tag:theconversation.com,2011:/fr/topics/united-arab-emirates-17017/articlesUnited Arab Emirates – The Conversation2024-03-18T16:52:03Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2257482024-03-18T16:52:03Z2024-03-18T16:52:03ZVladimir Putin’s gold strategy explains why sanctions against Russia have failed<p><a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/russia-sanctions-economy-1.7141305">There are more than 16,000 sanctions imposed against Russia</a>. Yet the Russian economy and war machine grew by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-gdp-boost-military-spending-belies-wider-economic-woes-2024-02-07/">3.6 per cent in 2023 and is projected to grow another 2.6 per cent in 2024</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/90753">Nearly six per cent of Russia’s gross domestic product goes towards military spending</a>. At a time when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is scrambling to acquire arms, funds and recruits, Vladimir Putin seems <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/putin-s-confidence-heading-2024">confident in his ambitions for the future</a>.</p>
<p>How have <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/russia-sanctions-economy-1.7141305">16,000 strategic sanctions issued by some of the most powerful economies in the world</a> failed to derail Putin? </p>
<p>As I recently watched the news break on CBC about Russia’s robust economy, an advertisement from <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-ZRGt5Mj4tU">the World Gold Council</a> popped onto the screen. And there was the answer, hiding in plain sight: Gold.</p>
<h2>The role of gold</h2>
<p>Sanctions against Russia needed to be strategic, targeting the environment it operates in.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/smart-sanctions-for-a-stupid-war-the-west-finally-gets-clever-about-russia-196105">Smart sanctions for a stupid war: The West finally gets clever about Russia</a>
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<p>Economic sanctions targeted shipping and trade into Russia, but the gold market is a massive environment left largely untouched. After Russia invaded Ukraine two years ago, <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-cracks-down-on-gold-and-oil-networks-propping-up-russias-war-economy">the United Kingdom, a major gold broker with one of the world’s largest gold reserves, cut all Russian imports of gold into the U.K</a>. </p>
<p>According to the <a href="https://www.gold.org/what-we-do?gad_source=1&gclid=Cj0KCQjwqdqvBhCPARIsANrmZhMH6km3d7zz-Sx3e4A64LwKNb1Qa7l7mivRcH9Fa7UXsCgnSri8IvIaAu9PEALw_wcB">World Gold Council</a>, Russia is now the second largest producer of gold at <a href="https://www.mining-technology.com/data-insights/gold-in-russia/">324.7 tonnes in 2023, behind China at 374 million tonnes. Russia is expected to increase production of gold by four per cent a year until 2026</a>.</p>
<p>Since 2013, Russia has been <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2024/03/11/why-russia-has-been-so-resilient-to-western-export-controls-pub-91894">preparing for western sanctions</a> and managed to isolate its economy from transactions requiring American dollars.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.nationalheraldindia.com/international/russias-currency-bounces-back-after-moscow-mandates-payment-for-gas-in-gold-pegged-ruble">In early 2022, Russia pegged its currency, the ruble, to gold</a>, and 5,000 rubles will now buy an ounce of pure gold. The plan was to shift the currency away from a pegged value and into the gold standard itself so the <a href="https://bullionexchanges.com/blog/russia-pegs-ruble-to-gold-what-does-that-mean-to-the-world-order">ruble would become a credible gold substitute at a fixed rate</a>. </p>
<p>Usually the rationale for holding on to gold reserves is to use them to settle foreign transactions at home and abroad. Gold holders can trade it on one of several bullion exchanges; it can be swapped for currencies to settle transactions and then swapped back into bullion.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/maduro-to-tap-sanctioned-dealmaker-to-ship-gold-to-iran-1.1433389">Venezuela, for example — a heavily sanctioned country — sent gold bullion to Iran in exchange for technical assistance with oil production.</a></p>
<p>Usually countries want gold <a href="https://doi.org/10.5089/9798400229947.001">as a safety backing to insulate against broader global financial shocks</a>. Many central banks are purchasing gold at breakneck pace, with about <a href="https://www.gold.org/goldhub/research/gold-demand-trends/gold-demand-trends-full-year-2023/central-banks">1,073 tonnes purchased in 2022</a>. A single tonne is about US$65 million, which means $110.6 billion in gold went into central banks globally in 2023.</p>
<h2>Gold prices fluctuate</h2>
<p>China is the world’s leading producer of gold, and also the world’s second largest buyer of it. <a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-product/gold/reporter/chn">China imported US$67.6 billion in gold in 2022</a>, whereas <a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/country/che">Switzerland took top place by importing US$94.9 billion</a>. </p>
<p>China’s appetite for gold has a great deal to do with stabilizing its own currency. In 2022, if someone purchased a new condo in Shanghai, often the developer would throw in a few <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/12/gold-bars-used-to-lure-chinese-homebuyers-amid-market-slowdown">gold bars to sweeten the deal</a>. </p>
<p>The World Gold Council argues that gold is the safest place to invest in times of conflict. But if that were true, there would have been a permanent bull market for gold dating back to <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/071414/when-and-why-do-gold-prices-plummet.asp">Tutankhamen, making the price today infinite</a>. </p>
<p>Its price rises and falls like anything else. Which is why Putin’s goal of turning the ruble into pure gold is not genius, it is desperate.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-russia-has-put-the-rouble-on-a-gold-standard-but-its-unlikely-to-last-180632">Why Russia has put the rouble on a gold standard – but it's unlikely to last</a>
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<p>The U.K., the United States and Canada will not touch Russian gold. But others will. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/russia-with-gold-uae-cashes-sanctions-bite-2023-05-25/">The United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) imported 96.4 tonnes (US$6.2 billion)</a> of Russian gold in 2022 following the British sanctions. That’s up 15 times from the 2021 imports of only 1.3 tonnes (US$84.5 million). </p>
<p>It’s no mystery why so many <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/private-jets-go-russia-dubai-after-putin-pledges-self-cleansing-2022-3">private jets left Russia for Dubai</a> following the war and ensuing sanctions. </p>
<p>The other big client of Russian gold is Switzerland. </p>
<p>In 2022, Switzerland imported 75 tonnes of Russian gold (US$4.87 billion). <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-09-20/swiss-imports-of-russian-gold-climb-to-highest-since-april-2020">In 2023, it imported about US$8.22 billion</a> in gold from the U.A.E., which doesn’t produce its own but buys enormous sums from Russia, and US$3.92 billion from Uzbekistan, Russia’s next-door neighbour. </p>
<p>Billions upon billions of dollars of Russian gold is being freely traded at top dollar while avoiding every one of those 16,000 sanctions. </p>
<p>That’s why global sanctions against Russia haven’t derailed a thing. In order for Putin’s plan for economic resilience through gold to work, however, gold needs to increase in value. His long-term goal is that gold, not the U.S. dollar, will be the global trading currency. </p>
<h2>Consumer activism</h2>
<p>Here’s where average citizens come in, and how they can help determine what’s to come.</p>
<p>Right now, if you’re a Costco member, <a href="https://www.costco.ca/1-oz-gold-bar-pamp-suisse-lady-fortuna-veriscan-new-in-assay.product.4000201245.html">you can order an ounce of Swiss gold for CA$3,045</a> (limit two per member, and no refunds). This is not a speculative investment. Physical gold will not quadruple in value by Christmas. </p>
<p>Instead, buying gold is a <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/071414/when-and-why-do-gold-prices-plummet.asp">guard against inflation and currency devaluation</a> in times of uncertainty. It’s the doomsday currency, which is why the World Gold Council advertises gold on cable news networks in exactly that vein. </p>
<p>If North American consumers, central banks and investors are panicked enough to buy gold en masse, the price will go up, and Putin’s plan works. </p>
<p>In the last quarter of 2023, American consumers purchased more than <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/12/15/costco-sold-more-than-100-million-in-gold-bars-last-quarter.html">US$100 million in gold bars through Costco alone</a>. </p>
<p>Is there actual Russian gold in those bars? Between Switzerland’s 2022 gold purchases from Russia and the 2023 purchases from the U.A.E., it’s likely there is.</p>
<p>If people are worried about the ethics of purchasing Russian gold, they can always buy <a href="https://www.costco.ca/1-oz-gold-coin-2024-canadian-maple-leaf.product.4000258262.html">the single-source Canadian Maple Leaf gold coin</a>. It comes from Québec, and as demand for coins like this increases, so too does the price of gold overall. </p>
<p>Still, bars and coins cannot compete with the power of demand from the central banks, and currently it’s high.</p>
<h2>Tarnishing gold</h2>
<p>To thwart Putin’s plan, the lustre needs to be removed from gold. Increasing gold supply could lower the price. Australia, Canada and the U.S. have important roles to play as leading gold producers. </p>
<p>Rising interest rates also tend to lower gold prices. A mass sell-off of government holdings in gold could also cause a tailspin for the ruble, but likely for the U.S. and Canadian dollars as well.</p>
<p>No single policy can thwart Putin’s goals — it requires disrupting the supply of gold beyond Russia, and that might well mean involving the U.A.E.</p>
<p>But with 16,000 sanctions on the books against Russia, one more smart sanction against the Emirates might be the golden egg Zelenskyy needs right now.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225748/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Huish received funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council. </span></em></p>Russia has tied its currency to gold to evade sanctions. Shifting the ruble away from a pegged value and into the gold standard itself is aimed at making it a credible gold substitute at a fixed rate.Robert Huish, Associate Professor in International Development Studies, Dalhousie UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2245132024-02-28T04:09:29Z2024-02-28T04:09:29ZDutton wants a ‘mature debate’ about nuclear power. By the time we’ve had one, new plants will be too late to replace coal<p>If you believe Newspoll and the Australian Financial Review, Australia wants to go nuclear – as long as it’s small. </p>
<p>Newspoll this week <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/most-australians-would-back-a-move-to-small-scale-nuclear-power/news-story/88589682d1d46b8257c0386f61d51aa6">suggests a majority</a> of us are in favour of building small modular nuclear reactors. A <a href="https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/afr-readers-want-small-nuclear-reactors-considered-20230723-p5dqi9">poll of Australian Financial Review readers</a> last year told a similar story.</p>
<p>These polls (and a more general question about nuclear power in a <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/voters-warm-to-nuclear-as-billionaire-andrew-forrest-slams-coalition-bulldust-20240226-p5f7wo.html">Resolve poll</a> for Nine newspapers this week) come after a concerted effort by the Coalition to normalise talking about nuclear power – specifically, the small, modular kind that’s meant to be cheaper and safer. Unfortunately, while small reactors have been around for decades, they are <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0360544223015980">generally costlier</a> than larger reactors with a similar design. This reflects the economies of size associated with larger boilers. </p>
<p>The hope (and it’s still only a hope) is “modular” design will permit reactors to be built in factories in large numbers (and therefore at low cost), then shipped to the sites where they are installed.</p>
<p>Coalition enthusiasm for talking about small modular reactors has not been dented by the failure of the only serious proposal to build them: that of NuScale, a company that designs and markets these reactors in the United States. Faced with long delays and increases in the projected costs of the <a href="https://www.nuscalepower.com/en/products/voygr-smr-plants">Voygr reactor</a>, the intended buyers, a <a href="https://www.uamps.com/">group of municipal power utilities</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/nov/09/small-modular-nuclear-reactor-that-was-hailed-by-coalition-as-future-cancelled-due-to-rising-costs">pulled the plug</a>. The project had a decade of development behind it but had not even reached prototype stage. </p>
<p>Other proposals to build small modular reactors abound but none are likely to be constructed anywhere before the mid-2030s, if at all. Even if they work as planned (<a href="https://www.energycouncil.com.au/analysis/small-nuclear-reactors-come-with-big-price-tag-report/">a big if</a>), they will arrive too late to replace coal power in Australia. So Opposition Leader Peter Dutton needs to put up a detailed plan for how he would deliver nuclear power in time.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/is-nuclear-the-answer-to-australias-climate-crisis-216891">Is nuclear the answer to Australia's climate crisis?</a>
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<h2>So why would Australians support nuclear?</h2>
<p>It is worth looking at the claim that Australians support nuclear power. This was the question the Newspoll asked:</p>
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<p>There is a proposal to build several small modular nuclear reactors around Australia to produce zero-emissions energy on the sites of existing coal-fired power stations once they are retired. Do you approve or disapprove of this proposal?</p>
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<p>This question assumes two things. First, that small modular reactors exist. Second, that someone is proposing to build and operate them, presumably expecting they can do so at a cost low enough to compete with alternative energy sources. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, neither is true. Nuclear-generated power <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-nuclear-the-answer-to-australias-climate-crisis-216891">costs up to ten times as much</a> as solar and wind energy. A more accurate phrasing of the question would be:</p>
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<p>There is a proposal to keep coal-fired power stations operating until the development of small modular reactors which might, in the future, supply zero-emissions energy. Do you approve or disapprove of this proposal?</p>
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<p>It seems unlikely such a proposal would gain majority support.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/military-interests-are-pushing-new-nuclear-power-and-the-uk-government-has-finally-admitted-it-216118">Military interests are pushing new nuclear power – and the UK government has finally admitted it</a>
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<h2>Building nuclear takes a long time</h2>
<p>When we consider the timeline for existing reactor projects, the difficulties with nuclear power come into sharp focus.</p>
<p>As National Party Senate Leader Bridget McKenzie has <a href="https://www.skynews.com.au/australia-news/politics/that-is-rubbish-bridget-zali-steggall-and-bridget-mckenzie-clash-over-nuclear/video/652fb62845ef39da803325f0f14bd49d">pointed out</a>, the most successful recent implementation of nuclear power has been in the United Arab Emirates. In 2008, the UAE president (and emir of Abi Dhabi), Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, announced a plan to build four nuclear reactors. Construction started in 2012. The last reactor is about to be connected to the grid, 16 years after the project was announced.</p>
<p>The UAE’s performance is better than that achieved recently <a href="https://www.sustainabilitybynumbers.com/p/nuclear-construction-time">in Western countries</a> including the US, UK, France and Finland.</p>
<p>In 16 years’ time, by 2040, most of Australia’s remaining coal-fired power stations will have shut down. Suppose the Coalition gained office in 2025 on a program of advocating nuclear power and managed to pass the necessary legislation in 2026. If we could match the pace of the UAE, nuclear power stations would start coming online just in time to replace them. </p>
<p>If we spent three to five years discussing the issue, then matched the UAE schedule, the plants would arrive too late.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/dutton-wants-australia-to-join-the-nuclear-renaissance-but-this-dream-has-failed-before-209584">Dutton wants Australia to join the "nuclear renaissance" – but this dream has failed before</a>
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<h2>It would take longer in Australia</h2>
<p>Would it be possible to match the UAE schedule? The UAE had no need to pass legislation: it doesn’t have a parliament like ours, let alone a Senate that can obstruct government legislation. The necessary institutions, including a regulatory commission and a publicly owned nuclear power firm, were established by decree.</p>
<p>There were no problems with site selection, not to mention environmental impact statements and court actions. The site at Barakah was conveniently located on an almost uninhabited stretch of desert coastline, but still close enough to the main population centres to permit a connection to transmission lines, access for workers, and so on. There’s nowhere in Australia’s eastern states (where the power is needed) that matches that description.</p>
<p>Finally, there are no problems with strikes or union demands: both are illegal in the UAE. Foreign workers with even less rights than Emirati citizens did almost all the construction work.</p>
<p>Despite all these advantages, the UAE has not gone any further with nuclear power. Instead of building more reactors after the first four, it’s <a href="https://www.khaleejtimes.com/energy/uae-new-1500mw-solar-plant-to-be-developed-in-abu-dhabi-will-power-160000-homes">investing massively</a> in solar power and battery storage.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/climate-minister-chris-bowen-says-replacing-coal-fired-power-stations-with-nuclear-would-cost-387-billion-213735">Climate minister Chris Bowen says replacing coal-fired power stations with nuclear would cost $387 billion</a>
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<h2>Time to start work is running out</h2>
<p>The Coalition began calling for a “<a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/peter-dutton-calls-for-mature-debate-over-nuclear-energy/news-story/bb023ce4ee8691c1709b772876f6beca">mature debate</a>” on nuclear <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2022/jun/06/the-coalition-didnt-do-much-on-nuclear-energy-while-in-office-why-are-they-talking-about-it-now">immediately after losing office</a>. </p>
<p>But it’s now too late for discussion. If Australia is to replace any of our retiring coal-fired power stations with nuclear reactors, Dutton must commit to this goal before the 2025 election. </p>
<p>Talk about hypothetical future technologies is, at this point, nothing more than a distraction. If Dutton is serious about nuclear power in Australia, he needs to put forward a plan now. It must spell out a realistic timeline that includes the establishment of necessary regulation, the required funding model and the sites to be considered.</p>
<p>In summary, it’s time to put up or shut up.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224513/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Quiggin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Small modular reactors are popular among conservative politicians and supposedly the Australian public. But they’re nowhere near ready to power Australia in time to replace coal-powered stations.John Quiggin, Professor, School of Economics, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2185232024-01-21T19:02:45Z2024-01-21T19:02:45ZI felt nothing at Madame Tussauds – until I found my brother’s statue, and felt love<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/561678/original/file-20231126-26-i4zlza.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=124%2C0%2C5418%2C2002&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Encountering my brother and his wax double.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Cherine Fahd</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Spitting image, dead ringer, chip off the old block. Doubles, twins and doppelgangers have a funny way of tricking us. </p>
<p>When I encountered <a href="https://www.artgallery.nsw.gov.au/collection/works/326.2011/">Anne Zahalka’s photo portrait of Nicole Kidman</a> at the Art Gallery of New South Wales, I assumed what I was looking at was a straightforward representation of the Hollywood actress. </p>
<p>Then I discovered that the portrait was, in fact, Kidman’s wax double at Madame Tussauds. By photographing a wax double, Zahalka reproduced a copy, intensifying the duplication of an already replicated image.</p>
<p>Beyond Zahalka’s portrait of Kidman, my encounter with Madame Tussauds had been nil. Truthfully, the global tourist attraction had never been on my bucket list, until now. </p>
<p>In October 2021, Madame Tussauds Dubai revealed a life-size wax figure <a href="https://www.khaleejtimes.com/news/watch-dubai-celebrity-rj-kris-fade-reacts-to-his-madame-tussauds-wax-figure">of my brother Kristan Fahd,</a> known for the past 16 years in the United Arab Emirates as radio entertainer Kris Fade. </p>
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<span class="caption">My parents meet their son’s wax figure at Madame Tussauds.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Cherine Fahd</span></span>
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<h2>My other brother</h2>
<p>My brother hosts the UAE’s number-one morning radio program, The Kris Fade Show, on Virgin Radio. His breakfast show can be heard across Australia on Sunday mornings on KIIS FM. Last year, he also joined the cast of Netflix’s Dubai Bling. And if that’s not enough to keep him busy, he founded a Dubai-based healthy snack company, Fade Fit, in 2018. All this made him endearingly popular enough to attract his own wax figure.</p>
<p>With his family in Sydney, Kris shared photographs of his wax effigy online. We were excited by this public recognition of his contribution to culture in the UAE. In our family group chat we collectively celebrated this illustrious milestone. </p>
<p>But it wasn’t until I visited Madame Tussauds Dubai with him and my family in March 2022 that the strangeness of such an encounter set in. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/561656/original/file-20231126-20-o74xmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="The wax figure and his beard." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/561656/original/file-20231126-20-o74xmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/561656/original/file-20231126-20-o74xmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561656/original/file-20231126-20-o74xmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561656/original/file-20231126-20-o74xmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561656/original/file-20231126-20-o74xmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561656/original/file-20231126-20-o74xmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561656/original/file-20231126-20-o74xmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">I was examining the details up close.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Cherine Fahd</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Encountering Lady Gaga, Posh and Becks, Taylor Swift and Tom Cruise registered the typical expression of “Wow, aren’t they so lifelike!” </p>
<p>But encountering a sibling – a person I love, the brother whose face feels and looks like my face – is an altogether different experience. </p>
<p>At first, I watched as fans came and went, posing with his statue in a replica radio studio and feeling lucky because they happened to come on the day the real Kris Fade was there. </p>
<p>I watched my parents turn the corner and enter the room to encounter their son. It appeared like a slow-motion scene from a romantic movie, deaccelerated for my benefit, the artist daughter with the watchful eye. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/561654/original/file-20231126-15-yki5f4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/561654/original/file-20231126-15-yki5f4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/561654/original/file-20231126-15-yki5f4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=1066&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561654/original/file-20231126-15-yki5f4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=1066&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561654/original/file-20231126-15-yki5f4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=1066&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561654/original/file-20231126-15-yki5f4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1339&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561654/original/file-20231126-15-yki5f4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1339&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561654/original/file-20231126-15-yki5f4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1339&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Dad greets his son.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Cherine Fahd</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>My father spontaneously wept. It was as if my brother had been resurrected. My mother, also in tears, could not keep her hands off him. She stroked and touched and blessed him. When she tried to kiss his face with her Chanel red lips, my brother had to stop her: “Mum, you’re not allowed to touch me.” </p>
<p>“I love you,” she whispered to the statue. </p>
<p>Then, our London-based relatives approached and took photos with the two of him. I listened intently as they chatted and laughed, amazed by the realism of the statue and the fame that a Madame Tussauds wax figure gestures toward. </p>
<p>Then, it was my turn to approach. I didn’t touch. I got right up close and looked straight into his shining black eyes. It was these tiny details that moved me most. I took a photo with both my brothers and left. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/561658/original/file-20231126-25-ivda9t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Cherine with her brother and his doppelgänger." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/561658/original/file-20231126-25-ivda9t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/561658/original/file-20231126-25-ivda9t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561658/original/file-20231126-25-ivda9t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561658/original/file-20231126-25-ivda9t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561658/original/file-20231126-25-ivda9t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561658/original/file-20231126-25-ivda9t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561658/original/file-20231126-25-ivda9t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An uncanny and emotional experience, the author posing with the two Kris’ at Madame Tussauds Dubai.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Cherine Fahd</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/im-a-photographer-who-wanted-to-be-more-present-in-my-life-so-i-put-down-the-camera-212534">I’m a photographer who wanted to be more present in my life – so I put down the camera</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Feeling love</h2>
<p>I returned a year and a half after my first encounter for a private visit. I wanted to study the statue without my brother and family in tow. </p>
<p>It was quiet, and the statue was in a new setting. From an Arabian desert scene, he appeared to be welcoming visitors to Dubai. </p>
<p>I got to work studying the statue the way an artist does. I saw that every hair on his face and head appeared in the right place. His stubble appeared just like the one that scratches my face when we hug and kiss. </p>
<p>The big gothic punk rings on his fingers, so idiosyncratic, were exact. The open chest stance, the tattoos peering out from under the clothes, the muscle shirt – all his signature style. His long hair and man bun, the curl of his lip, the size of his nose, his diamond piercings and his affectionate posture perfectly resembled my brother. </p>
<p>Then I turned my attention to myself. What was I, his big sister, an artist, bringing to this encounter? I felt nothing in front of the other statues. In front of him, I felt love. I placed my hand on his hand and thanked him for the ease of our affection. </p>
<p>Seeing resemblances is easy. But it was at the level of feeling that I understood the most. This wax figure was displaced by sibling attachment. It was not a Madame Tussauds wax figure of a celebrity. It was my brother. Not a replica, but him. At the level of feeling, they were one and the same. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/561679/original/file-20231126-26-a02xa6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Kris takes a photo of his wax figure." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/561679/original/file-20231126-26-a02xa6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/561679/original/file-20231126-26-a02xa6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561679/original/file-20231126-26-a02xa6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561679/original/file-20231126-26-a02xa6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561679/original/file-20231126-26-a02xa6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=571&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561679/original/file-20231126-26-a02xa6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=571&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561679/original/file-20231126-26-a02xa6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=571&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Kris seeing Kris.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Cherine Fahd</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Kris and I discussed his wax double. I shared my personal experience, and he expressed a fascination with the unavoidable reversal of the Picture of Dorian Gray. In contrast to Dorian’s perpetual youth, my brother contemplates the mortal experience of growing older while witnessing the everlasting shine of his immortal self. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/drawing-data-i-make-art-from-the-bodily-experience-of-long-distance-running-182762">Drawing data: I make art from the bodily experience of long-distance running</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218523/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kris Fade is the author's brother.</span></em></p>Madame Tussauds Dubai is home a life-size wax figure of my brother Kristan Fahd, also known as radio entertainer Kris Fade.Cherine Fahd, Associate Professor Visual Communication, University of Technology SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2201422023-12-20T13:38:01Z2023-12-20T13:38:01ZWhy the COP28 climate summit mattered, and what to watch for in 2024<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/566693/original/file-20231219-17-i3ffem.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=6%2C9%2C2038%2C1352&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry and his Chinese counterpart, Xie Zhenhua, had front-row seats at COP28's final session. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/unfccc/53394837161/in/album-72177720313353788/">Kiara Worth/UN Climate Change via Flickr,</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Reading down the lengthy <a href="https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2023_L17_adv.pdf">final agreement of the COP28</a> United Nations climate conference held in December 2023, you’ll go a long way before finding a strong, active verb. The lengthy recitation of climate impacts “notes with concern” and occasionally with “significant concern” <a href="https://www.unep.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-2023">glaring gaps</a> in countries’ current policies. But while countries volunteered pledges to act, they were less keen to have those pledges framed as binding agreements in the final text.</p>
<p>Reactions to COP28’s conclusion have been understandably mixed. Going into the talks, the world was <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/qa-what-is-the-global-stocktake-and-could-it-accelerate-climate-action/">more on track</a> to avert catastrophic warming than it would have been without the <a href="https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement">2015 Paris Agreement</a>, but a long way from where it needs to be.</p>
<p>Even <a href="https://www.iea.org/news/iea-assessment-of-the-evolving-pledges-at-cop28">if all the pledges made at COP28 are implemented</a>, the world will still exceed the Paris goal of keeping global warming under 1.5 degrees Celsius (2.7 Fahrenheit) compared to preindustrial temperatures.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/566601/original/file-20231219-27-qde9s6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Chart shows if all COP28 pledges were met, the world would be closer to the goal of keeping emissions under 1.5 C but not on track." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/566601/original/file-20231219-27-qde9s6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/566601/original/file-20231219-27-qde9s6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/566601/original/file-20231219-27-qde9s6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/566601/original/file-20231219-27-qde9s6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/566601/original/file-20231219-27-qde9s6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=462&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/566601/original/file-20231219-27-qde9s6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=462&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/566601/original/file-20231219-27-qde9s6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=462&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Climate Action Tracker assessment of countries’ pledges at COP28 to reduce emissions shows progress toward the 2030 goal, but a large gap.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://climateactiontracker.org/publications/cop28-initiatives-create-buzz-will-only-reduce-emissions-if-followed-through/">Copyright Climate Analytics and NewClimate Institute</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Politically, the agreement may have been the best that nations could reach at this time of <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/middle-east/age-great-power-distraction-kimmage-notte">rising geopolitical tensions</a> and under the leadership of the United Arab Emirates. The UAE is a country of contradictions – a petrostate with renewable energy ambitions, keen to emerge onto the global stage as a green champion, but also <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/nov/30/the-new-scramble-for-africa-how-a-uae-sheikh-quietly-made-carbon-deals-for-forests-bigger-than-uk">accused of colonization tactics</a> in Africa.</p>
<p>Most headlines have focused on the COP28 agreement’s mention of fossil fuels for the first time. The convoluted language called for countries to “<a href="https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2023_L17_adv.pdf">contribute” to</a> “transitioning away from fossil fuels,” not the phaseout supported by a majority of countries. With an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/dec/05/record-number-of-fossil-fuel-lobbyists-get-access-to-cop28-climate-talks">unprecedented number of energy industry lobbyists</a> on hand, the consensus was described by the most vulnerable countries as a <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-cop28-failed-the-worlds-small-islands-219938">litany of loopholes</a>.</p>
<p>The final agreement was, in large parts, written in a way to secure the future of the natural gas industry. It portrayed natural gas as a necessary bridge fuel while renewable energy expands, an argument that was <a href="https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-outlook-2023">disproved by the International Energy Agency</a> before COP28. The agreement also furthered the expectation of continued heavy subsidies for carbon capture and storage, which many energy analysts and economists have dismissed as <a href="https://apnews.com/article/carbon-capture-removal-cop28-fossil-fuels-oil-gas-2bc53c6a8df6d337c1afcabad56377e8">unscalable at a reasonable cost</a>.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, the UAE blasted through some of the old shibboleths of climate negotiation. It broke the polarity of climate finance – the Global South waiting for the Global North to fulfill its promises of public finance – by <a href="https://www.climatechangenews.com/2023/12/10/what-is-alterra-the-uaes-30-billion-green-investment-fund/">focusing on private investment</a> and putting tens of billions of dollars of its sovereign wealth into play. It was not able to persuade others to match its generosity, but there will be more pressure in 2024.</p>
<p>So, what should we look for in the coming months?</p>
<h2>1. Turning new energy pledges into action</h2>
<p>COP28 included <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/af71fc48-b89f-4920-a35b-2867b7adcc0c">significant commitments toward an energy transition</a> away from fossil fuels, including pledges to triple <a href="https://www.cop28.com/en/global-renewables-and-energy-efficiency-pledge">renewable energy capacity, increase energy efficiency</a> and cut <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/2/at-cop28-oil-companies-pledge-to-lower-methane-emissions">methane emissions</a>.</p>
<p>Now it’s up to countries and companies to show progress. That will depend on investments and overcoming supply bottlenecks, as well as new policies and, in the case of methane, <a href="https://www.piie.com/publications/policy-briefs/how-international-agreement-methane-emissions-can-pave-way-enhanced">standards for imports and exports</a>.</p>
<p>The new <a href="https://www.unep.org/resources/report/global-cooling-pledge">Global Cooling Pledge</a> to reduce emissions from cooling by 68% while increasing access to cooling technology is increasingly critical. <a href="https://www.iea.org/energy-system/buildings/space-cooling">Demand for cooling is driving up energy demand</a> across the globe, particularly in populous countries hard hit by extreme heat, such as India. Developing technologies that help the billions of people most at risk and improve cold supply chains for food and medicine will require more investment and greater priority from governments.</p>
<p>Watch for <a href="https://www.climateresilience.org/">more cities to appoint heat czars</a> to spearhead efforts to protect populations from extreme heat, <a href="https://time.com/6336537/america-tree-equity-urban-climate-solution/">adoption of tree equity plans</a> to increase shade and cooling, and more investment in cooling technologies.</p>
<h2>2. Deploying innovations in finance</h2>
<p>COP28 saw significant innovation in finance, including the UAE’s announcement of the Alterra Fund – a <a href="https://www.climatechangenews.com/2023/12/10/what-is-alterra-the-uaes-30-billion-green-investment-fund/">$30 billion commitment</a> to mobilize private investment in developing countries.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.iosco.org/news/pdf/IOSCONEWS717.pdf">International Organization of Securities Commissions</a> sent a strong statement in support of <a href="https://www.ifrs.org/groups/international-sustainability-standards-board/">corporate sustainability disclosure standards</a> and welcomed <a href="https://icvcm.org/icvcm-and-vcmi-join-forces-to-operationalize-a-high-integrity-market-to-accelerate-global-climate-action/">corporate integrity standards in the voluntary carbon markets</a>. Look for more countries to add rules around <a href="https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/net-zero-coalition">“net-zero emissions” pledges</a>.</p>
<h2>3. Putting trade to work for the climate</h2>
<p>Linked to finance and investment is trade, which <a href="https://www.thebanker.com/How-trade-and-trade-finance-can-assist-the-transition-to-net-zero-1701941013">COP28 welcomed</a> to the main stage for the first time.</p>
<p>There are two things to look for in 2024. First, look for the World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to align their advice to governments on effective carbon pricing.</p>
<p>Second, while trade and climate negotiators traditionally move in different circles, they will <a href="https://earth.org/free-trade-agreement/">need to work together</a> to ensure the trade system supports climate action. For example, making sure green products and services are not made more expensive than their polluting alternatives.</p>
<h2>4. Fixing the carbon markets</h2>
<p>2023 was a year of pushback on the voluntary carbon markets, as <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/18/revealed-forest-carbon-offsets-biggest-provider-worthless-verra-aoe">investigations questioned their effectiveness</a>. COP28’s failure to advance agreements on carbon markets under <a href="https://www.undp.org/energy/blog/what-article-6-paris-agreement-and-why-it-important">Article 6 of the Paris Agreement</a> means they will be a focus in 2024.</p>
<p>In this case, <a href="https://carbonmarketwatch.org/2023/12/13/cop28-article-6-failure-avoids-a-worse-outcome/">no deal was better than a bad deal</a>, but the delay means countries that plan to use carbon markets to meet their net-zero targets are left with uncertainty.</p>
<h2>5. Getting more adaptation funding where it’s needed</h2>
<p>An agreement on a global goal on adaptation, a collective commitment to build resilience and adaptive capacity across the world, was finally reached, but negotiators left the <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/guest-post-what-would-an-ambitious-global-goal-on-adaptation-look-like-at-cop28/">details to be filled in over the next two years</a>.</p>
<p>To get adaptation funding flowing to where it is most needed, top-down discussions will need to start, including <a href="https://www.wri.org/initiatives/locally-led-adaptation/principles-locally-led-adaptation">locally led efforts</a>. Look for adaptation to become a much bigger part of countries’ second-generation climate plans to be submitted to the U.N. before COP30.</p>
<h2>6. Turning new food and ag pledges into action</h2>
<p>A majority of the world’s countries, 159, signed the <a href="https://www.cop28.com/en/food-and-agriculture">UAE Declaration on Sustainable Agriculture, Resilient Food Systems and Climate Action</a>. They agreed to include food systems, which contribute a significant percentage of global emissions and which are fundamental to adaptation and resilience, in the next generation of climate plans to be submitted to the U.N.</p>
<p>The pledge was thin on details, however, so how each country turns words into actions will be crucial in 2024.</p>
<h2>The next big climate milestones</h2>
<p>In late 2024, COP29 will take place in Baku, Azerbaijan – another oil-producing nation. The focus will be on finance. But the <a href="https://unfccc.int/news/cop28-agreement-signals-beginning-of-the-end-of-the-fossil-fuel-era">next big milestone is in 2025</a>, when governments must submit their future pledges and plans for reducing emissions.</p>
<p>COP30 is to be held in Belen in the Brazilian state of Para – the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-great-amazon-land-grab-how-brazils-government-is-clearing-the-way-for-deforestation-173416">frontline of Amazon protection</a>. This will bring a focus on nature-based solutions, but from the perspective of the Global South. President Lula da Silva, who is also the host of the G20 in 2024, wants to see change in the international trade and finance system to reflect shifts in the global economy.</p>
<p>COP28 set forth important initiatives but balked at binding commitments. As countries work on their next generation of plans to try to get the world on track to limit global warming, they will have to consider the whole of their economies and cover all greenhouse gases. The world can’t afford to balk twice.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220142/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rachel Kyte is affiliated with VCMI - Voluntary Carbon Markets Integrity Initiative, and Climate Resilience for All CRA</span></em></p>The UN climate conference brought some progress. A former UN official who has been involved in international climate policy for years explains what has to happen now for that progress to pay off.Rachel Kyte, Visiting Professor of Practice, Blavatnik School of Government, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2191282023-12-04T14:12:05Z2023-12-04T14:12:05ZCOP28 president is wrong – science clearly shows fossil fuels must go (and fast)<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563352/original/file-20231204-25-xwlavd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C6016%2C3998&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/new-york-ny-september-17-2023-2364442405">John Hanson Pye/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>According to the president of COP28, the latest round of UN climate negotiations in the United Arab Emirates, there is “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/dec/03/back-into-caves-cop28-president-dismisses-phase-out-of-fossil-fuels">no science</a>” indicating that phasing out fossil fuels is necessary to restrict global heating to 1.5°C.</p>
<p>President Sultan Al Jaber is wrong. There is a wealth of scientific evidence demonstrating that a fossil fuel phase-out will be essential for reining in the greenhouse gas emissions driving climate change. I know because I have published some of it.</p>
<p>Back in 2021, just before the COP26 climate summit in Glasgow, my colleagues and I published a paper in Nature entitled <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-021-03821-8">Unextractable fossil fuels in a 1.5°C world</a>. It argued that 90% of the world’s coal and around 60% of its oil and gas <a href="https://theconversation.com/climate-change-ditch-90-of-worlds-coal-and-60-of-oil-and-gas-to-limit-warming-to-1-5-c-experts-167494">needed to remain underground</a> if humanity is to have any chance of meeting the Paris agreement’s temperature goals. </p>
<p>Crucially, our research also highlighted that the production of oil and gas needed to start declining immediately (from 2020), at around 3% each year until 2050.</p>
<p>This assessment was based on a clear understanding that the production and use of fossil fuels, as the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/science/causes-effects-climate-change">primary cause of CO₂ emissions</a> (90%), needs to be reduced in order to stop further heating. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) says that net zero CO₂ emissions will only be reached globally in the early 2050s, and <a href="https://www.ipcc.ch/report/sixth-assessment-report-working-group-3/">warming stabilised at 1.5°C</a>, if a shift away from fossil fuels to low-carbon energy sources begins immediately. </p>
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<img alt="Hands lowering solar panels into place on a roof." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563349/original/file-20231204-19-si8int.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563349/original/file-20231204-19-si8int.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=343&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563349/original/file-20231204-19-si8int.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=343&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563349/original/file-20231204-19-si8int.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=343&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563349/original/file-20231204-19-si8int.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563349/original/file-20231204-19-si8int.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563349/original/file-20231204-19-si8int.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Humanity has figured out how to cheaply capture and use the Sun’s energy.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/rooftop-solar-power-plant-installation-1681272895">Tsetso Photo/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>If global emissions and fossil fuel burning continue at their current rates, this warming level will be <a href="https://doi.org/10.5194/essd-15-2295-2023">breached by 2030</a>. </p>
<p>Since the publication of our Nature paper, scientists have modelled hundreds of scenarios to explore the world’s options for limiting warming to 1.5°C. Many feature in the latest report by the IPCC. Here is what they tell us about the necessary scale of a fossil fuel phase-out.</p>
<h2>Fossil fuel use must fall fast</h2>
<p>A recent <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-023-41105-z">paper</a> led by atmospheric scientist Ploy Achakulwisut took a detailed look at existing scenarios for limiting warming to 1.5°C. For pathways consistent with 1.5°C, coal, oil and gas supply must decline by 95%, 62% and 42% respectively, between 2020 and 2050. </p>
<p>However, many of these pathways assume rates of carbon capture and storage and carbon dioxide removal that are likely to be greater than what could <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2542435121004323">be feasibly achieved</a>. Filtering out these scenarios shows that gas actually needs to be eliminated twice as fast, declining by 84% in 2050 relative to 2020 levels. Coal and oil would also see larger declines: 99% and 70% respectively.</p>
<p>In fact, oil and gas may need to be eliminated even quicker than that. A <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-022-01576-2">study</a> by energy economist Greg Muttitt showed that many of the pathways used in the most recent IPCC report assume coal can be phased out in developing countries faster than is realistic, considering the speed of history’s most rapid energy transitions. A more feasible scenario would oblige developed countries in particular to get off oil and gas faster.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/for-developing-world-to-quit-coal-rich-countries-must-eliminate-oil-and-gas-faster-new-study-199649">For developing world to quit coal, rich countries must eliminate oil and gas faster – new study</a>
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<h2>A fair and orderly transition</h2>
<p>The International Energy Agency (IEA) has added to evidence in favour of phasing out fossil fuels by concluding that there is no need to license and exploit new oil and gas fields, first in a <a href="https://www.iea.org/reports/net-zero-by-2050">2021 report</a> and <a href="https://www.iea.org/reports/net-zero-roadmap-a-global-pathway-to-keep-the-15-0c-goal-in-reach">again this year</a>.</p>
<p>This latest IEA analysis also estimates that existing oil and gas fields would need to wind down their production by 2.5% a year on average to 2030, accelerating to 5% a year from 2030 (and 7.5% for gas between 2030-40).</p>
<p>A separate <a href="https://www.iisd.org/publications/report/ipcc-pathways-paris-aligned-policies">analysis</a> of the IPCC’s scenarios for holding global warming at 1.5°C came to the same conclusion. Since no new fields need to be brought into development, global production of oil and gas should be falling. </p>
<p>This message was reinforced by the UN’s recent <a href="https://www.unep.org/resources/production-gap-report-2023">production gap report</a>, which concluded that producer countries including the United Arab Emirates need to be moving towards a rapid phase-out of fossil fuels, not expanding production. Instead, the report estimated that in CO₂ terms, planned fossil fuel production in 2030 is projected to be 110% higher than the required phase-out trajectory to meet 1.5°C.</p>
<p>The evidence for a fossil fuel phase-out is clear. The debate should now turn to executing it. </p>
<p>A fair and orderly transition from fossil fuels must acknowledge the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14693062.2020.1763900">differing capacity</a> of countries: developing countries are more economically dependent on fossil fuels and have less money to switch to cleaner technologies. Some investment in oil and gas will be needed for existing infrastructure. This would maintain the minimum level of production necessary for a carefully managed transition. Overall though, fossil fuels should now be in rapid decline. </p>
<p>Rich countries need to phase out fossil fuels now and raise the funding to help developing countries make the transition.</p>
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<img alt="Imagine weekly climate newsletter" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steve Pye does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>To avert climate breakdown, most of the world’s coal, oil and gas must stay underground.Steve Pye, Associate Professor in Energy Systems, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2178592023-11-27T16:58:06Z2023-11-27T16:58:06ZCOP28: inside the United Arab Emirates, the oil giant hosting 2023 climate change summit<p>The United Arab Emirates (UAE), the world’s <a href="https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=709&t=6">seventh largest oil producer</a>, will <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/01/12/cop28-uae-sparks-backlash-by-appointing-oil-chief-as-president.html">host</a> the 28th UN climate change summit (COP28) in Dubai from November 30 to December 12. Presiding over the conference will be the chief executive of the UAE state-owned oil company Adnoc, Sultan al-Jaber.</p>
<p>Given fossil fuels account for <a href="https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/science/causes-effects-climate-change#:%7E:text=Fossil%20fuels%20%E2%80%93%20coal%2C%20oil%20and,they%20trap%20the%20sun's%20heat.">nearly 90%</a> of the carbon dioxide emissions driving climate change, many have argued that there is a clear <a href="https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0263596">conflict of interest</a> in having oil and gas producers at the helm of climate talks. The UAE is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/nov/17/cop28-host-uae-breaking-its-own-ban-on-routine-gas-flaring-data-shows">alleged to flare</a> more gas than it reports and plans to increase oil production from 3.7 million barrels a day to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/uae-brings-forward-oil-production-capacity-expansion-2027-2022-11-28/">5 million by 2027</a>. </p>
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<p>Some <a href="https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/oil-and-gas/our-insights/the-future-is-now-how-oil-and-gas-companies-can-decarbonize">contend</a> that the oil and gas industry could throw the brake on greenhouse gas emissions by investing its vast revenues into <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/10/20/oil-innovations-to-reduce-climate-impacts-pub-64891">plugging gas flares</a> and <a href="https://status22.globalccsinstitute.com">injecting captured carbon</a> underground. But independent <a href="https://www.iea.org/reports/net-zero-by-2050">assessments</a> maintain that the industry will need to leave at least some of its commercially recoverable reserves permanently underground to limit global warming. No oil-exporting country but <a href="https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20221116-how-colombia-plans-to-keep-its-oil-and-gas-in-the-ground">Colombia</a> has yet indicated it will do this.</p>
<p>Dubai appears determined to undermine even this small victory. <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-67508331">An investigation</a> has released documents showing the UAE hosts planned to advise a Colombian minister that Adnoc “stands ready” to help the South American country develop its oil and gas reserves.</p>
<p>The UK invited ridicule by <a href="https://theconversation.com/offering-oil-and-gas-licences-every-year-distracts-from-the-challenge-of-winding-down-uk-north-sea-217325">expanding its North Sea oil fields</a> less than two years after urging the world to raise its climate ambitions <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/factcheck-can-new-uk-oil-and-gas-licences-ever-be-climate-compatible/">as summit host</a>. The UAE seems destined for a similar fate – before its talks have even begun.</p>
<h2>Oil consumption & dependence</h2>
<p>The UAE’s <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4967.2011.00508.x">fast-growing population</a> of <a href="https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/united-arab-emirates/summaries/">9.9 million</a> (only 1 million are Emirati citizens) has the <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/270508/co2-emissions-per-capita-by-country/">sixth highest</a> CO₂ emissions per head globally. </p>
<p>Citizens are used to driving gas-guzzling cars with fuel priced well below <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EP.PMP.SGAS.CD?most_recent_value_desc=true">international market rates</a> and using air conditioning for much of the year thanks to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.egyr.2019.08.020">utility subsidies</a>. Visiting tourists and conference-goers have come to expect chilled shopping malls, swimming pools and lush golf greens that depend entirely on <a href="https://energycentral.com/c/ec/desalination-and-energy-consumption">energy-hungry</a> desalinated water.</p>
<p>Despite decades of policies aimed at diversifying the country’s economy away from oil, the UAE’s hydrocarbon sector makes up a <a href="https://www.amf.org.ae/ar/publications/reports/joint-arab-economic-reports">quarter of GDP</a>, half of the country’s exports and <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214845017301552#fig1">80% of government revenues</a>. Oil rent helps buy socioeconomic stability, for instance, by providing local people with <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13678868.2023.2182097">public-sector sinecures</a>. </p>
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<img alt="An oil drilling platform rising above red desert sand." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/561873/original/file-20231127-17-dr4pgs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4500%2C2991&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/561873/original/file-20231127-17-dr4pgs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561873/original/file-20231127-17-dr4pgs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561873/original/file-20231127-17-dr4pgs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561873/original/file-20231127-17-dr4pgs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561873/original/file-20231127-17-dr4pgs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561873/original/file-20231127-17-dr4pgs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">An oil field within the Arabian Desert, near Dubai.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/sunset-over-oil-field-red-sand-350313140">Fedor Selivanov/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>This state of affairs is a central tenet of the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13678868.2023.2182097">Arabian Gulf social contract</a>, in which <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4967.2010.00437.x">citizens</a> of the six gulf states mostly occupy bureaucratic public sector positions administering an oil-based economy with expatriate labour dominating the non-oil private sector.</p>
<h2>Tech-fixes, targets and the future</h2>
<p>How does the UAE plan to cut its own emissions?</p>
<p><a href="https://www.adnoc.ae/en/ourstrategy/maximum-energy-minimum-emissions">Adnoc</a> and other <a href="https://guides.loc.gov/oil-and-gas-industry/companies">international oil companies</a> are banking on select technologies (to sceptics, “<a href="https://www.clientearth.org/projects/the-greenwashing-files/exxonmobil/">green cover</a>” for further climate damage) to preserve their <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14693062.2023.2262439">core business model</a>: extracting oil. </p>
<p>Adnoc, along with the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14693062.2023.2262439">wider oil and gas industry</a>, has invested in <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/09/uae-other-gulf-states-shift-talk-action-carbon-capture-tech">carbon sequestration</a> and making <a href="https://www.adnoc.ae/en/our-business/hydrogen">hydrogen fuel</a> from the byproducts of oil extraction. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (<a href="https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg3/figures/summary-for-policymakers/figure-spm-7/">IPCC</a>), such measures, even if fully implemented, will only have a small impact on greenhouse gas emissions. </p>
<p>The UAE was <a href="https://www.uae-embassy.org/discover-uae/climate-and-energy/international-engagement">the first</a> in the Middle East to ratify the <a href="https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement">Paris climate agreement</a> and to commit to <a href="https://u.ae/en/information-and-services/environment-and-energy/climate-change/theuaesresponsetoclimatechange/uae-net-zero-2050">net zero emissions by 2050</a>. With near limitless sunshine and substantial sovereign wealth, the UAE ranks <a href="https://www.irena.org/Publications/2023/Mar/Renewable-capacity-statistics-2023">18th globally</a> per capita and first among Opec countries for solar power capacity. Solar now meets around <a href="https://www.energyinst.org/statistical-review">4.5%</a> of the UAE’s electricity demand and projects in the pipeline will see output rise from <a href="https://www.uae-embassy.org/discover-uae/climate-and-energy/uae-energy-diversification">23 gigawatts (GW) today to 50GW</a> by 2031. </p>
<p>The Barakah nuclear power plant (the <a href="https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-t-z/united-arab-emirates.aspx">Arab world’s first</a>) started generating electricity in 2020. While only meeting <a href="https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/ARE">1%</a> of the country’s electricity demand, when fully operational in 2030, this may rise to <a href="https://www.iaea.org/bulletin/preparing-60-years-in-advance-the-uaes-first-nuclear-power-plant-and-plans-for-future-decommissioning">25%</a>. </p>
<p>The oil sector is inherently capital-intensive, not labour-intensive, and so it cannot provide sufficient jobs for Emiratis. The UAE will need to transition to a <a href="https://www.erutledge.com/media/Government-of-Abu-Dhabi.-(2008).--The-Abu-Dhabi-Economic-Vision-2030.pdf">knowledge-based economy</a> with productive employment in sectors not linked to resource extraction. </p>
<p>In the UAE, sovereign wealth fund Mubadala is tasked with <a href="https://www.mubadala.com/en/what-we-do/our-portfolio">enabling this transition</a>. It has invested in a variety of high-tech sectors, spanning commercial satellites to research and development in renewable energy.</p>
<p>But even if the UAE was to achieve net zero by some measure domestically, continuing to export oil internationally means it will be burned somewhere, and so the climate crisis will continue to grow.</p>
<h2>Self-interest</h2>
<p>Is disappointment a foregone conclusion in Dubai?</p>
<p>Already one of the <a href="https://www.mpg.de/10856695/W004_Environment_climate_062-069.pdf">hottest places</a> in the world, parts of the Middle East may be too hot to live <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/04/middle-east-front-lines-climate-change-mena/">within the next 50 years</a> according to some <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/08/24/the-middle-east-is-becoming-literally-uninhabitable/">predictions</a>. </p>
<p>Rising temperatures risk the UAE’s tourism and conference-hosting sectors, which have <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/14673584221122488">grown meteorically</a> since the 1990s (third-degree burns and heatstrokes won’t attract international visitors). A show-stopping announcement to further its <a href="https://sciendo.com/article/10.1515/mmcks-2017-0013">global leadership ambitions</a> is not out of the question. </p>
<p>At some point, one of the major oil-exporting countries must announce plans to leave some of its commercially recoverable oil <a href="https://www.popsci.com/environment/fossil-fuels-hydrocarbons-avoid-climate-change/">permanently untapped</a>. COP28 provides an ideal platform. A participating country may make such a commitment with the caveat that it first needs to build infrastructure <a href="https://www.iea.org/reports/the-oil-and-gas-industry-in-energy-transitions">powered by renewable energy</a> and overhaul its national oil company’s business model to one that supplies renewable energy, not fossil fuel, globally. </p>
<p>The UAE has the private capital and sovereign wealth required to build a <a href="https://www.economist.com/leaders/2023/02/09/arab-petrostates-must-prepare-their-citizens-for-a-post-oil-future">post-oil</a> economy. But will it risk being the first mover?</p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>UAE will preside over talks to limit climate change – despite revelations it plans oil deals.Emilie Rutledge, Senior Lecturer in Economics, The Open UniversityAiora Zabala, Lecturer in Economics and the Environment, The Open UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2049312023-05-04T13:28:43Z2023-05-04T13:28:43ZSudan: the longer the conflict lasts, the higher the risk of a regional war<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/524404/original/file-20230504-15-id7xs6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Saudi security officers stand guard off the seaport of Port Sudan in April 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Fayez Nureldine/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The 2019 Sudan uprisings that ousted long-time dictator Omar al-Bashir and installed a military-civilian transitional government gave hope that the northern African country could finally <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N21/232/29/PDF/N2123229.pdf?OpenElement">transition</a> to democratic rule. The country has been <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-can-avoid-past-mistakes-by-drawing-lessons-from-its-history-115470">ruled</a> by the military for most of its independence since 1956. </p>
<p>But Sudan’s bumpy transition to democracy has come to a complete halt. The country now faces the worst conflict in its history as a full-blown civil war – with external entanglements – looms.</p>
<p>The Sudanese armed forces and a paramilitary force known as the Rapid Support Forces have declared war against each other, bringing the country to its knees. The main protagonists are two generals: Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, who leads the armed forces, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-conflict-hemedti-the-warlord-who-built-a-paramilitary-force-more-powerful-than-the-state-203949">Mohamad Hamdan Dagalo</a> (known as Hemedti) of the Rapid Support Forces.</p>
<p>The hostilities have been most intense in the capital city, Khartoum. But violence has broken out in other provinces and is threatening to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/battle-sudans-capital-risks-awakening-war-darfur-2023-04-25/">revive</a> long-simmering violence in Darfur. </p>
<p>There is also a risk that the conflict could spill over to neighbouring countries and escalate into a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep09654.4">regional conflict</a>. Geographically, Sudan borders seven countries: Chad, the Central African Republic (CAR), South Sudan, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Libya. Politically and culturally, it straddles the Middle East, north Africa and the Horn of Africa. </p>
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<p>Regional powers and neighbours have lined up behind either of the two generals – or in some cases both. Egypt and Saudi Arabia have been backing al-Burhan. For their part, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and General Khalifa Haftar of Libya have supported the Rapid Support Forces. But many other actors remain undecided. </p>
<p>There is a real possibility that regional and international actors will be arming different sides as they pursue their own, often competing interests. This could bring unprecedented shifts in the region’s already uneasy regional equilibrium, and test pre-existing alliances. </p>
<p>Regional and international actors are key in enabling – or preventing – the development of the crisis into a protracted civil war with regional dimensions. The best chance of halting Sudan’s slide into civil war lies in a united front of Western and regional powers, with Sudanese civil society groups putting pressure on the warring generals for a permanent ceasefire. And a return to a civilian-led transition. </p>
<p>But as time goes by, many despair that Sudan will soon reach the point of no return.</p>
<h2>Fretful neighbours</h2>
<p><strong>Egypt:</strong> Egypt had a long history of meddling in Sudan’s affairs. This has included supporting various military governments, as well as containing the Islamist resurgence in the 1990s. In 2019, when al-Bashir was <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/sudans-military-ousts-president-omar-al-bashir-following-protests/a-48282243">deposed</a>, Egypt supported al-Burhan in the transition. It didn’t want a military regime – and its ally – being replaced by a civilian democratic government. It feared that this would inspire Egyptians to do the same. </p>
<p>Since the outbreak of the recent conflict, Egypt has adopted a cautious approach by working to <a href="https://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2023/05/03/egypt-seeks-to-consolidate-ceasefire-in-sudan-to-pave-way-for-peaceful-dialogue-al-sisi/">mediate</a> a permanent ceasefire.</p>
<p>This is because the war brings risks. It is already having to manage a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/29/sudanese-flee-to-egypt-as-cairo-works-to-avoid-refugee-crisis">refugee crisis</a> as tens of thousands of Sudanese attempt to get away from the conflict. </p>
<p>In addition, an escalation of the conflict could potentially bring instability to Egypt’s southern borders. This could open up routes for arms smuggling and illegal trade. </p>
<p>Also, Egypt may be goaded to get involved militarily if the fighting continues.</p>
<p>But, Egypt’s greatest fear must be that it will lose its main ally in the ongoing disagreement with Ethiopia over the operation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), situated on the Blue Nile river near Ethiopia’s border with Sudan. The conflict will complicate the management of the dam, as both generals may have <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/2293531/world">different views</a> on the issue. A prolonged conflict in Sudan could have long consequences for Egypt’s food and water security.</p>
<p><strong>Ethiopia:</strong> Relations with Sudan have been strained in recent years due to <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/04/coordinating-international-responses-ethiopia-sudan-tensions/03-untangling-ethiopia-and">border disputes</a> over land claims and disagreements over <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/08/05/the-controversy-over-the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam/">the GERD</a>. A protracted conflict in Sudan could have an effect on border disputes. These disputes are connected to tensions over the contested fertile farmland of Al Fashaga and apparent Sudanese support for Tigrayan opponents against the Ethiopian federal government. </p>
<p>The crisis in Sudan may affect the equilibrium on these border issues.</p>
<p>On Sudan’s western frontiers, Libya, Chad and CAR risk <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/1/what-does-fighting-in-darfur-mean-for-sudans-western-frontier">spill overs</a> from violence and tensions in the Darfur region. Hemedti is a tribal leader from the Mahariya clan of Darfur’s Rizeigat tribe. He has been a main partner to Haftar of Libya in trading drugs, arms and refugees across borders between Sudan, Libya and Chad. </p>
<p>With tensions rising in Darfur, forces could be split: some will side with Hemedti’s forces. Others will seek to undermine them. </p>
<h2>External powers</h2>
<p>In civil wars in the Middle East and Africa, such as in Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen, international actors have intervened by replenishing their allies with weapons, sponsoring diplomacy involving the warring groups, and sometimes taking matters into their own hands by launching military interventions. </p>
<p>Clashes in Sudan could very well turn the region into a playground for external powers to extend their influence. </p>
<p>Under presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump, <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1758-5899.12777">US influence waned</a> across Africa and the Middle East. At the same time, America’s competitors took steps to carve out a strategic foothold in the Horn of Africa and the critical maritime route of the Red Sea. </p>
<p>Russia, for example, is reportedly negotiating <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/7824-port-sudan-caught-in-the-international-race-to-control-the-red-sea-region">military and economic deals</a>, allowing it to use Sudan’s ports on the main trading routes to Europe. There have also been <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/pmc-russias-wagner-group-in-sudan-gold-military-junta/a-65439746">accusations</a> that Russia’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-questions-about-wagner-group-involvement-as-another-african-country-falls-prey-to-russian-mercenaries-204299">Wagner Group</a> is involved in illicit gold mining in Sudan. </p>
<p>For its part <a href="https://www.diis.dk/en/research/whats-stake-china-in-sudan">China</a>, Sudan’s <a href="https://wits.worldbank.org/CountrySnapshot/en/SUD">second-largest trading partner</a> (after Saudi Arabia), has invested heavily in infrastructure and oil extraction, giving it an important stake in the conflict. </p>
<p>Wealthy oil producers – Saudi Arabia and the UAE – have an interest in establishing regional dominance. The UAE, aspiring to control maritime routes in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, has taken serious interest in <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/2215641/business-economy">ports in Sudan</a>. </p>
<p>For its part, Saudi Arabia has been keen to prevent Iran from establishing a foothold in Sudan. As a result, it has <a href="https://pomeps.org/the-great-game-of-the-uae-and-saudi-arabia-in-sudan">poured money</a> into supporting Sudan’s military. </p>
<p>Both interfered to shape the 2019 transition in Sudan to ensure a friendly regime would end up in power. And both invested in a range of economic and military enterprises. </p>
<p>But they haven’t been supporting the same general: Saudi Arabia has supported al-Burhan while the UAE has been an ardent supporter of Hemedti.</p>
<p>The longer the conflict continues, the greater the odds for a longer, bloody war with regional and international entanglements. This will make it more difficult to contain the conflict or find a resolution that satisfies all parties.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204931/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>May Darwich is the principal investigator of a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York for the project: Port Infrastructure, International Politics, Everyday Life: From the Arabian Gulf to the Horn of Africa, <a href="http://portinfrastructure.org">http://portinfrastructure.org</a>. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author. </span></em></p>There is a risk that Sudan’s conflict could spill over into neighbouring countries.May Darwich, Associate Professor of International Relations of the Middle East, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1945592022-11-14T17:31:12Z2022-11-14T17:31:12ZWhy COP27 should be the last of these pointless corporate love-ins<p>It’s a glorious afternoon at a luxury resort in Egypt, with six swimming pools leading to a lovely little stretch of beach on the Red Sea. A salsa aquatic class in one of the pools has several enthusiastic participants. Elsewhere, guests are lounging on deck chairs sipping ice cold cocktails. Cheerful waiters are refilling glasses and serving snacks. </p>
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<p>Welcome to Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt’s popular resort and host to the 27th meeting of the Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, or COP27. Or, as some critics would put it, the <a href="https://www.cadtm.org/Glasgow-s-Conference-of-the-Polluters-again-confirms-that-global-arson-needs">Conference of the Polluters</a>. </p>
<p>My first impression on arriving was that I had entered a gigantic theme park. The roads leading to the resorts were lined with brilliantly lit palm trees in green and yellow, and lamp posts draped in dazzling coloured lights. The night sky was criss-crossed with bright searchlights from the venue to draw attention to the climate emergency facing humanity. </p>
<p>This is my fourth COP, and I don’t intend to come again. Given how little these conferences have achieved since they began in 1995 – not to mention their gigantic carbon footprints – I am convinced it’s time for them to stop. </p>
<p>After 27 years of negotiations, conflicts and breakdowns, the world’s nations have basically agreed: (1) climate change is a serious problem; (2) something must be done to fix it; (3) rich nations should do more; and (4) based on the <a href="https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement">Paris agreement of 2015</a>, every country should set their own emissions goals and do their best to meet them. </p>
<p><a href="https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement#:%7E:text=The%20Paris%20Agreement%20is%20a,compared%20to%20pre%2Dindustrial%20levels.">The UN claims</a> that the Paris agreement is “legally binding”, but there are no enforcement mechanisms or penalties for countries in breach. Even current pledges <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/10/1129912">will not be enough</a> to meet the target to restrict global warming to the 1.5°C target agreed in Paris.</p>
<h2>How COP works</h2>
<p>There are three worlds that inhabit COP meetings but carefully evade each other. Official country delegates attend meetings and draft policies. Then there are the corporates and industry associations, who are by far the <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0170840612464609">most significant and powerful</a> presence here. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-63571610">Over 600</a> fossil-fuel industry lobbyists are attending. This is more than the combined delegations from the ten most climate-impacted countries, and the second largest delegation after the United Arab Emirates, itself a petroleum power. Among those 600 lobbyists, some have even been invited as part of 30 country delegations. </p>
<p>The third group at COP consists of civil society organisations from a wide range of countries, but dominated by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) from developed countries. Growing numbers of NGOs representing the interests of business and industry (BINGOs) occupy the civil society space in COP meetings to promote particular resource and energy use agendas. Funders include major oil corporations like Shell and Exxon, nuclear giants like Areva, and big miners like Rio Tinto and BHP. </p>
<p>Business and civil society delegates both participate in climate negotiations and host side events showcasing their climate actions. These can seem to take place in parallel realities. Directly after one session organised by international NGO Global Witness about the killings and disappearances of protesters against mining projects in Africa, Asia and Latin America was a session on “mining governance for a just energy transition”. </p>
<p>In this latter session participants from the Democratic Republic of Congo government and the <a href="https://www.icmm.com/en-gb/our-story/who-we-are">International Council for Mining and Metals</a> described inequalities, environmental impacts, tax avoidance and corruption as challenges facing mining in Africa. There was no mention of the violence and killings documented in the same region in the previous session. </p>
<h2>The police presence</h2>
<p>These opposing narratives are a feature of COP, but only become visible during protest marches. Notably, however, COP27 is the first to be held in a “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2022/oct/18/greenwashing-police-state-egypt-cop27-masquerade-naomi-klein-climate-crisis">police state</a>”. Before getting to the venue, I spent a few days in Cairo at a hotel near Tahrir Square, home of the 2011 revolution. The square had heavily armed police in armoured vehicles at every corner. I photographed the obelisk in the square with an armoured police vehicle in the foreground and was immediately reprimanded by an angry soldier. </p>
<p>There are remarkably <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2022/nov/12/cop27-first-week-roundup-powerful-dispatches-muted-protest-little-cash">few police</a> at the venue in Sharm el-Sheikh, however. This is because of the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/11/06/egypt-arrests-curbs-protests-cop27-nears">extraordinary lengths</a> taken by the organisers to prevent protests. </p>
<p>This has included pre-emptive arrests of local activists, a complicated registration process restricting the wider public to a “green zone”, and unprecedented surveillance including police-monitored cameras in all Sharm el-Sheikh taxis. There is also a “designated area” for protesters away from the venue to avoid the kind of mass protests that have hampered previous COP meetings. </p>
<p>Staging COP in a luxury resort has also priced out activists. Hotel rates average US$250 to US$300 (£213 to £255) a night and there are no “budget” options. A sandwich at the venue cost US$15, though this was halved after complaints. There are also no streets where people can gather, just roads linking the various resorts. </p>
<p>So while over <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/nov/11/cop26-police-tactics-creating-atmosphere-of-fear-protesters-say">100,000 people marched</a> the streets of Glasgow at COP26, and previous COPs like <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/dec/12/hundreds-arrested-copenhagen-protest-rally">Copenhagen</a>, <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2011-12-04-cop17-protesters-to-lay-charges-after-march-attack/">Durban</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-europe-34959192">Paris</a> also saw clashes between protesters and police, dissent is effectively neutralised here. <a href="https://www.commondreams.org/news/2022/11/12/not-yet-defeated-1000-march-climate-justice-cop27">Over 1,000 protesters</a> marched inside the venue on November 12, and I couldn’t even find them. </p>
<h2>COP and petroleum</h2>
<p>So what else has changed since I first came to a COP in Durban in 2011? Notably, the marketing of both corporates and NGOs is much slicker. And corporates have become much smarter – I can’t see a BP or Shell or Exxon-Mobil logo anywhere. The corporatisation of COP is complete when BP’s chief executive and four other senior employees are in the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-63584993">official delegation of Mauritania</a>, a country where BP has major investments. </p>
<p>To further consolidate the power of the fossil fuel industry, COP27 has a “Middle East Green Initiative” led by Saudi Arabia with the inevitable net zero pledge by 2050. Saudi also has one of the largest booths inside the conference venue. And it is no accident that the next COP will be hosted by the United Arab Emirates. </p>
<p>In 27 years of COP meetings there has not been a single call to phase out fossil fuels. The only reference was the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/cop26">agreement at COP26</a> which called for “the phasedown of
unabated coal power and phase-out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies”. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2022/nov/11/gas-producers-using-cop27-to-rebrand-gas-as-transitional-fuel-experts-warn?CMP=share_btn_tw">massive rebranding exercise</a> is underway at COP27 where natural gas is being positioned not as a fossil fuel but as a “transition fuel”. Once this reframing is complete, the major fossil fuel players will corner all subsidies for natural gas.</p>
<h2>COP’s great failure</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/276629/global-co2-emissions/">In 1995</a>, when COP1 was convened in Berlin, global carbon emissions were 23.45 billion metric tons. By 2021 they were 36.4 billion metric tons. Emissions have increased every year with two exceptions: the 2007-09 financial crisis and during COVID-19. In both cases this was because of economic contraction, not efforts to tackle climate change. </p>
<p>No one at COP will speak of this particular elephant in the room: that it <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1350508420973629">may well be impossible</a> to decouple economic growth from carbon emissions. Emissions rebounded on both occasions and are expected to reach their <a href="https://www.sciencealert.com/co2-is-on-track-to-hit-a-record-high-in-2022-and-shows-no-signs-of-going-down">highest recorded level</a> in 2022. </p>
<p>Let’s look at three other quantifiable COP measures: climate finance, which is seen as key to helping poor countries <a href="https://unfccc.int/topics/climate-finance/the-big-picture/introduction-to-climate-finance/introduction-to-climate-finance">to reduce emissions</a>; <a href="https://unfccc.int/topics/adaptation-and-resilience/workstreams/approaches-to-address-loss-and-damage-associated-with-climate-change-impacts-in-developing-countries">climate reparations</a> from rich to poor countries for damage caused by <a href="https://theconversation.com/cop27-how-responsible-are-industrialised-countries-for-climate-change-193965">historical carbon emissions</a>; and the success of technologies to mitigate emissions, particularly carbon capture and storage. </p>
<p>On climate finance, wealthier nations committed at Copenhagen 2009 to mobilise <a href="https://unfccc.int/topics/climate-finance/the-big-picture/climate-finance-in-the-negotiations">US$100 billion per year</a> for <a href="https://unfccc.int/topics/climate-finance/the-big-picture/introduction-to-climate-finance/introduction-to-climate-finance">poorer countries</a>. However, they have <a href="https://www.oecd.org/climate-change/finance-usd-100-billion-goal/">never achieved</a> this goal. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the 60 largest banks in the world <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/24/how-much-the-largest-banks-have-invested-in-fossil-fuel-report.html">have invested US$3.8 trillion</a> in fossil fuels since the Paris agreement. In December 2019 investors paid nearly US$26 billion for Saudi state oil company Aramco’s initial public offering. Of course, both fossil fuel companies and banks involved have pledged fictional net zero commitments for 2050. </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/its-the-big-issue-of-cop27-climate-summit-poor-nations-face-a-1trillion-loss-and-damage-bill-but-rich-nations-wont-pay-up-194043">Climate reparations</a> are on the official agenda at COP27 for the first time, which is certainly a <a href="https://theconversation.com/cop27-three-reasons-rich-countries-can-no-longer-ignore-calls-to-pay-developing-world-for-climate-havoc-193873">step forward</a>. It’s hard to be optimistic, however. The US will vigorously challenge creating any loss and damage fund for poor countries, as it has <a href="https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/fearing-liability-u-s-resists-u-n-fund-for-climate-damages/">consistently done</a> at past COPs. </p>
<p>As for carbon capture, it <a href="https://reneweconomy.com.au/new-global-ccs-report-shows-up-silliness-of-clean-coal-predictions-in-news-corp-81413/">only stored 0.02%</a> of fossil-fuel CO₂ in 2021. That makes a mockery of this cornerstone of climate change mitigation. </p>
<h2>Alternatives</h2>
<p>COP represents a gathering of elites. A <a href="https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/full/10.1146/annurev-environ-012220-011104">recent study</a> found that this was a major obstacle to climate mitigation. Excluded are the poor, disenfranchised, and those who bear the brunt of climate impacts but contributed least to the problem (and will bear the impact of rich nations’ energy transitions because the necessary minerals and metals will be extracted from their lands). Increasingly dissent is <a href="https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/05/14/pers-m14.html">becoming criminalised</a>, not only in “police states” but in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2022/oct/24/keir-starmer-backs-stiff-sentences-for-climate-protesters-who-block-roads">western liberal democracies too</a>. </p>
<p>It is time to end this spectacle of private jets flying in dignitaries and delegates to discuss the climate emergency. Genuine civil society organisations should boycott future COPs and focus on direct action at national and local levels. They need to make their governments accountable for emissions targets, and target fossil fuel corporations and the banks that finance them. </p>
<p>There is no accountability in COP, only a diffusion of (ir)responsibility that legitimises corporate power. COP27 will go the way of previous COPs: empty promises, stirring speeches and slick corporate campaigns. And higher carbon emissions next year.</p>
<p>So let COP become another Davos, a conference of and for the rich. There are plenty of luxury seaside and ski resorts in countries eager to host the next few COPs. Just don’t go there.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194559/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bobby Banerjee has received funding in the past from the Australian Research Council. He is attending COP27 as a delegate for Western Sydney University, Australia, which is his former employer and still retains him as an adjunct professor. </span></em></p>A look back at what the COPs have actually achieved.Bobby Banerjee, Professor of Management, City, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1911592022-10-12T14:07:02Z2022-10-12T14:07:02ZSomalia: Puntland state port is getting a revamp - this is key to its future<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486144/original/file-20220922-9184-qhdxbu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Bosaso has become a major export hub since security improved in Somalia's Puntland region.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/general-view-taken-on-november-18-2013-shows-bosaso-harbor-news-photo/450358003?adppopup=true">Mohamed Abdiwahab/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The port city of Bosaso, located at the north-eastern corner of Somalia, provides a striking example of the interlinkage between security and infrastructure. The city benefited from the civil war that ravaged the southern parts of Somalia in the 1990s and 2000s. It developed into a booming trade centre. But increased violence in Bosaso has negatively affected international trade in the last decade. Security improvements and the recovery of other ports in Somalia and Somaliland have provided alternatives.</p>
<p>In July 2022, the Emirates-based Dubai Ports World (DP World), a global operator of ports and logistics, returned to Bosaso. The company had signed a <a href="https://more.bham.ac.uk/port-infrastructure/2022/01/13/bossaso-port-optimising-port-activities-and-transforming-circulations/">concession agreement</a> with the government in Puntland, a federal member state of Somalia, in 2017. But the plans to modernise the port were never realised. </p>
<p>DP World’s <a href="https://puntlandpost.net/2022/02/21/puntland-renegotiates-dp-world-concession-to-manage-bosaso-port/">return</a> has instigated optimism across the city, though numerous challenges still lie ahead.</p>
<p>Our research project is <a href="http://portinfrastructure.org/">studying</a> the Horn of Africa’s emerging port infrastructures and their impact on the everyday lives of people in cities. </p>
<p>Bosaso’s efforts to remain economically relevant will have implications for the relative independence that Puntland has achieved from the federal government in Mogadishu. An upgraded port could bolster citizens’ trust in the semi-autonomous government.</p>
<h2>A lifeline for Puntland</h2>
<p>The port of Bosaso is located on the Red Sea. Its development was tied to the beginning of the civil war in Somalia in the 1980s. Siad Barre, the military dictator who ruled the country from 1969 to 1991, rehabilitated a highway between Bosaso and central Somalia, and <a href="https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01044642">allowed Bosaso to operate the port duty-free</a>. This was to appease his opponents in the north-east and to economically harm rising opposition in the north-west (now Somaliland). </p>
<p>Trading activities and property investments in Bosaso increased significantly after the Somali state collapsed in 1991. Bosaso City <a href="https://securityonthemove.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/SOTM-Research-Brief-BOSAASO.pdf">grew considerably</a> in the early 1990s when it evolved into a prime destination for people who fled from violence in the southern parts of Somalia. </p>
<p>Among the immigrants were former political and business elites with clan affiliations to the north-east. Others were from the politically marginalised and harassed clans and minority groups of southern Somalia. </p>
<p>The closeness and historic shipping links between Bosaso and Yemen additionally pulled people to the city. Younger people looking for an option to escape poverty and a life full of risks moved to Bosaso to embark on Tahriib, the <a href="https://riftvalley.net/publication/going-tahriib">undocumented and dangerous migration</a> across the Red Sea to the Gulf states and from there, if possible, further to Europe.</p>
<p>During the early 1990s, Bosaso had the only relatively safe port in Somalia. It became a major trade hub for livestock exports and consumer goods imports. This integrated Bosaso into an international trade network and linked the port to central Somalia and eastern Ethiopia. </p>
<p>New livestock quarantine stations were established, financed by Saudi Arabia and managed by a highly skilled labour force (mainly from Egypt). This was to avoid economically damaging <a href="https://sominvest.gov.so/livestock-trade-in-the-djibouti-somali-and-ethiopian-borderlands-2010/">livestock bans</a> from Saudi Arabia on the basis of animal health. </p>
<p>Income from the flourishing seaport supported the establishment of the semi-autonomous region of Puntland in 1998. </p>
<h2>Port in decline</h2>
<p>But Bosaso is currently struggling to maintain its economic relevance. This has political implications for the relative independence that Puntland has achieved from the Somali federal government. </p>
<p>International trade activities have been declining during the last decade. Since 2015, the war in Yemen has interrupted established trade routes. Additionally, the city has faced threats from Islamist insurgents, prominently Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State in Somalia. </p>
<p>The concession agreement with DP World’s subsidiary P&O Ports in 2017 added further layers of insecurity. Local groups criticised the “sell-out” of the port to a foreign country, while business groups feared that a rise in port fees would have a negative impact on local trade. </p>
<p>Disputes among the Puntland leadership, and disagreements between Puntland and P&O Ports, delayed the planned modernisation. P&O eventually left Bosaso in 2019 after <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-47114779">its port manager</a> was killed by gunmen, an attack for which al-Shabaab claimed responsibility. </p>
<p>These developments stood in contrast to security improvements in southern Somalia. These were visible in the reopening of Mogadishu’s seaport, which has been managed by <a href="https://dlca.logcluster.org/display/public/DLCA/2.1.1+Somalia+Port+of+Mogadishu">a Turkish company</a> since 2014. Competition increased further with the DP World-driven modernisation of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/waiting-for-ethiopia-berbera-port-upgrade-raises-somalilands-hopes-for-trade-188949">port in Berbera</a> in Somaliland. </p>
<p>Bosaso is not able to compete with the much larger multi-purpose ports in Berbera and Mogadishu. The two ports are fitted with container terminals and furnished with modern equipment. Bosaso, instead, has had a <a href="https://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/1275207/DIIS_WP_2017_13.pdf">crucial position</a> in a more informal overseas trade. </p>
<p>The ongoing transformation of global supply chains, with circulation increasingly relying on cranes and containers, detaches Bosaso from important trade networks. For example, containerised ports import goods directly from producing countries like China, while Bosaso relies on transshipment through intermediary ports in Yemen, Oman or elsewhere.</p>
<p>These developments have political implications. Many Bosaso residents attribute the port’s decline to leadership failure. A port official explained in an interview in August 2022: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The port has been neglected by all Puntland leaders. There was no investment provided to the port since 1991. The port is about to be relegated to irrelevance. </p>
</blockquote>
<h2>At a crossroads</h2>
<p>The modernisation of the port is critical for Puntland. An upgraded port will ensure Puntland keeps a significant position within the fragmented political landscape of Somalia. It will also prevent traders from looking for alternative outlets. </p>
<p>Multiple challenges, among them security considerations, lie ahead. The relations between Puntland and the government in Mogadishu, as well as disagreements within the Puntland leadership, are crucial. In short, Bosaso is at a crossroads and faces a defining moment for its political and economic future.</p>
<p><em>Mohamed Hassan Ibrahim, a research consultant in the <a href="https://more.bham.ac.uk/port-infrastructure/staff/">port infrastructure project</a>, is a lead contributor and conducted most of the research for this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191159/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>This research was made possible by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the authors. The research is part of the project: Port Infrastructure, International Politics, and Everyday Life in the Horn of Africa, <a href="http://portinfrastructure.org">http://portinfrastructure.org</a></span></em></p>A modern port raises Puntland’s stake within the fragmented political landscape of Somalia and prevents traders from seeking alternatives.Jutta Bakonyi, Professor in Development and Conflict, Durham UniversityMay Darwich, Associate Professor of International Relations of the Middle East, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1556942021-04-12T12:54:32Z2021-04-12T12:54:32ZGeneration Z: when it comes to behaviour, not all digital natives look alike<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/393135/original/file-20210401-21-t0xkzh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=7%2C0%2C4909%2C3036&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Rawpixel.com via Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Gradually over the past few years, the once-ubiquitous discussions about millennials are being replaced by an interest in the new kids on the block: generation Z – or, to give them a recently assigned alias – “Zoomers”.</p>
<p>According to most reckonings, to be genZ means <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/articles/zf8j92p">you were born</a> some time between 1997 and 2012 (although this varies depending on who you listen to – some estimates say the youngest Zoomers were born as late as 2015). GenZ is <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2020/05/14/on-the-cusp-of-adulthood-and-facing-an-uncertain-future-what-we-know-about-gen-z-so-far-2/">defined by</a> the influential Pew Foundation as being:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>More racially and ethnically diverse than any previous generation, and they are on track to be the most well-educated generation yet. They are also digital natives who have little or no memory of the world as it existed before smartphones.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But as with previous generations, the temptation is to lump this generation together and assume they all respond to similar experiences, attitudes and behaviours no matter where in the world they grow up. </p>
<p>Most notably, genZ has grown up in a digital world, saturated by technology. Media commentators tend to describe them as having similar consumption habits, creating a “global youth culture”. We wanted to challenge this one-size-fits-all approach, by focusing on one aspect of genZ: their use and experience of technology. </p>
<p>We looked at genZ media use in three Asian countries: Japan (east Asia), Vietnam (south-east Asia) and United Arab Emirates (UAE in western Asia). Our study has been published in a <a href="https://books.emeraldinsight.com/page/detail/The-New-Generation-Z-in-Asia/?k=9781800432215">new book</a>, Generation Z in Europe: Inputs, Insights and Implications. </p>
<h2>Are all digital natives the same?</h2>
<p>GenZ has been <a href="https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/retail/our-insights/asias-generation-z-comes-of-age">linked to hyperconnectivity</a>, a constant attachment to their smartphones and the ability to easily learn new technologies and navigate websites and apps. When it comes to internet or mobile phone use, one-third of genZ-ers in Asia spend six hours or more a day on their phones and 36% of them say they “carefully curate” their online presence.</p>
<p>There are some minor differences in the online platforms used by genZ in each country. The <a href="https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/978-1-80043-220-820201007/full/html">Japanese use</a> video-sharing websites (60.5% of respondents) the most and also play a lot of online games (50.7%). They also use social media every day – a <a href="https://www.nippon.com/en/japan-data/h00785/">recent survey</a> found that Line was the most-used platform, followed by Twitter, YouTube, Instagram, Tik-Tok and Facebook. Live video broadcasting is also huge, with young people streaming on average between 300 and 500 minutes of content per month.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Young girl looking at her smartphone and making peace sign." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/393142/original/file-20210401-23-ovffue.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/393142/original/file-20210401-23-ovffue.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393142/original/file-20210401-23-ovffue.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393142/original/file-20210401-23-ovffue.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393142/original/file-20210401-23-ovffue.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393142/original/file-20210401-23-ovffue.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393142/original/file-20210401-23-ovffue.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Research suggests that Generation Z, or ‘Zoomers’, spend significant time online, but this varies from country to country.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">MR.Yanukit via Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In Vietnam, 99% of genZ report having a Facebook account and 77% are on local social networking app <a href="https://fintechnews.sg/26214/vietnam/vietnam-zalo-pay-super-app-which-might-be-bought-by-facebook-in-2020/">Zalo</a>. Interestingly, though, 99% say they still watch TV every day – compared with their peers in Japan where <a href="https://www.nippon.com/en/news/yjj2019112500213/more-young-japanese-tend-not-to-watch-tv-jiji-poll.html">only 12%</a> watch TV regularly.</p>
<p>As one of the most advanced digital economies in the world, the UAE also has one of the <a href="https://www.themedialab.me/uae-digital-media-statistics-2019/">highest smartphone adoption rates</a> at 96%. Generally, genZ in the UAE use their smartphones for an average of around three hours a day. But here we see the influence of the culture within different countries, as <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0747563218303753">it is reported</a> that some male family members limit the ability of their female relatives to access social networks, reflecting the traditional gender divisions within the UAE and affecting how people socialise and interact.</p>
<p>When it comes to how much genZ-ers in different countries trust what they see online, there’s quite a difference across the three countries we surveyed. A survey from <a href="https://www.decisionlab.co/download-material-genzilla-vietnam">DecisionLab</a> found that Vietnam’s generation Z reports a high level of scepticism about the internet. When it came to <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/davisbrett/2018/02/03/understanding-vietnams-generation-z/?sh=67ae8cd17529">trusted sources of information</a>, parents and “experts” topped the list at 72%, while just 13% reported trusting online reviews. </p>
<p>In the UAE, <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/337146109_UAE%27s_Strategy_Towards_Most_Cyber_Resilient_Nation">concerns focus</a> on smartphone security due to a national cybersecurity awareness programme targeted at the younger generation.</p>
<h2>How do Zoomers shop?</h2>
<p>When it comes to shopping, technology plays a key role in purchasing decisions across Asia. This manifests in different ways in the three countries. In Japan, the top three information sources that genZ <a href="https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/978-1-80043-220-820201007/full/html">used for purchase decisions</a> were websites, such as online retailers (66.4%), family and friends (54.2%) and social media (40.9%).</p>
<p>Young people in Japan will search the internet to find information to support purchase decisions but also say they tend to discuss their intentions with their friends on Line before buying anything. Gen Z in Japan is <a href="https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/978-1-80043-220-820201007/full/html">greatly influenced</a> in their brand selection by video content: they learn about new brands via video-based social media (YouTube or TikTok).</p>
<p>In Vietnam, by contrast, while genZ-ers also use the internet for shopping they reported being more likely to <a href="https://www.nielsen.com/apac/en/insights/article/2018/how-to-engage-with-generation-z-in-vietnam/">rely on their parents</a> for advice when shopping for themselves. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Panoramic photo of a modern shopping centre in Dubai, UAE." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/393146/original/file-20210401-19-1pz76gb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/393146/original/file-20210401-19-1pz76gb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393146/original/file-20210401-19-1pz76gb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393146/original/file-20210401-19-1pz76gb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393146/original/file-20210401-19-1pz76gb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393146/original/file-20210401-19-1pz76gb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393146/original/file-20210401-19-1pz76gb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Shopping centre in Dubai: the United Arab Emirates has some of the world’s most technologically advanced shopping malls.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Elnur via Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In UAE, <a href="https://www.tahawultech.com/industry/retail/gen-z-real-world-retail-over-online-shopping/">research</a> suggests that genZ-ers prefer the physical shopping experience. If they use technology, it’s more likely to be to find out where they can go to get what they want and compare prices and quality. The UAE has some of the most <a href="https://gulfnews.com/technology/uae-most-digitally-advanced-in-arab-world-1.2239034">advanced shopping malls</a> in the world, where physical and virtual worlds are integrated.</p>
<h2>How to reach your market</h2>
<p>As with the rest of the world, we found some common ground across Asia: technology and particularly social media is an important influence on the way that Zoomers interact and make choices in relation to shopping and work. But social media used by this cohort is also shaped by cultural and traditional patterns within each country. </p>
<p>So even within one continent, there are important differences within genZ in relation to the use, and the influence of, digital technology. </p>
<p>We may be looking at a cohort of digital natives who have grown up with smartphones and social media technology, but it’s far too simplistic to talk about a single generation Z in relation to its characteristics and behaviour. Advertisers take note – do this at your peril: to reach your market, you first have to know how they get their information.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/155694/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Anyone who wants to market to ‘Zoomers’ needs to do their research first.Elodie Gentina, Associate professor, marketing, IÉSEG School of ManagementEmma Parry, Professor of Human Resource Management, Cranfield UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1537912021-02-09T19:07:45Z2021-02-09T19:07:45ZAs new probes reach Mars, here’s what we know so far from trips to the red planet<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381867/original/file-20210202-23-jt4fc5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C13%2C2281%2C1149&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://mars.nasa.gov/resources/6564/rover-tracks-in-northward-view-along-west-rim-of-endeavour-false-color/">NASA/JPL-Caltech/Cornell University/Arizona State University</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Three new spacecraft are due to arrive at Mars this month, ending their seven-month journey through space. </p>
<p>The first, the United Arab Emirates’ <a href="https://www.emiratesmarsmission.ae/">Hope Probe</a>, should have made it to the red planet this week. It will stay in orbit and study its atmosphere for one complete Martian year (687 Earth days). </p>
<p>China’s <a href="https://www.planetary.org/space-missions/tianwen-1">Tianwen-1 mission</a> also enters orbit this month and will begin scouting the potential landing site for its Mars rover, due to be deployed in May.</p>
<p>If successful, China will become the second country to land a rover on Mars. </p>
<p>These two missions will join six orbiting spacecraft actively studying the red planet from above:</p>
<ul>
<li>NASA’s <a href="https://mars.nasa.gov/odyssey/">Mars Odyssey</a>, Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter (<a href="https://mars.nasa.gov/mro/">MRO</a>) and <a href="https://mars.nasa.gov/maven/">MAVEN Orbiter</a></li>
<li>Europe’s <a href="https://sci.esa.int/web/mars-express">Mars Express</a></li>
<li>India’s Mars Orbiter Mission (<a href="https://www.isro.gov.in/pslv-c25-mars-orbiter-mission">MOM</a>)</li>
<li>the European and Russian partnership <a href="https://exploration.esa.int/web/mars/-/46475-trace-gas-orbiter">ExoMars Trace Gas Orbiter</a>.</li>
</ul>
<p>The oldest active probe - Mars Odyssey - has been orbiting the planet for 20 years.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-get-people-from-earth-to-mars-and-safely-back-again-150167">How to get people from Earth to Mars and safely back again</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The third spacecraft to reach Mars this month is NASA’s <a href="https://mars.nasa.gov/mars2020/">Perseverance rover</a>, scheduled to land on February 18. It will search for signs of ancient microbial life but its mission also looks ahead, testing <a href="https://mars.nasa.gov/mars2020/spacecraft/instruments/moxie/">new technologies</a> that may support humans visiting Mars one day.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/tITni_HY1Bk?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Now NASA hopes Perseverance will land on Mars.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Laboratories on wheels</h2>
<p>NASA has an impressive track record for landing on Mars. It has operated all eight successful missions to the Martian surface. </p>
<p>What began with the two <a href="https://mars.nasa.gov/mars-exploration/missions/viking-1-2/">Viking landers</a> in the 1970s continues today with the <a href="https://mars.nasa.gov/insight/">InSight lander</a>, which has studied the <a href="https://mars.nasa.gov/insight/weather/">daily weather on Mars</a> and <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-03796-7">detected Marsquakes</a> for the past two years. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381605/original/file-20210201-17-1q5j86p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A rock strewn field and the foot of the Viking 1 lander appears in one corner." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381605/original/file-20210201-17-1q5j86p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381605/original/file-20210201-17-1q5j86p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=213&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381605/original/file-20210201-17-1q5j86p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=213&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381605/original/file-20210201-17-1q5j86p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=213&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381605/original/file-20210201-17-1q5j86p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=268&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381605/original/file-20210201-17-1q5j86p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=268&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381605/original/file-20210201-17-1q5j86p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=268&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Just minutes after landing, Viking 1 captured the first ever photograph taken from the Martian surface.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://rps.nasa.gov/resources/16/first-picture-from-the-surface-of-mars/">NASA/JPL</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Perseverance will be the fifth rover to arrive on Mars that’s capable of venturing across the surface of another planet. </p>
<p>These amazing laboratories on wheels have extended our knowledge of a faraway world. Here’s what they’ve told us so far. </p>
<h2>The first rover - Sojourner</h2>
<p>Twenty years after Viking 1 & 2 landed stationary probes on Mars, a third spacecraft finally reached the planet, but this one could move.</p>
<p>On July 4, 1997, NASA’s <a href="https://mars.nasa.gov/mars-exploration/missions/pathfinder/">Pathfinder</a> literally bounced onto the Martian surface, safely enclosed in a giant set of airbags. Once stable, the lander released the Sojourner rover. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/9HGRReKUzfU?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">See the Sojourner probe from Pathfinder’s viewpoint.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The first rover on Mars could move at a maximum speed of 1cm a second and was about as long (63cm) as a skateboard — smaller than some of the boulders it encountered. </p>
<p>Sojourner explored 16 locations near the Pathfinder lander, including the volcanic rock “Yogi”. Pictures of its landing site, Ares Vallis, showed it was littered with rounded pebbles and conglomerate rocks, evidence of ancient flood plains. </p>
<h2>The geologists - Spirit and Opportunity</h2>
<p>A pair of upsized rovers arrived on Mars in early 2004. <a href="https://mars.nasa.gov/mars-exploration/missions/mars-exploration-rovers/">Spirit and Opportunity</a> were geologists, searching for minerals within the rocks and soil, hidden clues that dry, cold Mars may once have been wet and warm.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381608/original/file-20210201-23-14r6qkk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Looking down on Spirit rover." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381608/original/file-20210201-23-14r6qkk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381608/original/file-20210201-23-14r6qkk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381608/original/file-20210201-23-14r6qkk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381608/original/file-20210201-23-14r6qkk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381608/original/file-20210201-23-14r6qkk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381608/original/file-20210201-23-14r6qkk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381608/original/file-20210201-23-14r6qkk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">This overhead ‘selfie’ was combined with Spirit’s largest ever panorama - it contains hundreds of individual images of Gusev Crater taken over three Martian days.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://mars.nasa.gov/mro/multimedia/images/?ImageID=5835">NASA/JPL-Caltech/Cornell</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Spirit landed in Gusev Crater, a 150km-wide crater created billions of years ago when an asteroid crashed into Mars. </p>
<p>Spirit discovered evidence of an ancient volcanic explosion, caused by hot lava meeting water. Small rocks had been thrown skyward but then fell back to Mars. Examination of the impact or “<a href="http://redplanet.asu.edu/?p=1216">bomb sag</a>” showed the rock had landed on wet soil. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381847/original/file-20210202-19-z79fs3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A small crater on Mars." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381847/original/file-20210202-19-z79fs3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381847/original/file-20210202-19-z79fs3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381847/original/file-20210202-19-z79fs3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381847/original/file-20210202-19-z79fs3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381847/original/file-20210202-19-z79fs3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381847/original/file-20210202-19-z79fs3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381847/original/file-20210202-19-z79fs3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The arrow points to a small crater or bomb sag, just 4cm across, that formed in the soaking wet ground when an ejected rock fell back to Mars.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://redplanet.asu.edu/?p=1216">NASA/JPL-Caltech/USGS/Cornell</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Even when things went wrong, Spirit made new discoveries. While dragging a <a href="https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn8944-mars-rovers-broken-wheel-is-beyond-repair/">broken front wheel</a>, Spirit churned up a track of soil revealing a <a href="https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn11914-mars-rovers-disability-leads-to-major-water-discovery/">patch of white silica</a>. </p>
<p>This mineral usually exists in hot springs or steam vents, ideal environments where life on Earth tends to flourish. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381609/original/file-20210201-15-boa9dl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Track of disturbed red soil revealing white silica." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381609/original/file-20210201-15-boa9dl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381609/original/file-20210201-15-boa9dl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381609/original/file-20210201-15-boa9dl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381609/original/file-20210201-15-boa9dl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381609/original/file-20210201-15-boa9dl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381609/original/file-20210201-15-boa9dl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381609/original/file-20210201-15-boa9dl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A 20cm track revealing white silica and a clue that Mars was once wet and warm.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.jpl.nasa.gov/news/mars-rover-spirit-unearths-surprise-evidence-of-wetter-past">NASA/JPL/Cornell</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The rover that kept on going</h2>
<p>Opportunity arrived on Mars three weeks after Spirit. Its original three-month mission was extended to 14 years as it travelled almost 50km across the Martian terrain. </p>
<p>Landing in the small Eagle Crater, Opportunity went on to visit more than 100 impact craters. It also found a handful of meteorites, <a href="https://mars.nasa.gov/mer/newsroom/pressreleases/20050119a.html">the first to be studied on another planet</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/382476/original/file-20210204-22-oxoad8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Opportunity’s journey mapped on an aerial view of Mars" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/382476/original/file-20210204-22-oxoad8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/382476/original/file-20210204-22-oxoad8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=463&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382476/original/file-20210204-22-oxoad8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=463&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382476/original/file-20210204-22-oxoad8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=463&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382476/original/file-20210204-22-oxoad8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=582&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382476/original/file-20210204-22-oxoad8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=582&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/382476/original/file-20210204-22-oxoad8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=582&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Outlined in yellow is Opportunity’s journey from Eagle Crater towards its final resting spot on the rim of Endeavour Crater. The blue outline of Victoria’s Phillip Island is included for scale.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">NASA/JPL-Caltech/MSSS/Museums Victoria</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The rover was descending into Endeavour Crater when a dust storm <a href="https://mars.nasa.gov/news/8413/nasas-opportunity-rover-mission-on-mars-comes-to-end/">ended its mission</a>. But it was along the crater’s edge that Opportunity made its biggest discoveries. </p>
<p>It found signs of ancient water flows and discovered the crater walls are <a href="https://mars.nasa.gov/mer/newsroom/pressreleases/20110901a.html">made of clays</a> that can only form where freshwater is available — more evidence that Mars could well have been a place for life. </p>
<h2>The chemist - Curiosity</h2>
<p><a href="https://mars.nasa.gov/mars-exploration/missions/mars-science-laboratory/">Curiosity</a> landed in Gale Crater on August 6, 2012, and continues to explore the region today. During the coronavirus pandemic, scientists and engineers have been commanding the rover from their homes.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381858/original/file-20210202-19-11bt6t4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="The Curiosity rover lowered to Mars." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381858/original/file-20210202-19-11bt6t4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381858/original/file-20210202-19-11bt6t4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381858/original/file-20210202-19-11bt6t4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381858/original/file-20210202-19-11bt6t4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381858/original/file-20210202-19-11bt6t4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381858/original/file-20210202-19-11bt6t4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381858/original/file-20210202-19-11bt6t4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An artist’s impression of Curiosity as it descends from the top of the Martian atmosphere to softly touchdown on the planet’s surface.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/msl/multimedia/gallery/pia14839.html">NASA/JPL-Caltech</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In a first for space exploration, NASA’s Curiosity was lowered to the Martian surface using a “sky crane”. After a successful soft landing, the crane’s cables were cut and the spacecraft’s descent stage flew away to crash elsewhere.</p>
<p>Curiosity is a fully equipped chemical laboratory. It can shoot lasers at rocks and also drill into the soil to collect samples. It’s confirmed ancient Mars once had the right chemistry to <a href="https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/msl/news/msl20130312.html">support microbial life</a>. </p>
<p>Curiosity also found evidence of ancient freshwater rivers and lakes. It seems that water once flowed towards a basin at Mount Sharp, a central peak that rises 5.5km from within Gale Crater. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381861/original/file-20210202-17-kqxcbk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="The Curiosity rover on the Martian surface." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381861/original/file-20210202-17-kqxcbk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381861/original/file-20210202-17-kqxcbk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381861/original/file-20210202-17-kqxcbk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381861/original/file-20210202-17-kqxcbk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381861/original/file-20210202-17-kqxcbk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381861/original/file-20210202-17-kqxcbk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381861/original/file-20210202-17-kqxcbk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Curiosity takes a picture of itself, working through the COVID-19 pandemic and drilling holes in a possible ancient riverbed.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.nasa.gov/feature/jpl/nasas-curiosity-takes-selfie-with-mary-anning-on-the-red-planet">NASA/JPL-Caltech/MSSS</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>From being on the surface of Mars, we’ve learned it was once very different to the dry, dusty planet it is today.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-conversation-weekly-podcast-ep-1-transcript-why-its-a-big-month-for-mars-154500">The Conversation Weekly podcast Ep #1 transcript: Why it's a big month for Mars</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>With flowing water, possible oceans, volcanic activity and an abundance of key ingredients necessary for life, the red planet was once much more Earth-like. What happened to make it change so dramatically? </p>
<p>It’s exciting to consider what the Perseverance and Taiwen-1 rovers may discover as they explore their own patch of Mars. They might even lead us to the day when humans are exploring the red planet for ourselves.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381611/original/file-20210201-17-jy1jiy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A Martian rocky landscape." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381611/original/file-20210201-17-jy1jiy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/381611/original/file-20210201-17-jy1jiy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=275&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381611/original/file-20210201-17-jy1jiy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=275&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381611/original/file-20210201-17-jy1jiy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=275&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381611/original/file-20210201-17-jy1jiy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=346&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381611/original/file-20210201-17-jy1jiy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=346&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/381611/original/file-20210201-17-jy1jiy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=346&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The colours in this image from Gale Crater have been adjusted to match conditions on Earth – this helps geologists interpret the rocks but it also changes the natural pink Martian sky to an Earth-like blue.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://mars.nasa.gov/resources/7505/strata-at-base-of-mount-sharp/">NASA/JPL-Caltech</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/153791/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tanya Hill does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Of the three probes to reach Mars this month, only two will land. But they will add to our growing knowledge of the red planet, and the search for evidence of life.Tanya Hill, Honorary Fellow of the University of Melbourne and Senior Curator (Astronomy), Museums Victoria Research InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1469732020-10-08T19:31:01Z2020-10-08T19:31:01ZHow the Abraham Accords could create real peace in the Middle East<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/361503/original/file-20201004-13-4wre6e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C232%2C5167%2C3117&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">U.S. President Donald Trump walks to the Abraham Accords signing ceremony at the White House on Sept. 15, 2020, with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Bahrain Foreign Minister Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa and United Arab Emirates Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nahyan.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Alex Brandon)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>How will history books judge the so-called <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/09/winners-losers/616364/">Abraham Accords</a>, aimed at normalizing diplomatic relations between Israel and two Arab Gulf states, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)? </p>
<p>Will it be remembered as the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/15/politics/israel-uae-abraham-accords-documents/index.html">declaration text</a> envisions it: a critical milestone in the evolution of “peace, security, and prosperity in the Middle East?”</p>
<p>Or it will go down the annals of the Arab-Israeli conflict as one in a series of United States-brokered peace treaties that didn’t live up to the hype surrounding it. </p>
<p>The answer may well depend on the choices that the architects of the Abraham Accords make today.</p>
<h2>Education needed</h2>
<p>Two peace treaties signed in the past — <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Camp-David-Accords">Israel-Egypt</a> in 1978 and <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Israel/The-Oslo-Accords">Israel-Jordan</a> in 1994 — may help determine whether the Abraham Accords will be able to deliver on their promises. </p>
<p>Bahrain, Israel and the UAE should ensure these accords are not merely an agreement among governments, but also among their citizens. Education can make this possible. The <a href="https://www.thenational.ae/uae/education/mbzuai-signs-first-higher-education-co-operation-plan-between-uae-and-israel-1.1076958">recent agreement</a> between the UAE’s Mohammed bin Zayed University of Artificial Intelligence and Israel’s Weizmann Institute of Science to collaborate on the development and use of artificial intelligence is an important first step. </p>
<p>Education may seem a particularly inauspicious place to start. While education has an undisputed ability to enlighten people and cultivate a predisposition to peaceful solutions, it’s not the first thing typically considered by governments seeking quick results in international politics.</p>
<p>This is partly because the majority of foreign policy officials cut their professional teeth on the considerations of power politics and realpolitik. </p>
<p>International politics don’t follow the moral laws and standards of interaction that govern the behaviour of individuals in society. Rather, it’s power that really matters. The mantra “<a href="https://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/xmlui/handle/1794/18310">might makes right</a>” is probably the most succinct summary of this sort of thinking. Therefore, education rarely wins the day in the calculus of foreign policy interests.</p>
<p>That’s why the news about the UAE’s <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/31/israel-uae-peace-deal-f-35-arms-sales-palestine/">bid to acquire the advanced F-35</a> stealth jet, and how that could influence the balance of power in the region, overshadowed other important developments resulting — or could result from — normalizing relations with Israel.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A fighter jet sits on a tarmac." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/361501/original/file-20201004-13-1afh0il.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/361501/original/file-20201004-13-1afh0il.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/361501/original/file-20201004-13-1afh0il.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/361501/original/file-20201004-13-1afh0il.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/361501/original/file-20201004-13-1afh0il.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/361501/original/file-20201004-13-1afh0il.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/361501/original/file-20201004-13-1afh0il.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">An F-35 fighter jet is seen in this 2019 photo.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Wilson Ring)</span></span>
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</figure>
<h2>AI agreement</h2>
<p>Chief among those developments is the co-operation in higher education between Israel and the UAE. Their agreement is designed to discredit the knee-jerk accusation that the accords are only aimed at confronting a <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/09/14/israels-peace-deals-are-a-strategic-nightmare-for-iran/">mutual geopolitical threat: Iran</a>. </p>
<p>In fact, there are other issues upon which the Gulf states and Israel see eye to eye, including the potential of technology to secure long-term stability.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/historic-israel-deal-wont-likely-bring-peace-to-the-middle-east-144480">'Historic' Israel deal won't likely bring peace to the Middle East</a>
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<p>For decades now, the Gulf states have undertaken <a href="https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF006/22194-9781498303231/22194-9781498303231/22194-9781498303231_A001.xml?language=en&redirect=true">economic diversification efforts</a> to decrease their reliance on hydrocarbon wealth. Israel has the most technological gravitas in the region. The Israelis, in return, will benefit from access to markets for their hi-tech businesses. It’s a win-win situation, and both sides could use their newfound economic interdependence to convince other Arab neighbours in dispute to find peaceful resolutions.</p>
<p>This paints a rosy picture, and every peace-loving person probably hopes to see the future unfold this way. However, economic and geopolitical interests alone can’t guarantee genuine peace unless the ideas of tolerance and mutual respect are planted at the roots of the consciousness of citizens. Education is probably the best way to pursue this goal.</p>
<h2>Science diplomacy</h2>
<p>The educational accord signed by universities from the UAE and Israel is an important step in this direction. It offers opportunities for <a href="http://sitn.hms.harvard.edu/flash/2018/science-diplomacy-collaboration-rapidly-changing-world/">science diplomacy</a> and dialogue from which people may find common ground and form new shared moral understandings. It also demonstrates that both countries are committed to peace.</p>
<p>People of course don’t change their positions overnight simply because of conversations in the study hall. But when these events recur, they offer opportunities for interaction, discussions, the re-examination of values and to identify collaborative projects that could strengthen civil society relationships among countries.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, left, President Donald Trump, Bahrain Foreign Minister Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa and United Arab Emirates Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nahyan stand together on a balcony." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/361500/original/file-20201004-20-1mtzs0i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=39%2C19%2C4389%2C2897&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/361500/original/file-20201004-20-1mtzs0i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/361500/original/file-20201004-20-1mtzs0i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/361500/original/file-20201004-20-1mtzs0i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/361500/original/file-20201004-20-1mtzs0i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/361500/original/file-20201004-20-1mtzs0i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/361500/original/file-20201004-20-1mtzs0i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, left, President Donald Trump, Bahrain Foreign Minister Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa and United Arab Emirates Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nahyan stand on the Blue Room Balcony after signing the Abraham Accords during a ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House on Sept. 15, 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Alex Brandon)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the past, <a href="https://dayan.org/content/working-paper-no-2">education was used</a> to ensure that the Arab-Israeli conflict remained in the foreground of people’s thinking, weaving it into the fabric of their domestic and foreign policy at key junctures. </p>
<p>Almost all the revolutions that changed regimes in the Arab world in the 1950s and 1960s used the tensions between Israel and the Arab world in one way or another to justify regime change. </p>
<h2>Mullahs stoked Arab-Israel tensions</h2>
<p>The mullah regime in Iran is no different in that it also employed the Arab-Israeli conflict to advance its political agenda. </p>
<p>When the mullahs <a href="http://americandiplomacy.web.unc.edu/2015/11/the-islamic-republic-of-iran-the-genesis-of-its-foreign-policy-since-1979/">seized power in Iran in 1979,</a> they jumped on the bandwagon, and not because it necessarily benefited their people. It was because the religious establishment found the Arab-Israeli conflict a convenient way to gain political leverage and animate their rather messianic vision of <a href="https://www.usmcu.edu/Outreach/Marine-Corps-University-Press/Expeditions-with-MCUP-digital-journal/Irans-Islamic-Revolutionary-Guard-Corps/">exporting the revolution</a>.</p>
<p>What did all these so-called revolutionary regimes had in common? Two things. </p>
<p>The first was the emphasis on appearing to be helping Palestinians, even though it was insincere. The second was the removal of human rights by undermining education and development. Instead, they gave their people a common enemy via the Arab-Israeli conflict.</p>
<p>Opportunities for dramatic change rarely arise in the Middle East. But now is such a time. From a combative political atmosphere, some new thinking has emerged. </p>
<p>The need for change is apparent, but most efforts are following a top-down, government-level approach. Education, however, at the grassroots level can help a peaceful co-existence percolate and create connection, based on a shared belief in the unity of God found in both Judaism and Islam.</p>
<p><em>This is a corrected version of a story originally published on Oct. 8, 2020. The earlier story said there was co-operation in higher education between Israel and Bahrain instead of Israel and the UAE.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/146973/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Edmund Adam does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Opportunities for dramatic change rarely arise in the Middle East. But now is such a time.Edmund Adam, PhD candidate of Higher Education (Comparative, International and Development Education) at OISE, University of TorontoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1444112020-09-01T16:51:45Z2020-09-01T16:51:45ZWhy the Gulf monarchies have survived<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/355671/original/file-20200901-24-tot2o8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C2046%2C1196&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Saudi King Salman accompanies Kuwait's emir, Sheikh Sabah Al Ahmad Al Sabah, left, during the 40th Gulf Cooperation Council Summit in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in December 2019.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Amr Nabil)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When the <a href="https://rlp.hds.harvard.edu/faq/arab-spring-egypt">Arab Spring</a> protests erupted in 2010, many <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/11/13/yes-the-gulf-monarchs-are-in-trouble/">political pundits predicted</a> the uprisings would ripple through the entire region and ultimately reach the oil-rich Gulf states, sweeping away monarchies.</p>
<p>But ultimately, the Gulf monarchies of Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates — and to a lesser extent, Bahrain — were the least affected by the Arab Spring. These six Gulf monarchies <a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2012/04/understanding-the-resilience-of-monarchy-during-the-arab-spring/">were more successful in weathering the political storm</a> than their republican neighbours, which in some cases <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2016/01/arab-spring-five-years-on/">were plunged into civil wars</a> with a heavy humanitarian and economic toll.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/355425/original/file-20200830-20-1c0tyje.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man wearing a head scarf and sunglasses." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/355425/original/file-20200830-20-1c0tyje.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/355425/original/file-20200830-20-1c0tyje.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355425/original/file-20200830-20-1c0tyje.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355425/original/file-20200830-20-1c0tyje.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355425/original/file-20200830-20-1c0tyje.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355425/original/file-20200830-20-1c0tyje.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355425/original/file-20200830-20-1c0tyje.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Haitham bin Tariq Al Said is seen in this November 2016 photo. He was named Oman’s new sultan earlier this year.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Kamran Jebreili)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>I spent a good deal of my life in the region and during the uncertain times of the Arab Spring, so curious colleagues ask me how the Gulf monarchies continue to hold on. In response, I draw not on my memories but on my political training. And I believe there are lessons to learn from the durability of these regimes that could enhance global efforts to understand the region and build sustainable peace in the Middle East.</p>
<h2>Most Middle East countries are oil-rich</h2>
<p>I generally scoff at the argument that Gulf monarchies have only managed to navigate the tricky waters of the region’s geopolitics and avoided a mass exodus of their citizens because of their oil wealth. <a href="https://www.economist.com/special-report/2018/06/21/how-oil-transformed-the-gulf">This popular wisdom holds</a> that <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/petrodollars.asp">petrodollars</a> allow the Gulf monarchies to coax people into submission, and that’s why they endure.</p>
<p>Missing from this assessment is acknowledgement that the Gulf monarchies <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/mena/04econ.htm">aren’t the only countries in the broader region with ample hydrocarbon riches</a>. Yet petrodollars in the broader region that often benefited citizens of those countries didn’t prevent public anger or major challenges to authority.</p>
<p>Brief comparisons between the Gulf monarchies and other oil-producing countries in the region reveal other common ground besides oil, such as culture and religion. Yet their respective trajectories since the 1950s — Gulf monarchies modernized quickly, while other oil-exporting countries (for example <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14546763">Iraq</a>, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13755445">Libya</a>, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14118856">Algeria</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14542438">Iran</a>) have undergone political crises, coups and even regime change. That’s only added to the sense that Gulf monarchies and other oil-producing countries in the region are heading in different directions. </p>
<p>So oil alone doesn’t explain the longevity of the Gulf monarchies. Other factors help explain their success.</p>
<h2>Monarchies accepted in Gulf region</h2>
<p>First and foremost is whether people in the Gulf region see monarchy as a legitimate form of government. In Western political thought, elections represent one of the key benchmarks for judging the legitimacy of government. This is the foundation of participatory democracy. </p>
<p>By this token, only leaders from presidential republics pass muster in terms of Western legitimacy. After all, these countries hold regular presidential elections. </p>
<p>But are those elections themselves legitimate?</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="A man gestures in a dark suit and red tie gestures while speaking." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/355428/original/file-20200830-24-yu02ml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/355428/original/file-20200830-24-yu02ml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355428/original/file-20200830-24-yu02ml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355428/original/file-20200830-24-yu02ml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355428/original/file-20200830-24-yu02ml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355428/original/file-20200830-24-yu02ml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355428/original/file-20200830-24-yu02ml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Elliott Abrams, now the State Department Special Representative for Venezuela, speaks recently on Capitol Hill in Washington.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Andrew Harnik)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In 2011, at the height of the Arab Spring, Elliott Abrams, deputy national security adviser to former U.S. President George W. Bush, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/rid-ding-syria-of-a-despot/2011/03/25/AFSRRVYB_story.html">wrote that</a> “Arab monarchies … are more legitimate than the false republics.” This assessment raises two critical issues.</p>
<p>The first is the reliability of elections in the Gulf. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jun/02/syria-election-vote-for-assad-or-else">Presidential elections in Middle Eastern republics</a> have often <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/02/20/why-irans-rigged-elections-matter/">been fraudulent</a>. It would make a mockery of democracy to consider these elections proof of legitimacy.</p>
<p>The second concerns the compatibility between society and its political institutions. This is one of the pillars of stability in any society. Hereditary monarchies like the ones in the Gulf aren’t a novelty for the native cultures of the region. These monarchies therefore derive legitimacy from the fit between their royal institutions and the cultural norms of their people. This is a <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legitimacy/#:%7E:text=According%20to%20Weber%2C%20that%20a,virtue%20of%20which%20persons%20exercising">traditional form of political legitimacy</a>.</p>
<p>With their emphasis on tradition, hierarchy, loyalties and social alliances, monarchies are accepted by many of the cultures of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21534764.2014.971647">the Arabian Peninsula</a>. The Gulf monarchies were borne out of their own socio-cultural heritages, and this gives them more legitimacy.</p>
<h2>Ruling at a distance</h2>
<p>This legitimacy however sets certain limits on executive authority and places demands on the monarchs, who are expected to be arbiters between competing interests — benevolent stabilizers, so to speak. In fact, problems have arisen when monarchs fail to project this image or perform this role. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="Bahrain's King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa in mid-sentence." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/355673/original/file-20200901-16-6iznls.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/355673/original/file-20200901-16-6iznls.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355673/original/file-20200901-16-6iznls.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355673/original/file-20200901-16-6iznls.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355673/original/file-20200901-16-6iznls.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355673/original/file-20200901-16-6iznls.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355673/original/file-20200901-16-6iznls.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Bahrain’s King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa is seen in this May 2017 photo in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Evan Vucci)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>An example is <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/02/25/nine-years-after-bahrains-uprising-its-human-rights-crisis-has-only-worsened">Bahrain’s mass protests in 2011</a>, when many citizens felt their king showed little commitment to the principles of compromise and moderation that had largely characterized his predecessors’ reign.</p>
<p>The arbiter status gives the monarchs respect and authority, which enables them to rule at distance.</p>
<p>This has helped them maintain power with less reliance on force than their non-monarchy neighbours, which base their claims for legitimacy on political ideology like nationalism and independence. More often than not, these ideologies don’t resonate with people. This poses a major challenge to their ability to maintain power, so the republics rely more on force and security to maintain power. </p>
<p>This best expresses itself in Syria, where <a href="http://www.understandingwar.org/report/assad-regime">the Al-Assad regime</a> has ruled for decades through a network of overlapping security agencies to enforce questionable legitimacy.</p>
<p>That’s why the regional republics <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/kings-for-all-seasons-how-the-middle-easts-monarchies-survived-the-arab-spring/">were hit harder by the Arab Spring</a>. Popular uprisings there were fuelled by greater discontent.</p>
<h2>Creating stability</h2>
<p>This has spared the Gulf monarchies from frequent legitimacy crises and allowed them to divert resources to other aspects of governance, like building <a href="https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft5g50071k&chunk.id=d0e3492&toc.depth=100&toc.id=0&brand=ucpress&query=qatar">state capacity</a>. This refers to the ability of governments to employ administrative and technical processes, rather than force, to address societal challenges and create stability.</p>
<p>State capacity is bound with a country’s investment in education and human capital, which in turn create a capacity for informed decision-making. This is evident in the volume of publications by Gulf universities. Despite the relative youth of universities in Gulf monarchy states — most of them were founded in the mid-1970s — they outperform their counterparts in Arab republics in terms of quantity of publications.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A table shows the number of published documents among Gulf State universities." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/355550/original/file-20200831-18-1op0bgv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/355550/original/file-20200831-18-1op0bgv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=172&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355550/original/file-20200831-18-1op0bgv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=172&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355550/original/file-20200831-18-1op0bgv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=172&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355550/original/file-20200831-18-1op0bgv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=216&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355550/original/file-20200831-18-1op0bgv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=216&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355550/original/file-20200831-18-1op0bgv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=216&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Number of published documents from Clarivate Analytics Web of ScienceTM: InCites Dataset (Retrieved August 2020)</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author provided</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The future success of the Gulf monarchies probably hinges on further investment in education. </p>
<p>Doing so will enhance the quantity and quality of intellectual activity and produce citizens who can share power, steer economies in response to societal and technological challenges and guarantee long-term stability.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/144411/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Edmund Adam does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Gulf monarchies emerged from the Arab Spring relatively unscathed, while some Middle East republics were devastated by civil war. Here’s how they managed — and how education may have played a part.Edmund Adam, PhD candidate of Higher Education (Comparative, International and Development Education) at OISE, University of TorontoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1444802020-08-17T19:15:10Z2020-08-17T19:15:10Z‘Historic’ Israel deal won’t likely bring peace to the Middle East<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/353202/original/file-20200817-22-1u65vv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5000%2C3278&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">These Palestinians aren't happy with Trump's Israel deal, which required Israel to make no territorial concessions. Gaza, Aug. 16, 2020.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/supporters-of-the-palestinian-democratic-front-hold-news-photo/1228069922?adppopup=true">Mahmoud Issa/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images)</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The heralded recent <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/13/us/politics/trump-israel-united-arab-emirates-uae.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage">agreement to normalize relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates</a> may not be the grand achievement it was made out to be. </p>
<p>The White House-brokered deal, which was announced with <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-united-states-state-israel-united-arab-emirates/">much fanfare</a> on Aug. 13, is undoubtedly a diplomatic win for U.S. President Donald Trump and for Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, who declared its signing a “<a href="https://twitter.com/netanyahu/status/866741286270849024?lang=en">historic day</a>.”</p>
<p>But the United Arab Emirates and Israel have never been at war, so the new agreement between them is <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/israel-peace-deal-united-arab-emirates-transforms-the-middle-east">not really a peace treaty</a>, as <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/politics/kushner-hails-israel-uae-peace-deal-as-paradigm-shift-for-middle-east">some White House officials</a> and press accounts suggested. It is an agreement to begin officially upgrading relations that have been quietly improving for some time, a process that will probably unfold slowly and tentatively. </p>
<p>Nor is it a deal that helps resolve the long-running conflict between Israel and the Palestinians – the subject of <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-israeli-palestinian-conflict-9780190625337?cc=us&lang=en&">my academic research and recent book</a>. For Palestinians, in fact, the Israeli-Emirati agreement is seen as a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/14/world/middleeast/palestinians-israel-uae-annexation-peace.html">major setback</a>, weakening their bargaining position with Israel. </p>
<h2>Winners of the Abraham Accords</h2>
<p>Until now, the <a href="https://mitvim.org.il/wp-content/uploads/Moran_Zaga_-_Israel-UAE_-_Opportunities_on_Hold_-_December_2018-1.pdf">growing Israeli-Emirati relationship</a> has been conducted informally and secretly. It was largely focused on <a href="https://www.axios.com/israel-uae-white-house-meeting-iran-trump-kushner-ec81aa24-02db-4920-b4f2-88eec301222c.html?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=twsocialshare&utm_campaign=organic">sharing intelligence to counter their mutual enemy, Iran</a>. The new deal, dubbed the Abraham Accords, will bolster this <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/06/18/donald-trumps-new-world-order">de facto alliance against Iran</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A photo of newspapers heralding the Israel-UAE 'peace deal'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/353193/original/file-20200817-14-1q5z3ir.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=36%2C24%2C4031%2C2655&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/353193/original/file-20200817-14-1q5z3ir.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353193/original/file-20200817-14-1q5z3ir.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353193/original/file-20200817-14-1q5z3ir.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353193/original/file-20200817-14-1q5z3ir.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353193/original/file-20200817-14-1q5z3ir.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353193/original/file-20200817-14-1q5z3ir.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Look beyond the headlines to understand what the Israel-United Arab Emirates agreement really does – and what it doesn’t.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/this-picture-taken-on-august-14-2020-in-dubai-shows-the-news-photo/1228036588?adppopup=true">Guiseppe Cacace/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It will also accelerate commercial ties between the two nations, which have already <a href="https://www.upi.com/Defense-News/2012/01/27/Emirates-has-security-links-with-Israel/73471327687767/?ur3=1">begun to develop in recent years</a>. Economic and technological cooperation between Israel and the United Arab Emirates – an important economic center in the Gulf region – can now take place publicly and expand into more areas. </p>
<p>Scientific cooperation, <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/uae-israeli-companies-sign-coronavirus-research-agreement-1.9075573">especially around the COVID-19 pandemic</a>, will also commence, as will tourism. Both Israel and the Emirates will undoubtedly benefit from their growing relationship. </p>
<p>White House and Israeli officials hope that the agreement will also encourage other Arab states in the Gulf to <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/after-israel-uae-deal-kushner-indicates-more-arab-countries-will-follow/">upgrade their own relations with Israel</a>, with <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/senior-israeli-officials-reportedly-say-bahrain-next-in-line-for-normalization/">Bahrain and Oman the most likely to follow the Emirates’ lead</a>. Both countries have <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-08-15/bahrain-joins-egypt-oman-in-supporting-uae-israel-deal">expressed their support for the agreement</a>. </p>
<p>Saudi Arabia, the most important Gulf Arab state, however, has been conspicuously quiet about the deal. Due to their desire to lead the Sunni Muslim world and their typically cautious foreign policy, the Saudis seem unlikely to normalize their relationship with Israel <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/saudi-foreign-minister-relations-israel-peace-deal">unless major progress is made towards resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict</a>. </p>
<p>The agreement relates to that conflict by preventing Israel from implementing its <a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-suspends-formal-annexation-of-the-west-bank-but-its-controversial-settlements-continue-144469">pledge to unilaterally annex parts of the West Bank</a>, an Israeli-occupied territory that the Palestinians claim as their land. </p>
<h2>Losers of the Abraham Accords</h2>
<p>The Emiratis demanded that concession from Israel in return for normalizing relations. But it’s far from clear that the Israeli-Emirati agreement will help the prospects for peace between Israel and the Palestinians. </p>
<p>For one, <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-in-uae-deal-netanyahu-trades-imaginary-annexation-for-real-life-diplomacy-win-1.9071474">Israel analysts question</a> whether Prime Minister Netanyahu really intended to carry out his <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/israel-west-bank-annexation-netanyahu-explanation-reactions-history-2020-7">election campaign promises</a> to annex some of the West Bank, especially in the midst of an economic and health crisis. Israel is now confronting its <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/22/israel-coronavirus-second-wave-netanyahu/">second wave of the coronavirus</a>. Annexation, which would be illegal under international law, also faced domestic, American and international opposition. </p>
<p>President Trump has declared annexation “off the table” as a result of the United Arab Emirates deal. But <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/after-netanyahu-says-still-committed-to-annexation-trump-says-it-s-off-the-table-1.9071859">Netanyahu claims</a> it is postponed.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/353195/original/file-20200817-14-afe73a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Trump sits next to his standing advisors in the Oval Office" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/353195/original/file-20200817-14-afe73a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/353195/original/file-20200817-14-afe73a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353195/original/file-20200817-14-afe73a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353195/original/file-20200817-14-afe73a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353195/original/file-20200817-14-afe73a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353195/original/file-20200817-14-afe73a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353195/original/file-20200817-14-afe73a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Trump and his advisers, including his Mideast czar, Jared Kushner, announcing the Israel deal on Aug. 13, 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-donald-trump-speaks-during-a-meeting-with-leaders-news-photo/1228029060?adppopup=true">Doug Mills-Pool/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Palestinians say it makes little difference to them whether Israel has called off or merely paused its official annexation of West Bank territory. Either way, some 2.8 million Palestinians in the West Bank will continue to live under <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/12/17/born-without-civil-rights/israels-use-draconian-military-orders-repress">Israeli military rule</a> alongside <a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-suspends-formal-annexation-of-the-west-bank-but-its-controversial-settlements-continue-144469">an ever-growing population of Jewish settlers</a>, now numbering more than 430,000. </p>
<p>Israel has been <a href="https://wonitor.com/World/2020/0318/Why-Israeli-settlements-keep-growing-with-Trump-support">building its settlements in the West Bank</a> since it conquered the territory in the 1967 war. Palestinians and many observers see the relentless expansion of Jewish settlements as amounting to Israel’s “<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-journal-of-international-law/article/israels-creeping-annexation/6C18D4A2686DBFDBD54FC0F5EC5FD12A/core-reader">creeping annexation</a>” of West Bank land. </p>
<p>This process will continue despite the deal. It could even accelerate if Netanyahu tries to appease Jewish settlers, who <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/right-decries-annexations-downfall-as-most-politicians-laud-uae-deal/">feel betrayed by his suspension of annexation</a>. </p>
<h2>‘Sold out by your friends’</h2>
<p>The divided, fractious leadership of the Palestinians has <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/08/palestinians-unanimously-reject-uae-israel-deal-200814115311669.html">unanimously denounced the agreement</a>. They describe it as a “stab in the back” for the United Arab Emirates to break from the Arab <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/mar/28/israel7">consensus not to normalize relations with Israel until it makes peace with the Palestinians</a>. In practice, that would mean withdrawing from the West Bank and allowing a Palestinian state to be established. </p>
<p>Now, Israel has achieved normalization with an important Arab state without making any territorial concessions to the Palestinians. Palestinians fear that gives Israel <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/upending-traditional-views-on-peacemaking-israel-uae-deal-truly-heralds-new-era/">less incentive to ever leave the West Bank</a>. That’s especially true if other Arab allies tire of supporting the Palestinian cause, and opt to forge relations with Israel based upon their own interests, as the Emiratis have done. </p>
<p>“May you never be sold out by your ‘friends,’” Hanan Ashrawi, a veteran Palestinian politician, <a href="https://de.reuters.com/article/uk-israel-emirates-analysts-factbox/factbox-triple-win-or-double-cross-analysts-react-to-israel-uae-deal-idUKKCN259314">tweeted in reaction to the agreement</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/144480/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dov Waxman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Israel and the United Arab Emirates weren’t at war, so their new deal is not really a peace accord. Nor does it satisfy the Palestinians, who need Arab nations to support their drive for statehood.Dov Waxman, Director of the UCLA Y&S Nazarian Center for Israel Studies and The Rosalinde and Arthur Gilbert Foundation Chair in Israel Studies, University of California, Los AngelesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1444952020-08-14T05:51:27Z2020-08-14T05:51:27ZMarriage of convenience: what does the historic Israel-UAE agreement mean for Middle East peace?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352891/original/file-20200814-24-7ctgxe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=251%2C314%2C5739%2C3673&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Andrew Harnik/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/13/us/politics/trump-israel-united-arab-emirates-uae.html">The normalisation of diplomatic ties</a> between Israel and the United Arab Emirates has variously been described as a “breakthrough” and an important staging moment towards a comprehensive Middle East peace.</p>
<p>These conclusions are, at best, premature.</p>
<p>Normalisation of relations between Israel and an important Gulf state is a highly significant development whose fallout is unpredictable. What seems clear is that the UAE initiative will further deepen a regional divide.</p>
<p>In the Middle East, historic shifts rarely take place without unforeseen consequences. Israel’s <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/with-trump-s-help-israel-and-the-uae-reach-historic-deal-to-normalize-relations-1.9070687">pledge</a> not to go ahead with the annexation of one-third of the West Bank and the Jordan Valley for the time being will be cold comfort for the Palestinians.</p>
<p>What has been exposed by the normalisation agreement between Israel and the UAE, brokered by Washington, is acceptance of the arguments for a regional buffer to counter Iran’s growing power and influence.</p>
<p>This is a marriage of convenience.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Tel Aviv's city hall lit up with the UAE flag." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352854/original/file-20200814-18-1ezdhc8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352854/original/file-20200814-18-1ezdhc8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352854/original/file-20200814-18-1ezdhc8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352854/original/file-20200814-18-1ezdhc8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352854/original/file-20200814-18-1ezdhc8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352854/original/file-20200814-18-1ezdhc8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352854/original/file-20200814-18-1ezdhc8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">After news of the deal, Tel Aviv’s city hall was lit up with the UAE flag.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Oded Balilty/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The enemy of my enemy is my friend</h2>
<p>It should go without saying that absent Iran’s growing security threat to Gulf states, it’s doubtful such a normalisation of ties would have taken place outside a comprehensive Middle East peace.</p>
<p>The latest development bears out one of the Arab world’s stock standard sayings: the enemy of my enemy is my friend.</p>
<p>In other words, an Iranian threat to the UAE and its fellow Gulf Cooperation Council members has brought about an accord with Israel that would previously have been unthinkable.</p>
<p>This is not to say this development is unexpected.</p>
<p>Israel has gradually broadened its informal diplomatic contacts with Gulf states in recent years to the point where little attempt has been made to disguise these contacts.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-suspends-formal-annexation-of-the-west-bank-but-its-controversial-settlements-continue-144469">Israel suspends formal annexation of the West Bank, but its controversial settlements continue</a>
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<hr>
<p>These interactions included <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-oman/israeli-pm-netanyahu-makes-rare-visit-to-oman-idUSKCN1N01WN">a visit by Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Oman</a> in 2018. </p>
<p>In all of this, a fault line in the Middle East is likely to deepen between Sunni Muslim states and Iran, as well as that country’s allies in Syria and in Lebanon.</p>
<p>These Sunni states, led by Saudi Arabia and backed by the United States in collaboration with Israel, are building a buffer against Iran.</p>
<p>It may be simplistic to say this, but a die has been cast.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352892/original/file-20200814-18-noty56.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352892/original/file-20200814-18-noty56.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352892/original/file-20200814-18-noty56.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352892/original/file-20200814-18-noty56.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352892/original/file-20200814-18-noty56.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352892/original/file-20200814-18-noty56.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352892/original/file-20200814-18-noty56.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Benjamin Netanyahu has put his planned annexation of parts of the West Bank on hold as part of the deal.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">ABIR SULTAN / POOL/ EPA</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What will other Gulf states do?</h2>
<p>Of course, it remains to be seen whether regional friends and erstwhile enemies will remain steadfast in their new commitments.</p>
<p>In the shifting sands of Middle East power politics, today’s friends can be tomorrow’s enemies.</p>
<p>If Israel and the UAE are the betrothed in a marriage of convenience, the Trump White House is the matchmaker. Behind the scenes, Saudi Arabia, the dominant Sunni state in the Gulf, will have encouraged the Emiratis to take the first step</p>
<p>Time will tell how quickly other Gulf states will follow. These Arab fiefdoms will be assessing fallout before taking action themselves.</p>
<p>Among the principal aims of US Middle East policy since President Donald Trump came to power has been to broker improved ties between Israel and America’s Arab allies in the Gulf.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/israels-proposed-annexation-of-the-west-bank-could-bring-a-diplomatic-tsunami-141688">Israel's proposed annexation of the West Bank could bring a 'diplomatic tsunami'</a>
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<p>This has been part of a wider Trump Middle East peace plan to bring about the “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/28/world/middleeast/peace-plan.html">deal of the century</a>”, as the president calls it, that would end decades of conflict between Israel and the Palestinians.</p>
<p>Trump officials believe Gulf states could be more fully engaged in exerting pressure on Palestinians to make concessions that might enable progress towards such a deal.</p>
<p>The UAE and its fellow Gulf states have been among principal donors to the Palestinian movement over many years. Their funding, for example, helped establish and sustain the Palestine Liberation Organisation.</p>
<p>However, times change. Oil-producing Gulf states have much less money to splash around given the demands of their own expanding populations. The collapse in oil prices has not helped.</p>
<h2>Where does this leave the Palestinians?</h2>
<p>In any case, Arab states more generally have found the Palestinian issue increasingly a distraction from their immediate concern of keeping Iran at bay.</p>
<p>By and large, these states paid lip service in their criticism of the Trump “deal of the century” when it was unveiled in January. Previously, their reaction would have been one of outright rejection.</p>
<p>In summary, the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-set-to-release-long-awaited-mideast-peace-package-seen-as-generous-to-israel/2020/01/28/883e3d50-41d3-11ea-b5fc-eefa848cde99_story.html">peace plan</a> demanded the Palestinians set aside their long-held dream of a Palestinian state. Instead, they were asked to accept semi-autonomous enclaves in Israeli-controlled territories more or less in perpetuity</p>
<p>Needless to say this was <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-plo-official-lashes-out-at-uae-for-selling-out-palestinians-in-israel-agreement-1.9071095">rejected</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="An Israeli border police officer outside a house being demolished in the West Bank." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352865/original/file-20200814-14-1cdrceo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352865/original/file-20200814-14-1cdrceo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352865/original/file-20200814-14-1cdrceo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352865/original/file-20200814-14-1cdrceo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352865/original/file-20200814-14-1cdrceo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=498&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352865/original/file-20200814-14-1cdrceo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=498&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352865/original/file-20200814-14-1cdrceo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=498&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ownership of the West Bank has been contested since 1967.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Abed Al Hashlamoun/AAP</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>All this leaves the much-weakened Palestinian movement in a bind. The UAE’s decisions will be viewed by its leaders as one more betrayal of their cause in a long list going back to the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Balfour-Declaration">Balfour declaration of 1917</a>. In that declaration, Britain promised the Jews a homeland in Palestine.</p>
<p>The question for the Palestinians in light of what is effectively and conspicuously a collapse in Arab solidarity in rejection of Israel is what options might be available to them.</p>
<p>Initially, Palestinian reaction has been to decry the UAE’s actions. The Palestinian ambassador to the UAE has been <a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/palestinians-recall-ambassador-from-uae-over-israel-deal/story-xEGaScjbVPqYUPq9TaYYHN.html">recalled</a>.</p>
<p>However, these sorts of responses don’t amount to a sustainable long-term strategy for a movement that is both divided and tired. What would seem to be required is a closing of ranks among Palestinians under a younger, more dynamic leadership.</p>
<p>It is long past time for vestiges of the PLO’s historic leadership to move aside to be replaced by a new generation.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-constitutes-fair-and-unfair-criticism-of-israel-128342">What constitutes fair and unfair criticism of Israel?</a>
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</em>
</p>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/144495/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tony Walker does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The normalisation of ties between Israel and an important Gulf state reveals an acceptance of the arguments for a regional buffer to counter Iran’s growing influence.Tony Walker, Adjunct Professor, School of Communications, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1424392020-07-13T11:51:45Z2020-07-13T11:51:45ZThe UAE’s Mars mission seeks to bring Hope to more places than the red planet<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/346922/original/file-20200710-18-1dnnq5r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=75%2C33%2C5531%2C3699&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Star trails in the desert.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/star-trail-in-the-desert-riyadh-saudi-arabia-royalty-free-image/936327752?adppopup=true&uiloc=thumbnail_similar_images_adp">TARIQ_M_1 / Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>On July 14, a new Mars-bound spacecraft will launch from Japan. While several Mars missions are <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-020-01861-0">planned to launch</a> over the next month, what makes this different is who’s launching it: the United Arab Emirates.</p>
<p>Though new to space exploration, the UAE has set high goals for the probe, named Hope. The mission aims to further study the climate of Mars, but <a href="https://www.space.com/united-arab-emirates-hope-mars-mission.html">Omran Sharaf, mission lead, also says</a>, “It’s a means for a bigger goal: to expedite the development in our educational sector, academic sector.”</p>
<p>With space exploration usually pursued by actors like the United States, Russia, China, the European Space Agency and more recently, India, Hope will be the first mission to the red planet from a Middle Eastern country. <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=PxIOz7cAAAAJ&hl=en">As a space policy expert</a>, I believe Hope is also significant in two other ways: It shows how international collaboration, through which Hope was designed and built, enables a new generation of space exploration and demonstrates the expansion of this sector can further economic development.</p>
<h2>Growing international collaboration</h2>
<p>While tense relations in space between major countries seem to dominate the headlines, the UAE’s mission shows how cooperation is just as important. Despite being <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamiecartereurope/2020/06/16/in-30-days-a-country-of-96-million-people-will-send-a-mission-to-mars-this-is-what-hope-can-do/#2fba84c050c3">the third-richest country</a> in the world, the UAE’s scientific and engineering community is still small. As such, the Emiratis turned to other experts for help. <a href="https://www.space.com/united-arab-emirates-hope-mars-mission.html">To build Hope</a> and its scientific instrumentation, the UAE worked with the University of Colorado Boulder and then sent it to Japan to be launched on a Japanese H-2A rocket.</p>
<p>International cooperation in space is not new. Typically, such collaboration is used by states to either advance the interest of a particular state – usually, the U.S. or Russia – or to reduce the costs of space exploration. For example, early in the space race, the <a href="https://history.nasa.gov/SP-4407/vol2/v2chapter1-1.pdf">United States assisted European countries</a> with launching satellites to demonstrate the power of the U.S. in space. The International Space Station, on the other hand, has been a work in progress since the mid-1990s. It was built through a partnership established <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S0160-791X(98)00026-8">to reduce the costs</a> of building and operating such a large project in low Earth orbit.</p>
<p>While international prestige plays a role for Hope (its arrival at Mars is timed to the UAE’s 50th anniversary), the cooperation involved is different. Instead of relying on countries for direct assistance, the UAE contracted with an American university and a commercial Japanese launcher. By doing so, they have taken advantage of significant changes in the accessibility and affordability of space technology to produce a fairly low-cost mission. For just <a href="https://www.thenational.ae/uae/science/uae-mars-mission-the-hope-probe-cost-nearly-dh735-million-1.1045660">US$200 million in costs</a>, they believe Hope will stimulate and grow their economic base.</p>
<p>[<em>Deep knowledge, daily.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>.]</p>
<p>Though resource-rich, the UAE remains an economically fragile state. They <a href="https://www.nature.com/immersive/d41586-020-01862-z/index.html">have historically produced few Ph.D.’s</a> in the basic sciences and lack a robust knowledge economy. Sharaf, Hope’s mission lead, has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/09/it-is-about-our-survival-uaes-mars-mission-prepares-for-launch">frankly acknowledged</a> that the mission “is about the future of the UAE and our survival.” The idea is for Hope to inspire a new generation of Emiratis to pursue education in STEM fields to diversify and strengthen the country’s economy. This approach seems to be working, with <a href="https://www.nature.com/immersive/d41586-020-01862-z/index.html">the UAE already seeing a 12% annual increase</a> in STEM enrollment for the past several years.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/346924/original/file-20200710-22-lxcg3s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/346924/original/file-20200710-22-lxcg3s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/346924/original/file-20200710-22-lxcg3s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/346924/original/file-20200710-22-lxcg3s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/346924/original/file-20200710-22-lxcg3s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/346924/original/file-20200710-22-lxcg3s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/346924/original/file-20200710-22-lxcg3s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">The United Arab Emirates’ first astronaut, Hazza Al Mansouri, gives an OK sign during a spacesuit check before a launch to the International Space Station.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/expedition-61-62-main-crew-member-the-united-arab-emirates-news-photo/1171006296?adppopup=true">Sergei Savostyanov/TASS via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The economic expansion of space exploration</h2>
<p>While international achievement remains important, economic concerns like the UAE’s are increasingly driving space exploration.</p>
<p>In addition to the UAE and other Middle Eastern countries, African states are also looking to take advantage of space. To date, <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2020/06/is-the-united-states-losing-the-african-space-race/#:%7E:text=Africa's%20space%20programs%20account%20for,of%20the%20world's%20space%20activity.&text=Since%201999%2C%2011%20African%20countries,three%20multilateral%20satellites%20into%20orbit.">11 African countries</a> have launched satellites and Africa’s space economy is currently worth around $7 billion. As a sign of how serious the continent is, the African Union is planning to <a href="https://qz.com/africa/1550551/egypt-to-host-african-space-agency/">establish an African space agency</a> that will be headquartered in Egypt.</p>
<p>Unlike Hope, whose goal is to indirectly stimulate the Emirati economy, African countries are seeking direct economic impact through the use of satellites. In South Africa, <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2019/11/01/south-africa-space-063031">remote imaging satellites are being used</a> to catch illegal fishing off its coast. Ethiopia is using <a href="https://qz.com/africa/1772671/ethiopia-launched-its-first-space-satellite-with-chinas-help/">its first Earth-observing satellite</a> to improve weather monitoring in the Horn of Africa. <a href="https://africanews.space/how-much-has-nasrda-contributed-to-nigerias-economic-growth-and-development/">Nigeria has used</a> its three Earth satellites to aid in resource and even electoral mapping.</p>
<p>Given a lack of homegrown capabilities, South Africa, Ethiopia, Nigeria and the UAE have all had to take advantage of international collaboration. This is especially true when it comes to launching the satellites. As such, the use of space exploration to support economic development can only continue through the type of cooperation that led to Hope.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/142439/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Wendy Whitman Cobb is affiliated with the US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. Her views are her own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its components.. </span></em></p>A new country launches a mission to Mars. A space expert explains what this means for the Middle East and the African continent.Wendy Whitman Cobb, Professor of Strategy and Security Studies, Air UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1366312020-04-21T13:11:44Z2020-04-21T13:11:44ZGulf states use coronavirus threat to tighten authoritarian controls and surveillance<p>Governments across the Middle East have moved to upgrade their surveillance capabilities under the banner of combatting COVID-19, the disease linked to the new coronavirus.</p>
<p>Overtly <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Political_Military_Relations_and_the_Sta.html?id=Ac3cAAAAQBAJ&source=kp_book_description&redir_esc=y">repressive policies</a> have been commonplace across the Middle East for years, notably in Egypt, Iraq and Syria, where violent measures have been taken to control populations. </p>
<p>As a result of technological advances, an increase in political engagement and changes of leadership, the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – have also <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/10arabworld.pdf">upgraded their form of authoritarianism</a> in recent years. This has seen policies of partial economic liberalisation and market-based reforms used to obscure an increase in repression and surveillance, for example by containing the work of civil society groups. </p>
<p>Following the pattern in which authoritarian states tend to exploit common threats, some of the GCC states are now manipulating the current pandemic to enhance their social power and control – as I’ve explored in a recent <a href="https://pomeps.org/authoritarian-exploitation-of-covid-19-in-the-gcc">article</a> as part of a contribution for the Project on Middle East Political Science at George Washington University. </p>
<h2>New controls</h2>
<p>In Dubai, nationwide curfews have been put in place and enforced by the <a href="http://www.dxbpermit.gov.ae/">security services</a> and <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/16/countries-in-the-middle-east-are-using-ai-to-fight-coronavirus.html">surveillance</a>. Authorities in the UAE have also introduced criminal <a href="https://gulfnews.com/uae/crime/covid-19-temporary-imprisonment-for-spreading-rumours-in-uae-1.1585722668466">penalties</a> for the dissemination of information about the virus deemed to be false. Meanwhile, Bahrain introduced <a href="https://www.thenational.ae/world/gcc/coronavirus-bahrain-to-use-electronic-tags-for-people-in-quarantine-1.1001903">electronic tags</a> for patients who had tested positive for COVID-19. In Saudi Arabia, people have been arrested for <a href="https://gulfnews.com/world/gulf/saudi/covid-19-34-curfew-violators-nabbed-in-saudi-arabia-1.1587299810053">violating strict curfew laws</a>. </p>
<p>Beijing’s recent <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-52321529">admission</a> that more people had died than originally reported in Wuhan, the original epicentre of the pandemic, shows the fragile nature of information and truth within authoritarian states. Likewise, it’s difficult to assess the scale of who has been affected so far across the GCC. According to official government statistics as <a href="https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html">of April 21</a>, there were 10,484 reported cases in Saudi Arabia and 103 deaths from COVID-19. The UAE had reported 7,265 cases and 43 deaths, Qatar 6,105 ases and nine deaths and Kuwait 2,080 cases and 11 deaths.</p>
<p>China’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-coronavirus-cover-up-how-censorship-and-propaganda-obstructed-the-truth-133095">handling of its own early COVID-19 whistleblowers</a> showed how authoritarian states often react promptly to the dissemination of news which could undermine their authority. Of course, the curtailing of “fake news” during this time is important to prevent hysteria and panic. </p>
<p>But <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/01/matthew-hedges-uae-held-me-spy-west-complicit/581200/">from my own experience</a> of being forcibly detained for six months and falsely accused of spying charges in the UAE, I know full well how these laws can be abused and twisted for ulterior purposes. The real test will be to see if all of these preventative laws are relaxed once the pandemic is under control.</p>
<p>The inherent weaknesses of GCC states are also being further exposed through this pandemic. GCC citizens only inadvertently hold the power of accountability over their monarchies, due to the lack of formal political mechanisms that generate and provide legitimacy in democracies. In essence, the monarchs hold power until they don’t.</p>
<p>In response, Middle Eastern states have introduced programmes in recent years that emphasise cultural traditions in an attempt to further centralise power using key figures within their regime. A recent anti-corruption drive in Saudi Arabia, which climaxed with the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/06/how-saudi-elite-became-five-star-prisoners-at-the-riyadh-ritz-carlton">Ritz-Carlton incident</a> in which more than 30 elite figures were detained in a luxury hotel, highlighted the ascendancy of Mohammed Bin Salman, the crown prince. </p>
<p>In the UAE, the security state has been intensified through the creation of <a href="https://u.ae/en/information-and-services/social-affairs/preserving-the-emirati-national-identity/initiatives-to-preserve-the-national-identity-of-the-uae/the-uae-national-service-law">conscription</a> programmes which emphasise national identity under the patronage of Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed. </p>
<h2>Biopolitics</h2>
<p>Central to the current messaging around COVID-19 is the heightened value of “purity” within the nation. This notion has been promoted through the prism of the family, with the region’s rulers extending the meaning to include the nation in an attempt to retain cohesiveness. In the current context, for example, only one member of a family is allowed to pick up food during the lockdown in some Gulf states, and there have been greater protections imposed for nationals than non-nationals, many of whom <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/b4f3c258-7ec9-477c-92f7-5607203f77fc">have been deported</a>.</p>
<p>But this comes at a moment when the so-called purity of the family unit is under threat as dowry costs, marriages to foreigners and divorce rates are <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331436638_Tribe_and_Tribalism_The_Trojan_Horse_of_GCC_States_The_Anatomy_of_a_Crisis">all increasing across the GCC</a>. This has helped maintain a heightened significance of the family within GCC politics. As a result, issues such as <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-women/saudi-promo-video-labels-feminism-atheism-homosexuality-as-extremist-ideas-idUSKBN1XL29Z">homosexuality</a>, marriage to foreigners and now even COVID-19 are seen as a threat which has the potential to dilute the national gene pool. </p>
<p>The GCC states are also capitalising on a new vein of conservative nationalism across the region that is highly personalised and driven by security concerns. An era of assertive foreign policy from Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Doha is now playing out as a matter of principle and survival. As a result, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have fortified their political and military engagements. Their closer ties with regional players such as Libya’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/11/suspected-military-supplies-libya-un-cargo">General Khalifa Haftar</a> and pro-government Yemeni <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/25/yemen-saudi-forces-torture-disappear-yemenis">forces</a> have helped keep these conflicts alive within a reduced footprint. </p>
<p>Back home, the GCC states have exploited the underlying threats of the virus to bolster their own survival strategies. In the past, authoritarian states such as the former Soviet Union often relied on crude illustrations of force alongside state propaganda. But the modern authoritarians in the GCC take a more co-optive route to manage their populations. They have been able to enact policies which undermine civil liberties, perpetuating their current political designs and generating no protest from their populations. So it’s crucial to understand how these practices are maintained, why they have the population’s consent, and upon what basis they will continue to be applied.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/136631/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Hedges does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The states of the Gulf Cooperation Council have exploited the underlying threats of the virus to bolster their own survival strategies.Matthew Hedges, Doctoral Research Candidate in the School of Government and International Affairs, Durham UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1332932020-03-13T12:02:36Z2020-03-13T12:02:36ZThe oil shock of 2020 appears to be here – and the pain could be wide and deep<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/320282/original/file-20200312-111232-15sq2wp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=63%2C158%2C5232%2C3279&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Suffering from sanctions, Russia is trying produce more and gain market share.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/pumpjacks-near-the-yamashinskoye-rural-settlement-in-the-news-photo/1206328964?adppopup=true"> Yegor Aleyev via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The world is again undergoing an oil shock. </p>
<p>Prices, already on a downward trend, have collapsed 30% in less than a week, bringing the total fall to <a href="https://oilprice.com/commodity-price-charts?1&page=chart&sym=CB*1&name=Brent%20Crude">nearly 50%</a> since highs in early January. Consumers, of course, can <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/08/plummeting-oil-prices-and-mortgage-rates-could-boost-consumers.html">expect gasoline prices to go down</a>, but the story is far more complicated than that.</p>
<p>Having <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=dCRySjIAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">researched energy for decades</a>, I see this as a big deal, not only for the global economy, but for geopolitics, the future of transport and efforts to mitigate climate change, particularly if the world enters into a sustained period of cheap oil. </p>
<p><iframe id="wrqNJ" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/wrqNJ/2/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>What happened?</h2>
<p>Oil prices have been forced downward due to major influences from both the demand and supply sides. </p>
<p>Demand for crude oil and petroleum fuels <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/02/business/oil-price-opec-coronavirus.html">has fallen worldwide</a> because of the coronavirus pandemic, nowhere more so <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-02-02/china-oil-demand-is-said-to-have-plunged-20-on-virus-lockdown">than in China</a>. Locking down millions of people closed factories, cut supply chains and reduced transport at home and abroad via trade. This is key, because China is the globe’s <a href="https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=34812">largest oil importer</a> and a major driver of global demand. A global downturn in <a href="https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2083583-iea-likely-to-revise-down-oil-demand-projection">demand from transportation</a>, not least <a href="https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/air-transport/2020-03-06/coronavirus-spread-becomes-global-crisis-airlines">in air travel</a>, has eroded demand further. </p>
<p>On the supply side, an uneasy partnership between OPEC and Russia has turned into <a href="https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2020-03-08/oil-price-war">a bitter breakup</a>. The resulting war for market share has flooded the world with oil.</p>
<p>OPEC and Russia <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-opec-meeting/opec-non-opec-agree-first-global-oil-pact-since-2001-idUSKBN13Z0J8">first got together in 2016</a> to cut production and raise prices against a river of <a href="https://theconversation.com/attacks-on-saudi-oil-why-didnt-prices-go-crazy-123823">new oil from shale drilling in the U.S.</a> To a degree, it worked – prices did rise, though in <a href="https://www.macrotrends.net/1369/crude-oil-price-history-chart">volatile fashion.</a></p>
<p>But at a meeting on March 6, the Saudis <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/06/opec-meeting-coronavirus-weighs-on-oil-demand-as-oil-prices-fall.html">proposed</a> yet another cut to counter muted demand from the coronavirus’ effect on the economy. Russia said it would <a href="https://washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/oil-price-war-threatens-widespread-collateral-damage/2020/03/09/3e42c9e2-6207-11ea-acca-80c22bbee96f_story.html">elevate production instead</a>, and the Saudis responded by saying they would, too. A few days later, the United Arab Emirates said it would also <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-aramco-output-capacity/saudi-announces-plan-to-boost-oil-production-capacity-for-first-time-in-years-idUSKBN20Y0PO">boost output to record levels</a> and accelerate plans to increase capacity.</p>
<p>Russia’s motives <a href="https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2020-03-08/oil-price-war">seem evident</a>. Suffering under sanctions for its seizure of Crimea, Russia had kept its production relatively muted for years at the bidding of Saudi Arabia, which allowed U.S. shale producers to gain market share at the expense of Russian companies.</p>
<p>There is little doubt, too, that U.S. oil companies are <a href="https://qz.com/1815335/russias-oil-price-war-with-saudi-arabia-could-cause-defaults-in-us/">especially vulnerable right now</a>. Many have operated along the edges of profitability and remain deep in debt. With demand falling, an added downward push on prices should bring real pain to the plains of Texas, North Dakota and Ohio. Still, I expect U.S. producers to survive as they have before – by consolidating, finding ways to lower costs, becoming more efficient and innovating. </p>
<h2>Floods of oil</h2>
<p>Russia’s calculus that it could gain market share against shale companies by boosting output was likely accurate, but it probably didn’t include the Saudi-UAE response. Russian officials have said companies can probably <a href="https://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/Oil-Price-War-Escalates-As-OPECs-No3-Boosts-Production.html">raise production</a> by around 200,000 to 300,000 barrels per day in the short term, with the <a href="https://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/Russia-Fires-Back-Could-Boost-Oil-Production-By-500000-Bpd.html">Kremlin claiming 500,000 barrels a day later in 2020</a>. My own estimates suggest that, together, the Saudis and Emiratis can boost flows by as much as 3.5 million barrels per day – possibly 10 times the Russian volume – over the rest of this year, with about 2 million barrels in the short term.</p>
<p>Even without any of these increases, there was already a glut of oil globally. According to the International Energy Agency’s <a href="https://www.iea.org/reports/oil-market-report-march-2020">Oil Market Report for March 2020</a>, the fall in demand and rise in shale production would have left the global market oversupplied by more than 3 million barrels per day unless OPEC made big cuts. This surplus now looks modest compared to what the year seems likely to bring.</p>
<p><iframe id="IDVt6" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/IDVt6/5/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>Broad and deep global impacts</h2>
<p>History may not repeat itself, but it does provide analogies. In <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-11-26/oil-bust-of-1986-reminds-u-s-drillers-of-price-war-risks">1986, the Saudis opened the spigots</a> against rising production from the North Sea and, more importantly, the Soviet Union. The result was a generation of cheap oil that lasted until Chinese demand <a href="https://doi.org/10.4000/chinaperspectives.2783">forced prices higher starting in 2004</a>. During this era of <a href="https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bin:bpeajo:v:17:y:1986:i:1986-2:p:237-284">low oil prices</a>, the U.S. had little development of alternative energy sources; increased consumption; a <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-federal-government-came-to-control-your-cars-fuel-economy-94467">decline in fuel economy</a>; saw the <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/america-has-fallen-out-of-love-with-the-sedan-1535169698">surge of the SUV</a>; and growth in oil imports to the U.S. That period also saw U.S. military intervention in the Middle East. </p>
<p>Can all this happen again? No. And the direction of prices could, of course, change course. But an era of very low prices, say less than $40 per barrel as exists right now, would bring new negatives, perhaps even more worrisome. </p>
<p>Like what? This is, of course, speculation, but I could imagine the following trends emerging:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Significant economic damage in oil-producing countries beyond OPEC and Russia, including Argentina, Brazil, Guyana, Ivory Coast, Malaysia, Indonesia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan.</p></li>
<li><p>Major economic and possibly social disruption in nations with fragile democracies, like Iraq, Algeria, Nigeria, Gabon. Iraq is a particular worry, given its partial emergence from war and insurgency.</p></li>
<li><p>Bankruptcies, unemployment, rural decay, elevated drug use, “deaths of despair” likely in U.S. states where the oil boom is active, such as Texas, New Mexico, Utah, Colorado, North Dakota, Alaska, Ohio, among others.</p></li>
<li><p>Ultra-cheap carbon fuels might turn public interest and vehicle manufacturer incentives away from higher fuel economy and efficiency, including nontransport uses.</p></li>
<li><p>Cheap fuel could become a possible hurdle to all-electric transport, which is now at a critical period, as major car and truck manufacturers bring out <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/promises-carmakers-have-made-about-their-future-electric-vehicles-2020-1#toyota-1">full lines of electric vehicles</a> through 2025.</p></li>
<li><p>Major decline in the value of recyclable plastics as manufacturing new plastic becomes cheaper than the cost of recycling.</p></li>
<li><p>Even more importance on government policy to advance action on lowering emissions, therefore on politics, which has not yet proven reliable in this sphere. </p></li>
<li><p>Low-price oil could become especially attractive to less developed nations (transport, power generation, heating) now undergoing energy modernization and lacking in income.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Cheap gas isn’t everything</h2>
<p>The current shock is not yet over at this writing, and more big changes may lie ahead. What can be said with some assurance is that the effects of mega-cheap oil are bound to be diverse and, in some ways, nuanced. But they are not likely to be beneficial. Yes, there will be some perks for consumers if fuel prices are at basement levels for longer than a few months. Food and heating oil, for example, will be variably cheaper.</p>
<p>But ultra-cheap oil is not the world’s friend. There are too many reasons to move away from dependence on petroleum in the domain of fuel. I’ve suggested only some in the list above. Such a move will be a massive undertaking, to say the least. It will not be aided by another era in which oil is more affordable than bottled water.</p>
<p>[<em>You’re smart and curious about the world. So are The Conversation’s authors and editors.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=youresmart">You can read us daily by subscribing to our newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/133293/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Scott L. Montgomery does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Has the world entered an era of ultra-low prices? An energy scholar argues that a long period of low oil prices will set the U.S. – and globe – back on the economy and the environment.Scott L. Montgomery, Lecturer, Jackson School of International Studies, University of WashingtonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1196912019-08-29T13:11:58Z2019-08-29T13:11:58ZWhy increasing Arab-Israeli closeness matters<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/289652/original/file-20190827-184252-16ifs2m.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Bahrain's Minister of Foreign Affairs Shaikh Khalid bin Ahmed bin Mohammed Al Khalifa gave an interview to Israel's Channel 13 in June -- a first.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NBqO7CAPUe8">Screenshot, Official Youtube of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of Bahrain</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>While the connection of Jews to Israel is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/17/us/politics/trump-israel-jews.html">frequently in the news</a>, the changing nature of Jewish and Israeli links to Arab countries is a story that has shown up less frequently. </p>
<p>Yet that change is significant and noteworthy. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://religionnews.com/2019/05/14/in-the-heart-of-the-persian-gulf-a-fledgling-synagogue-gets-a-rabbi/">new synagogue recently open in Dubai</a>, the first in decades.</p>
<p>Jared Kushner, an observant Jew and a top adviser to his father-in-law, President Donald Trump, is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/08/world/middleeast/saudi-mbs-jared-kushner.html">close friends</a> with the acting ruler of Saudi Arabia. </p>
<p>The foreign minister of Bahrain, a Gulf Arab country, gave an <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NBqO7CAPUe8">interview to Israeli media</a>, highlighting the important role that Israel has in the contemporary Middle East.</p>
<p>This is a shift in official Arab postures towards Jews and Israel.</p>
<p>Since Israeli independence in 1948, <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/culture/books/the-arab-israeli-conflict-in-10-points-1.2754159">the country’s presence in the region and dominion over Palestinian Arabs have fostered</a> four major wars with Arab neighboring countries. Israel has only slowly achieved formal peace and diplomatic relations with Egypt, in 1979, and Jordan in 1994. </p>
<p>Why do more Arab states suddenly seem much warmer toward Israel, and, perhaps, by extension, to Jews and Judaism more generally?</p>
<p>There is both a simple and a complex answer here. The simple answer is Iran. The more complex one is that Israel, Arab states and the U.S. have found increasing common priorities of national security and strong authority.</p>
<h2>A brief history of Arab-Israeli relations</h2>
<p>From the advent of Islam into the 20th century, Jewish <a href="https://www.thejc.com/comment/columnists/judaism-middle-eastern-again-1.439935">communities existed and often thrived</a> across the Arab world. </p>
<p>The founding of the state of Israel changed this quickly. Viewed by most Arabs as an <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/05/15/on-israels-70th-anniversary-what-does-the-region-think/">unjust post-colonial incursion of Europeans into a newly decolonized Middle East</a>, Israel found itself attacked when its statehood began. It didn’t help that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jan/14/israel">the emerging country’s military forces, and Arab leaders as well, pushed many Palestinian Arabs</a> to leave their homes for other Arab states. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/289660/original/file-20190827-184207-vh8ydk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/289660/original/file-20190827-184207-vh8ydk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/289660/original/file-20190827-184207-vh8ydk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=341&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/289660/original/file-20190827-184207-vh8ydk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=341&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/289660/original/file-20190827-184207-vh8ydk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=341&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/289660/original/file-20190827-184207-vh8ydk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/289660/original/file-20190827-184207-vh8ydk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/289660/original/file-20190827-184207-vh8ydk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The New York Times front page, May 16, 1948.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://twitter.com/OnThisDayNYT/status/864457914462765056">New York Times Twitter account, screenshot</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Given Arab states’ hostility to Israel, Jews in these countries mostly fled to Europe, Israel and the U.S. The influence of strong regional Arab identity and support for Palestinian Arabs in a charged Cold War global climate <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39960461">encouraged further Arab-Israeli</a> wars in 1956, 1967 and 1973. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.cfr.org/expert-roundup/how-six-days-1967-shaped-modern-middle-east">1967 war gave Israel direct control of Palestinian territories</a>, further angering Arab leaders. In 1973, Arab oil producers <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/06/05/the-1967-war-and-the-oil-weapon/">used the “oil weapon,”</a> stopping oil sales to the U.S. to pressure it to decrease its consistent support of Israel.</p>
<p>To be sure, the depth of Arab enmity towards Israel varied by country. Complex, cooperative links <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20190211-ex-saudi-intelligence-chief-reveals-secret-israel-saudi-relation">have nevertheless existed unofficially</a>, such as economic ties between Arab Gulf states and Israel. </p>
<p>Still, after <a href="https://www.politico.com/story/2014/03/this-day-in-politics-egypt-israel-march-26-1979-105014">Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979</a>, it took another 15 years until a second Arab state, <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/october/26/newsid_3764000/3764162.stm">Jordan, established diplomatic relations with Israel</a>. While Israel’s peace treaties with both Egypt and Jordan have remained intact for decades, <a href="https://thearabweekly.com/marking-four-decades-egypt-israel-cold-peace">relations have been mostly chilly</a>, and no other Arab state has followed their lead.</p>
<h2>Changing times and Saudi power</h2>
<p>Now there are growing signs of at least informal relations between Israel and many other Arab states. </p>
<p>The driver for much of this is Saudi Arabia, and its enmity toward Iran. </p>
<p>In recent years, the Saudi government has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/05/washington-urges-riyadh-to-end-military-crackdown-in-sudan">attempted to become the Arab world’s major power</a> by using its economic clout, in a reaction to its own and neighboring states’ insecurity in the wake of the 2011 uprisings around the Arab world.</p>
<p>As part of this strategy, the Saudi government has <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/12/20/whats-behind-the-feud-between-saudi-arabia-and-iran-power">intensified its long-term enmity toward Iran</a>. Since its 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran has been a vocal political force for Shi’i Islam, the major form of Islam distinct from Sunni Islam. Sunni Islam is the majority form of Islam which most Arabs embrace and the Saudis aspire to lead.</p>
<p>Under its crown prince and actual day-to-day ruler, Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Saudi Arabia has pursued its efforts to be the dominant Sunni Arab power <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/young-princes-rise-signals-a-more-aggressive-saudi-arabia-1498057452">more aggressively</a>. This includes <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/key-facts-war-yemen-160607112342462.html">its military engagement in Yemen</a>, where it has tried with limited success to eradicate local Shi’i forces that have some ties to Iran. </p>
<p>Forceful Saudi foreign policy under Salman has also included <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-have-other-gulf-states-cut-ties-with-qatar-78906">isolating rival Qatar</a>, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/06/03/the-arab-alliance-is-a-circular-firing-squad/">allying closely</a> with Egypt’s military ruler Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and <a href="https://www.pri.org/stories/2019-03-27/saudi-arabia-buying-more-weapons-ever">increasing its already huge</a> advanced weapons purchases.</p>
<p>All of this is meant to both cement Saudi influence and cripple Iran. But the Saudi strategy has had mixed success. </p>
<p>The war in Yemen has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/12/world/middleeast/saudi-airport-attack.html">bogged down</a>, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/11/world/middleeast/yemen-emirates-saudi-war.html">forcing Saudi ally, the United Arab Emirates, to pull back</a>. <a href="https://time.com/5428983/saudi-arabia-crown-prince-mbs-khashoggi/">Salman faces blowback</a> from civil rights advocates for increasing Saudi crackdowns on political dissidents. </p>
<p>His limited success has given Salman all the more reason to stress alliances with like-minded rulers in the region. In addition to stalwart allies the UAE and Egypt, this definitely includes Israel. Indeed, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Salman rival one another in their <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/netanyahu-appears-say-war-iran-common-goal-n971266">public enmity toward Iran</a>.</p>
<h2>New security alliance</h2>
<p>Saudi Arabia’s increasing efforts to be the dominant Arab power in the Middle East are part of another trend in the region: the consolidation of states that <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/north-africa-west-asia/return-of-authoritarianism-is-priming-middle-east-for-more-con/">focus on security at the expense of democratic rights</a>. </p>
<p>The lesson many Arab governments seem to have drawn from 2011’s Arab Spring unrest is that dissent, and even open political expression, can <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/08/world/africa/arab-spring-north-africa-protesters.html">mushroom into political collapse and chaos</a>. Determined to avoid political challenge, most Arab political systems have amplified their already strong investment in internal security and <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/63867/trumps-fake-news-tirades-embolden-arab-leaders-crackdowns/">cracked down on political speech</a>. </p>
<p>At the same time, many Arab societies, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have made efforts to be <a href="https://agsiw.org/the-gray-zone-of-social-reforms-in-saudi-arabia/">more open to social diversity</a>. There has been modest progress in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/24/world/middleeast/saudi-driving-ban-anniversary.html">gender rights</a> in Saudi Arabia and <a href="https://gulfnews.com/uae/uae-is-not-just-tolerant-it-is-welcoming-1.60364652">increased tolerance of religious pluralism</a> in Dubai, for example. </p>
<p>Strong security, limited official acceptance of political dissent and social pluralism also help align electoral democracies under stress with non-democratic governments. This is a current trend evident in the closeness of leaders like Trump and more repressive rulers like <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/letter-from-trumps-washington/are-we-really-where-we-are-trump-putin-and-washingtons-unbelievable-new-normal">Vladimir Putin of Russia</a> or <a href="https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/viktor-orban-donald-trump-hungary-835480/">Viktor Orban of Hungary</a>. </p>
<p>It is no less of a trend in the Middle East. The approach of boosting military and police power and decreasing tolerance towards political opposition brings countries like Saudi Arabia and Israel naturally together. </p>
<p>Indeed, if Arab governments stress security to stave off fears of political uprising, they are likely to see Palestinians with little power under direct or indirect Israeli control as a <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/arab-leaders-abandon-the-palestinians-1522708189">problem to sidestep</a>, rather than a priority to resolve. </p>
<p>In short, the threat of Iran and the prevalence of anti-democratic politics is solidifying a long-standing political affinity, and a growing behind-the-scenes alliance, between Israel, Saudi Arabia and Saudi Arabia’s Arab allies.</p>
<p>Arab-Israeli increasing collaboration may be good news for some Jews wishing to be more secure as visitors or residents in Arab countries. Yet the news is likely less good for people hoping for greater political rights for Palestinians, Yemenis and other beleaguered populations in the Middle East.</p>
<p>[ <em>You’re smart and curious about the world. So are The Conversation’s authors and editors.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=youresmart">You can read us daily by subscribing to our newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/119691/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Mednicoff does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With the opening of a synagogue in Dubai and warmer relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel, some Arab states suddenly appear to be more open to friendship with Israel and Jews. Why?David Mednicoff, Chair, Department of Judaic and Near Eastern Studies, and Associate Professor of Middle Eastern Studies and Public Policy, UMass AmherstLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1161922019-05-01T11:06:03Z2019-05-01T11:06:03ZCan you wake up after decades in a coma? The story behind the headlines<p>In 1991, a car crash left Munira Abdulla, a 32-year-old woman from the United Arab Emirates, with devastating brain injuries. Doctors reportedly thought she might never regain full consciousness. However, in late 2018, almost three decades after her initial injury, Abdulla showed signs of recovery – including calling out her son’s name.</p>
<p>Abdulla’s story became public on April 22 2019, when an interview with her son was published <a href="https://www.thenational.ae/uae/health/emirati-woman-wakes-up-from-coma-after-almost-30-years-1.851923">in The National</a> (a major news outlet in the United Arab Emirates). The following day it was reported by international media under <a href="https://thenewdaily.com.au/news/good-news/2019/04/24/woman-wakes-up-decades-long-coma/">headlines such as</a> “Modern-day miracle: Woman wakes after almost three decades in a coma”. </p>
<figure>
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<p>The story was framed as extraordinary and inspiring – and I received a flurry of calls from journalists asking me to explain what had happened. Was she trapped in her body all along? How will she adjust to the modern world? What does this mean for families considering whether it would be kinder to let a loved one die?</p>
<p>Just like these journalists – working to a tight timeframe – I relied on The National’s report to try to contribute to the public discussion of Abdulla’s case. This is far from ideal but, looking at this original source, there were clues that, although a very unusual case, the “miracle” might have been overstated and oversimplified.</p>
<h2>Diagnosis</h2>
<p>Rather than always being “vegetative” (completely unaware of herself and her environment), the National’s report stated that Abdulla had early on been diagnosed as “minimally conscious”. There were minimal and intermittent signs of some basic consciousness even if this was at a very low level. This meant that she was <a href="http://healthtalk.org/peoples-experiences/nerves-brain/family-experiences-vegetative-and-minimally-conscious-states/what-minimally-conscious-state">more likely to recover full consciousness</a> than if she were in a vegetative state. </p>
<p>But this diagnosis was not mentioned in some later reports and, if the term “minimally conscious” was used at all, it often appeared interchangeably with “<a href="https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/8917933/mum-wakes-up-coma-30-years/">coma</a>” or “<a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/woman-coma-vegetative-state-wakes-up-munira-abdulla-germany-uae-a8881081.html">vegetative</a>” in ways which obscured its potential significance. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/271959/original/file-20190501-113864-ex16db.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/271959/original/file-20190501-113864-ex16db.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/271959/original/file-20190501-113864-ex16db.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271959/original/file-20190501-113864-ex16db.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271959/original/file-20190501-113864-ex16db.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271959/original/file-20190501-113864-ex16db.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271959/original/file-20190501-113864-ex16db.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271959/original/file-20190501-113864-ex16db.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Media outlets have used different medical conditions as interchangeable terms.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Treatment</h2>
<p>Rehabilitation can make a difference to the level of recovery after brain injury – and skilled interventions and reassessment can help ensure that consciousness <a href="https://www.rcplondon.ac.uk/guidelines-policy/prolonged-disorders-consciousness-national-clinical-guidelines">is not suppressed</a> by pain, compounding clinical factors or, for example, the sedative effects of drugs. It may be significant that before the “miracle” Abdulla had been moved to a specialist centre where she was given treatment such as surgery on her limbs, physical therapy and improved epilepsy control. </p>
<p>However, despite the potential link between this treatment and the recovery (or discovery) of a higher level of consciousness, reporters seemed to prefer the idea of a “magic trigger”. Several secondary articles focus on the son’s comment that his mother became more alert after an argument at her bedside. “She sensed I was at risk,” he told The National, “which caused her a shock”. </p>
<h2>‘Awakening’</h2>
<p>Patients who emerge from a long-term minimally conscious state (not uncommon <a href="https://www.rcplondon.ac.uk/guidelines-policy/prolonged-disorders-consciousness-national-clinical-guidelines">in the first few years</a>) are likely to have profound and permanent physical and mental impairments. They <a href="http://healthtalk.org/peoples-experiences/nerves-brain/family-experiences-vegetative-and-minimally-conscious-states/recovery">remain dependent</a> on others for day-to-day care and lack the ability to make crucial choices about their own lives. They may also be disoriented, unable to remember what happened a few moments ago, and able to engage in only limited conversation in response to prompts.</p>
<p>The National’s description of Abdulla is consistent with this level of recovery. She is said to be able to communicate “in familiar situations”. Her son says “once I start with the prayer she continues the lines”. </p>
<p>But the language used in some articles – especially the phrase “wakes up” – suggests a far fuller recovery. Indeed, this framing led to journalists asking me how she would cope with the internet, or historical shifts and political changes – quite irrelevant questions given Abdulla is unlikely to be able to understand much of the world around her. </p>
<p>Dedicating a day to interacting with journalists about this story was intense, instructive and had mixed success (you can see examples <a href="https://cdoc.org.uk/news-2019/#media-appearances">of my radio interviews here</a>). On balance I think my experience shows the importance of academics trying to contextualise emerging stories, albeit cautiously when we’ve not had the opportunity to research the particular case in detail. It certainly underlines the importance of journalists talking to relevant experts and avoiding recycling <a href="http://orca.cf.ac.uk/73188/1/MediaRepresentationsComaKitzinger.pdf">cultural myths</a> about “sleeping beauty” coma patients or <a href="https://www.greatnortherncatskills.com/arts-culture/rip-van-winkle">Rip Van Winkle-style awakenings</a>. </p>
<p>For the general public (and families in this situation) I hope I’ve illustrated the ongoing need for a sceptical approach to media reports. It’s important to reflect on their origins and the realities which may lie behind the headlines. For this particular story it may also be important to look for follow-up reports, to see how Abdulla’s future unfolds and, eventually, any case report from her treating clinicians.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/116192/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jenny Kitzinger has received funding from the ESRC to research this area.</span></em></p>UAE woman Munira Abdulla is fully conscious after 27 years - but reports of her “miraculous” story are misleading.Jenny Kitzinger, Professor of communications research, School of Journalism, Media and Culture, Co-Director of the Coma and Disorders of Consciousness Research Centre, Cardiff UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1158522019-04-23T16:14:18Z2019-04-23T16:14:18ZTrump’s crackdown on Iran’s oil exports could backfire badly – with serious risks to global economy<p>The US has unnerved the world oil market by ramping up the pressure in its long-running dispute with Iran. It has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-iran-oil/u-s-to-announce-end-to-iran-sanctions-waivers-oil-prices-spike-idUSKCN1RX0R1?il=0">announced</a> that, after May 1, it won’t renew the exemptions given to eight countries that enable them to buy Iranian oil. Those affected, which include China, India, Japan, Italy and South Korea, will face sanctions from Washington if they don’t comply. The move will likely squeeze global oil supply at a time when it is already struggling from disruptions in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-oil-exports-exclusive/exclusive-venezuela-oil-exports-stable-in-march-despite-sanctions-blackouts-idUSKCN1RE24K">Venezuela</a>, <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-07/libya-fighting-erupts-again-here-s-the-oil-impact-quicktake">Libya</a> and <a href="https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/Key-Nigerian-Oil-Export-Pipeline-Under-Force-Majeure-After-Fire-Breaks-Out.html">Nigeria</a>. Indeed, the Brent crude price has already <a href="https://oilprice.com/">risen</a> on the back of the announcement to US$74 (£57) per barrel, the highest since last November. </p>
<p>President Donald Trump <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-ends-waivers-for-countries-to-import-iranian-oil-11555937349">has said</a> he is confident that a supply crunch can be avoided thanks to extra output from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, but traders and Asian petrochemical firms are sceptical that these countries will fully comply. In recent months, Saudi Arabia and other OPEC members have cut supply dramatically to <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-01/opec-output-slides-as-saudis-deepen-cut-venezuela-crisis-grows">redress</a> their fears that hefty US shale oil output and declining global energy demand could cause a supply glut that would batter prices. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/270466/original/file-20190423-175524-lyinit.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/270466/original/file-20190423-175524-lyinit.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/270466/original/file-20190423-175524-lyinit.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=694&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/270466/original/file-20190423-175524-lyinit.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=694&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/270466/original/file-20190423-175524-lyinit.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=694&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/270466/original/file-20190423-175524-lyinit.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=873&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/270466/original/file-20190423-175524-lyinit.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=873&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/270466/original/file-20190423-175524-lyinit.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=873&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Arab gulf?</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-illustration/october-13-2017-illustration-showing-flag-733592455?src=Gz_KwxL68VZ0Gn8O5EwxJg-1-2">Wael Khalil Alfuzai</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In December the oil cartel, along with Russia and other allies, <a href="http://www.tradearabia.com/news/OGN_348466.html">agreed to</a> reduce output by 1.2m barrels per day (bpd), cutting the <a href="https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=709&t=6">global total volume</a> by more than 1%. They have since exceeded those benchmarks, with Saudi Arabia alone reducing supply by 800,000 bpd in total. In March the kingdom <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-01/opec-output-slides-as-saudis-deepen-cut-venezuela-crisis-grows">slashed production</a> to a four-year low of 9.82m bpd, making up the majority of OPEC’s reduction of 295,000 daily barrels for the month to 30.3m bpd. </p>
<h2>Oil politics</h2>
<p>Trump has <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/28/trump-says-its-very-important-that-opec-increase-the-flow-of-oil-because-prices-are-too-high.html">already been</a> calling on OPEC to raise production, with little success. The Saudis may be close allies of the Americans, but they will only act in concert with their OPEC counterparts and many around the table will be wary of risking reducing prices at an unpredictable time for the global economy. </p>
<p>No one ever forgets when the Saudis famously went against Western interests in the <a href="https://www.thebalance.com/opec-oil-embargo-causes-and-effects-of-the-crisis-3305806">Arab Oil Embargo</a> of 1973, in response to US policies with similarly global consequences: president Richard Nixon had scrapped the gold standard, heavily devaluing the US dollar, and then backed the Israelis in the Yom Kippur war against Egypt. Inflation-adjusted oil prices nearly doubled during the embargo from around US$26 per barrel in 1973 to over US$46 per barrel the following year, sending <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/opendemocracyuk/forty-years-on-effects-of-1973-74-oil-crisis-still-shape-british-foreign-po/">economic shockwaves</a> around the world. </p>
<p>America’s latest move against Iran is making things worse for the global economy at a time when it has already been under pressure from <a href="https://www.goldrepublic.com/news/fed-paves-the-way-for-worldwide-loose-monetary-policy">rising interest rates</a> and <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/23/anthony-gardner-on-us-eu-relations-trump-tariffs-on-europe.html">trade wars</a>. If Iran’s entire output were removed – a <a href="https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Iran-shrugs-off-US-oil-threats-We-will-surpass-a-million-barrels-a-day-587655">big if</a> since it is far from certain that all countries will comply with the Americans – it <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-global-oil/oil-near-2019-highs-after-u-s-ends-all-iran-sanction-exemptions-idUKKCN1RZ01S">would wipe</a> another 1m bpd or so off the world supply. </p>
<p><strong>Brent crude price, daily chart</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/270467/original/file-20190423-175539-zkupuz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/270467/original/file-20190423-175539-zkupuz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/270467/original/file-20190423-175539-zkupuz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=363&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/270467/original/file-20190423-175539-zkupuz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=363&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/270467/original/file-20190423-175539-zkupuz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=363&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/270467/original/file-20190423-175539-zkupuz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=456&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/270467/original/file-20190423-175539-zkupuz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=456&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/270467/original/file-20190423-175539-zkupuz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=456&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.macrotrends.net/2480/brent-crude-oil-prices-10-year-daily-chart">Macrotrends</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Any resulting rise in oil prices would spread to other commodity prices, leading to inflationary pressure – particularly in countries affected by the end of waiver such as India, where inflation <a href="https://in.reuters.com/article/india-markets/expert-views-indias-march-inflation-picks-up-slightly-idINKCN1RO1IQ">has already</a> started picking up. Such countries would also see direct effects on their import bill and hence their balance of trade. For every dollar increase in oil rates in India, for instance, the import bill <a href="https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/budget/excise-duty-tweaked-on-petrol-diesel-keeps-tax-unchanged/article22623780.ece">will rise</a> by R110 billion (£1.2 billion) at a time when the country’s trade deficit <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/india/balance-of-trade">already stands</a> at over £8 billion. </p>
<p>In many cases, such economic effects are all too capable of being exported. Take South Korea, which is the second biggest oil importer from Iran after China. South Korea mainly imports condensate, an ultra-light form of crude oil used for petrochemical products like naptha which it exports to neighbouring countries. If these petrochemical exports fall because Korean prices are no longer competitive, its neighbours will have to look further afield, creating a trade imbalance in the region.</p>
<p>In the run-up to Trump’s campaign to be re-elected for a second presidential term next year – assuming he <a href="https://theconversation.com/did-trump-obstruct-justice-5-questions-congress-must-answer-115751">makes it</a> that far – there is therefore a great deal riding on this US gambit. If OPEC does not step up to the plate, and the oil price continues surging upwards, it could yet become the moment when the longstanding fears around the health of the world economy finally crystallise into a full-blown downturn.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/115852/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nafis Alam does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>From May 2, any countries buying oil from Iran can expect US sanctions.Nafis Alam, Associate Professor, University of ReadingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1052542018-10-22T05:01:23Z2018-10-22T05:01:23ZAcademic freedom: I spent four months at UAE’s national university – this is what I found<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/241426/original/file-20181019-105754-2j8kro.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The case of the Durham PhD student, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-tyne-45871581">Matthew Hedges</a> – who has been arrested and placed in solitary confinement on the charge of spying – exposes the extreme limits on academic freedom in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). But Hedges’s plight, while outrageous, is not altogether shocking for seasoned observers of the oil-rich Gulf monarchy.</p>
<p>This year I spent four months as a visiting professor at the UAE’s national university. I found much to admire in their universities. Staff conduct research in campuses endowed with world-class facilities that arouse awe and jealousy from visiting academics. Highly motivated students make teaching rewarding. </p>
<p>These benefits however come at a price – academic freedom. Academics are often banned from entering the country because they are classified as <a href="https://www.chronicle.com/article/NYU-Faculty-Members-Shun-Abu/241685">security threats</a>. Academics find themselves arbitrarily imprisoned for <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/05/uae-activist-ahmed-mansoor-sentenced-to-10-years-in-prison-for-social-media-posts/">human rights activism</a>. <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/02/25/academic-freedom-and-uae-funding/">Censorship</a> is regularly applied to academics and scholarly events. During my time in the UAE, restrictions were placed unannounced on internet and Skype use.</p>
<p>These limits on academic freedom are motivated by the authorities’ obsession with clamping down on any activity considered threatening to security and authority. The state is unnerved by the chaos unleashed by the protests and demonstrations of the Arab Spring, and will do anything to stop this being exported to its shores. </p>
<p>Any hint of dissent directed at the Emirati elites, or demand for greater liberties, predictably results in a security crackdown. The potentially democracy-promoting spaces of the internet – and especially social media – are of particular suspicion. In 2012 the law on <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/02/25/academic-freedom-and-uae-funding/">cyber crimes</a> made imprisonment acceptable for any speech seen as damaging the state. </p>
<h2>The Qatari spat</h2>
<p>It is its neighbour <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-40173757">Qatar</a> that particularly vexes the UAE at present. The UAE <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/09/qatar-refutes-saudi-uae-allegations-supporting-terrorism-180930105046850.html">accuses</a> Qatar of sponsoring terrorists to destabilise the region. These claims are currently elevated to a full-blown diplomatic crisis involving <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-40159080">sanctions and a major blockade</a> against Qatar – with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt, the UAE, and the internationally recognised Yemeni government severing diplomatic relations.</p>
<p>But what really drives UAE’s antagonism towards Qatar is its state-funded media network, Al Jazeera. The broadcaster represents a thorn in the side of the Gulf monarchies by broadcasting <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/08/rex-tillerson-stopped-saudi-uae-attacking-qatar-180801125651449.html">embarrassing stories</a> about them. And in pursuit of taking down its rival, the UAE courts help from allies. </p>
<p>In the US special counsel <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/mueller-probe-into-u-a-e-influence-broadens-1522718922">Robert Mueller’s</a> investigators have probed for information about possible attempts by the UAE to gain political influence by siphoning money into Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign. And in March this year, the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-43281519">BBC obtained emails</a> of a lobbying effort by the UAE to get the US secretary of state, Rex Tillerson, sacked for failing to support the UAE against Qatar. </p>
<p>This returns us to Hedges’ case. The UAE’s attorney general announced that the PhD student is accused of “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/oct/15/matthew-hedges-british-academic-charged-spying-united-arab-emirates">spying for and on behalf of a foreign state</a>” and jeopardising “the military, economic and political security of the UAE”. Matthew Hedges’ research, which investigates the impact of the Arab Spring on the UAE’s security strategy, clearly hits a tender nerve. His arrest additionally acts as a powerful message that the state is willing to curtail the free speech of academics.</p>
<h2>The limits to academic freedom</h2>
<p>As an academic working in the social sciences, I have been brought up to think perhaps optimistically of universities as bastions of free speech and critical thinking. In spending a number of months based at the UAE’s national university I soon learned that education here served a rather different function. Rather than encouraging critical thinking, education in the UAE rests on a technocratic logic. Education is supposed to help its society resolve tricky social problems and maintain the status quo. </p>
<p>For example, up to <a href="https://www.thenational.ae/uae/women-continue-to-dominate-uae-federal-colleges-and-universities-1.622982">90% of students</a> at the national university are women and the university is segregated into male and female campuses. By studying at university, women are supposed to gain practical skills that help them integrate into the labour force without losing their traditional roles as mothers and wives. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/241438/original/file-20181019-105754-1arl80o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/241438/original/file-20181019-105754-1arl80o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241438/original/file-20181019-105754-1arl80o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241438/original/file-20181019-105754-1arl80o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241438/original/file-20181019-105754-1arl80o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241438/original/file-20181019-105754-1arl80o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241438/original/file-20181019-105754-1arl80o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Women outnumber men at university in the UAE.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But the state may be fighting a losing battle. <a href="https://www.khaleejtimes.com/nation/abu-dhabi/50-of-marriages-in-abu-dhabi-dont-last-3-years">Marriage rates are decreasing and the UAE has the highest divorce rate</a> in the region, as women demand more independence. In teaching, I found the female students to be incredibly hardworking, engaging and ambitious driven by increasing openings in employment. The issue of free speech may well come next from students.</p>
<h2>The lure of the UAE</h2>
<p>Given that there are many wealthy students keen on gaining qualifications from world-ranking institutions, the UAE is an attractive destination for cash-strapped UK universities. In September, for example, <a href="https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/dubai/index.aspx">the University of Birmingham</a> opened a campus in Dubai. But academic freedom is an inescapable issue confronting these institutions. A number of high-profile cases have plagued <a href="http://www.thereviewatnyu.com/all/2017/12/9/debate-debrief-was-nyu-abu-dhabi-a-mistake">New York University Abu Dhabi</a> since it opened in 2008.</p>
<p>I enormously enjoyed my time as an academic in the UAE and I can’t complain of any bad personal experience. But I very quickly learned the limits of academic freedom. I would love to return, but I fear that even writing this piece could see me fall foul of the UAE authorities. </p>
<p>Some <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/02/25/academic-freedom-and-uae-funding/">UK-based academics have already been banned</a> from entering the UAE for penning critiques of the Gulf state. And as can be seen in Hedges’ case, doing research on topics deemed to be sensitive leads to frightening consequences.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/105254/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Nagle does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Durham University student Matthew Hedges has been jailed for life for ‘spying’ in UAE.John Nagle, Reader in Sociology, University of AberdeenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/809362017-07-16T18:08:52Z2017-07-16T18:08:52ZIs America’s digital leadership on the wane?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178284/original/file-20170714-15958-1qbf51q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Is America's digital economy facing a stormy future?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/usa-waving-flag-on-bad-day-208242883">Filipe Frazao/Shutterstock.com</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>American leadership in technology innovation and economic competitiveness is at risk if U.S. policymakers don’t take crucial steps to protect the country’s digital future. The country that gave the world the internet and the very concept of the disruptive startup could find its role in the global innovation economy slipping from reigning incumbent to a disrupted has-been.</p>
<p>My research, conducted with <a href="http://fletcher.tufts.edu/eBiz/About/Team/Ravi-Shankar-Chaturvedi">Ravi Shankar Chaturvedi</a>, investigates our increasingly digital global society, in which physical interactions – in communications, social and political exchange, commerce, media and entertainment – are being displaced by electronically mediated ones. Our most recent report,
“<a href="http://sites.tufts.edu/digitalplanet/dei17/">Digital Planet 2017</a>: How Competitiveness and Trust in Digital Economies Vary Across the World,” confirms that the U.S. is on the brink of losing its long-held global advantage in digital innovation.</p>
<p>Our yearlong study examined factors that influence innovation, such as economic conditions, governmental backing, startup funding, research and development spending and entrepreneurial talent across 60 countries. We found that while the U.S. has a very advanced digital environment, the pace of American investment and innovation is slowing. Other countries – not just major powers like China, but also smaller nations like New Zealand, Singapore and the United Arab Emirates – are building significant public and private efforts that we expect to become foundations for future generations of innovation and successful startup businesses.</p>
<p>Based on our findings, I believe that <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/17/opinion/donald-trumps-multi-pronged-attack-on-the-internet.html">rolling back net neutrality rules</a> will jeopardize the digital startup ecosystem that has created value for customers, wealth for investors and globally recognized leadership for American technology companies and entrepreneurs. The digital economy in the U.S. is already on the verge of stalling; <a href="https://www.freepress.net/blog/2017/04/25/net-neutrality-violations-brief-history">failing to protect an open internet</a> would further erode the United States’ digital competitiveness, making a troubling situation even worse.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178159/original/file-20170713-9618-1kyxddx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178159/original/file-20170713-9618-1kyxddx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178159/original/file-20170713-9618-1kyxddx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=447&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178159/original/file-20170713-9618-1kyxddx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=447&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178159/original/file-20170713-9618-1kyxddx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=447&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178159/original/file-20170713-9618-1kyxddx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=562&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178159/original/file-20170713-9618-1kyxddx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=562&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178159/original/file-20170713-9618-1kyxddx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=562&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Comparing 60 countries’ digital economies.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://hbr.org/2017/07/60-countries-digital-competitiveness-indexed">Harvard Business Review, used and reproducible by permission</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Comparing competitiveness</h2>
<p>In the U.S., the reins of internet connectivity are tightly controlled. Just five companies – Comcast, Spectrum, Verizon, CenturyLink and AT&T – <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/17/opinion/donald-trumps-multi-pronged-attack-on-the-internet.html?_r=0">serve more than 80 percent of wired-internet customers</a>. What those companies provide is both <a href="https://www.dailydot.com/layer8/us-broadband-speed-cost-infographic/">slower and more expensive</a> than in many countries around the world. Ending net neutrality, as the <a href="https://www.fcc.gov/restoring-internet-freedom">Trump administration has proposed</a>, would give internet providers even more power, letting them decide which companies’ innovations can reach the public, and at what costs and speeds.</p>
<p>However, our research shows that the U.S. doesn’t need more limits on startups. Rather, it should work to revive the creative energy that has been America’s gift to the digital planet. For each of the 60 countries we examined, we combined 170 factors – including elements that measure technological infrastructure, government policies and economic activity – into a ranking we call the <a href="http://sites.tufts.edu/digitalplanet/dei17/">Digital Evolution Index</a>. </p>
<p>To evaluate a country’s competitiveness, we looked not only at current conditions, but also at how fast those conditions are changing. For example, we noted not only how many people have broadband internet service, but also how quickly access is becoming available to more of a country’s population. And we observed not just how many consumers are prepared to buy and sell online, but whether this readiness to transact online is increasing each year and by how much. </p>
<p>The countries formed four major groups: </p>
<ul>
<li>“Stand Out” countries can be considered the digital elite; they are both highly digitally evolved and advancing quickly.</li>
<li>“Stall Out” countries have reached a high level of digital evolution, but risk falling behind due to a slower pace of progress and would benefit from a heightened focus on innovation.</li>
<li>“Break Out” countries score relatively low for overall digital evolution, but are evolving quickly enough to suggest they have the potential to become strong digital economies.</li>
<li>“Watch Out” countries are neither well advanced nor improving rapidly. They have a lot of work to do, both in terms of infrastructure development and innovation.</li>
</ul>
<h2>The US is stalling out</h2>
<p>The picture that emerges for the U.S. is not a pretty one. Despite being the 10th-most digitally advanced country today, America’s progress is slowing. It is close to joining the major EU countries and the Nordic nations in a club of nations that are, digitally speaking, stalling out. </p>
<p>The “Stand Out” countries are setting new global standards of high states of evolution and high rates of change, and exploring various innovations such as <a href="http://money.cnn.com/2017/05/03/technology/nutonomy-psa-group-peugot/index.html">self-driving cars</a> or <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-40026940">robot policemen</a>. New Zealand, for example, is investing in a <a href="http://www.mbie.govt.nz/info-services/sectors-industries/technology-communications/fast-broadband">superior telecommunications system</a> and adopting <a href="http://www.mbie.govt.nz/info-services/science-innovation/digital-economy">forward-looking policies</a> that create <a href="http://kiwilandingpad.com/">incentives for entrepreneurs</a>. Singapore plans to <a href="http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/business/govt-commits-s-19b-to-new-5-year-plan-for-r-amp-d-initiatives-ri-8214052">invest more than US$13 billion in high-tech industries</a> by 2020. The United Arab Emirates has created free-trade zones and is transforming the city of Dubai into a “<a href="https://government.ae/en/about-the-uae/the-uae-government/smart-uae/smart-dubai">smart city</a>,” linking sensors and government offices with residents and visitors to create an interconnected web of transportation, utilities and government services.</p>
<p>The “Break Out” countries, many in Asia, are typically not as advanced as others at present, but are catching up quickly, and are on pace to surpass some of today’s “Stand Out” nations in the near future. For example, China – the world’s <a href="https://www.emarketer.com/Article/China-Eclipses-US-Become-Worlds-Largest-Retail-Market/1014364">largest retail and e-commerce market</a>, with the world’s largest number of people using the internet – has the fastest-changing digital economy. Another “Break Out” country is India, which is already the <a href="http://www.counterpointresearch.com/press_release/indiahandsetmarket2015/">world’s second-largest smartphone market</a>. Though only one-fifth of its 1.3 billion people have online access today, by 2030, some estimates suggest, <a href="https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21693925-battle-indias-e-commerce-market-about-much-more-retailing-india-online">1 billion Indians will be online</a>.</p>
<p>By contrast, the U.S. is on the edge between “Stand Out” and “Stall Out.” One reason is that the American startup economy is slowing down: Private startups are attracting huge investments, but <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-10/silicon-valley-s-overstuffed-startups-risk-messy-blowout">those efforts aren’t paying off</a> when the startups are either acquired by bigger companies or offer themselves on the public stock markets. </p>
<p>Investors, business leaders and policymakers need to take a more realistic look at the best way to profit from innovation, balancing efforts toward both huge results and modest ones. They may need to recall the lesson from the founding of the internet itself: If government invests in key aspects of digital infrastructure, either directly or by creating subsidies and tax incentives, that lays the groundwork for massive private investment and innovation that can transform the economy.</p>
<p>In addition, investments in Asian digital startups have exceeded those in the U.S. <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f97ed1aa-669d-11e7-9a66-93fb352ba1fe">for the first time</a>. According to CB Insights and PwC, US$19.3 billion in venture capital from sources around the world was invested in Asian tech startups in the second quarter of 2017, while the U.S. <a href="https://www.cbinsights.com/research-venture-capital-reports-q2-2017">had $18.4 billion in new investment</a> over the same period. </p>
<p>This is consistent with our findings that Asian high-momentum countries are the ones in the “Break Out” zone; these countries are the ones most exciting for investors. Over time, the U.S.-Asia gap could widen; both money and talent could migrate to digital hot spots elsewhere, such as China and India, or smaller destinations, such as Singapore and New Zealand.</p>
<p>For the country that gave the world the foundations of the digital economy and a president who seems <a href="http://twitter.com">perpetually plugged in</a>, falling behind would, indeed, be a disgrace.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80936/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bhaskar Chakravorti directs the Institute for Business in the Global Context at The Fletcher School at Tufts, which receives funding from Mastercard, Microsoft and the Gates Foundation. </span></em></p>The digital economy in the US is already on the verge of stalling; failing to protect an open internet would further erode the United States’ digital competitiveness.Bhaskar Chakravorti, Senior Associate Dean, International Business & Finance, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/799432017-07-02T08:36:35Z2017-07-02T08:36:35ZNews of Saif al-Islam’s release: regional politics fuels rumour mill in Libya<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/175848/original/file-20170627-24749-zt2h9r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Saif al-Islam, son of late Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Stringer</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The release of Saif al-Islam son of former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi dominated the media for several days <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-40236808">in early June</a>. But the saga of Saif’s unconfirmed release fits right into broader regional politics and the contest for power and influence by countries in the region. </p>
<p>Libya descended into chaos following the overthrow and killing of its long time leader Gaddafi in 2011 after <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8838340/Libya-rebellion-timeline.html">a popular uprising</a>. Several militias and groups emerged after Gaddafi’s death seizing <a href="https://pure.abdn.ac.uk:8443/ws/files/68607751/The_rocky_road_ahead_to_peace_the_Arab_U.pdf">different regions of the country</a>. </p>
<p>In the 2011 conflict it was the NATO invasion that changed the balance of power in Libya. Today it’s the diplomatic, financial and material support that the local rival actors receive from external interests that’s shaping the power game in the country. The two main players are the eastern-based factional Tobruk government which is aligned with the self-styled Libya National Army of General Khalifa Haftar, and the UN-backed government in the capital, Tripoli.</p>
<p>Egypt and the United Arab Emirates have been very active in the Libyan conflict. Under the goal set by Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi to eradicate terrorism, its military aligns with the Tobruk-based government and Haftar forces. Cairo has consistently violated the UN-imposed arms embargo in their efforts to support the Haftar forces with weapons among other things <a href="http://undocs.org/S/2017/466">as the latest</a> report by the UN panel of experts illustrates. </p>
<p>The powerful role played by Egypt and the UAE in Libya was also evident in the decision taken by Libya’s Tobruk government to <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar-libya-idUSKBN18W11M">cut diplomatic ties</a> with Qatar along with Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt and Bahrain. </p>
<p>Qatar has also been an important actor in the Libyan conflict. Like Turkey, it has been of accused of <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/qatar/11110931/How-Qatar-is-funding-the-rise-of-Islamist-extremists.html">supporting Islamist groups</a> in Libya. Qatar’s involvement in Libyan affairs was noticeable even during the last days of Gaddafi’s regime when it was <a href="http://acdemocracy.org/libya-ali-al-salabi-and-the-re-emerging-muslim-brotherhood/">pressing for the release</a>of members of the Muslim Brotherhood. </p>
<p>Qatar’s involvement in the conflict violates the UN imposed embargo as it supplies weapons and provides <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/06/qatar-uae-libya-connection-170612080219306.html">financial support to Islamist-leaning factions</a>, mainly in the western part of the country. </p>
<p>It’s no coincidence that only a few days after the embargo on Qatar by its neighbours Saif was allegedly released. The Libyan conflict has long been considered as a proxy war of Gulf Arab rivalry with the UAE and Qatar backing competing militias in Libya. The timing and the particulars of the release of Saif could only benefit the anti-Qatar camp in Libya, as it could portray the Haftar as the sole conciliatory player in the Libyan conflict who could bring old rivals under his magnanimous protection.</p>
<h2>Complexities</h2>
<p>The Abubaker Sadiq brigade of Libya’s north western city of Zintan where Saif was captured during the uprising announced that it released the former Libyan heir to comply with a new amnesty law issued by the Tobruk government.</p>
<p>But Ibrahim Massud Ali, general prosecutor of the UN-backed and internationally recognised Tripoli-based government, <a href="http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/freed-saif-al-islam-qaddafi-still-wanted-by-libya-court-prosecutor">argues</a> that Saif doesn’t fulfil amnesty requirements and that the son of the late Libyan strongman is still wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes against humanity. The court issued <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/record.aspx?docNo=ICC-01/11-01/11-3">a warrant of arrest</a> for Saif in 2011 before his capture. </p>
<p>In addition, many would see Saif’s release as a huge injustice and a betrayal of the uprisings that sacked his father and put him in captivity since he was one of the most prominent figures in his father’s regime and was touted to be his preferred successor.</p>
<p>On learning of his release Human Rights Watch <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/06/15/libya-surrender-saif-al-islam-gaddafi-icc">issued a statement</a> asking that he surrender to the ICC.</p>
<p>It’s unclear how, if he came before the court, Saif’s case would evolve. The ICC may have lost the moral right to try him given the fact that many African governments view it as a <a href="https://www.pambazuka.org/governance/icc-now-instrument-imperialism">“tool of Western imperialism”</a>. </p>
<p>The Trump administration’s indifference to the promotion of human rights as a foreign policy objective muddies the water further. And the US has shown more interest in the vast oil reserves of Libya than in the well being of a country that’s become a hotbed for extremists. </p>
<p>Added to this heady mix is Russia’s role with Moscow appearing to have a strong relationship with General Haftar. This only further delegitimises the UN-backed Government of National Accord. </p>
<h2>Propaganda and Information Warfare</h2>
<p>We need to take the news of Saif with a pinch of salt. The past six years of warfare in Libya has also been conducted on the news front too. The fabrication of news has become <a href="http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-libya-media-hoax-fabricated-scenes-of-jubilation-and-euphoria-on-green-square/26155">common practice</a>. In the light of this many have <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g_CllijYitA">questioned the veracity</a> of reports about Saif’s release. Last time he was seen by independent observers was in the summer of 2014 in Zintan. </p>
<p>So we need to wait to see some visual proof of his release and his status before taking the reports seriously. </p>
<p>Aeschylus, 25 centuries ago, noted that the first casualty of war is truth. This seems to be true of the situation in Libya.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/79943/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ilia Xypolia does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The news of Saif al-Islam’s release should be taken with a pinch of salt. During the past six years of warfare in Libya the fabrication of news has become common practice.Ilia Xypolia, Research fellow, University of AberdeenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/796442017-06-19T20:13:04Z2017-06-19T20:13:04ZQatar’s conflict with its neighbours can easily set the Horn of Africa alight<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/174315/original/file-20170618-28759-pezb6e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Djibouti soldier along the border with Eritrea after conflict flared in 2008. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Omar Hassan</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It began as a squabble between Arab allies, but the standoff between Qatar and its neighbours is threatening to engulf the Horn of Africa. When Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen and the Maldives declared at the beginning of June that they were <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/05/saudi-arabia-and-bahrain-break-diplomatic-ties-with-qatar-over-terrorism">severing diplomatic relations</a> with Qatar it appeared to be of interest mainly to the Arabian Peninsula – and the Gulf in particular. </p>
<p>The Saudis and their allies accused Qatar of backing international terrorism. The US, which has the Al Udeid air base in Qatar, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/05/world/middleeast/qatar-saudi-arabia-egypt-bahrain-united-arab-emirates.html?_r=0">looked askance</a>, but did little more than use its good offices to try to ensure that the war of words did not flare into an open conflict.</p>
<p>But the countries just across the Red Sea have found themselves dragged into the dispute. After prevaricating for some time, Eritrea, which had hitherto good relations with Qatar, fell into line with the Saudis and broke ties with Qatar. </p>
<p>A <a href="http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article62713">statement</a> attributed to the Eritrean government declared limited support for the rupture with Qatar. Eritrea explained that the initiative taken by the Gulf nations </p>
<blockquote>
<p>is among many in the right direction that envisages full realisation of regional peace and stability. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Matters might have ended there, but such are the ties between nations on both sides of the Red Sea that this was unlikely. The UAE and Saudi Arabia have been <a href="http://untribune.com/un-report-uae-saudi-leasing-eritean-port-using-eritrean-land-sea-airspace-and-possibly-troops-in-yemen-battle/">using the Eritrean port</a> of Assab in their war against the Houthi rebels in Yemen. Egypt – which is part of the Saudi alliance – is also reported to have <a href="https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/News/2017/4/29/Egypt-to-build-naval-base-in-Eritreas-Nora-island">plans</a> to build a major base on an Eritrean island in the Red Sea. The Eritreans are alleged to have some 400 troops fighting against the Iranian backed Houthis. </p>
<p>In the circumstances, a rupture between the Saudi alliance and Qatar was highly likely to spread to the Horn. And this was exactly what took place. Qatar had been a <a href="http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_1869.pdf">generous donor</a> to Eritrea. It had also played a key mediating role in Eritrea’s border <a href="http://dspace.africaportal.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/31056/1/SITREP150908.pdf?1">conflict</a> with Djibouti, which flared in April 2008. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/25/world/africa/25iht-eritrea.4.13193224.html?pagewanted=all">origins</a> of the disputed border lie buried in the sands of colonial history and would never be easily resolved.</p>
<h2>Qatar pull-out stokes tensions</h2>
<p>The fighting left a number of Djibouti troops as prisoners of war in Eritrea and Qatar did their best to resolve this issue by mediation. Indeed, so close were the ties that when UN monitors met the political advisor to the President of Eritrea, Yemane Gebreab, in January 2013 and enquired about the Djiboutian prisoners of war, he <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N13/361/92/PDF/N1336192.pdf?OpenElement">responded</a> that </p>
<blockquote>
<p>all matters concerning the resolution of the conflict with Djibouti could only be addressed through the mediation of Qatar, and that no other intermediary was necessary.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Qatar went further, deploying some 200 of its own troops along the Eritrea-Djibouti border in an attempt to reduce the tension. The Qatari peacekeeping force only supervised a small sector of the border near Ras Dumeira. It was therefore not in a position to observe or interdict cross-border movements further to the south, but its presence was symbolically important. </p>
<p>So when Qataris pulled their troops out on June 12th and 13th, there was something of a vacuum, which Eritrea is reported to have promptly filled. Djibouti <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-djibouti-eritrea-border-idUSKBN1971JR">accused</a> the Eritreans of moving their troops into the disputed territory. Djibouti’s Foreign Minister Mahamoud Ali Youssouf declared that his country’s military had gone into “alert”. </p>
<p>A senior Eritrean diplomat at the African Union <a href="https://apnews.com/243ba2f8ef5841a5a2eeeb3c9e6edccf?utm_content=bufferaf0de&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer">said</a> the move came after Eritrea cut diplomatic ties with Qatar and his country sought no confrontation with Djibouti. </p>
<p>But a <a href="http://www.shabait.com/news/local-news/24188-press-statement">terse statement</a> from the Eritrean Ministry of Information issued days later described Qatar’s withdrawal as “hasty”. It said Eritrea had refrained from commenting because it was not privy to the action but would do so once it had all the information about the event.</p>
<p>The African Union, seldom swift to comment or intervene in any disputes effecting its members, finally made a move. Moussa Faki Mahamat, chairperson of the African Union Commission, tweeted that the AUC would send a delegation to Djibouti border to <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2017/06/17/au-deploys-fact-finding-mission-to-eritrea-djibouti-border-calls-for-calm/">monitor</a> developments and work with all parties.</p>
<h2>More uncertainty for The Horn</h2>
<p>These events appear to have fallen well for Ethiopia, which has been at loggerheads with Eritrea since their own border war of 1998-2000. While Eritrea and Djibouti are daggers drawn following the Qatari withdrawal, Ethiopia has refrained from taking sides between the Saudis and Qatar. Both parties have sent delegations to Addis Ababa, no doubt asking for <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/qatar-crisis-eritrea-saudi-arabia-625356">Ethiopian support</a>, but so far Ethiopia has sat on the fence.</p>
<p>Ethiopia recently announced that it would reveal a <a href="https://www.ezega.com/News/NewsDetails/4157/Ethiopia-to-Have-New-Policy-Direction-on-Eritrea-">new policy</a> towards Eritrea, but none has appeared to date. With its troublesome northern neighbour locked in a fresh controversy with Djibouti, Ethiopia may find it’s more likely to receive a sympathetic hearing for any initiative from the international community. </p>
<p>It will not be difficult, for instance, for Addis Ababa to portray Eritrea as a regional troublemaker, always willing to exploit a neighbour’s weakness. It should not be forgotten that since independence in 1993 Eritrea has been involved in conflicts with Yemen, Djibouti and Ethiopia - hardly a proud record.</p>
<p>The UN and the African Union are now engaged in trying to mediate between Eritrea and Djibouti. Meanwhile, the ongoing conflict in Yemen continues to have implications for the Horn, as the Saudis and UAE continue to use Eritrea as a rear base. The UAE is in fact seeking a further base in nearby <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-africa-39051551/why-is-uae-building-a-military-base-in-somaliland">Somaliland</a>. </p>
<p>As ever, it’s difficult to predict how events will unfold, but sparks from Arabia can easily set the Horn alight.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/79644/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Martin Plaut is affiliated with the Institute of Commonwealth Studies of the University of London, the Royal African Society and Chatham House</span></em></p>Qatar withdrawing its troops has reignited tensions between Eritrea and Djibouti which the UN and African Union are trying to mediate. This comes as Eritrea is also embroiled in the Yemen civil war.Martin Plaut, Senior Research Fellow, Horn of Africa and Southern Africa, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, School of Advanced Study, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.