART/350-530014?OpenDocument">International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg</a> in 1945 also declared the “planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression” to be crimes against peace. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1497005559475810304"}"></div></p>
<p>Finally, Russia’s acts constitute a serious breach of the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter">UN Charter</a>, which states:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.</p>
</blockquote>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-invasion-should-russia-lose-its-seat-on-the-un-security-council-177870">Ukraine invasion: should Russia lose its seat on the UN Security Council?</a>
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<h2>What can the UN Security Council do?</h2>
<p>But what is the point of all this international law if Russia can still invade Ukraine? Where is the enforcement? </p>
<p><a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text#:%7E:text=Article%2024,Council%20acts%20on%20their%20behalf.">Article 24 of the UN Charter</a> grants the Security Council primary responsibility for the “maintenance of international peace and security”. This includes taking collective measures to prevent and counter threats to peace and suppressing acts of aggression. </p>
<p>The UN was established specifically to prevent a global war between great powers from happening again. And since we haven’t seen this sort of event in the past 75 years, the UN has been largely successful at this primary goal. </p>
<p>But here’s the rub: the UN Security Council (and the UN Charter more generally) was established by the allied powers who “won” the second world war. In establishing the UN, these powers (China, France, the UK, the US and Russia as successor state to the USSR) were positioned functionally above the law.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1496686476771397632"}"></div></p>
<p>They were made permanent members of the Security Council (known as the P5) and given veto power over UN action. </p>
<p>This was done expressly to prevent the UN from being able to take action against them and to allow them to act as a balance to each other’s ambitions. The system only works, however, when the P5 agree to abide by the rules. </p>
<p>This worked through the Cold War because no P5 state felt comfortable enough in its own power to act unilaterally and upset that balance. Once that uneasy balance of power fell apart with the collapse of the USSR, the willingness of the P5 members to act with restraint began to chip away.</p>
<p>In the 1990s, the US and UK used the Security Council to rubber stamp their expansive military activity. Later, when Russia and China felt confident enough to use their veto power (most prominently in the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/06/international/europe/france-and-russia-ready-to-use-veto-against-iraq-war.html">Iraq invasion in 2003</a>), the US and UK simply acted unilaterally. The Security Council – by design – was powerless to prevent it. </p>
<p>The same scenario is playing out now, with Russia as the aggressor. The restraint of the P5 in their use of military action has been hanging by a thread for decades. We may have just seen it permanently snap.</p>
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<h2>Are there other responses under international law?</h2>
<p>Russia’s ongoing transgression of the law is not the end of the story. There are other ways international law can be used to either defend Ukraine or punish Russia that go beyond <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/how-financial-western-sanctions-might-target-russia-2022-01-19/">economic sanctions</a>.</p>
<p>One option is the invocation of <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text#:%7E:text=Article%2051,maintain%20international%20peace%20and%20security.">Article 51 of the UN Charter</a>, which gives states the right of individual and collective self-defence. </p>
<p>Ukraine can legally use force to defend itself from attack, and moreover, can request military assistance from other countries. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, Kuwait issued a number of such requests to help it defend itself.</p>
<p>Questions have also been asked about whether Russia could be stripped of its permanent membership on the Security Council. </p>
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<img alt="Russia's UN ambassador, Vasily Nebenzya." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/448485/original/file-20220225-17-1sslj23.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/448485/original/file-20220225-17-1sslj23.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448485/original/file-20220225-17-1sslj23.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448485/original/file-20220225-17-1sslj23.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448485/original/file-20220225-17-1sslj23.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448485/original/file-20220225-17-1sslj23.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448485/original/file-20220225-17-1sslj23.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Russia’s UN ambassador, Vasily Nebenzya, speaks during an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">UNTV/AP</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>The simple answer is no. Arguments are now being made that Russia should not have inherited the USSR’s seat on the council. But all the states arising from the collapse of the USSR (including Ukraine) <a href="https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL(1994)054-e">did agree</a> to this in 1991. </p>
<p>As for the question of reforming the UN Charter to remove Russia, that is also functionally impossible. </p>
<p>While Article 108 of the UN Charter does allow for amendments, it requires all of the P5 to agree. So, in order to remove Russia from the Security Council, Russia would have to agree, and that’s never going to happen. </p>
<p>This, again, is by design, so the P5 would feel confident in their security when taking action to police the world. Unfortunately, peace can’t be enforced when your enforcer is the one breaching the peace.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-invasion-should-russia-lose-its-seat-on-the-un-security-council-177870">Ukraine invasion: should Russia lose its seat on the UN Security Council?</a>
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<h2>Can Putin be prosecuted for crimes?</h2>
<p>There is also international criminal law. Putin has committed the <a href="https://crimeofaggression.info/role-of-the-icc/definition-of-the-crime-of-aggression/">crime of aggression</a> by launching an illegal war, and any Russian war crimes on Ukrainian territory are within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC). </p>
<p>But Putin will not stand trial before the ICC for aggression, due to the court’s <a href="https://www.gojil.eu/issues/22/22_article_coracini.pdf">narrow jurisdiction</a>. </p>
<p>Uniquely, the aggressor state and the victim of its actions must both accept the Rome Statute (the treaty that established the court) and its jurisdiction over aggression. While Ukraine has accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction, Russia is a not party to the Rome Statute.</p>
<p>So, the ICC has no jurisdiction over Russian aggression without the Security Council referring Russia to the court as a non-party. And, of course, Russia can veto this action as a permanent member of the council. </p>
<p>While the ICC also has jurisdiction over war crimes, tying a president to the crimes of foot soldiers is complex and not something the court has ever succeeded in doing.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1496911972310335498"}"></div></p>
<p>However, the ICC is not the only game in town. Any country in the world can prosecute grave war crimes, such as <a href="https://twitter.com/bellingcat/status/1496762986161127425?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1496762986161127425%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.1news.co.nz%2F2022%2F02%2F24%2Freports-of-civilian-casualties-as-russia-invades-ukraine%2F">intentionally attacking civilians</a>. </p>
<p>And countries can prosecute nationals of other states for aggression, if they have laws in place to do so. Germany, the Netherlands, Ukraine and even <a href="https://www.imolin.org/doc/amlid/Russian_Federation_Criminal_Code.pdf">Russia</a> all have such “universal jurisdiction” laws that apply to acts of aggression. </p>
<p>Similarly, the doctrine of command responsibility is also subject to universal jurisdiction. So, war crimes prosecutions need not stop with front-line soldiers.</p>
<p>However, the difficulty with universal jurisdiction is bringing suspects into custody. Heads of state, in particular, are generally immune from being prosecuted for crimes in foreign courts. </p>
<p>Not only that, for such prosecutions to happen, Russian political and military leaders would need to be removed from their posts, arrested and then extradited to face trial.</p>
<p>So, in the short run, will anyone be hauled before a court? No. In the long run? Maybe. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the job of the international community is to gather evidence of crimes as they occur, and to support Ukraine’s right of self-defence. International law is there, states now must use it.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Correction: This piece has been updated to correct that Ukraine is not a party to the Rome Statute, it has only accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177905/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Douglas Guilfoyle receives funding from the Australian Research Council. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tamsin Phillipa Paige received funding from the Australian Department of Education in the form of an Endeavour Scholarship in relation to her research on the UN Security Council. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Juliette McIntyre does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>What’s the point of international law if Russia can still invade Ukraine? Where is the enforcement? Three experts explain why holding Russia to account is so difficult.Juliette McIntyre, Lecturer in Law, University of South AustraliaDouglas Guilfoyle, Professor of International Law and Security, UNSW SydneyTamsin Phillipa Paige, Senior Lecturer, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/715952017-01-19T22:02:33Z2017-01-19T22:02:33ZThe questionable legality of military intervention in The Gambia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/153510/original/image-20170119-26543-1ujxeut.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Gambia's President-elect Adama Barrow waves after his inauguration at Gambia's embassy in Dakar, Senegal. But will he be able to go home?</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Thierry Gouegnon</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>With tensions rising in The Gambia, a coalition of states have <a href="http://theconversation.com/high-stakes-as-west-africa-prepares-military-action-against-gambias-jammeh-71481?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Latest%20from%20The%20Conversation%20for%20January%2018%202017%20-%206538&utm_content=Latest%20from%20The%20Conversation%20for%20January%2018%202017%20-%206538+CID_6277126a11150d67a52f619707011a3c&utm_source=campaign_monitor_africa&utm_term=High%20stakes%20as%20West%20Africa%20prepares%20military%20action%20against%20Gambias%20Jammeh">deployed forces along the country’s borders</a>, poised to launch a military intervention should President Yahya Jammeh refuse to cede power to opposition leader Adama Barrow. <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/01/19/gambia-crisis-british-tourists-flee-west-african-forces-poised/">Senegalese troop</a>s crossed the border into The Gambia on January 19, later halting their operation to give Jammeh more time to vacate office – and vowing to continue their intervention if he did not.</p>
<p>While Jammeh is an unpopular figure domestically, regionally and internationally, the legality of a military intervention in The Gambia is far from clear. But whether the legality or otherwise of military intervention ever makes a difference to potential interveners is another matter. </p>
<p>In essence, in Africa, as elsewhere, the key determinant on whether a military intervention takes place is political will rather than legality. Military intervention is sanctioned and executed by states. It is thus always a function of state interests rather than the objective, principled enforcement of law. </p>
<p>As a result, the history of military intervention shows inconsistency and, at times, hypocrisy. </p>
<h2>Sources of legality</h2>
<p>The UN Security Council has the primary – some would say exclusive – authority to mandate military intervention. According to the UN Charter, force is legal in two circumstances: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>under Article 51 states may use force in self-defence; while</p></li>
<li><p>under Chapter VII the council can authorise the use of force in response to a threat to international peace and security. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>In the case of The Gambia, self-defence clearly does not apply. And whether the matter is a threat to international peace and security is obviously a matter of opinion. But this is a largely academic consideration. </p>
<p>In practice, since the end of the Cold War the Security Council has interpreted some internal crises as threats to international peace and security. For example, in 1994 it mandated the <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N94/312/22/PDF/N9431222.pdf?OpenElement">use of force in Haiti</a> to restore the ousted president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. </p>
<p>While many welcomed its more proactive approach, the council has implemented this new understanding of its Chapter VII powers in a highly inconsistent and obviously political way. </p>
<p>Under Article 52 the UN recognises <a href="http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/regional_arrangements.shtml">a role for regional organisations</a> in “the peaceful settlement of disputes”. Article 53 stipulates that regional organisations can “take enforcement action” but this must be done “with explicit authorisation by the Security Council”. </p>
<p>Thus, while regional organisations are legally empowered to take enforcement action, this does not diminish the primacy of the Security Council. In practice, however, it has proved willing to tolerate regional organisations acting without prior authorisation. </p>
<p>This happened in 1990, when the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/2003-01-01/liberias-civil-war-nigeria-ecomog-and-regional-security-west">intervened</a> in Liberia and again in 1997 when it intervened in Sierra Leone. The monitoring group is a multilateral armed force established by the Economic Community of West African States.</p>
<p>The primacy of the Security Council was challenged – to an extent – in 2003 by the African Union’s (AU) <a href="http://au.int/en/constitutive">Constitutive Act</a>. Article 4(h) of the Act recognises its right:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>This led to <a href="http://voelkerrechtsblog.org/does-the-african-union-truly-defy-the-united-nations-peace-and-security-regime/">debates</a> as to whether the AU, in effect, declared itself an alternative source of authority to the Security Council.<br>
Again, however, this is a largely academic matter for two reasons.</p>
<p>First, the AU has never triggered the article. </p>
<p>Second, and of more importance in the case of The Gambia, there is no evidence – yet – that war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity have been committed. The threshold has therefore not been met. </p>
<p>But, in 2003, a “<a href="https://www.au.int/en/treaties/protocol-amendments-constitutive-act-african-union">Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the AU</a>” was issued. This expanded the scope of Article 4(h) to include “a serious threat to legitimate order”. This would potentially apply in the case of The Gambia. But the protocols have not yet entered into force as two-thirds of the AU have <a href="https://t.co/XoShiYYVC6">yet to ratify them</a>. </p>
<p>The final, and most controversial, basis on which military intervention can be legitimised is unilateral humanitarian intervention. This relates to situations where a state or group of states act without explicit UN authorisation to prevent or halt atrocities being perpetrated inside another state. </p>
<p>Perhaps the clearest example in recent years was <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/1999-11-01/natos-success-kosovo">NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999</a>. While the illegality of such intervention is relatively clear, some have argued that such action can at times be legitimate on moral or humanitarian grounds. </p>
<p>Tanzania’s intervention <a href="http://www.worldhistory.biz/sundries/41817-uganda-tanzanian-invasion-1979-1980.html">in Uganda in 1979</a>, though technically illegal, was essentially tolerated – and in some quarters openly welcomed – given the nature of Idi Amin’s regime. Again, however, in the case of The Gambia, there is scant evidence of atrocity crimes. Thus this cannot be a basis on which an intervention is legitimised. </p>
<p>Not that the prospect of atrocity crimes in The Gambia can be ruled out. In June 2016 the UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide <a href="http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=54197#.WIDSh30x0QQ">condemned</a> Jammeh’s inflammatory comments about the Mandinka ethnic group as “irresponsible and extremely dangerous”. Many have accused him of a history of <a href="http://gcr2p.cmail19.com/t/ViewEmail/j/594FACF6A6676A37/A9AF22BC97DD37BB025DA65DC0D0F53A">inciting ethnic division</a>.</p>
<p>Thus, as it stands, it is not clear that military intervention in The Gambia would be legal. Yet one may well wonder whether this actually matters. History suggests that politics, rather than legal texts, determines both whether interventions take place, and how they are perceived by the international community </p>
<h2>Law or politics?</h2>
<p>In Africa, interventions to date illustrate that political calculations – particularly of powerful states – have always been key to the impetus for intervention. </p>
<p>This is true too of the regional response to intervention. This was particularly evident in to Nigeria’s role within ECOMOG. In 1990 the monitoring group intervened in Liberia, in 1997 in Sierra Leone, and in 1999 in Guinea-Bissau. </p>
<p>The interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone are generally deemed to have been a success. But the intervention in Guinea-Bissau – though initially key to preventing major loss of life – essentially ended in failure. Without the political will exercised by Nigeria, the interventions are unlikely to have occurred. </p>
<p>In this sense, military interventions have always been the function more of political calculations than determinations to act in defence of human rights or defend democracy. Indicatively, ECOMOG’s interventions highlighted fissures between Anglophone and Francophone states. Debates on the merits of military action have been largely divided along these lines. </p>
<p>Both ECOWAS and the African Union are coalitions of states. Previous attempts to create a genuinely trans-state political union in Africa have failed, and while the AU’s charter includes a provision for a standing army, this does not exist. Thus politics and national interests will, as ever, drive the response to The Gambia. </p>
<p>A robust and quick response to this crisis may well be legitimate. But it will invariably lead people to wonder why the intervening states were so keen to act swiftly in The Gambia, while similar resolve was not in evidence elsewhere.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/71595/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aidan Hehir does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Military intervention is sanctioned and executed by states. It is thus always a function of state interests rather than the objective enforcement of law. The case of The Gambia is no different.Aidan Hehir, Reader in International Relations, University of WestminsterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/650592016-09-08T13:15:50Z2016-09-08T13:15:50ZWho is winning the battle for the moral high ground in Syria?<p>Outrage. Again. In Syria. The latest cause of anti-Assad angst is an <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/08/25/un-proves-assad-regime-dropped-chemical-bombs-on-civilians/">apparent chlorine gas attack against civilians in Aleppo</a>. The only surprise is that anybody can still be surprised by such activity. </p>
<p>The first and obvious question is: why would the Syrian president order such an attack? The equally obvious answer is: because he can – and because it is effective. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/un-report-holds-assad-responsible-for-chemical-attacks-but-dont-expect-justice-any-time-soon-64697">evidence of the past five years suggests</a> that he will suffer no repercussions. <a href="http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/russia-blocks-un-move-sanction-syria-over-government-chemical-attacks-1055462454">Russia ensures it</a>. </p>
<p>Bashar al-Assad and Vladimir Putin are regularly condemned by US, British and other political leaders and humanitarian organisations. The <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/boris-johnson-attacks-russia-support-assad-syria-killing-machine-a7229596.html">latest critic is Boris Johnson</a>, the UK’s foreign secretary. He refers to Assad’s “killing machine” and Russia’s “seemingly indefensible” protection of the Syrian leader. But Russia’s approach is more sophisticated than blunt, indefensible realpolitik.</p>
<p>There are distinct moral underpinnings to every action in Syria, whether Western, Russian, Assad government and even jihadist. Each competing morality is shaped by the priority given to the individual, the state, or God. Westerners do not have to agree with the arguments, but they should be acknowledged. Also, Western moral assumptions have weaknesses that need to be recognised. </p>
<p>The official Syrian approach is the easiest to understand. Assad, his government and the remnants of Syria as we once knew it are fighting for survival. People will do extreme things in order to survive. The use of chemical weapons against civilians is just one of them. And it is not new.</p>
<p>When Britain was fighting a war of survival against Germany two generations ago, it <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/area_bombing_01.shtml">deliberately bombed civilians</a>. Even as the Allies started to dominate, Winston Churchill <a href="http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/12251410.Memo__From_Winston_Churchill_________To__General_Ismay_________Date__July_6__1944__It_may_be_several_weeks_before_I_ask_you_to_drench_Germany_with_poison_gas__and_if_we__do_it__let_us_do_it_one_hundred_per_cent/">was prepared to use gas</a> if necessary – he’d used it before as secretary of state for war in 1919 <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/shortcuts/2013/sep/01/winston-churchill-shocking-use-chemical-weapons">against Bolshevik troops in Russia</a>.</p>
<p>In Japan, America was not remotely threatened with defeat when it opted to <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/august/6/newsid_3602000/3602189.stm">use the atom bomb against civilians</a>. It was politically, and morally, preferable to sacrificing the lives of countless American soldiers. Those past events are still relevant because out of the Allied victory came the <a href="http://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/">United Nations and its Charter</a> – international law that stands to this day. </p>
<p>Which brings us back to Russian actions in Syria. </p>
<h2>Whose law?</h2>
<p>In 2015, Putin declared that Russia was acting within “the norms of international law”. He means international law based primarily on state sovereignty and the <a href="http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-i/index.htmlf">rights to political independence and non-interference</a>. This must be seen as distinct from international humanitarian law, which <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/document/ihl-icrc-launches-new-guidance-bolstering-relevance-geneva-conventions">seeks to protect individuals in war</a>.</p>
<p>The state – its independence, geographical integrity and interests – is prioritised above the individual in <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50482">Russia’s moral framework</a>. Preserving Syria is an extension of that moral principle and many individuals can be sacrificed for it. A few hundred Syrians with chlorine burns and a few bombed-out hospitals – while terrible in themselves – are therefore seen as a price worth paying.</p>
<p>Such actions are regularly criticised by NGOs and Western governments. They are also routinely ignored or rejected. Such criticism is unimportant in the Russian morality at work in the service of the state.</p>
<h2>Our morality is better than yours</h2>
<p>From philosophers to politicians in the US, UK and elsewhere, there is a commonly held belief that Western morality equals universal morality – that “we” know how to behave and “you” should be like us. Then everything will work out for the better. Except it doesn’t. Consider recent results of Western moral imperialism, backed up by <a href="http://www.newstatesman.com/world-affairs/2014/08/tragic-cycle-western-powers-and-middle-east">military force in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya</a>. Morally-based Western dreams of democratic utopia are dying in the deserts of these countries.</p>
<p>The US and its European allies have naively expected liberated peoples to surge towards the “freedom” of democracy – as if such a thing can ever be given. Instead, the countries they have “helped” in this mission are in violent chaos, and Islamic State and countless Islamist militias are fighting against secularising forces in Syria, Iraq and elsewhere. Many are supported, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-29074514">officially or unofficially</a>, by states such as Iran and Saudi Arabia.</p>
<p>Islamic State, like its religious competitors, <a href="https://researchportal.port.ac.uk/portal/en/projects/perspectives-around-syria-moralities-in-conflict(c8f550ef-3f7c-456f-89e0-eac0cb090eae).html">has its own moral framework</a> as well. Its leaders and fighters do not wake up each day thinking: “We are evil people doing evil things. How can we ensnare the innocent children of the West through our brainwashing?”</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/137070/original/image-20160908-25249-14qycv4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/137070/original/image-20160908-25249-14qycv4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/137070/original/image-20160908-25249-14qycv4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/137070/original/image-20160908-25249-14qycv4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/137070/original/image-20160908-25249-14qycv4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/137070/original/image-20160908-25249-14qycv4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/137070/original/image-20160908-25249-14qycv4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/137070/original/image-20160908-25249-14qycv4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Islamic State uses social media effectively.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Twitter</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Like countless religiously motivated groups over many millennia, they offer an enticing morality that many find attractive: “Join us to escape Western decadent corruption and fight for a new way of living. Be rewarded in a heavenly paradise afterwards.”</p>
<p>Jihadist social media use is sophisticated and enticing. It refers to God, faithfulness, sacrifice, honour, modesty, purity and other morally worthy ambitions. Ignore the contradiction that this purity is achieved through beheadings, torture, forced marriage, rape and deadly homophobia.</p>
<h2>Race to the bottom</h2>
<p>So where does that leave moral considerations in Syria? The Assad and Putin governments, Western powers, regional powers and Islamic State all have their own interests which are justified within opposing moral frameworks. The problem is not that these moral frameworks are all equally valid – they are not. The West is absolutely right to abhor and condemn both beheadings and chemical attacks – but we will not understand the behaviour of these various enemies unless we understand their moral motivations. </p>
<p>The problem is that every interested party thinks its moral framework is superior to everyone else’s. And some are willing to behave brutally in order to prove it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/65059/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>This article draws on ideas from the paper, ‘Perspectives Around Syria: Moralities in Conflict’, by Peter Lee, Tom Smith, Sameera Khalfey, Vladimir Rauta. The compilation of this report from original research by the authors was funded by DSTL.</span></em></p>The problem with Syria is that all sides have their own reasons for acting the way they do – and they all think they’re right.Peter Lee, Reader in Politics and Ethics, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/299072014-07-31T17:03:41Z2014-07-31T17:03:41ZHard Evidence: who uses veto in the UN Security Council most often – and for what?<p>On Thursday July 17, 298 people lost their lives when <a href="https://theconversation.com/topics/flight-mh17">Flight MH17</a> was downed in eastern Ukraine. Almost immediately accusations were made that the aircraft had been shot down by pro-Russian separatists operating in the area. The same day, 25 Palestinians lost their lives (despite a five-hour humanitarian ceasefire being apparently in force) as Israel launched phase two of Operation Protective Edge, among whom were four boys <a href="http://www.dci-palestine.org/documents/eight-children-killed-israeli-airstrikes-over-gaza">killed as they played football on a beach</a>.</p>
<p>Two international crises for the UN Security Council to handle. But the responses could not have been more different. Responding to the downing of MH17, on July 22 the Security Council passed a resolution drafted by Australia that called for for an independent investigation and full access to the site and asked Russia to ensure separatist groups allowed this. Russia was also enjoined to use its influence to bring the conflict in eastern Ukraine to a close. While the resolution may be criticised for not going far enough, it may be seen as a success for the pursuit of international justice in the face of previous Russian intransigence on the eastern Ukraine situation. </p>
<p>Russia had previously vetoed a resolution on the situation in eastern Ukraine and, a mere two months later, chose not to exercise its veto. </p>
<p>Debate on the escalation of Operation Protective Edge in Gaza was heated, with more than 60 states participating and on the day after the Security Council passed its resolution on MH17, the president of the Security Council, <a href="http://rwandaun.org/site/2014/07/22/statement-by-minister-gasana-at-the-un-security-council-open-debate-on-the-situation-in-the-middle-east-including-the-palestine-question/">Eugène-Richard Gasana</a> of Rwanda, made a statement deploring the number of civilian deaths and calling for a cessation of hostilities but recognising Israel’s right to self-defence. </p>
<p>This fairly rote statement, made with the death toll standing at more than 600 civilians (it is now estimated at more than double that) is in stark contrast to the rapid and unanimous resolution on MH17 and – as ever, the pressure is on the Security Council to act to protect civilians. But, as ever, the possibility of a US veto looms over the Council, casting doubts on whether humanitarianism will prevail over national interests.</p>
<p>And here is the irony. When a resolution was mooted over the downing of MH17, many observers expected Russia to exercise its veto right as a member of the P5 – the five permanent members of the Security Council which also includes the US, China, Britain and France. But Russia <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-28412346">voted with the rest of the Security Council</a> (and, let’s not forget, it may well have been in Moscow’s interests to do so, given that it may be that a full investigation finds that Russia is not in any way implicated in the incident as is so widely believed).</p>
<p>These contrasting responses are not an anomaly. The history of the Security Council is replete with similar examples: when an expected veto does not materialise or when a veto blocks action when such action seems all-too necessary. The influence of the veto on the outcome of the Security Council deliberations is well known. But perhaps what is less well known is that Russia is no longer the main offender when it comes to wielding its veto. And that the old “truism” that the veto is exercised solely in pursuit of national interests, may no longer hold.</p>
<h2>Who vetoes what</h2>
<p>The UN Charter <a href="http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter5.shtml">does not explicitly mention the P5’s veto power</a>. Instead it stipulates that, for a resolution to pass, it must receive nine affirmative votes of the 15 member states on the Council, including the concurring votes of the P5. Hence, a negative vote cast by one or more of the P5 is, in essence, a veto. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
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<p>During the Cold War the veto was exercised extensively. The USSR clocked up an impressive 68 vetoes with the US in second place with 61 vetoes - there were other vetoes, often from the USSR or the US, which were simply tit-for-tat blocking of other countries’ applications to be members of the UN – for example Russia blocked Japan, considering it to be too subject to influence from the US, while US blocked Vietnam’s application after 1975. The UN tends to omit these vetoes when calculating its data. </p>
<p>Both states blocked resolutions on their Cold War activities. Thus the USSR vetoed resolutions on its “assistance” to Hungary following the 1956 revolt, its 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia and its 1989 invasion of Afghanistan. The US similarly blocked a resolution on its 1983 invasion of Grenada while its involvement in the Vietnam War was not even considered by the Security Council. The US also blocked resolutions on its activities in support of the Contra rebels in Nicaragua – activities which the <a href="http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=367&p1=3&p2=3&case=70&p3=5">International Court of Justice found illegal in 1986</a>. </p>
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<p>Britain has used its veto most often over southern Africa – including South Africa and Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), acting, in the main, in concert with the US and, less often, France. This intransigence was set against an increasingly vociferous General Assembly on the issue of racism generally and the situations in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa specifically. The UK also consistently blocked, at times with help from the US and France, resolutions on the independence of Namibia. This was notwithstanding repeated General Assembly resolutions and an <a href="http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/?p1=3&p2=4&k=a7&case=53&code=nam&p3=4">advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice</a>.</p>
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<p>The use of the veto during the Cold War is a story of the pursuit of national interests - even in the face of contrary world opinion and reasoned judicial decisions. That said, the Security Council did manage to pass more than 600 resolutions between 1945 - 1989. While many of these pertained to more procedural matters, such as the admission of states and the appointment of the Secretary-General, neither matter was immune from the vagaries of cold war rivalries and the national interest. </p>
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<p>Towards the end of the Cold War, there was a decline in the use of the veto which has continued into the post-Cold War era. Some 29 resolutions have been vetoed with 35 no votes cast by the US, Russia and China. The UK and France last exercised their veto in 1989 (on Panama). The US is now the most frequent user of the veto having resorted to the veto 16 times between Jan 1990 and the present – the overwhelming majority of which (14) pertain to the Israel/Palestine situation. </p>
<p>The Russian Federaion (as distinct from the USSR) comes in second with 11 vetoes – six of which have been issued jointly with China. China has also used its veto (along with Russia) to block a Security Council resolution condemning political repression in Myanmar. Both states were concerned that the Security Council was overstepping its international peace and security mandate by <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/12/AR2007011201115.html">unduly interfering in the internal affairs of Myanmar</a>. They <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jul/11/unitednations.zimbabwe">offered similar reasons</a> for blocking a comparable resolution on the situation in Zimbabwe in 2008. China, in particular, has resisted the turn to humanitarianism to justify a role for the Security Council in what it sees as the internal affairs of states. </p>
<p>However, the concern as to respecting principles of the charter – specifically the principle of non-interference – came to a head in 2012 with the Libyan situation. The UN had previously endorsed the idea of the responsibility to protect populations from atrocity crimes and references to it peppered the <a href="http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10574.doc.htm">Security Council debates and resolutions on Libya</a>. Notably, Russia and China refrained from exercising the veto, arguably putting humanitarianism above respect for the principle of non-interference and, perhaps national interests. </p>
<p>However, both saw the consequent intervention as going too far and, <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/01/world/middleeast/battle-over-possible-united-nations-resolution-on-syria-intensifies.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0">as shown by the four vetoed resolutions on Syria</a>, returned to citing Security Council over-reach and the principle of non-interference.</p>
<h2>What now for the Security Council?</h2>
<p>There’s no doubt that the number of vetoes used at the Security Council has fallen since the end of the Cold War and the break-up of the USSR – while the number of resolutions, in particular unanimous resolutions, has grown exponentially over the same period, suggesting a co-operative and working Security Council. Yet the veto remains and arguments continue as to how and when it is used. The debate has evolved beyond national interests to include observing the letter, or the spirit, of the UN Charter, and protecting the most vulnerable at times of humanitarian crisis. </p>
<p>Following the deadlock over Syria – and drawing on the <a href="http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/responsibility.shtml">Responsibility to Protect</a> – France proposed a <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/04/opinion/a-call-for-self-restraint-at-the-un.html">“code of conduct” for the P5</a>. Here, the permanent members would pledge not to use the veto in cases of humanitarian crises, especially where atrocity crimes are at issue. It is the latest in a long line of such proposals and the worsening humanitarian situation in Gaza shows a Security Council torn between national interests and humanitarianism. Perhaps it is time to decide who or what the Security Council is for. </p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/29907/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Emma McClean does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>On Thursday July 17, 298 people lost their lives when Flight MH17 was downed in eastern Ukraine. Almost immediately accusations were made that the aircraft had been shot down by pro-Russian separatists…Emma McClean, Senior lecturer in Law, University of WestminsterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.